DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the 

World Trade Center Disaster 

OIG-04-49 September 2004 

Offi ce of Audits 

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It 

is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, 

and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

Contents

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 3

 Results in Brief .............................................................................................................................. 3

 Background .................................................................................................................................... 4

Estimate of Abuse .......................................................................................................................... 5

Eligibility Requirements were Consistent with Regulations But Increased Risk of Abuse .......... 5

Deceptive Advertising Exacerbates Risk of Abuse ........................................................................ 7

 Actions Taken to Combat Abuse ................................................................................................... 8

 Conclusion and Recommendation ................................................................................................ 8

Appendices 

Appendix A: Congressional Request Letter. ......................................................... 10

Appendix B: Associated Press Article ..................................................................................... 12

Appendix C: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ..................................................................... 14

Appendix D: Recommendation................................................................................................ 15

Appendix E: Management Comments..................................................................................... 16

Appendix F: OIG Analysis of Management’s Comments ....................................................... 27

Appendix G: Major Contributors to This Report..................................................... 28

Appendix H: Report Distribution ..................................................................... 29

Abbreviations

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

IFG Individual and Family Grant

 WTC World Trade Center disaster 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

SBA Small Business Administration 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

 EPR Emergency Preparedness and Response 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 1

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Page 2 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Offi ce of Inspector General 

Introduction 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG), at the request of Representatives Carolyn 

B. Maloney and Jose Serrano, audited the management of the Individual and 

Family Grant (IFG) program after the World Trade Center disaster (WTC) to 

determine whether actions by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) and the state of New York contributed to reported fraud and abuse in the 

program. The Associated Press, in an article dated February 20, 2003, stated that 

the program is “rife with fraud and abuse” and that 90% of the applications for air 

quality items were filed by people not suffering from the effects of contaminated 

air. A copy of the request letter and the Associated Press article are included as 

Appendixes A and B, respectively. 

Results in Brief 

FEMA and state officials took several actions related to air quality items that 

while, consistent with FEMA regulations, reduced managerial controls and 

increased the risk of abuse. Some actions, such as eliminating home inspections 

for air conditioners, were taken for valid practical reasons; other actions were 

taken to reduce paperwork and expedite program delivery. In addition, FEMA 

and the state authorized advanced payments to applicants who were fi nancially 

unable to purchase air quality items. Although FEMA and state offi cials kept 

residents informed through press releases, these decisions, exacerbated by 

misleading advertising campaigns by companies selling air quality items, greatly 

increased the number of apparently fraudulent applications. 

Once the problems were identified, FEMA and the state took action to address 

suspected fraudulent applications. FEMA program officials selected two 

samples of applicants to conduct home inspections: one of applicants who 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 3

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
applied for assistance to buy window air conditioners, and one to verify whether 

cash advances were applied for properly. While the claim that ninety percent 

of applicants for air quality items were filed by people not suffering from the 

effects of contaminated air was probably overstated, the number of questionable 

applications based on the sample was high, as much as 62 percent for those 

applying for air conditioners. FEMA OIG investigated a number of alleged 

instances of fraud and referred several for prosecution. While no abuse should be 

tolerated, OIG found no evidence that problems within the IFG program caused 

any eligible New York citizens not to receive needed air quality items. 

OIG recommended that, when faced with a similar situation in the future, 

FEMA require the state to sample individual applicants on a continuous basis to 

verify their eligibility, and lessen the potential for programmatic abuse. FEMA 

concurred with this recommendation. 

Background 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public 

Law 93-288, as amended (Stafford Act) was enacted to support State and local 

governments and their citizens when disasters overwhelm them. The Stafford Act 

authorized FEMA to administer five Individual Assistance programs that provided 

aid to individuals, families, and business owners, in response to presidential 

disaster declarations. One of the those programs, the IFG program, was created 

to meet disaster-related necessary expenses or serious needs that could not be met 

through other Stafford Act programs or through other means, such as insurance, 

other Federal assistance, or voluntary agency programs. Eligible expense 

included real and personal property, medical and dental, funeral, transportation, 

and others specifically requested by the state. Disaster victims were generally 

required to apply for, and be denied, SBA disaster loans before being considered 

for the IFG program. 

