U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

28–997 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–74] 

TERRORISM AND IRAN: DEFENSE 

CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

JEN STEWART, Staff Director 

JENNIFER BIRD, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command .................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 48 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 47 

Votel, GEN Joseph L. ....................................................................................... 50 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cook ............................................................................................................ 99 

Mr. O’Rourke .................................................................................................... 99 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 99 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 99 

(1) 

TERRORISM AND IRAN: DEFENSE CHALLENGES 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 27, 2018. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

We welcome back to the committee the commander of the U.S. 

Central Command, General Joseph Votel. We are particularly interested in hearing General Votel’s views on the changes that the 

new National Defense Strategy brings to his area of responsibility. 

The strategy’s emphasis on strategic competition has implications for a region where Russian influence and presence is much 

greater now than it was before the Syrian conflict began, a region 

that is one of the targets of the Chinese whole-of-nation effort to 

increase its sway, and a region where the Iranians are aggressively 

expanding its wide arc of control to the detriment of its neighbors. 

These developments and the continuing threat of terrorism in 

and emanating from the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] region, suggests that the United States cannot afford to remove our 

attention or our presence from this vital area. Fortunately, we have 

a number of strong allies and partners that are able and willing 

to actively defend our joint interests, but as we have painfully 

learned in recent years, there is simply no substitute for the 

United States. 

When we withdraw prematurely, the world, including the threats 

to our homeland, can rapidly grow more dangerous. The challenge, 

however, is that CENTCOM has received the lion’s share of military resources for some time. And while it is important to remain, 

we have to be more active in other vital areas of the world at the 

same time. The recent budget agreement helps, but it will take 

time to rebuild and field needed capability. In these circumstances, 

General Votel has his hands full in making sure that U.S. national 

security is protected. 

Let me yield to the acting ranking member, the gentlelady from 

California, Mrs. Davis. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 
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STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member’s statement 

be entered into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

And I would also like to welcome General Votel and thank him 

for appearing today. 

The Central Command area of responsibility remains critical to 

our national interests, and we have to maintain a focus on security 

in the region. Reports of continuing military progress in the counter-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] campaign are encouraging, but military achievements alone, as I think we all know, will 

not guarantee long-term success. We must work with the international community and employ a whole-of-government approach to 

foster and to sustain political, economic, and social conditions to 

ensure long-term stability. We cannot allow the region to fall into 

violent extremism again. To truly defeat ISIS, we must be just as 

determined to secure a durable peace as we have been to achieve 

a decisive military victory. 

We have long sought a stable end state in Afghanistan. For more 

than 16 years, the United States has concentrated on eliminating 

terrorist threats while working closely with our allies and our partners to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces to secure the country. Despite significant progress, Afghan forces are still in need of 

assistance, so where are we headed? 

Although our commitments to oppose violent extremism in Iraq, 

Syria, and Afghanistan are consuming, we must also remain alert 

to other regional security challenges. Despite an agreement regarding its nuclear program, Iran remains a designated state sponsor 

of terrorism, and it exerts destabilizing influence in Iraq, Syria, 

Lebanon, and Yemen. We must deter Iran from precipitating conflict and dissuade it from engaging in malign activities. And we 

must also deter Russia that is increasingly involved in the region 

as well. 

Certainly a complex set of issues, General, and I look forward to 

your testimony. Thank you very much for joining us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, without objection, your full written 

statement will be made part of the record. Welcome back. The floor 

is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General VOTEL. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis, 

distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank 

you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the current posture and state of readiness of the United States Central Command. 

I come before you today on behalf of the over 80,000 members of 

the command. It is a dedicated team of military service members 

and civilians, along with our coalition partners, representing 70 na-
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tions and 4 international organizations, many of whom are forward-deployed across some of the most dangerous areas in the 

world. They sacrifice and risk on a daily basis, in many cases for 

the benefit of not only American strategic interests, but also the 

world’s. 

Our people are the very best at what they do, and they, and especially their families, deserve our admiration and gratitude. It is 

my sincere honor to lead and be a member of such a fine team of 

dedicated professionals. 

I am approaching the 2-year mark of my time in command. This 

period has been both incredibly challenging and immensely rewarding during what has arguably been one of the most volatile times 

in this complex region’s history. 

It has been 11 months since I last appeared before this committee, and since then, we have made considerable military progress in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon, and the maritime environment. However, we remain very clear-eyed regarding 

both the permanence of that progress and the challenges that we 

face in the future. 

In the past year, we have achieved incredible success against 

ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi security forces and Syrian Democratic Forces are operating at their most effective levels since Operation Inherent Resolve began, and now, over 98 percent of the territory previously held by ISIS in Iraq and Syria is no longer under 

their control. The destruction of the ISIS physical caliphate is imminent, and millions of displaced persons are returning home and 

beginning the long process of rebuilding. Now we must consolidate 

our gains by investing in the security forces’ relationships and capabilities that will hold the territory and keep ISIS from returning. 

Based upon that progress, CENTCOM is conducting an operational alignment and rebalancing effort to achieve three specific 

goals. The first goal is to complete major combat operations in Iraq 

and Syria and bring the defeat-ISIS campaign to a responsible 

close. Military success in the campaign up to this point presents us 

an opportunity to reposition some of our resources from Iraq and 

Syria to Afghanistan in a manner that keeps the pressure on ISIS, 

but also sets us up to break the stalemate in Afghanistan. 

We retain sufficient capability to continue our efforts against 

ISIS despite the increasingly complex situation across Syria and especially in the northwest province of Afrin. We are fully engaged 

with our mission partners and the Department of State to carefully 

balance our objectives. Our partners on the ground in Syria have 

advanced us a long way towards our objectives, and we will stick 

with them through the completion of this fight. In Iraq, the Iraqi 

security forces are rapidly consolidating gains and preparing to 

support elections later this spring. 

The second goal is to prioritize the implementation of the South 

Asia strategy in Afghanistan. This strategy reaffirms the U.S. Government’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan by reinforcing the 

two complementary military missions: The NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization]-led train, advise, and assist mission, and the 

U.S. counterterrorism mission. We are making sure that, with our 

support, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces are well- 
4 

postured to begin operations to seize the initiative, expand population control, and secure credible elections. 

Part and parcel of this effort is our regionalized approach to engage all countries with a stake in Afghanistan’s stability, especially 

Pakistan. Our goal here is to develop a productive and trustful relationship that benefits both of our militaries and supports our objectives in the region. 

The third goal is to ensure that we have aligned our military efforts with our broader interagency and international efforts to neutralize, counterbalance, and shape the destabilizing impact that 

Iran has across the region. Make no mistake, while we continue to 

confront the scourge of terrorism, Iran’s malign activities across the 

region pose a long-term threat to stability in this part of the world. 

We view ourselves, the military, as supporting the many other 

and more effective resources and capabilities of the U.S. Government and its partners in this endeavor. The recently published National Defense Strategy rightly identifies the resurgence of great 

power competition as our principal national security challenge, and 

we in CENTCOM see the effects of that competition throughout the 

region. 

Russia’s support of the Assad regime has not only propped him 

up, but has also added complexity to the defeat-ISIS campaign. 

Diplomatically and militarily, Moscow plays both arsonist and firefighter, fueling tensions among all parties in Syria, the Syrian regime, Iran, Turkey, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the United 

States, and other coalition partners, then serving as an arbiter to 

resolve disputes attempting to undermine and weaken each party’s 

bargaining positions. 

Despite the key role that our partners on the ground, the Syrian 

Democratic Forces, and the coalition have played in dealing defeat 

to ISIS, Russia has placed this progress at risk with their activities, which are not focused on defeating ISIS but, rather, on preserving their own influence and control over the outcome of the situation. It is clear that Russia’s interests in Syria are Russia’s interests, and not those of the wider international community. 

China is pursuing long-term, steady economic growth in the region through its One Belt, One Road policy, but it is also improving 

its military posture by connecting ports, such as Gwadar in Pakistan, with its first overseas military base in Djibouti, adjacent to 

the critical Bab-el-Mandeb. While Beijing claims both locations 

support peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the new military base and port bolsters China’s force projection into the region. 

Both China and Russia seek to fill in perceived gaps in U.S. interests by increasing defense cooperation and sales of their equipment to our regional partners. They both are also cultivating multidimensional ties to Iran. The lifting of U.N. [United Nations] sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] open 

the path for Iran to resume membership application to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 

In addition, Russia, supported by Iran, continues to bolster a 

friendly regime in Syria, attempt to limit our U.S. military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and creates friction among NATO 

partners. Against this backdrop of increasing great power interaction are the enduring issues of the region: social, economic, and 
5 

political challenges; high unemployment; falling oil prices; a youth 

bulge; large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; 

and long-standing border conflicts. 

We in CENTCOM stand ready with all of our partners to defend 

U.S. interests against these and other threats. Our strategic approach of preparing the environment, pursuing opportunities, and 

working to prevail wherever we can is working. We are postured 

for purpose, proactive in pursuing opportunities, and resolve to 

win. 

I would like to close by sharing three dynamics that we assess 

are essential to prevailing in this region. First, as I have previously 

testified, in the conduct of our campaigns in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, as well as our operations in places like Yemen, Lebanon, and Egypt, we have adopted a by, with, and through approach that places a heavy reliance on indigenous partner nation 

forces. Our partners do not always want us to solve their problems 

for them, so we enable them to stand on their own. And while this 

approach does present its own challenges and can be more time 

consuming, it provides local solutions to local problems. This approach is not without risk, as we are seeing unfold in Syria today. 

But in general, it is proving very effective and will likely pay significant dividends going forward. 

Secondly, successful pursuit of U.S. objectives in this region only 

comes from an integrated approach aligned with interorganizational partners. Defense of the Nation is a team sport. This applies 

not just within the command, but with our fellow combatant commands, our component commands, our established combined and 

joint task forces, the Central Region’s 18 country teams, and other 

departments, agencies, and organizations of the U.S. Government 

who have provided unwavering support over almost two decades of 

persistent conflict. 

Our allies in the region and the wider international community 

are equally as critical to supporting our mission. They directly support the CENTCOM headquarters with more than 200 foreign military officers from 49 nations, all of whom are part of the success 

of CENTCOM, and we are grateful for and largely depend upon 

their partnership. As the National Defense Strategy captures clearly, strengthening existing relationships and building new ones will 

be key to our future success. We are doing this in CENTCOM every 

day. 

Finally, we could not do what we do on a daily basis without the 

support of Congress, and by extension, the American people. We 

sincerely appreciate this committee’s continued strong support for 

our operations, authorities, and resources, and especially the same 

to the services, Special Operations Command, and other defense 

agencies that we rely upon for our military wherewithal. 

Your support will remain important as we contend with what potentially are generational struggles to defend our homeland from 

the threats outlined in our National Defense Strategy. U.S. Government commitment to the CENTCOM area of responsibility 

[AOR] is more important now than ever. For our part, we will support the third pillar of the National Defense Strategy, business reform, by continuing to be good stewards of the resources and authorities that Congress provides us. 
6 

To close, I want to once again thank the outstanding men and 

women who comprise the United States Central Command, easily 

our finest and most precious resource. They continue to make great 

sacrifices and contributions to ensure the command meets our strategic objectives and protects our Nation’s interests. We must ensure they have everything they need to do their jobs as effectively 

and efficiently as possible. 

We are also keenly aware and grateful for the sacrifices made by 

our families. They are vital members of the team, and we could not 

accomplish our mission without them. They, too, make important 

contributions and tremendous sacrifices every day to support us. I 

thank them on behalf of the command and a grateful Nation. 

Thank you again, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 50.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. 

Let me remind members that immediately upon conclusion of 

this open hearing, we will regather with General Votel upstairs in 

a classified session. So be in touch to know exactly when this open 

hearing ends. 

Since General Votel and I have had a chance to visit recently, 

I am going to yield 5 minutes, initially, to the gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

General Votel, for your service and for being here today. 

I wanted to ask you to elaborate in particular on the threat from 

Iran. And, you know, one of the many grave flaws of the JCPOA 

is the fact that it failed to deal with Iran’s ballistic missile threat. 

And we are now seeing across the region increasingly evidence that 

Iran is transferring ballistic missiles and other conventional equipment to its allies in the region. Can you talk about exactly what 

you are seeing in this regard and what the Department of Defense 

[DOD] is in a position to be able to do to defend us and our allies 

against that threat? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think you have 

highlighted one of the principal concerns that we have, the increasing, not just quantity, but quality of their ballistic missiles, and the 

export and movement of those capabilities to other groups and locations around the region. Certainly, as we have seen with Ambassador Haley in her demonstration most recently with some of the 

items recovered from Saudi Arabia, these weapons pose the threat 

of widening the conflict out of Yemen, and, frankly, put our forces, 

our embassy in Riyadh, our forces in the United Arab Emirates, at 

risk, as well as our partners. So I think first and foremost about 

their threat is the quality and the quantity that they have been 

pursuing over the last several years, particularly with respect to 

this. 

Their direct introduction of asymmetric capabilities concerns me 

as we look at places like the Bab-el-Mandeb where we see the introduction of coastal defense cruise missiles, some that have been 

modified. We know these are not capabilities that the Houthis had, 

so they have been provided to them by someone. That someone is 

Iran. The presence of explosive boats, the increased presence of 
7 

mines in this area are all very similar to the layered threat that 

Iran has posed in the Straits of Hormuz, and we hold them accountable for that. So that is a second aspect of this. 

The third, of course, is their continually changing power projection model, not only their own forces, but their proxies and the 

partners that they are attempting to create around the region. I 

think these all give us very significant concerns. 

With respect to your question about what we are doing, we are 

working with Saudi Arabia and some of our partners to ensure that 

they are optimizing their capabilities that they have, many of them 

U.S.-provided capabilities, to ensure that they can defend themselves. And I would report to you in this session that we are seeing 

some progress in that regard. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, General. And in respect to Syria, could 

you talk a little bit about, there have been reports that we have 

seen facilities, for example, being built in Syria, reports in open 

source, Iranian missile facilities. Obviously, the threat there is significant, not just to U.S. interests, but also to allies like Israel. And 

could you talk more about what we might be able to do, particularly on the ground in Syria, as we see the challenge of—we have 

been very effective against ISIS there, but, obviously, our interests 

are still significantly threatened given the failed state situation we 

are facing. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congresswoman. As you know, countering Iran is not one of the coalition missions in Syria. That said, 

I think one of the most effective things that we can do in this particular area is build strong relationships. 

Ms. CHENEY. General, I am sorry, could you just—I understand 

it is not potentially formally part of the mission, but it seems to 

me if we are focused on countering Iran, we need to be doing it 

every place our interests are threatened. 

General VOTEL. Absolutely. And one of the key ways that we are 

doing that is through our strong relationships that we are building 

with the Government of Iraq military forces, that include, not only 

forces that are in the interior, but certainly along their border. Our 

strong relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the east 

and in the northern part of the country puts us in a position where 

we can impede Iran’s objectives of establishing lines of communication through these critical areas and trying to connect Tehran to 

Beirut, for example. 

So I think, first and foremost, some of these indirect things we 

are doing are very, very important to that. I think beyond that, I 

think also continuing to highlight and illuminate their activities is 

extraordinarily important so that they can be addressed, not just 

with military means, but certainly with the other means that are 

available to us across government. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much. 

I will yield back the balance of my time and look forward to discussing this further in the closed session. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Votel, 

again, thank you for joining us. 
8 

As you just mentioned, and certainly in your written statement, 

the National Defense Strategy stated that great power competition, 

not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security. 

Could you elaborate for us on those comments, and also talk about 

the shift in this national strategy? How exactly will it impact 

CENTCOM? And what, if any, significant changes will actually materialize as a result of the shift? And how will Central Command’s 

capacity to perform its mission be affected? 

General VOTEL. Well, thanks, Congresswoman. I think that, you 

know, the shifts that are outlined in the National Defense Strategy 

are things that will take place over time. And so, you know, one 

of the principal ways that we are trying to manage that, of course, 

is through the development of and continued relationship building 

that we have in place with partners in the region and continuing 

to strengthen those relationships. 

One of the things that we have learned through this by, with, 

and through approach is that we can do a lot through our partners 

by providing advice, by providing expertise in areas where we have 

experience, and we can do that with the smaller footprint and with 

the, you know, correspondingly smaller investment. So I think one 

of the principal ways that we will address this going forward is 

continuing to build on these relationships and continuing to empower our partners in the region. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Can you just speak to the key challenges in doing 

that? 

General VOTEL. Well, you know, I think, certainly, one of the key 

challenges will be making sure that we don’t create the impression 

that we are abandoning CENTCOM. And this, of course, is a key 

talking—or the region. And so this, of course, is a key talking 

point, not only for me, but for all leaders that come in there. We 

recognize that the interest that we have, the national interest that 

we have in this region for preventing attacks on the homeland, for 

preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce through the critical 

straits, for ensuring other countries can’t destabilize, those are enduring interests that we will always have. And so this will always 

require us to continue to be engaged there to some aspect. But, of 

course, the Secretary will make decisions on shifting resources in 

accordance with the National Defense Strategy. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. You also talked about local solutions, 

and we know how critical that is, as you have just mentioned. I am 

wondering if you could also talk about the inclusion of women as 

a critical strategy that advances countering terrorism, national security, and democratization and economic and social development. 

Some of those programs have been successful, but there certainly 

is more to be done. How can we increase the effectiveness of these 

programs? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think the best way we can do it is by 

sharing our experiences with this. We learned by our inability to 

include women into many of our counterterrorism operations back 

in the beginning of these fights that we have been involved in, that 

we are missing 50 percent of the population in doing that. And 

when we began to introduce them into positions where they could 

have influence, we learned a lot from that. So I think one of the 
9 

key things that we can do is continue to lead by example in this 

area and demonstrate how this is valued by us. 

We do see partners in the region doing this. The Afghans are 

doing this. The Iraqis are doing this. We certainly see this with the 

Syrian Democratic Forces that we are working with in Syria. And 

I would highlight to you that one of the principal commanders that 

they have, a very successful commander, is a female. And so it is 

very much recognized that contributions come from the entirety of 

the force. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think that a number 

of us have participated in those efforts, and I hope that we can continue to do more of that. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Votel, recently, the United Nations released a remarkably gruesome report outlining North Korea’s ongoing efforts to assist Syria building chemical weapons. This report states that North 

Korea has been shipping supplies to the Syrian Government, including acid-resistant tiles, valves, and thermometers. Additionally, 

North Korean missile technicians have been observed working at 

chemical weapons and missile facilities in Syria. 

Are you able to comment on the U.N. report? And if not, could 

you describe the malign and disruptive role North Korea currently 

plays in Syria and whether or not you see their role expanding in 

the coming years? Additionally, what is being done to disrupt this 

cooperation between the dictatorships of North Korea and the Syrian Government? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I admit, I have not seen that report, so I can’t comment specifically on it. Obviously, we are concerned about the proliferation of these type of weapons in Syria 

with a country that has demonstrated the intent to use them. So 

this will be an area that we will continue to pay close attention to. 

Mr. WILSON. And it is so important. I was actually pleasantly 

surprised that The New York Times covered it today. My experience with that newspaper is they frequently overlook threats to 

stability in the world, but I urge your consideration. 

Also, a primary concern for the long-term stability of the Middle 

East surrounds a return of defeated Islamic State fighters who are 

returning home from fighting in Iraq and Syria. An estimate from 

The Soufan Center and The Global Strategy Network have tracked 

5,600 fighters who have returned to their home countries. Specifically, sadly, Turkey has 900 returning and Saudi Arabia has 760 

returning. 

Could you explain what threat the return of the defeated Islamic 

State fighters to their home country represents to the long-term 

stability in the region? And can you explain the proposed or ongoing efforts to work with ally nations in dealing with this flow of 

fighters? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. Well, certainly, these 

fighters that are able to depart these war zones are able to take 

with them experiences and tactics that could potentially be applied 

to other places. Additionally, they are radicalized so they have the 

ability to bring others onboard with this. These, I think, are the 
10 

principal concerns. This has been at the forefront of our efforts 

from the very beginning. As you have heard the Secretary talk 

about our strategy of annihilation, in the conduct of our operations, 

we have always attempted to isolate these areas and prevent the 

escape of these fighters so that they are either killed or captured 

where we take them on, and I think we have been successful in 

that. Certainly, there are some that have gotten away. 

We have, with the support of some of the authorities that have 

been provided to us by Congress, we do have an effective program 

to interdict foreign fighters as they attempt to depart the area. And 

we are now working with the Department of State and the Department of Justice to ensure that these hundreds that are in the control of our partners in both Iraq and Syria are moving into a judicial process that holds them accountable and, ultimately, returns 

them to the countries from which they came. 

Mr. WILSON. And what a challenge that is. The detainees you are 

speaking of, not just fighters, but their families. And this has just 

got to be addressed, and I appreciate you bringing that issue up. 

Additionally, Turkey has been a valued ally, for nearly a century, 

of the United States. A member of NATO, beginning with the Korean War, they have been fighting side by side with Americans for 

freedom. What is being done to continue our important alliance? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, and I would just echo your comments. Turkey has been absolutely vital throughout the entire campaign plan. They certainly have serious concerns of PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] terrorism. Of course, this has created some 

tension with some of the partners we have on the ground. 

The principal way that we are addressing this, Congressman, is 

by being transparent and clear and candid with Turkey about the 

things that we are doing on a day-to-day basis with our partners. 

Just this morning, I had a conversation with my counterpart in 

Turkey, again, sharing information back and forth, keeping the 

communication channels professional and open as we discuss this 

very, very difficult challenge that we are working through. 

Mr. WILSON. And with the multitude of issues you have to face, 

Yemen, what is the latest on efforts to provide security in working 

with Saudi Arabia? 

General VOTEL. I would say, you know, our effort in this setting 

is principally to help them defend themselves, and I think we have 

made some very good progress in this area. And I look forward, in 

the closed session, to sharing with you some examples. 

Mr. WILSON. We appreciate your service. Thank you. 

General VOTEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask you, there was a column in The Wall Street 

Journal, I believe in their opinion section maybe about 4 days ago, 

that talked about where they allege that there was a Russian attack on U.S. special operation forces on the evening of February 

the 7th and 8th. And I specifically wanted to ask you what you 

know about that, and how can CENTCOM prioritize U.S. counterterrorism objectives while trying to avoid any sort of dangerous escalation with Russia? 
11 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. You know, I think we 

have kind of characterized that as pro-regime forces. You know, we 

are certainly aware of the amount of media that is out there talking about this. But in this particular instance, this was a very clear 

case of self-defense on our part. And so I, frankly, am quite proud 

of the way the force responded to this: quickly identified it, immediately got on the net to our Russian—our channel here to talk 

with them about this—we were talking with them before, during, 

and after this—and very effectively brought together the right capabilities to address this self-defense threat. And so they have continued to do that. 

So, you know, I think what I would just tell you is that we retain 

sufficient capability to protect ourselves at the same time that we 

are pursuing our counterterrorism objectives in Syria. 

Mr. VEASEY. Do you think that Russia is going to want to try to 

have more influence or diminish our influence in the region once 

we push ISIS out of there, or how do you see that relationship, you 

know, playing out long term? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think what I would say, Congressman, is 

what we see is Russia has failed to follow through on delivering the 

regime in a number of different areas. As we look at the U.N. sanctions, cease-fire that was put in this place, one that they helped 

draft and agreed to implement and to cause the regime to comply 

by it, they have failed to do that. So I think either Russia has to 

admit that it is not capable or it doesn’t want to play a role in ending the Syrian conflict here. I think the role is incredibly destabilizing at this point. 

Mr. VEASEY. I would also like to briefly kind of switch here and 

ask you just a little bit about Afghanistan too. I know that there 

have been some that have been concerned about our deteriorating 

relationship with the Pakistanis, and was wondering, how important do you think it is for us to continue to have relationships with 

Pakistan, keeping routes open, so we can adequately supply troops 

in the Afghanistan part of the Middle East? And just what are 

some of your thoughts on that whole relationship and, particularly, 

just how it lines up with Afghanistan? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, my view is that success in Afghanistan and South Asia will require a strong relationship and 

the cooperation of Pakistan. And since the announcement of the 

South Asia strategy, this has been one of my principal focuses here, 

is to help Pakistan and us together, achieve the specific things that 

we require for them, we have asked them to do in support of our 

strategy. 

And what I would report to you and to the committee is that I 

do have very frequent and routine professional communications 

with my counterpart. We talk almost weekly. We meet frequently 

face-to-face. And my goal is to develop this very productive and 

trustful relationship that will help us move forward together. I 

can’t characterize the relationship as trustful at this particular 

point. There is a lot of history here that has to be overcome. 

But what I will also tell you is that we are now beginning to see 

positive indicators. They, through their communications, they are 

reporting to us some of the actions that they are taking on the 

ground. These are positive indicators that they are moving in the 
12 

right direction. It does not yet equal the decisive action that we 

would like to see them take in terms of a strategic shift, but they 

are positive indicators. And it gives me hope that our approach is 

the right one. I have confidence in our approach, and it gives me 

hope that we can begin to restore this very important relationship. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, thank 

you for your service. 

You have barely mentioned Lebanon and we hardly ever talk 

about Lebanon. But there are so many problems there, and in any 

other part of the world, it would be front and center in the headlines all the time. But with all the other problems in CENTCOM, 

it takes a backseat. 

But given that Hezbollah is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization and that the Lebanese President has been very public in his 

support of Hezbollah as a military partner with the Lebanese 

Armed Forces, and given that we have, in the past anyway, supplied high-quality American arms to the Lebanese Armed Forces, 

do you think we should keep working with the Lebanese Armed 

Forces and giving them high-quality American weaponry, and are 

they a reliable partner? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I think they are a very reliable 

partner. And I think the investments that we have made over the 

last 10 or 11 years, very moderate investments in terms of people 

and money, compared to some of the other things we do, have really paid off. And they are helping us develop a very professional 

Lebanese Armed Forces that is beginning to be viewed as the principal security arm in Afghanistan. 

And I note your comment here about it doesn’t appear in the 

news, but, frankly, Lebanon is a frequent stopping place for me and 

for all of my commanders, and we pay a lot of attention to this relationship. We have an outstanding ambassador there who is a 

very, very engaged in the activities, and we are very proud of what 

Lebanese Armed Forces are doing. They very effectively last fall, 

on their own, orchestrated a pretty effective operation against ISIS. 

They view us as their most important partner, and I do think it 

is an investment worth continuing. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But doesn’t the relationship between the cozying 

up to Hezbollah within Lebanon to the conventional forces there 

give you pause? 

General VOTEL. Well, I tell you, I frequently interact with the 

chief of defense there. I consider him to be a very professional military officer. You know, this is a multiconfessional arrangement 

here in Pakistan that obviously trips over into the political environment, but what I observe in Lebanon is a military that is answerable to the leadership, is doing a good job at staying apolitical, and 

is focused on security of the country. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Shifting gears to Saudi Arabia, are we 

doing enough to help them and the United Arab Emirates defend 

themselves, as was discussed a little earlier, from Iranian-supplied 

missiles to the Houthi rebels? Are we doing enough? 
13 

General VOTEL. In this setting, I would say yes, we are. We are 

definitely focused on this particular threat right here, and I look 

forward to sharing a few more comments with you about this in the 

closed session. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. Now, in Yemen, the U.S. military has conducted a much higher number of strikes against terrorist targets last year than in 2016, the previous year. What positive impact, if any, have these strikes had on AQAP [al-Qaida in 

the Arabian Peninsula] and on ISIS in Yemen—or excuse me, Islamic State in Yemen? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. It has had, I think, a 

very significant impact on AQAP. Certainly, it has impacted their 

ability to conduct external operations. It has gone into the areas in 

which they have had sanctuary, and it has continued to present 

them with multiple dilemmas that they have to deal with. So not 

only are they contending with our strikes, but they are also contending with partner operations that we work with our Arab coalition partners on the ground and with our Yemeni partners on the 

ground. And this has become very, very effective. 

And I would tell you that we are extending that to ISIS in 

Yemen as well. That is not as well developed as al-Qaida is, but, 

of course, it is ISIS. We understand their ideology. We understand 

where they are going. And so we are very concerned about them 

as well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And lastly, I would like to ask 

about the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson in my district. They 

are sending a brigade combat team to Afghanistan this spring. And 

even though we have had budget shortfalls for the military in recent years, we have made huge steps with this latest budget agreement to beef up military spending, which I totally applaud and 

support. So I think readiness will be less of an issue in the future, 

but do you feel good about the current state of readiness with, for 

instance, the brigade combat team going to Afghanistan this 

spring? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I do. I haven’t had an opportunity 

to visit that specific brigade, but I just had an opportunity to visit 

one of the brigades that is coming in, the Security Force Assistance 

Brigade. I am extraordinarily appreciative of the efforts that are 

put forth by the Army, by the Marine Corps, the Air Force, all the 

services here that we depend upon in Afghanistan to give us highquality forces. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General 

Votel, for your service and for being here. 

I would like to talk a little bit more about what you began with 

in your opening statement and some of the comments you have 

made since about U.S. military objectives in Syria. You talked 

about how you are working to defeat ISIS and bring that campaign 

to a responsible close. Later, you mentioned that countering Iran 

is not a coalition mission in Syria. Last month, we heard from Secretary Tillerson about how U.S. military presence in Syria will remain for an indefinite period of time. And he went on to list a very 

expansive list of strategic objectives of the U.S. military, to include 
14 

ensuring the defeat of ISIS, to include diminishing the influence of 

Iran, advancing U.N.-led political resolution, et cetera, et cetera. 

So my question is: What is the objective of our U.S. forces in 

Syria? And under what legal basis is this indefinite presence in 

Syria planned under? 

General VOTEL. Thank you. So the principal reason we are in 

Syria is to defeat ISIS. And that remains our sole and single task 

that we are principally oriented on. Part of defeating ISIS, though, 

is removing their control of the physical caliphate, the physical terrain, as you are well aware, and ensuring they can’t resurge. So 

that means that after we have removed them from their controlled 

terrain, we have to consolidate our gains and we have to ensure 

that the right security and stability is in place so that they cannot 

resurge. So that is part of being responsible coalition members in 

here, and that will take some time beyond all of this. 

Our legal basis for operating in Syria was largely driven by the 

collective self-defense of Iraq. But when we first went there, ISIS, 

being an organization that did not adhere to sovereign boundaries, 

were moving back and forth across the area. And while we were 

beginning to address ISIS in Iraq, we knew that we also had to address ISIS in Syria. 

I would also point out, Congresswoman, that the Syrian regime 

itself has proved unwilling and unable to address this particular 

threat. While they did do some operations down in the middle Euphrates Valley here several months ago, they have largely departed 

that area, and they have taken the pressure off of ISIS and created 

more problems for the coalition in dealing with this. 

So, you know, I think those are the principal—— 

Ms. GABBARD. So our U.S. forces are still operating under the 

2001 AUMF. Is that correct? 

General VOTEL. We are. 

Ms. GABBARD. And does countering Iran—I am just seeing some 

contradiction between what the Secretary of State is saying, that 

that is now going to be a part of the U.S. military objective in 

Syria, and what you stated today, saying that countering Iran is 

not a part of the coalition mission. 

Just a follow-up to that, if it is, then how does that fall under 

the 2001 AUMF that deals directly with countering al-Qaida and 

its affiliates? 

General VOTEL. I think my understanding as the Secretary of 

State laid this out is he laid it out not as a U.S. military objective, 

but he laid it out as a U.S. objective. So there are certainly other 

ways that we can address Iran’s destabilizing activities and other 

than through military means. 

The fact of the matter is, as I mentioned a few moments ago, 

even though Iran isn’t our principal focus here in this campaign, 

our relationship with partners both in Iraq and in Syria does put 

us in a position where we can indirectly have an impact on the objectives that Iran is pursuing in this part of the world. So I think 

I would characterize it more in that regard than us actively doing 

something militarily against Iran. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. I believe Secretary Tillerson was quite 

specific in speaking about this within the justification of a maintained U.S. military presence there. 
15 

My last quick question is about Yemen, and under what authorization are we providing arms and direct military support to Saudi 

Arabia in what is essentially a proxy war between Saudi Arabia 

and Iran? 

General VOTEL. Well, any armed sales, of course, go through our 

foreign military sales and foreign military funding process that is 

managed by the Department of State, and so they have the principal oversight for that. The provision of fuel to Saudi aircraft is 

provided for under the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement that 

we have in place with Saudi Arabia. And so that provides us the 

authority to provide that support to them. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Votel, thanks so much for joining us today. I wanted to 

begin by getting your perspective. You speak about Navy presence 

in the Gulf and the Red Sea, and we think about CENTCOM as 

being land-centric. But we also see, as you specifically point out, 

the first overseas Navy base put in place by the Chinese in 

Djibouti. We see in Port Doraleh a single berth there reserved for 

the Chinese Navy. We see President Xi Jinping, through a modernization of his military, looking to very aggressively expand and 

sustain operations around the world. 

From your perspective there as CENTCOM commander in that 

AOR, specifically what do you see our U.S. Navy doing to counter 

this Chinese expansionism? And what do you need as far as U.S. 

Navy presence there to make sure that we have what is necessary 

there in relation to what we see as Chinese aggressive expansion? 

General VOTEL. Thanks, Congressman, I appreciate the question. 

I would share—I am an Army guy saying this, I would share that 

while we do think about the land territory in CENTCOM, it very 

much is a maritime theater with the three critical chokepoints 

that, you know, are so important to us in this area. So I do recognize that. 

I would just tell you that I think, certainly, the resources that 

are being provided to me, the maritime resources that are provided 

to me by the Navy and the Marine Corps, I think are adequate to 

the task that we have right now. I think the principal way that we 

develop resilience against these types of, you know, great power influences in this area is through, first of all, our presence, our constant presence, and we do maintain a constant presence in both the 

Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, into the Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf of 

Oman as well, and through our very close partnership with our 

partners. We have three combined maritime task forces that are 

led out of our naval headquarters in Bahrain that include a variety 

of different nations. 

So when I look at the nations that are on our team and I look 

at the nations that are lining up with some of these others that are 

entering in the area, I think our teams are very strong. And I think 

this is a very key way for us to maintain our influence and pursue 

our interests in the CENTCOM maritime environment. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Last year, the U.S. Naval Office of Intelligence pointed out some challenges there with potentially placing the mines that would put at risk commercial vessels there near 
16 

Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Give me your perspective, not only on what 

that potential threat is, because we see Houthis operating in the 

area, obviously, shooting at U.S. ships. Give me your perspective 

on what we are doing in minesweeping our operations there, looking to counter that potential threat for mines, because we know 

that that is a chokepoint area that is strategically very important. 

General VOTEL. Thank you. Well, we certainly maintain minesweeping capabilities in the Gulf and have for a number of years, 

but so do our partners. And I would just point out, you know, some 

of our partners, like the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have some 

very good capability in this regard. And so one of the things that 

we do is work with them to optimize their capabilities. Again, by, 

with, and through getting them to use their capabilities and using 

our intelligence and some of our experience to help them be more 

effective at this. 

And so this, I think, has been very effective in preventing, you 

know, a major mine catastrophe, if you will, in the Bab-el-Mandeb, 

one that we are very concerned about. Sixty to seventy ships a day 

go through the Bab-el-Mandeb, not just ours, everybody’s. So this 

is a very real threat that we have to pay attention to. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you currently have intelligence gathering operations to look at what is happening in Bab-el-Mandeb Strait about 

the activities that are going on there, what we can do to maybe 

counter that, or the things we can do to interdict it? Because, obviously, keeping a mine from being laid is a lot better than having 

to go in and sweep those particular areas, especially from a time 

perspective. Give us your perspective on what is happening there. 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I would say in this setting, we absolutely do, and I would look forward to sharing the details with 

you in a different setting. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Votel, thank you 

for being here today. 

America has been engaged in Afghanistan for 16 years, and it is 

difficult to determine what progress we have made. The administration’s new strategy increased its troop levels to 14,000 troops. 

However, unable to learn from history, we are investing more lives 

and resources without clearly defined benchmarks. I am extremely 

concerned about the fact that significant information is being withheld from the Office of Inspector General for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction and, ultimately, the American people. 

According to the inspector general, quote: ‘‘It is hard to make a 

determination of how good a job we are doing, because if the Afghan military is not fighting that well, and there are not many of 

them, we can’t determine fraud, waste, and abuse in Afghanistan.’’ 

Because they can’t get basic facts from the Department, how are 

you measuring progress in Afghanistan? Please describe the end 

state. What does success look like to you? Currently, what is the 

amount of territory under the Afghan Government’s control? And 

help me understand how withholding information has made a difference in our operations in Afghanistan. 
17 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. I will take your last 

one here. We are aware of that issue, and I think measures are 

being taken to address that right now. Some of that information is 

not necessarily U.S. Government information. It is information of 

the Afghan Government, and so they control the release and classification of that information. So this is something we have to continue to work with. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. General, if I could just interrupt you. It is great 

to parlay that to the Afghan Government, but we are the ones with 

resources and the lives of our military there. So we have got to be 

able to get some information from them to appease those of us that 

have to make decisions on what kind of investments we need to 

make in the area. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman, and I am committed 

to making sure that you do have those details. 

You asked also about kind of how we are looking at the situation 

right now. What I would tell you is, the big idea here with what 

we are trying to do in Afghanistan right now, is drive towards reconciliation. This is different than the approach we have had in the 

past. And we are trying to do that through creating, not just military pressure with our military activities on the ground, but we are 

trying to do it through creating social pressure with things that the 

Afghan Government is doing, like credible elections that they are 

pursuing this year at the parliamentary level and the national 

level next year. And we are doing it through creating diplomatic 

and regional pressure, just as we talked about with Pakistan a few 

moments ago. 

The idea here is that creating pressure on all of those three axes 

are going to create enough pressure on the Taliban that they come 

to the table. What is different this time as we approach this is that 

we are taking a conditions-based approach that is focused on reconciliation as its end state. It is a regional focus here, and we are 

engaging the partners in the region, not just Pakistan, but the 

Central Asian states as well who are key to this. 

And we have changed the way that we are working with the Afghan forces. So we previously had advised down to a very low level 

with their Afghan special operations forces. We are now, with the 

additional enablers and additional advisers that the Department 

has approved for us, are taking that capability and extending it out 

to their conventional forces. We are building out the Afghan Air 

Force. We are doubling the size of their Afghan special operations 

capability. So there are a variety of different aspects to this approach. This will give us the ability to measure the progress. 

You asked about how much of the population is controlled by the 

Afghan Government. Today, the figure is 64 percent. Twelve percent of the population is in areas that are controlled by the 

Taliban, and the balance of that are in contested areas. Our focus, 

the focus of our military operations is on increasing and expanding 

population control by the Government of Afghanistan. And what we 

are going to do this season is we are going to—our intention is to 

break the stalemate, grab the initiative, begin to expand population 

control this year and next year, and then ensure that we create an 

environment here that allows for credible elections to take place, 
18 

one of the most important things that the Afghan people need to 

see from their government. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. We are running out of time. What about information, the sharing of information with the inspector general? 

General VOTEL. As I mentioned, Congressman, we will do our 

very best to ensure that you have the information that you need 

to make the decisions that are necessary. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you so much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for 

being here. 

I want to talk with you a little bit about ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the CENTCOM area. And I know 

you have got a lot of partners in that area, but what percentage 

of the ISR does the United States provide? 

General VOTEL. I am not sure I can tell you what the percentage 

overall is. I mean, it is very clear that the majority of the ISR in 

the region is being provided by the United States. 

Mr. SCOTT. What about the DOD’s capacity to meet the demand 

for ISR? Do you have enough ISR currently? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think, Congressman, I don’t think you are 

going to find any commander that is going to say that he has 

enough ISR. We right now, today, have the largest concentration 

of MQ–9s down in Kandahar Airfield designed to support General 

Nicholson and his forces, and I know that is adequate for what he 

needs right now. But given his own druthers, I am sure he would 

want more. And so we would want more in all these areas. 

Mr. SCOTT. I understand that the Army in some ways and commanders are agnostic as to the different platforms that ISR may 

come from, but I assume that when it comes to providing additional 

ISR, the commanders would not be agnostic to the timeline to get 

new ISR to the field. Would that be a fair statement? 

General VOTEL. That is right. I think the faster we can continue 

to provide those capabilities, the better. 

Mr. SCOTT. So one of my concerns, and I certainly have a tremendous amount of respect for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force as well, but as they have changed the strategy to more of a China or Russia strategy, they are canceling the 

procurement or have proposed to cancel the procurement of items 

that are not capable of flying against the Russians or the Chinese 

or in a direct conflict with the Russians and the Chinese. 

One of these platforms is the new JSTARS [Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System], the recapitalization of the JSTARS, 

which we have spent hundreds of millions to develop and are now 

currently ready to purchase. And they have proposed to cancel the 

procurement of the JSTARS because they have said that they are 

going to use a system that has not been developed yet, which, obviously, changes the timeline on when we can deliver that system to 

you. 

I guess my question is: Do the systems that you use in Central 

Command have to be survivable, if you will, in a conflict that 

would be as high end as that between the Russians and the Chinese, a direct conflict? 
19 

General VOTEL. Well, they don’t necessarily need to be. I mean, 

the environment is different in parts of CENTCOM than it might 

be in other parts of the world. So, you know, some of the requirements that I have, the environment that we operate in, are probably different than what Admiral Harris and others, and General 

Scaparrotti, you know, deal with, and PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] and EUCOM [U.S. European Command], respectively, here. 

Mr. SCOTT. I would appreciate any advocacy you could have. I 

agree with you 100 percent, and I am not opposed to the DOD developing the system that they want for the fight against the Russians and the Chinese. But even in developing that system, we 

don’t want to use that system unless we have to because we don’t 

want the Russians and the Chinese to be able to gather the intel 

that they are going to gather from it every time we fly it. 

So we certainly continue to be concerned about, as we shift in 

strategy to China and Russia, abandoning platforms that work in 

the other parts of the world which are very serious fights that we 

are in and that you are commanding right now. 

I am down to about a minute, but just briefly, if you would, 

again, I have been on the border of Syria and Israel. The military 

objectives in Syria, can you just outline for us what they are again 

very briefly? 

General VOTEL. Well, specifically, it is to ensure—principally, it 

is to ensure an enduring defeat of ISIS is what the principal objective is of our military campaign right now in Syria. You know, certainly we are concerned about the weapons of mass destruction, in 

terms of some of their chemical capabilities. As you have seen in 

the past, we are obviously very concerned about making sure we 

can provide the humanitarian aid, the stability that goes along 

with getting people back into their homes. We are concerned about 

making sure that we protect allies that are on the flanks of Syria— 

Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey—that all feel the impacts of that. And, of 

course, we are very keen to ensure that there is a political resolution to all of this. Of course, that is beyond my military—— 

Mr. SCOTT. General, my time has expired, but it is a tough situation. I am glad that we have a leader like you over there and thank 

you for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Votel, thank you for your leadership and for appearing before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss the 

readiness, the posture, and the activities within CENTCOM. So 

thank you. 

I want to bring your attention back to Iran and its activities in 

Syria, perhaps covering some ground that has been covered and 

hopefully clarifying at least one point that you made. Iran is playing a very large role in Syria, providing senior advisers to the 

Assad regime, delivering weapons, cash, recruiting, and encouraging foreign fighters. 

Last month, Iran launched a drone that entered Israeli airspace. 

There was a series of events resulting in the downing of an F–16. 

The situation is clearly escalating and at greater risk. 

