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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47838

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RACHAEL LOUISE MEYER, aka 

RACHEAL LOUISE MEYER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: March 3, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge. 

Order denying motion for return of property, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge 

Rachael Louise Meyer appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion for return 

of property. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Meyer was convicted of trafficking in heroin, and her conviction and sentence were 

affirmed on appeal. State v. Meyer, Docket No. 46014 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2019) (unpublished). 

During the traffic stop which led to her arrest and eventual conviction, Meyer’s purse was searched 

and found to contain a large amount of heroin and $3,038 in cash. The money was confiscated 

and, after her conviction and appeal, Meyer filed a pro se motion for its return. The district court 

found that the money had been forfeited in a separate civil action pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-
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2744. Since a default judgment had been entered in that case, the district court found that Meyer 

no longer had a right to make a claim for the property and denied her motion. 

Meyer filed a second motion for return of property, which the district court denied on the 

same grounds as the first motion. Meyer timely appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

Meyer argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for return of property. 

Specifically, Meyer argues that she is the lawful owner of the money at issue, and the State 

presented no evidence that the confiscated money was connected to drug activity. Meyer concedes 

that the magistrate court entered a default judgment in the civil forfeiture case, but contends she

was not served with a copy of the default judgment or any other documents in the civil forfeiture 

case. The State argues that the district court was correct that since the confiscated money was 

forfeited in the civil action, Meyer no longer had any ownership interest in the money. In addition, 

the State argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the validity of the judgment 

in the civil forfeiture case. 

Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(6) provides that money found in close proximity to controlled 

substances may be subject to forfeiture. Forfeiture proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules 

of Civil Procedure and, in the case of money, must determine whether the property was used, or 

intended for use, in connection with the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or possession 

of controlled substances. I.C. § 37-2744(d)(2). 

Meyer argues that she is the lawful owner of the money. However, as the district court 

noted, and Meyer conceded, the money was forfeited in a separate civil case pursuant to I.C. § 37-

2744, and Meyer no longer has an ownership interest in the money. As to Meyer’s argument that 

the State presented no evidence that the money was connected to drug activity, and that she 

received no notification of the civil forfeiture case, the State is correct that there is no rule that 

allows a collateral attack on the forfeiture judgment. “Absent a statute or rule extending its 

jurisdiction, the trial court’s jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the 

judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment 

on appeal.” State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). Without a rule 

permitting the district court to consider the validity of the forfeiture judgment, the district court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider Meyer’s argument. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
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consider the validity of the forfeiture judgment, it did not err in denying Meyer’s motion for return 

of property. 

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err by denying Meyer’s motion for return of property. 

Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Meyer’s motion for return of property is affirmed. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.