[H.N.S.C. No. 104-41] 

OCEANOGRAPHY 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

AND THE 

FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE 

35--799 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES 

[Serial No. H.J.-2] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 6, 1995 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASIDNGTON : 1996 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 

ISBN 0-16-053903-X 
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVEWPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Chairman. 

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado 

RICHARD 'DOC' HASTINGS, Washington SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio JOHN TANNER, Tennessee 

HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ROBERT K. DORNAN, California MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam 

RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, California JANE HARMAN, California 

JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana PETE GEREN, Texas 

VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Islan ... 

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida 

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina 

DOUGLAS C. RoACH, Professional Staff Member 

WilLIAM J. ANDAHAZY, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN D. REED, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISl'OPHER A. WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN RAYFIEW, Professional Staff Member 

TRACY W. FINCK, Staff Assistant 

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES 

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

JOHN J . DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

KEN CALVERT, California 

RICHARD W. POMBO, California 

PETER G. TORKILDSEN, MaBBachusetts 

J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona 

FRANK A. CREMEANS, Ohio 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

WES COOLEY, Oregon 

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho 

LINDA SMITH, Washington 

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California 

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina 

WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY, Texas 

RICHARD (DOC) HASTINGS, Washington 

JACK METCALF, Washington 

JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., Maine 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

JOHN E. ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE MILLER, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NICK J . RAHALL II, West Virginia 

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota 

DALE E. KILDEE, Michigan 

PAT WILLIAMS, Montana 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut 

BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, Californil! 

CARLOS A. ROMERO-BARCELO, Puerto 

Rico 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam 

SAM FARR, California 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

DANIEL VAL KISH, Chief of Staff 

DAVID DYE, Chief Counsel 

CHRISTINE A. KENNEDY, Chief Clerk I Administrator 

JOHN LAWRENCE, Democratic Staff Director 

(II) 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairrn4n 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

WAYNE GILCHREST, Maryland 

PETER TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts 

LINDA SMITH, Washington 

WALTER JONES, JR., North Carolina 

JACK METCALF, Washington 

JAMES B. LONGLEY, Maine 

GERRY E. STUDDS, M888achusetts 

GEORGE MILLER, California 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut 

SOLOMON ORTIZ, Texas 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

SAM FARR, California 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

HARRY BURROUGHS, Staff Director 

JOHN RAYFIELD, Professional Staff 

RICK HEALY, Democratic Legislative Staff 

( Ill) 

CONTENTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Kennedy, Hon. Patrick J., a Representative from Rhode Island ........................ . Pallone, Hon. Frank, Jr., a Representative from New Jers~y ............................ . Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Fisheries, 

Wildlife and Oceans Subcommittee: Prepared Statement ............................... . Spratt, Hon. John M., Jr., a Representative from South Carolina, Ranking 

Minority Member, Military Research and Development Subcommittee ........ . Young, Hon. Don, a Representative from Alaska ................................................ . Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative from Pennsylvania, Chairman, Military 

Research and Development Subcommittee ..................................................... 00. 

Page 

9 

7 

10 

6 

14 

1 

PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED 

WRITTEN STATEMENTS 

Brass, Dr. Garrett W., Director, Arctic Research Commission: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . 

Bryn~~i~~~eQ!~~;_;jj~;~~;d~;;·&~~~~~-D~p~~~~t,"'N~;;~gi~~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . Prepared statement ......................................................................................... . Colson, Ambassador David A., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, 

International Environment, Department of State: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . 

Edm~lalli~ j~~M~tP~r~~~·~;··~r·~-~h~ri~"t;y;··iJ~-p-~;t-;;;_~-;;i··~·r·E~rth;··A."t: mospheric and Planetary Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . Prepared statement ......................................................................................... . Gershwin, Dr. Lawrence K., National Intelligence Council: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . Prepared statement ......................................................................................... . Goodman, Sherri W., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental 

Security: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . Prepared statement ......................................................................................... . Grassle, Dr. Fred, Director, Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences, Rutgers University: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . 

Hec~~~~A1:!a~~P!ci"P;i·i>~"P~ty·A~~i~i~"t-A:drici~i;~~;;·om~~-~r·l~t;;;: national Activities, Environmental Protection Agency: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . Prepared statement ......................................................................................... . Millemann, Beth, Executive Director, Coast Alliance: 

Statement ......................................................................................................... . 

Pel~~~d A~M!;··Chi~r-~f"N·~~~~-&~~~h:··jj~·j;;;rt~~~t:·~f"th~·N;ry; Statement ......................................................................................................... . Prepared statement ......................................................................................... . Valent, Dr. Philip J., Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center: 

Statement ······oo••oo•oo···················•oooooooooo•oooooooooooooo•oo•••oo·············oo·oooooo•·····oo·oo····· Prepared statement 00000000 00000000000 •• oo ..... oo •oo• 000000000000000000000000······ ••••••• 0000 oo•• ...• 00 ••••• 

(V) 

103 

106 

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28 

47 

51 

143 

145 

110 

114 

62 

65 

148 

151 

70 

74 

156 

159 

88 

93 

128 

130 
VI 

Page 

Yablokov, Dr. Alekaai V., Ruasian Federation, Interagency Commission on Ecological Security, National Security Council: 

Statement.......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement ................... .............................. .... ............... .................. .... 20 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITl'ED FOR THE RECORD 

Letter from Vice President Gore ........................................................................ .... 3 

Additional information submitted for the record .................................................. 180 
THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND 

OTHER TOXIC WASTE IN OCEANS AND TRIDUTARIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MILITARY RESEARCH AND 

DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FISHERIES, WILDLIFE 

AND OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

RESOURCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 6, 

1995. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:42 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee) and Hon. 

Jim Saxton (chairman of the Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans Subcommittee) presiding. Members present: Representatives Weldon, Saxton, Farr, Gilchrest, Hastings, Jones, Spratt, Ortiz, Pallone, Underwood, McHale, Geren, and Kennedy. Staff present: Bill Andahazy and John Rayfield. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVEWPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. WELDON. The subcommittees will come to order. 

This morning it gives me a great pleasure to cochair with Congressman Jim Saxton of the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife 

and Oceans what I call a landmark hearing. I call this a landmark 

hearing because, for the first time, we bring together other nations 

in a Congressional forum to discuss the environmental impacts caused by both the construction and destruction of the cold war, 

weapons that, thank God, we never had to see used, but today may be just as destructive, silently causing devastation of our ecosystem. We are all concerned about the potential impacts on radioactivity from exposed obsolete nuclear weapons or products of nuclear weapons that are improperly stored or haphazardly dumped in our oceans. 

Last Congress, as the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 

Oceanography, Gulf of Mexico, and the Outer Continental Shelf, I 

worked closely with my good friend and chairman of that subcommittee, Solomon Ortiz, our honorable friend who is here with 

us today as he is also a member of this subcommittee, to begin to 

raise the awareness of our colleagues in the House regarding the 

importance of understanding the marine environment. 

As a matter of national security, the U.S. military has long utilized oceanography as a tool for maintaining a strong national defense. Historically, however, the United States in a nondefense capacity has spent relatively little understanding our oceans while at 

(1) 
2 

the same time spending billions exploring outer space, which I 

have supported, I might add. 

Today's hearing, which focuses specifically on the dumping of radioactive material and other toxic wastes, will kick off a series of 

ocean hearings which will follow up on the work of the 103d Congress and hopefully provide us with a better understanding of the 

marine environment. Vice President AI Gore is behind this effort, 

and I would, without objection, submit a letter from the Vice President to me applauding this subcommittee and our colleagues on the 

Science and National Resources Committee for their cooperation in 

moving forward with this series of three hearings. 

[The letter from Vice President Gore follows:] 
* 

* 

The Honorable Curt Weldon 

Chairman 

3 

THE VICE PRESIDENT 

WASHIN G T O N 

December 6, 1995 

Subcommittee on Military Research 

2452 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Chairman: 

As you know, the topics on which the Committee will focus 

during this series of hearings have been of interest to me for 

some time, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to share my 

perspective. As President Lyndon Baines Johnson said duri ng his 

tenure, "The waters which flow between the banks belong to all 

the people." While the President was speaking about a domestic 

issue at the time, his message resonates today. 

Oceans cover 71 percent of the Earth's surface, and we face 

a common threat to this precious resource . In this time of lean 

budgets, creative efforts to exploit existing research and 

technology effo rts for dual purposes are not only sensible but 

essential. The United States has tremendous resources which only 

have t o be harnessed, and the Committee's hearings represent a 

signific ant step in that direction. 

As we approach the 21st Century, I welcome efforts to ensure 

that our country is well prepared to act on the basis of the very 

best data. I particularly want to thank you for your efforts in 

this regard. Your ideas and insight on these issues are 

important to me, and your continued support is essential . 

Again, please accept my very best wishes for a productive 

series of hearings. 

Al Gore 

AG/ jec 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER 
4 

Mr. WELDON. While our subcommittee has jurisdiction over 

oceanography in the context of military operations, there exists a 

unique opportunity for a joint effort in research exploration between the defense and civilian community. I am happy to announce 

that a major joint hearing examining the concept of technology development through partnerships has been planned for early next 

year, in fact, on January 25, between the Subcommittee on Research and Development, the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife 

and Oceans, and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of 

the House Science Committee. In September 1993, I urged then-Chairman Ortiz to hold a hearing examining the dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic 

Ocean. The intention was not to point fingers at the Russians for 

past environmental actions. As many of you remember, we were 

quick to hold the U.S. Navy accountable for its own actions. At the 

hearing, I pressed the Navy to declassify information on two sunken U.S. nuclear submarines, the Thresher and the Scorpion. Within 

weeks, the Navy complied, and those videos were broadcast on 

"Nightline" in the national media. 

In addition, we just recently learned of the dumping of low-level 

waste in the 1960's off the coast of the Farollon Islands by the 

United States Government. I believe we should be held accountable 

for these actions, as well. The intent of the 1993 hearing, however, was to assess the shortand long-term effects of dumping radioactive waste in the Arctic, 

to determine the extent of Russia's dumping practices, and to determine the lack of Russia's ability to store and dispose of future 

nuclear waste. My colleagues have been given a map, an Arctic portrayal of the world, and when you look at how close we are, we can 

quickly get a glimpse of how important it is for us to work together. 

Of principal concern to the subcommittee in 1993 was a report 

prepared for Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin by Dr. Aleksai Yablokov. As most of you know, Dr. Yablokov provided us 

with the first ever detailed report of Russian dumping activities. The Yablokov Report confirmed what many had been hearing for 

years, that the Russians had dumped over 2.5 million curies of ra- diation in the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Japan over the past several decades, including 16 naval reactors from seven former Soviet 

Union submarines, the icebreaker Lenin; between 1959 and 1991, 

low-level liquid radioactive waste in the Baltic, White, Barents, and 

Kara Sea; and between 1964 and 1991, low and intermediate solid 

radioactive waste was dumped at sites in the Barents and Kara 

Seas. It is an honor to have Dr. Yablokov testify before the subcommittees today and I want to stress the importance of his presence. A 

mere 5 years ago, it would have been unheard of for a high-ranking 

Russian official to come before a committee of this Congress to detail documented cases of Russian nuclear dumping. I believe this 

signifies an important first step toward a more open and honest relationship between the former Soviet Union and the Western World 

regarding the state of the environment in Russia and the world 

today. 
5 

I want to acknowledge to my· colleagues who do not know Dr. 

Yablokov, in reading the reports as I do every morning, last week, 

I came across three articles, each of which documented problems 

inside of Russia. In each of the articles, which were criticizing Russia on its chemical weapons levels, on low priority on smaller nuclear weapons, and on decommissioning nuclear submarines, they 

quoted one individual and that is the individual appearing before 

us today, Dr. Yablokov. He is the leading authority in Russia on 

environmental matters and has the ear of President Yeltsin, which 

is all the more reason why we need to understand and work with 

him and share his perspectives. 

While we are beginning to reveal the location and quantity of nuclear contamination worldwide, still little is known about the shortand long-term effects of dumping radionuclides and other toxic 

waste in the oceans, the health risks that may occur, and the impact to the ocean ecosystem as a whole. 

Since 1992 and 1993 when this problem was first brought to us, 

there has been committee after committee, council after council, 

conference after conference, international meeting after international meeting to determine what impact this waste may have on 

the environment. But the truth is, there has been insufficiency in 

funding, insufficiency in leadership, and insufficiency in commitment to address this issue head-on with our international friends. 

If we are to successfully address the problem, greater international cooperation is an imperative. The final report issued by 

the Office of Technology Assessment just recently, just several 

months ago, on nuclear waste in the Arctic stressed this point emphatically and called for increased expansion of international efforts. We need to go beyond the Arctic region in this cooperative 

effort. 

I am happy to be here also as the chair of the Oceans Task Force 

of the United States branch of GLOBE USA, Global Legislators for 

a Balanced Environment, working with our counterparts in the 

Russian Duma headed by Nicholai Veransoff, the Japanese Diet 

headed by Akiko Dimota, and the European Parliament headed by 

Carlos Pimento and Tom Spencer. We are working together in the 

parliaments and legislative bodies of each of those nations and bodies on these common environmental problems. 

I am also serving this year as the U.S. Vice President for 

ACOPS, the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas. 

Through these two international organizations, we are successfully 

coordinating international efforts in regard to the world's oceans. 

Finally, we are in the process of establishing an exchange program between Members of this Congress in a bipartisan manner 

with members of the Russian Duma who are working on defense 

issues as well as environmental issues in the context of the postcold-war era. 

Today, we are honored to have this distinguished panel of experts from the Russian Federation and Norway, and policy makers 

and technical experts from throughout our country. In addition to 

Dr. Yablokov, we will hear from Kare Bryn, Director General/Ambassador of the Resources Department of the Norwegian Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs who will give us the international perspective. 
6 

Prior to our hearing today, we had a press conference with the 

Bellona Foundation and highlighted the concern that many of us 

in the world have with the security agency in Russia, having just 

recently infiltrated their headquarters and confiscated photographs 

and documentation and computer systems and software that was 

being used to document some gross nuclear storage problems inside 

of Russia. 

We are not here, however, to criticize Russia alone. We are here 

to say this is a world problem. We have not always been as forthcoming in this country and we are going to talk about that today 

in this hearing. But we are committing to work together, to use the 

resources of this subcommittee and the other involved subcommittees to make things happen. I pledge my full unequivocal support 

and I think I know that that is shared by our colleagues on both 

sides of the aisle, to have results that benefit the entire world community. Hopefully in that regard we can find solutions to these 

most vexing and difficult problems. 

With that, I will yield to my distinguished friend and colleague 

and longtime leader on national security, the honorable gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The room is full and we have important witnesses. I do not want 

to take much time. I want to start, though, by thanking you and 

commending you for calling this hearing. I once chaired the Department of Energy panel on this committee and our mission, part of 

it was to focus attention on the legacy of 50 years of nuclear weapons production. 

We should acknowledge from the outset, and our chairman already has, that this is not a problem that is unique to the former 

Soviet Union. This is our problem, too. And the purpose of this 

hearing, as the chairman said, is not to point fingers at our former 

adversaries. It is to shed light on a common problem and an enormous problem for both of us. 

Today, in particular, we bring attention to one phase of the problem which has received too little attention. We have tended to treat 

the oceans as someone else's problem, as a place to put things that 

is off our shore and off our national territory and therefore of no 

immediate concern to us but is eventually of immediate concern to 

everybody because the oceans belong to all of us and affect all of 

us. 

I want to welcome our witnesses to our hearing today. Some of 

you have traveled great distances to come and we look forward to 

your testimony. 

Safely disposing of the wastes that we have generated to support 

our nuclear arsenals during the cold war is a huge challenge and 

it will take staggering sums of money to deal with it. For our country alone, the cost estimates run from $400 billion to as much as 

$1.4 trillion, and as the chairman said, we have not yet stepped up 

to the funding challenge. Indeed, this very committee reduced the 
7 

funding request from the Department of Energy this year by $500 

million for environmental waste and remediation at a time when 

we were plussing up the rest of the budget by $7.5 billion, so this 

is a timely hearing for this very committee. 

I want to credit the Clinton administration for several steps it 

has taken to address this problem. I had the pleasure to go with 

Vice President Gore when he was Senator Gore under the Arctic 

Circle with the Navy to see what the Navy was doing in response 

to the strategic environmental initiative taken by the Senate committee, which Ms. Goodman had a hand in crafting some years ago. 

We are seeing the fruits of that today with the release of the enormous store of information that the Navy has amassed over the 

years. 

I want to credit the President, too, for taking a bold step and declaring a moratorium on nuclear testing. It was not a popular step in every quarter but it has had a number of positive effects. The 

most important, of course, was the extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, but it also gave the Russians a political cover 

to stop testing, and the testing they were doing at that time was 

no longer in Kajakistan, it was in the Arctic Circle and it was an 

active, ongoing source of radioactive pollution. This also gave both 

countries the opportunity to devote more resources and attention to 

cleanup and remediation. 

This administration also reversed the longstanding U.S. policy and signed a pledge not to dump nuclear waste in the world's 

oceans as an addendum to the London Convention, a long overdue 

step for our Nation. 

And finally, the administration has shown that it is committed 

to making the cleanup of national waste a budget priority. Today, we are looking at just one aspect of the problem in the 

former Soviet Union, the dumping of nuclear waste at sea. The 

United States and the former Soviet Union are still paying for the 

cold war and will do so for decades to come. 

I commend the chairman once again for calling today's hearing 

so that we have an opportunity to consider the consequences of nuclear dumping at sea, to begin thinking about what we are going 

to do about it, and for reminding my colleagues on this committee 

that this is but one part of an enormous problem which we have 

only begun to pay for and deal with. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Spratt. Are there other members who would like to make brief opening statements? Mr. Pallone. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A 

REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am an original cosponsor of your bill, H.R. 1154, that would 

amend the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act to 

close loopholes in our laws relating to the ocean dumping of radioactive waste. I know you have been a leader in this area and I 

want to commend you for your efforts. 

But I came today, because even more important to me locally, because I represent a coastal district, is the second part of today's 
8 

hearing, which deals with the disposal of waste on the ocean floor. 

In 1988, Congress passed legislation that banned the ocean dumping of waste at sea. In that same year, the New Jersey State Legislature enacted our State's ocean dumping ban. Dumping at sea was 

a threat to our marine environment and to the health and economic 

well-being of those who are dependent upon coastal resources. It 

was the main reason I decided to run for Congress. 

It is hard for me to believe that just over 15 years ago, there 

were more than 400 industries and municipalities which had permits or were seeking permits to dump waste in the ocean. Just 7 

years ago, washups of sewage sludge and medical waste on the 

New Jersey Shore forced closures and scared tourists away to the 

point where we lost some $3 billion in potential revenue in the 

State of New Jersey. 

However, thanks to the ocean dumping ban in 1993, New Jersey's coastal regions received about 14 million overnight visitors 

who spent some $10.3 billion and helped create over 171,000 jobs. 

I only mention that to show how important ocean water quality is 

to the New Jersey Shore. 

Despite all the progress we have made on ocean protection and 

the clear policy statement of Congress on ocean dumping, in 1992, 

as was mentioned before, in the Merchant Marine Committee, our 

former colleague, Bill Hughes, our current chairman, Jim Saxton, 

and myself found ourselves fighting a backdoor attempt to reopen 

the ocean dumping ban. That year, advocates of a technology called 

deep ocean isolation sought to authorize the use of the ocean floor 

as a landfill. Clearly, they were reopening the ocean dumping ban 

even for research purposes and that would have represented a retreat from the strong action that Congress took in 1988 and from 

efforts to reduce, reuse, and recycle our society's wastes. 

Today, we are once again faced with an attack on one of the most 

important environmental laws by a group of people who seem intent on dumping wastes at sea. Late yesterday, I found out that 

supporters of ocean dumping succeeded in getting a provision in 

the Commerce, Justice, and State conference report that we are 

going to vote on today that would have the Federal Government 

spend taxpayer dollars to develop a demonstration project on deep 

ocean isolation of waste. This language was not in the House Commerce report. It was not in the Senate Commerce report. But suddenly, mysteriously, it is in the conference report that we are going 

to vote on today without any opportunity to take that out of the 

conference report. 

Deep ocean isolation and this tethered container technology in 

particular has already been specifically rejected by the Department 

of Commerce as not only unsafe but antithetical to U.S. and international law regarding the dumping of waste at sea. In addition, 

the Naval Research Lab has already analyzed the technology and 

in January of this year deemed it unacceptable. 

I hope my colleagues will take full advantage of this hearing to 

join me in expressing their outrage over the appropriators' actions 

and their efforts to go behind the back of our subcommittee to reopen the issue of ocean dumping. This is not the first time in this 

Congress that appropriation bills have been used to deal with 
9 

things that should have gone through the authorizing committees, 

but I think it is particularly egregious in this case. 

Ocean dumping is illegal. At a time when Congress is proposing 

to cut funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by 

21 percent and to significantly weaken many of our most important 

environmental protections, it is particularly irresponsible, in my 

opinion, and wrong to use taxpayers' money to fund experiments in 

ocean dumping of any kind of waste. 

I do not want to take up your time because I know we are going 

to deal with this in the fourth panel, and that is later today, Mr. 

Chairman, but I am so concerned about it because of what is happening on the floor today and, of course, I am going to go over 

there at some point today to make my point during the debate on 

the conference report. Thank you. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentlemen. 

Are there other members who would like to make opening statements? Mr. Kennedy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. KENNEDY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to begin by commending you for your leadership on 

this issue. I also want to commend Bill Andahazy from the professional staff here for his effort in bringing today's witnesses to testify. 

I would like to say that I look forward to working with you on 

this panel and on the Natural Resources Committee, to which I 

have just been appointed, to work on this to determine what the 

size and extent of the problem is and all the circumstances with 

which various forms of pollution can become really hazardous to 

the environmental security that I think everyone on this committee 

has an interest in, not only we in this country but countries all 

over the world, given the fact that 70 percent of our world's surface 

is ocean and we need to understand what we have done in the past 

and what we continue to do and what its impact is on our environment. Thank you. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank my friend and colleague and would add 

that we are committed to doing the second of the three hearings 

on this topic in the area of the gentleman's district in cooperation 

with the Woods Hole and I look forward to that field hearing, as 

well. 

I would like to insert the opening statement of the gentleman 

from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton, who, as I mentioned, is on the House 

floor now and will be joining us later this afternoon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton follows:] 
10 

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JIM SAXTON, 

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, 

WILDLIFE AND OCEANS, AT THE JOINT OVERSIGHT 

HEARING ON OCEAN DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE 

MATERIALS: DECEMBER 6, 1995. 

I am pleased to join with my National Security 

Committee colleagues today to examine the issue of 

radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic and the use of the 

abyssal plain for waste disposal. 

Since I serve on both committees, it is nice to see this . overlap of concerns. I would also note that the former 

Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, on which both 

Curt and I served, held hearings on both of these topics. I 
11 

- 2 -

am glad that despite the demise of that committee, Congress is 

still considering ocean issues. 

Certainly the United States, and all the nations that 

border the Arctic Ocean, must be concerned about the 

dumping of radioactive and other contaminated materials 

there. Therefore, I look forward to hearing from both our 

international and domestic witnesses on the fate of material 

already disposed of in the Arctic Ocean, and on plans to 

prevent future contamination. 

In preparing for today's panel on deep ocean disposal of 

dredged material, I looked back at my remarks about deep 

ocean disposal before the Coast Guard Subcommittee in 1993. 

At that time, I said that deep ocean disposal was "a 
12 

- 3 -

cockamamie idea driven more by profit than by rational 

environmental policy" . At present, I have no reason to 

change my views. 

Removing our wastes from sight is not the same as 

responsible management of those wastes, nor does it replace 

efforts to develop practical cost-effective ways to reduce the 

stream of waste we produce. Our efforts should be focused 

on pollution reduction so that we don't end up being forced to 

choose between a host of more unacceptable and less 

unacceptable alternatives. Despite my strong opposition to the 

dumping of land-based or nearshore-based waste in the ocean, 

I am interested in hearing what today's witnesses have to say. 

###### 

JS:jrm 
13 

Mr. WELDON. I would also like to include the opening statement 

of Chairman Don Young of the Resources Committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:] 
14 

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DON YOUNG 

(R-AK) AT THE JOINT OVERSIGHT HEARING ON 

OCEAN DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS: 

DECEMBER 6, 1995. 

I am pleased that the Subcommittees are holding this joint 

hearing today. As the Member who represents the Arctic 

Ocean shoreline of the United States, I am, of course, very 

concerned about how that ocean is used. I look forward to 

the witnesses' assessments of the environmental fate of the 

material that has already been dumped into the Arctic Ocean, 

and what can be done to prevent additional contamination of 

the Arctic. 

I also look forward to hearing from the panel dealing 

with deep ocean disposal of dredged material. Improved 
15 

- 2 -

scientific understanding of the environment and advances in 

technology have already improved our environmental 

management capabilities dramatically, and hold the promise 

for significant additional improvements. As our understanding of the deep ocean environment increases, we may 

find that deep ocean placement technology provides a disposal 

option for some materials that will improve near-coastal water 

quality, and avoid the need to develop additional land-based 

disposal alternatives. 

I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses. 

###### 

DY:jrm 
16 

Mr. WELDON. Are there any other opening statements? With 

that, Dr. Yablokov, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ALEKSAI V. YABLOKOV, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, INTERAGENCY COMMISSION ON ECOLOGICAL SECURITY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask somebody to 

show some pictures, if it is possible. It may be more informative 

than my written presentation. 

I have to say that I deeply appreciated your invitation. I greatly 

appreciated such possibility to express my understanding of this 

situation, because the situation with Arctic pollution is not only a 

Russian problem. It is a problem for all Arctic countries, including 

the United States, Canada, and maybe even not only the Arctic but 

all countries which belong to the Northern Hemisphere. For example, you know not only pollution from military Russian 

source but also from Great Britain is detectable, even in the Kara 

Sea, in the White Sea, especially in the Barents Sea. 

This is the last minute before dumping of one of the nuclear submarines near shore in the new land. The dumping place is only 20 

meters deep. It is a last minute life of submarine. So the 17 submarine was dumped near new land. The last expedition shows that 

only near submarine some radioactivity was slightly higher than in 

the Kara Sea, so it does not create immediate danger. We have 

time. We have time, maybe several years to improve the situation. 

I hope that in several years, we have the possibility to erase all of 

this submarine and to blaze it into safety deposition. 

Mr. WELDON. Dr. Yablokov, you have to excuse us. Do you have 

these technical problems in Russia? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Yes, of course. It is typical. [Laughter.] 

Dr. YABLOKOV. In my written text, you can see a more detailed 

explanation of what the Russian Government has done and tried 

to do in this direction. Some visible activity, especially in the last 

year. Just in the last month, my government approved a special 

Federal program to overcome the nuclear waste problem. It is a 

big, big project, many pages, but only $1 billion which they allocated to spend during 10 years. It is nothing, if you count the prob- lem which we are facing and what we need for this problem, for 

radioactive contamination of the Arctic. 

We will have a possibility to show my picture, or I can talk without the picture. 

Mr. WELDON. If you can proceed, we will try to get it corrected. 

I think the light bulb went out. But if you can proceed without the 

photo, we will try to get it corrected and then put it up. Do you 

have photos you can pass around, Dr. Yablokov? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Yes. I will continue without pictures. 

What we have to do, the scale of problem, we understand it is 

an enormous scale of problem, not only nuclear submarines which 

were dumped but also three installations in Central Siberia which 

produced military plutonium have an enormous amount of radioactive waste which are going to the Arctic Ocean, because as you 

recall, the northern slope. Asia has some slope to the Arctic Ocean 

and all waste is going to the Arctic sooner or later. 
17 

The official estimation and the minimal estimation is that 3 billion curies which are in the Yenisey River basin and the Ob River 

basin, and in several tens of years, maybe 100 years, no more than 

100 years, all this radioactivity will be in the Arctic Ocean if we 

cannot do something just now or in the next years. 

Mr. WELDON. Excuse me, did you say 3 billion curies? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Three billion curies. Three billion curies. Three 

billion curies. 

The problem is also with so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. In 

the Soviet time, we conducted more than 100 peaceful nuclear 

explosions. The bulk of them, maybe about 35 or 37 of them were 

conducted in the Arctic. It is also an additional source of radioactive pollution. 

But it is not only radioactive pollution. We have enormous oil 

and gas pollution. The amount of oil in the mouth of Siberia in the 

river, especially in the Ob River, jumped during the last 20 years 10 times and continues rising. Every year in Siberia, we catch 

about 200 million tons of oil. At least 5 million tons of oil we lost 

because of leaking, leaking in the pipeline, leaking during transpor- tation and so on and so on and so on. All this oil is going into the 

northern ocean. Fifteen percent of the Bering Sea is covered by a 

film from oil. 

I have to continue a description of the environmental pollution of the Arctic, but now I have to turn your attention to what we can 

do, what we have to do. First of all, we need a special agreement or treaty about Arctic protection. We were near to this treaty 2 years ago but it was the State Department of the United 

States who spoiled this treaty. We have practically full ready text 

of such a treaty for protection, a Russian-American treaty for pro- tection of the Arctic, but your State Department, because here is 

some ridiculous, from my point of view, obstacles for this treaty stopped this activity. Now, I think we have no possibility to repeat it because our military have now more powers than 2 years ago and for Russia's 

side, it would be an enormous problem to come back to this treaty. We have lost this possibility. But we tried to do something in this. 

I will show you the level of radioactivity and the place where we 

produce plutonium, K.rasnoyarsk-26, Tomsk-7, and Chelyabinsk-70. The first number is the radioactivity in surface water, 1 billion curies in Chelyabinsk and zero on the ground. In Tomsk, 500 million 

in the surface and 500 million on the ground dumping. And in the 

Krasnoyarsk, about 100 million curies in the lake and 600 million 

curies on the ground. 

This map shows us the places for underground nuclear explo- sions, underground nuclear explosions. You can see how many nuclear explosions were conducted in the Arctic and all this radioactivity going to the Arctic. The next slide, please. 

This shows us oil pollution, oil pollution in the Barents Sea. Now 

it is much more water polluted, not only in the Barents Sea but 

also in the Kara Sea. I took your attention, it is just before the famous leaking in the Komi Republic which took all public attention 

in last year. It is just before the Komi leaking we have such heavy oil pollution in the Barents Sea. Next, please. 
18 

This is interesting. This is a night view from space on the world. 

This is from the National Geographic map. Look for the angle, the 

right angle here is the brightest place all over the world. It is not 

New York, it is not Los Angeles, but it is Surgood. It is the Surgood 

region in Northwestern Siberia, the gas and oil deposition. Tens of 

thousands of gas storage creates such an enormous light which is 

located from hundreds and hundreds of kilometers from space. It 

has created not only light but it has created enormous pollution. 

I fully agree with my friend Al Gore, who, in his book which was 

published 4 years ago, mentioned that the fastest way to stop climate change is to stop leaking and to stop gas storage in North Siberia. And the last one? 

So what do we have to do now? This is a joke, of course, but this 

joke has a sense. All our problems are going to the Soviet past, 

going to the Soviet past. Yes, the cold war is over but we have an 

enormous problem, how we can conduct, how we can deal with the 

problem which was created during the cold war. You created this 

problem. We created this problem. Now we have joined our 

strengths to overcome this problem. 

Thank you very much. The lights, please? 

My first proposition was about the Arctic agreement. My next 

proposition is we need to do something with the London Convention. Until now, the London Convention, which is against any 

dumping, does not cover any pollution, any radioactive pollution 

from land. We know that fuel in Great Britain, in the reprocessing 

plant in France, continues to dump, practically to dump an enormous amount of radioactive contamination into the North Atlantic. 

The next proposal, after the white book in Russia about dumping, we dream that other countries who conduct such activity also 

published its own book but we have no white book about dumping 

in the United States. We have no white book about dumping in 

Great Britain. We have no white book about dumping in Japan. We 

know the enormous scale of dumping in Japan, but nobody calculated it officially. We need such a calculation. 

Also, I never mentioned it before but I mention it here, we have 

an enormous problem with Arctic pollution from space activity. 

Twenty-two million hectares in the Russian territory are highly 

polluted from space remnants, but not only territory, also Arctic 

pollution. The Arctic Ocean is highly polluted in several places in 

the Arctic Ocean. What is your English place where you are landing your space rockets? 

Mr. WELDON. Cape Kennedy. 

Dr. YABLOKOV. It is a more active place for landing all over the 

globe. It has a visible negative effect for the Arctic. 

I think we have to support the Norway, American, and Russian 

agreement to overcome some enormous problem. We need to develop this agreement and maybe to raise the level of this agreement some. 

This is my main proposal and my last note. It is just the right 

place and the right time to raise the question before the G-7. In 

several months, the G-7 has a meeting in Moscow specially devoted to the radioactive problem. It will be exactly in 10 years after 

the Chernobyl catastrophe. Just now, you have to elaborate some 
19 

new proposal and during the G-7 meeting it will be approved. This 

proposal is just the proper time. 

Thank you very much for your attention. [The prepared statement of Dr. Yablokov follows:] 
ASET 

Job #58132348 

12/5/95 

20 

For Use in the Testimony of Alexei V. Yablokov 

Committee on National Security 

U.S. House ofRepresentatives 

December 6, 1995 

1. On tbe current state of rivers feeding the Northern Arctic Ocean 

There different types of pollution for the rivers in the various regions of the Russian 

Arctic: 

Heavy metals (particularly mercury): the Northern Divina (the paper industry) and the 

Aldan, a tributary of the Lena River (the gold refining industry); 

Petroleum products: the Pechora River Basin; the Ob' River Basin; 

Phenols: the Northern Divina; the Pechora; the Lena; the Yana; the Indigirka and the 

Kolyma Rivers (decaying wood); 

Radiooudides: the Yenisei (plutonium has been discovered at the mouth of the river due 

to in-line cooling of military teactors at Krasnoyarsk-26); 

The Tobol River Basin (a tributary of the Ob' River) due to plutonium production at the 

Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-70); 

The Tom' River Basin (a tributary of the Ob' River) due to plutonium production at the 

Siberian Chemical Mining Plant (Tomsk-7). 

2. Tbe current state of research and methods of avoiding the influx of new 

pollutants 

In the climate of very limited financial support characteristic of the current scientific 

environment in Russia research on radioactive conditions in the Barents Sea and Kara Sea were 

accelerated after the publication of the White Book on Radioactive Dumping in Russian Seas 

(1993). Maritime expeditions are conducted annually. Two such expeditions were conducted in 

conjunction with Norway. 

At the same time the network of observation posts along the rivers and Arctic coastline is 

being curtailed due to budgetary financing shortfalls from the Russian State Committee on 
21 

Hydrometerology (Roskomgidromet ]. 

There is no unified state plan to prevent pollution the Arctic Basin. The Federal State 

Committee on Northern issues--which repeatedly focused on the need to deal with pollution of 

the Arctic--was abolished two years ago. This committee was re-established by decree of the 

President of Russia one week ago. 

Isolated measures which could help to stabilize the pollution level have been set forth in 

state programs for handling radioactive waste and dioxins adopted in the last two months. 

However, given budgetary financing levels (approximately one million U.S. dollars for radioactive 

waste and even less for dioxins) reveals the more symbolic rather than realistic nature of sucb 

programs. 

A fundamentally new method of detecting radiation levels accumulated in the bodies of 

mammals (electro-paramagnetic resonance analyses of tooth enamel} have revealed that wild 

reindeer on Novaya Zemlya were exposed to enormous radiation doses prior to the termination of 

nuclear testing there. Large scale research utilizing this method has not yet been possible due to 

the lack of sufficient financial support. 

3. The level of assistance from international projects in preventin& new 

pollution 

World Bank credits of one hundred million dollars is helping to reduce oil pollution in the 

Pechora River Basin. 

A small amount of assistance &om the Republic of Sakha (Y akutiya) to improve water 

quality in the Lena River has been obtained through the Northern Council. 

Efforts to reduce air pollution emissions of some of the most hazardous regional polluters-

• the Sevronikel and Pechenganikel metallurgical plants on the Kola Peninsula--have been 

undertaken within the framework of inter-governmental accords between Russia and Norway. 

Seminars (courses) for mid-level management for dissemination of natural conservation and 

resource saving technologies in the Barents region (Murmansk and Arkangel Province, Republic 

ofKareliya have already been conducted for several years at the impetus of Norway. 

There is an inter-governmental Norweigan-American-Russian agreement to provide 

assistance to Russia for treating liquid and storing solid radioactive waste in the Murmansk 

region. 

4. Tbe success of Russian organizations in environmental protection and 

nuclear security 

A new federal law--the Russian Water Code--went into effect November 23, 199S. 

Article 104 of the Water Code expressly prohibits all discharge and disposal of radioactive and 

toxic substances in water bodies. This same law forbids a broad range of operations associated 
22 

with the possible hazardous pollution of water bodies, including pollution deriving from nuclear 

explosions. 

Unfortunately, Article 42 of the federal law that went into effect on November 25, 1995 

"On the Use of Nuclear Energy" authorizes the discharge of nuclear materials and radioactive 

substances in quantities that do not "exceed limits established by standards and regulations in the 

field of nuclear energy use". 

The draft law "On Environmental Security" which has not yet adopted by Parliament (but 

has already passed through two reviews before the State Duma) stipulates a comprehensive ban 

on underground nuclear explosions, including those employed for peaceful purposes which have 

in the past had a substantial impact on radioactive pollution of the Arctic. Pollution of the Arctic 

by space-oriented operations has not yet been legally regulated (the Plesetsk Cosmodrome: the 

most extensively utilized space facility on earth). On September I, 1995 at the impetus of the 

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, the government adopted a Targeted Program for 

Reprocessing and Recycling of Metallic Radioactive Waste (primarily salvaging of nuclear 

submarines) with anticipated costs of approximately five miUion U.S. dollars by the year 2002. 

This program stipulates the development of four systems for reprocessing of metallic radioactive 

waste with a total annual capacity of up to 150,000 metric tons. It is believed that Russia 

currently contains up to 600,000 metric tons of such waste (including more than 140 nuclear 

submarines that are no longer in service). 

A State Commission for Comprehensive Resolution of the Problem of Radioactive Waste 

was established in 1993 (the chairman was Y. G. Vishnevskiy, Director ofGoskomatomnadzor 

[Russian Federal Oversight of Nuclear Energy]. However, in June of 1995 the President of 

Russia (under severe pressure by the Ministry of Defense) to create that Goskomatomnadzor was 

to be stripped of the right to inspect nuclear and military radiation facilities. 

On October 23, 1995 the government adopted the Targeted Federal Program "Handling of 

Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Materials, Their Recycling and Disposal for 1996-2005" for 

a total federal budgetary financing level of near one million dollars. This program included 

(among other clements) the following measures affecting the Arctic region: 

The design and construction on the Novaya Zemlya Archepelago of a facility for disposal 

of radioactive waste from salvaging of nuclear submarines (approximately SO million dollars by 

the year 2005 ); 

Upgrade and construction of new spent nuclear fuel storage facilities from nuclear 

submarines (approximately 20 million dollars from 1997 through the year 2005); 

The modernization and development of facilities for conditioning liquid and solid radwaste 

at nuclear civilian fleet facilities (approximately eight million dollars from 1996 through the year 

2000) as well as for the military fleet (approximately II million dollars from 1996 through the 

year 2005); 
23 

Survey radwaste disposal sites in northern and far-eastern seas (approximately 1 S million 

dollars from 1997 through the year 2005); 

Clean-up of the Yenisei and Tom' River Basins to eliminate radioactive contamination 

attributable to plutonium production reactors (approximately 11 million dollars from 1997 

through the year 2000). 

On November 2, 1995 the Russian government adopted the Federal Targeted Program 

Entitled "Establishment of a Unified State Automated System for Monitoring Radiation 

Conditions on the Territory of the Russian FederationR (EGASKRO) under which approximately 

100 million dollars is to be spent by the year 2002 (beginning in 1997). However, there are 

serious doubts that this program will come to fruition due to a lack of financing. 

5. The deeree of impact of the London Conference and the GoreChernomyrdin Commission on reducin& the need for nuclear waste disposal in 

the oceans. 

Russia's acknowledgment of its obligations in 1993 deriving from the London Conference 

significantly changed the situation in naval forces which during the Soviet period assumed that the 

disposal ofliquid radioactive waste in the Arctic and far-eastern seas was entirely acceptable. 

Such disposal practices have been nearly entirely eliminated in the Northern Fleet. 

Discussions within the framework of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission have been 

useful for developing specific proposals to facilitate the development of projects for reprocessing 

of liquid radioactive waste in the Northern Fleet. 

6. What research programs and international projects can be treated as 

priority areas for development of an effective program for prevention of 

nuclear and other waste disposal ill ocean ecosystems? 

An international agreement (accord or convention) on Arctic environmental protection is 

necessary. 

It would be advisable for the U.S. to follow Ru$$ia's example and publish a White Book 

of its radwaste disposal sites at sea. This would provide a good political foundation for 

development of a joint American-Russian (possibly lllso involving Norway) program for clean-up 

of the Arctic seas to eliminate hazardous solid radwaste dumped into these waters. 

It would advisable to develop a special international agreement for environmental 

protection from space activities (specifically the dumping of separable rocket booster stages 

containing hazardous rocket fuel into the Arctic seas). 

A special convention (agreement or accord) or annex to the London Convention to 

prohibit radwaste disposal into the sea from coastal locations is required. Radwaste from Sella-
24 

field and the Lya-aga (the British and French spent nuclear fuel reprocessing factories, 

respectively) have been dumped in enonnous quantities into the ocean for many tens of years 

along extended pipelines from the sea coast and such waste is being discovered throughout the 

seas in the northern Atlantic and the Kara Sea. 

It would be useful, as an extension and development ofRussian-American-Norweigian 

agreements to prevent radwaste disposal in the Arctic, to develop a special program of 

international assistance for Russia to resolve the problems associated with organizing safe storage 

of the enonnous quantity (estimated at over 40 million curie ofradwaste from the Soviet Navy 

operating in the Muransk region (the problem of organizing safe storage of spent nuclear fuel 

from nuclear submarines and the problem of salvaging nuclear submarines and storing the 

submarine reactors). However, for political reasons, this program can only be developed after 

appropriate resolution at the presidential level between our countries. 

Chainnan of the Inter-Governmental Commission 

on Environmental Security 

Russian Committee on Security 

Moscow, 4 December 1995 

{Professor A. Yablokov) 
25 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Yablokov. We will have questions for you but we would like to hear from our distinguished Norwegian panelist, Mr. Kare Bryn. 

STATEMENT OF KARE BRYN, DIRECTOR GENERAUAMBASSADOR, RESOURCES DEPARTMENT, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY 

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

Mr. BRYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It 

is a pleasure for me to participate in this hearing. I have prepared 

a written statement for the record and I will highlight the main 

points from that. 

My thesis is that the problem is not so much the waste already dumped in the oceans but rather the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste that in the future may end up in the marine environment unless urgent and decisive action is taken by the international community. 

To go back, Mr. Chairman, in spring 1994, the Norwegian Government presented the report to our parliament on the threat of 

nuclear pollution in areas adjacent to our northern borders. The 

background was the mounting evidence which had come to light after the collapse of the Soviet Union of safety deficiencies at nuclear facilities, as well as practices of dumping nuclear structures 

and radioactive waste in the ocean. Gradually, as contacts with the 

Russian authorities developed, we also became aware of their prob- lems with storage facilities and the management of radioactive 

waste. The debate on this report in Parliament took place in June 1994, 

and it led to a call for a plan of action and intensified cooperation both with Russia and other countries in order to deal with the 

problems. Such a plan was made public in March 1995. 

To follow up the plan of action, the parliament also authorized 

approximately $20 million U.S. for this year and we expect that a 

similar sum is to be available for the financial year 1996. 

So far, international cooperation has mainly focused on the oper- ational safety of civilian nuclear powerplants. This, of course, is 

natural in the light of the Chernobyl accident and involves the 

amount of documentation available of unsatisfactory safety at Eastern and Central European nuclear powerplants. The nuclear safety 

accounts operated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 

Development was a timely response by the international community to this challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, looking at the threat to the marine environment 

which is the theme for this hearing, the situation is less clear and 

far more complex both technically and politically. Today, we have 

a very positive situation as far as the radioactivity in the northern 

seas is concerned. For instance, I could mention that the level of 

cesium-137 in the Bering Sea is about seven becerel [?] per cubic 

meter of water. This is the same level as can be found in the Atlantic Ocean. The level is almost 15 times higher in the Irish Sea, 

which no doubt is a result of the considerable emissions from the 

Sellafield reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom. To preserve the favorable situation in the Bering Sea is very important, as here we find some of the richest fishing grounds in the 

world. 
26 

In order to map out the situation, Norwegian and Russian scientists have undertaken joint expeditions to the Soviet dumping 

areas in the Kara Sea and along the coast in 1992, 1993, and 1994. 

