[Cite as In re A.J., 2024-Ohio-280.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LUCAS COUNTY

In re A.J., S.H., K.H. Court of Appeals No. L-23-1189

Trial Court No. JC 22288344

 

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Decided: January 22, 2024

* * * * *

Rebecca L. West-Estell, for appellee.

Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.

* * * * *

ZMUDA, J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal from the judgment of the Lucas 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying the request for continuance 

of appellant, S.P., the father of S.H., and granting permanent custody of S.H., (d.o.b.

10/7/16) to Lucas County Children Services. Finding no error, we affirm.
2.

II. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} Lucas County Children Services (LCCS or the Agency) had a history with

the mother of S.H., and S.H. and her siblings were previously adjudicated dependent and 

neglected in 2019, with protective supervision lasting until 2021. In January 2022, LCCS 

received a new referral alleging mother was using illicit drugs and S.H. and a sibling 

were not attending school, with another sibling left in the care of “some lady.” On

March 4, 2022, the juvenile court granted the petition for access filed by LCCS after 

mother refused to cooperate with the investigation. When mother continued to resist the 

investigation, LCCS filed a complaint in dependency and neglect on March 11, 2022. 

{¶ 3} On March 11, 2022, the juvenile court held an emergency shelter care 

hearing. Mother and appellant did not appear at hearing. The juvenile court appointed 

counsel for mother and LCCS indicated it was unable to locate appellant. The juvenile 

court awarded interim temporary custody of S.H. and her siblings to LCCS and appointed 

a court-appointed special advocate (CASA)/ guardian ad litem for the children. An 

attempt to serve appellant with a copy of the juvenile court’s March 11, 2022 order by 

certified mail to a Mansfield address was unsuccessful, with certified mail returned as 

refused.

{¶ 4} On April 13, 2022, summons issued to appellant for personal service at a 

new address, on Lawrence Avenue. On April 26, 2022, summons returned with failure of 

service, noting service as refused.
3.

{¶ 5} On April 26, 2022, the CASA filed her report and recommendations, and on 

May 11, 2022, LCCS filed its case plan and a motion to change placement and terminate 

temporary custody, with a request for hearing. The juvenile court adopted the case plan 

as an order of the court and scheduled the matter for hearing. Service issued to appellant 

at the Lawrence Avenue address.

{¶ 6} On May 12, 2022, the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing, with the 

hearing on disposition bifurcated at mother’s request. Mother appeared at the hearing

with appointed counsel and consented to a finding of neglect. The juvenile court 

adjudicated S.H. and her siblings neglected, continued the shelter care orders, and 

scheduled the matter for hearing on disposition.

{¶ 7} On August 26, 2022, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing. 

{¶ 8} Mother appeared with counsel at the hearing. Mother stipulated that the 

fathers of two of S.H.’s siblings were deceased and agreed to an award of temporary 

custody of the children to LCCS and agreed to comply with case plan services. Mother 

acknowledged that appellant is the father of S.H. Mother then left the hearing with the 

court’s permission. 

{¶ 9} Appellant appeared for this hearing, with appointed counsel, and for the first 

time was named in the LCCS case and the court’s filings as a party. Testimony at the 

hearing demonstrated mother did not have contact information for appellant, and 

appellant had no contact with S.H. until recently. Additionally, during the 2019 case 
4.

concerning mother and S.H., LCCS indicated that appellant may have been incarcerated. 

At the time of the hearing, appellant had an active warrant. Appellant did not consent to 

an award of temporary custody of S.H. to LCCS, and the matter proceeded to hearing as 

to appellant and S.H.1

{¶ 10} LCCS introduced testimony of an assessments caseworker, noting concerns 

regarding appellant. Appellant had appeared at the agency the day before hearing to take 

custody of S.H., and asked for the address of S.H.’s foster placement. Appellant was 

upset that S.H. was in foster care, and caused a disruption, resulting in security asking 

him to leave. Appellant provided LCCS with a phone number and address. As to 

temporary custody, LCCS believed temporary custody of S.H. with LCCS to be in her 

best interest, with a desire for appellant to complete case plan services. The juvenile 

court admitted LCCS exhibits that included documentation of appellant’s criminal record.

{¶ 11} Appellant presented no witnesses or evidence at this hearing. 

{¶ 12} Following hearing, the juvenile court found temporary custody to LCCS 

was in the best interest of S.H. and ordered LCCS to make reasonable efforts based on 

the case plan filed May 11, 2022, with a goal of reunification. The juvenile court ordered 

1 The father of mother’s youngest child, not adjudicated within this case, also appeared at 

hearing and expressed his wish to obtain custody of all mother’s children. As he did not 

file a motion in this case or seek to appeal the judgment, his appearance is not relevant to 

this appeal. 
5.

the parties to comply with all case plan services and ordered appellant to submit a urine 

screen that day. The record reflected that appellant did not submit a urine screen. 

{¶ 13} On September 7, 2022, LCCS filed an updated case plan, and on

October 11, 2022, the juvenile court adopted the case plan as an order of the court. 

Subsequent case plans were filed on September 26, 2022, February 21, 2023, and

March 9, 2023, with each approved as an order of the court. Consequently, appellant was 

ordered to comply with the following case plan services: dual diagnostic assessment, 

obtain appropriate housing, and complete anger management services.

{¶ 14} On December 15, 2022, LCCS filed a motion for permanent custody 

pursuant to R.C. sections 2151.23, 2151.413, and 2151.414. 

{¶ 15} On March 9, 2023, the matter was before the juvenile court on an annual 

review and on the LCCS motion for an extension of temporary custody. Appellant’s case 

plan services were outlined for the court, and included a dual diagnostic assessment,

anger management, and drug screens, with LCCS requesting two screens and appellant 

completing no drug screens. However, appellant did provide a urine sample to Unison in 

December 2022, and his levels were “very high for marijuana.” The juvenile court

granted the motion to extend temporary custody, found that LCCS was continuing to 

make reasonable efforts, and ordered the parties to comply with case plan services. The 

court also scheduled the motion for permanent custody for trial.
6.

{¶ 16} The juvenile court held trial on the motion for permanent custody on

June 15, and June 28, 2023. Mother did not appear for trial, and her counsel informed the 

court that mother ceased contact with counsel in January, and did not respond to attempts 

to reach her at her last known phone number and address since that time. The juvenile 

court granted mother’s counsel leave to withdraw, deeming mother’s lack of contact a 

waiver of counsel. 

{¶ 17} Appellant appeared with his counsel, and at the start of the first day of trial, 

he made an oral motion to continue the hearing. In support, appellant argued he was 

“almost done completing his services” and wanted additional time to demonstrate 

completion of services to the court. LCCS opposed a continuance, arguing the motion for 

permanent custody had been pending for several months, and the matter should proceed 

without any delay for the “sake of permanency for these children.” The CASA also 

opposed a continuance, noting this case was not the first for the children, who “have had 

dealings with Children Services” relative to the 2019 case, and deserved resolution and 

permanency.

{¶ 18} The juvenile court denied the request for continuance, noting the case had 

been pending 14 months, the motion had been pending since December, and appellant 

presented no reason to merit continuing the scheduled hearing. 

{¶ 19} LCCS proceeded on its motion, and on the first day of trial, presented 

testimony of its family visits monitor, security officer, and ongoing supervisor. The 
7.

family visits monitor testified regarding an incident with appellant during one of his visits 

with S.H., in which appellant became disruptive after being informed he was not 

scheduled for his visit at noon during mother’s visitation time, but needed to return at 

1:00 p.m., after mother’s visit. The monitor testified that mother had more supervised 

visits, at Level 1, while appellant’s visitation was Level 2, a step down from the 

supervision in Level 1. 

{¶ 20} After the monitor and the guard told appellant he needed to come back at 

1:00 p.m., according to the schedule provided by the caseworker, Appellant stood up and 

said, in front of S.H., that it was “bullshit” and left. He did not return for his scheduled 

visitation time that day, but otherwise regularly attended visitation. Appellant continued 

to join mother during her visitation time, in Level 1, and both mother and appellant were 

given visitation from 12-2:00 p.m. together with S.H. and her siblings. The monitor 

testified that at some point S.H. refused to go the to the Level 2 room with appellant, and 

“for whatever reason it didn’t happen in Level 2” for the rest of the visitations. With the 

exception of appellant’s outburst, the monitor testified that appellant was appropriate 

with S.H. at visitations, and was consistent in attending.

{¶ 21} The security guard also testified regarding appellant’s visitation time, based 

on her observations in Level 1. She testified that, while appellant had Level 2 visitation, 

the supervisor asked the guard if appellant could come into Level 1 “because his daughter 

didn’t want to go to the room that he was in” for Level 2 visitation, one-on-one with 
8.

appellant. The guard also described an incident with appellant that resulted in appellant 

being asked to leave. In that instance, appellant “was interfering in a conversation that I 

was having with another father in the room that had nothing to do with him.” After the 

guard told the other father that he and his child could not leave the room to visit the 

vending machine, appellant told the other father he could do it, and told the guard, “You 

don’t know what you’re talking about. You don’t know how to do your job.” The guard 

told appellant he needed to leave, and appellant “got up and walked out, and that was the 

end of it.”

{¶ 22} Next, the LCCS ongoing supervisor, the supervisor for appellant’s LCCS 

caseworker, testified regarding her direct contact with appellant. On December 19, 2022, 

appellant came to the agency to speak with his caseworker, but she was unavailable. The 

supervisor met with appellant, face-to-face, in what she believed was an unannounced 

visit. The two discussed his case plan, and because appellant smelled of marijuana, she 

asked and appellant acknowledged he currently smoked marijuana but was “trying to cut 

down.” He admitted to using other drugs in the past, and stated his past drug use was the 

reason he did not want to do group sessions for substance abuse counseling, because 

being exposed to people who do drugs other than marijuana was triggering. Appellant 

told the supervisor that he did not believe he needed treatment, but would do individual 

counseling. 
9.

{¶ 23} The supervisor testified that subsequent in-person meetings were pleasant, 

although his manner toward her was less friendly than his manner with others. She 

testified that appellant was direct on phone calls, calling for an answer to a specific 

question, but there were two phone calls that she witnessed that were more 

confrontational. The first phone call was earlier in the case, and between appellant and 

his case manager. Appellant could be heard screaming at his caseworker over the phone, 

with the volume loud enough to cause the caseworker to hold the phone away from her 

ear. The supervisor testified that she took the receiver from the caseworker and spoke 

with appellant to calm him, and he calmed down when the supervisor addressed his 

immediate concern regarding visitation. 

{¶ 24} In the second phone call, the day before hearing, appellant was angry that 

the agency had filed for permanent custody. He called the supervisor names and accused 

the agency of trying to prevent him from reunifying with his child. The supervisor then 

testified regarding threats appellant directed at her, as follows:

He said, How do you think this is going to work out for you? I had a 

hard time getting anything in because he kept over-talking. He said, You’re 

going to feel my pain. And I said that sounds like a threat, [appellant]. Are 

you threatening me? And he went on to cuss and yell calling me the N 

word. He told me I was dumb as fuck, quoting him. He stated – he asked if 
10.

I had children, and I said I’m not going to answer that question. And he 

said that – he said I better watch over my children and then I said again

* * *

He was yelling and hung – and hung up on me.

{¶ 25} After this exchange, the supervisor alerted LCCS counsel and security, and 

filed an incident report. As a result of this call, appellant’s visits were moved back to 

Level 1 and LCCS staff was directed to meet with appellant only at the agency. 

{¶ 26} In addition to testimony that illustrated appellant’s temper, appellant 

interrupted throughout the proceedings with angry outbursts, calling testimony “lies” or 

arguing with the witness, prompting the juvenile court to admonish appellant to not speak 

out and let the witness testify.

{¶ 27} After the supervisor’s testimony, court recessed until the next hearing date.

{¶ 28} On June 28, 2023, trial continued on the request for permanent custody by 

LCCS. Mother did not appear. Appellant was present with his counsel. Prior to 

testimony, the parties stipulated to the admission of certified exhibits that included 

treatment records for appellant and the docket for an Oregon Municipal Court case in 

which appellant was a defendant. LCCS then called appellant’s LCCS caseworker as a 

witness.

{¶ 29} Appellant’s caseworker testified that she was assigned to the case since 

November 2022, after the shelter care hearing, and took over for another case worker 
11.

who was no longer at LCCS. She testified regarding the case plan for the family, 

indicating appellant first had contact with LCCS in September 2022. Appellant’s case 

plan services included a dual diagnostic evaluation, housing, and anger management. 

Appellant completed his dual diagnostic evaluation through Unison in December 2022, 

and Unison recommended IOP services for marijuana, but appellant did not engage in 

those services. Instead, appellant completed a second dual diagnostic evaluation through 

OhioGuidestone at the end of January 2023, and OhioGuidestone recommended weekly 

group, two times a month, for mental health therapy. 

{¶ 30} According to his caseworker, appellant has engaged in those services, 

based on verbal updates from his therapist to his caseworker. Appellant’s caseworker 

never received any records to review despite multiple requests for records from 

OhioGuidestone. According to the verbal reports, appellant attended his therapy 

sessions, and within the past month started a COG program. The caseworker was unsure 

what the COG program entailed, but testified “to be eligible for the COG program they 

would identify substance use issues and basically learn healthy coping mechanisms.” 

The caseworker testified that this program is not the equivalent of an anger management 

service, and appellant was not enrolled in anger management services at any other 

provider, despite discussions with appellant regarding the need to engage in this service. 

{¶ 31} Appellant’s caseworker testified that appellant indicated openness to anger 

management services, and signed a release for Harbor to participate in their program, but 
12.

did not follow through after starting the COG program, which he thought was an anger 

management program. She admitted she had no discussion with appellant regarding the 

fact the COG program was not considered an anger management service. She also 

testified regarding the angry phone call, referenced by her supervisor in earlier testimony, 

but identified no other incidents with appellant aside from noting he got “angry very 

quickly in meetings” but would also deescalate pretty quickly, too. She identified two 

meetings she attended with appellant, and testified he “wasn’t very open to hearing what 

our lawyers and what other people had to express to him.”

{¶ 32} The caseworker also testified regarding visitations and her discussions with 

S.H. about appellant. She testified that appellant attended almost every visitation, and 

while he was moved to Level 2, he stayed with mother and the other children to visit with 

S.H., as S.H. wished. The caseworker testified that, while S.H. did not provide reasons, 

“she says visits are good with mom and visits are bad with dad” and indicated appellant 

“yells sometimes and he’s loud.” She acknowledged, however, that she did not observe 

appellant’s interactions with S.H. during the visitations, and the security guard reported 

no incidents based on appellant’s conduct with S.H.

{¶ 33} Appellant’s caseworker requested his drug screens, with five screens 

requested and zero screens provided. She testified appellant admitted to using marijuana 

but claimed “he is cutting down on his marijuana usage.” She also testified that appellant 

had recent criminal drug charges, arising from alleged possession of methamphetamine, 
13.

cocaine, a pipe, and three bags of marijuana. The charges had been bound over to a 

grand jury, and she believed they remained pending at the time of the hearing. Because 

appellant did not comply with drug screening, LCCS had no way to verify whether he 

used the drugs allegedly found in his possession, and the criminal charges caused a 

concern of potential incarceration.

{¶ 34} As to housing, appellant’s caseworker testified she attempted to see his 

prior home through unannounced home visits, but appellant moved without notice and his 

caseworker was not sure of the new address. Appellant provided a new address, long 

after he moved, but after appellant’s threatening phone call with her supervisor, she was 

no longer permitted to do a home visit. 

{¶ 35} Finally, the caseworker testified regarding S.H.’s current foster placement. 

She testified that S.H. is in the same placement as her brother, and she was academically 

behind when she first started kindergarten, but attended a summer program and is caught 

up “quite a bit.” Although S.H. is fully potty trained, she does have accidents, often after 

visitations. Both S.H. and her brother expressed a desire to stay with their current foster 

parents. Appellant identified an aunt as a potential placement, but the aunt never 

followed up with LCCS to complete a home study. The caseworker testified that LCCS 

recommended permanent custody with the agency, in the best interests of S.H. and her 

siblings.
14.

