United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2009-8002 

SUSAN JUNEAU, KEVIN JUNEAU, 

RYAN JUNEAU, and STEVEN JUNEAU, 

As Surviving Spouse and Children of JOHN ROSS JUNEAU, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Respondent. 

Joseph P. Durham, Jr., Langley & Lee, LLC, of Albany, Georgia, for petitioner. 

Jeffrey A. Regner, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on 

the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, 

and Todd M. Hughes, Deputy Director. 

Appealed from: Public Safety Officers’ Benefits 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2009-8002 

SUSAN JUNEAU, KEVIN JUNEAU, 

RYAN JUNEAU, and STEVEN JUNEAU, 

As Surviving Spouse and Children of JOHN ROSS JUNEAU, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Respondent. 

On petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in 

PSOB claim no. 2004-110. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: September 29, 2008 

__________________________ 

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge MICHEL. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit 

Judge NEWMAN. 

MICHEL, Chief Judge. 

The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) denied the claim 

of Susan Juneau and her three children (Claimants) for benefits under the Public Safety 

Officers’ Benefits Act (the PSOB Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796 et seq. Because the BJA 

correctly determined that Mrs. Juneau’s deceased husband did not suffer a “personal 

injury” as contemplated by the PSOB Act, this court affirms. 

 
I. BACKGROUND 

The City of Albany, Georgia, employed John Ross Juneau as the Safety Chief at 

the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport, a position that required Mr. Juneau to be a law 

enforcement officer certified by the State of Georgia. In addition to his employment as 

the airport Safety Chief, Mr. Juneau also worked part time as a security guard for 

Dillard’s, Inc., a department store located in the Albany Mall. 

On March 2, 2003, while working at Dillard’s, Mr. Juneau noticed two people who 

he believed were shoplifting. As Mr. Juneau approached the suspects, they began to 

flee, and a chase on foot ensued. After chasing the suspects out of the store and 

across the Albany Mall parking lot, Mr. Juneau caught one suspect and brought him to 

an interview room at Dillard’s for interrogation. After sitting down, Mr. Juneau slumped 

over in his chair and lost consciousness. Mr. Juneau was taken to a hospital, but he 

was pronounced dead shortly after arriving there.

Mr. Juneau’s death certificate lists his cause of death as “[c]omplications of 

coronary atherosclerotic disease . . . in a background of insulin dependent diabetes 

mellitus.” An autopsy was performed by Dr. Anthony Clark, the same doctor who 

completed the death certificate; Dr. Clark’s autopsy report listed the same cause of 

death as the death certificate and stated that “no evidence of significant recent or 

remote traumatic injuries” was present. 

After Mr. Juneau’s death, his wife and children applied to the Georgia State 

Indemnification Commission, which ultimately held that, because Mr. Juneau had died 

in the line of duty, his estate should receive benefits from the State of Georgia. Key in 

the Georgia State Indemnification Commission’s decision was an opinion from the 

2009-8002 2 
Georgia Attorney General considering whether “an off-duty law enforcement officer 

[who] is working as a security guard and [who] dies from a heart attack pursuing 

shoplifters” could be said to have died “in the line of duty.” 

The Claimants also applied to the BJA for benefits under the PSOB Act, which 

provides a one-time cash payment to survivors of “a public safety officer [who] has died 

as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty.” 42 

U.S.C. § 3796(a). In October 2004, the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits (PSOB) Office 

denied this claim on two grounds: (1) Mr. Juneau was serving as a private security 

guard rather than as a public safety officer at the time of his death, and (2) Mr. Juneau’s 

death was not the result of a traumatic injury. On the latter point, the PSOB Office 

relied on the decision of this court’s predecessor in Smykowski v. United States, 647 

F.2d 1103 (Ct. Cl. 1981), to find that Mr. Juneau’s death, resulting from “a chronic, 

congenital, or progressive disease or other condition,” was not a death resulting from a 

“personal injury,” as that term is used in the PSOB Act. 

In February 2005, Claimants appealed the initial determination to a hearing 

officer. The hearing officer heard testimony from Mr. Juneau’s wife and from employees 

of Dillard’s and the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport. He also received documentary 

evidence from Dr. Clark, who had performed the autopsy on Mr. Juneau; Dr. Laurence 

T. Crimmins, Mr. Juneau’s family physician; and two physicians from the Armed Forces 

Institute of Pathology, Dr. Dzuy Nguyen and Dr. Craig Mallak. Dr. Nguyen and Dr. 

Mallak agreed with Dr. Clark that “Mr. Juneau died from atherosclerotic cardiovascular 

disease, a natural process.” Dr. Crimmins, though, argued that he believed that Mr. 

2009-8002 3 
Juneau “died as a result of trauma, specifically the trauma to his body caused by the 

chase and apprehension of the shoplifting suspect in the minutes before his collapse.” 

In March 2007, the hearing officer reversed the October 2004 determination, 

finding both that “the physical nature of the lengthy chase . . . as well as the energy 

exerted while chasing the suspect . . . were substantial factors contributing to John 

Ross Juneau’s death” and that, “when Mr. Juneau exited the doors of Dillard’s, he was 

acting within the scope of his duties as a State of Georgia law enforcement officer, not 

as a security guard.” Having thus disposed of both problems found in the initial 

determination, the hearing officer held that Mr. Juneau’s survivors were “eligible for 

coverage under the [PSOB] Program.” 

In October 2008, the director of the BJA reviewed the hearing officer’s decision. 

The director agreed with the hearing officer that Mr. Juneau was a “public safety officer” 

within the meaning of that term as used in the PSOB Act, but the director reversed the 

hearing officer’s determination that Mr. Juneau died as a result of an “injury,” as that 

term is used in the PSOB Act. Because the director’s finding that Mr. Juneau did not 

die as the result of an injury required denial of benefits, the director did not make any 

finding regarding whether Mr. Juneau was acting in the line of duty at the time of his 

death. 

Claimants have appealed the director’s final decision that Mr. Juneau did not die 

as a result of an “injury,” as that term is used in the PSOB Act. This court has 

jurisdiction over Claimants’ appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 3796c-2. 

2009-8002 4 
II. DISCUSSION 

Our review of a denial of benefits under the PSOB Act by the BJA is limited to 

three inquiries: “(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory 

requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been 

any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and 

(3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim.” AmberMessick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

The BJA has promulgated regulations implementing the requirement of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3796(a) that it pay a benefit of $250,000 to survivors of any public safety officer who 

“die[s] as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of 

duty.” Among Claimants’ arguments is that, in determining that Mr. Juneau did not die 

of an “injury” within the meaning of the PSOB Act, the BJA improperly applied versions 

of its regulations that were not promulgated until after Claimants filed their claim. In 

particular, Claimants argue that the BJA should have applied the versions of 28 C.F.R. 

§ 32.4, providing that “any reasonable doubt arising from the circumstances of the 

officer’s death” should be resolved “in favor of payment of the death . . . benefit,” and 28 

C.F.R. § 32.5, providing that the BJA should “give substantial weight to the evidence 

and findings of fact presented by State, local, and Federal administrative and 

investigative agencies,” that were in effect in 2004, rather than applying the versions of 

these regulations presently in effect, which do not contain these provisions. Chiefly, 

Claimants believe that, had the BJA applied the 2004 version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.5 to give 

“substantial weight” to the findings of the Georgia State Indemnification Commission, 

the BJA could not have then found, as it did, that Mr. Juneau’s death was anything other 

2009-8002 5 
than the result of an “injury.” Claimants also suggest that, had the BJA applied the 2004 

version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 to resolve reasonable doubt in Claimants’ favor, the 

disagreement between Mr. Juneau’s family physician and the three pathologists who 

presented opinions on the cause of Mr. Juneau’s death would have been resolved by 

agreeing with Dr. Crimmins that the trauma experienced by Mr. Juneau constituted an 

“injury” within the meaning of the PSOB Act. 

We disagree on both counts. First, the findings of the Georgia State 

Indemnification Commission were irrelevant to the BJA’s decision regarding whether or 

not Mr. Juneau suffered an “injury.” The Georgia State Indemnification Commission 

focused entirely on the question of whether Mr. Juneau died in the line of duty, no 

surprise given that the relevant Georgia statute contains no requirement that an officer 

have died as the result of an “injury,” but rather only a requirement that the officer have 

been “killed in the line of duty.” Ga. Code Ann. § 45-9-82(a)(1). Thus, the state agency 

made no findings relevant to any issue other than whether Mr. Juneau died in the line of 

duty, an issue not presented by this appeal. Regardless of whether Claimants are 

correct that the 2004 version of the BJA regulations should have been used instead of 

the present version, the outcome of the BJA’s analysis would have been identical either 

way. Given the irrelevance of this issue to the appeal, the Court need not reach the 

question of which version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.5 should have been used. 

A similar problem exists with respect to Claimants’ argument that the BJA should 

have applied the 2004 version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4. Even if Claimants were correct, the 

old version of the regulation merely required that the BJA resolve “reasonable” doubt in 

Claimants’ favor. Given that two pathologists appointed by the BJA agreed with the 

2009-8002 6 
pathologist who performed the autopsy on Mr. Juneau that Mr. Juneau did not suffer 

any traumatic injury, the testimony of Mr. Juneau’s family physician—who had not seen 

Mr. Juneau for two years before his death—that Mr. Juneau experienced trauma is not 

sufficient in our view to create reasonable doubt about whether that trauma was the 

result of an “injury” within the meaning of the PSOB Act. Given the lack of reasonable 

doubt, even application of the 2004 version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 would not have required 

the BJA to adopt the findings of Dr. Crimmins. Again, then, the Court need not reach 

the question of which version of the regulations should have been applied. 

This leaves only the issue of whether the bodily condition that killed Mr. Juneau, 

which counsel for the BJA characterize as a “heart attack” and which Claimants refer to 

as a “traumatized condition of the body” caused by the body being in “a hypoxic state,” 

constitutes an “injury,” as that term is defined in the regulations promulgated by the BJA 

to implement the PSOB Act. Once again we are faced with a change in the language of 

the regulations. Both the 2004 version and the present version of the regulations 

provide a definition of “injury,” but, as with the other regulations discussed above, it 

makes no difference which version of the regulations we apply. 

The present version of the PSOB regulations provides definitions at 28 C.F.R. 

§ 32.3 and defines the term “injury” as: 

a traumatic physical wound (or a traumatized physical condition of the 

body) directly and proximately caused by external force (such as bullets, 

explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects, or physical blows), 

chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious disease, radiation, virii 

[sic], or bacteria, but does not include -- 

(1) Any occupational disease; or 

(2) Any condition of the body caused or occasioned by stress or strain. 

2009-8002 7 
28 C.F.R. § 32.3 (2009). The 2004 version of the regulations provides a definition of 

“injury” at 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(e) as “any traumatic injury, as well as diseases which are 

caused by or result from such an injury, but not occupational diseases.” The 2004 

regulations further define “traumatic injury” as “a wound or a condition of the body 

caused by external force, including injuries inflicted by bullets, explosives, sharp 

instruments, blunt objects or other physical blows, chemicals, electricity, climatic 

conditions, infectious diseases, radiation, and bacteria, but excluding stress and strain.” 

28 C.F.R. § 32.2(g). Thus, the 2004 regulations can be synthesized to provide a 

definition of injury as “any [wound or condition of the body caused by external force, 

including injuries inflicted by bullets, explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects or 

other physical blows, chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious diseases, 

radiation, and bacteria, but excluding stress and strain], as well as diseases which are 

caused by or result from such [a wound or condition of the body], but not occupational 

diseases.” But for the addition in the present regulation of wounds or bodily conditions 

caused by viruses, this definition is essentially identical to that presently in effect. 

Here, we agree with the BJA that Mr. Juneau’s death was not caused by an 

“injury” falling within this definition. There is no dispute that Mr. Juneau’s chasing the 

shoplifting suspects on foot gave rise to a traumatic condition that, given his “coronary 

atherosclerotic disease” and “insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus,” caused his heart to 

fail. But a traumatic condition, even one caused by actions taken in the line of duty as a 

law enforcement officer, is not sufficient to warrant payment of benefits under the PSOB 

Act. The traumatic condition must also be caused by an injury, and such was not the 

case here. 

2009-8002 8 
Among other things, both the 2004 definition and the present definition have in 

common that conditions caused by “stress or strain” are excluded from the definition of 

“injury,” even if those conditions can be characterized as “traumatic.” Here, Mr. 

Juneau’s traumatic bodily condition was caused by the stress and strain occasioned by 

his chasing the shoplifting suspects out of Dillard’s and across the mall parking lot, 

physically apprehending one suspect, and bringing that suspect back into the 

department store for interrogation. This conclusion is supported by all four physicians 

who presented opinions to the BJA. Dr. Clark, who performed the autopsy, stated that 

Mr. Juneau’s death was natural and a result of “complications of coronary artery 

disease in a background of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus,” and he found “no 

evidence of significant recent or remote traumatic injuries.” Dr. Nguyen and Dr. Mallak, 

who were asked by the BJA to answer the question of whether Mr. Juneau’s death 

could be “attributed to the direct or proximate result of the traumatic injury he sustained 

in the line of duty,” answered that “[t]here was no evidence of a traumatic injury” and 

that death could be expected for someone with “severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular 

disease . . . when the heart is subjected to increased oxygen demand such as 

strenuous work.” Finally, even Dr. Crimmins, Mr. Juneau’s own physician, stated only 

that Mr. Juneau “died as a result of trauma . . . caused by the chase and apprehension 

of the shoplifting suspect in the minutes before his collapse,” providing no opinion 

regarding any injury that Mr. Juneau sustained that might have caused the trauma. 

Given this consistent medical evidence, we cannot say that the BJA’s decision fails the 

requirement that it be supported by substantial evidence. Amber-Messick, 483 F.3d at 

1321. 

2009-8002 9 
Claimants argue that, merely because Mr. Juneau died from a “traumatic 

condition of the body” that was “directly attributable [to] the events” following Mr. 

Juneau’s detection of the alleged shoplifting at Dillard’s, his death satisfies the injury 

requirement of the PSOB Act. This ignores the portion of the definition that lays out the 

causes of traumatic bodily conditions that render those conditions “injuries” under the 

PSOB Act. The definition limits these causes to “external force (such as bullets, 

explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects, or physical blows), chemicals, electricity, 

climatic conditions, infectious disease, radiation, [viruses], or bacteria.” 28 C.F.R. § 

32.3 (2009). None of these causes was present in Mr. Juneau’s case; the record shows 

no evidence of Mr. Juneau’s having been shot, stabbed, hit, involved in an explosion, 

exposed to chemicals, electricity, or unusually adverse climatic conditions, infected with 

any disease-causing agent, or subjected to radiation. Instead, the record amply 

demonstrates, as the BJA held, that Mr. Juneau’s traumatic bodily condition stemmed 

directly from the stress and strain of chasing and apprehending the shoplifting suspects. 

To avoid this conclusion, Claimants argue that this case is factually similar to that 

presented to the Court of Federal Claims in Bice v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 432 

(2006), in which the court awarded PSOB benefits to a firefighter who died of a heart 

attack a little more than one month after having been exposed to heavy smoke while 

fighting a forest fire. Claimants suggest that here, Mr. Juneau’s death is attributable to 

what happened to him on the job, just as Ms. Bice’s death was attributable to the smoke 

she inhaled in Bice. But this misses the point. In Bice, the issue was whether the 

firefighter’s death was attributable to her smoke inhalation, or whether it was instead 

attributable solely to her pre-existing heart disease. 72 Fed. Cl. at 436. There was no 

2009-8002 10 
2009-8002 11 

issue regarding whether there was an appropriate injury that occurred in the line of duty, 

only whether that injury was actually the cause of the firefighter’s death. Id.; see also 

Bice v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 420, 430-31 (2004) (decision pre-dating remand to 

the BJA, finding that smoke inhalation constitutes a traumatic injury, because smoke is 

a climatic condition). Here, we encounter precisely the opposite scenario: there is no 

dispute that Mr. Juneau’s death was caused by activities he performed in chasing down 

the shoplifting suspects, but there is a question whether he suffered any “injury” in the 

course of those activities that entitles his survivors to benefits. We answer this question 

in the negative. 

The situation here is factually most similar to that in Smykowski, in which this 

court’s predecessor found no benefits payable where a police officer died of a heart 

attack after he entered a house in which a suspect was hiding, found the suspect, and 

struggled with the suspect for a few minutes. 647 F.2d at 1106. The Court of Claims 

noted that it could not “accept . . . that physical struggle represents a form of traumatic 

injury. . . . At most, a physical struggle can serve as the occasion for the sustaining of 

injuries.” Id. Similarly, Mr. Juneau in this case chased and apprehended a suspect. 

Just as our predecessor court found it difficult to accept that a struggle could be called 

an injury, we have trouble seeing how a foot chase can be called an injury. Thus, we 

agree with the BJA that Mr. Juneau did not die as a result of the type of “injury” that is 

compensable under the PSOB Act. 

COSTS 

No costs. 

AFFIRMED
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 2009-8002 

SUSAN JUNEAU, KEVIN JUNEAU, 

RYAN JUNEAU, and STEVEN JUNEAU, 

As Surviving Spouse and Children of JOHN ROSS JUNEAU, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Respondent. 

On petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in PSOB Claim No. 

2004-110. 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

On May 2, 2003, John Ross Juneau, an airport safety chief, while working as a parttime security guard at a department store, ran after two persons he believed had committed 

a crime and who were fleeing outside the store, and apprehended one of the suspects. A 

short time thereafter Mr. Juneau collapsed and died. Mr. Juneau’s surviving family 

members filed a claim pursuant to the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act (PSOBA), which 

provides for payment to beneficiaries when “a public safety officer has died as the direct 

and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty.” 42 U.S.C. §3796(a). 

 The medical examiner who performed the autopsy stated that the “immediate precipitating 

factor contributing to the cause of death was the chase and surrounding events on May 2, 
2003.” Mr. Juneau’s family physician stated that “John Ross Juneau died as a result of 

trauma, specifically the trauma to his body caused by the chase and apprehension of the 

shoplifting suspect in the minutes before his collapse on May 2, 2003.” 

A Hearing Officer for the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Dr. Voncile B. Gowdy, 

heard live testimony at a hearing and then requested further documentary evidence, 

including an independent medical evaluation by two physicians from the Armed Forces 

Institute of Pathology. Dr. Gowdy considered all of the facts and circumstances of Mr. 

Juneau’s death and concluded that the requirements of the statute were met. Dr. Gowdy 

remarked that there were discrepancies between the medical evaluation he had ordered 

(which was based solely on documentation of Mr. Juneau’s death) and the medical 

opinions of the coroner and Mr. Juneau’s family physician (who had personally observed 

Mr. Juneau’s body). The Hearing Officer applied the BJA’s “reasonable doubt” regulation 

then in effect, to resolve the issue in favor of the claimants. See 28 C.F.R. §32.4 (2004) 

(“The Bureau shall resolve any reasonable doubt arising from the circumstances of the 

officer’s death or permanent and total disability in favor of payment of the death or disability 

benefit.”).1

 The Hearing Officer concluded that “the physical nature of the lengthy chase, 

coupled with the condition of the weather that was present that day, as well as the energy 

exerted while chasing the suspect on May 2, 2003 were substantial factors contributing to 

 1

 The Department of Justice argues in this appeal that a regulatory change in 

2006 that removed the reasonable doubt standard had retroactive effect to the 2003 death 

of Mr. Juneau. That retroactivity argument has been rejected by this court and the Court of 

Federal Claims, which courts have applied the pre-2006 BJA regulation to claims that 

accrued before the regulatory change. See Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 

1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Winuk v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 207, 215 (2007).

2009-8002 2
John Ross Juneau’s death.” 

The Director of the BJA, reversing the decision of the Hearing Officer, determined 

that Officer Juneau had suffered no injury, despite his death from heart failure that all agree 

was caused by his strenuous pursuit and apprehension of an apparent criminal. This is an 

implausible conclusion, and is not reconcilable with the purpose of the PSOBA. See

Demutiis v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 81, 86 (2000) (“The PSOBA is likewise remedial in 

nature and thus should not be applied grudgingly, but rather should be construed liberally to 

avoid frustration of its beneficial legislative purpose.”); see also Baltimore & Phila. 

Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932) (laws designed to compensate 

employees for “personal injuries and deaths occurring in the course of their work” are 

“deemed to be in the public interest and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the 

purpose for which they were enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh 

results”). 

The Department of Justice does not dispute that Mr. Juneau was acting “in the line 

of duty,” as required for benefits under the PSOBA. See 42 U.S.C. §3796(a). It is also not 

disputed that Mr. Juneau’s act of running down and apprehending a person he believed 

had committed a crime was the direct and proximate cause of his death; that is, Mr. Juneau 

died from the physical trauma induced by the encounter. The Director of the BJA 

nonetheless found that Mr. Juneau had not been injured in the line of duty. The Director 

apparently ignored or discounted the medical evidence that supported the petitioners’ 

claim, and did not take account of the reasonable doubt regulation. This was in violation of 

the BJA regulations that applied to the petitioners’ claim. 

2009-8002 3
The terms and purpose of the PSOBA are squarely met on the facts of this case. 

The public interest served by this law is not in dispute. The Director’s decision, affirmed by 

my colleagues on this panel, is not the appropriate application of the PSOBA. I respectfully 

dissent. 

2009-8002 4