FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

DRAFT

Progress in Developing 

the 

National Asset Database 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews

OIG-06-40 June 2006
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 June 20, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibility to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the department. 

This report assesses the actions DHS has taken to identify and organize the nation’s critical 

infrastructure and key resources in the National Asset Database. It is based on interviews with 

employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents. 

The recommendations have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, and have 

been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report will 

result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of 

those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Contents 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................. 1 

Background........................................................................................................................................... 2 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................................. 5 

Identification and Collection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Information.......... 5 

Concerns About State-Identified Assets ................................................................................... 9 

Prioritizing the National Asset Database ................................................................................ 16 

Enhancing Prioritization Capability.................................................................................................... 18 

Recommendations............................................................................................................................... 21 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ....................................................................................... 21 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................................26 

 Appendix B: Preparedness Response to OIG ............................................................................28 

 Appendix C: Roles and Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management Framework.............35 

 Appendix D: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors ................................................41 

 Appendix E: Guidelines for Identifying National Level Critical Infrastructure and Key 

Resources .............................................................................................................42 

 Appendix F: Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource Totals By State..........................................46 

 Appendix G: Major Contributors to This Report.......................................................................48 

 Appendix H: Report Distribution...............................................................................................49 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

Abbreviations 

 BZPP Buffer Zone Protection Program 

 CI/KR Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources 

 CIP-DSS Critical Infrastructure Protection-Decision Support System 

 COP Common Operational Picture 

 GCOA Gross Consequences of Attack 

 HITRAC Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 

 HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002 

 HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center 

 HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

 IA Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

 IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate 

 IP Office of Infrastructure Protection 

 LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 

 NADB National Asset Database 

 NICC National Infrastructure Coordination Center 

 NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

 NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 

 NRC National Response Center 

 NSHS National Strategy for Homeland Security 

 NSPP National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 

 ODP Office for Domestic Preparedness 

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

 PCCIP President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

 PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program 

 PDD Presidential Decision Directive 

 PMTL Protective Measures Target List 

 RAMCAP Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection 

RMD Risk Management Division 

SSA Sector Specific Agency 

UASI Urban Area Security Initiative 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

1

Executive Summary 

On December 17, 2003, President Bush released Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive No. 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization, and Protection - a national policy for federal departments and 

agencies to identify and prioritize the United States’ critical infrastructure and 

key resources (CI/KR) and to protect them from terrorist attacks. The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for establishing the 

risk management framework necessary to coordinate these efforts. This 

framework requires the support of a comprehensive, national asset inventory. 

DHS calls this inventory the National Asset Database (NADB). 

DHS’ Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) is still identifying and collecting 

CI/KR data, simultaneously populating the first-generation NADB, and 

building the next-generation NADB. As of January 2006, the NADB 

contained 77,069 assets, which are not distinguished by criticality. Only after 

IP completes risk assessments of the assets will it have actual lists of CI/KR. 

Nonetheless, the varying presence of non-critical assets - and they are difficult 

to quantify – confirms that the NADB is not an accurate representation of the 

nation’s CI/KR. In addition, the NADB is not yet comprehensive enough to 

support the management and resource allocation decision-making envisioned 

by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 

IP has a substantial amount of work ahead to determine the ultimate 

disposition of the NADB’s contents and each asset’s importance to the 

country. It is working on enhancing its ability to analyze and prioritize CI/KR 

data but those efforts continue to be affected by slow development of both the 

NADB and risk assessment tools. We cannot predict when IP will have both 

the data and the analytical tools to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of 

the country’s critical infrastructure and key resources. 

We are recommending four specific actions to the Under Secretary for 

Preparedness to improve the development and quality of the national asset 

database. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

2

Background 

In 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 

(PDD-63), Critical Infrastructure Protection, which set forth principles for 

protecting the nation by minimizing the threat of smaller-scale terrorist attacks 

against information technology and geographically-distributed supply chains 

that could cascade and disrupt entire sectors of the economy.1

 Absent a 

centralized authority for homeland security, federal agencies were designated 

as Lead Agencies in their sector of expertise. The Lead Agencies were tasked 

to develop sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to 

coordinate efforts with the private sector. PDD-63 required the creation of a 

National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. 

The present administration was reviewing this strategy when the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, accelerated its implementation. It began to 

adapt and develop the principles of PDD-63. Executive Orders 13228 and 

13231 expanded the federal role as a coordinating partner for state and local 

agencies as well as the private sector, raised the priority of physical assets as 

distinguished from cyber assets, and organized infrastructure coordination 

through the creation of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, the 

Homeland Security Council, and the Office of Homeland Security.2

 

In July 2002, the White House Office of Homeland Security released the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS). Protecting the nation’s 

critical infrastructure and key assets was one of its six critical mission areas.3

 

Critical infrastructure was previously defined as “systems and assets, whether 

physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 

destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 

security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 

combination of those matters....”4

 The NSHS adds to this concept a concern 

for key assets, “individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital 

systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage our Nation’s 

morale or confidence. Key assets include symbols or historical attractions, 

 

1 Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998. Executive Order 13010: Critical 

Infrastructure Protection, established the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). Federal 

Register Vol. 61, No. 138, July 17, 1996, pp. 37347-37350. PCCIP fostered the development of PDD-63. 

2

 Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, Vol. 66, 

No. 196, Oct. 10, 2001. pp. 51812-51817. Executive Order 13231: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information 

Age. Federal Register. Vol. 66, No. 202. Oct. 18, 2001. pp. 53063-53071. 

3

 National Strategy for Homeland Security, pp. viii, 29-36. 

4 USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56 Sec. 1016(e). 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

3

such as prominent national, state, or local monuments and icons.”5

 This 

differs slightly from the term “key resources,” defined in the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (HSA) as “publicly or privately controlled resources 

essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.”6

 The 

NSHS continued the concept of lead agencies—now called Sector-Specific 

Agencies (SSAs)—but designated the yet-to-be-created DHS to coordinate the 

strategy as well as be the lead agency for some sectors. It defined eight major 

initiatives in protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, including 

“[b]uild[ing] and maintain[ing] a complete assessment of America’s critical 

infrastructure and key assets.”7

 

The HSA created DHS. Within DHS’s Information Analysis and 

Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), the Office of Infrastructure 

Protection (IP) assumed responsibility for assessing the nation’s critical 

infrastructure and key resources.8

 IAIP was responsible for accessing and 

integrating information from the federal government, state, and local 

government agencies, and private sector entities in order to “identify and 

assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland.”9

 

Additionally, it was responsible for developing and coordinating a 

comprehensive national plan to secure critical infrastructure and key 

resources. This includes assessments of risk, integrating “relevant 

information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments... in order to identify 

priorities for protective and support measures....”10 

Within a month of its establishment, in February 2003, DHS took steps toward 

developing a national plan by issuing the National Strategy for the Physical 

Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. This document 

identified the leadership role of the federal government in “[t]aking stock of 

our most critical facilities, systems, and functions...” and required DHS to: 

(1) “[d]evelop a uniform methodology” for identifying critical assets; 

(2) “[b]uild a comprehensive database to catalog these critical facilities, 

systems, and functions”; (3) maintain an “up-to-date assessment of 

vulnerabilities and preparedness across critical sectors”; and, (4) establish a 

 

5

 NSHS p. 30. 

6 Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, Sect. 2(9). 7

 NSHS, p. 33. 

8

 HSA, Sect. 201(d)(2) assigned responsibility for assessing CI/KR to IAIP. When DHS reorganized in 2005 and IAIP’s 

two primary components, the Office of Information Analysis (IA) and the Office of Infrastructure Protection, were split. 

IA was renamed the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and now reports directly to the Secretary. IP retained its name 

and was moved to the Preparedness Directorate. The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection leads IP. 9

 HSA, Sect. 201(d)(1)(A). 

10 PL 107-296, Sect. 201(d)(3). 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

4

multi-year approach for critical infrastructure and key asset protection to 

“instill predictability and structure in the planning process.” 11 Developing a 

geospatial mapping of critical infrastructure and key resources was a separate 

but related part of the strategy.12 

In December 2003, this over-arching strategy became policy in Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7), Critical Infrastructure 

Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. HSPD-7 sets forth the Secretary 

of Homeland Security’s role in setting “uniform policies, approaches, 

guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection 

and risk management activities,” based on critical infrastructure for which 

DHS, including IP, will “identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection.” 13 

The HSPD-7 required DHS to detail a national plan for CI/KR protection 

within one year; DHS did not meet this deadline.14 

The development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has 

taken longer than expected, with an interim NIPP released in February 2005 

and a draft version of the final NIPP made available for public comment in 

November 2005 (as of this report, DHS had not released a final NIPP). The 

draft NIPP draws on the key elements of HSPD-7 in its risk management 

framework, which involves the following stages: 1) identification of critical 

infrastructure; 2) identification and assessment of vulnerabilities; 

3) normalization, analysis, and prioritization; 4) implementation of protective 

programs; and, 5) measuring effectiveness. Federal, state and local, and 

private sector entities all have a role in implementing this framework (see 

Appendix C). The NIPP envisions a comprehensive, national inventory of 

assets to support its framework. DHS calls this inventory the NADB. 

