Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Information Sharing With Fusion 


Centers Has Improved, but Information 


System Challenges Remain 


OIG-11-04 October 2010 
Office (~f Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

Homeland

Security

OCT 26 tOlD

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy,

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department.

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of DRS' information sharing with

state and local fusion centers and the implementation of information technology to

SUppOlt these activities. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant

agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

~/J/ Frank Deffer

Assistant Inspector General,

Information Technology Audits

.. ..'
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1 

Background ..........................................................................................................................2 

Results of Audit ...................................................................................................................9 

DHS’ Approach to Information Sharing With Fusion Centers ......................................9 

Information Sharing Systems.......................................................................................15 

Recommendations ........................................................................................................20 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................22 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .........................................................25 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .........................................27 

Appendix C: Related Reports on Fusion Center Information Sharing ........................32 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report .........................................................33 

Appendix E: Report Distribution .................................................................................34 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

HIR Homeland Intelligence Report 

HSDN Homeland Secure Data Network 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

HSIN-LE Homeland Security Information Network-Law Enforcement 

HS SLIC Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IT Information Technology 

NOC National Operations Center 

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

SBU Sensitive But Unclassified 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Figures
 

Figure 1: I&A Organization Chart................................................................................ 4 

Figure 2: OPS Organization Chart ................................................................................ 5 

Figure 3: Major DHS Information Sharing Systems .................................................... 6 

Figure 4: HS SLIC State and Local Usage ................................................................. 16 

Figure 5: HSDN State and Local Usage ..................................................................... 18 
 

OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We reviewed the department’s approach to information sharing 

with state and local fusion centers. Our objectives were to 

determine (1) the effectiveness of DHS’ strategy, processes, and 

activities for facilitating information sharing with fusion centers; 

and (2) the extent to which information technology systems 

support information sharing between the department and these 

centers. 

DHS has made progress in its efforts to improve information 

sharing with fusion centers. Fusion center personnel indicated that 

information sharing had improved over time and the information 

received from the department met their needs primarily due to the 

deployment of DHS intelligence officers to the centers. As a result 

of improved information sharing, fusion centers have successfully 

collaborated with the department during numerous large-scale 

events and maintained situational awareness after attempted 

terrorist attacks or other incidents. However, DHS component 

collaboration in the information sharing process needs 

improvement, and some intelligence products could better meet 

state and local needs. 

In addition, information technology systems do not fully support 

information sharing between DHS and state and local fusion 

centers. Specifically, fusion center personnel make limited use of 

information sharing systems and instead rely on emails for 

situational awareness and intelligence sharing. Personnel from 

fusion centers identified challenges with limited system content 

and usability, as well as the existence of too many federal systems 

and no ability to conduct comprehensive or simultaneous searches 

across multiple systems or department databases. 

We are making recommendations to the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis to improve information sharing and system capabilities. 

In addition, we are making recommendations to the Homeland 

Security Information Network Program Manager to address 

challenges identified with this system. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 1 
 

Background 

According to The 9/11 Commission Report, a breakdown in 

information sharing contributed to the collective failure to prevent 

the attacks.1 To promote greater information sharing and 

collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence and law 

enforcement entities, states and some major urban areas have 

established a network of fusion centers throughout the country. A 

fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 

provide resources, expertise, and information to maximize their 

ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and 

terrorist activity. These centers vary based on state and local needs 

and involve a range of federal, state, and local entities that collect 

and analyze terrorism, law enforcement, and other homeland 

security information. As of May 2010, there were 50 state and 22 

major urban area fusion centers. 

Over time, fusion centers have become an integral part of the 

federal government’s approach to information sharing with state 

and local partners. DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have 

worked with fusion centers since their inception. In August 2006, 

DHS and DOJ, in collaboration with state and local partners, 

published the Fusion Center Guidelines.2 These guidelines 

provide assistance to developing fusion centers and were intended 

to improve consistency among the state and local fusion centers, 

enhance coordination, strengthen regional and national 

partnerships, and improve fusion center capabilities. Further, in 

October 2007, President George W. Bush issued the first National 

Strategy for Information Sharing, which designated fusion centers 

as the primary state and local entities for sharing terrorism-related 

information.3 

DHS’ Role With Fusion Centers 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned DHS the mission to 

coordinate and share homeland security information across all 

levels of government, including federal, state, local, and tribal 

governments and the private sector.4 Since 2004, when states 

began creating fusion centers, DHS has taken steps to partner with 

1 The 9/11 Commission Report, July 2004. 2 Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, August 

2006. 

3 National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 

Information Sharing, October 2007.
 4

 Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 2 
 

 

these centers to accomplish its information sharing mandate. In 

addition, Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007.5 These same laws also require DHS to implement systems 

to support information sharing within the department and between 

federal, state, and local partners. This report addresses the role of 

two DHS components, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

(I&A) and the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

(OPS), that support fusion center development, share information 

with those centers, and provide information technology to facilitate 

information exchange. 

