DHS’ Fragmented 

Approach to 

Immigration Enforcement 

and Poor Planning 

Resulted in Extended 

Migrant Detention during 

the 2019 Surge 

March 18, 2021 

OIG-21-29 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS 

DHS’ Fragmented Approach to 

Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning 

Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge 

March 18, 2021 

Why We 

Did This 

Evaluation 

We conducted this 

evaluation to identify issues 

CBP faced complying with 

the requirement to hold 

detainees in its custody for 

no longer than 72 hours 

during the 2019 migrant 

surge. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made six 

recommendations for ICE, 

CBP, and DHS to plan for 

surge detention capacity; 

standardize alien 

processing paperwork; 

inventory best practices and 

surge infrastructure; and 

identify thresholds for DHS 

intervention in future 

surges. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

A key issue preventing U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) from transferring detainees out of its 

facilities within 72 hours was insufficient Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal 

Operations’ (ICE ERO) bed space. ICE ERO also could not 

increase capacity quickly enough to keep pace with CBP’s 

apprehensions, and available bed space was not always 

appropriate for the aliens in need of placement. As a 

result, CBP’s Border Patrol faced rapidly increasing 

numbers of detainees — especially single adults — who 

remained in CBP’s holding facilities intended for shortterm custody. 

Despite worsening conditions, Border Patrol generally did 

not exercise its authority to release single adults from its 

custody. Border Patrol sectors created ad-hoc solutions to 

manage the growing detainee populations in its facilities, 

because their local response plans did not adequately 

account for ICE ERO’s detention limitations. 

Furthermore, longstanding fragmentation in immigration 

enforcement operations between CBP and ICE ERO 

further exacerbated these challenges. 

DHS was aware of a potential land migration surge and 

the challenges it would pose. DHS had both a multicomponent task force in place at the border and a plan for 

land migration surges, but used neither during the 2019 

surge. In May 2019, DHS created a headquarters 

coordination group to advise leadership and help manage 

future emergencies, like a migrant surge. However, if the 

Department does not develop a DHS-wide framework for 

surges and address day-to-day fragmentation, CBP and 

ICE ERO will face the same challenges in future surges. 

Management Response

DHS concurred with all recommendations, which are 

resolved and open. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 3 

Results of Evaluation .................................................................................... 11 

Insufficient ICE ERO Resources Led to Prolonged Detention of Single 

Adults in CBP Facilities ....................................................................... 12 

CBP’s Border Patrol Detained Single Adults for Extended Times in 

Crowded Conditions Despite Having the Authority to Release Them Due 

to Border Security Concerns ................................................................ 19 

Border Patrol Sectors Created Ad-Hoc Solutions to Manage Detainees 

ICE ERO Could Not Accept .................................................................. 25 

CBP’s and ICE ERO’s Fragmented Approach to the Migrant Surge 

Hindered an Efficient Response ........................................................... 28 

DHS Did Not Implement a 2015 Plan Created to Respond to Migrant 

Surges and Did Not Develop New Department-level Operational 

Solutions ............................................................................................. 34 

Recommendations......................................................................................... 45 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 50 

Appendix C: Overview of Immigration Process after Border 

Appendix D: Roles of Federal Government Stakeholders in 

Appendix F: Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations Major 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report..................... 52 

Apprehension .................................................................. 57 

Immigration .................................................................... 58 

Appendix E: FY 2019 Detention Facilities Used by ICE ERO ................ 59 

Contributors to This Report ............................................. 60 

Appendix G: Report Distribution.......................................................... 61 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Abbreviations 

ADP average daily population 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulations 

E3 ENFORCE 3 

EARM Enforce Alien Removal Module 

ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

IBEC Interagency Border Emergency Cell 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IPT Interagency Planning Team 

JIAG Joint Incident Advisory Group 

JTF-West Joint Task Force - West 

OFO Office of Field Operations 

OPS Office of Operations 

PBNDS Performance-Based National Detention Standards 

SIGMA Secured Integrated Government Mainframe Access 

TEDS National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and 

Search 

UAC unaccompanied alien children 

UCG SWB Unified Coordination Group Southwest Border 

U.S.C. United States Code 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for securing U.S. borders 

from illegal activity and regulating travel and legal trade. Within DHS, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforces immigration laws and 

safeguards approximately 6,000 miles of U.S. border, including 2,000 miles on 

the Southwest border. CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers manage 

which people and goods enter and exit the United States at the ports of entry. 

CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) agents apprehend individuals illegally 

crossing the border between ports of entry. DHS’ Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) manages the custody of aliens in various types of detention 

facilities nationwide and repatriates individuals present in the country illegally. 

When CBP encounters individuals without valid documents for entry into the 

United States either between or at ports of entry, Border Patrol agents and OFO 

officers apprehend them and determine whether the apprehended individuals 

are admissible into the United States (through a practice known as 

“processing”).1 If the individual is determined to be inadmissible, he or she is 

processed for appropriate removal proceedings and may be detained during 

those proceedings.2 Individuals who assert they intend to apply for asylum are 

also subject to detention.3 CBP is responsible for short-term detention of 

aliens at Border Patrol stations and checkpoints and OFO ports of entry while 

they are being processed. If CBP determines the apprehended individuals are 

inadmissible,4 they then are referred for appropriate immigration processing, 

which may include removal proceedings under section 1229a5 (including 

applying for asylum),6 or expedited removal proceedings,7 consistent with the 

1 Processing includes collecting biographical and biometric information, performing 

immigration and criminal history checks, verifying the individual’s claimed identity, and 

screening for acute or emergent medical issues. 

2 See 8 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1225(b)(2)(A) and 8 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 

235.3(b)(2)(iii), (b)(4)(ii), (c); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1). However, certain inadmissible aliens 

from contiguous countries (i.e., Mexico and Canada) can be returned to their country instead of 

being detained. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). 3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii). Initially, an inadmissible alien 

placed in expedited removal proceedings would assert a credible fear of persecution. An 

asylum officer would then determine whether there is a significant possibility, taking into 

account the credibility of the alien’s statements and other information available to the officer, 

that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum. 

4 Inadmissible aliens are persons who are not U.S. citizens or nationals and are determined to 

be inadmissible on one of several statutory grounds. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(3), 1182(a). 5 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 

6 During removal proceedings under section 1229a, individuals can present evidence to an 

immigration judge to challenge their removal from the United States and apply for relief or 

protection, including asylum. Actions Needed to Improve DHS Processing of Families and 

Coordination between DHS and HHS, GAO-20-245, p. 7, Feb. 2020. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 7 In expedited removal proceedings, the Government can order individuals removed from the 

United States without further hearings before an immigration judge if they either lack valid 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Immigration and Nationality Act.8 They may also be referred for prosecution9 in 

some cases, if appropriate. Generally, these proceedings for detained 

individuals can take anywhere from days to years from apprehension to 

resolution. For example, an expedited removal case with no claims of fear of 

returning to a contiguous country could be resolved relatively quickly. In 

contrast, it could take years to resolve a case where an inadmissible alien 

applies for asylum and undergoes removal proceedings under 1229a, including 

any afforded appeals. 

In the instances where immigration proceedings are not resolved quickly, ICE 

Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)is responsible for the longer-term 

detention of inadmissible family units10 and single adults,11 while the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee 

Resettlement arranges for the housing of unaccompanied alien children 

(UAC).12 If inadmissible aliens are ultimately ordered removed, ICE ERO is also 

responsible for returning them to their home country. Appendix C describes 

the immigration process as it applies to apprehended aliens. 

Border security and immigration enforcement require coordination, not only 

among CBP, ICE ERO, and HHS, but also with DHS’ U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services13 and other Federal Government stakeholders that play a 

role in the administration of immigration law, including: 

• the Department of Justice, which prosecutes aliens, detains aliens 

serving sentences for immigration offenses, and adjudicates immigration 

cases; 

entry documents or attempted to gain admission through fraud or misrepresentation unless 

they indicate an intention to apply for asylum, a fear of persecution or torture, or a fear of 

return to their home country. Actions Needed to Improve DHS Processing of Families and 

Coordination between DHS and HHS, GAO-20-245, pp. 7–8, Feb. 2020. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 9 CBP may refer the alien for criminal violations, often related to attempting to evade inspection 

(under 8 U.S.C. § 1325), which is followed by the inadmissible alien’s transfer to Department of 

Justice custody. 

