Audit of 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures 

At Domestic Airports 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Offi ce of Inspector General

Offi ce of Audits

OIG-04-37 September 2004
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of

Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, 

inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS 

oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement. 

This report represents an abbreviated version of our classified report assessing 

compliance by the Transportation Security Administration with federal aviation 

requirements to inspect passengers and property for explosives and weapons. It is 

based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and 

institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations contained in this report have been developed to the best 

knowledge available to the OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those 

responsible for implementing them. It is my hope that this report will result in more 

effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my appreciation to all of 

those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Clark Kent Ervin 

Inspector General 
Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 1

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 

Introduction 

In response to concerns about the vulnerability of airplane passenger and baggage 

screening processes to terrorist activity, we reviewed the aviation security screening 

function at selected domestic airports nationwide. The purpose of the review, which 

consisted of undercover tests of screener and equipment performance, was to evaluate 

compliance with federal aviation security requirements to inspect passengers and 

property for explosives and weapons. Following is an abbreviated, public version of a 

classified report made available to the relevant congressional committees. 

Results in Brief 

Improvements are needed in the screening process to ensure that dangerous prohibited 

items are not being carried into the sterile areas of heavily used airports or do not enter 

the checked baggage system. There were four areas that caused most of the test failures 

and were in need of improvement: training; equipment and technology; policy and 

procedures; and management and supervision. We made recommendations that 

addressed these areas and would improve overall screener performance. TSA 

implemented significant improvements since the conclusion of our testing. 

Background 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) - (Public Law 107-71), enacted 

November 19, 2001, created TSA. The ATSA mandated, among other things, that the 

airlines, who had contracted with private security companies, transfer the responsibility 

for screening passengers and baggage to the federal government.1 This transfer of 

responsibility was effected on November 19, 2002. 

At the direction of the President, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) OIG 

conducted a series of undercover tests of security at airports throughout the country from 

November 2001 to July 2002. DOT OIG testing indicated many areas of vulnerability. 

 

1

 The ATSA also directed TSA to establish a pilot program under which the screening of passengers and 

property will be carried out by qualified private screening companies. TSA chose five airports of varying 

sizes: San Francisco, Kansas City, Rochester, Jackson Hole, and Tupelo.
Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 2

In response to DOT OIG's findings and recommendations, and for other reasons, TSA 

established an Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review (OIAPR). The OIAPR 

developed criteria to evaluate the performance of TSA’s newly hired and trained screener 

workforce and to assess the adequacy of security systems and controls at commercial 

airports nationwide. 

In July 2003, we initiated our own undercover tests of screener and equipment 

performance at airports nationwide. Fieldwork concluded in November 2003, and 

included hundreds of screening checkpoint and checked baggage tests at different 

categories of airports.2 For example, a "test" at a passenger screening checkpoint 

consisted of one tester attempting to take one threat object through the checkpoint into 

the sterile area undetected on his or her body or in his or her carry-on bag. To the extent 

practicable, we duplicated DOT OIG's checkpoint test methodology.

At the conclusion of each test, we met with the screeners involved and their supervisors 

to discuss the nature and results of the test. We also met with the Federal Security 

Director, or a representative if the FSD was unavailable, and the staff at each airport at 

the end of each testing period to summarize and discuss the results of our testing.

We also met with the TSA's OIAPR to discuss their internal testing. We obtained and 

reviewed all pertinent TSA Security Directives (SDs) and Standard Operation Procedures 

(SOPs) relating to screening of checked baggage, and passengers and their carry-on 

items. We designed our test protocols from those SDs and SOPs.

We interviewed officials from the TSA's Office of Workforce Performance and Training 

and the Office of Operations Policy on an ongoing basis to discuss and clarify training, 

policy issues, and updates to the SOPs. In addition, we made several visits to the 

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic City, New Jersey, to discuss our 

test methodology and to obtain technical guidance on the equipment available at the 

airports to screen passengers and their property. The TSL also provided us with some of 

the test items used during our testing.

Screener Training, Use of Technology, Procedures, and 

Management Needed Improvement

Although each test was a discrete and unique event that challenged an individual screener 

to make judgments or perform specific actions in response to the unfolding test scenario, 

there are four areas that we concluded were the cause of most of the test failures: training; 

equipment and technology; policy and procedures; and management and supervision. 

These four areas should not be viewed in isolation, however, as certain of their aspects

often overlap one another. For example, screener’s failure to follow a standard operating 

 

2

 Commercial airports are categorized based on the number of annual enplanements. The nation’s busiest 

airports are termed Category X airports while airports with fewer enplanements are categorized as 

Category I, Category II, or Category III.
Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 3

procedure may reflect supervisor’s and manager’s failure to train screeners or monitor 

their performance adequately.

Training 

Screeners currently receive a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours 

of on-the-job instruction before they are qualified to make independent judgments as to 

whether individuals or property may enter a sterile area or aircraft without further 

inspection. Because there was no formal program of recurrent training in the field, 

qualified screeners may not have received any continuous professional training to 

enhance and refine their skills. The lack of recurrent training led to many of the 

checkpoint test failures. We recommended that the TSA Assistant Secretary develop and 

implement a program of recurrent professional training to enhance screener performance. 

The program should require a mandatory minimum amount of documented, continuous 

professional training for each screener every calendar quarter, be standardized, scheduled 

during duty hours, and performed locally. The training should also include testing to 

determine mastery of the material, and the test results made an element of the annual 

screener performance evaluation. 

In October and November 2003, TSA initiated a Screener Performance Improvement 

Program and a recurrent training program. 

Equipment and Technology 

There are several aspects of passenger screening that would benefit from the 

improvement or initial deployment of technology, as discussed below. 

Multi-view x-ray. At the screening checkpoint, several technological innovations or 

upgrades could improve the detection rate of test and actual threat objects. One such 

innovation is a dual- or multi-view x-ray machine. This x-ray machine has the potential 

to provide screeners with high resolution 3-D images that can be rotated on the screening 

monitor for optimal viewing, enabling screeners to identify both explosives and weapons 

easily. This technology, assuming such things as cost, size, weight, and other 

considerations are not an obstacle, might significantly increase screeners' ability to detect 

prohibited items, and prevent them from being carried into the sterile area and onto 

airplanes. 

Walk-Through Metal Detector Alarm Resolution (WTMD). There were instances where 

the WTMD alarmed, but screeners failed to resolve3 the alarm properly. A technology 

 

3

 Passenger Screening Standard Operating Procedures require screeners to resolve WTMD alarms by 

performing secondary screening. This involves the use of a handheld metal detector (HHMD). Screeners 

are required to resolve all areas that cause an HHMD to alarm to determine whether the passenger is 

carrying a prohibited item into the sterile area.
Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 4

that could be used to manage the resolution of WTMD alarms is backscatter x- rays.4 

Backscatter technology offers a more effective and unambiguous alarm resolution 

strategy than a pat-down inspection. Backscatter technology has some drawbacks, 

however, including the size and amount of space needed for the equipment, its cost, the 

rate of passengers screened per hour, and concerns about radiation exposure and privacy. 5

We recommended that TSA aggressively pursue the development and deployment of 

innovations and improvements to aviation security technologies, particularly for use at 

the screening checkpoint. TSA agreed with our recommendation and is working to 

implement it. 

Threat Image Projection (TIP). TIP is a computer software program that displays 

fictitious images of threat items in the actual image of passenger bags, or that projects 

entirely fictitious bags, with or without threat items, on to the x-ray monitor. TIP can be 

used both to train x-ray operators and evaluate their performance. TIP had been installed 

at all of the checkpoints at eight airports, at some of the checkpoints at four airports, and 

at none of the checkpoints at three airports. Also, there were some deployed x-ray 

machines that were not TIP-ready, i.e., that were not able to have the TIP library installed 

or operated. As of February 10, 2004, TSA reported that all of the TIP-ready x-ray 

machines had the full TIP library installed and activated, meaning that TIP was activated 

and being used to train and evaluate screeners. 

We recommended that the TSA Assistant Secretary improve and expand the TIP library. 

TSA noted that it has significantly expanded its image library, and plans to produce new 

images regularly to expand the image library. 

Policy and Procedures 

There are several areas where a change in screening checkpoint SOPs could increase the 

effectiveness of the screening process. TSA is evaluating our recommended changes. 

Management and Supervision 

While screeners are the first line of defense in preventing prohibited items from being 

carried into the sterile area, supervisors and screening managers are the first line of 

defense in ensuring that the screening force is performing its job diligently and 

effectively. The TSA Checked Baggage SOP requires screening supervisors to "actively 

monitor all screening activities... to ensure effective, vigilant, and courteous screening." 

 

4

 Backscatter is a non-physically intrusive inspection technology that displays both organic and inorganic 

materials hidden on a person's body. With backscatter technology, x-rays deflected off dense materials 

such as metal or plastic produce a darker image than those deflected off skin. 

5

 Backscatter images can be very revealing and may make many passengers reluctant to submit to this type 

of screening. However, there are ways to mitigate passenger concerns, including separating the backscatter 

operator and the subject, and using software enhancements to obfuscate the images.
Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 5

Supervisors and screening managers needed to be more attentive in identifying and 

correcting improper or inadequate screener performance. Screening supervisors and 

screening managers must be trained and sensitized to the primary role that they play in 

improving the performance of checkpoint screeners. Further, screening managers and 

screening supervisors must ensure that screeners are meeting a high standard of 

performance and are complying with published SOPs at all times. Any instances of noncompliance must be corrected on the spot. Screening managers and supervisors should 

receive specific training in detecting and correcting improper screening performance and 

should have that aspect of their responsibility made an element of their performance 

evaluations. 

We recommended that the TSA Assistant Secretary take appropriate steps to improve 

management and supervisory oversight of screeners. TSA initiated specific training for 

supervisors to address this recommendation.
Additional Information and Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Offi ce of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Offi ce of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.