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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS:

A POST-SUMMIT ASSESSMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 15, 2004

Serial No. 108–131

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

His Excellency Gu ̈nter Burghardt, Head of Delegation, European Commission ........................................................................................................................ 4

Simon Serfaty, Ph.D., Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies ........................................................................................... 9

Daniel S. Hamilton, Ph.D., Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies ............ 20

Philip H. Gordon, Director, Center on the United States and Europe, The 

Brookings Institution ........................................................................................... 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

His Excellency Gu ̈nter Burghardt: Prepared statement ...................................... 6

Simon Serfaty, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 13

Daniel S. Hamilton, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 24

Philip H. Gordon: Prepared statement .................................................................. 40

(1)

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: 

A POST-SUMMIT ASSESSMENT 

THURSDAY, JULY 15, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jo Ann Davis presiding. 

Ms. DAVIS. The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order. Congressman Wexler has been delayed, but we expect him here shortly, so we will go ahead and get started. 

Today, the Europe Subcommittee will examine the results of several recent summit meetings held between the United States and 

our European friends and allies. The Subcommittee wishes to assess the state of transatlantic relations and to determine whether 

that relation is heading in the right direction. The transatlantic relationship has undergone an extremely difficult period over the 

past year. Many have suggested the relationship has never been 

worse off. Many have expressed doubts over its future. Yet, anyone 

who holds any doubts about the importance of transatlantic relations need only look at the June calendar to realize however difficult the relationship tends to be. The United States and Europe 

continue to consult and continue to find new ways to cooperate on 

issues of mutual interest. 

After the D-Day commemorations in France and the G–8 summit 

at Sea Island, President Bush traveled to Europe to attend backto-back summits with European leaders, first at the U.S.–EU meeting in Ireland, then on to Istanbul for the NATO summit. I do not 

believe there has been a time in recent memory where such highlevel meetings with our European allies and partners have figured 

so prominently on a President’s agenda in such a brief period of 

time. 

As our Chairman, Mr. Bereuter, has stated on several occasions 

from this chair, by any measure, the relationship between the 

United States and the nations of Europe and its union is the most 

important foreign relationship we have. No two regions in the 

world share a history, a common set of values, and a global vision 

as much as do the United States and Europe. 

For the most part, our traditional and closest allies are in Europe. In Europe, our core national interests are fully engaged. With 

our European partners, we share a wider range of interest and a 

higher level of cooperation on issues than with any other region in 

2

the world. We share a common belief in democracy, rule of law, and 

human rights, and while we and Europe may sometimes differ on 

an exact strategy to pursue, we strive for geopolitical stability and 

are committed to preventing potential threats from failing states. 

We are united in the effort to defeat global terrorism, transnational 

crime, the spread of disease, and illiteracy. We work hand in hand 

to address global poverty and weapons of mass destruction. We 

support and promote open-market economies. 

It is clear that our economies, our political futures, our system 

of trade, and our security are intricately linked and depend on a 

strong United States-European partnership. These facts should 

lead us to conclude, as many have, that the partnership is probably 

more necessary now than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is 

today. Thus, the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and 

strengthened. 

The two recent summits in Europe were the last major meetings 

before important national elections take place here in the United 

States and new political developments take hold in Europe, specifically with the EU. The intent of each of these meetings was clearly 

to move the transatlantic partnership beyond the Iraq debate and 

to set the stage for the future exploration of new initiatives for enhanced transatlantic cooperation. 

At the U.S.–EU summit in Ireland, President Bush declared that 

the rift between Europe and the United States over Iraq had 

ended. If that is the case, we must look to the future of transatlantic relations and determine where we and Europe are heading. 

Today, the Subcommittee has asked our distinguished panel of 

witnesses to present their impressions of these meetings, both in 

practical and deliverable terms, as well as their symbolic significance, to assess the current state of transatlantic relations and to 

speculate on its future outlook. I look forward to their comments. 

I now would like to ask Ms. Lee if she has an opening statement. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be very brief. I wanted 

to thank our panelists for being here today. This is a very important hearing. One of our priorities, I believe, is to determine how 

to reengage our most important allies to confront some of the great 

challenges of our time. I look forward to listening to the testimony, 

and I just want to thank the Chair for the hearing. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Ms. Lee. I will begin by introducing all 

four of our panel of witnesses today before I recognize you each for 

10 minutes. In the Subcommittee I chair, we only give 5 minutes, 

so we are very generous in this Subcommittee today. We will begin, 

first, with Ambassador Dr. Gu ̈nter Burghardt. 

Ambassador Burghardt, it is good to see you again as always. 

Ambassador Burghardt is Head of the Delegation of the European 

Commission in Washington. He was nominated to this position in 

October 1999 after serving as the Commission’s Director General 

for external relations and the Commission’s Political Director. In 

that post, he administered EU policies toward Europe and the new 

independent states, as well as the common foreign and security policy. 

From 1985 to 1993, he worked as Deputy Head of Cabinet to the 

European Commission President. He has also served with the DiVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:02 Sep 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\071504\94836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

rectorate General for external relations, dealing with relations with 

the United States, Canada, and Australia. 

Ambassador Burghardt has received degrees in law, economy, 

and political science from the Hamburg, Strasbourg, and Paris Universities and a Ph.D. in law from the University of Hamburg. 

Next, we will have Simon Serfaty, who is the first holder of the 

Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Welcome, Mr. Serfaty. 

From 1994 to 2004, he served as Director of the Europe Program 

at CSIS, where he remains a Senior Adviser. Dr. Serfaty is also a 

Senior Professor of U.S. foreign policy with the graduate program 

in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, 

Virginia. 

Dr. Serfaty is the author of numerous books and articles which 

have appeared in most leading professional journals in the United 

States and Europe. He has also been a guest lecturer throughout 

Europe. We are glad to have you here today, Dr. Serfaty. 

Next is Dr. Daniel Hamilton, who is the Richard von Weizacker 

Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at 

the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS], 

Johns Hopkins University. He also serves as Executive Director of 

the American Consortium for EU Studies at Johns Hopkins, and in 

this capacity he also serves as Principal Adviser to the Congressional Staff Roundtable on the European Union. 

Dr. Hamilton served most recently as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for European Affairs, responsible for NATO, OSCE and 

European security, Balkan stabilization, and Northern European 

issues. Prior to that, Dr. Hamilton was Senior Associate for European-American Relations at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Hamilton is the Publisher of the bimonthly 

magazine, Transatlantic: Europe, America, and the World, and has 

been a guest professor of U.S. foreign policy and United States-European relations at the University of Innsbruck and the Free University of Berlin. He has also been a consultant to ABC News. He 

has authored many articles and books on transatlantic relations. 

Dr. Hamilton, we are pleased to have you with us today as well. 

And last, but not least, we have Dr. Philip Gordon, who is a Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 

He currently serves as the Director at the Center on the United 

States and Europe. Before joining the Brookings Institution, Dr. 

Gordon served as the Director for European Affairs at the National 

Security Council during the Clinton Administration. Prior to that, 

Dr. Gordon served as Senior Fellow for U.S. Strategic Studies, 

International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has also been a 

professor at the School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS], 

Johns Hopkins University. 

Dr. Gordon is also the author of numerous books and articles, 

and, Dr. Gordon, we are glad to have you with us as well today. 

We have a distinguished group of witnesses, so we are all looking 

forward to hearing what you have to say, and we will begin with 

you, Ambassador Burghardt. 

4

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY GU ̈ NTER BURGHARDT, 

HEAD OF DELEGATION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Ambassador BURGHARDT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I 

would like to thank you for the opportunity here to review the 

transatlantic relationship in the light of the three summits which 

you mentioned: The bilateral summit between the European Union 

and the United States, which is an annual event; the G–8 summit, 

another annual event where the European Union, as such, participates, together with four of its member states; and the NATO summit. And let me also thank you for the occasion to do this in the 

company of this distinguished and highly respected group of copanelists. 

Before proceeding with the overview on the summits, let me simply echo one or two things which you said in your opening statement. Today, the transatlantic relationship between the United 

States and the European Union constitutes the strongest, most 

comprehensive, and strategically most important, partnership in 

the world. Our relationship is founded on shared values and common roots, interests and ideals, a common appreciation of democratic principles and human rights, and covers all issues of the 

international agenda, ranging from trade to development to foreign 

and security policy. Our agenda is not limited to the ever-broader 

bilateral relationship but is essential also in the context of regional 

and global fora, such as NATO, the United Nations, the World 

Trade Organization, and the G–8. 

However, it is well known that the transatlantic relationship 

has, over the past 31⁄2 years, experienced an unusual period of turbulence where the co-pilots have the sign, ‘‘Fasten your seatbelt,’’ 

on all of the time. The many disagreements focussed on the appropriate course of action in dealing with Iraq. They have undeniably 

strained transatlantic relations to a degree unprecedented during 

the past decades. 

I, therefore, take new optimism and confidence from the fact that 

the combined result of the three June summits has helped to reverse that trend, refocusing our attention on the essentials of our 

common agenda, including working together to meet the immediate 

challenges in Iraq. We now need to build on this positive orientation and to inject new momentum through the determined implementation of the many agreements reached throughout June. 

If I may add a personal note, Ms. Chairwoman, having cut my 

teeth in the 1970s as the Commission’s U.S. desk officer and having served in various foreign policy capacities during subsequent 

decades, I believe we are moving back toward a greater degree of 

normality in our relationship. This is important because the recent 

crisis went deeper than what we have witnessed over the past 30 

years, and its structural, partly ideological, components could be 

cause for major preoccupation if not brought under control. 

Ms. Chairwoman, I have submitted a detailed written account of 

the broad agendas the three summits have dealt with, and I have 

attached the relevant documentation referred to in my prepared 

statement, which, with your permission, will be a part of the record 

of this meeting; and, therefore, let me focus on the main features, 

both atmospheric and substantive. 

5

On the atmospheric side, the first of the three, the G–8 summit 

hosted by President Bush on Sea Island, was preceded by the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day on the beaches of Normandy, and all 

three meetings took place against the close deadline of transfer of 

sovereignty in Iraq. What a powerful coincidence of historical symbolism and present overwhelming challenges. No wonder that a 

sense of humility and resolve characterized large parts of the proceedings. 

The G–8 summit opened against the background of the unanimously adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 on Iraq and 

pledged our common will to support the Iraqi people throughout a 

most difficult transition. 

The EU–U.S. summit was the first such meeting after the historic enlargement to 25 member states and the adoption of the European Union Constitutional Treaty. Those landmark achievements 

not only highlighted the enormity of the transformations from an 

old Europe at war, with heavy United States sacrifice to restore democracy and the economy, to a new Europe at peace with itself and 

its partners, sharing sovereignty through the European Union common institutions and projecting stability and prosperity not only 

within the European Union but throughout the continent and beyond. 

President Bush had come to all three meetings obviously determined to narrow past divides and to enlist support for a common 

agenda ahead. All of these were essential ingredients for making 

this last bilateral EU–U.S. summit under the present Administration the most productive one, not to mention the excellent personal 

chemistry between President Bush, the Irish Taoiseach, and Commission President Prodi at the meeting in Dromoland Castle. 

Now, on substance, since I have detailed all of this in the written 

statement, let me be very brief and sum up. All three summits, in 

fact, had to deal with the overriding issue of how to help the transition in Iraq, both under the aegis of nation-building, administrative 

capacity, and security. Therefore, it was a subject for the G–8, for 

the EU–U.S. summit, and for the NATO summit. And on this subject, including the discussion on Afghanistan and the broader Middle East, it was very clear that the European Union was able, if 

security conditions were met, to bring a lot to the table, and we 

came to the summits with a document, a proposal from the Commission on the framework of action in Iraq, which had just been 

agreed upon by the European Council. 

Now, the G–8 and the EU–U.S. summit meeting also covered a 

number of global issues, from HIV/AIDS to the situation in Sudan 

and the very important issue of economic growth. The EU–U.S. 

summit had an extremely large agenda. It was, in a way, a rich 

harvest which we were able to make at Dromoland because of the 

very excellent ground work which had happened throughout the 

year and which was not affected by the geopolitical disagreements 

which we had over other issues and the very fact that we signed 

just before the summit the PNR Agreement, that we signed at the 

summit the Galileo/GPS Agreement, and that we agreed on seven 

very broad declarations on various issues, from the fight against 

terrorism, proliferation, in addition to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

broader Middle East, issues like Sudan and the HIV crisis, and, 

6

more importantly for our day-to-day work, the declaration on our 

economic relationship. Let me perhaps spend 2 minutes on this. 

In this economic realm, we did a number of things. We gave a 

push to the negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Round. 

As you know, there are 2 weeks left, more or less, in order to ensure that the new momentum which had been injected in these negotiations, both by Commissioner Lamy and Ambassador Zoellick, 

can bring fruit and can make sure that 2004 will not be a lost year 

for the DDA purpose, and we made a huge step on the bilateral relationship. 

The most significant summit event was an agreement on a joint 

declaration on the strengthening of our economic partnership. This 

agreement is based already on a very solid economic relationship 

for which there are many figures, most recently published by Daniel Hamilton’s institute, to which I do not have to refer to here. But 

what is left are essentially a lot of regulatory issues. These involve 

a lot of stakeholders and agencies, and what has been agreed at 

the summit is that we should now work hard, including with the 

help of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue and other stakeholders 

and the Transatlantic Policy Network, which has done a lot of 

ground work for this, to flesh out a roadmap on how to remove the 

remaining barriers in the transatlantic market. 

The proposals on how to do that concretely will be put to the 

next summit meeting in 2005 and will, therefore, be a very important step to inject new momentum in our relationship under the 

new administration or the next administration because this is 

something we should also be aware of. 

We have a kind of coincidence this year on both sides of the Atlantic of important leadership elections. The new administration 

will come into office on the first of November. On the second of November, the new President of the Commission will know who the 

next President of the United States is, a new one or a renewed one, 

and, as we know, every Administration reassesses policies. 

So we hope that in the reassessment of policies we can bring in 

this new momentum, both on strengthening the economic relationship, on opening a dialogue on our security strategy on the basis 

of the two security strategy papers that exist, and on reviewing our 

capacity in a partnership which for some time may remain one 

with a lot of asymmetries, but in a partnership where we agree on 

common purposes and objectives, we can implement those agreements in a complementary fashion by bringing the capabilities of 

the European Union and the United States together. Thank you 

very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burghardt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY GU ̈ NTER BURGHARDT, HEAD OF

DELEGATION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the other Members of the Subcommittee for this opportunity to review the transatlantic relationship in light of 

the recent, EU–US, G–8, and NATO summits. These meetings were indeed valuable 

in addressing the broad range of issues of concern to the transatlantic relationship. 

Before proceeding with that overview, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for your 

many years of dedicated service to this body and to the transatlantic relationship. 

I wish you much success as you take up your new responsibilities as President of 

the Asia Foundation. 

7

Today, the transatlantic relationship between the United States and the European Union constitutes the strongest, most comprehensive and strategically most 

important partnership in the world. Our relationship is founded on shared values 

and common roots, interests and ideals, a common appreciation of democratic principles and human rights, and covers all issues of the international agenda, ranging 

from trade to development to foreign and security policy. And, as you are well aware 

Mr. Chairman, transatlantic cooperation is not limited to our ever broader bilateral 

relationship, but is essential also in the context of regional and global fora, such as 

NATO, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the G–8, the annual 

informal gathering of the world’s leading industrialized partners, including the US, 

the EU and four of its member states. 

Mr. Chairman, it is well known that the transatlantic relationship has recently 

experienced an unusual period of turbulence. Disagreements on the appropriate 

course of action in dealing with Iraq have undeniably strained transatlantic relations to a degree unprecedented during the past decades. The combined result of the 

three June summits has helped to reverse that trend, refocusing our attention on 

the essentials of our common agenda, including working together to meet the immediate challenges in Iraq. The three summits thus helped to restore trust and a positive orientation to our crucially important bilateral relationship. 

If I may add a personal note, Mr. Chairman, having cut my teeth in the 1970s 

as the US desk officer within the Commission’s external relations service, and having served in various foreign policy capacities during subsequent decades, I believe 

we are moving back toward a greater degree of normality in our relationship. This 

is a trend that is much to be welcomed, and that I hope will continue. 

June began with the G–8 summit, hosted by President Bush in the beautiful setting of Sea Island, Georgia, and providing our leaders with an opportunity to exchange ideas on the major challenges facing the world today. The G–8 Leaders 

launched the ‘Partnership for Progress and a Common Future’ to support political, 

economic and social reform in the Broader Middle East and North Africa. The timing for such an initiative was indeed propitious, since Sea Island opened against the 

background of the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1546 on Iraq, reflecting our common will to support the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Interim Government. On our side, 

the European Council welcomed UNSCR 1546 and pledged its support to the ‘‘reassertion by Iraq of its full sovereignty, the proposed timetable for political transition 

to democratic government, the role of the UN and the authorization for a multinational force.’’ (See attached document 1). To this effect, the European Council endorsed European Commission proposals on a new framework for the European 

Union’s (EU) relations with Iraq, including actions for the immediate future, the 

post-election period and the medium term, to eventually culminate in a bilateral 

agreement associating Iraq with the EU’s longstanding policies towards countries in 

the region. (See attached document 2) 

The positive spirit at Sea Island also led to a number of initiatives on other 

issues, including Endorsing and Establishing a Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise, 

Helping to Stop Polio Forever, as well as Ending the Cycle of Famine in the Horn 

of Africa, Raising Agricultural Productivity, and Promoting Rural Development in 

Food Insecure Countries. (See attached documents 3, 4, and 5) Furthermore, the G–

8 Leaders endorsed an Action Plan on a Global Capability for Peace Support Operations (See attached document 6), which focuses on Africa in particular, and pledged 

to support debt sustainability in the world’s poorest countries through the implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). 

