U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

29–491 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–87] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST 

ON AIR FORCE AIRBORNE 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, 

AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2018 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Dolan, Lt Gen John L., USAF, Director of Operations (J3), Headquarters, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................................ 7 

Harris, Lt Gen Jerry D., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Plans and Requirements (A8), Headquarters, U.S. Air Force .......................... 5 

Ierardi, LTG Anthony R., USA, Director, Force Structure, Resources, and 

Assessment (J8), Headquarters, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .......... 6 

Thornton, Susan J., Director for Information Dominance Programs (SAF/ 

AQI), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition ......... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Harris, Lt Gen Jerry D., Jr., joint with Susan J. Thornton .......................... 30 

Ierardi, LTG Anthony R., joint with Lt Gen John L. Dolan ......................... 44 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bacon .......................................................................................................... 55 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST ON AIR FORCE 

AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, March 15, 2018. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on airborne 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] programs contained in the Air Force’s fiscal year [FY] 2019 budget request. 

I want to welcome our witnesses today for today’s panel: Lieutenant General Jerry Harris, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements; Ms. Susan Thornton, a member of 

the Air Force’s Senior Executive Service and Director of Air Force 

Information Dominance Acquisition programs; Lieutenant General 

Anthony Ierardi, a Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Lieutenant General John Dolan, Director of Operations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You all have really long titles. 

We thank all of you for your service and for being with us today. 

And after reviewing the Air Force’s fiscal year 2019 budget request, 

the subcommittee is somewhat satisfied with its content and funding levels provided for the airborne ISR enterprise. The budget request appears to support what is needed to sustain the legacy fleet 

of ISR programs, but the subcommittee is disappointed that there 

is no significant capacity growth in the Air Force’s ISR portfolio to 

meet more airborne ISR requirements. 

ISR is the pacesetter for operations. In short, ISR is a combat 

multiplier that not only informs our commanders where they need 

to engage, but also where not to engage and what areas to avoid. 

With the exception of full motion video [FMV] capability provided 

for counterterrorism support, there appears to be stagnation in the 

remainder of the ISR portfolio for other critical intelligence needs. 

This situation—stagnation maintains the ISR capacity shortfall 

and should be reversed to fill more combatant commanders’ intelligence requirements. 
2 

We understand that we cannot afford to satisfy all combatant 

commander ISR requirements, but consistently we see, year after 

year, ISR fulfillment rates for critical intelligence areas in singledigit percentages and with higher risk than there should be. It 

seems that if there is not more effort within all of the services to 

achieve more ISR capacity for our combatant commanders, that we 

will have a continued shortfall. 

I am pleased, however, to see that the Air Force has finally removed the uncertainty regarding the high-altitude ISR capability 

that the U–2 and RQ–4 Global Hawk provide, and that both platforms will be sustained and modernized well into the future. 

There is one major point of contention in the budget request that 

we will need to work through, but I am confident that we will 

reach a satisfactory compromise: the Joint Surveillance and Target 

Attack Radar System Recapitalization program, also known as 

JSTARS Recap, and the Air Force’s decision to terminate this program on essentially the eve of the source selection decision; the Air 

Force’s request to forego JSTARS Recap program in favor of fielding a concept called Advanced Battle Management System, or 

ABMS. 

At the moment, there appears to be multiple disconnects with 

this concept, and I want to highlight a few that stand out. First 

and foremost, the new concept appears to contradict the years of 

extensive analysis and testimony to Congress that underpin the 

current validated requirements. From as early as December 2011, 

when the Air Force completed its analysis of alternatives [AOA], to 

as late as August 2016, when the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council [JROC] validated the JSTARS Recap capability development document, which is the document that justifies how and why 

a platform is being designed against a validated requirement, all 

conclusions pointed to a capability consisting of a business jet-sized 

aircraft with a reduced crew that would provide, at the tactical 

edge of the contested battlefield, onboard, real-time battle management command and control [BMC2] and moving target indicator intelligence to the warfighter maneuvering on the ground. 

These years of analysis were molded against anti-access/area denial threats per the previous administration’s defense strategy of 

2012, which identified that states such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetrical means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons 

and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, 

the U.S. military will invest, as required, to ensure its ability to 

operate effectively in anti-access/area denial environments. 

There is not enough time to go through all the analysis completed by many entities within the Department [of Defense], but 

the committee staff provided a comprehensive summary to each 

member’s office outlining specific details. 

Second, the Air Force plans to rely upon unmanned aircraft capabilities and sensors in increment [INC] 1 of ABMS that the analysis of alternatives has already determined would not meet fullspectrum requirements, for the Air Force now wants to rely upon 

the airborne warnings and control systems, or AWACS [Airborne 

Warning and Control System], aircraft to do battle management 

command and control for ground forces in addition to its primary 
3 

mission of providing battle management command and control for 

airborne forces, all without increasing the crew size or adding additional mission spaces onboard the aircraft to effectively perform 

this mission because the aircraft has no physical growth capacity. 

Third, ABMS is not forecasted to reach initial operational capability until 2035, which is 11 years after JSTARS Recap would 

begin fielding. ABMS is not forecasted to reach full operational capacity until 2042, which, theoretically, is 6 years prior to when 

JSTARS Recap is scheduled to begin retirement. This schedule, of 

course, assumes that everything goes as planned and that all technologies and capabilities with the ABMS, many of which are still 

yet to be developed, are fielded without any issues. 

Finally, JSTARS Recap aircraft is being designed as a true open 

architecture, open mission systems capability with a highly advanced fifth-generation radar and robust communication and battle 

management command and control suite of capabilities. This is a 

hallmark example of acquisition reform that this committee’s been 

pushing, and it does not make sense why this capability is not 

being used as the foundation for the ABMS concept. 

As we move forward in understanding the ABMS concept, we 

also need to understand where the risks to the warfighter lie and 

what risk mitigation paths we can take in the near and mid term 

to ensure that the validated requirements of the ground warfighter 

are met without question. 

To put this all in perspective, we understand the projected 

threats to our forces are real and that the Air Force has submitted 

a budget that does not include JSTARS Recap. However, completely walking away from this program may prove to be an unacceptable level of risk to our warfighters for this committee. As we 

continue to build the FY 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], we hope to learn more, and look forward to working with 

the Air Force on a path forward that will both mitigate risks to the 

warfighter and invest in the new Air Force programs that the Air 

Force is proposing. 

I will now turn to my good friend from Massachusetts, Ms. Niki 

Tsongas, for her comments that she might want to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good afternoon to 

our witnesses. It is good to have you here. I would like to thank 

you for being here today to talk about the several Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs. 

As the chairman has pointed out, ensuring that the Air Force 

preserves and expands the support it provides to the joint force in 

this mission area has been an ongoing concern for the subcommittee for many years. The United States has the world’s largest and 

most advanced airborne reconnaissance fleet. The question for Congress is, in my view, how do we keep it that way and make it even 

better? 
4 

This capability does not, of course, come cheap. Continued investment in the platforms, sensors, data networks and, importantly, 

the people across the ISR community is required. It is not surprising, then, that the cost of this enterprise creates tension inside the 

Air Force’s budget. And while some tradeoffs with other important 

Air Force missions are appropriate, all too often, this mission area 

appears to be viewed as a bill payer for other Air Force needs. 

In addition, there is some important recent history with the Congress in this area. Since I joined this committee, the Air Force has 

proposed retiring the U–2 and Global Hawk fleets. In both cases, 

Congress blocked these plans based primarily on concerns about 

overall ISR capacity and constant shortfalls in this mission area. 

In the end, in both cases, Congress concluded that the Air Force’s 

request to retire these platforms was the result of a narrow, shortterm, purely funding-driven view that failed to account for an evergrowing demand for ISR on behalf of our combatant commanders 

around the world. That is important context for today’s hearing. 

The fiscal year 2019 request for Air Force programs in this area 

is, overall, quite well funded. Continued investments in the U–2, 

RQ–4 Global Hawk, RQ–9 Reaper, RC–135 reconnaissance aircraft, 

and E–3 Sentry fleets look healthy compared to recent requests. 

There is also funding for the ground-based side of the ISR enterprise. There is, however, one important exception to this overall 

positive trend: the proposed termination of the JSTARS replacement program. 

As we will hear more about today, the Air Force plans to cancel 

the JSTARS replacement program in order to develop a decentralized network capability to integrate sensors across many platforms. 

This decision deserves close consideration for several reasons. 

First, while the Air Force knows its decision is based on new 

threats, those very same threats were considered in 2011 when the 

DOD [Department of Defense] conducted an analysis of alternatives that led to the JSTARS replacement program. 

Second, those same threats cited by the Air Force are a danger 

to any non-stealth aircraft in the early stages of a conflict, yet the 

Air Force is not proposing mass retirements of fourth-generation 

fighters or even other reconnaissance aircraft based on commercial 

aircraft, such as the E–3 AWACS, KC–46 tanker, RC–135 Rivet 

Joint, or Compass Call. 

Third, the Air Force appears to be walking away from the joint 

in joint—in JSTARS. The origin of the original E–8 JSTARS fleet 

was a desire to integrate with U.S. Army sensors and weapons to 

attack targets behind enemy lines. The Air Force’s proposal to terminate this program sends a message to the U.S. Army that the 

Air Force is no longer prioritizing this mission. 

Fourth, the Air Force appears to have discounted the risks involved with their alternative network-based plan. Specifically, the 

time risk, the cost risk, and potential vulnerability of such a network to jamming or cyberattack. 

Finally, the Air Force is once again proposing to shrink the size 

of the airborne ISR fleet at the same time that demands continue 

to rise. This committee has rejected the Air Force’s last two proposals to do the very same thing. 

I look forward to today’s hearing and yield back. 
5 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to participate at today’s hearing, after all subcommittee 

members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Without objection, so ordered. 

I also want to remind members that immediately following adjournment of this hearing, we will reconvene in Rayburn 2337 for 

a classified presentation by our witnesses. 

Without objection, each of the witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be included in the hearing record. We will begin with General 

Harris. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JERRY D. HARRIS, JR., USAF, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS (A8), HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General HARRIS. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Tsongas, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify again. And I am glad our engagements continue in both frequency and qualitative content as they 

are very beneficial to the Department of the Air Force. 

Today, there may be questions that lead to classified answers, to 

which we will be happy to continue on our scheduled closed session 

rather than talk around a correct answer in this open session. 

The United States Air Force now operates several intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, capabilities across many 

domains. This hearing is focused on the air domain, and the witnesses you have invited appearing here are, clearly, experts that 

can speak to our joint requirements and operations, as well as our 

Air Force modernization plans. 

The National Defense Strategy published in January of this year 

highlights the importance of competing and winning at all levels of 

engagement, above and below the level of armed conflict. The same 

strategy also tells us to focus on the high-end side of the combat 

spectrum and gives us some areas to take risk. Most of these risk 

discussions will need to take place in our already scheduled closed 

session. 

To understand the situation and make decisions to keep the 

United States and our joint forces ahead of our adversaries, we 

must maintain a robust and survivable network of ISR systems 

that will ensure our competitive advantage. This means we must 

not only collect the information, but we must also process, exploit, 

and disseminate it. 

Additionally, we must protect the information and ensure that it 

is accurate, reliable, and of decision quality. This soup-to-nuts effort was the focus for the ISR portion of our FY 2019 budget. 

We appreciate the continued support of the Tactical Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee, and we look forward to your questions. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Thornton. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Harris and Ms. Thornton can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 
6 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN J. THORNTON, DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE PROGRAMS (SAF/AQI), OFFICE OF THE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

Ms. THORNTON. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, 

and distinguished members of the Tactical Air and Land Forces 

Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss 

the Air Force’s fiscal year 2019 budget request for airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs. 

In my capacity as the Director of Information Dominance Programs, I have the distinct pleasure of supporting the modernization 

activities the Air Force is accomplishing to put cutting-edge ISR capabilities in the hands of our warfighters. From the applications 

used for planning airborne campaigns resident within our air operation centers, to the intelligence-gathering and strike capabilities 

on the MQ–9 remotely piloted aircraft, the Air Force’s ISR programs are critical to providing the combatant commanders with the 

capability needed to support and engage in combat, drug interdiction, and humanitarian operations across the globe. 

I hope our discussions today will provide the committee with a 

greater understanding of the direction the Air Force is taking to 

modernize our ISR assets. Your support is paramount to ensuring 

the Air Force has the funding needed to keep our ISR portfolio viable and ahead of adversarial threats and enhancements. 

I thank you for taking the time to have these discussions and for 

your continued support of these critical capabilities. 

STATEMENT OF LTG ANTHONY R. IERARDI, USA, DIRECTOR, 

FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES, AND ASSESSMENT (J8), 

HEADQUARTERS, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

General IERARDI. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am grateful to 

have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the critical importance of airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance as we face the reemergence of long-term strategic competition. 

