(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM 

CO., INC., ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22–1079. Argued March 19, 2024—Decided June 6, 2024 

Petitioner Truck Insurance Exchange is the primary insurer for companies that manufactured and sold products containing asbestos. Two of 

those companies, Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement 

(Debtors), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after facing thousands of 

asbestos-related lawsuits. As part of the bankruptcy process, the Debtors filed a proposed reorganization plan (Plan). That Plan creates an 

Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (Trust) under 11 U. S. C. §524(g), a 

provision that allows Chapter 11 debtors with substantial asbestosrelated liability to fund a trust and channel all present and future asbestos-related claims into that trust. Truck is contractually obligated

to defend each covered asbestos personal injury claim and to indemnify 

the Debtors for up to $500,000 per claim. For their part, the Debtors

must pay a $5,000 deductible per claim, and assist and cooperate with

Truck in defending the claims. The Plan treats insured and uninsured 

claims differently, requiring insured claims to be filed in the tort system for the benefit of the insurance coverage, while uninsured claims

are submitted directly to the Trust for resolution. 

Truck sought to oppose the Plan under §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy

Code, which permits any “party in interest” to “raise” and “be heard on 

any issue” in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Among other things, Truck 

argues that the Plan exposes it to millions of dollars in fraudulent 

claims because the Plan does not require the same disclosures and authorizations for insured and uninsured claims. Truck also asserts that 

the Plan impermissibly alters its rights under its insurance policies.

The District Court confirmed the Plan. It concluded, among other 

things, that Truck had limited standing to object to the Plan because 
 

 

 

 

 

2 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Syllabus 

the Plan was “insurance neutral,” i.e., it did not increase Truck’s prepetition obligations or impair its contractual rights under its insurance 

policies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Truck was not a 

“party in interest” under §1109(b) because the plan was “insurance 

neutral.” 

Held: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a

“party in interest” under §1109(b) that “may raise and may appear and 

be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 case. Pp. 7–15.

(a) Section 1109(b)’s text, context, and history confirm that an insurer such as Truck with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy

claim is a “party in interest” because it may be directly and adversely 

affected by the reorganization plan. Pp. 7–13.

(1) Section 1109(b)’s text is capacious. To start, it provides an illustrative but not exhaustive list of parties in interest, all of which are

directly affected by a reorganization plan either because they have a 

financial interest in the estate’s assets or because they represent parties that do. This Court has observed that Congress uses the phrase 

“party in interest” in bankruptcy provisions when it intends the provision to apply “broadly.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 7. This understanding aligns with the 

ordinary meaning of the terms “party” and “interest,” which together 

refer to entities that are potentially concerned with, or affected by, a 

proceeding. The historical context and purpose of §1109(b) also support this interpretation. Congress consistently has acted to promote

greater participation in reorganization proceedings. That expansion 

of participatory rights continued with the enactment of §1109(b).

Broad participation promotes a fair and equitable reorganization process. Pp. 7–11. 

(2) Applying these principles, insurers such as Truck are parties 

in interest. An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy 

claims can be directly and adversely affected by the reorganization proceedings in myriad ways. In this case, for example, Truck will have to 

pay the vast majority of the Trust’s liability, and §524(g)’s channeling 

injunction, which stays any action against the Debtors, means that 

Truck would stand alone in carrying that financial burden. According 

to Truck, however, a plan that lacks the disclosure requirements for 

the uninsured claims risks exposing Truck to millions of dollars in 

fraudulent tort claims. The Government frames Truck’s interest 

slightly differently, but the result is the same: Where a proposed plan

“allows a party to put its hands into other people’s pockets, the ones 

with the pockets are entitled to be fully heard and to have their legitimate objections addressed.” In re Global Indus. Technologies, Inc., 645 

F. 3d 201, 204. 

Providing Truck an opportunity to be heard is consistent with 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

Syllabus 

§1109(b)’s purpose of promoting a fair and equitable reorganization 

process. Here, the Plan eliminates the Debtors ongoing liability, and 

claimants similarly have little incentive to propose barriers to their

ability to recover from Truck. Truck may well be the only entity with 

an incentive to identify problems with the Plan. Pp. 11–13.

