Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Risk Management Advisory 

for the SBInet Program Initiation

Office of Audits 

OIG-07-07 November 2006
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

November 14, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This advisory report addresses risks and challenges for the SBInet program initiation. It is based on 

interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, 

and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report 

will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all 

of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

 Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 1 

Background .................................................................................................................................... 2 

Results of Review .......................................................................................................................... 3 

Organizational Capacity for Management and Oversight ....................................................... 3 

Operational Requirements & Performance Management ........................................................ 6 

Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 9 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................................... 10 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Lessons Learned From Other DHS Major Acquisition Programs ..................... 11 

Appendix B: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ..................................................................... 14 

Appendix C: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report .................. 15 

Appendix D: Chief Procurement Officer Response to the Draft Report ................................. 22 

Appendix E: Major Contributions to this Report .................................................................... 23 

Appendix F: Report Distribution ............................................................................................. 24 

Abbreviations 

APB Acquisition Program Baseline 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CPO Chief Procurement Officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EAB Enterprise Architecture Board 

IRB Investment Review Board 

JRC Joint Requirements Council 

OBP Office of Border Patrol 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PMO Program Manager Office 

RFP Request for Proposal 

SBI Secure Border Initiative 

SBInet Secure Border Initiative network 

SOO Statement of Objectives 
Advisory OIG Report 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The purpose of this report is to highlight certain acquisition risks 

associated with the SBInet program. This is the first in a series of 

reviews we plan to perform of the SBInet program and its contracts. 

We reviewed the acquisition strategy of the SBInet program and 

sought to determine whether lessons learned from other DHS major 

acquisitions were being applied. We focused our review on the two 

most critical risk areas for a new program: organizational capacity and 

operational requirements. 

We analyzed prior DHS OIG and GAO reviews of other major 

acquisition programs within the department (See Appendix A). We 

then reviewed DHS’ capacity for managing the program and SBInet’s 

operational requirements. We completed our review in August 2006 

and provided draft reports to department officials prior to the award of 

the systems integration contract in September 2006. 

Although the department was actively seeking to identify and apply 

lessons learned from the experience of other DHS programs, it had not 

established, prior to awarding the contract, the organizational capacity 

to oversee, manage, and execute the program; or properly defined, 

validated, and stabilized its operational requirements. 

Since our review, the status of the SBInet program has changed 

substantially, most notably, the award of the Boeing contract. With 

the selection of the solution proposed by Boeing, the department has 

moved rapidly to refine and stabilize requirements and implement 

performance management systems and processes, while continuing to 

build up its program management and program oversight capacity. 

Although the department is taking the necessary steps to mitigate 

many of the attendant risks associated with a performance based 

contract, much more work remains before adequate controls are in 

place to ensure effective contract oversight and implementation. 

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Background 

In the fall of 2005, the White House and the department announced the 

Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive multi-year effort to 

secure the borders and reduce illegal immigration, which included a 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement led plan to increase and 

improve the apprehension, detention, and removal of illegal aliens; a 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service led plan for expanding the 

guest worker program and streamlining immigration benefits 

processes; and a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) led 

program to gain control of the nation’s land borders. The CBP 

program, referred to as SBInet, is intended to improve border control 

operations, deploying more infrastructure and personnel with 

modernized technology and tactics. 

The objective of SBInet is to develop solutions to manage, control, and 

secure the borders using a mix of proven, current, and future 

technology, infrastructure, personnel, response capability, and 

processes. SBInet is a new major acquisition program that replaces 

and expands upon two previous efforts to gain control of the borders: 

the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) and the 

America’s Shield Initiative (ASI). The department recognized that 

differences in the geography and conditions among sectors of the 

border require a different mix of technology, infrastructure, and 

personnel. Therefore, the department decided to award a multi-year 

contract to a systems integrator to manage this effort. 

To select the systems integrator, the department issued a request for 

proposals in April 2006, asking industry to propose a unified border 

control strategy and provide solutions that include the full range of 

services, products, and management required to ensure 

accomplishment of the SBInet program objectives. In response, 

industry teams defined approaches and tasks for a national strategy, as 

well as a tailored implementation plan for a Border Patrol sector. 

