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HOM E LA ND SE CU R ITY ADV IS ORY

COU NC IL

INTERIM REPORT

OF THE

CBP INTEGRITY ADVISORY PANEL

June 29t h, 2015
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INTEGRITY ADVISORY PANEL MEMBERS

William Joseph “Bill” Bratton (Co-Chair) – Police Commissioner, City of New York

Karen P. Tandy (Co-Chair) – Administrator (Ret.), Drug Enforcement Administration

Robert C. Bonner –Senior Principal, Sentinel Strategy & Policy Consulting; Commissioner 

(Ret.), U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Rick Fuentes – Colonel, 14th Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police 

John Magaw – Consultant, Domestic and International Security issues; Member of Homeland 

Security Advisory Council

Walter McNeil – Past President, International Association of Chiefs of Police

Roberto Villaseñor – Chief of Police, Tucson Police Department

William Webster – (ex-officio) Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP

The CBP Integrity Advisory Panel would like to thank the following for their excellent support 

and service to the Panel:

Matthew Pontillo, Assistant Chief, Commanding Officer, Risk Management Bureau, New 

York Police Department

John Sprague, Inspector, Commanding Officer, Force Investigation Division, New York 

Police Department

Patrick Thornton, Captain, Office of the Chief of Staff, New Jersey State Police

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL STAFF

Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Mike Miron, Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Erin Walls, Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Jay Visconti, Staff, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Katrina Woodhams, Staff, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Noah Applebaum, Student Intern

Andrea Brent, Student Intern

Toni Mikec, Student Intern

Karly Nocera, Student Intern
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................................1

Recommendations: Assuring Integrity ................................................................................................. 2

Recommendations: Preventing Unauthorized Use of Force .................................................................. 2

Recommendations: Improving Transparency ....................................................................................... 3

ASSURING INTEGRITY ...................................................................................................................5

PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE....................................................................13

IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY....................................................................................................21

APPENDIX A – PANEL MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES....................................................................23

APPENDIX B – TASK STATEMENT ............................................................................................26

APPENDIX C – SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS ..........................................................................28

APPENDIX D – May 5, 2015 NGO letter to CBP IAP Co-Chairs Bratton and Tandy.................30
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Created as part of the homeland security reorganization of 2003, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) is the single, unified agency to protect and secure our nation’s borders. 

CBP is by far the largest law enforcement agency of our country. In terms of its more than 

44,000 arms carrying, sworn law enforcement officers, CBP is more than double the size of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and substantially larger than New York Police Department 

(NYPD), the largest local police force in the U.S. Unquestionably, CBP is far more effective in 

performing its border protection mission than was the case pre-2003 when border enforcement 

authority and personnel were fragmented into four separate agencies aligned within three 

different departments of government. 

Yet as a border agency with a national security and law enforcement mission, CBP is 

vulnerable to the potential for corruption within its workforce which, if not detected and 

effectively investigated, could severely undermine its mission. Moreover, it is imperative, as 

with all law enforcement, that CBP officers and agents avoid using excessive and unnecessary 

force in carrying out their duties. To this end, it is essential that CBP be capable of effectively 

investigating and deterring the potential unlawful and out-of-policy use of force by its personnel. 

It is within this context that in December 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

requested the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to create the CBP Integrity 

Advisory Panel (“Panel”), a subcommittee of the HSAC, in order to take stock of and evaluate 

the progress of CBP regarding its efforts to deter and prevent corruption and the use of excessive 

force and its efforts to restore public confidence through more transparency with key 

stakeholders and the public. As part of the Secretary’s tasking, he requested recommendations 

based upon law enforcement best practices regarding further steps needed to assure the highest 

level of integrity, compliance with use of force policy, incident response transparency, and 

stakeholder engagement. The Secretary’s six specific tasking’s are set forth in his letter to the 

HSAC dated December 9, 2014. (See Appendix B)

This interim report discusses integrity and use of force/transparency issues separately, yet 

some of our recommendations apply to both. A prime example is our recommendation that the 

number of criminal investigators in CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) be substantially 

increased. An adequately staffed IA is essential to giving CBP the capacity to timely and 

thoroughly investigate all allegations of corruption as well as all use of force violations of CBP 

policy.

Since its inception less than four months ago, in March 2015, the Panel has met and 

reviewed numerous prior reports, gathered a prodigious amount of data and met with and 

interviewed dozens of representatives of CBP, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), various 

stakeholders and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).

This is our first interim report and recommendations with more to follow in the future. 

Given the extraordinary importance of maintaining integrity and assuring compliance with use of 
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force policy, the Panel believes that consideration of our recommendations, and action upon 

them, should not await our final report.

Recommendations: Assuring Integrity

1. The Secretary of Homeland Security should make clear that the Commissioner of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection is responsible for assuring integrity and the proper use of 

force by employees of CBP.

2. Adequately staff CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs with sufficient and experienced 1811 

criminal investigators to timely and effectively investigate allegations of corruption and 

use of excessive force involving CBP personnel.

3. Allocate and budget for 550 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) 1811 criminal investigators in 

IA, for a net increase of 350 FTE.

4. CBP should work with DHS to amend Management Directive 810.1 of June 10, 2004 as 

follows:

a. To establish a policy that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) will ordinarily 

defer to CBP’s IA in corruption, use of force and other serious misconduct 

allegations involving CBP personnel, 

b. In those instances in which OIG does not defer, the amendment should make clear 

that the default position would be for OIG to investigate corruption and use of 

force matters involving CBP personnel jointly with IA, and

c. In any event, it should be clarified that the commencement of an investigation by 

IA will not be delayed while OIG is evaluating whether to take an investigation.

Recommendations: Preventing Unauthorized Use of Force

5. CBP should revise its use of force policy guidelines, as follows:

a. Emphasize that its overarching responsibility is to preserve human life.

b. Implement specific restrictions on the use of firearms involving a moving vehicle 

and individuals throwing objects.

6. Training should continue to emphasize scenario based learning and should include deescalation techniques designed to stabilize a situation and reduce the immediacy of the 

threat so that more time, options, and/or resources are available.

7. CBP should consider:

a. Developing local/regional Use of Force Incident Teams (UFIT)

b. Expanding the role of the Use of Force Review Boards (UFRB) to include a 

separate determination as to tactics employed during a use of force incident
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c. Consider a pilot project mandating that CBP law enforcement officers wear their 

body armor in operational assignments. Alternatively and in addition, better 

defined those circumstances where wearing body armor is required.

8. CBP should identify metrics to compare similarly situated officers/agents in order to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the body-worn cameras. Additionally, CBP should continue 

to consult with stakeholders and review model policies as it considers its final body worn 

camera policy in light of the lessons learned during the feasibility study.

Recommendations: Improving Transparency

9. CBP has the correct policy (“Maximum Disclosure Minimum Delay”) but needs to focus 

on establishing and streamlining its process to further minimize delay in releasing 

information to the media and public.

10. The Commissioner should consider designating one person at a sufficiently high 

leadership level in CBP to direct and oversee the implementation of CBP’s transparency 

policy across the agency.

a. CBP should consider posting on the internet all high profile policies and 

guidelines that may be of interest to the media or public, i.e. Use of Force, 

Pursuit, Internal Affairs, and Domestic Violence with Law Enforcement Officers.

b. It is imperative that the two separate entities, Office of Public Affairs (OPA)

Media Division and the Border Community Liaisons (BCLs), are functioning 

under a single congruent policy with the same mission. Information sharing 

between two must be mandatory.

11. As with all law enforcement agencies, CBP recently promulgated comprehensive, clear 

and concise policies on the use of force that include training, investigations, discipline, 

prosecutions, data collection, and information sharing. 

a. CBP should consider making these policies openly available for public inspection.

b. Policies on use of force should clearly state what types of information will be 

released, when, and in what situation to maintain transparency.

1

12. The BCLs should be pro-active in their outreach to engage stakeholders, community 

partners and leaders regardless of whether a high profile law enforcement incident 

involves CBP. For example, nationally high profile incidents (Ferguson, MO; Staten 

Island, NY; Tulsa, OK; North Charleston, SC, and Baltimore, MD) that do not directly 

affect CBP should be viewed at as an opportunity for the BCLs to stay in contact with 

their stakeholders and engage community partners in an open dialogue.

 

1 The media policies made available to the Panel contain this information, but the reputation of CBP has been that 

the practice of expedient release of information is not followed.
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13. CBP should reinforce its existing policy that mandates all uniformed personnel must 

wear visible name tags identifying their last name on all uniforms at all times.

14. CBP has posted a Spanish language version of the complaints form on its website but 

should review and improve its overall complaints system, including fully integrated 

Spanish language capability in the CBP call center and other steps to provide public 

accessibility and transparency in its complaint process for non-English speaking 

individuals.
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ASSURING INTEGRITY

Improving Integrity, eliminating corruption and providing for an effective Office of 

Internal Affairs

Several of Secretary Johnson’s tasking’s set forth in his December 9, 2014 letter to the 

Homeland Security Advisory Council (see, e.g., Nos. 2, 4 and 5) relate to the threat of corruption 

faced by a border agency such as CBP and call for recommendations from the Panel regarding 

how corruption and other serious misconduct can be deterred and prevented. Tasking No. 4, in 

particular, seeks recommendations that assure that CBP develops “an effective capability for 

investigating criminal misconduct within its ranks”, including corruption and the unlawful use of 

force. 

1. CBP General Background

CBP is one of the seven component agencies of DHS. In terms of personnel and budget, 

it is the largest component agency within DHS, with 60,000 employees and a budget of $12 

billion. Indeed, 25% of all the personnel of DHS are CBP employees.

CBP is a law enforcement agency, albeit one with a unique law enforcement mission to 

enforce the laws at and near the borders of the U.S. Of CBP’s 60,000 employees, 44,000 are 

armed law enforcement officers (LEOs) authorized to interrogate, conduct searches and make 

arrests. 21,000 of CBP’s LEOs are Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to CBP’s Border 

Patrol assigned between the nation’s ports of entry and 22,000 are CBP Officers (CBPOs) 

assigned to our nation’s 300+ ports of entry, along our land borders and at our seaports and 

international airports. CBPOs are under CBP’s Office of Field Operations. Given the number of 

LEOs within CBP (44,000), CBP is the largest law enforcement agency of the United States; 

larger than the New York Police Department with 34,500 sworn officers and larger than the FBI 

with 13,000 Special Agents. 

CBP’s primary mission is to enforce our nation’s laws at and near our borders - - laws 

against smuggling of drugs and other contraband, against illegal migration, etc. - - and to protect 

the United States and its citizens against asymmetrical attack by international terrorist 

organizations, state sponsored or otherwise. In sum, CBP’s mission is both a law enforcement 

and a national security mission and there is little room for error2.

2. Corruption as a Threat to CBP

Every border agency in the world is vulnerable to bribery and corruption; arguably more 

so than any other type of law enforcement agency, federal, state or local, and CBP is no 

exception. Indeed, corruption is the Achilles heel of border agencies. The mere perception of 

widespread corruption does irreparable damage to the agency’s reputation for integrity and 

causes other agencies to refuse to share information essential to effective border enforcement and 

 

2 At our nation’s ports of entry, CBP must perform this mission without unduly impeding the flow of legitimate 

trade and travel.
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interdiction. The threat of corruption cannot be gainsaid. There are major drug trafficking and 

smuggling organizations - - transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that operate on both 

sides of our borders - - that have budgets in the tens of millions of dollar for bribes and 

corruption of government officials. The need to assure integrity within CBP, therefore, is one of 

its paramount priorities.

An adequately staffed internal affairs component within the border agency, reporting to 

the agency head, is not only an internationally recognized anti-corruption best practice, but it is 

an indispensable tool, along with a functioning disciplinary system, to containing, reducing and 

deterring corruption. As part of its international role, CBP is in the awkward position of teaching 

professionalism and integrity to foreign Customs and border agencies around the world, 

including the need for a robust internal affairs capability, and yet CBP itself does not have an 

adequately staffed internal affairs and has not had one since the creation of CBP in March 2003.3

This needs to be rectified as expeditiously as possible.

Over the past decade, the number of allegations of corruption involving CBP employees, 

both Border Patrol Agents and CBP Officers at the ports of entry, may be increasing4 as has the 

public perception, through the media, of increasingly pervasive corruption within CBP’s ranks.5

Moreover, there is data indicating that arrests for corruption of CBP personnel far exceed, on a 

per capita basis, such arrests at other federal law enforcement agencies. And yet the 

investigations of corruption within CBP, to the extent they occur, have been undertaken outside 

of CBP, principally by the DHS Office of Inspector General.6 These investigations are nearly all 

reactive and do not use proactive, risk analysis to identify potential corruption. Moreover, they 

often take far too long and are conducted without the ability of the Commissioner to prioritize 

them. They often occur without any visibility of the Commissioner into ongoing corruption 

investigations involving his own agency. Until this is reversed, CBP remains vulnerable to 

corruption that threatens its effectiveness and national security. 

3. The Genesis of the Problem

The U.S. Customs Service, the principal predecessor agency of CBP, had an effective 

internal affairs office. This office was decimated as an inadvertent, unintended consequence of 

the Homeland Security reorganization of March 2003. As part of the reorganization, all 3,400 

Customs Special Agents (1811 criminal investigators) were transferred from Customs/CBP to 

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Because 180-200 Customs Special Agents had 

been assigned to Customs Office of Internal Affairs7, CBP was left on March 1, 2003 with no

 

3 CBP exercises a leadership position on the anti-corruption issue through its prominent role in the World Customs 

Organization.

4 There is data for corruption arrests. This data, which does not capture the number of corruption allegations or the 

current situation, has fluctuated generally downward since spiking in 2009. 

5 Moran, Greg “Border boost spiked corruption case: Decade-long increase in staffing coincide with legal trouble for 

law enforcement,” San Diego Union-Tribune, December 8, 2013. 

6 Some corruption investigations of CBP personnel are conducted by the FBI-led Border Corruption Task Forces 

(BCTFs). CBP Internal Affairs investigators participate on the BCTFs, giving the CBP Commissioner desirable 

visibility over those matters. Until last year, when the Secretary delegated authority to investigate criminal matters 

involving CBP to CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs, ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility handled the CBP 

criminal misconduct investigations declined by the DHS OIG.

7 All investigators in U.S. Customs’ Office of Internal Affairs were Customs Special Agents.
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internal affairs investigators. CBP has had to rebuild its internal affairs capability, but it is still 

far below what is needed. Currently, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs is woefully understaffed. 

CBP has approximately 218 Internal Affairs investigators8for a workforce of nearly 60,000 

employees, 44,000 of whom are law enforcement officers. 

4. The Secretary’s Actions

Secretary Johnson has taken two important steps to restore CBP’s internal affairs 

capability. First, in August 2014, he delegated to CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs investigators 

the authority to investigate potential criminal misconduct on the part of CBP personnel.9 Prior to 

this delegation, CBP internal affairs investigators could only investigate administrative

violations. Since corruption by its nature is a potential criminal offense, CBP’s Office of Internal 

Affairs, astonishingly, had lacked the authority to investigate such matters. 