In these areas, several reactors with and without spent fuel, vessels, barges, and numerous containers with radioactive waste, as 

well as a large quantity of low-level liquid nuclear waste, have 

been dumped before 1991. 

The main conclusion from these expeditions is that although 

leakages do occur, the radionuclides can be traced only in sediments in the very close vicinity of the dumped objects. However, we 

have no guarantee that this positive situation will continue. A regular monitoring program is definitely needed, but it seems clear 

that in the short run, other problems should be given higher priority as far as concrete efforts to prevent contamination is concerned. If you can take some comfort from the investigations of the 

dumping sites, the opposite is true when it comes to the question 

of management, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. We know that existing storage facilities are full 

and that many are in extremely bad condition. Here lies the potential for accidents, future dumping, and leakages to the marine environment if corrective action is not taken. 

The question for the international community is, can we afford 

to leave the situation as it is and wait until the Russians have the 

economic strength to deal with the problems themselves? 

Some countries have already demonstrated their willingness to 

start addressing these issues. Norway and the United States are 

now developing plans to assist Russia to upgrade and expand the 

plant for treatment of low-level liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk. A review meeting of the plans between Russian, American, 

and Norwegian scientists will take place in Oslo in a week's time. 

Hopefully, the construction phase can start early in 1996. 

Another example of concrete action is the advisory committee 

which has been formed to consider the plans to deal with the storage of ship Lepse. The United States, France, Norway, and the European Commission and Russia are taking part in this cooperation. 

Here again, we expect concrete proposals to be put on the table in 

1996. 

These projects are very important in themselves, and really, I 

would say, invaluable in gaining experience to deal with central 

and local Russian authorities, but the main problem is not the civilian nuclear facilities but the military ones. Our cooperation with 

the Russian Navy and the northern fleet is much less developed 

than cooperation with the civilian authorities. The problem is 

manifold. The Russian Navy has exhausted their storage capacities. There is pollution coming from inland facilities which may 

spread through the river systems, as talked about by Dr. Yablokov. 

In addition, at least 17 nuclear submarines which have already 

been decommissioned are lying around the shores of the Kola Peninsula. Spent fuel has been removed from less than one-third of 

them. The number of submarines taken out of service is growing 

steadily. 

Of course, I think it is very important to state that the Russian 

Navy must set aside resources to address these problems. Our impression is that they are showing an increasing willingness to do 
27 

so. The question is if they can, even if they really tried, deal with 

the enormous backlog which for many reasons has developed. 

A significant step was recently taken by the Russian authorities 

in developing a plan for the decommissioning of submarines. A 

Norwegian company financed under our plan of action has taken 

part in the development of this plan. I am sure we will hear more 

about this in the months ahead. 

It seems to me that a key to addressing the waste problem in the 

Russian northern fleet is to build up relations with those organs 

responsible on the Russian side. Inter alia, for this purpose, a military expert group has been set up between Russia, the United 

States, and Norway. We hope that the group also will gradually expand its work to solving concrete problems. 

Significant work in confidence building as well as in research has 

also been done through the pilot study which has been created by 

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in jargon called the NACC. 

The first phase of the pilot study was concluded in September this 

year. This study was the result of a Norwegian initiative in 1992 

to exploit the new possibilities opened up by the end of the cold 

war and the creation of the NACC. 

I believe it is fair to say that our expectations were met and that 

the first phase of the study was successful. The participation of 

more than 20 countries, as well as the final report on radioactive 

and chemical pollution problems bear witness to this. A phase 2 of 

the study has now been launched with broad participation and we 

have great expectation that the phase 2 will help us develop a common understanding of the challenges identified in the first phase. 

Mr. Chairman, although each country must take the responsibility for its nuclear facilities, we cannot overlook the fact that the situation Russia finds itself in after the cold war is a very special one. 

Furthermore, the interdependence and transboundary character of 

the problems are such that we cannot afford to leave the situation 

as it is until Russia can deal with it herself. Therefore, an international effort to assist Russia and assist ourselves is urgently called for. 

At the G-7 summit in Halifax this year, the G-7 leaders and 

President Yeltsin agreed to arrange a summit on nuclear safety in 

Moscow in April 1996. We have great expectations that the summit, in addition to considering the safety of nuclear reactors and 

illicit tracking of nuclear materials, also will address in a substantive way the problems of management and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. 

The summit should initiate urgent work to further study these 

problems, as well as give impetus to international cooperation on 

concrete projects. An appropriate multilateral forum for coordinating activities should be identified. 

Last, the summit should initiate discussions regarding how national efforts may be supplemented by multilateral financial assistance, for instance, as a parallel to the nuclear safety account operated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryn follows:] 
28 

UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL HEARING TO ASSESS THE MAGNITUDE 

AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DUMPING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND 

OTHER TOXIC WASTE INTO THE WORLD OCEANS AND TRIBUTARIES 

6 DECEMBER 1995 

STATEMENT BY 

MR. KARE BRYN, DIRECTOR GENERAL 

ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
29 

Mr. Chairman, 

ladies and gentlemen, 

It is a pleasure for me to participate in this Hearing on radioactive waste issues. Let me right 

away state my main thesis which will guide my presentation: The problem is not so much the 

waste already dumped in the oceans, but rather the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste 

that may end up in the marine environment in the future unless urgent and decisive action is 

taken by the international community. My emphasis is on the challenges of radioactive waste 

management, with particular reference to nuclear facilities and activities in Northwest Russia. 

I BACKGROUND 

Nuclear activities raise questions of serious concern which need to be addressed by the 

international community. In particular, safety deficiencies at nuclear facilities and materials 

located in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union pose a threat not only to 

the countries themselves, but also to the environment far beyond their borders. These threats 

require action by all countries concerned with preserving the quality of the environment and 

promoting nuclear non-proliferation. 

Each country is ultimately responsible for the safety of its nuclear facilities and for solving 

any problems resulting from the operation of these facilities. However, in some instances the 

problems are so severe, the solutions so costly, and the transborder consequences of accidents 

or continued malpractices so frightening, that broad-based international co-operation is 

necessary to deal with them adequately and responsibly. 

A number of nuclear facilities are located in Northwest Russia. These include i.a. a nuclear 

power plant on the Kola Peninsula, eight civilian nuclear-powered icebreakers, several 

storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, and the world's largest 

concentration of nuclear-powered naval vessels, the Northern Fleet. The Russian navy has 

more than 80 operational nuclear submarines and two nuclear-powered cruisers stationed at 

bases on the Kola Peninsula. In addition, at least 70 nuclear submarines have already been 

decommissioned, although spent nuclear fuel has been removed from only about 21 . The 

number of submarines taken out of service is growing steadily. 

The operation of these facilities are characterized by unsatisfactory safety standards. 

Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel pile up, and the decommissioned submarines are 

more often corroding at various naval bases than disposed of in a safe way. 

II NORWEGIAN PLAN OF ACTION ON NUCLEAR AFFAIRS 

The Norwegian Government has considered various ways and means of strengthening cooperation with the Russian Federation in order to improve nuclear safety and prevent 

radioactive pollution. The Government presented a report in 1994 to the national assembly, 

the Stoning, on nuclear activities and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our Northern 

borders. A Plan of Action to follow up the Report, tp the Stoning was presented in March 
30 

1995. Approximately USD 20 mill. has been earmarked for projects in 1995, and a similar 

amount will be available to continue this important work in 1996. A number of projects have 

been identified in four priority areas: 

• Safety measures at nuclear facilities. 

• Management and storage of spent nudear fuel and radioactive waste. 

• Dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents- and Kara Seas, and inputs into the sea via 

rivers in the Russian Federation. 

• Anns-related environmental hazards. 

Norway and Russia have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning 

cooperation on nuclear affairs. The Parties agreed i.a. to establish a procedure for 

consultations at state secretary level in the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to facilitate 

co-operation on projects and similar activities in the priority areas specified above, including 

efforts to expand the political, technological and financial basis for such co-operation. 

In addition, selected nuclear issues, i.a. the Norwegian-Russian expeditions to the Kara Sea, 

are on the agenda of the Joint Environmental Commission and its Expert Group on the 

investigation of radioactive contamination of the Northern areas. 

Through the Report to the Stoning, the Plan of Action and the MOU the Norwegian 

Government wishes to demonstrate its strong commitment to actively participate in a 

partnership with the Russian Federation, other countries, the EU and international 

organizations, in addressing one of the most serious threats to security, human health, and the 

environment. 

Norway encourages other countries to formulate domestic policies and programmes for 

assistance to promote nuclear safety and the safe management, storage and disposal of spent 

nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, in particular in the Russian Federation. 

These policies and programmes must be matched by an appropriate organizational structure as 

well as by sufficient funds for project implementation. 

Ill RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMPED IN THE BARENTS- AND KARA SEAS 

The Norwegian-Russian expedition to the Kara Sea in 1992 was the first expedition to this 

area to investigate the dumping of nuclear material with participation of western scientists. 

The expeditions to the Tsivolki, Stepovogo and Abrosimov Fjords at Novaja Zemlja ( 1993, 

1994) were the first international expeditions to the dumping sites. In addition to Norwegian 

and Russian scientists, observers from the IAEA and EU (from 1993) participated in the 

expeditions. According to the Russian Whitebook (1993) several reactors with and without 

spent fuel, vessels, barges, and numerous containers have been dumped in these fjords. 

The main conclusion from these expeditions is that enhanced levels of artificially produced 

radionuclides in sediments collected in the very close vicinity of almost all localized dumped 

objects demonstrate that some leakages occur. The highest contamination of 13 7Cs, 60Co, 

90Sr, or 239,240Pu is observed in sediments collected close to dumped containers in the 

Abrosimov and Stepovogo Fjords. 
31 

The levels ofradionuclides in the waters, sediments and biota in the Open Kara Sea, however, 

cannot be attributed to the dumped objects, but rather to fallout from the atmospheric nuclear 

weapon tests, marine transport of effluents from European reprocessing plants, especially the 

Sellafield plant in the UK, marine transport of fallout from the Chemobyl accident, and 

transport by the rivers Ob and Yenisey: 

The level of radionuclides in waters, sediments, and biota in the Kara Sea is very low 

compared to other marine systems, e.g. the Irish Sea, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. The 

radiation doses from the present level of contamination are negligible. 

Radioactive contamination in the Arctic is not an acute crisis, but rather a long-term problem 

if corrective action is not taken in time. 

International structures already exist for data collection, risk analyses, environmental 

assessments, and monitoring: 

and 

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) with the Arctic Monitoring and 

Assessment Programme (AMAP) 

The International Arctic Seas Assessment Programme (!ASAP) in the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

Very few mechanisms exist, however, to prevent future releases. 

( Cf. Report on the results from the Russian-Norwegian 1993 expedition to the Kara Sea, and 

the Extended swrunary of the results from three years of investigations ( 1992-94) in the Kara 

Sea). 

IV THE LONDON CONVENTION 

The London Convention of 1972 is a global convention on the prevention of marine pollution 

by dumping of wastes and other matter, including radioactive waste. The dumping of high 

level radioactive waste has been prohibited in accordance with the London Convention since 

1974. In 1983 the parties to the convention adopted a voluntary moratorium on all types of 

radioactive waste. This was prolonged in 1985. The Inter-governmental Panel of Experts on 

Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea, IPGRAD, presented its final report in 1993, followed by 

the adoption at the 16th consultative meeting of the London Convention of a total ban on 

dumping of radioactive waste. All parties, except the Russian Federation, have acceded to this 

ban. 

Norway, the USA and Russia co-operate to upgrade and expand the capacity of the nuclearpowered icebreaker fleet's effluent treatment facility for low-level radioactive waste in 

Murmansk. The design phase of the project is nearly completed and hopefully the 

construction of the facility can begin shortly. This project figures prominently on the agenda 

of the Gore/Chernomyrdin Commission. 
32 

Norway is of the opinion that the Moscow Summit on nuclear issues should result in a 

Russian pledge to accede to the ban on dumping of radioactive waste at sea adopted in 1993 

by the London Convention of 1972. The Norwegian-American-Russian project to expand the 

capacity of the effluent treatment facility in Murmansk should facilitate such a policy change. 

V MANAGEMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND 

RADIOACTIVE WASTE. 

According to a recently published United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report on 

nuclear safety, there are 221 nuclear facilities operating in the Former Soviet Union. 99 of 

them are located in the Russian Federation. The list in the GAO report does not include the 

nuclear-powered submarines, ice-breakers, and support ships in the Russian military and 

civilian fleets. 

All nuclear facilities generate radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, the accumulation of 

which is a major problem. Few, if any, countries with nuclear facilities have arrived at 

satisfactory, long-term solutions to this problem. 

Existing storage facilities in the Russian Federation are virtually filled to capacity and in very 

poor condition. Some of these facilities are located quite close to the Norwegian-Russian 

border and within a few hundred meters from fjords ending in the Barents Sea with some of 

the richest fishing grounds in the world. The more information we get, the more dramatic the 

situation seems to be. 

Safe management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from civil 

and military facilities are matters of urgency if we are to prevent accidental releases, leakages 

to the marine environment and further dumping. Assistance in this field will address a serious 

environmental threat which is also an important security risk. 

The question for the international community is: Can we afford to leave the situation as it is 

and wait until the Russian Federation has the economic strength to deal with the problems 

herself? 

VI INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 

International co-operation on safety problems in nuclear power plants is well established e.g. 

under the auspices of the EBRD, as a result of the decision of the G-7 Summit in Munich in 

1992 to establish the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA). Valuable work is also done by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) 

to improve safety at nuclear power plants. 

Norway is prepared to continue. intensifY and expand the emerging contacts between 

Norwegian, Russian and American defence communities with a view to preventing 

radioactive contamination from defence-related activities and installations. This is an attempt 

to pave the way for closer co-operation in order to address key problems relevant to the 
33 

protection of the Arctic environment. These problems include i.a. the accumulation of 

radioactive waste, spent fuel and decommissioned submarines at naval bases. 

Significant work in confidence-building, as well as in research, has also been done in the 

NATO/NACC/CCMS Pilot study on cross-border environmental problems emanating from 

defence-related installations and activities. The study is a result of a Norwegian initiative in 

1992 to exploit the new possibilities opened up by the end of the cold war and the creation of 

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The participation of more than 20 countries 

and the final reports on radioactive and chemical pollution bear witness to the· success of the 

first phase of the study. Phase two has recently been launched with broad participation and 

with the following sub-topics: 

* 

* 

* 

* 

Hazardous constituents in defence-related activities, with the USA as the lead country. 

Transport of contaminants through rivers, deltas, and estuaries, with France as the lead 

country. 

Safe disposal of radioactive and mixed waste, with Norway as the lead country. 

Environmental risk assessments for specific defence-related problems, also with 

Norway as the lead country. 

We have great expectations that phase two of this NATO/NACC/CCMS Pilot study will help 

us develop a common understanding of the challenges identified in phase one. It is important 

to identify the know-how and technologies needed as well as organizational aspects of 

managing defence-related environmental problems. 

The Russian Federation, Norway, USA, France and the European Commission have 

established an Advisory Committee to co-ordinate their efforts to assist Russia to deal with 

the vessel "Lepse", which is used for storing spent nuclear fuel in the Murmansk harbour. We 

believe that the choice of technological solution to this problem, as well as the organizational 

model. may be relevant for other, similar projects, too. 

A Norwegian-Russian project to formulate a programme for the complete disposal of Russian 

nuclear-powered submarines decommissioned from the Northern Fleet, may form the basis 

for future international co-operation concerning one of the most serious environmental threats 

in Northwest Russia. A Norwegian company, financed under our Plan of Action on nuclear 

affairs, is taking part in developing this programme. This and other projects indicate an 

increasing openness on the Russian side about nuclear problems, and an increasing 

commitment to address them. 

As for other countries' and international organizations' co-operation with the Russian 

Federation concerning radioactive waste management programmes, I would like to draw your 

attention to the proceedings from the IAEA seminar in May 1995 on International cooperation on nuclear waste management in the Russian Federation. 
34 

VII THE WAY AHEAD. 

The present economic situation in the Russian Federation makes it difficult for the authorities 

to fulfill their responsibilities in dealing adequately with nuclear safety and nuclear waste 

problems. Expanded and strengthened international co-operation is imperative if we are to 

find satisfactory solutions to these problems and thereby help prevent future Arctic 

radioactive contamination. Moreover, international co-operation is important to avoid 

unnecessary and costly duplication of work. The situation requires creative and flexible 

approaches by the international community. So far, management of radioactive waste has not 

attracted as much attention from the international community as the issue of nuclear safety at 

civilian nuclear power plants. 

In order to facilitate international co-operation, we need an appropriate forum and adequate 

funds for addressing and solving the most pressing problems concerning the management, 

storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (as a parallel to the Nuclear 

Safety Account). 

An appropriate forum is emerging. A Contact Expert Group (CEG) for facilitating 

international co-operation on radioactive waste management projects in the Russian 

Federation, including technical, legal, organizational and financial aspects, is scheduled to 

have its first meeting early in 1996. The establishment of the CEG is the most important 

follow-up measure to the seminar on international co-operation on nuclear waste management 

in the Russian Federation, which was arranged in May 1995 by the IAEA, at the request of the 

Nordic Council of Ministers. 

The seminar proceedings provide the first comprehensive picture of the waste management 

infrastructure of the Russian Federation to countries and organizations that may wish to begin 

or to extend co-operative programmes in this area. 

The Russian delegation at the seminar demonstrated the resolve of the Government, the 

relevant Russian authorities and organizations, and the regions to deal speedily and effectively 

with the problem of radioactive waste management, in full collaboration with the international 

community. 

Norway sees the establishment of the CEG as an interesting forum for future international cooperation on nuclear waste management projects, and would encourage the USA and other 

countries to participate actively in the CEG. 

Norway welcomes the decision to arrange a G-7/P-8 summit meeting on nuclear issues in 

Moscow in April1996. We have great expectations that the Summit, in addition to 

considering the safety of nuclear reactors and security of nuclear materials, also will address 

in a substantive way the problems of management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel 

and radioactive waste. The summit should initiate studies as well as give impetus to 

international co-operation on concrete projects. The summit should initiate discussions on 

how national efforts may be supplemented by multilateral financial assistance, for instance as 

a parallel to the Nuclear Safety Account operated by the EBRD. Norway has prepared a paper 
35 

with our comments to the summit draft agenda. We hope our input will influence the 

outcome of the Summit next year. 
36 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Bryn, and thank you both for the 

excellent testimony. I am sure we will have a number of questions, 

so I will start off and just ask a few myself so that we can give 

everyone a chance to ask you questions and come back for a second 

round. Dr. Yablokov, you referred to the London Convention. As my colleague and friend, Mr. Spratt, mentioned, this administration did, 

in fact, change the previous position of this country in regard to the 

London Convention. As a matter of fact, a number of us involved 

in the GLOBE organization here signed a letter to the President 

urging him to reverse that policy, to support the convention and 

make it the official policy of this country to stop the dumping. That 

is when I introduced legislation, which passed the House in the 

last session, to codify that. Hopefully, this session, we will get the 

Senate to follow suit to put it into law. My question has to do with some recent reports that I picked up 

in a statement by Victor Kotsenko which appeared in the Moscow 

press on November 1 in regard to his prediction that Russia perhaps would make an announcement as early as December that it 

may resume the practice of dumping its liquid nuclear waste in the 

oceans. Would you comment on that and whether or not you think 

that is valid? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. I only have to say that literally 10 days ago, we 

had the new Russian parliament pass a special new law regarding 

water code [?), a special article of this water code. Any nuclear 

dumping is strictly prohibited. But the situation is complicated, because after this law, our parliament passed the next law about the 

use of nuclear energy, and under the next law. using nuclear energy, they have passed some loophole and mentioned that, yes, nuclear dumping is principally prohibited, but in some cases it is possible under some condition and so on and so on and so on. 

So now we have a contradiction between the laws. In the juridical sense, the water code is a much higher law than the ordinary 

law about nuclear energy, but let us see what happens. I do not 

know. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Yablokov. In your testimony, your 

oral and your written, you mention that you thought that 2 -years 

ago we were very close to an agreement on solving some of the environmental problems but that there were delays. I think you specifically cited the State Department. 

They are going to be testifying in the next panel, and perhaps 

they would disagree, but I would ask you to elaborate on your comments and what the Russian perspective is in terms of why the bureaucracy eventually caused that agreement to fall apart and tell 

us in your own observations what happened and where we are now 

in terms of perhaps restarting that process. 

Dr. YABLOKOV. I can say that 3 years ago, 2% years ago, I personally participated in the preparing of this law. I know that this 

law passed, maybe you have other procedure, but in Russia we 

have such procedure. Any international agreement has to pass 

through all Federal agencies and each Federal agency has to sign 

it, not quite to sign it, with some addition and so on. We had been lucky that the Minister of Defense and all other 

powerful ministers signed this agreement, this draft agreement 2 
37 

years ago, and we hoped that this agreement will be signed by our 

President 2 years ago. 

I had a discussion with the State Department here and I know 

that the State Department, it was the body here who strongly was 

against this law for some, I can repeat, ridiculous reason, some 

small, smallest, smallest disagreement, not principle but smallest 

formal disagreement with some formality, with some technical formality. But now I feel that we have no possibility to pass such draft of 

law through our military, through our KGB, because during the 

last 2 years, the secrecy, the governmental secrecy has been arising 

enormously. Literally 3 days ago, my President signed, or 1 week 

ago, my President signed a special decree about state secrets. 

Under this decree-! have this decree with me-practically any 

Arctic investigation, any Arctic activity has the possibility to announce like classified activity. 

So we have a real-it will meet with some active development of 

our military. We are past the point. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. I have one final question before I turn 

to our ranking member for questions. Dr. Yablokov, it is no secret 

the Russian Navy is decommissioning a number of nuclear-powered 

submarines and decommissioning a lot of nuclear material. What 

happens if there are no additional dollars nor additional commitment to deal with the problem? What do you predict is going to be 

the result of this massive downsizing? As you have testified, there 

is a huge storage problem now that is not protected storage of nuclear waste and nuclear fuel. What is going to happen if the world 

does not respond to the problem that Russia has? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. I mentioned, not now but in the press conference, 

I mentioned that during last year, my Government passed a special 

declassified resolution about organizing the commission of nuclear 

submarine and failed. But September 1, it was a special open declaration, open resolution of my Government, which looked like a 

good step for solving this problem. They created a special society, 

half government, half commercial society. They put some money to 

cut down this nuclear submarine. It is an enormous problem, much, much larger than my friend 

from Norway just mentioned. We have 142 decommissioned nuclear 

submarines-142-not only in the Arctic but all over my country, 

and nobody knows what we have to do with such a huge amount 

of metal, a huge amount of so on and so on and so on. It looks like this decision of my Government opens the door, 

opens the door. It is possible to involve some commercial capital 

money to solving this problem. Let us see what happens. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Yablokov. 

I now turn it over to the distinguished gentleman from South 

Carolina. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you both for your testimony. Unfortunately, I had to step out and 

I missed some of it, so if I repeat your question, I beg your pardon. 

Basically, I want to ask a few fundamental questions. First of all, 

I am curious to know the sources of your information, the places 

where you obtained the information that you lay out in your testimony. Is this in the open domain? Is this information available to 
38 

you as a citizen or did you obtain it through the Academy of 

Sciences or as a member of the Duma? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. My official position is chairman of Interagency Commission for Environmental Security in the National Security Council. My commission has 18 members. The first deputy minister 

of defense is a member of my commission. The first deputy KGB 

is a member of my commission. The first deputy minister of environment, chairman of land committee, chairman of water committee, chairman of hydro, metallurgical committee, and so on, such 

a top level of governmental body. The main source of my information, it is official information 

which was previously classified. We tried action under law about 

state secrets. We have a law about state secrets, 2 years old. We 

have a special article, article 7, in the law about state secrets. 

Under this article 7, the law about state secrets, environmental information and information which could deal with public health has 

to be open, has to be open. 

I used this law to open this information. My commission has a 

meeting every month, this official meeting, and we have received 

all information, classified information and open information. And 

after a meeting of my commission, I, going under this law, opened this information to the public. This is the main source of my infor- mation. Mr. SPRATT. Are you satisfied that you have a good, comprehensive estimation of the waste, where it is and how much and what 

quantities? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. No, of course not, because it is a difficult question, especially, for exampl~we discussed in my commission, three times in this year we discussed the problem of radioactive 

waste in different, radioactive waste which is generated from under 

destroying of nuclear arms, radioactive waste which we have in 

Myak, radioactive waste which, and so on. And after this discussion, the minister of nuclear energy several times gave us the full 

information when they collect especially for us. 

The ridiculous situation is that nobody has information in Russia. Nobody has full information in Russia, part information collected by the Norwegian environmental organization, part information collected by Greenpeace, part information collected by my commission in their official way. When we put all this information together, we hope that we receive something near to real. 

Mr. SPRATT. Has anyone attempted to develop a cost estimate, an 

estimate of what it would cost to clean up, remediate, correct these 

problems in Russia alone, or the former Soviet Union States? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. We hope that we now understand the scale of the 

problem, not the detail but the scale of the problem. The scale of 

problem we know is a billion curies. We discussed 6 billion curies 

of radioactive waste we have in Russia or a billion curies we have 

in Russia. This is maybe 9 billion curies. 

Mr. WELDON. Would you yield for a question? 

Mr. SPRATT. Certainly. 

Mr. WELDON. I am not a scientist, but just to put that into per- spective, you say 6 billion curies. My lay understanding is that 

Three Mile Island at its worst gave off 15 curies of radioactivity, 
39 

and I see some heads shaking, · so 15 curies and you are saying 6 

billion curies is what the problem is in Russia? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Yes. A more visible unit for radioactive fallout is 

Chernobyl. All Chernobyl fallout, it was 50 million curies-50 million curies. It was all Chernobyl catastrophe, and 50 million, it is 

enough to cover all the globe, practically all the globe. You can 

reach Chernobyl fallout even in this room just now. So 50 million. 

We have at least 6 billion curies. 

Mr. SPRATT. Is there any effort or program now in Russia to correct this problem, to clean it up? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Yes. I just mentioned, we have a huge program which passed through the Government October 23 and signed by 

my Premier Chernomyrdin, a Federal program about how to deal 

with radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel between 1996 and 

2005. But I mentioned the money which is allocated for this program, only about $1 billion, no more, but the problem costs, really 

costs hundreds of billion dollars. It is a visible step but it is absolutely not enough. It is only a first step, maybe the intention to 

solve the problem, not solving. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Bryn, could I ask you also your sources of information, where you developed the data that you presented? 

Mr. BRYN. We had the same problem as Dr. Yablokov explains. We really talk about that we have three phases as far as .dealing with these problems are concerned. The first phase is the gathering of information, the second is making the priorities, and the third 

is the operative one. 

By and large now, in some of the areas, we have a pretty good view of the situation. As I mentioned, the expeditions we have had 

to the dumping sites around Novaja Zemlja. We feel we know what 

is there. We can then on the dumping side, at least, start to make 

priorities. 

Where we lack information is obviously how the situation is in 

the northern fleet shipyards and also in the facilities inland. There, 

new information is coming to hand . . We know the general picture that it is very difficult as far as the storage is concerned. We know 

that the number of submarines that is easily counted and so on. 

So one knows quite a lot, and probably enough to start a sort of 

international program which we feel is necessary. 

But, as I said, I think it has to be an ongoing process to gather information while at the same time we make some priorities and 

start operational work. As I said, I am happy to say that at least 

Norway and the United States are cooperating on some start, really very small projects, but they give great promise for the future, 

not least in getting used to dealing with the Russian authorities, 

both centrally and locally, which is tremendously important, because we cannot force cooperation on the Russians. We have to 

stimulate the sort of cooperation, and I am particularly talking 

about the military establishment. Thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WELDON. Thank you. 

Mr. Hastings. Mr. HAsTINGS. I just have one question of Mr. Bryn. You talk 

about the summit next year in Moscow. What countries will be par-
40 

ticipating in that, and what expectations that there will be a solution, I guess, to all of this, or a start of talking about a solution, 

and is there anything in setting up this summit in Moscow that 

would have some sort of a binding agreement among those that are 

participating? First, how many countries are participating? 

Mr. BRYN. Thank you. Of course, this is a meeting for the G-7 

group of countries, the seven leading industrialized countries, the 

United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, 

and Japan, then meeting together with Russia. 

What can come out of it remains to be seen. The agenda covers 

three substantive items. The first item has to do with reactor safety. I think there we have international processes which have started and which really are working. The nuclear safety account under 

the EBRD is effective. A lot of work has been done to upgrade the 

security of power plants in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. 

The third-I skipped the second agenda point for the time being, 

but the third agenda item point has to do with smuggling, illicit 

trafficking of nuclear material, and I think there, what we would 

like to see corning out of the Moscow summit would be a plan of 

action, how to deal with it. That, again, I feel is very much an organizational problem. It has very much to do to establish procedures 

to account for nuclear materials and so on. I think it is solvable. 

But where we have not seen the sort of international processes 

being set up is on the second agenda item, which has to do with 

the waste issue. That has very much to do, I think, with the lack 

of information which has been the situation up to now and which 

we have talked about. We feel now that there is much greater understanding in both Canada, the United States, and other countries 

among the authorities for these problems. 

I had a meeting yesterday in the State Department here. I was 

in Ottawa on Monday. We have great hopes that what will come 

out of the summit will be establishing some processes, because obviously one needs to go further into these problems, like Dr. 

Yablokov said, to get information to make the priorities, because 

these are costly things. 

And when we make these priorities, we also have to talk about 

the financing. There are positive signs that the Russian authorities 

are taking these matters seriously and also will be able to use 

quite considerable funds for them. But if we want a quick solution, 

a quick cleanup, we need to start to consider creating some much 

larger mechanism in order to assist the Russians. 

And I would underline again, we are not talking here about a 

permanent situation for the next 50 or 100 years. This is a onetime operation to clean up a very deplorable situation which has 

come about through the political developments in the world during 

the last 30 or 40 years. Thank you. 

Mr. HAsTINGS. So the waste issue that you are addressing is not 

confined just to the oceans, is it, but it is also land-based waste 

then, also? 

Mr. BRYN. That is right. 

Mr. HAsTINGS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Hastings. 
41 

And, in fact, . the Bellona Foundation, which is here today, has a 

report which they will share with you on land-based problems. 

They were the target of an action by the security functions in Russia to confiscate their documentation, but they have photographs 

and documentation which they will give you. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you for 

doing a great job. I know that you are very interested in the serious problems that we have worldwide. 

Dr. Yablokov, I am happy to see you here again. I remember 

about 18 months ago when Chairman Weldon and I led a delegation to Russia. You gave us a very, very good briefing. I was just 

wondering, what has happened during the last 18 months? Is the 

problem getting worse, that we have more dumping sites than we 

had 18 months ago? Is the problem more serious? Are the international countries that we are working with, are they helping out? 

Can you give us more or less what has changed? Is it more positive 

change, more negative change in the last 18 months? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. The situation is extremely controversial in Moscow. We had a dramatic presidential decree in July this year. 

Under this decree, the Gosatomnadzor, the nuclear regulating body 

in Russia, lost half of its power, at least half of its power, because 

under the new presidential decree, he has no possibility to inspect 

any military installation. This presidential decree had been signed, 

obviously after huge pressure from the military, because the military did not want to open its dirty places. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission was one independent body who showed us the hot 

topic, what we have to concentrate our energy on. So this is a bad situation, but we have also a good situation, because I mentioned the new law about nuclear energy. Under this 

new law, which is now only newborn, two weeks, maybe, it was 

published 25 November, under this new law, the Government has 

to create a new Federal body specially devoted to the problem of 

nuclear waste. Nobody knows what it will look like, this body, who 

will belong, the minister of nuclear energy or some minister of environment, nobody knows, but it is under discussion. 

Anyway, we have a decision that you have a new body which is 

doing something, something sound with the nuclear waste problem. It is good. So it is extremely controversial, also. 

I am enthusiastic about the G-7 meeting in Moscow. We have no 

choice. We have to do something to prepare for this meeting. I 

know Russian custom. Now we have no good proposals, but 2 

weeks before, we have very sound, good proposals, maybe some 

breakthrough. I hope for some breakthrough in this problem at the 

end of March. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I would just like to have one more question for Mr. 

Bryn. Welcome again to this committee. Are we beginning to see 

an impact on marine life and human beings, people getting sick? 

Is this something that is visible now or is it something that is 

going to take years before it shows? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. We are lucky. Until now, we have no real evidence about the harmful effect of nuclear dumping. I agree with my 

Norwegian colleague that all data through us, it is only local, only 

local influence. Yes, it is a huge amount of radioactivity created on 
42 

the new land in the Kara Sea, but the influence of this dumping, maybe several hundred meters about each place, and the Kara Sea, 

it has no fishing, practically has no fishing. In the Bering Sea, we 

have not any evidence that some level of radioactivity is rising in 

fish or in other organisms, no. 

Mr. BRYN. Yes, and that is exactly our impression, as well. Our 

concern is that we want to preserve this very positive situation we 

have in the Bering Sea because of the fish resources, of course. For 

us, it is really to apply a precautionary principle which says that 

if there is a danger for irreparable damage, then one should act, 

even if one does not necessarily have full scientific knowledge at 

the time, because the odds here are very high, indeed. 

It is those dangers which so far have not really developed in the 

worst way, as we talked about the nuclear submarine situation, the 

storage facility with the northern fleet, the runoff from the river 

systems, and so on. That could be catastrophes in the next ten, 20, 

30 years, and so on. So that is the sort of preemptive action we are 

talking about and that is the important thing. 

We must do those things now. You cannot wait, because if the 

damage has been done, it is too late, actually. But it is important 

to have in mind all the time that, as Dr. Yablokov said, as well, 

that dumping so far has not led to any catastrophe. We have come 

to the conclusion, as I said, that for us, the priority is not now to 

deal with those objects which have been dumped. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We thank both of you for your dedication and commitment to making this world a safer place. We appreciate your testimony today. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank our colleague. 

Mr. Underwood from Guam. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would 

like to commend you for this very important meeting. I know it is 

important on an international scale. It is very important to those 

of us who live in the middle of the ocean. 

Dr. Yablokov, you have outlined a very sobering picture about 

the problems that are attendant to cleanup and storage and management of nuclear waste, and in the course of lour presentation 

you indicatedl without giving any specific sums o money, you said, 

well, maybe ;r,lOO billion would start to work us toward a solution 

of this. 

I would like to just ask two questions off of that. One, what is 

Russia doing currently in terms of the expenditure of resources or 

the dedication of resources to this problem, and second, let us assume for the sake of argument that you had access to $100 billion. 

What would you do? How would you tackle the problem? What 

would you do in maybe two or three easy steps that someone like 

me can understand? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. That is a difficult question. I have no good answer. I have to say that our military now tried to drain more power in my society, drain more budget money, and it will happen. Using this tendency, my commission, during the last meeting of my commission in the national security council last month, in November, 

raised the question about creation inside the military, inside the 

military forces, special environmental forces. If my military has 

more money, why cannot we use this money for the proper way, not 
43 

for military, for armament, but for battle with sicknesses of past 

military activity. We have such a solution. We have such a resolution, an official 

resolution, and I hope that we maybe in the next half-a-year will 

try to create inside the military troops, specially environmental 

troops, which are fully concerned, which are doing something with 

radioactive pollution, with chemical pollution, with oil pollution. 

You have an enormous problem with oil pollution in the military, 

also. 

So it is one of part of the solution to this problem, because, of 

course, we have no money, enough money to overcome this problem, obviously. 

The next maybe not theoretically but maybe more wide question, 

in our energy policy, what is the nuclear cycle you have to conduct 

in Russia is a hot topic for discussion in our military and our nuclear industry. You have not here reprocessing in the United 

States. AU spent nuclear fuel, you keep under special places. In my 

country, we have reprocessing. We have one place for reprocessing 

nuclear fuel in the South Ural, in Myak, is the name of this factory, Myak. 

And we have a special presidential decree to create a new huge 

reprocessing plant in the Krasnyosk, but they have no money. They 

dream that they collect money from Switzerland, from Taiwan, 

from Japan, not from Norway but from Germany and so on and so 

on, and when they collect this money, they construct this reprocessing plant. But with the end of this reprocessing plant, plutonium, 

you see, plutonium. What can we do with plutonium? We need to 

create a new generation of nuclear power plant which works on 

plutonium fuel. We environmentalists are strongly against this 

plant. 

But, you see, your question has no answer, has no good answer, 

because under discussion is the strategy, the strategy of reprocessing. If you continue to reprocess or are rising the scale of reprocess- ing fuel, there is an enormous problem with plutonium. Maybe during the G-7 meeting we have to discuss this problem, also. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. It seems like, based on your answer, you are 

going to engage in the kind of debate that we have engaged in here 

in this country about whether strictly defense appropriations and 

what you do with them and what are environmental issues, and I 

think there is a strong basis for arguing that they are so intimately 

related, particularly in an instance like this. 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Yes. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Bryn, this is perhaps a question a little far 

afield from you, but I caught in your testimony that you stated that 

the problem is not so much what has already been dumped but the 

management of future radioactive waste. Of interest to me are 

plans in the Pacific, such as those, plans that I do not agree with, 

but plans, for example, by the republic of the Marshall Islands to 

invite radioactive waste to be stored in those islands since they assume that those islands are already so polluted. What is your impression or opinion about those kinds of plans? 

Mr. BRYN. I do not know those plans in detail, so it is very difficult to comment on them. But, of course, the main principle we 

tried to stick to as much as possible is that each country has a re-
44 

sponsibility for its own waste and its own debris, so that is at least 

a useful point of departure. Thank you. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Underwood. 

Mr. Kennedy from Rhode Island. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When facing the problem, it seems to me first you do an inventory of the problem and you do a risk assessment. To me, I just 

want to clarify some of the questions that have been raised so far 

as to what you have participated in and what we have done as a 

country. 

As I understand it, the International Atomic Energy Agency has 

already begun an assessment of the radioactive contamination due 

to dumped radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas, is that 

not the case? So there is already cooperation between your governments and ours in determining just to what extent there is this 

dumping that has already taken place. Am I to conclude from this that we have some pretty hard data 

from your slides that you showed of where there are problems and 

how much waste there actually is? We have scientific data on that, 

am I right? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. So it seems to me what we need to continue to do 

is determine to what extent in the future that is going to become 

a problem, and it requires the best scientific kind of evaluation of 

where these radionuclides are and other toxic waste sites are and 

what is the possibility of them spreading, so you sort of do a risk 

assessment. 

So what I am asking you is, is not this already taking place? I 

mean, I see the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program has already been up and its report is due this spring. I understand it is 

done in conjunction with your countries. It is an intercountry group 

that is doing this. They will be able to issue a report that will say 

pretty specifically where there are problems and what the hierarchy of our interest should be in terms of which problems we need 

to solve first, am I right? 

I mean, are we going to get a pretty good map here? Not only 

do we have a map of all the sites, but we also have a map of which 

sites, in an order of priority, we would want to go after first as opposed to second or down the road. So that would answer my colleague's question as to where would we spend the money first if we 

had it. Is that pretty much the case? 

So what I would like to hear from you, given the cooperation that 

seems has already taken place between our two countries, is where 

do we have an agreed-upon approach of the technical capabilities 

that we share in this world for determining what the extent of a 

given problem is and what the best technology is for mitigating 

that problem, whether it is capping it or excavating it and dumping 

it someplace else. To what extent do you think there can be common agreement on that issue, of what is the best way to go about 

this? 

I want to hear your acceptance of my premise, and that is we 

have already got the map and we already have a list of priorities 

as to which are the hot spots and which are not. Am I to under-
45 

stand that we also can draw predictive models scientifically as to 

what areas may cause the most problems in the future? 

Mr. BRYN. Thank you. I partly agree with you, because we have 

those data more and more, not fully fledged perhaps yet, but as far 

as the present dumping is concerned, I think we are starting to get 

the data we need. What is needed for that is constant monitoring 

of the situation, that the situation is stable. 

Where we do not have the data is the waste, including the decommissioned submarines which rest with the northern fleet, with 

the military, and I am talking now particularly about the Kola Peninsula problems. There, we lack the data. There, much is based 

on work like what is being done by Bellona, other groups, what we 

get out through official meetings, what Dr. Yablokov can tell us, 

but we do not really have scientific confirmed data for these areas 

and that is why we have felt that this is such a huge problem. 

It involves so many structures and it is so much linked to high 

politics, really, that it is an area for the G-7 leaders at the summit 

in Moscow to start the sort of processes which will lead to the data. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Let me just interrupt there. Is it that there is not 

data that is being disclosed? You are saying that is a problem, not 

everyone has come up with where the problems are on an objective 

basis, not scientific here, just on objective data of where the problem is? In your military and ours, there has not been a forthcoming 

set of hard data as to where the problems are, is that the problem? 

Mr. BRYN. That is absolutely correct. 

Mr. KENNEDY. All right. 

Mr. BRYN. Let me add one thing. We have started a very interesting cooperation through what I call the pilot study under the 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the NACC. I think everybody 

has seen the reports which have come out of the first phase and 

are quite impressed with the ability to draw in experts both from 

the United States Navy and from the Russian Navy, and the second phase will take another couple of years to be on the table. I 

think we will bring some very interesting information out. 

But in order also to get the right people to participate in that 

sort of work is absolutely necessary that the order come from the 

very top, and that, again to return to my favorite them, that if the 

G-7 Russia summit in April can start those processes, I think we 

are on the right track. 

Mr. KENNEDY. It would seem to me, before anything else can 

take place, we need to do an inventory. We cannot determine what 

the problem is unless we have an inventory. So afterwards, I will 

look forward to hearing the other panelists. Once you get the inventory, then we can move on to determine to what extent these 

are problems and what extent they are not, and then what technologies to use to mitigate these problems and what technologies 

are not cost effective. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing this with the other 

witnesses. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. His questions are excellent. 

During our second panel and third panel, we will talk about some 

of the things our agencies are doing to cooperate. I know there are 

some initiatives underway right now, both classified and unclassi-
46 

fied, to share the process, perhaps a new process of understanding where problems are, and then we can, as you say, respond to them. 

With that, the gentleman from Texas, my good friend, Mr. Geren. 

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chainnan. Let me just say I appre- ciate very much your working on this issue and bringing it to the 

attention of the Congress and of the American people. I do not have any questions at this time. I most certainly have 

found this very disturbing, very eye-opening, and I look forward to 

this committee's continued work in this area and I commend our 

panel today for their work in this area. 

Thank you, Mr. Chainnan. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Geren. 

I have a couple of followup questions and then we will thank you both for being here. I think we have allowed our members to ask 

their questions. 

Dr. Yablokov, there have been some reports of dumping of high- level waste near Lake Karachi. Is that true? I understand that, in 

fact, this could be more severe than any other of the existing sites 

that we know about, and certainly it would even exceed the 1993 

white paper, your report, the Yablokov Report. Since Lake Karachi 

drains into other rivers leading to the Arctic Ocean, could you elaborate on what you know about the dumping in Lake Karachi? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. I am sorry, I cannot follow. Would you repeat, please, what is your question? 

Mr. WELDON. The reports of dumping high-level waste near Lake 

Karachi and what extent that dumping has been. Are you aware 

of it, and if so, to what extent has that dumping been? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. If I understand you correctly, I think the more 

dangerous situation is not with dumping but with radioactive pol- lution going through the Siberian River to the Arctic is potentially much more dangerous, because we can lift the dumped containers, 

the dumped submarines. It is possible to conduct in the next several years. But what we have to do with the huge, many, many times, much more polluted river. For example, the latest situation in Myak, you know Lake Karachi is a more polluted, radioactively polluted place which contains 

about 1 billion curies in one lake. They covered it after the tragedy in 1961 when it was extremely dry season and some small [?] 

catches radioactive dust and cover the secret city, Chelyabinsk-70. After this, they tried to do something with this lake, but to cover 

it, it is concrete. 

My government allocates 5 billion rubles for this in the last year, 

to cover this, and now it is near to the end of this process. But 

what happened, enonnous pollution underground. Now, the lake is 

dead. There is a huge body, underground body of heavily polluted 

waters going through the Tobol River each year for 65 or 87 meters, in large this water underground leaves. If this process will be 

continued, in 5 years, the Tobol River, one of the tributaries of the 

Ob, will be highly polluted. 

I asked my specialists, my advisors, my experts how we can stop it. Technically, it is possible. We need only $6 or $8 billion to stop the dispersion, the distribution, the ground distribution of this pol- lution. Nobody has such money, nobody. 
Mr. WELDON. Dr. Yablokov, one final question. There is a press 

story running in the Western media this past week quoting 

Nicholai Veransoff, saying that the upcoming December elections 

for the Duma really have no candidates who are out front on environmental issues. And, in fact, Mr. Veransoff makes the case that 

there is one faction running, one party claiming to be an environmental group and he says there is no one in that party who, in 

fact, is concerned with the environment. Would you comment on 

that? 

