1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

v. 

RANDY KOONTZ, 

 Defendant. 

Crim. Action No. 16-16 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction 

Randy Koontz (“Mr. Koontz” or “Defendant”) pled guilty to 

one count of Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual 

Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and one count of 

Distribution of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(2). See Plea Agreement, ECF No. 14 at 1.1 He is 

currently serving concurrent sentences of 30 years and 40 years 

imprisonment on those counts, respectively. See Minute Entry 

(Jan. 12, 2018). In 2020, Mr. Koontz filed a pro se § 2255 

motion to vacate his guilty plea. See Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in 

Federal Custody (“§ 2255 Mot.”), ECF No. 57. This Court denied 

the motion, see Mem. Op. (“§ 2255 Op.”), ECF No. 77; and Mr. 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum 

Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the 

original page number of the filed document. 
2

Koontz now seeks a certificate of appealability, see Application 

for Certificate of Appealability (“COA Mot.”), ECF No. 73.2

Upon consideration of Mr. Koontz’s motion, the response,

the applicable law, and the entire record, the Court DENIES Mr. 

Koontz’s motion for a Certificate of Appealability, ECF No. 73. 

II. Background3

A. Factual Background

In March 2015, Mr. Koontz began messaging with an 

undercover officer on an internet chat site. See Statement of 

Offense, ECF No. 13 at 1-2. The two began communicating via 

Skype, where Mr. Koontz sent the officer two video files of 

child pornography. Id. at 2. The officer told Mr. Koontz that he 

had a five-year-old daughter and Mr. Koontz arranged to meet 

them in a hotel room in D.C. so that Mr. Koontz could have sex 

with the child. Id. at 3-4.

On April 2, 2015, Mr. Koontz and the officer met at a 

coffee shop in D.C. Id. at 5. Mr. Koontz gave the officer a 

2 Although Mr. Koontz’s Certificate of Appealability is 

designated as docket number 73, the actual document can be found 

in docket number 72 as the document serves as both Mr. Koontz’s 

application for the certificate and his notice of appeal. To 

avoid confusion, the Court will reference the motion as docket 

number 73. 

3 The following background provides a brief summary of the 

information relevant for resolving Mr. Koontz’s present motion. 

A more detailed factual and procedural history of this case can 

be found in the Court’s previous opinion denying Mr. Koontz’s 

§ 2255 motion. See § 2255 Op., ECF No. 77 at 2-12.
3

thumb drive with child pornography and discussed going to a

hotel room to meet the officer’s daughter. Id. The officer gave 

Mr. Koontz a hotel room key, but Mr. Koontz handed the key back 

to the officer and stated that he “should walk into the room 

with the child first.” Id. Mr. Koontz was then arrested. Id. 

During his arrest, the officers seized Mr. Koontz’s laptop 

and two cell phones. Id. at 6. When they later executed a search 

warrant at Mr. Koontz’s residence, they seized other electronic 

devices and found that the devices “in total” contained “several 

thousand images and videos of child pornography.” Id. 

B. Procedural Background

On March 2, 2016, Mr. Koontz waived his right to a jury 

trial, see Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge for 

Inquiry Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, ECF 

No. 10; waived his right to prosecution by indictment, see 

Waiver of Indictment, ECF No. 12; and pleaded guilty to one 

count of Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and one count of 

Distribution of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(2), see Plea Agreement, ECF No. 14 at 1.

Mr. Koontz’s plea agreement included several waivers. 

First, he agreed to “waive the right to appeal the sentence in 

this case, including any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, 

award of restitution, term of supervised release, authority of 
4

the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which 

the sentence was determined.” Id. at 9. The two exceptions to 

this waiver were if: (1) “the Court sentences [Mr. Koontz] above 

the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the 

Court” or (2) Mr. Koontz “claims that [he] received ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Id. If Mr. Koontz were to bring such 

claims under the exceptions, he would not be allowed “to raise 

on appeal other issues regarding sentencing.” Id. 