{¶ 36} LCCS’s final witness was the CASA/guardian ad litem. The CASA 

testified that she met with the children at least once a month for the duration of the case. 

She first met appellant at the court hearing in August 2022. The CASA observed the 

parents during visits twice, with S.H. relaxed during mother’s visits and uncomfortable 

during appellant’s visits. The CASA testified that S.H. “didn’t seem relaxed. She didn’t 

talk.” The CASA also testified that both mother and appellant tried to interact with S.H. 

and her siblings, and she did not see anything of concern during the visits. 

{¶ 37} As to S.H.’s foster placement, the CASA testified that S.H. and her brother 

are doing well in foster care, and S.H. “seems really attached to the foster parents.” S.H. 

is affectionate towards the foster parents and “seems really happy, and she says she’s 

happy there.” While living with the foster parents, S.H.’s progress in school has 

improved, and the foster parents meet all S.H.’s needs and interact with her in a positive 

manner, with positive and supportive parenting skills. The CASA also testified that S.H. 

interacts with the foster parent’s three biological children and one other foster child “like 

a sister would.” S.H. has “said she would like to keep living with the foster parents.” 

S.H. has also said “she does not want to see her father,” but gave no reason in support. 

{¶ 38} The CASA testified that the foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt 

S.H. and her brother. Other possible placements, provided by the parents, were not 

recommended. The CASA recommended permanent custody of the S.H. and her siblings 

with LCCS in the best interests of the children.
15.

{¶ 39} Appellant testified on his own behalf. He stated he first learned of the 

LCCS case while he was in prison, but he also testified that he was not incarcerated in 

March 2022. He admitted he did not see S.H. between March 2022 and shortly before 

the hearing in August 2022. He testified that he started inquiring to learn where S.H. was 

after he had not heard from mother in a while, and he had no current phone number. He 

created a Facebook account and messaged mother, and she responded a week later, 

informing him of the LCCS case. This occurred right before the hearing in August 2022, 

prompting his visit to LCCS to get information. Appellant acknowledged that he 

appeared at LCCS “demanding answers,” and the situation “made my blood boil,” 

resulting in LCCS calling police.

{¶ 40} Appellant testified that he had to keep pushing the prior caseworker to set 

up visitation with S.H., and he has attended visitation regularly since then. He believed 

that his visits went well. As to services, appellant testified that nobody asked him to do 

any services, and he did the assessments on his own. He testified he went to counseling 

at OhioGuidestone and participated in anger management programming there, but his 

caseworker did not approve the anger management. Appellant described his counseling 

and participation in COG, which he described as a program that addressed “behavioral 

steps. Like, not getting angry and not – I know if I do, though, out of frustration what is 

my consequences and all of that.”
16.

{¶ 41} Appellant acknowledged that he often got upset but testified that he got 

upset because of things LCCS workers did, such as canceling his visits based on mother’s 

no-shows or because those involved in the case “try to go against me about something the 

truth is.” When asked if the COG program helped him with anger management, appellant 

testified “the COG program is to get me not to get upset.” Appellant testified that he was 

scheduled to finish the COG program July 2, 2023, but the counseling would remain 

ongoing.

{¶ 42} As to employment and housing, appellant testified he works for a company 

that provides a tire service for disabled semis and also for his family’s construction 

business. At the time of hearing, he testified that he stays with a girlfriend and pays rent 

but is not on the lease. He described his current home as happy but not necessarily 

permanent, and LCCS did not attempt to visit his home. 

{¶ 43} At several points in his testimony, both on direct and cross examination, 

appellant exhibited frustration and anger, lashing out at the attorney questioning him, 

prompting the juvenile court to stop and address appellant as follows:

Sir, I need to hear the information. She’s trying to give information 

to me, the judge, that is going to make the decision. So maybe you think 

some of these questions aren’t very important, but they are important to her 

and then every other lawyer who is asking questions. So – no, no. So what 

I’m trying to do is help you not lose your temper.
17.