In September 2006, the department awarded an indefinite delivery, 

indefinite quantity contract, leaving the work tasks and deliverables 

largely undefined until the government negotiates a specific delivery 

task order. The program office plans to negotiate separate task orders 

for each of the Border Patrol’s 20 sectors spanning the northern and 

southern borders. The contract base period is only three years with 

three 1-year options; however, early plans were for a long-term 

arrangement. Also, the value of the contract was anticipated to be 

greater. The FY 2007 budget request for SBInet included $100 million 

for border security technology and over $1.1 billion was appropriated 

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for tactical infrastructure at the border in FY 2007. However, early 

forecasts and estimates of the program’s value range from $8 billion to 

$30 billion. 

Results of Review 

The department embarked on this multi-billion dollar acquisition 

project without having laid the foundation to oversee and assess 

contractor performance and control cost and schedule. While the 

department had not established the organizational capacity to oversee, 

manage, and execute the program; or properly defined, validated, and 

stabilized its operational requirements prior to awarding the contract, 

the department was taking steps to mitigate many of the attendant 

risks. The department identified actions, pending the selection of the 

systems integration contractor and their proposed solution for securing 

the border, to refine requirements and build capacity. The program 

office was actively seeking to identify and apply lessons learned from 

the experience of other DHS programs. 

Since our review, the department has developed a corrective action 

plan, which is responsive to concerns raised in this report. 

Additionally, the program office has continued to develop its program 

management plans with the systems integrator. 

Organizational Capacity for Management and Oversight 

The department does not have the capacity needed to effectively plan, 

oversee, and execute the SBInet program; administer its contracts; and 

control costs and schedule. The department’s acquisition management 

capacity lacks the appropriate work force, business processes, and 

management controls for planning and executing a new start major 

acquisition program such as SBInet. 

Without a pre-existing professional acquisition workforce, CBP has 

had to create staffing plans, locate workspace, and establish business 

processes, while simultaneously initiating one of the largest 

acquisition programs in the department. For example, in mid-July, the 

program office moved into reconfigured offices from a temporary 

work site in CBP headquarters. Also, during our review, the program 

office identified and began implementing a management information 

system with the document control and workflow processes needed to 

support program management operations and administer the contract; 

however, full implementation was deferred until after contract award. 

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Staffing has been a critical shortfall for the program office. The 

associated organizational structure was in flux and key positions were 

still being identified and filled. For example, four individuals have 

filled the Program Management Office (PMO) Director position 

during the brief course of our review. The program office recently 

performed the work breakdown analysis needed to define and stabilize 

the structure and restructured the organization to reflect this analysis. 

While the emerging organizational structure proposed 252 positions, it 

is unclear whether that organization would be up to the challenge of 

the tasks ahead. At the time of review, the specific challenges 

included: 

 Ensuring the program office can handle its workload. As of 

August 29, 2006, only 69 of 252 positions were filled. Some 

of the positions were filled with personnel from the Offices of 

Border Patrol, Field Operations, and CBP Air and Marine; in 

some instances the personnel were detailed from field offices. 

The workload demands on the program office will balloon with 

necessary but deferred tasks1 and control implementation due 

after award. Further, the success of the pilot sectors will 

increase pressure to rapidly deploy SBInet capabilities to the 

remaining sectors of the border, raising the question of how the 

program office could handle accelerating the program.

2 

 Ensuring organizational roles and functions are assigned 

appropriately for employees and contractors. While 

contractors are appropriate for support services, only federal 

employees should perform inherently governmental functions.3 

The emerging organizational structure identified 65% of the 

252 positions as contractors and only 27 of the 69 filled 

positions were government employees. At this decisionintensive stage of the program, when courses of action are 

being set, this indicates the extent of reliance on service 

contractors will be excessive for the management control 

environment. 

 The deferred or impending tasks include: negotiating the contract and multiple delivery tasks orders; developing the 

deferred acquisition program baseline, plans, budgets, and cost estimates; and analyzing the winning proposal and 

approach to identify deficiencies and how the government can best meet those missing requirements. 2

 The corrective action plan submitted by CBP (Appendix C) indicates the staffing plan that has been approved is for 270 

positions, as described on p.18. 3

 OMB Policy Letter 92-1 and Circular A-76 describe inherently governmental functions as those so intimately related to 

the public interest as to mandate performance by government employees, and provide guidelines for ensuring that 

accountability is not undermined by the use of contractor services. 

