UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4166

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DONALD RAY CRAIG, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:07-cr-00044-FDW-1) 

Submitted: March 18, 2009 Decided: March 31, 2009 

Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

_______________ 

Claire J. Rauscher, Steven Slawinski, Ross H. Richardson, Emily 

Marroquin, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. 

Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy 

E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

 Donald Ray Craig pled guilty to felon in possession of 

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(e) (2006). 

Craig was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 210 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, his sole argument is that the district 

court erred in admitting and considering victim testimony from 

his adoptive father, Mr. Craig. Finding no reversible error, we 

affirm. 

 At sentencing, the Government called Mr. Craig to 

testify. Craig objected, arguing Mr. Craig was not a crime 

victim under the Crime Victims Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 

(West Supp. 2008) (“CVRA”), and thus any victim impact testimony 

from him would be improper. The district court agreed that he 

was not a victim for purposes of CVRA, but admitted the 

testimony, as well as a letter the court received from Mr. Craig 

prior to sentencing, under relevant conduct. After hearing the 

parties’ arguments and considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) sentencing factors, the district court sentenced Craig to 

210 months’ imprisonment. 

 “Rulings related to admission and exclusion of 

evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 

judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that 

discretion.” United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 896 (4th 
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Cir. 2001). A district court “abuses its discretion when it 

makes an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 

(1996). Evidentiary rulings are also subject to review for 

harmless error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), 

and will be found harmless if the reviewing court can conclude, 

“without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” United 

States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted); see also United States v. 

Patrick, 988 F.2d 641, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[I]mproprieties 

on the part of sentencing judges are subject to review under the 

harmless error rule.”). 

 In this case, the district court admitted Mr. Craig’s 

statements as consideration of relevant conduct, conduct the 

court is required to consider in sentencing Craig. See USSG 

§ 1B1.3(a)(1) (stating court can consider “all acts and 

omissions committed . . . by the defendant . . . that occurred 

during the commission of the offense of conviction, in 

preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to 

avoid detection or responsibility for that offense”). Although 

Craig concedes that the district court was permitted to consider 

Mr. Craig’s statements, he maintains that the court relied on 
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Mr. Craig’s victim status to permit testimony that did not 

necessarily relate to relevant conduct. 

 The district court explained the reasons for its 

sentence in great detail, relying primarily on Craig’s extensive 

criminal history. There is no indication in the record that the 

district court was “substantially swayed” by Mr. Craig’s 

testimony. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 371. Thus, we conclude that, 

even assuming there was error in admitting the statements, the 

error was harmless. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED