NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION 

Enhancing Deterrence with 

Supplemental Nuclear Capabilities

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: A Growing Imbalance

In addition to modernization and fielding of new strategic nuclear capabilities, 

Russia is modernizing and expanding its arsenal of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This includes nuclear torpedoes, nuclear air and 

missile defense interceptors, nuclear depth charges, nuclear landmines, and 

nuclear artillery shells—more than a dozen types. None of these are limited by 

any current arms control treaty. 

The U.S. and Russia agreed to reduce or eliminate many of these non-strategic nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold 

War. Although the U.S. did so, and retains only a small number of one type (B61 nuclear gravity bombs), Russia has not 

fulfilled its commitment and has retained, modernized, and is expanding its non-strategic arsenal. The numerical 

imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons between Russia and the U.S. is very large and growing. 

Russia’s public statements and nuclear threats, its well-documented and wellrehearsed military doctrine to use nuclear weapons to “de-escalate” a 

conventional conflict, and its military resourcing decisions make clear that 

Russian leaders may perceive they can use these lower-yield, non-strategic 

nuclear weapons to coerce other countries and win a conventional conflict 

without a nuclear response from the United States.

U.S. Response

The U.S. nuclear deterrent must dissuade any adversary from mistakenly believing it can benefit from using nuclear 

weapons—even in a limited way—against the U.S. or its allies and partners. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review concluded 

that the U.S. must adapt its existing forces with two modest supplemental capabilities to ensure that Russia, China, and 

others do not perceive a gap in our regional deterrence posture.

These supplemental capabilities do not require nuclear testing, do not violate arms control treaties, and do not lower 

the U.S. threshold for nuclear use—these capabilities are intended to raise Russia’s nuclear threshold, not lower our 

own. They will address the imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons without matching Russia system for system and 

provide leverage for future arms control efforts. 

By modifying a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads to provide a low-yield option and 

by restoring a modern nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force, the U.S. will have assured and credible response 

options to nuclear attacks of any magnitude. This will discourage adversaries from limited nuclear attacks—

strengthening deterrence and helping prevent conflict in the first place.

“Russia demonstrates its perception 

of the advantage these systems 

provide...Correcting this mistaken 

Russian perception is a 

strategic imperative.” 

– 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

“Moscow has clearly stated in their 

doctrine that they are prepared to use 

nuclear weapons in regional conflicts:

‘escalate-to-de-escalate’ as they say.” 

– NATO Secretary General 

Jens Stoltenberg

“Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile is of concern because it facilitates Moscow's mistaken belief that 

limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia a coercive advantage in crises and 

at lower levels of conflict. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for adjustments to U.S. nuclear forces to close this 

perceived gap on the escalation ladder and reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.”

– General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, U.S. European Command