(b) The Court of Appeals looked exclusively at whether the Plan altered Truck’s contract rights or its “quantum of liability.” This approach, known as the “insurance neutrality” doctrine, is conceptually 

wrong and makes little practical sense. Conceptually, the doctrine 

conflates the merits of an objection with the threshold party in interest

inquiry. The §1109(b) inquiry asks whether the reorganization proceedings might affect a prospective party, not how a particular reorganization plan actually affects that party. Practically, the doctrine is 

too limited in its scope. By focusing on the insurer’s prepetition obligations and policy rights, the doctrine wrongly ignores all the other 

ways in which bankruptcy proceedings and reorganization plans can 

alter and impose obligations on insurers and debtors. The fact that 

Truck’s financial exposure may be directly and adversely affected by a 

plan is sufficient to give Truck a right to voice its objections. Finally,

in resisting the text of §1109(b), the Debtors emphasize the risks of

allowing “peripheral parties” to derail a reorganization. This “parade 

of horribles” argument cannot override the statute’s text, and in any 

event, §1109(b) provides parties in interest only an opportunity to be 

heard—not a vote or a veto in the proceedings. In all events, the Court 

today does not opine on the outer bounds of §1109. Difficult cases may

require courts to evaluate whether truly peripheral parties have a sufficiently direct interest to be heard. This case is not one of them because insurers such as Truck with financial responsibility for claims

are not peripheral parties. Pp. 13–15. 

60 F. 4th 73, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other 

Members joined, except ALITO, J., who took no part in the consideration

or decision of the case. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–1079 

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, PETITIONER v. 

KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 6, 2024]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Bankruptcy Code allows any “party in interest” to 

“raise” and “be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 11 U. S. C. §1109(b). The question in this case is 

whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” under this provision. 

Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) is the primary insurer for companies that manufactured and sold products 

containing asbestos. Those companies filed for Chapter 11

bankruptcy after facing thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. Truck is obligated to pay up to $500,000 per asbestos

claim covered under its insurance contracts with the companies. Truck sought to object to the companies’ bankruptcy reorganization plan primarily because the plan

lacked disclosure requirements that Truck thought could 

save it from paying millions of dollars in fraudulent claims.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Truck was not a 

“party in interest” because the reorganization plan was “insurance neutral”; that is, the plan neither increased Truck’s 

prepetition obligations nor impaired its rights under the insurance contracts. This Court disagrees. The insurance 
 

2 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

neutrality doctrine conflates the merits of an insurer’s objection with the threshold §1109(b) question of who qualifies as a “party in interest.” Section 1109(b) asks whether 

the reorganization proceedings might directly affect a prospective party, not how a particular reorganization plan actually affects that party.

Truck is a “party in interest” under §1109(b). An insurer 

with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is sufficiently concerned with, or affected by, the proceedings to

be a “party in interest” that can raise objections to a reorganization plan. Section 1109(b) grants insurers neither a

vote nor a veto; it simply provides them a voice in the proceedings. 

I 

A 

Bankruptcy offers individuals and businesses in financial 

distress a fresh start to reorganize, discharge their debts,

and maximize the property available to creditors. “Chapter

11 of the Bankruptcy Code enables a debtor company to reorganize its business under a court-approved plan governing the distribution of assets to creditors.” U. S. Bank N. A. 

v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 389 (2018). 

This plan, which is primarily the product of negotiations

between the debtor and creditors, “govern[s] the distribution of valuable assets from the debtor’s estate and often 

keep[s] the business operating as a going concern.” 

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. 451, 455 (2017). 

Chapter 11 strikes “a balance between a debtor’s interest in

reorganizing and restructuring its debts and the creditors’ 

interest in maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” 

Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 

U. S. 33, 51 (2008).

Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code addresses which 

stakeholders can participate, and to what extent, in these

reorganization proceedings: 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee,

a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be 

heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” 

A “party in interest” enjoys certain rights in the proceedings, including the ability to file a Chapter 11 plan when a

trustee has been appointed, 11 U. S. C. §1121(c)(1); request 

the appointment or removal of a trustee, §§1104, 1105; challenge the good faith of persons voting to approve a plan,

§1126(e); and object to confirmation of a plan, §1128(b). 

