The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United 

States of America (2007) was drafted in coordination with 

the National Counterintelligence Policy Board. Chaired by 

the National Counterintelligence Executive, the National 

Counterintelligence Policy Board consists of senior

personnel of departments and elements of the United

States Government, appointed by the head of the

department or element concerned, as follows:

the Department of Justice, 

including the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

the Department of Defense, 

including the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

the Department of State;

the Department of Energy;

the Central Intelligence Agency; and

the Department of Homeland Security.
iii

PREFACE

This National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United 

States of America elaborates the fundamental responsibility for US 

intelligence to warn of and help prevent terrorist attacks against 

the homeland, engage other asymmetric threats, and provide 

reliable intelligence on traditional and enduring strategic issues. It 

also describes a way forward by which the counterintelligence

organizations of the US government will engage elements in the 

public and private sectors to address the threat posed by the

intelligence activities of foreign powers and groups and protect our 

nation’s secrets and the means by which we obtain those secrets. 

The Strategy has been produced by the National

Counterintelligence Executive, coordinated across the counterintelligence elements of the US government, and endorsed by the 

National Counterintelligence Policy Board. 

Approved by the President as required by Section 402a of 

Title 50 of the United States Code, the Strategy provides guidance 

for the conduct of the counterintelligence programs and activities 

of the US government. I am confident that when implemented, it 

will enhance the integration and effectiveness of the nation’s

counterintelligence elements, as Congress intended in the National 

Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002.

J.M. McConnell

Director of National Intelligence
 

iv

Counterintelligence 

activities include but are 

not limited to collection, 

analysis, investigations, 

and operations. 

 Counterintelligence is 

"information gathered 

and activities conducted 

to protect against espionage, other intelligence 

activities, sabotage, or

assassinations conducted for or on behalf 

of foreign powers, organizations or persons, 

or international terrorist 

activities, but not 

including personnel, 

physical, document or 

communications security 

programs." (Executive 

Order 12333 as 

amended)

FOREWORD

The United States faces substantial challenges to its security, 

freedom, and prosperity. Transnational terrorism, continued

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), asymmetric 

warfare, extremist movements, and failed states present severe

challenges to a just and stable international order. Our ability to 

meet these challenges is threatened by the intelligence activities of 

traditional and non-traditional adversaries. Our adversaries –

foreign intelligence services, terrorists, foreign criminal enterprises 

and cyber intruders – use overt, covert, and clandestine activities 

to exploit and undermine US national security interests.

Counterintelligence is one of several instruments of national power 

that can thwart such activities, but its effectiveness depends in 

many respects on coordination with other elements of government 

and with the private sector.

During the Cold War, our nation’s adversaries gained access 

to vital secrets of the most closely guarded institutions of our

national security establishment and penetrated virtually all organizations of the US intelligence and defense communities. The

resulting losses produced grave damage to our national security in 

terms of secrets compromised, intelligence sources degraded, and 

lives lost, and would have been catastrophic had we been at war. 

Today we are engaged in a war, fighting terrorists who have

invaded our nation’s shores and threaten Americans and our allies 

around the world. In this struggle – which has cultural, economic, 

diplomatic, and political as well as military dimensions – the

potential consequences of counterintelligence failures can be

immediate and devastating, putting in jeopardy our nation’s vital

information, infrastructure, military forces and a wide range of US 

interests, technologies and personnel around the world.

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the counterintelligence community has begun to evolve from a confederation toward a unified enterprise able to bring the full range of

counterintelligence capabilities to bear on national issues. The

Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as amended, and 

the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

accelerated this evolution and charged the National

Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) with producing this National 

Counterintelligence Strategy and providing the President with

reports on its implementation. Yet much remains undone. 

Continuing the process of integrating counterintelligence 

activities is an urgent national requirement. The

counterintelligence community must do this through increasingly 

rigorous policy, doctrine, standards, and technology, and by

aligning policy and practice with the budgetary and operational

 The agencies and 

departments that make 

up the counterintelligence community derive 

their authorities from 

the National Security 

Act of 1947, Exec.Ord. 

12333, the Counterintelligence Enhancement 

Act of 2002, and the 

Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004.
v

The National 

Counterintelligence 

Policy Board was 

authorized by the 

Counterintelligence 

Enhancement Act of 

2002. It serves as the 

principal mechanism for 

developing policies and 

procedures for the approval of the President 

to govern the conduct of 

counterintelligence 

activities.

priorities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 

Counterintelligence activities must be orchestrated and integrated 

to better protect America’s secrets and vital assets while providing 

incisive intelligence to national security decision makers. 