New York State, as grantee, administered and implemented the IFG program. 

FEMA worked closely with the state and provided advice, accepted applications, 

and assisted with eligibility determinations. 

Page 4 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Estimate of Abuse 

The Associated Press reported that people who did not suffer from the effects of 

contaminated air filed 90 percent of the applications for reimbursements for air 

quality items. The source of this statistic was an estimate by the FEMA disaster 

recovery officer for the WTC disaster. The estimate was based on an assumption 

that, of the 225,000 applicants for air quality items, only the 25,000 who 

lived in lower Manhattan and were eligible to participate in an Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) home cleaning program suffered from contaminated 

air. Consequently, about 90 percent of the applications were estimated to be fi led 

by people not suffering from the effects of contaminated air. However, although 

it was reasonable to assume that the participants in the EPA’s home cleaning 

program suffered from contaminated air, it was not reasonable to assume that they 

were the only ones who were affected by contaminated air. IFG offi cials believed 

that residents in other parts of the city also may have suffered from contaminated 

air and would be eligible for air quality items. 

The FEMA disaster recovery officer said that he disclosed the estimate to get the 

attention of applicants who had applied for, but not yet received, assistance. The 

intent of the disclosure was to encourage applicants who were not suffering from 

or affected by contaminated air to voluntarily withdraw their applications. He 

said that, after publication of the article, several thousand people withdrew their 

applications. 

Eligibility Requirements were Consistent with Regulations, But Increased 

Risk of Abuse 

FEMA and state officials took several actions related to air quality items that, 

while consistent with FEMA regulations, reduced managerial controls and 

increased the risk of abuse. Although FEMA and state offi cials kept residents 

informed through press releases, these decisions, exacerbated by misleading 

advertising campaigns by companies selling air quality items, greatly increased 

the number of apparently fraudulent applications. 

The IFG program, managed by the state with assistance from FEMA, was 

established to help disaster victims meet disaster related necessary expenses or 

serious needs. It is not intended to indemnify disaster losses or to permit purchase 

of items that are non-essential. Eligible expenses include those for real and 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 5

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
personal property, medical and dental expenses, funeral expenses, transportation 

needs, and other expenses specifically requested by the state. FEMA and the state 

generally rely on several managerial control mechanisms to verify that applicants 

meet eligibility requirements. 

First, FEMA conducts inspections of applicants’ homes to verify that they suffered 

disaster damage, normally using contract inspectors brought in immediately after 

the disaster. Next, because the delivery sequence for disaster assistance places the 

IFG program after assistance from SBA disaster loans, FEMA generally requires 

that IFG applicants apply for, and be denied, SBA disaster loans before being 

considered for the IFG program. This helps establish that assistance for a serious 

need cannot be obtained by other means. Finally, receipts or other expense 

records can be required to verify that expenditures were used to meet essential 

needs. This is often done for medical, funeral, and similar expenses. 

On October 18, 2001, air purifiers, air filters, and vacuum cleaners with high 

efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, were added to the eligible items list. 

Eligibility for these items was based on applicants’ suffering from contaminated 

air, a difficult condition to verify. Also, the items were listed in an “other” 

category, which exempted them from the SBA loan application requirement under 

FEMA’s regulations. 

On March 22, 2002, FEMA and the state added window air conditioners to the 

list of items eligible for IFG program assistance. Eligibility was dependent on 

applicants’ having owned a window air conditioner that was damaged during 

the disaster. Window air conditioners normally would be inspected to verify 

damage before being approved for repair or replacement. However, at the time 

air conditioners were added to the list of eligible property, home inspections had 

been completed, and FEMA decided that it would not be cost effective to bring 

the inspectors back to verify damage to a single property item, i.e., the window 

air conditioner. This was a reasonable decision because there were more than 

200,000 IFG applications. Instead, the state implemented a self-certifi cation 

process and placed window air conditioners in the “other” category, so applicants 

were not required to apply for and be denied SBA disaster loans before receiving 

IFG assistance. 