Second, Secretary Johnson gave CBP the authority to hire investigators as 1811s.10 

Previously CBP internal affairs investigators had the more limited 1801 personnel designator. 

As a consequence of Secretary Johnson’s action, CBP has recently been able to convert most of 

its 1801 Internal Affairs investigators to 1811s. The 1811 status will also help CBP recruit the 

best investigators into its Office of Internal Affairs going forward.

5. An adequately staffed Office of Internal Affairs within CBP is essential

As noted, CBP has 218 criminal investigators authorized for its Office of Internal Affairs. 

This is not a sufficient number. Indeed, the failure to adequately staff CBP Internal Affairs with 

sufficient 1811 criminal investigators to promptly and thoroughly investigate allegations of 

internal corruption and other serious misconduct leaves CBP with an enormous vulnerability: the 

risk of systemic corruption and potential scandal.

It is important to bear in mind that the CBP Commissioner is responsible and accountable 

for the integrity of CBP personnel. Indeed, no one within DHS has a greater institutional interest 

in preventing, ferreting out and staunching corruption within CBP’s ranks than the 

Commissioner. On this important issue, and as a matter of good governance, it is of the utmost 

importance that the Secretary of Homeland Security is able to look to one person, the 

Commissioner, as the person within DHS who is ultimately responsible and can be held 

accountable for CBP workforce integrity. The Commissioner must have visibility into allegations 

of corruption and their investigation. Only the Commissioner can assure that they are 

investigated promptly. Only he/she can see that appropriate management action is taken to break 

up any developing nest of corruption at particular ports of entry or Border Patrol stations or 

checkpoints. Only the Commissioner can assure that investigations are timely completed, so that 

the cloud of a wrongful allegation can be removed when it is not proven and that swift and sure 

 

8 Excluding polygraph examiners, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs is currently authorized 218 criminal 

investigators. There are 207 criminal investigators on board. 

9 CBP Memo to Secretary Jeh Johnson “Authorization to the Commissioner of CBP to Investigate Allegations of 

Criminal Misconduct by CBP Employees and to Convert CBP Internal Affairs GS-1801 Employees to GS-1811 

Series to Conduct such Investigations” dated August 29, 2014

10 CBP Memo to Secretary Jeh Johnson “Authorization to the Commissioner of CBP to Investigate Allegations of 

Criminal Misconduct by CBP Employees and to Convert CBP Internal Affairs GS-1801 Employees to GS-1811 

Series to Conduct such Investigations” dated August 29, 2014.
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discipline results when the allegation is proven. And only the Commissioner can assure that the 

investigatory and disciplinary apparatus is operating effectively to achieve optimal deterrence. 

The Commissioner must have visibility into and oversight over investigations of corruption and 

other serious misconduct, and the authority and resources to see that investigations are prompt 

and thorough. For this, CBP needs an adequate staff of competent criminal investigators in 

CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs, headed by an Assistant Commissioner for Internal Affairs, who 

reports directly to the Commissioner.

If the CBP Commissioner, who heads the largest law enforcement agency in the United 

States in terms of number of law enforcement officers, is to be held accountable for the integrity 

and conduct of CBP personnel, he/she also must be provided with the resources and authority 

needed. No chief of police of a major police department could be held accountable for the 

conduct of his/her personnel if he had no internal affairs capacity and could not investigate 

corruption and other serious misconduct within his organization’s ranks. Until Secretary 

Johnson’s recent steps to correct this internal affairs gap, that has been the case with CBP.

CBP’s nearly 60,000 FTEs, most of whom are deployed at or near our nation’s borders, is 

comprised of 21,000 Border Patrol Agents within CBP’s Border Patrol, and 22,000 CBP Officers 

at our nation’s ports of entry. There are over 1,000 CBP Air and Marine officers. All of them 

carry a firearm, a badge, and have law enforcement authority to arrest and take other law 

enforcement actions. Last year, for example, CBP Officers made over 8,000 arrests at U.S. ports 

of entry of individuals wanted for serious crimes; CBP Border Patrol Agents arrested over 

486,000 people illegally entering the U.S; and CBP as a whole seized over 3.5 million pounds of 

illegal drugs at and near the U.S. borders.

To have an effective internal affairs capacity for a border law enforcement agency of 

CBP’s size requires an internal affairs office of a minimum of 550 fulltime 1811 investigators. 

We base this number on an analysis of the ratio of LEOs to internal affairs investigators at CBP’s 

predecessor agency, the U.S. Customs Service, as well as the NYPD and the FBI.

Before the homeland security reorganization of 2003, the U.S. Customs Service had an 

effective internal affairs function within its Office of Internal Affairs (OIA). It consisted of 

approximately 180 1811 Special Agents, most of whom were assigned for four year assignments 

to Customs’ Office of Internal Affairs from Customs’ Office of Investigation (OI). Customs 

assured that only the best and most highly motivated Agents were assigned to its Internal Affairs 

Office by assuring a good assignment within OI after serving in Internal Affairs. Assuming that 

the number of U.S Customs Service OIA investigators was adequate, CBP would need 

approximately 550-560 investigators.

Shortly before CBP was created, legacy Customs was an agency of 23,000 employees, 

14,000 of which were LEOs (Customs Inspectors and 1811 Special Agents). Using the legacy 

Customs’ ratio of LEOs to internal affairs investigators as a benchmark, CBP should have 565 

full-time investigators in its Office of Internal Affairs.

11

 

11 Using this ratio, 565 internal affairs investigators are warranted.

180 565 (Projected)

__________________ ________________

 14,000 44,000
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Benchmarking the ratio of FBI’s internal affairs investigators with the number of FBI Special 

Agents would support an even larger number of Agents in CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs. The 

FBI has 13,000 Special Agents. Approximately 250 Agents, or the equivalent,12 are assigned to 

internal affairs investigations.13 It is noteworthy that ICE currently has 200 agents assigned its 

Office of Professional Responsibility. Its workforce of 19,000 is roughly 1/3 of CBP. This is 

another indicator that CBP IA should be approximately 550 to 600 agents.

In many ways CBP more closely resembles a large police department than a federal 

investigative agency. The largest police department in the U.S. is the NYPD. NYPD has 34,500 

sworn officers. There are 550 officers assigned to its Internal Affairs component. Using this 

ratio, CBP would require 580 investigators in its IA.

 6. How to meet the CBP requirement for internal affairs resources

Pursuant to the Secretary’s authorization, CBP has converted most of the current CBP 

Internal Affairs 1801 investigators, who were eligible, to 1811 status. Excluding polygraph

examiners, there are currently 218 criminal investigators authorized under CBP’s budget. There 

are various ways to build CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs to 550. One way would be to budget 

an additional 330 1811 FTE into CBP’s budget and begin hiring. This of course takes time. 

Another, and one which could achieve the desired staffing goal more quickly, would be to reassign and train approximately 200 experienced investigators from within the current CBP ranks, 

that is, approximately 100 Border Patrol Agents and 100 CBP Officers. Ideally, these reassigned LEOs would be backfilled with a budget augmentation. The balance of the 130 1811 

shortfall could be achieved by an interagency transfer of 1811 FTE from ICE and OIG. 14 It is 

worth remembering that as part of the homeland security reorganization, all of Customs 180 

internal affairs investigators moved to ICE. It is only appropriate that they, or the FTE they 

represent, now be returned to CBP. Moreover, as CBP’s internal affairs capability is ramped up, 

most CBP corruption investigations previously being investigated by OIG and/or ICE will be 

investigated by CBP Internal Affairs going forward, and it is only fair and appropriate to do a 

resource transfer that reflects this new reality, i.e., the reduced workload for OIG and ICE which 

is being and will be absorbed by CBP’s IA as it ramps up to strength. 