You mentioned, in response to Ms. Cheney’s question, that we 

can impede Tehran. Can you just identify what those strategic and/ 
20 

or operational impediments are that we are putting in Tehran’s 

way, and can you evaluate the effectiveness of them? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think some—as I mentioned, I think one 

of the things that we can do is we can build strong and resilient 

partnerships with our partners, whether it is the Iraqis on their 

side of the border or whether it is, you know, kind of the Syrian 

Democratic Forces. At this point, that is our partner on the ground. 

You know, in many regards, these partners share the same concerns we do with this, that they don’t want their countries, they 

don’t want their areas exploited by others for purposes of creating 

instability in this area. 

So the relationships that we develop with them, Iraqi forces, you 

know, particularly their border control forces, I think help aid and 

prevent the movement of these types of activities and equipment 

back and forth across their borders. I think the Iraqis are as concerned about that as we would be and as most countries would be. 

And, certainly, I think in Syria, although I do acknowledge our 

partners on the ground are a very indigenous partner, they do control very important areas along the border between Iraq and Syria. 

And so they can as well, through their own operations, make it difficult for Iran to pursue their activities through these particular 

areas. And so that is why I kind of describe it much more in an 

indirect way as—— 

Mr. BROWN. If I may, General, so that sounds a little bit aspirational and I appreciate that. Can you evaluate the effectiveness of 

what you just described? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think we are working on how we actually 

do that. I mean, most of these networks are very resilient. They are 

very savvy in terms of how they are doing things. So this is something that we are looking at now, how we measure the effectiveness of it. 

I mean, we are only in this case largely talking about ground 

routes. Certainly, Iran has the ability to use air routes as well to 

basically go over or around all of that. They have the ability to use 

maritime routes. They have the ability to go through Africa to get 

to these areas as well. 

So, you know, we have to look at this holistically as we try to 

address this. 

Mr. BROWN. So let me ask one other question, perhaps the last 

in the time I have remaining. I understand that Israel is in the 

EUCOM AOR. You know, conflict in that region doesn’t necessarily 

respect the area of operations of our different commands. Can you 

talk about in the event, regardless of the likelihood, of a conflict 

between Iran and Israel, regardless of how it is provoked, can you 

just comment on what our readiness—in this setting, perhaps it is 

best for the classified setting—our readiness and posture to come 

to the aid of Israel? 

General VOTEL. Again, I think that is probably a question that 

is best suited for General Scaparrotti, but what I would tell 

you—— 

Mr. BROWN. For readiness and posture? That wouldn’t involve 

CENTCOM? 

General VOTEL. Right. Given that it is in his area and he has the 

principal responsibility for that relationship. 
21 

What I would tell you is this, is that, you know, the CENTCOM 

area, not just on the Israeli border, but certainly on the border of 

Egypt with Libya, on the border of Pakistan with India, to the 

north of the Central Asian states with Russia, it is a tough neighborhood. And so it is imperative for the combatant commanders to 

be very well-nested across all of these areas. 

And I think, under the leadership of our chairman and with the 

National Defense Strategy that the Secretary has put in place, that 

we are improving significantly our ability to operate in cooperation 

with each other and in many cases very, very seamlessly. 

So it is not unusual for General Scaparrotti and I to have a lot 

of coordination and talking across our common areas of concern, 

just like it is not uncommon for General Waldhauser in AFRICOM 

[U.S. Africa Command] and I to talk or Admiral Harris and I to 

talk about the things on his side. 

So this is an area where we have really got to continue to pay 

attention to, and I think we are doing a much, much better job of 

this. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Votel, good to see you again. I have three important 

questions. I will be as fast as I can. The first is about this attack 

on U.S. forces in Syria, media reports alleging it is by Russian mercenaries. 

Can you comment at all if we have confirmation that, in fact, 

those were Russian mercenaries, number one? How many do you 

think were killed? And do we have any confirmation that that was 

approved or ordered by the Kremlin or Putin? And what do you 

think their objective might have been? 

General VOTEL. Congresswoman, I am not sure I can report anything different than you have seen in the media and in the press 

on this right now, in terms of numbers and attribution of who this 

is. What I can tell you is that, throughout this entire event, we 

were in communications on our communication channel with the 

Russians before, during, after. And what they told us is these were 

not their forces and not their military forces. 

So, you know, I think that kind of speaks for itself here in terms 

of what they are. And then, of course, we have seen all the media 

that has come out after this. So, to me, it highlights, again, the unwillingness, inability of the regime and pro-regime forces to take 

seriously the ISIS threat, particularly if there is apparent contracted forces in the area attempting to do this. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So do you believe they were not Russian mercenaries, and do we have any intelligence to corroborate or confirm 

or deny that? 

General VOTEL. None that I would discuss in this particular setting. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Could we maybe discuss in the follow-on setting? 

General VOTEL. I would be happy to talk with you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But do you personally believe that they were not 

Russian mercenaries at this point, or can you not even say that? 
22 

General VOTEL. We have characterized them as pro-regime forces 

at this point. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. I look forward to following up in a classified 

setting. 

The second topic is A–10 Warthog was back in Afghanistan kicking butt in January. Can you comment on the types of missions 

that they are doing? And I know it is a little specific, but as part 

of the shift in strategy, it seems like we are now going after more 

of the sources of revenue perhaps overall in attacking the, you 

know, poppy industry and the drugmaking facilities. And how is 

the A–10 doing over there? 

General VOTEL. A–10s are doing great. They were in action within 24 hours of being on the ground here. And I have had an opportunity to visit the squadron and meet the squadron commander, 

and very, very proud of what they are doing. And they are doing 

the things that we would expect the A–10s to do. 

Part of our concept and why we are pushing adviser teams down 

to a lower level is so that we can bring capabilities like the A–10 

to bear very effectively in support of the Afghan National Defense 

Forces. And so that is what we expect they are doing. 

You are correct: One of the things that has been successful and 

we have tried to carry over from our defeat-ISIS campaign is going 

after the revenue generation and, in this case, the narcotrafficking 

that fuels the Taliban. And so this is a key focus for General Nicholson and our forces at this point. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I do want to note if the last administration got their way, all the A–10s would be in the boneyard 

by now. And as I told this President, you are going to have to pry 

them out of my cold dead hands, because it is such a critical warfighting capability. And I appreciate this committee and leadership 

working to keep that asset so we can be doing missions like this. 

The last topic is I am really concerned about the buildup on 

Israel’s northern border, so southern Syria, of Iranian-backed militias and forces, Quds Force commanding that, and the increased 

aggression we are seeing from there, as the Assad regime seems to 

be shoring up controlling that area, and the potential for escalation 

of a crisis with Israel. 

Again, I know that’s EUCOM’s AOR, but Syria is yours. So can 

you speak to what you are seeing in the trends in the Golan area 

and whether there is a threat there? 

General VOTEL. I think we share the same concerns that you 

have just highlighted right here. And, you know, what this is—you 

know, very effectively in this southwestern corner of Syria, we have 

been able to diplomatically begin to address that. And so working 

with the special Presidential envoy, Mr. McGurk, and others, we 

are continuing to keep focus on that. 

Again, Russia is a party to this and they have responsibilities to 

ensure that, you know, the detractable partners that may be in this 

area are under control. And so they have to take responsibility for 

this and be held accountable, not just the Iranians but the others 

that are down there that are much more akin to the violent extremists down there. So I think we have to continue to address 

that in this particular aspect. 
23 

Ms. MCSALLY. Can you share any of the trends that you are seeing, increase in military capability we have seen, again, with the 

escalation over the last few weeks, and any concerns you have 

about that escalating into a full-blown crisis with Israel? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think what I am concerned about is in 

these places down in the southwest and particularly up in places 

like Idlib, these are becoming collection zones for a lot of unsavory 

organizations right here, and eventually, they are going to have to 

be dealt with. And so I am concerned that, left unaddressed, that 

they will become bigger problems. 

In terms of trends and stuff like this, I can’t tell you in the 

southwest, particularly in this setting, that we have seen anything 

specific here in terms of this, but obviously there are some concerns. But what we have seen in places like Idlib and others is 

where these groups that have come together do potentially pose 

long-term challenges for security of the region, above and beyond 

Syria. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I am over my time, but I look forward to discussing further in the closed session. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, great to see you again. Thank you for your great service 

to the Nation. It is a pleasure to have you back before the committee once again. 

I would like to continue on the Iran topic as well and do a deeper 

dive on this topic. So Iran supports numerous proxies: Hezbollah 

in Israel, Lebanon, and Syria; the Houthis in Yemen; and militias 

in Iraq. Iran is using its militias and insurgents abroad to upset 

the existing order and sow chaos, obviously. In addition to proxies, 

Iran uses other asymmetric means, like cyber operations and information warfare, to expand its influence in the region. 

So can you explain how you have seen Iran utilize these techniques during your tenure as CENTCOM commander to create a 

land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, and if you think 

they have been effective in increasing their influence through this 

strategy? 

General VOTEL. Thanks. Thanks, Congressman. Some of this discussion probably I think is best set for a closed session here, but, 

you know, I think, you know, what Iran attempts to do is by creating proxy organizations that can go out there and do their bidding, that can operate in areas in which they have interests. I 

think they are attempting to do that. And I do think we see some 

instances of that as we look at some of the undisciplined Shia militia organizations that are here that are much more beholden to 

Iran than they are to, say, the Government of Iraq. This is very 

concerning to us, and I think this gives us indications that they are 

acting not on behalf of the government they say they are representing but on behalf of another party. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Good. I look forward to following up on 

that question too once we are in the closed session. 

So the war in Syria has left hundreds of thousands dead, millions either internally displaced or seeking asylum as refugees. But 

as the fight against ISIL transitions to consolidating gains and 

building stability, it seems as if some of the groups that have 
24 

formed partnerships of convenience may now turn their attention 

towards fighting each other instead. 

So how do you see these various elements aligning themselves in 

Syria, and do you worry about a potential shifting regional balance 

of power, and do you feel the Syrian Kurds might feel slighted by 

recent events and align more closely with Iran to ward off threats? 

General VOTEL. Yes. So, first off, Congressman, what I would say 

is, with the partners that we operate, the Syrian Democratic 

Forces, we have not necessarily seen infighting among themselves 

here in terms of that. I mean, it is a large organization, roughly 

half Kurd/half Arab, and with some others thrown in there, Yazidis 

and others, Turkmen, that are involved in this group. But, frankly, 

they, in my estimation, have continued to be pretty coherent in 

terms of how they are doing this. 

I guess the way I would describe it is that, as we are completing 

the defeat of ISIS, I think what we are now beginning to see is the 

reemergence of many of the underlying issues that have always 

been in place in Syria. And as we have converging forces in the 

area, we are now seeing diverging interests. 

And I think we see this down in the middle Euphrates Valley between the focus of the coalition and our partners on the ground and 

what the pro-regime element is focused on. They are less concerned 

about rooting out ISIS than they are about going in and addressing 

some of the opposition elements to the regime. 

So I think what we—I think what we have to be mindful of is 

that, as the caliphate goes away and as the threat of ISIS is removed, we will begin to see more of a return to the underlying 

challenges that really gave birth to many of these—to this problem 

and other problems in the country. And those are ultimately going 

to have to be addressed through some type of Geneva process that 

brings the parties together to, you know, establish some kind of 

process and arrangement that allows Syria to be the country that 

it should be. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. It seems that we are at that tipping point right 

now where the State Department has to play a stronger role in 

working with the powers that have interests there and try to bring 

about a political solution. So I hope we are going to be pursuing 

that on dual tracks. 

I see my time is about to run out, so I will hold my questions 

for the closed session, but, again, thank you for your service, General, and I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Russell. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General Votel, for your testimony today. 

A couple of areas that I have not heard discussed. Could you give 

us your thoughts on Turkish operations in Afrin and its partnering 

with al-Qaida affiliates, its attacks on U.S.-backed forces, and how 

that will impact the by, with, and through strategy to make a stable border security force? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I think some of that will probably 

be reserved for the closed session here. But, you know, I think we 

have acknowledged that Turkey has some concerns, has some significant concerns along their border with longstanding PKK inter-
25 

ests. Our concern, of course, is that this activity in Afrin is detracting from our efforts against ISIS. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And then kind of a broader scope on that. What 

actions do you think are needed to prevent this mixture of Erdogan-Putin counter-efforts to secure the hard-fought gains against 

ISIS? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, as I have said a couple times here, I really view Russia 

as being at the heart of many of these issues here. 

And I am being very serious when I say they play the role of 

both arsonist and fireman, fueling tensions and then trying to resolve them in their favor and manipulating all the parties they can 

to try to achieve their objectives—their objectives—and not necessarily the broader objectives of the international community here. 

So I think there certainly has to be more accountability and pressure put on Russia to do what they said they were going to do. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Do you think that that pressure could come from 

the other instruments of national power from the United States on 

our NATO ally in Turkey? 

General VOTEL. I think they can come from a variety of different 

sources, Congressman. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And then I guess can you speak also to the need 

to interdict the ISIS/al-Qaida migration into sub-Saharan Africa, 

AQ Maghreb, Boko Haram, others, see a lot of that now, that as 

they have been pushed out of one area, that they may drift over 

to the other, and how that would cooperate between the combatant 

commands. 

General VOTEL. Well, certainly, we are very cognizant of what 

AFRICOM is dealing with with their partners on the ground in 

Sahel and the Maghreb here and very, very concerned about that. 

I think one of the principal things that we can do is continue to 

share information back and forth. 

Frankly, we are not seeing mass migration of these fighters. I 

won’t tell you that they are probably not getting out with refugees 

and others that are doing that. That probably is occurring. But certainly, this is a concern long term. 

And so I think one of the things that we are attempting to do 

is, particularly now that we have so many foreign fighters that 

have been captured and are in some level of detention with our 

partners here, is try to get the international community engaged 

in taking responsibility for their people and bringing them to some 

level of justice. There is a lot that can be learned from these foreign fighters, and we have to make sure that we have exploited 

that and learned as much as we can so we can prevent it, but we 

also need to make sure that they are put back into the judicial 

process so they can be dealt with by their countries from which 

they came. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Then I guess the last question I have would be, 

could you give your assessment of Egyptian and Saudi combined efforts on Yemen and the status of Yemen? 

General VOTEL. With respect to the status of Yemen, I think, obviously, Yemen is very destabilized at this particular point. Not 

only do they have a civil war going on, they have kind of a proxy 

war playing out here between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Iran in-
26 

troducing advanced technology into there. We see the enabled 

Houthis trying to challenge navigation in the Bab-el-Mandeb, and, 

of course, they have a counterterrorism problem that we are very 

focused on. 

So, you know, I think, from the counterterrorism standpoint, I 

think we are making very good progress in this particular area. I 

don’t see significant changes in the civil conflict that is taking 

place, that is largely being orchestrated by the Arab coalitions on 

the ground there. They certainly need to put some more effort into 

that. We are paying attention to the efforts by our diplomats and 

others here to try to address this politically. There had been—there 

has been some opportunities in the past that have not come to fruition yet, and I think we still have to continue on in this area. 

But I think Yemen is an area that we should all be concerned 

about, because we are seeing all kinds of problems in that particular area and, on top of it, huge humanitarian issues. The people 

are suffering greatly. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Rosen. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. I want to thank the general for being 

here today and thank the ranking member and the chairman for 

this important hearing. 

I would like to speak a little bit about sanctions on Iran and Russia, and what is your opinion and how would implementing sanctions or what level of sanctions, if any, do you think would influence activities in the Middle East, specifically Russia and Iran? 

General VOTEL. Well, Congresswoman, we don’t really manage 

those within the Department of Defense and certainly not within 

CENTCOM. I do know that the Secretary has recently provided 

some information to Senator Corker and others with regards to 

CAATSA [Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act] and some of the other things regarding sanctions out here, and 

I think those kind of represent his interest. 

You know, I think sanctions are a very important part of this. 

In most of these threats—and I think as I tried to mention in my 

opening comments, this is a team sport. And so we can do things 

militarily, but we also need the other instruments of our national 

power, whether it is diplomatic, whether it is economic, whether it 

is informational, to really kick in on these things. And when we are 

able to bring all of those together, to include things like sanctions, 

I think we often have the best effects. 

And so, you know, I think there are certainly some very good 

areas where sanctions will make a difference. We do have to look 

at the impact of those on some of our partners, and we have to be 

mindful of that. I do think granting waiver authority to the Secretary of State with regard to some of these things is a good approach and gives us the flexibility that we need in these regards, 

but, you know, I look at it as a key part of the whole-of-government 

approach. 

Ms. ROSEN. So you feel you are getting enough support in this 

regard? 

General VOTEL. I do. And I certainly know this is a continuing 

area of topic in other parts of the government. 
27 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

I also want to switch over and talk about Syria a little bit. And 

so where does the communication stand after Russian-aligned 

troops, of course, attacked our partner forces in Syria in early February? So how are things going there? And our strategy of deconfliction with Russian mechanisms, has that been helpful? 

General VOTEL. Congresswoman, there has been no change in 

the communication channel that we have had. Our deconfliction 

channel remains a very professional military discussion. It was before, and it has been since. And so it remains an effective way to 

deconflict our forces and make sure our airmen stay safe and our 

people on the ground are safe. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Just to follow up briefly on something Mr. Russell said, what do we say to our NATO allies in Ankara regarding 

our support for Kurdish elements in Syria, the YPG, and other elements? What message do we communicate to them? 

General VOTEL. The message that I have conveyed is that our 

Kurdish partners, part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multiethnic force that consists in equal measures and actually in greater 

measures of Arabs than Kurds, has been the most effective force 

on the ground in Syria against ISIS. And we need them to finish 

this fight. So I think that is the first thing and really one of the 

principal things we have to acknowledge to them. I think we also 

have to acknowledge their concerns about this. And so our attempts to try to be as transparent and clear in terms of what we 

are doing and our way forward I think are things we have to continue to emphasize to them. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do they simply make no distinction between the 

PKK and the elements that we support on the ground in Syria? 

General VOTEL. Well, they don’t draw that distinction. And, of 

course, that is the tension. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. To follow up on something Ms. Cheney said earlier, or that you said in response to her question, that it is not part 

of the coalition effort to counter Iran in Syria, how would you characterize our strategy in Syria vis-a-vis Iran? What are we trying 

to do to Iran in Syria? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think our broad U.S. Government objective here is to limit Iran’s influence in Syria, because, as we have 

seen, they are attempting to arm and motivate fighters that could 

pose threats to our other vital partners here. And so, you know, I 

think as a government, we have interest in trying to limit their influence and activities in this part of the region. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I don’t want to spend my remaining time on a 

semantic debate, but I just would say if their influence is gaining 

in Syria and we need to limit that, I sort of think that necessarily 

involves us countering their gains in Syria. So perhaps some clarity, or let me rather say, what is our strategy? How would you 

characterize our strategy vis-a-vis Iran throughout the rest of the 

region? 

General VOTEL. I would characterize our strategy as deter, assure, and compete. We have to have capabilities in place to deter 
28 

Iran’s use of ballistic missile capability against our partners, and 

we have to ensure that we can deter their ability to race to a nuclear weapons capability. 

We have to always assure our partners in the region. As I think 

I have said several times here, our partnerships, when you line up 

our coalition versus their coalition, ours is much more capable. And 

so continuing to develop those relationships is really very important and assuring our partners that we are going to be there with 

them. 

And then we have to compete with them not just militarily but 

with our other instruments of power, in the areas that we can. And 

this is pushing back, rolling back on their influence, pushing back 

on their narrative where we can, and then, in the areas where we 

must, preventing them from moving their weapons and other 

things around the theater that pose threats to our partners. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. But does that rollback, that competition sort of 

reach a limit in Syria? Is there some reason we are being less aggressive there? You sort of mentioned Iraq as an area where we are 

competing more effectively with them. 

General VOTEL. I think my point is only that, as we form the coalition, the defeat-ISIS coalition, that, you know, has both a military 

and a political component to it, that one of the objectives that has 

not been assigned to us is countering Iran. It has specifically been 

focused on the ISIS mission. So I think that is what I am trying 

to emphasize. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And then, in Iraq, do you think we are actively 

or effectively competing with them? And I am thinking specifically 

of, you know, one of the biggest phenomena in the last year has 

been the rise of the PMF [Popular Mobilization Forces] and, you 

know, some of these groups may be able to be incorporated in the 

ISF [Iraqi security forces], but others are terrorists, you know, taking orders from the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]. 

General VOTEL. Well, I think, you know, certainly addressing the 

PMF is something that the Prime Minister will have to do, and in 

many regards, he has done that. But, again, I think one of the best 

things we can do on the ground in Syria is being a really good and 

valued partner to the Iraqi security forces, and I think the assistance that the United States and the coalition did I think demonstrated that. 

And in my engagements with the security force leaders that I 

talk to on a regular basis, I think they deeply value that, and they 

appreciate it, and they look forward to maintaining that relationship in the future. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I have run out of time. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. General, I want to thank you so much for your service and the great work of everyone under your command throughout the regions that are under your command. 

My particular concerns are about Afghanistan that I briefly discussed with you before the hearing began. And the special inspector general’s report on Afghan reconstruction reports that we are 

not making progress as far as population centers and how much we 

control. In fact, we lost a little bit of ground from the last report. 
29 

And I support what the military is doing. I supported the effort 

to increase the number of troops recently. And I think that you 

have a very clear strategy as far as the five points of help the Afghan Army, helping the Afghan special forces to increase their size 

and effectiveness; increase the collaboration between the Afghan 

Air Force and the Army; as well as replace their platforms with 

American equipment as opposed to Russian equipment; help the 

police; and put more pressure on Pakistan. It is a clear five-point 

strategy that makes tremendous sense, and you are doing a very 

effective job of clearing and holding area. 