On May 1, 2002, FEMA and the state authorized advance payments to applicants 

who were financially unable to purchase air quality items. Rather than having 

to provide receipts for the items prior to grant approval as normally required or 

proving financial need, applicants were permitted to certify that they were unable 

Page 6 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
to pay for the items and were asked to provide receipts after they purchased the 

items. 

FEMA and state officials kept residents informed about eligibility requirements 

by periodically issuing press releases that explained what assistance was available 

and how to apply for it. The OIG found no indications that eligible recipients 

did not receive assistance. However, many people who received assistance may 

not have been entitled to it, because reduced managerial controls over air quality 

items increased opportunities for fraud and abuse. 

In addition, the original geographic area of eligibility was very broad. From 

September 2001 to May 2002, people living in fifteen New York counties were 

eligible to apply for assistance under the IFG program. This large geographic 

boundary created an extremely large number of potential applicants. In June 

2002, however, the state limited assistance for air quality items to New York City, 

i.e., counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond. Although it 

was understood that the primary area affected was lower Manhattan, IFG program 

officials said that, in their judgment, residents in any of the five counties might 

have been in need of air quality items. 

Deceptive Advertising Exacerbates Risk of Abuse 

In June 2002, applications for air quality items rose sharply and continued to 

increase in July and August. Before then, the number of applications had been 

dropping each month. FEMA believes that the increases may have been due to 

deceptive advertising by companies selling air quality items and offering “free 

air conditioners”. These companies distributed fliers to encourage the public to 

buy their products and get reimbursed by FEMA. In the same timeframe, EPA 

announced that air quality in New York City was poor. An additional factor may 

have been the closing of non-profi t programs.1

 FEMA officials said that, due to 

the large increase in applications, they became concerned about possible abuse. 

In response to this situation, FEMA implemented a sampling program to verify 

applicant eligibility and to identify abusers. 

1 FEMA’s Delivery of Individual Assistance Programs: New York – September 11, 2001; FEMA OIG Inspections Division, December 2000. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 7

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Actions Taken to Combat Abuse 

Federal regulation 44 CFR 206.131 provides for sampling applicants to verify 

program effectiveness. FEMA program officials selected two random samples: 

one of applicants who repaired or replaced air conditioners, and one of applicants 

who received advances for air quality items. Although the samples were not 

designed to be statistically valid, the results suggest that a large number of 

applicants were not suffering from the effects of contaminated air. 

In January 2003, FEMA program officials selected a sample of 4,435 people who 

applied for assistance to buy window air conditioners and visited their homes 

to verify that they had window air conditioners before the disaster occurred. 

FEMA representatives inspected damaged air conditioners or, when damaged 

air conditioners had been disposed of, inspected indentations left in windows by 

the air conditioners. The home inspections identified 1,704 applicants who had 

evidence of the prior existence of a window air conditioner, and 2,731 applicants, 

or 62%, who did not and therefore were probably ineligible for assistance. 

The second sample of 5,602 applications was selected in March 2003 to verify 

the proper use of $5.8 million in advances for air quality items. Applicants who 

received advances were required to submit receipts to the state within 30 days 

after receiving the funds, but program officials said that none of the applicants 

included in the sample complied with this requirement. As of July 22, 2003, 

FEMA program officials had completed 5,029 home inspections and determined 

that 3,347 applicants had purchased the air quality items. FEMA referred the 

1,682 applicants, or 33%, who had not purchased the air quality items to the state 

for collection. 

The sampling was effective in identifying ineligible applicants and preventing 

many from receiving grants. Although only a few cases were accepted for 

prosecution due to the small amount of money involved, there was some deterrent 

value in publicizing those prosecutions. Finally, OIG investigated complaints 

against 16 air quality products companies for using unethical sales tactics and 

referred them to the New York State Attorney General’s office. 

Conclusion and Recommendation 

The unique circumstances surrounding a disaster often make such measures as 

advancing payments to applicants and exempting items from home inspection 

or SBA loan application requirements, which are within FEMA’s authority, 

appropriate. However, it is important to recognize that these measures 

Page 8 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
significantly increase the risk of abuse. When eligibility is not verified by a 

FEMA managed home inspection or SBA’s disaster loan review process, the state 

should take extra measures, such as sampling applicants, to ensure that applicants 

are eligible for the IFG program. Such procedures can identify abuse early in the 

process, so timely action can be taken to prosecute abusers, and deter others from 

abuse. 

