IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs May 2, 2017

IN RE LEWIS BONDING COMPANY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-16-205 Donald H. Allen, Judge

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No. W2016-02171-CCA-R3-CD

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The appellant, Lewis Bonding Company, appeals the denial of its “Petition to Allow 

Lewis Bonding Company to Use Real Property as Security Collateral,” arguing the trial 

court abused its discretion by denying the appellant’s request to pledge real property to 

underwrite bonds in lieu of a cash deposit with the clerk of court. The State contends the 

trial court’s denial of the petition was a proper use of its broad discretion to regulate 

bondsmen. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we agree with 

the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN and 

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Joseph T. Howell, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lewis Bonding Company.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jerry Woodall, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

This appeal arises as the result of the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s request 

to use unencumbered real property located at 212 East Main Street, Jackson, Tennessee, 

valued at $120,000.00, as collateral security for bail bonds written in the Twenty-Sixth

Judicial District. In its petition, the appellant argued it has been authorized, without 

incident, to write bail bonds in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District since 1960 and has 

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$80,000.00 deposited with the court clerk as collateral and requested permission from the 

trial court to substitute the real property as collateral in lieu of the cash. 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing in which Daryl Lewis, an owner of 

Lewis Bonding Co., testified he has been writing bonds in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial 

District for fifty-five years and is in good standing with the court and all licensing 

agencies. He understood the local rules require bail bondsmen to post collateral with the 

court and confirmed the appellant had $80,000.00 deposited in the court clerk’s office in 

compliance with that requirement. According to Daryl,

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the appellant wished to 

substitute the cash security with unencumbered real property located at 212 East Main 

Street, Jackson, Tennessee, the office building from which the bond company operated. 

Daryl and his brother, Mr. David Lewis, owned the property. Daryl testified he and 

David would use the $80,000.00 retrieved from the court clerk to pay for building 

renovations.

David Lewis testified next. David confirmed he and his brother wished for the 

trial court to take the unencumbered title to the real estate located at 212 East Main 

Street, Jackson, Tennessee, and place it in the clerk’s office in lieu of the $80,000.00 

currently held by the court clerk as a security deposit. David further confirmed they 

wished to use the $80,000.00 to renovate their office building and, thereby, increase its 

value. If the trial court would accept the unencumbered title as the Tennessee-mandated 

security deposit, then he would happily execute the paperwork necessary to ensure the 

proper security interest vests with the court clerk. 

At the conclusion of their testimony, the trial court required Daryl and David 

Lewis to undergo random drug screenings. Following the screenings, David Presson, a 

probation officer with Madison County Community Corrections, testified as to the 

results. Mr. Presson indicated he performed a ten panel drug screen on both gentlemen, 

and the results were negative for both. 

After receiving the results of the drug screening, the trial court denied the petition, 

stating, “[W]e want bondsmen who are willing to invest their money and their time and 

their resources in the bonding business.” Other local bail bond companies posted the 

requisite cash collateral, so the trial court found the appellant must do the same and could 

only retrieve the $80,000.00 cash collateral if it ceased writing bonds altogether. In its 

written order denying the petition, the trial court stated:

 

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Because this witness has the same last name as David Lewis, who also testified at the evidentiary hearing, 

we refer to both witnesses by their first names. We intend no disrespect.
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After reviewing the [p]etition, hearing the testimony of the [p]etitioners, 

both of whom passed in court drug screens and are licensed to write bail 

bonds in this judicial district, and there being no objection from the State of 

Tennessee, the Court finds that the [p]etition is not appropriate under the 

circumstances and should be denied.

This timely appeal followed. 

Analysis

On appeal, the appellant asserts Tennessee law permits bond companies to pledge, 

as collateral, equity in real estate to the court clerk in the judicial district where the bonds 

will be written, so the trial court erred when denying its petition. The State contends the 

trial court has broad discretion to regulate bail bondsmen operating in its judicial district, 

and the denial of the petition was a proper use of this discretion. Upon our review of the 

submissions of the parties and the pertinent authorities, we agree with the State and 

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court has full authority to determine who should be allowed to make

bonds in its courts. Gilbreath v. Ferguson, 260 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tenn. 1953). It is 

within the inherent power of the trial court to administer its affairs, including the right to 

impose reasonable regulations regarding bail bonds. In re Hitt, 910 S.W.2d 900, 904 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The trial court is given wide discretion in its regulation of bail 

bondsmen, and its actions will not be overturned absent a showing they were capricious, 

arbitrary, or illegal. Taylor v. Waddey, 334 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tenn. 1960). While the 

legislature has adopted statutes addressing bail bondsmen, these statutory requirements 

“do [] not by any stretch of the imagination attempt to cover the whole field of what is 

necessary for a bondsman before he is allowed to make bonds in the various courts.” Id. 