The NADB is intended to be a “comprehensive catalog that includes an 

inventory and descriptive information regarding the assets and systems that 

comprise the nation’s CI/KR.”15 DHS is now focused on populating the firstgeneration NADB, the national asset inventory that will support the 

development of an informed national risk profile. The current NADB is 

diverse and includes entries under every category of CI/KR (see Chart 1). 

 

11 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003. p.ix and 

p.23. 

12 NSPP CI/KA. pp. 24. 

13 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection, Dec. 17, 2003. 14 DHS also missed additional deadlines for reports on risk assessment and readiness enacted in the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458. 

15 Draft NIPP, November 2005, Section 3.2.1, p. 29. This document is pre-decisional. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

5

Chart 1: NADB Totals by Sector 

For example, the inventory includes 4,055 malls, shopping centers, and retail 

outlets; 224 racetracks; 539 theme or amusement parks and 163 water parks; 

514 religious meeting places; 4,164 educational facilities; 1,305 casinos; 234 

retail stores; 127 gas stations; 130 libraries; 335 petroleum pipelines; 217 

railroad bridges; 140 defense industrial base assets; 224 national monuments 

and icons; and 8 wind power plants. In addition to hosting the national asset 

inventory, the current NADB is integrating information available in various 

DHS and other federal databases using a single portal with a common 

interface. 

Results of Review 

Identification and Collection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource 

Information 

The NADB began as a small list of assets. In summer 2003, IP’s Risk 

Management Division (RMD) (known then as the Protective Security 

Division), which oversees the NADB program, applied gross consequences 

and significant economic impact criteria to identify 160 nationally critical 

Government Facilities (12,019)

 Public Health (8,402)

Energy (7,889)

Agriculture & Food (7,542)

Transportation (6,141)

Water (3,842)

Telecommunications (3,020)

Chemical & Hazardous 

Materials (2,963)

Emergency Services (2,420)

Dams (2,029)

Information Technology (757)

Banking & Finance (669)

Postal & Shipping (417)

National Monuments & Icons 

(224)

Nuclear Power Plants (178)

Defense Industrial Base (140)

Not Specified (290)

Commercial Assets (17,327)
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

6

assets as part of Operation Liberty Shield.16 Later that year, under pressure 

from Congress to produce a prioritized list, IP identified more assets and 

expanded the list to 1,849.17 IP identified assets in specific sectors—

chemical, hazardous material, nuclear, business and finance, electric, oil and 

natural gas, transportation, commercial, and government facilities—that it 

determined required additional protection or mitigation against terrorist 

attacks. It was called the Protected Measures Target List (PMTL).18 

Subsequently, the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) asked state and 

local governments to provide critical infrastructure data as part of a state selfassessment program.19 By February 2004, that data was combined with the 

PMTL to become a national asset list of 28,368 assets. The list did not 

adequately represent the nation’s 13 critical infrastructure sectors and 4 key 

resources (see Appendix D). 

In July 2004, IP initiated a data call to states and territories for critical 

infrastructure and key resource information. Between July 2004 and July 

2005, states identified and submitted data for 48,701 assets. States tried to 

follow DHS’ criteria for identifying national critical infrastructure and key 

resources, but their submissions were inconsistent and often delayed. IP 

included every submitted asset in the NADB in order to make it as 

comprehensive as possible. IP went to considerable effort to process, format, 

and verify this information, even eliminating 3,846 duplicate submissions 

between the two data calls. The NADB is considered the official database and 

these initiatives combined generated a total of 77,069 assets (see chart 2).20 

However, IP has access to, and is pursuing, asset information in other federal 

and commercial repositories that it can link to the NADB, which could 

increase the number of assets in the NADB by hundreds of thousands. 

 

16 Operation Liberty Shield was a comprehensive national plan to protect critical infrastructure while Operation Iraqi 

Freedom was executed overseas. IP selected the assets based on a risk assessment. The risk assessment considered sites 

that if attacked could produce consequences of national scale, primarily significant loss of life or catastrophic damage to 

the economy. Then-DHS Secretary Ridge asked governors to protect these assets. 17 Officials both in and out of DHS frequently referred to the “list of 1,700.” Based on feedback from States, IP 

subsequently expanded the list to 1,849. 

18 The 1,849 assets became the focus of, and a starting point for, IP’s Buffer Zone Protection Program. 

19 Last year RMD began adding the source of each entry in the NADB. We learned late in our review that many sources 

of data were culled as part of the state assessments and to help prepare the national inventory list. Examples included 

several “DHS Lists,” the “Chemical Sites List,” “GSA Buildings,” “ME Critical Assets, Systems, and Infrastructure,” 

and “Largest Water Utilities.” 

20 The NADB is housed at a national laboratory. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

7

Chart 2: NADB Totals by Stages of Development 

2003 Data Call 

(ODP) - 26,359

Liberty Shield - 

160

PMTL - 1,849

2004 Data Call 

(IAIP) - 47,701 

Processing State Submissions Has Been Difficult

States took more than a year to compile information for 17 fields of 

identification and location data on each asset to complete their submissions. 

IP then needed time to resolve numerous formatting issues with the data. IP 

set a deadline of October 1, 2004, to submit responses but underestimated how 

much time states would require and the level of difficulty involved. Only 2 of 

56 states and territories met that deadline. The timeliness of the submissions 

was dictated by each state’s approach, how much it already knew about 

critical infrastructure (some states did not have a database of critical 

infrastructure), how it interpreted IP’s criteria, and whether there were legal 

obstacles to forwarding CI/KR information on private sector assets. Some 

states did not share information with DHS immediately because state 

legislation prevented disclosure. It was not unusual for states to send multiple 

submissions to IP, and for the content of their responses to vary. 

IP hired a contractor to format and verify data for thousands of assets. It 

encountered numerous obstacles. For example, states (1) submitted data in 

different formats; (2) omitted facility names; (3) submitted duplicate assets 

(for example, an asset located on a state line is submitted by both states); and, 

(4) used inconsistent zip codes. Puerto Rico’s data had to be translated 

because it was prepared in Spanish. A significant challenge was finding 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

8

missing information about assets. IP deemed data fields such as state, 

address, sector, owner, owner type, phone, local law enforcement POC, and 

latitude and longitude coordinates as critical. Officials estimated that on 

average each CI/KR record they researched was missing information for about 

seven fields. By December 2004, the contractor had completed research on 13 

states. In the summer of 2005, IP hired another contractor to perform the 

critical task of verifying the location of each asset, which it did, by December 

2005. 21 

Criteria for Identifying CI/KR is Improving

The guidance DHS gave to states for the 2003 ODP-led data call was minimal. 

It required that states “....[T]ake immediate action to identify and increase the 

security of critical infrastructure and key assets within your state. In selecting 

such infrastructure you should consider any system or asset that if attacked 

would result in catastrophic loss of life and/or catastrophic economic loss.”22 

It also identified specific types of facilities that states should consider while 

identifying CI/KR.23 

IP expanded and improved upon ODP’s criteria for its July 2004 data call. It 

sent to states the “Guidelines for Identifying National Level Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources” for the 13 critical infrastructure sectors 

and 4 key resources. The guidelines identified more categories of CI/KR and 

accompanying parameters or subcategories (see Appendix E). For example, 

they included subcategories such as “major banking and financial centers,” 

“refineries with refining capacity in excess of 225,000 barrels per day,” 

“primary medical care facilities with unique services,” “IT systems with 

access or control points distributed on both coasts and throughout the 

country,” and “commercial centers with potential economic loss impact of $10 

billion or capacity of more than 35,000 individuals.” DHS kept the criteria 

general to encourage states to submit any asset they thought to be important. 

In August 2005, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection approved 

the NADB taxonomy. IP solicited input from all CI/KR sectors, and federal 

departments and agencies made substantial contributions to its development. 