I&A 

I&A is the department’s lead component for coordination with 

fusion centers. The DHS Support Implementation Plan for State 

and Local Fusion Centers, implemented in June 2006, designated 

I&A as the executive agent for managing the department’s role in 

the nationwide fusion center initiative. I&A’s mission is to 

strengthen the department’s and its partners’ ability to perform 

their homeland security functions by accessing, integrating, 

analyzing, and sharing timely and relevant intelligence and 

information, while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of the 

people it serves. I&A’s strategic plan contains goals that include 

strengthening the Nation’s network of fusion centers and building 

support for and integrating a robust information sharing capability 

among state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities and the private 

sector. 

Within I&A, the State and Local Program Office was directing 

fusion center activities at the time of our audit. Among its 

activities to support fusion centers, the State and Local Program 

Office led the initiative to deploy intelligence officers to fusion 

centers to facilitate and coordinate information sharing between the 

centers and DHS. I&A deployed intelligence officers to 53 fusion 

centers, and also established six regional representatives at fusion 

centers in the National Capital Region, Northeast, West, Central, 

Southeast, and Great Lakes. Its goal is to deploy intelligence 

officers at all 72 fusion centers and establish ten regional 

representatives by the end of FY 2010. The State and Local 

Program Office also coordinated the deployment of classified and 

unclassified systems to support information sharing with fusion 

5

 Public Law 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 3 
 

centers. Figure 1 shows a simplified version of the organizational 

structure of I&A.6 

Figure 1: I&A Organization Chart 

During our fieldwork, I&A was reorganizing the State and Local 

Program Office to address the need for a department-wide 

approach to support and interface with state and major urban area 

fusion centers. Several I&A working groups, with representatives 

from other DHS components, created an implementation plan for a 

new program management office. The plan was approved by 

Secretary Janet Napolitano in March 2010, and the State and Local 

Program Office was maintained to lead the department-wide fusion 

center initiative. 

OPS 

Along with I&A, OPS has a primary role in sharing information 

with fusion centers. OPS’ mission is to integrate DHS and 

interagency planning and operations coordination in order to 

prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from terrorist threats or 

attacks and other manmade or national disasters. OPS is 

responsible for the National Operations Center (NOC), which 

serves as the primary national-level hub for domestic situational 

awareness, information sharing, communications, and operations 

coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and 

domestic incident management. Further, the NOC serves as the 

National Fusion Center to collect and immediately fuse all-source 

6

 I&A’s organization chart was in draft during our fieldwork. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 4 
information to quickly determine if there is a terrorism nexus. The 

NOC brings together state fusion center, law enforcement, national 

intelligence, emergency response, and private sector reporting. It 

also disseminates homeland security information to appropriate 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies, other homeland 

security partners, the DHS leadership, and the White House. 

Situated within the NOC and staffed by I&A personnel, 

Intelligence Watch and Warning has the mission to ensure a 

constant flow of information to homeland security partners at all 

levels using current, relevant, and actionable intelligence, and to 

share threat indications and warnings. Figure 2 shows a simplified 

version of the current OPS organizational structure. 

Figure 2: OPS Organization Chart 

Information Sharing Systems 

DHS has implemented several information technology (IT) 

systems to support information sharing with fusion centers. 

Specifically, I&A and OPS use the Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN) and the Homeland Security State and Local 

Intelligence Community of Interest (HS SLIC) for Sensitive But 

Unclassified (SBU) information. In addition, the Homeland 

Secure Data Network (HSDN) provides secret-level classified 

information to fusion centers that have access. Figure 3 provides 

current information on these major systems and networks. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 5 
 

Figure 3: Major DHS Information Sharing Systems 

HSIN 

HSIN was implemented in 2004 and designated as the official 

system for operational SBU information sharing within the 

department and with its partners in 2006. The mission of HSIN is 

to provide a secure and trusted national platform for SBU 

information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, local, 

tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners. HSIN 

contains several distinct portals for various communities such as 

emergency management, the private sector, and law enforcement. 

In addition, several states have implemented HSIN portals to share 

information within their jurisdictions. This report focuses on the 

HSIN Law Enforcement (HSIN-LE) portal.7

 HSIN-LE had a total 

of 642 users as of May 2010. As of June 2010, HSIN in its 

entirety had 50,000 registered users, 23,000 of which were 

considered active. Since its inception in 2004, DHS has spent 

$154 million on HSIN. The HSIN program is transitioning from 

OPS to the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO). 

HS SLIC 

I&A began a pilot information sharing portal for intelligence 

analysts in 2006, which was named HS SLIC in 2007.8 HS SLIC 

provides a secure information sharing and collaboration portal for 

federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial users engaged in 

intelligence analysis. According to the HS SLIC charter, it is a 

7

 The scope of our audit was limited to law enforcement and intelligence information sharing. 

8

 HS SLIC is a community of interest hosted on I&A’s secure web portal. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 6 
 

 

 

“virtual community” of intelligence officers and analysts from the 

law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence community 

who analyze crimes and threats that have a nexus to homeland 

security. As of May 2010, HS SLIC had a total of 3,409 account 

holders, 1,844 of which were state and local users. In addition, HS 

SLIC was used at 56 fusion centers. DHS program management 

estimated that the total cost of HS SLIC since its inception has 

been approximately $6 million. 

