NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION 

Dangers of a Nuclear No First Use Policy

Longstanding U.S. Declaratory Policy

In the many decades that U.S. nuclear forces have

deterred adversaries and assured allies and 

partners, the U.S. has never adopted a policy 

declaring it would not use nuclear weapons first in 

a conflict. Today, the U.S. continues its 

longstanding policy of retaining some degree of 

ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that 

might lead to a U.S. nuclear response.

Within the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) process, 

every recent U.S. administration has examined 

whether and how U.S. nuclear declaratory policy should change. The 2018 NPR is consistent with NPRs conducted 

by previous administrations in rejecting a no first use policy and notes that “the United States would only consider 

the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its 

allies, and partners.” Given the significant deterioration in the international security and nuclear threat environment 

since the previous 2010 NPR, a no first use policy remains unjustified. 

No First Use Could Invite Attack or Coercion

Advocates argue that a U.S. no first use policy would reduce the risk of nuclear war. However, adoption of such a 

policy could increase the likelihood of devastating conflict, including one that escalates to nuclear war, by 

incentivizing non-nuclear strategic attack on, and coercion of, the U.S. or our allies and partners. Such a policy may 

change how adversaries and allies view the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and our resolve to use it when 

our vital interests are threatened. Operational scenarios exist in which the U.S. would consider first use. 

Retaining a degree of ambiguity and refraining from a no first use policy creates uncertainty in the mind of potential 

adversaries and reinforces deterrence of aggression by ensuring adversaries cannot predict what specific actions 

will lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Implementing a no first use policy could undermine the U.S. ability to deter 

Russian, Chinese, and North Korean aggression, especially with respect to their growing capability to carry out nonnuclear strategic attacks.

Concerns of Allies and Partners

From their inception, U.S. alliances with NATO, Japan, and South Korea have depended upon U.S. extended nuclear 

deterrence. A U.S. no first use policy would be deeply concerning to many of our allies and partners. Such a policy 

could undermine these relationships by suggesting the U.S. would not use the full means at its disposal to deter 

and respond to devastating, non-nuclear strategic attacks on our allies and partners—and could even incentivize 

U.S. allies and partners to pursue their own nuclear forces. 

“The U.S. should retain calculated ambiguity as an 

element of its nuclear declaratory policy...calculated 

ambiguity creates uncertainty in the mind of a potential 

aggressor about just how the U.S. might respond to an 

act of aggression, and this ought to reinforce restraint 

and caution on the part of that potential aggressor...

[The U.S.] should not abandon calculated ambiguity by 

adopting a policy of no first use.” 

– Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States, 2009