{¶ 44} Appellant testified about his temper, acknowledging the recent phone call 

with the LCCS supervisor, and when asked whether he was aware the supervisor 

considered the phone call a threat, stated, “No, I am not considering that. But I know 

what a threat is.” He admitted the phone call occurred after he had been participating in 

the COG program for some time, but maintained the call was not a threat, because he 

knew “how to talk” and “how to word what I say.” 

{¶ 45} Finally, the juvenile court inquired regarding appellant’s relationship with 

S.H. Appellant testified that he was incarcerated when S.H. was born in 2016, and he 

first saw her when he was released from prison in April 2021. Appellant testified he had 

“more conversations than [in-person] visits” with S.H. prior to the LCCS case, and 

probably saw her in person four or five times before the Agency was involved. He 

testified that he has four other children, ranging in age from eight to 18. None of his 

other children live with him, but he testified he sees each child every day and pays child 

support.

{¶ 46} At the close of hearing, the juvenile court heard argument from the parties

regarding the motion for permanent custody. LCCS argued that permanent custody with 

LCCS was in the best interest of S.H and her siblings. As to appellant, LCCS noted he 

participated in some case services but continues to exhibit problems controlling his anger, 

the threatening phone call an example of appellant’s lack of control. Additionally, LCCS 

noted that appellant did not complete his substance abuse treatment, submitted no drug 
18.

screens requested by the Agency, and admits to using marijuana. At the time of hearing, 

appellant also had four, pending drug-related charges for drugs other than marijuana. 

S.H. is bonded with her foster parents and doing well and expressed a wish to remain in 

that placement. 

{¶ 47} Appellant’s trial counsel argued against permanent custody, and for denial 

of the LCCS motion. Counsel pointed to the case plan services appellant did complete, 

and his consistent attendance at visitations. While not excusing appellant’s outbursts, 

Counsel argued that much of it stemmed from frustration with the Agency, and was not 

directed at S.H. Appellant’s counsel requested the court deny the motion and extend 

temporary custody so that appellant could complete his case plan services within a sixmonth period and continue visitations with S.H. 

{¶ 48} At the close of the hearing, the parties agreed to an in-camera hearing with 

an older sibling of S.H., at which time the case would be submitted for decision.

{¶ 49} On July 11, 2023, the juvenile court called the matter for hearing to place 

its decision on the record. Neither mother nor appellant appeared. Appellant’s trial 

counsel appeared on his behalf.

{¶ 50} The juvenile court, having reviewed all admissible evidence and the 

testimony from the in-camera interview, found by clear and convincing evidence that, 

despite reasonable efforts to prevent the continued removal of the children from their 
19.

parents, that the children should not and could not be returned to the parents, and found 

permanent custody of the children to LCCS was in the best interests of each child.

{¶ 51} The juvenile court’s findings with respect to S.H. were that reasonable 

efforts to reunify had been made, but it was in S.H.’s best interest for permanent 

placement with LCCS pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4).

{¶ 52} On July 26, 2023, the juvenile court filed its judgment entry, denying 

appellant’s motion to continue the permanent custody trial, construing appellant’s request 

for additional time as a motion to extend temporary custody and denying that motion, and 

awarding permanent custody to LCCS. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that S.H. cannot be placed with the parents within a reasonable time or should 

not be placed with the parents, in accordance to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The court 

further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that a grant of permanent custody to 

LCCS was in S.H.’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D). 

{¶ 53} As part of its factual findings, the juvenile court determined that appellant 

completed a dual diagnostic assessment with two different mental health providers, 

participated in individual substance use treatment, a weekly group, and mental health 

therapy twice a month, but did not participate in an anger management program and has 

not completed drug screens requested by LCCS. Appellant admitted to using marijuana, 

but claimed he is cutting down on use, and has four pending drug charges that have been 

bound over to the Lucas County grand jury, with the allegations involving offenses with 
20.

drugs other than marijuana, and potential incarceration is a concern for LCCS. Finally, 

appellant has not demonstrated verifiable stable, appropriate housing, and LCCS has 

continuing concern for appellant’s anger issues, with the most recent incident a 

threatening phone call to the LCCS supervisor on the day prior to the beginning of trial.