HSDN 

In 2004, DHS created HSDN to be the secret-level classified 

communications network for the department’s components and 

partners to share information and collaborate. HSDN provides 

state and local governments with the ability to access secret-level 

threat information and to communicate at the secret level with 

federal law enforcement and intelligence community partners. 

HSDN is owned and managed jointly by I&A and the DHS OCIO. 

I&A has prioritized the deployment of HSDN to state and local 

fusion centers. As of May 2010, HSDN had been deployed to 39 

fusion centers and had 611 state and local account holders. DHS’ 

goal is to deploy HSDN to all 72 fusion centers by the end of 2011. 

Prior Reports 

Prior audit reports have identified challenges pertaining to 

information sharing with fusion centers and the supporting 

technology. Specifically, in 2006 we identified challenges with the 

implementation of HSIN due to, among other things, the need for a 

clearly defined relationship with existing collaboration systems, 

inadequate user requirements, and limited system use.9 In 2008, 

we identified continued challenges with requirements gathering 

and inadequate metrics to evaluate system use and performance.10 

Further, in 2008 we reported on DHS’ evolving role with fusion 

centers and identified challenges providing fusion centers with 

timely and accurate information.11 Similarly, in 2007 the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on fusion 

center challenges accessing and managing multiple federal 

information sharing systems.12 Appendix C contains a list of prior 

9

 Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, OIG-06-

38, June 2006. 

10 DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network, OIG-09-07, October 2008. 11 DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving, OIG-09-12, December 2008. 12 Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and
 

Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35, October 2007. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 7 
OIG and GAO reports on information sharing with fusion centers 

and supporting federal IT systems. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 8 
 

 

Results of Audit 

DHS’ Approach to Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

DHS has made progress in its efforts to improve information sharing with 

fusion centers. Specifically, personnel from the fusion centers we 

contacted said that information sharing had improved, the process was 

effective overall, and the information received from DHS met their needs. 

Fusion center personnel attributed the improvement primarily to the 

deployment of I&A intelligence officers to the centers. As a result of 

improved information sharing, fusion centers have successfully 

collaborated with DHS during numerous large-scale events and 

maintained situational awareness after attempted terrorist attacks or other 

incidents. 

Despite progress toward more effective information sharing, several 

challenges remain. Specifically, DHS component collaboration in the 

information sharing process needs improvement, certain unfinished 

intelligence products could be timelier, and fusion centers could be offered 

more opportunities to contribute to finished intelligence products. 

Information Sharing Has Improved 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to share 

information with state and local partners, and the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires 

DHS to support fusion centers in fulfilling this mission.13 In 

addition, the National Strategy for Information Sharing designates 

fusion centers as the focal point to ensure that state and local 

governments have access to timely and actionable information and 

intelligence.14 

We interviewed fusion center personnel, including fusion center 

directors and other leadership, I&A representatives, and state and 

local analysts at 15 fusion centers. The majority of those 

interviewed said that information sharing had improved. For 

example, personnel at several fusion centers said that in the past, 

information was not always timely and relevant. Personnel at one 

fusion center, however, said that they now receive NOC updates 

every few minutes when incidents of national significance occur. 

13 Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002. Public Law 110-53, Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 14 National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 

Information Sharing, October 2007.
 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 9 
Fusion center personnel also said that information sharing was 

currently effective. For example, personnel at one fusion center 

said that information was shared effectively when a plane that had 

possibly been hijacked was heading toward that fusion center’s 

state. The NOC called the fusion center to inform them of the 

situation, and the fusion center was able to work with state partners 

to manage the situation, which turned out to be a false alarm. 

In addition, fusion center personnel generally felt that the 

information they received from DHS met their needs. For 

example, personnel at one fusion center said that DHS previously 

took a long time to produce lengthy reports that did not provide a 

lot of value. For instance, when major incidents occurred, such as 

the London bombings in July 2005, it could take several months 

for DHS to issue a report on the incidents. Personnel at this center 

said that information is now much timelier. 

DHS has improved information sharing by deploying I&A 

intelligence officers to fusion centers. Fusion center personnel said 

that the I&A intelligence officers provided a critical point of 

contact to facilitate communication with DHS, and the intelligence 

officers also filled prior information sharing gaps. For example, 

personnel at one fusion center said that its I&A intelligence officer 

provided timely and accurate information after the attempted 

bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, 

which they otherwise would not have received. Personnel at 

another fusion center said that its I&A intelligence officer was 

particularly helpful when the Guardians of the Free Republic 

began sending threatening letters to governors across the country. 

In this case, the I&A intelligence officer provided the fusion center 

with information on the experiences of other states, which allowed 

the fusion center to alert state officials early on what to expect and 

to seek assistance from the proper authorities. As of the end of our 

fieldwork, I&A intelligence officers had been deployed to 53 of 

the 72 fusion centers. The remaining 19 fusion centers relied on 

one of the six I&A regional directors. 