7. Reasons to Act Now

Equipping CBP with the staffing and structure to prevent and respond to corruption 

within its ranks is clearly time sensitive. OIG’s investigations are reactive, chronically slow and 

not prioritized to focus on this issue. The true levels of corruption within CBP are not known, 

 

12 The FBI has 30 Agents assigned to its Headquarters’ internal investigations unit, but draws upon 1,400 Special 

Agents in the field. The 250 figure represents the approximate number of Agent years devoted to internal 

investigations in any given year. CBP would not be able to use this model inasmuch as it has no 1811 investigators, 

outside of its Office of Internal Affairs, in the field.

13

 Using the ratio of IA investigators to LEOs would result in a need for about 800 investigators for CBP, well over 

the 550 investigators we are recommending. 

14 In lieu of a direct transfer from ICE, it may be possible through an interagency Memorandum of Understanding to 

have ICE re-assign approximately 130 Special Agents to CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs for 3-4 year assignments, 

with the expectation that most would return to ICE.
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nor is there an evaluation based on sophisticated risk analysis. This means that pockets of 

corruption could fester within CBP, potentially for years. In turn, it also means that CBP 

employees against whom allegations of corruption are made live under a cloud for far too long, 

which affects their ability to be promoted, etc. As the accountable leader, the CBP 

Commissioner must have the ability to prioritize such serious misconduct investigations if 

corruption is to be checked and countered by expeditious and effective investigations and 

followed by appropriate prosecutive and/or disciplinary actions. Finally, it is noteworthy that a 

strong and fully functioning Internal Affairs also serves as a training ground for more effective 

future leaders in an agency and as a guidepost for better informed agency policy, training and 

recruitment. 

8. Revise Management Directive 810.1 

The alignment of accountability to prevent and curtail corruption requires more than just 

increased resources in CBP’s IA; it requires fundamentally changing the paradigm that currently 

exists between CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs and the Department’s Office of Inspector 

General. This means changing DHS Management Directive 810.1. 15

Currently, and based on a Management Directive that dates back to 2004, the OIG 

exercises a right of first refusal with respect to all allegations of corruption (and use of excessive 

force) that are presented to it. Some of these allegations come through CBP reporting into the 

Joint Intake Center (JIC), but some come to the OIG through separate channels. CBP has no 

visibility into corruption allegations and investigations that by-pass the JIC. But even those that 

are reported to the JIC, under the current system, may be investigated by the OIG with limited or 

no visibility by the Commissioner or involvement of CBP IA. This may have made sense before 

CBP has its own Office of Internal Affairs with investigators empowered to conduct 

investigations into allegations of corruption, excessive use of force and other potentially criminal 

and serious misconduct, but it no longer makes sense. And, it leaves CBP unnecessarily 

vulnerable to corruption.

As noted in the December 2011 report of the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis 

Institute (HSSAI) on CBP Workforce Integrity, there is a serious structural problem created by 

the current relationship between the DHS OIG and CBP’s OIA, a problem that has existed since 

the very creation of DHS. The HSSAI report emphasizes that this relationship needs to change. 

In this regard, the HSSAI found - - and we agree - - that the OIG relationship with CBP’s 

Internal Affairs is broken. The HSSAI stated that this relationship has “proven to be largely 

ineffective” and was contrary to the “conventional federal law enforcement model for internal 

affairs”, noting that “model calls for the placement of the internal investigative function within 

the agency which bears the strongest institutional interest in deterring and detecting corrupt 

behavior.” Importantly, the HSSAI recommended that the DHS leadership should change the 

OIG-CBP organizational structure for, among other things, assignment and investigation of CBP 

workforce misconduct. (See HSSAI Final Report, pages 14-18).

 

15 As noted elsewhere in this report, the Commissioner also needs similar authority and resources in order for CBP 

to reduce and curtail unlawful and out-of-policy use of force.
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Facilitating effective internal affairs investigations, overseen by the CBP Commissioner, 

requires a modification of the DHS Management Directive 810.1, which was promulgated June 

10, 2004, shortly after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. It is noteworthy the 

first Secretary of Homeland Security issued this Management Directive at a time when CBP had 

no internal affairs investigators and no delegated authority to investigate allegations of potential 

criminal misconduct.16 Under the outdated 2004 Management Directive, DHS OIG is given the 

right of first refusal regarding all corruption and other serious misconduct allegations against 

CBP personnel. This impairs the launching of an investigation by CBP IA, often for days, until 

the OIG decides whether to investigate. Moreover, the OIG’s decision whether to investigate is 

not made pursuant to any defined criteria. Rather, the decision is delegated by the Inspector 

General (IG) to OIG agents-in-charge in the field who are given no guidance as to when or when 

not to investigate a matter17. When OIG elects to investigate, the Commissioner of CBP has no 

control over such investigations. The Commissioner has no ability to prioritize these 

investigations or take any preventative management actions for the simple reason that the 

Commissioner has limited to no visibility and has no authority to direct OIG agents.

By contrast, at the Treasury Department, the Treasury OIG, while it had a right of first 

refusal, almost routinely deferred investigation of corruption and other misconduct involving 

U.S. Customs employees to Customs’ internal affairs. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has no 

Management Directive governing the relationship between the DOJ OIG and its law enforcement 

component agencies, i.e., FBI, DEA and ATF. Each DOJ component agency has a separate

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the DOJ OIG. We understand that ordinarily the 

DOJ OIG defers to the individual agencies’ internal affairs components.

With an adequately staffed CBP Office of Internal Affairs and visibility by and oversight 

of the CBP Commissioner, the current antiquated arrangement between the OIG and CBP needs 

to change. The Management Directive should be amended to make clear that, while all 

allegations of misconduct will be reported to the OIG, the OIG ordinarily will defer the 

investigation of such allegations to CBP IA. In particular, the OIG should apply criteria that it 

will ordinarily defer to CBP IA in corruption and use of force cases involving CBP personnel. In

those instances in which the OIG chooses not defer to CBP IA, the ordinary default position 

should be that the OIG and IA will jointly investigate the allegation. 18 The Secretary of 

Homeland Security should direct that the OIG’s guideline for these cases should be to defer to 

CBP’s IA, or at a minimum to work these investigations jointly with CBP IA, and this guideline 

should be specifically incorporated as an amendment to MD 810.1. 

 

16 The operative MoU between the OIG and CBP is even older. It dates back to December 2003 and is between the 

OIG and the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), a part of the DHS that no longer exists. BTS 

was abolished in 2006. This means that, in reality, there is no operative MoU between CBP and OIG. That said, the 

OIG-BTS MoU was entered into at a time, unlike today, when CBP had no internal affairs investigators, much less 

investigators with authority to investigate criminal and other serious misconduct.

17 Currently, the IG provides no criteria to the Office of Investigations of the OIG when it should accept matters for 

investigation or defer to CBP IA. Agents in charge of OIG field offices are left to decide without any criteria or 

guidelines to follow from the IG. This is simply not an efficient way to proceed, particularly with respect to 

allegations of corruption or excessive use of force.

18 The only exception where OIG would exclusively investigate CBP personnel is where the allegations involve the 

highest level management of CBP or personnel of CBP’s IA. Only in these rare instances, where there could be an 

appearance of partiality, should the OIG investigate alone.
Page | 12

In lieu of or in addition to a revision of the Management Directive, the foregoing could 

be accomplished by a separate MoU between the OIG and CBP. 
Page | 13

PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE

The first tasking of the Secretary’s December 9, 2014 relates to Use of Force issues, and 

particularly CBP’s training and actions to address use of force incidents as well as its progress in 

responding to use of force reviews.