B 

This case concerns the Chapter 11 reorganization of companies facing overwhelming asbestos liability. Exposure to

asbestos, a natural mineral used in industrial work, has led 

to devastating health consequences for millions of people. 

See National Cancer Institute, Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk (Nov. 29, 2021). Companies filing for bankruptcy 

because of asbestos liability face unique challenges. 

“‘[B]ecause of a latency period that may last as long as 40 

years for some asbestos related diseases, a continuing

stream of claims can be expected.’” Amchem Products, Inc. 

v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 598 (1997). Claims therefore arrive on a long and unpredictable timeline. If bankruptcy 

proceedings resolved only existing asbestos liability, companies would face unknown future liability and claimants 

might be unable to recover just because their injuries had 

not yet manifested.

Congress responded to these challenges in §524(g) of the

Bankruptcy Code. This section allows a Chapter 11 debtor 

with substantial asbestos-related liability to establish and 

fund a trust that assumes the debtor’s liability for “damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products.” §524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I). 

Section 524(g) then channels all present and future claims 
 

4 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

into the trust by “enjoin[ing] entities from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or indirectly collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery” for claims “to be

paid in whole or in part by [the] trust.” Finally, §524(g) imposes safeguards, including the appointment of a representative to protect the interest of future claimants, 

§524(g)(4)(B)(i); treatment of “present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same

manner,” §524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V); and approval from at least 

75% of current claimants, §524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). This all 

“ensure[s] that health claims can be asserted only against 

the Trust and that [the company’s] operating entities will

be protected from an onslaught of crippling lawsuits that

could jeopardize the entire reorganization effort.” Kane v. 

Johns-Mansville Corp., 843 F. 2d 636, 640 (CA2 1988). It 

also ensures that “future claimants” are “treated identically 

to the present claimants.” Ibid. 

C 

Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and its parent company,

Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., manufactured and sold 

products that, at some point, contained asbestos. The companies faced tens of thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits 

as a result. To resolve their liabilities, both companies 

(Debtors) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy

Court in turn appointed representatives for the current and

future asbestos claimants (Claimants). The Debtors eventually agreed on a proposed reorganization plan (Plan) with

the Claimants, various creditors and government agencies, 

and all but one of their insurance providers. 

The Plan creates a §524(g) Asbestos Personal Injury 

Trust (Trust) that assumes the Debtors’ liabilities and is

funded by the Debtors and their parent company. The Plan 

also transfers “all of the Debtors’ rights” under their insurance contracts to the Trust, including “all rights to coverage

and insurance proceeds.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 181a. 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Truck was the Debtors’ primary insurer. It issued policies that covered the Debtors from 1965 through 1983. 

Truck is contractually obligated to defend each covered asbestos personal injury claim and typically indemnify the

Debtors for up to $500,000 per claim. The Debtors have to 

pay a $5,000 deductible per claim, and assist and cooperate

with Truck in defending against the claims. The Plan required the Bankruptcy Court to make a finding that the 

Debtors’ conduct in the bankruptcy proceedings neither violated this assistance-and-cooperation duty nor breached 

any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Plan

Finding).

The Plan treats insured and uninsured claims differently. Insured claims are filed “in the tort system to obtain 

the benefit of [the] insurance coverage.” Id., at 241a. Truck 

has to defend these lawsuits, and if the claimant obtains a 

favorable judgment, the Trust pays the deductible and 

Truck pays up to $500,000 per claim. Uninsured claims, 

however, are submitted directly to the Trust for resolution.

As part of that process, claimants have to identify “all other 

[related] claims” and file a release authorizing the Trust to

obtain documentation from other asbestos trusts about 

other submitted claims. See 2 App. 428–431. These disclosure requirements are intended to reduce fraudulent and 

duplicative claims.1 

Truck was the only party involved in the bankruptcy that 

—————— 1Without these requirements, Truck contends, it can be difficult to 

trace an asbestos injury to a particular exposure or to identify earlier 

claims against other entities. Knowing a claimant’s other exposures and 

claims helps prevent inflated recoveries. The Debtors and Claimants 

contend that Truck was not entitled to these disclosures before bankruptcy and could still obtain them in discovery in the tort system. That 

ignores the practical and legal consequences of the Debtors’ bankruptcy 

petition. See infra, at 14. Indeed, in recent years, “nearly every Section 

524(g) trust has included almost identical fraud-prevention measures to

protect debtors and their insurers.” Brief for Petitioner 10. In any event,

these are merits arguments on which Truck is entitled to be heard. 
 

