IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 71290-0-1 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WITHDRAWING OPINION, AND SUBSTITUTING OPINION P.K. Appellant.


### The appellant, P.K., has filed amotion for reconsideration. The respondent, State 

### ofWashington, has filed an answer, and P.K. has filed areply. The court has taken the matter under consideration and has determined thatthemotion for reconsideration should
be denied. Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied; and, it isfurther 

### ORDERED that the opinion in the above-referenced case filed on May 4, 2015, is withdrawn and a substitute opinion be filed in its place. 7& 

# Donethis /3 " dayof Qy^ 2015. CZD

FOR THE COURT: 

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. -4 t-,

r\: <^Lv£,IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Detention of ] No. 71290-0-1 

## P.K., i DIVISION ONE Appellant. ] UNPUBLISHED OPINION t*5 fi.^h:'" i FILED: July 13, 2015

— ••- r~" CO, Trickey, J. — P.K. appeals the trial court's order revoking her release from 

### inpatient mental health treatment to a less restrictive alternative. She contends she is entitled to reversal ofthe order because the trial courtfailed to hold the revocation hearing within the time frame required by statute. P.K. also challenges the trial court's consideration ofevidence contained in her medical records and the conclusion that she had substantially decompensated. We affirm. FACTS 

### On August 15, 2013, the trial courtentered anorder involuntarily committing P.K. for a period of14 days. On September3, 2013, P.K. entered into anagreed orderfor 90 

### days ofa less restrictive alternative. The order required P.K. to live atEvans House, a 

### supportive housing facility. P.K was also required to attend all appointments with the DESC PACT1 team and take medications as prescribed. 

### The Statesubsequentlyfiled a petition torevoke the lessrestrictive alternative and return P.K. to a hospital setting. The record shows thatP.K. was detained at 5:50 a.m.

on November 11, 2013.

1 The Downtown Emergency Service Center's Program for Assertive Community Treatment provides intensive, community-based mental health services.No. 71290-0-1/2 A revocation hearing was held on November 18, 2013. The State offered the 

### testimony oftwo fact witnesses, Melina Breland and Robyn Hughes, and one expert witness, Gerri Pergola. Breland, P.K.'s PACTteam case manager, testified thatP.K. was required to meet 

### with the PACT team every morning for medication monitoring, but had missed at least 

### five appointments since her release from inpatient treatment in September. Breland testified that in early November P.K. left Evans House and was gone for four days. 

### Breland eventually located P.K. atP.K.'s mother's house. Breland alsotestified that P.K. had decompensatedfrom herbaseline level offunctioning. P.K.'s hygiene had noticeably deteriorated, sherefused to answer any ofBreland's questions, and sheasked Breland to call her by a different name. 

### Hughes, aresidentialcounseloratEvans House, testifiedthatP.K.'s hygienesince 

## September was consistently poor and P.K. was frequently covered in her own feces. 

## Hughes testified thatin Novembershe attempted to enforce ahouse rulewith P.K. P.K. screamed atHughes and Hughes "tookacouple steps backbecause [Hughes]justdidn't feel safe."2 Hughes testified the interaction "felt more threatening to [Hughes]" than previous contacts with P.K. 

### Pergola, a licensed clinical social worker at Fairfax Hospital, testified that she recommended the less restrictive alternative be revoked and P.K. remain hospitalized. 

## Pergola based her opinion on her review of P.K.'s medical records following her

2Report of Proceedings (RP) at 34.No. 71290-0-1/3
admission to Fairfax Hospital on November 11, 2013, a consultation with P.K.'s treatment team, and her own personal assessment of P.K. The State offered P.K.'s medical records as evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court admitted the records, stating: All right. The court will accept the Fairfax medical records as business records and treatments therein, statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. The court recognizes, however, that under the statute there are limitations ifthere are opinions as to [P.K.'s] mental state that are entered intothe record by someone ... otherthan this witness. The courtwill acceptthem solely forpurposes of supporting Ms. Pergola's expert opinions.[3] The trial court permitted Pergola to testify regarding the content of the records: So the physicalobservations Iwill allow as substantive evidence. The notes as to mental status I'll accept solely for your opinion.w 

### Pergola testified that, according to the records, P.K. was "uncooperative" with 

### questions, was "disorganized," and appeared to be "responding to internal stimuli."5 The records also showed P.K. had been decompensating and had a history of aggressive
behavior. 

### Pergola also testified that she met with P.K. the morning of the hearing to determine her level of functioning. P.K.'s responses to Pergola's questions were nonsensical and P.K. was unable to articulate any plan for her continued safety and
treatment outside of the hospital.