{¶ 54} The juvenile court found that under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), following 

placement of S.H. outside the home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and 

diligent efforts by LCCS to assist to remedy the problems that initially caused that 

placement, appellant failed to continuously and repeatedly, substantially remedy the 

conditions. While appellant did engage in services, he still exhibits concerning behavior 

including the inability to control his anger, evidenced by the threats to the LCCS 

supervisor and his behavior at trial. Appellant also did not complete drug screens 

requested by LCCS or a drug screen ordered by the court. Finally, appellant failed to 

obtain appropriate housing.

{¶ 55} The juvenile court further found that under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), appellant 

demonstrated a lack of commitment to S.H. by failing to regularly support, visit, or 

communicate with S.H., or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an 

adequate permanent home for the child. Specifically, the juvenile court found appellant 

failed to show a lack of substantial compliance with his case plan, including failing to 

demonstrate an ability to control his anger, failing to establish stable housing, failing to

submit to drug screens, and obtaining another drug charge while the case was pending.
21.

{¶ 56} In weighing the best interests of the child, the juvenile court noted S.H. is 

bonded to her foster parents and doing well in placement, along with her brother. S.H., 

also, has been in the custody of LCCS since March 11, 2022. Finding S.H. needs a 

legally secure placement, and with no family identified to provide a permanent home that 

meets her needs, the juvenile court determined a legally secure, permanent placement can 

not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to LCCS. 

{¶ 57} This appeal followed.

III. Assignment of Error

{¶ 58} Appellant asserts a single assignment of error on appeal, as follows:

1. The finding of permanent custody being in [S.H.’s] best interest 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence as Father had completed 

case plan services. 

IV. Analysis

{¶ 59} In reviewing the juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights and 

award permanent custody to LCCS, we must determine whether the juvenile court’s

findings are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Z.C., Slip Opinion 

2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1; In re A.H., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1057, 2011-Ohio-4857, ¶ 11. 

“Reversal is proper only where [it is] determined, after weighing the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences including the credibility of the witnesses, that the juvenile court 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment 
22.

must be reversed.” In re N.J., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1114, 2023-Ohio-3190, ¶ 38, 

citing In re T.J., 2021-Ohio-4085, 180 N.E.3d 706, ¶ 40 (6th Dist.), citing State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

{¶ 60} In a review based on manifest weight, we recognize that the juvenile court 

is in the best position to weigh evidence and evaluate testimony, so “every reasonable 

intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and 

the finding of facts.” In re A.E., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1043, 2023-Ohio-2310, ¶ 58, 

quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 21, 

quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn. 3, 461 N.E.2d 

1273 (1984).

{¶ 61} Before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody to 

LCCS under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must first find, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that (1) one of the enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply 

and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). 

“Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a 

mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is 

required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph 

three of the syllabus.
23.

{¶ 62} In this case, appellant only disputes the juvenile court’s award of 

permanent custody, with no challenge to the finding regarding neglect. 

{¶ 63} Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), a court may grant permanent custody of a 

child when it is in the best interests of the child, by clear and convincing evidence, and 

the child has not been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months 

within a consecutive twenty-four-month period and the evidence demonstrates “the child 

cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not 

be placed with the child’s parents. Because the juvenile court determined R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a) applied, it examined the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E), with only 

one factor required to support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent 

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. In re T.G., 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-23-1073, 2023-Ohio-2576, ¶ 38.

{¶ 64} Here, the juvenile court determined that the factors under (E)(1) and (4) 

applied. As stated in R.C. 2151.414(E):

* * * If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a 

hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of 

division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more 

of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court shall enter a 

finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
24.

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home 

and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the 

agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the 

child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to 

the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to 

resume and maintain parental duties.

* * * 

(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the 

child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child 

when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide 

an adequate permanent home for the child;

{¶ 65} If the juvenile court determines any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) 

applies, it must next determine whether an award of permanent custody to LCCS is in the 

best interest of the child, based on the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). 
25.

{¶ 66} Appellant’s assignment of error raises two arguments, addressing the 

findings under R.C. 2151.414(B), as well as the best interest of the child determination in 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). We address each argument in turn.

A. The manifest weight of the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding 

that S.H. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time

or should not be placed with either parent.

