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Filed 6/27/16 P. v. Crunk CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KASEY ROBERT CRUNK,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A143097

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. SCR647867)

Kasey Robert Crunk challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive 

sentences for two offenses arising out of Crunk’s flight from a police officer. Crunk 

contends the consecutive sentences violate Penal Code section 654 (section 654) because, 

he claims, the offenses were part of a single, indivisible course of conduct and were 

temporally proximate. We have reviewed the record, and we conclude the trial court’s 

finding that the offenses were separate is supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 27, 2014, at around 11:00 p.m., Santa Rosa Police Officer Patrick 

Gillette was on patrol in full police uniform and driving a marked police vehicle in the 

Codding Town area. Officer Gillette saw a Honda sedan leaving the parking lot of the 

Motel 6 or Vagabond Inn, which the officer knew to be a high crime area. The driver of 

the Honda was later identified as appellant Crunk. The officer followed the Honda as it 
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pulled into a closed, darkened Chevron gas station. Officer Gillette parked nearby at a 

Bank of America and observed Crunk. 

After approximately 30 seconds, Crunk drove away from the gas station. Officer 

Gillette performed a computer records search of the Honda’s license plate and discovered 

its registration had expired, a Vehicle Code violation. Based on that violation, Officer 

Gillette decided to perform a traffic stop. He turned on his vehicle’s forward facing red 

lights. Crunk did not pull over but instead accelerated to about 50 miles per hour in a 30 

mile per hour zone and then turned right. Crunk had many opportunities to pull over but 

failed to do so. 

Officer Gillette increased the number of lights displayed on his vehicle and 

activated the siren. The Honda still did not slow down or pull off to the side. Crunk 

pulled into an apartment complex, but the gate to the complex was closed. The reverse 

lights of the Honda illuminated and Officer Gillette slammed on his brakes. The Honda 

reversed and hit the front of the police vehicle causing damage to the front grille. It then 

turned left and headed west bound for a hundred yards. Crunk attempted to make a Uturn, but his car became inoperable. He got out of the car and ran back towards the 

apartment complex. He passed the officer, who was momentarily stuck in his seat belt, 

and climbed the fence to the complex. Crunk’s sweatpants became entangled on top of 

the fence and he was stuck hanging from his clothing while suspended upside down.

Crunk struggled while suspended from the fence until his pants tore and he fell to 

the ground inside the apartment complex. Officer Gillette shouted at him to stop.

Crunk’s hands were concealed near his waistband. Officer Gillette told Crunk to show 

his hands. Concerned that Crunk had a weapon, the officer shot him with Taser darts, 

which incapacitated him for five seconds. After he recovered, Crunk got up and ran. 

Rodney Gladney, a bystander, arrived on scene and jumped on Crunk. Gladney 

heard Officer Gillette yell “stop.” Gladney then secured Crunk in an arm hold. After 

Gladney and Crunk struggled on the ground, Officer Gillette activated his Taser again. 

Crunk said “okay” and surrendered. The officer then handcuffed him to the fence. It had 
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been a minute from the time Crunk ran from his car to the time he was handcuffed to the 

fence. Additional officers arrived on the scene and Crunk was taken into custody. 

Crunk was on parole. Officer Gillette found a hypodermic needle on the ground 

approximately 10 feet west of where Crunk had tried to jump the fence. He also found a 

bent spoon with a brown residue a few feet away from the needle. 

On June 12, 2014, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed an information 

charging Crunk with a felony for operating a motor vehicle while willfully and 

unlawfully evading a pursing a peace officer with willful or wanton disregard for the 

safety of persons and property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); Count I), a misdemeanor 

for leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); Count II), and a 

misdemeanor for willfully and unlawfully resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148; 

Count III). As to the first count, the information alleged four prior convictions within the 

meaning of Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(4) which rendered Crunk ineligible 

for probation. The information also alleged Crunk had suffered three prison priors (Pen. 

Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and was ineligible for sentencing pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1170, subdivision (h) because he had a prior strike. 

On September 15, 2014, a jury found Crunk not guilty of Count I, but guilty of the 

lesser included misdemeanor of evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)). The 

jury also found him guilty of Counts II and III. The prison priors and other felony 

enhancement allegations were not proven as there were no felony convictions to which 

they could attach.

At a hearing on September 18, 2014, the trial court heard argument from counsel 

on whether sentencing Crunk on all offenses would violate section 654. The prosecutor 

argued all three offenses were separate for purposes of section 654 and thus could be 

sentenced separately. She contended there were three separate crimes, stating, “We have 

the [Vehicle Code section] 2800 alleged as the first act, then there’s the vehicle accident, 

followed by Mr. Crunk’s continued flight from Officer Gillette.” The prosecutor 

acknowledged Crunk’s crimes were of a similar nature, but contended Crunk “at every 

turn, literally every turn, was continuing criminal conduct, [and] never once acquiesced 
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to law enforcement until tased multiple times and subdued by a civilian witness.” 

Defense counsel responded that section 654 applied because the offenses occurred within 

a short period of time and all of Crunk’s conduct centered on one objective, namely, “to 

flee” from Officer Gillette. 

The trial court sentenced Crunk to one year of county jail for evading a peace 

officer and to a consecutive 10-month term in county jail for resisting a peace officer, 

totaling 22 months. The court stayed the sentence on Count II, leaving the scene of an 

accident, pursuant to section 654, because it found the first two counts “factually merge 

as a continuous course of conduct.” It explained its ruling as to Count III as follows: 

“Now, regarding the 148, I believe that’s different. What was testified to, it is a separable 

charged incident. It is different manner of criminal objectives [sic] . . . . [¶] But, 

certainly, the testimony was that the collision occurred. There’s a very short driving 

thereafter, until the car was disabled, completely. [¶] But then, there’s a break. The 

officer sees the defendant[’s] flight from his car, and then, the officer’s trying to get out 

of his car, and the defendant at that time, there’s a break in time, break in criminal 

objectives. He could have stopped and waited. [¶] And instead, he flees on foot, actually 

runs to the officer, and as the officer’s hung up in his car, getting his seat belt off, the 

defendant proceeds past him. [¶] Then he gets hung up on the fence. So, there’s another 

point in time he could have given up. Could have given up after the first tasing. Does 

not. [¶] In fact, civilian gets involved in trying to wrestle him down, hold him down. 

And the Court does find the significant break in time, break in activity and criminality 

involving now a civilian. It took a second tasing, once the civilian was clear from the 

defendant, before the defendant finally gave up on the 148. [¶] So, I do find that the 148 

is not a continuous crime. It’s different from being in a vehicle and not failing to yield to 

the officer’s siren and lights. [¶] And there was a period of time in between where he 

could have made a different decision, but he decided instead to continue with a different 

crime, resisting, delaying, and getting involved in a [sic] civilian as well, whole different 

person, who [sic] could have been tried or charged as a separate crime, had the People 
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been clever enough in parsing through the facts of that arrest that was resisted not only by 

the deputy, but by the civilian.” 

On September 19, 2014, the trial court sentenced Crunk to one year of county jail 

on Count I and to a consecutive 10-month term for Count III, totaling 22 months. The 

court stayed the sentence on Count II pursuant to Penal Code section 654 (section 654). 

That same day, Crunk filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Crunk raises a single claim of error on appeal. He contends the trial court erred in 

imposing a 10-month term in county jail for his misdemeanor conviction for resisting a 

peace officer (Count III), consecutively to his misdemeanor sentence for evading a peace 

officer (Count I). We will address his contention after setting out the governing law and 

our standard of review.

I. Governing Law and Standard of Review

Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “An act or omission that is 

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the 

provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case 

shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” This section 

“precludes multiple punishment for a single act or omission, or an indivisible course of 

conduct.” (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591.) “The purpose of the protection 

against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant’s punishment will be 

commensurate with his criminal liability.” (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 

11, 20 (Neal), disapproved on another point in People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 

344.)

“It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, 

which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. [Citations.] . . . [I]f all of the 

offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating 

one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may 

be punished only once.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) On the other 

hand, if the defendant “harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were independent 
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of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory

violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared 

common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.) In such a case, “the trial court may impose punishment for independent violations 

committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or 

were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.] The principal 

inquiry in each case is whether the defendant's criminal intent and objective were single 

or multiple.” (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135.) Few crimes are the 

result of a single physical act. (Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 19.)

While the temporal proximity of the crimes is not determinative, it is a relevant 

factor in our analysis. (See People v. Martin (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 776, 781 [close 

temporal proximity of offenses was relevant consideration in determining whether 

defendant had single criminal objective]; People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 

603, fn. 10 [same].) But even where multiple crimes occur very close in time, they will 

not be deemed to comprise a single act for purposes of section 654 if the defendant had a 

chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of harm to the 

victim. (People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 916; People v. Kwok (1998) 63 

Cal.App.4th 1236, 1255-1256.) Thus, even offenses separated by less than a minute may 

properly be viewed as separate acts, and punished separately, when each successive

offense creates a new risk of harm. (People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 366-368

(Trotter); see also People v. Kwok, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1255-1256.)

“Whether the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives is a factual 

question for the trial court, and its findings on this question will be upheld on appeal if 

there is any substantial evidence to sustain them.” (People v. Nubla (1999) 74 

Cal.App.4th 719, 730.) We review the trial court’s findings in the light most favorable to 

the People, and we presume in support of the sentencing order the existence of every fact 

the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Atencio (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 1239, 1243.)
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II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Imposing a Consecutive Sentence for Count III.

