UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

SILAS WILSON, JR., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

KEITH C. REID, individually and official 

capacity, Tulsa Police Officer; CHUCK 

JORDAN, individually and official 

capacity, Chief of Police Tulsa Police 

Department; G. T. BYNUM, individually 

and official capacity, Mayor of City of 

Tulsa; SALLY HOWE SMITH, 

individually and official capacity, (former) 

Court Clerk Tulsa County; DON 

NEWBERRY, individually and official 

capacity, Court Clerk Tulsa County; FNU 

LNU, individually and official capacity, 

Unknown Deputy Court Clerks; 

STANLEY GLANTZ; GERALD M. 

BENDER; G. CHRIS BENGE; TULSA 

COUNTY; CITY OF TULSA; 

OKLAHOMA SECRETARY OF STATE, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 19-5017 

(D.C. Nos. 1:18-CV-374 JED-JFJ 

and 4:18-CV-00374-JED-JFJ) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 * Oral argument would not materially help us to decide this appeal. We 

have thus decided the appeal based on the appellate briefs and the record 

on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

 This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

FILED 

United States Court of 

Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 8, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

FILED 

United States Court of 

Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 8, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for damages, an injunction, and a declaratory judgment. In his pro se 

complaint, Mr. Silas Wilson, Jr. alleges that he was illegally detained prior 

to trial because of an affidavit containing a forged signature. Mr. Wilson 

also alleges that 

 city and county officials failed to investigate the alleged 

forgery and interfered with his right to petition for an 

investigation and 

 county officials refused to provide him with public records 

relating to his arrest. 

According to Mr. Wilson, these actions violated his rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection and due-process clauses. 

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding 

that Mr. Wilson had not alleged constitutional violations.1

 We affirm. 

 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if 

otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

1

 The district court relied not only on the absence of a constitutional 

violation but also on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the 

Supreme Court held that courts must dismiss § 1983 suits brought by state 

prisoners when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. 

 As Mr. Wilson points out, the Supreme Court has stated that an

illegal detention does not void a subsequent conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh, 
3 

I. We conduct de novo review of the district court’s dismissal.

 When a district court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a 

valid claim, our review is de novo.2 Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1264 

(10th Cir. 2013). Under de novo review, we liberally construe a pro se 

complaint. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007). For a pro 

se complaint, the district court can dismiss with prejudice for failure to 

state a claim if 

 the alleged facts are obviously insufficient to allow the 

plaintiff to prevail and 

 any further opportunity to amend would be futile. 

Id. at 1217. 

II. The district court properly dismissed Mr. Wilson’s claims 

stemming from his allegedly illegal detention. 

In his appeal brief, Mr. Wilson argues that the district court 

misinterpreted his complaint as alleging that 

 he was arrested pursuant to a warrant and 

 the allegedly forged affidavit supported the warrant. 

 

420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975). But we need not decide whether Heck would bar 

Mr. Wilson’s claims. 

2

 We deny Mr. Wilson’s motion to supplement the record. In this

motion, Mr. Wilson lists factual allegations allegedly misstated or 

misrepresented by the district court. But the proposed supplementation 

would not affect our decision. 
4 

According to Mr. Wilson, the district court’s misinterpretation of his 

factual allegations resulted in the erroneous dismissal of his illegaldetention claim. 

The district court apparently did misunderstand Mr. Wilson’s factual 

allegations. In the complaint, Mr. Wilson alleges that he was arrested 

“without a warrant.” Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 18 at 5; see also id. at 13 (referring 

to his “warrantless arrest”). Mr. Wilson also alleges that the affidavit 

served as the basis for his allegedly illegal detention. In Mr. Wilson’s 

view, the detention was illegal because a signature on the affidavit had 

been forged. 

As we understand Mr. Wilson’s factual allegations, the affidavit 

caused his detention before the legal process had begun. A claim for 

unlawful detention prior to the institution of legal process is a Fourth 

Amendment false-imprisonment claim. See Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 

F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The period of time between an unlawful 

arrest and the institution of legal process forms on constitutional claim, 

arising under the Fourth Amendment.”). So the district court interpreted 

Mr. Wilson’s complaint as potentially raising a false-imprisonment claim 

under the Fourth Amendment. But in his appeal brief, Mr. Wilson states in 

several places that the district court misconstrued his allegations by 

treating his complaint as potentially raising such a claim. These parts of 

Mr. Wilson’s appeal brief appear to disavow a Fourth Amendment claim. 
5 

 Elsewhere, however, Mr. Wilson contends that his factual allegations 

do state a Fourth Amendment claim. Given this contention, we consider the 

possibility that Mr. Wilson may be intending to assert a Fourth Amendment 

claim. 

 We conclude that if he is intending to assert a Fourth Amendment 

claim, it would have been untimely. A Fourth Amendment falseimprisonment claim accrues when an existing legal process caused the 

imprisonment. Mondragon, 519 F.3d at 1083. Legal process is instituted, 

for example, when a person is arraigned or bound over for trial. Wallace v. 

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). 

At the latest, legal process justifying the imprisonment was instituted 

on May 11, 2012 (when Mr. Wilson was arraigned). State of Oklahoma v. 

Silas Wilson Jr., No. CF-2012-1979. From this date, Mr. Wilson had two 

years to bring his false-imprisonment claim.3

 But Mr. Wilson began the 

suit on June 15, 2018—over six years after his arraignment. Thus, a Fourth 

Amendment claim for false-imprisonment would have been untimely. 

 3

 The statute of limitations for such claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 “is dictated by the personal injury statute of limitations in the state 

in which the claim arose.” McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th 

Cir. 2011). In this case, the claim arose in Oklahoma, which has a two-year 

limitations period for personal-injury claims. 12 Okla. Stat. tit. 12, 

§ 95(A)(3); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988).
6 

We thus conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. 

Wilson’s claim of illegal detention. 

III. Mr. Wilson failed to adequately brief his remaining appellate 

arguments. 

 For the remainder of his appellate arguments, Mr. Wilson relies 

solely on his incorporation of a motion that he filed in the district court. In 

our circuit, however, a party may not incorporate materials that had been 

filed in district court.4 See 10th Cir. Rule 28.3(B) (2019) (“Incorporating 

by reference portions of lower court or agency briefs or pleadings is 

disapproved and does not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 28(a) and (b).”); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, 

Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 623–24 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the use of 

incorporation by reference in appellate briefs). Mr. Wilson’s pro se status 

does not excuse his failure to comply with this rule. See Wardell v. 

Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 964 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the plaintiff’s 

pro se status did not exempt him from adherence to the rule against 

 4

 We have explained that “[a]llowing litigants to adopt district court 

filings would provide an effective means of circumventing the page 

limitations on briefs set forth in the appellate rules and unnecessarily 

complicate the task of an appellate judge.” Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 

USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 
7 

incorporation by reference). Mr. Wilson’s remaining appellate arguments 

are thus waived for inadequate briefing. Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d at 624. 

IV. Amendment would be futile.

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Because 

Mr. Wilson was acting pro se, dismissal with prejudice was appropriate 

only if amendment would have been futile. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 

1217 (10th Cir. 2007). 

 Based on Mr. Wilson’s preserved appellate arguments, we conclude 

that amendment would have been futile. His only preserved argument 

relates to his detention before the institution of legal process. This claim is 

a Fourth Amendment false-imprisonment claim. But even if Mr. Wilson has 

not disavowed such a claim, it would have been time-barred. See p. 5, 

above. Thus, amendment of the complaint would have been futile.

 Affirmed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Robert E. Bacharach 

 Circuit Judge