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1
 Ensuring access to requisite knowledge and skills. In hiring 

and staff development, the program office will need to ensure 

the workforce has the appropriate qualifications and necessary 

training in acquisition management, as well as the right skill 

mix. At issue is whether the emerging organizational structure 

will adequately provide for the mix of business and technical 

disciplines needed for the effective use of integrated product 

teams, which are required by OMB capital budgeting 

regulations.4 

 Mitigating workforce turnover and fluctuations. As a stopgap 

measure, CBP is detailing agents and other staff on temporary 

assignment to identify and perform acquisition management 

tasks for which they are not experienced or trained. Many of 

the positions were filled with Office of Border Patrol and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine agents detailed 

from distant field offices. The program office had no clear 

plan for replacing the detailees and transferring their 

institutional knowledge. Without turnover procedures and 

documentation of decisions and deliberations, new personnel 

will be at a disadvantage in managing implementation. 

While CBP is taking steps to meet these challenges, the department 

needs to take steps to ensure effective investment review and 

oversight. The department has yet to establish robust investment 

oversight processes integrated into planning, programming, budgeting, 

and execution systems. The department’s existing processes were 

sidelined in the urgent pursuit of SBInet’s aggressive schedule. The 

department’s Investment Review Board and Joint Requirements 

Council provide for deliberative processes to obtain the counsel of 

functional stakeholders. However, for SBInet, these prescribed 

processes were bypassed and key decisions about the scope of the 

program and the acquisition strategy were made without rigorous 

review and analysis or transparency. The program office stated its 

intention to present program plans and the appropriate program 

documentation for Joint Requirements Council review within 60 days 

of award and the Investment Review Board within 90 days, in order to 

ensure the program is on the right track, and to bolster support for 

revising its FY 2008 budget estimates. 

4

 OMB Circular A-11 requires use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPTs bring a variety of functional disciplines to 

the task, ensuring full consideration of perspectives in making program decisions, so that the potential impacts are 

identified and trade-offs understood. At issue for SBInet is whether the appropriate mix of technical and business 

disciplines, such as engineers, logisticians, contracting officers, and cost analysts will be available to staff the IPTs. 

Risk Management Advisory on the SBInet Program Initiation

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Operational Requirements & Performance Management 

Until the department fully defines, validates, and stabilizes the 

operational requirements underlying the SBInet program, the 

program’s objectives are at risk and effective cost and schedule control 

are precluded. 

The department deferred fully defining operational requirements until 

after award of the systems integration contract. In selecting the 

systems integrator, the department used a broad statement of 

objectives as part of its acquisition strategy in order to allow industry 

to be creative in its solutions and, consequently, deferred setting 

contract requirements, including performance metrics, until delivery 

task order negotiations. 

While this approach added risk to the program during the competition 

for a system integrator, the program office took steps to mitigate this 

risk. The risk stemmed from the vagueness of the statement of 

objectives. While the SBInet statement of objectives is an appropriate 

algorithm5 for encouraging the systems engineering desired, success in 

accomplishing this macro algorithm cannot be practically measured. 

By not setting measurable performance goals and thresholds, the 

government was at increased risk that offerors would rely on unproven 

technologies and high-risk technical solutions that would delay 

implementation or be unaffordable. 

To mitigate this risk, the solicitation asked for solutions that used 

commercial-off-the-shelf and government-off-the-shelf solutions, even 

as the department publicly encouraged use of high-risk, developmental 

items, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the department 

required submission of quality assurance plans as part of the proposals 

to mitigate this risk. However, it remained to be seen whether the 

offerors would propose quality assurance plans adequate to meet the 

department’s needs, or how the department would timely set 

operational requirements as criteria for gauging program success or 

timely establish a system and processes for gauging the contractor’s 

performance. To control this risk, the department needs to refine, 

validate and set stable operational requirements for SBInet, enabling 

the program office to define and set contract requirements in task order 

 The macro algorithm is to “detect entries, identify and classify, respond, resolve” which is essential to basic command 

center operations and common to any systems designed to target action. The SBInet system is to detect entries when 

they occur; identify what the entry is; classify its level of threat (who are they, what are they doing, how many, etc.); 

effectively and efficiently respond to the entry; and bring the situation to the appropriate law enforcement resolution 

(apprehension, interdiction, transport to interdiction processing point, etc.). 