1. Background re Use of Force

As noted, CBP has 44,000 gun carrying, sworn law enforcement officers (LEOs). To 

carrying out its law enforcement and national security mission at and near the borders of the 

U.S. CBP divides it operational components into three separate operational divisions, the 

Office of Field Operations, the United States Border Patrol and the Office of Air & Marine. 

This include 21,000 Border Patrol Agents, 22,000 Customs and Border Protection Officers at 

the nation’s ports of entry, and 1,000 Air and Marine Officers. Unlike any police department 

or any other federal law enforcement agency, CBP’s LEOs have a law enforcement mission 

and operate in a far-flung, often rugged environment. This is particularly true of CBP’s 

Border Patrol which operates and patrols vast segments of our country’s borders between the 

land ports of entry. This includes a 4,000+ mile border with Canada, and the 2,000 mile 

border with Mexico. Indeed, because of the threats from illegal drugs and illegal migrant 

smuggling, approximately 18,000 Border Patrol Agents are stationed at and near the U.S. 

border with Mexico. 

The primary mission of CBP is to prevent illegal entry of persons and contraband, 

including illegal drugs into the U.S. But CBP’s priority mission is to prevent terrorists and 

terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. 

CBP’s Border Patrol operates in a particularly difficult and often dangerous environment, 

with their typical law enforcement encounters occurring in rugged, rural terrain and almost 

always at night. Whereas, CBP’s LEOs at the ports of entry, while also exposed to danger, 

operate in an enclosed, more controllable environment. It is not surprising, then, that most of 

the attention, and criticism, of use of force within CBP has been focused on CBP’s Border 

Patrol Agents. Indeed, most uses of force resulting in death or serious bodily injury by CBP 

LEOs are force exercised by Border Patrol Agents. All 67 instances of use of force 

referenced in the PERF review involved Border Patrol Agents. Most of the adverse media

relating to CBP’s use of force involves the Border Patrol.

There are times when, in order to accomplish its mission, CBP’s LEOs must and 

appropriately do use force, even lethal force. Yet as is true of all law enforcement agencies, 

and CBP is no exception, the exercise of force must be consistent with the U.S. Constitution 

and laws and in compliance with sound policy based on a model of law enforcement best 

practices, primarily developed and implemented by large urban police departments within the 

U.S., e.g., the NYPD.

As discussed below, Commissioner Kerlikowske has moved forward and implemented 

the first comprehensive use of force policy for all LEOs within CBP. He has launched Use 
Page | 14

of Force Incident Teams (UFIT) and established the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB). 

He has improved training to the Use of Force policy. Yet CBP still lacks the number of 

investigators to investigate all significant use of force incidents and only recently received 

the authority to investigate the more serious use of force cases.19

2. Model Practice

The following model practice should be used to develop use of force policy within law 

enforcement agencies, regardless of their specific mission and areas of responsibility.

The use of force by law enforcement officers must at all times be consistent with federal 

constitutional requirements. This is the minimum standard that applies to all applications of 

force. Many law enforcement agencies have established standards for the use of force that 

exceed the constitutional requirements. It is the collective experience of these agencies that 

raising the standard within the agency has resulted in a decrease in the use of deadly force 

without compromising officer safety. Additionally, promulgation of succinct restrictions 

resonates with officers/agents and does not place them in the precarious position of deciphering 

what in some contexts may be complicated or nuanced areas of law. Nothing contained in the 

Panel’s recommendations should be construed in a manner that contravenes constitutional 

requirements. Our recommendations are intended to serve as additional limitations beyond the 

minimum requirements of the constitution.

An overarching responsibility of all law enforcement, including CBP LEOs, is to 

preserve human life. Whenever possible, de-escalation techniques shall be employed to safely 

gain voluntary compliance by a subject. In situations in which this is not feasible, officers/agents

will use only the amount of force reasonably necessary to gain compliance, control or custody of 

a subject. Deadly force should be used only as a last resort to protect officers/agents and/or the 

public from a threat of serious physical injury or death.

Any use of force must be both necessary and objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances to ensure the safety of the officer/agent, protect life, control volatile situations, 

and/or bring subjects into custody. All officers/agents are responsible and accountable for the 

proper use of force. The application of force must be consistent with existing law and CBP

policies and training.

Excessive or unnecessary force will not be tolerated. Officers/agents who use excessive 

force will be subject to discipline, up to and including dismissal from the agency. Similarly, 

failure to intervene and or report the use of excessive or unnecessary force, is itself serious 

misconduct that may result in discipline, up to and including dismissal from the agency. 

 

19 Recent articles have severely criticized CBP for failing to adequately investigate the uses of force. Duara, Nigel, 

“Border Patrol agents, facing scrutiny over shootings, have harsh words for their leaders”, LA Times, June 17, 2015. 

And yet, CBP did not have sufficient IA investigators to investigate these incidents, nor until recently did its IA 

investigators have authority to conduct investigations involving potential criminal misconduct in the exercise of use 

of force by CBP’s LEOs
Page | 15

The use of force policy and training materials should emphasize the values and principles

articulated above, include best practices including de-escalation and less lethal techniques, 

provide clear guidelines, employ scenario based learning and stress sound tactics. Meaningful 

in-service training for all officers/agents is essential to buttress these principles. An effective 

and robust use of force investigation and evaluation program is essential to ensuring adherence to 

the use of force guidelines and identifying tactical deficiencies as well as training needs.

3. Changes in CBP Policies and Systems

a. Updated and Ongoing Policy Changes

There are times in law enforcement when some level of force must be used to 

safeguard the public or protect an officer or agent. Any use of force must be justified 

by law and consistent with CBP policy. 

The CBP use of force policy requires that deadly force only be used when an officer 

or agent has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent 

danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or agent or another person. 

b. The PERF Report and the Public Release of CBP’s Use of Force Handbook 

In 2012, CBP commissioned the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) to 

conduct a review of the use of force by CBP officers and agents. PERF reviewed 

CBP’s Use of Force Policies and specific cases of deadly force. The PERF review 

raised concerns about shots fired at vehicles and shots fired at subjects throwing rocks 

and other objects at agents. PERF also recommended improvements in initial 

reporting, investigations, incident review, weapons, personal protective equipment, 

and training. 

Based on the observations and recommendations made in the PERF’s report, “U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Use of Force Review: Cases and Policies,” and 

following its own review, CBP revised its Use of Force Policy Handbook and its 

training processes for agents and officers (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Use 

of Force Review: Cases and Policies, February 2013, conducted by PERF, p. 2). 

In May 2014, to reinforce accountability and transparency in use of force situations, 

CBP Commissioner Kerlikowske ordered the public release of the agency’s Use of 

Force Policy Handbook and the PERF report. This was the first time the Handbook

had been made public. At the time of its release, Commissioner Kerlikowske said, 

“We initiated both internal and external use of force reviews to improve ourselves 

and our responsibility to the public and to use force only when necessary . . . the 

policy and training changes they represent are the beginning of a continuous review 

of our responsibility to only use force when it is necessary to protect people” (CBP 

Press Release, CBP Releases Use of Force Policy Handbook and Police Executive 

Research Forum Report, May 30, 2014). The Handbook went into full effect on 

October 1, 2014.
Page | 16

In addition to the above CBP actions to improve their policies, practices, training and 

other requirements to address proper use of force, CBP has issued safe tactics directives, 

undertaken policy reviews such as vehicle pursuit, added systems to manage their use of force 

program such as a center of excellence to address and oversee use of force training policy, and 

has established an administrative review process that includes use of force incident response 

teams (UFIT) and local and national review boards (UFRB).