The annual US–EU Summit that took place in Ireland at Dromoland Castle on 

June 26 was the first bilateral summit after the historic EU enlargement to 25 

Member States and the adoption of the European Union Constitutional Treaty. 

Those recent landmark achievements had clearly lifted the spirits on the EU side. 

That, together with the excellent work by Ireland as the EU Presidency and host 

country, and the fact that President Bush was obviously determined to narrow past 

deep divides, were all essential ingredients in making this by far the most productive EU–US meeting under the Bush Administration. This is also witnessed by a 

number of agreements including that on PNR finalized prior to the summit, the signature of the GPS/Galileo Agreement during the summit, and seven joint declarations on a wide variety of issues, including Iraq. 

The signature at the Summit of the agreement on cooperation between the Galileo 

and GPS satellite navigation system is notable both in ensuring that vital common 

security interests are protected, and in paving the way for more comprehensive use 

of this technology for all users, including a commitment to making the two independent systems compatible and interoperable. (See document 7) This technology 

can now develop into a valued asset to our economic partnership, which already represents the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world. 

8

Following the positive example of the G–8, the EU and US also issued a Joint 

Declaration of Support for the People of Iraq (See attached document 8), welcoming 

the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government and the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, and pledging our assistance to meeting Iraqi needs. As I have already stated, the European Council has endorsed European Commission proposals on a new 

framework for the European Union’s (EU) relations with Iraq. Also following the example of the G–8, the EU and US agreed a Joint Declaration Supporting Peace, 

Progress and Reform in the Broader Middle East and in the Mediterranean, reaffirming our continued support for democratic development, human rights, education, and economic integration in the region. (See attached document 9) Here the 

European Union brings to bear a long and successful record of cooperation via EuroMediterranean Partnerships, which will be further reinforced by the New Neighborhood Policy, and support of the Middle East Peace Process. The summit welcomed 

several positive developments in this area, such as Israel’s announcement of withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, and Egyptian involvement in resolving Gaza-related security issues. The United States and the European Union, as 

members of the Quartet, are working together to ensure the announced withdrawal 

takes place within the context of the internationally agreed upon Road Map, as a 

step towards enduring peace and a two-state solution. 

Reinforcing our common determination to meet the threat of terrorism, a challenge posed to all democratic and free societies, the Summit also adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism. (See attached document 10) This document opens a 

new phase of transatlantic cooperation by emphasizing our desire to deepen the 

international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism. It includes a key commitment to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other economic resources by actively supporting the work of the Financial Action Task Force, 

and at the same time commits us to work together to address the underlying root 

causes of terrorism. 

The summit also produced a joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. (See attached document 11) Here, the European Union shares the 

United States’ serious concerns regarding Iran’s insufficient cooperation with the 

IAEA, and is equally disturbed by Iran’s recent announcement of its intention to resume the manufacturing and assembly of nuclear centrifuges. Reiterating that ‘‘the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is a major 

threat to international peace and security’’, the Declaration sends a strong signal 

to Iran—and to North Korea—to return to full compliance with international obligations. Even though the US and EU hold distinct views on the most effective approach to bringing about the necessary changes in Iran’s policy, there remains a 

strong need for transatlantic cooperation and continued dialogue on this issue. 

Addressing several issues of special concern to Africa, the EU and US agreed Declarations on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, and on Sudan. (See documents 

12 and 13). Both partners agreed to support measures preventing the spread of communicable diseases, including those taken at the country level and by the private 

sector and civil society. With reference to Sudan, both partners welcomed the 

Nairobi Declaration and called upon the Government of Sudan to stop supporting 

aggressive actions by militia groups in the Upper Nile region. 

In the economic realm, the European Union and the United States reaffirmed 

their commitment to work together for the successful conclusion of the WTO Doha 

Development Agenda, which is the best guarantee of continued global economic 

growth and prosperity. The European Commission’s recent proposals on agriculture, 

which obviously need to be reciprocated by our trading partners, constitute a bold 

and constructive initiative, demonstrating our genuine willingness to break the impasse in this area as well as our strong determination to make the adoption of a 

framework for negotiating modalities in the WTO possible by the end of this month. 

Such an outcome would fully validate Ambassador Zoellick’s and Commissioner 

Lamy’s determined efforts towards our WTO partners to convince them that 2004 

should not be a lost year for DDA purposes. 

As we work together in the multilateral area, good progress has already been 

made and is continuing in the bilateral area as well. The EU–US Declaration on 

the Strengthening of our Economic Partnership adopted by the Summit draws on 

an impressive list of achievements in this regard: the development of a Roadmap 

for Regulatory Cooperation, which will help minimize regulatory divergences between the US and the EU, our Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue, and the recently signed customs agreement on container security are only but some examples. 

(See attached document 14). More importantly, the Declaration contains a forward 

looking element which should lead to the preparation of a roadmap, in early 2005, 

to further enhance our economic partnership and eliminate barriers. On this basis, 

the next US Administration, the next European Commission, and the rotating EU 

9

Presidency will have the opportunity at the 2005 Summit to debate ways to give 

the relationship a fresh impetus. This process can only benefit from active involvement of the various stakeholders and, in this respect, I would like to mention the 

valuable contribution of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, which met in the margins of the Summit and with the Leaders, and which produced suggestions leading 

to the establishment of a ‘‘barrier-free transatlantic market’’, including issues such 

as trade and security, accounting standards, and the fight against counterfeiting. 

Addressing also the compliance issue in our bilateral trade disputes, and in particular in the single most important one we face at the moment, the Summit expressed the expectation that Congress will rapidly adopt legislation repealing the 

FSC/ETI. We hope that this will occur before the end of the mandate of the present 

Congress. The EU leaders moreover welcomed President Bush’s offer to have his Administration review aspects of the current visa system that have raised specific concerns in no less than 10 of the 25 EU Member States. 

Mr. Chairman, let me repeat that, to my mind, the meeting at Dromoland Castle 

represented a welcome step toward the return of ‘normalcy’ in our bilateral relations, focusing on mutual concerns and our important work together, rather than 

disagreement on a particular issue. 

The third and final summit under review today is that of NATO, held in Istanbul 

on June 28 and 29. Here I should limit myself to noting that interaction between 

the EU and NATO is a key element also within the European Union’s Security 

Strategy as the EU’s military capabilities evolve. Following the examples of the G–

8 and EU–US summits, the NATO meeting expressed a shared commitment to a 

free, secure, and democratic Iraq by adopting a statement on Iraq. All NATO members (including 19 EU Member States) expressed support for the Iraqi people and 

offered full cooperation to the new sovereign Interim Government. 

The agreements reached in Istanbul on the expansion of the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the enhancement of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the launching 

of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the strengthening of NATO’s anti-terrorism 

efforts, and the further development of its operational capabilities have again highlighted NATO’s continuing transatlantic importance. The European Union fully supports these initiatives, and has demonstrated its readiness to bring security and stability to the Balkans through the intended deployment of a UN-mandated mission 

to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the successful conclusion of NATO’s SFOR operations. Here I would also recall statements made by the EU High Representative 

and Foreign Minister-designate Javier Solana and other EU leaders, to the effect 

that the European Union must not shrink from backing up soft power with hard 

power. At the same time, we hope our American friends will recognize that both can 

play an important role in promoting our common agenda. 

In closing, let me point to the political calendar which on both sides of the Atlantic provides for important leadership decisions in the autumn. In the European 

Union a new European Commission is set to take office on November 1, with the 

new Commission President-designate Jose ́ Manuel Dura ̃o Barroso, former Prime 

Minister of Portugal, and the 24 other Commissioners-designate to be confirmed by 

the newly elected European Parliament. On the US side, following Congressional 

and Presidential elections on November 2, the next Administration, new or renewed, 

will as usual undertake a reassessment of US foreign policy. 

Building on the positive results of these most recent summits, the respective reassessments can provide new momentum in transatlantic relations in 2005 and beyond. We can do no less. The transatlantic relationship indeed constitutes an ‘indispensable partnership’ in the promotion of peace, stability and democracy. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this most welcome opportunity. I look forward 

to the remarks of my distinguished fellow panelists, and will be pleased to address 

any questions you or the other Members may have.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Ambassador Burghardt, and we will submit all written statements for the record and any other extraneous 

material that you referenced, Ambassador Burghardt. 

Next, we will hear from Dr. Serfaty. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF SIMON SERFATY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, EUROPE 

PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. SERFATY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ms. Lee, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify 

10

on the state of transatlantic relations after the summit meetings 

held this past month. 

As you pointed out in the opening statement, Madam Chairwoman, a great deal of history was revived and lived over the past 

6 weeks. In Normandy and here at the Capitol, memories of the 

landings that helped end World War II and of the President who 

helped end the cold war served as reminders of how far we have 

come over the past 60 or 20 years. Later in the month, the EU and 

NATO summits in mid- and late June, as well as the G–8 and 

U.S.–EU summits in between, also served as reminders of how far 

we still have to go over the next 20 to 60 weeks. 

As Ambassador Burghardt just noted, each of these four summits 

produced significant decisions. Meeting for the first time as a union 

of 25 members, the EU summit produced a historical constitutional 

treaty that brings the post-war transformation of Europe closer to 

finality. Meeting for the first time as an organization of 26 members, the NATO summit confirmed its adaptation as a global alliance that was still beyond its members’ reach at the Washington 

summit a mere 5 years ago. 

In Shannon, Ireland, the U.S.–EU summit confirmed the emergence of the EU as a virtual power that the U.S. now engages 

along the full policy spectrum, while the G–8 summit in Sea Island, 

Georgia, placed unusual emphasis on such political issues as the 

broader Middle East initiative. 

That none of these meetings nevertheless proved sufficient to end 

the Atlantic crisis of 2003 is not surprising. The crisis was not bilateral, not even with France. It was not personal, not even over 

President Bush. It was not circumstantial, not even over Iraq. The 

Atlantic crisis of 2003 was and remains structural, having to do 

with the transformation of Europe, the ascendancy of American 

power, and the new security normalcy inherited from the end of the 

cold war and the events of September 11, 2001. 

Reshaping that transatlantic structure will take longer than one, 

two, three, or four summits. It will take time, but at the very least, 

these summits pointed to a roadmap for the institutional renewal 

of the alliance. How that map is explored, how well and how expeditiously, but also with and without whom, will define our relations 

for the next generation. 

The June summits uncovered or confirmed four main elements of 

transatlantic renewal, to which I would like to devote the balance 

of my time on the assumption that, indeed, the prepared statement 

that I provided your staff with will be distributed. 

First, the states of Europe and their union must assume a larger 

role commensurate with their new capabilities, interests, and influence. To achieve that role, they must also upgrade their individual 

and collective military capabilities and political cohesion. That 14 

European members of NATO would spend less than 2 percent on 

defense is no longer acceptable. Two percent of GNP should be a 

minimum, not a maximum, and minimum percentages should also 

be determined within each national defense budget for line items 

on acquisitions and research and development as opposed to personnel spending. 

Europe’s goal in spending more and smarter is not to build an 

adversarial counterweight; it is to gain the weight needed to be an 

11

active counterpart of the United States with and within NATO. In 

other words, even though Europe is not a world power, due to a 

lack of military capabilities, it is now a power in the world, and it 

must act like one if it is to be heard like one and addressed as the 

equal partner it deserves to be and which we in the United States 

want to have. 

Afghanistan was a case in point throughout. Apart from the U.S., 

NATO countries now have 1.2 to 1.5 million men in arms. Their 

NATO equipment includes 13,000 tanks, 35,000 armored vehicles, 

and 11,000 aircraft. Yet, in spite of President Karzai’s plea to 

‘‘please hurry, as NATO in Afghanistan . . . today and not tomorrow,’’ the European members could not agree at any of these summits to send the 3,500 to 4,000 troops, today and not tomorrow or, 

at the very least, tomorrow rather than the day after, needed for 

adequate security in the parliamentary elections scheduled for next 

October. 

That, Madam Chairwoman, is disappointing, and post-summit 

negotiations within NATO will hopefully make it possible to respond to Mr. Karzai’s request so that the elections can be held on 

time and with a modicum of security. 

The second dimension of the emerging transatlantic consensus is 

that a NATO that has effectively gone global must be able and willing to act locally if it is to remain the security institution of choice 

for its members. Madam Chairwoman, the Istanbul debate over 

modalities that was especially evident over Iraq is unfortunate. 

Whether the war in Iraq was a war of choice or a war of necessity 

can be argued on moral as well as on security grounds, but ending 

the war responds to both a moral and a security imperative that 

cannot be ignored. 

The Administration’s change of course over the past few months 

confirms its own conclusion that the coalition is not up to the missions of liberation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation 

that will ensure success in Iraq. Now that the coalition has gained 

U.N. legitimacy, it needs to be enlarged. It demands more involvement from NATO, the EU, and their members, and it demands 

more involvement now. 

On this matter, the agreement in Istanbul was also to agree 

later. Even as Chancellor Schroeder praised the ‘‘remarkable 

change in the American foreign policy’’ shown at Sea Island, or 

President Chirac found in Istanbul ‘‘much, much more openness 

than at any time in the past,’’ both heads of state and government 

seemed tempted to postpone the final decision over Iraq pending 

the outcome of the presidential election next November. If that is 

the case, it is, of course, unfortunate because later may be too late; 

this attitude may even be irresponsible. Conversations between Europe and the new Iraqi foreign minister are encouraging, but the 

EU response does not seem to reflect the sense of urgency we feel 

in this country about Iraq and its future. 

Third, a strategic dialogue across the Atlantic is needed to develop a comprehensive approach to the post-cold war, post-9/11, security agenda. This dialogue should aim at the development of policies that need not be common in each instance but must remain 

complementary in all instances. Granted that a credible dialogue 

12

must await the November election, we should make sure it starts 

at the earliest possible time after that. 

If reelected, President Bush should meet his European counterparts, heads of state and government of all current EU and NATO 

members, in Europe, possibly on the eve of the next EU summit 

in Holland in December 2004. In case of the opposite result, President-elect John Kerry should name a special envoy to Europe for 

consultation in all of the main European capitals in anticipation of 

a visit to Europe in February 2005. 

To sustain this dialogue, Madam Chairwoman, both men should 

also be committed to sending the best available men and women 

to represent the nation as U.S. Ambassadors in the main European 

capitals. The failure in public diplomacy in recent years had much 

to do with a neglect of the skills and experience needed to assume 

such important assignments, including linquisitic skills and relevant background. 

In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran is an important introduction to the strategic dialogue we need. France, Germany, and 

Great Britain wanted to lead, and to this effect they launched an 

initiative designed to contain and reverse Iran’s interest in the development of weapons of mass destruction. The EU followed soon 

afterward. The U.S. approved, notwithstanding concerns that were 

stated at the time. Now, Europe must deliver on its initiative, including the imposition of sanctions if the Iranian government does 

not follow up on the commitments it made to the EU powers, as 

seems to be the case. 

Madam Chairwoman, the historical enlargements of both the EU 

and NATO, the naming of a new European Commission, and a new 

or renewed U.S. Administration open the door for a New Deal in 

U.S.–EU–NATO relations. Passing these tests of efficacy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran will also ensure that the EU, NATO, and 

their members, current and future, also pass the test of Euro-Atlantic longevity. 

And, fourth, the consensus uncovered by the past summits includes recognitions that the greater Middle East is bound to be a 

central issue of Euro-Atlantic concern during the coming decades. 

Like Europe during the second half of the 20th century, the significance of this region, coupled with its volatility, make it the defining 

geopolitical challenge of our time. There cannot be any global order 

if there is no order within that region. For such an order to emerge, 

American power, however indispensable it may be, will not prove 

sufficient unless it can rely on Europe’s power, which however necessary it is, remains insufficient as well. That is the challenge that 

must now be addressed on behalf of the greater Middle East with 

the same bold spirit, the same compelling compassion, and the 

same common purpose, as was shown when the transformation of 

Europe began 60 years ago as a revolt against a failed past. 

This, Madam Chairwoman, is not a small agenda, but it is not 

a new vision either, for it is no more than the extension of the vision that was launched after the World War II in the name of the 

cold war and now needs completion after the cold war and in the 

name of the wars of September 11, all wars that America did not 

start but which it did wage, win, and ultimately end. The goal is 

to transform a community of compatible values and converging inVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:02 Sep 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\071504\94836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

terests into a community of action. With the EU, around NATO, on 

the basis of a comprehensive and complementary western strategy, 

and with emphasis on the greater Middle East, this is a community 

that will enable us to do everything, even if we do not find it possible to do each of those things together. 

Thank you for your attention. I am looking forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serfaty follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SIMON SERFATY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wexler, Members of the Subcommittee on Europe, 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the state of transatlantic relations 

after the various summit meetings held this past month. As was the case in previous instances, appearing before you is a privilege. In this particular case, however, 

let me first state, Mr. Chairman, that your decision to not run for election in November 2004 is cause for much regret in and beyond the think tank communities 

on both sides of the Atlantic. Your leadership will be missed. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a defining moment for the states of Europe and their Union 

(EU), as well as for the Atlantic alliance and its Organization (NATO). Over a sixweek period this spring, the historic enlargements of NATO and the EU, together 

with the moving celebration of the landings in Normandy, served as reminders of 

how far we have come over the past 60 years. Then, over a three-week period in 

June, the EU Summit in Brussels, the G–8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, the 

U.S.–EU Summit in Shannon, Ireland, and the NATO Summit in Istanbul reminded 

us of how far we still have to go over the next 60 months. As shall be seen, each 

of these Summits produced significant decisions. How, how well, and how expeditiously these decisions are enforced—and with or without whom—will leave NATO, 

the European Union, and the transatlantic partnership either much more cohesive 

and thus stronger, or more divided and therefore weaker. 

Indeed, the upcoming five-year period is comparable to another such moment, in 

1948–1953 when, following a hard-fought presidential election, an institutional architecture was put in place that defined a Western strategy for facing the new security conditions that had been emerging during the previous three years. Now, too, 

we fear a new security normalcy, inaugurated by horrific events nearly three years 

ago, and a comprehensive Western strategy is needed to defeat it. 

This will not be easy. To help, of course, we have the institutions inherited from 

the Cold War. Yet much work remains to be done to complete the EU, adapt NATO, 

and renew our partnership. On all three accounts, each of last month’s summits produced warm embraces and communique ́s, but none can yet permit one to conclude 

that the Atlantic Crisis of 2003 is behind us at last. That such would be the case 

is not surprising. The crisis was neither bilateral—not even between the United 

States and France, our most outspoken critic in Europe. Nor was the crisis personal—not even over Europe’s disturbing, and probably irreversible, mistrust of 

President George W. Bush and parts of his administration. Rather, the crisis of 

2003 was, and remains a structural crisis resulting from Europe’s unfinished transformation and America’s preponderant power in the face of the new security challenges inherited from the end of the Cold War and the horrific events of September 

11, 2001. 

Before reviewing the post-Summit condition of intra-European and trans-Atlantic 

relations let me start on an explicitly positive note. In recent years, there has been 

much pessimism about Europe and our alliance with the states of Europe and their 

Union. Much of that pessimism has grown out of, or has led to, an unbalanced analysis that either exaggerated Europe’s weakness while overstating the scope and superiority of American power or, conversely, overstated Europe’s potential as an adversarial counterweight of an America supposedly unable to meet the imperial tests 

of efficacy and hence durability. A more balanced and less dogmatic analysis should 

begin with the recognition of the remarkable developments that have taken place 

in Europe and between Europe and the United States not only since World War II 

or the end of the Cold War, but also since 2001 and even over the past 15 months.

• As a Euro-Atlantic community of increasingly compatible values, the West 

has continued to expand its membership—up to 26 for NATO and 25 for the 

EU. Now, the Euro-Atlantic space comprises 32 countries, including 19 European countries that belong to both Western institutions. This is not the end 

of enlargement for either institution, however. Among the countries that are 

14

awaiting membership, Turkey for the EU and Ukraine for NATO are especially important. Elections scheduled for Ukraine next fall may prove decisive, 

and NATO should be prepared to respond to signs of a maturing democracy 

in this important country after they are confirmed later this year. As to Turkey, genuine democratic reforms are making its membership in the EU ‘‘irreversible’’—in President Chirac’s word—and the start of negotiations will hopefully be announced at the next European Council summit in December 2004, 

when decisions for Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia—expected for 2007—are 

awaited as well.

• As a Euro-Atlantic community of converging interests, the West has also 

deepened during this difficult period. Antiwar sentiments in Europe and occasional bursts of Euro-phobic reactions in the United States have not prevented a sharp increase in investment flows across the Atlantic. Our economic 

space is truly integrated. Areas of tensions remain, to be sure, on matters of 

trade, regulation, competition, money, and much more—but these tensions 

are limited to a miniscule percentage of the totality of our commercial transactions that add up into an ever-closer transatlantic market place that can 

itself reach finality by the middle of the next decade. We care about Europe, 

and Europe cares about us, like two people do after a 50-odd year marriage: 

with the recognition we have become alike, however difficult it may be for 

some to accept it; with the knowledge that we have become one, because of 

the impossibility to separate our respective assets; and with the belief that 

divorce is not a viable option because however difficult life may be with each 

other it would be worse if lived with someone else.

• As an emerging Euro-Atlantic community of action, the West has been able 

to achieve cohesion in various areas essential to our ability to fulfill the many 

goals we share in the world generally and in the war against terrorism specifically. While the coalition of the willing now in Iraq is not as large as we 

would have liked it to be, we were nonetheless able to achieve a universal 

consensus at the UN twice in 30 months, first in November 2002 and next 

in June 2004. While the agreement to give NATO a more significant role in 

Iraq did not go as far as we had hoped, and even as several NATO members 

remain unequivocally hostile to deploying their national forces there, NATO 

is engaged in Afghanistan and its members are playing a critical role on 

many other fronts of the global wars against terror, or in some of the conflicts 

that developed after the Cold War, in Bosnia, Macedonia, and elsewhere. 

Equally noticeable in recent years is the sharp improvement in intelligence 

cooperation within the EU and with the United States, the coordinated use 

of non-military tools for the defeat of terrorist groups and organizations, and 

much more, including U.S.–EU and EU–NATO security relations.

• And finally, as a uniquely intimate partnership whose members share a strategic vision of world order among them more than with any other group of 

states, NATO and the EU are making compatible sounds on most global 

issues. That, to be sure, is still short of a common, let alone single, voice: the 

war we in the United States have been waging since September 11, 2001, is 

still not felt with the same urgency in Europe. But especially since the tragic 

incidents of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain, Europe is slowly coming to 

grips with a reality it can no longer easily deny. As Irving Kristol once put 

it, a neo-conservative is a liberal who’s been mugged by reality: however tragic the mugging of March 11 in Spain, the post-9/11 reality is catching up with 

Europe, and as a result Europe may be catching up with America.

Although banal, my initial conclusion, Mr. Chairman, deserves to be repeated. 

While the end of the Cold War and the advent of the war against global terrorism 

changed many things, neither changed the centrality of our relations with Europe. 

Admittedly, the Old World no longer has the same geopolitical significance as it did 

in the past, either as a collection of world powers or as the primary stake of a struggle between two extra-European superpowers. Yet whatever geopolitical significance 

it may have lost, Europe has gained in all other areas as a producer of relevant 

power and influence. We are each other’s partners of choice for peace, for stability, 

for progress, and for prosperity—not just among us, because on the whole these 

goals have been met in the West, but on behalf of other parts of the world that still 

lag behind in all these areas. Notwithstanding a few moments and words of tensions, the broad terms of this partnership were reasserted in the summits held this 

past month. There is, in short, a genuinely pro-American world out there, in Europe, 

and this provides us with the window of opportunity needed to renew our relations 

because there is nothing out there in the world that cannot be done more effectively 

and more expeditiously together rather than separately. 

15

COMPLETING THE UNION?

As explained in a previous testimony for this subcommittee, the transformation 

of Europe, from a fragmented mosaic of nation-states into a peaceful union of member-states, stands as the most significant geopolitical development of the second half 

of the 20th century. That is cause for legitimate satisfaction. To an extent, the idea 

of Europe is an American idea not only because a few hundred million Europeans 

are repeating in the Old World what a few hundred thousand of them began in the 

New World two hundred years earlier, but also because it is the postwar commitment of U.S. power and leadership that gave the states of Europe the means and 

the security they needed to engage into the bold and even extravagant process of 

integration that is now nearing finality. 

The most recent EU Summit four weeks ago was a historic success, and credit 

must go to the Irish presidency that was ready to move full speed when opportunities for agreement began to appear in mid-March-agreement on enlargement, a constitutional treaty, reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the selection of a 

new President for the Commission. Yet, satisfaction over what was achieved at this 

Summit is tempered by some apprehension over the obstacles that still stand in the 

way of what remains to be done. 

For more than four decades, Europe’s integration has depended on three main 

conditions that influenced the scope, pace, and effectiveness of each new initiative 

embraced by these treaties:

• Robust, sustained, and widely shared economic growth, with benefits for the 

most recent members or the more needy small economies;

• Stable and confident centrist national leadership able to resist pressures from 

either political extreme; and

• Regional stability, in the East but also, and especially since September 11, 

in the South across the Mediterranean.

In the midst or on the eve of finality these features are lacking, and the EU will 

be facing difficult challenges as it prepares for its blind date with history, on the 

occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties.

• Growth is weak, and prospects for future growth remain unsatisfactory. The 

Lisbon agenda for social and economic renewal is stalled, and the June EU 

summit did little to re-launch it—a task now assumed by the Dutch presidency that began on July 1. In part as a result of Europe’s inability to 

produce more affluence to justify the increasing pains of membership, there 

seems to be a growing public unease with the EU and its institutions. Public 

participation at the June elections for a new European Parliament was historically low—even among the new EU members (17 percent in Slovakia, 20 

percent in Poland, and 28 percent in the Czech Republic).

• Political leaders, including but not limited to those who followed the U.S. lead 

in Iraq, are at the mercy of their electoral calendar, as shown by the recent 

national elections in Greece and Spain, and regional elections in Germany, 

France and Italy. For the European elections, the largest government party 

of all EU members except Greece and Spain suffered serious setbacks. In Poland, Britain and Germany in 2005, Italy in 2006, and up to France in May 

2007, existing governing majorities are all at risk. Over the past 18 months, 

the pattern has been clear: strong governments that joined the coalition of the 

willing have weakened (in Spain, Great Britain, Poland, and Italy) while 

weak governments that opposed the coalition have become weaker (including 

France and Germany).

• Few political leaders, experts, and analysts are prepared to rule out one or 

more additional acts of terror in Europe before the end of the year. Europe’s 

vulnerability is a matter of geographic proximity, economic dependence, and 

cultural sensitivity. Soft targets abound. Instabilities in the Greater Middle 

East would quickly spill over to the continent, whatever their form—whether 

out of the Persian Gulf, because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or, least 

mentioned but hardly least likely, through disruptions in Saudi Arabia. Because of their economic and political consequences, instabilities exported from 

this region would impact the EU agenda—as happened after the first oil crisis 

and related Middle East War in 1973. Because of the presence of large communities of Muslim citizens, such instabilities could also spill over into the 

streets of the main European capitals.

16

Four issues will be especially contentious during the coming two to three years. 

These will serve as benchmarks for how and how well the EU can be expected to 

perform during the next several years:

• The two-year ratification debates for the EU constitutional treaty, which will 

be signed in October 2004. Approval by all members is needed, but with several members committed to a public referendum, including Great Britain, 

what would occur if one or more states were to reject the treaty is not clear. 

Indeed, some EU states now seem to argue that approval by at least fourfifths of the current 25 members could be deemed sufficient, thus launching 

a so-called two-speed Europe of ill-defined content and direction.

• The re-negotiation of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is a pre-condition 

for the completion of the euro zone. Europe is hardly near the write-off that 

is often claimed—with serious corporate restructuring and profitability gains, 

and Germany seemingly standing at the beginning of a cyclical upturn. But 

the benefits of the single currency are still lacking behind as the three EU 

members that opted out when the euro was launched continue to postpone 

participation.

• The performance of the new EU members, including Poland, where there is 

already some public resentment over the one-sided negotiations of the past 

few years. In this context, the negotiation of a new EU budget for the years 

2007–2013 is also an important benchmark, and a source of significant debate 

among and within the members.

• New decisions for further enlargement, including especially Turkey (whose 

membership is unlikely to occur before 2013 even if negotiations were to start 

in 2005), not to mention the membership of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, 

now scheduled for 2007, and possibly some Balkan states in 2010. Such discussions, it should be noted, could have serious negative consequences on the 

upcoming constitutional debates.

Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues know well the importance of the EU to 

a strong transatlantic partnership. History teaches that the United States most suffers from conditions in Europe when some European states start something they 

cannot complete—a war or a revolution in the past, and now a currency or a union. 

Yet even as the need for more Europe remains stronger than ever before, the public 

taste for Europe also seems to be turning increasingly sour and resentful. 

POWER AND WEAKNESSES

Throughout the Cold War, Europe’s inability to produce more military power of 

its own was cause for exasperation. After the Cold War, initial hopes that Europe’s 

time had finally come in Bosnia were quickly deflated. Since September 2001, it has 

become painfully clear that only a Euro-Atlantic partnership that relies on a better 

military balance can escape a condition of ‘‘power and weakness’’ that makes Europe 

look mostly like a dead weight relative to an America whose preponderance makes 

it look like an imperial bully. Achieving such balance does not require America to 

become weaker; rather it demands that Europe itself acquire more of the military 

strength it lacks. 

There is no need for subtlety here. With the main exceptions of France and the 

UK, most EU members of NATO do not spend enough on defense: 2 percent of GNP 

should be a minimum, and 14 European members of NATO do not meet that minimum. To make matters worse, much of that spending is on personnel—about 60 

percent—and little is left for procurement, leaving an estimated 80,000 troops out 

of a reported 1.2 to 1.5 million non-U.S. NATO troops in uniform readily available 

for deployment. Spending more and spending better is overdue—an obligation neglected for too long and now too deep to be neglected any longer. To argue that the 

accounting of defense spending should include spending on alleged ‘‘soft power’’ is 

intellectually creative but it remains an alibi for continuing to do less than what 

is needed under current security conditions. 

This condition creates a contradiction that is a significant source of current transatlantic tensions. As an unfinished union of states, Europe now stands as a power 

in the world, which gives it a legitimate voice that America must hear more and 

more clearly than has been the case to-date, especially by this administration; but 

lacking the capabilities required for military action when necessary, it is not, or not 

yet, the world power that it claims to be, and the price of consultation is not always 

worth the benefits it brings. 

As a power in the world, the countries of Europe and their Union show:

17

• Interests that are global in scope and vital in significance as the EU expands 

its spheres of influence and values into and beyond the realm of its members’ 

former empires;

• Capabilities that have become competitive in most dimensions of power except 

for military force. These include preventive security tools like commercial policy, economic aid, and public diplomacy. In recent years and months, the EU 

states and the Union have also made significant progress in developing their 

defensive tools of homeland security like law enforcement measures, border 

and aviation security, first steps for the physical and cyber protection of critical infrastructures, and more;

• A saliency that is truly universal because of a reputation in the world gained 

by its nation-states during their long history, for the better and for the worse, 

but renewed through its institutions, mostly for the better, over the past 50 

years.

The next few years will show whether Europe and its Union are willing and able 

to also gain the military power, as well as the will to use it, without which they 

would remain unable to move up to the next level—as a power in the world that 

would also stand as a world power—or, as Tony Blair put it, a superpower but not 

a super state. The reference to Tony Blair is not fortuitous: the key to Europe’s ability to develop an effective foreign, security, and defense policy is indeed the participation of the UK, a participation that is even more indispensable politically, at least 

in the short term, than Germany’s military contributions may prove to be in the 

long term. The time is long gone, when Britain could stay out of Europe, and Europe 

away from Britain. 

When dealing with security issues and, more specifically, Europe’s contributions 

to the management of these issues, the Sea Island and Istanbul summits were 

frankly disappointing. The states that objected to joining the U.S.-sponsored coalition of the willing in Iraq in the spring of 2003 continued to object to renewed UNendorsed efforts to end the occupation on behalf of a rehabilitated Iraqi state that 

explicitly asked for NATO support and clearly needs additional EU help. Further 

contributions on the other fronts of the war against terrorism, especially in Afghanistan where additional troops are needed, were also postponed. And while there was 

recognition that threatening instabilities in the Greater Middle East cannot be ignored much longer, little was agreed in practice—notwithstanding seven separate 

communique ́s released after the U.S.–EU Summit held immediately before the 

NATO summit. What emerged out of Istanbul and Sea Island was a minimum consensus that fell far short of legitimate expectations: agree to not disagree by agreeing to agree at a later date. In so doing, each head of state or government was able 

to go home claiming that he had been convincing and, most of all, firm or cooperative depending on his specific political needs. 

Mr. Chairman, this persistent debate over modalities when faced with a complex 

set of urgent issues—Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, but also Iran—is troubling. Whether Iraq was a war of choice or a war of necessity can be argued on 

moral as well as security grounds; but ending the war responds to both a moral and 

a security imperative that cannot be ignored. Failure in Iraq is not an option, because of consequences that are unthinkable and thus unpredictable. By some definitions of failure, it may already have occurred as many of the reasons used earlier 

to explain the need for war have proven to be misleading, while most of the goals 

asserted to present it as a just war have not been fulfilled yet. Mistakes were made 

on all sides. Prior to the war, we overplayed a strong military hand, and some in 

Europe overplayed a weak diplomatic hand. After the collapse of public diplomacy 

in early 2003, the conduct of the war proper was impressive. In the spring, 

Saddam’s removal made Iraq freer but whether it also made us safer can be debated—and most Europeans fear otherwise. In the fall, it became clear that planning for postwar Iraq had been grossly insufficient to say the least. This is not the 

time to engage into any sort of blame game, however, whether at home, in the coalition, or within the alliance at large. The administration’s change of course over the 

past 10 to 12 weeks confirms that the coalition has not been up to the current missions of liberation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation. To be effectively 

assumed, these missions demand a fuller involvement of NATO, the EU and their 

respective members on top of the global legitimacy provided by the UN.

• With occupation ended, completing Iraq’s liberation from foreign and local 

forces that promote terror and deepen insecurity requires more foreign 

ground forces, pending the organization of viable Iraqi military and police 

forces preferably trained by NATO in Iraq. This is not the moment to set a 

date certain for the withdrawal of coalition forces now deployed in Iraq.

18

• With an Iraqi government now leading a period of transition from partial to 

complete sovereignty, rehabilitating the Iraqi state demands a direct UN role 

in organizing credible national elections no later than January 2005.

• Notwithstanding the fact that full security will remain out of reach for some 

time to come, Iraq’s reconstruction needs to proceed under direct control of 

the new Iraqi government, and with the full support of all allies, whatever 

their disposition at the start of the war.

The June summits addressed many of these issues, but none was conclusive. Even 

as Chancellor Schroeder praised the ‘‘remarkable change in the American foreign 

policy’’ shown at Sea Island, or President Chirac found in Istanbul ‘‘much, much 

more openness’’ than ‘‘at any time in the past,’’ both men remained reluctant to respond in kind at this time. The temptation to postpone final decision may grow out 

of a desire to await the outcome of the next U.S. presidential election. That would 

be, of course, unfortunate. Because there is some urgency in attending to the issues 

currently on the Euro-Atlantic agenda, this attitude may even be irresponsible. 

