____________________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED DECEMBER 30, 2003 

ALICE JO MORALES, as Guardian and

Conservator for ANTONIO MORALES, a

legally incapacitated person,

also known as ANTHONY MORALES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

JAMES W. BOYD, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Trustee, 

 Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 122601 

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

PER CURIAM 

AFTER REMAND 

At issue in this case is whether prejudgment interest 

awarded under MCL 600.6013 accrues during appellate 
 

proceedings. On the authority of Dedes v Asch,1 the Court of 

Appeals held that it does not.2 We disagree because the 

language of MCL 600.6013 unambiguously states that 

prejudgment interest is to be calculated from the date the 

complaint is filed. It contains no exception for periods 

of appellate delay. Accordingly, we overrule the 1998 

Court of Appeals decision in Dedes. We also reverse in 

part the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case and 

remand it to the trial court for recalculation of the 

prejudgment interest. 

I. Background 

Antonio Morales was left substantially disabled after 

an automobile accident in 1991. He had purchased no-fault 

insurance coverage from defendant Auto-Owners Insurance 

Company, but the company denied his claim on the ground 

that the policy had expired six days before the accident. 

Mr. Morales’s conservator, plaintiff Alice Jo Morales, 

filed suit against defendant. The trial court granted 

defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and the Court 

of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted leave to appeal, 

reversed, and remanded the case for trial. 458 Mich 288; 

582 NW2d 776 (1998). 

1

233 Mich App 329, 340; 590 NW2d 605 (1998). 

2

Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 4, 2002

(Docket No. 233826). 

2 
 

 

Thus, after about four years of appellate proceedings, 

this case was remanded to the Missaukee Circuit Court for 

trial. The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Morales, and 

the trial court awarded prejudgment interest to her under 

MCL 600.6013. Defendant argued that prejudgment interest 

should not accrue during the four-year period while the 

case was on appeal, because that delay was not its fault. 

The trial court rejected this argument and awarded full 

interest on the judgment. 

The Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on Dedes, it 

held that “[p]rejudgment interest does not continue to 

accrue during the appellate process.” It remanded the case 

to the trial court for a recalculation of prejudgment 

interest. Ms. Morales now seeks leave to appeal to this 

Court.3 

II. Standard of Review 

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 

this Court reviews de novo. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc 

v City of Holland, 463 Mich 675, 681; 625 NW2d 377 (2001). 

The cardinal principle of statutory construction is that 

courts must give effect to legislative intent. Dressel v 

3

On August 1, 2003, we granted two motions for leave to

file briefs amicus curiae and granted the motion to 

intervene filed by James W. Boyd, a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Trustee. We now grant Taco Bell Corporation’s and the

Michigan Defense Trial Counsel’s motions for leave to file

briefs amicus curiae. 

3
 
 

 

Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 562; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). If the 

Legislature’s intent is clearly expressed, no further 

construction is permitted. Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 

99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000). Under such circumstances, a court 

is prohibited from imposing a “contrary judicial gloss” on 

the statute. In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes 

Special Projects Procurement v Continental Biomass 

Industries, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 119; 659 NW2d 597 (2003). 

III. Analysis 

 MCL 600.60134

 states: 

(1) Interest is allowed on a money judgment

recovered in a civil action . . . . 

* * * 

(6) For a complaint filed on or after 

January 1, 1987, but before July 1, 2002, if the

civil action has not resulted in a final,

nonappealable judgment as of July 1, 2002, and if

a judgment is or has been rendered on a written

instrument that does not evidence indebtedness 

with a specified interest rate, interest is 

calculated as provided in subsection (8). 

Subsection 8 confirms that interest accrues “from the date 

of filing the complaint” and that it “is calculated on the 

entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney 

fees and other costs.” MCL 600.6013(8). 

4

This statute was amended after the trial court 

calculated the award of prejudgment interest. The most 

recent amendments apply to this case.

4 
 In Dedes, the Court of Appeals held that prejudgment 

interest awarded under MCL 600.6013 may be disallowed for 

periods of delay that are neither the fault of, nor caused 

by, the judgment debtor. 233 Mich App 340. The Dedes 

Court concluded that prejudgment appellate proceedings fell 

within this category, and it reversed the trial court’s 

grant of prejudgment interest for the period that the case 

was on appeal. It explained: 

To allow interest to continue to accrue 

during an appellate process would hinder parties

from asserting new and innovative arguments in

the trial court for fear that interest will 

continue to accrue on a claim that may be 

reversed during the appeal process. Id. 

Relying on Dedes, the Court of Appeals held here that 

defendant was not responsible for prejudgment interest 

during the four years that this case was on appeal. 

The Dedes decision is wholly inconsistent with MCL 

600.6013, which states that prejudgment interest is 

calculated “from the date of filing the complaint . . . .” 

MCL 600.6013(8). The statute makes no exception for 

periods of prejudgment appellate delay. In the face of the 

Legislature’s clearly expressed intent, this Court will not 

read such an exception into the statute. Dressel, 468 Mich 

562; In re Certified Question (Henes v Continental Biomass, 

468 Mich 119. Under MCL 600.6013, Ms. Morales is entitled 

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to an award of prejudgment interest that includes the fouryear period during which this case was on appeal.5 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, we overrule the 1998 Court of Appeals 

decision in Dedes v Asch. We reverse part II of the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals concerning prejudgment 

interest in this case and remand the case to the circuit 

court for recalculation of the prejudgment interest. MCR 

7.302(G)(1). We otherwise deny plaintiff’s application for 

leave to appeal and defendant’s application to cross-appeal 

because we are not persuaded that this Court should review 

the other questions presented. 

Maura D. Corrigan

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

5

As a general rule, prejudgment interest runs from the

date the complaint is filed. Here, the judgment includes

an award of no-fault benefits that were not incurred until 

after the complaint was filed. In the trial court, Ms.

Morales agreed that prejudgment interest on those benefits

would run from the first date that the benefits were 

unpaid, not from when the complaint was filed. We do not 

intend our holding in this case to disturb the parties’

stipulation. 

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