4. Use of Force – Looking Ahead

a. Use of Force Guidelines

Customs and Border Protection has already made significant improvements to its use 

of force policies, training and investigations as outlined above and CBP continues to 

evaluate these programs in an effort to identify best practices and seek improvement. 

The following observations and recommendations are offered to assist CBP in this 

process by highlighting the shared experiences of other law enforcement agencies in 

these challenging areas. 

CBP has comprehensive use of force guidelines promulgated in its “Use of Force 

Policy, Guidelines and Procedures Handbook,” but should consider revising those 

guidelines to include a decisive value statement prominently featured at the outset of 

the policy stating that above all, CBP values human life and the dignity of every 

person and that the primary duty of every CBP officer/agent is the preservation of 

human life. Such a value statement clearly establishes the agency’s priorities and 

provides the context for the policies that flow from it. Accordingly, CBP should 

clarify its statement that a use of force is “necessary” when it is “reasonably required 

to carry out the officer’s/agent’s law enforcement duties”20 and limit the use of force 

to the minimum amount necessary to protect life and personal safety as well take 

control of a suspect. 

In the current Handbook, the policy statement limiting the application of deadly force 

to situations in which the officer/agent is facing imminent danger of death or serious 

physical injury should be prominently featured at the forefront of the policy. It 

should be stressed that firearms are to be used only as a last resort and then only to 

protect human life. While a certain degree of discretion is absolutely necessary for 

officers/agents to perform their duties and protect their safety, that discretion should 

be constrained by very specific policies addressing the most problematic situations.21

CBP should consider specific restrictions on the use of deadly force including the 

following:

i. Prohibit or restrict discharging firearms at a moving vehicle unless deadly 

force, other than the vehicle itself, is being used/threatened against the 

officer/agent or another person present unless it is not possible for the 

 

20 Customs and Border Protection, Use of Force Policy, Guidelines and Procedures Handbook (May 2014) p.1.

21 Walker, Samuel, E. & Archbold, Carol, A., The New World of Police Accountability (2014) pp. 66 – 71.
Page | 17

threatened officer to avoid being struck by the vehicle.

22

 When firing at a 

moving vehicle, there is little likelihood of incapacitating the driver or 

disabling the vehicle. Even if the driver is incapacitated, an out of control 

vehicle may present an even greater hazard to the officers/agents.23

ii. Prohibiting the use of deadly force if objects are hurled/thrown at 

officers/agents unless the object(s) are likely to cause serious physical 

injury or death. In many cases the use of cover and positioning may

mitigate the threat posed by thrown objects.

iii. Prohibiting the discharging of firearms if in the officer’s/agents 

professional judgment doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent 

persons.

Under the current guidelines, following the use of deadly force, an officer/agent is 

required to notify a supervisor. While an important step, there is an opportunity to 

emphasize the values articulated above more clearly. The immediate action following 

a use of deadly force should be to take whatever action is necessary to mitigate any 

threats to life and safety. Next, the officer/agent should request medical assistance 

and render aid if practicable. After these life-saving/life-preserving measures, it 

would be appropriate to notify a supervisor as well as request additional resources.

Finally, CBP should consider mandating that officers/agents wear their body armor 

when performing an operational function in the field. Currently the decision to wear 

body armor is optional although a local commander can mandate it in certain 

situations. CBP should conduct a pilot project in several areas to study the impact 

and effects of wearing the body armor.

b. Use of Force Training

CBP’s in-service training should continue to emphasize scenario-based training that 

includes actual situations encountered by officers/agents in the field. 24 Training 

should involve all levels along the use of force continuum and not necessarily follow 

a set progression (utilize a randomized approach so the outcomes are not predictable 

 

22 The only exception to this prohibition would be when it is impossible for the threatened CBP LEO to avoid the 

vehicle or escape its probable impact.

23 In 1972, the NYPD recorded over 900 officer involved shootings. In that same year, the NYPD adopted a use of 

deadly force policy that was more restrictive than state law required. The NYPD prohibited firing warning shots and 

firing at a moving vehicle and required the reporting and investigation of all firearm discharges. Officer involved 

shootings declined by 30% over the next three years. In 2014, the NYPD recorded 80 officer involved shootings 

(includes intention/adversarial, accidental and animal encounters).

24 There is a consensus among law enforcement agencies that that the key to improving police-recruit training is to 

move from traditional classroom to more hands-on instruction by increasing the quality, number, and use of 

scenario-based training events. There needs to be sufficient flexibility in the training schedule to allow students the 

opportunity to repeat training if necessary until they can demonstrate that they have mastered the skills being taught. 

Rand Center on Quality Policing, Evaluation of the New York City Police Department Firearm Training and 

Firearm-Discharge Review Process (2008).
Page | 18

to the trainees). Scenarios should include de-escalation techniques and the application 

of less lethal options. Training should also emphasize effective tactics that may avoid 

necessitating the use of force (e.g. repositioning and utilizing cover to mitigate a 

threat from rock throwers).

De-escalation techniques can be used to stabilize the situation and reduce the 

immediacy of the threat so that more time, options, and/or resources are available 

(e.g., tactical communication, requesting additional resources, etc.). The goal is to 

gain the voluntary compliance of the subject, when feasible and consistent with 

personal safety, to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. Officers/agents 

should communicate from a safe position by using distance, cover or concealment 

and attempt conflict negotiation techniques to calm an agitated subject and obtain 

voluntary compliance if feasible. De-escalation techniques should be attempted 

whenever feasible.

c. Investigation of use of force incidents

CBP should investigate, or whenever possible, participate in investigations of use of 

significant force by CBP LEOs. Such investigations have a threefold purpose. One is 

to develop evidence of violation of CBP’s use of force policy for purposes of 

imposing discipline25, and, where warranted, to support criminal prosecutions for, e.g. 

violation of a victims civil rights. But such investigation, whether initiated by the 

UFIT or otherwise, are needed in order that the Commissioner and the UFRB have 

insight into upgrades in policy and training that are indicated by patterns detected. It 

is also noted that investigations permit better tracking of potential problem personnel.

d. Review of use of force incidents

According to the CBP Handbook, the Use of Force Review Committee reviews 

certain shooting incidents and is chaired by the director of the Use of Force Center for 

Excellence (UFCE). However, during recent CBP briefings for this panel, UFCE 

executives indicated that an executive from Internal Affairs chairs the review. This 

discrepancy needs to be clarified. The IAP recommends that neither position should 

chair the review committee. Each of these disciplines as well as the operational 

components within the agency play an important role in the review process but each 

represents a specialized interest. CBP should consider vesting authority to chair the 

review board in the Deputy Commissioner’s office or in someone at a sufficiently 

high level within CBP to command and respect by CBP’s operational components.

The UFRB reviews all significant use of force incidents resulting in serious physical 

injury or death, or any incident involving the discharge of a firearm. The UFRB 

determines if the actions of an officer/agent were consistent with agency policy, 

whether there was any misconduct and what lessons were learned from the incident. 

 

25 We intend to address the adequacy of CBP’s discipline process in a subsequent report, but it is an important 

component for deterring out-of-policy force.
Page | 19

In determining whether a firearms discharge was within agency guidelines, the 

actions of each officer/agent involved should be evaluated and a determination made 

as to each round fired or action taken. Additionally, the UFRB should assess the 

tactics employed surrounding each action taken and round discharged and make a 

determination whether the officer/agent contributed to the need to use force by 

ineffective tactics. Examples of such an analysis, also addressed by the PERF report, 

include:

i. Moving into the path of a moving vehicle in an attempt to stop the vehicle 

may result in a threat to the officer/agent requiring the use of deadly force.

ii. Moving into or remaining in a position susceptible of being struck by a rock 

may place the officer/agent in a position to use force, which could be negated 

by changing position.