3 RP at 49-50. 4 RP at 56. 5 RP at 51-52, 57.No. 71290-0-1/4 P.K. constantly interrupted the proceedings with incoherent and tangential statements. When P.K. testified, she was unable to state her own name for the record. When asked ifshe wanted to return to Evans House, she agreed, but the remainder of her testimony was nonresponsive. The trial court revoked P.K.'s less restrictive alternative, finding that P.K. had violated the terms of the less restrictive alternative orderby missing medication meetings, 

### failing to physically reside atEvans House, and threatening Evans House staff. The trial court also found that P.K. had suffered a substantial decompensation. The trial court 

### remanded P.K. to inpatient treatment for the remainder of the 90-day period. P.K. appeals. ANALYSIS 

### Adesignated mental health professional (DMHP) may petition the trial court to revoke an orderfor a less restrictive alternative on one of the following grounds: (1) the 

### individual is failing to adhereto the terms and conditions ofthe less restrictive alternative; 

### (2) the individual's condition has undergone "[substantial deterioration;" (3) there is evidence of "substantial decompensation with a reasonable probability that the 

### decompensation can be reversed by further inpatient treatment;" or (4) "[t]he person 

### poses alikelihood ofserious harm." RCW71.05.340(3)(a)(i)-(iv). An individual detained pursuantto such apetition "shall be held until such time, not exceeding five days," as a hearing on the revocation can bescheduled. RCW 71.05.340(3)(c). At the hearing on 

### the petition, thetrial courtdetermines whetheranyofthe grounds in RCW71.05.340(3)(a) have been met, and if so, "whether theterms ofconditional release should be modified ortheperson should be returned to thefacility." RCW 71.05.340(3)(d).
4No. 71290-0-1/5

Timeliness ofthe Hearing P.K. argues that the trial court violated RCW 71.05.340(3)(c) because the revocation hearing was not heldwithin five days of her detention bythe DMHP. In support of her argument, P.K. cites to RCW 71.05.180, which governs the time by which a probable cause hearing must be held. RCW 71.05.180 provides: Ifthe evaluation and treatment facility admits the person, it may detain him or her for evaluation and treatment for a period not to exceed seventy-two hours from the time of acceptance as set forth in RCW 71.05.170. T_he computation of such seventv-two hour period shall exclude Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.® P.K. compares RCW 71.05.180 with RCW 71.05.340(3)(c), which provides: 

### Aperson detained under this subsection (3) shall be held until such time, not exceeding five days, as a hearing can be scheduled to determine whether ornotthe person should be returned to the hospital orfacility from which he or she had been conditionally released. 

### P.K. argues that because RCW 71.05.340(3)(c) is silent as to whetherthe five-day time period excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, we must presume that itdoes not. However, this courtrecently rejected a similarargument in In reDetention ofClark, 

### Wn. App. ,348 P.3d 1231 (2015), involving the timeliness ofacontinuance ofa 14- day commitment hearing. In Clark, we examined the legislative history ofchapter71.05 RCW and determined that, where the statute did not specify whether weekends and 

### holidays should be included, the SuperiorCourtCivil Rules governing the computation of time apply. 

### Thus, thecrucial question ishowtocountthe 48 and 24hourperiods 

### mandated by the statute—specifically, whether to exclude weekends and 

### holidays. Under RCW 71.05.180, the initial 72 hour detention excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. RCW 71.05.240(1) does not state the
6Emphasis added.No. 71290-0-1/6

same exclusion for continuances. Clark asks us to interpret this omission as evidence that the legislature intended for weekends and holidays to be categorically included when granting continuances. However, based on the history of this statute, we decline to do so.3
3 It is apparent that the difference between the two provisions was a legislative artifact. Originally, RCW 71.05.180 expressly included weekends and holidays when calculating the initial 72 hour period. Laws of 1973, 1st ex. sess., ch. 142, § 23. This indicated that RCW 71.05.180 was an exception to RCW 1.12.040, the general time computation statute which provides for exclusion of nonjudicial days. See Laws of 1887, ch. 20, § 1. RCW 71.05.240 did not specify whether weekends and holidays should be included when calculating the length ofcontinuances. See Laws of 1973, 1st ex. sess., ch. 142, § 29. We interpret this to mean that RCW 71.05.240 was—and is—subject to the general time computation statute. See Amalgamated Transit Union Legislative Council v. State, 145 Wn.2d 544, 552, 40 P.3d 656 (2002) ("The legislature is presumed to be aware of its own enactments."). RCW 71.05.180 was later amended to exclude weekends and holidays, signaling that the legislature reversed its position as to the 72 hour determinations. Laws of 1979,1stex. sess., ch.215, sec. 11. Clark, 348 P.3d at 1235. 

