Filed 10/17/19 ; Certified for Publication 11/18/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SHEILLA BROWN

,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

UP SIDE GADING, LP, et al.

,

Defendants and Appellants

. A 157685

(Alameda County

Super. Ct. No. RG18928503)

This is an appeal i n a landlord

– tenant class action from a trial court order

invalidating the broad releas es of claims signed by approximately 26 tenant putative class

members and requiring the parties to meet and confer regarding a corrective notice for the

putative class a fter the court found said releases contained mislea ding and one

- sided

information regar ding the underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff Sheilla Brown brought this action

on behalf of herself and other similarly situated persons against defendants Upside

Gading, LP and Upside Management Company, Inc. (Upside) for al leged violations of

the City of Hayw ard’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Tenant Protection Ordinance

(ordinance). According to plaintiff

, a tenant in low

- income

, rent

- controlled housing

owned and mana ged by Upside, Upside claimed an exemption to the o rdinance based

upon misleading infor mation and thereafter imposed upon the often non

- English

speaking tenant putative class members i llegal rent increases, charged them excessive latefees, and failed to p ay required security deposit interest in violation of local and state

laws. 1

After Ups ide representatives approached the tenant putative class members in the

evening in their respective units with pre

- written releases from the class action 2 that

contained misleading, coercive and inadequate information, a long with pre

- written

checks as “com pensation” for past rent increases and other payments, plaintiffs sought

and obtained the trial court order dated June 19, 2019

, that is at the heart of this appeal. 3

A fter Upside appealed this order, this court stayed briefing and ordered Upside to

submi t a letter brief either requesting to dismiss this appeal or explaining why this court

1 For the purposes of this opinion, it is not necessary to set forth the extended

procedural or factual background of this case.

2 The contents of Upside’s releases and other communications with the putative

class members were described in declarations submi tted by the parties in connection with

plaintiffs’ Motion to Limit Defendants’ Class Communications and for Corrective

Actions , and are largely u ndisputed.

3 T he release s presented to the tenants contained in part the following language:

“ ‘ Tenant and Lan dlord have reached a full and complete settlement of the Released

Claims, ’ .

. . mean[ing] that the tenants ‘ individually, and on behalf of their respective

agents, attorneys, representatives, heirs, family members ’ and other related parties,

‘ hereby release[]

, acquit[] and forever, absolutely and unconditionally, discharge[]

Landlord and all of its agents, contractors, subcontra ctors, attorney, ’ a nd other

representatives, ‘ of and from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands,

righ ts, injuries, debts, obligations, liabilities, contracts, duties, damages, costs, attorneys’

fees, expenses or losses of every kind

. . . that accrued at any time prior to execution of

this Agreement

. . . whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticip ated, direct or

indirect, fixed or contingent, ’ ‘ arising from any matter, cause or thing, whatsoever

occurred, done or omitted, including without any limitat ion, any claims under Tenant’s

lease and other claims for (1) rent abatement, (2) reimbursement of rental charges,

(3) any claims relating to late fees charged

. . . , (4) any claims relating to any alleged

violations of the HUD Use Agre ement, and (5) any claims arising from any alleged

violation of the [ ordinance ]. ’ ” Translated copies of the releases were not provided to the

non

- English

- speaking tenants.should not dismiss the appeal for the reason that it is taken from a nonappealable order. 4

Plaintiff, in turn, was permitted to file a responsive letter brief. ( See Je nnings v. Marralle

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126 [“A reviewing court must raise the issue on its own initiative

whenever a doubt exists as to whether the trial court has ent ered a final judgment or other

order or judgment made appealable by Code of Civil Proce dure section 904.1 ”].)

Upside responded to our order with a letter brief arguing that the trial court’s

June 19, 2019 order is appealable as an injuncti ve order within the meaning of Code of

Civil Procedure s ection 904.1 , subdivision (a)(6) because it man dates certain actions on

their part with respect to the putative class members. 5 Plaintiffs, in turn, request ed

dismissal of the appeal on the ground that section 904.1 provides no basis for appealing a

stand ard interlocutory order such as this one . We a gree with plaintiffs and, accordingly,

dismiss this appeal.

DISCUSSION

“ The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an

appeal.” ( Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292.) “California is governed

by the ‘one final judgment’ rule which provides ‘interlocutory or interim orders are not

ap pealable, but are only “reviewable on appeal” from the final judgment.’ [Citation.]

The rule w as designed to prevent piecemeal dispositions and costly multiple appeals

which burden the court and impede the judicial process. [Citation.] In keeping with this

rule, section 904.1 generally authorizes appeals from superior court judgments, except

thos e which are interlocutory.” ( Id. at pp. 1292

– 1293.) Interlocutory rulings “ ‘within

t he statutory classes of appealable interlocutory judgments’ ” remain appealable;

however, the appellant bears the burden of establishing the appealability of such a ruli ng.

4 Our July 5, 2019 order also denied Upside’s petition for writ of super s ede a s

see king a stay of enfo rcement pending appeal of the provision of the trial court’s order

requiring Upside to meet and con fer with plaintiff regarding a corrective notice

.

5 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Code of Civil

Proce dure.( Id. at p. 1293; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204 (a)(2)(B) ; In re Marriage of Fajot a (2014)

230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1496, fn. 5.)

Relevant here, under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6), an appeal may be taken

from an order granting or denying a request for an injunction, meaning

, an order

requiring a person to perform, or to refrain from performing

, a particular act. (§§ 904.1,

subd. (a)(6), 525; PV Little Italy, LLC v. MetroWork Condominium Assn. (2012) 210

Cal.App.4th 132, 143.) “Whether a particular order constitutes an appealable injunction

depends not on its title or the form of the order, but on ‘ “the substance and effect of the

adjudicati on.” ’ ” ( Id. at pp. 142

– 143.)