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5
negotiations, including the performance metrics needed to ensure 

accomplishment of the program’s objectives. 

The department needs to define and document the underlying 

operational requirements, translating mission needs, describing 

shortcomings with the status quo systems and tactics, setting 

thresholds and objectives for key performance parameters including 

affordability, and prioritizing among competing needs and conflicting 

goals. Without doing so, the department will not have set a common 

understanding of what the program office is to accomplish or provide 

the guidance program managers need for balancing competing 

objectives and making trade-offs in cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives through the life of the program. Furthermore, until 

operational requirements are fully defined and validated, providing 

firm support and validated assumptions for the program’s cost 

estimates, the credibility of budget estimates is undermined. 

The program office took steps during the competition for the systems 

integration contract to compensate for the lack of fully defined, 

validated, stabilized, and documented requirements. While the 

participating DHS and CBP officials had a strong sense of the 

underlying operational requirements they expected the SBInet program 

to fulfill, such an understanding was not reduced to writing and 

conveyed to others. However, the SBInet program office provided 

industry with a library of documents and videos that describe mission 

goals, current operations, and desired improvements over current 

operations. Also, the program office conducted an extensive “due 

diligence” process and held oral presentations and question and answer 

sessions with the competitors to better exchange information. 

Additionally, the program office developed a structure to frame 

analysis of the offerors’ approaches. The department then modified 

the solicitation, requiring offers to be mapped to this structure; thereby 

clarifying proposed approaches, assumptions, and costs and facilitating 

comparisons. Eventually, this work break down analysis should 

facilitate comparison of the winning industry approach to the validated 

operational requirements. 

However, until the operational requirements are validated and 

stabilized, the SBInet program will be vulnerable to changing 

direction. Changing the program’s direction will likely require 

contract changes and equitable adjustments, involve rework of the 

contractor’s planning, management, and systems engineering efforts, 

and add cost and delay. 

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With firm requirements, the SBInet program office can and should 

move quickly to implement a performance management process. A 

deferred, but critical, first step in establishing control of cost, schedule, 

and performance is the setting of an acquisition program baseline. 

This baseline of performance and schedule requirements and total cost 

estimates is needed to monitor the health of the program. The lack of 

an acquisition program baseline is a significant risk to the SBInet 

program. The department deferred setting a baseline until after 

contract award because of the uncertainties related to industry 

solutions. Without an acquisition program baseline, however, it is 

impossible to gauge the effectiveness of the program. An acquisition 

program baseline is a necessary first step in implementing earned 

value management. The program office plans to rectify this omission 

with the aforementioned Investment Review Board and Joint 

Requirements Council review and approvals. 

Another significant risk is the SBInet program’s lack of an earned 

value management system. This comprehensive management 

information and analysis system, fed by cost accounting data arrayed 

against work break down structures and program schedules, is 

essential to the department’s understanding of the program status, the 

contractor’s performance, and reliability of program budgets and cost 

estimates. It is essential for the program manager to know how the 

actual cost of the work performed compares to the budgeted cost of the 

work scheduled. Automated analyses of this data across the many 

tasks and activities being undertaken by all personnel working on the 

program should focus management attention where needed and trigger 

early corrective action. Earned value management is not only a best 

practice, it is an OMB capital budgeting requirement. 

The department included provisions for earned value management in 

the solicitation and the program office is developing plans to start and 

implement the process. However, the system is not in place and the 

department does not have a successful track record implementing this 

valuable tool. For example, under the Deepwater program, the Coast 

Guard did not timely or fully implement earned value management, 

thus losing an understanding of how changing requirements were 

affecting the program and a sound basis for program cost estimates. 

Early, effective earned value management implementation will be key 

to understanding the impact that changes will have on the program, 

including trade-offs needed to balance progress across the many 

components of the program. 

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Recommendations 

We recommend that: 

Recommendation #1: The CBP Commissioner, in coordination with 

the DHS Chief Procurement Officer (CPO), prepare a plan of action 

with performance milestones for developing its capacity to manage the 

program, administer its contracts and agreements, and ensure effective 

oversight and implementation. Each should specify the actions they 

will take to assist the program office in accomplishing the objectives 

of the plan, especially with regard to resource capacity building. 