### CR 6(a), which controls thecomputation oftime forcivil proceedings, provides that 

### "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall beexcluded in thecomputation." The record shows that P.K. was detained at 5:50 a.m. on Monday, November 11, 2013. A revocation 

### hearing washeld onMonday, November 18, 2013. The intervening period contained one holiday (Veterans Day), a Saturday, and a Sunday. PursuanttoCR 6(a), thesedays are excluded from the computation of time. Thus, P.K.'s revocation hearing was timely because it was held four days after herdetention bythe DMHP.7
7P.K. contends that CR6(a) does not apply because proceedings under chapter 71.05 RCW are "special proceedings." CR 81 provides that the Superior Court Civil Rules govern all civilNo. 71290-0-1/7

Business Records P.K. argues the trial court erred when it allowed Pergola to testify to the content of medical records containing information about P.K.'s mental state. We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. DeVincentis. 150 Wn.2d 11, 17, 74 P.3d 119 (2003). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The record is clear the trial court properly considered this testimony only for the basis ofPergola's opinion, not as substantive evidence. P.K. relies on RCW71.05.360(9), which provides that "[t]he record maker shall not berequired totestify in ordertointroduce medical orpsychological records ofthedetained 

### person so long as the requirements ofRCW 5.45.020 are metexceptthatportions ofthe record which contain opinions as to the detained person's mental state must be deleted from such records unless the person making such conclusions is available for crossexamination." Butto the extent P.K. argues the trial court erred in admitting the medical records in violation of RCW 71.05.360(9), the record is insufficient to permit review because P.K. failed to designate the exhibit on appeal. Moreover, RCW 71.05.360(9) does not prohibit an expert witness from testifying

as to the basis oftheir opinion. ER 703 states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 

### opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. proceedings "[e]xceptwhere inconsistentwith rules orstatutes applicableto special proceedings." We need not address P.K.'s claim that proceedings under chapter 71.05 RCW are "special proceedings" because our decision in Clark makes it clear CR 6(a) isnot inconsistentwith RCW 71.05.340(3)(c).No. 71290-0-1/8 Pergola testified that she relied on the medical records in forming heropinion thatP.K.'s less restrictive alternative should be revoked. The trial court clearly stated it would not consider any statement ofopinion about P.K.'s mental status as substantive evidence. Furthermore, because this was a bench trial, we presume that the trial court based its 

### decision solely on admissible evidence. Crosetto v. Crosetto. 65 Wn.2d 366, 368, 397 

### P.2d 418 (1964). P.K. fails to establish any abuse of the trial court's discretion.8 Sufficiency ofthe Evidence P.K. contends the evidence was insufficient to show that she had substantially 

### decompensated. "Decompensation" is "the progressive deterioration of routine 

### functioning supported byevidence ofrepeated orescalating loss ofcognitive orvolitional control ofactions." In reDetention ofLaBelle. 107Wn.2d 196, 206, 728P.2d 138(1986). 

### Where, as here, a trial court has weighed the evidence, our review is limited to 

### determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the 

### findings supportthe conclusions oflaw. In re Detention ofA.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998). Thetrial court found thatwhen Breland located P.K. at her mother's house, P.K. 

### exhibited "delusional behaviorbeyond herusual level offunctioning."9 Thetrial courtalso found that P.K. exhibited "a consistentpattern ofbeing unable tocontrol herbowels" and 

### "symptoms ofbeing unable to focus or answerquestions."10 Furthermore, the trial court 8In reWelfare of J.M.. 130 Wn. App. 912, 924-25, 125 P.3d 245 (2005), which P.K. cites, is 

### distinguishable. In M, the trial courtadmitted medical records containing psychiatricdiagnoses as business records and considered them as substantive evidence. 9Clerk's Papers (CP) at 88. 10 CP at 88.
8No. 71290-0-1/9 found thetestimony ofBreland, Hughes, and Pergola to be credible. BecauseP.K. does 

### not challenge any ofthe trial court's findings, they are verities on appeal. See Cowiche Canvon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118 Wn.2d 801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). The findings 

### were sufficient to support thetrial court's conclusion thatP.K. had suffered a substantial decompensation in her functioning.
Affirmed. 

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WE CONCUR: 

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