Dr. YABLOKOV. It is strategy for our political systems. We have 

one small official green party. This party belongs to some oil magnates. In my point of view, it is specially created to intervene in 

the Duma, not to solve the environmental problem but for other 

reasons, maybe half criminal reasons. 

Now, I know only three or four visible environmental activists 

who have a good chance to be elected to the next Duma. One of 

them is Madam Zlotnica from Olenburg [?], one of the leaders of 

the green movement in the existing Duma. But let us see what 

happens. Let us see what happens. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, and thank you both for your testimony. 

It was outstanding. We appreciate you being here and for making 

a long trip to our country. 

With that, we will convene our next panel, Ambassador David 

Colson from the Department of State, Assistant Secretary for 

Oceans, International Environment; Sherri Goodman, Deputy 

Under Secretary, Department of Defense, for Environmental Security; and Dr. Alan Hecht, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator 

for the Environmental Protection Agency, to discuss what, in fact, 

is happening within the U.S. Government and our agencies to assist in the problems that we have just discussed internationally, and I am sure to respond to Dr. Yablokov's comments. Ambassador Colson, we appreciate you being here. We know you have to catch a plane back to London for the London Convention 

discussions, I assume, and we appreciate you coming out in spite 

of the fact that you will be on an airplane in a few short hours. We will allow you to go first, and if we have questions we will ask 

them of you. Then you can feel free to take off. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DAVID A. COLSON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador COLSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do 

have a prepared statement and ask that it be placed in the record. 

I had the privilege to testify for the administration before the 

House Oceanography Subcommittee on this subject in 1993 and I 

think perhaps the best thing I could do is simply note some 

changes that have happened in the last 2 years. I will hit four specific areas. 

First, in respect to administration policy, in June 1994, after extensive interagency consideration, the President endorsed an Arctic 

policy for this Nation based on six objectives: Protecting the Arctic 

environment and conserving its biological resources; assuring that 

natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable; strengthening institutions 
48 

for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations; fourth, involving 

the indigenous peoples of the Arctic on decisions that affect them; 

fifth, enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues; and finally, meeting postcold-war national security and defense needs. 

Mr. Chairman, it is within this framework that U.S. agencies 

now work on Arctic issues. This Arctic policy review, which was the 

first in over a decade, reflects the needs and realities of the postcold-war era. Vigilance in the Arctic in defense of our national security will be no less, but we recognize that other objectives must 

be pursued, as well. 

When there was last a hearing on this subject in September 

1993, we had all just become aware of the Yablokov Report, which 

detailed Soviet dumping illegally of high- and low-level radioactive 

waste in the Arctic. We were intent at that time on achieving global international agreement on a prohibition on dumping in the 

ocean of high- and low-level nuclear waste. Fortunately, we 

achieved that in the fall of 1993 in the London Convention, which 

is the appropriate international forum. Unfortunately, Russia, as 

the only country, stood upon its treaty rights and opted out of this 

decision in respect of low-level liquid radioactive waste. 

There are several ways one can look at this turn of events. It is, 

perhaps, honest recognition that Russia does not and has not the 

facilities to process and store such waste on land at the present 

time. On the other hand, it appears to reflect an unwillingness to 

give high priority to waste management within the Russian military system. Mter all, at least with respect to low-level waste storage and processing, the cost is relatively modest, certainly so when 

compared to the cost of a nuclear submarine or to the operation of 

a nuclear submarine. 

To try to assist the Russian Government and assure against Russian dumping, we have acted on two fronts. First, at the September 

1994 summit here in Washington, we secured a joint statement between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to solidify political commitment by Russia at its highest level not to dump radioactive waste 

in the ocean. 

Second, together with Norway and Russia, we are working on the 

Murmansk project, which will provide the necessary facilities in 

the northern region. Dr. Hecht, I am sure, will go into this project 

in more detail. Likewise, we encouraged Japan in similar efforts in 

the Vladivostok region. 

The third area where there has been progress is in international 

cooperation on Arctic matters. Bilaterally, in December 1994, within the Gore-Chernomyrdin context, we reached agreement on an 

Arctic contamination agreement that is particularly noteworthy in 

its provisions providing for access to important research sites. This 

agreement is not limited to radioactive waste investigation, as we 

assume that other contaminants may be of even greater concern, 

particularly in the near term. 

Here I have to pause and speak to the point raised by Dr. 

Yablokov and the reflection that the State Department somehow 

did something with respect to an agreement that Russia proposed. 

I think it is fair to say that we did receive-we, the United States 

Government-received a proposal within the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
49 

context from Russia. The end result of the negotiation of that pro- posal was this agreement which was reached and signed by Vice 

President Gore in December 1994. 

We certainly did not accept the first Russian draft. It was a draft 

that contained no particular commitment on Russia's part to do 

anything in particular and it has us essentially funding everything. I think that if we had accepted this, we would have been criticized. 

We wanted an agreement that gave us access to important areas 

that we thought that our scientists needed access to and we wanted 

recognition that cooperation was a two-way street and we also 

wanted recognition that other contaminants, and others, I think, on 

these panels following us will go into the fact that other contaminants may be of, at least in the near term, even higher importance than the radioactive waste. We feel that we got that in the agree- ment that was finally reached. 

Multilaterally, we continued to stress the Arctic Monitoring and 

Assessment Program as one of the key components of the Arctic environmental protection strategy. There is, as well, the Barents 

Council, a Norwegian initiative, and ongoing discussions of an Arctic Council that has been proposed by Canada. 

Mr. Chairman, all of these are relatively new international initiatives and I must confess some concern about our ability to lead 

as we confront the funding and personnel constraints in front of us. 

Moreover, I must also note that the Arctic has become a bit of a 

fad. We need to guard against a proliferation of meetings, of institutionalization of new bureaucracies associated with Arctic coopera- tion and new initiatives which simply sap our strength and our resources and keep us from really accomplishing much. 

Dr. Yablokov mentioned that he thought that the London Convention might be reconfigured to also deal with land-based sources 

of pollution. That, of course, goes outside of the mandate of the 

present convention and it is an area in which the administration, again, exercised leadership on in hosting a conference here in 

Washington just at the end of October on land-based marine pollu- tion, including radioactive waste from land-based sources and developed a program of action in that connection, and we feel that 

that is the better vehicle through which to pursue international cooperation on land-based activities that pollute the marine environment 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, on the research front, a great deal has 

been accomplished since 1993. Only since 1991 have our scientists 

begun to share data and to conduct collaborative research in the 

north of Russia, where the land and the river and the sea and the 

ocean pollution have international implications. Only in the last 2 

years have joint Norwegian and Russian cruises investigated dump sites in the Barents and Kara Seas. Assessment of these and other 

findings in the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project of the 

IAEA are now beginning to be published. Joint cruises have also 

taken place off Russia's far east coast. 

With funds supplied to the U.S. Defense Department, the Arctic 

Nuclear Waste Assessment Program during fiscal years 1993 

through 1995, we have for the first time studies from a variety of 

areas, including in the Ob and Yenisey Rivers, which drain into the 

Arctic. 
50 

The assessment of the information generated continues. A great 

deal of work remains, however. Frankly, baseline information is 

lacking in many areas. That is why Arctic monitoring programs are 

so essential. Our domestic agencies work in a coordinated fashion 

through the National Science Foundation-chaired interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee and internationally within the 

framework provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency 

and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program. 

But again, Mr. Chairman, I have to note that the IAEA is a U.N. 

institution, and thus, it is within the target area as funding for 

U.N. agencies is slashed. Also, the new IAEA programs, such as 

the present Arctic work, must be done through voluntary contributions and there is likely to be less of that in the days ahead. Our 

support for AMAP, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, 

has largely been via a dedication of U.S. agency personnel and the 

small grants program that my bureau in the State Department has 

administered since fiscal year 1992. Unfortunately, that program 

may not exist in fiscal year 1996. 

The Arctic cannot be monitored for free. The administration and 

the Congress need to work together to see how that might best be 

done. We have made a start by developing a coordinated Arctic research budget, as called for several years ago by P.L. 101-609 and 

reaffirmed in the administration's policy review. However, funding 

remains inconsistent, fragmented, and in some cases nonexistent. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, there is no lack of enthusiasm within 

agencies or internationally in establishing programs to tackle these 

issues, but we are all struggling with very real budget constraints 

and prioritization must occur among the many needs that we all 

have. The big question we face, frankly, is just where do these issues of Arctic contamination really stand in that priority list. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. I do have about a 

half hour and I would be happy to wait. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Colson follows:] 
51 

AMBASSADOR DAVID A. COLSON 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ACTING) 

FOR OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 

AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE A JOINT HEARING BY THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

AND 

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

6 DECEMBER 1995 

Mr. Chairman: 

I am pleased to appear before the joint Committees on National Security and Resources to discuss the problems of 

radioactive and other toxic contamination in the Arctic. 

My presentation addresses these important issues from the 

international perspective and seeks to place them within the 

context of United States Arctic policy and the international 

mechanisms, both regional and bilateral, within which we pursue 

that policy. 

In June 1994, President Clinton endorsed an Arctic Policy 

reflecting our unique and critical needs and interests in the 

region . This endorsement followed a broad interagency review of u.s. interests in the Arctic, based on analyzing and responding 

to post Cold-War challenges in the North in the areas of 

security, resources, science and the environment. 

Let me review . the policy briefly. It is based on the 

following goals: 

Protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its 

biological resources. 

Assuring that natural resource management and economic 

development in the region are environmentally sustainable. 
52 

- 2 -

Strengthening institutions (or cooperation among the eight 

Arctic nations. 

Involving the Arctic's indigenous people in decisions that 

affect them. 

Enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, 

regional, and global environmental issues. 

Meeting post-Cold War national security and defense needs. 

A major focus in the implementation of our Arctic policy has 

been to address the issues of radioactive and other contaminants 

in the Arctic. Particular concern has been generated by reports 

of potential radioactive contamination from the former Soviet 

nuclear weapons and other military programs, including illegal 

ocean dumping and other disposal of nuclear wastes and 

components, as well as discharges through rivers. A primary 

objective in the efforts to respond to these issues has been to 

secure the involvement of Russia in efforts to deal with them. 

Turning to the international institutional framework 

relevant to the Arctic environment within which we implement 

this policy, there are two major global instruments that are 

specifically applicable to Arctic contaminants. 

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

sets forth obligations to prevent. reduce and control pollution 

of the marine environment from all sources. Though the United 

States and the other Arctic nations, with the exception of 

Iceland. are not yet Parties to the Convention, its marine 

environmental protection obligations are recognized as 

reflecting international law, binding on all nations. 

Also of particular relevance to the problems of 

contamination in the Arctic are the Law of the Sea Convention's 

provisions on prevention, reduction and control of pollution 

from land-based sources, a topic to which I will return toward 

the end of my remarks. 

The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 

the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention) 

implements the obligations of the Law of the Sea Convention with 

respect to ocean dumping. It includes a prohibition on the 

deliberate disposal at sea of high-level radioactive wastes and, 

in 1993, was amended to extend the prohibition to all 

radio~ctive wastes, including low-level radioactive wastes. 
- 3 -

There are two primary multilateral channels directly 

applicable to addressing the contaminants in the Arctic . 

The International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA) is the 

international organization charged, inter alia, with promoting 

the safe use of nuclear energy and preventing radioactive 

contamination from any such uses, including in the Arctic. 

At the regional level, efforts to address Arctic 

contaminants have been centered within the Arctic Environmental 

Protection Strategy {AEPS), a cooperative program among the 

United States and the seven other Arctic nations {Canada, 

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia). A 

primary objective of the Strategy is securing ongoing Russian 

involvement , particularly in light of the extensive pollution 

from past Soviet disposal of toxic waste and radioactive 

material. 

The London Convention: 

The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 

the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter {the London Convention) 

is the primary international agreement controlling the 

deliberate disposal of wastes at sea. The London Convention 

prohibits the disposal at sea of high-level radioactive waste. 

While the original provisions of the Convention permitted, under 

special permit, the dumping of low level of radioactive waste, 

the Parties adopted a voluntary moratorium on such disposal in 

1985 . However, concern arose both within the London Convention 

forum and within the IAEA over reports of significant at sea 

disposal of radioactive wastes by the Soviet Union and, later, 

Russia. As a result, the government of Russia committed itself 

to provide information and, in May 1993, released the Yablokov 

Report (or the White Book). 

The Yablokov Report detailed Soviet and later Russian 

disposal practices in the Kara and Barents Seas and in the Sea 

of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan and North Pacific Ocean , from 1959 

through 1992 . These practices included past disposal of high 

level wastes that violated the London Convention's ban and 

ongoing disposal of low level wastes inconsistent with the 

voluntary moratorium. 

In Nov ember 1993 , the Parties to the London Convention 

adopted an amendment that extended the prohibition on disposal 

to low level radioactive wastes . Under Convention procedures , 

lhe amendment would enter into force for all Parties, except for 

Lhose that declared within 100 days of adoption (that is, by 

February 24 . 1994) that they were unable to accept it . Russia 

abstained on the adoption of the amendment and later filed an 
- 4 -

objection, thereby opting out of its provisions. At the same 

time, Russia indicated its intent to seek means of establishing 

the capability of adhering to the prohibition as rapidly as possible. As will be noted, the U.S. has sought, in a variety 

of ways, to work with Russia in fulfilling this commitment. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 

In 1992 at the request of the London Convention, the 

Inter.national Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) initiated an effort to 

evaluate the state of radioactive contamination due to dumped 

radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas; to assess the 

risks to human health and the environment; and , if necessary , to 

examine possible remedial actions. Exploratory cruises to the 

dumping areas were conducted in 1992, 1993 and 1994. Since 

1993, the U.S. has contributed a total of $270,000 from funds 

designated to support international organizations, and also 

provided the expert services of U.S . scientists to the Agency·s 

Marine Environmental Laboratory . It is widely recognized that 

it was the U.S. contribution which made this program possible. 

The results of the !AEA"s efforts are to be reported to the 

London Convention in 1996, and the collection and management of 

scientific data is being coordinated with the regionally-based 

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. 

While it appears from the IAEA's evaluation that there are no significant regional or 9lobal effects at present from the 

dumped waste, the gradual deterioration of the barrier materials 

used to contain the contaminants could lead to future impacts. 

These could occur through contamination of the marine food 

chain, possibly resulting in the radiation exposure of humans 

through the consumption of fish and other marine foodstuffs . Since the wastes are lying in shallow waters, the possibility of r~diation exposure by other routes -- such as the movement and 

transport of the waste packages by natural events (ice or storm 

action), or deliberate human action --cannot be ruled out. 

The half-lives of the radioactive materials involved are very 

long (tens of thousands of years) and, therefore, the possible 

impact of climatic change has also to be taken into account . In 

order to provide answers to these questions, it is necessary to 

have a thorough understanding of the present ~nd future 

physical, chemical. and biological characteristics of the 

environment surrounding the wastes and of the wastes themselves. 

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS): 

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was established in 1991. Its origins extend back to 1989, when the 

eight Arctic nations agreed to a process of creating an 
55 

- 5 -

informal, cooperative association for the purpose of studying 

the current state of Arctic contamination from all sources. The 

Strategy identifies six pollution threats requiring urgent 

attention, including radioactive substances, persistent organic 

pollutants, oil, heavy metals, noise, and acidification and 

there are four AEPS working groups addressing issues of 

contamination. 

One of the principal working groups under the AEPS is the 

Arctic Monitoring and Assesment Program (AMAP). AMAP's first 

report is due in late 1996 or 97. It will be a comprehensive 

survey of the state of pollution in the Arctic, and will include 

coverage of persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals and 

radionuclides. NOAA is the agency responsible for coordination 

of u.s. data input. The U.S . has also supplied funding for 

general data compilation related to AMAP . 

Another important working group under AEPS is that on 

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). PAME's 

final report, including U.S. data coordinated by NOAA, is due in 

March, 1996 . The report is a survey of Arctic sources of Arctic 

marine contamination and existing legal mechanisms to address 

such contaminants. It is noteworthy that in both of these 

international scientific working groups, Russian scientists have 

been very forthcoming about their national problems. A third 

AEPS working group is devoted to studying the need for Emergency 

Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR). The U.S . Coast 

Guard is playing a leading role in the development of this 

group's report. The group has used the recent oil spill in the 

Komi Republic of Russia as a real-life case study for 

monitoring. The subsequent clean-up effort is being used as a 

model for planning purposes . 

One aspect of Arctic pollution which will not be addressed 

in detail in the AEPS reports is that of contaminants which 

originate outside of the Arctic, but are transported there by 

various means. The study of the transport mechanisms for 

pollutants is an area which requires further study, as is the 

impact of the pollutants on the plant, animal and human 

inhabitants of the Arctic. 

Bilateral Efforts with Russia: 

There are a variety of bilateral channels through which we 

seek to address issues of Arctic pollution, obviously most 

importantly with Russia . Many of. the specific initiatives of 

this nature will be addressed by my fellow witnesses. I will 

refer to several of those directly relevant to Arctic 

contaminants. 
- 6 -

President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin 

announced at their summit meeting in September 1994. that 

cooperation in the resolution of the problems of processing and 

storage of Russian liquid radioactive wastes in the North of 

Russia was an important component of any regime for effective 

protection of environmental quality and the natural resources of 

the Arctic. Specifically, their announcement sta ted that: 

The Russian Federation and the United States of America 

confirmed their readiness to cooperate in consistently 

preventing the dumping of liquid radioactive wastes, in 

accordance with the London Convention, and to proceed to a 

solution of the problem of Arctic pollution from all sources . 

To this end, Russia and the United States agreed to 

undertake. in cooperation with Norway and other interested 

countries, a step-by-step expansion and upgrade of the 

treatment facility in Murmansk. At the same time. Russia 

stated its intention to continue to abide by its voluntary 

commitment to prohibit the dumping of liquid radioactive 

wastes under the London Convention with a view to eventual 

formal adherence to the prohibition . 

It is important for Russia to support the ban and not to 

dump i n the ocean, not j ust in the Arctic but also in the north 

Pacific where Japan has concentrated similar efforts . Japan had 

agreed to provide up to $15 million to construct processing and 

storage facilities near Vladivostok, moving this issue to center 

stage in the Japan-Russia relationship . Japan has made it 

clear , however, that such financial assistance wou ld be severely jeopardized if Russian dumping continues. 

Whether we discuss the Murmansk facility or Vladivostok or dumping in general, we can assume the environmental side of the 

Russian bureaucracy is with us (and Japan) on the issue. 

However, the problem rests with the Russian Navy. The Navy is 

the institution with the budgetary responsibility to deal with 

the storage problem and we are endeavoring to work with them on this issue. 

At the end of 1994 , the United States and Russi a signed an agreement on cooperation in dealing with Arctic contaminants - the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Prevention ot Pollution of the Environment in 

the Arctic. The agreement emerged from the Gore-Chernomyrdin 

process. Fully implementing that Agreement will ta ke time. 

While the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy remains the 

main forum for multilateral cooperation, this Agreement should 

help ensure access to a bilateral forum and to raise the profile of work already being done . 
57 

- 7 -

Another area involving U.S.-Russia bilateral activity has 

been in response to the major oil spill in the Komi region of 

Russia caused by rupture of pipeline. The spill including 

discharge into the Pechora River that flows into the Arctic 

Ocean threatened major environmental impacts. The U.S. was 

instrumental in facilitating World Bank involvement in cleanup 

operations. 

The World Bank and the lead contractor for the Komi 

clean-up, Hartec of Anchorage, Alaska, report that, to date, 94 

percent of the oil from last year's massive spill has been 

cleaned up. Hartec executed its activities in two phases -

containment and clean-up . The six major spill sites required 

significantly different remediation strategies , and in some 

cases, lotal reconstruction of Russian-built siphon dams and 

dikes. Russian clean-up efforts prior to arrival of Hartec were 

minimal and intentional burning of slicks complicated clean-up 

drastically. 

Before the onset of the Russian winter, Hartec had 500 

Russians at work processing about 500 tons of oil per day, much 

of it re-injected into the pipeline; new equipment installed 

this fall tripled the number of personnel involved and the 

processing rate. Repairs on the problem sections of the 

pipeline are reported to be finished and with clean-up 

activities essentially complete. Attention in Komi now turns to 

containment of residual oil. The World Bank projects a new 

pipeline will be constructed within 3-5 years. 

Finally, a contract for an environmental monitoring program 

for the Komi/Kolva region will be awarded very soon. We noted 

to the Bank that the Russians have lobbied hard at the GCC and 

the AEPS for a more extensive program to cover the Pechora Basin 

as a whole (and thus, the Arctic). The Bank agreed that such a program would have environmental and political value. At last 

week's AEPS meeting, there was wide-spread regional support for 

such efforts with the aim of pollution prevention. 

Land-Based Sources - The Global Programme of Action for 

Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities: 

The most recent international undertaking that bears upon 

what must ~e a long-term effort to deal with pollution in the 

Arctic is a program of action that emerged from the conference 

held here in Washington one month ago aimed at protection of 

oceans and coastal areas from the impacts of land-based 

activities. The conference hosted by the United States, in 

partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme, 

adopten the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the 

Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. The Programme of 
58 

- 8 -

Action is designed to identify ~nd facilitate practical steps to 

implement the legal obligations of states set forth in the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to prevent, 

reduce and control impacts upon the marine environment from 

land-based activities . 

Municipal, industrial and agricultural wastes and run-off 

resulting from land- based activities contribute most of the 

pollution load of the oceans. The impacts of these activities 

encompass the effects of a broad range of pollutants and harmful 

processes, including sewage (pathogens and microorganisms), 

persistent organic pollutants, radioactive substances , heavy 

metals, oils (hydrocarbons), nutrients, sediment mobilization , 

litter, and physical alterations and destruction of habitat . 

The programme of action : 

a) incorporates practical guidance for national programs, 

including a methodology for accurate identification and 

assessment of the sources of land-based impacts; and for 

establishing clear priorities for dealing with those sources; 

b) calls for cooperation at the regional level, through 

legal instruments and action plans; and, 

c) cooperative steps at the global level to facilitate 

eff~ctive action at the national and regional levels, 

including building national capacity for effective action; 

mobilization of financial resources in support of such 

action ; and involving the relevant United Nat i ons and other 

institutions in the implementation effort. 

The United States is pleased with the results of the 

Washington conference. We consider effective steps to implement 

The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 

Environment from Land-Based Activities as a major priority for 

our oceans policy. The Programme stresses action at the 

regional level and I believe offers an important platform upon 

which to identify and apply "what works" in addressing problems 

of Arctic contamination. 
59 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Ambassador. I just have a couple of 

questions. I appreciate the work that has been done with the 

money that we spent, and as the chairman of this subcommittee 

have supported and will continue to support the administration in 

requesting dollars. 

Unfortunately, in the past, while we have had the success of primarily Senator Stevens putting money in, in this year's defense 

bill, to my knowledge, there has been no money added and there 

was no request from the administration. Therefore, we are looking 

at a zero dollar amount for fiscal year 1996. That is unfortunate, 

and it is troubling in light of what we have heard today. Do you 

have any suggestions as to the administration planning on asking 

for some reprogram dollars or something that we can do to help 

prod some additional money in that area? 

Ambassador COLSON. Mr. Chairman, it is dangerous for me to 

talk about money issues, but I think all of us that are interested 

in these issues have to be mindful of the budget processes and to 

fight our battles within them. Certainly, within the administration 

process, we will again be revisiting this as we plan for fiscal year 

1997 and we have not given up on trying to find some money at 

least within the State Department to-the small grants program is 

a very small program, but sometimes if you can bump something 

with a $10,000 or $15,000 contribution, it really makes a difference. We will still be working within the Department so that 

once we do have a budget, maybe we are able to have some of that 

money. 

Mr. WELDON. I extend my offer to work with you in a bipartisan 

mode to help accomplish that objective and to make sure that we 

do not renege on the financial commitment necessary. I am willing 

to stand up within my own party and make that case because I 

think this is an extremely important priority for this country and 

really for the world. 

The ONR has been, I guess, the lead agency in this. Is that satisfactory from the State Department's standpoint in terms of this 

issue? 

Ambassador CoLSON. Mr. Chairman, I think, again, our job on 

an issue like this is to coordinate and take on the international 

side of the debate. We are not a technical agency in any sense. The 

money has come to ONR but they have worked with and through 

the established interagency process that NSF chairs to identify our 

priorities. They have worked and our agencies have worked within 

the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program that has been put 

together, so all of this has tied together rather well, I think. It can 

always be done a little bit better, but we certainly have no complaints in that respect. 

Mr. WELDON. One of the questions I am going to ask our other 

panelists, both after you leave and the other panel, is in regard to 

the United States DOD-Russian DOD memorandum of understanding on environmental protection that was signed in June 1995, the 

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which has the potential for removing the bureaucratic barriers that arise. I guess I want to get 

to the heart of the perception that perhaps there have been some 

within the naval-nuclear-environmental community who have not 

been maybe as forthcoming and as cooperative as maybe they 
60 

should be. Is that your assessment, and are there things that per- haps we could do to help prod that along? 

Ambassador COLSON. I do not have that assessment. I do not 

have that knowledge. If you are speaking of our people and our 

naval officers and the Defense Department, I think there has been 

good cooperation within the interagency community. 

I know that Deputy Secretary Talbot talked to former Deputy Secretary Perry about this at an earlier date to try to advance the 

cooperation with Norway and to bring our military into this, because we did feel that working sort of through the normal State 

Department to foreign ministry channels was not the right way to 

accomplish what we needed to accomplish with the Russian military. I think the kinds of military to military contacts that we are 

now having are essential and it is something that the Department of State certainly supports. 

Mr. WELDON. So you are not aware of any opposition from the 

U.S. Navy's naval reactors program? Ambassador COLSON. I am not aware of any, no, sir. 

Mr. WELDON. That is a question I will ask the other panelists. I am giving them a heads-up in case they want to think about their 

answer prior to that question being asked. 

I will now tum to my good friend from Guam, Mr. Underwood. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I was struck by the comment, I guess, that you said that some of the attention given to the Arctic is somewhat of 

a fad. Given the nature of the earlier panel, perhaps you could give 

me some reason to believe that it is a fad. How does this compare in terms of the dangers overall worldwide and what would lead you 

to make such a comment, at the risk of wanting the Pacific to be 

a fad. 

Ambassador CoLSON. Perhaps the use of the word "fad" was unfortunate, but I do find that oftentimes in international activities, 

there will become an issue that will be popular and it will become 

the source of funding for lots of meetings but not for any particular work. I think that that is what we are finding today in many respects in the Arctic, that some government, some agency is interested in 

the Arctic. It is sort of a new issue. It was an issue that during 

the cold war we did not talk about Arctic cooperation because it 

really did not exist. Now that has broken down and there are lots 

of environmental groups, there are a lot of other countries interested in things Arctic. 

My point was simply that we have to guard against a proliferation of nonproductive initiatives. We can get bogged down very easily with the limited resources that we have simply going off to 

meetings, flying in airplanes to talk about Arctic things and not 

getting anything done. It is one of these issues where just about 

every government has their own Arctic initiative and I think we 

have to guard against that and focus in arid try to use our resources wisely and efficiently, and that sometimes means saying no 

to simply the interest in having meetings or forums and things like 

that. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. But it is not meant to delimit the impact or the 

presentation of the severity of the situation? 
61 

Ambassador COLSON. No, clearly not, and if I gave that impression, I apologize. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Turning to some place a little bit warmer, I am 

sure that in the course of your own work you have had perhaps the 

opportunity to deal with the proposal by people in the Marshall Islands to do some nuclear storage on Bikini Atoll. I am curious. 

What has been the State Department's interaction with the Marshall Islands on this issue? Is there an official position? Are steps 

being actively taken to kind of dissuade them from this notion and 

what is the status of that? 

I guess the logic of it is that they are going to store it on Bikini 

because it is already contaminated. Is that technically seen as 

land-based because of the possibility of seepage into the ocean? I 

know that it is supposed to have a geological base of some 18,000 

feet. 

Ambassador COLSON. On the latter point, I think in the way we 

categorize these issues, I think we would call that land-based. But 

I am generally aware of the issue. This is something that we have 

been deferring the technical issues to the U.S. Geological Survey 

and other agencies of the Government that have much more capability to judge the feasibility of this. We have been also telling the Marshall Islands and the other 

South Pacific countries that we would like to see a more clear 

statement of the interests of the Pacific Island countries themselves in this project. It, as you know, is often the case that the 

small island countries of the Pacific do stand together on issues, 

whether it is fisheries or anything like this, and we think it is incumbent on the Marshalls to try to make their case to their neighbors before they really come to the United States Government asking for a blessing. 

We have withheld that blessing. We have withheld criticism of 

it and we would like to see if they can develop some international 

consensus within the region that this is the right and proper thing 

to do before we take any sort of formal position on it. 

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Underwood. Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to ask the Ambassador what you feel in terms of the 

Arctic environmental protection strategy, you feel that this is the 

best way to go forward, that it is already a working program to 

bring into focus what the problem is and how to measure the problem, monitor it, and determine where the problems will be in the 

future? Do you think that is the hook to hang ourselves on in terms 

of the Arctic environment and what the former panel was testifying 

to? Do you think that is the best? 

Ambassador COLSON. I think our general judgment is that the 

Arctic environmental protection strategy is a viable international 

cooperative mechanism through which we can accomplish the kinds 

of assessment and monitoring programs and coordinate the programs that the United States does, that Russia does, that Norway 

does, and the other Arctic countries do in the Arctic. We do not 

need to duplicate efforts and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 

Program helps us to avoid duplication. 
62 

It will also help us and is developing the map that you were 

speaking of earlier, where I think in another few months we will 

have the best compilation of information of the hot spots in the 

Arctic that we might have not only with respect to radioactive 

waste but with respect to a host of other contaminants that we are 

concerned about. 

We have to continue to work these other parts of this puzzle. We 

have to work bilaterally with the Russians when that would seem 

to be the best way to proceed. We have to work trilaterally with 

Norway and Russia in other contexts. But I think for the general overview of scientific cooperation in the Arctic, that the Arctic environmental protection program and the component of that called 

AMAP, the monitoring and assessment program, is the area that 

we think is probably the best focal area. Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. Could I have Sherri Goodman talk 

to----

Mr. WELDON. Would the gentleman yield? We have not had them 

testify yet. I just wanted to finish with Ambassador Colson. He has 

to leave for a plane. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Excuse me. I am sorry. 

Mr. WELDON. That is all right. He has to go back to London. Do 

you have any other questions for the Ambassador? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No. 

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. We appreciate your testimony and your willingness to work with us and we pledge our 

support to work with you. 

Ambassador COLSON. Thank you very much. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, and have a safe plane trip. Ms. Goodman, thank you for waiting for us. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF SHERRI W. GOODMAN, DEPUTY UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 

Ms. GOODMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittees. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement 

for the record and I will summarize it for you. I would like to address DOD's unique role in the effort we are 

discussing today, the criteria for our involvement, and our work to 

date. The Department's primary goal is security. In the Arctic, security means protecting human health and safety. It also means 

ensuring that the Arctic ecosystem remains healthy and resilient. 

Keeping the Arctic healthy avoids tension between adjacent nations 

who depend upon its resources for food, economic benefit, transportation, and research. 

The Department of Defense role begins with national security. The threat of widespread contamination, real or perceived, is a 

threat to security. Protecting the environmental resources all 

States share is thus a critical component to protecting security. Additionally, the Department of Defense has an operational interest 

in retaining access to the Arctic sea lanes. DOD has an array of environmentally-friendly tools upon which 

to draw. We have a Navy patrolling global waters, undertaking sophisticated scientific research in the course of its operations. We 

have environmental professionals deployed on U.S. bases around 
63 

the world, and we have the wisdom borne of 25 years of experience in integrating environmental protection into military activities. 

Before I describe how the Department of Defense has applied these capabilities in the Arctic region, let me address the criteria 

for DOD involvement here. In the Arctic, as elsewhere, the Department must continuously scrutinize its activities to ensure that we 

achieve maximum return on our investment for the national security dollar. 

The criteria for judgment in the Arctic are, first, to minimize po- litical tensions generated by real or perceived pollution. Radioactive waste has attracted the most attention in this regard. Second, tQ minimize the real threat to human health and the 

natural environment in the Arctic by military activities. 

Third, to realize the best return for our investment of time and 

resources. 

Fourth, to address environmental problems according to a riskbased analysis, as Congressman Kennedy has alluded to. 

The source of much of the environmental security concerning the 

Arctic today stems from the Russian military, and that brings me 

to the fifth criteria, which is to measurably improve Russian military environmental management of nuclear and hazardous waste. 

The good news is that the Department's and others' research to 

date indicates that there is not a significant immediate threat to 

human health and to the food chain in the Arctic, but good news 

should not lull us into complacency. The Arctic remains vulnerable 

to a host of commonplace toxins, such as heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants. We have a responsibility to do all we can 

to help ensure that an environmental disaster never occurs, because once it does, it could take decades or centuries to reverse. 

Let me now briefly address how we have set DOD's capabilities 

to work with others in the Arctic. First, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which under the leadership of the Vice President, Vice 

President Gore, provides an enduring forum for bilateral coopera- tion. Because the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 

meet several times a year, there is plentiful opportunity for exchange. The Department of Defense is a full participant in anumber of the committees, not only the National Security Committee 

but the Environment Committee, as well, and I have personally had the opportunity to present the Department of Defense environmental program to Russian defense and environmental officials at 

a Moscow meeting of the GCC. 

Second, in June 1995, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, and 

his Russian counterpart, Minister Grachev, did sign a memorandum of understanding, as you referred to, Mr. Chairman, to facilitate military environmental cooperation. Under this agreement, we 

can share information and experiences in a wide variety of subjects, ranging from risk analysis as an environmental prioritization 

tool to environmentally sound weapons demilitarization to person- nel education and training. We would like to commence developing 

project proposals under this agreement as early as possible. 

Next, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, established the Arctic 

Military Environmental Cooperation Program, which we refer to as 

AMEC, at the request of the Norwegian Minister of Defense, 

Kosmo, in June 1994. This is a trilateral military-to-military dialog 
64 

among the United States, Russia, and Norway on Arctic military 

contamination. At the first trilateral meeting in Horton, Norway, 

in the spring, United States and Norwegian officials presented the 

results of our research on nuclear contamination in the Arctic and 

briefed Russian officials on the integration of sound environmental 

management practices into military activities. 

Let me note at this point and respond to your question about the 

participation of the U.S. Office of Naval Reactors. Let me say they 

have been very productive participants in this dialog and overall in 

our Arctic military environmental strategy. In fact, the Naval Reactors Office has been an active participant on this delegation and 

was part of the briefings presented to the Russians on the United 

States nuclear fuel cycle. 

We are still hoping to have a meeting early next year. What 

needs to happen now is engaging the northern fleet, the Russian 

northern fleet and the ministry of defense in this military-to-military dialog. This would be a useful step in encouraging the Russians to take responsibility for their actions and to improve environmental management of the active and decommissioned submarine fleet. In essence, we need to have the right Russian mili- tary participants attend these meetings in order productively to 

have a dialog that could lead to some specific proposals and to the 

Russian Navy taking greater responsibility for environmental management of their submarine fleet. 

Next, the Department's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, called ANWAP, is a 3-year-old effort begun by Congress to 

assess the nature and extent of nuclear waste in the Arctic region. The Office of Naval Research, as you know, conducts this program and Admiral Pelaez will address the program in detail during his 

testimony today. 

So I will go now finally to the Murmansk initiative, which will 

be addressed in greater detail by Dr. Hecht, but the Department 

of Defense is a partner in that initiative. We have supported that 

project financially with the Government of Norway and other United States agencies to upgrade an existing low-level radioactive 

waste processing facility for use by the Russian northern fleet. 

Let me conclude with two thoughts, Mr. Chairman. First, the Department of Defense views protection of the Arctic environment as 

important to national security, and second, we must focus on positively influencing the Russian military's environmental management. Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Department's perspective today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:] 
65 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE 

AND HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

AND 

DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND OTHER 

TOXIC WASTE IN OCEANS AND TRIBUTARIES 

STATEMENT OF 

SHERRI W. GOODMAN 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

(ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY) 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY'S 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

AND 

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE RESOURCES' 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

DECEMBER 6, 1995 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE 

AND HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE 
66 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittees, I thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. 

U.S. Goals and Objectives 

I would like to address with you today DoD's unique role in this effort, the criteria 

for our involvement, and our work to date. The Department's primary goal is security. In the 

Arctic, security means protecting human health and safety. It also means ensuring that the 

Arctic ecosystem remains healthy and resilient. Keeping the Arctic healthy avoids tension 

between adjacent nations who depend upon its resources for food, economic benefit, 

transportation and research. It also ensures that the Arctic environmental resources will be 

available for generations to come. DoD has developed strategic partnerships with other U.S. 

agencies and with members of the international community to further these security goals. 

Department of Defense Role 

The Department of Defense role begins with national security. The threat of 

widespread contamination, real or perceived, is a threat to security. Nations concerned with 

the quality of the air blowing over their soil, the cleanliness of the water at their shores or the 

health of the fish feeding their populations, cannot work together harmoniously. Protecting 

the environmental resources all states share is thus a critical component to protecting security. 

Additionally, DOD has an operational interest in retaining access to the Arctic sea lanes. 

Public sentiment opposed to Russian radioactive waste dumping could lead to restrictions on 

Arctic transit. To safeguard access for the U.S. military, we need to promote environmental 

stewardship by all militaries that operate in the Arctic. 

DOD has an array of environmentally friendly tools upon which to draw. We have a 

Navy patrolling global waters, undertaking sophisticated scientific research in the course of its 

operations. We have environmental professionals deployed on U.S. bases around the world. 

And we have the wisdom borne of 25 years of experience in integrating environmental 

protection into military activities. Our soldiers, sailors and airmen work cooperatively with 

militaries with a long history of environmental protection, such as the Norwegian Ministry of 

Defense; and with those new at ecosystem management, such as the Russian Ministry of 

Defense. The Department's activities are guided fundamental policy goals, Executive Orders, 

and by specific agreements such as the Agreement between the Govemment of the United 

States of America and the Govemment of the Russia! Federotion on Cooperotion in the Field 

of Environmental Proection and Natuml Resources of June 1994, and the Agreement between 

the United States of America and the Govemment of the Russia! Federotion on Cooperotion 

in the Prevention of Pollution in the Arctic of December 1994. 

Before I describe how the Department of Defense has applied these capabilities in the 

Arctic region, let me address the criteria for DOD involvement. 
67 

DoD Criteria 

In the Arctic as elsewhere, the Department must continuously scrutinize its activities 

to ensure that we achieve maximum return on investment for our national security dollar. 

The criteria for judgment in the Arctic are: 

o First, minimize political tensions generated by real or perceived pollution. Radioactive 

waste has attracted the most attention in this regard. 

o Second, minimize the real threat to human health and the natural environment in the 

Arctic by military activities. 

o Third, realize the best return for our investment of time and resources; or more 

colloquially, to maximize the "bang for our environmental security buck." 

o Fourth, address environmental problems according to a risk-based analysis. 

The source of much of the environmental security concern in the Arctic today stems 

from the Russian military. The Russian Northern Fleet has operated for decades with little 

regard for the environment. The Fleet leadership asserts that it is working toward halting 

nuclear dumping and improving management practices, but much more needs to be done. 

That brings me to the fifth criteria: 

o Measurably improve Russian military environmental management of nuclear and 

hazardous wastes. 

The good news is that the Department's studies indicate the immediate threat to human 

health and the food chain in the Arctic is negligible. But good news should not lull us into 

complacency. The Arctic remains vulnerable to a host of commonplace toxins, such as heavy 

metals and persistent organic pollutants. Environmental disasters, once visited upon the 

Arctic, can take decades or centuries to reverse. We have a responsibility to do all we can to 

help ensure an environmental disaster never occurs. 

Cwrent DOD Activities 

Let me now briefly describe how we've set DoD's unique capabilities to work with 

others in the Arctic region. 

The Gore-Chernomyrdjn Commission (GCC), under the leadership of Vice President 

Gore, provides an enduring forum for bilateral cooperation. Because the Vice President and 

Russian Prime Minister meet several times a year, there is a plentiful and predictable stream 

of political will to form lasting relationships, and present results. I have personally had the 

opportunity to present the Department of Defense's environmental program to Russian defense 

and environment officials at a Moscow meeting of the GCC. Within the Environmental 

2 
68 

Working Group under the GCC, we and the Russians are exploring how intelligence assets 

developed during the Cold War can be used to characterize environmental contamination at 

military bases. We will exchange the first derived products next year. 

In June 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry and his Russian counterpart 

Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev signed a Memorandum of Understandini to facilitate 

military environmental cooperation. Under this agreement we can share information and 

experiences in a wide variety of subjects, ranging from risk analysis as an environmental 

prioritization tool, to environmentally sound weapons demilitarization, to personnel education 

and training. 

The Secretary of Defense established the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation 

program at the request of Norwegian Minister of Defense Kosmo in June 1994. It comprises 

a trilateral military-to-military dialogue between the U.S., Russia and Norway on Arctic 

military contamination. At the first trilateral meeting in Horton, Norway this spring, U.S . and 

Norwegian officials presented the results of our research on nuclear contamination in the 

Arctic, and briefed Russian officials on the integration of sound environmental management 

practices into military activities. We are still hoping to have a meeting early next year. 

Engaging the Northern Fleet in this military-to-military dialogue is a useful step in 

encouraging the Russians to take responsibility for their actions and improving the 

environmental management of the active and decommissioned submarine fleet. 

The Department's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Proiram (AA'WAP) is a threeyear old effort begun by Congress to assess the nature and extent of nuclear waste in the 

Arctic region. The Office of Naval Research conducts this research program. ADM Palaez 

will address the program in detail in his testimony today. The study found that no 

radioactivity from dumped Russian material is measurable except in very localized regions; 

that is, directly adjacent to some of the dumped material. Currently, there appears to be no 

risk to the coast of Alaska, or the Arctic basin as a whole from the radioactive waste disposal 

practices of the former Soviet Union. As part of the project. ONR is developing a model 

which will be useful to examine the risk from any type of contaminant (both radioactive and 

non-radioactive) entering the Arctic from any source. Using an earlier version of this model, 

it shows that even assuming a worst-case scenario for release of the dumped material, no 

radioactivity above background would reach Alaskan shores. What may be deserving of 

additional study is potential risk from heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants, 

emanating from industrial facilities near rivers flowing into the Arctic. 

Finally, through the Murmansk Initiative DoD is partnering with EPA, AID, DOE and 

the Government of Norway to upgrade an existing low-level radioactive waste processing 

facility for use by the Russian Northern Fleet. The current facility services the civilian 

nuclear icebreaker fleet of the Murrnansk Shipping Company, and has a capacity of 1200 

cubic meters a year. After the upgrade, the facility will be able to process the high-saline 

wastes generated by the Northern Fleet, with a total capacity of 5,000 cubic meters per year. 

The Russian Navy and Ministry of Defense have indicated that they will use the facility, on a 

3 
69 

fee-for-service basis, to process low-level radioactive waste from their active and 

decommissioned nuclear submarines. Storage facilities for this waste are reported to be 95% 

full at the present time. The Government of Russia has plans to further expand the facility to 

15,000 cubic meters, in anticipation of accelerating the decommissioning process. 

Summary 

Thank you for allowing me to appear today to discuss DoD's environmental security 

goals, criteria and activities in the Arctic. I would like to conclude with two thoughts. First, 

the Department of Defense views protection of the Arctic environment as critical to national 

security. Although studies indicate that radioactive waste dumped in the Arctic seas does not 

pose a significant health risk today, some continued monitoring is appropriate. We must be 

equally conscious of the enduring effects of heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants and 

other military-generated toxins which have received less public attention. 

Second, we must focus must be on promoting positive change in the Russian military's 

environmental management. DoD's role is to engage the Russian military on environmental 

management. Other U.S. agencies with differing missions and authorities can make 

contributions to creating institutional and legal infrastructure, business development, and 

public-private dialogue on environmental management. As each of these developments 

strengthens democracy, each contributes to national security. Thus in the field of 

environmental security, partnership between agencies and countries is a necessary component 

to promoting responsible environmental stewardship. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide the Department's perspective on this 

issue. 

--End--

4 
70 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Ms. Goodman. 

Dr. Hecht. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN D. HECHT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Dr. HECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittees. I am very pleased to have an opportunity to join this 

panel. I am not sure that EPA often has a chance to speak in a 

panel on environmental or national security. 

You have my testimony and I would only like to highlight a few 

points, since I assume the testimony will be part of the record. 

Mr. WELDON. Without objection. 