One of the key capabilities that has supported U.S. military 

dominance for many years is the Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System, also known as JSTARS. For the last several years, 

the Air Force has been working on an effort to recapitalize this 

platform. While the ability to collect ground moving target indicator [GMTI] data and to conduct battle management command 

and control remain key joint force requirements, changes in the 

threat mean JSTARS Recap will be challenged to satisfy these requirements in a highly contested wartime environment. 

In December of last year, the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council acknowledged the validity of the existing JSTARS Recap 

requirements, but also recognized the evolving threats and contested environments as an imperative for change, requesting the 

Air Force return to the JROC by April, next month, of 2018, with 

options for providing these capabilities in both permissive and nonpermissive environments. 
7 

Turning to the broader ISR enterprise, we note that ISR demand 

continues to outstrip supply, but continued investment and additional capacity alone will not reverse this trend. Adaptation and innovation in the development and employment of ISR capabilities 

will be key to ensure we have the ability to collect the right information, connect the right dots, and to get the critical information 

to the right people in a timely fashion. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and, more importantly, for your continued support for these vital programs which 

support the Department’s enduring mission to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of 

our Nation. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Ierardi and General 

Dolan can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN L. DOLAN, USAF, DIRECTOR OF 

OPERATIONS (J3), HEADQUARTERS, CHAIRMAN OF THE 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DOLAN. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, 

and distinguished members, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss the Chairman’s Joint Chief of Staff’s 

global integration efforts as we look to meet the increasing requirements against the Nation’s strategic competitors and violent extremist organizations. I look forward to the follow-on discussion 

and any other questions you may have. Thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for your testimony. 

You know, obviously, you heard from both of our opening statements that there are significant issues and concerns by the committee. The subcommittee has heard dueling testimony on a number of systems, and this seems to be like one of them, where we 

are told we absolutely have to have the capability and then we 

don’t need to have the capability anymore, we need to switch to a 

different capability, which is not yet completed or defined. That 

leaves us with not a whole lot of confidence in transitioning to the 

next stage. 

The Secretary of the Air Force is very eloquent when she talks 

of, you know, her initial time here in Washington where she was 

at the National Security Council, and she would grab a taxi to go 

around town. And now, she has an iPhone, and as Secretary of the 

Air Force has the technology of Uber, and she wants to make certain that the Air Force has the ability to lean in for that technology. 

But as she and I have discussed, taxis are still on the road. So 

it is reaching that new technology without abandoning technology. 

If we all got rid of all taxis and just went to Uber, we wouldn’t 

have the efficient transportation system we have in our urban 

areas. And certainly, when you look at the arguments to abandon 

JSTARS, you are left with that sense that perhaps the stretch for 

a new technology isn’t being correctly evaluated in the terms of 

what our true needs remain. 

Now, one concern that we stated in our opening was the Air 

Force’s ABMS concept is not scheduled to achieve initial operational capability until 2035. Let’s just pause for a moment on that 

number: 2035, initial operational capability. And full operational 
8 

capability until 2042. How do you plan to mitigate BMC2 risk for 

the joint warfighter on the ground if JSTARS Recap is not fielded 

and ABMS does not reach full operational capacity until 24 years 

from now? 

You know, when we all think of—back to the Secretary’s analysis 

of technology and the analogy to the iPhone, the iPhone has only 

been with us for 11 years. And this isn’t going to reach full operational capacity until 24 years from now, but yet we are going to 

lose a capability if we don’t pursue modernization recapitalization 

of JSTARS at the same time that we reach for new technology. 

So, General Dolan, explain that gap. Explain how we are going 

to be able to evaluate what this effect is going to be on the battlefield and what we need to do in the upcoming NDAA. 

General DOLAN. Well, Chairman, I can tell you, from the perspective of a requirement, we will always have a requirement to have 

multitargeting indicator. There is going to be a requirement to be 

able to fuse information in order to have the capabilities that the 

JSTARS currently has, that I don’t see a—any future or time commitment that that would change that in the upcoming years. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Well, that was certainly validation of the 

concern. I don’t know how the plan that we are being presented 

might be able to address that. 

Anyone else want to comment? 

General. 

General IERARDI. Mr. Chairman, from the perspective of the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Staff, providing support to the warfighter is paramount in terms of marshalling the capabilities to support our missions around the world. 

There is a period where we look at this evolving threat that 

caused the JROC to ask the Air Force to review the options available to perform the ground moving target indicator and battle management command functions that JSTARS performs, and that work 

is forthcoming, some of which you will hear about today. 

I think there is a period here at least acknowledge your concern 

with the timeline into the future for the delivery of the full systems. There is—that I know, the Air Force can describe in greater 

detail—an incremental approach that does allow for a degradation, 

a graceful degradation, if you will, in the numbers of JSTARS platforms available to our warfighters in the near years while ABMS 

is being developed. And there is work to be done for sure in developing ABMS, but there is a plan to mitigate that risk as ABMS is 

developed with both existing platforms as well as new capabilities 

that can be brought to bear. 

Mr. TURNER. General Harris and Ms. Thornton, the JSTARS 

Recap platform is being developed as a true open architecture, open 

mission systems platform, the same as what the Air Force is stating it’s trying to achieve for ABMS concepts. If Congress were to 

provide sufficient funding to continue the JSTARS Recap program, 

could you integrate this system as the foundation for Increment 1 

of the ABMS concept? General. 

General HARRIS. Chairman, yes. Simple answer to that is we 

would be able to increment and bring it into Increment 1 or 2. Two 

is basically the timeframe you are looking at by the time we would 

have this developed. 
9 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Thornton, do you want to comment? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yes. I will just add to that, we are able to do 

that from a technology standpoint. Certainly, again, it is available 

in the Increment 2 timeframe, not the Increment 1 timeframe. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

I would like to just visit the process that brought us to this place 

with this sort of abrupt change of direction. So as we know, 7 years 

ago, the Air Force conducted the analysis of alternatives to determine what capabilities a JSTARS replacement would need and 

what kinds of threats the aircraft would likely encounter. And 

since that time, the Air Force has invested hundreds of millions of 

taxpayer dollars and countless staff hours from some of our brightest minds to build a next-generation JSTARS capability, an effort 

built around conclusions that were drawn in 2011. Now those conclusions have been reexamined, and Congress is being asked to cut 

our losses and pursue a different and technologically challenged alternative, with time risks, cost risks, and unknown cyber vulnerabilities. 

So my point is this: There has to be a process in place to make 

sure that taxpayer dollars are being spent as wisely and efficiently 

as possible and that we in Congress can trust that process. So, 

General Harris, my question is twofold: Did the Air Force simply 

get the 2011 AOA wrong? And if so, how can we go about correcting the AOA process in the future to make sure we are spending taxpayer dollars on the capabilities we need and that it is a 

process that brings—when it brings forth its decisions we in Congress can trust what was done in a forward-looking way? 

General HARRIS. Yes, ma’am, that is a great question. I wouldn’t 

say in 2011 we got the analysis of alternative studies wrong; we 

just looked at and underestimate the pace of change and the 

threats that come up. We talked through that AOA multiple 

threats that exist today that were forecast to be here in 2024 and 

2028. So that threat has accelerated quickly. And I think the committee here will recognize why that has happened based on some 

of the pictures we have shown in our past engagements from that. 

When it comes to us in the process, we do intend to move our 

acquisition process and our requirements process faster than what 

we have been doing, which will allow us to be able to get ahead 

of the technology piece. So the money that we invested in the 

JSTARS Recap effort, those radars, the technologies we are pulling 

out of that, we think will still benefit us in Increment 2 and Increment 3 as we move forward. So it was not money wasted. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So what you are suggesting is that you didn’t anticipate the pace of change—or the pace of evolution among our 

near peers. And my question would be there have to be people out 

there who could have been brought into this process, who could 

have better assisted the Air Force in thinking further out, or a better understanding that who are in a world in which change comes 

much more quickly who knew this had the potential to move rather 

quickly, more quickly than you were thinking about. 

And so how in the future do you be sure you are casting a wide 

net to get that kind of thinking at the table? 
10 

General HARRIS. Okay. So we do have a new senior acquisition 

leader in our department who leans forward in that direction. And 

as we heard testimony from him yesterday in a different committee, he is committed to that process. So I think you will see 

those changes coming up, and it is a change in the way we have 

done business in the past. 

We certainly don’t intend to start down one direction and have 

abrupt changes, but we have a National Defense Strategy that has 

changed. In 2011, we weren’t talking about peer threats. We didn’t 

have a strategy that said you need to focus on the high end of the 

combat. We were focused on winning today’s fight in a COIN 

[counterinsurgency] type of an environment where this airplane 

was well developed and deserved. 

So I would say that while we may not be keeping with the pace 

of change, we are trying to change that, rather than continue to invest money in the old way of doing things; that 15 years from now, 

we will have the same capability and a JSTARS Recap aircraft that 

we have today, but it will only work in a small portion of the globe, 

rather than our Increment 3 that we are trying to get at to span 

the globe. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Question for you, General Ierardi. The original 

reason for the JSTARS aircraft was to enable Air Force and Army 

coordination for attacking targets deep behind enemy lines. That 

mission still seems very relevant in the context of possible conflicts 

with North Korea and Russia where the U.S. Army and our allies 

will likely face large enemy ground forces. 

The Air Force’s original AOA certified by the Joint Staff determined that joint battle command with the U.S. Army onboard the 

aircraft itself was still an important requirement. Is that no longer 

the case? And how will the Air Force integrate the ability to attack 

well behind enemy lines with the Army under the proposed 

JSTARS alternative? 

General IERARDI. Thank you, ma’am. The Army certainly should 

expect the delivery of the capabilities required for it to operate in 

a wartime environment against a near-peer or a peer competitor in 

a high-intensity action. That, we expect will be delivered by the Air 

Force, by the joint force, the collection of assets that are available 

to provide commanders what they require. 

So the JSTARS as it was envisioned to provide those capabilities 

in a contested environment as we have described, that has 

changed. Indeed, we can say—the intent would be to be able to deliver under ABMS an even greater level of support to warfighting 

commanders in contested environments than they might otherwise 

receive as we watch the threat evolve in places like—as you have 

described. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is, I guess, General Harris and General Dolan—you know, 

our thirst for intel can never be quenched. And we currently cannot 

meet all the ISR requirements for all of our combatant commands, 

yet we are talking about lessening that capability. That just absolutely makes no sense to a dumb grunt. 
11 

We certainly need to shift our reliance on relatively indefensible 

surveillance systems, as state competitors or peers like Russia and 

China, you know, challenge that. But we also, our bombers in 

World War II didn’t have the capability of defending themselves on 

deep bombing missions, but we didn’t discontinue bombers because 

they weren’t survivable; we put fighters with them to make them 

more survivable. We have lots of things in the Army that are not 

survivable by themselves, but we place protection around them 

based on the criticality of that asset. 

So I am very disappointed that we would even think about reducing our ISR capabilities without first fully replacing that when we 

already have a shortfall that is critical in all areas of the globe. 

And so, you know, we have gone through this with the U–2. We 

have gone through it with the A–10s for us ground guys with the 

Air Force where they didn’t want to use A–10s because they are 

not survivable in air-to-air, and they are not. But at the end of the 

day, nothing is better for that grunt on the ground than an A–10 

killing those tanks. Because an F–16 doesn’t do that and an F–35 

doesn’t do that, they have different missions, but an A–10 is still 

critical to killing those tanks on the ground, which is what us 

Army guys care about. 

And so how is the planned cancellation of JSTARS Recap going 

to affect the ISR requirements of warfighters on the ground? And 

has the Air Force discussed this decision with the Army and Marine Corps? And if so, what do the Army and Marine Corps think 

about this? 

Now, either General Harris or General Dolan, either one. 

General HARRIS. Sir, I would be happy to start that, and if General Dolan has something to add, he is more than welcome to participate. 

So, sir, we have spoken with the Army and the Marine Corps, 

and we are also speaking with each one of the combatant commanders to make sure. And to this point, they have all agreed with 

our way ahead. Mostly because the fights we are most concerned 

about for our soldiers and our Marines that are on the ground are 

these highly contested fights in these areas where we may not have 

air superiority over the top of them on day one. The JSTARS Recap 

does not do that for us. It would be pushed out of that same fight. 

You talk about adding fighters to our bombers in World War I 

and II to make them survivable. Completely agree. But a fighter 

with the JSTARS doesn’t help when it is multiple SAMs [surfaceto-air missiles] coming out and there is nothing the fighter can do 

about it from that perspective, even if it is a fifth-gen [generation] 

fighter attacking other missiles that are long range and exceed the 

radar capabilities of the JSTARS Recap. It still doesn’t change that 

situation. 

