RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-4101-17T2

 A-4103-17T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.S. AND J.C.,

Defendants-Appellants.

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF G.C. 

and M.C.,

Minors.

Argued January 22, 2019 – Decided February 14, 2019

Before Judges Messano and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FG-02-0034-17.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, Designated Counsel, argued 

the cause for appellant J.S. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, on the 

briefs).

Mark E. Kleiman, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant J.C. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Mark E. Kleiman, on the briefs).

Natasha C. Fitzsimmons, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, 

Attorney General, attorney; Jason W. Rockwell, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Natasha C. 

Fitzsimmons, on the brief).

Toya Davis, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for 

minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney; Toya Davis, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, defendants J.S. (mother) and J.C. (father) 

appeal from an April 27, 2018 judgment terminating their parental rights to two 

of their biological children, G.C., born in October 2014, and M.C., born in 

December 2015, and granting guardianship of the children to the Division of 

Child Protection and Permanency (Division). Defendants contend the Division 

failed to prove all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing 

evidence. The Law Guardian supports the termination on appeal as it did before 

the trial court. 
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In a comprehensive seventy-six-page written opinion, Judge William R. 

DeLorenzo, Jr. found the Division satisfied the four-prong test by clear and 

convincing evidence, and held that termination was in the children's best 

interests. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999). Based on 

our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied the evidence in 

favor of the guardianship petition adequately supports the termination of 

defendants' parental rights. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 

189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (holding that a reviewing court should uphold the 

factual findings regarding the termination of parental rights if they are supported 

by substantial and credible evidence in the record as a whole). Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

I.

The guardianship trial spanned four days in November and December 

2017. The Division moved into evidence more than forty documents and 

presented testimony from two caseworkers and a licensed psychologist, Frank 

J. Dyer, Ph.D. Defendants did not testify, but J.S. presented the testimony of 

her mother, T.S.

The evidence adduced at the trial is set forth at length in Judge 

DeLorenzo's opinion and need not be repeated in the same level of detail here. 
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Instead, we incorporate by reference the judge's thorough factual findings and 

recount the most significant evidence to lend context to the judge's legal 

conclusions. 

The precipitating event that led to the guardianship complaint involved 

J.C. and N.P., the then six-year-old biological son of J.S. At that time, the 

household was comprised of J.C., J.S., T.S., N.P., and D.S., the then seven-yearold biological son of J.S.1

 G.C., then three months old also resided in the home; 

M.C. was not yet born.

Specifically, in January 2015, the Division received a referral, reporting 

N.P. arrived at school with bruises on his head, back, and arms. N.P. told the 

school nurse that his "stepdad" caused the injuries. During a follow-up 

interview with the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO), N.P. explained 

that "he was supposed to get ready for school and instead he was playing around 

. . . [when J.C.] told him to shut his mouth, threw him in the closet, dragged him 

 

1 During the pendency of the present proceedings, N.P. and D.S. were placed in 

the custody of their respective biological fathers. At oral argument before us, 

counsel advised that N.P. remains in the sole custody of his father, and D.S. is 

in the custody of the Division, which has filed guardianship proceedings on his 

behalf. N.P., D.S., and their biological fathers are not parties to this appeal. J.C. 

is the biological father of four older children, all of whom are in their biological 

mothers' custody, and also are not parties to this appeal. 
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out of the closet onto the floor . . . [and] threw him toward the bunk beds[,]" 

causing N.P. to hit his head. J.C. was arrested and charged with second-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).2

The following day, J.S. contacted the BCPO, claiming N.P. recanted his 

statement. J.S. told Division workers that "[N.P. had] lied and by him [now] 

telling the truth [J.C.] can get released [from jail]." However, during his second 

statement to the BCPO, N.P. maintained that J.C. caused his injuries. 

Thereafter, the Division implemented a safety protection plan (SPP) 

restraining J.C. from unsupervised contact with G.C. and D.S. Because J.C. had 

been ordered to refrain from contact with N.P. in the criminal proceedings, N.P. 

was not included in the SPP. Notwithstanding the no-contact provisions, J.S. 

 

2 According to a Division report, in January 2017, defendant pled guilty to 

"child endangerment and abandonment" and was sentenced to a probationary 

term of one year. However, the judgment of conviction was not entered in 

evidence at the guardianship trial and, as such, is not contained in the appellate 

record. Notwithstanding his guilty plea, defendant maintained his innocence 

throughout the guardianship proceedings, claiming he pled guilty to a lesser 

offense to avoid risking a lengthy prison sentence if convicted at trial, and 

thereby losing "his babies[,]" G.C. and M.C.
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permitted J.C. into the home on several occasions, prompting the Division to 

conduct a Dodd removal3 of N.P., D.S. and G.C. 

Nine months later, J.S. gave birth to M.C., but declined to provide the 

hospital with any information concerning the child's father. J.S. initially 

informed the Division she was acting as a surrogate for a friend, but later 

acknowledged the possibility that J.C. was M.C.'s father. The Division executed 

a Dodd removal of M.C. the day after her birth, and was granted custody 

following a hearing on December 22, 2015. DNA testing determined J.C. is 

M.C.'s father. 

During the ensuing months, the Division provided a multitude of services 

to both defendants, including parenting classes, mental health evaluations and 

treatment, and supervised parenting time. Indeed, for seven months, the judge 

who conducted the Title Nine abuse and neglect proceedings rejected the 

Division's permanency plan to ensure proper services were provided to J.S. 

Although defendants availed themselves of services, they were unable to 

eliminate the risk of harm to G.C. and M.C. Thereafter, the Title Nine judge 

 

3 A Dodd removal is an emergent removal of a minor without a court order 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82, known as the Dodd Act. N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011).
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approved the Division's plan for permanency, and the Division filed a complaint 

for guardianship on October 24, 2016. 

Based on the evidence adduced at the guardianship trial, Judge DeLorenzo 

aptly analyzed each prong of the best interests test, and gave careful attention to 

the importance of permanency and stability for the children. In doing so, the 

judge made detailed credibility findings, determining the Division's witnesses 

were believable. In particular, the judge credited the expert opinion of Dr. Dyer, 

who performed the psychological evaluations of J.S. and J.C. and bonding 

evaluations of the children with defendants and their resource parent. 

Conversely, the judge determined T.S., who opined that J.S. was capable of 

safely and properly caring for her children, was clearly biased in favor of her 

daughter. Ultimately, the judge concluded it was in the best interests of G.C. 

and M.C. to terminate defendants' parental rights. These appeals followed.

II.

It is well settled that parents have a fundamental right to raise their 

children, and that right is constitutionally protected. N.J. Div. of Youth &

Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). "[T]erminations should be 

granted sparingly and with great caution because they irretrievably impair 

imperative constitutionally-protected liberty interests and scores of centuries of 
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societal family constructs." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 

N.J. 527, 553 (2014) (citation omitted). However, a parent's rights are not 

absolute. Ibid. "Because of its parens patriae responsibility, the State may 

terminate parental rights if the child is at risk of serious physical or emotional 

harm or when necessary to protect the child's best interests." Id. at 553-54 

(citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986)). 

In order for the court to terminate parental rights, the Division must satisfy 

the following four prongs of the "best interests of the child" test by clear and 

convincing evidence: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child; 

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and 
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(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4).] 

The four prongs are not independent of one another. Rather, they "are 

interrelated and overlapping[,] . . . designed to identify and assess what may be 

necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the child." State, Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006). 

Parental fitness is the crucial issue. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. Determinations of 

parental fitness are very fact sensitive and require specific evidence. Ibid. 

Ultimately, "the purpose of termination is always to effectuate the best interests 

of the child, not the punishment of the parent." Id. at 350. 

Our appellate review of Judge DeLorenzo's decision is limited. R.G., 217 

N.J. at 552. We are bound to accept his factual findings, as long as they are 

"supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Ibid. (citing N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). Additionally, 

we accord his decision particular deference "[b]ecause of the family courts' 

special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," and because the judge was 

uniquely in a position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998). However, we review the trial court's legal 

interpretations de novo. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552-53. 
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Having reviewed the record in light of those legal standards, we conclude 

Judge DeLorenzo's factual findings are supported by substantial credible 

evidence in the record, and the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are 

indisputable. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 

448-49 (2012). Consequently, we are obligated to defer to his findings. Ibid. 

We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge in his 

well-reasoned opinion. We add only the following comments, addressing those 

arguments that are pertinent to these appeals. 

We first consider defendants' overlapping arguments that the judge's 

findings were insufficient to establish the first prong of the best interests test. 

In particular, J.S. contends she did not cause her children any actual harm, and 

J.C.'s conduct against N.P. was an "isolated incident." J.C., in turn, argues that, 

in determining J.C. engaged in excessive corporal punishment of N.P., the judge 

improperly relied on the findings by the judge in the Title Nine action, which 

only required proof by the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. He 

maintains N.P. did not sustain injuries to support a finding of excessive corporal 

punishment. 

Defendants' focus on the "actual harm" component of prong one is 

misplaced. Indeed, it is well settled that the Division need not demonstrate 
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actual harm to satisfy prong one. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 

344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001). The focus under the first prong is 

not on any "single or isolated harm," but rather on "the effect of harms arising 

from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's health and 

development." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348 (citing A.W., 103 N.J. at 604-10). The 

harm may be established by "a delay in establishing a stable and permanent 

home." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999). 

As the judge aptly recognized here, "the safety, health and development 

of the children [were] endangered at the time of their removal by the Division 

and will continue to be endangered as a result of the failure by . . . [d]efendant[s]

. . . to remediate their parental deficits." The judge's determination was therefore 

grounded in defendants' inability to provide a safe, stable and permanent home 

for G.C. and M.C. The record evidence supports the judge's conclusion.

As to J.S., the judge cited Dr. Dyer's opinion that J.S.'s pattern of 

deceptive behavior, lack of insight into her children's needs, and 

"subordinat[ing] her interest, and those of the children, to J.C.['s] . . . present[ed] 

a risk of future harm to the children." For example, J.S. permitted J.C. into the 

family home in violation of court-ordered no-contact provisions, attempted to 
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influence N.P. to recant his statement about J.C.'s abuse, and lied about 

surrogating M.C. for a friend. 

As to J.C., the judge properly relied on Dr. Dyer's opinion that J.C. "posed 

a risk to the children due to his paranoid and antisocial behaviors coupled with 

his low threshold for aggressive behavior." Dr. Dyer's opinion was soundly 

supported by J.C.'s refusal to accept responsibility for injuring N.P., despite his 

guilty plea, and J.C.'s refusal to acknowledge his anger management issues and 

his need for psychotherapy. Indeed, J.C. acknowledged

that he has a history of incarceration for violent 

offenses including a "threat to kill" in 2006 for which 

he served three years in prison, a simple assault and 

disorderly persons act in 2000 as well as [a] domestic 

violence incident for which he attended anger 

management services. J.C. also served a seven[-]year 

prison term for assaulting his girlfriend at the time. 

Accordingly, Dr. Dyer concluded, "In light of [J.C.'s] lengthy history of

physically aggressive and erratic behavior, his poor response to previous 

psychological and psychiatric services, and his adamant denial of any need for 

treatment, his prognosis for positive change is regarded as extremely poor." 

Further, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support 

the judge's finding that J.C. engaged in excessive corporal punishment of N.P. 

In particular, then six-year-old N.P. gave two consistent statements to the 
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BCPO, despite J.S.'s attempts to persuade him to change his account. That 

account was corroborated by physical manifestations of injury to the child. Nor 

are we persuaded by J.C.'s argument that he pled guilty to child endangerment 

on pragmatic grounds where, as here, the record is devoid of any evidence that 

he challenged his conviction by filing a motion to vacate his guilty plea, a postconviction relief petition, or an appeal of his conviction. 

We next consider J.S.'s argument that she availed herself of services, 

enabling her to provide a safe and stable home for the children. To support her 

contention, she claims the trial judge erroneously attributed greater weight to 

Dr. Dyer's opinions than to the findings of her therapist, Jeremy Sacher, a 

licensed clinical social worker.

It is undisputed that defendants engaged in services provided by the 

Division. Indeed, the Division's permanency plan initially was rejected by the 

judge in the Title Nine action on multiple return dates, thus affording J.S. "the 

benefit of approximately seven months of additional therapeutic and psychiatric 

services" that were tailored to her cognitive limitations. Relying on Dr. Dyer's 

unrefuted expert testimony and his thirty-two page comprehensive evaluation of 

the family, Judge DeLorenzo determined J.S. failed to sufficiently benefit from 

those services. Because J.S. was unable to "acquire insight" and "grasp the 
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essential issues" in therapy, Dr. Dyer determined her prognosis for positive 

change in her parenting ability was "poor." 

Conversely, Sacher, who did not testify at trial, provided brief one-page 

updates to the Division during the course of J.S.'s treatment. For example, six 

months after the guardianship complaint was filed, Sacher indicated J.S. "is now 

able to see that her children's well[-]being is of the utmost importance." 

However, his update provided no indication that it would be safe to return the 

children to J.S. Further, J.S.'s treatment with Sacher was inconsistent: within 

three months of that report, Sacher closed J.S.'s file for failure to attend sessions, 

although she later resumed therapy. 

Finally, J.C. contends the Division failed to properly consider his aunt and 

uncle (M family) as a source of placement for the children. Although the M 

family was committed to adopting G.C.,4they did not complete the licensing 

process. In February 2016, the Division closed its file, but failed to send a 

formal "rule out" letter to the M family, advising them of their noncompliance 

with the required home study. Accordingly, Judge DeLorenzo acknowledged 

the Division deprived the M family "of the opportunity to have the Division 

 

4 When the M family was first named as a resource, M.C. was not yet born. It 

is unclear from the record whether their visits with the children were limited to 

G.C. 
15 A-4101-17T2

review its actions." However, the Division's admitted failure to issue a rule-out 

letter, see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(b), does not warrant jeopardizing the safety of 

the children or their entitlement to permanency without further delay. See N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568, 581 (App. Div. 

2011) ("Delay of permanency or reversal of termination based on the Division's 

noncompliance with its statutory obligations is warranted only when it is in the 

best interests of the child."). 

Affirmed.