In Iraq, the allies’ reluctance to increase their contributions at this time was predictable, despite the fact that much of what had been requested by our critics had 

actually been met. Indeed, prospects for 2005 are for a smaller rather than a larger 

coalition as some of its ‘‘willing’’ members are preparing for a withdrawal of some 

of their forces currently deployed in Iraq. But what about Afghanistan, where unlike 

Iraq the consensus for war was global and UN legitimacy beyond question? In this 

case, too, the June summits produced general agreements that fell short of specific 

actions. 

NATO currently has 5 million military personnel overall—active and reserve, 

from all of its services, apart from U.S. contributions. Non-U.S. NATO equipment 

is reported to include 13,000 tanks, 35,000 armored infantry vehicles, and 11,000 

aircrafts. NATO countries outside the United States now spend close to $200 billions 

dollars every year on their military. Yet, in spite of President Hamid Karzai’s plea 

‘‘to please hurry, as NATO in Afghanistan . . . today and not tomorrow,’’ the European members of NATO have not mustered the 3,500 to 4,000 troops needed to ensure adequate security for parliamentary elections this fall. That, Mr. Chairman, is 

disappointing and post-Summit negotiations within NATO will hopefully make it 

possible to respond to Mr. Karzai’s request, so that the presidential election at least 

can be held in October with a modicum of security. 

Completing this ‘‘iron triangle’’ of short-term issues is Iran, which did not figure 

at the center of these summits. Yet the significance of Iran in coming months and 

years should not be neglected. Iran is a test of Europe’s interest in, commitment 

to, and capacity for leadership. France, Germany, and Great Britain wanted to lead 

and launched an initiative designed to address issues of concern with regard to 

Iran’s development of weapons of mass destruction. The EU followed soon afterward. The United States quickly approved, notwithstanding some concerns that 

were stated at the time. Now, there is a need for Europe to deliver on its initiative, 

including the imposition and enforcement of sanctions if the Iranian government 

does not follow up on the commitments it made to the EU powers. This is a test 

that the EU must pass, just as Afghanistan is a challenge NATO must meet, and 

Iraq is a test America cannot fail. 

A NEW CONSENSUS

That one or more summits could not fully resolve the structural dimensions of the 

Atlantic crisis of 2003 is not surprising. That will take time—a time likely to last 

the term of the next U.S. administration if not longer. An institutional road map 

for the structural renewal of the Western alliance includes:

• The states of Europe and their Union need to assume a larger role commensurate with their current capabilities, interests, and influence. They also need 

to move on with their efforts to upgrade their military capabilities and 

achieve the cohesion they need to play that role. The goal is not to build an 

adversarial counterweight but to gain the weight needed to be an active counterpart of the United States with and within NATO. This broad conclusion 

could certainly be inferred from the U.S.–EU summit, as well as from the EU 

summit that preceded it and the NATO summit that followed.

• A NATO that has gone global must be ready and able to act locally if it is 

to remain the security institution of choice for all of its members. More than 

a decade after the end of the Cold War, it is still in business, but what that 

business actually consists of is not as clear as it must be. The European members of NATO must provide the Organization with the additional capabilities 

it needs to face the new global mandate linked to the events of September 

19

11, 2001 and March 11, 2004. This conclusion could credibly be inferred from 

the Istanbul summit that confirmed the goals that had been set at Prague 

in November 2003.

• A strategic dialogue is needed to develop a comprehensive approach to the 

post-Cold War, post-9/11 security agenda aimed at the development of policies 

that need not be common in each instance but must remain complementary 

in all instances. While such a dialogue will have to await the U.S. presidential election of November 2004, it should start at the earliest possible time 

after that. For such a dialogue to be sustained over time, the next administration will have to be committed to sending the best available group of U.S. ambassadors to represent the country in the main European capitals. The failure 

in public diplomacy in recent years had much to do with a neglect of the skills 

and experience needed to assume such important assignments—including linguistic skills and relevant background.

• The G–8 summit especially gave particular attention to the Greater Middle 

East, a central part of the Euro-Atlantic strategic dialogue needed for the 

coming decades. Like Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, 

the significance of this region, coupled with its volatility, makes it the defining geopolitical challenge of our time. There cannot be any sort of global order 

if there is no order within that region. For such an order to emerge, American 

power—however indispensable it may be—will not prove sufficient unless it 

can rely on Europe’s power which—however necessary it is—is not sufficient 

either. That is the challenge that must now be addressed with the same bold 

spirit, the same compelling compassion, and the same common purpose as 

was shown when the transformation of Europe began 50 years ago, as a revolt 

against a failed past. We are now at this point: Americans and Europeans 

alike, as well as those who live in that region, have failed to generate the conditions that would make it possible to live up to its potential within a peaceful, democratic, affluent, and stable environment. A Euro-Atlantic initiative 

for the Middle East includes a commitment to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but it need not await its final outcome to get started. 

As learned in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, reconciliation follows pacification and reconstruction, and not the other way 

around.

Along the road, there are many goals we need to pursue if we are to achieve the 

comprehensive Euro-Atlantic strategy of global complementarity we need for the 

wars of 911. These include:

• Complementarity of European membership in NATO and the EU, meaning 

that all European members of NATO should ultimately be members of the 

EU, including Turkey but also Norway, and all EU members should be NATO 

members as well, including Austria but also Sweden, Finland, and others.

• Complementarity of NATO and EU relations with countries that are not 

members of either institution, meaning especially a more effective coordination of U.S. and European policies toward Russia—a Euro-Atlantic Ostpolitik. 

Territorial oddities like Kaliningrad, and institutional orphans in Europe, like 

Ukraine, also demand more policy coordination by the United States and Europe, as do other countries that are not part of the Euro-Atlantic geographic 

area but are nonetheless seeking partnerships for peace and prosperity in its 

context—like the countries of North Africa.

• Closer U.S.–EU relations, as Europe’s recognition of its special partnership 

with the United States—a non-member member state of the EU—but also as 

a U.S. acknowledgement of the EU and its members as a vital, though unfinished, partner. The historic enlargements of both the EU and NATO, the 

naming of a new European Commission, and a new or renewed U.S. administration open the door for a New Deal in U.S.–EU–NATO relations. If re-elected, President Bush should meet his European counterparts—heads of state 

and government of all current EU and NATO members—in Europe, possibly 

on the eve of the next EU Summit in December 2004. In case of the opposite 

result, President-elect John Kerry should immediately name a special envoy 

to Europe for consultation in anticipation of an official visit to the main European capitals in February 2005.

• Better coordination between NATO and the EU as two institutions whose parallel contributions to the war against global terror are indispensable if those 

wars are going to be both won and ended. The future of a European security 

pillar is tied to NATO, and NATO’s future is dependent on its ability to act 

globally—on the basis of capabilities enhanced by a better coordination of 

20

non-military security tools between the allies, and a common understanding 

of the priorities they share on the basis of a more compatible strategic view 

of the world they face.

This, Mr. Chairman, is not a small agenda. But it is not a new vision either—

for it is no more than the extension of the vision that was launched after World 

War II in the name of the Cold War, and now needs completion after the Cold War 

and in the name of the wars of September 11—all wars that America did not start 

but which it did wage, win, and ultimately end.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Dr. Serfaty, and now we will hear from 

Dr. Hamilton. Dr. Hamilton, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. HAMILTON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS 

UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Congresswoman 

Lee. I will not try to summarize things that my colleagues have already said but just continue the discussion. I have also submitted 

a statement for the record that provides more detail. 

I agree with Ambassador Burghardt that we can all feel a bit 

better about the relationship after these summits, but I do think 

it is too much to say that we are back on track. Three and a half 

years of crisis are not overcome by a few meetings. While each 

summit produced individual points of success, overall there is a 

long way to go, particularly when measured against the agenda 

that faces us. It is not enough to get back to business; we have to 

tackle the business that awaits us, and here there is much to be 

done that is not being done. 

Also, Simon and I are good friends, but for the sake of argument, 

let me disagree with his basic premise that European-American differences are structural. I do not believe they are. I believe such dissonance derives fundamentally not from differences in power or capability gaps; but rather from differences over strategic rationale, 

priorities, and political will. The power gap between the United 

States and the countries of Europe was as great, if not greater, at 

the end of World War II as it is today. At that time, however, the 

United States used its power to create institutions and new ways 

of working in the world to deal with the challenges that faced that 

generation. We have not done so this time, we have squandered the 

opportunity—born of the 9/11 tragedy—to energize our alliances 

and our partnerships. 

Now, as a professor and also as a participant in past incarnations of each of these summits, I would give the Sea Island summit 

and the U.S.–EU summit, frankly, both a grade of B-minus. I 

would give the NATO summit a C—not because of what these summits achieved in their own right but because of what they failed 

to achieve in terms of your own criteria, Madam Chairman: Setting 

forth a common vision. I do not believe that such a vision or sense 

of shared purpose emerged. The message that emerged was that 

the U.S. and its core partners had finally found a way to talk to 

each other again, to manage a vast collection of disparate issues. 

That is not leadership, and that is not pushing forward a new 

agenda attuned to the real challenges we face. 

The G–8 summit did come around on Iraq and on the Middle 

East peace process, allowing us to at least talk to each other and 

21

set the frame for an initiative on the Greater Middle East, which 

I have long supported. The transformation of that region is the 

strategic challenge of our generation. Such an ambitious undertaking offers a huge opportunity to rejuvenate the transatlantic relationship. Europeans and Americans alike face turbulence from 

this region, and hooking that region back into the world in a peaceful way is a challenge for an entire generation. 

In short, the G–8 summit moved us a bit further along this 

track, but a lot of things that did not happen, including the fact 

that some of the leaders from the region who were invited turned 

down the invitation because of the dynamics that are going on. It 

was a good beginning, but there is so much more to be done, and 

the Broader Middle East Initiative has had a difficult birth. 

There were some interesting initiatives on Africa at the G–8 

summit, and if one packages a number of the initiatives together, 

there was a good focus on Africa, more than at past summits, in 

various areas. The challenge for the G–8, however, is always 

whether it follows through on any of these declarations. Many of 

the 253 commitments the leaders made in Sea Island will be forgotten or have already been forgotten. The test of the G–8 will be 

whether any of these initiatives will be around next year? Will we 

remember what anyone said? Unfortunately, I wonder whether Africa will receive the same spirit and level of attention next year as 

it did this year. Tony Blair has said that as next year’s host he will 

also devote attention to Africa, but follow-through remains the critical test of G–8 effectiveness. 

There were also some interesting initiatives on nonproliferation. 

The whole effort on the Global Partnership on Nonproliferation, 

however, focuses heavily on the nuclear dimension. There is little 

to no attention paid to bioterrorism, and there is little to no attention paid to biological weapons. These weapons pose a first-order, 

strategic threat to the United States and to our European allies. 

In the hands of terrorists, they would be as lethal as nuclear weapons, yet their consequences are very different. I do not believe that 

either side of the Atlantic is really prepared to deal with this type 

of trust. There must be much more done in that area; the G–8 summit did little. 

The last G–8 initiative was on transportation security, and, 

again, while some aspects were positive, the U.S. proposal, which 

was much more intrusive, was actually turned down. So the end result was a mix, frankly. 

On the U.S.–EU summit, I do not want to reiterate what Ambassador Burghardt said. To my mind there were two basic areas of 

progress. One was on the economics, and the Ambassador mentioned that. The second, though, was what I would call ‘‘transatlantic homeland security.’’ It is not a term that maybe everyone 

uses, but I think you understand what I mean, that our efforts 

here and efforts in Europe to protect societies must be organized 

on a transatlantic basis, not just at home. Neither Europeans nor 

Americans can be safe at home alone anymore, and we are relevant 

to each other in terms of our security. 

All of the efforts that the United States advances through the 

Department of Homeland Security, I believe, need to be matched 

with complementary or joint efforts with our European allies and 

22

vice versa. A biological attack of contagious disease in the Frankfurt Airport would not only be a disaster for Europe, it would affect 

Americans there and affect the rest of this country in a matter of 

hours. It would not recognize distinctions between allies and partners. It is a threat that must be tackled together. We saw on September 11th the same phenomenon. Many, many Europeans were 

killed in that attack as well as Americans. 

A number of U.S.–EU initiatives in this area were quite good in 

terms of passenger name recognition, in terms of container security, closer work with Interpol, customs cooperation, and maritime 

security. But the cooperation needs to be taken to a different level. 

We really need to understand we have a common ‘‘transatlantic 

homeland’’ that we need to protect. We talk about projecting our 

power to the greater Middle East in order to take the fight to the 

terrorist. But what happens if that fails? How are we protecting 

our homeland against the possibility of a terrorist attack of weapons of mass destruction, and are we doing it together? That, I 

think, is the core issue we face in this realm, and there is more 

work to be done, especially on the U.S.–EU track. It is not necessarily a first-order issue for NATO, although it includes NATO. 

The third summit was the NATO/EAPC summit in Istanbul. 

Leaders agreed that Afghanistan was important, but all the summit really did was increase the troop commitment from a paltry 

6,500 troops to 8,000 troops. It extended NATO’s writ without extending its resources, and I am afraid that our rhetoric about support is far ahead of the energy and attention we are willing to invest to get Afghanistan right. Afghanistan risks falling off our political radar screen as we focus overwhelmingly on Iraq. 

I am one of those, as is the President, who says that NATO must 

go to Iraq, that we must have a much more forceful transatlantic 

presence there. Unfortunately, the summit only produced an agreement on some training for Iraqi forces and probably not in Iraq 

itself. So I think that reflects the underlying disagreements that 

are very much still there. 

There were some efforts to improve the capabilities of our allies, 

but they fell short, as they have in the past. As Simon said, this 

was the first time the alliance met at 26 with our new allies. The 

alliance reiterated that the door is open to others, which I think 

is a good statement, but it really said nothing about the Partnership for Peace, which has been an important mechanism connecting 

NATO allies to other partner nations. 

It is a strange situation now. The alliance is now bigger than the 

partnership, and the partnership is divided strongly into two 

groups of countries. You have Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Sweden, and Ireland on the one hand and you have Central Asia on 

the other. These are our partners now in the Partnership for Peace, 

and there is not a concept being advanced by the Administration 

or, frankly, the NATO allies of how this partnership can be adapted, now that we have a larger alliance, to the challenges we and 

our partners face. 

My small proposal is that we rejuvenate the Partnership for 

Peace and its political umbrella, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council, by embracing the concept of societal security or transatlantic homeland security. Swiss-Swedish concepts of total defense 

23

develops over decades due to their nonaligned, neutral status, are 

very relevant to the current American debate about societal security. These countries have been working on these issues for decades. Why not adapt these notions into a new initiative encouraging NATO and its partners, also in cooperation with the EU to 

advance societal security throughout the transatlantic region? 

In short, I think the NATO summit really did not project this vision. It took care of a few things. It dealt with some issues of military transformation, as it tends to do. But it has still not fundamentally dealt with the political transformation of the alliance in 

ways that are anchored in parliamentary and in public support. I 

do not believe we have had the kind of debate about what NATO 

really is about today, but it is already in Afghanistan, and it is partially in Iraq. Is this the NATO we want? If so, how do we equip 

it to do what we are asking it to do? The Administration has not 

allowed these issues. 

Madam Chairman, you and Congressman Bereuter had asked us 

to comment also on the transatlantic economic relationship, and 

what I have done in the statement is provide you with some background on the relationship by putting our trade disputes in a 

broader context. Very simply, trade is a very misleading benchmark of the economic relationship between Europe and the United 

States. Investment flows, not trade, determine much of the transatlantic relationship, and those are overwhelmingly important to 

American states and communities. Investment flows and trade determine much of our economic relationship today. Trade disputes 

account for only about 1 to 2 percent of transatlantic commerce, 

and yet gets all of the attention, which sucks the political energy 

out of any effort to advance an ambitious transatlantic economic 

agenda that could pay real dividends for American and European 

consumers, workers, and their families. 

In the statement I provide statistics about European investment 

and in-sourced jobs from Europe to every U.S. state, including Virginia. It is interesting to note, for example, that Texas is the largest state target of European investment into the United States, and 

that there is more European investment just in Texas than all of 

American investment in China and Japan put together. It shows 

you how important the transatlantic relationship is. It is still the 

central relationship economically that we have. 

To sum up, the summits showed that we can work together, but 

their focus was about managing an agenda, not projecting a way 

to harness our potential to deal with the challenges we face. After 

enlargement of the EU and NATO, we face integration of a new 

band of states to Europe’s east, including some very difficult countries but ones that we have to work to include. This also means upgrading the U.S.–EU relationship in the West. Beyond Europe, we 

must tackle the Greater Middle East with the seriousness it deserves, and we must work together to make our institutions more 

effective. 

Across the Atlantic we face a big agenda. Politically, there has 

been a drifting apart over the past 3 years. But every objective 

measure of European-American information tells us that our societies and economies are not drifting apart, they are colliding. In 

the age of globalization we are literally smashing into each other. 

24

1 A detailed outline of the Sea Island Summit, as well as previous summits, can be found on 

the University of Toronto’s G8 Information Centre website, including a paper by its Director, 

John Kirton, at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2004seaisland/kirton2004.html 

We are interacting more than ever before across the Atlantic since 

the end of the cold war, not less, and some of the frictions we have 

come because we are deep into each other’s systems, and our respective regulations and regulatory mechanisms we have are not 

equipped to deal with that. That is the agenda we face, for which 

I have not seen a whole lot of serious activity. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. HAMILTON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you and your colleagues again 

to discuss the transatlantic relationship after Iraq. 

Before I do, however, let me congratulate you personally, Mr. Chairman, for your 

strong personal and professional efforts to advance a vibrant and effective transatlantic partnership. My wife’s family comes from your district in Nebraska, Mr. 

Chairman, and I know from my many visits there how much your constituents value 

your efforts on their behalf in the U.S. Congress. We shall miss your voice in the 

Congress, and wish you well. 