If there is a reduction—and right now, we are under-promising 

and intend to over-deliver—I don’t think it will be long in our ISR 

capability. And when we do complete INC 3 hopefully well before 

the time that is laid out in the plan now, and I think we will see 

more of that in our closed session, you will see much more capacity 

to get after ISR across the globe in this GMTI type of role, rather 

than in two or three narrow orbits in CAPs [combat air patrols]. 
12 

Mr. KELLY. So we are not going to have a gap, because I point 

this out: If they are targeting at JSTARS as opposed to some other 

asset, that shows the value of that JSTARS to our guys on the 

ground that they would target—because we only go after highvalue targets. So the fact that they would take a JSTARS out of 

the sky as opposed to something else shows the value it has to the 

guys on the ground. 

And so I just want to make sure and I want you guys, regardless—I don’t care which system we got to. Here is what I do care, 

is that we never have a gap where we don’t have the ability to get 

that ISR to the combatant commanders. And can you all tell me 

that is what we are going to do if we do this, we are never going 

to lose capability that we currently have, whether contested or not 

contested? 

General HARRIS. No, sir. We are not making that promise. Even 

with today’s fleet, there will be a gap. There is nothing we can do 

about it because of the way the threat has accelerated. 

If it requires us to have soldiers on the ground that are in this 

battle space, we will put airmen up there. Our approach to this is 

to put fewer airmen at risk so that we can get this mission done. 

We have multiple other sensors—some manned, some unmanned— 

that get after this. So we are intending to minimize the gap and 

make sure that when we are done, we actually provide a better capability in both contested and uncontested than where we are 

heading with the recap. 

Mr. KELLY. I understand. But when those airmen and airwomen 

are not at risk, those guys on the ground, those soldiers and Marines are at risk to prevent that risk to Air Force people, and we 

just can’t accept the lack of ISR. And I hope you guys will really 

rethink this, because we really cannot accept a gap in our capabilities to conduct ISR until we have a replacement. We shouldn’t 

chase shiny objects until we have one that works. And I just say, 

we cannot afford at this critical stage—we still have COIN fight 

going on, and we can’t afford to just fight the peer fight; we have 

to fight them both. 

And, Mr. Chairman, my time is out, but I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Ms. Rosen. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

our guests for being here today. 

I would like to switch the conversation a little bit to the MQ–9. 

I represent southern Nevada and, of course, we are proud to have 

Creech Air Force Base that conducts those airborne ISR operations, 

well, actually, Nellis and Creech in Nevada fighting the global war 

on terrorism. So I know that the MQ–9 have been operating at 

surge capacity levels for over 15 years; obviously, not an end in 

sight, as we need intelligence more and better each and every day. 

Our current fleet is about, is 268. I know you are asking for 29 

more, putting us up to 297 MQ–9s. So what I would like to know 

is what is the current status of the MQ–9 enterprise? What are 

your plans to normalize those operations in order to reduce us from 

surge operations to our steady-state sustainable operation going 

forward? 

General HARRIS. Ma’am, I would be happy to start with that. 

Thank you to the outstanding airmen that are supporting this mis-
13 

sion. And while they may not be present over the battlefield, they 

are doing everything they can to have the effect they are looking 

for in our COIN environment. 

Our effort, as you know, this past week, we have flown our last 

MQ–1 in combat from a sortie perspective. We are now to a fully 

100 percent MQ–9 fleet, and that brings a better capability and capacity, rather than being stuck with that MQ–1 and not ever 

transitioning to something that is new. So much like what we are 

trying in the GMTI environment, there is a better way to do this. 

To help the airmen that have been at this surge capacity for 15 

years and not getting the credit because they weren’t seen as being 

present on the battlefield, we have—I am sorry, started our CPIP 

[Culture and Process Improvement Program] effort to take care of 

those airmen that are deployed at home, that are working 61⁄2, 7 

days a week in this combat environment and still have all the 

home things that are associated with that with none of the benefits 

of returning to a country that is grateful for the work that they are 

doing. 

We are thankful to say that we have opened up and said we are 

going to have more locations, so some of them like to have an option other than just being in the desert there in Nevada. Very 

much happy to be there myself, but we have opened up Shaw as 

the next location for them to give them opportunities to move about 

and continue a normal Air Force career while they do this fantastic 

mission. 

We have also fully manned the MQ–9 RTU [Reinforcement 

Training Unit] so that we are able to get more aircrew out, and we 

are increasing the crew ratio so that these flying airmen get some 

time off. It is work hard for 2 months on this, then be able to take 

a month to train, and we haven’t been able to do that in the past 

and we are starting to make progress in that. So it is moving well 

for the MQ–9 fleet. 

Ms. ROSEN. I really thank you for that, because as we go out 

there and talk to the airmen and women who are working there, 

it is stressful in its own way, even though they are not actually 

there. And I appreciate that. 

I have one more question. Actually, I would like to talk a little 

bit about the termination of the software development modernization contract that we had for Air Force operation centers, known 

as AOC [Air Operations Center] 10.2. 

So what do you feel, Ms. Thornton, were the root causes of the 

failure of the program? And how can we develop software that we 

can utilize, be more agile and nimble, dynamic, the next environment? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you, ma’am, for that question. The AOC 

10.2 program, as you know, was canceled. There were schedule 

issues. There were challenges in trying to deliver a lot of capability 

all at once, rather than looking at it more incrementally and how 

we could make improvements rapidly to support our users in need. 

So we are now embarking on AOC Pathfinder, which started in August of 2017. And with that Pathfinder we are using modern software and hardware, using cloud capability, as well as taking advantage of the way the commercial world develops software. You 

know, the Facebooks, the Googles, the Amazons, they know how to 
14 

do it well, and so we are taking advantage of what they have 

learned to be able to deliver quality software, very user friendly, 

very quickly, and securely. So that program is going very well, the 

Pathfinder. 

By this time, we were expected to have delivered one capability, 

which was the critical capability for dynamic targeting and, in fact, 

we have delivered four capabilities to Al Udeid [Air Base]. So that 

has been a great benefit to those users out there. They have sat 

side by side with the developers and given feedback. So as we continue this effort, we expect to expand it out, and it will allow us 

to actually sunset our current 10.1 Air Operation Center sooner 

than we would have under the old program. 

So we are seeing a lot of successes. We are taking lessons 

learned in a way that we can apply to other programs successfully. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROSEN. Fantastic. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you 

all for being here today. As a retired ISR guy and an electronic 

warfare person, these are exciting conversations. 

So I know you have got a challenge. We—each COCOM [combatant command] is asking for more assets than we have in the Total 

Force, essentially. It is like coming to deliver 10 gallons of water 

when you have got 1 gallon of water with you. So I know it is a 

very big challenge. 

So I want to first start off by recognizing General Dolan and 

thanking the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the 

Joint Staff team for the new organizational structure that we have 

put in for ISR. I understand the charter that General Mattis put 

out is very detailed, and we appreciate it. We think it is, you know, 

a great work. 

In the last NDAA, we put in multiple reports that we were requesting from the Joint Staff or OSD. And there are four of them 

that were due on 1 March that we are still waiting on. I just want 

to point them out so you can push them along, if you would. 

We did ask for a joint force sufficiency assessment for ISR. How 

much ISR do we really need? We would like to get a better handle 

for what you think that is. Also for the Joint Staff, an implementation, a strategy plan to establish common standards and management procedures for MTI [moving target indicator] exploitation so 

that we can take MTI and standardize all those platforms and the 

data that comes off. 

And when I was working, when I was in the Air Staff, it was the 

fifth-generation sensor. So how do we get that data off the F–35 

and other fifth generation? And how do we exploit it quickly back 

at the Air Operations Center so we can get it back to the warfighters? 

And the fourth one is getting the steady-state requirements for 

the RPA [remotely piloted aircraft] line, for beyond-line-of-site, 

wide-area motion imagery. And, General Dolan, I will just give you 

a chance, you may not know where those four are at, but—— 

General DOLAN. Well, Congressman Bacon, first off, I want to 

thank you for your continued service here. Your background, obvi-
15 

ously, with the committee is very helpful. It is helpful for the enterprise, it is helpful for the Department. 

Mr. BACON. I like being an advocate. 

General DOLAN. And so I want to thank you for that. 

With regard to the reports, we would definitely get back—— 

Mr. BACON. Okay. Thank you. 

General DOLAN [continuing]. In a timely manner to get back here 

with you on that. 

You touched on a lot of the innovation that the Department is 

trying to take on. And as you know, when you take a look at the 

joint solution, we have to look beyond just platform. We have to 

look at a whole-of-system solution. And I think you understand 

that as we put thought, energy, and resources to that, that is going 

to make us better down the road, because we will never meet 100 

percent of the combatant commanders’ requirement. 

Mr. BACON. All right. 

General DOLAN. So we have to be—— 

Mr. BACON. It is hard to meet one of them. 

General DOLAN. We have to put effort towards that. You know, 

I think that with very pointed and educated look at and questions 

for us that challenge the Department is good, and it is going to 

help us stay focused. 

Mr. BACON. Okay. Thank you, General Dolan. 

Question for you, General Harris. I think the vision for MTI is 

laudable; you are aiming high, thinking big. It seems to me there’s 

two key points that we have to give confidence to people on. Will 

the current Joint STARS be able to bridge that gap? I mean, is it— 

it is struggling right now maintenance-wise. Can it cover that gap 

that you are looking for to go to this new, you know, concept? And 

second part is, I think we just want confidence that you will get 

approval from the Joint Staff or JROC for the plan before you move 

beyond the Recap or the new Joint STARS. Thank you. 

General HARRIS. Congressman, great questions. If you don’t 

mind, I will also come back to talk about that fifth to fourth project 

that you worked on because you had some successes to report. 

Yes, sir, we are confident that current JSTARS fleet, the E–8 

fleet will have the ability to cover this gap. We have got the decision point in FY 2023 that allows us to use that fleet longer if we 

find that INC 2 or INC 3 are late in delivering, and that could extend that fleet by a few years to cover those gaps. So we are comfortable that we will be there and confident that we will be able 

to work this process, to include where we think we are headed with 

the JROC and their approach to it. Because what we have brought 

forward recently, we are seeing positive responses in both CAPE 

[Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] and AT&L [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics], now that it has broken up, the 

[R&E, Research and and Engineering] and A&S [Acquisition and 

Sustainment] organizations. And we think it won’t be an issue getting this through the JROC process. 

So your fifth to fourth and that communication piece, that is part 

of the solution that we are looking at of making sure that we have 

both the sensors available and the communication to port that 

back. And we just recently demoed in an exercise in Alaska and 2 

months ago in Japan with real-world aircraft as was in the exercise 
16 

that out in the combat operational scenario with F–35s to F–15Cs, 

and it is working now. So we are happy with that. 

Mr. BACON. Good, because that is a great sensor capability that 

we can get back, hopefully, to the AOC to watch the next wave of 

aircraft before those F–35s ever come back. 

One last question. I understand that we have a really good system for real-time MTI tracking, but then we have to go back and 

do forensics, quality-of-life studies, that there is a lot more challenges. Do we have a plan for that? 

General HARRIS. We do, sir. That is part of the process exploitation and dissemination that we are working through. Too much 

of what we collect right now in any ISR platform ends up on the 

floor and is never looked at again, other than just the initial take, 

and we have to fix that. Part of that is our AI/ML, so it is artificial 

intelligence/machine learning, getting that to do things that they 

are much faster at computer-to-computer than we are with the 

human in the loop. And as we continue to grow and evolve and invest in that, we expect that that is the technology that is not widely available now. It will be in the 2023 to 2025 timeframe well before it becomes a necessary part of this. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, panel. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being 

here today. 

The MQ–9s are essential to the State of California’s National 

Guard as it utilizes aircraft during natural disasters, such as fires, 

floods, and search and rescue, as was the case recently in my district. Most recently, the MQ–9 was used to assist in the suppression of the Thomas fire, which devastated my district. MQ–9 is a 

vital ISR capability that provides around-the-clock situational 

awareness for our combatant commanders, but they are also essential to our Guards as it is a lifesaving capability for our emergency 

responders and citizens. 

However, MQ–9s are not meant to fly as a fast—as fast as larger 

aircraft. In order to more rapidly deploy the MQ–9s, a deployable 

kit capability has been identified which would allow the kit to be 

packed in a larger aircraft. Has the Air Force or the Army looked 

at the feasibility of incorporating and funding a deployable MQ–9 

launch and recover element kit? 

General HARRIS. Yes, sir. We are looking at that and that is part 

of the study. The LRE [launch and recovery elements] that you 

speak about, it is a significant move when we go out and do that. 

I am not sure if the Army is looking at it from that perspective, 

because it is your Air Force that’s flying the MQ–9s, but in similar 

platforms for them with their Gray Eagle. 

We are looking at it from that perspective, but right now, sir, our 

MQ–9s, minus a few that are available for elements in title 32 status, and our guardsmen are awesome at bringing that to the table 

to help when we can here stateside. We just don’t have the capacity 

right now in our ability to fly additional lines. So the LREs are in 

place. We are looking at different plans to move those LREs, but 

from a deployable kit; we will continue to study that, but it has not 
17 

risen yet to the priority that it is something we must fund at this 

time. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

Lieutenant General, any—— 

General IERARDI. On behalf of the Joint Staff, nothing else to add 

to General Harris’ response, sir. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Great. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, I yield 

back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And first, I would like to associate my comments with you, 

Chairman Turner, and also with Ranking Member Tsongas, with 

the concerns about the proposal. And as I have listened to the comments from the panel, we have an operational capability of the new 

ABMS system of 2042, if things go as planned. Is that correct? 

That is when—all right, 2042. And you plan to stand down all of 

the JSTARS by the end of 2025. That is a 17-year gap between the 

standing down of 100 percent of the fleet and the operational capabilities of the new system. 

I don’t—I guess my question—General Ierardi, what are you 

going to do during that 17-year gap? 

General IERARDI. Sir, the notion of the Advanced Battle Management System is the integration of sensors and capabilities—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

General IERARDI. [continuing]. To be able to deliver information 

to warfighters faster. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

General IERARDI. So that is the intent of the ABMS, and at the 

appropriate time, in the near future—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Sir, if I may? 

General IERARDI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. We intend to be there operational capabilities 2042. 

Is that correct? 

General IERARDI. For the final operating capability, yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. 2035 for first operational capability. 

General IERARDI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. And 2042 for good capacity, if you will. But 2035 is 

the initial operation. If everything goes as planned, 2035, but the 

JSTARS are going to stand down—the intent is to stand them all 

down by 2025, you have got a 10-year gap where you have nothing. 

General IERARDI. Sir, I believe that the incremental approach 

that the Air Force is taking will yield capabilities along the way; 

that is the plan. The JROC will have an opportunity to review that 

plan in the near future. 

Mr. SCOTT. What platform do they intend to use to deliver that? 

General IERARDI. A number of platforms would be netted together to produce the outcome, sir. 

General DOLAN. So, Congressman, if I will, I will say from a— 

you talk about the gap, you talk about where we are at now and 

how we are going to cover down, if you will, between now and 2035, 

JSTARS is, with respect to the moving target indicator, we have 

got five—from a joint force, we have five platforms that crosses 

multi-services that will come across from there. 
18 

Mr. SCOTT. If you did not need the new JSTARS, then why did 

you request $417 million for the JSTARS less than 12 months ago? 

General DOLAN. I will yield to the Air Force on that question. 

General HARRIS. Sir, because we are still in the study and we 

didn’t have a National Defense Strategy at the time, it was directing us to focus elsewhere and put your highest priorities in that 

conventional plate. 

And, sir, to your question, the JSTARS stand-down that we are 

talking about in that timeframe is only 10 percent to 15 percent 

of our GMTI capability. We will still continue to provide that, as 

was mentioned, with the other platforms, to include the Global 

Hawk Block 40 and the MQ–9 with its GMTI capability, in addition 

to the assets that are in the other services. So it is—— 

Mr. SCOTT. And you will be pulling those. Are those assets currently being used? 

General HARRIS. Yes, sir, they are. 

Mr. SCOTT. So which fights do you intend to stop using them in? 

General HARRIS. We will use them less in our low-intensity counterinsurgency fights. And the intent now as we bring these forward 

into a higher combat level from the perspective of using them in 

contested environments, if we must be there to support our teammates on the ground. It also brings the sensors that allow us to not 

only see the target and to pass that information and share it, but 

to take action on it from a combat perspective. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you assume that you are going to have to maintain 

the JSTARS to fill the capacity until the operational capacity is 

there for the new Advanced Battle Management System—and I am 

not opposed to development of the new Advanced Battle Management System; I want you to understand that—what is the difference in the cost of recapitalization—of the recapitalization 

versus the maintenance of the current JSTARS fleet? 

General HARRIS. Sir, the recapitalization bill is about $6.5 billion 

for the new system to bring in the JSTARS Recap program. And 

are you asking them to keep the cost difference for the current fleet 

of E–8s? 

Mr. SCOTT. My point is that the cost of the recapitalization 

versus the cost of maintaining the existing JSTARS fleet, there is 

not that much difference in the two. But the capabilities are very 

different. I would just—I don’t know, I don’t understand the logic 

that the Air Force has used with regard to this decision. I think 

that y’all have made a decision and you are trying to back into it. 

I again want to associate myself with the comments of both Mr. 

Turner and Ms. Tsongas. It is—I do not understand how the Air 

Force could have requested almost half a billion dollars about 12 

months ago for the JSTARS Recapitalization program and then 

turned around and said we don’t need it. So we just wasted that 

half billion dollars. 

With that said, I will yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Let’s switch topics. Some of the materials that were handed to 

us right before this in regards to the U–2—and surprisingly, but 

good to hear that the U–2, with proper updates, can last 50 more 
19 

years and be effective, and maybe even longer. So can we—as part 

of our fleet. 

Can we just have a little more details on what kind of investments are needed to ensure the health of the U–2 program? And 

we will start left to right, if that works. 

Lieutenant General. 

Ms. Thornton, would you like to take this? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yes, I will take it. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

Ms. THORNTON. So we are investing in working through diminishing manufacturing sources. Many of the sensors are—there are 

diminishing resources for that. We are looking at our ejection seats 

and how we want to make—modernize them and make them safer, 

so we continue to do that. We are also—as you know, the U–2s are 

pretty much rebuilt every 7 years, so right now, they have a life 

out to 2055, but we are also investing in a structural study to look 

at taking that out to the full 75,000-hour life, which would take 

them out to 2100. So pretty far out there. 

So again, we, as a part of the next-generation ISR dominance 

flight plan, there will be a high-altitude annex that we will describe in a little more detail, we expect to deliver that this spring, 

all of the different capabilities that will be looking out for U–2 and 

the whole high-altitude fleet in incorporating those capabilities. 

But we are continuing to modernize the U–2 and expect that to 

continue to be a valuable asset to the Air Force for some time to 

come. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Yes. 

General HARRIS. Yes, sir. The NDAA that we have from FY 2017 

tells us that we can’t do anything to retire the U–2 until we have 

shown the Global Hawk Block 40 reach parity with it. So we are 

also making similar investments in the Global Hawk Block 40, I’m 

sorry Block 30 to get after this effort. So we are continuing to move 

and provide additional capability and capacity from what the original plans were to retire the U–2, but that is our expectation at this 

time. 

From an air perspective, nothing provides the altitude associated 

with the U–2 operations. The Global Hawk can see targets for a 

longer period of time. So each one of these platforms brings their 

different strengths, and we will continue to fund both while we can. 

General IERARDI. The only thing I would add is that the U–2 is 

a part of an important set of capabilities that we will employ. And 

I don’t have anything else to add to their responses. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

General DOLAN. Congressman, I will tell you, you know, from 

someone who has to fill requirements, it is the capability of what 

the platform brings, in this case with the U–2, with the capability 

it brings right now until there is another capability that is brought 

up that the Air Force identified. We are going to actively employ 

the U–2 to its fullest right now in all theaters. And you can see 

now that it is across the world we are going to continue to employ 

it. 

Mr. GALLEGO. From some of the briefings I have had, it is a 

great platform that really has served this country well. Thank you, 

and I yield back. 
20 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for your testimony here today and for your service to the 

Nation. Thank you. 

I know that we touched on this processing question. Mr. Bacon 

raised this, but I am going to dive into it a little deeper. Although 

we know we don’t have enough ISR platforms to meet combatant 

commander requirements, we still do collect enormous amounts of 

data, all of which take time to analyze. So processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination capacity is the primary limiting factor, as I see 

it, that we face in terms of making this massive amount of data 

actually useful. 

So how do we more fully use artificial intelligence and machine 

learning to more quickly sift through the data? And how will that 

allow you to more strategically allocate the limited analyst manpower that you have? And what types of gains do you see possible 

with increased use of machine learning? And then finally, do you 

think that we will eventually see a reduced need for ISR, given 

that machine learning will better focus our collection efforts? 

General HARRIS. Thank you, sir. Great questions. And that is one 

of the areas where we see some of our most promising efforts getting after artificial intelligence to help reduce the manpower burden associated right now with the process, exploitation, dissemination of our intel. 

As we said, it is less than 20 percent of what we collect actually 

gets significant analyst time to help us come back with that. So we 

are working with several groups within our DCGS enterprise, our 

distributed common ground system enterprise, to make sure that 

they are tagging the data that they see, that we can then turn back 

and run through algorithms within the machines to help them 

learn so they can come back later and tell us, that is a vehicle with 

wheels, that is a vehicle with a track, to help us with those important parts. 

What we really think is that as we move forward, we can have 

the machines coming back telling us, look here for an analyst, look 

here for an analyst, rather than trying to scan the entire time of 

FMV. And we think we will see significant improvements in that. 

And, again, these are fantastic airmen that are working. 

So I don’t think we will do away with ISR; it is how we get that 

ISR. In the fifties, we collected the same amount of ISR that is exquisite that we do today, but it was probably half of what was 

available at the time. Now, in today’s information age, collecting 

about that same amount of exquisite ISR, it is only a percent of 

what is actually available across the spectrum. 

So we are actually trying to open up and use publicly available 

information to help us gather the information that we need as a 

Nation to keep the lead in the technology advances that we have. 

General DOLAN. Congressman, I will just add that it is just not 

a service-centric project that General Harris is talking about. It is 

actually a Department-wide initiative to look at it, because we have 

to use automation and intelligence—artificial intelligence in order 

to go through big data. 

The Department has actually formulated a plan to go forward 

with that. And not only does it come back on the PED [processing, 
21 

exploitation, and dissemination] that you described, but it is also 

going to come back in the manpower and the crews that you need 

to do that. So there is a huge manpower piece, not only from an 

hour, man-hours perspective, but trained specialists and linguists 

that you can save also in doing that. And so it is a very important 

initiative across the Department. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. THORNTON. Sir, may I add to that, too? In the DCGS program, we have been, similar to our Air Operations Center, we have 

been moving to an open architecture. We have done three pilots to 

date. And in our FY 2019 request, you will see about 289 additional 

funds requested to implement that architecture across all 27 of our 

DCGS sites. 

And what that does for us is then allow some of these applications and capabilities that General Harris and General Dolan 

talked about, because we have got the right commercial hardwaresoftware baseline to work from to allow for that machine learning 

and artificial intelligence to be developed in that PED enterprise. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you all for that. 

So most of the ISR that we are flying right now are in areas 

where we maintain air dominance. Would our current mix of ISR 

meet the capability requirements if we needed to fight in contested 

environments? And how are we hardening our systems to make 

sure that they are protected against cyber or electronic warfare attacks by sophisticated threats? 

General DOLAN. Congressman, I will start off. From a requirements standpoint, the answer is no. And that is a priority that the 

Department is looking at. And I will yield to my colleagues to give 

more detail. 

General IERARDI. I would only briefly add, sir, that that is one 

of the main reasons why, in fact, with JSTARS we feel like we 

have got to review the recap program to ensure that we are able 

to operate in those high-intensity environments that you described. 

General HARRIS. Thank you, sir. And we are working through 

both the cyber protection, but also the physical defenses that are 

coming up, which is why we think we need to expand beyond the 

air domain for our ISR and increase our capability and capacity in 

all domains. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I know my time has expired. I have 

additional questions that I will submit for the record, but thank 

you for the answers and thank you again for your service to the 

country. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you all for your testimony. 

This subcommittee will now reconvene in Rayburn 2337 for a 

classified presentation by our witnesses. 

Also, we have votes that are to occur at like 3:25. To the extent 

that people might be able to rapidly move to 2337, I would appreciate it. 

[Whereupon, at 3:06 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 15, 2018 

(27) 

Statement of the Honorable Michael Turner 

Hearing on Air Force Airborne TSR Program in the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget 

Request 

March 15,2018 

The hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on airborne intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance programs contained in the Air Force's fiscal year 

2019 budget request. 

I want to welcome our witnesses for today's panel: 

• Lieutenant General Jerry Harris, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Strategic Plans and Requirements; 

• Ms. Susan Thornton, a member of the Air Force's Senior Executive 

Service and Director of Air Force Information Dominance Acquisition 

Programs; 

• Lieutenant General Anthony Ierardi, Director of Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

and, 

• Lieutenant General John Dolan, Director of Operations for the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

We thank all of you for your service and being with us here today, and look 

forward to your testimony. 

After reviewing the Air Force's fiscal year 2019 budget request, the 

subcommittee is somewhat satisfied with its content and funding levels provided 

for the airborne ISR enterprise. 

The budget request appears to support what is needed to sustain the legacy 

fleet of ISR platforms, but the subcommittee is disappointed that there is no 

significant capacity growth in the Air Force's airborne ISR portfolio to meet more 

airborne ISR requirements. 