Dr. HECHT. It is obvious that EPA's principal objective is environmental protection, the health and safety of U.S. citizens. This 

is, of course, predominately a domestic agenda, but many of the issues we face have an international dimension, and EPA's international program, of which we are dealing with one today, emanates from our responsibility to protect U.S. citizens from either 

transboundary pollution or, of course, global environmental threats. 

In addition, EPA, as one agency of the Government, is an element, is an arm of our efforts to implement foreign policy, and in 

that regard EPA has had some responsibilities over the years to assist the State Department and other agencies of Government in 

carrying out these objectives. 

For example, EPA has worked for many years with our Agency for International Development in assistance programs in Eastern 

Europe under the Seed Act and in the fonner Soviet Union under 

the freedom Act. More particularly, EPA has had a very long and 

productive history of cooperation with Russia dating back to at 

least 1972. The first environmental agreement, which was revised 

more recently in 1974, was in many ways a hallmark of cooperation during difficult periods of the cold war. 

More recently, with the initiative of Gore and Chernomyrdin to 

establish a commission to deal with areas of cooperation across the 

board, EPA Administrator Carol Browner was asked to chair the 

environmental committee or the environmental working group of 

that activity and in that regard has brought the full resources of 

EPA to begin to address a number of these important bilateral issues. 

At the same time on the international arena, our accession and 

our agreement in the London Convention, something that EPA was 

a strong supporter of, has given us an opportunity to work with 

Russia and other governments to facilitate their accession to the 

tenns of the London Convention. 

There are a number of important policy documents that have 

helped frame what we have done in Munnansk. Many have been 

mentioned already today, but let me just highlight a few. The Arctic environmental protection strategy is basically an agreement under which AMAP, this monitoring and research program, has 

been carried out. The United States-Russian environmental agreement, which was signed in December 1994, is an update and a renewal of the agreement that was signed in 1992. 
71 

The United States-Russian comprehensive Arctic agreement, which Ambassador Colson had referred to earlier, attempts to address in a comprehensive way issues in the Arctic. The Presidential 

Directive on the Arctic, which Ambassador Colson also alluded to 

just a few moments ago, are all frameworks in which implementation of any specific project at least has a policy framework. 

Many of these agreements do not have a road map to implement them, but in at least the case I am going to discuss with you today, Murmansk, we are beginning to develop a kind of road map and 

a means by which the full resources of all of our agencies can be 

brought to bear on these problems. 

Murmansk has been mentioned many times and you have been 

promised that I would say something in more detail about it, so let 

me deal with that. From our leadership on the environment committee of the Gore-Chernomyrdin process and as a result of Russia's difficulty in acceding to the terms of the London Convention, 

we have been very interested in seeking ways to ensure that radioactive dumping in all of the oceans and in the Arctic is stopped. We have been motivated, I think to a large extent, by discussions 

with Norway. They have been a key partner in terms of our discussions with Russia and have been early-on in helping us to identify the opportunities that exist at the Murmansk facility. While it is 

primarily a facility for processing civilian radioactive waste, lowlevel waste, there are enormous implications and enormous oppor- tunities that emerge from a successful collaboration between the 

United States, Russia, and Norway to upgrade this facility to process more than the current cubic meters of radioactive waste and, 

at the same time, to ensure that the Russian military uses it in 

their process of the decomll}issioning of submarines under the 

terms of international agreements. 

So beginning in fall 1993, we began to have discussions with 

Norway and Russia and the United States about the technical issues related to this facility and what it would take to upgrade it 

to begin to process more of the low-level radioactive waste. In the 

course of the period since fall 1993, the facility in Murmansk has 

been visited by several technical groups. We have hosted Russian 

technical experts to the United States with the help of the Department of Energy. I believe, Congressman Weldon, you yourself have 

been at the facility. Many of my EPA colleagues have been there. We are now at an absolutely crucial point in this process, because we designed this in three stages. There is the stage which 

is about to be completed, the assessment stage, which is can we expand the facility, whether technical difficulties, what kind of technology will be used, what are the engineering specifications, this 

whole range of assessment functions. That is about to be completed 

and next week in Norway we will have a meeting to finalize those 

assessment reports. 

The second phase is the construction phase. That is to expand 

this facility and make it operational, to go from the 15,000 cubic 

meters of radioactive low-level waste to the 5,000 that it is being designed for. 

And beyond that, there is another phase. There is the operational phase of assessing that we have done this correctly, that everything fits together, and that the Russian Government is going to 
72 

use that as a basis to expand their activities and their intention 

to use this facility to go beyond the 5,000 cubic meters to 15,000. 

All of this has been enormously successful in the sense that we 

have completed the assessment stage. And while both Governments 

or all three Governments, the Russian, the United States, and Norway have from the data that are available, and it is not all the 

data, at least some assurance that the containment of the radioactive waste is not an immediate threat to the global food chain, 

this project, in our judgment, is absolutely crucial in laying a foundation for future work, and let me list a number of reasons why 

I think this is the case, because, in essence, this is the core, I 

think, of why this international cooperation is important and continues to be important. 

First, by means of this project, we are building trust with the 

Russian Government, both in the civilian sector and in the military 

sector, and I think that is extremely important in terms of just 

being able to talk to each other and be able to discuss these issues 

in an open way. 

The collaboration with Norway has been essential and lays the 

groundwork for further expansion with other governments. We 

have discussed the participation of Canada in this process and we 

think that the more governments of the Arctic region that are involved, the stronger will be the commitment to see this through to 

the end. 

The ability to deal with the northern fleet has been one of the 

real successes in terms of this project. We have had meetings with 

the admiral and vice admiral of the northern fleet. They have indicated to us, and we can give you a very nice report of their assessment of the situation, their priorities, which will help us in future 

planning. 

This is also a project which is now beginning to help us in terms 

of experience of how we put together a project like this, a project 

of design, construction, construction in Russia, which involves 

many agencies and three governments. 

It is a project that addresses a specific problem with a result in 

the end which leads to a policy decision, which has led to a policy 

decision in the Russian Government to use the facility on the military side and to go beyond-go beyond-what we are able to do, 

but to take on the responsibilities to expand it later. 

And finally, two other things. One, it is a model of how a number 

of Government agencies have been able to pool their resources, pool 

their authorities, and pool their interests together to accomplish 

something as described here. I will not take time to lament with 

you the difficulty, as I am sure you can imagine, there has been 

to get these resources together, but without the leadership under 

the Gore-Chernomyrdin process, which I think is a good example 

of why that is a good mechanism, and just genuine cooperation on 

the part of DOD and DOE and State and EPA to do this, I think 

we would have not been able to put the resources together to do 

the assessment stage and the resources to do the initial construction stage. 

I will be very frank with you in saying, of course, that what happens in the future is very uncertain in terms of where our budgets 

are and in terms of what is available, but we have made effort to 
73 

leverage our resources, and I think our work with Norway has been 

a good example of this. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is one project which we have referred to several times today. It is really a bridge between what 

has emerged in public policy literature and certainly in the public 

literature about, ''What is environmental security and how does it 

relate to national security?" The policy of the United States is that 

environmental security is part of national security. 

In EPA, I think it is new to us to think in those terms, but the 

very important linkage here, nexus, is that as Russia continues to 

meet their obligations to decommission their military fleets, more 

waste is generated. That waste is a potential threat not only to 

their own citizens but to all the Arctic nations. 

Automatically, the two of us here from Defense and EPA have a 

new relationship to begin to explore, and I know that from our 

point of view, as a policy issue, this opportunity to take the small 

leverage that EPA brings to the table and contribute to foreign policy development is something that we are very happy in EPA to be 

able to do. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, this has been a very successful first 

step. This is really, for me, an opportunity and I am very pleased 

to be here with Dr. Yablokov and Kare Bryn, people we have 

worked with over the years. This is the beginning of the future for 

us in terms of a new direction, and I would only like to end, I have 

brought with me, which I will give to you for the record, copies of 

a report done by our science board. 

I am not sure this has been made available to this committee, 

but I do want to leave it with you, called Beyond the Horizon: 

Using Foresight to Protect the Environmental Future by the EPA 

Science Advisory Board, and I will give you that because in the 

end, among the many recommendations, it says, "The United 

States must begin to develop strategic national policies that link 

national security, foreign relations, environmental quality, and economic growth, and EPA should play a strongly supportive role in 

this process." We are using this example and our capabilities and 

our human resources to try and contribute in that way. Thank you, 

sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hecht follows:] 
74 

TESTIMONY OF 

DR. ALAN D. HECHT 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE . OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE 

AND THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

OP THE HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE 

DECEMBER 6, 1995 

Mr. Chairmen , members of the subcommittees, I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today. I would like to discuss 

EPA's role in addressing environmental contamination from past 

ocean dumping of radioactive and associated hazardous wastes. 

The focus of. my testimony will be on EPA's efforts to address 

contamination in the Arctic, a region which we share with seven 

other nations, including Russia and Norway. 

We are all familiar with the recent disclosures that large 

quantities of radioactive waste have been dumped into th~ Arctic 

seas by the Former Soviet Union. There has been great concern 

here and abroad about potential impacts from these past events to 

the fragile Arctic ecosystem and the health of U.S. and other 

coastal populations in the North. Now we know that the range and 

1 
75 

magnitude of the radioactive contamina*ion problems is even 

I greater as the Russian Federation attejpts to deal with the 

decommissioning and dismantlement of its vast nuclear submarine 

I 

fleet . These problems range from the processing of low-level 

liquid radioactive waste to the transplrt and storage of spent 

and damaged nuclear fuel from the · submkrine reactors. . 

EPA <eoogni<ea that the A<otio ij a fragile environment and 

I . . that the impact of releases of radioa1rive and associated: 

hazardous materials in this region may, have unknown adverse 

consequences to the unique ecosystems !involved . It is the ' 

potential for biological change that Js of most concern to I 

I ; people. Therefore, a careful scientific approach must be· used 

! 

when considering the release of radioJctive and associatea 

hazardous contaminants into these Arcdic seas. Since the·re are I 

multiple sources of contaminants to tJe Arctic, we advocate a 

comparative approach to assessing ris, so that the most important 

sources can be mitigated as quickly as possible . 

I 

You have asked us for a 'Short sJ.opsis of past U.S. :dumping 

activity and current policy. The 

. u.sl I phased out all oc~an . 

dumping of radioactive materials by 1970 . In that year, t!he 

Council on Environmental Quality issuld a recommendation · (Ocean 

Dumping: A National Policy) calling f~r cessation of any :future I I 

ocean dumping of radioactive material~ by the United Sta~es. In 

1972, Congress enacted the Marine Prolection, Research artd 

. 2 
76 

sanctuaries Act (PL 92-532) which prohibited the ocean dumping of 

I 

all high level radioactive waste . ; 

i 

I 

I At the international level, control of radioactive waste 

I 

dumping in the ocean is addressed in the provisions of the 1972 

London Convention (Convention on the Plevention of Marine I . Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter) which went into 

force in 1975 and to which the U.S. is/ a party. Specifically, I 

I 

this Convention banned the dumping of high-level radioactive 

i 

wastes and other matter, but, prior td 1993, did not address lowlevel radioactive wastes. In 1993, tde London Convention' was 

amended to prohibit the ocean dumping /of radioactive· materials 

containing more than de minimis concentrations of radioactivity . 

The U.S. Environmental Protection AgeJcy (EPA) was a strong 

proponent of this amendment. I 

c ' . . h h . J . ont1nu1ng w1t t e 1nter11at1ona j p1cture, you have asked 

about the degree to which internationJl partnerships are 

assisting in prevention of additional /contamination in Arctic 

waters. These ' partnerships take two forms: 

I 

(1) formal agreements and mecha~isms for cooperation, such 

as the: 

o Arctic Environmental P~otection Strategy (AEPS) of ; 

I 

Jono >99 > , boowoo: Oho l eigho Arooic counorioo; 
77 

0 International· Atomic Enbrgy Agency (IAEA). I 

International Arctic seks Assessment Program 

(!ASAP) ; I 

0 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commilsion (GCC) ; 

I 

(2) informal agreements, such asr memoranda of 

understanding and records o~ discussi on . 

I 

I 

Under the AEPS, EPA is participading in two key worklng 

groups, (1) Protection of the Arctic ~arine Environment (PAME), 

and (2) the Arctic Monitoring and Assdssment Program (AMAP) . 

PAME is developing a list of priorityltasks to address Arctic 

I 

contami nation problems . Under AMAP, EPA is leading the U.S. 

effort and working with Norway to assJss radiation sources and 

I 

associat ed radio logical consequences in the Arctic environment 

I f r om all sources of radi oactivity. I 

I 

The IAEA's International Arctic Seas Assessment Program 

(!ASAP) is assessing the environmental impact of the past dumping 

acti vities of the former Soviet Union 1in the Arctic marginal seas 

I . near Northwest Russia. Under this program, EPA is chairing the 

I . group of experts evaluat i ng the performance of the barrier 

I materials/packaging used to isolate the radioactive waste I . . sources dumped in the Arctic marine env~ronment. !ASAP is also 

I 4 
78 

studying transport pathways of radioactive materials released 

I 

from these sources and relative risk t6 populations that may be I . ! 

exposed to radiation from any released j radioactive materials . 

i 

I 

EPA is the lead U.S. agency for t~e Environment Committee of 

the Gore-Cherno~yrdin Commission. Thel Environment Committee of 

the GCC is the forum for facilitating booperative projects at the I . 

h i ghest levels in the U.S. and Russia~ governments. The key 

Arctic project in this forum is the MJrmansk Initiative, an 

I ongoing initiative that EPA, along witih other federal agencies, 

Norway and Russia is taking to addresJ one of these problems. I I 

will describe this project to you in ~orne detail later. 

I 

I 

U.S. concern for the potential i~pacts on Alaska of past 

radioactive waste dumping by the formJr Soviet Union resulted in 

I . a three year research, monitoring and ,assessment program, the 

Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP), which began in I 

1993. Although this program will be covered in much greater 

I 

detail by scientific experts in later l testimony, EPA is the lead 

organization in two key studies: I 

I o evaluation of the two key b~rrier materials used in the 

I 

packaging of the high-level j radioactive waste dumped in 

the Kara Sea {f urfural and ~pecial steels) , 

l 

i 

I o the immobilization potentia ~ of sediments in the Kara 

I 

5 j 
79 

:::,:::

0

:a::onud i doo, •uch r Co•i~-m and 

i 

These projects are being conducted with the cooperation of Norwa: 

and Russian research inst i tutes. Thesl are examples of 

international informal agreements invo ~v ing EPA . 

C would liko Co compl••• my coacilony by di•cu•oing ih• 

Murmansk Initiative in some detail. I /feel that this project 

could be a blueprint for future u.s. ~nternational partnerships 

I 

for effective prevention of further cdntamination of the Arcti c 

env~ronment by radioactive and associJted hazardous materials . 

en ""· <h• Ru••ian FodoraCi= LnCifiod a pmicularly 

urgent radioactive waste management p J oblem preventing their I 

formal adherence to the amendments to lthe London Convention that 

I were negotiated that year . Their pro?lem was the inability to 

process the large volumes of low-levef liquid radioactive waste 

(LLRW) arising from the decommissionilg of nuclear submarines . I . Consequently, they were also unable to fully meet their 

commitments under the START II agreemint . At the London 

I 

Convention Consultative Meeting in 19~3 , the Russian Federation 

I made it clear that if interested countries could assist them in 

solving this problem in both Northwesh Russia and the Fa~ East , 

then Russia would be prepared to formklly adhere to the 

prohibition under the London Conventi~n which bans the dumping of 

! 

6 I 
80 

both high and l ow level radioactive wastes . We will focus our 

comments on the situation in Northwest Russia, since Japari is 

working on the problem in the Far East. 

Th is problem has become increasingly urgent as the number of 

nuclear submarines taken out of operation (decommissioned) 

increased. By early 1995, about 125 Russian submarines had been 

decommissioned, mostly in the last five years, and another 40-80 

nuclear submarines are expected to be decommissioned by the end 

of the decade. Most of these submarines are attached to Russia's 

North Navy in the Murmansk region of the Kola Peninsula. The 

waste is being temporarily stored both on land and in floating 

vessels, but this capacity is being rapidly exhausted and is 

reported to be 90-95 percent full . 

EPA became active in this issue with the goal of 

facilitating Russia's signing of the amended London Convention. 

EPA's domestic concerns in the Arctic,region have involved us in 

programs which may appear outside of our authori ties and mission. 

Yet, environmental and national security interests in the Arctic 

are linked, and we have therefore begun cooperative international 

projects working with other federal agencies . 

In 1994, the United States and Norway began exploring with 

Russia the possibility of expanding and upgrading the only 

operational Russian LLRW processing facility. This facility, 

7 
81 

located in Murmansk, was designed to process the wastes pro duced 

by Russia's nuclear powered icebreaker fleet. 

The concept for upgrading the Murmansk facility was 

presented at the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting in J u ne 

1994 by the EPA Administrator, Ca.rol Browner. This concept was 

accepted by both Vice-President Gore and Russian Prime Minister, 

Viktor Chernomyrdin and was subsequently presented at the Summit 

meeting of the Heads of State. President Clinton and President 

Yeltsin issued a joint U. S.-Russian Summit Announcement on 

September 28, 1994 that cooperation on the resolution of the 

problem of processing and storing Russian liquid radioactive 

waste is considered an important component of more effective 

protection for the environmental quality and natural resou rces of 

the Arctic. 

This project moved very quickly. On the U.S . side, the 

Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of State, the 

Department of Energy, the Department of Defense and the Agency 

for International Development have jointly collaborated on this 

Murmansk Initiative, within the context of U. S . Arctic 

environmental protection, pollution prevention and environmental 

security objectives. 

In Norway, there has been active participation led by the 

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including the 

8 
82 

Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Min istry of Environment 

and Defense Research Establishment. The Russian Federation, 

including various ministries and institutes and the civilian 

operators of the icebreaker fleet have given their full 

participation and c6operation to this project. The participating 

Russian Ministries have included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Ministry of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of 

Environment, and Ministry of Transportation. Regional 

representatives from t he Murmansk and Arkangelsk Oblasts and the 

Murmansk Shipping Company have also actively participated . 

Since May, 1994, a series of tec~~ical discussions and 

exchange visits have been held between U.S., Norwegian and 

Russian technical experts, including two U.S.-Norwegian trips to 

Murmansk, two technical mee tings in Oslo and a visit to the U. S. 

Hanford facility in Richland, Washington. These technical 

efforts resulted in a final engineering design, in November 1995, 

for expanding and upgrading the Murmansk facility . A meeting 

will be held in Oslo, Norway, on December 13-14, 1995 for the 

purpose of formally completing the design phase of the Murmansk 

Initiative and initiating the construction phase . Construction 

will get underway very soon thereafter. Financial support for 

the construction has been obligated and will be provided by 

Norway and the United States. Russia will provide in-kind 

assista~ce, including scientific and engineering support. The 

construction phase is scheduled for completion by early 1997. 

9 
83 

While the LLRW processing problem may not be the most 

serious Arctic environmental threat from the perspective of 

environmental risk, it illustrates how effective partnering, team 

building, and sharing of technical know-how can help solve this 

and other more complex Arctic environmental security issues. 

Norway has been and continues to be a strong leader and p~rtner 

in our efforts in this region. 

Successful completion of this Murmansk Initiative can 

provide a bridge to addressing broader Arctic environmental 

contaminati on problems. Many of the remaining problems facing 

the Arctic nations are either direct or indirect consequences of 

the era of the Cold War. ·The nature of the environmental 

problems exceeds the ability of any one nation or any one 

governmental agency to successfully address . As the Murmansk 

Initiative has demonstrated, we need cooperative efforts between 

governments and cooperative efforts by the agencies or ministries 

of the participating governments to develop the processes by 

which the broad range of environmental problems in the A±ctic can 

be solved. 

I thank the members of both subcommittees for the 

opportunity to address these important matters. 

10 
84 

[The report of the Environmental Protection Agency Science Advisory Board will be retained in committee files.] 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Hecht. Thank you both for your 

comments and your testimony. Can either of you come up with an idea of how much total U.S. 

dollars are being spent on the Arctic or the Arctic dumping prob- lem, if you look at DOD, EPA, State, NOAA, and perhaps any other 

agency, the Geological Survey or whatever, any idea what that 

total amount is annually? 

Dr. HECHT. I am not sure. Off the top, I have the total number 

that reflects all of the agencies' work under the Arctic environmental strategy, but the Arctic research community, which is here 

in full force today, has lots of documents and I think that we can 

get from them, from NSF, which is part of this group, or even the 

next panel, a good assessment of all the agencies. 

Mr. WELDON. We will get that, I guess. It looks like we are going 

to get that, then. 

Dr. HECHT. Separate from that, I can tell you that for just the 

Murmansk activity which I have just described, the assessment 

phase has been on the order of about $400,000, of which Norway has contributed $50,000. The construction phase is something on 

the order of $1.2 million, and Norway will contribute half of that; 

the United States Government will contribute half. And then beyond that is the operational phase. 

So I would look to the interagency community that is here today 

to give you a good, solid number which reflects, I think, what all 

the agencies are doing. 

Mr. WELDON. I have been very supportive of the money that has 

been spent up until now, both within the committee and on the 

floor of the House, defending our investment because of the importance in this area and the spin-off impact it is having. I was 

pleased to attend a conference hosted by one of our friends in the 

audience, Dr. Radvani, down at Mississippi State University, par- tially funded with money, to encourage the Japanese to step up to 

the plate and provide similar support for a solution out on the eastern part of Russia, which I understand now is moving along. As a matter of fact, I got a fax to me that looks as though there 

is an effort by the Japanese to put as much as $20 million into a 

floating barge that will be used to dispose of low-level nuclear 

waste from submarine decommissioning, which is a success that is 

taking place. 

So I am supportive of this and I would just ask Ms. Goodman 

if, in all the money that we are going to spend on environment this 

year in the defense bill, which, if I am not mistaken, and correct 

me if I am wrong, is about $13 billion if you take both nuclear and 

non-nuclear dollars that we are going to spend this year, do you 

think it is possible for us to find that $10 million that was not put in because it was not requested and because perhaps it fell through 

the cracks? Do you think that is possible that we could get from 

the administration some assistance in trying to find those dollars 

to keep that program going? 

Ms. GooDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the answer to that depends on the 

Department having an authorization or direction to invest that 

money. The $13 billion you refer to, more of that is in the Depart-
85 

ment of Energy's environmental management program, as you well 

know. The DOD program is about $5 billion, but it has been coming down. 

We do not have the authority today to make that investment, 

other than if we are directed to do so by Congress. We have invested $30 million over the last several years at congressional direction in the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, which 

Admiral Pelaez will address in his testimony. I think that has been 

wisely invested. I do think there are opportunities for wise, though 

modest, levels of investment in the future and we would welcome 

your support and congressional direction on that. 

Much of the investment we make in this area really comes from 

what is called the Nunn-Lugar funds. That $30 million that is invested so far has been part of that funding. As you know, that is 

very important to Dr. Perry. It has also been a subject of much debate and discussion among the Congress. To date, much of that investment has gone to helping the Russians meet their treaty commitments, some of which, including $25 million that has helped the 

Russians dismantle their missile compartments, has some application in this area, although it is not designed exclusively to address 

environmental management practices, but further direction by Congress to us in this area could be helpful. 

Mr. WELDON. I will just say on the record that you have my assurance that I will assist you in the administration's attempt or 

success in finding the money to reprogram for this, because a reprogramming request from the administration to us carries with it 

the authorization that is needed to fund the program. So if we, in 

fact, can get the administration to work with us in that regard, I 

will perform my task in helping you through the process and would 

just offer that to you for further consideration. I am sure we will 

be discussing that in the future. 

One final question, and I appreciate you answering the question 

on the U.S. naval reactor program. I am not here to trash anyone, 

because I do not have any hidden agenda here. It is just to find 

out the facts. 

I have been told, and I want to ask this question on the record 

just so I can get an answer, if not right now, perhaps for the 

record, that there was a specific request made by Nicholai Yegeroff, 

the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, back in, I think it was February, to bring a team of Russians over-this request was made 

through DOE so it did not go to DOD directly-to understand the 

way that we remove reactor compartments from our ships. They 

were going to go to Puget Sound, and then I think they wanted to 

go to Hanford to see how this material is, in fact, handled by us. 

I have been told that that was never responded to nor was 

agreed to. Now, there may be reasons for that. Maybe there are security reasons. Maybe there are other things that I do not know 

about and perhaps maybe did not even occur. Perhaps you cannot 

answer this for the record, but I would appreciate a response to 

know whether or not-1 know the reqeust was made, because I 

have a copy of Yegeroff's letter, but was there a response? Was it 

negative? And if it was negative, why, so that I can better understand. 
86 

Perhaps there are areas in which we cannot work with the Russians, and I need to understand that. But I do not have that answer now and I would appreciate it if you could help me get that, 

if you do not have an answer now, which I assume you do not. 

Ms. GooDMAN. I am not personally familiar with it but I will get 

you the answer. I do know that under the auspices of the Department of Energy, a Russian delegation has been to Hanford and I 

will look into this invitation. 

Mr. WELDON. I will give you a copy of the letter. Thank you. 

Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask Ms. Goodman about the statement that you 

made about the Department studies indicate the immediate threat 

to human health and the food chain in the Arctic is negligible. 

What is that based upon, what assessment? 

Ms. GooDMAN. That is based on the studies that have been conducted by the Office of Naval Research, which Admiral Pelaez will 

address, as well as other research conducted by Russia and Norway. As I also said in my next sentence, that is not necessarily a 

sign for complacency. It is an indication that there is not an immediate risk to human health and that most of what we can detect 

today is localized as opposed to spreading throughout the Arctic. 

But there is reason to continue to understand the Arctic environment better, particularly to understand the impact of chemicals 

and persistent organic pollutants. Those are as important, perhaps 

more important in their environmental effect than the radioactive 

contaminants. 

Mr. KENNEDY. How is this measured, can you tell me? How are 

these assessments made? Can you give me a description of how the 

study was conducted? 

Ms. GooDMAN. There were a whole series of studies, and what 

I would like to do is ask Admiral Pelaez in his testimony to address 

that so that he can give you the best technically accurate statement on that. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is terrific. Thank you. If I could just ask Dr. Hecht, what you were talking about was 

essentially how prospectively we keep this stuff from ever getting 

dumped to begin with, just so that we can understand what your 

testimony was, because I think it is confusing for us, talking about 

ocean dumping, when we are thinking about all the sites out there, 

to distinguish between what has been dumped and what you are 

working on doing and that is building a facility so that they do not 

ever have to dump it. They put it and process it in the facility. 

I applaud your efforts, but I just wanted to make that very clear, 

because the threat of contamination spreading is as much a part 

of keeping the thing from ever being dumped as it is keeping what 

has already been dumped from spreading. It may seem like I am 

splitting hairs here, but it was not clear to me. I think it is important for the committee later on to understand what you are doing 

is prospective and it is not looking back at what has already been 

done. Dr. HECHT. You are quite correct. I think in stages, thanks to the 

report of Dr. Yablokov, and I think you really cannot underestimate the importance of that white paper, we have the history of 
87 

a series of dumpings, radioactive waste in the Arctic, with subsequent studies both by ship traverse and other means to determine 

whether that past dumping poses a significant threat to the Arctic 

nations. 

The bulk of the information right now, as just described by Sherri and others, is that it is localized. It does not seem to have 

gotten into the full food chain and poses, at least for the moment, 

no serious environmental risk to the health and safety of the Arctic 

nations. 

The problem is to make certain that we monitor and fully document where they all are and make sure there are no surprises here 

that we do not know about yet, and second, to ensure that as we 

go forward with further decommissioning, further retirement of 

vessels, that the ocean is not used as the disposal grounds for 

them. That means in the Arctic, a facility both for the liquid and 

the solid. In the Far East, as the chairman has pointed out, an 

area of an equal problem. And what we have done with our efforts 

in Murmansk is to ensure that we create the right policy and polit- ical framework and technical capability to move away from the 

ocean, in this case, Arctic dumping. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Let me ask you finally, do we have hard science 

on how soluble and what the chemical compounds of all these different toxics are and the environment in the ocean that they are 

in, how deep it is, how cold it is, how much current there is, so that 

with each of these sites we can say that it is safe? 

What I need is to hear that there is hard science that says, we 

know where this is. We know that this will not dissolve. We know 

the containers. The containers are two inches thick here and we do 

not have to worry about this thing deteriorating any time soon, and 

if it does, it is going nowhere because the current is not-I mean, 

do we have all that? 

Dr. HECHT. I would say that my best answer to you is, let us do 

it in writing. But I think on the infonnation that we have, one can 

draw certain conclusions, and the infonnation that we have includes some of the information you are requesting, in addition to 

some modeling about how the currents are moving. Mr. KENNEDY. But can we have predictive models? You can tell 

me now, we have an inventory of 10 sites, ones at this step, ones 

at this step, and here is how much we have of this radionuclide 

and you can give me the power of it and the like, and then we can 

use, given what we know about the ocean and the salinity and the 

temperature and the rest, and you can do predictive models saying when this is going to become a problem and when it is not. I mean, 

can you do that kind of a model? 

Dr. HECHT. On principle, yes, but let me defer the question and 

get back to you in terms of really what is the quality of the data 

that we have now, what are the models that are available. It goes beyond what I have at my fingertips. Let me give you kind of the 

assessment that forms the basis of our current thinking. Ms. GooDMAN. Congressman, I believe Admiral Pelaez will be 

able to address those questions for you in his testimony and, in 

fact, has prepared a briefing on those issues. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much. 
88 

Mr. WELDON. I thank our colleague and thank both of you for 

coming in today, for your excellent testimony, and I appreciate your follow-up to questions that need to be resolved. Thank you both 

very much. 

Our third panel, the assessment panel, we are pleased to have 

join us Admiral Marc Pelaez, the Chief of Naval Research for the 

Department of the Navy; Dr. Garrett Brass, Director of the Arctic 

Research Commission; and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Council. 

Thank you all for appearing. We welcome you to the committees 

and we will, without objection, enter your statements into the 

record as written and you can be prepared to discuss whatever 

comments you would like to make. We will start off with Admiral 

Pelaez. Thank you for coming in. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MARC PELAEZ, CHIEF OF NAVAL 

RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Admiral PELAEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss this important 

program that the Office of Naval Research has been conducting for 

the Congress, actually. It was a congressional initiative, and I 

think a very good one. 

The Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, and we have 

used the acronym ANW AP in a number of fora, was initiated in 

1993 as a result of United States congressional concern over the 

disposal of nuclear materials by the former Soviet Union, as we 

have all heard. It had three principal science and technology objec- tives-and at the risk of burdening the committee, I am going to 

go through a little bit of that and try and answer the questions 

that the committee and its staff has posed-the magnitude and location of radioactive waste in the Arctic marine environment, the 

transport pathways of radioactive contamination through the Arctic 

basin and the present levels away from the various contamination 

sources, and third, the impact on the environment and human 

health from observed and projected radioactive contamination. I would say that this program has strong linkages with both national and international organizations concerned with the Arctic 

environment, including, and I have a fairly long list in my testimony but I will summarize some of them, the U.S. Interagency 

Arctic Research Policy Committee, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Environment Committee, the NATO Committee for Challenges in Modern Society, Norwegian bilateral cooperations, International Arctic Seas Assessment Program, Arctic Environmental 

Protection Strategy, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, and the U.S. State Department, Department of Energy, and Environmental Protection Agency programs. So I think it has been conducted in very much a joint government and international program. 

Russian participation in the program has been an area of par- ticular emphasis, with over 10 percent, for instance, in 1995 of the 

funds going to Russian institutions. Russian collaboration included 

exchange of data, radionuclide source term characterization, a monitoring feasibility study, radiological dose assessment to large animals, cooperative surveys throughout the Arctic basin and Siberian 
89 

river systems, and a human health survey in the Tamyr region. 

Seven other countries have also participated in this program. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, before outlining some 

of ANWAP's accomplishments and addressing your interest in a future research agenda, I want to emphasize the tremendous leverage this program has enjoyed. The results achieved to date in addressing an acute problem of national concern would never have 

been possible in 3 short years without the prior decades of basic 

research investment by my organization in the Arctic. A high-quality pool of scientists with high-latitude expertise, reliable and accurate field instruments, and powerful numerical models were all 

available when we needed them. 

This technology base grew from our sustained commitment to research in the Arctic. The $30 million of this particular program's 

effort has capitalized on more than $500 million of research over 

the last 30 years. This is a good example of how wise investment 

in science and technology pays dividends for national security in a 

world where threats may come in unexpected forms. 

The over 70 different projects in this program include field surveys, laboratory experiments, modeling studies, and archival data 

analysis. Over 120 investigators from academic institutions, government laboratories and agencies, foreign institutions, and industry are participating. I have brought several posters which I would like to refer to during my presentation, and I would point out that Lt. Comdr. Bob 

Edson is my program manager. He is an oceanographer in this 

field. The first poster, and I know it is difficult to read but I think you 

can see it in context, shows the research surveys which this program has sponsored over the last 3 years in order to quantify the 

radionuclide levels and the relevant transport pathways. Twentythree multinational and multidisciplinary cruises, including the 

submarine USS Cavalla, have conducted survey operations. These 

surveys have collected water, sediment, and biological samples and 

have covered the Eastern Arctic near the dump sites, the Ob, 

Yenisey, Lena, Kalema, and Anadyr River systems, the Kara, 

Laptev, East Siberian, Chuckchea, Beaufort, and Bearing Seas, and 

across the Arctic basin. 

Surveys provide the necessary chemical, physical, and biological 

baseline data to understand environmental processes and to assess 

the potential threat of radioactive contamination to the Alaskan 

economy, for example, or the health of U.S. citizens in that region, 

which was one of the interests of the congressional mandate. 

The results of the sampling support the preliminary conclusion, 

and I will say preliminary because, as I will state later, our final 

report will probably be out early in 1997 as we are still analyzing 

data, the preliminary conclusion that the radioactive waste disposal activities of the Soviet Union have to date not significantly 

impacted the Arctic environment. On the next chart, one of the methods used for tracking radionuclide contamination is analysis of sediment cores. A representative core sample taken from the old estuary by the Woods Hole 

Oceanographic Institute is shown in this poster. These cores show 

a clear record of radioactivity levels back to the prenuclear age. A 
90 

peak radioactivity level is seen in the early 1960's, coincident with 

a cessation of the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Levels 

fall off after this point, continuing to fall to the present day with 

the exception of a small signal from the Chernobyl accident. 

Research surveys further upriver have supported the Russian reports that radioactivity is measured above background levels only 

when one gets within a few hundred kilometers of the nuclear facilities. Surveys of the Anadyr River, the closest major Russian Siberian river to Alaska, have shown a very clean, nearly pristine environment. Now, those sites that we talked about, the dump sites, 

the holding sites, the processing plants are not in that river system. It is only at very localized sites in the Kara Sea region that 

elevated radionuclide concentrations are identified. 

The major conclusion from the program sampling so far is that 

the largest signals for regionwide radionuclide contamination in 

the Arctic marine environment appear to arise from atmospheric 

testing of nuclear weapons, nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes from 

facilities in Western Europe and accidents such as Chernobyl, in 

that order. 

This program is not restricted to in situ sampling but has also 

developed a suite of very sophisticated models to analyze transport 

of radionuclides throughout the Arctic basin. The core of this suite 

is the Navy's operational polar ice prediction model, which has 

been adapted to address contaminant transport questions. It is important to note that this is a physics-based model requiring the latest supercomputing resources to operate. 

Now, I have a presentation, both a poster of one piece of the output, but I have right here next to me, if we can turn the lights, 

Dr. Ruth Preller from the Naval Research Laboratory who is in 

charge of this model, and I have a video which should show the 

model running over a 10-year period. 

[A video tape was played.] 

Admiral PELAEZ. I think it is important to note that in that simulation, Mr. Chairman, it has some conservatism in it. It assumed 

a constant rate of discharge out of these rivers, but it did not give 

any consideration for settling that might occur, so we assumed full 

transport and mixing to be the case there, which does become more 

conservative. I cannot say it is the worst case because it was a constant introduction over a 10-year period. 

But that is the sort of thing that we have the capability of predicting very accurately and being able to look at various situations 

of potential contaminants entering those three river systems. We 

have similar models that will show, for instance, contamination entering at other points. While the physical processes which affect contaminant transport 

may vary from one contaminant to the next, it should be noted that 

this model, as well as the other models developed, are robust 

enough. They can show that transport throughout the basin. Therefore, the tremendous investment I believe that has been made in 

this has far-reaching applications, much beyond the specific mandate of this program. 

At this time, radionuclide concentrations in Alaskan waters remain at background levels, and I am talking about the manmade 

radionuclides. Indeed, human radiation dosage from naturally oc-
91 

curring isotopes, such as polonium-210 in fish, are 100 times higher than that from contaminated sources at present in Alaskan waters, both Arctic and Pacific. Our measurements of marine life thus 

far, and it tracks around the world, show that there are naturally 

occurring radioactive sources throughout the world that today we 

measure at 100 times the effects that we are seeing from any manmade, and that includes the nuclear weapons testing. 

If disposal is controlled in the future, the main risk will be extreme contaminant releases from existing waste sites, particularly 

along the major rivers. This possibility remains one of the most intensive areas of research within our program. A major program 

goal was to develop innovative monitoring techniques and technologies. I think that some of the other witnesses said we need to 

have continuing monitoring and we are trying to assess and develop innovative technology and monitoring techniques to allow us 

to put in place a cost-effective monitoring strategy for critical 

transport and food chain pathways. 

While United States monitoring efforts are aimed at waters near 

Alaska, this program is also working with the Russian investigators to develop monitoring strategies for Russian coastal waters. 

The program is currently working on a formal, integrated risk 

assessment of the radioactive waste in the Arctic environment. 

This assessment is being accomplished by a team of individuals 

from institutions, laboratories which have had experience in this 

area. The first iteration of the risk assessment will be completed 

by late spring/early summer 1996 and our intent is to submit that 

for peer review by the scientific community to get any potential 

criticisms and be able to address them appropriately and incorporate them in our final risk assessment, which I believe, as I said, 

will be out in about spring 1997. 

This program and the Navy, as a matter of policy, will ensure 

the prompt and accurate communication of the research results 

and the final risk assessment to the citizens of the State of Alaska, 

and we have had quite a bit of interaction with them as they are 

one of the concerned parties from the United States, and the American public and policy makers, of course. The details of environmental studies and all environmental concerns are clearly of the 

utmost importance to the Navy and to our national interests. Interaction with Alaskan Native groups is ongoing, and every effort is 

being made to integrate the local populus into the process and address their concerns. 

Clearly, both research and monitoring must continue to guard 

against the threat of contamination of both domestic waters and 

international waters. We also recognize that potential contaminants include a broader spectrum of substances than the radionuclides investigated by direction in our program. The program's 

research will produce an initial integrated risk assessment that can 

be used to develop an effective research and monitoring strategy. 

Implementing such a strategy must be a multiagency endeavor. 

Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee has begun this process, and the Navy will continue its active role in interagency coordinated activities. 

The U.S. Navy is in a strong position to support any future efforts in this area, providing both innovative technology, sampling 
92 

systems, and numerical models, and an enhanced understanding, I 

will say, as a result of this program, of the environment to enable 

these powerful tools to be efficiently and cost effectively employed. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Pelaez follows:] 
93 

STATEMENT OF 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL 

RELEASED BY THE HOUSE 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

COMMITTEE (RESEARCH AND 

DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE) 

AND THE HOUSE RESOURCES 

COMMITTEE (FISHERIERS, 

WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEE) 

REAR ADMIRAL MARC PELAEZ 

CH IEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH 

BEFORE THE 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE 

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE 

AND THE 

FISHERIES , WILDLIFE AND OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE 

HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE 

ON 

OCEAN DUMPING OF NUCLEAR AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL 

RELEASED BY THE HOUSE 

NATIONAL SECURITY COMMI TTEE 

(RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

SUBCOMMITTEE) AND THE 

HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE 

(FISHERI ERS, WI LDLIFE AND 

OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE) 
94 

REAR ADMIRAL MARC Y. E. PELAEZ 

OIIEF OF NAVAL RESEAROI 

RADM Pelaez became the 18th Chief of Naval Research 

on June 18, 1993. A native of Hollywood, Florida, RADM 

Pelaez is a 1968 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. 

He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in 1993. 

Following training in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 

Program in 1969, RADM Pelaez reported aboard the USS 

SIMON BOLIVAR (SSBN 641), where he held various 

divisional and departmental assignments, culminating in duties 

as Engineer Officer. In 1972, he was transferred to the Naval 

Military Personnel Command, Submarine/Nuclear Power 

Division, where he served as the assignment officer for all 

nuclear trained junior submarine officers. Upon graduation 

from the Submarine Officers Advanced Course in New London, 

Connecticut in 1976, RADM Pelaez was assigned as Engineer . 

Officer, USS TUNNY (SSN 682). Mer a successful three-year tour, he was transferred to the USS 

JAMES MONROE (SSBN 622), where he served as Executive Officer. During his tour, the JAMES 

MONROE was awarded the Battle Efficiency ("E") award and was chosen "Best Fleet Ballistic Missile 

Submarine" in the Atlantic Fleet. 

In 1981, RADM Pelaez was assigned as Assistant for Research and Development Submarines, 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. He was transferred in 1984, assuming command of the 

nuclear attack submarine USS SUNFISH (SSN 649). Under his command, the SUNFISH was awarded 

two meritorious unit commendations. Mer completion of this tour, RADM Pelaez became the program 

manager for the Advanced Submarine Combat System at the Naval Sea Systems Command. As a result 

of congressional direction to start a comprehensive submarine technology program, RADM Pelaez was 

detached in January 1988 to a joint assignment at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) as program manager of the Advanced Submarine Technology Program. AfTer completion of 

his DARPA assignment, RADM Pelaez became Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)). 

As the Chief of Naval Research, RADM Pelaez manages the science and technology programs of 

the Navy and Marine Corps from basic research through advanced technology development. 

Organizational entities reporting to the Chief of Naval Research include the four directorates of the 

Office of Naval Research (ONR); the Naval Research !Aboratozy in Washington, D.C. and its field 

activities; and ONR's overseas offices in Tokyo and London. ONR's annual budget of approximately 

$1.5 billion is allocated for research and development work conducted at universities, Navy 

laboratories, and industl)'. 

RADM Pelaez reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy via ASN(RD&A). He is the Navy's 

science and technology executive, and ranks organizationally with Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the 

Navy. 

RADM Pelaez's awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with 

gold star, the Meritorious Service Medal with gold· star, the Navy Commendation Medal with gold star, 

the Navy Achievement Medal, a Navy Unit Commendation, three Meritorious Unit Commendations, the 

Battle "E" Rlbbon, the Navy Expeditionazy Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, and the Sea 

Service Rlbbon (five awards). 

RADM Pelaez is married to the former Sheila Prom of Miami Springs, Florida. They have two 

children, John and Jeannine. 
95 

STA'l'EIIEN'l' OF 

REAR A.'liiiRAL MARC PELAEZ 

CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH 

Mr. Chairman , distinguished members of the Subcommittee and 

staff, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the impact of 

radioactive waste disposed in the marine environment by the 

Former Soviet Union, and to discuss the Office of Naval 

Research's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP). 

OVERVIEW 

In the early 1990's, new information on environmental 

conditions in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) became available. 

One revelation concerned the large quantities of radioactive 

waste disposed in the marine environment and in the catchment 

basins of sev er a l Arctic river systems. The 1993 Yablokov Report 

to the President of Russia officially documented the scope of the 

radioactive wast e problem and described disposal sites of both 

high and low lev el waste in both the Arctic and North Pacific. 

Other potential sources of radioactive contamination in the 

Arctic are the nuclear fuel processing facilities and nuclear 

power reactors in the water sheds of the Ob and Yenisey Rivers. 

These facilities have deposited significant waste into the 

environment with risk of contamination of the river systems 

draining into the Arctic Basin. 

ARCTIC NUCLEAR WASTE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 

The ANWAP wa s initiated in 1993 as a result of U. S. 

Congressional c once rn over the disposal of nuclear materials by 

the Former soviet Union into the Arctic marine environment . 

Total funding has been $30 million dollars over 3 years. The 

science and technology aspects of ANWAP are conducted by the 

Ocean, Atmospher e and Space Modeling and Prediction Division of 

the Office of Nava l Research . ANWAP objectives are to determine : 

a ) the magnitude and location of radioactive waste in the 

Arcti c marine environment; 

b) the transport pathways of radioactive contamination 

through the Arctic basin and the present levels away 

from t h e various contamination sources; and 

c) the impact on the environment and human health from 

observed and projected radioactive contamination . 