You asked for an assessment of the G–8, US–EU and NATO summits held in 

June and their impact on U.S.-European relations, as well as views on transatlantic 

economic issues. I will assess each summit and its impact briefly, and then turn to 

transatlantic economic relations. I will conclude with a few points about the future 

relationship. 

June 2004 was a veritable traveling summit roadshow. The month started with 

President Bush’s June 4 visit with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the 

Pope in Rome, a June 5 visit with French president Jacques Chirac in Paris, and 

a June 6 encounter in Normandy among all G8 leaders except Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to celebrate the 60th anniversary of D-Day. The G–8 Sea 

Island summit followed June 8–10. Many European leaders then joined President 

Bush in Washington to attend Ronald Reagan’s funeral. President Bush then flew 

to Europe to attend the U.S.–EU Summit at Dromoland Castle in County Clare, Ireland June 26 and the NATO summit in Istanbul on June 28–29. 

THE G8 SEA ISLAND SUMMIT

It is important to recall that the original impetus for what has become the G8 

was the perceived need, in the mid-1970s, by leaders of the larger west European 

countries to discuss directly with the U.S. President a few key issues, primarily in 

the economic field. 

Sea Island was in many ways reflective of how the G8 Summit has strayed from 

this original impulse. The focus on economic topics has given way to primarily political discussions. What were once short, specific agendas are now broad, comprehensive themes accompanied by a confusing array of action plans and supporting papers. The G8 at Sea Island issued a record 16 documents, most quite detailed, covering 10 separate issue areas. Together the G8 countries signed up to a record 253 

collective commitments and mobilized an estimated $2.77 billion to advance these 

commitments, higher than that at the 2003 Evian Summit but far lower than the 

$50 billion mobilized at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit. 19 different G8 or related 

institutions at the ministerial, official and civil society levels were either created or 

tasked. And more than 500 instructions or declarations were issued to a vast number of other international bodies.1

While such a plethora of plans and papers can easily overwhelm effectiveness, the 

G8 can perform an important agenda-setting function by prioritizing certain themes 

and mobilizing energy and resources behind them. The key test for the G8 is followthrough: how many of these themes will be around next year, and will any real 

progress have been made? Will financial pledges be honored in timely fashion? Will 

the G8 nations really make good on these 253 commitments? Unfortunately, if past 

is prologue, only a few initiatives are likely to survive in any effective fashion. This 

has diminished the G8’s credibility and is why some critics view it more as a photo 

opportunity for hortatory declarations than a serious effort to tackle issues. 

25

The centerpiece for the Sea Island Summit, and for President Bush as its host, 

was the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, which was only possible 

because of some last-minute compromises over the related issues of Iraq and the 

Middle East peace process. 

One hour before the Summit opened the U.N. Security Council unanimously 

passed a resolution transferring sovereignty to a new Iraqi government by the end 

of June, thus offering G8 members an opportunity for partial rapprochement after 

their bitter divisions over the Iraq invasion. The principle of debt reduction for Iraq 

was also accepted, but U.S. efforts to secure close to complete debt forgiveness were 

resisted by France, Germany, Russia and Japan—who hold more of the debt than 

does the U.S.—on the grounds that this was far more than was on offer to very poor 

countries without oil resources. The matter was not discussed by the heads and was 

delegated to the Paris Club. 

Another area of considerable transatlantic tension has been the Israeli-Palestinian issue. When Ariel Sharon visited Washington in April, President Bush not 

only welcomed his plan for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza but also made suggestions, 

without any consultations with the Palestinians, about the shape of a final settlement that abandoned established principles deemed essential by the Palestinians. 

This was very badly received in the Arab world as well as by Washington’s other 

partners in the Quartet backing the roadmap to a final settlement. At the G8 summit the partners sought to get back on track by again invoking relevant UN resolutions, endorsing the objective of ‘‘two states living side by side in peace,’’ confirming 

the central position of the Quartet in advancing the roadmap, commending the 

Israeli plan for Gaza withdrawal, and calling on both sides to end all acts of violence. Despite some diplomatic rapprochement, it is questionable whether such 

statements will have any real impact on the ground in the Middle East absent 

movement from the parties themselves. 

Progress on these two issues enabled the G8 partners to endorse a declaration 

promising support for the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights 

in the Middle East, backed by a G8 Plan of Support for Reform and other measures, 

including a ‘‘Forum for the Future’’ to advance democracy and hold Arab governments accountable on issues of human rights and freedoms. The initiative does provides a potentially important mechanism through which civil society and private 

sector actors in the region can engage, but it also has some shortcomings. The reform plan is long on declaratory rhetoric and short on meaningful steps. The action 

plan is a lowest common denominator document. The Future Forum treats Middle 

Eastern states as ‘‘targets’’ of the reform dialogue, and the G8 did not link progress 

on civil society or democratic accountability to other elements of the G8 reform 

package, thus depriving the G8 states of much of the Initiative’s potential leverage. 

In short, Arab states are offered the help of the West to advance those economic 

reforms they want, while sidestepping political reforms they do not want. 

The initiative also survived a difficult birth, marked by continuing tensions over 

Iraq and the Middle East peace process, combined with the negative responses from 

the region to the leaked initial U.S. draft and revelations about American abuse of 

Iraqi prisoners. Key countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia declined the invitation to join the summit, leaving the G8 leaders to meet with a relatively unrepresentative group comprised of leaders from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, 

Turkey, Yemen and the new Iraqi president. 

In sum, the initiative is a welcome beginning, but it is based on a rather fragile 

consensus among the G8 with no guarantee that it will be funded or sustained at 

future Summits; no basic bargain with the region itself, and few resources and levers. I say this with regret because the peaceful transformation of the broader Middle East is perhaps the greatest challenge of our generation, and a potentially important project for a rejuvenated transatlantic partnership. But the beginning has 

been awkward. 

The second major package of efforts at Sea Island related to Africa. African leaders, who attended the G8 for the fourth year in a row, secured a new program to 

build capacity for peacekeeping and peace support, backed by almost $1 billion from 

the U.S. and the EU. They obtained support for a new effort to end the cycle of famine in the Horn of Africa and to provide broader food security. Poor countries in Africa and elsewhere also received a promise, potentially worth another $1 billion, 

that G8 leaders were prepared to extend for two more years their initiative to aid 

heavily indebted poor countries. They also obtained a $200 million commitment to 

eradicate polio by 2005, and a $375 million program to develop vaccines and fight 

HIV/AIDS. Africans (and others) also stand to benefit from a G8 initiative to lower 

the cost of remittances sent by those in the rich north to family members and 

friends in the poor south. 

26

A third summit theme was nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Here 

again an ‘‘action plan’’ brought together a range of issues. There was agreement to 

strengthen the capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but no 

support for a U.S. proposal to ban the transfer of nuclear enrichment technology to 

any state that did not already have it. The G8 only agreed to apply a one-year moratorium on such transfers and to take up the issue again in 2005. Just days before 

the Summit Russia became the final G8 member to join the U.S.-led Proliferation 

Security Initiative, which appears to have proven its worth by the November 2003 

interdiction of a ship carrying nuclear equipment to Libya. The G8 also expanded 

its 2002 Global Partnership for safely dismantling weapons of mass destruction to 

several countries beyond Russia, most notably Iraq and Libya. Implementation remains very slow, however, due to persistent problems surrounding access to sensitive areas and with legal and insurance protection in Russia. The program is also 

focuses heavily on nuclear issues, with some attention to chemical weapons proliferation, but with little focus on biosecurity. 

The G8 also adopted the ‘‘Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative’’ 

(SAFTI), focused on improved practices to deter terrorist attacks on air transport, 

working with the International Civil Air Organization (ICAO). But it omitted a contentious U.S. proposal for full airside screening or measures to deal with small airports and aircraft or ground transportation on subways and trains. 

Results in other areas were modest, particularly on the economy. Leaders tasked 

ministers to establish a framework by the end of July for the deadlocked WTO Doha 

negotiations, but failed to acknowledge their outstanding commitment to complete 

the Doha negotiations by 2005, and devoted no attention to how the international 

financial system could meet 21st century needs. 

THE US–EU SUMMIT IN IRELAND

The U.S.–EU Summit at Dromoland Castle in County Clare, Ireland picked up 

on many G8 themes and initiatives. Both sides expressed their commitment to support the people of Iraq. The EU has engaged the Iraqi Interim Government and announced its readiness to provide support for the political process and elections and 

to consider further support for the rule of law and civil administration in Iraq. 

President Bush and his European counterparts echoed G8 support for transformation of the broader Middle East, although each side highlighted its own specific initiatives, rather than undertaking any joint efforts. 

Homeland security and economic issues were the main themes of the U.S.–EU 

Summit. Some progress was made to ensure complementary efforts at what might 

be called ‘‘transatlantic homeland security.’’ Both sides recently signed agreements 

to improve container security, expand customs cooperation, and transfer passenger 

name record (PNR) data. At the Summit they agreed to enhance information exchange to target and interdict maritime threats, work more closely through Interpol 

to deal with lost and stolen passports and other border issues, incorporate interoperable biometric identifiers into travel documentation, continue a policy dialogue on 

border and transport security, and start a dialogue on improving capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks. 

While the list of agreements is impressive, it is tempered by the fact that agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance signed at the 2003 US–EU Summit have yet to come into force. This lag is hampering the possibility for enhanced 

US–EU cooperation to combat terrorism, including enhanced joint investigative undertakings and enhanced tools to identify bank accounts of terrorists. 

Since the economic relationship between the U.S. and the EU is by far the broadest and deepest of any in the world, there are of course always a significant number 

of trade and regulatory issues on the table. The most significant current issue is 

that of sanctions imposed in March by the EU on a list of U.S. products, followed 

by automatic, monthly increases by 1% until March 2005, until the U.S. complied 

with a WTO ruling that found U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) and the Extra 

Territorial Income (ETI) Act to constitute illegal export subsidies under international law. Adoption by the U.S. Senate of the JOBS Act on May 11, and adoption 

by the House of Representatives of the Thomas bill on June 17 repealing the FSC/

ETI are significant steps forward to resolving this issue, but the two bills still need 

to be reconciled and signed by the President. The EU has repeatedly declared that 

it would lift the sanctions as soon as this happens. 

After more than four years of intensive negotiations, an agreement was signed on 

cooperation between the Galileo and GPS satellite navigation systems. The agreement will allow each system to work alongside the other without interfering with 

its counterpart’s signals. This means that all users of satellite radio-navigation will 

be able to use one or the other of the two systems simultaneously, with only one 

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receiver, or use both at the same time. This opens wide-ranging commercial opportunities: the market potential is projected to be 3 billion receivers and revenues of 

some $280 billion per year by 2010 worldwide, creating hundreds of thousands of 

jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. 

The Summit failed to produce a transatlantic open skies agreement, however. 

These talks began after an EU court ruled that U.S. bilateral agreements with individual EU states broke European rules that create a single internal market. The 

key sticking point centers on U.S. refusal to allow European carriers to fly U.S. domestic routes, known as ‘‘cabotage.’’ U.S. airlines have this right in some European 

countries under agreements the U.S. negotiated with individual EU countries. EU 

officials argue that this creates an imbalance in market access. 

Since the U.S. is in an election year and a new European Commission will take 

over on November 1, there was little opportunity to chart far-reaching summit economic initiatives at the Summit. Instead, leaders want to initiate a six-month ‘‘reflection period’’ on ways to eliminate trade, regulatory and investment impediments 

to further economic integration. They tasked the U.S.–EU Senior Level Group to 

present these ideas to the 2005 Summit. They also agreed to a roadmap for EU–

US regulatory cooperation and transparency, which comprises a series of discrete 

activities intended to reduce costs, expand market opportunities and help minimize 

EU–US regulatory differences. This includes development of a model confidentiality 

agreement to support the sharing of confidential information under a range of EU–

US regulatory cooperation projects. Intensified EU–US regulatory cooperation has 

the potential to facilitate trade in goods and enable regulators to better discharge 

their public responsibility for health, safety, the environment and consumer protection. The Commission and the U.S. Government will also be seeking concrete ideas 

from interested stakeholders on prospective EU–US cooperation activities. My Center, for example, is engaged in a number of such ‘‘reflection’’ activities seeking ways 

to improve transatlantic cooperation. 

THE NATO/EAPC SUMMIT IN ISTANBUL

Achievements at Istanbul were modest. A variety of initiatives were agreed, and 

while some were important in and of themselves, together they failed to project a 

vigorous image of a 21st century Alliance. I also say this with regret, since NATO 

and its partners are perhaps engaged as never before—and being stretched to the 

limit. 

A key issue for NATO is ensuring the success of its mission in Afghanistan. We 

all have a vital interest in making sure that Afghanistan holds successful elections 

in September and does not slip back into chaos or once again become a safe haven 

for terrorists. But Alliance nations have had a hard time meeting their commitments. It has taken them considerable time to provide the forces and equipment required. Alliance leaders agreed to increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction 

teams to extend the authority of the central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction. But they failed to provide adequate resources for this extended commitment—NATO’s garrison in Afghanistan was increased only slightly 

from a relatively paltry 6,500 troops to 8,000 or so. 

The second summit decision was to offer training for Iraqi security forces, and to 

consider other options for possible NATO support to the new Iraqi Government in 

addition to continuing to support Poland in its leadership of the multinational division in Iraq. This role is in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1546, 

and at the specific request of the new Iraqi Government. But it is marginal given 

the need, and reflects continued transatlantic dissonance. 

Third, the Alliance agreed to a package of capabilities improvements and counterterrorism measures. NATO’s new multinational defence battalion to deal with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks has become fully operational, and 

the NATO Response Force will soon achieve its initial operational capability. European allies committed to improving the deployability of their forces, which is critical, 

since currently less than 100,000 troops are deployable of 1.5 million European 

NATO forces. But uneven progress on such issues since the Prague Summit offers 

room for doubt whether such commitments will be met anytime soon. 

The Istanbul Summit was the first NATO Summit with the seven countries who 

joined the Alliance earlier this spring. NATO leaders affirmed that the door remains 

open to others who want to add their strength to ours. But in my view the Summit 

missed a major opportunity to breathe new life into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council and its military arm, the Partnership for Peace. With the further enlargement of NATO, the Partnership is now smaller than the Alliance itself, and itself 

divided between such non-aligned nations as Sweden, Finland and Switzerland and 

countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The former countries have significant 

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experience with concepts of ‘‘societal security’’ and ‘‘total defense,’’ which can be 

quite relevant to transatlantic efforts in the ‘‘homeland security’’ realm. And turmoil 

in the Caucasus and Central Asia may present challenges for which allies and partners may need closer cooperation, a theme to which I return below. 

Another area of disappointment had to do with the broader Middle East. Transatlantic disputes over Iraq, the reluctance of leaders from the region to join western 

summit efforts, and the resultant failure of the earlier summits to get the broader 

Middle East effort off to a solid start meant that the NATO Summit could do little 

substantively to advance this agenda. All it could muster was a deepening of its existing Mediterranean Dialogue and a new outreach to the countries of the broader 

Middle East through a new ‘‘Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,’’ intended to promote 

practical bilateral cooperation with interested countries of the region, starting with 

countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While such efforts can be useful, 

they are at most likely to be modest contributions to the ambitious transformative 

agenda espoused by the President. 

The final note of the summit was announcement that the SFOR mission in Bosnia 

would be terminated by years’ end in favor of an EU mission. This offers some potential for NATO–EU collaboration, but I fear the motivation for the transition is 

not a brighter picture in the Balkans but rather an effort by the Administration to 

shed burdens and find areas for Europeans to ‘‘backfill’’ to free up U.S. energy and 

resources elsewhere. Overall, the picture in the Balkans is clouded once again. U.S. 

engagement is still required. 

In short, it was a minimalist Summit, certainly not of the quality of the Prague 

or Washington summits, which underscores an important challenge for the Alliance: 

unless the U.S. and its allies can forge a common vision on the use of strategic 

power outside Europe, Americans and Europeans alike will begin to view NATO as 

the 10th planet beyond Pluto, interesting to behold yet quite distant from earthly 

concerns. 

A NATO that just gets bigger without getting better has no future. Transatlantic 

squabbling has underscored the need for a new strategic vision of how the Alliance 

can cope with 21st century threats. NATO commanders are working on these issues, 

but the debate remains one between insiders. A sustainable vision for NATO must 

be anchored by parliamentary and public support, and much more needs to be done 

in this area. 

Second, an Alliance of 26 nations could be a recipe for paralysis unless NATO’s 

decision-making processes are made more flexible, particularly by granting veto 

power for specific key missions only to those nations contributing substantial resources and effort to such missions, while retaining the consensus rule for overarching decisions on such issues as NATO’s strategic concept, admitting new members, core goals or standards. 

Third, in a world of failed and failing states, NATO must be able to win peace 

as well as war. The Alliance needs an integrated, multinational security support 

component that would organize, train and equip selected U.S., Canadian and European units—civilian and military—for a variety of post-conflict operations. These 

units should be designed flexibly to support operations by NATO, NATO and its 

partners, the EU, and the UN. 

Fourth, NATO’s nations—and their partners—must be prepared not only to 

project power beyond Europe but also to prevent, deter and, if necessary, cope with 

the consequences of WMD attacks on their societies—from any source. Al-Qaeda has 

directly attacked three NATO allies—the U.S., Turkey and Spain—and has tried to 

launch attacks in other parts of Europe as well. If Alliance governments fail to defend their societies from a WMD attack, the Alliance will have failed in its most 

fundamental task. NATO’s civilian disaster response efforts are still largely geared 

to natural disasters rather than intentional attacks, and remain very low priority. 