ISR is the pacesetter for operations. In short, ISR is a combat multiplier that 

not only informs our commanders where they need to engage---but also where 

NOT to engage and what areas to avoid. 

With the exception offull-motion video capability provided for counterterrorism support, there appears to be stagnation in the remainder of the ISR 

portfolio for other critical intelligence needs. 

This stagnation maintains the TSR capacity short fall and should be reversed 

to fill more combatant commander's intelligence requirements. 

We understand that we cannot afford to satisfy all combatant commander 

ISR requirements, but consistently we see year-after-year ISR fulfillment rates for 

critical intelligence areas in single digit percentages and with higher risk than there 
28 

should be. lt concerns me that there is not more effort within all the services to 

achieve more ISR capacity for our combatant commanders. 

I am pleased, however, to see that the Air Force has finally removed the 

uncertainty regarding the high-altitude ISR capability that the U-2 and RQ-4 

Global Hawk provide, and that both platforms will be sustained and modernized 

well into the future. 

There is one major point of contention in the budget request that we'll need 

to work through, but I am confident that we can reach a satisfactory compromise. 

The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Recapitalization program, 

also known as just "J-STARS Recap," and the Air Force's decision to terminate 

this program on essentially the eve of the source-selection decision. 

The Air Force is requesting to forego the J-ST ARS Recap program in favor 

of fielding a concept called Advanced Battle Management System, or "ABMS". 

At the moment, there appear to be multiple disconnects with this concept, and I 

want to highlight a few that stand-out. 

First and foremost, this new concept appears to contradict the years of 

extensive analyses and testimony to Congress that underpin the current validated 

requirements. From as early as December 2011, when the Air Force completed its 

Analysis of Alternatives, to as late as August 2016, when the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council validated the J-ST ARS Recap Capability Development 

Document ... which is the document that justifies how and why a platform is being 

designed against the validated requirements ... all conclusions pointed to a 

capability consisting of a business-jet sized aircraft with a reduced crew, that 

would provide at the tactical edge of the contested battlefield, on-board, real-time 

Battle Management Command and Control, and Moving Target Indicator 

intelligence to the warfighter maneuvering on the ground. 

These years of analysis were modeled against anti-access, area-denial threats 

per the previous Administration's defense strategy of2012 which identified that 

"states such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to 

counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated 

weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the 

U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in 

anti-access, area-denial environments." 

There is not enough time to go through all the analyses completed by many 

entities within the Department, but the committee staff provided a comprehensive 

summary to each Member office outlining specific details. 

Second, the Air Force plans to rely upon unmanned aircraft capabilities and 

sensors in Increment one of ABMS that the Analysis of Alternatives has already 

determined would not meet full-spectrum requirements. 

Further, the Air Force now wants to rely upon the Airborne Warning and 

Control System, or "A WACS" aircraft to do Battle Management, Command and 

Control for ground forces, in addition to its primary mission of providing Battle 

Management, Command and Control for airborne forces- all without increasing 

the crew size or adding additional mission spaces on-board the aircraft to 
29 

effectively perform this mission because the aircraft has no physical growth 

capacity. 

Third, ABMS is not forecasted to reach Initial Operational Capability until 

2035, which is 11 years after J-STARS Recap would begin fielding. ABMS is not 

forecasted to reach Full Operational Capability until 2042, which theoretically is 6 

years prior to when J-STARS Recap is scheduled to begin retirement. This 

schedule of course assumes that everything goes as planned and that all 

technologies and capabilities within the ABMS, many of which are still yet to be 

developed, are fielded without issue. 

Finally, the J-STARS Recap aircraft is being designed as a true openarchitecture, open-mission systems capability with a highly advanced 5th 

generation radar and robust communication and Battle Management, Command 

and Control suite of capabilities. This is a hallmark example of acquisition reform 

this committee has been pushing, and it does not make since why this capability is 

not being used as the foundation for the ABMS concept. 

As we move forward in understanding the ABMS concept, we also need to 

understand where the risks to the warfighter lie, and what risk mitigation paths we 

can take in the near and mid-term to ensure that the validated requirements of the 

ground warfighter are met without question. 

To put it all into perspective, we understand that the projected threats to our 

forces are real, and that the Air Force has submitted a budget that does not include 

J-ST ARS Recap. However, completely walking away from this program may 

prove to be an unacceptable level of risk to our warfighters for this committee. 

As we continue to build the FY19 NDAA, we hope to learn more and look 

forward to working with the Air Force on a path forward that will both mitigate 

risk to the warfighter and invest in the new Air Force programs that the Air Force 

is proposing. 

I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee Members be allowed to 

participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee Members have had an 

opportunity to ask questions. Without objection? So ordered. 

I also want to remind Members that immediately following adjournment of 

this hearing, we'll reconvene in Rayburn 2337 for a classified presentation by our 

witnesses. 

Without objection, each of the witnesses prepared statements will be 

included in the hearing record. 

Lieutenant General Harris, please begin with your brief opening remarks, 

and you'll be followed by Ms. Thornton, Lieutenant General Ierardi, and then 

Lieutenant General Dolan. 
30 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AND LAND FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

PRESENTATION TO Tf IE HOUSE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACT! CAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request on Air Force Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (!SR) Programs 

STATEMENT OF: Lieutenant General Jerry Harris, Jr. 

Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements 

And 

Ms. Susan Thornton (SES) 

Director of Information Dominance Programs 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 

March 15,2018 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AND LAND FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
31 

Lt Gen Harris and Ms. Thornton 

Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for 

Airborne ISR Programs 

House Armed Services Committee March 15, 

2018 

Chainnan Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, and distinguished members of the Tactical Air 

Land Forces Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the Air Force's 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Request for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) Programs. The programs you are inquiring about are of vital importance to supporting 

Combatant Commanders and warfightcrs across the globe, so we thank you for taking the time to 

discuss the Air Force's intent for these critical assets. 

In the invitation to testify, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee identified specific 

topics for discussion during the hearing, and it is the Air Force's hope our dialogue today will 

impart a greater understanding to all present as to the utility of the Airborne TSR portfolio and the 

rationale for the planned modernizations and updates the Service is seeking to conduct. 

Way Ahead on Joint Surveillance Targeting and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 

Recapitalization and the Advanced Battle Management System 

As we prepare to deter or defeat potential adversaries as outlined in the National Defense 

Strategy, failure to prioritize investment in future technologies that allow us to operate in highlycontested environments is not an option. These highly contested scenarios present the lowest margin 

for error and the greatest risk to our national security. The recapitalization of the current JSTARS 

platform is not viable in future contested environments, putting the Battle Management Command and 

2 
32 

Control and Ground Moving Target Indicator missions at risk in a peer engagement. In light of this the 

Air Force owes it to the joint force an alternative approach to fulfill the Combat Commander 

requirements for Ground Moving Target Indication and Battle Management Command and Control. 

To achieve this evolutionary shift, the Air Force is transitioning from a primarily aircraft centric to a 

net-centric approach using sensors across the battlespace linked by agile, resilient communications to 

provide the warfighter persistent capabilities across the full range of military options, uncontested and 

highly-contested, to meet the Nation's future needs. The key for future success is to establish a 

family of systems capable of integrating and fusing sensor inforn1ation from all domains and bridging 

resilient communications across multiple pathways at all security levels. 

The Air Force is pursuing a three-phased "incremental approach" to regain a strategic 

advantage and strengthen long-tenn lethality for the joint force. Increment 1 continues to employ the 

current E-SC JSTARS fleet in the manner in which it operates today, and begins the investments in 

agile communications and advanced sensors. This approach builds up resilience by incorporating 

technologies assessed at low technical risk. Increment 2 builds upon capability improvements by 

integrating advanced sensors and Open Mission System software into ground and air-based Battle 

Management Command and Control platforms. This increment also fully incorporates joint and 

coalition sensors. as well as fifth generation aircraft sensors, which provide the ability to sense targets 

in highly contested environments. Increment 3 realizes the full potential of the proposed incremental 

approach with full operational capability of the Advanced Battle Management System. This system 

leverages both Increment I and 2 enhancements as well as emerging technologies. 

The Air Force envisions the Advanced Battle Management System as an open architecture 

system, capable of ingesting new sensors and leveraging communications capabilities as the science 

and technology communities deliver them. Ultimately, the Air Force anticipates a more robust, resilient, 

reliable, and survivable architecture than currently exists. This open architecture will provide the means to 
33 

integrate new technologies and create a more lethal force capable of operating in all environments. If we 

continue down last year's path, we will spend billions of dollars and end up with today's capability and capacity 

that will only be effective on small portions of the world. 

Overview of High-Interest ISR Systems 

Airborne Operations Center (AOC! 10.1 

The AOC 10.1 program is a sustainment etfm1 tielding hardware and software to replace endof-life or end of support components. These upgrades are required to keep the AOCs interoperable, 

supportable, and cyber security compliant while the Air Force modernizes the AOC enterprise. 

AOC 10.2 and AOC Pathfinder 

In response to Combatant Commanders' needs for rapid development of new capabilities in the 

current figbt and to outpace our ncar-peer competitors, the Air Force initiated the AOC Pathfinder 

effort in August 2017, and subsequently terminated the AOC 10.2 program in January 2018. AOC 

Pathfinder seeks to rapidly deliver a subset of the AOC 10.2 requirements using industry software 

development best practices. These best practices include using cloud-native computing technologies, 

lean agile software development methodologies, and an entrepreneurial management structure. If the 

AOC Pathfinder proves successful, which it is showing great progress to date, its development 

approach will become the model for continued AOC modemization. The legacy AOC 10.1 

infrastructure would then sunset by the end of Fiscal Year 2020, three years earlier than originally 

planned under the AOC 10.2 acquisition program. 

Air Force Distributed Common Ground Svstem (DCGS) 

Air Force DCGS is currently transitioning away from a proprietary, stove-piped, original 

equipment manufacturer controlled system to an open architecture framework. Using the open 

architecture DCGS agile framework, Air Force DCGS has ceased all original equipment manufacturer 

block releases with the goal of shifting the average time to field for new capability from seven years to 

4 
34 

six months. The Air Force completed three open architecture pilots (Full Motion Video, High-Altitude 

Geospatial Intelligence, and Multi-Intelligence Correlation and Fusion) in 2017. After the associated 

Operational Utility Evaluations in the Spring and Summer of 2018, we will begin deploying 

capabilities to all twenty-seven worldwide, regionally aligned DCGS sites. Active duty, Air National 

Guard, and Reserve analysts will realize the operational benefits of improved worktlows, best-ofbreed tools, higher quality data, and faster turn-around time of requested system updates and 

modifications. 

Open Skies Treaty Observation Aircrafl 

In the FY 2019 President's Budget, the Air Force is requesting $222M for the Open Skies 

program. This funding will allow the Air Force move forward to finalize the requirements for the 

recapitalization the fleet of two OC-135B aircraft and to address capability perfmmance gaps limiting 

the ability of the legacy jets to complete their primary mission. This will enable full tetTitorial access 

to the Russian Federation, while also generating improved mission success rates due to higher aircraft 

availability. 

Modernizations and Upgrades for Fielded Airborne ISR Assets 

Airborne Warning and Control Svstem (AWACS) 

In order to add capability to the AWACS Fleet, eight modification programs are targeted to 

provide capability improvements across all AWACS missions. These improvements will be 

implemented as aircraft cycle through Programmed Depot Maintenance and Jield modiJications, 

completing in FY 2029. Cockpit improvements and the Block 40/45 program are on-going to ensure 

global access by revitalizing the mission systems necessary to improve the integration, quality, and 

timeliness of sensor data to support the wartighter. Additional capability improvements center around 

commnnications upgrades required to provide war-winning Battle Management Command and 
35 

Control. Upgrades include Link 16, Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), Second Generation 

Anti-jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN), and a fifth to fourth generation aircraft 

communication capability. These modifications will allow AWACS to remain a key contributor to the 

warfighter through its projected service life date of2035. 

E-8JSTARS 

The E-8C JST ARS fleet is in sustainment, but the Air Force is accomplishing a limited number 

of modernizations to ensure viability of the tleet. The current modernization efforts include Primary 

Mission Equipment Diminishing Manufacturing Sources, Combined Enterprise Regional Information 

Exchange System, Emergency Locator Transmitter and Common Data Link. The Air Force intends to 

fly a leaner E-8C JSTARS Legacy tleet over the next decade and has a divestiture/retirement schedule 

which will gradually reduce the JST ARS fleet size. The current plan is to divest three aircraft in FY 

2019 and one aircraft in FY 2021. The remaining 12 aircraft are projected to fly until the mid-2020s. 

This gradual reduction of the JSTARS Legacy fleet will cause no reduction in current Battle 

Management Command and Control and Ground Moving Target Indicator capabilities. 