The counterintelligence capabilities of the United States

evolved over time to fit the shape and mission of the disparate

institutions that controlled them. Taken individually, these capabilities do not provide a response equal to the breadth of the

threats arrayed against the nation, and they have not always

functioned cohesively in support of focused national priorities. 

Furthermore, repeated legislation and executive directives have 

emphatically called attention to our failure to align our activities 

and resources with a unified national counterintelligence policy. In 

2002 Congress created the position of the NCIX to serve as the 

head of counterintelligence for the US government. Three years

later The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 

States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction emphatically called 

attention to the failure to align activities and resources with a

unified counterintelligence policy and called for the creation of a 

“Mission Manager” for counterintelligence. Subsequently, in 2006, 

the DNI named the NCIX the Mission Manager for

Counterintelligence. Consistent with these authorities, the NCIX 

and the Office of the NCIX (ONCIX) will guide the integration of 

the counterintelligence community and implement its

responsibilities to identify, assess, prioritize, and counter the

intelligence threats to the United States. 

The NCIX, in consultation with the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, will shape and set priorities for a unified

national counterintelligence program that will guide the conduct of 

all the nation’s counterintelligence activities. Moreover, the NCIX 

will engage with other elements of the Intelligence Community, the 

broader US government, the law enforcement community, the

private sector, and academia to thwart intelligence threats directed 

against the United States. Only through a unified approach can the 

counterintelligence elements of the federal government

successfully execute our duties to enhance the security of our

nation, the integrity of the intelligence system, our competitive 

economic advantages, our armed forces, and our government’s

decision-making processes.

In this setting, the counterintelligence community is poised 

to make measurable progress, and the DNI expects us to do so. 

This task is urgent. We must capture our successes and efforts in 

measurable ways. Moreover, because resources are finite and

cannot be expected to grow in the near term, the NCIX will make 

the hard decisions necessary to improve the efficiency of the

nation’s counterintelligence elements. At the same time, the recommendations resulting from counterintelligence assessments done in 

the wake of penetrations and unauthorized disclosures will be
vi

rigorously followed up and monitored to assure that suitable mitigation measures are implemented. 

This National Counterintelligence Strategy is the product of 

an intensive consultation process across the Intelligence Community. It sets forth strategic objectives for the counterintelligence 

community, and it does so consistent with statutory requirements. 

The strategy will guide the organizational, programmatic, and

budgetary priorities of all counterintelligence elements of the US 

government. It will do so consistent with the President’s National 

Security Strategy, the DNI’s National Intelligence Strategy, and 

other applicable guidance. Essential strategic goals do not and

should not change every year; yet the process of risk management 

requires that the counterintelligence community continually assess 

challenges, opportunities, and vulnerabilities. The NCIX will

therefore review this strategy every year and, supported by the 

National Counterintelligence Policy Board, will make adjustments 

as circumstances require.

Joel F. Brenner

National Counterintelligence Executive
1

THE STRATEGY

The nation’s counterintelligence 

elements will operate as a unified,

coherent community and will jointly

conduct their activities consistent with

their respective capabilities and

authorities and according to the priorities 

established by the National

Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). 

SECURE THE NATION AGAINST 

FOREIGN ESPIONAGE AND 

ELECTRONIC PENETRATION.

The United States faces a wide

range of threats to its security from foreign 

intelligence activities, terrorist elements,

and other non-traditional adversaries

designed to achieve advantage over US

military, diplomatic, and economic interests at home and abroad. The counterintelligence community must act jointly to 

understand, confound, manipulate, and

thwart these threats, which exceed the

ability or resources of any single US

agency or department to overcome. When 

necessary, we will disrupt these activities 

through arrest and expulsion.

The counterintelligence community will therefore identify and prioritize adversarial intelligence activities 

targeting US interests and leverage its

collection, analytical, investigative, and

operational resources to defeat these

activities. We will also expand our capabilities in cyberspace. The cyber environment provides unprecedented 

opportunities for adversarial activities and 

is particularly vulnerable because of the

nation’s heavy reliance on information

systems. The counterintelligence 

community will exploit and defeat

adversary intelligence activities through

the application of the full range of

intelligence techniques. 

