IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40142

Summary Calendar

JOE BLESSETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

TEXAS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GALVESTON COUNTY 

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:17-CV-164

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joe Blessett, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of 

his civil complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the 

Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. He argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 

inapplicable because he did not receive notice of any of the judicial acts entered 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 6, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-40142

2

against him in state court and because he is seeking to set aside state court 

judgments obtained by extrinsic fraud. Blessett also complains that the 

district court erroneously denied his motions for entry of a default judgment 

and his motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

We review the grant of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion 

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 

557 (5th Cir. 2008). In reviewing the dismissal order, we view “the well-pled 

factual allegations of the complaint as true” and construe them “in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that federal district courts lack 

subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits that effectively seek to “overturn” a 

state court ruling. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 

280, 291 (2005). The doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers 

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 

rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284.

Our review of the complaint reveals that Blessett asserted claims that 

collaterally attack the state court divorce decree and judgments concerning 

paternity and child support, as well as claims that assert constitutional 

violations relating to the enforcement of the state child support judgments. 

The former claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they 

“invit[e] district court review and rejection” of the state divorce decree and 

child support judgments. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Moreover, it is of 

no help to Blessett that he claims he failed to receive notice of any hearing in 

relation to the child support arrearage judgment of July 13, 2015, as 

“[c]onstitutional questions arising in state proceedings are to be resolved by 

the state courts.” Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

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We reach a different result as to Blessett’s claims that the defendant and 

its “contractors” engaged in fraud and violated his constitutional rights in their

efforts to enforce and collect the state child support judgments. Because such 

claims do not ask the district court to review and reject a final order of a state 

court, they are not barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Truong v. 

Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382-84 (5th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we vacate 

the dismissal of such claims and remand to the district court.

As noted, Blessett also challenges the district court’s denial of his 

motions for entry of default judgment against the defendants based on their 

failure to answer his amended complaint. This challenge ignores that the 

district court denied leave to file the amended complaint, and thus the 

defendants were under no obligation to respond to an unfiled pleading. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Blessett’s motions for entry of a default judgment against 

the defendants. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001).

In view of the above determinations, it is unnecessary to consider 

Blessett’s arguments concerning the district court’s denial of his motion 

seeking leave to file an amended complaint.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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