The problem is the backfilling. And in your prepared testimony, 

you talked about how Kabul’s uncertain political situation remains 

the greatest risk of stability. And you went on to say that ‘‘the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to suffer 

from a professional governmental capacity deficit, competing interests, and corruption.’’ And my concern is that your colleagues on 

the civilian side do not have a clear plan the way that the military 

has. So I want to ask you, who do you see as being your clearest 

partners with General Nicholson on the civilian side in this effort, 

and what do you perceive their strategy to be? If you could put it 

in a succinct way, because I don’t see them putting out a clear succinct plan on the civilian side. So you are clearing and holding, but 

when it comes to rebuilding and transitioning, they are not laying 

out a clear plan. So I just want to ask you to comment on that, 

please, General. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think that the principal partner that we would look to on the 

U.S. side certainly is the Ambassador and the country team. And, 

you know, I do think we have a very outstanding Ambassador on 

the ground. I think he is very engaged in this. And I think we are 

beginning to address many of these things that you have talked 

about. 

As I mentioned to you, in many regards the military missions in 

many of these countries really are the easy part of addressing the 

situation. And the more difficult part is the political resolution that 

has to take place afterwards, because this is when you have to address the deep underlying issues that, you know, oftentimes gave 

way to the conflict that we just resolved. 

As I think I mentioned to you beforehand, you know, tomorrow 

in Kabul, President Ghani and, you know, certainly with the support of our Embassy, will be hosting the Kabul Process conference 

that will address both reconciliation and counterterrorism and will 

be an opportunity with 25 nations brought in to help do that. 

There are efforts underway with our Department of State interlocutors to help devise ways to move forward with reconciliation. It 

is extraordinarily complex. The Taliban is not a singular contiguous group to deal with. It is broken. It is fractured. And so not 

only do we have to look at reconciliation, we have to look at things 

like reintegration as well. 

So, you know, the task in front of our diplomats to solve this I 

think is an extraordinarily complex one as they move forward. And 

I do think this certainly is a challenge here, but I do think that 

they are moving forward in ways to begin to address this effectively 
30 

here as we apply military, social, and diplomatic pressure to bring 

the Taliban to the table. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So, General, in your testimony, you also—thank you 

very much for that, by the way. In your testimony, you talked 

about how Pakistan is starting to share more information and collaborate more than they had historically. What is your prognosis 

with Pakistan? What do you see happening in real time other than 

the sharing of information, and what can we hope to expect as far 

as progress regarding the governing of the ungoverned areas? 

General VOTEL. Well, you know, I would say that, first off, I 

think it is important to recognize that Pakistan has actually—you 

know, Pakistan as a country has suffered greatly from terrorism, 

perhaps as much as anybody in the region and maybe as much as 

anybody around the world. And they have taken a number of measures to address terrorism within their borders, and that has contributed over the years to, you know, some increased security in 

the area, and we have to recognize that upfront. 

So our approach I think is to continue to be engaged with them. 

We want to have a candid discussion. I think I do. We want to have 

frequent communication. We want to build trust in this relationship. The history of the United States and Pakistan, there is a very 

long history here. We do share many interests, and they share 

many things in common with us culturally, militarily, politically, in 

terms of what we are doing, but we have to continue to work with 

them to move them in directions that cause them to make strategic 

changes in their approach. And that is really what we are aimed 

at. I don’t know that we can put a time limit on that, but, as I 

mentioned to you, we are seeing some positive indicators, and we 

have to ensure that we don’t overlook these as we move forward 

and we continue to build on these, and this is what my objective 

is with my counterparts. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your service and for being here. 

There is no place in the world where Iranian-backed proxy forces 

are a stabilizing feature of the terrain, is there? 

General VOTEL. Not that I would—I would not characterize it 

that way, Congressman. 

Mr. GAETZ. So, in July of 2015, we have the birth of the JCPOA. 

From that point in time until today, would we say that Iran has 

made the same investment in their proxy forces, a reduced investment in their proxy forces, or an enhanced investment in their 

proxy forces? 

General VOTEL. I think I would characterize it as an enhanced 

investment in their proxies and partners. 

Mr. GAETZ. So, since the JCPOA, we have got Iran putting more 

money behind proxy forces that are destabilizing in literally 100 

percent of the circumstances in which they exist. In August of 

2017, the Iranian Parliament votes to increase their military 

spending. 

Are there particular capabilities that we think may emerge from 

that, particular tactics that Iran is investing in as they use more 
31 

of the cash that they now have access to to be a destabilizing hegemon? 

General VOTEL. Well, Congressman, I mean, as I mentioned earlier, I think, as we look at the Iranian threat, I think what we have 

seen is not only an increase quantitatively but, in some cases, an 

increase qualitatively in some of the capabilities that they have developed. 

They are using the opportunity of things like Yemen to—you 

know, like we go out to China Lake to test our weapon systems. 

They go to Yemen to test their weapon systems. So they are taking 

advantage of these opportunities to improve their capabilities 

around the world. So I definitely am concerned about this. 

Mr. GAETZ. You also test some great weapon systems off my district in northwest Florida we are very proud of. My district is also 

home to the 7th Special Forces Group. They do a great deal of work 

in the CENTCOM AOR, and frequently they return home and then 

deploy to SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] AOR to find 

themselves fighting a very similarly flavored enemy in radical Islamic extremists funded in many circumstances by Iran through 

their terror proxies. 

Are there areas within CENTCOM’s AOR where there are training activities, where recruits are being brought in from other parts 

of the world, particularly the Western Hemisphere, and then essentially redeployed after receiving training in the CENTCOM AOR? 

General VOTEL. I am not sure I can answer that in this particular setting here. I am sure that there probably are. 

Mr. GAETZ. Okay. We may chat about that a little later today 

then. Are there particular capabilities in the development of Iran’s 

terror proxies that we find them particularly investing in, whether 

that is drone technology, whether that is guerilla capability, the development of explosives? 

General VOTEL. I think all of the above. I think these are all tactics that we have seen in the past. You know, certainly we are concerned about the increasing use of missiles, of all short-range, medium-range missiles, and that type of stuff is very concerning. 

Their use of UASes [unmanned aerial systems] is a particular concerning emerging threat for us here that we are concerned about. 

But I think one, you know, of the other things is that, you know, 

I think as we look at what Iran did in—what it took Iran to do, 

took 20 years for Iran to do in Lebanon with the Lebanese 

Hezbollah, they are attempting to do in about 5 years with the 

Houthis in Yemen. This is very concerning to us. 

So I think they are accelerating their pace in their ability to do 

this, and this is something we have to be very concerned about. 

Mr. GAETZ. I completely agree. And I would add to the list activities in the Western Hemisphere where that very same game plan 

that we have seen Iran run in Syria, then on the Arabian Peninsula, and now in our own backyard would continue that troubling 

trend line with an increased boost in volume and in quality. 

As we look at the particular missile systems that you mentioned 

and the areas where they may be used, I look particularly to our 

ally Israel as a point of vulnerability. Do we see the—or in what 

capacity do we see the Iranians hardening their positions in south-
32 

ern Syria, and what feedback have we gotten at the mil-to-mil level 

from our ally Israel about their discomfort with that? 

General VOTEL. In this setting, I would just say I think we have 

seen and we have seen in public media releases here, you know, 

Israel has struck at some of these locations here that they have 

posed a threat to them. 

So, you know, I think in this setting, I think I would leave it at 

that, that there certainly are some concerns there. 

Mr. GAETZ. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our next setting. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, General. 

We recently heard from Admiral Harris that munitions have 

been a great concern for him in PACOM. CENTCOM has obviously 

been using a lot of munitions in the counter-ISIL fight. So please 

describe for me the state of our current munitions in CENTCOM, 

and are you getting what you currently need? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, we are. And I would be happy to 

take it for the record and give you some more detail on this. But 

what we did in CENTCOM here over the last—with the support of 

the Department, was put in controlled supply rates for our key munitions here, and we have been managing that for some time. Certainly, the success we have had in Iraq and Syria has resulted in 

a lowered use of that, which has allowed us to cross-level within 

the theater to Afghanistan to address our issues. 

I won’t comment on the broader Department-wide challenge with 

this, but I think we are being well supported right now in CENTCOM. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Good. So, to follow up a little on that then, from 

where you stand, are the other combatant commands, especially 

EUCOM, are they keeping their stocks at the appropriate levels 

they need, anticipating the kind of adversaries—— 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I think that is probably a better 

question for them. I can’t comment on their stockage. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Switching gears then, would you call Qatar a dependable partner? 

General VOTEL. I think Qatar has been a dependable partner to 

us. Certainly, we have our—my forward headquarters is located in 

Qatar. We have our air operations center there. I think they have 

been good partners to us in the past. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Is the discord between our GCC [Gulf Cooperation 

Council]—other partners outside of Qatar and especially between 

the Saudi and Qatar in regards to the bloc, has that affected any 

of our operations in CENTCOM? 

General VOTEL. It has not had a significant impact on our military activities. And we have made this very clear from the beginning that we would not allow that, and I think we have largely 

been successful in mitigating most of that. 

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you for being here today. 
33 

Can we go back to Afghanistan for a moment, and could you comment more specifically on how tenuous is our 39-member-nation coalition? Is it continuing to weaken, or do you have more of an optimistic outlook on where our coalition is heading forward? 

General VOTEL. I think our coalition remains very, very strong 

in Afghanistan. You know, one of the things that underpins, you 

know, the President’s roadmap for the Afghan National Defense 

[and] Security Forces was the commitment made by the NATO nations and the partner nations at the Brussels conference and in 

Warsaw to make sure that the support would be continued. And so 

we have seen the partner nations continue to sustain and in many 

cases increase their contributions to the effort. 

Mr. BANKS. Just to repeat, so we are seeing in some places an 

increase. Can you mention which nations are increasing their commitment? 

General VOTEL. I think the U.K. is an example. They have increased some of their recent contributions. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay, thank you. A moment ago, you said, in addressing Mr. Suozzi’s comments, that Pakistan has paid a significant 

price. ‘‘Has suffered greatly’’ was your quote. 

In your testimony, though, you, quote, say: ‘‘The Taliban and 

Haqqani leadership and fighters continue to find sanctuary in Pakistan,’’ end quote. And then, on the next page, you talk about our 

discontinuing of IMET/FMF [International Military Education and 

Training/Foreign Military Financing] support to Pakistan. 

Could you dig a little bit deeper into that? I mean, what is working to bring Pakistan back to the table to thwart the Taliban and 

other like-minded groups in providing them sanctuary in Pakistan? 

General VOTEL. Well, you know, I think certainly the pressure 

that our government put on Pakistan as we brought out the strategy I think contributed to that. I think what is also working right 

now is the approach that we have in place with them. I think we 

have tried to be very clear in terms of the things that we need 

Pakistan to do for us. 

And what I have endeavored to do, not always in a public way 

but in a private way, is develop a relationship that allows us to 

provide feedback both ways. There are things, frankly, that Pakistan has asked of us as well. So this is a two-way street here. And 

so it is my responsibility, I think, to make sure that we have feedback loops in place that go back and forth between the things that 

we are doing to try to support each other and moving forward in 

that regard. 

And so, you know, I would be happy to talk a little bit more 

about this perhaps in a closed session here, but that is really what 

this is about. It is about building a bridge back, building the trust 

that has to underpin this relationship that has been missing from 

it for a long time. 

Mr. BANKS. Has there been a plan to recontinue FMF and IMET 

support to Pakistan? 

General VOTEL. I don’t think we have addressed that at this particular point. 

Mr. BANKS. So we remain in a posture of discontinuing that support? Pakistan has obviously—— 
34 

General VOTEL. That is the current posture, and I would imagine 

hopefully in the future we will have an opportunity to reconsider. 

Mr. BANKS. Has that been beneficial? 

General VOTEL. Again, I think it has created some of the pressure on this. In many regards, you know, Pakistan isn’t necessarily 

looking for our equipment in all these cases. They are looking for 

our understanding and respect, in terms of what they have accomplished here. So, again, this is really about relationship building, 

and that is principally my focus here with my counterpart. 

Mr. BANKS. Pakistan continues to provide a very important and 

strategic logistical route for our efforts into Afghanistan. Have you 

seen those logistical routes continue to operate fully as they 

have—— 

General VOTEL. I have. I have. 

Mr. BANKS [continuing]. For the past decade plus? 

General VOTEL. Ground lines communication, airlines communications, absolutely vital to us, and they have continued to sustain 

that. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

General VOTEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, could you tell us how many U.S. forces we have in Afghanistan right now? How many service members are deployed 

there as of this moment? 

General VOTEL. We generally don’t talk numbers in public here, 

Congressman. I would be happy to—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. What can you say that we can say in a public setting? There is lots of reporting on this. What is a ballpark you 

could talk about? 

General VOTEL. We are at the level that the Department of Defense has approved for us in this area, and we will maintain that 

going forward. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Is that public information, the level that the Department of Defense has? 

General VOTEL. I think that the Office of Secretary of Defense 

has put some numbers out. I don’t recall what their most recent 

one is, but I would be happy to follow up on that with you. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. And so I would like to ask you, how many 

U.S. service members are in Syria or operating in Syria? I am expecting to get a similar answer. Are you able to tell me? 

General VOTEL. Right. I think, you know, that the Department 

of Defense I think has basically said around 1,700 have been there, 

but, again, I would offer the same response to you in this. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And in answer to Ms. Gabbard’s question about 

what our purpose is, you responded that the sole and single task 

is to defeat ISIS. Is that, in fact, the reason for our military presence? 

General VOTEL. That is the reason for our military presence. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And with the defeat of ISIS, will we no longer 

have a military presence in Syria? 

General VOTEL. Well, when we have completed our—when we 

have completed our mission here in Syria. It involves not only kick-
35 

ing ISIS out of the areas in which they occupy, but it also includes 

the consolidation and the consolidation of gains and the stability 

that allows us to move forward with a political resolution to this. 

So that has been defined for us by our leadership here, and so 

that is how we are gauging our military support. That is part of 

the mission. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The first part of your answer is clear to me. If 

there are no longer ISIS combatants on the battlefield, if we no 

longer have a threat from them, I think that is probably something 

we can measure. 

The second part sounds a little mushy. Could you define that in 

terms that I and my constituents can understand so we will know 

when we have won and when service members can come back from 

Syria? 

General VOTEL. Right. So what we will continue to do is support 

our partners on the ground, to ensure that we can consolidate our 

gains, we can stabilize the area, we can ensure that international 

organizations, humanitarian aid organizations can come back, and 

people can get into their homes. And this is about creating the security environment that allows that and provides the time for our 

diplomats to pursue the solution that we are seeking through the 

United Nations in Syria. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So, even after ISIS is gone, there is an indefinite 

military commitment from the United States of America, from the 

description you just gave me. What is the legal justification to be 

there after ISIS is no longer there? 

General VOTEL. Well, the fact is ISIS is still there, and that is 

what we are dealing with right now. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. But the question I asked you is: After ISIS is defeated and you have accomplished the task, what is the legal justification for U.S. service members to be deployed in Syria? 

General VOTEL. Well, the principal thing will be to ensure that 

ISIS does not reemerge in this particular area. Even though they 

have been eliminated from controlling terrain does not mean that 

ISIS is not present in this area. I think we have been very clear 

on that. So we have to ensure that ISIS isn’t given the opportunity 

to resurge here. 

With regard to your question on the legal authority of this, 

again, I would cite that, you know, the principal legal authority 

here was self-defense of Iraq in terms of this, and the unwillingness and inability of the Syrian regime to address this particular 

threat that posed a threat to, not just the country of Syria and 

Iraq, but really to a much broader group of countries around the 

world. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. My understanding is that the administration has 

used the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, whose 

justification is premised on the attacks of 9/11 and stopping those 

who attacked this country from being able to do so again. 

And I think the logical conclusion of your answer to my question 

about our presence after ISIS is defeated is that the U.S. military 

can be in every country that there was ever an ISIS presence just 

so that there will not be an ISIS presence going forward, and I 

think that is a recipe for disaster. We will not have successful over-
36 

sight or accountability or prosecution of that war, because we cannot define its goals or the strategy. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, what happened when we left Iraq completely in 2009 after we had supposedly defeated al-Qaida in Iraq? 

General VOTEL. Well, Chairman, we saw the rise of ISIS, and we 

saw the inability of the Iraqi security forces to effectively address 

it as it was growing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hice. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, according to the Worldwide Threat Assessment, the 

most recent one, Director Coats and the intelligence community assessed that Iran’s support for the popular mobilization committee 

and Shia militants remain the primary threat to U.S. personnel in 

Iraq. Do you agree with that assessment? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I do think they certainly could 

pose a threat to our forces on the ground. This is something we are 

very vigilant for and are paying very, very close attention to. We 

have not seen that threat manifest itself at this particular point, 

but it is certainly something that we are very cognizant of. 

Mr. HICE. How is CENTCOM working with the Iraqi Government and other regional partners to try to address this? 

General VOTEL. Well, you know, certainly the Iraqi Government 

has a law in place that addresses paramilitary forces. And what we 

are doing as part of our broader security sector reform support that 

we provide to the Government of Iraq is encouraging them to take 

the steps to bring those forces to the right size and to ensure they 

have the right leadership and they are beholden to the Government 

of Iraq. So the principal way that we will do this is through our 

advice and, where necessary, our assistance to the Government of 

Iraq. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. I would like to follow up a little bit on Mr. Gallagher’s questions a little while ago and just kind of an overall perspective. What is CENTCOM’s role in trying to curb Iranian influence, particularly in Iraq, but in the entire region? 

General VOTEL. Well, you know, I think one of the principal roles 

that we have, as I mentioned, is assuring our partners and building partnerships around the region and helping our partners be resilient against this particular threat and making sure that they 

have the wherewithal to protect themselves. So certainly developing partnerships and assuring our partners is a key piece of this. 

Another key piece of this is making sure that we have the right 

military capabilities in place to deter Iran from taking action, particularly with their growing and increasingly capable missile capability that they are developing. So we have a deterrence role. 

And then, finally, I think we have a competition role. We have 

to challenge them for some of the things that they are doing. And 

we certainly can do that militarily, but we can also do that with 

our other instruments of national power that we have available for 

us. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Thank you. And that actually raises some questions that I think would probably be more appropriate in our next 

session. 

But, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you. 
37 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. General Votel, thank you for your leadership, and I 

appreciate and thank the men and women who serve in the United 

States Central Command. I was a four-time deployed veteran of the 

command and proud of that. 

I would like to drill a little bit more into the Iranian influence 

in Syria itself and that specific problem set. Iran has propped up 

Assad, I think maybe more so than Russia, but the two together 

have clearly been working together. They got advisers. They have 

sent fighters to Syria. They encourage Hezbollah to be supportive. 

Shia militants from other countries have been sent there. They 

have sent weapons, cash, petroleum. They have recently launched 

a drone, it appears. I think it was an Iranian drone versus a Syrian 

drone. 

So what I am hearing from you—and please correct me if I am 

wrong, if my characterization is not right—that we do have a 

grander strategy that focuses on Iran in your AOR, but in Syria 

itself, we really don’t have a strategy that limits Iran’s influence 

in Syria. Is that a true characterization? 

General VOTEL. I am not sure I would necessarily characterize 

it that way. There are things that are appropriate for the military 

to do, and that is the angle that I talk about, but there are certainly other parts of our government and other capabilities that we 

have within our national resources that can address Iran’s malign 

activities, whether they are in Syria or in other places. 

Mr. BACON. But you would agree it would be unacceptable for 

Iran to have a long-term presence in western Syria? 

General VOTEL. It would be unacceptable if that presence resulted in threats to our other partners or in further destabilization 

of the region. 

Mr. BACON. Would you say it is acceptable or unacceptable for 

Iran to build a land bridge from Iran, through Iraq, Syria, to the 

borders of Israel? 

General VOTEL. I would say it is unacceptable if the purpose of 

that land bridge is to move lethal technologies and advanced capabilities in the hands of other fighters who may use those to attack 

their neighbors. 

Mr. BACON. What would you say was the purpose of Iran launching that drone into Israel? Was that, indeed, Iran, or could it have 

been Syrian? 

General VOTEL. You know, I am not sure. I think that is probably a better question for the Iranians here, in terms of that. 

Mr. BACON. There seems to be a recent decline in Iranian harassment of our ships in the Persian Gulf and in the straits. Is that 

true, and why do you think that may be? 

General VOTEL. It is true. We have seen a decrease in some of 

the interactions that we have seen. I think this is principally because of some of the strong rhetoric or the strong—the discussion 

we have had about the lack of professionalism of Iranian maritime 

forces and how they operate in this region. I think that has got 

their attention. 

I also do think they are perhaps concerned about our stronger 

position on some of Iran’s activities beyond just their nuclear weapons program here, and so they are paying attention to that. 
38 

I would tell you, Mr. Congressman, that one of the things we are 

concerned about is their increasing use of UAVs [ummanned aerial 

vehicles]. So, while we may see decreases with some of their activities in this area, I am equally concerned about their increasing use 

of UAVs that could pose a threat to our maritime activities in the 

region. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. Are we actively interdicting shipments 

to the Hezbollah in Lebanon from Iran? 

General VOTEL. I think that is probably beyond the discussion in 

this room. 

Mr. BACON. Going back to a previous question on Joint STARS, 

we are being asked by the Air Force to determine should we recapitalize the Joint STARS with a new airframe or let that go away 

and go to some new capabilities. And we are getting conflicting advice and counsel on that. 

I would love to have your perspective. Do you need more Joint 

STAR capabilities or less, or do you have thoughts for us at the 

HASC [House Armed Services Committee]? 

General VOTEL. You know, as a combatant commander, you 

know, I am very dependent upon the services to provide us the 

right capabilities. And they always do, and we are very, very satisfied with that. So I am less concerned about which platform it is 

on and more concerned with the capability that is coming our way. 

Certainly, the Joint STARS provides not only ground movement 

targeting indicator capability that is very important in my theater 

and other theaters, but it also provides, you know, battlespace 

management command and control that comes along with. These 

are key capabilities. 

What I am trying to achieve with our use of ISR is layered ISR. 

I want to be able to draw all these capabilities into an ISR scheme 

that meets our requirements in this particular theater. 

Mr. BACON. Well, again, thank you for being here today and answering our questions. We are grateful to you. 

I yield back. 

General VOTEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for 

being here. If you stick around long enough, you get to ask a question, whether you are good or not, if you are there. 