In addition to the deployment of I&A intelligence officers, several 

other DHS initiatives have contributed to information sharing 

improvements. Specifically, in 2009 I&A developed and provided 

the fusion centers an extensive list that identified the enduring 

intelligence and information needs of the department and its 

components. Fusion center personnel said that this list improved 

their understanding of the types of information that they should 

provide to DHS. To further improve the process, I&A is obtaining 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 10 
information requirements from all state and local fusion centers to 

enable DHS to better understand each center’s information needs. 

I&A and the NOC have also implemented a state and local support 

request process. Using this process, fusion centers can submit all 

requests for information directly to the NOC, which then forwards 

them to the office or component best suited to respond to the 

requests. Although personnel at some fusion centers said that the 

response time for some requests has been slow, they believe that 

the process provides accountability and has been effective. They 

also said that DHS provided them with adequate responses to their 

information requests. 

As a result of improved information sharing, fusion centers have 

successfully collaborated with DHS during large-scale events. For 

example, fusion centers coordinated information sharing for both 

the Republican and Democratic National Conventions in 2008. In 

addition, the Washington, DC, and other area fusion centers 

provided timely and relevant information during the 2009 

presidential inauguration, and they worked successfully with DHS 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to coordinate 

operational intelligence activities and update threat information. 

In addition, improved information sharing has helped maintain 

situational awareness after attempted terrorist attacks or other 

incidents. Specifically, one fusion center director said that if the 

attempted bombing in Times Square had occurred 3 years ago, 

personnel at the fusion center would have had to make calls to 

obtain information. Now, fusion centers no longer have to pull 

information, as DHS is proactive in pushing information to them. 

Similarly, personnel at several fusion centers said that DHS 

provided helpful information after an individual crashed a plane 

into an Internal Revenue Service building in Austin, TX. I&A 

developed an unclassified intelligence product called a “Snapshot” 

quickly after the incident to provide key facts about the incident to 

fusion centers. 

DHS’ improved ability to share information with fusion centers 

has not only kept state and local officials better informed during 

times of crisis, it has also assisted investigations. For example, 

officials at one fusion center said that they were informed of a 

suspicious shipment of chemical processing equipment from a 

private business in the United States to a buyer in the United 

Kingdom. Fusion center analysts passed this information to DHS, 

which then alerted the appropriate officials in the United Kingdom, 

leading to an investigation. Officials at another fusion center 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 11 
informed DHS about a string of propane thefts, which led DHS to 

produce a national intelligence product to alert every state to this 

potential threat. 

Information Sharing Challenges 

Despite the overall improvements, DHS continues to face several 

information sharing challenges. Specifically, DHS component 

collaboration in the information sharing process needs 

improvement. In addition, unfinished intelligence products have 

not always been timely, and the production process for finished 

intelligence products should allow for more fusion center 

collaboration. 

Component Collaboration 

DHS component collaboration in the information sharing process 

needs improvement. Specifically, although fusion center access to 

intelligence and situational awareness through I&A and the NOC 

has improved, access to information held by other operational 

components of the department was varied. Representatives from 

all of the operational components within DHS are assigned to the 

NOC to act as a single point of contact; however, many fusion 

center officials did not rely on this process. Several fusion center 

officials said that component representatives were reluctant to 

share information with state and local personnel. 

Instead of going through the NOC, fusion center personnel said 

that they rely on their own local points of contact at DHS 

component field offices. Reliance on personal contacts rather than 

the NOC has led to varying degrees of effectiveness for fusion 

centers attempting to obtain information from components. Fusion 

center officials were able to acquire information from components 

where they had strong local points of contact, but obtaining 

information from components where no contacts existed was 

difficult. For example, officials at one fusion center were able to 

effectively share information with Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), with 

which they had strong liaisons; however, this center did not have 

effective sharing with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE). Conversely, personnel at another center had good 

information sharing with liaisons at ICE, but had difficulty 

obtaining information from TSA. 

DHS is working to improve information sharing between fusion 

centers and DHS components. Specifically, DHS is deploying 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 12 
CBP and ICE representatives to some fusion centers. Additionally, 

the State and Local Program Office has undertaken an initiative to 

improve coordination among the different DHS entities and fusion 

centers. One fusion center official we spoke with called this 

initiative an important improvement to get all the DHS 

components working together. The official added that the 

department-wide approach will help improve relations between 

fusion centers and components that do not completely understand 

the role of fusion centers. 

Improvements to Intelligence Products 

Unfinished intelligence products are not always timely. I&A 

analysts produce unfinished intelligence reports, called Homeland 

Intelligence Reports (HIRs), that contain information that has not 

yet been fully evaluated. For example, HIRs are used to share 

information quickly with state and local personnel on suspicious 

activities prior to being fully vetted. However, an I&A quarterly 

performance report on the fusion center support request process 

shows that 144 HIRs were overdue as of March 2010. Of the 144 

overdue reports, 93 were more than 90 days behind schedule. 

Fusion center personnel identified the lengthy DHS headquarters 

review process required prior to dissemination as the main cause of 

delays. 

As a result, the information contained in the HIRs may no longer 

be relevant by the time it reaches the fusion centers. For example, 

one fusion center official said that its center received an HIR with 

information about a suspicious individual that was 6 months old. 

