To: US EPA Region 9 — Pacific Islands Contact Office 300 Ala Moana Boulevard room 5124 Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96850

Solid and Hazardous Waste Branch — Attn: Red Hill
Hawai‘i Department of Health 919 Ala Moana Boulevard #212 Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96814 RedHill@epa.gov

Date: July 20, 2015

Re: Comments on the proposed Administrative Order on Consent (AOC) between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Hawai ʻ i State Department of Health (DOH), the U.S. Navy, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) concerning the ongoing seepage of jet and marine fuel from Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility near Pearl Harbor, O‘ahu.

We strongly urge the parties to strengthen the AOC so as to ensure the public’s clean drinking water is not devastated for generations to come due to a catastrophic--and wholly foreseeable--leak from the Navy’s fuel storage tanks in Red Hill.

Our primary concerns with the proposed AOC are its: (1) lack of specific, immediate measures for protecting human health, the aquifer, the underlying bedrock, and surrounding areas; (2) lack of assessment of locating the UST fuel storage above the aquifer in the first place; (3) requirement that DOH forfeit its public trust duties, (4) lack of cost estimates for the loss of drinking water resources on O’ahu, (5) lack of cost estimates for planning, investigation, and remediation of jet-fuel contamination; (6) lack of affirmative identification of potential effects on human health and the need to include the fuel-soaked bedrock and surrounding areas as within the scope of remedial work.

The fuel storage tanks have struggled with leaks since 1947, shortly after they were installed. The Navy has been publicly reporting fuel leaks from these tanks since 1998. In 2000, the Navy’s transverse core samples showed fuel seeping into bedrock underlying 19 of the 20 tanks. In 2014, the Navy discovered approximately 27,000 gallons of fuel had leaked into the area. However, the total amount of fuel leaked over the life of the tanks is unknown, but thought to be over 1 million gallons

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### Red Hill Fuel Tank AOC Sierra Club - O’ahu Group July 20, 2015

1. Immediate action is necessary—Drain the tanks. The Navy and DLA are required to commence performance upon the effective date of the AOC, but the Statement of Work (SOW) outlines 34 work actions, not including sub-actions. None of the actions outlined in the SOW appear to include emergency measures and implementation. Actual remediation work is the fifth step of the Investigation and Remediation of Releases process. Under the SOW, the Navy would not be required to begin actual remediation until 31 months after the AOC’s effective date. This is unacceptable.

During the approximately 31 months it would take to begin to implement a plan for presumably complete remediation, jet fuel could continue to contaminate the bedrock and aquifer, and risk the health of one-quarter of urban Honolulu, from Moanalua to Hawaii Kai. Rather than waiting nearly 2 1⁄2 years to act, the Navy and DLA should be required to immediately drain the tanks. Further, as the seepage continues, installation of more monitoring wells is essential.

2. Remove and/or replace the Navy fuel tanks in Red Hill. The Navy’s Red Hill Underground Storage Tanks (USTs) are beyond their useful life. Despite the considerable money and effort the Navy devoted to inspecting, testing, and repairing these tanks, they leak. The tanks failed to meet federal UST regulations for protecting groundwater and human health promulgated in the 1980s. They continue to fail to meet those regulations and pose an immediate threat to O’ahu’s communities. This is unconscionable . The tanks have served well-beyond their useful life and must be retired.

The SOW focuses on improving the Navy’s fuel tank system and not reassessing the wisdom of storing jet fuel above the aquifer in the first place. These tanks sit a mere 100 feet from the Waimalu and Moanalua aquifers. Instead of waiting to develop plans to improve on a bad idea, the Navy could act now to drain the tanks and installed superior storage equipment in a more appropriate location. Setbacks from aquifer areas and other options that would facilitate leak detection and better ensure protection of O‘ahu’s groundwater should be designed , presented, and adopted.

The goal should be to bring the Navy’s fuel storage system on O‘ahu up to best industry standards. This prevents loss of essential jet fuel for the Navy and protects essential groundwater resources for the public

. This means complying with the EPA’s strengthened “Underground Storage Tank Requirements” imposed on every fueling station subject to federal oversight or using above-ground storage with state-of-the-art leak detection and prevention systems. Operating the Navy’s fuel storage tanks in line with industry standards is the best way to preserve the Navy’s military-readiness and protect the public’s health.