I guess the first question is, we have been working on getting 

some kinds of UAVs, whether they are Predators or they are whatevers, to our allies in the Middle East, whether it is Saudi Arabia, 

the Emirates, UAE [United Arab Emirates], and we have been 

stopped. We have even offered them the ability to use U.S. contractors to do it so that they can prosecute their own targets, and we 

can use them instead of using our own. 

So the question is: Can we tolerate a reality where, because of 

self-imposed constraints, we can’t sell our allies our UAV technology, but the Chinese can—and you have already spoken to that 

point—but when it comes to technology, I think we are missing a 

big advantage there. Could you comment on that? 

General VOTEL. I think it is—you know, as you are alluding to 

here, I think the opportunity for us to improve our interoperability 

through common systems, whether it is ISR or other systems we 
39 

have out here, I think these are always opportunities that we have 

to pursue wherever we can. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you support us sharing our UAV technology 

with our allies? 

General VOTEL. I certainly think it deserves serious consideration. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. The second question is: In terms of Iran 

and a ratline that goes from Iran through Syria down to Israel, I 

have got big poster boards with Soleimani with his arm around 

every single Iraqi corps commander and militia guy. They are all 

buddies. Soleimani is now handpicking the guys that we are equipping and training, but that is the fight that we are in right now. 

So the question is—and you have already spoken to this—but 

specifically, do you think it is going to be possible to extract Iran 

out of Syria and Iraq if there is an end to what is happening in 

Syria? Because they are dug in deeply now. 

General VOTEL. Yeah. I think there certainly is an opportunity 

in Iraq through our strong relationships that we are developing 

here, and I think that, you know, one of the things that I have observed about Iraq over the last year has been their outreach to 

other partners across the region, whether it is Jordan, whether it 

is Saudi Arabia, whether it is Kuwait, whether it is Turkey, the 

other key Sunni nations in the area. And so they are very much 

emerging as, you know, trying to be much more involved in the region, which I think is a very positive thing. And I think it connotes 

the fact that Iraq is for Iraqis. And while they live in a difficult 

neighborhood with difficult neighbors and they have to deal with 

that, that they are principally concerned with Iraq. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, let’s bring it back right now because, right 

now, we are playing the enemy of our enemy is our friend. That 

is what we are playing right now. If the Iranians are the major 

power players with weapons and our training and our gear right 

now with their handpicked militia guys, the Iraqis can reach out 

all they want to, but the power is with the Iranians in Iraq and 

Syria right now. 

Is that not where the power lies, in your opinion, the actual 

power, and I am talking power by force? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think there certainly is influence here, 

there is no doubt about that. But, again, I do see within the Iraqi 

leadership a very strong sense of independence and a desire to protect Iraq. And so I think these are things that we have to continue 

to build on. 

Mr. HUNTER. So let me just lay it out then one last time. You 

are confident that in the next 10 years we are not going to see an 

Iranian-controlled ratline where the Iranians can go from Tehran 

through Syria down to Israel on a high-speed road with M1 

Abrams tanks that we have trained them on. You do not see that 

happening? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I wouldn’t speculate in that particular regard. What I would tell you is, I think our best opportunity to prevent something like that is to stay engaged and to—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I wouldn’t disagree with you on that. 

General VOTEL [continuing]. And to continue to be the valuable 

partner that we had been for them, and to continue to professional-
40 

ize their forces and their capabilities so that they are beholden to 

themselves and not beholden to others to do things for them, and 

they don’t allow their terrain to be exploited in the manner that 

you highlighted. 

Mr. HUNTER. As you have seen, General, as we train and equip 

and try to pick sides, we are not always right on who we end up 

helping. And that has turned around to, you know, bite us a few 

times. And I really hope that, right now, with the Iranians we are 

not doing that in a much bigger way than we have messed up in 

the past. So thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, I want to follow on two questions that 

I don’t think you have been asked directly. You started the hearing 

talking about considerable success in the fight to eliminate ISIS 

from controlling any territory. Is there or will there be a reduction 

in U.S. people and U.S. capabilities from Iraq, especially due to 

that success? 

General VOTEL. Well, as part of our alignment process there already has been. And, you know, the success we have had has given 

us the ability to move some of these critical resources, whether it 

is ISR or fighter aircraft or some of our engineering capability or 

medical capability that we required on the ground and we have 

been able to reposition that within the theater, Afghanistan in particular, to make sure that General Nicholson has what he needs to 

be successful. So we already have seen that. 

And, of course, as the situation continues to mature, we will continue to make smart decisions on this. We don’t want to keep one 

more soldier, one more piece of equipment there than is needed to 

support the mission. And that is what we are pursuing, but we are 

trying to do it as smartly as we can. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Because we also don’t want to repeat the 

mistakes of the past and leave completely. 

The other thing, at one point, the assessment we got was the 

most capable terrorist enemy we faced was AQAP, especially in 

their bombmaking and so forth. You have talked a little bit about 

al-Qaida and ISIS in Yemen. Is there still a terrorist threat that 

emanates from Yemen? 

General VOTEL. There is, Chairman, and I think—first of all, I 

think our efforts over the last year have been very effective at addressing many of the concerns that we had with al-Qaida in the 

Arabian Peninsula. And I think we have addressed their leadership, their media capability, their external operations capability, 

certainly some of their explosive capability that has been inherent 

in this organization. 

But I think with al-Qaida, I think it is important to always understand what their long-term objectives are. And they are a very 

patient and savvy organization, and I think we always have to be 

concerned about al-Qaida. And so it is absolutely vital to not take 

the pressure off now but to keep the pressure on them and make 

sure that we complete this effort against them. 

The CHAIRMAN. While it is a complex situation, you talked about 

the humanitarian, the Houthis, and all that is going on, I just 

think it is important not to lose sight of the fact that there continues to be a terrorist threat that emanates from there. 
41 

I think that we are good for now. Thank you for being here. 

We will adjourn this open session, and within about 5 minutes, 

reconvene upstairs. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

(47) 

House Armed Services Committee Chairman William "Mac" Thornberry 

Opening Remarks 

Full Committee Hearing on 

Terrorism and Iran: Defense Challenges in the Middle East 

February 27, 2018 

We welcome back to the Committee the Commander of the U.S. Central 

Command, General Joseph Vote!. We are particularly interested in hearing 

General Votel's views on the changes that the new National Defense Strategy 

brings to his area of responsibility. 

The Strategy's emphasis on strategic competition has implications for a region 

where Russian influence and presence is much greater now than it was before the 

Syrian conflict began, a region that is one of the targets of the Chinese whole-ofnation effort to increase its sway, and a region where the Iranians are aggressively 

expanding its wide arc of control to the detriment of its neighbors. 

These developments and the continuing threat of terrorism in and emanating from 

the CENTCOM region suggests that the United States cannot afford to remove our 

attention or our presence from this vital region. 

Fortunately, we have a number of strong allies and partners that are able and 

willing to actively defend our joint interests. But as we have painfully learned in 

recent years, there is simply no substitute tor the United States. When we 

withdraw prematurely, the world, including the threats to our homeland, can 

rapidly grow more dangerous. 

The challenge, however, is that CENTCOM has received the lion's share of 

military resources for some time, and while its importance remains, we have to be 

more active in other vital areas of the world at the same time. The recent budget 

agreement helps, but it will take time to rebuild and field needed capability. In 

these circumstances, General Vote! has his hands full in making sure that U.S. 

national security is protected. 
48 

Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith 

House Armed Services Committee Hearing on: 

"Terrorism and Iran: Defense Challenges in the Middle East" 

February 27,2018 

Thank you, Mr. Chainnan, for holding this important hearing. I would also 

like to welcome General Vote! and to thank him for appearing today. His 

professional military views are instrumental to our evaluation of the complex and 

evolving security situations in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. 

The geographic region spanning the Middle East and much of Central and 

Southwest Asia is crucial to our national interests, and the United States must 

maintain its focus on security in that region. As we guard against threats, our 

efforts should be aimed primarily at easing tensions, promoting peace, and 

upholding the international rules-based order. Unfortunately, security challenges 

continue to penneate the region and emanate from it. The Summary of the 2018 

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (the NDS Summary) 

states, "Despite the defeat ofiSlS's physical caliphate, threats to stability remain 

as terrorist groups with long reach continue to murder the innocent and threaten 

peace more broadly." The NDS Summary also asserts, "In the Middle East, Iran is 

competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of influence and instability while 

vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities, a growing 

network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives." 

Reports of continued military progress in the counter-ISIS campaign are 

encouraging. In the past year, Iraqi Security Forces secured Mosul and Syrian 

Democratic Forces liberated Raqqa. The persistent, cooperative methodology of 

Operation Inherent Resolve is succeeding. However, military achievements alone 

will not guarantee acceptable end states, and Secretary Tillerson recently indicated 

that the United States will undertake "stabilization initiatives." In doing so, the 

United States must work with the international community and employ a whole-ofgovernment approach to foster and to sustain political, economic, and social 

conditions that are conducive to long-term stability. If left unaddressed, residual 

discontent will again metastasize into violent extremism. Moreover, we must make 

every effort to minimize civilian suffering by addressing the serious humanitarian 

situations that have been worsened by years of conflict. The Department of 

Defense is already providing necessary assistance through the interagency START 

team to address humanitarian needs in Syria. To truly defeat IS IS, we must be just 

as detennined to secure a durable peace, as we have been to achieve a decisive 

military outcome. 

We have long sought a stable end state in Afghanistan. For more than 

sixteen years, the United States has concentrated on eliminating threats from 

violent extremist organizations, including AI Qaeda and ISIS in the Khorasan 

province, and on denying these organizations safe haven from which to conduct 

terrorist activities. We have also worked closely with our allies and partners to 
49 

train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to secure 

the country, and, despite significant progress, Afghan forces are still in need of 

assistance. So, where are we headed? Although the Administration's South Asia 

Strategy includes the familiar goal of a negotiated political settlement with the 

Tali ban, I am concerned that it provides an open-ended pledge of increased 

military support without an articulated plan for how to reach the objective. We also 

must stay mindful ofthe fragile security situation in Pakistan, a nuclear-armed 

state that is vulnerable to extremist threats, and to ensure that policies are 

structured to yield results that will bolster stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Although our commitments to oppose violent extremism in Iraq, Syria, and 

Afghanistan are consuming, we must also remain alert to other regional security 

challenges. AI Qaeda has not been eradicated, and some AI Qaeda affiliates 

continue to pose threats to the United States. The NOS Summary characterizes Iran 

as "the most significant challenge to Middle East stability." While the United 

States and other key members of the international community concluded an 

agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program, Iran is still a designated State 

Sponsor of Terrorism, and it exerts destabilizing influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, 

and Yemen. We must deter Iran from precipitating conflict and dissuade it from 

engaging in malign activities. Russia is increasingly involved in the region as well. 

Russian military units are operating in Syria, Russia may be establishing ties to the 

Afghan Taliban, and Russia is reportedly running influence campaigns to 

undermine U.S. and coalition efforts in the region. How will these and other 

considerations factor in the broader U.S. strategy to treat Russia as a strategic 

competitor? 

I am also curious to know how Central Command's posture will evolve, 

especially in light of the NDS Summary's new direction regarding strategic 

priorities. The NOS Summary proclaims, "Inter-state strategic competition, not 

terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security." What, if any, 

significant changes will materialize as a result ofthis shift and how would such 

changes affect Central Command's capacity to perform its mission set? It is vital 

that we receive a timely and comprehensive assessment from the combatant 

commander, because a thorough understanding of our military posture in the 

Middle East and Central and Southwest Asia is fundamental to this committee's 

work in shaping the defense budget and in providing the resources necessary for 

U.S. Central Command to perform its duties effectively. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to General Votel's testimony. 
50 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL 

COMMANDER 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

TERRORISM AND IRAN: DEFENSE CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

27 FEBRUARY 2018 
51 

Introduction 

Last month I walked down the main street ofRaqqah, the former capital of the brutal Islamic State 

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Amidst the mountains of rubble, reminiscent of European cities in World War 

II, vegetable sellers and falafel carts have set up shop, Raqqawi citizens are coordinating reconstruction 

efforts, and children are preparing to return to school- evidence of the indomitable spirit of the Syrian 

population. 

Our Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and partners, in particular the Iraqi Security Forces (TSF) 

and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have made extraordinary progress for over three years, 

liberating Mosul and Raqqah-the former capitals of!SIS's selt~proclaimed "caliphate." Now, 

more than 98% of the territmy in Iraq and Syria formerly held by ISIS is no longer under their 

control. In Afghanistan, our Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition of39 countries is supporting 

an increasingly capable Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) as they destroy 

Tali ban and ISIS safe havens, remove terrorists from the battlefield, and establish the conditions for 

greater Afghan governmental control. U.S. Navy vessels and the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) 

patrol the Gulf and Red Sea, ensuring the free flow of commerce through these strategic waterways. 

Every day, our military and civilian personnel, forward deployed across the region, conduct training 

exercises and strengthen our partners' abi I ities to defend themselves from external threats and 

challenge violent extremism within their borders. These activities, paired with robust diplomatic 

efforts from our country teams also help balance against Iran's destabilizing influence in the region. 

Our success over the last year is largely due to the unyielding support of our allies, tremendous 

cooperation with our interagency partners, provision of additional authorities, and the continued 

faith of the American people in our military. However, despite the great strides we have made, 

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there is much work left to do. The challenges in the region are many: terrorism, violent conflicts, 

massive refugee populations, economic stagnation, social upheaval, great power competition, 

nuclear and ballistic missile threats, humanitarian crises, and radical violent ideologies to name a few. 

As our country begins to shift focus to threats in other parts of the world, the CENTCOM region 

remains vital to United States' security and economic interests. We will continue to ensure our nation's 

resources are responsibly employed to protect the American people from terror, promote American 

centers of trade and prosperity, and preserve peace through strength to deter future conflicts. 

CENTCOM's Challenging Environment 

The CENTCOM area of responsibility stretches from northeast Africa, across the Middle East, to 

Central and South Asia. The twenty countries within this vast region confront profound social, 

economic, and political upheaval while simultaneously facing grave security challenges in the form of 

widespread conflict, expansionist regional powers, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and 

destabilizing behavior from outside actors. The enduring tension between the nuclear powers ofTndia 

and Pakistan remains unreconciled while fractured states like Yemen and Syria are wrestling with 

enormous humanitarian concerns. The generational Israeli-Palestinian conl1ict simmers incessantly 

below the surface and complicates partnerships and coordination. Iran, Russia, and China are 

increasingly competing to be the partner of choice- militarily, politically, and economically·- with U.S. 

allies. Turmoil in the Central Region seldom remains contained, and regional problems quickly become 

global as they bleed across Combatant Command seams into Africa, Europe, Asia, and threaten the 

United States. 

Humanitarian Crises. Years of conflict in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen have caused largescale humanitarian crises, created havens for extremism, blurred national borders, and provided Iran and 

Russia opportunities to expand their influence in the region. Millions of refugees stress Middle Eastern 
53 

and European countries. The government oflraq, in partnership with the UN, has facilitated the 

return of millions oflnternally Displaced Persons (lOPs), but sustainable returns are contingent on 

successful security and stability efforts. In Syria, the return of displaced persons has started but the 

vast majority cannot safely return to their homes until fighting has ended, IDPs feel free from 

Syrian regime reprisals, and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) are cleared from their roads and 

homes. Yemen is plagued by cholera and malnutrition, with nearly 80% of the population requiring 

urgent humanitarian assistance. 

Economic Uncertainty. Economic prospects across the region remain hampered by poor 

economic policies and corruption, which are compounded by inadequate education and health 

services. This has led to stagnant economies marked by inflation, low wages, and high 

unemployment. Many economies in the CENTCOM region depend on oil and gas revenues, but 

low oil prices have challenged governments' abilities to balance fiscal considerations with social 

contracts. Large state-owned sectors and bloated civil service departments are a drag on economic 

growth and limit opportunities for a burgeoning youth population. 

Corruption inhibits reform and stabilization efforts and undermines the population's confidence 

in its government. Unfortunately, corruption in the Central Region is at historically high levels; 

according to Transparency International CotTuption Index, 90% of countries in the Middle East 

score a failing grade, and CENTCOM includes some of the most corrupt countries in the world 

Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. President Ghani is challenging persistent corruption in Afghanistan by 

putting refotTOs in motion to fight corruption in the military and government. Iraqi Prime Minister 

Abadi is working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to implement an 

ambitious reform program, but the challenges are daunting. Some of the countries in the region are 

working to address these economic challenges; Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 program, Egypt's 

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54 

ambitious macroeconomic reforms, and Jordan's concerted efforts to boost GOP growth rates and 

reduce unemployment are a few examples. 

Violent Extremism. The violent extremist ideulogies of!SIS, al-Qa'ida (AQ) and other VEOs 

remain a threat to the United States and our allies and partners, not just in the CENTCOM region but 

worldwide. Although ISIS has steadily lost control over physical territory and no longer controls any 

major population centers in Iraq or Syria, Sunni populations remain vulnerable to identity-based 

recmitment into VEOs. Violent extremists have utilized online forums to spread violent interpretations 

of! slam to audiences across the globe. The impressionable youth in this tumultuous region, seeking 

community and justice, are highly susceptible to extremists' teachings; consequently, a new generation 

of radicalized followers could become online citizens of a "virtual caliphate," dedicated to the struggle 

against the West. 

Both ISIS and AQ are resilient and have proven capable of projecting propaganda and inspiring 

attacks throughout the region and outside of the Middle East. In Egypt, ISIS has expanded its reach into 

the mainland and carried out mass-casualty attacks. ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) continues to orchestrate 

high-profile attacks in Afghanistan. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to plan 

attacks on the homeland from the ungoverned spaces in Yemen. 

Proxy Warfare. The Central Region has a long history of proxy warfare, violent militias, and 

irregular forces operating in the "grey zone"- military competition short of war. Iran has extended its 

tentacles across the region through numerous proxies, including Lebanese Hizballah operating in 

multiple countries, hard line Iranian-backed Shia Militia Groups (SMGs) in Iraq and Syria, and Iranian 

support has enabled the Houthis. The result is prolonging the civil war in Yemen, threatening Saudi 

Arabia and the UAE, and risking expansion ofYemen's civil war into a regional conflict. Iran uses its 
55 

proxies to secure supply lines for malign activities and influence neighboring governments. 

Militants operating out of remote areas in Pakistan threaten Afghanistan and India. 

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Regional conflicts and power imbalances drive 

nations to seek and acquire nuclear weapons and extend ballistic missile capabilities to secure their 

influence. As an example. Iran continues to develop advanced ballistic missile capabilities and also 

transfer them to the Houthis and to its liizballah proxies. This will enable them to strike U.S. 

partners and allies, and the possibility Tehran will reinvigorate its nuclear program in the out-years 

of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains a potential risk. Nuclear proliferation, 

combined with proxy warfare, increases opportunities for miscalculation and generates a serious 

threat to the region and the United States. 

Regional Competitors. Iran remains the major threat to U.S. interests and partnerships in the 

Central Region. The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for influence in the region 

exacerbates multiple security dilemmas throughout the Middle East from Iran's support of 

Houthis in Yemen, to Riyadh's attempt to diminish Hizballah's authority in Lebanon. Iran is also 

working through proxies and friendly political allies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to establish an arc 

of influence, or "Shia Crescent" across the Middle East. As we navigate the many challenges and 

relationships in our region, we partially view them through the lens of countering Iran and 

diminishing malign influence. 

We must also compete with Russia and China as they vie for access and influence in the 

Central Region. Russia's presence in Syria established Moscow as a long-term player in the region, 

and the Kremlin is using the conflict in Syria to test and exercise new weapons and tactics, often 

with little regard for collateral damage or civilian casualties. An increase in Russian surface-to-air 

missile systems in the region threatens our access and ability to dominate the airspace. 

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On the diplomatic front, Moscow is playing the role of arsonist and firefighter- fueling the conflict 

in Syria between the Syrian Regime, YPG, and Turkey, then claiming to serve as an arbiter to resolve 

the dispute. Moscow continues to advocate for alternate diplomatic initiatives to Western-led political 

negotiations in Syria and Afghan-led peace processes in Afghanistan, attempting to thwart the UN's role 

and limit the advance of American influence. Russia's insistence on a separate Syrian political peace 

process at Astana and Sochi detracts from the internationally-sanctioned UN talks in Geneva. In 

Afghanistan, Moscow has exaggerated the presence of the lS!S-K threat, and while the Coalition and the 

Afghans are the only forces actively fighting ISIS there, Russia has used fluniliar propaganda techniques 

to brand ISIS's presence as a U.S./NATO failure. 

Russia is also trying to cultivate multi-dimensional ties to Iran. Though historic rivals, Moscow and 

Tehran share interests across the region, including an overarching desire to sideline, if not expel, the 

U.S. from the region. Russia and !ran are both trying to bolster a brutal regime in Syria, limit U.S. 

military influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and fracture the longstanding U.S.-Turkey strategic 

partnership. 

Russia also maintains significant influence in Central Asia, where the countries of the former-Soviet 

Union rely on Russia to varying degrees for their economic and security needs. This is problematic as 

Russia's efforts could limit U.S. engagement options and provide Moscow additional levers of 

influence, particularly as NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan are dependent on Central Asian 

partners for logistical support. Since 2014, Russia has increased Eurasian integration efforts to reassert 

Moscow's dominant influence along the periphery or buffer zone. 

Likewise, an increasingly assertive China is testing Russia's dominance in the economic and 

security arenas of Central Asia but also posing challenges to U.S. influence. China seeks to capitalize 

on regional concerns over what it perceives as waning U.S. influence and support. Toward this end, 

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Beijing is building and strengthening trade, infrastructure, defense, and political relationships across 

the Middle East, Central and South Asia. 

China is pursuing long-term, steady economic growth that bolsters its international influence 

and access to energy resources. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BR1), which includes the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), could serve as a stabilizing, profit-generating project in the 

region, but it could also improve China's military posture. This collection of infrastructure projects 

already provides China with access to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is operated through a 

Chinese-Pakistani agreement and has the potential to increase China's strategic presence in the 

Indian Ocean. China also recently established its first overseas military base adjacent to the Bab a! 