Here, Upside contends the trial court’s June 19, 2019 order constitutes an

a ppealable injunction “insofar as it requires Appellants to take affirmative steps to ef fect

invalidation of the Releases” by “participat[ing] in the preparation of a corrective notice

and

. . . provid[ing] Plaintiff’s counsel with the Releases and contact information for

those tenants who executed the same

. ” We disagree with Upside’s reason ing

.

A court order nearly always requires some action or inaction from one or both

parties or their counsel. However, this fact does not render nearly all court orders

injunctive in nature. Rather, an order requiring an action or inaction by a party may

simply be a proper exerci se of the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings

before it. It is “well established that courts have fundamental inherent equit y,

supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigat ion

before them.” ( Ruther ford v. Owens

- Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967; see § 128,

subd. (a)(5) [powers include controlling the “conduct of

. . . persons

. . . connected with a

judicial proceeding before it”].)

Moreover

, in the context of a cla ss action such as this, “it is the court’s authority

and duty to exercise control over the class action to protect the rights of all parties, and to

prevent abuses which might undermine the proper administration of justice.” ( Howard

Gunty Profit Sharing P lan v. Superior Court (2 001) 88 Cal.App.4th 572, 581.)

“ Communications that misrepresent the status or effect of the pending action, or which

may cause confusion, adver sely affect the administration of justice. ” ( Id

. at p. 582; seealso Hernandez v. Vita min Shoppe Industries, I nc. (20 09 ) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454

[ “ Where a trial court identifies a potential for abuse, the court ‘ “has both the duty and the

broad author ity to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders

governing t he conduct of counsel ” ’ ” ]

. )

And while it is well established tha t an interlocutory order denying class

certification is appealable because such an order effectively s erves as the “death knell” of

the lawsuit for all class members aside from the named pl aintiff, other routine interim

orders directed at litigation management in class action lawsuits are not generally

appealable. (See Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owne rs Assn., Inc. (2008) 163

Cal.App.4th 1545, 1547

– 1548 [order sustaining demurrer with l eave to amend in class

action not appealable; “ other orders dealing with class actions [besides orders denying

class certification] have not been incl uded in the death k nell doctrine. Thus, excluded

from the death knell doctrine are orders certifying a cl ass, orders partially certifying a

class, orders compelling the representative of a class to arbitrate, and orders directing

service of notice to clas s members, to name four examples” ]; Steen v. Fremont Cemetery

Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1224, 1228

– 1229 [ an order “directing service of notice

of class action to the members of respondent class, and allocating the cost of preparing

such notice betwe en appellant and re spondent class in the manner specified in the order”

is a nonappealable, interlocutory order].)

We find particularly helpful the opinion of our Second Appellate District

colleagues in Estrada v. RPS, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 976 ( Estrada )

. There, the

named plaintiff in a class action sought review of orders by the trial court requiring a

questionnaire to be sent to potential class members, and then dismissing potential

members who failed to respond to this questionnaire. ( Id . at p. 978.) Our colleagu es

dismissed the appeals as premature, reasoning (inter alia) that the challenged order s were

“ part and parcel of the class certification process and, as such, not appealable.” ( Id . at

pp. 985

– 986.) We conclude the same is true in this case.

The pre

- c lass

- certification order at issue in this case invalidated the releases

obtained by Ups ide through misleading , coercive and otherwise impropercommunications and required: (1) the parties to me et and confer regarding preparation of

a corrective notice to be sent to the putative class members ; (2) Upside to refrain from

communicating with pu tative class members about the lawsuit until the corrective notice

is issued ; and (3) Upside to provide pla intiffs’ counsel with copies of the improperly

obtained execut ed releases and contact information for the signatories. Just as in

Estrada

, th is orde r under challenge is “ part and parcel of the class certification process

and, as such, not appealable.” ( Estrada

, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 985

– 986.) Accordingly,

we dism iss Upside’s appeal a s taken from a nonappealable order. 6 ( Jennings v. Marralle

,

supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 126 [ “ The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to an appeal”].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed

.

6 I t is true that appellate courts have the discretion to treat an appeal from a

nonappealable order as a petition for writ relief, and thus determine the merits of the

challenge to the order, but only under limited, extraordinary circumstances. ( E. g., Olson

v. Cory ( 1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 400

– 401.) Here, however, Upside has put forth no

extraordinary or compe lling reason for us to consider its appeal as a writ petition.

Accordingly, we conclude dismissal of the appeal is the appropriate action. (Se e MinCal

Consumer L aw Group v. Carlsbad Police Dept. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 259, 265

– 266.)_______ __________________ Wick, J. *

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Petrou, J.

A157685/ Brown v. Upside Gading, LP

* Judge of the Superior Court of Sonoma County, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.Filed 11/18/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SHEILLA BROWN

,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

UPSIDE GADING, LP, et al.

,

Defendants and Appellants

. A157685

(Alameda County

Super. Ct. No. RG18928503)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION

FOR PUBLICATION ;

NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on October 1 7 , 201 9 , was not

certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that th e

opinion should be published in the Official Reports

, and it is so ordered.

Date: 11/18/2019 FUJISAKI, J. , Acting P. J.A1 57685/Brown v. Upside Gading, LP

Trial Court: Superior Cour t of Alameda County

Trial Judge: Brad Seligman , J.

Counsel: Centro Legal de la Raza

, Jesse Newmark and Micaela Alvarez ; Law

Offices of Andrew Wolff

, Andrew Wolff, Tony Ruch and Wortham

Briscoe for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

Pahl & McCay, Stephen D. Pahl, Servando R. Sandoval and Helene A.

Simvoulakis

- Panos for Defendant s and Appellants

.