 

In collaboration with our colleagues in the broader Intelligence

Community and pursuant to strategic

threat guidance, counterintelligence

The NCIX takes strategic threat guidance 

from the National Intelligence Priorities 

Framework (NIPF), the National Threat 

Identification and Prioritization 

Assessment (NTIPA), and other 

authorities.

elements will assess the intelligence 

capabilities and activities of foreign powers 

and non-state groups including terrorists

and will describe their resources, plans,

methods of operations, and worldwide

reach. Foreign intelligence establishments 

and terrorist groups acquire resources, train 

and deploy personnel, and execute both

clandestine and covert intelligence 

operations against us. The counterintelligence community must understand

who they are, who their intelligence allies 

are, what they do, why they do it, and what 

they can do. Counterintelligence elements

will use this knowledge to direct activities 

that counter, exploit, and defeat adversary 

intelligence activities – particularly the

rooting out of spies in our nation’s midst. 

 Accordingly, the counterintelligence community will conduct aggressive, 

strategically directed operations against

priority intelligence targets around the

world using the full range of operational

means. The intelligence activities of foreign powers afford us opportunities to

exploit their operations and gain access to 

their intelligence in order to corrupt its

integrity. We will conduct worldwide 

operations to disrupt or defeat our

intelligence adversaries as they assess and 

respond to the United States. Each agency 

and department will contribute its own

unique capabilities, authorities, and

resources in a unified effort.

PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE 

US INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

The US intelligence system must

provide reliable information to the US
2

government and its allies. The integrity

and reliability of this system – the people, 

the structure, the information systems,

and the information they hold – depend 

on our ability to keep it free from

penetration or influence. In pursuit of this 

objective, the counterintelligence 

community will work closely with our

colleagues in security, acquisition, 

information assurance, and other relevant 

specialties across the US government. The 

effectiveness of security countermeasures 

in preventing penetration will be enhanced 

by intelligence concerning the current

nature and scope of the adversarial intelligence threat. No single department or

agency alone can ensure the integrity of

the US intelligence system and of our vital 

national assets. 

Vulnerabilities are inherent in the 

human and technological dimensions of

our culture, practices, standards, tradecraft, methods, and resources. Assessing 

these vulnerabilities is an integral part of

the essential and continual task of risk

management. Recommendations to

address these risks will include vulnerability mitigation measures such as the

institution of countermeasures, rigorous 

standards and practices, and the

identification of opportunities for

exploitation.

The ability of foreign powers and

hostile groups to threaten the integrity of 

the US intelligence system relies in part

on their knowledge of our security

practices as well as intelligence and

counterintelligence capabilities. Some of 

that knowledge has been made available 

to them through the robust workings of an 

open, democratic, and remarkably transparent society. That knowledge has been 

profoundly increased by foreign penetrations of our own government and by the 

treasonous acts of our own citizens. 

Thwarting the threat posed by foreign 

intelligence operatives depends on our

skill in learning what they know, as well 

as confirming what they do not know

about us, and in leveraging and exploiting 

that knowledge. That skill depends in

large part on our success in penetrating

these same adversaries in order to understand their full range of operational and 

analytical means. To the extent we do this, 

we will better protect our own secrets and 

decision making processes while

producing superior foreign intelligence.

Decision makers require intelligence free from hostile control or

manipulation. Since every intelligence

discipline is subject to manipulation by

our adversaries, validating the reliability of 

intelligence from all collection platforms is 

essential. Accordingly, each counterintelligence organization will validate the reliability of sources and methods that relate 

to the counterintelligence mission in

accordance with common standards. For

other mission areas, we will examine

collection, analysis, dissemination practices, and other intelligence activities and 

will recommend improvements, best practices, and common standards.

Intelligence is vulnerable not only 

to external but also internal threats.

Subversion, treason, and leaks expose our 

vulnerabilities, our governmental and

commercial secrets, and our intelligence 

sources and methods. This insider threat 

has been a source of extraordinary damage 

to US national security. Countering this

threat will require an aggressive national 

effort. In coordination with organizations 

responsible for areas such as security,

information assurance, intelligence and

law enforcement, and science and

technology, the counterintelligence 

community must develop new policies, 

tools, and methods to deter, discover, and 

negate insider threats. For example, electronic systems designed to discover

unexplained patterns of activities or

anomalous events must be put in place,

and they must be monitored. Adding

these new tools and techniques to our

nation’s existing arsenal, the counterintelligence community will seek to
3

manipulate foreign spies, conduct aggressive investigations, make arrests and,

where foreign officials are involved, expel 

them for engaging in practices inconsistent 

with their diplomatic status. 

The Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 directed 

the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 

to “ensure maximum availability of and

access to intelligence information within

the intelligence community consistent 

with national security requirements.” The 

National Intelligence Strategy responded 

to that directive by requiring the Intelligence Community to ensure that its

members and customers “can access the

information they need when they need it.” 

More specifically, we have been required

to do a much better job of sharing

information and to jettison the notion of 

“ownership” of information – a notion that 

encourages hoarding rather than sharing. 

This mandate will receive the full support 

of the counterintelligence community. At 

the same time we must scrupulously protect those pockets of information that are 

so sensitive that they can be disseminated 

only to those that meet the criteria for

access. Counterintelligence risk is in

direct tension with the seamless sharing of 

information. That is, the more readily

available one makes classified

information, the more likely it is to be

somehow compromised, and the easier it 

is to steal. 

Several espionage cases have

already highlighted this vulnerability and 

have done incalculable harm to our

national security. No counterintelligence 

official can guarantee our nation will

never suffer another incident of treason or 

espionage. We can, however, assure the 

President, the Congress, and the

American people that we have measurably 

increased the rigor of our system of

national intelligence and have put in place 

systems, practices, and procedures that

make foreign penetration more difficult to 

accomplish and easier to detect. To do 

this we must expand our efforts into

cyberspace. We must act jointly to counter 

espionage; those counterintelligence 

elements that do not include security and 

law enforcement must be more closely

tied to their security and law enforcement 

colleagues.

SUPPORT NATIONAL POLICY AND 

DECISIONS.

Foreign powers and adversarial

groups use intelligence activities to

support their national security goals,

project power in areas of vital interest, and 

in some cases threaten the national

security of the United States and its allies. 

When understood, these activities can

provide indications of their strategic

capabilities, limitations, and plans, and

provide warning of unacceptable 

intentions. Such intelligence is vital to

senior policy and decision makers as well 

as mission planners and operators. 

It is imperative that we enhance 

the Intelligence Community’s ability to

advise our nation’s decision makers of

impending threats, vulnerabilities and

opportunities. The counterintelligence 

organizations will do this through a joint 

approach to strategic analysis and by

collaboratively supporting intelligence

investigations and operations. National 

security plans, including counterterrorism 

and counterproliferation operations and

the indications and warning function of 

our nation’s intelligence system, are

vulnerable to foreign intelligence activities. As the intelligence capabilities of our 

adversaries evolve, our effectiveness in

thwarting them will depend on our ability 

to identify and fill critical intelligence

gaps in both collection and analysis. In 

meeting these goals, we will exploit all

available sources including open-source 

information, and will leverage new technologies and relationships.

Counterintelligence considerations 

must be included in mission planning to
4

ensure the operational community is

aware of adversarial attempts to manipulate, deceive, or thwart their missions. As 

operations progress, a continued

counterintelligence perspective also

permits mission planners to take

advantage of intelligence gathering

opportunities that would otherwise be

missed. This perspective is critical as we

conduct our analysis of adversarial

intelligence services and their relationship 

to terrorist organizations.

 The National Intelligence Strategy

directs the NCIX to support the analysis of 

terror networks. In coordination with the 

National Counterterrorism Center, the

counterintelligence community will produce actionable analysis to support the

disruption of terrorist operations and

safeguard US intelligence capabilities. To 

further support counterterrorism, the

counterintelligence community will review 

operations and intelligence reporting to

detect attempts by terrorist entities to

penetrate or manipulate us. We will also 

assess how key foreign intelligence services advance or obstruct US efforts to

fight terrorism and counter those activities 

that are hostile.

