SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSE Y APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

- 3795

- 17T1 LORI HEWITT, Appellant,

v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LAB O R, and THE COMMUNITY SCHOOL, INC.,
R espondents.

___________________________

Submitted October 16 , 2019

– Decided Before Judges Accurso and Gilson

. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 129 , 360. Leslie A. Farber, att o rney for appellant. Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review ( Donna Sue Arons , Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Shareef M. Omar , Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the c ase and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

- 3.

November 20, 20192 A

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- 17T1 Respondent The Community S ch ool has not fi l ed a brief.
PER CURIAM Appellant Lori Hewitt, formerly a teacher at the Community School , appeals from the final decision of the Board of Review disqualifying h er from receipt of unemployment benefits because she left h er job without good cause
attributa b le to the work. We affirm. Hewitt was a special education math teacher f or s ix years. At the end of the 2016 school year, the school offered her a new annual contract for $52,399 , which she rejected because a colleague was better compensated. In respon s e , the school upped its offer to $55,317 , tendering a revised contract fo r her signature

. Hewitt met with the Director of Education, expressing displeasure with the higher offer

. Hewitt testified before the appeal tribunal that she told the Director of E ducation she would not sign the contract and left the meeting without accepting it. Although she anticipated a further conversation with the Director of Program , a family emergency required her presence out

- of

- state for three weeks. When the original de a dline for returning the executed contract passed , as well as the start of the new contract year , without any indication that Hewitt would rejoin the faculty for the 2016

- 2017 term, the school sent her a
letter advising of her COBRA benefits.3 A

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Hewitt appli e d for une mployment benefits in August 2016 and shortly thereafter began receiving a weekly benefit of $657. In August 2017, Hewitt was informed a redetermination found her disqualified for benefits because she left work voluntarily . Hewitt appealed from the redet ermination and the Board's demand for the return of $17, 082 in benefits received. Following a hearing in which the above facts were adduced, the appeal tribunal determined it was "clear that [Hewitt] knew what the customarily acceptable time per i od
was to return a signed contract, r efused to accept the employer's contract, did not request any further negotiation, and made no further attempt to communicate with the employer about the matter." The appeal tribunal thus concluded Hewitt left work vo l untarily over her dissatisfaction with her raise. The Board affirmed. While the matter was pending in this court, the Board made a motion for remand to address an argument not raised to the tribunal, namely the reopening of the claim in 2017. We grant ed the motion , and the Board issued a decision on remand addressing the procedural posture of the case. The Board explained that when a laid

- off worker files an unemployment claim, the worker is provided a notice of their monetary benefit and benefit paym en t s follow. There is no further determination as to the worker's entitlement to benefits. If4 A

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the worker, on the other hand, advises he or she quit or was fired, the worker is interviewed to determine an entitlement to benefits. The Board explained it ha d no record of what Hewitt said was the reason she was not working when she filed for benefits, but she was not interviewed and no determination was issued before benefits were begun. The

" redetermination " was triggered by the employer's protest, likely a f ter having been sent a bill for Hewitt's u nemployment benefits, that Hewitt should have been denied benefits because she quit her job. The Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance sent Hewitt a questionnaire in response to the employer's charg e, which Hewitt did not return. The claims examiner thereafter determined Hewitt disqualified for benefits and the Director issued a demand for refund , which Hewitt appealed in this proceeding. The B oard found no due process violation in the redeterminat io n of benefits and reaffirmed its agreement with the appeal tribunal that Hewitt quit her job because of dissatisfaction with her raise, which was not good cause to leave work. Hewitt appeals, arguing her "due process rights w ere violated because the Di re c tor's request for a refund was not preceded by an appeal by an interested party , " and that she did not voluntarily leave her employment5 A

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because there was no deadline for her response to the school's second contract offer. We find both arguments to be wit h out merit.
O ur review of administrative agency decisions is limited. In re Stallworth , 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)

. The agency's determination carries a presumption of cor rectness , and the claimant bears a substantial burden of persuasion. Gloucester C t y. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civil Serv. Comm'n , 93 N.J. 384, 390

- 91 (1983). "If the Board's factual findings are supported by 'sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obligated t o accept them.'" Brady v. Bd. of Review , 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Self v

. Bd. of Review , 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid

. Under N.J.S.A. 43:21

- 5(a), a person is ineligible for unemployment
benefits if h e or she leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. "[G]ood cause" is "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compell ing as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 1 2:17

- 9.1(b). "Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work volunta rily." Domenico v. Bd. of Review , 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983)6 A

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(qu o ting Medwick v. Bd. of Review , 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). Thus, an employee who quits a job without a sufficient work

- related reason is disqualified from benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21

- 5(a). "[ A ] n employee's frustration caused by not rec e iving an expected pay raise does not constitute good cause within the statut ory intendment. " DeSantis v. Bd. of Review , 149 N.J. Super. 35, 38 (App. Div. 1977)

. Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we find no occasion to interfere with the Board's ruling here . The record supports its decision. Hewitt does not dis pute that she never accepted the school's offer of a new contract for the 2016

- 2017 school year . She testified she told the Director of Education she was disappointed with the ra i se and would not sign the school's second proffered contract . The Director of Program made clear at the hearing that the school wanted Hewitt to return. Because Hewitt was not entitled to benefits, she is obligated to repay them , regardless of whether s h e accepted them in good faith. See N.J.S.A. 43:21

- 16(d); Bannan v. Bd. of R eview , 299 N.J. Super. 671, 673 (App. Div. 1997)

. We reject as without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion her argument that the Division 's7 A

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action to reco u p public benefits paid in error after being alerted by the school that Hewit t quit her job violated her due process rights. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E)

. Affirmed.