It is time to ramp up these efforts to address intentional WMD attacks on NATO 

territory, to work with partners such as Russia to develop new capabilities and procedures for collaboration with civilian authorities, and to tap the expertise of partners such as Sweden or Switzerland who have had decades of experience with homeland security, or what they call ‘‘total defense.’’ This is an attractive new mission 

for the Partnership for Peace. A bioterrorist attack of contagious disease will not 

distinguish between ‘‘allies’’ and ‘‘partners.’’ And a number of partners have more 

experience with issues of mobilizing for societal security than do many allies. 

Finally, the U.S. and like-minded partners must continue to press for an expanded NATO role in Iraq. Training is not enough. The Administration must mobilize the Alliance behind a bold NATO role, under UN Security Council Resolution 

1546. Failure in Iraq will also be a failure—and a threat—for Europe, and recalcitrant allies should not stop others from contributing as they can. 

29

This is a challenging agenda. But if Alliance transformation is to be successful, 

it must go beyond the purely military dimension. If NATO is to be better not just 

bigger, it must transform its scope and strategic rationale, its capabilities, its partnerships, its very ways of doing business. Unfortunately, Istanbul was a summit of 

missed opportunities. 

TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC ISSUES

Mr. Chairman, you also asked me to offer views on transatlantic economic relations. I touched on a number of current trade issues in the context of the US–EU 

Summit. But I believe that an inordinate focus on these issues provides a misleading picture of transatlantic economic relations. 

Transatlantic trade squabbles may steal the headlines, but they account for only 

1–2 % of transatlantic commerce. In fact, trade itself accounts for less than 20% of 

transatlantic commerce. Trade flows are a misleading benchmark of transatlantic 

economic interaction. Foreign investment, not trade, drives transatlantic commerce, 

and contrary to common wisdom, most U.S. and European investments flow to each 

other, rather than to lower-wage developing nations. 

Foreign affiliate sales, not trade, are the backbone of the transatlantic economy. 

In 2001 foreign affiliate sales amounted to $2.8 trillion, more than five times the 

$549 billion in total trade. 

Foreign affiliate sales not only dwarf transatlantic trade flows but also every 

other international commercial artery linking the United States to the rest of the 

world. In 2001, total foreign affiliate sales between the U. S. and Europe were more 

than double U.S.-transpacific foreign affiliates sales, more than three times larger 

than total transpacific trade flows, and more than four times larger than foreign affiliate sales between the U.S. and Nafta partners Mexico and Canada.

This simple—but apparently little-known—comparison underscores that one of the 

most dangerous deficits affecting transatlantic relations today is not one of trade, 

payments or military capabilities but rather a deficit in understanding of the vital 

stake Americans and Europeans have developed in the health of our respective 

economies. 

The facts are straightforward yet rarely acknowledged. Despite the perennial hype 

about the significance of Nafta, the ‘‘rise of Asia’’ or ‘‘big emerging markets,’’ the 

United States and Europe remain by far each other’s most important commercial 

partners. The economic relationship between the United States and Europe is by a 

wide margin the deepest and broadest between any two continents in history—and 

those ties are accelerating. The years since the Cold War—the years when the fading ‘‘glue’’ of the Cold War partnership supposedly loosened transatlantic ties—


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marked in fact one of the most intense periods of transatlantic integration ever. 

This transatlantic economy generates $2.5 trillion in total commercial sales a year 

and employs over 12 million workers in mutually ‘‘insourced’’ jobs on both sides of 

the Atlantic who enjoy high wages, high labor and environmental standards, and 

open, largely nondiscriminatory access to each other’s markets.

Lost in headline stories about banana, beef or steel disputes are three critical 

facts. First, trade squabbles represent a miniscule amount—only 1–2 per cent—of 

overall transatlantic economic activity. Second, as indicated trade flows themselves 

are a misleading benchmark of transatlantic economic interaction. Foreign investment and foreign affiliate sales, not trade, drive transatlantic commerce, and contrary to common wisdom, most U.S. and European investments flow to each other, 

rather than to lower wage developing nations. Third, when U.S. or European companies invest in the other side of the Atlantic, that investment usually generates 

greater transatlantic trade because the company’s home base and its overseas affiliates are connected through intra-firm production networks. Such investments and 

the economic linkages they generate are fusing European and American societies together far more tightly than the shallow form of integration represented by trade 

flows alone. 

MARS, VENUS—OR MERCURY?

These days, political pundits are fond of quoting Robert Kagan’s quip that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. Those images were reinforced 

by transatlantic disputes over Iraq in 2003. But the related tale of 2003 is that both 

Mars and Venus should take greater heed of Mercury, the god of commerce. 

For transatlantic relations, 2003 was a year of political bust and economic boom. 

Even as transatlantic bickering engendered by America’s war with Iraq plunged 

transatlantic political relations to one of their lowest points in six decades, the economic ties that bind the United States and Europe together only grew stronger in 

2003. 

2003 was a banner year for the transatlantic economy. Transatlantic trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio flows and profits all rebounded robustly from the 

cyclical economic downturn of 2001–02. Economic integration strengthened in a year 

of political disintegration. What is perhaps most striking is that during the first six 

months of the year—the months of greatest transatlantic political tension—economic 

engagement deepened considerably between the United States and those two bad 

‘‘old’’ boys of Europe, France and Germany. 

Despite transatlantic tensions over Iraq, corporate America pumped nearly $87 

billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Europe in 2003. That represents a 

jump of 30.5% from 2002 and was more than double the rate of growth in total U.S. 


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investment outflows for the year. Europe accounted for nearly 65% of total U.S. foreign direct investment in 2003. 

Even though U.S.-German relations ebbed to one of their lowest levels since 

World War II, American firms sank $7 billion in Germany in 2003, a sharp reversal 

from 2002, when U.S. firms pulled some $5 billion out of Germany. And despite 

Franco-American diplomatic tensions, U.S. investment flows to France in 2003 rose 

by more than 10% to $2.3 billion, and U.S. affiliates more than doubled their profits 

in France to $4.3 billion. French firms were also among the largest European investors and largest foreign sources of jobs in the U.S.—Corporate France invested $4.2 

billion in the United States in 2003. 

Transatlantic commerce with other European countries also flourished. U.S. investment in Ireland alone in 2003 ($4.7 billion) was more than two-and-a-half times 

greater than U.S. investment in China ($1.7 billion). U.S. investment flows to Denmark between 2000 and 2003 ($4.1 billion) were nearly three times greater than 

U.S. flows to India ($1.5 billion). The $19.2 billion of U.S. investment in the Netherlands alone in 2003 was not far behind total U.S. investment in all of Asia ($22.4 

billion). 

Europe’s investment stakes in the U.S., on a historical-cost basis, exceeded $1 trillion in 2002, 20% more than America’s stake in Europe. Europe’s investment stake 

in the U.S. doubled between 1998 and 2002. Europe accounts for nearly threefourths of all foreign investment in the U.S. No other region of the world has made 

such a large capital commitment to the United States. 

Virulent anti-war sentiment across Europe did not prevent European firms from 

investing $36.9 billion in foreign direct investment in the U.S. in 2003. That represents a sharp rebound from the depressed levels of 2002, when European FDI 

inflows to the United States totaled $26 billion. 

Europe is the most important commercial market in the world for corporate America by a wide yet underappreciated margin. U.S. companies continue to rely on Europe for half their total annual foreign profits. Similarly, the United States is the 

most important market in the world in terms of earnings for many European multinationals. The annual earnings of Europe’s U.S. affiliates has risen more than tenfold since the end of the Cold War, from $4.4 billion in 1990 to $46.4 billion in 2003. 

Despite talk of transatlantic boycotts or consumer backlash due to EuropeanAmerican tensions over Iraq, 2003 was a banner year for transatlantic profits as 

measured by foreign affiliate income. U.S. foreign affiliate income from Europe 

surged to a record $77.1 billion in 2003, a 30% jump from 2002. And despite the 

strong euro, European affiliate earnings of $46.4 billion easily surpassed earnings 

of 2002 ($32.23 billion) and 2001 ($17.4 billion), and the previous peak in earnings 

of $38.8 billion in 2000. 

Despite all the talk about Nafta and the ‘‘Pacific Century,’’ over the past decade 

U.S. firms have ploughed ten times as much capital into the Netherlands as into 

China, and twice as much into the Netherlands as into Mexico. And European investments in the United States have skyrocketed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

There is as much European investment in Texas alone as all U.S. investment in 

Japan and China put together. 

That is why it is important to the U.S. that Europe grow faster. Weak European 

growth means lost opportunities for Americans. Growth of just 3% in Europe would 

create a new market the size of the entire country of Argentina for companies and 

investors from the U.S. and other countries. 

The U.S. also ‘‘insources’’ more jobs from Europe than it ‘‘outsources’’ across the 

Atlantic. In fact, the U.S. enjoys a ‘‘million worker surplus’’ with Europe. In 2001 

European affiliates of U.S. firms directly employed roughly 3.2 million workers, 

while U.S. affiliates of European firms directly employed just over 4.2 million U.S. 

workers. Europe is by far the greatest source of America’s insourced jobs. The top 

five employers in the U.S. are the United Kingdom (1.1 million), Germany (734,000), 

France (578,000), the Netherlands (571,000) and Switzerland (546,000).

32

Figures tracking direct employment due to investment alone do not include indirect employment related to nonequity arrangements like strategic alliances, joint 

ventures and other deals. Moreover, affiliate employment figures do not include jobs 

supported by trade, and yet employment related trade is substantial in many U.S. 

states and European regions. In total, and adding in indirect employment, we estimate that the overall transatlantic work force numbers some 12–14 million workers. 

The bottom line is that while outsourcing has become a pejorative term in the 

United States, European firms provide more employment to U.S. workers than U.S. 

firms to European laborers.


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In sum, the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall have witnessed the greatest 

period of transatlantic economic integration in history. Our mutual stake in each 

other’s prosperity and success has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold 

War. Ignoring these realities is shortsighted and shortchanges American and European consumers, producers, investors, workers and their families. 

The networks of interdependence that are being created across the Atlantic have 

become so dense, in fact, that they have attained a quality far different than those 

either continent has with any other. Many transatlantic tensions result less from 


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the fashionable notion that our societies are drifting apart, and more from the growing evidence that they are in fact colliding. Often these frictions are so severe precisely because they are not traditional ‘‘at-the-border’’ trade disputes, but reach beyond the border and affect such fundamental domestic issues as the ways Americans 

and Europeans are taxed, how our societies are governed, or how our economies are 

regulated. 

These issues go to the heart of globalization. Because the United States and Europe have been at the forefront of a more integrated global economy, the possibilities—and potential limits—of globalization are likely to be defined first and foremost by the successes or failures of the transatlantic relationship. If the U.S. and 

Europe fail to resolve such differences with each other, they are unlikely to resolve 

them with economies much less like their own. 

I do not mean to gloss over significant difficulties facing both partners. Many European economies remain plagued by slow growth, aging societies, chronic unemployment, rigid labor laws, difficult regulatory environments, and weaker productivity. Americans face a mounting federal budget deficit, daunting social security 

and Medicare liabilities, net losss of jobs over the past four years, accelerating domestic and foreign debt. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic face a host of 

contentious economic issues, ranging from export subsidies and currency levels to 

corporate governance standards and genetically modified organisms. 

These differences of perspective and policy are powerful. But the history of European-American relations has often been the history of difference. Merely asserting 

difference or reciting lists of tough issues does not make the case for divergence or 

divorce. 

In fact, 2003 suggests that transatlantic commerce, fuelled by the deep integrating forces of mutual investment, remains strong, dynamic and—thankfully—

more attuned to good economics than bad diplomacy. But this does not mean that 

the transatlantic economy is impervious to the sour and strained mood of the moment. In fact, that is our concern—that in an increasingly context-free debate more 

Europeans and Americans have come to believe they have little to lose by looser 

transatlantic bonds. Talk of no-cost transatlantic divorce is dangerously myopic. 

Pouring French wine down American drains or vandalizing McDonalds on European 

streets may make for splashy headlines, but the more significant development is the 

accelerating integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy—particularly 

since the end of the Cold War. Contrary to expectations, these bonds only tightened 

in 2003. 

LOOKING FORWARD

Taken together, the June summits successful conveyed the impression that the 

U.S. and its European partners were again working on some important issues. Some 

individual initiatives were quite important. Perhaps given the serious strains of the 

past year, such ‘‘feel-good’’ summits were the best that could be mustered And yet 

the challenges—and opportunities—facing Europe and America demand more. 

The first and most important step is rebuilding a sense of common cause. For half 

a century the primary agenda of European-American relations was to work toward 

a Europe that was whole, free and at peace with itself. Our common challenge now 

is to reconcile a new stage of European integration with a strategic transformation 

of transatlantic relations. This new strategic agenda rests on three pillars. The first 

centers on the challenges facing a wider Europe. The second deals with issues beyond the European continent, particularly but not only those affecting the broader 

Middle East. The third focuses on issues affecting the relationship between European and American societies—of deep integration across the Atlantic. 

THE STRATEGIC AGENDA WITHIN EUROPE

The dual enlargement of the EU and NATO to central and eastern Europe has 

helped to stabilize and secure large parts of the continent, but also now presents 

us with a new agenda to anchor democracy and project security even further to the 

continent’s east. This means redoubling our focus on Ukraine’s relationship to the 

West, facilitating democratic change in Belarus, and engaging particularly with the 

states stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian as we seek to strengthen our 

efforts to fight terrorism and transform the broader Middle East. This is an area 

of turbulence and potential instability requiring the same degree of commitment 

that Europe and the United States demonstrated in integrating central Europe and 

quelling violence in the Balkans. It must encompass a democratic Turkey fully integrated into all key western institutions. It means tending to the problems of the 

southeastern Europe, particularly since issues of final status for Kosovo loom. And 

35

it means facing up to the challenges posed by a Russia marked by more autocratic 

rule at home and more blatant neo-imperial policies towards its neighbors. 

A refocused approach on Europe’s new neighborhood must be combined with a 

rethink of our approach to Europes’s west. Loose talk within the Bush Administration of ‘‘disaggregating’’ Europe would be a dangerous turn for U.S. policy and would 

undermine the very unity we have sought to achieve in Europe. Europe’s wars have 

cost the lives of thousands of Americans. U.S. efforts to pit some parts of Europe 

against others is a reversal of American support, over six decades, of an ever closer 

European union, and threaten to return that continent to the very pattern of history 

that in the last century brought untold tragedy, not only to Europe but to America 

and the wider world. Such efforts are as inept as they are dangerous, and must be 

rejected. It is decidedly in American interests to have a partner to tackle challenges 

that no nation—not even a superpower—can cope with alone. That means supporting further European integration and lifting the US–EU relationship in ways 

that enable us to act together effectively, not only in Europe but on a wider canvas. 

THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA BEYOND EUROPE

The greatest security threats to the United States and Europe today stem from 

problems that defy borders: terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pandemics and environmental scarcities. They stem from challenges that have 

traditionally been marginal but contentious in the transatlantic security dialogue: 

‘‘out of area’’ peacekeeping; post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation; rogue 

states, failed states and states hijacked by groups or networks. And they come from 

places, such as Africa, Southwest or Central Asia and the Caucasus, that the transatlantic agenda has often ignored. 

On many of these issues, there is often disagreement within as well as between 

Europe and America. But unless Europeans and Americans find a way to focus together on these challenges, they will surely drive us apart. Forging the political will 

to meet these challenges together has become a critical challenge for our partnership. 

We must begin in Iraq. Differences over Iraq cannot be allowed to obscure the fact 

that failure there would be a failure for Europe as well as America. The U.S. needs 

support from its allies, and its allies must have a strong interest in ensuring that 

Iraq succeeds. European misgivings about U.S. strategy are still stopping them from 

becoming the full partners we need. It is critical that we work hard to broaden and 

further internationalize the coalition to help the Iraqi people to transform their 

country into a democratic and sovereign state. 

Issues of the wider region also pose critical tests for transatlantic cooperation. We 

neglect Afghanistan at our peril. U.S.-European differences over Iran have hampered our ability to stop Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Transatlantic 

cooperation remains essential for Israeli-Palestinian peace. U.S. commitment to 

work on these issues with our European partners is likely to elicit greater European 

efforts to engage with us and other partners to transform the wider region itself. 

This broad strategic alignment must be accompanies by a serious transatlantic debate to define what we might mean by ‘‘effective multilateralism.’’ The EU’s new Security Strategy, approved in December, repositions the EU in the post-911, postSaddam world, and gives Europeans a vehicle with which to engage the U.S. in a 

strategic dialogue about the U.S. National Security Strategy. President Bush has 

also now embraced ‘‘effective multilateralism’’ as a way to reconcile America’s unilateral temptations with the cooperative imperative imposed by global challenges. 

Europeans who believe that robust international norms and enforcement mechanisms are needed to tackle these challenges must focus equally on the effective enforcement of such regimes, and be more forthright about the necessity to act when 

these regimes fail. Americans who see these treaties and regimes at best as ineffective and at worst as an unacceptable constraint on U.S. freedom of action should 

heed the costs of unilateral action in terms of less legitimacy, greater burdens, and 

ultimately the ability to achieve one’s goals. 

Such a dialogue should focus on the most divisive themes, particularly regarding 

the use of force. It should cover the entire range of issues associated with preemption and prevention, and it should focus on ways to narrow the yawning gap between legality and legitimacy in today’s world. How should nations engage when 

faced with a conflict between state sovereignty and human rights? How can international institutions originally created to keep the peace between nations can be 

adapted to secure peace within nations? How can the international community prevent future Afghanistans, future Rwandas, future Kosovos, future Iraqs—future Sudans? 

36

THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SOCIETIES

A third priority is to work together to deal with the impact of globalization on 

our societies. Two areas in particular deserve greater attention. 