The MQ-9 fleet continues to meet the demands of the combatant commanders with over 1.6 

million flying hours accumulated and supporting 60 steady-state combat lines and nine Government 

owned contractor operated combat lines. The Capability Development Document for MQ-9 was 

approved by the Joint Requirement Oversight Council in January 2006 and since that time, significant 

enhancements have been made to the MQ-911eet. Upgrades include the Lynx Sy11thetic Aperture 

Radar, extended range, the multi-spectral sensor ball, and various reliability and maintenance 

improvements. The MQ-9 program continues to field advanced capabilities to the warfighter. The FY 

2019 President's Budget requests funding to increase beyond line of sight capabilities, sensor 

multiplexing to enable simultaneous sensor missions, automatic take-off and landing capabilities, 

6 
36 

increased test infrastmcture and ground control station capability upgrades via the Block 15 to Block 

30 conversions. 

The ground control system upgrades allow for operation of the newest MQ-9 Block 5 aircraft 

in addition to increased radio capabilities and mitigation for diminishing manufacturing sources and 

material shortages. In FY 2018, the MQ-9 program initiated a new start etTort to standardize the 

Squadron Operation Centers across the enterprise. The Squadron Operation Centers merge multiple 

ground control stations into a common operation picture allowing tor greater command and control 

within the operational squadrons. These efforts will continue with the funding requested in FY 2019. 

RC-135 

The RC-135 is a fleet of heavily modified C-135 aircraft that provide intelligence and 

reconnaissance support, which enables decision advantages to national, joint and coalition leaders 

across the range of military operations. Seventeen RC-l35V/W RIVET JOINT aircraft provide near 

real time on-scene signals intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. Two RC-l35U 

COMBAT SENT aircraft collect technical electronic reconnaissance data used by the intelligence and 

joint warfighting community to characterize next generation threats. Three RC-135S COBRA BALL 

aircraft collect optical and electronic data on ballistic targets, as directed by the Intelligence 

Community and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The WC-135 CONSTANT PHOENIX is a 

fleet of two modified C-135 aircraft that provide atmospheric collection of particulate and gaseous 

effluents and debris supporting the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. All three variants of the 

RC-135 are currently deployed in support of the Combatant Commands in accordance with the Global 

Force Management Allocation Plan. Within 72 hours of being tasked, the WC-135 deploys to meet 

national collection requirements. All three variants of the RC-135 undergo extensive programmed 

depot maintenance that will enable these 50+ year airframes to continue operating through 2050. The 

fleet utilizes a spiral baseline upgrade process that allow the platfonns to keep pace with adversary 

7 
37 

threats and technological advancements. The FY 19 President's Budget includes funding to convert 3 

KC-l35Rs to WC-135Rs to improve mission effectiveness and aircraft availability. These three 

aircraft will allow the retirement of the existing two WC-l35s. Additionally, the cooperative RC-135 

program with the Royal Air Force provided three aircraft under Foreign Military Sales (final aircraft 

delivered in 20 17) expanding partner capacity and capability with our most valued international 

mission partner. 

The Air Force is modernizing the RQ-4 Global Hawk to increase mission effectiveness and 

replace aging ground components. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the RQ-4 

modernization approach in November 2015. Since then, the Air Force has initiated two 

modernization activities. The MS-177 sensor development and integration contract was awarded in 

November 2015 with an Initial Operational Capability scheduled for third quarter FY 2018 and Full 

Operational Capability scheduled for third quarter FY 2020. The MS-177 sensor will provide multispectral, long-range imaging capabilities on the RQ-4. The second modernization effort, the Ground 

Segment Modernization Program, award was initiated in July 2016. Ground Segment Modernization 

Program will replace outdated trailer-based Launch and Recovery Elements and Mission Control 

Elements with a modem building-based ground segment solution capable of supporting the RQ-4 

mission and aircraft command and control requirements. Development and operational testing for this 

effort will be conducted in FY 2019 through FY 2020, with fielding beginning in FY 2021. 

U-2 

The U-2 is a high altitude, all-weather, day/night, selt~defended, simultaneous multiintelligence platform that provides near-real-time intelligence collection in contested and permissive 

environments. Programmed depot maintenance ensures every aircraft is rebuilt every seven years 

providing an average lifespan beyond 2055. The U-2 is continuously deployed in support ofthe 
38 

Combatant Commanders in accordance with the Global Force Management Allocation Plan providing 

intelligence to meet collection needs at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict. 

Modernization and upgrade plan were provided in accordance with the Congressional reporting 

requirement stipulated in the FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. The "U-2 and RQ-4 

Aircraft and Sensor Modernization and Sustainment Plan" submitted to the Congressional Defense 

Committees in February 2018. The report highlights modifications to include updating the navigation 

and avionics systems to achieve Open Mission Systems compliance; modernization of the advanced 

electronic warfare system to increase capability in the highly contested environment; upgraded deeplook synthetic aperture radar with multi-mission collection capabilities; on-board automatic target 

recognition and artificial intelligence to enable processing, exploitation, and dissemination without 

reach back communication; and the usage of emerging quick reaction capabilities. These 

modernization efforts will make use of the investment of other programs of record, promote sensor 

interoperability, ensure modularity with other platforms where applicable, and capitalize on the unique 

strengths of the platfom1. The U-2 is funded using a combination of base and overseas contingency 

funding with weapon system sustainment funded in accordance with the FY 2019 requirement. 

Assessment of Airborne ISR Readiness 

The Air Force understands the concerns the Committee has on the assessment of Airborne ISR 

Readiness. As a Service, we also place great impmtance on the readiness of our ISR Airbome 

platfonns as we move forward to align with the National Defense Strategy. Per the request of the 

Committee, an assessment being conducted on the assessment of the weapon system sustainment and 

readiness. As soon as the assessment is completed, we will provide it to the Congressional Defense 

Committees. 

9 
39 

Status of the Air Force's Remotely Piloted Aircraft "Get-Well" Plan 

The "Get-Well" Plan goals of increasing MQ-9 formal training unit manning to I 00% and 

increasing overall manning to a 10:1 crew-to-Combat Line ratio were achieved by the first quarter of 

2017. Culture and Process Improvement Program goals of generate in-garrison combat-to-dwell, 

establish new MQ-9 Wing, expand MQ-9 leadership opportunities and expand assignment options 

remain ongoing. To achieve Culture and Process Improvement Program goals, MQ-9 fmmal training 

unit production will be expanding in FY 2020 via the creation of two new active duty formal training 

unit squadrons at Air National Guard bases. In addition, the first of two new bases housing a new 

MQ-9 Wing will stand up this year. The new Wing and active/associate squadrons will achieve 

increasing leadership opportunities at the squadron, group and wing levels as well as expand 

assignment options for remotely piloted aircraft ainnan. The Air Force is progressing towards its goal 

of achieving a 2: I combat-to-dwell ratio by FY 2024. Air Combat Command, as the lead Command, 

ensures MQ-9 training resources are proportionally fielded across Active Duty, Air National Guard, 

and Air Force Reserve components. 

Conclusion 

The Air Force's Airborne ISR pmifolio is of paramount importance for the execution of 

operations around the world, and the funding the Service requested in the FY 2019 President's 

Budget ensures our ISR capabilities are viable and ahead of adversarial threats and enhancements. 

The Air Force thanks the Committee for the continued advocacy of these vital capabilities and 

requests you support our FY 2019 funding request so we can continue to put cutting edge capability 

in the hands of our warfighters. 

10 
40 

Lieutenant General .Jerry D. Harris Jr. 

Lt. Gen. Jerry Harris is Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. In support of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of 

the Air Force, General Harris leads the development and integration of the Air Force strategy, 

long-range plans and operational capabilities-based requirements. He directs and coordinates 

activities ensuring the Air Force builds and employs effective air, space and cyber forces to 

achieve national defense objectives. 

Generalllarris entered the Air Force in 1985 as a graduate of the ROTC program at Washington 

State University. He has served as a flight commander, operations officer, weapons officer and 

inspector general. The general served on the staffs of two numbered Air Forces and one major 

command, all in operations. He has also served as the Combined Air and Space Operations 

Center Battle Director for operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. General Harris has 

commanded at squadron, group and wing levels. Prior to his current assignment, General Harris 

was the Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, responsible 

for organizing, training, equipping and maintaining combat-ready forces for rapid deployment 

and employment while ensuring strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of 

peace time air sovereignty and wartime defense. General Harris is a command pilot with more 

than 3,100 flying hours in the F-16. 

EDUCATION 

1985 Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Washington State University 

1992 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala 

1997 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB. Ala. 

1997 Master of Science in Aeronautical Science Technology, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 

Daytona Beach, Fla. 

1998 School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1998 Master of Science in Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell 

AFB,Ala. 

19')8 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

2001 Air War College, by correspondence 

2006 National Defense College, New Delhi, India 

2011 Capstone General and Flag Officer Course, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

I. February 1986- January 1987, Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz. 

2. January 1987- Aprill987, Student, AT-388 lead-in fighter training, Holloman AFB, N.M. 

3. April 1987- December 1987, Student, F -16 8-Course, Mac Dill AFB, Fla. 

4. December 1987- July 1989, Chief, Current Operations Division; Squadron Assistant Programmer; 

Training Officer; and Mobility Officer, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

5. August 1989- January 1992, Chief of Weapons and Tactics and Air-To-Surface Weapons Officer, 

Moody AFB, Ga. 

6. January 1992- February 1992, Student, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

7. Februaty 1992- March 1994, Chief of Mid-range Programming and Student, Fighter Weapons School, 

Luke AFB, Ariz. 

8. March 1994- June 1996, Weapons and Tactics Flight Commander; Chief of Wing Weapons; and Chief 

of Squadron Weapons, Eielson AFB, Alaska 

9. July 1996- July 1998, Student, School of Advanced Airpower Studies and Air Command and Staff 

College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

10. July 1998- September 1998, Student, Anned Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

II. September 1998- March 1999, NATO Joint Staff Officer, Long-range Plans, Plans and Policy, 

Headquarters, Southern Region Air Command, Naples, Italy 

12. March 1999 -August 2000, Chief of Strategy, Crisis Action Group, Headquarters Southern Region 
41 

Air Command, Naples, Italy 

13. September 2000- January 2001, Student, F-16 requalification, Luke AFB, Ariz. 

14. January 200 l -February 2003, Operations Officer and Chief of Standardization and Evaluation, 20th 

Operations Group; and assistant Director of Operations, 79th Fighter Squadron, Shaw AFB, S.C. 

15. March 2003 -February 2005, Commander, 79th Fighter Squadron, Shaw AFB S.C. 

16. March 2005- July 2005, StatJDirector and Inspector General, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB S.C. 

17. July 2005 - December 2005, Deputy Commander, 20th Operations Group, Shaw AFB S.C. 

18. January 2006- January 2007, Student, National Defense College, New Delhi, India 

19. Janua•y 2007- July 2008, Commander, 505th Training Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 

20. July 2008- November 2008, Director of Air, Space and Information Operations, 13th Air Force, 

Hickam AFB, Hawaii 

21. November 2008 - September 2009, Commander, 8th Fighter Wing, Knnsan Air Base, South Korea 

22. September 2009 - September 20 l 0, Assistant Director of Operations, Plans, Requirements and 

Programs, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii 

23. September 2010- September 2012, Commander, 56th Fighter Wing, Luke AFB, Ariz. 

24. September 2012- March 2014, Vice Commander, 5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan 

25. March 2014- April20l5, Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief ofStatHor Strategic 

Plans and Programs, Headquarters lJ.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

26. April2015" February 2017, Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, 

Va. 

27. February 2017- Present, Deputy Chief ofStafl'for Strategic Plans, Programs, and Requirements, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

September 1998 -August 2000, NATO Joint Staff Officer, Long-range Plans, Plans and Policy; and Chief 

of Strategy, Crisis Action Group, Headquarters Southern Region Air Command, Naples Italy, as a major 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: command pilot 

Flight hours: more than 3,300 

Aircraft t1own: F-16, T-37, T-38, Mig-29 and Mig-21 

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters 

Aerial Achievement Medal 

Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Joint Service Achievement Medal 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with three bronze stars 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Sandi Arabia) 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (government of Kuwait) 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant May II, 1985 

First Lieutenant Sept. I, 1987 

Captain Sept. 1, 1989 

Major Sept. I, 1995 

Lieutenant Colonel April!, 2000 

Colonel Jan. l, 2006 

Brigadier General Nov. 3, 2010 

Major General June 27,2014 

Lieutenant General Feb. 22, 2017 

(Current as of February 2017) 
42 

Susan J. Thornton 

Susan J. Thornton, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is the Director for Information 

Dominance Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force tor Acquisition, 

Washington, D.C. She is responsible for planning and programming all acquisition and 

modemization activities for Air Force command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs. She guides development of program 

management directives, acquisition strategies, budget submissions, congressional testimony and 

international acquisition programs. She advocates acquisition pro!,>ram strategies for 

reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, command and control and 

combat support systems, evolving C4ISR infrastructure, net-centric operations and information 

warfare programs. Ms. Thornton also provides the Secretary of the Air Force direction and 

guidance for combat C4ISR systems and architectures to the Air Staff, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and Congress. She directs activities tor tour C4ISR 

divisions. 