 

21 Several contractors have been actively involved in the development of the NADB, a gross consequences of attack 

prioritization methodology, and software for accessing the NADB as well as housing the NADB and coordinating expert 

panels to assess the NADB. 

22 Criteria for the selection of critical infrastructure, ODP, 2003. 

23 For example, facilities included public water systems, primary data storage and processing, chemical, major power 

generation, nuclear power plants, electric substations, rail and highway bridges, natural gas and liquid natural gas 

storage, and major mass transit subway systems. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

9

IP officials view the new taxonomy as the driving architecture behind the 

next-generation NADB because it standardizes the terminology that DHS, 

sector-specific agencies, states and territories, and private industry will use to 

categorize and subcategorize national infrastructure. It uses multiple levels of 

detail, defines attributes of interest for each level, and notes other possible 

categorizations for an asset. For example, the agriculture & food sector is 

broken down into numerous subcategories including supply, processing, 

packaging, and production, product storage, product transportation, 

distribution, and supporting facilities. The taxonomy does not perform any 

risk analysis; it does not assign values to the specific attribute data or 

determine each asset’s national significance. IP has not yet applied the 

taxonomy to categorize assets in the NADB, or shared it with the states. 

Concerns About State-Identified Assets 

Both data calls generated an abundance of unusual, or out-of-place, assets 

now in the NADB whose criticality is not readily apparent. There are also 

inconsistencies when comparing state-by-state asset totals. Furthermore, the 

NADB indicates 32,631 of its assets are not nationally significant, 

outnumbering the nationally significant assets 3 to 1. While it is not IP’s 

intent at this stage to specifically assign criticality or identify the most critical 

assets—it is still focusing on collecting data to develop the national asset 

inventory—their presence complicates efforts to develop a useful, firstgeneration database. Ambiguity about what constitutes a CI/KR could lead to 

inefficient use of limited homeland security resources.24 

IP officials share our concern about the quality of the NADB and whether 

DHS is directing resources to the most significant CI/KR. IP officials believe 

it is essential that the NADB retain any asset that could be a terrorist target in 

order for it to properly support the NIPP. IP asked states to identify their 

nationally significant assets but at the same time did not discourage them from 

submitting any asset. This information will help with the national risk profile 

as well as provide the capability to map threat data against critical 

infrastructure in a geospatial environment. Testifying before Congress, the 

former Under Secretary for IAIP remarked, “We take the intelligence that we 

get day-to-day and we share it from IA to IP, so we track, or what we call 

map, the intelligence against the 1,700 [assets] ...and then broadly speaking, 

 

24 Congressional Research Service: Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition and Identification, October 2004. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

10

across this larger database of 28,000 sites.”25 IP will gather additional 

information on those assets it determines to be nationally significant. Per the 

NIPP, examples of this information include vital system components, 

dependencies and interdependencies, existing protective measures, worst 

reasonable case consequences, and quantitative consequence analysis. 

Out-of-place assets make resource allocation decisions more challenging; 

every possible target is not going to rise to the level of national significance. 

IP plans on filtering those assets from the NADB with the individual analyses 

for each program or sector. However, having more assets may obscure 

desired data, making such prioritizations more difficult. Additionally, assets 

that will never be used in an analysis will have to be filtered out repeatedly. 

Both of the department’s recent data calls generated many assets now in the 

NADB whose national significance is questionable and IP might waste time 

and resources trying to prioritize them. 

State Responses to Criticality Question Were Inconsistent

DHS also requested states to designate those assets that “met national level 

criteria.” In deciding which assets to submit, states had considerable latitude 

in interpreting what DHS meant by a nationally critical asset. States assessed 

potential catastrophic loss, economic impact, public confidence or national 

symbolism, and replaceability to identify the assets. The NADB currently 

shows that 11,018 assets (14 percent) rise to the level of nationally significant, 

while 32,631 assets (42 percent) do not. The question of national significance 

is undetermined for another 33,419 assets (43 percent).26 IP officials 

acknowledge that many assets will never be analyzed in depth or used to 

support any program activity. 

Some states submitted assets that they knew were critical to the state but 

were not sure about their national importance, and some did not. States that 

adopt an all-hazards approach to infrastructure protection consider schools 

as critical to the general public’s safety during a natural disaster because 

they function as emergency shelters. However, states did not consistently 

submit schools because they did not know whether they warranted inclusion 

in the NADB. The lack of guidance on whether questionable categories of 

 

25 General Frank Libutti, testifying before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on DHS 

FY2005 Appropriations, April 1, 2004. 

26 To the best of our knowledge, the question of national significance was not incorporated into ODP’s data collection 

efforts in 2003. While these figures suggest otherwise, DHS is in the process of filling these fields for each asset. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

11

assets (such as schools) should be included led to significant variation in 

submissions, and decreases the value of comparisons across states. 

In addition, the NADB contains general categories because DHS did not 

provide guidance for naming assets by level of specificity. For example, 

states were not sure whether to simply identify a subway system by name, or 

name each important facility or station within that system. Instead of a 

specific school, some locations listed schools in general. Other generalities 

include restaurants and churches. There are inherent challenges in capturing 

systems and asset data simultaneously. At present, the NADB is not 

structured in a way that enables it to capture information about systems. 

Even if the categories above are reasonable, the NADB requires a consistent 

approach listing the specific assets to be a useful tool. The NADB taxonomy 

is the first step in delineating and creating a consistent approach to listing 

assets, systems and networks across the SSAs and down to the local level. 

Portion of NADB Populated by First Data Call Lacks Credibility 

 

The 2003 ODP-led data call generated 28,368 assets. The presence of large 

numbers of out-of-place assets taints the credibility of the data (see examples 

in Table 1). The states’ unfamiliarity with identifying CI/KR, and DHS’ lack 

of direction contributed to the poor quality of the data. 

Table 1: Examples of Out-of-Place Assets 

(ODP 2003 Data Call) 

Old MacDonald’s petting zoo Mall at Sears 

Bean Fest Nix’s Check Cashing 

Amer. Society of Young Musicians Trees of Mystery 

Car Dealerships Kennel Club and Poker Room 

Historical Bok Sanctuary 4 Cs Fuel and Lube 

DPW Landfill Kangaroo Conservation Center 

Assyrian American Association [state] Right to Life Committee 

Association for the Jewish Blind [university] Insect Zoo 

Bourbon Festival Theological Seminary 

Jay’s Sporting Goods Nestle Purina Pet food Plant 

Auto Shop Veterinary Clinic 

Groundhog Zoo Sweetwater Flea Market 

High Stakes Bingo Petting Zoo 

[state] Community College [a] Restaurant 

Frontier Fun Park [a] Travel Stop 

Mule Day Parade Beach at End of [a] Street 

Amish Country Popcorn [a] Pepper and Herb Company 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

12

State officials had little knowledge about the first data call, and did not know 

that it resulted in lists of assets that were included in DHS’ national asset 

inventory. In fact, officials were repeatedly surprised to learn about the 

existence of another batch of assets from their state in the NADB. One state 

official remarked that the list should be deleted. DHS did not appear to have 

communicated its intentions to add those assets to the NADB. State officials 

said they would seek clarification from IP as to their respective total number 

of assets in the NADB. One state official commented that he was told by 

DHS that the data was in the NADB because DHS needed to begin preparing 

a prioritized list of national critical infrastructure and it was going to use this 

information if states did not adequately respond to the 2004 data call. 

Since we began monitoring the development of the NADB, IP officials have 

asserted that the older data was of low quality and that they had little faith in 

it. They claimed not to know what criteria ODP used.27 We received scant 

information detailing those criteria. However, based on the origins of the 

data, the subjective criteria used, the process used to collect the data, the 

states’ lack of knowledge, and in some cases denial of those lists, IP should 

examine the data to identify those assets that other sources find insignificant. 

It should receive cooperation from state officials, who said definitively that 

they want to have more input on their assets in the NADB. 

July 2004 Data Call Included Some Curious Assets 

The July 2004 data call was significantly more organized and achieved better 

results than the previous data call. IP provided sector-specific parameters to 

help states identify the assets it wanted and encouraged states to submit any 

asset they thought was important (see Appendix E). IP expected states would 

value sectors differently, and states did arrive at different conclusions about 

which assets, and how many, were nationally significant. Their responses also 

varied because of a lack of understanding of critical systems on a national 

level. States that pursued every asset thought to be a potential target may 

have submitted assets that are not in fact nationally significant. 