The OIG recommends that the Director, Recovery Division, Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Directorate, when faced with a similar situation in the 

future, require the state to randomly select individual applicants on a continuous 

basis, and take whatever action is appropriate to verify their eligibility. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 9

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix A 

Congressional Request Letter 

Page 10 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix A 

Congressional Request Letter 

1 We received differing opinions about the effective date for the implementation of the Act. The date stated here was derived from language 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 11 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix B 

Associated Press Article 

P Page 1 of 2 

9/11 Air-Quality Aid Program Troubled (AP) 

Associated Press 

By Sara Kugler 

February 20, 2003 

NEW YORK - A $100 million federal program to reimburse New Yorkers for air conditioners, fi lters, 

vacuums and other air-purifying tools after the World Trade Center collapse is rife with fraud and abuse, 

government offi cials say. 

As many as 90 percent of the more than 219,000 applications for reimbursement were fi led by people not 

suffering from the effects of contaminated air, according to estimates from federal offi cials. 

They say fraud has taken several forms: Some people have manipulated the program to score a free air 

conditioner, while con artists have posed as federal employees and sold air-purifying items to residents. 

About $45.8 million has been paid out so far, and while many applications are legitimate, offi cials said 

millions have been paid to people scamming the system. The government is so concerned that it is sending a 

dozen teams of inspectors daily to applicants’ homes to verify claims. 

The government can turn cases over to prosecutors — though none have brought charges — or they can try 

to reclaim the money. 

The grants were set up by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to reimburse residents in all fi ve 

boroughs for the purchase of air quality items, up to about $1,500 per applicant. 

Unlike other aid programs created specifically to address the Sept. 11 attack, the reimbursements 

came from an existing program. The program is traditionally used to help people with costs not covered 

by other assistance programs, but FEMA officials said they have never encountered this level of misuse in 

prior disasters. 

The size and extent of the program have proven to be among its problems. 

While many trade center grants were limited to residents of lower Manhattan, this program was open to all 

New York City residents. 

“We were trying to do the right thing. Unfortunately people took advantage of that, so now we have 

people way out in Queens or upper Manhattan where there was no potential for air quality impacts,” said 

Brad Gair, FEMA’s trade center federal recovery offi cer. 

As word spread about the ways to cheat the system, Gair said, a program that was originally budgeted at $15 

million — and initially had trouble attracting applicants — turned into a $100 million monster. 

“We know we’ve come across people who are not telling the truth,” said Jack Casale, a FEMA 

investigator, during a day of visits to homes in Queens, more than 10 miles east of the trade center. 

Scientists and federal environmental officials are still studying the effect of trade center dust and the path it 

took, but experts agree that the cloud hovered over lower Manhattan and spread mostly south toward Brooklyn. 

Page 12 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix B 

Associated Press Article 

 Page 2 of 2 

Investigators have discovered numerous cases where people purchased FEMA-covered items, 

submitted the receipts to get reimbursement checks and then returned the products to the store, pocketing 

the cash. Some receipts even appear to have been forged, Gair said. 

Home visits have turned up residents who applied for air-conditioner reimbursements living in buildings 

with central air where the windows do not even open. Other times, applicants who received checks for hundreds 

of dollars’ worth of reimbursed purchases could not produce the items when investigators visited their homes; 

stores have reported unusual numbers of people returning air conditioners, vacuums and air purifi ers. 

Local district attorneys say no applicants have been charged in connection with the FEMA program, in part 

because it may be difficult to prove that someone taking advantage of the system is breaking any laws. 

The city Department of Consumer Affairs is also investigating but is concentrating on the wider 

scams run by people who posed as FEMA employees to sell air quality products at infl ated prices. That 

would be an illegal trade practice. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 13

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Appendix C 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

This audit’s objective was to determine whether actions by FEMA and the State 

of New York contributed to reported fraud and abuse in the IFG program after the 

WTC disaster. We interviewed FEMA and state IFG program offi cials in New 

York City and Albany who implemented the program under the WTC disaster 

declaration. Also, we interviewed members of four New York City advocacy 

groups who were concerned about the assistance provided to their constituents. 