Another fusion center official said that it can take 9 to 10 months 

for the HIRs it produces to be disseminated, resulting in delayed 

access to this information for other fusion centers. Such delays 

have led some officials to avoid the DHS process and rely on the 

FBI to share unfinished intelligence information. 

In addition, I&A did not always provide fusion centers adequate 

opportunity to contribute to finished intelligence products. I&A 

analysts produce numerous intelligence products that are fully 

evaluated before distribution and are considered finished. For 

example, I&A analysts produce Homeland Security Assessments 

that provide in-depth analysis on a specific topic or threat, which are 

then provided to state and local personnel. However, officials at 

several fusion centers said that I&A did not allot enough time for 

fusion center analysts to contribute to these intelligence products. 

For example, one fusion center analyst said that the fusion center 

was given only 1 or 2 days to contribute to DHS’ intelligence 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 13 
products. Another fusion center official said that its fusion center 

was only given the opportunity to contribute to finished intelligence 

products if the center generated the product. Additionally, one 

fusion center official said that even though the center had 

information to contribute, DHS produced a finished intelligence 

product without providing the center the opportunity to include its 

information. An I&A official said that although a formal process to 

involve state and local analysts was not in place, one was being 

initiated. Without such a process in place, information that could 

have been provided by state and local officials may have been 

excluded. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 14 
 

Information Sharing Systems 

IT systems do not fully support information sharing between DHS and 

state and local fusion centers. Although DHS has implemented HSIN-LE 

and HS SLIC to share SBU information with fusion centers, and HSDN to 

share secret-level information, fusion center personnel make limited use of 

these systems. Instead, fusion center personnel rely on email for 

situational awareness and intelligence sharing. Fusion center personnel 

indicated that HS SLIC was difficult to navigate and search, and HSDN 

and HSIN-LE had limited useful content. In addition, fusion center 

personnel indicated that there were too many federal systems, and no 

ability to conduct comprehensive or simultaneous searches across multiple 

systems or DHS databases. Email may meet fusion centers’ need for 

situational awareness; however, collaboration across state, local, and 

federal partners to “connect the dots” to prevent and deter threats remains 

a challenge without effective information sharing IT systems. 

Limited System Use 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to establish a 

secure communications and IT infrastructure that allows federal, 

state, and local governments and other specified groups to access, 

receive, and analyze data, and to disseminate information acquired 

by DHS as appropriate.15 In addition, the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires the 

Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to establish a 

comprehensive IT network architecture to promote information 

sharing among intelligence and other personnel within the 

department.16 

Despite DHS’ efforts to implement IT systems, email and phone 

calls remain the primary methods for sharing information with 

fusion centers. NOC officials said that when an event of national 

significance occurs, it sends information to fusion centers and 

other stakeholders using email distribution lists. Personnel said 

that no one system functions as a “dashboard” that fusion centers 

can continuously monitor to receive real-time, constant notices and 

information. According to NOC officials, email is the one tool that 

stakeholders reliably monitor. Consequently, if information is not 

sent out via email, it may not reach all intended recipients. 

Further, email is available to personnel who are away from a 

computer and have access to only a handheld device, such as a 

15 Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002. 16 Public Law 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 15 
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Jan-09

Feb-09Mar-09

Apr-09

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Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

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49% logon each 

month on average

 

Jan-09

Feb-09Mar-09

Apr-09 

May-09 

Jun-09

Jul-09 

Aug-09 Sep-09 

Oct-09 

Nov-09 Dec-09 

Jan-10 

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10 

May-10 

BlackBerry. Fusion center personnel confirmed that email was the 

main tool for sharing information with DHS. 

Also, fusion center personnel make limited use of DHS IT systems 

for sharing information. Specifically, personnel from several 

fusion centers said that they logged into HS SLIC only 

occasionally for unclassified information sharing. Figure 4 

provides data on HS SLIC use from January 2009 to May 2010.17 Active Users

0% 

10% 

20% 

30% 

40% 

50% 

60% 

70% 

80% 

90% 

100%

Active Users 

49% logon each 

month on average 

Months 

Figure 4: HS SLIC State and Local Usage 

On average, from January 2009 to May 2010, only 49% of state 

and local account holders logged in each month. About a third of 

all inactive HS SLIC account holders, including headquarters and 

state and local accounts, have been so for 5 months or more. Users 

that logged in only did so an average of 4.5 times a month. In 

addition, usage is heavily skewed toward a small number of states 

that use the system much more than others. Specifically, in May 

2010, five states accounted for 44% of state logons. 

Although fusion center personnel who used HS SLIC said that 

some of the system’s functionality was beneficial, they said that it 

was difficult to search and find products and information. 

Specifically, personnel from several fusion centers said that the 

document library is difficult to navigate and the search tool is not 

effective. For example, fusion center personnel can set up alerts 

17 The total number of state and local accounts listed in the chart range from 1,307 on January 31, 2009 to 

1,844 on May 31, 2010. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 16 
on HS SLIC to receive email notifications when something is 

posted that meets defined alert criteria. However, personnel said 

that when they received the notifications they often could not 

locate the document due to the poor organization of the library and 

they could not search for the document because the search tool was 

ineffective. As a result, fusion center analysts said that they 

stopped logging into the system when they received an alert. 