Therefore, the legislature’s enactment of statutes addressing bail bondsmen does not 

interfere with the trial court’s inherent power to regulate the writing of bail bonds in its 

own courts. In re Hitt, 910 S.W.2d at 904.

In jurisdictions, like the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, where a professional 

bondsman uses collateral pledged with the court to underwrite bonds, Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-11-302 provides the bondsman’s capacity shall be determined as 

follows:

(1) Where the collateral pledged is cash, or an item readily converted to 

cash such as a certificate of deposit, the professional bondsman’s capacity 

shall not be less than ten (10) times the amount of collateral pledged;
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(2) Where the collateral pledged is equity in real estate, the professional 

bondsman’s capacity shall be not less than ten (10) times the value of the 

equity pledged as collateral. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-302(e). 

While Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-302(e) contemplates the ability of 

professional bondsmen to pledge equity in real estate as collateral for bail bonds written, 

consistent with its right to regulate the bail bondsmen operating in its courts, the TwentySixth Judicial District by per curiam order has implemented its own additional 

requirements for holding bonding privileges, including the requirements that: 

2) All bonding companies APPROVED AFTER January 1, 2015, must 

deposit a minimum of $75,000.00 cash with the Clerk’s Office for 

the Clerk to hold in an interest bearing account. This applies to all 

bonding companies whether insurance or money backed. All 

insurance backed bonding companies must also supply insurance 

verification which consists of proof of insurance and that the 

company is in compliance with all insurance requirements.

a) All bonding companies must deposit $5,000.00 cash with the 

Clerk’s Office for the Clerk to hold in an interest bearing

account for each bonding agent that writes bonds, other than 

the owner, for their company.

b) The deposited cash shall not be withdrawn or applied to 

satisfy a Final Forfeiture of Judgment. Withdrawal will be 

permitted upon the termination of business and all bail bonds 

paid or exonerated. 

3) A company operating on posted security may write bail bonds up to 

ten (10) times the amount of the security. Security is defined as the 

total amount of cash on deposit with the Circuit Court Clerk. Any 

company utilizing insurance companies having posted the minimum 

cash deposit may be entitled to write bail bonds up to twenty (20) 

times the amount of the security posted with the Circuit Court 

Clerk’s Office.

“[T]he promulgation of the local rules is somewhat analogous to the legislative 

actions and the interpretation and construction of the rules as guided by the rules 

concerning statutory construction.” May v. Woodlawn Memorial Park, Inc., No. M2001-
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02945-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31059223, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2002). When 

interpreting a statute or rule, we look first to the plain language of the rule, giving the 

words their ordinary and plain meaning. See generally Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 

362, 368 (Tenn. 2012). When the meaning of a statute is clear, “[courts] apply the plain 

meaning without complicating the task” and enforce the statute as written. Lind v. 

Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011). “[S]tatues ‘in pari materia’ –

those relating to the same subject or having common purpose – are to be construed 

together, and the construction of one such statute, if doubtful, may be aided by 

considering the words and legislative intent indicated by the language of another statute.” 

Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). 

Courts must adopt the most “reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and 

provides for harmonious operation of the laws.” Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 

34, 35 (Tenn. 1997).

The plain language of the local rules adopted by the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District 

requires bail bonding companies to post cash collateral in the clerk’s office and does not 

include a provision allowing for the posting of unencumbered real property instead. We 

previously determined similar local rules adopted by the Thirtieth Judicial District were 

properly within the province of the trial court’s ability to regulate bondsmen practicing in 

their courts. See In Re A-River City Bail Bond, Inc., No. W2015-01578-CCA-R3-CD, 

2016 WL 7190909, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2016) (concluding “the requirement 

that bonding companies in Shelby County post a minimum of $75,000 in cash or 

certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk applies to all bonding companies 

practicing before courts of record in Shelby County with criminal jurisdiction,” and this 

regulation, which further prohibited the use of real property as collateral, was properly 

within the province of the trial court, thus not arbitrary or capricious). We reach the same 

conclusion here. 

The trial court is given wide discretion in its regulation of bail bondsmen, and its 

actions will not be overturned absent a showing they were arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 

No such showing has been made here. Tennessee law permits court clerks to accept 

equity in real property as collateral from bail bondsmen, but it does not require it. Here, 

the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District has elected to accept only cash collateral from bail 

bondsmen, and it was properly within its authority to do so. The appellant is not entitled 

to relief on this issue.

 

Conclusion

Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and the foregoing analysis, we affirm 

the judgment of the trial court.
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 J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE