P urs uan t t o Fed eral Ru le o f Ap pel lat e P roce du re 43 (c)(2 ), A tt orn ey Gen eral Mi chael B. 1 Muka se y is a uto matic a lly

su bs tit ute d f or fo rm e r A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l A lbe rt o R. Go nza le s a s a responde nt in this case . 07
- 07 56
- ag Ll anos - Fer nan dez v
. M uk as ey 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 3

_______________ 4 5 August Term, 2007 6 7 Argued: J anuar

y 10, 2008 Dec ided: J uly 22, 2008 8 L ast supplemental brie f filed: May 20, 2008 9 10 Docke t No. 07-0756-a g 11

_______________ 12 13 14 E DI S ON I GNAC I O L L ANOS -F ER NAN DEZ , 15 Petitioner , 16 17 —v.— 18 19 M I CH A EL B. M UKAS EY , A TTORN EY G ENERAL OF THE U NI TED S TA TES , M I CH A EL C H ER T O FF , 1 20 S EC RE T A RY O F U NI TED S T A T ES D EP A RT M EN T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY , 21 Re sp on de nts . 22

_______________ 23 24 B e f o r e : 25 S TR AUB , W ES L EY , and L I VI NGS TON , 26 Circuit Judges
. 27

_______________ 28 Petitioner Edison I g nacio L lanos-F erna ndez petitions for review

of an or der of

the B oard 29 of Immigration Appeals af firming an Immigration J udg e’s de cision denying L lanos-F erna ndez’s 30 motion to reopen his remova l proce eding s. L lanos-F erna ndez, who was four

teen year s old at the 31 time he enter ed the United States, w as orde red r emoved in a bs e nti a afte r he f ailed to appe ar f

or 32 his imm ig ratio n p ro c e e din g s. He argue s th a t hi s c a se sh ou ld b e re op e ne d a nd his in a bs e nti a 33 order

resc inded pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (5)( C)(ii) and 8 C.F .R. § 1003.23(b)(4) (iii)(A)( 2) 34 beca

use his uncle, into whose c ustody he had be en re lease d, was not ser ved with the notice of 35 hear ing. T he petition for r eview is GRANT ED. 36

_________________________________2 1 KEV I N E. D EH GHANI , New H aven, CT, for Petitioner
. 2 3 J EF F ER Y R. L EIS T , Attorney (Peter D . Keisler, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, Civil Divisi on, 4 David V. B erna l, Assistant Director, on the brief ), Of fi c e of I mmi g ratio n L iti g a tio n, U. S. 5 Depa

rtment of Just ice, Washing ton, D.C., for Re sp on de nts . 6

_________________________________ 7 P ER C UR I AM : 8 Petitioner Edison I g nacio L lanos-F erna ndez petitions for review

of a January

30, 2007 9 order

of the B oard of

I mmigration Appeals (“ BIA”) aff irming a J uly 17, 2006 decision of 10 I mmi g ratio n Jud g e (“ I J”) Mic ha e l W. St ra us de nying

L lano s- F e rn a

nd e z’s mot ion

to r e op e n h is 11 re mov a l pr oc e e din g s and re sc ind his in absentia remova l order. In reEd iso n I gn ac io L lan os 12 Fernandez , No. A 77 667 913 (B I A J an. 30, 2007), aff’g No. A 77 667 913 (Immig. Ct. Hartf ord 13 J uly

17, 2006). F or the followingrea sons, we g rant the pe tition for review . The de cision of the 14 B I A i s v a c a te d, and the c a se is r e mand e d to the B I A f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s 15 opinion. 16 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND 17 L lanos-F erna ndez, a native a

nd citizen of Ecuador , was take n into custody by 18 immigration authorities on Dece mber 13, 1999, a fter ha ving e ntere d the United States without 19 ins pe c tio n. On

De c e mbe r 1 4, 19 99 , L lano s- F e rn and e z, th e n f ourt e e n y e a

rs old , w a s p e rs on a lly 20 se rv e d w itha

no tic e to a

pp e ar ( “ NT A” ) a

t a date and tim e “ TO B E SE T. ” Th a t sa me da y , L lano s21 Fe rnande z was relea sed into the custody of his uncle, Segundo Bosc o Fe rnande z Bautista, a 22 United States citizen, who completed a nd signe d a “Q uestionnaire f or Applica

nts SeekingIn Reno v . Flores , 507 U.S. 292 (1993), the United States Supre me Court held that the 2 imm ig ratio n r e g ulatio n p e rm itt ingde ta ine d juve nil e a lie ns to b e re le a se d o nly to t he ir pa re nts , close re latives, or leg al guardia ns, except in unusual and compellingcirc umstances, did not violate principles of

substantive or proc edura l due proc ess, and that the r egulation was within the scope of the Attorney

Gene ral’s statutory

discretion to continue c ustody over a rre sted aliens. Id
. at 315. On Marc h 1, 2003, the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service was re constituted as the

3 Bur eau of I mmigration and Customs Enforc ement and the Bur eau of U.S. Cit izenship and I mmigration Services, both within the Depa rtment of Homela

nd Security
. See M

onter v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 546, 548 n.1 ( 2d Cir. 2005). 3 1 Cus tod

y of Juve nil e s Purs ua

nt t o F lor e s, e t a l. v s. Re no .” In th is q ue sti onna ir e , L lano s- 2 2 Fe rnande z’s uncle ag ree d, inte r a lia , t o “e n s ure th e m i n o r’ s p re s en ce atal l fu t ure p ro ce ed i n gs 3 befor e the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service and the Immigration court,” to “notify the 4 I mmigration and Natura liz ation Service of any addre ss chang e within 5 day s of a move,” to “not 5 tr ans fe r [the ] min or ’s c us tod y [wit ho ut] wri tte n p e rm iss ion

fr om t he Di str ic t D ir e c tor ,” and to 6 “pre sent the juvenile be fore the offic ers or ag ents of the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service 7 and/or be fore the Executive Off ice f or Immigration Review for a ny court he aring .” 3 8 On J une 14, 2000, a notice of hea ringwas ser

ved by mail on L lanos-F erna

ndez. The 9 notice indicate d that a “MA STER hearing ” had be en set for November

21, 2000. I t is undisput ed 1 0 th atL l an o s -F ern an d ez ’s un cl e w as n o ts erv edwi thei th er th e N T A o r t h e n o t i ce o f h ea ri n g. 11 L lano s- F e rn and e z fa ile d to a pp e ar at th e he ari ng , a

nd on No ve mbe r 2 1, 20 00 , th e I J ord e re d h im 12 remove d to Ecuador
. 13 On May

5, 2006, two day s shy

of his twenty -first birthday , L lanos-F erna ndez filed a 14 motion to reopen his remova l proce eding s and re scind the in a bs e nti a remova l order on the 15 g round that he did not re ceive proper notice of his hea

ringdate. He argued that bec ause he was4 1 only

fiftee n y ear s old at the time the notice of he aringwas issued, his uncle should have bee n 2 serve d with the notice of he aringas we ll. The I J acknow ledg ed that the Ninth Circuit’s dec ision 3 in Flor es- Cha v e

z v . A sh c ro

ft , 362 F.3d 1150 ( 9th Cir. 2004), supported L lanos-F erna ndez’s 4 position; never

theless, on J uly

17, 2006, the I J denied the motion, re asoningthat the immigration 5 court wa s “not bound by the Ninth Circuit decision,” a nd that the re g ulations are “ very clea r” that 6 “[s] ervic e of notice to the custodial adult of a minor is only require d in situations when the minor 7 is und e r 1 4 y e ars of a g e .” B y or de r d a te d Jan