ANWAP emphasizes impact on Alaska, and has strong linkages 
96 

with both national and international organizations concerned with 

the Arctic environment including the: 

u.s. Interagency Arctic Research Policy committee; 

Gore/Chernomyrdin Commission Environment Committee; 

NATO Committee for Challenges in Modern Society; 

Norwegian bilateral cooperations; 

International Arctic Seas Assessment Program; 

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy; 

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program; and u.s. State Department, Department of Energy, and 

Environmental Protection Agency. 

Ten percent of the funds have gone to Russian institutions 

for research or logistical support, with over $1 million dollars 

committed in FY1995. Russian collaboration includes: 

exchange of data; 

radionuclide source term characterization; a monitoring feasibility study; a radiological dose assessment to large animals; 

cooperative surveys of the Kara, Laptev, and East 

Siberian Seas, the Ob and Yenisey Rivers; a human health study in the Tamyr region. 

CAPITALIZING ON OUR RESEARCH BASE 

Mr. chairman and distinguished members, before outlining some ANWAP accomplishments and addressing your interests in a future research agenda, I want to emphasize the tremendous 

leverage this Program has enjoyed. The results achieved to date 

in addressing an acute problem of national concern would never have been possible in three short years without the prior decades 

of basic research investment by ONR in the Arctic. A high quality 

pool of scientists with high latitude expertise, reliable and 

accurate field instruments, and powerful numerical models were all available when we needed them. This technology base grew 

from our sustained commitment to research in the Arctic. The $30 

million dollars ANWAP effort has capitalized on well more than 

$500 million dollars of effort for over 30 years. This is a good example of how wise investment in science and technology pays 

dividends for national security in a world where threats may come in unexpected forms. 

RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 

The 70 different projects in ANWAP include field surveys, 

laboratory experiments, modeling studies and archival data 

analysis. Over 120 investigators from academic institutions, 

government laboratories and agencies, foreign institutions, and 

industry are participating. Surveys provide the necessary 

2 
97 

chemical, physical, and biological baseline data to understand 

environmental processes and to assess the potential threat of 

radioactive contamination to the Alaskan economy or the health of 

U.S. citizens. Twenty-three multi-national and multidisciplinary cruises (FIGURE 1), including the U.S. submarine CAVALLA, have 

collected water, sediment, and biological samples in the eastern 

Arctic near the dump sites, in the Ob, Yenisey and Anadyr River 

systems, the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Beaufort Seas and across the Arctic Basin. Processes investigated include: 

ice uptake and movement of radionuclides and sediment; 

density driven currents on Arctic shelves; 

sediment dynamics in the Kara Sea; 

interactions between colloids and radionuclides in the 

Arctic river systems; 

corrosion of disposal barrier materials; 

identification of sentinel organisms for the monitoring 

and evaluation of Arctic radionuclide contamination; 

radionuclide levels and bioconcentration in Arctic 

animals; 

deposition of radionuclides due to interactions with 

phytoplankton; and 

sublethal biological effects from radionuclide 

contamination . 

Transport modeling efforts account for marine surface and 

subsurface layers, coastal currents, estuarine and river water, 

and ground water over a broad range of spatial and temporal 

scales. Near-field modeling at dump sites includes sediment re- distribution physics and biology. Model validation and 

integration are key ongoing activities that build upon decades of 

previous research. 

A major data compilation effort at the Naval Research 

Laboratory (NRL) uses a Geographic Information System to analyze changes in marine radionuclide levels over space and time. The 

three largest contamination signals in the Arctic region can be seen in Cesium-137 distributions in the surface layer (0-SOm) of 

the ocean. Fallout from atmospheric bomb tests, which ceased in 

the. early 1960's, resulted in elevated levels (10-20 Bq/m3) 

throughout the region that have since decayed considerably. Radioactive waste discharges from the Sellafield re-processing facility, which peaked during the early 1980's, can now be traced 

(10-30 Bq/m3) throughout the eastern Arctic basin following the 

major oceanic current systems. Trace amounts of this source have 

recently been detected .in. the ..westein Arctic as well. In the 

1990's, the Sellafield signal has decreased and the effects of 

the Chernobyl accident dominate, particularly in the Baltic (over 

100 Bq/m3) . Signatures of these events can also be seen in 

sediment cores throughout the region (FIGURE 2) . At this time, 

concentrations in Alaskan waters remain at background levels, 

3 
98 

consistent with model predictions(FIGURE 3). Indeed, human 

radiation dosage from naturally occurring isotopes such as polonium-210 in fish are two orders of magnitude higher than that 

from contaminated sources at present in Alaskan waters (both 

Arctic and Pacific). If disposal is controlled in the future, 

the main risk will be extreme contaminant releases from existing 

waste sites, particularly along the major rivers. Local sites of 

elevated radionuclide concentration from dumping and weapons 

testing have also been identified in the Kara Sea region. 

Pre-existing and new radionuclide data as well as bathymetric, sediment, chemical and physical information are included in a major ANWAP data base project. This database 

effort is being conducted jointly with the Arctic Monitoring and 

Assessment Program and the International Arctic Marine 

Radioactive Contamination Database in Norway, and is jointly 

funded by the Norwegian government. The database project is also 

being coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 

Korean investigators to prevent duplication and ensure that all 

date is compatible and accessible to the worldwide scientific 

community. 

MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT 

A major ANWAP goal is to develop innovative monitoring 

techniques and technologies and an integrated cost-effective 

monitoring strategy for critical transport and food-chain 

pathways. While u.s. monitoring efforts are aimed at waters near Alaska, ANWAP is also working with Russian investigators to 

develop monitoring strategies for Russian coastal waters. This 

year, for example, a project was initiated to investigate 

monitoring dumped materials in Stepovogo Bay. 

Research results are being synthesized into an integrated 

risk assessment for radiological dosage to man and the 

environment. These new tools enable evaluation of existing and 

future radionuclide contamination as well as other pollutants. The risk assessment includes consideration of extreme events such as river floods, dam failures, and accidents at civilian power 

plants and other nuclear facilities. An output of this effort 

will also be a sensitivity/uncertainty analyses to help guide 

future research. Factors with the greatest impact on risk will 

be given top priority for research. 

COMMUNICATION 

A continuing goal of ANWAP and the Navy, as a matter of 

policy, is to promptly and accurately communicate the results of 

the research and the final risk assessment to the citizens of the 

State of Alaska, and the American public and policy makers. The 

details of environmental studies and all environmental concerns are of the utmost important to the Navy and the U.S. policy. 

4 
99 

Interaction with Alaskan native groups is ongoing, and every effort is being made to integrate the local populace into the 

process, and address their concerns at every step of the process. 

CONCLUSION 

Clearly, both research and monitoring must continue to guard against the threat of contamination of domestic waters. We also 

recognize that potential contaminants include a broader spectrum of substances than the radionuclides investigated by direction in our Program. ANWAP research will produce an initial, integrated risk assessment that can be used to develop an effective research 

and monitoring strategy. Implementing such a strategy must be a multi-agency endeavor. Inter-agency Arctic Research Policy 

Committee has begun this process, and the Navy will continue its 

active role in inter-agency coordinated activities. If funded, our contribution, consistent with our overall mission, will be 

innovative technology, both sampling systems and numerical 

models, and an enhanced understanding of the environment to 

enable these powerful tools to be efficiently and costeffectively deployed. We look forward to continued working with 

the other agencies who are responsible for long term monitoring and risk assessment. 

5 
100 

Figure 1 
101 

Cs-137 Distribution In a Core 

from the Ob River Delta 

1992 

~ 1986 

,... 

~ ~ 

~ 1978 -....;;.. 

.§ 

..... '0 1970 

0 

2-

Q 

1: 1962 

Q) 

.E 

'6 

Q) 

CJ) 1954 .... 

0 

Cl) 

.! 

~ 1946 

Cs-137 Activity (disintegration/minute/gram) 

Figure 2 

5 

10 

E' 

~ 

15 1: 

Q) 

.§ 

'b 

Q) 

20 CJ) 

c: 

·-
102 

RV+SLFD 

Levels of radioactivity (in PC ill) in the surface level of the ocean at the end 

of ten years. Source locations are the Ob, the Yenisei and the Pechora 

rivers as well as Sellafield. Vectors represent surface level ocean currents. 

Figure 3 
103 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Admiral. 

Dr. Brass. 

STATEMENT OF DR. GARRETT W. BRASS, DIRECTOR, ARCTIC 

RESEARCH COMMISSION 

Dr. BRASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. I did 

submit written testimony, which you have already agreed to enter 

into the record. 

With me is Mr. George Newton, who is a member of the Commission and is here to answer any questions you may have on the scientific ice experiment with the Navy nuclear submarine that I will 

mention. 

Mr. WELDON. Welcome. 

Dr. BRASS. It is not necessary to elaborate on the testimony already given here on the extent of the threat of contamination of the 

Arctic, especially by emissions from the former Soviet Union. Environmental concerns were of a pretty low priority in the former Soviet Union and many potential contaminants are widespread and 

either uncontained or only partially and insecurely stored. 

The United States has been fortunate. The reactor accident at 

Chernobyl occurred just a few short weeks after the annual dissipation of the stable Arctic haze layer, which would have trapped airborne contaminants and transported substantial amounts of radioactive byproducts of the accident to the United States. 

Similarly, the Komi oil spill occurred during winter when the rivers and streams were frozen and the temperatures so low that the 

oil did not flow easily. A summertime spill, particularly in one of 

the oil fields closer to the seas and/or near a large and unfrozen 

river would probably not have been contained, much less cleaned 

up, and serious pollution of the Arctic Ocean and transport to our 

shores would probably have been the result. 

One indication of the ongoing risk that we suffer is that in the 

former Soviet Union, an amount of oil greater than the amount 

spilled from the Exxon Valdez is spilled every day. 

On page 21 of the Commission's goals report, the Commission 

recommended that the Interagency Arctic Research and Policy 

Committee's Arctic Contaminants Initiative be fully funded. This 

plan is included in one form in the biennial Arctic Research of the 

United States Interagency Arctic Research Plan and in a more detailed way in the blue-covered plan which I also submitted to your 

office. 

This program envisions an attack on four key classes of contaminants: Persistent organic compounds, trace and heavy metals, 

radionuclides, and chronic hydrocarbon contamination. The program is based on an integrated, comprehensive assessment including data and information management, data rescue and synthesis, 

observations, process-oriented research, model development, and 

impact analysis and determination of risk. 

Although constructed by IARPC to meet the Nation's needs and 

approved by the Office of the President when the biennial revision 

of the plan was approved, the plan is not included in the budget 

request nor is it, as far as I can tell, included in any way in congressional budget initiatives. The Office of Naval Research's Arctic 

Nuclear Waste Assessment Program has not been funded this year 
104 

and that program will be rapidly winding down as the currently 

appropriated funds are expended. The result is that the United 

States will have no organized program for the study of contaminants in the Arctic. 

The Federal agencies have not remained passively on the sidelines even though the initiative was not passed, and we can look 

to two other programs, one ongoing and one proposed. The ongoing 

program is the scientific ice experiment, SCICEX. The Arctic Research Commission coordinated the signing of an MOA between the 

Navy, the National Science Foundation, NOAA, NSF, and the U.S. 

Geological Survey for a program of annual deployments of a Navy 

nuclear submarine into the Arctic Ocean. 

This program, known as SCICEX, conducts an ambitious scientific program and in 1995 has just finished its program in the 

summertime. Four civilian scientists sailed in the USS Cavalla 

from Pearl Harbor through the Bering Strait and into the Arctic 

Ocean. The scientific program occupied 44 days and covered a track 

of 10,800 nautical miles. The 1996 expedition is under active planning. It will sail in the coming summer on the USS Pogey. 

These studies represent the best way that intermediate and 

wide-ranging surveys can be carried out in the Arctic Ocean. The 

mobility and endurance of the nuclear submarine makes it a research platform without peer. The limited availability, the small 

size of the science party, and the limitations in onboard working 

space are obstacles which the scientific community has worked 

hard to overcome with the outgoing and thorough cooperation of 

the Navy and the active and enthusiastic participation of the submarine's officers and crew. 

This is a unique activity for civilian science and it has gone extremely well and yielded important results which are entering the 

literature now. The oceanography meeting of the American Geophysical Union and ASLO, the American Society of Luminology and 

Oceanography, next February will have a session on Arctic oceanography every one of the 5 days. 

We need to exploit this opportunity fully. The NOAA coastal Arctic initiative is a planned initiative, and I sent over to you the 

NOAA one-pager on that. There are more detailed descriptions of 

the plans and I think they are still evolving, so I am not going to 

go into any detail with them, but they do include integrated modeling of contaminant transport, establishment of an Alaska early 

warning system, the assessment. of contaminated coastal sites, and 

an evaluation of risk to all comers. 

You have asked about international cooperation and we want to 

reinforce what has been said about the Arctic environmental protection strategy. I will not go into any details on AEPS, but it is 

the view of the Arctic Research Commission and the Interagency 

Arctic Research and Policy Committee that that is a major forum 

for our international collaboration in understanding contamination 

in the Arctic. 

Mr. Chairman, the Nation needs an integrated program to study 

fundamental questions in the Arctic, such as the paths by which 

"'1.aterials of all kinds are transported in the Arctic and the proces which can transfer contaminants from one transport path to 
105 

another, such as the inclusion of contaminated sediment into sea 

ice, a process we know happens but do not understand. 

We need an inventory of contaminants throughout the Arctic, 

particularly in the former Soviet Union, not just radionuclides but 

all of the contaminants that we have discussed already. 

We need to rescue historical data which can help us understand 

phenomena such as the statistics of river flooding and the probability that the 100-year flood, the biggest flood that occurs in 

every century, can mobilize contaminants that lay dormant almost 

all of the rest of the time under normal river flow conditions. 

We must look out for problems such as thaws of permafrost, 

which global change appears to be bringing to the Arctic. They can 

release from frozen soil where fluids are highly immobile into the 

mobile liquid realm large quantities of pollutants. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, contamination in the 

Arctic has a dangerous potential to affect the lives of citizens of the 

United States and of the world. The Federal agencies have been active in formulating plans for a comprehensive approach, but lack 

of funding has crippled and fragmented their efforts. I am afraid 

that the research, monitoring, and assessment necessary to meet 

the nation's needs has a low priority in the budgetary process, and 

as a result, the United States has not produced the integrated Arctic research effort of which we are capable. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brass follows:] 
106 

ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION 

TESTIMONY 

before the House Research and Development Subcommittee and the House Fisheries, 

Wildlife and Ocean Subcommittee 

Dr. Garrett W. Brass 

Executive Director 

Chairman Weldon, Chairman Saxton, members of the Committees, the Arctic Research 

Commission thanks you for this opportunity to discuss the important question of 

contamination in the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Research Commission was established 

by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (PL 98-373 as amended by PL 101-609) 

which also established the Interagency Arctic Research and Policy Committee (IARPC). 

IARPC is composed of representatives of the twelve agencies with research and/or 

policy interests in the Arctic. The IARPC agencies are responsible for the National 

Arctic Research Plan and, with guidance from the Commission, IARPC conducts a 

biennial revision of the plan. I have brought with me several copies of the 

Commission's Biennial Statement entitled Goals and Priorities to Guide United States 

Arctic Research (the Goals Report) and copies of volume 9 (Spring '95) of the journal 

Arctic Research of the United States published by IARPC which contains the most 

recent revision of the US Arctic Research Plan for the years 1996-2000. 

I need not elaborate on testimony already given here on the extent of the threat of 

contamination of the Arctic, especially by emissions from the Former Soviet Union 

(FSU). Environmental concerns were of low priority in the FSU and many potential 

contaminants are wide spread and either uncontained or only partially and insecurely 

stored. The United States has been fortunate. The reactor accident at Chernobyl 

occurred just a few short weeks after the annual dissipation of the stable Arctic Haze 

layer which would have trapped airborne contaminants near the surface and would 

probably have transported substantial amounts of radioactive byproducts of the 

accident to the United States. Similarly, the Komi oil spill occurred during winter when 

the rivers and streams were frozen and temperatures so low that the oil did not flow 

easily. A summertime spill, particularly in one of the oil fields of closer to the sea and/or 

near a larger and unfrozen river would probably not have been contained (much Jess 

cleaned up) and serious pollution of the Arctic Ocean and transport to our shores would 

probably have been the result. We have been lucky - very lucky - twice. 

On page 21 of the Commission's Goals Report the Commission "recommends that the 

IARPC Arctic Contaminants Initiative be fully funded." On pages 12-18 of the US Arctic 

Research Plan, IARPC describes the Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment 

Program. The publication of the Plan was approved by the office of the President. 1 

I 

4350 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE, SUITE 630, ARUNGTON, VIRGINIA 22203 

703-525-0111 FAX 703-525-0114 
107 

have also brought copies of the Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment 

Program detailed description which includes budget figures for the various agencies 

who wish to participate in the program. 

This program envisions an attack on four key classes of contaminant in the Arctic: 

persistent organic compounds, trace and heavy metals, radionuclides and chronic 

hydrocarbon contaminants. The Program is based on an integrated, comprehensive 

assessment including: 

• Data and information management, data rescue and synthesis; 

• Observations; 

• Process-oriented research; 

• Model development; and 

• Impact analysis and determination of risk. 

Although constructed by IARPC to meet the nation's needs and approved by the office 

of the President, the plan is not included in budget requests nor is it, as far as I can tell, 

included in any way in Congressional budget initiatives. The Office of Naval 

Research's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program has not been funded this year 

and that program will be rapidly winding down. The result is that the United States will 

have no organized program for the study of contaminants in the Arctic. 

The Federal agencies have not remained passively on the sidelines even though the 

IARPC Initiative was not supported. We can look to one planned, two current and one 

recent agency activity focussed on Arctic contamination. These are: The NOAA 

Coastal Arctic Initiative, AEPS, SCICEX and AMAP. 

The NOAA Coastal Arctic Initiative: The planned activity is the NOAA Coastal Arctic 

Initiative. I have brought with me a few of the summary discussion notices of the NOAA 

Coastal Arctic Initiative. This program is focussed on the problems affecting the coast 

of the Arctic including the following activities: 

• Memoranda of Understanding for cooperation in the initiative between NOAA 

and other Federal and State of Alaska agencies; 

• Formal accords and other arrangements for involvement in the initiative of the 

North Slope Borough and regional organizations; 

• Preliminary assessment of the current extent and magnitude of contamination 

and biological effects in the US Arctic; 

• Microcomputer-based information management and delivery system for the 

Arctic for officials, international organizations and students; 

• Establishment of a long-term environmental and ecosystem monitoring network 

in the US Arctic; 

• Establishment of an Alaskan Early Warning System so that catastrophic events 

can be monitored; 

• Integrated modeling of contaminant transport and exposure pathways, especially 
108 

radionuclides and persistent organic pollutants; and 

• Assessment of contaminated coastal sites in terms of potential risks to regional 

or local environmental quality, biota and ecosystems, habitats, human and 

coastal economies. 

More information on this program can be obtained from NOAA as it develops its plans. 

I expect that NOAA will request funds for their Coastal Arctic Initiative in the next 

budget cycle. 

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Many of the concerns expressed 

about Arctic contaminants are addressed by an international program known as the 

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). AEPS is currently divided into five 

studies: 

• The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); 

• The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); 

• Preservation of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); 

• Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and 

• The Sustainable Development Working Group. 

The United States is a full participant in the AEPS and the IARPC Agencies are 

responsible for supporting participation in working groups and producing reports on US 

data and activities. Unfortunately, this program was adopted without a new funding 

base and the IARPC Agencies are forced to curtail current activities to provide funds for 

AEPS participation. In these time of budget stringency this task is difficult and 

international participants and observers have expressed concern to me that US 

participation in the AEPS system has been weak. 

SCICEX: The Arctic Research Commission has coordinated the signing of a 

Memorandum of Agreement between the US Navy, the National Science Foundation, 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Office of Naval Research 

and the US Geological Survey for a program of annual deployments of a Navy nuclear 

attack submarine into the Arctic Ocean. This program, known as SCICEX, conducted 

an ambitious scientific program to study the Arctic Ocean in 1995. Four civilian 

scientists sailed in the USS Caval/a from Pearl Harbor, through the Bering Straits and 

into the Arctic Ocean. The scientific program occupied 44 days and covered a track 

10,800 nautical miles long. The 1996 expedition is under active planning and review 

now and subsequent expeditions are mapped out until 1999. These studies represent 

the best way that immediate and wide ranging surveys can be carried out in the Arctic. 

The mobility and endurance of the nuclear submarine makes it a research platform 

without peer. The limited availability, the small size of the science party and the 

limitations on onboard work space are obstacles which the scientific community has 

worked hard to overcome with the outgoing and thorough cooperation of the Navy and 

the active and enthusiastic participation of the submarine's officers and crew. This is a 

unique activity for civilian science in the Arctic and the junction of academic and military 
109 

cultures has gone extremely well and yielded important results which are entering the 

literature now. 

ANWAP: The ANWAP study which Admiral Pelaez has/will described in some detail 

had a limited objective- the potential for contamination of the Arctic Ocean and 

adjacent seas by past and present submarine and icebreaker reactor operations by the 

FSU. But this program's limited objectives and short duration have only allowed us to 

glimpse what needs to be done. 

The nation needs need a an integrated program to study fundamental questions in the 

Arctic such as the paths by which material of all kinds are transported in the Arctic, the 

process which can transfer contaminants from one transport path to another such as 

the inclusion of contaminated sediment into sea ice, a process we know occurs but 

don't understand welL We need an inventory of contaminants throughout the Arctic, 

particularly in the FSU and we need to rescue historical data which can help us 

understand phenomena such as the statistics of river flooding and the probability that 

the "100 year flood" can mobilize contaminants which have lain dormant for years. We 

need to watch and at the same time to develop the means to mitigate these risks when 

they occur. 

Chairman Weldon, Chairman Saxton, members of the Committees, contamination in 

the Arctic has a dangerous potential to affect the lives of citizens of the US and of the 

world. The Federal agencies have been active in formulating plans for a 

comprehensive approach to the problem but lack of funding has crippled and 

fragmented their efforts. Furthermore, the provisions of the Arctic Research and Policy 

Act which require OSTP to "consult closely with the Interagency Committee and the 

Commission to guide the Office of Technology Policy's efforts (SEC. 110.(a)(2).)" have 

not been adhered to. Neither has the requirement that OMB "consider all Federal 

agency requests for research related to the Arctic as one, integrated, coherent, and 

multiagency request, which shall be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget 

prior to submission of the President's annual budget request for adherence to the Plan 

(SEC. 110. (b)(1).)" I am afraid that the research, monitoring and assessment 

necessary to meet the nation's needs has a low priority in the budgetary process. As a 

result, the United States has not produced the integrated Arctic research effort of which 

we are capable. 
110 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Brass. 

Dr. Gershwin, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE K GERSHWIN, NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL 

Dr. GERSHWIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few remarks about some unique capabilities that the intelligence community has brought to bear on this problem and some observations we 

have on the Russian contamination issue. 

The intelligence community has published a number of classified 

intelligence reports on the magnitude and nature of environmental 

contamination in the former Soviet Union and that includes a national intelligence estimate produced last year. In June this year, 

the CIA presented a classified report to several members of your 

committee. I would like to just briefly mention a few highlights of 

some of our analysis. 

Regarding the Yablokov Report, April 1993, that report obviously 

presents a clear, credible picture of the magnitude of the former 

Soviet and Russian radioactive waste dumping at sea, and the CIA 

has, in many instances, corroborated that report. CIA analysis 

shows that solid and liquid radioactive wastes were dumped and 

that barges and ships that were possibly contaminated by or laden 

with radioactive waste were, in fact, scuttled. 

Measurements indicate that the Arctic has also been contaminated by industrial sources. These pollutants include chemicals, 

heavy metals, and organics and are generally transported into the 

Arctic by atmospheric and water-borne paths and are generally accepted to be the primary components of what is known as Arctic 

haze, a phenomenon similar to lower latitude smog. 

The CIA is aware of research being conducted on industrial contaminants in the Kara Sea, but I must defer comments on that 

issue to a closed and classified session. 

Russian policy on nuclear waste is truly murky and subject to 

sudden changes because of the large number of organizations involved and constantly changing laws and decrees, some of which, 

in fact, are conflicting, as has already been observed today. Russia 

has several laws and Government decrees that stipulate procedures 

for accepting, handling, and disposing of nuclear wastes. 

One murky area is the acceptance of foreign nuclear waste, 

which can be reprocessed but not permanently stored in Russia. 

However, Russia's definition of permanent storage is unclear and 

Moscow has not resolved whether or not it will accept nuclear 

waste from other former Soviet States and countries with Russian 

nuclear reactors. 

Some of the Russian Government's recent actions send a troubling signal regarding Moscow's commitment to stopping nuclear 

waste dumping in the Arctic waters. For example, a presidential 

decree that was issued in July that has been referred to earlier rescinds an earlier edict that, in fact, established civilian oversight 

of the military's management of radioactive waste. This effectively, 

by rescinding this, effectively allows the Russian military to police 

its own dumping practices, uncontrolled by civilian authority. 

According to a report released recently by the Norwegian environmental group Bellona, which works closely with Russian envi-
111 

ronmental groups, the main nuclear storage facility of Russia's 

northern fleet is makeshift, dilapidated, and contains 1,000 times 

more radiation than the largest of this year's French nuclear tests. 

While this report was being prepared, Bellona's offices in Murmansk were raided by the Russian Federal security service, essentially the successors to the KGB, which confiscated all of Bellona's 

materials on radioactive waste generated by the northern fleet and 

later called in for questioning many of Bellona's Russian contacts. 

Bellona's experience attests to the growing difficulties that Western and Russian environmental groups confront in trying to monitor military nuclear waste management in the fact of nationalist 

political pressures, skepticism about foreign involvement in military matters, and especially the steady widening of the powers enjoyed by Russia's internal security services, and this trend, we 

think, is most worrisome. 

Turning to some of the intelligence community's activities, we 

are now engaged in a number of new cooperative projects that 

bring unconventional resources to bear on these issues. As part of 

the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission effort, the United States and 

Russia have agreed to share products derived from national intelligence assets to help solve environmental problems of concern to 

both countries. The proposed projects include a study of the Arctic. 

In addition to the intelligence community, prominent U.S. scientists brought together by the Environmental Task Force are 

playing an important role in this endeavor. As many of you may 

be aware, the Environmental Task Force was established in 1992 

to determine how our Nation's national security assets could help 

answer key environmental questions in addition to fulfilling their 

more standard intelligence and defense role. The ETF brought together a team of about 50 prominent U.S. environmental and global change scientists, now known as MEDEA, 

who have been reviewing our most advanced reconnaissance satellite programs and Navy systems to determine what unique environmental and global change information could be derived from 

them. Working with both our intelligence and defense communities, 

MEDEA conducted several demonstrations that addressed specific 

environmental questions. 

I would like to summarize those aspects of this work that would 

help address the environmental impact of radionuclide waste 

dumping in the oceans. Although MEDEA has not yet conducted a 

demonstration to determine specifically how national security systems could monitor radionuclide waste or help in risk assessment, 

it has demonstrated a range of environmental capabilities of these 

systems that have a direct bearing on their ability to provide such 

information in the future. 

These capabilities fall into two broad categories. The first is the 

ability to detect directly and monitor the location of toxic pollution, 

either by observing the pollutant itself or by observing its effect on 

the local environment. The second is the ability to provide information that can help 

predict the transport of a pollutant both down rivers and around 

the oceans, and thus its potential impact on other locations. The best example of how our national security assets can monitor 

pollutants directly and determine their potential impact on other 
112 

regions is the so-called Komi oil spill. The Komi Republic of Russia 

became the focus of international attention last fall when the press 

reported a number of large oil spills. It is estimated that 100,000 

tons of crude oil were spilled, an amount nearly three times the 

size of the Exxon Valdez disaster. · International concern was raised that spilled oil might make it 

into nearby rivers that feed into the Barents Sea, thereby polluting 

the Arctic Ocean. At the request of senior policy makers, MEDEA 

worked closely with intelligence community and NOAA and EPA 

analysts to detennine the risk to the Arctic Ocean. Data from national security assets and other sources were analyzed to detennine 

the location of the largest spills. 

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the specific type of 

pennafrost terrain surrounding the oil spill locations was determined in this way. This infonnation, combined with the knowledge 

that the oil was a high-paraffin crude, led to a consensus that these 

spills posed only a minimal threat to regions outside of the immediate area, mainly because the local marshes prevented much of 

the oil from reaching the major rivers. 

The Komi oil spill demonstrates the ability of national security 

systems to provide detailed local infonnation for characterizing and 

monitoring a pollutant. In order to understand the more global impacts, scientists and decisionmakers must be able to predict where 

the pollutant may be transported and how much of it will reach a 

given destination. 

For ocea:b dumping of toxic wastes, this requires the use of models that predict the circulation of water bodies and the flow rate 

of rivers and tributaries. To be accurate, these models depend on 

inputs describing environmental conditions and processes that are 

not well understood for all parts of the world. This is the second area where data from national security systems can have an impact. To improve existing transport models, 

several MEDEA investigations are estimating global ocean circulation patterns as well as flow patterns in coastal regions. This infor- mation is difficult or impossible to generate with other existing remote sensing systems and requires the unique attributes of the national security systems. The large classified Navy data bases are 

also rich with data and MEDEA is working closely with the Navy 

on these activities. 

An important point here is that data taken by national security 

systems can be combined with data from civil systems to provide 

a much better base for the application of models developed by the 

Navy, NOAA, EPA, and the Department of Energy. 

An upcoming MEDEA investigation that will have direct impact 

on the use of national security systems for monitoring oceanic pollution is the Arctic Climatology Study, which will combine United 

States and Russian data bases to provide an unparalleled global 

view of the Arctic. Russian hydrographic and ice infonnation will 

provide a much finer view of Arctic processes than the United 

States currently possesses and this will significantly improve existing circulation models. In addition, this study will specifically investigate the use of radionuclides as traces for oceanic circulation 

patterns, thus providing a necessary validation of the models. 
113 

In summary, MEDEA activities directly relate to the problem of 

ocean dumping of radioactive and toxic wastes in three ways. First, 

MEDEA and the intelligence community have demonstrated the capability of national security systems to detect and monitor pollutant spills, to characterize the local terrain near the spill, and to use 

this information to predict the impact of the spill outside of the immediate area. Second, a number of MEDEA activities are extracting oceanic information from national security systems and Navy data bases that 

characterize the processes needed to model circulation and transport of pollution. This environmental information can be used to 

improve existing circulation models and thereby improve their prediction of toxic waste transport. 

Third, the working interaction between the scientific community and the national security community has enabled a rapid response 

with more complete information to environmentally-related policy questions. This, plus the greater openness of the intelligence community that has allowed results from national security systems to 

be discussed in an open forum, was used successfully in the Komi 

oil spill study and may be a useful model for addressing future pol- lutant problems. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Gershwin follows:] 
114 

Testimony of Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and 

Technology, 6 December 1995 

Research and Development Subcommittee, House National Security Committee 

and Subcommittee on Wildlife, Fisheries and Oceans, House National Security 

Committee 

The Intelligence Community has published a number of classified intelligence 

reports on the magnitude and nature of environmental contamination in the former Soviet 

Union including a National Intelligence Estimate. On 28 June 1995, CIA presented a 

classified summary to several members of your committee. At this time I would like to 

briefly summarize the analysis. 

In early April 1993, the Russian Government released a report on radioactive 

waste dumping in the Northern and Far Eastern seas. It is known as the "Yablokov 

Report," afteriits principal investigator Dr. Aleksey Yablokov, at that time Special 

Advisor to President Y eltsin on Ecology and Public Health who headed the investigation. 

The report: 

• Contains details about the dumping of radioactive waste, including used reactors 

from submarines, in the Northern (Barents, White, and Kara Seas) and Far Eastern 

Seas (Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and northwestern Pacific Ocean). 

• Lists 13 dump sites in the Northern Seas and 10 in the Far Eastern Seas. 

• Indicated that between 1959 and 1992, more than 2.3 million curies I of radioactive 

waste were dumped in the Northern Seas, and 19,200 curies of radioactive waste 

were dumped in the Far Eastern Seas. 

The Yablokov Report presents a clear, credible picture of the magnitude of 

former Soviet and Russian radioactive waste dumping at sea, and CIA has, in many 

1 A Curie is a unit of radioactivity. It is equal to 3.7 x 10 Becquerel; I Becquerel = 1 

nuclear decay per second. 
115 

instances, corroborated this report. ClA analysis shows that solid and liquid radioactive 

wastes were dumped and that barges and ships probably contaminated by or laden with 

radioactive waste were scuttled. 

Although intelligence cannot verify the accuracy of all the dumpsites reported in 

the Yablokov report, CIA believes that: 

• Based on the observed movements of radioactive waste ships since at least 1979, the 

locations and types of wastes reportedly dumped are accurate. 

• Civilian and naval ships probably began dumping liquid and solid radioactive waste 

in the Barents and Kara Seas and the Sea of Japan in the mid-1960s. Civilian ships 

probably have not conducted at-sea dumping since 1986. 

• This at-sea dumping activity does not present a direct threat to US fisheries or 

personnel,_including Alaska. 

The probable contamination of the Arctic can be traced to the industrial and 

nuclear activities of many countries and regions - including Great Britain, the United 

States, China, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and eastern Europe. 

Past, present, and future sources of Russian radionuclide contamination in the 

Arctic include atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons from Novaya Zernl'ya and 

Semipalatinsk, intentional dumping of radioactive materials by the Russian Northern and 

Pacific navy fleets, and accidents including-Chemobyl' and the Russian nuclear 

submarine Komsomolets which sank off the Norwegian coast. 

Ambient radiation levels in the waters of the Arctic Ocean generally are similar to 

those found in other ocean basins. The threat to marine life is unclear, since no records 

are available on the exact composition of the waste and because the extent of radioactive 

leakage from containers is unknown. However: 

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116 

• Studies by Russian and western scientists have noted an increase in the levels of 

Cesium-137 and Strontium-90 in Arctic waters following the Chernobyl' nuclear 

power plant accident in 1986. 

• Based upon measurements taken during a 1991 international expedition to the Arctic 

polar basin, a Danish researcher stated that the radioactivity in the Arctic Sea areas is 

four times higher than the quantity of radioactive fallout would suggest. 

• Russian researchers who took samples while floating across the Arctic Ocean on an 

ice floe between 1985 and 1987 have determined that much of the Arctic Ocean's 

cesium-137 contamination is concentrated in the top 200 meters. 

• CIA believes that some of the cesium-137 probably originated in Russian plutonium 

production facilities and was carried into the Arctic by the Ob' and Yenisey rivers. 

Based.on known oceanographic conditions in both the Barents and Kara Sea 

dumping areas, any contaminants would tend to be dispersed and diluted thus increasing 

the difficulty of detection and decreasing environmental hazard. 

Measurements indicate that the Arctic has also been contaminated by industrial 

sources. These pollutants are transported into the Arctic by atmospheric- and waterborne paths and are generally accepted to be the primary components of Arctic Haze -- a 

phenomenon similar to lower latitude smog. By the early 1980s, scientific studies had 

shown that chemicals, heavy metals, and organics were major components of Arctic 

Haze. CIA is aware of research being conducted on industrial contaminants in the Kara 

Sea, but I must defer comment on this issue to a closed, classified session. 

The Yablokov Report, although thorough, may not be exhaustive. For example, 

in May 1993 a Russian government committee told Japanese officials that in 1987 a 

Soviet Navy helicopter crashed into the Sea of Okhotsk while carrying an atomic-energy 

battery, according to press reporting. While the Russians told the Japanese that no leaks 

were detected from the accident, the battery, which used Strontium-90 as its power 

source, contained more than 20 times the amount of radiation the Russians had 

3 
117 

previously announced that they dumped into the Sea of Japan. This accident (with its 

radioactive source) was not included in the Yablokov Report. 

Russian policy on nuclear waste is murky and subject to sudden changes because 

of the large number of organizations involved and constantly changing laws and decrees-

-some of which are conflicting. Russia has several laws and government decrees that 

stipulate procedures for accepting, handling ljild disposing of nuclear wastes. One murky 

area is the acceptance of foreign nuclear waste, which can be accepted for reprocessing 

but cannot be pennanently stor¢ on Russian tenitory. However, permanent storage has 

been the subject of a variety of definitions and the question of Russia's acceptance of 

nuclear wastes from other former Soviet states and countries with Russian nuclear 

reactors remains unresolved. 

Some of the Russian government's recent actions send a troubling signal 

regarding Moscow's commitment to stop dumping nuclear waste in Arctic waters. For 

example: 

• A presidential decree issued in July rescinds an earlier edict establishing civilian 

oversight of the military's management of radioactive waste--although Russia's chief 

nuclear safety authority, Gosatomnadzor, has complained all along that it has been 

denied access to information about the navy--and effectively allows the military to 

police its own dumping practices. 

• According to a report released last month by the Norwegian environmental group, 

Bellona, which works closely with Russian environmental groups, the main nuclear 

storage. facility of Russia's Northern Fleet is makeshift, dilapidated, and contains 1,000 

times more radiation than the largest of this year's French nuclear tests. 

• While the report was being prepared, Bellona's office in Murmansk was raided by the 

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which confiscated all of Bellona's materials 

4 
118 

on radioactive waste generated by the Northern Fleet and later called in for 

questioning many of Bellona's contacts throughout Russia. 

Bellona's experience attests to the growing difficulties which Western and Russian 

environmental groups confront trying to monitor military nuclear waste management .in the 

face of nationalist political pressures, skepticism about foreign involvement in military 

matters, and especially the steady widening of the powers enjoyed by Russia's internal 

security services. Earlier this year, for example, the FSB publicly charged numerous 

Western aid and environmental groups with spying, and subsequently issued a series of 

shrill warnings about foreign threats to state secrets. Such retrogressive, Soviet-era trends 

will increasingly undermine efforts to monitor ocean dumping and, more importantly, to 

have the practice stopped. 

For its part, over the past four years, CIA has stepped up its use of national 

technical means, and has worked closely with its colleagues in the Intelligence 

Community a~d US Government to provide requirements and to disseminate our analysis 

of technical collection to assess the potential levels of contamination by both 

radionuclide and industrial sources. Naturally, we also study available open source 

information. Although we cannot readily declassify our information on ocean dumping 

because of the sensitive nature of the national technical means used to obtain the data, we 

could provide further details in closed classified session. 

The Intelligence Community is engaged in a number of new cooperative projects 

that bring unconventional resources to bear on these issues. As part of the GoreChernomyrdin Commission effort, the United States and Russia have agreed to share 

products derived from national intelligence assets to help solve environmental problems 

of concern to both countries. The proposed projects include a study of the Arctic. In 

addition to the Intelligence Community, prominent U.S. scientists brought together by 

the Environmental Task Force are playing an important role in this endeavour. 
119 

As many of you may be aware, the Environmental Task Force was established in 

1992 to determine the role that our nation's national security assets could play in 

answering key environmental questions in addition to fulfilling their more standard. 

intelligence and defense role. The ETF brought together a team of about 50 prominent 

U.S. environmental and global change scientists-- now known as MEDEA-- who have 

been reviewing our most advanced reconnaissance satellite programs and Navy systems, 

as well as a number of additional classified military and energy programs, to determine 

what unique environmental and global change information could be derived from these 

data. Working with both our Intelligence and Defense Communities, MEDEA is 

developing and demonstrating the capabilities of the national security systems to generate 

environmental information. These capabilities can be used to help monitor and predict 

the impact of ocean dumping of radioactive materials and other toxic wastes, and would 

offer a significant source of information for any future activity to assess the effect and 

magnitude of such dumpings on the world's oceanic environment. 

Today I would like to summarize those aspects of this work that would help 

address the environmental impact of radio nuclide waste dumping into the oceans. 

Although MEDEA has not conducted a demonstration to detennine specifically how 

national security systems could monitor radionuclide waste or help in risk assessment, it 

has demonstrated a range of environmental capabilities of these systems that have a 

direct bearing on their ability to provide such information. 

These capabilities fall into two broad categories. The first, is the ability to detect 

directly and monitor the location of toxic pollution, either by observing the pollutant 

itself or by observing its effects on the local environment. I will discuss in a moment a 

MEDEA demonstration concerning an oil spill in the Komi Republic of Russia that 

6 
120 

illustrates this capability. The second broad category is the ability to provide 

environmental information that can be used as input to models to predict the transpon of 

the pollutant, and thus its potential impact on other locations. For the purposes of the 

particular pollutants under discussion at these hearings --radionuclides and toxic wastes 

dumped into the world's oceans-- the main concerns would be circulation models that 

would predict how much of the pollutant would be moved around the major oceans, as 

well as flow models for individual rivers near the source of the pollution. I will describe 

some MEDEA activities that have determined the unique capabilities of our national 

security assets in gathering such information on ocean processes and some datasets that 

MEDEA has been coordinating that will provide information needed as input to models. 

Finally, I will briefly summarize an investigation that MEDEA will perform in FY '96 to 

address the question of radionuclide migration directly. 

The best example of how our national security assets can monitor pollutants 

directly and determine their potential impact on other regions is the so-called Komi oil 

spill. The Komi Republic of Russia became the focus of international attention in fall 

1994, when the press reported a number of large oilspills. The spills were concentrated 

along the main pipeline connecting the Yozey and Usinsk oilfields along the Kolva 

River, affecting about 175 acres of land and 25 miles of stream banks over a 22 mile 

section of the pipeline. It is estimated that 100,000 tons of crude oil were spilled-- an 

amount nearly three times the size of the Exxon Valdez disaster. International concern 

was raised that spilled oil might make it into nearby rivers that feed into the Barents Sea, 

thereby polluting the Arctic Ocean. 

At the request of senior policymak.ers, MEDEA worked closely with Intelligence 

Community and NOAA and EPA analysts to determine the risk to the Arctic Ocean. 

Data from national security assets and other sources were analyzed to determine the 

7 
121 

locatious of the largest oil spills. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the specific 

type of permafrost terrain surrounding the oil spill locations was detenrlined. This made 

it possible to predict whether a significant amount of the spilled oil would flow through 

the local terrain and into the nearby rivers, or whether the local terrain would trap most 

of the oil, preventing further significant contamination. This infom1ation, combined with 

the knowledge that the oil was a high-paraffin crude led to a consensus that these spills 

posed only a minimal threat to regions outside of the immediate area, mainly because the 

local marshes prevented much of the oil from reaching the major rivers. 

The Komi study illustrated that national security systems could provide detailed 

infonnation concerning both the pollutant and the local environment that was essential in 

estimating the impact of the spill on a larger region. This and other studies demonstrate 

an additional capability that MEDEA has been developing over a range of its activities 

that will be very important to future evaluations: the ability to combine the talents 

available in the scientific community, civil government agencies, and the Intelligence 

Community to respond to policy-related questions concerning world-wide pollution 

effects. Integrating the expertise of the MEDEA scientists with the analytical resources 

of the Intelligence Community led to a quick and accurate response to the Komi oil spill. 

This, plus the greater openness of the Intelligence Community that has allowed results 

from national security systems to be discussed in an open forum, was used successfully 

in the Komi oil spill study, and may be a useful model for addressing future pollutant 

problems. 

The Komi oil spill demonstrates the ability of national security systems to provide 

detailed local information for characterizing and monitoring a pollutant. In order to 

understand the more global impacts, scientists and decision makers must be able to 

predict where the pollutant may be transported and how much of it will reach a given 

8 
122 

destination. For ocean dumping of toxic wastes, this requires the use of models that 

predict the circulation of water bodies and the flow rates of rivers and tributaries. To be 

accurate, these models depend on inputs describing environmental conditions and 

processes that are not well understood for all parts of the world. 

This leads to the second area where data from National Security Systems can 

have an impact --general oceanography. Observations from national overhead systems 

can lead to better data on local winds and other meteorology, bathymetry, oceanic fronts, 

and tidal currents, as well as general circulation and upwelling areas. 

To improve existing transport models, several MEDEA investigations are 

estimating global ocean circulation patterns, as well as flow patterns in coastal regions. 

This information is difficult or impossible to generate with other existing remote sensing 

systems, and requires the unique attributes of the national security systems. 

The large classified Navy databases are also rich with data, and MEDEA is 

working closely with the Navy on these activities, to determine what unique 

environmental information the national security systems can provide, and to combine and 

coordinate the Navy databases with remote sensing data to provide more global coverage 

for many of these parameters. The Navy MEDEA effort has established a bridge between 

the scientific community and a number of classified Navy databases, and is providing the 

scientific community with access to a wide range of new information. Together, MEDEA 

and the Navy are working to extract environmental information from these databases to 

input into ocean circulation and transport models. An important point here is that data 

taken by national security systems can be combined with data from civil systems to 

provide a much better base for the application of models developed by the Navy, NOAA, 

EPA, and DOE. 