Although it generated more relevant assets, the 2004 data call included 

noticeable out-of-place assets, especially among those assets designated as 

non-nationally significant (see Table 2). We examined in more detail the 

NADB’s list of assets for Florida, Illinois, Indiana, and Maryland (we visited 

 

27 ODP officials provided evidence that they collaborated with infrastructure protection officials during the state 

assessments and both organizations prepared the criteria. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

13

all but Indiana) and identified several questionable soft and hard target 

assets.28 

Table 2: Examples of Out-of-Place Assets From Four States

(July 2004 Data Call) 

Psychiatry Behavioral Center Order of Elks National Memorial 

Ice Cream Parlor Bakery & Cookie Shop 

Inn Donut Shop 

Sears Auto Center Wine and Coffee Co. 

Sports Club Casket Company 

Bass Pro Shop Muzzle Shoot Enterprise 

Several Wal-Marts Property Owners Associations 

Apple and Pork Festival Rolls Royce Plant 

Pepsi Bottlers Yacht Repair Business 

Anti-Cruelty Society Tackle Shop 

Elevator Company Center for Veterinary Medicine 

American Legion UPS Store 

Heritage Groups Parcel Shop 

YMCA Center Brewery 

Mail Boxes Etc Night clubs 

While discussing the goals of July 2004 data call, state officials consistently 

said that they preferred to have a manageable list of critical infrastructure 

within their state over a larger, less accurate, and less relevant list. They 

acknowledged concern that they showed too much restraint and underreported 

critical infrastructure. The totals states reported support the belief that there is 

more CI/KR information that states could have reported which would be 

relevant to DHS. Florida officials stated that they did not submit schools for 

the NADB, even though they serve a vital role as shelters during natural 

disasters. 

Data Calls Resulted in Inconsistent State-by-State Totals

Together, the ODP-led 2003 data call and the July 2004 data call resulted in 

peculiar totals when comparing sectors or states. There was significant 

variation in which CI/KR states considered important with (1) total reported 

assets varying widely by state (the standard deviation was higher than the 

average number of reported assets); and, (2) states reporting quirky totals in 

particular sectors. Compared to the more risk-based considerations of the 

Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP), it appears this was due to 

 

28 Soft targets include places for large assemblies and gatherings, e.g. stadiums and outdoor areas such as those used for 

Independence Day celebrations. Hard targets are usually defined as having security on site, standoff distance, fences, or 

cameras. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

14

differences in reporting standards more than differences in risk.29 This is true 

for both total assets (a complete listing is contained in Appendix F) and for 

assets reported in various sectors. For example: 

• Indiana lists 8,591 assets in the NADB, more than any other state and 

fifty percent more than New York (5,687). 

• California has 3,212 assets, fewer than 7 other states including 

Nebraska (3,457), Wisconsin (7,146), and Indiana (8,591). 

• Vermont and New Hampshire have only 70 and 77 assets respectively. 

By comparison, Wisconsin and Indiana have a hundred times as many 

assets (7,146 and 8,591 respectively), almost all of which were 

submitted in the July 2004 data call. 

• There is substantial inconsistency in reporting subway systems. 

California lists the entire Bay Area Regional Transit system as one 

item, while New York lists 739 stations, and Illinois lists more general 

categories, such as “CTA-Train” and “CTA-Terminal.” 

• Schools submitted include colleges, high schools, elementary schools, 

even kindergartens and Head Start programs. Reporting varies, as 

Virginia totals 2,126 schools while eight states or territories list none. 

The national total of 4,164 reported schools represent less than five 

percent of the approximately 96,000 public schools in America, and a 

cursory review does not suggest that they were chosen based on any 

consistent criteria.30 

Comparing sectors also revealed inconsistency, in both national criticality and 

state reporting. For example: 

• Some classes of assets where national criticality needs to be 

determined include 1,305 casinos, 25 golf courses, 24 swimming 

pools, 44 recreational centers and 163 water parks. Other asset types 

and quantities reported included 130 public libraries, 159 cruise ships, 

34 Coca Cola bottlers/distributors, 244 correctional facilities, 718 

 

29 DHS initiated the Buffer Zone Protection Program to help address security concerns at the nation’s most critical 

facilities. The program initially targeted the first 1,700 assets in the NADB. The BZPP is a local plan that aims to 

extend the zone of protection out from the facility fence and into the community in order to take the operational 

environment away from terrorists. 

30 Digest of Education Statistics Tables and Figures, 2004 (http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_005.asp).
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

15

mortuaries, 571 nursing homes, and 3,773 malls, of which only 399 

met DHS’ criteria of over 1 million square feet. 

• Indiana and Wisconsin reported 77 times more agricultural assets than 

neighboring Illinois and Minnesota, even though Illinois and 

Wisconsin produce 50 percent more agricultural output with similar 

crops.31 

• Nebraska listed 17 times as many emergency services as neighboring 

Iowa. 

• Indiana lists 5,456 assets in the public health sector, or 65 percent of 

the sector total. The criticality of these assets, which included 417 

nursing homes, is not clear. 

• Illinois, home to some of the nation’s tallest buildings in its city of 

Chicago, listed 28 tall buildings or just two-thirds as many as the 41 

reported in Indiana. 

• Washington lists 65 national monuments and icons, while Washington, 

D.C. lists only 37. 

• New York lists only two percent of the nation’s banking & finance 

sector assets, ranking between North Dakota and Missouri. 

• New Mexico contained 73 percent of the information technology 

sector with 553 assets. The next highest state was Virginia with 68. 

Inconsistent reporting, varying both between states and within states between 

asset categories, makes comprehensive analysis difficult. Additional data 

calls with clearer guidance should help states deliver comparable totals in all 

asset categories. 

 

31 According to the Economic Research Service (USDA) State Data Sheets- viewed at 

http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/IN.htm, http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/WI.htm

http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/IL.htm, and http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/MN.htm. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

16

Prioritizing the National Asset Database 

As the Chairman of the House Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security noted, “Without a comprehensive and current inventory of our 

nation’s critical infrastructure and key assets and a coherent picture of threats, 

the department’s efforts to implement the appropriate protective measures, 

deploy the right technologies and make the right decisions about grant 

allocations are severely hampered.”32 IP currently does not intend to create a 

single prioritized list of infrastructure, but rather to prepare a comprehensive 

risk analysis of CI/KR as required by HSPD-7, highlighted in the NIPP, and 

requested by Congress. This analysis will be reflected in several, overlapping 

grant programs.33 The NIPP’s risk management framework includes an 

approach to integrate these prioritizations, stating “[DHS will] aggregate and 

order assessment results to present a comprehensive picture of national CI/KR 

risk in order to establish protection priorities and provide the basis for 

planning and the informed allocation of resources.”34 

Last year, the Government Accountability Office found that “DHS has begun 

developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the 

private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing 

risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and 

shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across 

different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly.”35 

Presently, the NADB enables DHS to conduct consequence-based 

prioritization through “simple analytical normalization tools to convert risk 

assessment results into comparable units.”36 

IP initially prioritized the Protected Measures Target List, the upper echelon 

list of 1,849 assets identified based on perceived threats and consequences, 

but later determined that the ranked list was unreliable. The NADB is not 

prioritized and is not intended to be, but rather serves as a resource for the 

development of other prioritized lists. The NIPP states that, “Although the 

NADB is not, in and of itself, a listing of prioritized assets, it has the 

 

32 Chairman Harold Rogers’ opening remarks during a hearing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security on DHS FY2005 Appropriations, April 1, 2004. 

33 Attempts to consolidate these grant programs in order to present a more comprehensive picture of national 

infrastructure efforts under the Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP) have not been approved by Congress. 

34 Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, November 2005, p.26. 

35 Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, Highlights of 

GAO-05-851, found at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05851.pdf. The ‘framework’ is DHS’ Risk Analysis and 

Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) tool. 

36 Draft NIPP, p. 37. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

17

capability to be queried in a variety of manners that can help inform...risk 

reduction activities.”37 

Several of DHS’ protection programs utilize information from the NADB to 

help allocate resources. However, in light of the variation in reporting 

between various sectors and states as well as the lack of detailed information 

on sites, we are not confident that the NADB can yet support effective grant 

decision-making. We learned that DHS factored CI/KR data into funding 

decisions for several grant programs including the Urban Area Security 

Initiative (UASI), the Port Security Grant Program, and the Buffer Zone 

Protection Program (BZPP), but only the BZPP was directly supported by the 

NADB. In FY2005, the NADB was used in limited support of grant decisions 

because managers were not familiar enough with, or did not trust the accuracy 

of, the NADB’s 77,069 assets. For UASI grants, DHS relied on other selected 

sector data where the source was deemed more reliable and detailed, e.g. 

known chemical plants. The Port Security Grant Program took into account 

data from the USCG rather than the NADB. The BZPP focused on CI/KR 

that comprised the Protected Measures Target List. In FY 2006, the NADB 

was used to a larger extent, although not exclusively. 