Mandeb (BAM) in Djibouti. While Beijing claims both locations support peacekeeping and 

humanitarian operations, the new military base and port allow China to project forces more 

permanently within the region and influence strategically valuable trade waterways. 

China also seeks to increase its economic and diplomatic cooperation with Iran. The lifting of 

UN sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) opened the path for Iran to 

resume membership application to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian political, 

economic, and security organization. This, along with the existing BRI cooperation between the 

two nations, increases China's ties to Iran. 

China considers its relationship with the GCC states critical for its current economic needs. 

The Gulf States provide approximately one-third of China's oil, and Qatar is its single largest 

supplier of natural gas. Like Russia, China has sought to arbitrate some conflicts in the region, 

offering to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Wbile China will continue to develop its 

relationships with nations in the Middle East, Beijing will likely maintain its stance of avoiding a 

major role in ongoing conflicts. 
58 

North Korea plays a relatively minor role in the Central Region, but its potential export of ballistic 

missile and nuclear technology remains an area of concern. For decades, North Korea widely 

proliferated ballistic missile expertise and materials to a number of actors including Iran and Syria. 

North Korea also exports cheap labor to various Middle Eastern countries; remittances from these 

laborers are a significant source of revenue for North Korea, despite the State Depruiment's efforts to 

persuade our partners to expel these workers. 

Prepare- Pursue - Prevail 

CENTCOM's mission is to direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and 

partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. We aim to 

accomplish this mission through our strategic approach of"Prepare, Pursue, Prevail." This approach 

aligns with the recently published National Defense Strategy (NDS), which directs us to "Compete, 

deter, and win in conflict and reinforce all levers of national power from sustainable positions of 

military advantage." It also aligns with the POTUS-approved strategies for Iraq and Iran. These 

strategies look to consolidate gains achieved through defeating ISIS, while neutralizing and countering 

Iran's destabilizing influence, and ensuring a stable Iraq does not align with Iran and remains a 

productive strategic U.S. partner. 

Preparing in advance of crises creates decision space for leaders and allows for the responsible and 

effective employment of resources and forces. Effective preparation enables CENT COM to compete 

with the other major actors in the region through strengthening alliances and partnerships. Pursuing 

opportunities ensures we seize and maintain the initiative as we meet each of the challenges in our 

complex region. We also retain the flexibility to effectively deter threats, preferably short of military 

force. We constantly seek to Prevail in conflict, winning the current tight and preparing for the next 

challenge. 

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CENTCOM Priorities 

While the CENTCOM team manages a broad range of difficult challenges on a daily basis, a 

significant portion of our efforts and resources are necessarily focused in three areas: supporting the 

Administration's South Asia Strategy- to include Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) and 

Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan; countering VEOs in the Central Region, to 

include Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) in Iraq/Syria; and countering Iranian destabilizing 

activities across the region. 

Supporting the Administration's South Asia Strategy. Since my last posture hearing, 

CENTCOM has begun a transition an operational alignment and rebalancing to better address 

challenges, mitigate risk, and optimize resources in an ever-changing battlespace. With ISIS's 

territorial control crumbling in Iraq and Syria, we have shifted our main effort to implementing the 

military component of the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan through OFS and NATO's noncombat RSM, while still retaining sut1icient resources to enable local security forces to prevent the 

reemergence ofiSIS in Iraq and Syria. 

The NDS directs us to deter adversaries from aggression against our vital interests and to 

discourage destabilizing behavior. Working "by, with, and through" the ANDSF, we have 

maintained constant pressure on the Tali ban with the intent of removing their influence on the 

population and forcing them to reconcile with the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (G!RoA). Our conditions-based approach to the conflict gives hope to our Afghan 

partners and demoralizes the enemy. This strategy reaffirms the U.S. government's enduring 

commitment to Afghanistan while supporting two complementary missions counter-terrorism 

operations and security force assistance ofRSM. Preventing AQ and ISIS-K from directing or 

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supporting external attacks against the United States and our allies is a vital national interest, and the 

RSM preserves peace through a strong network of alliances both regionally and globally. 

The GIRoA is making dedicated and transparent efforts to combat corruption at every level and 

ensure an effective Afghan fighting force. Implementation of the current GIRoA 4-Year Roadmap is 

improving overall AND SF capabilities. Our method of working "by, with, and through" the AND SF 

ensures we are training Afghan forces to take the lead in combat, enabling them with key assets like 

intelligence and logistics, and working through the G!RoA to find Afghan solutions to Afghan problems. 

ANDSF capability to respond to crises has greatly improved over the last tew years, and they are 

able to prevent security setbacks from becoming cascading events; however, the ANDSF docs not have 

the ability to prevent the insurgency from maintaining a rural presence and occasionally threatening a 

population center or critical ground lines of communication (GLOC). The increase in U.S. and RSM 

partner military personnel enables the provision of enhanced train, advise, and assist capability to the 

ANDSF. This will advance the ANDSF's ability to plan and execute simultaneous offensive military 

operations, keeping constant pressure on the enemy. 

In addition to our plan for closer, more persistent advising, we are developing critical capabilities 

within the ANDSF to provide them clear advantages over the Taliban. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) 

continues to develop offensive capability, and our security cooperation funds are training maintainers as 

the AAF transitions from dated Russian platforms to modern U.S. aircraft. We are also working to 

double the size of the Afghan Army's Special Operations force- currently the most effective combat 

element against the Tali ban. 

Simultaneously, we are targeting many of the Taliban's revenue and support networks; illicit 

narcotics production and trafficking largely finances insurgent operations. The Taliban remains a 

resilient adversary capable of inflicting heavy AND SF casualties, but we, shoulder to shoulder with our 

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ANDSF partners, will continue to apply military and economic pressure to force the Taliban to the 

negotiating table. 

Kabul's uncertain political situation remains the greatest risk to stability as the ANDSF 

increases security nationwide and the GIRoA prepares for planned 2018 elections. GIRoA 

continues to suffer from a professional governmental capacity deficit, competing interests, and 

corruption. We are pursuing opportunities to develop bilateral relationships with Central and South 

Asian states to promote regional stability and to encourage them, and our NATO allies, to 

contribute tinancial and advisory support to the G!RoA. As an example, we strongly support 

improved Indian-Afghanistan ties as a means to advance Kabul's economic interests and increase 

Afghanistan's financial independence. 

As Afghanistan's neighbor and a critical supply route for RSM operations, Pakistan presents 

both challenges and opportunities as we implement the new South Asia Strategy. Pakistan's 

cooperation is imperative for the success of our South Asia strategy. As the President made clear in 

the unveiling of the strategy last August, the United States expects Pakistan to take decisive action 

against the Taliban and Haqqani Network leaders that operate from its territory. Tali ban and 

Haqqani leadership and fighters continue to find sanctuary in Pakistan. Other Pakistan based 

groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba threaten Pakistan's neighbor, India, and carry out attacks that 

jeopardize regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. 

Pakistan has made many sacrifices in the war against terrorism, including important 

contributions in significantly degrading AQ and combatting ISlS-K. Anti-Pakistan militant groups 

like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are able to conduct devastating terrorist attacks within 

Pakistan, killing scores of civilians and military. The Pakistani military is conducting counterterrorism operations against select terrorist groups that target the Pakistani state. Pakistan has also 

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undertaken several high profile and effective counter-insurgency operations in North Waziristan and 

other parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) against TTP. Security along the 

border with Afghanistan will remain a priority in 20 18 as Pakistan seeks to expand border control 

mechanisms and efforts to improve paramilitary security capabilities. Recently we have started to see an 

increase in communication, information sharing, and actions on the ground in response to our specific 

requests --- these are positive indicators. However, ongoing national counter-terrorism efforts against 

anti-Pakistan militants throughout the country have not yet translated into the definitive actions we 

require Pakistan to take against Afghan Taliban or Haqqani leaders. This problem is compounded by 

increasing cross-border terrorist attacks and fires between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which hinders both 

countries' abilities to coordinate on border security. 

We have preserved our valuable military-to-military relationship with Pakistan and attempted to 

increase transparency and communication with influential military leaders, while pressing our serious 

concerns about Pakistan's provision of sanctuary and support to militant and terrorist groups that target 

U.S. personnel and interests. Achieving long-tenn stability in Afghanistan and defeating the insurgency 

will be difficult without Pakistan's suppott and assistance. Although most security assistance for 

Pakistan is currently suspended, since 2002 Pakistan has been among the largest recipients of U.S. 

provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (!MET). 

To date Pakistan has also been reimbursed hundreds of millions of dollars in Coalition Support Funds 

(CSF) for counter-insurgency operations that support U.S. security objectives in the region. We use 

ground and air routes in Pakistan to deliver materiel to Afghanistan. However we also have options to 

utilize routes through the other Central Asian nations. 

CENTCOM continues to promote U.S. interests in the rest of the Central Asia/South Asia (CASA) 

sub-region, which includes the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 

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Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our Central Asia partners continue to seek U.S. 

engagement, Russia, China, and Iran continue to discourage cooperation and engagement between 

Central Asian countries and the United States. Despite this pressure, several CASA governments 

continue to support the transit of supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan and engage the United 

States on shared interests related to access, border security, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, 

and counter-insurgency. 

Our Central Asian partners remain concerned ahout the long-term stability of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan as well as the specter of returning foreign terrorist fighters to their home countries. We are 

postured not only to help them address transnational threats, but also to continue to develop our 

military-to-military relationships in the CASA sub-region. In support of these efforts, our two 

major forums that promote military cooperation, the CASA Directors of Military Intelligence 

Conference and CASA Chiefs of Defense Conference, are developing beyond ceremonial affairs 

into venues that encourage free-flowing military-to-military communication and seek practical 

solutions to security challenges. These efforts, in addition to our operations in Afghanistan, will 

ensure that CENTCOM continues to support the Administration's South Asia Strategy in the CASA 

sub-region with a long-term, regional approach. 

The U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship is our most advanced military relationship in Central Asia. 

We are making notable progress as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense focuses on institutional 

reform of its Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, human resources administration, and its 

professional military education system. Reliance on Russian-produced equipment presents 

challenges to developing a more robust defense sales relationship. Despite these challenges, 

Kazakhstan looks to the U.S. to balance, not replace, Russian and Chinese influence through a 

multi-vector foreign policy, which allows more security cooperation possibilities. 

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The Kyrgyz Republic has increasingly aligned its interests with Russia and China. The U.S.-

Kyrgyz security relationship has declined since the closure of the Manas Transit Center and the 

termination of the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2014. Despite the Kyrgyz armed forces' 

desire to improve military-to-military cooperation with CENTCOM, Kyrgyz senior civilian leaders have 

shown little interest in improving military relations. 

Tajikistan remains a key U.S. partner in Central Asia due to its 800-mile border with Afghanistan. 

While U.S-Tajik relations are positive, Russia is increasingly impinging on U.S. intluence and spreading 

inaccurate information about Afghanistan and the region. Tajikistan is Central Asia's poorest country, 

and its armed forces are habitually under-funded and ill-equipped, which complicates our efforts to help 

the Tajiks build and sustain long-term security capacity. Moreover, the Russian forces at the 201" 

Military base located outside of Dushanbe loom large on the political and military landscape. The Tajik 

government also depends heavily on foreign assistance and on the remittances of its migrant laborers 

working in Russia, giving Moscow considerable leverage over the country. Despite all of these 

challenges, CENTCOM continues cooperation with Tajikistan focused on border security, counterterrorism, and counter-drug trafficking. Tajikistan is a major transit point for Afghan opiates; our efforts 

to help strengthen Afghan-Tajik border security are important to reducing the drug trade that funds the 

Tali ban and destabilizes the region. 

Turkmenistan is an important nation due to its strategic geographic location between Europe and 

Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, as other Central Asian states, is concemed about instability in Afghanistan 

and thus supports international counter-YEO, counter-terrorism, and border security efforts. Currently, 

we are building our partnership with Turkmenistan through medical exchanges. 

Uzbekistan remains a key U.S. partner in Central Asia due to its strategic geographic location at the 

heart of Eurasia and proximity to Afghanistan. Over the past year, Uzbekistan experienced a relatively 

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smooth succession of power from the late President Karimov to President Sbavkat Mirziyoyev, who 

bas instituted a number of reforms as Uzbekistan's second president since independence in 1991. 

Our bilateral relations serve to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Russia 

exercises a degree of political and economic influence, yet the Uzbeks continue to pursue a strategic 

relationship with the U.S. Uzbekistan has been a relatively closed society, but we are now seeing 

positive changes within Uzbekistan that are leading to improved military-to-military relations, to 

include increased military professionalization and training. CENTCOM is also working to improve 

its military's logistics and sustainment systems to better support previously transferred U.S. defense 

equipment. We also continue eftorts to bolster Uzbekistan's special operations forces. 

Countering Violent Extremist Organizations. Another critical objective from the NDS is to 

prevent terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the U.S. homeland, allies, 

and partners. In the past year, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE has achieved remarkable success 

against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The !SF and SDF are operating at their most effective levels since 

the operation began. Millions of IDPs have returned home and are starting to rebuild. The 

destruction of ISIS' so called physical "caliphate" is imminent, but now we must consolidate gains 

by investing in the population that will hold this territory and keep ISIS from returning. The U.S. 

Strategy for Iraq contains four primary objectives: stabilize Iraq, limit Iran's influence and its use of 

Iraq to shape the Middle East, achieve a stable Iraq economy, and sustain an enduring relationship 

with the !SF. We must now look to how we effectively resource these objectives along with the 

President's objectives in Syria. 

The Coalition's campaign to defeat ISIS has bad considerable success. Coalition airstrikes 

have killed hundreds of ISIS leadership figures and facilitators in Iraq and Syria, which has 

disrupted ISIS' command and control network; degraded its use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS); 

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reduced its ability to conduct research and development, procurement, and administration; and denied 

sources of funding for terrorist activities. These losses have undermined ISIS' ability to conduct attacks 

throughout the region and the world. With the loss of terrain and the liberation of the population, ISIS 

can no longer generate funding through extortion and taxation. Additionally, airstrikes and ground 

operations have crippled and seized hydrocarbon generating facilities and facilitation routes that moved 

and supplied ISIS fighters and supported illicit oil sales. We have also degraded ISIS media operations; 

the most recent version of their monthly online terror magazine "Rumiyah" was last published in 

September 2017. 

In Iraq, the !SF fought a vicious, urban battle to liberate Mosul, with ISIS providing stiff resistance 

using tunnels, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs ), and unmanned aerial systems. 

The liberation ofMosul provided the ISF with the momentum that led to the quick liberation of Tal Afar 

and Hawijah. Our partnership with the !SF is an excellent example of the successful application of the 

"by, with, and through" approach. Using a minimal number of U.S. and Coalition advisors, we enabled 

the !SF with robust communications, logistics, intelligence, and precision fires. Iraqi forces led from the 

front in each operation, and their success elevated their legitimacy with the population. 

There remain enduring political and cultural challenges in Iraq. Reconstruction, discontent with 

corruption and any delay of rebuilding efforts as well as the Kurdistan stand-off could fuel future 

instability. ISIS' reversion to an underground insurgency will remove the greatest unifying factor 

among Iraq's competing factions and may reignite unresolved grievances. In the post-ISIS period, the 

Go! will be challenged to rebuild Sunni areas while balancing competing security demands, enacting 

government reforms, and managing tensions among Iraq's political factions. The KRG remains a 

strategic partner and their negotiations with Baghdad for a peaceful settlement are critical to ensure the 

disputed territories are not further complicated by intra-Iraq divisions. 

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In Syria, the fight against ISIS has been complicated by the multiple countries involved in the 

conflict, many of whom have widely divergent interests. Syrian President Bashar al Assad remains 

in power, and, due to military support from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), is 

attempting to bring all of Syria under regime control. In 2017, the regime made significant 

territorial gains in central and eastern Syria, culminating in reducing opposition enclaves in western 

Syria and seizing urban centers from ISIS along the western bank ofthe Euphrates River from ISIS. 

Nevertheless, the Assad regime has insutlicient forces to adequately secure recaptured territory and 

often faces insurgent counterattacks behind its lines. The regime is highly dependent on billions of 

dollars in external Iranian and Russian economic and military support, the cost of which press both 

Moscow and Tehran to seek an end to the conflict. 

The intervention of the Coalition and regional powers in the Syrian conflict has blocked 

Assad's ability to recapture major portions of northern Syria, and entrenched opposition fighters 

and VEOs across Syria continue to challenge regime control. Diplomatic efforts to establish deescalation zones were most successful in a deal negotiated between Russia, the U.S., and Jordan in 

southwest Syria. Russian and Iranian-led Astana talks have been far less successful, and Russian 

bombardment of the Astana agreed de-escalation zone in East Ghouta calls into question Moscow's 

sincerity in guaranteeing the security of these areas. There has been some success, often under UN 

auspices, to negotiate on humanitarian issues, but Syrian regime recalcitrance to allow aid deliveries 

is probably driven by Assad's choice to use starvation as a weapon of war. Assad's reluctance to 

negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow's reluctance to force him to do so, 

indicates significant challenges lie ahead in forging a political resolution to the conflict. 

For the Coalition, the SDF's liberation of ISIS' capital Raqqah in October 2017 was a 

significant turning point in the conflict. The SDF, which is composed oflocal Sunni Arabs and 

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Kurds, has been a valuable partner in the fight against ISIS, and they sacrificed greatly to liberate large 

portions of their country. Simultaneous operations by the SDF in Syria and the !SF and PMF in Iraq 

effectively isolated ISIS remnants in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) and along the Syrian 

side of the Iraq-Syria border where both forces arc currently conducting operations to kill or capture all 

remaining ISIS fighters. 

Pro-Regime Forces (PRF) and Russia also continue to operate in the MERV as they isolate ISIS 

fighters south of the Euphrates River, though Assad's decision to prematurely withdraw his forces has 

likely given valuable breathing room to ISIS on the western side of the river. With PRF operating in 

close proximity to Coalition-backed forces in the MERV, de-confliction measures are vital, and we have 

worked closely with Russia to prevent accidental strikes and to ensure the safety of the various forces on 

an increasingly complex battlefield. The Coalition does not seek to fight the Syrian regime, Russian or 

pro-regime forces partnered with them. While the deconfliction efforts have been largely effective, the 

Coalition recently demonstrated its commitment to defend U.S. and partner forces operating in Syria by 

striking PRF that conducted an unprovoked attack on SDF and Coalition forces. And we will continue 

to do so, as necessary. 

Though our partnership with the SDF is critical to defeating ISIS in Syria, it has created challenges 

with our NATO ally Turkey, who views the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) elements within 

the SDF as analogous to the PKK terrorist group. U.S. Special Operations forces have been working 

with vetted elements of the SDF for several years to defeat ISIS. Our assistance to the SDF has been 

focused on this goal, and we have included safeguards and transparency measures to ensure it does not 

physically threaten Turkey. In January, Turkey began air strikes and ground incursions into the 

predominantly Kurdish enclave of Afrin, where CENTCOM has no presence or direct relationships in 

northwest Syria, in an attempt to, according to the Government of Turkey, "remove the terrorist threat 

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from its border." Though we have no relationship with YPG fighters in Afrin, who previously 

cooperated with Russia and the regime, these operations directly impact our ability to affect a lasting 

defeat against ISIS through the SDF. Many fighters in the SDF have familial ties to the Kurds in 

Afrin, and they are now forced to choose between completing operations against ISIS fighters in the 

MERV and assisting their fellow Kurds in northern Syria. Our alliance with Turkey is paramount, 

and we will continue to assist the Turkish military in countering the PKK and other VEOs that 

threaten their border, but we must continue to urge restraint as their actions have clearly increased 

risk to our campaign to defeat ISIS. 

Amidst the visible damage caused by the Syrian civil war, the country has also witnessed a far 

less-publicized change: democratic organizations in the form of local civil councils have assembled 

in places previously controlled by ISIS. These councils are providing the necessary basic functions 

of governance and starting to rebuild their war-torn communities. These ad-hoc democratic 

organizations come in various forms and engage in a range of activities from providing the most 

basic services to rallying the population against the re-emergence ofVEOs. For example, in the 

cities ofManbij and Raqqah, local councils ran civic campaigns against ISIS in concert with more 

moderate rebel groups, providing a two-pronged strategy that ultimately prevented ISIS from 

regaining a foothold in these areas. In other parts of Syria, councils have developed a more 

sophisticated capacity and are building roads, repairing sewage lines, and holding local elections. 

As Secretary of State Tillerson has said, "Interim local political arrangements that give voice to all 

groups and ethnicities supportive of Syria's broader political transition must emerge with 

international support." Any interim arrangements must be truly representative and must not threaten 

any of Syria's neighboring states. Similarly, the voices of Syrians from these regions must be heard 

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in Geneva and in the broader discussion about Syria's future." The key to the success of these groups is 

their ability to maintain legitimacy among the populace. 

Although these local councils have made great strides, they can only provide aid and assistance to 

the population at the pace at which they receive it. As we enable local solutions to local problems, 

supporting these local councils with our full range of Department of Defense, interagency, and Coalition 

capabilities will help them maintain popular support and set conditions for enduring, stable governance. 

A significant challenge we tace as we complete the defeat of ISIS is the repatriation of hundreds of 

foreign fighters to their home countries. The SDF and !SF are both holding several hundred fighters 

from a number of different countries in prisons or temporary detention facilities, with no clear process 

for prosecution or repatriation. The longer these fighters remain in detention together, the greater 

danger they pose as they form new connections, share lessons learned, and prepare to re-establish 

networks upon their release or escape. This urgent problem requires a concerted international effort 

involving law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic agreements. 