Ms. Thornton began her career at the Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, 

Ohio, in 1981. She has served in a wide variety of engineering positions for the Aeronautical 

Systems Center and Missile Defense Agency. Prior to this assignment, Ms. Thomton served as 

Director of Engineering and Technical Management, Headquarters Air Force Materiel 

Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Ms. Thornton was appointed to the Senior 

Executive Service in January 2007. 

EDUCATION 

1981 Bachelor of Science Degree in Systems Engineering, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio 

1988 Master's Degree in Public Administration, John F. Kennedy School ofGovemment, Harvard 

University, Cambridge, Mass. 

1990 Master of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering, University of Dayton, Ohio 

2000 Advanced Program Managers Course, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va. 

CAREER CHRONOLOGY 

I. 1981 1984, Project Engineer, Propulsion System Program Of1ice, Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio 

2. 1984- 1986, Lead Engineer for Engine Monitoring Systems, Propulsion SPO, Wright- Patterson AFB, 

Ohio. 

3. 1986- 1990, Lead Engineer for the Fl19 Engine, F-22 SPO, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

4. 1990 1993, Lead Propulsion Engineer, Special Operations Forces Program Otlice and Aircraft 

System Program Oflice, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

5. 1993-1994, ChiefEngineerforCV-22 Osprey, Special Operations Forces Program Office, WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio 

6. 1994-1997, Chief Engineer for MC-130H Combat Talon II, Special Operations Forces Program 

Office, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

7. 1997- 1998, Student, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

8. 1998- 1999, Chief, Technical and Acquisition Policy, Systems Engineering Division, Engineering 

Directorate, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

9. 1999-2001, Chief, Plans and Program Branch, Systems Engineering Division, Engineering 

Directorate, ASC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

I 0. 2001 -2007, Director of Engineering, Airbome Laser Program, ASC, Kirtland AFB, N.M. 

11. 2007- 2010, Director, Directed Energy Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, 

N.M. 

12. 2010 2012, Director of Engineering and Technical Management, Electronic Systems Center, 

Hanscom AFB, Mass. 

13. 20 12 - 20 16, Director of Engineering and Technical Management, Headquarters Air Force Materiel 

Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. 
43 

14. February 2016- Present, Director for Information Dominance Programs, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C. 

A WARDS AND HONORS 

1986 Junior Engineer of the Year, Air Force Association 

1998 Lucius N. Littauer Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 

2003 Chief Engineer of the Year, Aeronautical Systems Center 

2007 Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service 

2016 Meritorious Civilian Service Award 

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS 

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association 

(Current as of February 2016) 
44 

STATEMENT OF 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTf-IONY R. lERARDI, U.S. ARMY 

DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES, AND ASSESSMENTS 

AND 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOliN L. DOLAN, U.S. AIR FORCE 

DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS 

THE JOINT STAFF 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MARCH 15,2018 
45 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, and distinguished members of the Tactical Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to augment the discussion 

on the Air Force Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Request for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs. The programs you are inquiring about are of vital 

importance to supporting Combatant Commanders and the joint warfighter. 

In the invitation to testify, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee identified specific 

topics ror discussion during the bearing, and we hope the dialogue today will impart a greater 

understanding to all present as to the Joint Staffs role in validating requirements and allocating 

I SR. 

A central theme of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the reemergence oflong-term 

strategic competition in a world where our competitive military advantage is eroding. It is 

against this backdrop that the Department of Defense (DoD) must make difficult choices to 

ensure we continue to field a lethal, resilient, and adaptable Joint Force that is aligned with the 

strategic environment and the growing threats within it. 

One of the key capabilities that has supported U.S. military dominance for many years is the 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System also known as JST ARS. JSTARS has provided 

Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2), Intelligence Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (TSR), and communications capabilities to the Joint Force since it was originally 

deployed in 1991 as a part of Operation Desert Stonn. A key piece ofJSTARS-provided ISR 

data is Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMT!) information that helps us conduct wide-area 
46 

surveillance of mobile ground targets. The JSTARS E-SC aircraft is a modified Boeing 707-300 

with individual airframes dating back as far as the 1960s. As these aircraft have aged, 

availability rates have fallen and sustainment costs continue to rise. These trends led the Air 

Force to initiate a JSTARS Recapitalization (Recap) effort to ensure the Joint Force would have 

JSTARS-like capabilities well into the future. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC) validated both an Initial Capabilities Document (lCD) in 2013 and a Capability 

Development Document (CDD) in 2016 which form the basis of the capability requirements for 

the JST ARS Recap program. JST ARS Recap requirements are focused on providing a similar 

capability set to the original JSTARS program on a commercially-derived business jet-class 

aircraft. 

Changes in the threat environment, however, call into question the viability of the JSTARS 

Recap program. While the ability to collect wide-area GMT! data and conduct BMC2 remain 

key Joint Force requirements, JSTARS Recap will be unable to satisfy these requirements in a 

highly contested, wartime environment. As the NDS states, "we cannot expect success fighting 

tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's weapons or equipment." 

In December of last year, mindful of the evolving threat environment and new strategic direction, 

the Air Force approached the JROC with its proposal to re-allocate JSTARS Recap funding to 

help accelerate fielding of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). ABMS is 

envisioned to provide JSTARS-like capabilities via a net-centric (vice aircraft-centric) approach. 

The JROC recognized the validity of the existing JSTARS Recap requirements, but also 

acknowledged the imperative for change driven by the nature of future threats in a contested 
47 

environment. It requested the Air Force return to the JROC with options to provide survivable 

BMC2 and GMT! capabilities in both permissive and non-permissive environments and propose 

any requirement adjustments that might be needed to support these options. While the Air Force 

is still developing its response to the JROC request, it has already inserted funding into the FYI9 

President's Budget that will support efforts to accelerate building a robust, resilient ABMS that 

can operate across the full range of operating environments and mitigate the interim permissive 

environment risk that would result from halting the JST ARS Recap effort. 

The message from the Secretary of Defense is clear: we must pursue urgent change at significant 

scale if we are to halt the erosion of our competitive military advantage. Ensuring we can 

continue to deliver GMT! and BMC2 capabilities with a more resilient approach is an important 

piece of this effort. The Joint Staff will continue to work with the Air Force and other 

stakeholders to ensure we exercise good stewardship of the nation's resources to invest in needed 

capabilities that will support the Joint Force across the full range of potential operating 

environments. 

Turning from questions about BMC2 and GMT! to the broader ISR enterprise we again look to 

the NOS and its renewed focus on long-term strategic competition which requires that we 

concentrate on more than just individual platforms, also prioritizing development of resilient, 

survivable, federated networks and information ecosystems that inform everything from tactical 

actions to strategic plans. 
48 

Demand for ISR continues to outstrip supply, but continued investment in additional capacity 

alone will not reverse this trend. Adaptation and innovation in the development and employment 

ofiSR capabilities will be key. We must adapt the way we manage the flow of information. In 

many cases, the infmmation we need exists, but we sometimes lack the ability to "connect the 

dots" and then get that information to the right decision-makers at the right time. We need 

innovative means of collecting information that isn't overly focused on the current fight, but also 

prepares us to win the fights of the future. Efforts to address these shortfalls include not only 

upgrading the capabilities of our collection platforms but also investing in game-changing 

technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning as well as pursuing governance 

changes designed to improve ISR requirements and capability management. 

A key governance change occurred last fall when the Director of the Joint Staff approved the 

formation of JS J32 and the Secretary of Defense authorized the establishment of the Joint ISR 

Operations Center (JISROC) Chairman's Controlled Activity (CCA) on 9 November 2017. 

These organizations enable the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume leadership for 

synchronization of Combatant Command and Military Service ISR efforts. Activities under the 

purview ofthese organizations include global force management oflSR,joint ISR assessments, 

joint ISR mission approval and reporting, joint ISR enterprise management, DoD specialized 

scientific and technicallSR operations, allied and partner ISR integration, joint ISR modeling 

and simulation, JSR communication relay governance, joint ISR mission support tool 

management, and joint ISR force development. 
49 

Finally, House Report 115-200 tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide 

several ISR-related briefings and/or reports. What follows is a summary of the status of these 

tasks: 

I) Submit a report by 2 March 2018 on eflorts to develop capabilities to collect ISR on 

foreign military activities and the ISR prioritization process. The report is currently in 

final staffing and should be delivered to the HPSCI and HASC shortly. 

2) Submit a report by l March 2018 which includes a Joint Forces Sufficiency Assessment 

(JFSA) for ISR, based on a stress test of currently fielded ISR assets and capabilities for 

all approved level 3/4 OPLANS and CONPLANs. JS J32 has lead and will provide the 

coordinated response by the new approved suspense date of 28 August 2018. 

3) Provide a briefing by I March, which describes a strategy and implementation plan to 

establish common standards and management procedures among DOD stakeholders to 

ensure joint, integrated, TCPED of MTl information collected from DOD aircraft. 

Through conference, DoD determined USD( l) should have lead, with Joint Staff support. 

The briefing is in final staffing and should be delivered to the HPSCI and HASC shortly. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and, more importantly, for your continued 

support for these vital programs which support the Department's enduring mission to provide 

combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. 
50 

Lieutenant General Anthony R. Ierardi 

Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8), 

The Joint Staff 

Lieutenant Gcnerallcrardi is the Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8), 

Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He develops capabilities; conducts studies, analysis 

and assessments; and evaluates plans, programs and strategies for the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. He serves as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Secretary and as the 

Chairman of the Joint Capabilities Board. 

Prior to assumption of this position, he served as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8. 

In previous assignments, LTG Ierardi served as the III Corps Deputy Commanding General and 

Commanding General of the 1st Caval!y Division, "America's First Team;" Director of Force 

Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7; Director, Joint and Futures, Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff~ G-8; Executive Officer for the Department of Defense Counter-lED 

Senior Integration Group; and as Deputy Commander for Programs, Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan. He commanded Joint Task Force North at Fort Bliss, Texas 

and served as Director of Capabilities Development, U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at Fort Monroe, Virginia. He also served as the 

Chief of Staff of the 2d Infantry Division at Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea and as 

Commander of the 2d Infantry Division's First "Iron" Brigade at Camp Casey, Korea. While 

assigned at Fort Hood, Texas, he served as the Operations Ofticer (G-3) of the 1st Cavalry 

Division and Commander of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment. 

Earlier in his career, LTG Ierardi served as a Cavalry Troop Commander in the 2d Squadron, 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment in Bamberg, Germany and participated in Operation Desert Storm 

while assigned to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

LTG Ierardi trained and served as a Latin American Foreign Area Otl'icer, first as a student 

attending the Mexican Army's Command and General StafiCollege (Escuela Superior de 

Guerra) in Mexico City, and later as the Aide-de-Camp to the Commander of the U.S. Southern 

Command. 

LTG Ierardi's awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the 

Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Army 

Commendation Medal, and the Army Achievement Medal. LTG Ierardi holds a degree in 

Business Administration from Washington and Lee University, a Master of Arts Degree in Latin 

American Studies from Georgetown University and is also a graduate of both the U.S. Atmy 

Command and General StaliCollege and the U.S. Naval War College. 

Lieutenant General Ierardi is married and has two children. 
51 

Lieutenant General John L. Dolan 

Director for Operations, J-3 

Lt Gen John L. Dolan is the Director for Operations (DJ-3), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. He 

assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling his responsibilities as the principal 

military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The general develops and provides 

strategic guidance to the combatant commands and relays communications between the President 

and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders regarding current operations and 

plans. 

General Dolan received his commission in 1986 through the University of Northern Colorado's 

ROTC program. He has held various squadron, wing, and headquarters level positions in 

multiple overseas and deployed assignments. He instructed and commanded at the U.S. Air 

Force F-16 Weapons School, deployed as the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing vice commander, 

Joint Base Balad, Iraq, commanded the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, and 

commanded the 451st Air Expeditionary Wing and Kandahar Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, 

Afghanistan. Additionally, he served on the Joint Staff for warfighter requirements, as the U.S. 

Air Force's Deputy Director of the Legislative Liaison, and as the Chief of Staff, United States 

Pacific Command. In his last duty assignment, the general served as the Commander, U.S. 

Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Foree, Pacific Air Forces, Yokota Air Base, Japan and 

was the senior U.S. militmy representative in Japan. 

General Dolan is a command pilot with more than 4,000 flying hours, including more than 200 

combat missions during Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Northern Watch. 

EDUCATION 

1986 Bachelors of Science Degree in Chemistry, University ofNorthern Colorado, Colo. 

1993 Squadron Ofticer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1996 Masters of Aeronautical Science and Technology, Embry Riddle University, Fla. 