DHS has not yet accomplished its goals for the first-generation NADB. IP is 

still building and populating the first-generation NADB to function as the 

official repository of national-level asset information. According to the 

NIPP, the first-generation NADB should support the following activities: 

(1) identifying and cataloging of specific attribute information necessary for 

risk-reduction analysis; (2) development of a comprehensive picture of the 

nation’s critical infrastructure across all sectors; (3) use of a consequencebased prioritization process; (4) integration of a geospatial capability into the 

NADB; and (5) integration of data and results from research organizations, 

such as work performed by the National Infrastructure Simulation and 

Analysis Center (NISAC), through a single portal.38 The first NADB has 

met some success in supporting the first element, but it is unclear when it 

will be able to support the remaining elements. DHS estimates it will not 

complete the next-generation NADB, which will fully incorporate 

information contained in other relevant databases, for at least two more 

years.39

 

37 Draft NIPP, p. 81. 

38 Draft NIPP, p.82. 

39 Draft NIPP, p.87. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

18

Enhancing Prioritization Capability 

To effectively prioritize the NADB, DHS needs to be able to objectively 

compare each asset’s criticality. Accordingly, IP intends to establish values 

with respect to human health and safety, economic value, iconic or symbolic 

value, and substitutability to model the value of dissimilar assets. Weighing 

these concerns, or normalizing assets, requires subjective determinations, for 

example, quantifying the symbolic value of the Statue of Liberty, and would 

require significant deliberation to develop tools to support a comprehensive 

national risk analysis. 

IP has several ongoing tasks that should enhance its ability to prioritize assets 

across sectors. Specifically, IP is acquiring more and better data by 

purchasing or licensing data, directing SSAs to identify their most important 

assets, conducting gross consequence of attack analysis on the NADB, 

gathering expert panels to evaluate CI/KR data in the NADB, developing a 

standard risk assessment tool, and studying interdependencies across sectors. 

IP also seeks to collect as much data as possible in order to help develop a 

common operational picture (COP) via geospatial mapping of CI/KR. This 

includes integrating consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to 

provide a single risk analysis. By linking conditional risk with real time 

intelligence in the National Threat Incident Database, the NADB will support 

operational risk assessments. Analysts in DHS’ Homeland Infrastructure 

Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) are responsible for fusing 

credible threat information received from the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis (IA) with consequence assessments and vulnerability information 

provided by IP. HITRAC passes the results of its analysis back to IA and 

IP.40 

These are meaningful steps toward producing a comprehensive national risk 

analysis, and they attest to the complexity of developing the NADB. IP has 

been planning or working on these measures for months and we hesitate to 

predict when DHS will have a functional and useful NADB. IP’s progress in 

developing the NADB may affect key implementation milestones of the NIPP. 

Acquiring Data. Significant amounts of data have already been incorporated 

into the NADB, and as we reported earlier, there may be too many lower 

priority assets. However, there is also concern that the NADB may have too 

few assets in essential areas and may present an incomplete picture. IP faces 

challenges in developing a comprehensive inventory due to both varying state 

 

40 Draft NIPP, p.58. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

19

reports and reluctance of the private sector to share proprietary information 

due to privacy concerns. Data protection issues have hindered IP’s ability to 

expand the NADB; most asset identification activity has depended on 

cooperation from states and federal agencies. The private sector has concerns 

that information provided for security purposes will expose them to 

competitive or legal scrutiny. Sectors with significant government oversight 

and national security concerns, such as nuclear and chemical industries, have 

been responsive to requests for data. Entities in other sectors such as business 

and finance, the defense industrial base, and telecommunications have been 

less forthcoming due to concerns about sensitive information, despite the 

creation of the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program.41 

Still other sectors such as emergency services and agriculture/food are highly 

distributed; different perspectives exist on how to best determine at-risk assets 

in a complex system. IP continues to seek, and license where necessary, data 

from numerous sources including its own institutional expertise, federal 

agencies, Industry Sector Advisory Councils, commercial entities selling data, 

and the private sector. IP is planning future data calls to states, and agencies 

are still in the process of identifying CI/KR. 

Top 100 Lists. In May 2005, IP solicited each federal SSA for its most 

important CI/KR to create a consequence-driven dataset to help prioritize the 

NADB. Not all sectors have submitted responses. As of January 2006, three 

sectors (emergency services, information technology and agriculture/food) 

had not responded to IP’s call for such a list. Furthermore, IP has integrated 

only five Top 100 lists into the NADB: three sectors (national monuments and 

icons, government facilities and postal and shipping), and two subsectors 

(drinking water and wastewater). IP has not finished processing responses for 

10 other sectors. The submissions IP did receive varied in their utility. Some 

sectors have problems similar to those discussed above, including insufficient 

detail, information withheld due to security concerns, and a poor 

understanding of assets within a sector that cannot be reconciled with the 

NADB taxonomy. IP will continue to work with those sectors to ensure 

uniform and usable data as to the most important assets in each sector. 

Gross Consequences of Attack. Led by a contractor., IP has been developing 

several complex methodologies for conducting a consequence-based analysis 

of a large number of targets. They are known as the Gross Consequences of 

 

41 The Protected Critical Infrastructure Information program solicits voluntary critical infrastructure information from 

proprietors by protecting such information from disclosure. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

20

Attack (GCOA) tool.42 This tool is an automated process for evaluating large 

numbers of targets and attack modes to estimate, at a high level, the 

consequences of terrorist attacks. IP intended to run the tool on the NADB in 

September 2005, but flaws in the methodology and data quality concerns 

stalled the development of the GCOA tool. These issues have now been 

resolved, but technical concerns continue to limit wide-scale implementation. 

At the time of our report, IP had not performed this analysis. 

Expert Panels. IP intends to use expert panels consisting mostly of private 

sector representatives to review and refine the NADB. IP will provide panels 

data it has collected for each sector, including the results of gross consequence 

of attack analysis should it become available. The panels will focus on 

developing a methodology to measure and compare consequence by assigning 

values to various sector segments, such as prioritizing sector operations. The 

panels plan to review, sort, and rank all of their sector’s assets, too. Delays in 

processing state-submitted data prevented the panels from convening last year. 

The first expert panel met for the chemical sector in March 2006, and IP 

intends for expert panels to have concluded for all sectors by October 2006. 

Normalization. To develop a common risk analysis methodology that allows 

for comparability of consequence, vulnerability, threat and risk measurements, 

IP is developing a suite of tools called Risk Analysis and Management for 

Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP). RAMCAP is intended to provide asset 

owners and operators a means to calculate the potential consequences and 

vulnerability to an attack using a common and consistent system of 

measurements, or the means to convert the results from prior assessments 

performed with select approved methodologies into results that can be 

compared to those obtained using RAMCAP methodologies. Without 

RAMCAP, the ability to gauge an individual asset’s value or compare its 

importance to that of another asset will remain subjective and dependent upon 

the assessor’s personal knowledge or awareness about an asset. 

 

SSAs will complete and maintain their own risk assessments and IP will 

complete and maintain national cross-sector risk assessments. Risk 

assessments are ongoing and IP does not envision a definitive end-date when 

they will be complete. IP is working with the SSAs and other sector partners 

to develop, implement, and validate RAMCAP consequence and vulnerability 

assessment methodologies across the 17 CI/KR sectors. Assessments using 

RAMCAP have been conducted only in some sectors, in the pilot stages of 

 

42 The contractor developed three GCOA tools: Methodology for Indirect Economic Loss Model, Methodology for 

Casualty and Damage Models, and Hazard Methodology. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

21

development in other sectors, and awaiting development in still other sectors. 

Individual proprietors in other sectors are using different assessment tools, 

and IP will need to determine whether it can incorporate the results of other 

assessment tools. 

 

Interdependency Analysis. Understanding interdependencies is a key element 

in the future analysis and prioritization of CI/KR; the more IP understands 

interdependencies, the more it can confidently prioritize the NADB. As 

infrastructure by its nature has interconnected elements, the vulnerability of 

one asset may be dependent on another asset. These relationships require 

significant modeling and simulation to determine how cascading effects may 

create vulnerabilities. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 

Center (NISAC) is the government leader in the theoretical understanding of 

infrastructure interdependencies. IP coordinated in applying information from 

NISAC and other sources who are evaluating CI/KR. These entities have 

successfully modeled interdependencies in selected sectors independently of 

the NADB. 

 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Preparedness: 

1. Define, and systematically examine, out-of-place or “extremely 

insignificant” assets, and determine which of those assets should 

remain in the NADB. Consider redesignating low-value assets 

remaining in the NADB. 

2. Provide state homeland security advisors the opportunity to (a) review 

their previously submitted assets (with the taxonomy if necessary) that 

they believe fall within the definition of “extremely insignificant” and 

(b) recommend to DHS whether to retain them. 

3. For ongoing and future data calls, clarify the guidance states should 

follow for what data to submit, and how DHS intends to use that data. 

4. Identify and evaluate key milestones for the NADB and ensure that 

they are accurately captured in the NIPP. 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

22

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS’ Office of Preparedness commented on our draft report (a copy of its 

response in its entirety is recorded in Appendix B) and we incorporated 

several specific comments by DHS into this report. Additional analysis of 

DHS’ comments and responses to the recommendations follows. Based on 

the response and additional discussions with NADB program officials, we 

modified each of our recommendations. 

General Comments

Preparedness was concerned that the report did not accurately reflect the 

nature of criticality in the NADB, noting that the NADB is an inventory of 

assets across the nation to then be filtered to develop appropriate critical asset 

lists. It believes that criticality is not an important part of the initial inventory. 

We understand the purpose of the inventory, but believe that considering the 

relevance of questionable data is worthwhile. We concur that criticality may 

be conditional, reflecting time or other concerns, and the NADB should 

include more than just assets of obvious criticality. For example, 

Preparedness suggested that schools are essential not for infrastructure 

protection, but for additional uses in operational support. While such 

ambitious uses of the NADB may be worthwhile, they should not distract 

from the stated mission of the NADB in supporting the protection of critical 

infrastructure. It should not be a reason to reject the concept of criticality, but 

rather a reason to refine the definitions of criticality applied. We have 

modified some of the language in the report to clarify the role of the NADB in 

the process of infrastructure protection. 

 

Preparedness was also concerned that issues of insufficient staffing and 

funding were underrepresented in the report. We sought, and IP provided, 

some details regarding the NADB program budget. However, at the time of 

our report, we did not have sufficient information to draw conclusions 

regarding program needs. In its action plan to address Recommendation #4, 

IP should indicate whether funding shortfalls would impact its ability to meet 

certain milestones. 

Specific Comment #8 

Preparedness sought to clarify the role of the NADB as an asset inventory in 

the process of developing situational prioritized lists. Their response stated 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

23

that not only does the department not have one definitive prioritized list, but 

also that such a list is “neither possible nor useful....” Rather, Preparedness 

sees the NADB’s mission as supporting “a variety of asset groups for 

programmatic focus or to answer specific questions.” 

We recognize the distinction between the NADB as an inventory and the 

multiple prioritized lists of CI/KR that are created using the inventory. We 

clarified this distinction in our final report. However, we maintain that a 

comprehensive picture of CI/KR across the entire nation’s infrastructure is 

desired. The NIPP lists the “[p]rioritization of assets and systems across 

sectors and jurisdictions...”43 as one of the stated goals of the next generation 

NADB. While the NADB is used to inform programmatic analyses, a 

maturing NADB is also essential to the development of a comprehensive 

picture of the nation’s CI/KR. 

While risk-based prioritization currently supports specific programs and 

sector-specific goals, it also has value in informing overarching budget 

priorities across CI/KR sectors. That said, we are not entirely clear as to what 

the “comprehensive picture”44 will look like, and how DHS will interpret it to 

make funding decisions. 

Recommendation #1: Define, and systematically examine, out-of-place or 

“extremely insignificant” assets, and determine which of those assets 

should remain in the NADB. Consider redesignating low value assets 

remaining in the NADB. 

Preparedness perceived our original recommendation as misguided, 

representing a misunderstanding of the nature of the NADB’s role as an 

inventory rather than as a critical list. 

Based on Preparedness’ response and discussions with program officials, we 

modified this recommendation. We believe that the presence of out-of-place 

assets still warrants management’s attention. Over the development of this 

inventory, DHS has deferred to the judgment of the state, locality, or agency 

about which assets they should submit for the purposes of infrastructure 

protection, but there is evidence that these entities submitted assets for reasons 

other than state or local criticality assessments. This has led to out-of-place 

assets that should never have been included, and will never be used to inform 

 

43 Draft NIPP, p. 82 

44 Ibid 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

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a risk assessment. Without a method to clean such assets from the inventory, 

time and money will be wasted to repeatedly filter out such assets for each 

analysis, and perhaps more importantly, their presence undercuts confidence 

in the inventory. Such out of place assets should be addressed. 

IP already eliminates assets of “extreme insignificance,” although criteria for 

identifying such assets have not been determined. Based on follow-up 

conversations with IP, most removed assets were removed because they were 

determined to not exist, but in rare instances, some assets were removed 

because they were deemed to have negligible value. This suggests that IP 

recognizes some value in eliminating out of place assets. We suggest that IP 

more clearly define assets of “extreme insignificance.” This includes assets 

that are obviously out-of-place, as were many mentioned in this review. 

Recommendation #1: Unresolved - Open 

Recommendation #2: Provide state homeland security advisors the 

opportunity to (a) review their previously submitted assets (with the 

taxonomy if necessary) that they believe fall within the definition of 

“extremely insignificant” and (b) recommend to DHS whether to retain 

them. 

Preparedness concurred with our recommendation. IP intends to provide 

assets maintained within the NADB to the respective states in the next data 

call to reduce duplicate submissions. States will also have the opportunity to 

identify assets that they believe not be included in the inventory. 

Because IP will consider revising state assets in light of state concerns, we 

modified our recommendation to better reflect IP’s plans. We agree that this 

information sharing may be productive in identifying assets that may not be 

relevant to the database, dependent on IP’s assessment of the assets. It is 

unclear whether IP will give the same discretion to the state in removing 

assets as in submitting them. As part of its action plan, Preparedness should 

establish standards to guide the determination of assets. 

Recommendation #2: Resolved - Open 
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

25

Recommendation #3: For ongoing and future data calls, clarify the 

guidance given to states that discusses what data states should consider 

submitting, and how DHS intends to use that data. 

Preparedness did not have the opportunity to respond specifically to this 

recommendation, which we developed through subsequent dialogue with 

NADB program officials. Program officials are developing improved 

guidance for the next data call. 

As part of its action plan, Preparedness should provide an example of 

guidance for the next data call. This should include clarification of the 

purpose of the NADB and the intended breadth of assets to be contained 

within the NADB, to increase the consistency and comparability of state 

reports. 

Recommendation #3: Resolved - Open 

Recommendation #4: Identify and evaluate key milestones for the NADB 

and ensure that they are accurately captured in the NIPP.

Preparedness agreed with this recommendation in part. Preparedness raised 

an issue with the scope of our recommendation, as completion of a 

comprehensive risk analysis is not within the scope of the NADB. We agree 

that such an assessment is an activity that the NADB supports, and not an 

activity of the NADB program itself, and modified our recommendation 

accordingly. Preparedness is skeptical that it can produce a complete 

assessment, as the inventory and risk environment will continually evolve. 

Preparedness did agree on the importance of developing and refining clear 

milestones. 

We agree that the on-going process will continue to develop key milestones. 

As part of its action plan, Preparedness should provide documentation of 

NADB milestones as they are incorporated into the NIPP. Preparedness 

should indicate whether funding shortfalls would impact its ability to meet 

certain milestones. 

Recommendation #4: Resolved - Open 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

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We reviewed the ongoing development of the NADB as a result of 

conclusions noted in our February 2004 survey report of what was formerly 

known within DHS as the IAIP directorate.45 Our initial objective was to 

evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes used by IP to 

develop a prioritized list of the nation’s critical infrastructure and assets. IP 

did not have a comprehensive, prioritized list but was actively collecting data 

from states to help create one. During 2005, we followed IP’s progress 

toward completing the database. We also determined to what extent the 

database is supporting the NIPP and progressing toward a comprehensive, 

national risk assessment capability. 

 

We assessed the methodology and results of DHS’ 2004 data call to states for 

CI/KR information, as well as data DHS collected from states as part of the 

Office of Domestic Preparedness’ State Self-Assessment Program.46 We 

reviewed aggregate NADB data across multiple sectors and reviewed assets 

submitted by several states. We examined the NADB in July 2005 and again 

in January 2006. We reviewed documentation in support of the identification 

and selection process describing the business process. We became acquainted 

with IP’s RAMCAP tool, as well as other agency-specific vulnerability and 

risk assessment activity. 