Recommendation #2: The SBInet program office provide regular 

implementation status reports to the Commissioner and CPO on its 

plans for building program management and oversight capacity. 

Recommendation #3: The Commissioner and CPO develop a plan of 

action and milestones for defining, validating, and stabilizing the 

program’s operational requirements, translating them into contract 

requirements, and establishing a system of performance metrics and 

controls to gauge progress in meeting contract requirements and 

mission needs. Each should specify actions they will take in 

accomplishing the objectives of the plan, especially regarding 

resources needed to implement the plan and address ensuing contract 

and program cost estimate changes. 

Recommendation #4: The SBInet program office provide regular 

implementation status reports to the Commissioner and CPO on its 

plan of action and milestones to stabilize requirements and establish 

performance metrics and controls. 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Chief Procurement 

Officer concurred with each of our recommendations6 and worked 

with the SBInet program office to develop a corrective action plan. 

CBP’s response is included as Appendix C and the CPO’s letter 

affirming CBP’s response as Appendix D. The corrective action plan 

is responsive to the concerns raised in our risk management advisory 

letter. 

However, CBP did not concur with the content of the advisory letter, 

noting that it contained outdated information and omits significant 

progress made by the SBInet program management office since our 

review. CBP’s point is well taken and we acknowledge that a number 

of significant events, especially regarding the award of the contract, 

have occurred. With the award of the systems integration contract and 

the selection of the solution proposed by Boeing, CBP has moved 

rapidly to refine and stabilize requirements and implement 

performance management systems and processes, while continuing to 

build up its program management and program oversight capacity. As 

outlined in the corrective action plan, these activities are not just the 

result of the program office’s plans, but a concerted DHS effort to 

provide support and oversight to this major new program. While these 

plans and initiatives are a step in the right direction, it is imperative 

that they are fully implemented and maintained throughout the life 

cycle of the program. This will require close performance monitoring 

on a regularly scheduled basis during program execution. 

6

 The draft report submitted to CBP and the CPO for comment included six recommendations. We have merged these 

six recommendations into the four presented in this report. 

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Appendix A 

Lessons Learned From Other DHS Major Acquisitions Programs 

This appendix synopsizes our observations from prior DHS OIG and 

GAO reviews of other DHS major acquisition programs and contracts. 

A common thread among the department’s other major acquisition 

programs is that they were initiated without first properly defining the 

underlying operational requirements and without having the 

organizational capacity to properly manage the program. Without 

proper foundations, many of the department’s major acquisition 

programs have not accomplished their intended purpose, experienced 

cost overruns, and were missing program objectives. Such missteps 

characterize the department’s new starts since its inception on 

March 3, 2003, as well as the major programs, such as Deepwater, 

which were transferred into the department from their legacy agencies. 

The Value of Building An Internal Acquisition Management Capacity 

The experiences of the department since its inception can be 

characterized by a sense of urgency derived from the importance of its 

mission. Homeland Security is an urgent and important mission, and 

poses more difficult challenges than the department’s many legacy 

components previously faced. 

Developing and acquiring complex systems solutions to secure ports, 

coasts, borders, and transportation systems is one of the most difficult 

challenges facing the department. However, as described in our report 

on procurement and program management operations, the department 

was created without a substantial acquisition workforce, even as it was 

charged with multiple complex major investments. 

Across the department, such difficult work has overwhelmed the small 

number of contracting officers and program managers transferred to 

the department. Further, many of the contracting officers and program 

managers were not trained or experienced in developing and managing 

complex acquisition programs. However, the department has been 

slow to recognize and respond to the need to add organic systems 

acquisition program management capability. 

Reviews of the department’s other major acquisitions also show the 

involvement of operational managers, often pulled from the front lines. 

Operational managers are important stakeholders in the program and 

should drive setting of operational performance requirements. 

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Appendix A 

Lessons Learned From Other DHS Major Acquisitions Programs 

While operational managers’ sponsorship and involvement is 

invaluable to ensuring proper mission-focus, managing major systems 

acquisition programs requires more. It also takes the collective 

wisdom of multiple technical and business disciplines, such as 

engineers, logisticians, and cost analysts. Additionally, it takes 

contracting officers’ technical representatives and asset managers. 

Drawing on these different functional perspectives is a best practice 

and a regulatory requirement.7 

Lacking a proper acquisition workforce, the department has 

experienced missteps, waste, and delays in its acquisition programs. 

In addition to a ready workforce, robust business processes and 

information systems are needed to enable program offices to move 

forward expeditiously on the tasks of managing their programs and 

contracts. Without a ready source of acquisition managers and 

established business processes, information systems, and controls, 

managers of new complex acquisitions have been unable to focus on 

program objectives. Instead of moving the program forward, program 

managers play catch-up to overcome the department’s lack of an 

organic acquisition management capacity. 

The Value of Defined, Stable Operational Requirements 

The department’s major acquisition experiences reinforce the need for 

the department to define, validate, and stabilize its operational 

requirements as a necessary first step. This is especially true for 

performance-based acquisitions. Without defined and validated 

operational requirements, meaningful use of measures of effectiveness 

and performance are precluded. 

Without a foundation of well-defined, validated operational 

requirements, acquisition programs flounder and often result in wasted 

effort and the inefficient use of resources. Strong definition of 

operational requirements appropriately focuses and stabilizes the 

direction of program plans. 

7

 OMB Circular A-11 requires use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPTs bring a variety of functional disciplines to 

the task, ensuring full consideration of perspectives in making program decisions, so that the potential impacts are 

identified and trade-offs understood. 

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Appendix A 

Lessons Learned From Other DHS Major Acquisitions Programs 

Stability is key, as changing program plans alter the conditions and the 

terms of contracts and agreements and force the rework of 

management and systems engineering tasks. As contract changes and 

rework drive-up costs, the reliability of program cost estimates and 

budgets is undermined. 

In our previous review of department procurement operations, we 

reported that approving programs without adequately defined technical 

requirements increases the risk of cost overruns and has adverse 

schedule consequences.8

 Specifically, contracts expedited to quickly 

improve the nation’s security in response to rigid deadlines have 

resulted in higher costs, schedule delays, and failures to accomplish 

adequate technical or critical mission requirements. 

Department of Homeland Security’s Procurement and Program Management Operations, OIG-05-53, September 

2005. 

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Appendix B 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Our objective was to determine whether the SBInet acquisition had 

established: (1) clear, stable, and measurable operational requirements 

and (2) the organizational capacity to ensure government oversight of 

delivery schedules and cost estimates. In addition, we determined 

whether lessons learned from other department major acquisition 

programs were applied. 

We interviewed officials at the US Customs and Border Protection and 

Department Of Homeland Security headquarters staff in Washington, 

DC. In addition, we reviewed records supporting the SBInet 

solicitation and assessed the quality and maturity of the CBP’s 

program management office for SBI. 

To identify observations for lessons learned from other DHS major 

acquisition programs, we reviewed previous GAO and DHS OIG 

reports and congressional testimony and interviewed the review teams. 

We discussed comparisons with CBP officials on auditor observations 

of what caused schedule delays, cost overruns, and prevented the 

programs from achieving stated objectives. 

We conducted our review between June and August 2006 under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The 

nature and brevity of this review precluded use of our normal audit 

protocols; therefore, this review was not conducted according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Had we followed 

such standards, other matters may have come to our attention. 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

Chief Procurement Officer Response to the Draft Report 

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Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Phillip Maulden, Director 

Mark Ferguson, Program Manager 

Patricia Alcaniz, Auditor 

Yeseira Diaz, Auditor 

Julie Fleisher, Auditor 

Dennis Kallusingh, Auditor 

Maryann Pereira, Auditor 

Sue Vernier, Auditor 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, DHS GAO/OIG Audit Liaison 

DHS OIG Privacy Officer 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Undersecretary for Management 

DHS Chief Financial Officer 

DHS Chief Procurement Officer 

DHS Chief Information Officer 

Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Chief Information Officer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Audit Liaison 

Assistant Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of Chief 

Financial Officer 

Director, SBI Program Management Office, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of 

criminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 

2600, Attention: Office of Investigations – Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, 

Building 410, Washington, DC 20528; fax the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or 

email DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each 

writer and caller.