Similarly, personnel from fusion centers did not use HSIN-LE for 

sharing SBU law enforcement information regularly. According to 

HSIN program office data, only 15 of the 72 fusion centers use 

HSIN-LE. In addition, the number of active HSIN-LE account 

holders is limited. In July 2009, headquarters personnel conducted 

a user cleanup of HSIN-LE to close accounts that had been 

inactive for more than 180 days. The cleanup reduced the number 

of accounts from approximately 7,000 to 1,000. HSIN-LE had a 

total of 642 users as of May 2010. Personnel from most of the 

fusion centers we contacted said that they did not use HSIN-LE 

because of the limited content available via the system. Several 

fusion center analysts said that they stopped logging in because 

information was not posted regularly in the past. The HSIN 

program has since started working to understand the needs of the 

HSIN-LE community to increase system use. For example, 

program personnel conducted a survey to obtain user feedback on 

HSIN-LE user needs. 

Fusion centers with access to HSDN for secret-level information 

also do not use their access often. As of May 2010, 39 of the 72 

fusion centers had access to HSDN, with a total of 611 state and 

local account holders. Of the 611 account holders, 197 had never 

logged into the system. Those that did log in did so infrequently. 

On average, from January 2009 to May 2010, state and local 

account holders logged in only 1.5 times each month. Figure 5 

shows the percentage of inactive account holders as of May 2010. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 17 
 

 

 

Figure 5: HSDN State and Local Usage 

Although fusion center personnel who used HSDN said that it 

improved their access to secret information, many said that they 

did not log in often because of the limited content available. 

Fusion center personnel found the secure video teleconference, 

access to the National Counterterrorism Center’s classified web 

portal, and secure email useful. However, users said that many of 

the links to additional information sources did not work, and state 

and local personnel were not given enough access to classified 

websites. As a result, some fusion center personnel rely on other 

means, such as FBI systems, to access secret-level information. 

Inadequate System Integration 

In addition to limitations specific to the systems, personnel from 

10 of the 15 fusion centers we contacted said that there were too 

many federal information sharing systems that are not integrated. 

GAO and OIG reports from as early as 2006 have identified the 

inadequate integration between HSIN and DOJ systems, including 

the Regional Information Sharing System and Law Enforcement 

Online.18 Fusion center personnel said that information was still 

not integrated and often redundant across systems, and users must 

maintain separate user names and passwords for each system. 

Further, the two primary portals within DHS for sharing SBU 

information with fusion centers—HSIN and HS SLIC—are not 

integrated. The HS SLIC community used HSIN portal services 

18 Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, OIG-06-

38, June 2006. Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland Security 

Need to be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455, 

April 2007. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 18 
from March to September 2006 but became concerned about the 

lack of critical capabilities and security within the HSIN portal 

environment. To address these concerns, I&A leadership developed 

a separate platform for HS SLIC to provide stronger security with 

two-factor authentication, as well as other functionalities such as 

secure messaging. As a result, users must maintain separate 

accounts, and information cannot easily be shared across systems. 

For example, if I&A personnel decide that a product from HS SLIC 

should be posted to HSIN, the product is typically emailed to the 

Senior Watch Officer at the NOC with a request that it be posted to 

the appropriate HSIN portals. DHS senior leadership has 

emphasized the need to consolidate unclassified information sharing 

portals within the department, and HS SLIC is scheduled to migrate 

to HSIN Next Generation, a DHS initiative to update HSIN, by the 

end of 2011. 

Additionally, personnel from several fusion centers said that the 

inability to conduct a comprehensive search across systems and 

databases is a major challenge. Currently, users must log into each 

system separately when searching for information. Personnel at 

several fusion centers said that finding time to access multiple 

systems is a challenge. These analysts said that it would be ideal 

to have one system that would allow the user, based on his or her 

access rights, to search several systems at once. 

According to system program officials, HSIN Next Generation 

contains plans to address some of these challenges. Specifically, 

there are plans to include a single sign-on capability to access both 

HSIN and other DHS systems, as well as other portals such as the 

DOJ’s Law Enforcement Online and Regional Information Sharing 

System. In addition, HSIN program personnel said that HSIN 

Next Generation can provide comprehensive search capabilities 

across systems, and system program officials are working with the 

DHS CIO and components to expand the capability. 

HSIN Next Generation development and deployment has 

encountered delays and faces challenges. Transition to HSIN Next 

Generation was initially scheduled for May 2009; however, as of 

the end of our fieldwork, the transition had been delayed until 

December 2010. Due to performance concerns, OMB halted 

development, modernization, and enhancement funding for HSIN 

beyond 2010, and identified several corrective actions. HSIN 

program officials plan to meet with OMB in October 2010 to 

review progress on the actions required to improve the program. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 19 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the State and Local Program Office 

within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #1: Deploy I&A representatives to remaining 

fusion centers, as applicable. 

Recommendation #2: Facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, the 

deployment of component representatives to fusion centers as 

necessary. 

We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis and the 

Deputy Under Secretary for Enterprise and Mission Support within the 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #3: Coordinate with the NOC to improve fusion 

center access to component information. 