We met with IP officials, including those managing the NADB program, and 

officials in other DHS components including the Transportation Security 

Administration and the United States Coast Guard. We visited homeland 

security officials in Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 

New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. We interviewed 

representatives from the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 

Center and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We also held 

meetings with representatives of the contractor that played a key role in 

processing the data submitted by states as part of the July 2004 data call. 

We conducted our review between January 2005 and January 2006 under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

 

45 “Survey of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,” OIG-04-13, February 2004, p.24. 46 In 2003, states and urban areas participated in an assessment process that reflected post-9/11 threats and 

vulnerabilities. This second process enabled states and urban areas to refine and further develop their Homeland Security 

Strategies. 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

27

the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency.
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

28
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

29
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

30
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

31
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

32
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

33
Appendix B 

Preparedness Response to OIG 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

34
Appendix C 

Roles/Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management 

Framework

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

35

Roles and Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management Framework 
Appendix C 

Roles/Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management 

Framework

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

36
Appendix C 

Roles/Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management 

Framework

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

37
Appendix C 

Roles/Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management 

Framework

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

38
Appendix C 

Roles/Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management 

Framework

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

39
Appendix C 

Roles/Responsibilities within NIPP Risk Management 

Framework

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

40
Appendix D 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

41

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors 

Agriculture and Food 

 Supply Processing/ 

Packaging/Production 

 Agricultural and Food Product 

Storage 

 Agricultural and Food Production 

Transportation 

 Agricultural and Food Production 

Distribution 

 Agricultural and Food Production 

Facilities 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

 Other Agriculture and Food 

Banking and Finance 

 Banking and Credit 

 Securities, Commodities, and 

Financial Investments 

 Insurance Carriers 

Chemical and Hazardous Materials 

Industry 

 Chemical Manufacturing Plants 

 Hazardous Chemical Transport 

 Hazardous Chemical 

Storage/Stockpile/Utilization/Distribut

ion 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

 Other Hazardous Chemical Facilities 

Defense Industrial Base 

 Shipbuilding Industry 

 Aircraft Industry 

 Missile Industry 

 Space Industry 

 Combat Vehicle Industry 

 Ammunition Industry 

 Weapons Industry 

 Troop Support Industry 

 Information Technology Industry 

 Electronics Industry 

 Electrical Industry Commodities 

 Mechanical Industry Commodities 

 Structural Industry Commodities 

Energy 

 Electricity 

 Petroleum 

 Natural Gas 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

Emergency Services 

 Law Enforcement 

 Fire, Rescue, and Emergency 

Services 

 Search and Rescue 

 Emergency Medical Services 

 Emergency Management 

 Other Emergency Services 

Information Technology 

 Hardware Production 

 Software Production 

 Information Technology Services 

 Internet 

 Next Generation Networks 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

 Other Information Technology 

Facilities 

Telecommunications 

 Wired Telecommunications 

 Wireless Telecommunications 

 Satellite Telecommunications 

 Internet 

 Next Generation Networks 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

 Other Telecommunications Facilities 

Postal and Shipping 

 U.S. Postal Service 

 Couriers 

 Other Postal and Shipping Facilities 

Healthcare and Public Health 

 Direct Patient Healthcare 

 Public Health Agencies 

 Healthcare Educational Facilities 

 Health Supporting Facilities 

 End-of-Life Facilities 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

 Other Healthcare and Public Health 

Facilities 

Transportation 

 Aviation 

 Railroad 

 Road 

 Maritime 

 Mass Transit 

 Pipelines 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

Water 

 Raw Water Supply 

 Raw Water Transportation 

 Raw Water Storage 

 Water Treatment Facilities 

 Treated (Finished) Water Storage 

 Treated Water Distribution Systems 

 Treated Water Monitoring Systems 

 Treated Water Distribution Control 

Centers 

 Wastewater Facilities 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

National Monuments and Icons 

 National Monument/Icon Structures 

 National Monument/Icon 

Geographic Areas 

 National Monument/Icon 

Documents and Objects 

 Other National Monuments and 

Icons 

Commercial Assets 

 Business Assets 

 Community Assets 

 Industrial Assets 

 Other Commercial Assets 

Government Facilities 

 Executive Branch Facilities 

 Legislative Branch Facilities 

 Judicial Buildings 

 Foreign Government Buildings 

 Other Government Facilities 

Dams 

 Low Hazard Potential Dams 

 Significant Hazard Potential Dams 

 High Hazard Potential Dams 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

Nuclear Facilities 

 Nuclear Power Plants 

 Research, Training, and Test 

Reactors 

 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 

 Radioactive Waste Management 

 Nuclear Materials Transport 

 Deactivated Nuclear Facilities 

 Radioactive Material Users 

 Radioactive Source Production and 

Distribution Facilities 

 Regulatory, Oversight, and Industry 

Organizations 

 Other Nuclear Facilities
Appendix E 

Guidelines for Identifying National Level Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

42

On July 19, 2004, the Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure Protection, sent to 

State/Territorial Homeland Security Advisors via memorandum the following guidelines: 

Guidelines for Identifying National Level 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

AGRICULTURE/FOOD

1. Distribution facilities that ship to 5 or more states. 

2. Food Processors with product distribution to more then 10 states. 

3. Producers with herd of more then 20,000 Bovine, 30,000 swine or 500,000 poultry or 

distribution to more then 10 states or production of 50,001-250,000 bushels of crops. 

BANKING & FINANCE

1. Wholesale Securities/Funds Transfer Services in excess of $50B per year. 

2. Financial entities that provide wholesale funds or government securities transfer and 

settlement services. 

3. Primary dealers in the government securities market. 

4. Primary/Backup for the backbone computer infrastructure for stock market exchanges 

5. Major banking and financial centers. 

CHEMICAL

1. Sites that could cause death or serious injury in the event of a chemical release and have 

greater than 300,000 persons within a 25-mile radius of the facility. 

2. Economic impact of more than one billion dollars per day (e.g., an event impacting 

multiple sectors and cumulatively cause this amount of economic damage). 

NOTE: The term “sites” includes manufacturing plants; rail, maritime, or other transport systems; 

pipeline and other distribution networks; and storage, stockpile, and supply areas. 

ENERGY (EXCEPT NUCLEAR POWER)

Electricity 

1. Major power generation facilities that exceed 2000MW and if successfully attacked would 

disrupt the regional electric grid. 

2. Hydroelectric facilities and dams that produce power in excess of 2000MW or could result in 

catastrophic loss of life if breached. 

3. Substations that are the sole-source of power to critical commercial or government facilities 
Appendix E 

Guidelines for Identifying National Level Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

43

4. Regional transmission coordination centers: Control centers for Regional Transmission 

Organizations, Independent Transmission Operators, and Regional Coordinators. 

5. Transmission substations necessary for the reliable operation of the transmission grids 

6. Electric substations 500Kv or larger, and substations 345Kv or larger that are part of a 

critical system supporting population in excess of one million people. 

Oil & Gas 

1. Refineries with refining capacity in excess of 225,000 barrels per day. 

2. Product pipelines with a capacity in excess of 200,000 barrels per day.

3. Natural gas pipelines with a capacity equal to or greater than 1 billion cubic feet per day.

4. Natural Gas and liquid Natural Gas Storage (LNG) facilities. 

5. Major petroleum handling facilities such as pipelines, ports, refineries and terminals. 

EMERGENCY SERVICES

1. National Emergency Operations Centers (e.g. HSOC, NICC, NRC, USCOE, etc.) 

2. Operation centers responsible for receiving and disbursing National Strategic Stockpile 

Supplies at the state level, and in support of urban center distributions with populations 

greater than one million.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

1. IT Systems: Systems with access or control points distributed on both coasts and throughout 

the country. 

2. Networks: Networks with nodes distributed on both coasts and throughout the country. 

3. Digital Control Systems: Control Systems with access or control points distributed on both 

coasts and throughout the country. 

4. Major Primary data storage and processing facilities. 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1. Major telephony hotels.

2. Control centers controlling national or regional telephonic traffic.

POSTAL & SHIPPING

1. Major collection, sorting or distribution centers for national or regional shipments. 

PUBLIC HEALTH

1. Primary medical care facilities with unique services (i.e. shock trauma units) serving 

populations of greater than 250 thousand. 