 

6 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

did not support the Plan. It advanced three main objections. First, and most relevant here, the Plan was not “proposed in good faith,” 11 U. S. C. §1129(a)(3), “because it reflected a collusive agreement between the Debtors and 

claimant representatives,” and did not require “the same 

disclosures and authorizations” for insured and uninsured 

claims, In re Kaiser Gypsum Co., 60 F. 4th 73, 80 (CA4 

2023). This “disparate treatment would expose [Truck] to

millions of dollars in fraudulent tort claims.” Ibid. Second, 

the Plan Finding impermissibly altered Truck’s rights under its insurance policies “by relieving the Debtors of their 

assistance-and-cooperation obligations and by barring

Truck from raising the Debtors’ bankruptcy conduct as a

defense in future coverage disputes.” Ibid. Third, the Trust 

did not comply with various provisions of §524(g), including 

the requirement to “deal equitably with claims and future

demands,” as required by §524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III). 

Following the Bankruptcy Court’s recommendation, the

District Court confirmed the Plan. Relevant here, it concluded that “Truck has limited standing to object to the

Plan solely on the grounds that the Plan is not insurance 

neutral.” In re Kaiser Gypsum Co., 2021 WL 3215102, *27 

(WDNC, July 28, 2021). The court found, however, that the 

Plan was “insurance neutral” because it “neither increase[d] Truck’s obligations nor impair[ed] its prepetition 

contractual rights under the Truck Policies. The Plan 

simply restore[d] Truck to its position immediately prior to

the Petition Date.” Id., at *26. The court also rejected

Truck’s challenge to the Plan Finding because the Plan expressly provided that the Debtors “will continue to fulfill 

their cooperation obligations arising under” the policies. 

Id., at *27. 

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District

Court that Truck was not a “party in interest” under

§1109(b) because the Plan did not “increase [Truck’s] prepetition obligations or impair [Truck’s] pre-petition policy 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

rights.” 60 F. 4th, at 83. In other words, the Plan was “insurance neutral” because it did not “alte[r] Truck’s prebankruptcy ‘quantum of liability’” given that Truck was 

“not entitled” to the “fraud-prevention measures” it sought. 

Id., at 87. The court also concluded that the Plan Finding 

did not alter Truck’s contractual rights and that the Debtors did not “breach their assistance-and-cooperation obligations or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” 

Id., at 84. 

This Court granted certiorari to decide whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is 

a “party in interest” under §1109(b). 601 U. S. ___ (2023).2 

II 

Courts must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a

prospective party has a sufficient stake in reorganization

proceedings to be a “party in interest.” Section 1109(b)’s 

text, context, and history confirm that an insurer such as

Truck with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim

is a “party in interest” because it may be directly and adversely affected by the reorganization plan. 

A 

Section 1109(b) permits any “party in interest” to “appear 

and be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 proceeding.

This text is capacious. To start, §1109(b) provides an illustrative but not exhaustive list of parties in interest. See 

supra, at 3. A common thread uniting the seven listed parties is that each may be directly affected by a reorganization 

plan either because they have a financial interest in the estate’s assets (the debtor, creditor, and equity security 

—————— 2The courts below also addressed whether Truck is a “party in interest” on the separate basis that it is “a creditor.” 11 U. S. C. §1109(b). 

Because this Court holds that Truck is a “party in interest” based on its

insurer status, the Court does not address alternative arguments based

on Truck’s creditor status. 
 

 

 

8 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

holder) or because they represent parties that do (a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a 

trustee, and an indenture trustee). “The general theory behind [§1109(b)] is that anyone holding a direct financial 

stake in the outcome of the case should have an opportunity 

(either directly or through an appropriate representative) 

to participate in the adjudication of any issue that may ultimately shape the disposition of his or her interest.” 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1109.01 (16th ed. 2023). This understanding aligns with this Court’s observation that Congress

uses the phrase “‘party in interest’” in bankruptcy provisions when it intends the provision to apply “broadly.” 