ua ry 30 , 2 00 7, the B I A a ff

ir me d th e I J’s d e c isi on

in 8 an unp ub lis he d p e r c ur iam de c isi on signe d b y

on e me mbe r o f t

he B oa rd . T he B I A a g re e d w ith 9 the I J that Flores-Chave z “should [not] be adopte d in the Second Circuit,” a nd that “the 10 protec tion for minors under the ag e of f ourtee n should [ not] be extended until they are eig hteen.” 11 L lano s- F e rn and e z fi le d a tim e ly pe tit ion fo r r e vie w i n th is C ourt . 12 DISCUSSIO N 13 Under

the well-known principles of Che v ro n, U. S. A. , I nc . v . Na tural R eso urc es D e fe ns e 14 Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837 (1984), if a statute is clear

on its face , we “ must give e ffe ct to the 15 unambig uously

expressed intent of Cong ress.” Fu lan i v . FCC , 49 F.3d 904, 910 ( 2d Cir. 1995) 1 6 (q u o t i n g Chevron , 4 67 U. S. at 84 2- 43 ). I f, ho we ve r, “ the statut e is s ile nt o r a mbi g uo us wi th 17 respe ct to the spec ific issue, the que stion for the cour t is whether the a g ency ’s answe r is based on 18 a per

missibl e construc tion of the statute.” Id
. (q u o t i n g Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843). “The 19 [age ncy ]’s int erpr etations of ambiguous provisions of the [I mmigration and Nationality Act] are 20 owed substantial def ere nce unle ss ‘arbitra

ry , capr icious, or manife stly contra ry to the statute.’” 21 Mardones v . McElroy , 1 9 7 F. 3 d 6 1 9 , 6 2 4 (2 d

C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Chevron , 467 U.S. at 844).5 1 Wit h respe ct to regulations, the ag ency ’s interpre tations are a lso entitled to defer ence and ar e 2 “contr olling unless plainly err oneous or inconsistent with the re g ulation.” Auer v. R obbins , 519 3 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). 4 In most cases, a motion to reopen re moval proce eding s must be filed within 90 day s after 5 the final orde r of r emoval is enter ed, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c )(7) (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c )(2) ; 6 howeve r, pursua

nt to 8 U.S.C . § 1229a(b) (5)( C)(ii), an in absentia remova l order “ may be 7 resc inded . . . upon a motion to reope n filed at a ny time if the alien de monstrates that the a lien 8 did not rece ive notice in ac corda nce w ith” the Immigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”)
. Se e als o 9 8 C
. F. R
. § 1 0 0 3
. 2 3 (b )( 4 )( i i i )( A) (2 ) ( “A no rd er en t er edi nab s en t i a i nd ep o rt at i o np ro ce ed i n gs 10 may

be re scinded . . . upon a

motion to reopen filed . . . [a]t any time if the alien de monstrates 11 that he or she did not rece ive notice . . . .” ). 12 The I

NA re quires that the NT A “sha ll be g iven in person to the a lien (or, if pe rsonal 13 service is not practica ble, throug h service by

mail to the alien or to the a lien’s counse l of rec ord, 14 if any ). ” 8 U .S. C. § 12 29 (a )( 1) . T he statut e is s ile nt w ithre sp e c t to se rv ic e up on min or s; 15 howeve r, the c orre sponding r egulations provide that “[i] f the re spondent is . . . a minor under the 16 ag e of 14, the notice to appe ar . . . sha ll be serve d . . . upon the per son or per sons specified by 17 § 1 03 .5 a (c ) o f t

his c ha pte r. ” 8 C. F .R. § 2 36 .2 (a ). Se c tio n 1 03 .5 a (c )( 2) (i i) , in tur n, state s th a t “ in 18 the ca se of a