Second, Mr. Koontz agreed to waive “any right to challenge 

the conviction entered or sentence imposed under [the] Agreement 

or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the 

manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, 

including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255.” Id. The two exceptions to the collateral attack waiver 

were if: (1) “such a motion is based on newly discovered 

evidence” or (2) the claim was based on “ineffective assistance 

of counsel.” Id. Magistrate Judge Harvey specifically reviewed 

these waivers in the plea hearing and Mr. Koontz agreed that he 

understood the effects of such waivers. See Tr. of Plea Hr’g, 

ECF No. 50 at 11-13. This Court accepted Mr. Koontz’s plea on 

March 23, 2016. See Minute Order (Mar. 23, 2016). 

Mr. Koontz was sentenced to 30 years on the first count and 

40 years on the second count with sentences to run concurrently. 

See J. in a Criminal Case, ECF No. 47 at 2. He was also 
5

sentenced to a life term of supervised release, id. at 3; and 

was ordered to pay $21,000 in restitution and a $200 special 

assessment, id. at 6. He was also ordered to comply with the Sex 

Offender Registration requirements and participate in a program 

for sex offender assessment and treatment. Id. at 5. Mr. Koontz 

appealed his sentence, and the appeal was dismissed by the Court 

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) 

because Mr. Koontz “executed a valid waiver of his appellate 

rights.” United States v. Koontz, 767 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 

2019).

In June 2020, Mr. Koontz filed a pro se § 2255 motion, 

arguing that his guilty plea should be vacated. See § 2255 Mot., 

ECF No. 57. He advanced five arguments: (1) that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to 

inform him that his guilty plea meant “he would have to also be 

guilty of a 109A described offense,” id. at 4; (2) that § 2255 

does not provide the Court with subject-matter jurisdiction “to 

reverse a conviction, vacate a plea, or other non-sentence 

relief,” id. at 5; (3) that “18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)’s requirement 

of activity in violation of Chapter 109A” violates his “Fifth 

and Sixth Amendment” rights because he was never “formally 

charged” with a Chapter 109A crime, id. at 6-7; (4) he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney advised him 

to plead guilty to an information instead of an indictment, when 
6

there was not “enough evidence to prove a 109A crime,” id. at 8; 

and (5) his due process rights were violated when the “Court 

utilized documents not the result of the instant investigation 

to enhance [his] sentence,” id. at 9. 

This Court denied Mr. Koontz’s § 2255 motion. See § 2255 

Op., ECF No. 77 at 36. It determined that Mr. Koontz’s second, 

third, and fifth arguments were barred by his plea agreement’s 

waiver of his collateral attack rights, see id. at 17; and by 

procedural default, see id. at 22. It also determined that Mr. 

Koontz’s first and fourth arguments were meritless because he 

did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, failing both 

prongs of the Strickland test. Id. at 25-34. 

Mr. Koontz timely appealed and filed this instant motion 

for a certificate of appealability. See COA Mot., ECF No. 73. 

The D.C. Circuit ordered Mr. Koontz’s appeal “held in abeyance” 

pending this Court’s resolution of Mr. Koontz’s motion for a 

certificate of appealability. Order, ECF No. 75. The Government 

submitted its response to Mr. Koontz’s motion in November 2023. 

See United States’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Certificate of 

Appealability (“Gov’t Opp’n”), ECF No. 82. Mr. Koontz’s motion 

is now ripe and ready for adjudication.
7

III. Legal Standard for Issuance of a Certificate of 

Appealability

A certificate of appealability must be issued for an 

appellate court to hear an appeal from a “final order in a 

proceeding under section 2255.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The 

federal district court who rendered the order for which 

appellate review is sought must either issue the certificate of 

appealability or deny it, in which case a “party may not appeal 

the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals 

under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22.” Rules Governing 

Section 2255 Proceedings for the U.S. Dist. Cts. 11(a); see also 

Fed R. App. P. 22(b)(1). 

A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this 

showing, the petitioner “need not show that he should prevail on 

the merits. . . . Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues 

are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could 

resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the 

questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” United States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

When a court denies a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, 

a certificate of appealability may be granted if the petitioner 
8

clears the additional hurdle of showing “that jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether the district court was correct 

in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478

(2000); see also id. at 484-85 (“Determining whether a COA 

should issue where the petition was dismissed on procedural 

grounds has two components, one directed at the underlying 

constitutional claims and one directed at the district court’s 

procedural holding. . . . The recognition that the Court will 

not pass upon a constitutional question although properly 

presented by the record, if there is also present some other 

ground upon which the case may be disposed of . . . allows and 

encourages the court to first resolve procedural issues.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

IV. Analysis

In Mr. Koontz’s pro se § 2255 motion, he raised five

grounds for relief. See § 2255 Op., ECF No. 77 at 15-16. 