Crunk divides his argument into three parts. We will discuss each in the order 

presented in his opening brief.

A. The Trial Court Did Not Sentence Crunk for an Uncharged Offense.

Crunk first contends the trial court violated his right to due process and a fair trial 

by punishing him for the uncharged offense of resisting a civilian (Gladney), although the 

Penal Code contains no penalty for resisting a citizen’s arrest. Crunk acknowledges 

section 654 decisions ordinarily do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 

(See, e.g., People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1264, vacated on other grounds in

Black v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 1190.) The difference here, he claims, is that the 

trial court considered “the ‘criminality’ of resisting a civilian, [and] impermissibly 

punished [him] for an uncharged, untried (and nonexistent) offense, which violated [his] 

right to a jury trial on all facts that increase his sentence.” We disagree, because we find 

Crunk’s assertions are not borne out by the record.

In explaining its sentencing ruling, the trial court stated: “And there was a period 

of time in between where he could have made a different decision, but he decided instead 

to continue with a different crime, resisting, delaying, and getting involved in a [sic] 

civilian as well, whole different person, who [sic] could have been tried or charged as a 

separate crime, had the People been clever enough in parsing through the facts of that 

arrest that was resisted not only by the deputy, but by the civilian.” (Italics added.) As 

the italicized language makes clear, the court did not find Crunk guilty of a separate 

offense involving resisting a citizen’s arrest. The court was simply noting the People 

could have charged Crunk with a separate crime arising out of his altercation with 

Gladney, but the People did not “pars[e] through the facts of that arrest[.]” Considered in 

context and in the light most favorable to the judgment, the court’s statement can be 

viewed as nothing more than a passing comment on the additional danger Crunk created 

by running from his car and climbing into the apartment complex. (See People v. Foster

(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 27 [noting potential danger to robbery victims caused by 

defendant’s imprisoning them in a store cooler].) The court remarked only that the 
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People could have charged Crunk with some other offense of which Gladney was the 

victim, but it expressed no view about what that offense might be or whether Crunk was 

guilty of it. 

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding that the Offenses 

Were Divisible.

Crunk next argues that what he calls his nonviolent offenses stemmed from one 

indivisible course of conduct having the single objective of avoiding arrest by Officer 

Gillette. We reiterate that this is a question of fact which we review for substantial 

evidence, and we presume in support of the sentencing order the existence of every fact 

the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Atencio, supra, 208 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1243.)

As our fact statement shows, Crunk first eluded Officer Gillette in his car, a course 

of conduct that endangered other motorists, as well as pedestrians and the police. 

Commission of his first offense, fleeing a pursuing peace officer while operating a motor 

vehicle, ended when Crunk got out of the Honda. As the trial court noted, there was “a 

break,” and Crunk had an opportunity to reflect after his car was disabled. He did not 

surrender at that point, however. Instead, he went on to commit a new offense, resisting a 

peace officer, which introduced a new set of risks to the people in the surrounding 

neighborhood. Crunk then failed to surrender when he was caught on the fence, after he 

had fallen from the fence, and even after he was first tased.

Certainly, Crunk’s two offenses had the same general objective of avoiding arrest, 

but the trial court could properly find they were nevertheless temporally separate and 

distinct crimes which enhanced the potential harm to public safety. (See Trotter, supra, 7 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 367-368 [defendant who fired two gunshots at pursuing officer within 

the space of one minute could properly be punished for separate offenses].) Indeed, 

Gladney and the other residents of the apartment complex were drawn into the danger of 

the situation because of Crunk’s run from his car. (See id. at p. 368 [“Defendant’s 

conduct became more egregious with each successive shot. Each shot posed a separate 

and distinct risk to [the pursuing officer] and nearby freeway drivers.”].) This evidence
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supports the trial court’s finding that the two offenses were separate. The court therefore 

did not violate section 654 by imposing a sentence on Count III.

C. The Offenses Need Not Be Separated by Any Minimum Period of Time.

Crunk’s claim that the offenses were not sufficiently temporally separate as to 

permit him time to reflect requires little further discussion. As Trotter illustrates, a trial 

court may find offenses separate even when they are temporally proximate. Indeed, in 

Trotter, the gunshots at issue were fired within one minute. (Trotter, supra, 7 

Cal.App.4th at p. 366.) As our Supreme Court has explained in a case in which a series 

of sexual offenses were committed in rapid succession, “[c]ourts have long assumed that 

no minimum amount of time must separate such acts[.]” (People v. Harrison, supra, 48 

Cal.3d at p. 330.) The same is true here. Crunk has not persuaded us that the trial court’s 

finding on this point is unsupported by substantial evidence.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Jones, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Needham, J.

_________________________

Bruiniers, J.