minor under 14 year s of ag e, ser vice sha ll be made upon the pe rson with whom . . . 19 the minor reside s; wheneve r possible, servic e shall also be ma de on the ne ar r elative, guardia n, 20 committee, or fr iend.” 21 Section 236.3 of the re g ulations is entitl ed: “De tention and re lease of juveniles.” “ A6 1 juvenile is defined a s an alien unde r the a g e of 18 year s.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(a ). The r egulation 2 pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : 3 (1) Juveniles shall be rele ased, in orde r of pr efe renc e, to: 4 (i ) Apa re nt; 5 (ii) L eg al guardia n; or 6 (iii) An adult re lative (brothe r, sister, au n t , uncle, g randpa rent) who is not 7 prese ntly in Service de tention, unless a determ i n at i o n is made that the 8 detention of such juvenile is r equire d to se cure his or her timely appea ranc e 9 be fo re the Se rv ic e or the I mmi g ra tio n Co ur t or to e ns ur e the juv e nil e ’s sa fe ty 10 or that of other s. I n case s where the pare nt, leg al guardia n, or adult re lative 11 resides at a l o cation distant from whe re the juvenile is detained, he or she 12 may secur e release at a Service office located ne ar the pare nt, leg al guardia n, 13 or adult re lative. 14 15 (2) I f an individual spe cified in pa ragraphs (b)( 1)(i) throug h (iii) of t h i s section 16 cannot be located to a cc ep t cu s t o d y of a juve nile, and the juvenile ha s identified a 17 pare nt, leg al guar dian, or adult relative in Service detention, simultaneous rele ase of 18 the juvenile and the pare nt, le g al g uardia n, or adult re lative shall be e valuated on a 19 dis c re tio na ry c a se -b y -c a se ba sis
. 20 21 (3) In case s where the par ent or leg al guardia n is in S ervic e dete ntion or outside the 2 2 Uni te d

St a te s , th e juv e n il e ma

y b e r e le a s e d

to s u c hp e r s o na s is d e s ign a te d b y the 23 pare nt or l eg al guar dian i n a sworn aff idavit, executed bef

ore a n immigration officer 24 or consular office r, as c apable and willing to car e for the juvenile’s we ll-being . Such 25 person must execute a n ag ree ment to car e for

the juvenile and to e nsure the juve nile’s 26 prese nce a t all future pr ocee dings be fore the Service or an immig ration judg e. 27 28 (4) In unusual and c ompelling c ircumstance s and in the discre tion of t he Director of 29 the Of

fi c e of Juve nil e Af

fa ir s, a juv e nil e may be re le a se d to an a du lt, oth e r t ha n th os e 30 identified in para g raphs (b)( 1)(i) throug h (b)( 1)(iii) of this section, who e x ecute s an 31 ag ree ment to car e for the juvenile’s we ll-beingand to ensure the juvenile’s pr esenc e 32 at all future proce eding s befor e the Ser vice or an immigr ation judge
. 33 34 Id . § 236.3(b). 35 L lano s- F e rn and e z ar g ue s th a t hi s p ro c e e din g s sh ou ld b e re op e ne d a nd his in a bs e nti a 36 re mov a l or de r r e sc ind e d p ur su ant t o 8 U. S.C. § 1 22 9a (b )( 5) (C )( ii) and 8 C. F .R. 37 § 1003.23(b)( 4)(iii)(A) (2) be cause he did not rec eive notice of his remova l hear ing a s require d byThe c ourt in Flores-Chave z actua lly cited 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 throug hout its opi nion; 4 howeve r, as the c ourt noted, “[t] his regulation was re codified at 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 on March 6, 1997.” Flores-Chave

z , 362 F.3d at 1153 n.1. To avoid confusion, we ref er to the r egulation as § 236.3. In d ee d , i nth e p re s en tca s e, as s t at edab o v e, L l an o s -F ern an d ez ’s un cl e w as m ad e t o s i gn