However, in his present motion for a certificate of 

appealability, Mr. Koontz addresses none of those five grounds, 

and instead seeks vacatur of his “conviction on grounds of 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to protect his 

mentally incapacitated client.” COA Mot., ECF No. 73 at 5. 

Specifically, Mr. Koontz argues that his counsel was ineffective 

for “not acknowledging” his “due process rights by making known 

to the court the plaintiff[’s] inability to participate in his 
9

own defense” due to Mr. Koontz’s “depressive incapacitation,” 

which “made him incapable of understanding the consequences of 

his actions in his criminal proceedings.” Id. at 4. In support 

of his argument, Mr. Koontz states that his PSR and “several 

mental evaluations” proved that his mental cognizance was 

impaired, and he was experiencing “severe mental depression.” 

Id. at 2. 

The Government argues that Mr. Koontz’s COA motion is “in 

effect, a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, even though 

it is not labeled as such, as he did not raise these claims in 

his underlying § 2255 motion.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 82 at 5. Its 

proposed course of action is to have this Court transfer Mr. 

Koontz’s motion to the D.C. Circuit since district courts lack 

jurisdiction over successive § 2255 petitions without a court of 

appeals order authorizing the district court to consider the 

application. See id. at 7 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)). 

The Government also argues that even “if the Court determines 

that it may address defendant’s new claims, the Court should 

summarily deny them.” Id. 

Upon review of the record and applicable case law, the 

Court concludes that Mr. Koontz has waived the five grounds for 

§ 2255 relief which he brought in his original petition by not 

mentioning them in his present motion for a certificate of 

appealability. However, out of an abundance of caution, the 
10

Court also determines that even if it were to consider the 

grounds, it would deny a certificate of appealability for all 

five under the applicable standards. Furthermore, the Court 

concludes that based on the argument in Mr. Koontz’s present 

motion, the Government is correct that he is effectively 

bringing a successive § 2255 motion. However, this Court will 

not transfer the motion to the D.C. Circuit because the motion 

fails to meet the necessary criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 

A. Waiver

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) states that “[a] certificate of 

appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the “issuance 

of a COA must not be pro forma or a matter of course.” Miller-El 

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003). And the onus is on the 

petitioner to establish his claims for relief. See id. at 338 

(“A prisoner seeking a COA must prove something more than the 

absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his 

or her part.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 

added)); Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (“Where a district court has 

rejected the constitutional claim on the merits, the showing 

required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner 

must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 
11

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” (emphasis added)). 

Several circuits have used this requirement to conclude 

that when a petitioner fails to support a certain ground for 

§ 2255 relief in their COA, the petitioner has “waived” that

ground. See, e.g., Jones v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 607 F.3d 

1346, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing cases from the Second, 

Fifth, and Tenth Circuits). In Jones v. Secretary, Department of 

Corrections, 607 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2010), the Court of 

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit declined to provide a 

certificate of appealability to a petitioner on grounds where he 

did “not provide facts, legal arguments, or citations of 

authority that explain why he is entitled to a certification on 

those . . . grounds.” Id. at 1353. In explaining its reasoning, 

the Jones Court stated that generally litigants are “required 

. . . to identify errors and provide arguments about their 

entitlement to relief,” id.; and “[w]e have not treated 

petitioners seeking writs of habeas corpus any differently from 

other litigants,” meaning that the general “rule applies with 

equal force to petitioners seeking a certificate of 

appealability,” id. at 1354. 

Similarly, in Beatty v. United States, 293 F.3d 627 (2d 

Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 

that “[i]f [a petitioner] omits claims from his papers in 
12

support of a COA, those claims should normally be deemed 

abandoned.” Id. at 632 (citing Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 

613 (5th Cir. 1999)). It reasoned that since 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(3) requires a COA to specify which issues satisfy the 

COA standard, a “court, considering whether to issue a COA to 

permit appeal from the denial of a collateral attack, is 

entitled to limit its consideration to the grounds advanced by 

the prisoner in seeking a COA” “[j]ust as a district court 

adjudicating a section 2255 motion is entitled to limit its 

consideration to the grounds specified by the prisoner.” Id. 

Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has yet to directly rule on the issue, 

several judges in this district have denied a certificate of 

appealability when a petitioner has failed to develop their 

claim on the grounds presented in the § 2255 motion. See, e.g., 

United States v. Young, No. 7-153, 2016 WL 1381763, at * 2 

(D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2016) (denying COA where defendant’s papers were 

“devoid of any bases or grounds for challenging the Court’s 

denial of his § 2255 motion”); United States v. Jones, No. 5-

441, 2011 WL 13301402, at *1 (D.D.C. July 5, 2011) (denying COA 

where “[e]ven under a liberal pro se standard,” defendant made 

“no attempt to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among 

jurists of reason” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13

Applying the logic from Jones, Beatty, and several courts 

in this district to Mr. Koontz’s motion, the Court declines to 

issue a certificate of appealability. Mr. Koontz does not 

mention—much less advocate for—any of his original five grounds 

for § 2255 relief in the present COA motion. Therefore, Mr. 

Koontz has failed to “demonstrate that the issues are debatable 

among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues 

[in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Mitchell, 216 F.3d at

1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Original Grounds from § 2255 Motion

Although the Court concludes that Mr. Koontz has waived the 

five claims for § 2255 relief from his original motion by not 

mentioning them in the current COA motion, in an abundance of 

caution the Court will briefly examine why it also concludes 

that such grounds would not warrant a COA even if they had not 

been waived. 

1. Procedural Bars: Grounds Two, Three, and Five

This Court previously determined that Grounds Two, Three, 

and Five of Mr. Koontz’s claims for § 2255 relief were barred on 

procedural grounds. See § 2255 Op., ECF No. 77 at 17-25. 

Specifically, this Court held that the claims were barred by: 

(1) the waiver of Mr. Koontz’s collateral attack rights from his 

plea agreement, see id. at 17-22; and (2) procedural default for 
14

failing to raise the claims on direct appeal, see id. at 22-25. 

Although the Court stands by its reasoning on both grounds, for 

the sake of brevity and because either procedural bar would 

prevent Mr. Koontz from obtaining a COA, the Court will only 

examine the plea agreement waiver under the COA standard.

To issue a COA for Grounds Two, Three, and Five of Mr. 

Koontz’s § 2255 petition, the Court must conclude that “jurists 

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling,” Slack, 529 U.S. 484—in this 

case, that Mr. Koontz’s plea agreement bars those three grounds. 

Mr. Koontz’s plea agreement expressly bars collateral attacks 

“including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255” with the two exceptions of “a motion . . . based on 

newly discovered evidence or on a claim that [Mr. Koontz] 

received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Plea Agreement, ECF 

No. 14 at 9. 

None of the three grounds fall into the two exceptions. 

Ground Two involves the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction; 

Ground Three involves Mr. Koontz’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment 

rights based on being convicted of a Chapter 109A offense; and 

Ground Five involves the Court’s reliance on the PSI report to 

enhance Mr. Koontz’s sentence. See § 2255 Mot., ECF No. 57 at 5-

9. The D.C. Circuit construes plea agreements applying “contract 

principles” and dismisses claims where “the agreement 
15

unambiguously covers the accused’s claims.” Khadr v. United 

States, 67 F.4th 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2023). In this case, 

Grounds Two, Three, and Five from Mr. Koontz’s § 2255 motion are 

unambiguously covered by the terms of the collateral attack 

waiver because the waiver expressly bars all collateral attacks 

and none of the three grounds even arguably falls within the two 

explicit exceptions. 

Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that Mr. 

Koontz’s waiver of his collateral attack rights was not 

“knowing, intelligent, [or] voluntary.” United States v. 

Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The record 

establishes that Mr. Koontz signed the written agreement, 

affirmed that he read and discussed it with his attorney, and 

confirmed under oath to Magistrate Judge Harvey that he 

understood and accepted the collateral attack waiver after 

Magistrate Judge Harvey specifically explained the meaning of 

the waiver. § 2255 Op., ECF No. 77 at 20-21; see also United 

States v. Sumner, No. 2-1538, 2005 WL 1216980, at *3 (D.D.C. May 

20, 2005) (denying COA on “procedural default” grounds where 

“all evidence indicated that Petitioner voluntarily permitted 

his prosecution by information, and Petitioner acknowledged both 

on the record and with his signature indicating that he was 

aware that acceptance of his plea included waiver of his 

applicable . . . right[s]”); cf. Koontz, 767 F. App’x at 3-4 
16

(concluding that Mr. Koontz “executed a valid waiver of his 

appellate rights” because “both the plea agreement and the 

magistrate judge marked the precise metes and bounds of Koontz’s 

appellate rights” and “Koontz confirmed his understanding by 

signing the plea agreement and verbally acknowledging that he 

understood the magistrate judge’s recital”). 

Therefore, because the collateral attack waiver expressly 

covers Grounds Two, Three, and Five of Mr. Koontz’s § 2255 

motion and because there is no evidence in the record that Mr. 

Koontz’s waiver of his collateral attack rights was not 

“knowing, intelligent, [or] voluntary,” reasonable jurists would 

not find it debatable that Mr. Koontz’s claims are barred by his

plea agreement.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Grounds One 

and Four

The Court also previously determined that Mr. Koontz’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims—Grounds One and Four

from his § 2255 motion—failed both prongs of the Strickland 

test. See § 2255 Op., ECF No. 77 at 25-34. Although the Court 

stands by its reasoning on both grounds, for the sake of brevity 

and because failure on either prong would prevent Mr. Koontz 

from obtaining a COA, the Court will only examine the prejudice 

prong under the COA standard. 
17

The Supreme Court has stated that “when a defendant claims 

that his counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial 

by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show 

prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial.’” Lee v. United States, 582 

U.S. 357, 364 (2017) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985)). In conducting this inquiry, the Supreme Court urged 

lower courts to “not upset a plea solely because of post hoc 

assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but 

for his attorney’s deficiencies,” but instead to “look to 

contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed 

preferences.” Id. at 369. 

Mr. Koontz’s two claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are based on the assertions that his counsel failed to 

explain that “to be guilty of [a] § 2423 [crime] he would have 

to also be guilty of a 109A described offense” (Ground One), 

§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 57 at 4; and that his counsel advised 

pleading guilty to an information “and not indictment to a crime 

the Grand Jury could not indict for” (Ground Four), id. at 8. As 

this Court described in its opinion denying § 2255 relief, Mr. 

Koontz claims that he “would have gone to trial” if he had been 

properly advised but offers no contemporaneous evidence to 

substantiate his supposed preference. See § 2255 Op., ECF No. 77 
18

at 33-34. Mr. Koontz claimed that he “could have defended 

against the 109A charge and thereby defended the 2423(b) count” 

but also admits that “[c]ounsel never offered any defense 

available to a 109A charge,” § 2255 Mot., ECF No. 57 at 4; and 

that “[c]ounsel never presented any options of any defense 

strategy if he proceeded to trial,” id. at 8. Furthermore, as 

described in the § 2255 Opinion, the “overwhelming evidence” 

against Mr. Koontz, combined with Magistrate Judge Harvey’s 

observation that Mr. Koontz’s actions merited a life sentence, 

significantly undercuts his claim that he would have gone to 

trial absent his counsel’s purported inadequacies. See § 2255 

Op., ECF No. 77 at 33. 

Finally, the record reflects that in Mr. Koontz’s plea 

colloquy, Magistrate Judge Harvey specifically informed Mr. 

Koontz of the Chapter 109A violation, its elements, and the 

consequences of pleading guilty to an information instead of an 

indictment and confirmed that Mr. Koontz understood these 

issues. See Tr. of Plea Hr’g, ECF No. 50 at 8, 20-22, 27. Thus, 

Mr. Koontz cannot claim prejudice by his attorney’s purported 

failure to inform him on the issues because he was notified 

about them during his plea colloquy and given the express 

opportunity to decline to plead guilty based on their relevance. 