2001 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2006 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 

2014 Joint Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2016 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

I. October 1986- August 1987, Student, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Reese AFB, Texas. 

2. September 1987- January 1988, Student, F-16 Replacement Training Unit, MacDill AFB, Fla. 

3. February 1988 - December 1992, F-16 Instructor Pilot, Flight Examiner, Assistant Chief of Standards 

and Evaluation, Misawa AB, Japan. 

4. Janumy 1993- June 1993, Student, U.S. Air Force Weapons Instructor Course. Nellis AFB, Nev. 

5. July 1993- June 1996, F-16 Weapons Officer and Flight Commander, Spangdahlem AB, Gennany. 

6. July 1996- June 1999, F-16 U.S. Air Force Weapons Schoollnstructor, Flight Commander, Chief of 

Wing Scheduling, Assistant Operations Officer, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

7. July 1999- June 2000, Chief of Safety, Inspector General, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea. 

8. July 2000- June 2001, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

9. July 2001 -June 2002, Chief, F-22 Avionics and System Effectiveness, Headquarters Air Combat 

Command, Langley AFB, Va. 

I 0. July 2002 June 2005, Special Assistant to the Commandant, U.S. Air Force Weapons School, 

Commander, 16th Weapons Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

11. August 2005- June 2006, Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 

12. July 2006- March 2007, Lead, Fixed Wing Applications, Force Applications. J-8, the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. 

13. March 2007- July 2008, Chief, Force Applications Engagement Division, J-8, the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. 
52 

14. July 2008 -July 2009, Vice Commander. 332nd A it Expeditionary Wing, Joint Base Balad, Iraq. 

15. July 2009- May 2010, Chief, Senate Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

16. May 2010- May 2011, Commander, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea. 

17. May 2011 -October 2012, Deputy Director, Legislative Liaison, Ot1ice of the Secretary of the Air 

Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

18. November 2012- November 2013, Commander, 451 stAir Expeditionary Wing and Kandahar 

Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, Afghanistan. 

19. January 2013- May 2014, Assistant Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command and 

Assistant Vice Commander, 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force, Shaw AFB, S.C. 

20. May 2014- May 2015, Chief of Staff, United States Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. 

21. June 2015 - August 2016. Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, 5th Air Force, 

Yokota AB, Japan. 

22. August 2016- present, Director for Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

I. July 2006- March 2007, Lead, Fixed Wing Applications, Force Applications, J-8, the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. 

2. March 2007- July 2008, Chief, Force Applications Engagement Division, J-8, the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. 

3. November 2012- November 2013, Commander, Kandahar Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, Afghanistan. 

4. May 2014- May 2015, Chief of Staff, United States Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. 

5. June 2015- August 2016, Commander, United States Forces Japan, Yokota AB, Japan. 

6. August 2016- present, Director for Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: command pilot 

Flight hours: more than 4000 hours with 200+ combat missions 

Aircraft flown: F-16A/B/C/D 

MAJOR A WARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Medal with silver and bronze oak leaf clusters 

Afghanistan Campaign Medal with bronze star 

Iraq Campaign Medal with two bronze stars 

NATO Non-Article Five Medal (ISAF) 

Korean Defense Service Medal 

General Emblem of Honor (Romania) 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant June 14, 1986 

First Lieutenant August 9, 1988 

Captain August 9, 1990 

Major May 1,1998 

Lieutenant Colonel November 1, 2002 

Colonel September I, 2007 

Brigadier General May 2, 2012 

Major General March 2, 2015 

Lieutenant General June 5, 2015 

(Current as ofJanuary 2017) 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2018 

(55) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON 

Mr. BACON. Secretary Mattis’ assignment of responsibilities and authorities for 

the new Joint ISR management organization required in the FY18 NDAA represents an important evolution for the Department of Defense. To assist the subcommittee in ensuring this new structure has the resources necessary to succeed, 

1) What is the organizational structure of the J–32 and associated Chairman’s Controlled Activity for Joint ISR Management? 2) What is the current authorized manpower for these organizations for officer, enlisted, civilian and associated contractors, broken out by grade and service where appropriate? 3) Does the new organization have a dedicated source of funding? If so, what is it and what is its budget for 

FY18? 4) What is the current status of development and fielding of automated tools 

to enable management of our large and increasingly complex joint ISR enterprise? 

Specific areas of interest include tools that support joint collection management, ISR 

operations management, mission reporting and effectiveness analysis, and modeling 

and simulation. 

General DOLAN. 1) What is the organizational structure of the J–32 and associated 

Chairman’s Controlled Activity for Joint ISR Management? 

See attachment A ‘‘J32_Organization_Manpower.pdf’’ 

[The attachment referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

2) What is the current authorized manpower for these organizations for officer, enlisted, civilian and associated contractors, broken out by grade and service where appropriate? 

See attachment A ‘‘J32_Organization_Manpower.pdf’’ 

3) Does the new organization have a dedicated source of funding? If so, what is 

it and what is its budget for FY18? 

Upon completion of the transition from USSTRATCOM to Joint Staff on 1 October 

2018, J32-/JISROC CCA has two dedicated sources of funding starting in FY19: PE 

32222F Civ Pay US Air Force is the Executive Agent PE 92222F O&M US Air Force 

is the Executive Agent In FY18, J32/JFCC ISR’s budget was approximately $5.7M. 

4) What is the current status of development and fielding of automated tools to enable management of our large and increasingly complex joint ISR enterprise? 

Specific areas of interest include tools that support joint collection management, 

ISR operations management, mission reporting and effectiveness analysis, and modeling and simulation. The Combatant Command Intelligence Information Technology (CCIIT) Enterprise initiative, led by USD(I), is addressing chronic materiel 

and non-materiel gaps and improving enterprise management to align and modernize Combatant Command intelligence capabilities. The first materiel solution, 

based on validated CCIIT enterprise requirements and resourced beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, will address shortfalls in ‘‘Integrated Mission Management’’— 

the integration of currently siloed capabilities supporting requests for Information 

(RFI), Collection Management (CM), and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Mission Management (MM). DIA will deliver the integrated mission 

management (IMM) capability using agile development methodology, incorporating 

input and guidance from the functional managers for CM and MM, the Joint Staff 

J26 and J32, respectively. IMM will deliver a unified workspace to manage intelligence requirements and products, integrating data sources via a workflow tracking 

and monitoring dashboard. The current state is siloed systems which provide functions aligned to their own data, requiring users to access multiple tools to accomplish the mission. The future state is a presentation layer which provides a single 

point of entry, while an application layer aggregates data to the dashboard, providing access to IMM functionality of individual systems. Over time, rationalization 

will remove duplicative functionality and non-authoritative data. 

Capability Drops (CD). 

• CD–1 is projected in the first quarter of FY2019 and will provide an agile sprint 

plan and proof of concept. 

• CD–2 is projected in the first quarter of FY2020, focused on the design and development of IMM Workflow Data Services for tracking and monitoring, and 

will implement information discovery across multiple intelligence disciplines. 
56 

• CD–3 is projected in the fourth quarter of FY2021 and deliver access to data 

from additional data sources, design and develop end-to-end collection and Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination (PED) service by integrating with existing 

systems and new systems, obtain IMM Final Operating Capability (FOC), and 

capture FOC lessons learned. • CD–4 is projected in the fourth quarter of FY2021 and will develop Modeling 

and Simulation Capabilities, integrate tipping and cueing, and implement crossdomain information sharing capabilities. 

Mr. BACON. Please provide details on the USAF’s current capability and capacity 

to provide for the processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) and forensic 

analysis of Moving Target Indicator intelligence. In your response please provide 

specifics on: 1) The current number of USAF personnel trained to conduct the analysis and exploitation of MTI intelligence; 2) How the AF trains and certifies it’s personnel to perform PED and forensic analysis of MTI intelligence; 3) The current suit 

of tools used to assist USAF personnel in the performance of PED and forensic analysis of MTI intelligence; 4) Details on the portions of the USAF FY19 budget request that address resource requirements for the performance of PED and forensic 

analysis of MTI intelligence to include personnel, RDT&E, procurement, and operations and maintenance accounts and programs; and 5) The USAF strategy to increase its capability and capacity to perform PED and forensic analysis of MTI intelligence associated with the growth and diversification of MTI sensors as part of its 

ABMS proposal. 

General HARRIS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BACON. The F–35’s onboard sensors provide an asymmetric advantage to 

other F–35s in flight, but I am concerned about the ability of the F–35A to share 

the information it is capable of collecting with other users. Questions: 1) What capability/capacity does the F–35A Block 3F have to store and record information from 

each of the F–35A’s active and passive sensors? 2) Does the F–35A Block 3F have 

a post-mission data recovery architecture to allow sensor and mission data to be 

sanitized and passed on to other joint users, U.S. national intelligence agencies and 

international partners? 3) What are the USAF’s current Block 4/C2D2 requirements 

to record and share F–35A sensor data, both inflight and post-mission, and when 

does the USAF anticipate fielding this capability? 4) When will the F–35A have to 

ability to pass targeting information to support the following joint force missions: 

Inflight target cueing for Army long-range fires? Inflight target cuing for Navy 

TLAM strikes? Inflight imagery transfers to deployed joint special operations forces? 

Inflight and post mission electronic order of battle (EOB) updates to the appropriate 

national intelligence agencies and integrated broadcast services? 

General HARRIS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BACON. As the USAF program of record for multi-intelligence processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED), 1) How does the Distributed Common Ground 

System (DCGS) support the planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence collected by the RC–135 fleet? 2) Does AF DCGS provide tools 

and enterprise capabilities required to support management of information collected 

by RC–135 baseline sensors and quick reaction capabilities like it does for other ISR 

platforms like U–2, RQ–4 and MQ–9? If not, why not and does the AF have a plan 

to integrate PED mission requirements for all AF ISR platforms? 3) Does AF DCGS 

provide PED crews the ability to monitor secure radio channels and provide secure 

communications with distributed crews who operate remotely operated systems like 

the RQ–4, and MQ–9, similar to what exists for the U–2? Is there a modernization 

plan to provide secure crew communications to link all USAF distributed ISR operations crews? 

General HARRIS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BACON. Please provide details on the USAF’s current capability and capacity 

to provide for the processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) and forensic 

analysis of Moving Target Indicator intelligence. In your response please provide 

specifics on: 1) The current number of USAF personnel trained to conduct the analysis and exploitation of MTI intelligence; 2) How the AF trains and certifies it’s personnel to perform PED and forensic analysis of MTI intelligence; 3) The current suit 

of tools used to assist USAF personnel in the performance of PED and forensic analysis of MTI intelligence; 4) Details on the portions of the USAF FY19 budget request that address resource requirements for the performance of PED and forensic 

analysis of MTI intelligence to include personnel, RDT&E, procurement, and operations and maintenance accounts and programs; 5) The USAF strategy to increase 

its capability and capacity to perform PED and forensic analysis of MTI intelligence 

associated with the growth and diversification of MTI sensors as part of its ABMS 

proposal. 

Ms. THORNTON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
57 

Mr. BACON. The F–35’s onboard sensors provide an asymmetric advantage to 

other F–35s in flight, but I am concerned about the ability of the F–35A to share 

the information it is capable of collecting with other users. Questions: 1) What capability/capacity does the F–35A Block 3F have to store and record information from 

each of the F–35A’s active and passive sensors? 2) Does the F–35A Block 3F have 

a post-mission data recovery architecture to allow sensor and mission data to be 

sanitized and passed on to other joint users, U.S. national intelligence agencies and 

international partners? 3) What are the USAF’s current Block 4/C2D2 requirements 

to record and share F–35A sensor data, both inflight and post-mission, and when 

does the USAF anticipate fielding this capability? 4) When will the F–35A have to 

ability to pass targeting information to support the following joint force missions: 

Inflight target cueing for Army long-range fires? Inflight target cuing for Navy 

TLAM strikes? Inflight imagery transfers to deployed joint special operations forces? 

Inflight and post mission electronic order of battle (EOB) updates to the appropriate 

national intelligence agencies and integrated broadcast services? 

Ms. THORNTON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BACON. As the USAF program of record for multi-intelligence processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED), 1) How does the Distributed Common Ground 

System (DCGS) support the planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence collected by the RC–135 fleet? 2) Does AF DCGS provide tools 

and enterprise capabilities required to support management of information collected 

by RC–135 baseline sensors and quick reaction capabilities like it does for other ISR 

platforms like U–2, RQ–4 and MQ–9? If not, why not and does the AF have a plan 

to integrate PED mission requirements for all AF ISR platforms? 3) Does AF DCGS 

provide PED crews the ability to monitor secure radio channels and provide secure 

communications with distributed crews who operate remotely operated systems like 

the RQ–4, and MQ–9, similar to what exists for the U–2? Is there a modernization 

plan to provide secure crew communications to link all USAF distributed ISR operations crews? 

Ms. THORNTON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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