9 
123 

An upcoming MEDEA investigation that will have direct impact on the use of 

national security systems for monitoring oceanic pollution is the Arctic climatology 

study, which will combine U.S. and Russian databases to provide an unparalleled global 

view of the Arctic. Russian hydrographic and ice information will provide a much finer 

view of Arctic processes than the U.S. currently has, and this will significantly improve 

existing circulation models. In addition, this study will specifically investigate the use of 

radionuclides as traces for oceanic circulation patterns, thus providing a necessary 

validation of the models. 

Ln suiTimary, MEDEA activities directly relate to the problem of ocean dumping 

of radioactive and toxic wastes in three ways. First, MEDEA and the Intelligence 

Community have demonstrated the capability of national security systems to detect and 

monitor pollutant spills, to characterize the local terrain near the spill, and to use this 

information to predict the impact of the spill outside of the immediate area. Second, a 

number of MEDEA activities are extracting oceanic information from national security 

systems and Navy databases that characterize the processes needed to model circulation 

and transport of pollution. This environmental information can be used to improve 

existing circulation models and thereby improve their prediction of toxic waste transport. 

Third the working interaction between the scientific community and the National 

Security Community has enabled a rapid response with more complete information to 

environmentally related policy questions and, as demonstrated by the Komi oil spill 

study, this may be a useful model for addressing future pollutant problems. 

lO 
124 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you very much, Dr. Gershwin. I thank all four of you for appearing today and for your excellent 

statements. I just have a few questions, one that I will repeat from 

the second panel and that is, what is our total of dollar allocation 

that we are putting forth out of the Federal budget for Arctic work? 

I noticed that, Dr. Brass, I think you had your handle on that. 

Dr. BRASS. Just let me point to it, Congressman. It is in the 

back. This, by the way, is the Arctic Research of the United States 

publication that I mentioned before. The total budget in fiscal year 

1994 for research in the Arctic was $191 million, in fiscal 1995, $174.9, and in fiscal1996, proposed, $169.6. Our research funds for 

the Arctic are steadily declining. 

You might be interested in the DOD totals, which were $35 million in 1994, $33.6 million in 1995, and $23.2 million in 1996. That 

reflects the loss of the $10 million Nunn-Lugar threat reduction 

money. 

Mr. WELDON. Dr. Brass, how much of that money goes through 

the Arctic Commission and how do you get your funding? 

Dr. BRASS. The Arctic Commission does not fund research, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WELDON. At all? 

Dr. BRASS. It is our job to set policy and guide the interagency 

group in their formulation of the research plan. Mr. WELDON. How are you funded? 

Dr. BRASs. We are actually funded as an independent agency but 

through the appropriation for the National Science Foundation. 

Mr. WELDON. Very good. The impact of the $10 million loss, I 

guess I should say, first of all, what is undone, and I applaud the 

job, Admiral Pelaez, that you have done here, and I agree that you 

have done great work. What is left to be done? What needs to be 

done, perhaps, as opposed to asking you what amount of money 

you want, which puts you on the spot. What needs to be done? 

Admiral PELAEZ. My assessment would be the following. One, we 

took some 30,000-plus samples. While the procedures we used to 

gather some of those samples would not necessarily support the 

other toxin analysis, many of those samples would and they are 

preserved but, one, it has not been in our mandate and it has not 

been in our charter to go look at other pollution sources and their 

transport. Nevertheless, that is a very rich data base which could 

serve that, so there is some work to be done there. I think that you will see in our assessment that we need to be 

able to monitor conditions throughout this region. I am particularly 

concerned about up the rivers and these containment facilities. 

Some of these rivers, just to put them in perspective, have watersheds that are the equivalent of half the U.S. mainland. The ability 

to monitor that, to really get in to more detail on the security of 

those potential pollutants I think would be an area that we should 

be looking at as a continuing evolution. 

I believe that our assessment in 1997 will give us an accurate 

and good and, for the money that we have-we are pretty close to 

being able to finish that, I think, and if not, I have been supporting 

it myself. We will be able to give a good assessment of the impact 

of the existing dumped nuclear waste on the environment and the 

transport. 
125 

But as I said and as other witnesses have said, there are a number of other issues which we need to address, and there needs to 

be, and I think Ms. Goodman stated it as well, a sustaining program of monitoring. I think that we are well on the road with the 

tools that we have to be able to do that, understand when something happens what the impact might be, how much time we have 

to react, what the technical challenges might be in dealing with 

that. It is a complex problem and it does require sort of a continuing effort as we work also to control and prevent the release of further toxic wastes. 

Mr. WELDON. Admiral and others on the panel, has part of your 

function been to monitor the Komsomolets and any problems there, 

or is that not within the jurisdiction and it has not been a part of 

what has happened in terms of our work? 

Admiral PELAEZ. None of our direct measurements were on that 

site. 

Dr. BRASS. I can comment briefly, Mr. Chairman, that my understanding is from the other international participants in these kinds 

of programs that for the moment, at least, there appears to be no 

significant release from Komsomolets, but, of course, all of these 

problems involve the fact that we do not know enough about the 

corruption of reactor vessels, fuel rod cladding. There are two nuclear torpedoes in Komsomolets, as we understand it. We do not 

know what their corrosion resistance is, how long they will last. 

Admiral PELAEZ. Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair to say, though, 

that from the sites we have visited, even where there was breach 

of containment of some of the storage vessels, in some cases, in 

fact, they shot them full of holes to make them sink, even after 

they went through some precautions to contain the material, the 

release has been localized, very local in nature so far. So we are 

very fortunate in the nature of these types of materials, that they 

tend to be trapped into sediment and they do tend to stay in the 

near vicinity of the release. 

Mr. WELDON. Did you want to add something, Dr. Gershwin? 

Dr. GERSHWIN. Yes. Certainly, CIA analysis would agree. I mean, 

the worst thing you could do in a sense would be to try to raise 

this thing. Leave it where it is. Mr. WELDON. There was some discussion. I have heard others 

who say you should raise it--

Dr. GERSHWIN. No. Mr. WELDON [continuing]. But the bulk of the evidence I heard 

is that that should not occur. I assume we are doing even a more 

aggressive job in monitoring the Thresher and Scorpion. 

Admiral PELAEZ. Yes. The U.S. Navy has a continuing program 

and has had since the Thresher and Scorpion went down. 

Mr. WELDON. And no problems? 

Admiral PELAEZ. No. 

Dr. GERSHWIN. Could I add a point, though, which is a general 

problem we have in assessing all of this is that while we know the 

sites and we have information on measurements and so on of the 

situation in the ocean, what we really do not know is really what 

is there. We do not know the composition of what has been 

dumped. We do not know how much of it is leaking. I mean, there 

is just a basic lack of information on our part on what the Russian 
126 

nuclear dumping was. Knowing that would add significantly to our 

understanding of potential future risks. 

Dr. BRASs. I might add something to that, as well, Mr. Chairman, and Bob Edson can give you even more information on this, 

but it turns out in pursuing the records of dumped material, not 

all of the things supposed to have been dumped are dumped where 

it says they were dumped. There has been considerable effort to 

find some and at least one large one has not yet been found. One, 

for example, that was listed as a barge full of radioactive material 

looks in sonar imaging to be the Liberty ship. 

Mr. WELDON. Are we using the same modeling that you talked 

about to model and watch the dumping that occurred off the San 

Francisco coast a few years ago? Are any of you familiar with that? 

Is that part of this? You would not know that, I guess. Admiral PELAEZ. I would have to take that for the record to answer that specifically. Of course, we run global ocean models. We 

have running global ocean models, but I do not know if it was used 

at all in any particular dumping there. 

Mr. WELDON. Very good. And Dr. Gershwin, you mentioned the 

Bellona Foundation. As I mentioned earlier, we have been joined today by Frederick Hodge, who is the chief director of Bellona and 

we had a press conference before this hearing to state our concern 

for what occurred to Bellona in terms of the security apparatus in 

Russia. 

I have one final question. The recommendation of Bellona today 

to us was that perhaps we should have an international commission established to monitor nuclear waste sites, and since there is 

currently no such operation, we have all these commissions looking 

at nuclear weapons but we do not have anything specific to nuclear 

waste sites. What is your response to that, if any, off the top? Admiral PELAEZ. I would be a strong supporter. Mr. WELDON. The others, the same? 

Dr. GERSHWIN. I would certainly say that from the point of view 

of the U.S. intelligence community, we would understand a lot better what the risks are if we had access to information. 

Mr. WELDON. And the Arctic Commission? 

Dr. BRASS. I think, in addition to simply monitoring, to standing and watching these operations, it is probably worthwhile to conduct 

at least a basic research program in them. You heard Dr. Yablokov 

discuss the motion through the groundwater of the Myak radionuclides. This is a very serious problem and it takes more than just 

a few monitoring sites to keep track of what is going on and what 

processes are active in the system. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. 

Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have questions that I will follow up with the individual panel members later on. Thank you. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. 

Let me thank the panelists for their excellent testimony and 

their comments. This concludes the one part of our hearing. 

We are going to move into our fourth and final panel picking up 

a different issue, but before we do, there are a number of publica- tions that I would like to simply acknowledge for the record that 
127 

are out there. Some of them have been referred to here today, some 

outstanding publications put forth by the Bellona Foundation 

which are available. This is the one document that I would urge 

people to contact Bellona for, which I first came on 2 years ago, I 

guess, when it was first released. 

OTA did an outstanding study which was just released this past 

fall and that also is available through the Office of Technology Assessment. 

Several of the publications that you mentioned, we have already 

highlighted, but they also, I think, are worthwhile, and a publication by Murray Feshbock from Georgetown University also, I think, 

sums up the problem and is worth considering, as well as this document which I referred to earlier from the American Association 

for the Advancement of Science on "Ocean Pollution in the Arctic 

North", another publication available. 

I think we have raised a lot of interesting points. We have a status report on what is happening, both within our Government and 

internationally. We have a real commitment here that we are making to follow through. In our second hearing, we will look at broader ways that we can perform dual use cooperation in understanding 

the ocean and working with the military, but I will continue to follow through as a personal priority of mine the support to keep this 

Arctic research program underway and to assist the Russians with 

this terrible problem of disposing of their nuclear wastes. 

I thank all of you for coming in. 

Mr. WELDON. With that I would invite our fourth panel to step 

up to the table, Dr. Philip Valent from the Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center; John Edmond, professor of geochemistry from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. 

Fred Grassle, director, Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences 

from Rutgers University; and Ms. Beth Millemann, executive director of the Coast Alliance. 

Let me welcome you all to the subcommittees and apologize for 

making you sit through a rather long hearing. We try to combine 

the hearings to take advantage of the two subcommittees coming 

together, and also at the request of Chairman Jim Saxton, my good 

friend from New Jersey. 

Unfortunately, Jim is tied up on the floor, at least temporarily, 

with the same issue that was raised by Congressman Frank 

Pallone, a very important issue on the floor right now relative to 

one of our appropriation bills. He will join us when that act has 

been completed, but I understand it is causing a great deal of controversy, as you might imagine, at the eleventh hour among the 

members. We are extremely concerned about the abyssal waste plain disposal plan and the panel that we have assembled here today we 

think will give us some insights into where we are going. In 1992, 

the former Coast Guard Navigation Subcommittee held a hearing 

on the enforcement of the ocean dumping ban and on research and 

development of waste management technology that could place material on the abyssal plain. The Naval Research Laboratory has 

also undertaken work to assess the environmental feasibility of the 

isolation of dredged material, sewage sludge, and municipal incin-
128 

erator ash on the abyssal plains of the deep ocean. I look forward 

to hearing from Dr. Valent about that study. 

I also look forward to hearing from Drs. Edmond and Grassle 

about the status of knowledge about the deep ocean environment 

and Beth Millemann about the legal and policy implications of deep 

ocean placement. 

Personally, I have grave concerns about deep ocean disposal. Removing our waste from plain sight is not the same as responsible 

management of those wastes, nor does it replace efforts to develop practical, cost effective ways to reduce the stream of waste that we 

produce. However, I am interested in hearing the testimony of our 

distinguished panelists today and perhaps this will be the begin- ning of additional dialog on this issue in the Congress. Thank you all for coming. Your statements will be placed in the 

record. Feel free to make whatever comments you would like, either following your statement or without your notes. We will start 

with Dr. Valent. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PHll..IP J. VALENT, NAVAL RESEARCH 

LABORATORY, STENNIS SPACE CENTER 

Dr. VALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Philip Valent. I am the associate superintendent of 

the Marine Geosciences Division, Naval Research Laboratory, and 

a marine geoscientist and a registered civil engineer. I submit my written statement, which I will summarize orally. The United States relies mostly on land-based waste management alternatives since the cessation of ocean disposal of wastes 

with the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988. In fiscal year 1993, Congress tasked the Department of Defense to study the advantages, disadvantages, and economic viability of storing industrial waste in 

the abyssal plains of the ocean floor. Please note, the industrial 

waste is defined here as sewage sludge, fly ash from municipal incinerators, and dredged material and does not include radioactive 

waste, such as discussed in the previous panels. 

DOD tasked the Naval Research Laboratory to perform the paper study to examine the abyssal waste isolation option. I am the principal investigator on that project. 

Our first task was to conduct a technology assessment of the capabilities to transport and place wastes on the abyssal sea floor. Four concepts emerged as being technically feasible. The least risky and least costly concept is depicted in the first figure of a packet, 

which I hope you have. This figure depicts the barge transport of 

waste contained in geotextile bags. The waste-filled bags are released through trafdoors and free-fall to the abyssal sea floor without loss of materia to the water column. Our second task was to perform an environmental assessment 

where we sought first to identify areas of the abyssal sea floor 

within 1,000 nautical miles of the U.S. mainland where environmental isolation of waste would be maximized, where the environmental impact of placing the waste on the sea floor would be minimized, and where economic zones of other countries would be excluded. Favorable sites are shown on the second figure, with the 

darker squares marking those more favorable. 
129 

The results from the environmental predictive models are described in my written testimony. 

The results of the study lead to the following conclusions. One, 

placement of subject wastes on the abyssal sea floor with no accompanying loss to the water column appears feasible with modest advancements in technology. Initial indications are that the abyssal 

waste isolation option will be cost competitive with present waste 

management methods for higher priced areas. 

Two, model predictions suggest that for reasonable waste isolation scenarios, the placed waste would likely be contained locally 

within a defined site, would bury iocal fauna which would be replaced by different, more opportunistic abyssal communities, and 

would impact geochemical processes beneath the waste site for 

thousands to tens of thousands of years. 

Three, the Atlantic offers the most favorable sites for waste isolation. The Pacific sites are less favorable. The Gulf of Mexico offers 

poor choices for isolation sites. 

Four, overall impacts of placed waste are predicted to be localized. 

Our recommendations are, one, an in situ experiment using 

uncontaminated, organic-rich, fine-grained dredged material would 

be needed to generate the data necessary for further development 

and validation of models to predict changes in physical, biological, 

and chemical environments of the abyssal sea floor if perturbed by 

large-volume deposits of contaminated dredged material. 

Two, research must be undertaken to better predict the performance of waste-filled geotextile bags, especially hydrodynamic response and geotextile strains during release from a transport platform, descent through the water column, and impact on the sea 

floor. 

Three, development of technologies necessary for the handling, 

bagging, and transport of contaminated dredged material would be 

needed to ensure technology availability when, and if, environmental acceptability of the abyssal sea floor waste isolation option 

is demonstrated. 

In June 1995, NRL was funded by the Advanced Research 

Projects Agency [ARPA], to extend portions of this paper study, applying advanced simulation technologies to the waste isolation 

problem with focus on the end-to-end simulation and visualization 

of the relocation of contaminated dredged material to the abyssal 

sea floor and the potential environmental impact. The scope of this 

new project is summarized in my written testimony. 

My colleagues and I thank the chairman and the committee for 

this opportunity to make the results of our work known to the subcommittees. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have 

on our work. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Valent follows:] 
130 

TESTIMONY OF 

PHILIP J. VALENT 

ASSOCIATE SUPERINTENDENT, MARINE GEOSCIENCES DIVISION, NAVAL 

RESEARCH LABORATORY, STENNIS SPACE CENTER, MS 

before the 

NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

and the 

RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

6 December 1995 

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: My name is Philip Valent. I am 

Associate Superintendent of the Marine Geosciences Division, Naval Research Laboratory, 

Stennis Space Center, Mississippi. I submit thi~ written statement, which I will summarize 

orally, for inclusion in the hearing record. 

In addition to my administrative duties, I am also Project Manager and Principal Investigator for 

a project tasked to the Department of Defense (DoD) in the FY93 Appropriations Bill to " ... study 

the advantages, disadvantages, and economic viability of storing industrial waste in the abyssal 

plains of the ocean floor" (see Figure 1). I thank you for this opportunity to report to you the 

results, conclusions, and recommendations of that project. 

Background 

The US has had to rely largely on land-based waste management alternatives since the cessation 

of ocean disposal of wastes with enactment of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988. 

Remediation of contaminated wastes, though technically feasible, is very costly; and, therefore, 

land disposal is experiencing increased use. 

Implementing an environmentally sound and economically viable program for remediation of 

highly contaminated bottom sediments, and obtaining regulatory and public approval of such 

action, poses a particularly vexing problem. Inaction in remediation of these highly 

contaminated sediments from shipping berths, tliming basins, and navigation channels, because 

of concern over the environmental impact of removing these sediments by present alternatives, is 

compelling maritime commerce to avoid affected US ports (Haggerty 1993). 

In introducing our project report, let me acknowledge the recent prior work on the topic of waste 

isolation on the abyssal seafloor. Two workshops sponsored by the Sloan Foundation were 

conducted at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHO!), 7-10 January 1991, and 

Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT), 12-14 June 1991, to examine "the potential 

benefits and problems of an 'industrial scale' experiment extending over a period of 1 0 or so 

years ... " involving " ... the delivery of from one to a few million tons per year of waste to the deep 
131 

sea floor" (Spencer 1991, p 2). The waste stream considered in these WHOIIMITworkshops 

was sewage sludge, fly ash from municipal incinerators, and dredged material. The WHOI 

workshop developed the research program requirements for the experiment, and the MIT 

workshop reviewed potential systems for monitoring the waste deposit. 

The reCQmmended 1 0-year, industrial scale experiment was not pursued, in part, due to the 

environmentally controversial nature of such a full-scale experiment. Continuing waste disposal 

problems, particularly those of managing/disposing of contaminated dredged materials, as 

indicated by the conduct of a Congressional hearing (House Hearing 1992), have stimulated 

further interest in the abyssal seafloor disposal option. 

Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Project 

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) responded to the FY93 Congressional tasking with a 

proposal to the Department of Defense Strategic Environmental Research and Development 

Program, titled "Technical and Economic Assessment of Storage oflndustrial Waste on Abyssal 

Plains." Our proposal was funded in November 1993, all research and development work was 

completed in September 1994, and the last of six reports was submitted for printing in September 

1995. The effort was limited to a paper study addressing the same materials as the WHOI/MIT 

workshops. During the course of our work we adopted a shortened version of the project title, 

"Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation (APWI) Project." 

To carry out the APWI Project work, NRL augmented its in-house expertise in oceanography, 

geology, and geophysics with industrial expertise for most of the technical assessment 

(Oceaneering International, Inc.) and academic expertise for portions of the environmental 

assessment (geochemistry, Richard Jahnke, University of Georgia; benthic biology, Gilbert 

Rowe, Texas A&M; and physical oceanography, Curtis Collins, Naval Postgraduate School) and 

for the economics of waste handling (Di Jin and Hauke Kite-Powell, WHO!). 

Technology Assessment- The technology assessment for transporting and placing wastes on the 

abyssal seafloor was approached by first conducting a patent search to identify all potential 

applicable concepts and then assessing the technical feasibility of each. Four concepts emerged 

from the 128 patents as being most technically feasible for lowering waste through 6,100 m to 

the abyssal seafloor. They are synopsized as: 

1) Controlled lowering of the waste in a tethered bucket with a 250 metric ton payload; 

2) Pumping the waste down twin 1.37-m (54-in.) diameter, 7600-m long pipes; 

3) Containing a barge-load of wastes in 50 geotextile bags (380 m3 per bag) and freefalling the waste-filled bags to the seafloor; and 

4) Carrying !53 waste-filled bags (127m3 per bag) to near the seafloor in an unmanned 

submersible and free-falling the bags from 200m above the seafloor. 

Sewage sludge would not be readily moved to and maintained in a fixed position on the abyssal 

seafloor because of its relatively low bulk density (1.04 MN/m3 (65 lb/ft3)) which is slightly 

2 
132 

heavier than seawater. Thus, geotextile bags filled only with sewage sludge would sink very 

slowly through the water column and drift laterally for long distances. Methane gas generated in 

the sludge would decrease the bulk density even further, and the bags could float! Therefore, 

sewage sludge would require blending with a fme-grained weighting material to facilitate 

transporting the sludge to a specified abyssal seafloor isolation site and then ensuring that the 

sludge remains in place. Fly ash and dredged material, while not completely free of handling and 

placement problems, di.d not pose significant problems in the technical assessment. 

Concept I above was eliminated at an early stage from the technical assessment because it 

became clear that the rate of placing waste material on the abyssal seafloor would be one-tenth 

the rate estimated for the remaining concepts; therefore, the bucket concept was ·eliminated as not 

being cost competitive. Both risk and capital-operating cost analyses revealed Concept 3, that of 

free-falling the waste-filled bags from the ocean surface to the abyssal seafloor, to be the best 

option (see Figure 2) (Hightower et al. 1995a, b, c). 

Environmental Assessment -

Site Selection- We sought first to identify areas of the abyssal seafloor within 1800 km (1000 

nautical miles) of the US mainland where environmental isolation would be maximized, where 

the environmental impact of placing the wastes on the seafloor would be minimized, and where 

economic zones of other countries would be excluded. A site assessment model was developed 

to quantitatively compare the suitability for waste isolation within tO-degree (latitude-longitude) 

squares of the abyssal seafloor. Included in the analysis were environmental and anthropogenic 

factors. Areas in the Hatteras Abyssal Plain (Atlantic) and the abyssal hills province west of 

southern California (Pacific) were shown to be the most suitable for waste isolation because of 

low currents, low eddy kinetic energy, favorable sediment type, favorable weather, and low 

anthropogenic activity. Atlantic sites scored somewhat better because of lower seafloor slopes 

and less roughness. Even the best areas in the Gulf of Mexico were shown to be poorly suited 

due to the high near-seafloor currents and high eddy kinetic energy (see Figure 3). 

Hydrodynamic Processes- Simulations were conducted using the NRL six-layer, basin scale, 

ocean circulation model. Model results show that, if any dissolved contaminants were to be 

released into the water column during waste placement, these contaminants would not be 

advected shallower than 1000 m water depth for a I 0-year simulation period. Well within this 

period oftime, we would expect that the contaminants will have been adsorbed on/scavenged by 

particulates in the water column and would have settled to the seafloor. Model results, validated 

with existing data, indicate that near-seafloor currents at the most suitable abyssal seafloor sites 

will not be strong enough to erode/suspend uncontained dredged material or fly ash (Valent and 

Young 1995). 

Biological Processes -The overall response of abyssal animals to the placement of one or more 

million cubic meters of organic-rich material, containing varying degrees of adsorbed 

contaminants, on the abyssal seafloor is not known with any certainty. It is clear that all resident 

animals buried under the bags and the sediment apron resulting from the impact plumes 

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133 

generated by bag impact on the bottom would be smothered. Deposits of material greater than 

several millimeters depth would probably bury many invertebrates, which have adapted to 

extremely low sedimentation rates characteristic of the abyssal seafloor. Analogies with benthic 

recovery rates from abyssal turbidites suggest that it may take hundreds to thousands of years to 

return to an equilibrium community of animals following episodic disposal of waste materials 

greater than several centimeters over large areas of the abyssal seafloor. Given this very 

long-duration response of the abyssal community to disturbances on the large scale of turbidity 

flows, it would be preferable to limit the size and number of waste placement sites to minimize 

overall environmental impact. 

Direct transport of contaminants to surface waters by abyssal animals via bioaccumulation 

processes would not occur because they do not venture out of abyssal depths. There does exist 

one potential pathway, however, via transport in the yolks of eggs of certain fishes and 

invertebrates. These eggs are known to rise to shallow depths in the ocean and develop into 

larvae which, in turn, mature into juveniles, and the juveniles then return to the abyssal depths. 

While the eggs, larvae, and/or juveniles are at the shallow water depths, they could be consumed 

by other species closer to food chains utilized by man. 

Ten-year numerical simulations of a simplified abyssal food chain were run to simulate impact of 

a one-year duration placement of sewage sludge and/or organic-rich dredged material on the 

abyssal seafloor. One model simulation predicts a significant perturbation of the reproductive 

and growth cycle, with the natural 1-year cycle altered to a 6-year cycle for the megafauna 

(fishes and large invertebrates); we note that the timing of these cycles may be an artifact of 

oversimplifications in the modeled food chain - or this timing may tum out to be real - at this 

point too little is known about the origin of this mathematical result to make any informed 

judgements about its origin (see Figure 4). To better understand the significance for eggs of 

megafauna as potential pathways for contaminant export from the abyssal seafloor, the export of 

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) via this pathway was estimated using data from the 

1 06-mile site: the annual transport of P AHs from a 1-year placement of sewage sludge and/or 

dredged material (assuming lxl06 m3

) is estimated to be 1.7 grams, truly minuscule (Valent and 

Young 1995). 

Geochemical Processes - Placement of million-plus cubic meters of sewage sludge and/or 

dredged material on the abyssal seafloor would significantly alter the local oxic/anoxic balance 

affecting geochemical processes at the seafloor surface and in the subseafloor (see Figure 5). We 

have conducted numerical model simulations of the impact of placement and remineralization of 

combined sewage sludge and dredged material on the abyssal subseafloor, predicting the impact 

of organic matter oxidation reactions on profiles of oxygen, nitrate, sulfate, sulfide, ammonium, 

total inorganic carbon, alkalinity, and particulate organic carbon. The model results show that 

the available oxygen in the water overlying and downcurrent of the isolation site would not be 

depleted to a level injurious to abyssal animals. However, to attain geochemical equilibrium 

(referenced to conditions prior to waste placement) would take thousands to tens-of-thousands of 

years. This result is not surprising because turbidite deposits at abyssal depths which occurred 

4 
134 

over 12,000 years ago have not reached geochemical equilibrium (Valent and Young 1995). 

Regarding the contaminants contained in the wastes, US Army Corps of Engineers experience 

with dredged material placed at shallow water depths indicate that the contaminants would 

remain adsorbed on the clay mineral particles with some of the organic contaminants adsorbing 

on organic particulates in the dredged material. Geochemical changes in the waste deposit could 

cause iron and manganese compounds to go into solution, but the iron and manganese would 

then precipitate as oxides when reaching the deposit interface with the oxygenated overlying 

water. The oxides would then serve as scavengers of other heavy metal contaminants that may 

leach to the deposit-seawater interface (Spencer 1991, p 78). Sewage-sludge poses possibly a 

somewhat greater problem due to a potential deficit of appropriate clay minerals to provide 

adsorptive surfaces for scavenging heavy metal ions. This shortcoming could be corrected by 

blending clay mineral material into the sewage sludge during handling, which would increase 

overall volumes to be isolated and cost per unit volume. Fly ash poses the largest problem to the 

waste isolation option due to its easily leachable, high content oflead, cadmium, dioxins and 

furans. To isolate fly ash on the abyssal seafloor, the fly ash would probably have to be blended 

into a fine-grained, organic-rich dredged material to provide sufficient adsorptive surfaces for the 

contaminants. Developing an adequate approach to isolation of contaminants within a sewage 

sludge or fly ash deposit would require some laboratory experimentation which was beyond the 

scope of the DoD tasking for this study. 

Conclusions -

(I) Placement of subject wastes on the abyssal seafloor with no accompanying loss to the water 

column appears feasible using technology that could be developed. 

(2) Model predictions suggest that for reasonable waste isolation scenarios the placed wastes 

would (a) likely be contained locally within a defmed site, (b) bury local fauna which will be 

replaced by a new abyssal community of animals, and (c) impact local geochemical processes for 

thousands to tens-of-thousands of years. 

(3) Regarding potential abyssal sites for the isolation of wastes (a) the Atlantic offers the most 

favorable sites, (b) the Pacific sites are favorable but less so than those in the Atlantic, and (c) the 

Gulf of Mexico offers poor choices for isolation sites. 

(4) Overall impacts of placed wastes are predicted to be localized in extent. However, very little 

is actually known about the environmental impacts of such emplacement. 

Recommendations- Before deep ocean isolation of wastes could safely occur, significant 

additional research would be needed. 

(I) The models upon which this study was based, and disposal activity would be based, need to 

be refined. Some additional models need to be developed. This is underway in the ARPA study, 

discussed below. 

(2) In-situ research would be needed to learn more about the abyssal environment, including its 

processes and inhabitants, to accurately assess potential environmental impacts. 

(3) Research must be undertaken to better predict the performance of waste-filled geotextile bags 

5 
135 

especially (a) hydrodynamic response and geotextile strains during release from a transport 

platform, descent through the water column, and impact on the seafloor; and (b) responses of the 

geotextile bags to physical, chemical, and biological degradation caused by the combination of 

contained waste and abyssal environment. 

( 4) An in-situ experiment using uncontaminated, organic-rich, fine-grained dredged material 

would be needed to generate the data necessary for further development and validation of models 

to predict changes in physical, biological, and chemical environments of the abyssal seafloor 

when perturbed by large-volume deposits of contaminated dredged material. Tracers should be 

added to the material in the experiment to mimic potential contaminant bioaccumulation and 

transport if such were to occur with implementation of-the-abyssal-waste-isolation Qption. 

(5) Development and refmement of techniques necessary for the safe handling, bagging, and 

release of contaminated dredged material would be needed when, and if, environmental 

acceptability of the abyssal isolation option is demonstrated. 

Advanced Research Projects Agency Project 

Scope and Approach -In June 1995, NRL was funded by the Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (ARPA) to apply, to the extent possible, the concept of Simulation-Based Design to the 

waste isolation problem, focusing entirely on the end-to-end concept of dredged material 

isolation on the abyssal seafloor and the environmental impact, with the goal of optimizing the 

dredging-to-isolation system. The project scope includes consideration of dredging techniques 

and dredged material handling necessary to facilitate containment for transport and lowering 

through the water column. Model improvements and developments programmed for simulating 

the dredging-to-placement segment of the process include (l) modeling of improved 

full-containment dredge design and transport ship loading system; (2) optimization of the surface 

transporter through application oflinear and, if merited, non-linear ship design models; (3) 

optimization of the geotextile bag-hopper-release system design to reduce potential for bag 

tearing on release; and (4) modeling of the hydrodyrtamics of waste-filled bags in free-fall to 

understand and control the deviation from ideal free-fall path to the seafloor with the intent of 

maximizing the concentration of bags from each transporter payload drop. To facilitate 

improved understanding of the environmental impact of placing dredged material on the abyssal 

seafloor, model improvements and development underway include {l) modeling of the plume 

generated by filled bags impacting on the ocean bottom, and the subsequent advection, 

dispersion, and settlement of the plume materials; (2) modeling of the geochemical processes 

within individual dredged material-filled bags and sediments buried under bags; (3) modeling the 

formation of methane hydrate within the deposit and assessing potential impact on isolation; and 

( 4) modeling the pathways for toxicant bioaccumulation. 

Participants and Progress- We are now at an early stage of the ARPA project. We have brought 

all expected academic participants on board including one new participant, Robert Moorhead, 

Mississippi State University, who will develop a visualization of simulation products. We are in 

fmal contract negotiations with a contractor team of industrial and academic participants for 

developing the dredging-to-seafloor placement portion of the modeling and simulation. We 

6 
136 

expect completion of the ARPA project in September 1996. 

Synopsis 

I believe that the technology for placing contaminated dredged material at a specified abyssal 

seafloor site is either in hand or within easy reach. It is the environmental impact of the 

proposed deposit of several million cubic meters of dredged material that is difficult to predict 

with certainty. An in-situ experiment, spanning 7 years (including 2 years for planning and 

set-up), involving the placement of several thousand cubic meters of uncontaminated, 

organic-rich dredged material, will be the most efficient way to generate data ·and understanding 

necessary for predictive model development and validation. 

My colleagues and I thank the Chairmen for this opportunity to make the results of our work 

known to the Subcommittees. 

References 

Haggerty, B. 1993. "Dredge-Lock," Workboat Magazine, Nov-Dec, pp 28-31. 

Hightower, J.M., W.R. Richards, S. Balinski, W. Briggs, T. Foster, D. Mauck and A. Marcy 

1995a. "Technical Assessment Report for Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project," 

NRL/CR/7401--95-0021, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, MS, 143 p and 

7 appendices. 

Hightower, J.M., W.R. Richards and A.L. Marcy 1995b. "Economic Viability Report for Abyssal 

Plains Waste Isolation Project," NRL/CR/7401--94-0016, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis 

Space Center, MS, 34 p. 

Hightower, J.M., W.R. Richards, S. Balinski, W. Briggs, T. Foster, D. Mauck and A. Marcy 

1995c. "Summary Engineering Report for Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project," 

NRL/CR/7401--95-0018, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, MS, 63 p. 

House Hearing 1992. "Ocean Dumping Enforcement and the Current Status of Research Efforts", 

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Committee on Merchant 

Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Serial No. 102-96, US Government Printing 

Office, Washington, DC, 573 p. 

JOC 1995. "Toxic Load of Mud Springs Leak," by A. Abrams, Journal of Commerce, 19 Oct, p 

lA, SA. 

Spencer, D. W. 1991. "Report of a Workshop to Determine the Scientific Research Required to 

Assess the Potential of the Abyssal Ocean as an Option for Future Waste Management, An 

Abyssal Ocean Option for Waste Management," Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 7-10 

7 
137 

Jan, Ill p. 

USACOE 1995. "New York Harbor Dredged Material Management Plan: Phase I Report - Plan 

of Study," US Army Corps of Engineers New York District, Jul. 

Valent, P.J., and O.K. Young 1995. "Abyssal Seafloor Waste Isolation: Environmental Report," 

NRLIMR/7401-95-7576, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, MS, 477 p. 

8 
Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project 

CONGRESSIONAL TASI<ING @ 

...................................................................................... .. 

Tt'le Congress tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 

1993 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, Senate Report 

102-408, as part of DoD's Strategic Environmental Research and 

Development Program (SERDP), to: 

" ... study the advantages, disadvantages, and economic 

viability of storing industrial waste in the abyssal plains of 

the ocean floor. Abyssal plains are areas of the ocean 

floor at depths of over 10,000 feet which are believed to 

be geologically stable and to experience only slight Water 

currents. The Committee [i.e., Committee on 

Appropriations] understands that these characteristics 

may make abyssal plains viable regions for long-terril 

storage of industrial waste. The Committee is aware of 

preliminary scientific discussions of this concept and feels 

additional study of the concept would be useful." 

Figure 1 

...... 

