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No. 99-466 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 93N 

DANIEL M. BARNHART, SR., 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RICK DAY, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Powell,

The Honorable Ted L. Mizner, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Daniel M. Barnhart, Sr., pro se, Deer Lodge, Montana

For Respondents:

Matthew S. Robertson, Special Attorney General, Department

of Corrections, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 16, 1999 

Decided: April 11, 2000

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Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal Operating Rules, the 

following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk 

of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the 

State Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued 

by this Court.

¶2 Daniel M. Barnhart, Sr. (Barnhart) appeals from the order entered by the Third Judicial District 

Court, Powell County, granting the motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants, various employees and 

officials of the Montana Department of Corrections. We affirm.

¶3 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in dismissing Barnhart's complaint for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

BACKGROUND

¶4 Barnhart filed a complaint in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the 

Defendants violated various of his rights under the United States and Montana Constitutions by 

depriving him of his legal papers and books. The following facts are taken from the allegations in his 

complaint.

¶5 In September of 1997, Barnhart was returned to the Montana State Prison (MSP) from Spur, Texas, 

where he had been serving his sentence in the Dickens County Correctional Facility. On September 22, 

1997, Barnhart was transferred from the MSP to the Cascade County Jail in Great Falls, Montana. On 

that date, an MSP employee received and logged in a variety of Barnhart's personal property, including 

his legal papers and books. Barnhart returned from Great Falls to the MSP on November 19, 1997. Over 

the next eleven months, Barnhart attempted, through both informal and formal channels, to recover his 

legal papers and books, but was told that the MSP had no record of receiving any such items. 

Eventually, however, the papers and books were located and returned to Barnhart on October 20, 1998.

¶6 Barnhart's complaint alleged that the actions of various MSP employees and officials in failing to 

secure his legal papers and books and ensure their prompt return to him violated his civil rights. He 

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requested relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and monetary damages. The Defendants moved to 

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it contained 

no allegations of actual injury resulting from the alleged deprivation of Barnhart's papers and books as 

required by Lewis v. Casey (1996), 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606. The District Court 

agreed that Barnhart's complaint failed to allege actual injury as required by Lewis. Rather than 

dismissing the complaint, however, the court ordered Barnhart to amend his complaint to conform to the 

requirements of Lewis 

¶7 Barnhart subsequently filed an amended complaint, as well as a motion for appointment of counsel to 

assist him in pursuing his claim. The Defendants then moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the 

District Court's order, asserting that the amended complaint also failed to allege an actual injury 

resulting from the alleged deprivation of Barnhart's legal materials. The District Court granted the 

motion to dismiss and Barnhart appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶8 A district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether the court's application 

of the law is correct. Missoula YWCA v. Bard, 1999 MT 177, ¶ 3, 983 P.2d 933, ¶ 3, 56 St.Rep. 692, ¶ 3.

DISCUSSION 

¶9 Did the District Court err in dismissing Barnhart's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted? 

¶10 The Defendants contend that the gravamen of Barnhart's complaint is a claim that the alleged 

deprivation of his legal papers and books violated his constitutional right to access to the courts. 

Barnhart does not dispute this contention. In that regard, the United States Supreme Court has held that 

prison inmates have a constitutional right to access to the courts and that state prison officials may not 

actively interfere with that right. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith (1977), 430 U.S. 817, 821-22, 97 S.Ct. 

1491, 1494-95, 52 L.Ed.2d 72, 78-79. The Supreme Court also has held that an inmate alleging a 

violation of his or her right to access to the courts must show that the alleged actions of the prisons 

officials at issue resulted in an actual injury by hindering his or her efforts to pursue a legal claim.Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 349-51, 116 S.Ct. at 2179-80, 135 L.Ed.2d at 616-18.

¶11Barnhart first argues that Lewis is factually distinguishable and, therefore, inapplicable here because 

it addressed circumstances where prison officials failed to provide inmates with adequate library 

facilities and legal assistance, whereas he has alleged that the MSP personnel deprived him of his 

personal legal papers and books. This is a distinction without a difference.