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 

N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 7 (2000) (quoting 11 U. S. C. §502(a)).

The ordinary meaning of the terms “party” and “interest” 

confirms this. “Party” in this context is best understood as 

“[a] person who constitutes or is one of those who compose 

. . . one or [the] other of the two sides in an action or affair;

one concerned in an affair; a participator; as, a party in interest.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1784 (2d

ed. 1949). “Interest” is best understood as “[c]oncern, or the 

state of being concerned or affected, esp[ecially] with respect to advantage, personal or general.” Id., at 1294. The 

plain meaning of the phrase thus refers to entities that are

potentially concerned with or affected by a proceeding.3 

The parties in this case land on roughly this same definition. See Brief for Petitioner 26 (defining “party in interest”

as anyone that may be “‘directly and adversely affected’ by 

—————— 3Legal dictionaries from the time of §1109(b)’s enactment and onward 

similarly define the phrase “party in interest.” See Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 920 (3d ed. 1969) (defining “party in interest” as a “party to an 

action who has an actual interest in the controversy, as distinguished

from a nominal party”); cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 1122 (6th ed. 1990) 

(“Primary meaning ascribed the term ‘party in interest’ in bankruptcy 

cases is one whose pecuniary interest is directly affected by the bankruptcy proceeding”). 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

the reorganization” (alterations omitted)); Brief for DebtorSide Respondents 29 (“To the extent Truck acknowledges

that a ‘party in interest’ under Section 1109(b) is someone 

‘directly and adversely affected by the reorganization,’ the

parties are in violent agreement”); Brief for Claimant Respondents 1 (similar).4 

The historical context and purpose of §1109(b) also support this interpretation. Congress consistently has acted to

promote greater participation in reorganization proceedings. Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, for example, provided debtors the right to be heard on all issues, but 

limited the right of creditors and stockholders to only certain issues. See 11 U. S. C. §207 (1946 ed.). Section 206 of 

the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 broadened participation and 

provided that “[the] debtor, the indenture trustees, and any 

creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the right to 

be heard on all matters arising in a proceeding under this

chapter.” §606. Although the 1938 Act allowed a “party in 

interest” to intervene “for cause shown,” it permitted only 

—————— 4The phrase “party in interest” appears in other statutory contexts. 

The Court’s analysis of the term today does not apply across all other, 

unrelated statutory schemes. The term’s meaning elsewhere will turn

on the text, structure, context, history, and purpose of those statutory

provisions, just as it does here. Still, precedent confirms that this Court’s

interpretation of §1109(b) is not an outlier. See, e.g., Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47, 51–52 (1931) (competitor railroad was a “party in interest” under the Transportation Act

of 1920 because the challenged railroad expansion had the potential to

“directly and adversely affect the complainant’s welfare by bringing 

about some material change in the transportation situation”); L. Singer 

& Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. 295, 304 (1940) (food vendors 

were not a “party in interest” under the Transportation Act of 1920 because a “person engaged in business within or adjacent to a public market” was only “indirectly and consequentially affected” by a railroad 

“seeking only to serve a competing market by means of an extension”); 

Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 19–20 (1942) (railroad companies were “parties in interest” under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 

because they were “directly affected by competition with the motor 

transport industry”). 
 

10 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

the four named parties to intervene as of right. Still, the 

Advisory Committee’s Note to Former Chapter X, Bkrtcy.

Rule 10–210(a) (1976), which implemented §206, noted that

the section “was originally enacted to broaden the practice

that had developed upon former §77 . . . . This broader concept was to insure fair representation and to prevent excessive control over the proceedings by insider groups.” 11 

U. S. C. App., p. 1445 (1976 ed.).

In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code containing §1109(b), which continued the expansion of participatory rights in reorganization proceedings. Congress moved

from an exclusive list to the general and capacious term 

“party in interest,” accompanied by a nonexhaustive list of 

parties in interest. These parties “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue.” 11 U. S. C. §1109(b). “Section 206 . . . and Chapter X Rule 10–210(a), the predecessor 

provisions of section 1109(b) of the Code, constituted an effort to encourage and promote greater participation in reorganization cases. . . . Section 1109(b) continues in this tradition and should be understood in the same way.” In re 

Amatex Corp., 755 F. 2d 1034, 1042 (CA3 1985).