2. Primary blood supply facilities servicing national and regional areas. 

3. National Stockpile and unique pharmaceutical (i.e. vaccine facilities for flu, small pox) 

facilities. 
Appendix E 

Guidelines for Identifying National Level Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

44

TRANSPORTATION

Rail (Freight): 

1. Railroad Information Technology and Communications Infrastructure critical nodes. 

2. Rail tunnels and bridges or other critical assets where no practical reroute and rebuild time is 

over six months if all resources are available, rerouting results in 75% degradation of service. 

3. Primary entry points used to transport commercial or military shipments, which if destroyed 

would significantly impact the people, economy or national security. 

4. Unsecured rail yards, located within populated areas (greater than 50K), that on any given 

day, contain large quantities (greater than 5 tank cars) of poison inhalation hazard materials.

5. Rail yards that if disabled would cause significant disruption of national economy.

Mass Transit (Main/Major Terminals—Subways/Bus/Rail/Cruise) 

1. Subways: Subway systems and supporting ventilation systems. 

2. Bus: Terminals located within urban centers with a population of greater than 500K or 

servicing >5K passengers daily. 

3. Passenger Rail: Terminals located within urban centers with a population of greater than 

500K or servicing greater than 50K passengers daily. 

4. Cruise: Ports/Terminals located within urban centers with a population of greater than 500K 

or servicing greater than 10K passengers daily. 

Maritime 

1. Seaports that have been designated Strategic National Defense Seaports. 

2. Seaports that represent the majority of imports and exports of containerized and petroleum 

cargoes. 

3. Seaports and facilities that service the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 

4. Locks & dams critical for the operation of major inland commercial waterways. 

5. Harbor entrance waterway choke points that if blocked would deny port access. 

Aviation 

1. Major airports (passenger and freight). 

WATER

Supply

1. Water treatment facilities, ground water systems (wells), water transmission systems 

(aqueducts, viaducts, pipelines, open channel) that serve populations or water reservoir 

system(s) including ground or elevated that serve populations of greater that one million 

persons. 

Wastewater 

1. Waste water treatment facilities, wastewater collection systems and pumping systems (force 

mains) or wastewater storage system(s) that serve populations greater than one million 

persons. 
Appendix E 

Guidelines for Identifying National Level Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

45

NATIONAL MONUMENTS & ICONS

1. Monuments/icons of national significance. 

Key Resources

COMMERCIAL FACILITIES

1. Commercial Centers: Loss creates economic impact of greater than $10 billion or has a 

capacity greater than 35,000 individuals 

2. Office Buildings 

a. Height greater than 500 feet and/or of significant importance. 

b. Economic impact of loss greater than $10 billion 

c. Capacity greater than 8,000 individuals 

3. Stadiums – Arenas: Economic impact of loss greater than $10 billion or capacity greater 

than 25,000 individuals 

4. Amusement/Theme Parks: Economic impact of loss greater than $10 billion or capacity 

greater than 35,000 individuals 

5. Public Institutions (Educational Facilities): Economic impact of loss greater than $10 

billion or capacity greater than 25,000 individuals 

6. Hospitality Industry: Economic impact of loss more than $10 billion or capacity more than 

8,000 individuals 

GOVERNMENT FACILITIES

1. Federal or state-level COOP/COG facilities 

DAMS

1. High hazard dams, or dams that produce over .5 megawatts of hydropower or provide 

irrigation to agriculture greater than 10,000 acres or provide for navigation on significant 

waterways or provide flood control or locks that provide significant waterway navigational 

ability or levees that provide significant flood control that the loss of which would cause 

significant economic impact or loss of life. 

NUCLEAR REACTORS AND SPENT FUEL FACILITIES
Appendix F 

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource Totals By State 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

46

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource Totals by State

 

State or 

Territory 

Number 

of Assets 

already 

on NADB 

(FY04) 

Number 

of Assets 

submitted 

on NADB 

(FY05) 

Number of Assets 

on the NADB 

(FY04) and the 

NADB (FY05) 

(Duplicates) 

Percentage of NADB 

(FY05) Assets 

submitted that were 

duplicates of the 

NADB (FY04) Assets

Number of New 

Assets resulting

from the NADB 

(FY05) Data 

Call 

Total 

Number of 

Assets in the 

Database 

1 Alabama 701 39 30 76.92% 9 710 

2 Alaska 552 87 4 4.60% 83 635 

3 American 

Samoa 

- - - - - 10 

4 Arizona 597 151 73 48.34% 78 675 

5 Arkansas 367 144 15 10.42% 129 496 

6 California 3122 737 647 87.79% 90 3212 

7 Colorado 422 872 1 0.11% 871 1293 

8 Commonwealth 

of Northern 

Marianas 

- - - - - 28 

9 Commonwealth 

of Puerto Rico 

97 33 - - 33 130 

10 Connecticut 465 578 113 19.55% 465 930 

11 Delaware 51 415 11 2.65% 404 455 

12 District of 

Columbia 

308 158 50 31.65% 108 416 

13 Florida 1453 688 127 18.46% 561 2014 

14 Georgia 1493 74 53 71.62% 21 1514 

15 Guam - - - - - 116 

16 Hawaii 92 116 6 5.17% 110 202 

17 Idaho 153 595 1 0.17% 594 747 

18 Illinois 1801 429 171 39.86% 258 2059 

19 Indiana 322 8303 34 0.41% 8269 8591 

20 Iowa 349 147 41 27.89% 106 455 

21 Kansas 631 694 342 49.28% 352 983 

22 Kentucky 774 397 48 12.09% 349 1123 

23 Louisiana 447 393 94 23.92% 299 746 

24 Maine 208 80 17 21.25% 63 271 

25 Maryland 591 1152 51 4.43% 1101 1692 

26 Massachusetts 339 477 52 10.90% 425 764 

27 Michigan 916 631 80 12.68% 551 1467 

28 Minnesota 548 65 36 55.38% 29 577 

29 Mississippi 948 100 22 22.00% 78 1026 

30 Missouri 448 261 25 9.58% 236 684 

31 Montana 248 1148 11 0.96% 1137 1385 

32 Nebraska 1389 2401 333 13.87% 2068 3457 

33 Nevada 468 157 18 11.46% 139 607 
Appendix F 

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource Totals By State 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

47

 

State or 

Territory 

Number 

of Assets 

already 

on NADB 

(FY04) 

Number 

of Assets 

submitted 

on NADB 

(FY05) 

Number of Assets 

on the NADB 

(FY04) and the 

NADB (FY05) 

(Duplicates) 

Percentage of NADB 

(FY05) Assets 

submitted that were 

duplicates of the 

NADB (FY04) Assets

Number of New 

Assets resulting

from the NADB 

(FY05) Data 

Call 

Total 

Number of 

Assets in the 

Database 

34 New 

Hampshire 

- - - - - 77 

35 New Jersey 610 469 175 37.31% 294 904 

36 New Mexico 533 824 9 1.09% 815 1348 

37 New York 1634 4187 134 3.20% 4053 5687 

38 North Carolina 518 227 25 11.01% 202 720 

39 North Dakota 255 537 29 5.40% 508 763 

40 Ohio 1135 875 123 14.06% 752 1887 

41 Oklahoma 290 35 20 57.14% 15 305 

42 Oregon 737 353 250 70.82% 103 840 

43 Pennsylvania 617 2298 42 1.83% 2256 2873 

44 Rhode Island 70 34 7 20.59% 27 97 

45 South Carolina 214 117 23 19.66% 94 308 

46 South Dakota 261 129 30 23.26% 99 360 

47 Tennessee 763 267 55 20.60% 212 975 

48 Texas 988 2960 144 4.86% 2816 3804 

49 Utah 174 386 2 0.52% 384 558 

50 Vermont 67 10 7 70.00% 3 70 

51 Virgin Islands 19 69 2 2.90% 67 86 

52 Virginia 1099 3252 120 3.69% 3132 4231 

53 Washington 761 2974 85 2.86% 2889 3650 

54 West Virginia 240 292 11 3.77% 281 521 

55 Wisconsin 517 6667 38 0.57% 6629 7146 

56 Wyoming 161 217 9 4.15% 208 369 

57 Unlisted - - - - - 20 

 Totals 31963 48701 3846 7.90% 44855 77069 
Appendix G 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

48

William J. McCarron, Chief Inspector 

Carlton Mann, Chief Inspector 

Russell Lundberg, Inspector 
Appendix H 

Report Distribution 

Progress in Developing the National Asset Database 

49

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Assistant Secretary, Policy 

Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs 

Executive Secretariat 

Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection 

Assistant Secretary for Grants and Training 

DHS OIG Liaison 

Audit Liaison, Preparedness 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, Attn: Office of Inspector 

General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to protect the 

identity of each writer and caller.