We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis within the 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #4: Streamline the review process for 

unfinished intelligence products. 

We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary for Enterprise and 

Mission Support within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #5: Implement a process to include fusion 

center input for finished intelligence products. 

Recommendation #6: Coordinate with HSIN program 

management to integrate HS SLIC with HSIN Next Generation 

contingent on satisfaction of security and other user requirements 

to allow for single sign-on and the ability to share data across 

systems easily. 

Recommendation #7: Improve the organization and search 

capability within those systems used by the state and local 

intelligence community and define a strategy to encourage system 

usage. 

Recommendation #8: Complete installation of HSDN to all 

fusion centers and improve the availability of timely and relevant 

content through the system. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 20 
We recommend that the HSIN Program Manager: 

Recommendation #9: Evaluate and validate the mission need for 

the HSIN-LE portal within the environment of existing federal law 

enforcement information sharing portals. 

Recommendation #10: Pursue single sign-on and comprehensive 

search capabilities to improve integration of federal SBU systems 

and DHS databases available to fusion centers. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 21 
Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Deputy Under Secretary for Plans, Policy, and Performance 

Management within I&A, and the Acting Director for OPS. We 

have included a copy of the comments in their entirety in 

Appendix B. 

In their comments, the Deputy Under Secretary for Plans, Policy, 

and Performance Management within I&A, and the Acting 

Director for OPS concurred with our recommendations. 

Additionally, they provided details on steps being taken to address 

specific findings and recommendations in the report. We have 

reviewed management’s comments and provided an evaluation of 

the issues outlined in the comments below. 

In response to recommendation one, the Deputy Under Secretary 

concurred and stated that I&A continues to deploy intelligence 

officers and regional directors to fusion centers around the country, 

and is on track to have a deployed officer in every fusion center by 

the end of FY 2011. Once completed, this action will satisfy our 

recommendation. 

Responding to recommendations two and three, the Deputy Under 

Secretary concurred and stated that I&A recognized the importance 

of the recommendations. The Deputy Under Secretary suggested 

directing recommendation two to OPS as well as the State and 

Local Program Office, and minor reformatting of the language. 

We agreed with the suggested change in language. We did not 

redirect the recommendation to OPS because OPS had already 

completed its review of our recommendations. Additionally, we 

agreed with the Deputy Under Secretary’s request to assign 

recommendation three to both the Deputy Under Secretary for 

Analysis and the Deputy Under Secretary for Enterprise and 

Mission Support within I&A. We look forward to learning about 

progress toward addressing these recommendations. 

In response to recommendations four and five, the Deputy Under 

Secretary concurred with the recommendations. We agreed with 

the Deputy Under Secretary’s request to assign recommendation 

four to the Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis within I&A, and 

to assign recommendation five to the Deputy Under Secretary for 

Enterprise Mission Support for I&A. We look forward to learning 

about progress toward addressing these recommendations. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 22
 
In response to recommendation six, the Deputy Under Secretary 

concurred and stated that the HSIN Program Management Office is 

working closely with the HS SLIC community to assess the ability 

of HSIN to meet the requirements of this community for a web 

portal, including two-factor authentication, single sign-on, and 

secure messaging. The Deputy Under Secretary, however, 

reported that a delay has occurred in meeting the objective of 

migration into HSIN due to the reassessment underway by the 

OCIO of the HSIN program, including an analysis of alternatives 

regarding a technology platform. The HS SLIC requirements will 

be incorporated into the set of requirements for the HSIN Next 

Generation platform. The Under Secretary stated that the HSIN 

Mission Operations Committee will review all the requirements, 

including those specific to HS SLIC users, and assist the program 

in prioritization of the requirements. Once the HS SLIC 

community requirements have been implemented, the migration to 

HSIN will begin. As requested, we assigned this recommendation 

to the Deputy Under Secretary for Enterprise Mission Support. 

We believe that such efforts are good steps toward addressing our 

recommendation and look forward to learning more about 

continued progress and improvements in the future. 

The Deputy Under Secretary concurred with recommendations 

seven and eight. Responding to recommendation eight, the Deputy 

Under Secretary stated that I&A, through the National Security 

Systems Program, is working to deploy HSDN to all 72 recognized 

fusion centers. Additionally, the Deputy Under Secretary said that 

I&A is working with the Department of Defense to improve access 

to classified resources for State and Local users. We recognize this 

action as a positive step toward addressing recommendation eight. 

Responding to recommendation nine (recommendation seven of 

the draft report), the Acting Director of OPS concurred and stated 

that HSIN-LE supports DHS’ requirement to share Law 

Enforcement Sensitive information via a secure platform. In 

addition, the Acting Director said that HSIN-LE caters to a user 

base that is distinct from other law enforcement information 

sharing systems. However, the low numbers of active HSIN-LE 

user accounts and feedback from fusion center personnel showed 

that HSIN-LE had a limited number of users and useful content. 

