**____________________________________** Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion

Stephen J. Markman

**FILED DECEMBER 30, 2003**

**ALICE JO MORALES, as Guardian and Conservator for ANTONIO MORALES, a**  **legally incapacitated person, also known as ANTHONY MORALES,**  **Plaintiff-Appellant, and**  **JAMES W. BOYD, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee,**  **Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,**
**v No. 122601**  **AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.** 

**PER CURIAM**
**AFTER REMAND At issue in this case is whether prejudgment interest**  **awarded under MCL 600.6013 accrues during appellate proceedings. On the authority of**  Dedes v Asch **, 1**  **the Court of Appeals held that it does not.**  **2 We disagree because the**  **language of MCL 600.6013 unambiguously states that prejudgment interest is to be calculated from the date the**  **complaint is filed. It contains no exception for periods of appellate delay. Accordingly, we overrule the 1998**  **Court of Appeals decision in** Dedes **. We also reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case and**  **remand it to the trial court for recalculation of the prejudgment interest.** 
**I. Background**  **Antonio Morales was left substantially disabled after an automobile accident in 1991. He had purchased no-fault**  **insurance coverage from defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company, but the company denied his claim on the ground**  **that the policy had expired six days before the accident. Mr. Morales’s conservator, plaintiff Alice Jo Morales,**  **filed suit against defendant. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and the Court**  **of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted leave to appeal, reversed, and remanded the case for trial. 458 Mich 288;**  **582 NW2d 776 (1998).**

1 **233 Mich App 329, 340; 590 NW2d 605 (1998).**

2 **Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 4, 2002 (Docket No. 233826).**  2**Thus, after about four years of appellate proceedings, this case was remanded to the Missaukee Circuit Court for**  **trial. The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Morales, and the trial court awarded prejudgment interest to her under**  **MCL 600.6013. Defendant argued that prejudgment interest should not accrue during the four-year period while the**  **case was on appeal, because that delay was not its fault. The trial court rejected this argument and awarded full**  **interest on the judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on**  Dedes **, it held that “[p]rejudgment interest does not continue to**  **accrue during the appellate process.” It remanded the case to the trial court for a recalculation of prejudgment**  **interest. Ms. Morales now seeks leave to appeal to this** 
**Court. 3** 

**II. Standard of Review**  **Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.**  Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc v City of Holland **, 463 Mich 675, 681; 625 NW2d 377 (2001). The cardinal principle of sta**  **tutory construction is that courts must give effect to legislative intent.**  Dressel v

3 **On August 1, 2003, we granted two motions for leave to file briefs amicus curiae and granted the motion to**  **intervene filed by James W. Boyd, a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee. We now grant Taco Bell Corporation’s and the**  **Michigan Defense Trial Counsel’s motions for leave to file briefs amicus curiae.**  3Ameribank **, 468 Mich 557, 562; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). If the Legislature’s intent is clearly expressed, no further**  **construction is permitted.** Helder v Sruba **, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000). Under such circumstances, a court**  **is prohibited from imposing a “contrary judicial gloss” on the statute.**  In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes Special Projects Procurement v Continental Biomass Industries, Inc), **468 Mich 109, 119; 659 NW2d 597 (2003).**
**III. Analysis**  **MCL 600.6013 4**  **states: (1)**  **Interest is allowed on a money judgment recovered in a civil action . . . .**  *** * *** **(6) For a complaint filed on or after**  **January 1, 1987, but before July 1, 2002, if the civil action has not resulted in a final,**  **nonappealable judgment as of July 1, 2002, and if a judgment is or has been rendered on a written**  **instrument that does not evidence indebtedness with a specified interest rate, interest is**  **calculated as provided in subsection (8).**

**Subsection 8 confirms that interest accrues “from the date of filing the complaint” and that it “is calculated on the**  **entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney fees and other costs.” MCL 600.6013(8).** 

4 **This statute was amended after the trial court calculated the award of prejudgment interest. The most**  **recent amendments apply to this case.** 4**In** Dedes **, the Court of Appeals held that prejudgment interest awarded under MCL 600.6013 may be disallowed for**  **periods of delay that are neither the fault of, nor caused by, the judgment debtor. 233 Mich App 340. The**  Dedes **Court concluded that prejudgment appellate proceedings fell within this category, and it reversed the trial court’s**  **grant of prejudgment interest for the period that the case was on appeal. It explained:**  **To allow interest to continue to accrue during an appellate process would hinder parties**  **from asserting new and innovative arguments in the trial court for fear that interest will**  **continue to accrue on a claim that may be reversed during the appeal process.**  Id **.**

**Relying on** Dedes **, the Court of Appeals held here that defendant was not responsible for prejudgment interest**  **during the four years that this case was on appeal. The**  Dedes **decision is wholly inconsistent with MCL 600.6013, which states that prejudgment interest is**  **calculated “from the date of filing the complaint . . . .” MCL 600.6013(8). The statute makes no exception for**  **periods of prejudgment appellate delay. In the face of the Legislature’s clearly expressed intent, this Court will not**  **read such an exception into the statute.** Dressel **, 468 Mich 562;**  In re Certified Question (Henes v Continental Biomass, **468 Mich 119. Under MCL 600.6013, Ms. Morales is entitled**

5**to an award of prejudgment interest that includes the four**   ** year period during which this case was on appeal.** **5**

**IV. Conclusion**  **Accordingly, we overrule the 1998 Court of Appeals decision in**  Dedes v Asch **. We reverse part II of the judgment of the Court of Appeals concerning prejudgment**  **interest in this case and remand the case to the circuit court for recalculation of the prejudgment interest. MCR**  **7.302(G)(1). We otherwise deny plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal and defendant’s application to cross-appeal**  **because we are not persuaded that this Court should review the other questions presented.**  **Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh**  **Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly**  **Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr.**  **Stephen J. Markman**

5 **As a general rule, prejudgment interest runs from the date the complaint is filed. Here, the judgment includes**  **an award of no-fault benefits that were not incurred until** after **the complaint was filed. In the trial court, Ms. Morales agreed that prejudgment interest on those benefits**  **would run from the first date that the benefits were unpaid, not from when the complaint was filed. We do not**  **intend our holding in this case to disturb the parties’ stipulation.**  6