The first is develop transatlantic approaches to what Americans call homeland security and what Europeans call societal preparedness and protection. As I have 

noted, there has been some progress in this area, but a far more ambitious effort 

is needed. This is an area in which US–EU cooperation has even helped to advance 

deeper European integration, particularly regarding the creation of the European 

arrest warrant, the formation of Eurojust, and mutual extradition and legal assistance treaties. But more effective cooperation is needed in areas ranging from law 

enforcement and financial coordination to information and intelligence sharing, customs, air and seaport security, and protection against bioterrorism. 

Second, as noted in the discussion of economic issues above, what is most striking 

about the Iraq debate and the raft of differences currently afflicting transatlantic 

relations is the degree to which they are accompanied by a host of other trends, documented in this study, that point to ever-deepening interactions between Americans 

and Europeans. In this world of uneven globalization, our societies and our economies are not drifting apart, they are colliding. 

Neither the framework for our relationship—which in many respects remains 

rooted in Cold War structures—nor the way our governments are currently organized adequately capture these new realities. On the economic front, for instance, 

opinion shapers need to look more closely at the intersection between deep Atlantic 

integration and traditional areas of domestic regulation. There is considerable need 

to work more concertedly to identify ‘‘best practices’’ for governance that could improve coordination and create safety valves for political and social pressures resulting from deep integration. In democratic societies controversial domestic issues are 

decided by elections or court rulings. When such issues transcend the border and 

enter the realm of transatlantic domestic policy, however, such avenues do not exist, 

and so these types of issues need to be managed through new forms of transatlantic 

regulatory and parliamentary consultation and coordination and more innovative diplomacy that takes account of the growing role of private actors. 

The cutting edge of the transatlantic agenda, in fact, transcends current international mechanisms. Even a successful Doha global trade round, for example, will 

not address such pressing ‘‘deep integration’’ issues affecting the European and 

American economies as competition policies, standardized corporate governance, 

more effective regulatory cooperation, tax and other issues. Nor will it address 

issues raised by European and American scientists and entrepreneurs, who are 

pushing the frontiers of human discovery in such fields as genetics, nanotechnology 

and electronic commerce where there are neither global rules nor transatlantic 

mechanisms to sort out the complex legal, ethical and commercial tradeoffs posed 

by such innovation. In such areas the difficulty is less that there are different ‘‘European’’ or ‘‘American’’ answers to these challenges and more that neither side has 

even sorted out the appropriate questions, much less the answers. 

Transatlantic leadership is needed, not to challenge or replace multilateral efforts 

such as Doha with such competitive regional arrangements such as a Transatlantic 

Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA), but to be true pathfinders of the global economy 

by energizing Doha globally while charting a Doha-plus agenda transatlantically. 

This is a challenging agenda on its own, but it has become more difficult because 

of the changing relationship between the transatlantic strategic and economic agendas. 

During the Cold War, leaders worked hard to keep transatlantic economic conflicts from spilling over to damage our core political alliance. Today, the growing 

challenge is to keep transatlantic political disputes from damaging our core economic relationship. The real possibility we face is not transatlantic divorce but rather transatlantic dysfunction, in which growing transatlantic political disagreements 

spill over into our increasingly networked economic relationship, swamping efforts 

to cope with the consequences of deep transatlantic integration and blocking 

progress on a range of global challenges neither Europeans nor Americans will be 

able to tackle alone. 

Policy decisions and media reporting continue to overlook or underestimate the 

nature and degree of these changes. Yet a fuller appreciation of the depth and 

breadth of transatlantic economic ties is perhaps more important than ever, given 

that emotions have been rubbed raw by transatlantic disputes over Iraq and by festering trade squabbles. 

37

CONCLUSION

The past few years have been rough ones for transatlantic relations. Our economies and our societies are too deeply intertwined to allow transatlantic divorce, 

however. The real possibility we face is not divorce but dysfunction, in which growing transatlantic political disagreements spill over into the core economic relationship, swamping efforts to cope with the consequences of deep transatlantic integration and blocking progress on a range of global challenges neither Europeans nor 

Americans will be able to tackle alone. We must reconcile Europe’s grand experiment of integration with a reorientation and strategic transformation of transatlantic relations to create a new model: an Atlantic partnership that is more global, 

more equal—and more effective. Thank you.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton. And last, but not least, Dr. 

Gordon, we will hear from you for 10 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP H. GORDON, DIRECTOR, CENTER ON 

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I also 

appreciate the opportunity to address these issues at such a critical 

time. It is always difficult to be the last speaker, especially when 

you agree with much of what has been said, so what I think I 

would like to try to do—I also submitted formal remarks, but I will 

just summarize the overall thrust of what I had to say about the 

summits. 

Before I address the summits, let me say one brief word about 

the overall strategic context that some of the previous speakers 

also addressed. Dr. Serfaty talked about the structural differences 

between the United States and Europe. Dr. Hamilton argued that 

we continue to have common interests and can work together, and 

for the sake of harmony on the panel, let me agree with both of 

them in the sense that I think it is impossible to deny that there 

are structural differences between the United States and Europe 

that have contributed to some of the tensions we have seen over 

the past few years, but I also agree that they are surmountable. 

The structural differences are undeniable. I think the end of the 

cold war, which was the glue that formed this alliance in the first 

place, is one, but even more importantly and more recently, the 

rise in American power and the sense of American power and the 

rise in our sense of vulnerability after 9/11 really distinguishes 

American views about strategic issues from European ones. Obviously, Europeans felt the blow of 9/11 like we did, but it did not 

transform their world like it transformed the world of Americans. 

That unprecedented sense of vulnerability, for which we had a 

lower threshold for tolerance anyway, Europeans being much more 

used to vulnerability as small- and medium-sized nation states, 

much more experienced with terrorism, and much more inter-dependent than us. 

We felt the threat much more than they did, and combined with 

our sense of power, this led to an American foreign policy that was 

very different than European foreign policy; that is to say, the two 

together, our sense that after a decade of economic growth, military 

growth, technological growth, we could change the world and 

change the Middle East, distinguished us significantly from Europeans, who even if they had felt the sense of vulnerability that we 

felt after 9/11, frankly, did not have the option of changing the 

38

world and transforming the Middle East. So I think those factors 

are very important in understanding why we have had such a difficult time agreeing with our European partners on the strategic 

questions of the day. 

That said, I agree with Dan Hamilton that these differences are 

surmountable. At the end of the day, even though we come at them 

in different ways, we have such common interests, and like the cold 

war, which was a multigenerational, multidecade struggle, we had 

differences then on the tactics and approaches of dealing with it, 

but we overcame them because the overall interest was common. 

I think that is analogous to the situation we are in today. We have 

different takes on these issues, but at the end of the day, we have 

profoundly the same interests in most of the world. That is the 

strategic context. 

As for the summits themselves, I think, and this is very much 

in line with what I think Dan Hamilton was just saying, I think 

the best way to describe the summits that we just went through 

is to say that they showed that the alliance is on hold; that is to 

say, we went through the motion of the summits, we reached some 

agreements on certain questions, but I think it would be premature 

to say we put the differences behind us. 

And to be honest, I think there is a political aspect of this as 

well. It is no secret that the Bush Administration is unpopular in 

Europe. I think that this weighed on European leaders who, frankly, did not want to associate themselves too closely with this Administration and did not want to get involved in our election campaign, and they came to the summits pretty much with the attitude, let us wait and see what happens in November, and that is 

when we will start afresh, when we know which American Administration we are going to have to deal with. It was a sort of ‘‘Waiting for Godot’’ quality about these summits. People were there, but 

you could not help but notice that everyone was conscious of the 

American elections coming up. 

By saying that, I do not mean to suggest that nothing was accomplished, and we have heard from previous speakers about a 

number of things that were accomplished. I think that the D-Day 

ceremonies were quite moving, and the European expressions of 

gratitude for America’s role in Europe were quite sincere, and that 

was important. 

The U.N. Security Council Resolution on Iraq on the eve of the 

G–8 summit was very important and, I think, ultimately will be 

the passport toward cooperation in Iraq. The G–8 Initiative on the 

Broader Middle East was less than I think a lot of us initially 

hoped it would be, but it was an important steppingstone and gives 

us a political basis for cooperating on political change in the Middle 

East. 

And at NATO, as others have said, a few modest things were 

also accomplished. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative on reaching 

out to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern partners, the training for 

Iraqi security forces, and then, finally, the new commitments in Afghanistan were all modestly important steps in the right direction. 

Dan Hamilton is right that the additional commitment to Afghanistan was modest, but at least it arrived. 

39

There was great concern on the eve of the summit that despite 

the requests of the secretary general and others involved, we were 

not going to get the additional troops and the ability to expand the 

provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, but the allies did 

step up to the plate and made those commitments, and I think that 

was an important step because Afghanistan is really a test for this 

alliance. We are beyond the theoretical debate about whether 

NATO can go out of area or not. In theory, we have now all agreed 

it can, but if we cannot pass the test in Afghanistan, I think it 

raises real questions for the alliance. 

Iraq is a different matter because so many European governments and European populations disagreed with it, and so it is 

hard to ask them to send troops to Iraq, but if we cannot agree to 

provide the material resources for NATO in Afghanistan, it really 

does raise questions about the future of the alliance. 

So, yes, there were steps taken at these summits. Some of them 

were useful and give us a basis for moving forward in the future, 

but I do think it is premature to say that we have put all of the 

differences behind us, and there is still an enormous amount of difference and tension over Iraq, Iran, Israel, the war on terrorism, 

multilateral treaties, and other things. 

Let me just say, I do not think that the outcome of the alliance 

on hold was inevitable. I think, as recently as a few months ago, 

we still had a realistic shot at turning the corner, even on Iraq. 

You could have imagined a scenario where the United States transferred sovereignty, as Europeans wanted us to do; involved the 

U.N. more in Iraq, as they wanted us to do; adopted different military tactics in places like Fallujah, as they wanted us to do; and 

in return, Europeans would come and say, okay, now we are putting this behind us, and here are new commitments of money and 

troops to Iraq. That was reasonable to hope for, but it did not happen. 

I think what happened instead was, over the course of the 

spring, the rise in violence in Iraq, the change of the Spanish government, the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, the Abu 

Grahib prisoner abuse scandal and other things just made it too 

difficult for Europeans to be willing to turn that corner and say, 

okay, now is the time; we are willing to do more. It soured the political climate and inclined them even more, I believe, to wait until 

our election is over. 

And so the goal for the NATO summit went from being how do 

we get NATO involved in Iraq, and how do we get more European 

troops to Iraq, to simply holding onto those that are already there, 

and we significantly lowered our expectations for the NATO summit in Iraq, which is why they were met, and we got a modest 

agreement on training, which is better than nothing, but it is certainly not what the Administration and many others had initially 

hoped for. 

In sum, therefore, on the summits, a few useful steps were 

taken, but the real divisions and differences have not been overcome, and my sense is that this is all on hold until the election. 

Either way; that is to say, if we have a new Administration in 

Washington, that is obviously an opportunity for a fresh start, putting our differences behind us, and perhaps Europeans would be 

40

more willing to cooperate, but even if we do not have a new Administration, Europeans will at least know who they are dealing with 

for the next 4 years, there will be a new context, and perhaps then 

we can get beyond the past differences and start moving forward 

for the sake of our common interests, which, I would stress, as I 

said at the beginning, we certainly have. 

Last year’s debate and clash was over what to do about Iraq, regime change versus containment, and we disagreed, but now we do 

not disagree on what the objective is in Iraq. Everybody, even opponents of the war, want a stable, democratic Iraq, and I think, in 

that context, agreement with Europeans will be much easier. 

Let me conclude on the question of Iraq because I think that is 

central to this whole question of dealing with the Europeans, even 

if I and others have noted the many other disagreements we have 

had. I just got back from France, where officials and others keep 

insisting, do not make Iraq the heart of the transatlantic relationship because we disagree; and, therefore, that will only bring attention to what we disagree on. I think that is right, and there is 

much more to transatlantic relations than Iraq, but I also think 

Iraq cannot be ignored. It has been the central difference between 

the United States and many Europeans, and it is hard for me to 

imagine Americans really putting these differences behind us so 

long as the open sore continues in Iraq. 

Sending more European troops to Iraq is probably impossible for 

the short term, but in the longer run, there is a number of other 

things Europeans can do, and that should be our objective in Iraq: 

Training and equipping Iraqi security forces, more debt relief than 

they have already promised, a possible NATO role in Iraq for helping those NATO allies that are already in Iraq, guarding Iraqi borders. 

There are things more Europeans can do, in addition to what 

they are currently doing, that, I think, should be our objective. 

Whoever wins our election in November will have to reach out and 

try to reach such agreements with allies so that we can close this 

open wound. I do not think we can put the alliance on track overall 

until we do that. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP H. GORDON, DIRECTOR, CENTER ON THE UNITED

STATES AND EUROPE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the state of the transatlantic relationship at a critical time for the Alliance. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all you 

have done personally for the transatlantic alliance in your 25 years of service in this 

House and especially as Chairman of this Subcommittee and in your role in the 

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 

We are addressing this issue after what has arguably been the most intense 

month of summitry in the alliance’s history. The month of June 2004 began with 

the D-day anniversary celebrations in Normandy, France and included the G–8 

gathering in Sea Island, Ga., and the U.S.-European Union Summit in Ireland before concluding with the NATO summit in Istanbul, Turkey. 

In normal times, summits provide a tremendous opportunity for a U.S. President 

to showcase his role as the leader of the world’s democracies. Such meetings also 

are rare opportunities for European leaders to demonstrate continued faith in an 

alliance that has long underpinned their security and prosperity. But these are not 

normal times, and the alliance is not what it used to be. 

The traditional pomp and circumstance of summits—the photo-ops of leaders 

strolling on Sea Island’s beaches and saluting the fallen in Normandy’s cemeteries—

41

were there. But the superficial friendliness and diplomatic niceties could not mask 

the enduring gaps across the Atlantic or the differences that went essentially 

unaddressed. 

By saying that I do not was to suggest that nothing of value was achieved. The 

expressions of gratitude for past American sacrifices, expressed at the D-day ceremonies, were genuine and heartfelt. At the G–8 summit, leaders agreed to a useful 

initiative to promote political reform in the ‘‘broader Middle East’’ and endorsed a 

U.N. Security Council resolution, passed unanimously just a few days before, backing the American plan to transfer sovereignty to a new government in Iraq. And 

at the NATO summit, the allies reached out to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern 

neighbors through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, made important new commitments to expand the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 

Afghanistan, and decided to offer assistance to the new Iraqi government in the 

form of training of security forces. 

On the whole, however, the month of summits will be remembered more for what 

it failed to achieve. The Europeans have not adopted a position of obstructionism 

but they have refused to provide the things the United States wanted most: additional money and more troops for Iraq. Frankly, the Bush administration is now so 

unpopular with the European public that European leaders—even those such as 

Britain’s Tony Blair who have supported the President on Iraq—fear doing anything 

that would further tie their political futures to his. 

As a result, the month of summits had a sort of ‘‘Waiting for Godot’’ quality about 

it—European leaders biding time, neither creating a crisis nor mending fences, and 

hoping that the American election in November will provide more favorable circumstances for their interaction with the United States. 

How did things get this bad? As recently as a few months ago, there still appeared 

to be a reasonable chance that Iraq would prove to be just the latest in a long line 

of serious trans-Atlantic disputes and that this month’s summits would be used by 

both sides to turn the corner. Faced with difficulties in Iraq, the Bush administration was becoming more open to compromise. By the spring of 2004, the United 

States was willing to give the United Nations a more prominent role, transfer more 

complete powers to a newly sovereign Iraqi government and moderate American 

military tactics to avoid civilian casualties—all policies called for by the Europeans. 

Those changes made it possible to imagine Europe accepting American overtures 

for help because European leaders were acutely aware that instability and chaos in 

Iraq would be catastrophic for their countries as well as for the United States. 

The U.S. hope was that, to avoid such a calamity, all Europeans, including the 

French and Germans, would agree to support a NATO role in Iraq, fulfill pledges 

to relieve Iraqi debt, offer reconstruction aid, and possibly even agree to provide 

more troops after the hand-over of sovereignty. That scenario, however, did not play 

out at the summits. A series of events—most importantly the rise of violence in 

Iraq, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction stockpiles in Iraq, and the Abu 

Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal all combined to discourage European leaders from 

making common cause with a U.S. President opposed by so much of their public 

opinion. No European leader wants to suffer the fate of former Spanish Prime Minister Jose ́ Marı ́a Aznar, who was rejected by voters in March, in part because of 

his close association with President Bush and the United States. 

Given that inauspicious backdrop, by the start of the NATO summit the U.S. goal 

was no longer to get more European troops for Iraq, as the administration initially 

hoped, or even to define an explicit NATO role; Turkey, France and Germany all 

made it clear they did not support either. They argued that their military contributions would make little difference on the ground, that a NATO failure in Iraq could 

damage the organization and that NATO would be no more welcome in Iraq than 

the United States currently is. They sometimes added (implausibly, in my view) that 

NATO troops need to be saved for other contingencies, such as a potential ArabIsraeli peace deal. 

But the most compelling explanation for their opposition is that key European 

leaders are simply unwilling to support what they believe is a failed American policy, and unwilling to make peace with an administration they believe has ignored 

their interests and made the world less safe. 

The U.S.-European split, it should be noted, did not begin or end with the current 

administration. Ever since the end of the Cold War removed the common enemy, 

American and European strategic perspectives have diverged. During the 1990s, Europeans turned increasingly inward, focusing on the historic and difficult efforts to 

create a common currency and to complete the political integration of Europe. Accustomed to interdependence and acutely aware of the limits of their power, they 

sought to develop a rules-based international order built upon multilateral agreeVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:02 Sep 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\071504\94836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
42

ments such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty. 

Americans, by contrast, confident in their power, began to focus on new types of 

threats, particularly weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and ‘‘rogue states.’’ An 

increasingly powerful United States—particularly the Republican-held Congress—

chafed under the constraints of international treaties and institutions and sought 

to use the unilateral moment to fashion a new world order. 