Assessing the capabilities of foreign 

intelligence adversaries means understanding their collection platforms and 

their programs and activities. We must

know how they are structured, how they 

operate, how their decision-making process works, and where they are deployed

against US interests. This is both a collection challenge that the counterintelligence 

community must support and an analytical challenge that we must meet. We 

will conduct a common effort to address 

the most critical gaps in our knowledge of 

these targets, and, based on those gaps, 

we will contribute to the integrated

collection strategies of the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 

 We will also provide strategic

analysis, counterintelligence insight, and

policy options to the National Security

Council, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the DNI to

support their national security 

deliberations. We will report our assessments of the intelligence environment on a 

regular basis and will suggest actionable

alternatives as appropriate.

Even with the most rigorous of

security and counterintelligence practices 

we can expect compromises of classified 

information and operations. We must

therefore conduct prompt and appropriately coordinated damage assessments

that provide a strategic evaluation of the

risk to US national security while initiating 

actions to mitigate damage and prevent

further loss. In consultation with the

Department of Justice in those cases with 

criminal implications and as appropriate, 

the damage assessment process will in the 

future begin sooner and produce results

faster. Merely reporting our losses is not 

enough. The NCIX will therefore

implement a follow-up mechanism that

will, in coordination with the appropriate 

inspectors general and budgetary authorities, drive actionable recommendations.

PROTECT US ECONOMIC 

ADVANTAGE, TRADE SECRETS AND 

KNOW HOW.

In collaboration with our colleagues throughout the government, the

counterintelligence community will

protect our vital national assets – critical 

infrastructure, sensitive technologies, key 

resources, networks, and knowledge –

from intelligence-related attacks. Our

water and sewer systems, electricity grids, 

financial markets, payroll systems, and

air- and ground-traffic control systems –

to name only the most obvious – are

electronically controlled and subject to

sophisticated attack by both state-sponsored and free-lance hackers. These

attacks can be designed to steal our

nation’s intellectual property or manipulate information to cause financial or
5

logistical chaos. While protecting the

country’s physical infrastructure is a duty

of other elements of the government,

counterintelligence has an important role 

to play in understanding who is planning 

and carrying out those attacks or

preparing the ability to do so in order to 

parry them, and in some cases, to turn

them to our advantage. 

We must assist in the identification 

and protection of the nation’s vital assets 

that reside in myriad elements of the US 

government, the private sector, and academia, and whose significance may be

unknown even to those that control them. 

Collaboration between these parties and

counterintelligence, law enforcement, and 

security officials is crucial to identify those 

targets of interest to our nation’s adversaries. It is also crucial to identify information 

that, if known to an adversary, would

probably be targeted and the loss or

compromise of which would be damaging 

to the nation’s security. Counterintelligence elements will work with law enforcement and security to develop, sustain, and 

leverage knowledge of our adversaries’ 

strategies, collection priorities, intentions, 

and technical needs, and we will translate 

this knowledge into proposed collection 

requirements. We will also provide threat 

information and warning to vital asset

owners, including those outside the US

government.

SUPPORT US ARMED FORCES.

Counterintelligence activities 

protect those who protect America – especially the armed forces of the United

States. To maintain the viability of this

instrument of national power, the counterintelligence community must

neutralize and exploit adversarial

intelligence activities targeting the armed 

forces. 

The armed forces have long been a 

priority target of terrorist attacks and the 

adversarial intelligence activities that support them. In recent decades we have

witnessed attacks such as the bombings of 

the Marine barracks in Beirut, Khobar

Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole

in the port of Aden. Such terrorist acts are 

always preceded by intelligence operations 

to reconnoiter targets and plan attacks,

and it is these operations that we must

recognize and thwart. Executive Order

12333 directs the nation’s counterintelligence elements to protect against

espionage. The National Intelligence

Strategy further directs the Intelligence 

Community to “[d]eploy effective counterintelligence measures that enhance and

protect... our armed forces....” In accordance with these mandates, the counterintelligence community will employ

offensive and defensive capabilities to

neutralize and exploit the full spectrum of 

adversarial intelligence activities targeting 

the armed forces, whether in garrison, in 

transit, or in their areas of responsibility.

The counterintelligence community will counter adversarial intelligence threats to military plans, operations, 

capabilities, intentions, and global

posture, including the location and

disposition of forces. Counterintelligence 

elements will support the full gamut of

military operations from tactical activity to 

strategic initiatives. The armed forces’

effectiveness depends on their ability to

conduct military operations uncompromised by adversaries’ foreknowledge. The 

obligation to support such operations

extends beyond the Department of

Defense to the entire counterintelligence 

community, which must collaborate to

neutralize adversarial intelligence activity

directed against our armed forces, especially the intelligence activities that

precede terrorist attacks.
6

MANAGE THE 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY TO ACHIEVE

EFFICIENT COORDINATION.