Now consider the purpose of §1109(b). Broad participation promotes a fair and equitable reorganization process. 

The Bankruptcy Code seeks to prevent “the danger inherent in any reorganization plan proposed by a debtor” that 

“the plan will simply turn out to be too good a deal for the

debtor’s owners.” Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. 

Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U. S. 

434, 444 (1999); see also ibid. (discussing Congress’s concern that “‘a few insiders, whether representatives of management or major creditors, [could] use the reorganization 

process to gain an unfair advantage’”). Section 1109(b) addresses this concern. “[D]rafters and early commentators 

hoped that an expansive definition [of “party in interest” in 

§1109(b)] would allow a broad range of individual and mi-
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

nority interests to intervene in Chapter 11 cases, and expressly warned that undue restrictions on who may be a 

party in interest might enable dominant interests to control 

the restructuring process.” D. Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 759, 774–775 (2014).

In short, §1109(b) was “designed to serve . . . the policies of 

inclusion underlying the chapter 11 process.” 7 Collier on 

Bankruptcy ¶1109.02. 

B 

Applying these principles, the Court holds that insurers

such as Truck with financial responsibility for bankruptcy 

claims are parties in interest.

Bankruptcy reorganization proceedings can affect an insurer’s interests in myriad ways. A reorganization plan can

impair an insurer’s contractual right to control settlement

or defend claims. A plan can abrogate an insurer’s right to 

contribution from other insurance carriers. Or, as alleged

here, a plan may be collusive, in violation of the debtor’s

duty to cooperate and assist, and impair the insurer’s financial interests by inviting fraudulent claims. The list goes 

on. See, e.g., Brief for American Property Casualty Insurance Association et al. as Amici Curiae 16–17 (American

Property Brief) (“For example, a plan that purports to maintain an insurer’s coverage defenses could nonetheless allow 

claims at amounts far above their actual value and out of 

line with the claimants’ injuries or the payment of claims

for which little to no proof of injury is required”). An insurer 

with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims can be

directly and adversely affected by the reorganization proceedings in these and many other ways, making it a “party 

in interest” in those proceedings.

Take Truck, for example. Truck will have to pay the vast 

majority of the Trust’s liability—up to $500,000 per claim 

for thousands of covered asbestos-injury claims. The proposed Plan would have Truck stand alone in carrying the 
 

 

 

12 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

financial burden, because the §524(g) channeling injunction

“permanently and forever stay[s], restrain[s] and enjoin[s]”

any action against Debtors, App. to Pet. for Cert. 178a, and 

other “[e]ntities, other than Asbestos Insurers,” id., at 201a. 

According to Truck, however, a plan that lacks the disclosure requirements for the uninsured claims risks exposing

Truck “to millions of dollars in fraudulent tort claims.” 60 

F. 4th, at 80. That potential financial harm—attributable

to Truck’s status as an insurer with financial responsibility 

for bankruptcy claims—gives Truck an interest in bankruptcy proceedings and whatever reorganization plan is

proposed and eventually adopted.

The Government frames Truck’s interest in a slightly different but substantively identical way. According to the 

Government, Truck is a party in interest because it “is a 

party to a contract with the debtor that is property of the 

estate and may be interpreted, assigned, or otherwise affected by the Chapter 11 proceedings.” Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 13. This is just another side of the

same coin. Those executory contracts are the ones that give

insurers an interest in the proceedings and, in this case,

make Truck financially responsible for the bankruptcy

claims. So, whether Truck’s direct interest is framed as its 

executory contracts or instead its obligations resulting from 

those contracts, it cashes out in the same way: Where a proposed plan “allows a party to put its hands into other people’s pockets, the ones with the pockets are entitled to be

fully heard and to have their legitimate objections addressed.” In re Global Indus. Technologies, Inc., 645 F. 3d 

201, 204 (CA3 2011).