Finally, we reviewed the IFG program requirements contained in the Code of 

Federal Regulations and pertinent records maintained by FEMA program offi cials. 

The OIG performed the audit between April 2003 and July 2003 under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We complied with 

government auditing standards, except that we did not, as required by those 

standards, validate the accuracy of data provided by FEMA on samples of 

applications tested for eligibility or perform a comprehensive evaluation of the 

IFG program’s internal controls, because the scope of the audit was limited to 

work necessary to answer the questions posed by Representatives Maloney and 

Serrano. 

Throughout the audit, OIG worked closely with FEMA and state IFG program 

officials. The cooperation and courtesies extended to the audit team are 

appreciated. The principal OIG points of contact for the audit are Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, J. Richard Berman, at (202) 254-4100, and Dennis 

White, Director, Emergency Preparedness and Response at (202) 254-4157. 

Major OIG contributors to the project are identified in Appendix G. 

Page 14 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix D 

Recommendation 

Recommendation 

The OIG recommends that the Director, Recovery Division, Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Directorate, when faced with a similar situation in the 

future, require the state to implement a procedure to randomly select individual 

applicants on a continuous basis, and take whatever action is appropriate to verify 

their eligibility. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 15

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

Page 16 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 17

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

Page 18 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 19

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

Page 20 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 21

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

Page 22 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 23

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

Page 24 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 25

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster
Appendix E 

Management Comments 

Page 26 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix F 

OIG Analysis of Management’s Comments 

In response to the draft report, Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) 

concurred with the recommendation and agreed that the kinds of special measures 

implemented in the IFG program at WTC significantly increase the risk of abuse. 

EP&R stated that its actions were often in direct response to Congressional 

requests to make the programs more accessible. For example, EP&R stated that 

the New York congressional delegation strongly urged that the SBA process 

be avoided to expedite program delivery. EP&R also provided additional 

justification and information regarding the decisions discussed in the report. 

After reviewing EP&R’s comments, the OIG revised the report to make certain 

technical corrections and more fully explain the circumstances and relationship 

between management controls, deceptive advertising, and program abuse. 

Ultimately, however, it is impossible to quantify the adverse effect that the 

various conditions, e.g., vendors advertising and relaxation of controls, had on the 

problems that existed under the program. 

The OIG agrees that deceptive advertising by vendors clearly contributed to 

program improprieties. Further, each relaxation of FEMA program controls, taken 

separately, may have been prudent under the circumstances. However, relaxing 

all three control mechanisms left the program vulnerable when the deceptive 

advertising began. Vendors were encouraging all residents to apply for air quality 

items regardless of need, and FEMA and the state were awarding and disbursing 

funds with limited upfront verifications of eligibility and need. Had FEMA 

and the state maintained regular program controls or implemented alternative 

measures to verify applicant eligibility, the adverse affect of the vendors deceptive 

advertising could have been mitigated. 

EP&R also took exception to the OIG’s conclusion that the reported 

programmatic abuse estimate of 90 percent was high, and requested that the entire 

discussion of that estimate be deleted from the report. However, the estimate of 

90 percent abuse was at the very heart of the congressional request for this audit 

and, therefore, the OIG believes its inclusion in the report is necessary. 

We consider the recommendation closed. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 27

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix G 

Major Contributors to this Report 

George Peoples, Audit Manager, Atlanta Field Offi ce 

Sharon Thompson, Auditor, Atlanta Field Offi ce 

Gary Barard, Director, Atlanta Field Offi ce 

Dennis White, Director, Emergency Preparedness and Response Division 

Page 28 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Appendix H 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Under Secretary for Management 

Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate 

Director, EP&R Recovery Division 

DHS OIG Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Homeland Security Branch Chief 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney, Member of Congress 

The Honorable Jose Serrano, Member of Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 29

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Page 30 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program 

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individual and Family Grant Program Page 31

Management at the World Trade Center Disaster 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.