The tactical analysis should be a separate and distinct determination analogous to the 

determination whether the firearms discharge was within agency guidelines and 

whether there was any misconduct. Such analysis should not be lumped in with 

overall lessons learned which could diminish its significance. Poor or ineffective 

tactics can be the catalyst that places an officer/agent in a position necessitating the 

use of justifiable force.

CBP should consider expanding the mandate for the Use of Force Incident Teams 

(UFIT) to include all intentional firearms discharges, accidental discharges resulting 

in death or serious physical injury, deaths in custody or as a result of CBP action and 

any other case at the direction of the Commissioner. Often, the difference between a 

discharge resulting in injury or a miss is the result of chance. All intentional 

discharges should be treated the same and investigated by the UFIT. Additionally, 

local or regional UFITs can be established to investigate and review less lethal uses of 

force resulting in injury and accidental firearms’ discharges not resulting in a hit as 

well as other matters deemed appropriate by the Commissioner. The CBP-wide UFIT 

should maintain oversight over the local UFIT investigations to help ensure quality 

and consistency across the agency.

e. Use of Body Cameras

Law enforcement organizations are increasingly equipping their officers with bodyworn cameras as a method of reducing complaints, de-escalating volatile situations 

(thus enhancing officer/agent safety) and ensuring compliance with use of force 

policies.26 CBP has undertaken a feasibility study on the use of body-worn cameras 

in several operational areas since October 2014. CBP should continue to consult with 

stakeholders including prosecutors, Inspector General, unions, 

officer/agent/supervisor focus groups and advocacy groups/NGOs as the feasibility 

study progresses. Additionally, in the near term, CBP should complete its ongoing 

 

26 The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has published the National Body-Worn Camera Toolkit to assist agencies 

in developing a body-worn camera program (available at: https://www.bja.gov/bwc/).
Page | 20

review of model policies and recommendations including those published by the 

Police Executive Research Forum, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 

Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union to name a few, and 

formalize its final policy in light of the lessons learned during the feasibility study. 

Finally, CBP should identify metrics to compare similarly situated officers/agents in 

order to evaluate the effectiveness of the body-worn cameras. The body-worn camera 

program should include a system for supervisory review as well as an auditing 

program involving random sampling to ensure compliance with the policy and to 

assess officer/agent actions. 
Page | 21

IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY

The third tasking in Secretary Johnson’s December 9, 2014 letter asked the HSAC to 

“identify best practices . . . on transparency pertaining to incident response and discipline as well 

as stakeholder outreach.”

1. Background regarding transparency and outreach

Until recent changes, led by Commissioner Kerlikowske, CBP had no coherent policy for 

informing the public, or anyone outside of CBP, regarding the significant use of force by CBP 

LEOs, i.e., use of force resulting in death or serious bodily injury. And it was anything but 

transparent. Often CBP did not have accurate information, and when it did, it did almost nothing 

to inform the public, much less informing the public of information in a timely way. Part of the 

reason for this was that neither the Commissioner nor anyone else at CBP Headquarters had 

visibility into and an understanding of what happened in a timely way. This relates to a lack of 

investigative capacity for CBP and a tendency to defer to whatever administrative investigation 

was conducted by a field element of the operational component within CBP whose LEO had 

used significant force. Thus, the CBP’s Border Patrol field element, at the Sector level, 

investigated and determined whether discipline was warranted. Rarely was there an 

investigation by CBP’s IA much less centralized review by CBP, which lacked the central 

coordination necessary to formulating accurate, timely and appropriate releases of information to 

the public.

Under Commissioner Kerlikowske’s leadership, CBP has adopted a policy of 

transparency: Maximum Disclosure Minimum Delay. The challenge now is developing the 

coordination mechanisms and processes within CBP to implement CBP’s policy.

The need for transparency and accountability in law enforcement generally, also applies 

with equal force to CBP. In some measure, the public trust and confidence in CBP hinges on 

CBP providing the people they serve with accurate and timely information about CBP policies, 

activities and actions. The recent 21st Century Policing Report also recommends that law 

enforcement agencies communicate with citizens and the media swiftly, openly and neutrally27. 

CBP should be commended for selecting a former member of the media to head its public affairs 

and for its efforts to provide professional media training to its field leadership.

2. Implementing CBP’s transparency policy

The current Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that govern CBP’s Media Division, 

Office of Public Affairs (OPA) are well constructed and very thorough. CBP policy establishes 

that the OPA will adhere to “Maximum Disclosure Minimum Delay.” This model standard 

requires that every effort is made to timely disseminate an appropriate level of information about 

CBP’s cases within the bounds of the law. Although CBP’s public affairs policy directives are 

consistent with best practice, as noted, CBP has not had a reputation for releasing information 

 

27 Final Report of The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, May 2015, Action Item 1.3.2, pg. 13
Page | 22

expeditiously. A level of review and proper coordination is required to ensure the accuracy of 

information and the appropriateness of its release in the midst of legal proceedings and ongoing 

investigations. However, a balance must be struck to ensure that disclosure of the most basic 

information (arrest circumstances, charges, and involved agencies) is accomplished with minimal 

delay in order to maintain public confidence. Accordingly, CBP should review its information 

disclosure processes and its implementation of policy to identify and eliminate duplicative and 

time consuming layers of review that may hinder “maximum disclosure, minimum delay.” 

Additionally, disclosure should not be limited to basic information about an incident 

involving or under CBP investigation but should also include related CBP policies and 

guidelines in matters of public interest such as the use of force, pursuit, and employee 

misconduct. Increasingly, more law enforcement agencies are voluntarily posting their policies 

and guidelines for high profile matters on the Internet to expand public access instead of 

requiring a more formal and time-consuming applicant process pursuant to the Freedom of 

Information Act or Open Public Records Act. 

3. Community outreach

In July 2012, CBP established the Border Community Liaison (BCL) program for greater 

reach and sustained relationships within the communities in which CBP operates. The 

community partnerships and underlying trust developed through these BCL relationships are 

particularly essential during critical and high profile incidents. As such, the BCL and OPA 

should complement each other. Unfortunately, the establishment of the BCL program created a 

community relations silo, separating it from the Media Division of OPA. This organizational 

structure should be adjusted to foster a more collaborative relationship that maximizes public 

confidence and trust.

4. Nongovernmental Organization Concerns

Over the past several months, the CBP IAP conducted a listening session with a number 

of NGOs regarding CBP accountability and oversight, and reviewed a number of NGO 

recommendations and supplemental materials. (Appendix D, May 5, 2015 NGO letter to CBP 

IAP Co-Chairs Bratton and Tandy). The NGO perspective has been helpful to inform the panel 

of their concerns about CBP policies and practices. Recognizing that we are in the early stages 

of review and this is an interim report, there are some matters raised by the NGOs that can and 

should be addressed at this interim stage with more to follow in subsequent reports. 

 CBP should reinforce its existing policy that mandates all uniformed personnel must 

wear visible name tags identifying their last name on all uniforms at all times.