5 a qu es t i o n n ai re i nwh i ch h e a gre edt o “e n s ure th e m i n o r’ s p re s en ce atal l fu t ure p ro ce ed i n gs befor e the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service and the Immigration court,” a nd to “pre sent the juvenile bef

ore the office rs or a g ents of the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service and/or befor e the Executive Of

fice for Immigration Review for a ny court he aring .” 7 1 the statut e and

re g ulatio ns . Sp e c if

ic a lly , h e argue s th a t be c a us e he wa s o nly

fi ft e e n y e ars old 2 wh e n th e no tic e of he ari ngwa s is su e d, and

be c a us e his un c le wa s ma de to a g re e in wri tin g to 3 ensure his presenc e at a ny future immig ration proc eeding s, his uncle should have be en g iven 4 notice of the hear ing a s well. 5 L lanos-F erna ndez’s argument finds support in Flores-Chave z , a Ni nth Cir c uit c a se wi th 6 fa c ts l arg e ly

sim ila r t o th os e in t

he pr e se nt c a se . Re lyingon 8 C. F .R. § 2 36 .3 , the Ni nth Cir c uit 4 7 c on c lud e d th a t “ the I NS’ s se rv ic e of

the tim e and

pla c e of the pr oc e e din g s o n o nly

F lor e s h ims e lf 8 and not on the adult who took custody of him deprived F lores of the effective notice to which he 9 was leg ally

entitled” under

the statute. Flores-Chave z , 362 F.3d at 1157. The cour t rea soned that 10 “ [t]he fa ir

imp lic a tio n o f § [236 .3 ] as a wh ole is t

hat any a du lt t o w ho m an a lie n juve nil e is 11 rele ased is cha

rg ed with the dual r esponsibiliti es of c aringfor the juve nile and ensur ing that the 12 juvenile kee ps his obligations to the court.” Id . at 1156. I t further rea soned: 5 13 The re g ulatory framework which includes 8 C
. F. R. § [ 236.3] contemplates that no 14 min or

a lie n und e r a g e e ig hte e n s ho uld be pr e sume d r e sp on sib le fo r u nd e rs tand inghis 15 rig hts and responsibilities in prepar ing f o r and a ppear ing at final immigration 16 proce eding s. Adopti o n o f t h e I NS’s position would defeat the ve ry purpose of

the 17 re le a se pr ov isi on s. I t is ill og ic a l f or the I NS b oth to r equ ir e th e le g a lly

re sp on sib le 18 adult to ensure the juvenile’s attendance at t he hearing and to wit hhold the notice of 19 hear ing which would ena ble the adult to fulfill that responsibility and to under stand8 1 the conse quence s of a f ailure to do so. 2 3 Id . at 1157. 4 Th e c ourt

a lso po int e d to the arb itr ari ne ss o f t he a g e c uto ff

in 8 C.F .R. § 1 03 .5 a (c )( 2) (i i) 5 as anothe r re ason for reje cting the g overnme nt’s argument that service on a custodial a dult need 6 only

be made when the minor is under fourtee n y ear s of ag e: 7 The I

NS has offe red no justification whatsoev er for depa rting from its stated 8 pr e sumpt ion in [§ 23 6. 3] th a t a lie n juve nil e s und e r e ig hte en requ ir e a r e sp on sib le 9 adult to help them navig ate f inal immigration pr o ce ed i n g s. The I NS’s my sterious 10 selec tion with reg ard to notice alone of the ag e of f

ourtee n as the point at which a 1 1 m i n o r n o l o n ger n ee d s anadu l t ’s h el p i s p art i cu l ar l y i n co mp re h en s i b l e. In d ee d , atage 12 fo ur

te e n, a min or c ou ld n ot e ve n d

ri ve hi ms elf to a

he ari ngtha

t he is r e qu ir e d to 13 a tte nd , a

nd mig ht w e ll b e un a

ble to n avig a te a

pu bli c tr ans po rt a tio n s y ste m. 14 15 Id . at 1159. 16 Finally , the cour t rea soned that the g overnme nt’s prac tice of only servingminors over the 17 ag e of f

ourtee n implicated due pr ocess c oncer ns. Id . at 1160. Acc ording ly , the cour t perfor med 18 the three -fa ctor test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976), conc luding that 19 “ no tic e to a

n a lie n juve nil e in c us tod y but no t to the re sp on sib le a du lt i nto wh os e c are he is 20 rele ased c ould raise se rious constitutional due proce ss questions,” Flores-Chave z , 362 F.3d at 21 1162, and that “[i]n l ight of the constitutional conce rns, the only rea sonable c onstruction of the 22 statute and implementingregulations require s notice to the adult to whom the juvenile is re lease d 23 from custody ,” id . at 1163. Thus, the cour t held that “whe n the I

NS relea ses a minor a lien to an 24 adult’s custody

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. [§ 236.3] , there by makingthat adult responsible for the 25 minor’s future appea ranc e at immigr ation proce eding s, the ag ency must serve notice of the 26 minor’s rig hts and responsibilities upon that adult if the minor is under eig hteen.” Id
.I t is wo rt h n oti ngthat it

is unc le ar f

ro m th e fa c ts o f t

he c a se wh e the r t

he Ei g hth Cir c uit 6 wa s e ve n d e a lin g wi th 8 C.F .R. § 2 36 .3 (a ) o r whe the r a nyon e wa s a sk e d to sign a n a g re e me nt t o ensure L lapa- Sinchi’s presenc e at f uture immigr ation hear ings, a s the fac ts section mere ly states that L lapa- Sinchi was “re lease d . . . to a local leg al-a ssistance org anization, which contac ted her brother- in-law.” Llapa-Sinchi , 520 F.3d at 898. 9 1 The g overnme nt urg es us to reje ct the Ninth Circuit’s re asoningbeca use, in its view, “the 2 Ni nth

Cir c uit su bs tit ute d it s ju dg me nt f

or the jud g me nt o f C on g re ss a nd the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l, 3 who had de termined that ser vice of an [NTA] on an alien four teen year s old was suffic ient,” and 4 be c a

us e “ [t]he Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l, a c tin g fo r t

he a g e nc y , r e a so na

bly int e rp re te d th e statut e to 5 permit servic e of a Notice of Hea ringon an alien who was fif teen year s of ag e.” I

nstead, the 6 g overnme nt urg es us to follow the appr oach taken by the Eig hth Circuit in Llapa-Sinchi v. 7 Mukase

y , 520 F.3d 897 ( 8th Cir. 2008). 8 In Llapa-Sinchi , the Eig hth Circuit stated that it was not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s 9 decision in Flores-Chave z and found, to the c ontrary , that 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5a(c )(2) (ii) and 1 0 2 3 6
. 3 (a ) w er e n o ti n co n s i s t en twi thea ch o th er , re as o n i n g: 11 Th e purp os e of the no tic e pr ov isi on

is t o le t in div idu a ls k

no w the de ta ils of

the ir 12 leg al proc eeding s. The purpose of the re lease provision, however , is not to provide 13 knowledg e, but to provide a ssistance to minors in a for eig n land, per haps for the 14 first time. I t is therefor e log ical for the re g ulations to provide that minors entering 15 the country illega lly can be responsible for

rec eiving notice re g ardingtheir cour t 16 pr oc e e din g s and y e t a lso pr ov ide that mi no rs may ne e d a ssi sta

nc e fr om a du lts to 17 ob ta in b a sic ne c e ssi tie s. 18 19 Id . at 900-01. Moreove r, on the re cord be fore it, the Eighth Circuit saw no me rit in the due 6 20 proce ss challeng e to the ag ency ’s dec ision to i nterpre t the regulation in this manner and so found 21 no need to c onstrue the r egulations as had the Ninth Circuit, to avoid constitutional conce rns. Id
. 22 at 900.10 1 We t ake ne ith e r t he path t ake n b y

the Ni nth

Cir c uit , n or

that take n b y

the Ei g hth

Cir c uit , 2 opting instea d to remand to the B I A as a matter of disc retion so that it may , in the first instance, 3 provide a

prec edential inter

pretation of the rele vant re g ulations and statute. See Yuanli ang Liu v. 4 U.S. Dep’ t of Justice , 455 F.3d 106, 116 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (re manding , as a matter of discr etion, for 5 the B I A t o inte rp re t and c lari fy the re g ulator

y and statut or y pr ov isi on s r e latin g to f

ri vo lou sn e ss 6 deter

minations in asy lum cases)
. 7 As se t f

or th a bo ve , 8 U. S.C. § 1 22 9 is sil e nt w ithre sp e c t to se rv ic e up on min or s. 8 Simi larly , while 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a ) and 103.5a (c) (2)( ii) provide spec ial instructions for ser vice 9 in ever

y case wher e the r espondent is a minor unde r the a g e of f ourtee n, those regulations are 10 sil e nt w ithre sp e c t to se rv ic e up on re sp on de nts a g e fo ur

te e n o r o ve r. An d, a s th e Ni nth Cir c uit 11 pointed out in Flores-Chave z , i ns o m e c as es , p urs u an tt o 8 C
. F. R
. § 2 3 6
. 3 (a ), re s p o n d en t s age 12 fourtee n or over

but under the a g e of e ighte en ar e re lease d to responsible adults, provided the 13 adult signs a

n ag ree ment to ensure the responde nt’s attendanc e at a ll future immigr ation 1 4 p ro ce ed i n gs . Inl i gh to f t h e a gen cy ’s i mp l i ci tre co gn i t i o ni n§ 2 3 6
. 3 th atj u v en i l es un d er th e a ge 15 of eig hteen r equire the assistance of a r esponsible adult for at least some purposes, se e Flor es16 Chavez , 362 F.3d at 1157, as well as the B I A’s explicit recog nition in i ts own case law that “the 17 purpose of

requiringservice of a notice to appea r on the pe rson with whom a minor re spondent 18 resides [is] to direct ser vice of the cha rg ing doc ument upon the per son . . . most li kely to be 19 responsible for

ensuringthat an alien a

ppear s befor e the Immigration Court at the scheduled 20 time,” Matter of Mejia-Andino , 23 I . & N . Dec . 533, 536 (B I A 2002) (inter nal quotation marks 21 omitted), we think it nece ssary to remand to the a g ency

for guidance as to whethe r the statute a ndIn a ny e ve nt, it i s unc le ar whe the r a ny su c h r e a so nin g in a

n unp ub lis he d d e c isi on

wo uld 7 command any

defe renc e fr om us. See M aiwand v. Gonzales , 501 F.3d 101, 104 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (“ Pr e c e de nti al BIA dec isions are e ligible f or Chevron defe renc e insofar as they repr esent the a g e nc y ’s authoritat ive interpre tations of statutes.” (e mphases adde d)); Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employe es v. Am . Int’l Group, Inc

. , 4 62 F .3 d 1 21 , 1 26 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ) ( “ [W]hile ag ency interpre tations that lack the for ce of law do not war

rant de fer ence when they interpre t ambi g uo us statutes , they

do normally

war rant de fer ence when they

interpre t ambiguous regulations .” ); Mizrahi v. Gonzales , 4 9 2 F
. 3 d 1 5 6 , 1 5 8 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ [ U ] np u

b l i s h e d B IA decisions do not constitute ag ency interpre tations of law . . . .”)
.

11 1 regulations also require notice to the re sponsible adult in cases suc h as this one. Se e als o Reno v
. 2 Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 311 (1993) (r ecognizi ng that the purpose of the juvenile re lease regulation 3 is to “protect the w elfa re of the juvenile” ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted)). Such a 4 rea soned interpr etation will then provide this Court a “mea ningf ul opportunity

[for] review.” 5 Melnitsenko v . Mukase y , 517 F.3d 42, 52 ( 2d Cir. 2008). 6 We believe that r emand is nec essar y here beca

use, eve n fac ed with the Ninth Circuit’s 7 decision in Flores-Chave z , the B I A chose to issue an unpublished, non-pre cede ntial decision 8 signe d b y

on e me mbe r o f t

he B oa rd c on c lus or ily

fi nd ingtha

t L lano s- F e rn and e z “w a s p ro pe rl y 9 serve d with both the NTA and the hear ing notice .” This two-pa ragraph de cision does not provide 10 any

meaning ful interpre tation of the re levant statutory and re g ulatory

provisions, nor does it g ive 11 any

rea son to rejec t the rea soning of the Ninth Circuit, other than to say , “[w]e are not pe rsuade d 12 by

[L lanos-F erna

ndez] ’s asser

tion on appeal that the r easoningin the Flores-Chave z . . . s ho uld 13 be adopte d in the Second Circuit, or his contention that the pr otection for minors unde r the a g e of 14 fourtee n should be extended until they are eig hteen.” See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’ t of Justice ,

7 15 416 F.3d 184, 192 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clea r that it will not do for a 16 court to be c ompelled to g uess at the theor y underly ing a particula r ag ency ’s ac tion . . . . I t is notAlthough w e aske d the par ties after oral a rgument to provide leg islative and re g ulatory 8 history and supplementa l briefingas to, inte r a lia , the re asonable ness of the a g e cutof f at fo ur te e n in the re g ulatio ns the mse lve s, we no te that L lano s- F e rn and e z did no t me anin g fu lly

ra ise any such cha lleng e in his openingbrief to this Court. Acc ording ly , this argument is deemed waived. See, e .g. , J

os e ph v . Le av itt , 465 F.3d 87, 93–94 ( 2d Cir. 2006). The a g ency is, of course , fre e to explore this issue on remand. 12 1 difficult to understand why . Were c ourts oblige d to cre ate a nd assess ex-post justi fications for 2 inadequately

rea soned ag ency

decisions, cour

ts would, in effe ct, be c onscripted into making 3 policy . Such an ac tivity is, for my

riad a nd obvious reasons, more proper ly the province of other 4 bodies, particula

rly wher e, as he re, the other body is an ag ency

that can br ing to be ar pa

rticular 5 subject matter e x pertise.” (interna l quotation marks and alter ations omitt ed))
. 6 InY

ua nli an g Li u , we se t forth seve ral re asons for r emandingas a matter of discr etion, 7 including: ( 1) “Insufficie nt ag ency attention” to the issue; (2) “National uniformity”; (3) 8 “Statutory

ambig uity ” as w ell as ambiguity in the regulations; (4) “De arth of c ircuit law” on the 9 issue; (5) The “[h] igh volume” of similar ca ses; and (6) “Importance of the issue.” 455 F.3d at 10 116–18. Severa l, if not all, of the re asons for r emand g iven in that case are also prese nt here
. 11 Acc ording ly , we r emand this ca se to the B I A for r econside ration of L lanos-F erna ndez’s appea l 12 and to provide a

n interpre tation and clar ification of the statutory and re g ulatory

framework 13 reg ardingservice upon minors, particular ly minors, such as L lanos-F erna ndez, who wer e re lease d 14 to a re sponsible adult pursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(a ). 8 15 CO NC LU SION 16 For

the fore g oing r easons, the pe tition for reviewis GRANTED. The J anuar y 30, 2007 1 7 d ec i s i o no f t h e B I A i s VA C AT E D, an d th e c as e i s R E M AN DE D t o th e B I A f o r p ro ce ed i n gs 18 consistent with this opi nion.