Yemen is another area where VEOs pose a threat to the homeland. The civil war continues 

unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to 

lead a coalition supporting Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and despite attempts to 

reestablish itself in Aden, some elements of the Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) remain in 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Houthi forces control Yemen's capital, Sana' a, and are undeterred in their efforts 

to retain key tetTitory and attack the Saudi coalition. The civil war has severely affected Yemen's 

population, with nearly 80% of the population requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. Similarly, its 

economy has been devastated by insecurity, extremely high unemployment (35%) and near cessation of 

its petroleum industry. Neither the Houthis nor the exiled Hadi government has the ability to govern 

effectively. In December 2017, the relationship between previously aligned Houthis and former 

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President Ali Abdullah Salih disintegrated and culminated with Salih's assassination by his former 

allies. It is unclear if the Saudi-hacked Hadi faction can capitalize on these events, and Salih's forces 

have splintered, adding continued chaos. 

Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue to maintain a presence in Yemen and are 

focused on attacks against ROYG, the Saudi coalition, and Houthi targets. Since mid-2014, ISISYemen has leveraged the chaotic security situation to expand its capabilities and conduct 

intermittent attacks against Saudi coalition and Yemeni security targets in Aden. AQAP still aspires 

to threaten Western interests with high-profile attacks, although U.S. and Saudi coalition strikes 

have removed successive levels ofleadership and logistics support, critically damaging their 

network. Our Emirati partners have also played a key role in countering the threat from AQAP and 

ISIS-Yemen in southern Yemen. 

The conflict in Yemen has opened opportunities for Iran, which continues to provide support to 

the Houthis with the aim of building a proxy to pressure the Saudi-led coalition and expand its 

sphere of influence. This support enabled the Houthis to launch missiles at Saudi Arabian and 

Emirati cities and target ships in the Bab a! Mandab and Red Sea on multiple occasions in the last 

year, threatening Americans and our partners and raising the risk of broader regional conflict. 

CENTCOM is partnering with the Saudi-led coalition to help maintain a favorable regional balance. 

Our goal is to ensure that nations in close proximity to Yemen are able to secure their borders and 

safeguard their populations while negotiations lead to a cessation of hostilities between Houthis and the 

ROYG. Saudi Arabia has announced that it is working to facilitate the movement of humanitarian 

assistance, food, and fuel by opening ground and air avenues from Saudi Arabia into Yemen, utilizing 

additional ports, and partnering with NGOs to provide humanitarian and medical assistance. 

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The Levant, which includes the countries of, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon- and Iraq and 

Egypt remain an active area for CENTCOM theater security cooperation and partnership due to 

instability stemming from the Syrian Civil War, the rise of! SIS, and malign Iranian influence. 

Though the scourge oflSIS is receding, Levantine countries remain under threat of attack, as seen in 

Egypt where ISIS-Sinai continues to carry out barbaric attacks against civilians and Egyptian security 

forces, including the November murder of over 300 citizens in prayer at a mosque in northern Sinai. 

U.S. assistance to our partners in the Levant has enahled improved border security in Lebanon and 

Jordan. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) demonstrated this kinetically in August- expertly routing 

ISIS fighters on their eastern border during Operation Dawn of the Hills. 

In Jordan, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) remain a dedicated partner, providing access, basing, 

and overnight essential to furthering U.S. interests in the region- we must ensure we do not take them 

for granted. Though the GOJ and the JAF have successfully handled security concerns and domestic 

stability challenges, regional turmoil and persistently low economic growth rates have led to rising 

unemployment and high national debt. Additionally, Jordan currently hosts approximately 660,000 UNregistered Syrian refugees and 63,000 Iraqi refugees, straining government resources, services, and 

infrastructure. Despite this strain, the GOJ recently facilitated critical humanitarian support to the 

Rukban lDP camp on the Syrian side of the border. Continued commitment to funding Title l 0 

programs, in addition to FMF and economic and humanitarian assistance, enables Jordan to mitigate its 

humanitarian and economic difficulties, while remaining a capable partner in coalition efforts. The JAF 

is also contributing to stabilization efforts in OIR, including reopening the Turaybil/ Karama border 

crossing with Iraq in August2017, a key step in normalizing relations and restoring trade between the 

two countries. 

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Lebanon is critical to our national security interests and exemplifies our challenges in the 

Middle East. Wedged between a key friend in the region, Israel, and a corridor of Iranian influence 

from Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon has managed to remain relatively stable in a region 

embroiled in conflict. However, Lebanon faces a stagnant economy, a Syrian refugee crisis, and the 

growing influence ofHizballah, which holds a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions due to 

their strategic political alliances, omnipresent threat of violence, strength as a social service 

provider, and tinancial support trom Iran. Furthermore, the possibility of an Israel-Hizballah 

conflict is a constant threat to the stability ofLehanon and security of Israel. 

Our effort to strengthen the Lebanese security forces, especially the LAF, as the country's only 

legitimate security provider is a critical aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and 

security. With successful operations like Dawn of the Hills, the Lebanese people are realizing more 

and more that the LAF, their country's most trusted and respected institution, is increasingly 

capable of protecting them from external threats. The United States is the LAF's top security 

assistance partner, and our consistent, long-term commitment and training efforts, in addition to the 

more than $1.7 billion in security assistance provided since 2006, have successfully modernized and 

strengthened the LAF as a fighting force. U.S. Special Operations militaty and civilian personnel 

have forged a strong relationship with the LAF and enhanced their capabilities, making them a 

capable partner in our regional counter-terrorism campaign. During the most recent militaty 

operations against ISIS, U.S. militaty personnel assisted the LAF in planning and conducting 

combined arms maneuver, aerial reconnaissance, and integrated fires. Since our security assistance 

began, Lebanon has maintained an exemplaty track-record for adhering to regular and enhanced 

end-use monitoring protocols. We are confident the LAF has not transferred equipment to 

Hizballah. Nonetheless, we are concerned about Hizballah's efforts to infiltrate Lebanon's security 

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institutions and have made clear that any cooperation with Hizballah will risk our continued cooperation 

and assistance. 

On the western edge of the CENTCOM area of responsibility, Egypt remains an anchor ofU.S. 

interests in the region given its strategic location, demographic heft, religious and cultural influence, and 

its enduring peace treaty with Israel. Egypt is an essential partner in countering the flow of foreign 

fighters, materiel, and financial support to extremists transiting from Libya through Egypt into the 

Central Region. Egypt supports our overflight requests, ensures Suez Canal transit, and shares our 

commitment to defeat ISIS. The cornerstone of this relationship is our security assistance partnership. 

In one example of our intensifYing joint eftorts, in January 2018, we celebrated the successful signing of 

the bilateral Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CIS MOA), 

crowning over thirty years of eftort to enhance security and counterterrorism cooperation. 

ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct daily attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and 

security services, causing hundreds of casualties, while other extremist organizations have carried out 

attacks on the mainland. The United States commitment to continuing to support Egypt in this fight 

against terrorism, in bringing security for the Egyptian people, is steadfast. Until now, the EAF has 

contained most of the violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula; however, without a comprehensive 

whole of government strategy to defeat ISIS-Sinai, the threat will persist and grow. The United States is 

committed to working with Egypt to develop a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that 

addresses the underlying political, economic, and social conditions that give rise to extremist elements, 

while defeating the threats that plague Egypt and the region. 

Through our partnership efforts, we have observed improvement in the security of Egyptian 

maritime and land borders. The EAF has shown some success stemming the flow of fighters and illicit 

material into Israel and the Central Region. We will look to strengthen our security cooperation 

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partnership through continued engagement and with development of their counterterrorism/counterinsurgency strategy and capabilities, including the prioritization ofFMF toward appropriate defense 

articles and training. In FYl6 and FY 17, Congress appropriated up to $1.3 billion in FMF and $1.8 

million in !MET. As a sign of our continued support of Egypt's efforts, the President requested 

Congress continue to provide $1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt in FY 2018, despite the 

increasingly constrained budget environment. Moreover. the United States and Egypt have elevated 

the strategic nature of the assistance relationship through mechanisms such as our Military 

Cooperation Committee and Defense Resourcing Conferences. Through these means we help 

Egypt plan for its security needs on a long-term basis. 

Countering Iranian Expansionism. Countering the Iranian regime's malign influence in the 

region is a key component of our efforts to de lend allies from military aggression. bolster our 

partners against coercion, and share responsibilities lor the common defense. Our relationships with 

the GCC countries play a key role in this effort. 

Iran is generating instability across the region, and the Iranian Threat Network (!TN) continues 

to increase in strength, enhancing its capacity to threaten U.S. and partner nation interests. 

Concurrently, the Iranian regime continues to maintain longstanding criticisms that the United States 

is a source of instability in the Middle East and cannot be trusted. While the International Atomic 

Energy Agency reports that it continues to monitor and verity Tehran's implementation of its 

JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, Iran continues to express frustration with the degree and pace 

of sanctions relief under the JCPOA and has publicly criticized U.S. statements regarding continued 

participation in the JCPOA. Iran seeks expanded economic, and in some cases diplomatic, 

engagement with the International Community to achieve what it views as the full henefits of 

sanctions relief afforded under the deal. The United States is upholding its JPCOA commitments 

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and has made clear that Iran's economic troubles stem not from issues related to JCPOA 

implementation, but from internal economic mismanagement, a weak banking sector, and 

widespread corruption, among other factors. 

Over the past year, Iran has focused its regional efforts primarily on operations in Syria and Iraq to 

expand its influence in the region and secure supply routes to Hizballah to threaten Israel. Iran has 

provided increasingly sophisticated maritime and missile attack capabilities to the I louthis in Yemen. 

Additionally, Iran continues smaller-scale support to other groups such as Bahraini Shia militants, Gaza 

militants, and the Afghan Talihan. It remains wary of U.S. and coalition intentions throughout the 

region, and continues to engage Western nations in the "grey zone," rather than through direct conflict. 

Iran will continue to pursue policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals throughout the 

Middle East while seeking to expand diplomatic and economic relations with a wide range of nations. 

Leaders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (!RGC-QF) have taken advantage of 

surrogates, businesses, and logistics entities to execute direct action, intelligence, influence building, 

terrorism, and cyber operations against the U.S. and our partner nations. By supporting proxies in the 

fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and against the Saudi coalition in Yemen, Tehran seeks to gain 

lasting influence and indebted allies in each country. The conflict in Syria has also proven the ITN's 

expeditionary capacity; fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon wage war there solely at 

Iran's behest. After the current conflicts abate, the !TN will undoubtedly turn its attention to other 

adversaries; future flashpoints could occur wherever there is a U.S. or allied presence. 

Iran continues to acquire and develop increasingly lethal weapons to raise the cost of direct military 

conflict. The expansion of Iran's military capabilities over the last decade enables Tehran to threaten 

international trade and regional stability throughout the Gulf and beyond. Production of advanced 

military equipment and threats to the free flow of commerce through the Strait ofHormuz are intended 

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to challenge the U.S. enduring presence in the region. Iran's military is composed of approximately 

700,000 personnel divided into two separate militaries: the Islamic Republic oflran Armed Forces 

(Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which both continue to improve. 

Iran's ground forces are improving their ability to quickly mobilize and deploy in response to 

internal and external threats. Iran has also advertised the development of quick reaction forces, 

consisting of armor, artillery, and heliborne assets that can deploy within four hours. 

Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten- or be able to threaten- strategic 

locations like the Bab al Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, and oil platJonns. With little warning, Iran 

could quickly close tbe Strait ofHormuz using stockpiles of naval mines and disrupt key maritime 

chokepoints throughout the region. Iranian surface to air missiles (SAMs) along its littoral pose a 

significant threat to U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) assets operating in 

international airspace. During 2017, Iran's capabilities improved with the deployment of advanced 

S-300 long-range SAM systems provided by Russia. 

Additionally, Tehran continues to increase its strategic power projection capability with its 

expanding ballistic missile force. Iran has tbe largest missile force in tbe Middle East, which can 

range I ,200 miles and reach key targets in the region. Iran is continuing to increase the range, 

precision, and lethality of these missile systems. Tehran relies on these systems to deter adversaries 

and provide a reliable retaliatory capability against neighbors and U.S. forces. 

Iran intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi Arabia, threaten Israel, and maintain 

a capability to threaten strategically important maritime transit routes in the Bah al Mandeb, Strait of 

llormuz, and the Gulf. On a positive note, over the past year, we have seen an overall reduction in 

unprofessional Iranian actions toward U.S. and coalition vessels; such interactions decreased by 36% 

from 2016 to 2017. 

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To counter Iranian expansionism and destabilizing activities, CENTCOM will deter conventional 

Iranian aggression, bolster our network of allies and partners, and compete for influence throughout the 

region. Our forces maintain a high level of readiness at bases across the region and consistently patrol 

the waterways this persistent presence deters Iranian conventional military attacks against our allies 

and protects international sea lanes. By improving our Arab partners' capacity to defend themselves and 

encouraging them to work together as a coalition, we also create a bulwark against Iranian aggression 

and proxy warfare. 

Our efforts to compete to be the partner of choice for our Gulf and Levant partners ft1rther weakens 

Iranian threat networks and limits Tehran's malign political, economic, and military influence. This is 

especially crucial in Iraq, where Baghdad must work with Iran as a neighboring state, but limit Tehran's 

manipulation and infiltration of political parties and government institutions. We must continue to be a 

reliable partner to the !SF to build their capacity to provide internal security and protect their borders. 

Ongoing stabilization efforts that strengthen Iraqi social and economic institutions will also impede 

Iran's ability to negatively influence our Iraqi partner. 

On the Arabian Peninsula, GCC states are among the United States' best partners in the region and 

a counter-balance to Iran. The virtually unhindered access, basing, and overflight approvals from our 

Gulf partners, as well as their contributions of troops and airlift have been critical to the success of 

Defeat-ISIS operations over the past year. The GCC also represents the most promising baseline effort 

for promoting collective defense initiatives, including joint counter-terrorism and ballistic missile 

defense. As they look to the United States for military equipment, training, and assistance, it is essential 

we seek opportunities to include GCC partners in our combined efforts to defeat regional threats posed 

by extremism and Iran's burgeoning influence. However, the most significant complicating factor in the 

unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity is the still-unresolved rift between Saudi Arabia, UAE, 

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Bahrain, and Egypt with Qatar. While efforts to reduce the impact on military-to-military 

relationships among the Gulf States have been largely successful, the rift continues to present 

challenges in the political sphere. 

Within the GCC, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is undergoing potentially far-reaching 

changes in social, economic, and security spheres under the banner of Vision 2030 and the National 

Transformation Plan, which includes wide ranging fiscal and cultural liberalization. This could 

alter the dynamics of the Saudi economy. King Salman's appointment of his son Mohammed bin 

Salman as the Crown Prince, the purported anti-corruption campaign, and recent Saudi eftorts to 

influence Lebanon have exacerbated an environment of uncertainty in the kingdom's future. 

Saudi Arabia remains embroiled in the conflict in Yemen, which appears to be at an impasse in 

terms of a political or diplomatic solution with the Houthis. To assist with the military aspects of 

the conflict, we have increased the number of advisors to the Saudi military over the past year to 

help improve command and control and formalize targeting processes. These additional training 

and advisory efforts will help mitigate incidents of avoidable civilian casualties in Yemen. 

The (Jnited Arab Emirates' strategic location, vast natural resources, willingness to engage 

terrorist organizations, and ambition to be at the forefront of military innovation makes them a 

valuable partner. The UAE was among the first countries to join the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. 

Although its military role tapered off when its resources shifted to Yemen in March 2015, Abu 

Dhabi remains active in pnrsuing many of the Coalition's lines of effort, including counter-ISIS 

messaging, stabilization, countering ISIS financing, and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. 

Bahrain hosts CENTCOM's naval component and CMF and has publicly supported the 

Defeat-ISIS effort, including allowing U.S. forces to conduct counter-ISIS strikes from its 

territory. In Yemen, Bahrain's air, land, and sea forces participated in Saudi-led coalition 

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operations against AQAP and the Houthis; these deployments have improved the overall readiness of the 

Bahrain Defense Force. We continue to make strides in our collaborative efforts to enhance the 

Bahraini Coast Guard's capacity and expand Bahrain's role in countering piracy and violent extremism 

in the region's maritime domain. 

Internally, Bahrain is dealing with a domestic economy negatively impacted by low oil prices, 

political discord, and a persistent, low-level threat from Iranian-backed militant groups. We continue to 

provide appropriate assistance to help it address security threats. Prior restrictions on FMS to Bahrain 

created tension in the bilateral relationship; recent movement on key FMS cases, however, has provided 

renewed strength in military and political ties with Bahrain. We continue to reassure our Bahraini 

counterparts that we remain committed to our partnership, while also encouraging them to respect 

freedom of expression and pursue dialogue with the nonviolent political opposition. 

The Government of Kuwait continues to provide a critical environment within the Central Region 

for access, basing, and overflight in support of U.S. and coalition operations and hosts the forward 

headquarters ofCENTCOM's army component, U.S. Army Central Command. Kuwait is also 

CENTCOM's primary logistics gateway for movement into and out of the region. 

Over the last 20 years Qatar has provided the U.S. with invaluable regional access through basing 

and freedom of movement for U.S. forces at Camp As-Sayliyah and AI Udeid Air Base- home to the 

Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, U.S. Special Operations 

Command Central Forward, and the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. Qatar hosts approximately 

10,000 U.S. service members, and aircraft launched from AI Udeid Air Base support operations 

throughout the region. 

While the rift has had little direct impact on U.S. operations, it has imposed significant restrictions 

on Qatar's freedom of movement in the region through the closure ofland borders and air space. 

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Additionally, it has impacted Qatar's participation in Gulf state-hosted multilateral exercises and 

eroded coalition building efforts. It has also proven to be a distraction from Saudi-led operations in 

Yemen. In a concerning development, the rift has pushed Qatar to become more reliant on Iran and 

less connected to the GCC. 

Despite its small size, Qatar has contributed to coalition operations throughout the region, 

including against ISIS, and seeks to expand its participation in other regional coalitions. Qatar is 

currently the second largest FMS customer in the world with $25 billion dollars in new cases and is 

on track to surpass $40 billion dollars in the next live years with additional FMS purchases. Qatar's 

efforts to expand its military both in size and capacity have resulted in increased bilateral military 

engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari Atmed Forces. This gives the United States an 

invaluable opportunity to make a positive impact on the military development of a key partner in a 

turbulent region. 

The Sultanate of Oman's relationship with the United States remains strong, and Oman 

continues to play a constructive role in regional diplomatic issues, including serving as an 

interlocutor for the U.S. in dealing with Yemen, Iran, and the GCC. However, unless the 

government successfully makes policy changes to constrain government spending and attract 

foreign investment, Muscat will likely lace an economic crisis in the next few years. Oman's 

strategic location provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency 

capabilities; it provides important access in the form of over 5,000 aircraft overflights, 600 aircraft 

landings, and 80 port calls annually. The Omani military also participates in numerous bilateral 

exercises and training events on a yearly basis. 

Required Programs, Capabilities, and Resources 

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In order to ensure we can effectively execute the NOS and protect our national interests, we must he 

properly postured, alongside our interagency partners, with the necessary policies, capabilities, and 

resources to address the challenges and capitalize on the opportunities mentioned above. To this end, 

CENTCOM requires specific means in the form of programs, capabilities, and resources. We sincerely 

appreciate Congress' continued support for fiscal authorities and appropriations required to support ongoing theater operations, as well as the increased responsiveness of the USG in tackling the challenges 

inherent to the Central Region's complex environment. 

Building Partner Capacity (BPC). The Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), Afghan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Combatant Commanders Initiatives Fund (CC!F), Coalition Support Fund 

(CSF), and Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) have been key enablers to the 

battlefield successes the Coalition achieved in disrupting and dismantling ISIS and the Taliban. Your 

approval and increase in ASFF funding to support Afghan Aviation modernization allowed the ANDSF 

to begin closing their gaps in aerial fires and lift capability and reduced their reliance on U.S. and 

Coalition forces, while also making them more lethal against the Taliban and ISIS-K. 

In Syria, CTEF-procured equipment and supplies provided to the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) 

like the SDF have been instrumental to their success against ISIS. We will continue to use Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and other humanitarian and civic assistance funding 

to improve conditions and access for other U.S. federal and international aid organizations' follow-on 

missions. These authorities must respond in a timely manner to environmental and operational 

challenges. We continue to prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements, coalition and 

interagency capabilities, and the conditions on the ground. 

In Iraq, the success of the !SF in dismantling the physical caliphate and the fragmentation of the 

ISIS hybrid-conventional force over the past year is a validation of our Coalition's BPC effort. As we 

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reduced major combat operations, the authorities granted to the Office of Security CooperationIraq (OSC-1) were expanded to cover critical sustainment efforts. These authorities allow OSC-1 to 

work with all I SF that are posturing to battle a potential insurgency and secure their border with 

Syria. OSC-l is currently executing programs to enhance professionalization of the !SF along with 

prudent implementation and oversight ofFMF. In FY18, OSC-l will leverage $42 million in 

authorities to transform the !SF into a sustainable, affordable, and effective force through security 

sector reform and security cooperation efforts. 

CENTCOM efforts to implement and Jocus BPC initiatives yielded increased capabilities to 

support security cooperation and partner nation goals. The Section 333 authority also authorizes 

funds to be available for two fiscal years and program sustainment for up to five years, allowing for 

execution of long-lead time programs without cross-fiscal year constraints and improved program 

maintenance, training, and sustainment support. 

The CENTCOM Exercise and Training Program continues to be one of the most cost 

effective and efficient tools to conduct security cooperation engagement with partner nations 

throughout the region. Every exercise, including the planning process, provides an opportunity to 

demonstrate U.S. resolve in the region, strengthen partnerships, promote cooperation among our 

partners, conduct key leader engagements, and sustain and improve hoth joint and combined 

readiness. The program continued to grow in complexity and relevance with extended participation 

throughout the CENTCOM region during FY 17 and into FY 18. 