{¶ 67} In his first argument, appellant contends the juvenile court erred in 

determining S.H. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or 

should not be placed with either parent, based on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and the factors 

under R.C. 2151.414(E). Appellant acknowledges that the juvenile court found “he failed 

to control his anger, he failed to complete drug screens, failed to obtain appropriate 

housing, [and] was charged with another drug charge while the dependency case was 

open.”

{¶ 68} Appellant does not dispute the facts demonstrated by the evidence at trial, 

that he had anger issues, completed no drug screens, never had his housing approved, or 

was charged with new criminal offenses. Instead, appellant ignores his lack of 

compliance with drug screens and argues that the findings of the juvenile court should 

have included consideration of other factors, as presented through his own testimony. 

{¶ 69} Appellant argues that his new drug charges were dismissed by the grand 

jury, after the close of testimony, a matter not placed in the record of this case. Next, 

appellant argues his anger was never directed toward S.H., leading to the conclusion he 
26.

was not a danger to S.H. Appellant acknowledges his anger, but argues “a hard-headed 

personality is not a bar to being a parent,” and without LCCS demonstrating a link 

between appellant’s personality and negative effects on S.H.’s health, safety, or welfare, 

the finding of the court lacked evidentiary support. Finally, appellant argues that LCCS 

made little to no attempt to see his housing, based solely on his own testimony and 

without any attempt to address evidence that he moved without notifying LCCS for 

months and threatened an LCCS supervisor, precluding a site visit by LCCS personnel. 

{¶ 70} Appellant accepts the juvenile court’s finding that he refused to submit to 

drug screens, a part of his case plan services, and otherwise argues that the juvenile court 

should have weighed his testimony more favorably as to other factors concerning his 

anger issues or housing. In a review under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, 

however, the juvenile court’s “determination of credibility of testimony and evidence 

must not be encroached upon[.]” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 

St.3d 77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).

{¶ 71} The juvenile court determined the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and 

(4) applied to appellant. Upon review of the record, we conclude that competent credible 

evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s findings by clear and convincing 

evidence that appellant failed to remedy the problems that caused S.H. to be placed 

outside the home and failed to demonstrate a commitment toward S.H. based on his 

unwillingness to show substantial compliance with his case plan, including demonstrating 
27.

the ability to control his anger, demonstrating stable housing, and submitting to drug 

screens.

{¶ 72} Appellant’s first argument, therefore, lacks merit.

B. Permanent custody award to LCCS is in S.H.’s best interest. 

{¶ 73} In his second argument, appellant contends it was not in S.H.’s best interest 

to lose her relationship with appellant, her father. In support, appellant acknowledges the 

juvenile court’s findings that S.H. was bonded with her foster parents and doing well in 

her placement, and no other family was identified, appropriate to take legal custody of 

S.H. Rather than dispute these findings, appellant argues that the juvenile court failed to 

credit his involvement with S.H., and his lack of past involvement with LCCS regarding 

his other children. Appellant also characterizes his angry posture with LCCS staff as 

strong devotion to S.H. that should weigh in his favor in determining the best interests of 

S.H. 

{¶ 74} In reviewing the record, we find clear and convincing evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s finding. Appellant’s argument, moreover, does not challenge the 

evidence but, instead, attacks the credibility determination and seeks an interpretation of 

the evidence that favors him. For example, he argues that he never had involvement with 

LCCS regarding his other children, but he also never had custody of any of his other 

children, with his testimony describing the relationship as seeing them every day and 

paying child support. The juvenile court, moreover, found his anger issues to be a 
28.

negative, and not a positive sign of his desire to be in S.H.’s life. As addressed relative to 

appellant’s first argument, we do not encroach on the juvenile court’s credibility 

determination in a manifest weight of the evidence review. Accordingly, we find 

appellant’s second argument lacks merit.

{¶ 75} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s assignment of error is not well-taken. 

V. Conclusion

{¶ 76} Finding substantial justice has been done, we affirm the judgment of the 

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, awarding permanent custody 

of S.H. to LCCS. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 

24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________

JUDGE

Gene A. Zmuda, J. 

____________________________

Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

JUDGE
29.

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.