The integration and effective management of the counterintelligence 

programs of the agencies and departments 

of the Executive Branch is the NCIX’s top 

priority. Working with the DNI Chief

Financial Officer (CFO), the Office of the 

National Counterintelligence Executive

(ONCIX) will develop a plan to assess

current program development and

performance, identify unnecessary redundancy, and advise the DNI CFO of more

efficient ways to apply resources. Counterintelligence elements will provide the

NCIX with the resource data and

operational visibility required to perform 

the statutory functions of the office. In

addition, continuity of operations of

counterintelligence programs during

emergencies and other contingencies must 

be maintained.

IMPROVE TRAINING AND 

EDUCATION OF THE 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY.

The increasing complexity of

counterintelligence challenges requires us 

to address an ever-expanding range of

threats. Meeting these emerging threats

demands an adaptive, innovative, and

broadly educated workforce drawn from a 

wide range of backgrounds. 

As directed by the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as

amended, and in consultation with the

counterintelligence community, the

ONCIX will develop policy and standards 

for training and professional development 

of individuals engaged in counterintelligence activities. We will, consistent with 

the Intelligence Community’s Five Year

Strategic Human Capital Plan and other 

US government efforts, engage in a unified 

effort to establish best practices, baseline 

our community’s competencies, create 

core training courses, set professional 

standards, and support research

initiatives. To the extent feasible, we will 

integrate our training efforts and

standards with those of the National

Intelligence University. 

We will also develop an adaptable, 

expert counterintelligence workforce to

meet the challenge of evolving intelligence 

threats. Our efforts will focus on three key 

areas. First, we will recruit personnel with 

a broader range of skills and experiences 

from outside the counterintelligence community. Specifically, we will target those 

who have experienced other cultures,

speak other languages, or have specialized 

skills in information technology. Second, 

we will provide this cadre with a core

understanding in counterintelligence 

tradecraft, building on best practices from 

across the community. Third, we will

develop structured career paths that

emphasize professional growth by identifying key assignments and leadership

development opportunities and by clearly 

articulating promotion goals and standards. This lifecycle approach to

counterintelligence careers will be

grounded in a rigorous assessment of

needs and integrated into wider human

capital development efforts in the

Intelligence Community.

EXPAND NATIONAL AWARENESS 

OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK 

IN THE PRIVATE AS WELL AS 

PUBLIC SECTOR.

In order to better fulfill the mission 

of identifying, assessing, and countering

the intelligence threats to the nation, we

must reach outward to other elements of 

the US government, the private sector, and 

the general public. By engaging the

private sector and academia in meaningful 

dialogue, there is much we can learn, and 

in turn we can provide a mechanism to 
7

coordinate the public dissemination of

information on intelligence threats to the 

nation.

 Foreign intelligence activities

extend beyond traditional targets in the

Intelligence Community and other US

national security structures. The private

sector and academia are fertile breeding 

grounds for advanced scientific discovery, 

cutting-edge technology, and advanced

research and development that make them 

irresistible “soft targets” for foreign intelligence collectors. It is imperative that the 

American public understand that the cyber 

networks that businesses, universities, and 

ordinary citizens use every day are the

object of systematic hostile activities by

adversarial intelligence organizations, and 

that these activities threaten the integrity 

and safety of the nation’s infrastructure

and electronic networks. The counterintelligence community will engage the

private sector, academia, and the general 

public in an ongoing dialogue regarding

the threats we face and our responses to 

those threats. 

Counterintelligence elements will

work with willing private sector and

academic partners to advance intelligence 

community capabilities through research

and development and to anticipate and

identify emerging technical threats. 

Where the counterintelligence community 

can form liaisons with willing partners, it 

will reach outward for information critical 

to targeting foreign intelligence activities 

and defending national security. 

CONCLUSION

These strategic objectives will

guide counterintelligence community 

policy, planning, collection priorities,

analysis, operations, programming, 

budgeting, and execution. The ONCIX, in 

consultation with the National Counterintelligence Policy Board will oversee the

implementation of the objectives through 

an integrated counterintelligence 

community effort to capitalize on the

comparative advantages of its constituent 

organizations.