88 
~~~! 

Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project 

EMPLACEMENT CONCEPTS @ 

......................................................................................................... eLc~z I. 

1...__ IIOOmI I 

: Standoll Distance 1 

1 (Dynamic Posllionlng) 1 

: I 

..1~ I -'IIJil I 1 

....._ ><='><'> • s~!II!J!-"""'"" IJI.K!IJ"-11'"-'-"'••.t,_lll.".:- ~ ::.-c~ .... <>., 

• 10 minute Intervals for 

Trim/Ballast Adjustment 

Silo Tronapondors 

• 

Trac~ng/location 

Measurement 

I fll~ t Measured ~ Current Prolllo VS Oeplh \ 

5 mis 

Descent Speed 

5100m ~ ,.--.... 

........ 

...... 

Surface Emplacement Concept uses 50 ea. 382 m3 capacity geotextile bags for free-fall 

emplacement of 25,000 metric tons bulk waste per trip. 

Figure 2 

.... ~ ~ 
Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project 

SITE SELECTION @ 

................................................................................. 

... 

HIO"' ·-· · ·· 120" tOO" -····r -··-····---- ------- --·-····r· c\ 

SITE SELECTION MODEL Scores, %, for waste isolation scenario 

D _uillll ,,: : 

excluded 3-t-60 

·---..... 

II 

60-65 

· r ···- --( /'t 

\ 2..__.- •, ) ) '-...,_ -, \ 

, __ .) 

6>-, 1 

• • • • • 65-70 7G-75 80-85 85-89 

C- Surrogate s"es selected for engineering analyses 

... 

Flaurf!:1 

...... 
§'~~E 

Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project 

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS - Biological @ 

.............................................................................................................. IISLCM~ I. 

5= 5.0 r---· = I I I 4= 10000 : 3= 3000 : 

2=100000~ f5\ 

1 = 1 000 '.::-' 

(!) GonadaiExport 

® Heterotrophs 

5= 2.5 

4= 5000 

3= 1500 

2= 50000 

1=500 

ALL=O 

@ - - - Megafauna 

@ •. - . - Organics 

/'\ @•••ooooooo Dump ~ ,'\\ 

1- • ..1.-. -1.·- ·14"-.-.-.-.-.-.-!-.-

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• /-J T1' ' I ' ' ' ..... 11EC- £-:': ~ L = -L- ;p::C-G J ::-:;, ~ 

0 912.5 1825.0 2737.5 3650.0 

TIME (days) 

OUTPUT OF NUMERICAL SIMULATION WITH SLUDGE INPUT OF 1000 mg C m·2d·1 

Figure 4 

.... ~ .... 
~~Jll)J 

Abyssaf Pfains Waste Isolation Project 

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS -Chemical @ 

..................................................................................... 8LC~5~ SOLIDS 

Particle ''"t 

() ~ Mixing Burial 

DISSOLVED ~ Diffusive 

Pore Water I Bottom 

SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF TRANSPORT PROCESSES AND REACTIONS CONSIOERED 

IN THE WASTE DEPOSITION/REMINERALIZATION SIMULATION 

Figure 5 

.... ~ "" 
143 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Valent. 

Dr. Edmond, I apologize for your name tag not appropriately including your title. We apologize, so Dr. Edmond, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN M. EDMOND, PROFESSOR OF GEOCHEMISTRY, DEPARTMENT OF EARTH, ATMOSPHERIC AND 

PLANETARY SCIENCES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF 

TECHNOLOGY 

Dr. EDMOND. It is a pleasure to be before your panel. I think 

from the research support you just heard about, there really is no 

question about the technical feasibility of disposing of these relatively benign materials on the sea floor. We can place them accurately and one of the bags in this room at 3 miles water depth, routinely. We could stack them up and fill the whole room for you, if 

you like. So technically, we are extremely capable in terms of operating in the deep sea, largely, as was pointed out earlier, because 

of the enormous investment the Federal Government has made 

over the last 50 years in oceanographic research and, of course, 

anti-submarine warfare. 

The question is, should we, and if you ask that, then you want 

to look at a cost-benefit analysis. That is to say, we have a large 

inventory of waste. There is not anybody advocating that we just 

keep generating waste. Our problem is the inventory that we have 

right now is enormous, both in place in harbors and then also in 

essentially uncontrolled landfills. 

The question is, how can we dispose of that in the most benign 

way in terms of ecological and environmental impact, and I would 

argue that the place to put it is in the deep sea floor, which is 

about a third of the area of the planet-there is a lot of room down 

there--in that it is the lowest energy environment on the planet, 

so the potential for dispersal of material is minimal, either physically in the water column or by contamination of ground water. 

There is no ground water in the deep sea. It is a static system. 

There are no storms to speak of. There are no sea gulls to disperse 

things. There are no children to crawl into the dump site, and you 

will see, any dump site you go past, you see children. Plus, the 

standing crop of organisms is very low. 

Now, I have to be careful here. My distinguished colleague and 

friend, Fred Grassle, has made extremely exciting discoveries about 

the enormous variety of species that live predominately in the deep 

sea floor, but you must distinguish between the number of species 

and the standing crop of live organisms. 

The organic carbon content of the sediments that we are talking 

about impacting is about a tenth of a percent. Almost all of that 

carbon is the equivalent of humus in your garden. It is not live. 

The amount of live carbon in the abyssal sea floor is probably 

something like 0.05 to 0.01 percent by weight of the sediment. So 

we are talking about impacting a restricted area, a very restricted 

area, maybe a square mile of an enormous ecosystem that is relatively homogeneous laterally. 

So in terms of environmental damage, I would argue that this is 

the minimum damage site of any that we could conceivably access 

economically, and from that point of view, I think we have a great 

opportunity to use the enormous investment that we made in un-
144 

derstanding the deep sea to solve a very important societal problem, which I do not think is going to get easier to solve if we continue along the conventional routes that we are on right now. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Edmond follows:] 
145 

29 November 1995 

National Security Subcommittee on Military Research and 

Development 

and 

Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans 

House of Representatives 

Congress of the United States 

Witness Statement by Prof . .John M. Edmond, Professor of 

Marine Geochemistry, MIT, for joint hearing, 6 December 1995 

At the outset let me express my gratitude at being invited to 

testify before these two House Subcommittees today. As a 

foreign-born scientist who, over the last thirty years, has 

pursued a successful research career in the United States funded 

very largely by this Government through the National Science 

Foundation and the Office of Naval Research, I feel a strong 

obligation to be of service. It is also gratifying to be asked to 

help present the results of the enormous national investment 

made by this Government in oceanographic research over the 

last fifty years in support of your deliberations on a pressing 

societal problem, the disposal of waste streams. 

Post-WWII, oceanography developed as a quintessential Cold 

War science. The fundamental driver was anti-submarine 

warfare. Of course, numerous spin-offs occurred in particular 

the thriving off-shore oil industry. Over the last decade or so 

oceanographic studies have become central to our understanding 

of the complexities of our environment and its response to 

natural and, increasingly, human perturbations. It must be 

recognized that this new orientation would have been impossible 

without the massive military-related investments mentioned 

above. Your Subcommittees have the opportunity to apply the 

insights, understanding and experience of the oceanographic 

sciences and engineering to the resolution of an increasingly 

critical problem in our society, and the world, the safe and 
146 

permanent disposal of the various streams of industrial solid 

waste. 

The abyssal plains of the deep ocean are an attractive 

location for the disposal of solid wastes for a number of 

reasons; 

1. They represent the mm1mum energy environment on this 

planet. There are no storms or flowing groundwater to disperse 

the emplaced waste. 

l. The area available is vast, approximately one half of the 

surface of the Earth, as compared to that of the sites impacted. 

It is also quite homogeneous geologically and biologically. No 

site would be affecting a unique environment. 

3. The abyssal plains are accessible to all the coastal 

conurbations of the U.S., a few days ship transit time at most, 

thus minimizing the cost of transport. 

4. The technology exists todav to completely by-pass the 

biologically producti"e upper water column and emplace waste 

on the floor of the deep sea with the accuracy of a good dump 

truck on a landfill, to permanently archive the positioning 

information and to relocate and monitor the site as need be. 

Development costs for this disposal option would be minimal. 

5. Because the sites would be accurately located with the 

information in the public domain they would not be accidentally 

disturbed by, for example, deep sea mining ventures since these 

would be employing the same navigation techniques. Due to 

their remoteness at between two and three miles water depth, 

the possibility of deliberate disturbance can be ruled out. 

6. The biota in the deep sea is sparse although diverse in 

species, mainly of microfauna. The abundance of living 

biomass is extremely low, close to desert-like. Thus the 

ecological impact would be very much smaller than at a similar 

site on land. Bio-dispersal of the waste material might occur 

for short distances laterallY; however there is no significant 

possibility of vertical transport of the material and its reintroduction into the primary food chain in the upper waters. 
147 

7. We can be confident of these statements based on existing 

experience in the exploration for hot vents in the deep sea. 

These occur only in volcanically active areas remote from the 

abyssal plains. Although large volumes of hot water {600°F) 

laden with heavy metals are bein~ expelled, significant effects 

are restricted to a few hundreds of feet laterally around the 

vent sites and perhaps a thousand feet in the water column 

above. There is absolutely no manifestation at the sea surface. 

In fact vent fields are quite difficult to find! The exploration, 

navigation and monitoring techniques discussed above for the 

waste sites are exactly those used to study vents. 
148 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Edmond, for your statement and 

for your comments. We look forward to a dialog among the witnesses as we get to questions. 

Dr. Grassle, we welcome you from beautiful New Jersey, my 

neighboring State, my summer home State. 

STATEMENT OF DR. FRED GRASSLE, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF 

MARINE AND COASTAL SCIENCES, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY 

Dr. GRASSLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the 

distinguished members of the subcommittees for the opportunity to 

discuss the potential use of the deep ocean environment as a repository for certain types of waste, particularly contaminated dredge 

material. 

With support from the NOAA National Undersea Research Program, I have led several deep diving submersible expeditions to 

study the fate and effects of municipal sludge at the 106-mile deep 

water site, a depth of about 1.5 miles on the continental rise off of 

New York and New Jersey. Our institute at Rutgers has also 

played a role in issues associated with dredging and management 

of contaminated sediments in the New York-New Jersey Harbor 

Estuary and we have held three conferences for the port authority 

of New York and New Jersey on sediment remediation and dredging technologies. 

Marine scientists have only recently appreciated the richness of 

life found in the deep ocean. Indeed, the dark, cold, and inhospitable environment of the deep sea has previously been thought of 

as a desert-like habitat that is largely devoid of any life. Very few 

individuals have had the opportunity to observe the diversity of 

deep sea life that Dr. Edmond referred to and even fewer have the 

knowledge to identify deep sea life forms so that they can be enumerated and compared from one part of the ocean to another. Recent estimates indicate a richness of species in the deep ocean as 

high as from any environment on earth. 

The importance of our studies of deep ocean municipal sludge 

disposal at the 106-mile site is to predict the probable effects of the 

gradual buildup of pollutants that is occurring from other sources. 

Surface disposal of sludge over an approximately 75-nauticalsquare-mile area at the surface contaminated over 1,400 nautical 

square miles of deep sea floor. 

A reexamination of the site in 1994 suggested that as a result 

of cessation of sludge dumping in 1992, measurable recovery of the 

environment has started. If the National Undersea Research Program continues to be able to support this research, we expect to 

study the site again this coming summer. Our objective is to measure the progress toward recovery of the site and ideally predict the 

time to complete recovery. 

I also chaired an international working group on biological effects 

of deep ocean disposal in 1991 held at Woods Hole. We concluded 

that deep ocean marine disposal should only be considered where 

alternative disposal methods are inadequate, either now or in the 

foreseeable future. We further recommended that all risks needed 

to be assessed and an environmental cost-benefit audit be conducted before adopting new technology. 
149 

Because of the limited knowledge of the deep oceans, we recommended against ocean disposal of highly toxic wastes but in 

favor of an experiment on the mass disposal of relatively benign high-volume waste, such as sludge, and its impact on abyssal 

ecosystems. Such an experiment should include replicated experi- mental treatments and should be designed to maximize its usefulness in predicting future changes in oceanic ecosystems. In calculating whether deep ocean disposal is practical, the cost 

of bringing the knowledge of deep ocean processes up to levels we 

take for granted in other environments should be factored into the 

cost of disposal. Alternative approaches that include beneficial use, 

source reduction, and alternatives available for waste isolation 

should be carefully evaluated. 

A substantial portion of the cost associated with disposal alternatives are related to management and regulation, where obstacles 

have little to do with actual costs of containment or treatment. For 

purposes of comparison, costs associated with the most efficient 

management practices achievable should be used. 

Some of the interest in using the abyssal plains as a dumping ground for contaminated sediments is a result of a crisis presently faced by the port authority of New York and New Jersey. In my previous testimony before the House Subcommittee on Merchant 

Marine and Fisheries in 1993, I recommended continuation of the 

use of the 6-mile mud dump site in the short term, pending development of another method for containment; determination of the 

sources of contamination and a study of the transport processes associated with deposition of contaminated sediments in the shipping channels and berths; use of specially designed pits for subseabed 

containment within the harbor; and initiation of a broad-based, 

long-term strategy to develop methods for remediation of Newark 

Bay sediments. 

Some of the reasons there has been little progress in any of these 

areas include a complex and fragmented regulatory framework, lack of an adequate mechanism to evaluate new technology, an inadequately informed public, and our inability to manage the port 

as an entire system. I believe that the limited resources available 

to the port should be used to improve management of contaminated 

sediments rather than for development of techniques for isolation 

of sediment on the abyssal plain. This conclusion perhaps begs the more general question about 

the feasibility of using the abyssal to isolate wastes. Considerable 

investment by the Department of Energy was made approximately 

a decade ago to evaluate the possibility of using the abyssal plain for placement of high-level radioactive waste. Uncertainties associated with an inability to control the placement and transport of the 

material have argued for disposal under more manageable circumstances. 

Unfortunately, the deep sea is a habitat that is particularly difficult to access. Thus, once wastes have been planted there, future 

remediation is near impossible from a logistic or financial standpoint. It is possible that risks associated with land or near-shore 

disposal of some materials may be so great in the future that the 

equivalent of a landfill on the abyssal plain will eventually be 

needed. I believe this eventuality can be avoided. 
. 150 

In any case, because there are unmeasured effects of global increases in pollutant concentrations in deep sea sediments, it would 

be prudent to learn about life on the abyssal plain and to investigate the transport, fate, and effects of pollutants. I encourage you 

to continue to support research on deep ocean processes. 

I thank Mr. Saxton, Mr. Weldon, Mr. Pallone, and other members of the subcommittees for their continuing efforts to improve the knowledge base for developing environmental policy and for 

their continuing and strong support of ocean programs. 

I will be pleased to address any questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Grassle follows:] 
151 

Testimony 

Delivered by Frederick Grassle, Director 

Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences 

Rutgers University 

Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans 

Subcommittee on Military Research and Development 

Wednesday, December 6, 1995 

Chairman Saxton, Chairman Weldon, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee on Fisheries, 'wildlife and Oceans and Subcommittee on 

Military Research and Development, thank you f o r the o pport unity to 

discuss t he potential use of t he deep-ocean environment as a 

repository for certain types o f waste, particularly contaminated 

dredge material. For the last 3 0 years I have been among the 

relatively few scientists to study processes on the deep-ocean 

floor, and, especially, the living organisms on or in the deep-sea 

bed. Since coming to Rutgers University in 1989, I have led the 

development of the Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences and 

have continued my interest: in the deep ocean. In conjunction with 

scientists from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the U.S. 

Geological Survey, and two other universities, and with support 

from the NOAA National Undersea Research Program, I have led 

several deep-diving submersible expeditions t o s tudy the fate and 

effects of municipal sludge disposal at the 106-mile Deepwater 

Municipal Sludge Site at a depth o f over 1 . 5 miles o n the 

continental rise o ff New York and New Jersey. Our Institute has 

also played a role in issues associated with dredging and 

management of contaminated sediments in the NY/ NJ Harbor Estuary 

and we have held three conferences for the Port Authority of New 

York and New Jersey on sediment remediation and dredging 

technologies. I had the opportunity to give testimony before the 

House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on these subjects in 

1993. 

Marine scientists have only recently appreciated the richness of 

life found in the deep ocean . Indeed, t he dark, cold and 

inhospitable environment of the deep sea has previously been 

thought of as a desert-like habitat that is largely devoid of any 

life. Very few individuals have had the opportunity to observe the 

diversity of deep-sea life and even fewer have the knowledge to 

1 
152 

cientify deep-sea lif e forms, so that t~ y can be e numera ted and 

==mpared from o ne part o f the o cean to anothe r. Recent estimat e s 

c~dicate a richness of s pecl e s in the deep s ea as high as from a ny 

environment on earth. Although the d eep oc ean might be called a 

C:e sert if only total numbers or weight pe r are a o f a n i mals is 

==nsidered, it c annot be considered a desert i f we t ake i n to 

~ccount =he richness o f spe cies- -a richness that has ye t to be 

~~ ly de scribe d . Most of the deep ocean has never been sampled 

properly, and it is therefore l ikely to r eveal many more surprises 

:C:-1 the future. The deep -sea fauna :. s a vast reservoir of 

biologic al innovation that c an be tapped fo r use a s pharmaceuticals 

or fo r t he develo pment o f o ther usefu l compounds . 

Since the lowest points on the planet a re in the deep oc ean, 

qravity dictates that the deep-sea floor is also a repository for 

=~ e relatively small amount o f waste that is transported l arge 

distances in the atmosphere, o r through ocean circulation, great 

distances from land . Pollutants are detectable wherever they have 

been looked for in the deep sea , but so far the concentrations have 

not been shown to be a cause for immediate alarm. 

The main importance o f our studies of deep- ocean muni c ipal s ludge 

disposal is to predict the probable effects of the gradual build-up 

o f pollutants that is oc curring from other sources. The surface 

discharge of sludge from 1986 t o 1992, a t a rate o f about 8 -9 

miilion tons per year, resulted in: 1. significant increases in 

bo ttom contamination by both metal and o rganic pollutants over 

background concentrations (despite predictions t o the contrary), 2 . 

changes in bacterial community composition, 3 . transfer o f sludgederived carbon into the tissues of deep-sea animals, 4. a twofold 

increase in the oxygen uptake o f deep-sea s edi ments , a nd 5. the 

appearance of species not normally commo n a t the site. Surface 

disposal of sludge over an approximate 75 nautical square mile area 

affected and contaminated over 1,400 nautical square miles o f deepsea floor. A re-examination of the site in 1994 s uggested that , as 

a result of cessation of sludge dumping in 19 92, measurable 

recovery o f the environment had started. These results are 

available in a number of reports and published articles that we c an 

make available to you. If the National Undersea Research Program 

continues to be able to support this research, we expect to s tudy 

the site again in the summer o f 1996 . Our objective is to measure 

the continued recovery o f the site and to determine the time scales 

over which this sort of environmental disturbance might be expected 

2 
153 

to completely abate. 

I n 1991, I participated in a workshop a t the Woods Ho le 

Oceanographic Institution sponsored by the Sloan Foundation on "The 

Abyssal Ocean Option for Future Waste DisposaL" I chaired a 

working group of participants from France, Ge rmany, Norway, the 

United Ki ngdom and the U. S . A., which considered the biological 

effects of deep-ocean disposal . We concluded that: 

"marine disposal should only be considered where alternative 

disposal methods are inadequate either now o r in the 

forseeable future . " 

We recommended : 

"that all risks needed to be assessed and an environmental 

c ost/ benefit audit be conducted before adopting new 

technology. " 

Because of the limited knowledge of the deep oceans we recommended 

against ocean disposal of highly toxic wastes, but in favor o f a 

large-scale experiment on the mass disposal of a relatively benign, 

high-volume waste , such as sludge, and its impact on abyssal 

ecosystems. Such an experiment should include replicated 

experimental treatments and should be designed to maximize its 

usefulness in predicting future changes in oceanic ecosystems. 

Such a deep-sea, disposal experiment should have the following 

f eatures: 

disposal should not proceed until a quantitative assessment o f 

the species normally occurring in the e nvironment has been 

conducted, 

in addition to direct effects on deep-sea life, attention must 

also be given to the possibility o f c ontaminants reaching 

commercial fish species t hrough food web transfer, 

analyses should not make a ssumptions about effects on the 

organisms living on or in the abyssal sea bed without direct 

measurements, 

the rate of lateral transport across the seafloor over decades 

should be studied, especially if the material is not capped or 

otherwise contained. 

3 
154 

In calculating whether deep- ocean disposal is practical, the cost 

of b ringing the knowledge of deep-ocean processes up to the levels 

we take for granted i n other e nviro nmen ts should be facto red into 

the cost of disposal. The costs o f prevention o f short d umping, 

and the enforcement o f protoco ls for emplacement on the seafloor 

should also be included. Alternative approaches that include 

beneficial use, source reduction, and alternatives available for 

waste isolation should be carefully evaluated. A substantial 

portio n o f the coscs associated with disposal a lcernativ es are 

related to managemenc and regulatio n, where obstacles have little 

to do with the ac t u al costs of containment o r treatment . Rather 

than using the worst c ases of management of contaminated sediments, 

costs associated with the most efficient management practices 

achievable should be used. 

Some o f the i nte r e st in using t he abyssal pl a i n as dumping ground 

for contaminated sediments is a resulc o f a crisis presencly fa ced 

by the Po rt of New Yo rk and New Jersey . In my previous testimony 

before the House Subcommittee on Merchant Ma rine and Fisherie s in 

1993, I recommended: 

continuat ion o f the use o f the 6 -mile Mud Dump Site in the 

short term pending devel opment o f another me thod for 

containment, 

determination of the sources o f contamination and a study of 

the transport processes associated with deposition o f 

contaminated sediments in shipping channe ls and berths, 

use o f special ly-designed pits for sub- s eabed containment 

within t he Harbor, and 

i ni tiation of a broad-based, l ong-term s trategy to develop 

methods for r emediation of Newark Bay s ediments. 

Some of the reasons there has been little progress in any o f these 

areas include: a complex and fragmented regulatory framewo rk , l ack 

of an a dequate mechanism to evaluate new t echnology, an 

inadequately informed public, a nd our inabil ity t o manage the Port 

as an entire system. I believe that the limited resources 

available to the Port should be used to improve management of 

contaminated sediments rather than for development of techniques 

for isolation of sediment on the abyssal plain. 

This conclusion perhaps begs the more general question about the 

feasibility of using the abyssal plain to isolate wastes . 

4 
155 

: onsiderable i nvestment by the Department o f Energy was made 

a9proximately a decade ago to evaluate the possibility of using the 

abyssal plain for emplacement of high-level radioactive waste. 

certainties associated with an inability t o contro l the placement 

a nd transport of the material have, thus far , argued f or disposal 

nder more manageable circumstances . Unfortunately , t he deep sea 

~s a habitat that is particularly difficult to access; thus, o nce 

'""astes have been planted there, future r emediation i s near 

impossible from a logistic or financial standpo i nt. It is possible 

that r isks associated with land or near-shore disposal o f some 

materials may become so great that the equivalent of a landfill on 

the abyssal plain will eventually be needed. In any case, because 

there are unmeasured effects o f global i ncreases i n pollutant 

concentrations in deep-sea sediments, it woul d be prudent t o learn 

about life on the abyssal plain and to investigate t he transport, 

f ate and effects of pollutants. I encourage you t o continue to 

s upport r esearch o n deep-ocean processes a nd congratulate Mr. 

Saxton and his Subcommittee o n their continuing efforts t o improve 

t he knowledge base for developing environment al policy. I would 

also like to thank Mr. Saxton, Mr. Weldon, Mr. Pallone and other 

members o f the subcommittees for their continuing and strong 

support of ocean programs. I will be pleased t o address any 

questions you may have at this time . Thank you. 

5 
156 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Grassle, for your excellent statement. 

Ms. Beth Millemann, welcome. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF BETH MILLEMANN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

COAST ALLIANCE 

Ms. MILLEMANN. Thank you. I would like to thank you for staying for the very bitter end of this hearing. It has been many hours 

and very instructive for all of us who were here. 

I must comment that there is a certain schizophrenia inherent 

in having the first three panels and then this panel. The information that was raised in the previous panels raised the most sobering and disturbing of conclusions about what a willy-nilly approach 

to disposing of wastes in the ocean can bring 10 years and 15 years 

later after the fact, and that we are having a panel talking about 

introducing new wastes into the deep ocean is personally very disturbing to me, particularly in light of the very sobering information 

that was presented earlier. . I am presenting testimony today on behalf of the Coast Alliance 

and also 35 other environmental groups and sports and commercial 

fishing organizations and water recreation groups. We are very 

pleased to be here. 

I wanted to raise essentially five different issues that our groups 

have concerns over beginning deep ocean dumping. The first deals 

with the fact, as Dr. Grassle has raised before, that we are getting 

to learn more and more about the deep ocean and the fact that, as 

you stated, it is not a dead zone, that there is a variety of life. 

Beginning a waste disposal practice in an area that we are just 

now learning about its variety and abundancy seems to me precisely the wrong direction to go, and certainly the direction of 

waste disposal policies in this country vis-a-vis the ocean has been 

precisely the opposite direction. It has been to get out of the ocean, 

not to go back to the ocean for additional disposal. 

The passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act in 1988 and the recent changes to the London Convention in 1993 are only two examples of the fact that the public does not support ocean dumping of 

wastes. When the public becomes sufficiently concerned about the 

quality of ocean waters, it reacts very violently. The history of the 

ocean is not one of half-measures. When the public becomes sufficiently concerned, activities dumping in the ocean are banned. I 

think that any movement forward toward introducing a new deep 

ocean dumping regime will be met with the most hostile of public 

responses. 

Regarding the ban, the materials that are discussed in the Naval 

Research Lab report of January this year contemplate the disposal 

of dredge materials but also incinerator ash and also sewage sludge 

in the ocean. The Ocean Dumping Ban Act banned the disposal of 

sewage sludge and industrial wastes in the oceans. It also banned 

the incineration of wastes at sea. It also banned the transportation 

of those wastes across U.S. waters for purposes of dumping. 

The London Convention also bans the disposal of industrial 

wastes in the ocean, and there is certainly a good deal of conversation going on now about potentially expanding that ban to sewage 

sludge dumping. So the elements that are discussed in the Naval 
157 

Research Lab report discuss in part the disposal of materials that 

are illegal under current U.S. law and under international law. 

This is a profoundly disturbing point, that we are spending tax dollars into researching a proposal that is illegal under domestic and 

international regimes. 

Also, if we talk about beginning a deep ocean dumping policy, 

what we are really doing is leaving a legacy of shame for our 

grandchildren. I remember the proponents of nuclear power talked 

about waste that would be too cheap to meter and we are talking 

about beginning a new, hugely expensive and hugely intrusive 

waste disposal practice that ultimately our grandchildren will be 

left to bear the brunt of. 

Now, I say that because I have looked at some of the proposals 

that are included in the Naval Research Lab report. One of the proposals is this so-called tethered container proposal, which I was 

glad to see the report rejected as being unworkable. Unfortunately, 

that same proposal is what is in the Commerce Committee report 

that has come before you for a vote today. 

I was very disturbed, however, to see what the first choice was 

that was described in the lab report and it is a so-called surface 

emplacement project. Essentially, what would happen under that 

proposal would be this. A barge would sail from a major metropolitan area; Philadelphia is listed as one of the cities. It would be 

loaded with 55 million tons of waste; 50 bags would be packed on 

this barge and the waste would be loaded in the 50 bags. The barge 

would sail anywhere from 200 to 2,300 miles offshore. 

It would dump the 55 million pounds of waste through 3¥2 miles 

of water onto an ocean dump site that is almost as big as 100 football fields, and for the amount of wastes that are discussed in the 

lab report solely for dredged materials, we are talking about a universe of wastes that would be dumped every year in the deep ocean 

of 44 trillion pounds of dredged sediments. This is outrageous to 

even consider undertaking this kind of an activity in the deep 

ocean and we are very disturbed to see that time has been given 

to that. 

I was also disturbed to read that in the Naval Research Lab report, it cast grave doubts about the bags into which the waste 

would be put. Those bags have only been tested in 295 feet of water 

as opposed to 20,000 feet of water, as proposed in the Naval Research Lab report, so they are not tested in deep water. They also 

have a propensity to rip, and it is not at all clear that they would 

be able to withstand on the ocean floor the effects of the deep 

ocean. 

So we are talking about embarking on a waste management 

strategy with devices that may or may not work, have never been 

tested, for waste that we do not need to dump in the deep ocean, 

because, finally, my concluding remark is that we cannot legally 

dump industrial waste or sewage sludge in the oceans. That leaves 

dredged material. If the dredged material is clean, it should not be 

dumped in the ocean. It is a resource. It is fabulous for beach renourishment, for landfill cover, for nurseries, plant nurseries. It 

can all be used. We should not throw it away. 

If it is contaminated, it should not go into the ocean no matter 

what the size or the type of the container is. Again, under the 
158 

Ocean Dumping Act of 1972, we are not to dump materials in the 

ocean that degrade the marine environment. 

So there is not a waste crisis that is pushing this industry. What 

we can do is prevent the waste from being created in the first part and pursue a different Federal program that has been on the books 

since 1987, which is the development of technologies to clean up contaminated sediments, not to put them in bags and dump them 

in the ocean or put them in containers and dump them in the 

ocean but clean them up so they can be safely disposed of. 

The groups that I work with around the country strongly support that program and that approach to waste management rather than 

opening up the oceans for a variety of wastes. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Millemann follows:] 
BOARD Of DIRECTORS• 

Nell Armlngeon 

Ukt Pontchartraln Blsln Foundation 

O.naBeach 

$0ulhC.rolinaCOist.IIConse.valionLugue 

"""""""" A:Miic:lnli!IOniiSoclety 

Scott Bums Wolld Wildlife Fund 

O.lbC.rter Southern E!Wironrnental Law Center 

SarahChasis NabJI'III RtSOIJrces Defense CouncN 

DaviCIConr~~d 

NalioNII Wildlife Federation 

~"""" ~International 

ElelnorDorny 

ConstrvatiOn Law Foondation 

Tim Elchenblrg 

Center lor Mlrtn. Conservation Kathy Fletcher 

People lof Puglll Sound 

Gordon Glover 

Brett Hulsey 

Slern.CiubMidwestOtlice ...,........., Committee to Preserve AsNteague Island 

ArodyK"' Oregon Natural Resources CouncH 

Jeuica Llndm.ln Natural Ruoun:1ts Defense Council 

Pamtii.LelSingtr 

United Auto Workers 

Arnold Lto 

East Hllmpton Town Baymen's Assoclltlon 

Dawn..,.. 

Atrltfjcan Oceans Campaign 

O.vtciMk Nlllonal Audubon Society 

Todd Millet 

North Clrollna Coastal FederatiOn 

""""-" Siena Club O.vld E. Or'lmln FriW!diOftiWEarth,NW 

Dr.OrrWIPIIkey 

OukeLitnnee Rockefeller 

AmeW. Simon 

ShlflrlyTeytor 

..... Club 

Boyce Thome-M .. r 

Oce&n~tn 

ChmWekl ' 

Nellonal Coaltlon lor Martn. Consei'Ytltion 

Clodyl\>1 

CleenOcunAcllon 

•organlatlOnlt affilllltlons of brd Membtrs 

IIIWd!OfidlntlficatlonpYrposesonly 

159 

TESTIMONY 

BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVEWPMENT AND THE 

RESOURCES SUBCOMMITIEE ON F1SHERIES, WILDLIFE 

AND OCEANS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Regarcfin& the Potential Use of the Deep Ocean Environment as a 

Repository for Certain Types of Waste 

by Beth Millemann, Executive Director 

Coast Alliance 

Washington, D.C. 

On Behalf of: 

American Littoral Society (Highlands, NJ) 

Baykeeper, American Littoral Society (Highlands, NJ) 

Cape Arago Audubon (North Bend, OR) 

Center for Marine Conservation (Washington, D.C.) 

Clean Ocean Action (Highlands, NJ) 

Coast Alliance (Washington, D.C.) 

Coastal Advocates (Los Gatos, CA) 

Concerned Citizens of Montauk (Montauk, NY) 

Conservation Law Foundation (Boston, MA) 

Fisher's Island Civic Association (Fisher's Island, NY) 

Fisher's Island Conservancy, Inc. (Fisher's Island, NY) 

Friends of the Earth (Washington, D.C.) 

Great Lakes United (Buffalo, NY) 

Greenpeace International (Washington, D.C.) 

Heal the Bay (Santa Monica, CA) 

Jersey Coast Angler's Association (roms River, NJ) 

Lake Michigan Federation (Chicago, IL) 

Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation (Metairie, LA) 

League fdr Coastal Protection (Malibu, CA) 

Louisiana Environmental Action Network (New Iberia, LA) 

ManaSota-88. (Palmetto, FL) 

Montauk Fishermen's Emergency Fund (Montauk, NY) 
160 

Narragansett Baykeeper (Narragansett, RI) 

Natural Heritage Institute (San Francisco, CA) 

Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, D.C.) 

North Carolina Coastal Federation (Newport, NC) 

Northwest Environmental Advocates (Portland, OR) 

Ocean Advocates (Dickerson, MD) 

Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations (Sausalito, CA) 

People for Puget Sound (Seattle, WA) 

Saratoga Springs Hazardous Waste Coalition (Saratoga Springs, NY) 

Save The Bay (Providence, RI) 

Save the Harbor/Save the Bay (Boston, MA) 

Save Our Shores (Santa Cruz, CA) 

Sierra Club, Northeast Regional Field Office (Saratoga Springs, NY) 

Staten Island Sport Fishing Federation (Staten Island, NY). 

Surfrider Foundation, Santa Cruz Chapter (Santa Cruz, CA) 

December 6, 1995 
161 

My name is Beth Millemann, and I am Executive Director of the Coast Alliance, a 

national coalition of environmental leaders headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Coast 

Alliance works to educate the public about the value of ocean and coastal resources. I am 

presenting testimony today on behalf of the Coast Alliance and 35 other fishing, water recreation 

and environmental organizations. We appreciate the opportunity to express our grave concerns 

about, and opposition to, proposals to dump wastes in the deep ocean. 

Follow-Up To The 1992 Hearing 

In the letter inviting me to testify, Chairmen Weldon and Saxton described today's 

hearing as an investigation into potential use of the deep ocean environment as a repository for 

certain types of waste, particularly contaminated dredge material. Today's hearing was 

described as a follow-up to a 1992 hearing on using the deep ocean for contaminated dredge 

disposal. 

Many extremely valid concerns were msed at that 1992 hearing, and they are as relevant 

today as they were then. For example, Chairman Saxton joined his colleagues from New Jersey 

-- former Representative William Hughes and Representative Frank Pallone -- in pointing out 

the potential for deep ocean dumping to degrade the marine environment. Mr. Hughes vowed 

to work against any experimental ocean disposal program. Mr. Pallone rightly described 

proposals to dump in the deep ocean as turning the ocean floor into a landfill. And Chairman 

Saxton cautioned that: 

"Until scientifically determined conclusions are made beyond our present state of 

ignorance, this government during a time of fiscal restraint would be hard-pressed 

to assist research efforts -seeking to inject more waste into the ocean floor." 

The Oceans Are Biologically Rich 

Since Chairman Saxton's 1992 observations, our state of ignorance has greatly improved 

with regard to the deep ocean. In October 1995, the New York 1imes reported an astonishing 

breakthrough in knowledge about the deep Ocean and sea floor (see attached). According to . 

scientists interviewed by the New York 1imes, the deep ocean has now been · discovered to 

"harbor a riotous diversity of life•: 

* The diversity of species in the deep ocean is so high that it may rival that of 

tropical rain forests, often seen as the piMacle of biological richness. 

* The estimates for the number of species on the deep-sea floor have now soared 

to 10 million or even 100 million, hundreds of times larger than old projections. 

According to Dr. Lambshead, a marine biologist at the Natural History Museum 

in London, "all sorts of ecologic theories that looked good suddenly fall apart. 

We're having to change all our ideas. • 

• A huge variety of life occurs throughout the deep sea. Along with its ecological 

importance, there is the potential for significant commercial value. 
162 

2 

The Ocean• An Rich But The OJuntry 11 Not 

Our knowledge of the deep ocean environment has grown since 1992, as has the nation's 

debt. This Congress is focusing enormous attention on the budget and major financial problems 

facing the nation. A Summary Engineering Report prepared for the Naval Research Laboratory 

in January 1995 estimates that operating one barge for deep ocean dumping activities would cost 

$15 million per year, while another of the proposed ships would cost $32 million a year to 

operate. Presumably, several barges and ships will be needed to dispose of the 20 million metric 

tons of sediments discussed in the report, as 800 trips from port to dumpsite and back to port 

again will be needed to dump all that mud. The cost of retrofitting or building these barges and 

operating them could easily be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year. In comparison, 

the program for developing technologies to decontaminate dredged sediments costs $5 million 

a year. 

The government would be called on to be. a major financial player in the development 

of the dumping industries, shouldering the costs of modelling, testing, designing, building 

prototypes, and fmalizing the technologies for commercial development -- and for profit-making 

by the private companies once the government has paid to research and develop the machines. 

Instead of spending precious tax dollars on developing new ways to dump polluted waste in the 

ocean -- a practice which is illegal and strongly opposed by the public -- the Federal government 

should continue its extremely modest investment in technologies that can clean up toxic 

materials, not just get them "out of sight and out of mind. • 

The Naval Research Lab's Report was conducted over the strong objections of Senator 

Frank Lautenberg who urged in 1993 that the study be dropped because of "scarce federai 

resources. • He also pointed to the improvement of fisheries and water quality with the end of 

sewage sludge dumping off the Jersey shore. Representative Gerry Studds also cautioned the 

l>epartmellt of Defense to abide by the Ocean Dumping Ban Act, which makes it unlawful to 

dump, or tran~ for the purpose of dumping, sewaae sludge or industrial waste. 

The SI/IIIIMI'Y Engillurlng &port for AbySSlll Pllli111 Wa.ste lsolollon Project was 

completed in Januuy 1995 for the Navy. It is one of the more ra:ent documents propoling deep 

ocean dumpinc. It is useful to examine wllll this newest document ~-

In a nutshell, the Report focusses on deep ocean dumpina of industrial waste in the form 

of incinerator ub, sewqe sludp and contaminated dredpd sediments. T'hese malaials cannot 

be leplly ocean dumped. In lddition to bein& illepl, lilY new ocean dlllllpina activities would 

be extmnely unpopular. The public hu spobn out fon:efully and rept:aledly lpinst ocean 

ctumpina of poUutlnts, includin& shore tourisna infleleas, Wiler reaadon busineaea, fishermen 

and CIORieiVIIioais. 
163 

3 

What does the Navy's Report Recommend? 

The Report ranks different dumping concepts. It's number one choice is the "Surface 

Emplacement Concept. • In this instance, a barge would sail out to one of 400 dumpsites. Off 

the Atlantic coast, the waste-loaded barge would have to sail from over 630 miles to over 1,250 

miles to reach the dumpsite. For the Pacific, the barge would travel from 275 miles to nearly 

2300 miles from port to dumpsite. For the Gulf of Mexico, the barge would have to sail from 

250 to 712 miles from port to dumpsite. The dumpsites would be located off such heavily 

populated cities as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Seattle, San Francisco, Los 

Angeles, San Diego, Tampa, and Galveston. 

Each barge would carry 25,000 metric tons of wastes that are currently illegal to dump 

in the ocean. That translates into more than 55 million pounds of waste per bar&e The wastes 

would be put into 50 bags. · So barges travelling hundreds if not thousands of miles out to sea -

- subject to storms, hurricanes, and nor'easters -- would be loaded up with 55 million pounds 

of waste. 

Once the dumpsite was reached, the barge would dump bags of incinerator ash, 

contaminated dredged sediments, or sewage sludge into the ocean. The bags would be dropped 

from the bottom of the barge to sink through roughly 20.{)()() feet of water. This is a depth of 

over three-and-a-half miles. 

The 50 bags containing a total of 55 million pounds of waste would be dropped on a 

dumpsite measuring 500 meters by 500 meters. This translates into roughly 2. 7 million square 

feet-- making the dumpsite an ar.ea the size of nearly 100 football fields. The bags would be 

dropped through water over three-and-a-half miles deep; from a sight far out in the high seas 

subject to storm conditions and currents; to cover an ocean area the size of nearly 100 football 

fields. 

In the Repon, an estimate of roughly 20 million metric tons of dredged material is listed 

as "suitable" for deep ocean disposal every year. This translates into 40 trillion pounds of 

dredged sediments annually. 

The Repon estimates that the per-port capacity is 2.5 million metric tons, which means 

that presumably eight ports would be ports-of-call for the dumping barges. To dump 20 million 

metric tons of waste in the ocean, 800 trips would have to be made at the rate of 25,000 metric 

tons per trip. 

Therefore, the Report rimst envision the use of several barges to service the eight portsof-call to make the 800 trips necessary to dump 40 trillion oounds of dredged sediments in the 

~ 
164 

To summarize the Report's rwmber one dwicefor deep ocean dumping: 

A barge would sail from a major metropolitan area, looded with 55 million tons 

of waste. It would sail anywhere from 276 to 2300 miles offshore. It would 

dump 50 bags containing a total of 55 million pounds of waste into · the ocean. 

The bags would sink through more than 3 1/2 miles of water. The dumpsite area 

on the ocean floor would be the size of nearly 100 football fields. lf only 

dredged sediments are dumped -- as opposed to sewage sludge and incinerator 

ash, as also proposed by the report -- 44 trillion pounds of sediments would be 

dumped in the ocean annually. 

The top ten reasons why this proposal is full of flaws are: 

1. It would be illegal under U.S. and international law to dump the wastes 

proposed by the Report. 

2. It would be illegal under U.S. law to transport the wastes through U.S. waters 

for the purposes of dumping. Therefore, you could neither transwrt nor dump 

the wastes discussed by the Report. 

3. Transportation hazards would be enormous. Distances of hundreds or 

thousands of miles would be covered by a ship loaded with 55 million pounds of 

waste. What happens in the event of a storm, or leak, or spill? 

4. The deep ocean is extraordinarily vibrant and filled with life, much of it with 

great commercial potential. In addition, the ocean is traversed by marine 

mammals, all of which are endangered or threatened species. Vitally important 

fisheries use the ocean and depend on clean water for survival. It would be 

extremely difficult to monitor the impact on migratory · marine mammals and 

fisheries from exposure to the wastes. However, common sense dictates that 

dumping 44 trillion pounds of waste in the ocean would make an impact on its 

biological integrity. 

5. A dumpsite on the ocean floor the size of 100 football fields is the equivalent 

of firebombing the ocean floor. 

6. U.S. waste policy has developed more of an emphasis on monitoring disposal 

facilities to ensure that wastes are not moving offsite. Monitoring the movement 

of hundreds of bags on the cicean floor 3 1/2 miles below the water surface would 

be extremely difficult if not impossible. 

7. Ocean floor dumping would make waste retrieval for treatment nearly 

impossible, dooming the ocean floor to be a landfill forever. 

8. If the bags decayed or split open, cleaning up the resulting hazardous waste 

area would be impossible. In addition, the bags of waste would be dumped 

through extremely deep water. The only experience to date . with dumping 

geotextile bags filled with waste has been in water less than 300 feet deep. This 

Report proposes dumping in water 20,000 feet deep. 

9. There is no practical experience with the bags proposed to hold 1 · million 

4 
165 

pounds of waste each. They have never been tested in deep water; they have the 

potential to rip as they are dumped off the barge; there is no evidence showing 

they can withstand the forces of the deep ocean; and it is likely that their disposal 

in the ocean would be illegal under international and domestic law. 

10. There is no need to embark on this proposal of herculean and completely 

unproven proportions. Contaminated sediments can be stored on site, in upland 

facilities or treated. It is illegal to dump any other wastes in the ocean, with the 

exception of clean dredged materials. If the dredged sediments are clean, there 

are many beneficial reuse options, beach renourishment or safe disposal 

alternatives available: they are a resource, .not a waste. 

5 

The Report acknowledges some of these very fundamental problems in its next-to-the-last 

page. It acknowledges that the downside of the "Surface Emplacement" concept is that "the bags 

are expected to drift apart as they fall through the water column, • which presumably would 

make it difficult to actually dump in the designated dumpsite. Earlier in the Report, it is noted 

that the only experience with dumping bags of waste in the ocean has come from the Army 

Corps of Engineers in water depths of less than 300 feet, which is Jess than 5 percent of the 

depth of water discussed for deep ocean dumping. The susceptibility of bags to drift is raised. 

Bag survivability on the ocean floor is also a complete unknown. The. bags can also rip as they 

exit the barge. And there aren't enough of them: currently, 700 are made a year and the 

"Surface Emplacement" project would require seven times that. 

This entire concept pivots on the notion that wastes will be kept out of the marine 

environment because they will be in bags. But almost nothing is known about these bags, 

whether they can survive on the seafloor, whether they will land in the targeted dumpsite, 

whether they will rip on their way out of the barge, even whether there wiiJ be enough of them 

to sustain this new mini-industry. 

This concept also depends on current law being overturned. On the last page, the Report 

notes that the Ocean Dumping Ban Act made it illegal to dump sewage sludge at sea. 

Incinerator ash may contain contaminants that are prohibited from ocean dumping under the 

international treaty called the London c ·onvention. And the synthetic bags themselves could weiJ 

be iJiegal since the London Convention, the International Convention on the Prevention of 

Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act 

(MPRSA) make it unlawfui to dump persistent synthetics in the ocean. 

Why is an .activity that is illegal, potentially very damaging to the environment, extremely 

costly and entirely unproven being considered? 

Decontamination Technologies Are Further Developed Tluln Deep Ocean Dumping 

Technologies 

Instead of sinking Federal dollars into developing ocean dumping techniques, the Federal 
166 

6 

government should continue developing techniques that don't shuffle wastes around: rather, they 

reduce or remove the contaminants that make the waste problematic. Since 1987, the Federal 

government has supported demonstration projects at five sites in the Great Lakes that are geared 

toward developing ways to make contaminated sediments safe for re-use or disposal. In 1992, 

a demonstration project was authorized in the New York-New Jersey Harbor. 

These Great Lakes and New York-New Jersey decontamination projects show real 

promise for de-contaminating wastes, not just bagging them and dumping them. The 

Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers and entrepreneurs have 

cooperated to further develop methods to make contaminated sediments clean enough for reuse 

as landfill cover, plant nursery application, or safe disposal. 

Waste Dumping In The Deep Ocean Is Unwise and Unnecessary. 

There are several reasons why embarking on a deep ocean dumping concept is unwise 

and unnecessary. 

1. Ocean dumping of wastes other than clean dredged sediments is illegal under U.S. law. while 

the ocqn dumping of most other wastes is mega! under international law. 

A. Domestic Law. The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) was passed 

in 1972. It was later amended by the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988 (ODBA). The 1988Iaw 

banned c;x:ean dumping of sewage sludge and industrial waste, and prohibited ocean incineration 

of wastes. It also banned the transportation of wastes through U.S. waters for the purpose of 

ocean disposal. 

The ODBA bans were in addition to prohibitions already included in the original 1972 

law, the MPRSA. Under it, pollutants that cause cancer or genetic damage cannot be dumped 

in the ocean above "trace" amounts. Many of these pollutants are found in sediments dredged 

from harbors or rivers, including dioxin, PCBs, mercury and DDT. Therefore, under the 

MPRSA, dredged materials containing more than "trace" levels of carcinogens or mutagens 

cannot be legally dumped in the ocean. That leaves only one material that can be legally ocean 

dumped: dredged sediments that are clean or whose pollutant levels are below "trace. • 

In sum, the Navy's Summary Engineering Repon proposes to dump materials in the ocean 

that are illegal under the MPRSA and the Ocean Dumping Ban Act. 

B. International Law. The London Convention governs waste dumping activities in the ocean, 

and the United States -- along with dozens of other countries -- has been a part of the 

Convention since 1972. Like U. S. law, the London Convention has been steadily moving in 

the direction of increased ocean protection aHd decreased waste disposal at sea. In 1994, the 

London Convention voted to ban hazardous waste incineration at sea. It also banned the disposal 

of industrial· waste at sea, and outlawed the disposal of high-level and low-level radioactive waste 

dumping at sea. Only two materials may be legally dumped: sewage sludge and dredged 
167 

7 

sediments, and there is movement toward banning sewage sludge disposal soon. 

The direction taken by the international community through the London Convention and 

the United States through passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act is clear: the eventual 

elimination of waste dumping at sea. 

In addition to the London Convention's prohibitions, the MARPOL convention 

(International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) regulates waste dumping 

at sea. As mentioned above, it, along with the London Convention and MPRSA, prohibits ocean 

dumping of persistent synthetics, which raises questions about the legal ability to dump 

synthetically bagged wastes in the sea. 

Both U.S. and international law have moved away from the ocean as a waste repository. 

By and large, the wastes contemplated for a new deep ocean dumping regime cannot be legally 

dumped at sea. Starting a new ocean dumping industry would also run completely counter to 

U.S. and international waste disposal policies. · 

2. Embarkin~ on a new at-sea waste dumpjn~ protocol is completely inconsistent with U S. 

waste mana~ement policies. 

Waste dumping in the deep ocean would run counter to established waste management 

policies for the following reasons: 

A. deep ocean dumping would act as an enormous disineentive for waste 

prevention, recycling and reuse. 

B. waste disposal on the seafloor hundreds or thousands of miles offshore in 

depths of water over three miles deep would make waste monitoring incredibly 

difficult, while making waste retrieval and site clean-up nearly impossible. 

C. beginning a new deep ocean practice would divert limited Federal funds from 

the development of technologies that solve waste problems, not just move them 

around. 

D. scattering bags of wastes across the ocean floor would leave a legacy of waste 

for our grandchildren and great-grandchildren to grapple with. 

Waste Policy Has Shifted To Prevention, Recycling And Reuse 

The first preferred action in the waste management hierarchy is prevention, followed by 

recycling and reusing wastes .. Ocean dumping is a throw-back to an out-of-sight, out-of-mind· 

outlook on waste management. As history has shown, as long as the oceans have been available 

for waste dumping, preferred activities such .as waste prevention and reuse have languished. 

While the oceans received sewage sludge, little effort was made to· determine environmentally 

safe ways of decontaminating arid dispOsing of sludge. When the Ocean Dumping Ban Act 

passed in 1988, states and municipalities were forced to develop alternatives . . As we've closed 
168 

8 

the ocean as the ultimate garbage can, waste management has developed a more proactive and 

environmentally safe approach, which benefits everyone. 

The only material that can be legally oCeari dumped in U.S. waters is dredged sediment. 

Contaminants in the sediment pose a threat to the marine environment. Decontamination 

technologies developed in the Great Lakes, as well as techniques pioneered by mining 

companies, are succeeding in recycling useful minerals from sediments and removing harmful 

pollutants. If sediments were lumped into a bag and tossed overboard, the ability to mine them 

for useful elements or reduce their toxicity would be lost. 

Waste Monitoring, Retrieval And Site Clean-Up Would Be Nearly Impossible With Deep 

Ocean DwnpiJJ&. 

In terms of waste disposal on land, the emphasis is on constructing facilities whose 

activities can be closely monitored to deterinine if harm to the environment or human health is 

occurring. For example, landfills are now required to have double liners to help reduce the 

possibility that wastes will f!lter through to underground water supplies. Monitoring systems 

are required to determine if wastes are moving offsite or leaking from the disposal area. Wastes 

are supposed to be confined so that, if possible, treatment can occur. 

None of these criteria would be met with deep ocean dumping. Monitoring would be 

extremely difficult through 3 1/2 miles of water in an area subject to currents, underwater 

storms and wave action. Leakage or offsite movement would be difficult to determine and if 

found, remedies would be practically non-existent. 

A New DeeiM)cean Dwnpin& Practice Would Divert Federal Funds Away From ProblemSolrilll 

In the Navy's Repon, Federal funding would be required to develop and test the 

technologies that are in the five "concepts" discussed in the Report. As this Congress knows, 

Federal Funding budget for innovative technologies that benefit the environment is extremely 

limited. The entire budget for the Assessment and Remediation of Contamin.ated Sediments 

(ARCS) program in thC Great Lakes is a modest SS million per year. · Since this program has 

been ongoillg for eight years, and its New York-New Jersey counterpart has been in existence 

for a couple of years, it would make better fiscal sense for the Federal government to direct its 

limited resources into technologies that hold the promise of solving the waste problem, not just 

re-locating it. · 

Deep Ocean Dumpin& Would lave A Lepcy For Future Generatioas To Confront 

This country has a history of embarkiRg . on waste disposal activitj.es whose impacts are 

not realized for generations. For example, liquid hazardous wastes were dumped into unlined 

landfills, which led to toxics leaching out and poisoning drinking water. Tall stacks spewed air 

pollutants that resulted in acid rain and significant forest damage. Too often our response to a 
169 

9 

perceived "waste crisis" has been to jump first and think later. Deep ocean dumping would 

leave another waste legacy to our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who are already 

burdened with the problems created to date. 

3. There is no need to begin waste dumping in ihe dc:e1> ocean as economically and 

environmentally preferable waste disposal, prevention and reuse OJ!tions exist and are being 

further deye]Qped, 

Clean-up technologies are being developed through the Great Lakes and New York-New 

Jersey programs. While they are not currently ready for commercial application, they are 

moving toward that goal. It is quite possible that launching a deep ocean dumping industry will 

take as long as getting the decontamination technologies to a position of commercial readiness. 

Even in the absence of clean-up methods, new disposal and reuse options are reducing 

the volume of waste proposed for deep ocean dumping. For example, some ports are avoiding 

ocean dumping by using approaches such as creating new subaqueous pits for storage of 

contaminated sediments. The Port of New York-New Jersey is investigating this option for 

storage of polluted dredged materials. The Port of Boston has decided to avoid ocean dumping 

of problem sediments and is, instead, creating a disposal pit in one of its channels. On-site 

disposal options are also being pursued by the Port of Seattle and some of the Great Lakes ports. 

Some sediments are being treated to the point that they are suitable for landfill cover, thereby 

·becoming an asset, not an encumbrance. 

With everything banned for ocean disposal except dredged materials, the need for 

embarking on a massive new ocean dumping program is completely absent. 

4. Waste dumping in the deep ocean could harm living marine resources and industries 

deoendent Qn them, 

The New York Times and other publications, including Smithsonian and BioScience 

magazines, have reported new scientific breakthroughs regarding the incredible diversity and 

richness of the deep ocean. As well as threatening the plants and animals that live in the abyssal 

plain and elsewhere in the deep ocean, waste dumping activities would threaten animals that live 

closer to shore. For example, ships hauling SS million pounds of waste would sail for huge 

distances through areas used by endangered and threatened marine mammals. These areas are 

also rich commercial and recreational fisheries. If a spill or leak were to occur in transit, the 

impacts could be disastrous. In addition, the action. of dumping hundreds of million-pound bags 

through miles of water onto the seafloor could have catastrophic impacts. At a bare minimum, 

life on the ocean floor would be smothered or crushed by the bags landing intact or breakirig 

apart on impact. Waste bags tossed into ocean waters also threaten the delicate microlayer of 

the sea, which is a thin zone of water and air which supports foodchain basics like 

phytoplankton. The dumping activities -- transportation, water dumping and seabed landing --
170 

10 

are fraught with problems for the ocean and the resources it supports. 

Conclu5jon 

As proposed by the Janutlry 1995 Repon done for the Navy, deep ocean dumping would 

involve wastes that cannot legally be disposed in the ocean or even transported over it for 

purposes of disposal. The Repon's number one recommended proposal would go against longstanding public opposition to waste dumping in. the ocean. It would involve long-distance 

transportation over storm-prone seas to a site where literally trillions of pounds of waste would 

be tossed into the ocean to sink through over three miles of water and despoil an area of the 

ocean floor the size of almost I 00 football fields. 

This proposal is unworkable. It is also unnecessary. Other more environmentally 

sensitive disposal, reuse, recycling and prevention options exist. 

Any deep ocean dumping proposals would, by their nature, divert scarce Federal funds 

from supporting the development of technologies that would deal head-on with pollutants in 

~. not just bundle them up and dump them at sea. 

On behalf of the fishing, water recRJation and conservation interests I represent today, 

I strongly urge the subcommittees to prevent deep ocean dumping activities from occurring. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 
Vith the Arts 

Entertainment Science Times TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, JHS 

c1 

fhe World's Deep, Cold Sea Floors 

-Iarbor a Riotous Diversity of Life 

B)' WILLIAM J, IIROAD 

F RIGID and liJhtless, 1M noors of thr ocuns have t>Mn bloiop- t &l de!.fn. mentthatmaruwbiolociltS&rtno"·dtsccvrrinJthitthrsupposMdestnsHthrs-..ctthariO:of 

hie. Is so llil)lthtl It rr.l)' rival that o! tropic.) rainloruts, often sun u t.'>e 

pmnaclrolbioloJitalriehness. 

The of !pto<:its on the ocean noor llso 

postsasrvtrrchalie.,crtoC\Irrenttheory,si:>er 

new &rr usually to require 

ltlndoft:l\"lronment&lburlulnordtrtOdi•·r"If, 

Rouc!lrnimates forthotnumberofspeciesoa 

old projKtions of for all of 

marine life. 

Thenu.-firuresaJ!IOcontrutstarklywnb:.'>e 

sum of tile earth'splanu,anima.ls and micro!le:s 

that5clentistshave!IOfarname<l,aboutL4rnlllioa 

mlllion that rxperu had projKted u poss..'":lle 

totalsforthtnumbtroftrrrestria.lspecles.. 

"ll's chan&lna our •·hole \1tw btodri-.:rsl!y," said Dr. P. Jo!la D. llmbsbud, 1. ma.."ir.e 

bialoalstlt\heNatura.lHlstoryMuseumlnl.ond21 

hi added In anlnten·iew. "All sorts of ecoiC>Cic 

lMorles that looki!<l 10<101. bue<l OllternSUial 1006-

tlli,!iUddenlylallapan.V.'t'reha''lnltochanarlll 

our ldeu.." . _ ._, , . · .. : 

nw cruturu of lilt deep ano an,Yihilla bon 

Conu .... --:-:<-- .. 

...... 

-:J 

...... 
172 

THENBW YORK TIMUS. TUBSDA Y, OC1'0Dl!R i1,1m 

Deep Sea Floors Teem With Diversity of Life 

CantlttUed F rom Pore CJ 

cuddly or cute, men~~C~na or sinister. 

Dwelllna on or In aeabcd ooze and 

often smaller than an asplrtn tablet, 

they Include tiny 51up.. malls, crabs, 

brisl.le worms, ribbon worms, tamp 

Shells. tusll. Shells, •a anotmOnCS. 

briUte stars and sea cwcum&ers. The 

b~QeSt are seldom ~r \han a banana. . Often miles deep, \hrlvlnl:ln pitch 

darkness \1114er enormous pressure, 

the mobs of marine lnvertebrat~ 

have now been lound ln hundreds of 

:=Jh:r~i =~~r:a ::!: Hal£-inch crustacean, Ischnomesus brunni, from sea Door. 

western Pacific. and other parts of the global sea. The variety of life Is so hilh that 

there Is very lillie IM!rlap among species from various umpllnc sites, 

t"Yen when they are refaUvcly dose 

tocetMr. It 11 almost as u the ~nl· 

malsin any Civet\ sample were most· 

ly endemic, that Is. species that live nowhere dse, as 1!1 often found on 

Pacific and Caribbean Isles. In this use, however, the endemicIty Is occurring In water- a medium famous for Its lack of Isolating barriers and Its propensity to aid animal ml&raUon. Moreover,lt 15 apparently 

occurring over much of the domain of the dt!rp sea. a dark world that 

l!nYtior4 nearly twtHhlrds of the 

eanh. 

Thou&h small and ucly by human standards. lhe newly recogntt.td 

creatures are considered lmJ'IOrtant 

because of th<:'lr possible commer· clal villuc, h«.ause of their mlc In maintaining the c;mh's e<:oJoKical 

balance ancJ bccau.se of the Intellec- tual challenge of understanding their place In the planet's evolutionary 

history. 

The potential commercial value of 

the new organisms lies In their great 

genetic diversity. Jn general, all 

kinds of cre::.tuR!S with strange me- tabolisms from odd places around 

the earth are starling to be aggres- . slvely lnvcsllt:ated as possible sources of bloiQ&kal ~it lll. l'hc: 

hope Is to use lhelr uoUc genes 10 develop new drv&3, catalysts and 

agents that can break down toxic wastes. 

The discovery seems to give some Indirect credence In speculation 

about lhe exiSiencc of much larger 

sea cre:1tures that remain to be dlspnrtly driven by rcrroduetlve Isola· 

Uon. Speelcs often arise, he held, 

Wht.on barriers like mountains or deserts 

_ prevent the lnterbrcedln&. of ... _ 

In II~. aroups that bc<:ome lsolat· ed drift ap:n1 genetically and physically to form new species, meanln& 

that they arc $(,1 cltsstmllar that they 

cannot su«essfully procl'f!ate. 

L<tnd Is full (If such barriers, both 

geographic and climatic. Dut the sea 

has few - a fact Darwin and his scientific heirs oflen polntcd to In 

explaining why the land appeared to be so much richer biologically thiln 

the. sea. This IOCic secmetl n!lnforccd In tonslderlnr; the deep, which not 

only hild f~w ~nvlronmental barriers 

btu lacked primary JN"oducers such 

as plants. For food, Its fnttabtu.nts 

mainly had to rely on a rain of organ· tc scraps laflin~; from far above nr to prey on nne nnolhcr. 

Expeditions ovt!r the deeo:~dcs tho:~t 

dropped lines and dredges Into the tlccp sce•ned to con!lrm the waste· 

land ltlea. The !ew gllrnmcrlngs of 

life that were discovered tended to 

be monolonou:~ly similar. The sea cucumbers of the deep Atlantic were 

virtually 11\tll tln~:ulshablc from those of the deer Pacific, as many n 

weary r~scarcher Dbservcd. 

The first hint that things wen! rad· lcolly tllffcr~oc c;uuc 111 111e l:uc 

1960's when Dr. lles.sler and Dr. 

llownrd L. Sauder:;, both then o:~t the 

Woods Hole O<:canogr;~phlc lnstitu· 

Uon on Co:~pc Cod, developed new 

kinds of bottorn-so:~mpllng sleds that 

revealed an astonishing richness In 

~~=~!C::r ~~;~:;e u~:.!~a~e:;~=~~ Ec.ological theories 