See Sumner, 2005 WL 1216980, at *4 (declining to issue a COA for 

ineffective assistance of counsel when “the Court itself had 
19

repeatedly advised Petitioner of the very right he alleged his 

attorney failed to discuss with him”).

Since Mr. Koontz offered no evidence that he would have 

gone to trial absent his counsel’s purported errors and because 

the record reflects that the purported errors Mr. Koontz 

identified were expressly explained to him by the Court during 

his plea hearing, reasonable jurists would not be able to debate 

that Mr. Koontz’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

had any merit. 

C. New Grounds from COA Motion

In his present motion for a COA, Mr. Koontz argues 

ineffective assistance of counsel, but on the new ground that 

his “depressive incapacitation” made him unable “to participate 

in his own defense” and therefore his plea was not knowing and 

voluntary. See COA Mot., ECF No. 73 at 4. The D.C. Circuit has 

acknowledged that “[t]his Court has a well-established rule 

against allowing parties to initiate new [§ 2255] claims on 

appeal.” United States v. Naranjo, 254 F.3d 311, 313 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). Following this rule, the D.C. Circuit and district courts 

in this circuit have concluded that a Petitioner “may not add 

new claims for the first time in [a] motion for a certificate of 

appealability.” United States v. Locke, No. 9-259, 2014 WL 

12724270, at *2 (D.D.C. May 7, 2014); see also Miles v. Paul, 

No. 18-5224, 2020 WL 2621219, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2020)
20

(“To the extent appellant seeks to assert a new claim of 

ineffective assistance of . . . counsel, the court will not 

consider—as part of the request for a certificate of 

appealability—claims that appellant did not present to the 

district court and raises for the first time on appeal.”); 

United States v. Hicks, No. 18-3020, 2018 WL 5115517, at *1 

(D.C. Cir. Sept. 19, 2018). Thus, the Court may not consider the 

merits of Mr. Koontz’s new argument for § 2255 relief because he 

did not raise this ground in his original § 2255 motion. 

The Court agrees with the government that Mr. Koontz’s 

current COA motion is “in effect” a successive motion for § 2255 

habeas relief because it seeks vacatur of Mr. Koontz’s plea and 

argues for § 2255 relief on a new ground. See Dufur v. U.S. 

Parole Comm’n, 34 F.4th 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“The 

authority to recharacterize a pro se complaint extends to the 

longstanding practice of construing as a habeas petition a 

motion that a pro se federal prisoner has labeled differently.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Clark, 977 

F.3d 1283, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“no matter what label a 

Petitioner gives to an action, any motion filed in the district 

court that imposed the sentence, and [is] substantively within 

the scope of § 2255[], is a motion under § 2255” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 
21

The Government suggests that the Court “should transfer” 

the COA motion “to the D.C. Circuit so that court may determine 

whether to authorize the filing of this successive § 2255 

motion.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 82 at 7. However, section 2255(h) 

states that a successive habeas motion may only be certified by 

a court of appeals if the motion is based on “(1) newly 

discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in the light of 

the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder 

would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new 

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 

As the government acknowledges, Mr. Koontz’s motion meets 

neither criteria. His claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel because of his “severe mental depression,” is not based 

on new evidence. In fact, in his motion, Mr. Koontz states that 

the depression was “noted in his PSR,” and he was “proven 

impaired by several mental evaluations” but that was “ignored by 

his counsel.” COA Mot., ECF No. 73 at 2. Furthermore, Mr. Koontz 

does not identify any law in his motion and thus, it cannot be 

predicated on any “new rule of constitutional law.” Therefore, 

the Court declines to transfer the motion. See United States v. 

Naranjo, No. 93-418, 2014 WL 5408414, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 
22

2014) (declining to “transfer [Petitioner’s] motion to the D.C. 

Circuit for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion” 

because Petitioner “fails to meet the standards for 

certification”); United States v. Bufford, No. 14-169, 2019 WL 

7758881, at *1 (D.D.C. May 28, 2019) (dismissing successive 

petition “without prejudice to refile in the D.C. Circuit” but 

noting that “chances appear slim” such a certification would be 

granted because Petitioner “had not made either showing” that 

his motion would meet § 2255(h) standards). 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Koontz’s motion for a 

certificate of appealability, ECF No. 73, is DENIED. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

June 28, 2024