President Bush’s arrival added considerably to the already growing tensions. Key 

members of the new team had harshly criticized the Clinton administration for 

being excessively deferential to allies—fighting a ‘‘war by committee’’ in Kosovo, for 

example—and for its willingness to accept international constraints on America’s 

power. The Bush administration quickly abandoned several treaties dear to the Europeans and made clear that the United States would henceforth demonstrate a 

much more assertive style of leadership. 

But it was the American reaction to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks—and in particular the decision to invade Iraq—that turned gradually growing differences with 

Europe into a crisis of historic proportions. Americans’ new sense of vulnerability 

led most of them to accept the administration’s argument that their country was ‘‘at 

war’’ and that ‘‘regime change’’ in Iraq was necessary. The power and optimism of 

the United States encouraged most Americans to believe that Saddam Hussein’s 

overthrow—and Iraqi democracy—were possible. Europeans did not deny that Iraq 

was a problem, but they disagreed about the solution. Accustomed to both vulnerability and terrorism, lacking the military power even to contemplate large-scale invasions, and convinced from their own historical and colonial experiences that stabilizing and democratizing Iraq would be nearly impossible, most Europeans believed 

the risks of an invasion outweighed the benefits. 

These broad differences in perspective were exacerbated by diplomacy on both 

sides that seemed to place a much higher priority on ‘‘winning’’ the debate over Iraq 

than on maintaining the alliance. 

Such deep U.S.-European tensions will not evaporate simply because of one election in the United States or, for that matter, in Europe. Regardless of who wins our 

election, however, it will at least provide an opportunity for a badly needed fresh 

start in transatlantic relations. A few tentative steps toward that new start were 

taken at last month’s summits, but much more remains to be done. 

Ultimately, the rift in the Atlantic alliance will not heal until the United States 

and its key allies develop a common approach to the issue that has most divided 

them: Iraq. Despite differences over the war itself, Washington, Paris, Berlin and 

London do all now have a common interest: They want to foster a stable, democratic, self-governing Iraq. Even if key European leaders remain reluctant to send 

troops to Iraq, there is much more they could do in the areas of debt forgiveness, 

reconstruction funds, training and equipping of Iraqi security and police forces, and 

political support. Last month’s summits would have been an ideal place to start 

working toward our common goals in Iraq and to start mending relations within the 

alliance. Apparently, that process will have to wait at least until November.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Dr. Gordon, and I appreciate all of you 

being here and giving that fine testimony and trying to clarify 

some things for us. 

I chair the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue to the European 

Parliament and, Dr. Gordon just so you know, Iraq always comes 

up and we do not agree on it. We hope we can move on. Dr. Hamilton, I agreed quite a bit with some of the statements that you 

made and I certainly hope we can mend this relationship, but I do 

think it will take time. 

Dr. Serfaty, in a recent article you wrote which appeared in a 

CSIS publication entitled Visions of America and Europe, you characterized the relations between the United States and Europe in 

terms such as, and I quote, ‘‘. . . a dialogue of the deaf, two monologues that misheard and misrepresented,’’ and ‘‘an exercise in mutual schizophrenia and paranoia barely hiding the deep ambivalence shown by each side of the Atlantic toward the other.’’ In the 

wake of the recent summits has your view changed, and if not, how 

do we go about addressing your views? 

43

Mr. SERFATY. No. My view has not fundamentally changed. I 

think that there was a split that developed, especially in the context of September 11th, to which Phil Gordon made reference, as 

if there was a clash of history, if you will. We were not born to 

have war in our midst. War is expected to be waged over there. To 

the Europeans, who are more used, for the better and for the 

worse, to the reality of violence, quite frankly September 11th was 

a bad 30 minutes on a bad day in 1916, and there could not, therefore, be the same kind of urgency felt in the need to prevent, or 

even preempt whatever threat might be emerging as part of a new 

security normalcy. 

My own sense, in the context of this clash, is that we are repeating the conditions that prevailed between 1948 and 1953. For 3 

years after World War II in 1945, a few ideas were put together 

to deal with the new post-war security normalcy that had emerged 

in the context of a growing Soviet threat but also in the context of 

an inability to define how we should handle the defeated state, 

namely, Germany. The organization of an alliance was put on hold 

in the summer and early fall of 1948 pending the outcome of the 

presidential election, not because Mr. Dewey would not have waged 

a cold war, but because he might have waged it differently. And 

on that basis, therefore, past the election, with Mr. Truman, the incumbent President winning, a strategy was put in place during the 

next 4 years, in 1949–1953. 

The strategy was neither American nor European; it was western. The Europeans followed in spite of some misgivings about the 

institutional architecture that was being developed. Because they 

were weak, they were despondent, hopeless, helpless, they had no 

choice, which is surely not the case now. And once that western architecture was put in place, then it held firm for the next generation. 

I believe this is pretty much what we are facing now. As in 1948, 

the alliance is on hold. We are awaiting the outcome of the election 

to see how the ideas that were put forward over the past 3 years 

will be transformed into a strategy over the next 4 years. Mr. 

Kerry will wage the wars of 9/11. Mr. Bush will wage the wars of 

9/11. They may wage it differently, and what I was suggesting in 

my statement, Madam Chairwoman, is that a western strategy will 

be much more effective than an American or a European strategy, 

and I believe there are now elements that point to an understanding of what needs to be done in order to achieve that common 

strategy, and I hope that those elements will be pursued over the 

next 4 years. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Dr. Serfaty. 

Last year, at a hearing this Subcommittee held with the Department of State, an assistant secretary stated that the Department 

was actively using public diplomacy and other tools to reach the 

younger generations of Europe to help them appreciate the ‘‘bonds 

forged so firmly in the Second World War and the Marshall Plan’s 

reconstruction of Europe.’’ As a result of the war against Iraq, 

many of the younger European generation have turned hostile toward the United States. How deep is Europe’s anti-Americanism? 

Does it matter, and, in your opinion, what went wrong with our 

public diplomacy? Anybody can answer that. Ambassador? 

44

Ambassador BURGHARDT. Well, maybe I am not the only European around the table, but coming from Europe, and I think it is 

a very topical question you are asking. I have been back and forth 

several times over the past 31⁄2 years. 

Let me give you one interesting indicator which gives part of the 

answer to your question, and it is based on American-led polls, Pew 

Center and the Council on Foreign Relations,—if you take those 

figures together, there are two different questions asked, and that 

is very important to concentrate on your point. 

One question relates to America as a country, and the other 

question results to the policies of the past almost 4 years, and the 

answers you get are in a range concerning the kind of sympathy 

people feel with America as a country. The overall figure has gone 

down as compared to earlier years, from some 70 percent, and is 

now in the range around 55 percent, with differences from France, 

Britain, Germany, Italy, but it is around 55 percent, still positive 

and strongly positive. The answers you get as a reaction to the 

question which relates to the sympathy with the policies of the 

present Administration are around 25 percent, in fact, between 20 

and 27, in all countries, in all countries. 

So I have found this a quite interesting result because it shows, 

on the positive side, that the potential of sympathy from Europe to 

the United States—you can also look in the other direction, but I 

want to comment on the question you asked—is still significant. It 

has gone down. It is significant. But the reaction to the policies of 

the past years is absolutely scathing and indicates that a lot of 

anger and frustration has been built up because of some of the actions and the way the actions have been prepared in this country, 

and I think we should really try to learn a lesson from that. 

My conclusion, and I try to say that as diplomatically as I am 

obliged to say it as I can, I did not say, then, that we are back on 

track. I said that we have reversed the trend as a result of the 

three summits, and I was the person present in the room, so I 

could see how the personal chemistry really positively worked. We 

reversed the trend, but why did we reverse the trend? Because, on 

the one hand, the European side was somewhat more assertive because they came back from two positive events, the enlargement 

and the constitutional treaty, and on the United States side, the 

President wanted to be understood, and he wanted to enlist support. So this was the basis for what I said in my statement, a certain degree of humility which had entered into the relationship 

again, and that is the answer to the question. If we do not behave 

like partners, then we get into trouble. The same would happen if 

the Europeans would be in the Americans’ situation and the Americans in the Europeans’ situation. 

So my conclusion is, yes, we need to make a new start with 

whatever Administration will be in power here in November. Yes, 

we have a good basis to do that. The most solid one is the economy. 

The most difficult one will be on the strategic discussion because 

of the strategy of predominance here and the strategy of effective 

multilateralism in Europe, and in between will be the foreign policy issues on which each side has to bring a lot to the table. And, 

therefore, 2005, and the bilateral summit which will take place 

45

sometime in the course of 2005, should benefit from that reassessment, and that would be my conclusion. 

But we have to get back to the spirit of partnership and interdependence, and this means that both sides have to be able to and 

willing to be a partner. The Europeans are certainly willing. They 

are not maybe able across the board of all of the policies, and we 

have to do our homework on that. The U.S. side was certainly able, 

but there were great doubts whether part of the Administration 

was even willing to think in these terms and not, rather, in terms 

of coalitions of the willing and all of the divisive and polarizing 

things which happened from there. Thank you. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Ambassador. Dr. Gordon? 

Mr. GORDON. If I could just say a brief word because I think this 

is really important. I have spent a lot of time in Europe lately, and 

I think it is difficult to overstate the degree to which especially 

younger Europeans are now skeptical of the United States. I do not 

want to use the word ‘‘anti-American,’’ which has all sorts of connotations, but certainly deeply skeptical and unsupportive, and 

that is important. I think we have underestimated how important 

that is. There has been an American tendency to just sort of say, 

well, we are right, they are wrong; and, therefore, it does not matter. But now we are seeing how it matters. 

When public opinion plays out through governments, as I 

stressed in my statement, it is hard for governments to work with 

us, even if they may agree with us, when their publics are so hostile. For no other reason, it works through that mechanism. Our 

partners in Europe are democracies after all, and if public opinion 

is hostile to us, in the long run, they will change their governments, and we saw that in Spain as well. 

So we run the risk that public opinion can bring about governments that are less inclined to work with us, and thus you see it 

in important areas like Iraq, where after what has happened over 

the past few years and given our reputation and declining moral 

authority in Europe, we go when we need help from allies in somewhere like Iraq, where we are preparing an overwhelming portion 

of the burden, and what do we expect? It is just that much more 

difficult for those governments to come up with the troops and the 

money to help us in a context where we are so unpopular with 

their public opinion. I think that is hugely important and that we 

have underestimated its importance over the past few years. 

With all due respect to the State Department suggestion before 

your Committee that we are doing more for public diplomacy, I am 

sure certain individuals are, but my sense is that overall we are 

doing less and that budgets for public diplomacy in Europe are 

being cut rather than raised and that we are not engaging sufficiently with Europeans. My sense is that Administration officials 

do not travel to Europe nearly with the frequency that they used 

to, nor Members of Congress, for that matter. In terms of representing the Administration, they are not showing up, they are 

not engaged in the debate, and the general attitude over the past 

few years, especially on Iraq but also on other things, was you are 

either with us, or you are against us, and if you are against us, 

you are hostile, rather than respect the legitimate right of allies to 

disagree. 

46

Sometimes disagreement will be inevitable. If we have a disagreement, we have a disagreement, but to treat the allies as if 

their views were not even legitimate, especially given that in the 

past years a number of their concerns about Iraq have turned out 

to be the case, is something that we have paid a big price for and 

we need to take into consideration as we make our diplomacy in 

the future. 

Ms. DAVIS. I think Dr. Hamilton wants to answer this question 

as well. We have three votes, and I am not going to hold you gentlemen here. But, Dr. Hamilton, I want to give you an opportunity 

to respond. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. I will be brief. On the public-diplomacy question, there is the challenge for any administration, particularly in the State Department’s work, and the temptation to 

use ‘‘public diplomacy’’ as P.R. for a particular administration’s 

policies rather than public diplomacy as an effort to convey the 

richness and diversity of the United States of America and our 

ways of living. That is the type of public diplomacy that over time 

has an effect, but there is always a temptation, regardless of party 

to instrumentalize public diplomacy to certain ends, and that is, in 

the end usually counterproductive. 

Of course, in the wake of revelations such as those concerning 

abuse of prisoners at Abu Grahib it does not matter how much 

public diplomacy you are going to do. This is a serious issue, and 

so it is not a question of public diplomacy; it is a question of potentially serious violations of human rights and basic human dignity. 

I want to stress just one point. The foundation of our relationship 

over 60 years was based on the people who got to know each other 

across the Atlantic during the cold war. We justified all of our exchange programs to the Congress in the name of the cold war. We 

used a security rationale to justify all of the tremendous people-topeople exchanges that happened. 

That rationale is not there anymore, and I do not believe that the 

Executive Branch has really come forth well with a different kind 

of rationale to convey to you and your colleagues about why this 

is still important. Absent that rationale, it is easy to argue that we 

should shift all of the funding to the Middle East or to other parts 

of the world where we have not done as much as we have in Europe. While this is understandable, such thinking shortchanges our 

interests because Europe is not just another place where we have 

problems; it is the enabling partner for us to deal with all of the 

other problems. If we can have a serious and good relationship 

with our core allies, we are better able to tackle every other problem. They are going to amplify our capabilities. This starts with 

our ability to talk with each other and know each other across the 

Atlantic, and without those exchange programs, we will know each 

other less. 

My concern is that the people-to-people dimension of transatlantic relations gets often so overlooked. The consequence of this 

neglect is showing up now in spades. Since the end of the cold war 

and the fall of the Berlin wall we disinvested in our relationship 

across the Atlantic on both sides. Americans were preoccupied with 

other issues. Our European colleagues were integrating their continent. It was understandable to think that we could each afford 

47

to turn to other things. But we are seeing now the consequences 

of not understanding each other as much as we thought we did. I 

just want to make a pitch to you and your colleagues that the 

human foundation of our relationship remains just as essential as 

it always has. Thank you. 

Ms. DAVIS. I think you are absolutely right on that, Dr. Hamilton. I do not think we can ever have too much of the people-topeople dimension. Speaking from experience, I had not been to Europe, and when I ended up on the Europe Subcommittee and then 

ended up chairing the TLD, it made a big difference when I had 

the opportunity to meet parliamentaries from another part of the 

world and hear their thoughts. It made a huge difference. But like 

Dr. Gordon said, we also have public opinion we have to worry 

about in our elections as well. 

I am going to try and ask you one more question and hopefully, 

I can get an answer quickly before I have to run for my vote but 

I am just curious about this one. It is estimated that 30,000 policemen and soldiers were deployed throughout Istanbul to provide security for the summit, yet inside the summit NATO was barely 

able to give a commitment of more than, I think you all said, 1,000 

additional alliance soldiers to deploy to Afghanistan. 

Are we really dealing with a lack of military capability or a lack 

of political will? Many in this country continue to criticize the 

French and the Germans for not pulling their weight, but are there 

not other allies? Such as Turkey, who should be criticized as well 

because, after all, Turkey has 33,000 troops on the island of Cyprus 

apparently doing nothing. Would the transfer of 3,000 of those 

troops to Afghanistan really upset the balance of power on the island? Does anybody want to tackle that one pretty quickly? Thank 

you, Dr. Gordon. 

Mr. GORDON. I guess. You asked whether it is political will or 

lack of capabilities. It is clearly both, but the important thing in 

the issue you are bringing up is the latter because even with all 

of the goodwill in the world, even if everything we said about the 

politics of this was not the case, and the Europeans really wanted 

to help in Iraq and Afghanistan, they could not. They are maxed 

out because of their military structures that just do not allow for 

the deployable forces that we need. They know that, and they are 

trying gradually and slowly to do something about it, but that is 

the dirty little secret about this. Even if the French and Germans 

wanted to do something in Iraq, they could not do very much. 

The Europeans, in 1999, committed to creating a rapid-reaction 

capability with 60,000 troops that could go somewhere for a year 

and be deployed on short notice. The dirty little secret about that 

is it is basically already deployed in little bits around the world, 

in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Sierra Leone, and Cote D’Ivoire, 

so it is not there. 

So it is true, we spend a lot of our time talking about their political unwillingness to do this or that or to find some helicopters to 

send to Afghanistan, but the truth is the capabilities are not there, 

and that is something that is going to have to change if we are 

going to be able to tackle these problems. 

I do not know the degree to which you wanted us to address the 

Turkish troops on Cyprus. I would say there, at least, that where 

48

Iraq is concerned, which is the place that we are really pressing for 

contributions, the Turks did say that they were prepared to send 

troops to Iraq, and then we and the Iraqi government decided that 

they were not wanted after all, so at least there, the Turks were 

willing to step up to the plate. 

Ms. DAVIS. Dr. Hamilton? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Just to give this issue some specificity, there are 

about a million and a half European NATO forces, and only about 

100,000 of those can be deployed anywhere. Given force rotations, 

it is really a minimal ability, as Phil said. On the other hand, some 

of these countries are active and have forces deployed in many 

countries. 

We focus on the lack of German engagement with Iraq, but the 

Germans really have the major presence in Afghanistan. They are 

not equipped to deal with something like that. They have been defending the Fulda Gap for decades with heavy panzer divisions, 

and all of a sudden now they are having to transform their military 

into a projection force from what was a heavy, central-front-focused 

land force. 

They have some budget issues to address but it is really a huge 

transformation for all of our allies to shift from a cold war focus 

to a deployability focus. The United States, during the cold war, already had that focus. That is what we did with our forces. So the 

trauma of this transition is less for us in some ways than the others. In the end, of course, it is a question of political will, as you 

said, and that is why I gave the NATO summit a C, because this 

particular issue simply is not being pushed as far as it could be. 

Ms. DAVIS. I would love to stay here and discuss this for the rest 

of the day, but I have got about 3 minutes to get over and vote, 

and I think I had best do that rather than hold you gentlemen because we have more than one vote. 

I appreciate all of you for being here. I appreciate all of your remarks and look forward to having you back again. With that, the 

Subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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