~~~~i:':.Y~~~ '::C~opoco~~~~~:!cr~ :=: based on the land are 

::.ft;:: ~';:.~~~r~h:.~~~~ threatening to fall 

pr:~a~rfslnt:IY. !he discovery o! apart in the Sea. the sea floo r's biodiversity ha~ set on debates as sclenti!\ls,strug;;le lo .. . . . .. 

- -understand the unel!lpe~;tcd.oru~ence· • · of a sup~ly barren world. ~the depths or the north Atlantic. "Nobody has explained this," said The breakthrough was simple. l11e 

Dr. Robert R. Hessler, a pioneer of sampllna nets that had been regulardeep biodiversity who works at the ly towed behind such sleds were rc- Scrlpps lnslltutlon of Oceanography placed with ones In which the nylon 

In 1..1 Jolla, CaiU. "Everybody comes meshes were much finer. The new 

up with wonderfully plau:=-iblc Ideas. nets nught sn1ollcr creo:~tures, anti 

But nobody really knows why you get caught them In protllglous numbers. all these sr-ecles. 11)(! Issue Is Just One samplin~ run hauled up 365 spchangln& there." des. 

Dr. J. FrcderKJI Gras.sle, dlrK.Ior Though starllln~ the work was of the. Institute of Mllrhll! and Coastal stow to be duplkatcd elsewht!re beSciences <~t Rut~crs University In CflUSe deep rcse!lrch Wll~ so difficult 

New llrun~wlck, N.J., anti a lentltnn anti C1l.'\tly. Mnrrover, cnllecte<l figure In the lleltl, :iaicJ the mystery st .... "i:lnums wo.:r(! uttcu h.1 rd to ldcnll· 

hAd Important Implications for un· ty !Jecau:\Q sn few blolo~otlsts were derstandin& the fate of the earth. trained In deep-sea taxonomy. In 

"Species diversity Is one of the short, the richness was debatable. 

most sensitive Indicators ol change," The work was slowly cxtendctl In 

Dr. Grasslc said. "A lot of highly the 1970's to many new sites In the diverse are:- ~ need urgently to be Paetflc and Atlantic, wuh similar 

studied because they're disappear· stan ling results. Even so, skepticism 

lng, the rain forests and coral reefs. continued In some circles because "We don't know how threatened the samplln~; was Imprecise. Sled the deep sea Is," he added. "But In rons fnr dlllere111 tlmcs.antl Spct"!ds 

the long term there arc goJn& to be produced different n!s.llts. And It 

changes. So there ls some urgency In was tlard 10 know how f;u the sleds 

knowing what's out then." tro:~ vcled across on the bottom, a fact Sclenttric theor~ of life are often that m:.dethe dcosltyof sampletlllfe 

rooted In the Ideas or Charles Dar· ambiguous. 

win, whose "Origln of Species," pub- So Dr. Hessler, after he moved to llshc<l In 1859, said evolution was Scripps, workccJ with a colleague 

there to dcvdop a tlevlce known as A box corer. Like a gl:mt squal'f! caoklc 

cutter 20 tnchc$ on a side, II was 

dropped on aline from a shlpandeut 

Into :a Pft(:lse volume of muddy .sea 

tloor. A seal drawn .cross the corer's bottom kept the sample from 

falling out during retrieval. 

n1e box a~rcr ...-orkctl a tt.'volutlon 

In the field, o:~llo wlnJ a new level of precision. Now, for the first time, the 

distribution of tlccp fauna could be 

exactly mapped. lhough Individual samples were small, repeated ones 

over a rtj::lon could give a clear 

reading of species density. A half do;c:cn sites were studied 

with sueh methods In the lt70's and 

l!l80's, wllh tantalll.lnc results. DUt 

the fkfd really developed only alter Dr. Grassle, then at Woods HeM, and 

several other scientists embarked on an CJ:tenslvt! study off the east coast of the Unii(!(J States for the Interior Dcputment's Minerals Manaa;e· 

men I ~rvlce, which was considering 

nil nnd cas development In deep wa· ter. 

Armed with a lew million dolli1rs, 

Dr. Crassle. Dr. Nancy J. Madolek, 

Dr. James A. Blake and Dr. Drlgltte 

llllblg, among others, In the mid· 

1980's dropped boa~: corers me:.surln& one foot square Into waters off Detaw:ue, New Jersey, New Englond, :md Nnrlh :mtl Soulh Camtlna. A 

total of 5~ boa~: core samples were 

taken at sitc'i up to 1.1 miles deep. 

The feast of life extr01eted from the 

muck WOIS so great tho:~t taxonomists 

spent several years ldcntlrying all 

the tlltrcrenttypcs of animals. 

"Our results, from the first cxtcn· slvc quo:~ntt tatlve sampling of deepsea com111unillcs, Indicate a much ~realer d!V('r.;lty of species In the 

deep sea thiln previously thought," Dr. Gra~le and Dr. Maciolek wrote 

In the February 1992 Issue of The 

Amtrlc:.n Naturalist, a sclentllic journal. · 

From 171,009 11\dlvkluals caplured bythebo~~:corcrs,thcsclenllstskicn· 

tilled a t<Mill of 1,:'>97 species. More Important. the rate at which new 

species were addt-d remained high throughoul the sampling - In other words, the diversity of life was so 

great that newncs~ was found whcr· ever a boll: corer hit bottom. Every 

square foot of OOlC disclosed another duten or creatures that WCI'f! unknown to science. 

"The number or species continued 

torlsestclldllyasmoresomplcsand 

more lndtvkluals were colloctcd." 

the scientists wrote. 

Dn!'icdon the rate of additions, the 

:~Cicntt~ls e~Um<1tN that the tiCCfl s.:aln~o.:uo.: r<~ lmlshthuld IOOmllllm• 

!'ifiCCICs of small lnvencbratcs. As· 

sumtn~ tho:~t abyssal regions far 

from coullncntal shelves supportctl 

less lllc, they said, a more realistic 

number was 10 million species. "This 

estimate a. probably C~~~nServallve," 

they added. 

It nonetheless prowked arona debate. Dr. Robert M. Nay, a zoolollst 

at Oxford Unlwrsity, faulted lhe fl&· .URS U URIUpportab~ and .. kf that 

tM deep tolal wu unlllr;ely t.o exceed 

ll ball mUllan IP«k'S. By comrast, Dr. Gary C. B. Poore 

and Or. Georae: 0 . F. Wilson, Aultrallan bloklt;lsts, ukllhelr own field 

studies ln the Pacific suuested that 

&lobal specla richness was even 

gruttr than 10 miiUon. 

"We suspect new estimates coold 

be much hlcher," they wrote In the 

Feb. 18, ltll, issue of the journal Nature. 

Other t!Xper1s, such as Dr. LambWad of tile Nntural History MU· 

~m. forn1erly the British Museum, 

1.uqested tlult the! estimates would 

easily rise Into UM: ranee or 100 mii- Uon sptdn If lhe count lncluded 

even smaller ereatum such as 

thread worms, copepods and ostramds. uncounted honk!s of tiny multi· cellular animals that nourish In the 

deepoou. 

Or. llessler or Scripps, the deep 

New drugs may 

emerge from a vast 

pool of exotic genes 

in the depths. 

blodlversUy plonecr,sald In an Inter· 

view that marine blolotlsts needed to 

redouble lbelr research Instead or 

their rough estimates. "What we 

don't know is the rate of species 

replacement" across the deep beyond the few areas that have bec!n 

sampled, he said. "That's the big 

QUCStk>n." 

Elt(ler1s also want more Jnvtstlga. llnu.s of the rkJdk! bc!hlnd the diversi- ty -how the deep Is abte to support 

such richness, seemingly In detlance 

of Darwin. Dr. Grassle of Rutgers . 

uld the disparity Is probably more 

app:~rent than real. His work suggests that extraordinarily fine but 

nonetheless formidable barriers 

arise In the deep as, for Instance, 

food resources ralnlnc down from 

above collect on !he seabed In tran· slent p~tches. 

Another conjecture Is that the ex· 

tra billion years or 50 that Ill!!' has 

been evolving ln the sea compared 

with land may be a factor In the 

unexpected biological rtchncu of Its 

dtq) recesses. 

Given !he vast dimensions of the 

emerging field, satd Dr. Lambshcad 

olthe Natural History Museum. con· 

servatlonlats were wronr. to1ocus so ' exdu51vely on land ecosystems. 

"You'll sllll read In textbooks thnt80 

percent ol all species. are In tropical 

rain forests," he said. "Thnt's Nbbtsh. It simply means that 80 percent 

of all biodiversity sCientists work in 

rain forests." 

He saki deep tuonomlsts al'f! so 

lew, anc1 lhe new population estimates so large, that Just Identifying 

the lnltnbltml\S ul the ubyss coulcJ tult() thau;,onds of y~o:~rs. 

"The klncls or numbers we're com· 

tng up with arc frightening," he said. 

"It we·re only hallway rlcht, many 

spc<:ics could be fo~ Into eJ:tlnC· 

non before they're ever described." 
173 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you for your statement. I thank each of you 

for your excellent statements and comments and your testimony. 

It is very infrequently that we have a panel of witnesses appear 

before a committee of the House of Representatives at the very 

same time that the issue that they are here to testify about is on 

the House floor, so you have a unique opportunity here to directly 

impact at least four votes here in the Congress on this issue. I do 

not think we have voted on this yet. We have heard the pro and con here and we have heard reservations about the capability. We have the capability, but perhaps the 

technology relative to the bags, and we are talking about from 

what I understand on the appropriations conference report the patented tethered technology delivery system that you mentioned, 

which I understand has been rejected by the Navy. 

So the question that we have to decide for ourselves today I am 

going to put to each of you, and that is, should we be spending 

NOAA's money on this issue. Frank, would you give us an update? Has there been a vote yet? 

Mr. PALLONE. Do you want me to tell you? 

Mr. WELDON. Has it been resolved yet? I will yield to the gentleman from New Jersey to give us the latest update. We are not 

putting you on the spot until we hear what he has to say, so you 

can think about your answer. 

Mr. PALLONE. This really says a lot about the process, unfortunately, and the way things operate around here in terms of certain 

special interests, if you will, getting their way. But essentially, due 

to the work of Congressman Saxton and also Congressman 

Torkildsen from Massachusetts and myself, we had a dialogue on 

the House floor during the general debate on the conference report, which is occurring right now, with Mr. Livingston. 

And Mr. Livingston, of course, said that this research project 

would not result in any ocean dumping actually taking ,place, 

which, of course, I contest. But leaving that aside, he agreed basically that no action would be taken with regard to the research 

project until our subcommittee, meaning the Fisheries, Wildlife and 

Ocean Subcommittee, reported a bill authorizing it. 

As you know, Mr. Burton has introduced a bill that is essentially 

the same as what is in the conference report, so that is certainly 

a positive development because it would mean, at least in theory, 

that nothing would move forward until our subcommittee took action on the authorizing bill. That is at least the way I understood 

it, and maybe Mr. Saxton can confirm that when he comes back. But I am still concerned, because the suggestion was being made, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Livingston that this was not going to result 

in any ocean dumping. Of course, my position all along has been 

that the research project itself is essentially an open-ended opportunity to conduct various forms of ocean dumping and that is the 

reason why both the Commerce Department, when they did their 

study, and the Naval Research Lab, when they did their study, 

suggested that this not be done. If I could just read this and then I will leave you all alone here, 

and I read this on the floor, in the letter that came to the chairman 

of our Resources Committee, Mr. Young, July 28 this year, the 

General Counsel of the Department of Commerce says that, "The 
174 

bill," the Burton bill, "is inconsistent with the spirit as well as the 

letter of the Ocean Dumping Act and the London Convention. It allows for large-scale open-ended dumping without limitation on the 

amount of material. It contains no guidance or requirements with 

regard to prior consideration of the impacts of the authorized waste 

on the marine environment, monitoring programs after disposal, or 

methods of packaging or containment of the materials. Therefore, 

the research program requirements fail to ensure that activities 

will be scientifically sound, appropriately limited, and undertaken 

only after consideration of potential adverse impacts." 

So my point, Mr. Chairman, was that the research program itself 

is essentially an open-ended opportunity to do ocean dumping of 

dredged materials, you name it. There is no real definition. So I do 

not agree with Mr. Livingston that the research project, if it moved 

forward, would not result in ocean dumping. It would. But thankfully now, we have a commitment that it would not do this research project or this study until our subcommittee acts. 

At least, that is the way I understood it. I think that past experience tells us we have to be vigilant in this regard and constantly make the case that this should not happen, but I think that we at 

least made some progress today. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his 

comments and for his work on the House floor, and I thank our colleague from New Jersey, who I know is alive and well someplace in this building or the building across the street. Hopefully, we will 

see him before we adjourn the session. 

But with the comments that our good friend and colleague, Mr. 

Pallone, just made, we do have a distinguished panel of experts 

here, scientists, and as we know, in the scientific community there 

is always room for disagreement on a number of issues and that 

has been evident by the testimony today. So I would go down the 

line and ask each of you, if you had the chance to take action on 

this issue today and to allocate funds through NOAA, as I understand it would have been, to allow a research project to move forward, what would your position be? We will start with Dr. Valent 

and go right down the line. 

Dr. VALENT. To perform this 15-year demonstration project? Absolutely no. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. Dr. Edmond. 

Dr. EDMOND. I think absolutely yes. If you are talking contaminated dredged soil, the volumes involved are enormous. The expense of cleaning it up chemically is enormous. It is in the ocean 

already. Unfortunately, it is in one of the most biologically productive parts of the ocean, estuaries. We are taking it to the least biologically productive part of the ocean and disposing of it in an organized, safe way, and we should not be misled by the bags breaking. 

Those are engineering questions. We can solve those. It is an option that should not be walked away from because the situation is 

getting progressively more serious, both in this country and internationally. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. Dr. Grassle. 

Dr. GRASSLE. In terms of our priorities, I do not think we should 

go forward with the proposal as stated. I think that for contaminated sediments, there are bigger issues to be solved, particularly 
175 

with respect to some of the things that I mentioned in my testimony. There are certainly alternative approaches. Beth Millemann 

mentioned beneficial use. Certainly, source reduction and taking a 

systems engineering approach to contaminated sediments in our 

harbors is what is needed, considering the problem in its entirety. 

I think isolating the problem as an engineering issue somewhat 

begs the question. 

Mr. WELDON. And Ms. Millemann. 

Ms. MILLEMANN. I would agree with that. I would also say that, 

as we know, this is a time of very scarce Federal funds and what 

I would suggest instead of this kind of a completely unproven and 

unnecessary project would be to continue congressional support for 

the program that was begun in 1987, which is seeking to find a solution to the problem of contaminated sediments to begin with, 

which is ways to render those sediments safe enough to be reused 

or to be disposed of safely. That project has been joined by a project 

that Mr. Pallone has long championed to test different technologies 

in the New York-New Jersey Harbor area to find ways to clean 

those sediments up. 

I would also add that several of the ports, as Dr. Grassle pointed 

out also, including the Port of New York-New Jersey, are taking 

steps to create ways to deal with contaminated sediment issues 

that they face now. The Port of New York-New Jersey is talking 

about digging an underwater pit for storage of contaminated sediments. The Port of Boston is doing the same thing for its sediment 

contamination issue. The Ports of Seattle and Tacoma are doing 

upland disposal and on-site disposal. So the ports are trying to deal 

with this as well, too, and that is the prudent course. 

Mr. WELDON. What agency is heading up that program? 

Ms. MILLEMANN. The decontamination projects that were created 

in 1987 were amendments to the Clean Water Act that the EPA 

runs--

Mr. WELDON. So the EPA is running it? 

Ms. MILLEMANN [continuing]. Through the Great Lakes National 

Program Office. The project that Mr. Pallone has championed is 

run jointly by the Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA and it 

was authorized through the Water Resources Development Act of 

1990. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. 

Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WELDON. Let me thank you for sticking through this marathon landmark hearing. You have been here from the beginning 

and we appreciate that. Thank you. Mr. KENNEDY. Not at all. It has been a real education. I look forward to working with my new colleague, Congressman Pallone, and 

furthering his endeavors on the committee as a recent appointee of 

the Natural Resources Committee. I look forward to working with 

some of the panel members as we discuss this issue going forward. 

I cannot help but just immediately be struck by the importance 

of this issue economically. I mean, you can just see all of our landbased dump sites are getting to be such problems, and the cost of 

transporting waste across State lines is another issue altogether. 

You can only begin to imagine why this is now being debated in 
176 

the conference report. There is no mystery to this. There are big dollars behind this and I am anxious to get more educated and 

aware of it because I am sure if my constituency really understood 

what we are talking about here, they would be very interested in 

learning more about it, so thank you. 

Mr. WELDON. I would thank the gentleman and would say that 

when we have the field hearing up in your area, this is certainly 

an area that we could pick up on as it relates to Rhode Island and 

the coastal States in that area. 

Mr. Pallone, do you have any other comments or questions? 

Mr. PALLONE. I just wanted to say briefly, I know the day is long here, but--

Mr. WELDON. It is very long. 

Mr. PALLONE [continuing]. I appreciate all the testimony. I did 

miss some of it, and I think maybe the most important thing, Mr. 

Saxton has come back now so I am sure he will comment on it, 

but--

Mr. WELDON. He will adjourn the hearing. 

Mr. PALLONE. The most important thing, I think, is to continue 

to be vigilant. We know that this has come up before in the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. As I said, there is no doubt 

in my mind that this was put in the conference because it was not 

to see the light of day. If it had come up in this authorizing committee or if it had come up in even the regular appropriations process, it never would have gotten through. 

Now that this has been shifted back to our subcommittee, I think 

that we just have to make sure that we bring to light the problems with this bill and why it is essentially ocean dumping, albeit maybe 

on a limited scale or maybe not. 

I just wanted to thank Mr. Saxton and also Mr. Torkildsen for 

bringing this up on the floor today because I think that we at least 

have thrown another roadblock in the way, but it is going to come 

back to bite us again and we have to be constantly vigilant. So 

thank you, Beth, and thank you Fred and thanks to the others for 

bringing it to our attention again today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. MILLEMANN. We really thank both of you for your good work 

and very quick response time on this issue. It was really so important for you to raise your voice again for the ocean and we really 

appreciate your hard work on this. 

Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. Thank you all. I apologize, but as you 

know, things do not usually happen in twins around here but they 

did today on the same subject, so I had to choose, as Mr. Pallone 

has just correctly stated, to be on the floor addressing this same 

issue. I think we have done so today successfully, and I thank Mr. 

Pallone, who was the vanguard of ferreting out some language in 

the appropriations bill that was objectionable to the New Jersey 

delegation, so I am very pleased. I guess I would just ask that my statement be included in the 

record at the appropriate place. 

Just let me ask a question for anyone who wishes to respond. As 

you know, I just mentioned the conference report on the Department of Commerce appropriations bill includes direction to study 

potential technology delivery system for deep ocean material place-
177 

ment. Since apparently the Navy has at least indicated serious reservations about this technology or maybe even has rejected the 

technology do you think it is appropriate that we spend or direct 

NOAA to spend its funds relative to this topic. I am sorry if you 

may have already answered this question, but if you would like to 

address that issue, I would appreciate it. 

Dr. VALENT. My approach will be to transfer my reports and our 

findings and what not to NOAA to a contact that I have been talking to there, Don Pryor, and offer them to him for his use in replying to that Congressional tasking. I do not think they are going to 

come up with any different findings than we did, and basically, 

that finding is that a tethered bucket under controlled lowering has 

about one-tenth the throughput, or in other words, it will cost 10 

times as much to get the waste to the sea floor using a tethered 

bucket concept that is controlled on the way down. 

As far as the issue of speeding it up by allowing that bucket to 

free-fall, that is technically not feasible, but we will be happy to 

provide all of our information. . Mr. SAXTON. I thank you, and if you would provide a full set of 

that information, if you have not already done so, to the subcommittee we would appreciate that, because we believe that the 

changes that were made to the intent of the bill language today reaffirms the authority of the subcommittee to deal exclusively with 

this matter, so it would be presumptuous on our part to ask you 

to send that to NOAA at this point. We would prefer that you send 

it to us. 

Dr. VALENT. I see. Thank you. 

Mr. SAXTON. We think we have a commitment from all parties 

now that this process will not proceed until this subcommittee authorizes it. 

Dr. VALENT. I see. Thank you. We will do so. 

Mr. SAXTON. We think that we have made that much progress. 

Does anybody else want to respond? 

Ms. MILLEMANN. I would just like to respond and say that I 

think that since there has already been an analysis done of this 

process that outlined its inherent weaknesses, spending tax dollars 

to repeat that would be a silly use of money. We also believe that 

there is no need to start a deep ocean dumping regime. It is also 

illegal under the law that you and Mr. Pallone worked so hard to 

pass in 1988, the Ocean Dumping Ban Act. 

So many of the materials that have been discussed for deep 

ocean dumping are illegal under U.S. law, international law, incredibly expensive, examined, and rejected. We would prefer to see 

a continuing commitment to developing the decontamination technologies that are under development in the New York-New Jersey 

region through the demonstration project and in the Great Lakes 

region through the ARCS program. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Dr. Grassle. 

Dr. GRASSLE. I would also like to add that we should not consider 

the problem narrowly as an engineering problem, that there are 

some issues about our understanding of deep ocean processes and 

life on the sea floor which need to be considered before we would 

contemplate putting waste on the abyssal plain. 
178 

The other side of the issue is that the question of the contaminated sediments in our ports needs to be addressed broadly. We 

need to take a systems approach to contaminated sediments in our 

ports, looking at the entire system. As has been mentioned, we 

need to consider remediation technologies, but in the short term, 

it is more important to look for better approaches to containment 

of the dredged materials. There are a number of innovative proposals to contain sediments in our ports at a reasonable cost. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Edmond. 

Dr. EDMOND. I will be in the minority. I think this is an option 

that is well worth looking into, certainly at the level of paper studies, as they are called, although I do not find them very valuable. 

I think if you look at the bag technology, it would work. It would 

be cheap. It would be accurate. I have almost as many Alvin dives 

as Fred, and when you get down in the submarine with about a 

couple hundred pounds, you go straight down. We could accurately 

emplace material on the sea floor using the bag technology. 

We would be taking material from one of the most biologically 

productive areas in the ocean-remember, the dredged soil is already in the ocean-and putting it in the least biologically productive area, which seems to make sense, doing it at a cost that would 

be competitive certainly with remediation, and doing it with a system which could operate on a scale comparable to the problem, 

which is not only contaminated harbors in this country but worldwide. 

There is an international problem associated with disposal of 

contaminated soil. Nobody has come up with a good way of doing 

it. The study that has been funded has been in existence now for 

what, 7 or 8 years without any real bullet in the hands. It seems 

to me that this is an option that should be looked at. 

The law is the law and the law can be changed, so the law is 

not an argument. If it is in the national interest, legislation could 

be passed. And I think if you think of the problem seriously, as we 

all do, then there is at the moment no obvious way out that is not 

going to cost us an arm and a leg. Mr. SAXTON. Yes, sir, and that is why we had originally scheduled this hearing today, to begin that process, and we want to do 

that. 

I am not a scientist, but I come as other members of this panel 

do at this from a commonsense point of view and from some experience, I might add. Back several decades ago, we had a problem 

with sewer sludge and we decided that since the sea was such a 

vast area, that if we just transported it 12 miles off the tip of Mr. 

Pallone's district, that it would be out of sight and out of everyone's 

mind forever. 

We finally decided that that did not work, so we moved it to a 

site 106 miles off the southern tip of my district and dumped it 

there for a time, and finally we collectively decided that that did 

not work, in spite of the fact that the sea is such a vast area. So now we are considering the more vast reaches of the ocean because the first two did not work. So from an experience point of 

view as well as from a commonsense point of view, one of the 

things that many of us have concluded is that out of sight is not 

out of mind when it comes to these types of materials. 
179 

I do not claim to know what the answers are, but from some of 

our experiences in recent years and recent decades, it certainly appears that we need to move very cautiously on these issues. 

In any event, I am sure that we have not heard the last of this 

matter, as Mr. Pallone correctly points out. We thank you for coming to share your visions and your perspectives of this issue with 

us. We will continue to search together for answers. 

Thank you very much. The hearing is concluded. [Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] [The following information was submitted for the record:] 
180 

FACT SHEET 

March 1995 

PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPORT NO. 34 (1993-94) 

TO THE STORTING ON NUCLEAR ACTMTIES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN 

AREAS ADJACENT TO OUR NORTHERN BORDERS 

The Government presented Report no. 34 (1993-1994) to the Starting on nuclear activities 

and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our northern borders on 8 April 1994. The report 

was debated in the Starting on 16 June 1994. 

The Government has now drawn up a Plan of Action for following up this report. High priority 

is given to measures to increase nuclear safety and prevent radioactive contamination. 

Sllmmary of the Plan of Action 

Although Norwegian efforts in connection with nuclear issues will primarily be concentrated 

on northwest Russia. it may also prove appropriate to provide assistance for certain projects in 

the Baltic states and Central and Eastern European countries. 

The Plan of Action includes projects designed to address the following major problems: 

I. Unsatisfactory safety standards at nuclear facilities (power plants, nuclear-powered 

civilian vessels, nuclear powered naval vessels and reprocessing plants). 

2. Unsatisfactory management and storage of spent uranium fuel and radioactive waste. 

3. Dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Sea and input into the sea from 

Russian rivers. 

4. Weapons-related environmental hazards. 

Although the responsibility for solving these problems lies primarily with the Russian 

authorities. external support is necessary. Norway is seeking to initiate broad international 

cooperation on the technical and financial aspects of these problems. 
181 

Increasing international cooperation 

In a short period of time, the attention focused on nuclear problems and on the cooperation 

necessary to solve them has increased considerably. 

Norway participates actively in a large number of formal and informal bilateral, trilateral, 

regional and multilateral fora for cooperation and consultation. Cooperation has been initiated 

with Russia, the Nordic countries, France and the USA. 

Furthermore, nuclear safety and radioactive contamination have been placed on the agenda in a 

large number of multilateral fora. The most important of these are: 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

the OECD countries' G-24 group for nuclear safety, 

the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), 

the Nuclear Safety Fund of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

(EBRD), 

the London Convention of 1972, 

NATO/the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 

the Barents Cooperation, 

the Baltic Sea Council, 

the Nordic Council/Nordic Council of Ministers, 

the Rovaniemi Process, 

tbe UN and 

• theEU. 

Sm11ul jiiUIIU:ial btuis for iru:retuH Norwqitu1 DCti1lity 

The Plan of Action encompasses surveys and analyses, technical assistance (including training), 

equipment deliveries, work in connection with international agreements and conventions and 

political processes for obtaining as much information as possible and promoting the broadest 

possible international involvement in combating the threat of radioactive contamination in areas 

adjacent to our northern borders. 

The Starting has provided a sound financial basis for increased Norwegian activity in this field. 

The Government has earmarked up to NOK 130 million for implementation of the Plan of 

Action in 1995. 

In 1995 the Government's efforts to improve nuclear safety and prevent radioactive 

contamination will focus on the following: 

I . UII.SQtisfactory Mfety standards at nuclear facilities 

Technical assistance including training and equipment deliveries to the nuclear power 

plant on the Kola Peniosula. 

Risk and impact assessments related to accidents at the nuc:lear power plant on the Kola 

Peninsula. 
182 

Studies and measures related to the use of alternative energy sources, energy-saving and 

efforts to increase the efficiency of the energy sector in northwest Russia. 

Increased cooperation between Norwegian and Russian authorities which are responsible 

for safety and control measures at nuclear facilities. 

Contributions to the work of the Nuclear Safety Fund to improve safety standards at 

high-risk nuclear reactors in Russia and Eastern Europe pending their closure in the near 

future. Norway attaches great importance to ensuring the success of the Fund in 

implementing a project to improve safety standards at the nuclear power plant on the 

Kola Peninsula. 

Support for international cooperation on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power 

plant in Ukraine. 

Participation in the work of the IAEA and the OECDINEA related to liability for 

nuclear damage. 

2. Unsatisfactory manageme111 and storage of spent uramum fuel and radioactive waste. 

Financial and technical assistance for an international conference under the auspices of 

the IAEA on the management and storage of radioactive waste in Russia. 

Continuation of the Norwegian-Russian-US project aimed at expanding the capacity of 

the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet's effluent treatment facility for low-level radioactive 

waste in Murmansk. Funds may be made available for the co-financing of the facility. 

Efforts to initiate international cooperation on measures for the safe handling of the 

vessel "Lepse", which is used by the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet in Murmansk as a 

storage facility for radioactive waste, including high-level spent uranium fuel. Vis-a-vis 

countries and international organizations that have expressed an interest in this matter, 

Norway will propose the establishment of a steering group for international cooperation 

in connection with "Lepse". Funds have been reserved for specific measures in this 

connection. 

Continuation of the contacts between Norway, the USA and Russia with a view to 

preventing radioactive contamination from defence-related activities and installations. 

Funds have been reserved for specific measures in this connection. 

Continuation, under Norwegian leadership, of the NATO/NACC pilot study on crossborder environmental problems emanating from defence-related installations and 

activities, with special emphasis on obtaining information and developing methods for 

implementing risk assessments in connection with the decommissioning of nuclearpowered submarines and the handling and storage of waste resulting from this process. 

Participation in the efforts coordinated by the IAEA to draw up an international 

convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. 
183 

Renewed initiatives vis-a-vis the G-7 countries concerning the preparation of an 

international programme of action and the establishment of an international fund for 

multilateral projects to promote the safe management and storage of radioactive waste 

and fissile material. 

3. Dumping of radioaccive wasce in che Barems and Kara Seas and input imo the sea from 

Russian rivers 

• 

Completion of analyses and preparation of a scientific report on the 1994 expedition to 

the Kara Sea. 

Completion of the first phase of the survey on the risk of radioactive contamination from 

the Mayak reprocessing plant. 

Risk assessment of the hazards to humans and the environment posed by dumped 

radioactive waste. 

Development of a programme for monitoring radioactivity in the Northern seas in 

cooperation with Russia and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 

(AMAP). 

4. Weapons-related environmental hazards 

Proposals to the Russian authorities aimed at initiating a scientific survey on radioactive 

contamination resulting from nuclear tests. 

Participation in international cooperation to promote the adoption of a comprehensive 

test ban treaty. Contribution to a system of verification and control. 

Measures contributing to the environmentally sound destruction of Russian chemical 

weapons in areas adjacent to our borders. 

Promotion of an unconditional and indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT). Norway considers it important that the treaty be funher strengthened by 

universal adherence. Norway is also making efforts to ensure that the verification 

arrangements of the NPT - the IAEA's safeguard system - is strengthened with emphasis 

on greater transparency and with the right to inspect and monitor all nuclear facilities. 

Financial contributions to the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow. 

Participation in international cooperation to prevent illicit traffic in radioactive 

subst~.nces and nuclear material. Implementation of specific measures to improve border 

controls between Russia and Norway. 
Mr. Bill Andahazy 

184 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFF1CE or: L2Q~ ~ .... 

1300 NAVY PI!N'1lloOON 

WA.BHINOTON DC Z0350-1300 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on National Security 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C . 20515 

De ar Mr. Andaha zy , 

INREPLY~TO 

LA-581-235 

3 Oct 95 

I n response to your request f or information concerning the 

p r ocess the Navy uses to determine channel dredging requirements t o s upport harbor and Naval base a ccess, the attached informat ion 

i s provided. 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 

P.W . DUNNE 

Captain , U.S. Navy 

Director, Navy Programs 
185 

Reapon•• to Congr•••ional Requeat for Xnformation 

Queatioo• Baged o~ p~ojected ~avy Force Struc~ure, explain thG 

process Navy uses to determine channel dredging requirements to s~pport ha~bor and ~aval Bace ~ccecc. Provide a lict of channel 

anci harbors t!:a~ will require ciredg:.ng to support Naval 

ope. rut ionl!l in the :1ext 15 year~ . 

ADawar: n~dging requirements al· e principally baeed o:'l c::.-iteria 

fr.om Navy Des:gn Manual 26.1 . Harbors and channels are d~edged 

.i.u a ;.;<.:u<.<l«U<.:to wl Lh l!ld.><.l lllUIII Hd v ly .. L luw•l <.iL·ct[ 1.. ii.HU UIIUI:<L 'kt:'':O 1 

safety requirements (sue!: as sl:ip motion frorr. waves, ~rim , L.s::, 

aquae, :idea, sa:inity, diver clearance, etc.) or the vessels 

that will transit or be berthed in the area. Additional dredge 

depth may be required to accour.t t.or siltation and/or aquatic 

plan':: growth . 

~avy dredging is categorized as ei:her Ma::.ntenance or Cons:ruct:ion d:r:edging . Mainter_ance dredging is dredging to 

c;ffset :hE! effe:cts cf si::.LaLlor:. CuusLL1.4\:Li.c.;u U.n~d~ln9 .i.s dredgi~g in suppor: o: a new re~~ireme~t or waterfrant 

-..:pqrade/replace:ner.: p~oiect. 

Po~ts req'..liring dredging in the neKt "-S years i a cl'!lcie : 

NAS Nnrt.h Island . CA 

NAS Pe~sacola, FL NJW~'T'II. >;;H., n i Pgn, rA 

NAVSTA Pearl Harbor, HI 

NAVSTA Muypor~. FL 

NAVSTA Norfol!<, VA 

NAVSTA Ingl~s de, TX 

NAVSTA Pas ~go~la , MS 

SUB~SE Kingo B~y . CA 

SUBASE New London, CT 

OUDAOC Dango~ , WA 

Puget Sot;.nd Kaval Shipyard, WA 

Nv:::folk Nava.l Shipya.rJ, VA 

WPNSTA Eat·l.;:, NJ 

WPNSTA Ycrktowr. , VA 

QUESTION: Ove r t he neKt 15 years, what is the NaV".,r' s estimate 

tor tne nunber ot ~re~g~ng operations that wil_ be re~lired? How mu~h dn~dg~> milt.Priill wi l resul t., How mucl: of t his :naterial can be cor:s1.der·ed c :;!.t <.trr.inate<l or hazardoue and wi:.l requi::-e special 

dispoEal me>::hods? 

ANSWltll: 1\n es-.:irr.ated numbe::- of required dredg:.ng "ope.,.at'ono;" is n:::t available . The nurnbe:z: of construction dredging operations is 

predicated on how dredqinq requi:::ements a1:e packaqed into contracts and Lhe availability o= military construction funds to 

suppc:z:t constl·uo: tion dredgir.g !:equ.in~ en_::;. The uuuwe:· uf 
186 

"'" i nt "'"'"'ncQ dredging ope:::-ation::; i 3 bae<!C or. 15il tat. io:1 

rates/ aquatic plant growth. 

Estima~ed dre~ging quantities throu~t 2010: 

Construt:L_or: Dredging: 

14 Million CY, 30-40% potenr.ia~ly cor.taminated. 

Maintenance Drecging : 

30 Mtl:ion =Y. generally, lese th~n 10% potentially 

cont:am· .. natcd. 

QUES'J:J.UN: How aces t.:hE ~avy cu:r-rently disp:>se of dredge 

:r.at:erial, both contamir:ated anci ::lean? An~ e:1vironmental 

restrictions resulting in d~sposal problems that Navy will have 

to address in t~e future? 

ANSWER: No::-conta:ninated drejae material ifl lll':<"n ""' fill 

'llatet"iul. or for near-chore or- on-shore beach :::ep:.~nis!'lment. 

No!:- :ontaminatd material not 3tJi nh . P fr.r b4<~ch repleni10hm .. nt. io 

disposed o~ aL an off-shore disposa: sit~. 

Conta~inar.ed material is d!spos~d cf in ~pland disposal sites, 

capp"'<:l <ab:>vro W'>rPr nr br<lc.wl by cl .. •n dredge r:~.:>tcrial or n~ay be 

c hemicaL.y treated to re:novc or arrest t.'ll" co::;tami:1ar.ts in the 

drerlgPn m~~~rial. 

nff-r.::horc dispo•al eitec ;:ll.-c tlQW o;>en to a~: u.se:ts ctuLl ctLe 

primari:y contrnl1ed by tho Ar:ny Corpa of Engineers . These sic~s 

have lir.ited c:lp.:>city and arc subject Lu im;r~11sing IJUblic 

S·::rutiny and environmental restr.:.ctio::;s. D:..sposal of c.-J!lL.:.tr:•in.::ltcd C.redge mat~J:i.al ~n u:;l ct.LH.l disposal aites :.s 

extreme:y expe:1sive . Disposing of conl<uninated dredge material 

wil.!. continue tu L., ,., dwllenge as env:i.romental regulations 

become rr.ore restrictive . 
187 

The following is a list of printed information retained in committee files: 

• Goals and Priorities to Guide United States Arctic Research, Beinnial 

Statement, Arctic Research Commission, January 1995. 

• Arctic Research of the United States, Interagency Arctic Research Policy 

Committee, Volume 9, Spring 1995. 

• Ocean Pollution in the Arctic North and the Russian Far East, Edited by 

Elizabeth J. Kirk, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 

September 1, 1994. 

• Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to 

the Territory of the Russian Federation, Office of the President of the Russian 

Federation, Moscow, 1993. 

• Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment Program, Interagency Arctic 

Research Policy Committee (IARPC). 

0 


ISBN 0-16-053903-X 

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9 80160 539039