¶12 The constitutional right which the Supreme Court has recognized is that of an inmate's access to the 

courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350, 116 S.Ct. at 2179, 135 L.Ed.2d at 617 (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821, 

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97 S.Ct. at 1494-95, 52 L.Ed.2d at 78-79). This constitutional right is protected by prohibiting state 

prison officials from actively interfering with inmates' attempts to pursue legal claims, whatever that 

interference may be. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350, 116 S.Ct. at 2179, 135 L.Ed.2d at 617 (citations omitted). 

Thus, the Lewis requirement that an inmate show an actual injury resulting from the alleged official 

interference applies to all claims for the violation of an inmate's right to access to the courts and, to that 

extent, the manner in which interference by prison officials manifests itself is not a distinguishing factor.

¶13 Moreover, the requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of the right to access to the courts 

show an actual injury derives from the doctrine of standing. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349, 116 S.Ct. at 2179, 

135 L.Ed.2d at 616. Under the doctrine of standing, an allegation of a personal injury to the plaintiff is a 

prerequisite to an adjudication on the merits of the case. Bowen v. McDonald (1996), 276 Mont. 193, 

201-02, 915 P.2d 201, 206-07 (citation omitted). Consequently, a threshold requirement in every case, 

especially those where a constitutional violation is alleged to have occurred, is that the plaintiff establish 

standing to sue by alleging such a personal injury. Bowen, 276 Mont. at 201, 915 P.2d at 206 (citation 

omitted). As a result, the Lewis requirement that an inmate allege a personal injury, being derived from 

the concept of standing to sue, is a threshold requirement in any case based on an alleged violation of an 

inmate's constitutional right to access to the courts. We conclude that the District Court did not err in 

determining that Lewis applies here and requires Barnhart to allege a personal injury resulting from the 

alleged deprivation of his legal papers and books.

¶14 Next, Barnhart argues that his amended complaint alleged a personal injury sufficient to satisfy the 

Lewis requirements by alleging that the Defendants' actions "prevent[ed] plaintiff from litigating in his 

ongoing litigation or future litigation during the time that plaintiff was deprived of said legal 

material . . . ." We disagree.

¶15 An inmate bringing an action based on a violation of his or her right to access to the courts must 

show that the prison officials' interference "hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. 

at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180, 135 L.Ed.2d at 618. The Supreme Court stated that examples of such 

hindrance included showing that an inmate's complaint was dismissed or that the inmate was precluded 

for some reason from even filing a complaint. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180, 135 L.Ed.2d at 

618. In other words, Lewis requires an allegation that the inmate was precluded from adequately 

pursuing litigation in some specific manner.

¶16 Here, Barnhart's amended complaint alleged only that the deprivation of his legal papers and books 

prevented him from pursuing current and initiating new litigation. The complaint alleged no specific 

injury--such as the inability to timely respond to a motion or the dismissal of a complaint he had filed--

which resulted from the Defendants' alleged actions. We conclude that Barnhart's amended complaint 

fails to allege a specific injury as required by Lewis and, consequently, fails to state a claim for violation 

of his constitutional right to access to the courts.

¶17 Finally, Barnhart asserts that the District Court erred in ruling on the Defendants' motion to dismiss 

prior to ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel. While Barnhart cites various federal cases 

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describing circumstances under which it may be appropriate to appoint counsel for an indigent inmate, 

he cites no authority under which a district court is required to rule on a motion for appointment of 

counsel prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Rule 23(a)(4), M.

R.App.P., requires the appellant to support his argument with citation to authority and we regularly 

decline to address the merits of arguments not supported with legal authority. See In re Marriage of 

Pfennings, 1999 MT 250, ¶ 32, 989 P.2d 327, ¶ 32, 56 St.Rep. 981, ¶ 32 (citations omitted). As a result, 

we decline to address this argument further.

¶18 We hold that the District Court did not err in dismissing Barnhart's complaint for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.

¶19 Affirmed.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

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