We recognize the requirement for HSIN-LE and the steps that the 

HSIN program is taking to define and build the HSIN-LE user 

community. We look forward to learning more about continued 

progress and improvements in the future. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 23 
In response to recommendation ten (recommendation eight of the 

draft report), the Acting Director concurred and said that the HSIN 

Next Generation platform, scheduled for release beginning in FY 

2011, will incorporate a federated search capability and follow the 

Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management (GFIPM) 

standards. These standards will apply to the HSIN-LE Community 

of Interest, giving it the capability to conduct searches on Law 

Enforcement Online, Regional Information Sharing Systems, and 

other law enforcement information sharing portals. The HSIN 

program conducted a pilot test to integrate with the Department of 

Justice's Regional Information Sharing Systems. The initial phase 

of HSIN Next Generation GFIPM implementation has been 

completed. We believe that such efforts are good steps toward 

addressing our recommendation and look forward to learning more 

about continued progress and improvements in the future. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 24 
 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted an audit of DHS’ approach to information sharing 

with state and local fusion centers. Our objectives were to 

determine (1) the effectiveness of DHS’ strategy, processes, and 

activities for facilitating information sharing with state and local 

fusion centers; and (2) the extent to which IT systems support 

information sharing between DHS and these centers. Our audit 

focused on law enforcement and intelligence information sharing 

and did not address the requirements of the emergency 

management and private sector. 

We researched and reviewed federal laws and executive guidance 

related to DHS’ support of information sharing with fusion centers. 

We reviewed recent GAO and OIG reports to identify prior 

findings and recommendations. Using this information, we 

designed a data collection approach for our review, consisting of 

focused interviews and document analysis. 

We conducted interviews at DHS headquarters with both I&A and 

OPS personnel. At headquarters, we interviewed senior I&A and 

OPS leaders, including system owners and division directors, to 

discuss their roles and responsibilities related to DHS’ support of 

state and local fusion centers. We interviewed NOC personnel to 

learn about the current processes for sharing information with fusion 

centers. We also collected numerous documents from these offices 

about DHS accomplishments, current initiatives, and future plans 

to support fusion centers. 

We selected 15 fusion centers to contact based on a number of 

factors, including risk prioritization, geographic location, and 

inclusion of both state and major urban area centers. We visited 

seven fusion centers and conducted telephone conferences at the 

remaining eight centers. We interviewed a range of fusion center 

personnel, including the centers’ leadership, I&A representatives, 

and state and local analysts, to obtain feedback on information 

sharing with DHS and the supporting technology. We sought to 

evaluate existing practices for information sharing in the field and 

the extent to which headquarters provides tools for field users. 

Where possible, we obtained reports and other materials to support 

the information provided during the interviews. Additionally, we 

visited the Battle Lab in Herndon, VA, which was working on a 

federated single query search system. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 25 
We conducted our audit from March to June 2010 at DHS 

headquarters in Washington, DC, and at the following fusion 

center field locations: 

• Atlanta, GA 

• Austin, TX 

• Los Angeles, CA 

• Phoenix, AZ 

• Richmond, VA 

• Sacramento, CA 

• Washington, DC 

We conducted telephone conferences with the following fusion 

center locations: 

• Columbus, OH 

• East Lansing, MI 

• Fairfax, VA 

• Latham, NY 

• Maynard, MA 

• Minneapolis, MN 

• Providence, RI 

• Tallahassee, FL 

We performed our work pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions, based on our audit objectives. 

The principal OIG points of contact for this audit are Frank Deffer, 

Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology Audits, 

and Richard Harsche, Director of Information Management. Major 

OIG contributors to the audit are identified in Appendix D. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 26 
Appendix B 

Management Comments on the Draft Report 

Corresponds to 

recommendations 

#2 and #3 of the 

final report 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 27
 
Corresponds to 

recommendations 

#4 and #5 of the 

final report 

Corresponds to 

recommendation 

#6 of the final 

report 

Corresponds to 

recommendation 

#7 of the final 

report 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 28
 
Corresponds to 

recommendation 

#8 of the final 

report 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 29
 
Corresponds to 

recommendation 

#9 of the final 

report 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 30
 
Corresponds to 

recommendation 

#10 of the final 

report 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 31
 
Appendix C 

Related Reports on Fusion Center Information Sharing 

DHS OIG Reports 

DHS’ Efforts to Develop the Homeland Secure Data Network, 

OIG-05-19, April 2005. 

Homeland Security Information Network Could Support 

Information Sharing More Efficiently, OIG-06-38, June 2006. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information 

Network, OIG-09-07, October 2008. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving, OIG09-12, December 2008. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center, 

(Redacted) OIG-10-15, November 2009. 

GAO Reports 

Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to 

Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with 

Key State and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455, 

April 2007. 

Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate 

Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information 

Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35, October 2007. 

Information Sharing Environment: Definition of the Results to Be 

Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is 

Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress, GAO-08-

492, June 2008. 

Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and 

Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed, GAO-10-41, 

December 2009. 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 32 
 

Appendix D 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Information Management Division 

Richard Harsche, Director 

Steven Staats, Audit Manager 

Craig Adelman, Auditor 

Anna Hamlin, Auditor 

Steve Durst, Referencer 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 33 
Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

Audit Liaison for I&A 

Audit Liaison for OPS 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain 

Page 34 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.