This opportunity to be heard is consistent with §1109(b)’s 

purpose. In this case, neither the Debtors nor the Claimants have an incentive to limit the postconfirmation cost of 

defending or paying claims. For the Debtors, the Plan eliminates all of their ongoing liability. The Claimants similarly have little incentive to propose barriers to their ability 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

to recover from Truck. Truck may well be the only entity

with an incentive to identify problems with the Plan. This 

“realignment of the insured’s economic incentives . . . 

makes participation in the bankruptcy by insurers—who

will ultimately be asked to foot the bill for most or all of 

those claims—critical.” American Property Brief 15–16. 

III 

The Court of Appeals looked exclusively to whether the 

Plan altered Truck’s contract rights or its “quantum of liability.” Under this approach, known as the “insurance neutrality” doctrine, courts ask if the plan “increase[s] the insurer’s pre-petition obligations or impair[s] the insurer’s 

pre-petition policy rights.” 60 F. 4th, at 83, 87. This doctrine is conceptually wrong and makes little practical sense. 

Conceptually, the insurance neutrality doctrine conflates

the merits of an objection with the threshold party in interest inquiry. The §1109(b) inquiry asks whether the reorganization proceedings might affect a prospective party, not

how a particular reorganization plan actually affects that 

party. Indeed, §1109(b) cannot “depend on a plan-specific 

rule—that standard would be unusable for the Code provisions empowering a party in interest to request acts unrelated to a specific plan or that occur before a plan is confirmed or even proposed.” Reply Brief 11; see also supra, at 

3 (a party in interest, for example, can file a Chapter 11

plan when a trustee has been appointed or request the appointment and removal of a trustee). Practically, the insurance neutrality doctrine is too limited in its scope. It zooms 

in on the insurer’s prepetition obligations and policy rights. 

That wrongly ignores all the other ways in which bankruptcy proceedings and reorganization plans can alter and 

impose obligations on insurers. See supra, at 11–12. 

In defending the decision below, the Debtors and Claimants contend that Truck faces similar exposure in the tort 

system before and after bankruptcy, in part because Truck 
 

14 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. KAISER GYPSUM CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

was not entitled to the disclosure provisions before the 

bankruptcy. That may be so, but this argument suffers 

from the same flaw identified above—at bottom, it concerns 

the merits of whether the Plan should include the disclosure provisions for insured claims in accordance with

§§524(g) and 1129. See supra, at 5–6 (describing Truck’s 

objections). Whether and how the particular proposed Plan

here affects Truck’s prepetition and postpetition obligations

and exposure is not the question. The fact that Truck’s financial exposure may be directly and adversely affected by 

a plan is sufficient to give Truck (and other insurers with

financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims) a right to 

voice its objections in reorganization proceedings. The 

Debtors’ and Claimants’ argument also ignores the practical and legal consequences of the Debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings and reorganization plan. They transformed the

Debtors’ asbestos liabilities into bankruptcy claims that

Truck will now have to indemnify through the Trust without the protections of disclosure requirements in place for 

uninsured claims filed directly with the Trust.

Finally, in resisting the text of §1109(b), the Debtors emphasize the risk of allowing “‘peripheral parties’ to derail a 

reorganization.” Brief for Debtor-Side Respondents 33. To 

start, a “parade of horribles” argument generally cannot 

“surmount the plain language of the statute.” Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 629 (2009). Moreover, 

§1109(b) provides parties in interest only an opportunity to

be heard—not a vote or a veto in the proceedings.5 In all 

events, the Court today does not opine on the outer bounds 

of §1109. Of course, a party in interest is “not intended to 

—————— 5Bankruptcy courts also have equitable discretion to control participation in a proceeding. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §105(a) (“No provision of [the

Code] providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be

construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or 

making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process”). 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

include literally every conceivable entity that may be involved in or affected by the chapter 11 proceedings.” 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1109.03. There may be difficult cases

that require courts to evaluate whether truly peripheral

parties have a sufficiently direct interest. This case is not 

one of them. Insurers such as Truck with financial responsibility for claims are not peripheral parties. 

* * * 

Section 1109(b) provides parties in interest a voice in

bankruptcy proceedings. An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” that

may object to a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.