CENTCOM executed 53 bilateral and multilateral exercises during FY17 with 42 partner 

nations, spanning seven Combatant and Functional Commands. This enhanced U.S. Joint Force 

capability supports theater-wide contingency operations and sustains U.S. presence and access in 

the region. Other program impacts include improving partner nation interoperability through 

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military-to-military engagement, integrating staff planning, executing Joint and Combined opemtions, 

developing coalition warfare, and refining complementary partner warfare capabilities given conflicts 

that arc increasingly trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional in nature. 

However, continued force reductions in the area of responsibility, as well as the increased 

operational use of forces remaining in theater, threaten the viability of the CENTCOM Joint Exercise 

Program. Exercises like EAGER LION- the largest CENTCOM exercise- are routinely affected by 

reductions in participating forces or threatened with cancellation due to competing requirements for 

operational torces. Mitigation is limited with current exercise program funding levels that provide 

restricted air/surface options tor movement of out-of-theater (CONUS) based forces to participate in 

exercises. 

Forces and Equipment: The Key to lnteroperability. With the greater focus on operations "by, 

with, and through" our partners to accomplish common objectives, interoperability is increasingly 

important, and our BPC and FMS programs remain instrumental to this process. The "total package" 

approach with which we pursue equipment support and long-term sustainment ensures that maintenance 

support and training are a part of the FMS plan from the outset. 

However, due to political considerations, cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners are seeking 

alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China. When our 

partners go elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges our ability to incorporate their 

contributions into theater efforts. 

CENTCOM must also remain prepared for major unforeseen contingencies and crises; 

prepositioned war reserve materiel is a critical equipment enabler as we posture to address emerging and 

unforeseen threats. The tyranny of distance between our service depots and the Central Region requires 

ready, prepositioned capability sets that can rapidly integrate with deploying forces for contingency 

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response. These capability sets provide the necessary shock absorber and help us preserve decision 

space for the national leadership at the front-end of emerging contingencies. Congressional support for 

the services' regeneration and reset of prepositioned war reserve materiel remains essential to our 

operational depth and resiliency. 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). We are also working to counter the adaptive 

threats from enemy networks and adversary states in the form of emerging missile and unmanned 

aircraft technologies. CENTCOM continues to employ IAMD and Counter Unmanned Aerial 

System (CUAS) resources to provide the hest possible defense design to the theater. 

Threat missile systems continue to improve in accuracy, giving them the ability to selectively 

target CENTCOM's critical assets. Current IAMD resources remain vital to helping CENTCOM 

maintain acceptable levels of risk without creating additional demand on the force. Providing 

lAMD protection to deployed U.S. forces and our critical infrastructure is crucial to mission success 

and provides a visible deterrence to regional aggression. Moreover, it signals U.S. commitment to 

partners and provides flexibility to respond to contingencies. 

Partner nations continue to field missile defense systems that are technologically interoperable 

with U.S.-based defense systems. Several partner nations have also expressed interest in working 

together with the U.S. to address the growing CUAS problem set. We must work with our partners 

to integrate the systems into one comprehensive network that enables better interaction, flexibility, 

and increased levels of protection against all potential adversarial air and missile threats. 

Several of the GCC countries have expressed a desire to integrate their missile and CUAS 

defense systems with U.S. lAMD systems. The U.S. Patriot force in the GCC is an important 

warfighting capability and a visible symbol of U.S. partnership, resolve, and deterrence and is 

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linked to bi-lateral defense agreements. Integration of these systems would increase duration and level 

of protection provided by the defense design against the spectrum of threats in theater. 

Critical Munitions. We appreciate continued Congressional support for the procurement and 

development of precision and specific purpose munitions, which are essential to defeat the threats to our 

national interests. Multiple factors increase demand on worldwide precision munitions stock levels, to 

include readiness to address threats from China and Russia, enduring combat operations, investment in 

our "by, with, through" approach, our directive to minimize collateral damage, and the drawdown in 

munitions funding prior to OlR. Projected expenditures coupled with partner requests for precision 

munitions show a system under stress down to the industrial level. Saudi Arabia, in particular, continues 

to request precision munitions to assist in reducing the threat from Iranian-supported Houthi forces in 

Yemen in the most precise manner possible. 

We have implemented controls for existing and projected requirements to ensure we can meet our 

current commitments while staying ready to meet future operational needs. We also continue to work 

across the Department on process improvements to provide a more precise demand signal to the 

Services and the industrial base and enable multi-year investment in this critical commodity area. 

Congressional support for base budget, production, and forward positioning of critical preferred 

precision and specific purpose munitions is vital to the future success of military operations. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets. Competition witb China and Russia are 

increasing demands across the theater for ISR assets. In addition to continued ISR requirements to 

enable our partners in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, counter-Iran operations in Yemen, the Bab a! 

Mandeb, and the Gulf place substantial ISR demands on already severely limited resources. We also 

anticipate additional requirements to assist Egypt in their counter-ISIS operations in the Sinai 

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The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) enterprise is also stressed hy 

continuous operations; shortfalls of PED for collected intelligence will continue in the foreseeable 

future, necessitating an increased focus on automation and development of new PED tools, 

including tools to exploit publically available information. Funding for organizations such as the 

National Media Exploitation Center is also critical to our ability to handle the volume of captured 

enemy material. 

In order to partially mitigate these ISR shortfalls, CENTCOM is working closely with the 

Services, Joint Staff, Combat Support Agencies, Ot1ice of the Secretary of Defense, and the 

interagency to acquire contract ISR solutions, incorporate non-traditional ISR (such as that collected 

from strike assets), and improve efficiency and asset de-confliction. 

Our Coalition partners are also assisting with ISR collection and PED, but this support is 

limited hy national policies regarding deployed torce levels and manner of employment as well as 

resource shortages. Further, partners arc generally challenged to address many ofCENTCOM's 

requirements, such as those where multi-discipline, low-observable, or strike-capable assets are 

required. All of these factors combine to substantially increase operational risk in those areas that 

will not receive adequate ISR coverage due to decreased capacity. 

Information Operations/Strategic Communications. The operational information 

environment continues to evolve at a rapid pace; our adversaries are not limited by geographic 

boundaries as they increase global radicalization and recruitment online. Russia and Iran are also 

waging strategic communications campaigns to cloud perceptions of U.S. success in Syria and Iraq 

and to call into question our commitment to key partners in the region. Offensive Information 

Operations (010) capabilities developed and refined over the last two years provide CENTCOM 

and the Department of Defense with the best "high impact/low cost" investment to deter aggression, 

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counter destabilizing behavior, and decrease the potential for direct action operations requirements. 

CENTCOM com hines actions and information by employing assets ranging from print, radio, 

television, and the internet to conduct robust, synchronized information operations in order to influence, 

dismpt, eormpt, or usurp our adversary's decision making. These efforts also directly support both the 

Iran and Iraq strategies that specifically call for integrated strategic communications campaigns. 

The ISIS problem set has enabled the Department of Defense to closely collaborate with other U.S. 

government agencies, Coalition partners, and regional allies to coordinate and synchronize messaging 

strategies. We are building on our combined experiences to create a broad, long-term, whole-ofgovernment approach that amplifies our efforts toward conflict prevention. We also routinely work with 

Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to improve interoperability, share lessons learned, and ultimately 

develop a collaborative strategy to counter violent extremism our regional partners will play the 

largest role in shaping their own tutures. 

As we work to address the propaganda that terrorist organizations use to recmit new followers, we 

must also address the serious threat that state-sponsored dis information poses to U.S. national security. 

Amidst these trends in the information environment, it is more critical than ever that the U.S. 

government has a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to strategic communication that 

supports and harmonizes with our military efforts. In this vein, the Department of Defense works 

closely with the Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC), and we appreciate that 

Congress has expanded its mandate to synchronize and coordinate the federal government's efforts to 

recognize, understand, expose, and counter these harmful propaganda and disinformation efforts. 

Recognizing that information operations will continue to be a force multiplier, we must ensure 

organizations like the GEC can compete and win in the information environment. 

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Cyber Operations/Cybersecurity. All of the traditional threats within the Central Region are 

exacerbated by several challenges in the cyberspace domain. The global nature of cyberspace means it 

has no legal boundaries, challenging our legal system and ability to deter threats or respond to 

contingencies. We have an adaptive enemy who has proven creative in the information 

environment. 

Based on the speed of technological evolution, attackers in the cyberspace domain have an 

advantage over defenders. Worse, triendly capabilities can be co-opted by adversaries at a scale and 

ease greater than in other domains. Consequently, small groups can exercise state-like powers, 

while a state actor can have tremendous impact. Defenders must expend a disproportionate amount 

of resources to protect multiple avenues of attack on many different networks and resources. 

Integrated Operations with Interagency Partners. Whole of government solutions are critical 

to resolving the complex problems in the Central Region, and we strive to balance our own 

authorities and resources with our interagency partners' unique capabilities, expertise, and 

authorities. Our embassy country teams across the region are doing an incredible and critical job 

providing nuanced information, recommendations, and support for military operations, and senior 

embassy leadership is integral to facilitating our access to senior foreign leadership. We strive to 

ensure that our military activities in the AOR reinforce our embassy colleagues' diplomatic 

engagements in order to mutually advance national security priorities. The Department of State and 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been invaluable partners from the 

inception of combat operations in Iraq and Syria to efforts focused on consolidating hard fought 

gains. As Secretary Tillerson mentioned in his recent remarks at Stanford, "The United States has 

had diplomats on the ground in affected areas working with the UN, our partners in the Global 

Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and various NGOs. We will continue to devote personnel and resources to 

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stabilization efforts." In partnership with USAID, CENTCOM has been heavily involved in the conduct 

of foreign humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations across the region. Steady-state 

foreign humanitarian assistance activities are a key security cooperation tool that enhance our BPC 

efforts and improve Department of Defense visibility, access, and influence while addressing critical 

humanitarian needs. We request your support of the Administration's annual OHDACA funding request 

to allow us to continue these important engagement activities. 

Counterdrug-tunded train and equip programs have become increasingly important in the 

CENTCOM AOR. We work with our interagency partners in the region to reduce drug trafficking. 

This is most evident in the Central Asian states, where a large part ofCENTCOM's security cooperation 

activities provide counter-narcotics support. We routinely send additional manpower to embassies in the 

region to assist them in executing counter-drug programs that include infrastructure improvements, 

communications equipment, and training in the latest technology such as scanners and ground sensors. 

Together this builds an effective capability to stem the flow of illicit tratricking in narcotics, weapons, 

and persons. For example, the Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC) in Bahrain 

continues to facilitate the maritime interdiction of heroin and weapons emanating from the Makran 

Coast of Pakistan, by providing intelligence support to Allied naval partners. 

We are also working closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Department of 

Justice (DOJ) to provide counter-threat finance, counter-facilitation, and counter-procurement support to 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan's reinvigorated counter-threat finance cell. Continued linguist support and law 

enforcement training for Afghan DEA mentored units is critical to receiving time-sensitive information 

from the DEA-sponsored judicial wire intercept program. We will also participate in the Department of 

Treasury-led Terrorist Financing Targeting Cell in Saudi Arabia. This initiative is part of a larger Saudi41 
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led GCC effort to counter violent extremism in the Arabian Peninsula and throughout the Central 

Region. 

In the past year, we have also seen the effective expansion of our Department of Defense 

Rewards program, which allows for our !A partners to incentivize sources that deliver information, 

at great risk, that result in increased force protection or counter-terrorism kinetic strikes. 

A key component of our working relationship with the lA is the exchange of personnel; 

representatives from eight U.S. government departments and agencies reside within the CENTCOM 

Headquarters, a majority co-located in our Operations Directorate's Interagency Action Group 

(lAG). We sincerely appreciate the provision of high-quality personnel to support CENTCOM 

operations. Reciprocally, we have embedded personnel within the headquarters of several USG 

partners. These embeds provide support to the gaining organizations and facilitate collaboration on 

mutually supportive !A objectives. Embeds also allow us to maintain visibility and coordinate 

activities across our "seams" with EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM. 

Coalition Partners. A unique characteristic of CENTCOM remains the presence of 49 nations 

at our headquarters in Tampa. Over the last 15 years, the composition, task, and purpose of the 

national representation has changed based on security trends, ongoing operations, and our partner 

engagement strategy. Each nation is represented by a Senior National Representative, and most 

nations have additional officers that regularly synchronize with their counterparts in the Command 

staff, creating an integrated, coalition-centric approach to our operations. 

Many nations consider counter-YEO operations a focal point for their efforts. We capitalize on 

this extraordinary access to our partners to facilitate information sharing, interoperahility, 

operational support, and force generation. Our co-location with SOCOM in Tampa also enables us 

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to capitalize on economies of scale and synergies between our respective commands and coalition 

partners. 

In spite of the longevity of the Coalition, the current environment of fiscal austerity may inhibit our 

ability to sustain it at an optimal level of performance. Additionally, the lack of national-level 

intelligence sharing agreements often hinders the timely and comprehensive communication of 

information. Our classified networks are largely unavailable to our partner nations and inhibit our 

ability to integrate operations, often requiring costly and labor-intensive solutions to overcome. 

However, utilizing a coalition-centric approach necessitates a paradigm shift and a deliberate 

acceptance of risk in order to foster an environment of reciprocal information sharing. We have an 

opportunity to sustain momentum in the global campaign against ISIS and other VEOs while continuing 

to refine the whole-of-coalition approach. Opposition to violent extremism provides unique alignment 

of national interests and can increase trust, understanding, and cooperation on other critical issues. If we 

can sustain an enduring coalition, we will be able to deal with persistent conflict in the region and be 

postured for response when necessary. Our lessons learned can inform departmental and national 

strategies for attaining increased levels of integration with our partners. 

Conclusion 

Given the many forces driving change and uncertainty in the region, U.S. commitment to the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility is more important now than ever. Recent experience has shown that a 

precipitous withdrawal of support, before conditions for stabilization have been set, can lead to 

catastrophic results. We have also learned that a modest commitment of resources, applied steadily and 

consistently over time, and in a predictable fashion, can assist our partners in managing change, 

adjusting to new threats, and building their own capacity to act. This has the additional benefit of 

lessening our own requirements in future contingencies and building our reputation as a reliable partner. 

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Working "by, with, and through" our allies and partners allows us to multiply the effect of relatively 

modest commitments to ensure this crucial and truly "central" region never again requires a mass 

deployment of U.S. forces. We will retain the necessary American military presence in the region 

to protect the homeland from terrorist attack, preserve a favorable regional balance of power, and 

achieve our strategic objectives and interests found in our national strategies. 

CENTCOM remains the only geographic Combatant Command executing active combat 

operations. In the last year, we have made great strides toward defeating !SIS. This year we will 

shift our focus to the South Asia Strategy in order to push OFS toward a successful conclusion, 

while consolidating the gains we have made against ISIS, suppmiing our political and security 

objectives in the Gulf and Levant, and countering Iran. We must continue to degrade and destroy 

VEOs that threaten the safety of our citizens and partners by pursuing ISIS across the Central 

Region. We will continue to counter expansionist regional powers and inappropriate nuclear 

ambitions by developing strong allies and building peace through strength. 

We remain mindful that ours is a team effort and that success in the complex Central Region 

requires that we work together. This applies not just within the command but with our fellow 

Combatant Commands, our Component Commands, our established combined/joint task forces, the 

Central Region's 18 country teams, and the agencies and organizations of the U.S. government 

which have continued unwavering support over the almost two decades of persistent conflict. Our 

deliberate and close relationships with the U.S. Department of State, USAID, the U.S. Department 

of Treasury, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal 

Bureau oflnvestigation, and the Joint Improvised Explosive Devise Defeat Organization have paid 

enormous dividends in the pursuit of shared national goals and objectives. We look forward to 

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continuing to work with them and others on behalf of our nation. Further, we continue to benefit from 

our allies in the region, who support the CENTCOM headquarters with more than 200 foreign military 

officers from 49 nations all of whom are a part of the success ofCENTCOM, and we are grateful for 

their partnership. 

In all of this, the outstanding men and women who comprise the United States Central Command 

are our finest and most precious resource. The world class CENTCOM team- which includes more 

than 90,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and Civilians stationed throughout the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility- is highly-skilled, motivated, and stands ready to do whatever is 

necessary to accomplish the mission. They continue to make great sacrifices and contributions to ensure 

the command meets our strategic objectives and protects our nation's interests. We must ensure they 

have everything they need to do their jobs as effectively and efficiently as possible. This includes 

ensuring a safe environment for all our personnel, regardless of their race, gender, creed, or religion. 

We arc also keenly aware and grateful for the sacrifices made by our families. They arc vital 

members of our team, and we could not complete our mission without them. They, too, make important 

contributions and tremendous sacrifices each and every day in support of us and on behalf of the 

Command and a grateful nation. 

CENTCOM: Prepare, Pursue, Prevail! 

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General Joseph L. Vote! 

Commander, United States Central Command 

GEN Vote! attended the United States Military Academy and was commissioned in 1980 

as an Infantry Officer. His initial assignments were to the 3d Infantry Division in Germany 

where he served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, Battalion Adjutant and Rifle 

Company Commander. Following this he served as a Small Group Tactics Instructor at the 

Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia before being assigned to the 75th Ranger 

Regiment as a Plans I Liaison Officer where he pmiicipated in Operation JUST CAUSE. 

He was next posted to the 1st Ranger Battalion where he served as the Battalion Liaison 

Officer, Operations Officer and Executive Officer. 

Following this he was assigned to HQs, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy and 

the NATO Peace Implementation Force (!FOR) in Sarajevo. He commanded the 2d 

Battalion, 22d Infantry (Light) at Fort Drum, New York and was subsequently selected to 

command the 1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. Following 

attendance at the Army War College GEN Vote! commanded the 75th Ranger Regiment 

and participated in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, Iraq. 

As a general officer he served in the Pentagon as the Director of the Anny and Joint lED 

Defeat Task Force and subsequently as the Deputy Director of the Joint lED Defeat 

Organization established under the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He served as the Deputy 

Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division I CJTF-82, Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and was subsequently assigned as the Deputy 

Commanding General then Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations 

Command, F01i Bragg, North Carolina. He most recently served as the Commanding 

General of U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

GEN Vote! is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, United 

States Army Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War 

College. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

(99) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. There has been some question to how many service members are 

currently serving in Afghanistan. Can you give me a current number? 

Does that include temporary, or rotational, forces? 

Do you have a sense of the number of civilian contractors? Who keeps track of 

that? 

How are contractors part of the by, with and thru strategy? What is their focus? 

How many contract personnel are there in Afghanistan? 

Do you anticipate needing more service members? If so, how many? 

General VOTEL. [The information is for official use only and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. There has been some question to how many service members are 

currently serving in Afghanistan. Can you give me a current number? Does that include temporary, or rotational, forces? Do you have a sense of the number of civilian 

contractors? Who keeps track of that? How are contractors part of the by, with and 

thru strategy? What is their focus? How many contract personnel are there in Afghanistan? Do you anticipate needing more service members? If so, how many? 

General VOTEL. [The information is for official use only and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK 

Mr. COOK. After recently visiting the UAE, Saudi and Egypt, I was left with a 

deep concern about the loyalties and interactions of Qatar. While Qatar is an ally 

in some respects, their deteriorating relationship with our other allies in the region, 

and their alleged support for the Muslim Brotherhood and relationship with Iran 

are troubling. How does General Votel and CENTCOM see our future relationship 

with Qatar playing out? Is there a back-up plan to move our base and forces from 

Qatar if the relationship deteriorates any further? Does he think the Qatari government is making efforts to improve the relationship with CENTCOM and the U.S.? 

General VOTEL. [The information is for official use only and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Ms. STEFANIK. As best you can in this open forum, can you provide an overview 

of how you are approaching cyber operations to support your ongoing efforts across 

CENTCOM? And how specifically is U.S. CYBER COMMAND supporting your efforts? 

a) In terms of adversarial cyber capabilities, are you more concerned with Statesponsored activities such as those exhibited by Iran, or non-state actors such as AQ 

and ISIS? Any concern about Russian cyber activities within your AOR? 

b) We have heard a great deal about the need to speed up decision-making for 

cyber warfare and cyber operations. What has been your experience in making decisions to support cyber operations; would you agree with these assessments that we 

need to perhaps speed up the decision-making process, including those within the 

interagency? 

General VOTEL. [The information is for official use only and retained in the committee files.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. This question deals with countering adversarial propaganda and 

disinformation efforts: What do you think is your most effective tool as a combatant 

commander to counter adversarial disinformation efforts including those posed by 

ISIS, Russia, and Iran? 
100 

a) How do you work with the State Department? Does the Global Engagement 

Center support your operations? Are we doing enough? What else remains? 

b) The BBC recently conducted an open-source analysis that showed that ISIS 

media is showing signs of a recovery after a sharp decline. Does analysis match your 

experiences? Can you discuss recent trends in ISIS media and propaganda? 

c) What role does DOD play here as compared to the State Department? 

d) Do you have all of the authorities you need? 

General VOTEL. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. This question deals with the changing dynamics on the ground in 

Syria. More and more, our forces are engaging Russian and Syrian regime proxies, 

as most recently seen in the aggressive fighting in Der az-Zur (Dare-a-Zur). The defeat of ISIS now reveals the fingerprints of the larger geopolitical fight we are engaged in, putting at risk current authorities, frameworks, and partnerships. And, 

not to mention, the considerable risk to our forces on the ground in an already 

clouded and fractured battlefield. 

a) What is your long-term view of U.S. presence and investments in the region? 

b) What enduring counterterrorism capabilities do we need to be considering given 

the remaining threats on the ground ? 

General VOTEL. [The information is for official use only and retained in the committee files.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. The recent incident of overseas fitness trackers that telegraphed 

the positions and data of our servicemen and women overseas reminds us that the 

Internet-of-Things continues to change the game. 

a) Can you talk about how this is impacting your approach to force protection. 

What did we learn from this recent incident and what changes have been made? 

b) In a broader sense, and as a combatant commander, are you concerned about 

the proliferation of more than 50 billion connected sensors and devices? How does 

this impact your intelligence frameworks and collection, for example? 

General VOTEL. [The information is for official use only and retained in the committee files.] 

Æ