 CBP has posted a Spanish language version of the complaints form on its website but 

should review and improve its overall complaints system, including fully integrated 

Spanish language capability in the CBP call center and other steps to provide public 

accessibility and transparency in its complaint process for non-English speaking 

individuals.
Page | 23

APPENDIX A – PANEL MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

William J. Bratton (Co-Chair)

William (Bill) J. Bratton is the Police Commissioner, City of New York. Commissioner Bratton

began his policing career in 1970, and is the only person ever to serve as chief executive of the 

LAPD and the NYPD. Commissioner Bratton established an international reputation for reengineering police departments and fighting crime in the 1990s. As Chief of the New York City 

Transit Police, Boston Police Commissioner, then New York City Police Commissioner, Bratton 

revitalized morale and cut crime in all three posts, achieving the largest crime declines in New 

York City’s history. Afterward, Commissioner Bratton was named Chairman of Kroll, one of 

Altegrity, Inc.'s four core businesses. In his role with Kroll, Bratton worked with the business' 

senior leadership to achieve Kroll's strategic growth objectives as well as assist with client 

outreach and service initiatives. New York City Mayor Bill DeBlasio reinstated him as 

Commissioner of NYPD in January of 2014.

Karen Tandy (Co-Chair)

Karen Tandy has 37 years of leadership experience in the government and corporate sectors. For 

seven years, she was the Senior Vice President of Government Affairs for Motorola Solutions 

where she oversaw country management, compliance, governance and government affairs in 

more than 70 countries where Motorola operates. Her responsibilities also included corporate 

social responsibility, including the company’s charitable Foundation and sustainability 

initiatives. During her tenure, Ms. Tandy was Motorola’s top public policy spokesperson on 

issues related to global telecom policy, trade, regulation and spectrum allocation.

Prior to joining Motorola in 2007, Tandy headed the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA), where she managed a $2.4 billion budget and approximately 11,000 employees in 86 

global offices. Prior to that, she was U.S. Associate Deputy Attorney General, responsible for 

developing national drug enforcement and money laundering policy and strategies, including 

terrorist financing after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. She previously held a variety of leadership 

positions in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice where she led a nationwide 

organized crime task force comprised of thousands of prosecutors and law enforcement 

agents. She also served for more than a decade as Senior Litigation Counsel and Assistant U.S. 

Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia and in the Western District of Washington.

Robert C. Bonner

Robert Bonner is the Senior Principal of Sentinel Policy & Consulting, a consulting firm that 

provides strategic advice regarding homeland and border security issues, and a retired partner of 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. In September 2001 Mr. Bonner was appointed Commissioner of the 

U.S. Customs Service, and served until 2006 as the first Commissioner of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection. Mr. Bonner is also a former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), U.S. District Judge and Attorney for the Central District of California. 

He was the chair of the California Commission on Judicial Performance and currently serves on 
Page | 24

the board of trustees of the California Institute of Technology. Recently he was a member of the 

Mayor’s Blue Ribbon Panel on LAX security. Mr. Bonner received a B.A. from the University 

of Maryland, College Park in 1963 and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center 1966.

Rick Fuentes

Superintendent Rick Fuentes enlisted in the State Police in January 1978, as a member of the 

93A Class. He has served the Division of State Police throughout the state, including 

assignments as a general road duty Trooper in Central and Southern New Jersey, and an 

instructor at the Sea Girt Academy. He also was a supervisor with the FBI/NJSP Joint Terrorism 

Task Force, Narcotics Units, and the Street Gang Unit. Prior to being named Acting 

Superintendent, he was assigned as the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, overseeing nine units 

within the Intelligence Section. The recipient of numerous awards, Superintendent Fuentes has 

been recognized by the U.S. Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Administration, and in 1993 

was a co-recipient of the New Jersey State Police Trooper of the Year award. In 2006, Colonel 

Fuentes was appointed to a three year term as General Chair of the State and Provincial Division 

of the IACP. He is a member of the U.S. Attorney General’s Global Advisory Committee, a 

member of the Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Partners Group of the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, and an appointed member of Harvard University’s Executive 

Session on Policing and Public Safety.

John Magaw

John Magaw is a domestic and international security consultant who most recently served as the 

Under Secretary for Security at the Department of Transportation in 2002. In that role, Mr. 

Magaw was responsible for implementation of the “Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 

2001.” Mr. Magaw also previously served as the Acting Director of FEMA from January of 

2001 to February of 2001 where he led the Office of National Preparedness within FEMA. 

Magaw has also served as the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from 

1993 to 1999 and as the Director of the Secret Service from 1992 -1993. Mr. Magaw is a life 

member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. 

Walter McNeil 

Chief Walter McNeil was chosen as the Police Chief for the City of Quincy, February 28, 

2011. Chief McNeil had more than 29 years of law enforcement experience, serves as the

Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, and head of the Florida Department of 

Juvenile Justice. Prior to being selected to lead the above named agencies, he was the Chief of 

Police for the City of Tallahassee, Florida. Chief McNeil was a past president of the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police. Chief McNeil holds a Master’s Degree in Criminal 

Justice and a Bachelor’s Degree in Criminology. Chief McNeil is also a graduate of the FBI 

National Academy.

Roberto Villaseñor

Roberto Villaseñor is the Chief of Police for the Tucson Police Department and has held that position 

since 2009. He was awarded a Bachelor’s degree from Park University and a Master’s Degree from 
Page | 25

Northern Arizona University. He graduated from the FBI National Academy in Quantico, VA, 

the Senior Management Institute for Police and the FBI National Executives Institute. He is a 

member of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), the International Association of Chiefs 

of Police (IACP), the FBI Law Enforcement Executive Development Association (LEEDA) and 

is the President of the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police (AACOP). In January 2013 Chief 

Villaseñor became Treasurer of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and in January 

2015 he was appointed to President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. In 2015 Chief 

Villaseñor was also appointed by Arizona Governor Doug Ducey to the Arizona Criminal Justice 

Commission.

William “Bill” Webster

William H. Webster served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1987 

to 1991. Prior to his service as CIA Director, Judge Webster served as Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 

Circuit, and an attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri. In 1991, Judge Webster was 

presented the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. Judge Webster was also awarded the 

Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Security Medal. Following his departure from 

the CIA, Judge Webster joined the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP in 

Washington, DC, and is now a retired partner. In addition, Judge Webster serves as the 

Homeland Security Advisory Council Chair.
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APPENDIX B – TASK STATEMENT
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APPENDIX C – SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

Randolph Alles, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine

Paul Baker, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Training and Development

Patrina Clark, President, Pivotal Practices Consulting

Katherine Coffman, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Human Resources Management

Charlie Deane, Pivotal Practices Consulting 

Michael Friel, Supervisor Public Affairs Specialist, Office of Public Affairs

Chris Hall, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Training and Development

Rene Hanna, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Commissioner

Melvin Harris Executive Director, Office of Human Resources

Anna Hinken, NGO Liaison, Office of the Commissioner

R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Susan Keverline, Deputy Director, Office of Internal Affairs

Philip LaVelle, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Public Affairs

Kathryn Olson, Pivotal Practices Consulting

Chris Pignone, Deputy Director, Office of Internal Affairs

Lewis Roach, Deputy Executive Director, Office of Policy and Planning

John Roth, Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security

Edna Ruano, Chief, Office of Communications, Office of Public Affairs

Dana Salvano-Dunn, Compliance Branch Director, Department of Homeland Security

Jeremy Schappell, Acting Assistant Director, Use of Force Center of Excellence

Austin Skero, Director, Use of Force Center of Excellence

James Tomsheck, Former Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs
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Anthony Triplett, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs

Ronald Vitiello, Deputy Chief, Office of Border Patrol

John Wagner, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations
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APPENDIX D – May 5, 2015 NGO letter to CBP IAP Co-Chairs Bratton and Tandy
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