3. Remove section 14(a),(d), and (g) from the AOC forfeiting the state’s public trust obligations for protect O‘ahu’s drinking water. The State of Hawai‘i has an obligation to the public to protect our drinking water. The AOC would hand the State’s obligation over to the EPA for the

page of 2 4life of the agreement, which is at least 22 years long and possibly longer. This is unjustified and dangerous.

The EPA’s interests in negotiating with its brother-agency, Department of Defense, are not the same as the state’s interests and cannot be substituted. Moreover, such a delegation of public trust duties would mean the local electorate could not use their voting power to rectify what they may conclude are unacceptable compromises to our public health based on the Navy’s decisions going forward. There is a reason why local concerns, such as drinking water, are managed by those closest to the citizens affected. This relationship should not be altered. The EPA can continue to participate in the AOC and SOW without taking over the state’s responsibilities.

4. Provide cost estimates of contaminating a significant portion of O‘ahu’s drinking

water resource
. This draft of the AOC justifies the proposed course of action, in part, on the cost to the Navy for upgrades and changes. This analysis is incomplete without a comparison of the estimated cost to the State of Hawai‘i of contaminating 1/4th of O‘ahu’s drinking water. If O‘ahu’s drinking water were contaminated by jet fuel leaked from the Navy’s tanks, then how much would it cost to:

• provide medical treatment to those poisoned by the contamination?

• remove the jet fuel from the water?

• replace the contaminated water with other sources?

• what other sources of fresh drinking are available on O‘ahu if the groundwater is contaminated?

In addition, the AOC should analyze the secondary consequences of contaminating our drinking water to

on:

• Hawai‘i’s tourism-based economy,

• local medical services sector,

• substitute sources of fresh water, such as neighboring aquifers and desalination.

With this information, decision-makers can begin to compare the true costs and benefits of the proposed
AOC

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5. Provide cost estimates for fully funding complete clean-up. The proposed AOC provides: [T]he Navy and DLA shall timely seek sufficient funding through their budgetary processes to finance and perform all the Work. Navy and DLA recognize the requirements of this AOC as necessary actions subject to the provisions of Executive Order 12088 requiring request of sufficient funds in the agency budget. It is the expectation of the Parties to this AOC that all obligations of Navy and DLA arising under this AOC will be fully funded.

page of 3 4We also expect that the Navy and DLA will fully fund the clean-up and remediation of the aquifer, contaminated bedrock, surrounding areas, and all other adverse impacts consequent from their use of
Hawai ʻ i’s lands. That expectation should be elevated to a guarantee in the AOC by, amongst other things, procuring estimates for the amount needed for the full funding for the Navy and DLA’s obligations at the outset of executing the AOC. Ensuring that resources are available for clean-up and prevention bear on later decisions as to whether measures would be “feasib[le]” and could extend the scope of “the maximum extent practicable” remediation, prevention, and investigation, as described in the SOW.

6. Specify the scope of the clean-up. As mentioned above , the bulk of the proposed AOC and SOW focuses on improving and monitoring the UST systems themselves. The tanks are only a fraction of the problem. The aquifer, bedrock, and the communities that depend on those resources must be foregrounded in any consideration of the Navy and DLA’s liabilities for the USTs. The scope of clean-up, feasibility, and practicability analyses must include short and long term risks to O ʻ ahu’s drinking water, our communities, and fuel-contaminated areas. All of these weigh in favor of swift, comprehensive actions to ensure complete protections from fuel seepage.

The goal should be to bring the Navy’s storage of fuel in Hawai‘i up to best industry standards in order to prevent loss of essential jet fuel for the Navy and protect essential groundwater resources for the people of Hawai‘i. Operating the Navy’s fuel storage tanks in line with industry standards is the best way to preserve the Navy’s military-readiness and protect the public’s health. Thank you for considering our comments to strengthen the AOC between the EPA, DOH, Navy, and DLA

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