10 When CBP apprehends a child younger than 18 years with his or her parent or legal 

guardian, the child and parent or guardian are classified as a family unit. 

11 Individuals older than 18 years who are not part of a family unit are classified as “single 

adults.” 

12 UACs are aliens younger than 18 years of age with no lawful immigration status in the 

United States and without a parent or legal guardian in the United States available to take 

physical custody of, and to provide care for, them. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). 13 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials interview individuals placed in expedited 

removal proceedings and detained by CBP and ICE who indicate they will apply for asylum. 

These interviews, also called credible fear interviews, determine whether there is a possibility 

the detained individual would be subject to persecution or torture upon returning to his or her 

home country. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• U.S. Courts, where aliens are prosecuted for charges such as illegal entry 

or re-entry, and if convicted receive sentences for these offenses; and 

• the Department of Defense, which assists with border security 

operations. 

Appendix D outlines the general roles of Federal agencies in border security 

and immigration enforcement. 

CBP and ICE ERO Facilities 

CBP’s holding facilities are designed for short-term custody. Most CBP 

facilities hold detainees in locked cinderblock cells that have a metal combined 

toilet and sink. Facilities generally do not have beds and only some have 

showers. CBP’s National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search 

(TEDS), which govern the treatment of aliens in its custody, require they be 

segregated by age and gender, and that the capacity of CBP holding areas not 

be exceeded.14 TEDS standards also generally limit detention in CBP facilities 

to 72 hours, with the expectation that CBP will transfer family units and single 

adults to ICE ERO custody15 and UACs to HHS within that timeframe.16 

In fiscal year 2019, ICE ERO maintained a nationwide network of more than 

200 detention facilities designed for longer-term custody—i.e., detention for 

longer than 72 hours (see Appendix E). In contrast to CBP’s short-term 

holding facilities, the facilities ICE ERO uses for long-term detention have 

medical units, and generally have kitchen and dining spaces; residential 

sleeping areas with showers; visitation and legal services areas, including law 

libraries; recreational facilities; and barber shops. Most of the facilities in ICE 

ERO’s network receive Federal funds to hold ICE detainees, but are owned and 

operated by state and local governments or private companies. These facilities 

must adhere to the National Detention Standards issued in 2000 and revised in 

2019, 2008 Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), the 

2011 PBNDS (Revised in 2016), or the Family Residential Standards, issued in 

2007 and revised in 2020. According to ICE, the PBNDS establish consistent 

conditions of confinement, program operations, and management expectations 

within ICE’s varied detention system. 

14 TEDS 4.7 Hold Room Standards state “under no circumstances should the maximum 

occupancy rate, as set by the fire marshal, be exceeded.” 

15 Under TEDS 4.1 Duration of Detention, “[d]etainees should generally not be held for longer 

than 72 hours in CBP hold rooms or holding facilities. Every effort must be made to hold 

detainees for the least amount of time required for their processing, transfer, release, or 

repatriation as appropriate and as operationally feasible.” For DHS authority to detain 

individuals, see 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(8)(B) and DHS Delegation 7030.2, Delegation of Authority to 

the Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 16 HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement is responsible for custody of UACs. See 6 U.S.C. § 

279(a). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Although ICE ERO has bed space for approximately 40,000 detainees in its 

network, the availability of a bed for any given detainee is limited by certain 

factors. Namely, each facility is classified to hold specific types of detainees, 

based on demographics and security risk to protect general safety, security, 

and order in the facilities and the welfare of all detainees. Consistent with its 

detention standards, ICE ERO considers detainees’ nationality, age, gender, 

criminal history, gang affiliation, language(s) fluency, medical history, and legal 

and immigration status to arrange for placement in its facilities. Detention 

classification includes an assessment of any factors that could raise the risk of 

vulnerability, victimization, or assault, for detained individuals. ICE ERO does 

not accept inadmissible aliens unless it can identify a vacancy at a facility 

aligned with that individual’s classification. 

Mandatory Detention and Releases 

Detention of inadmissible aliens is generally required,17 but CBP and ICE also 

have the authority to release inadmissible aliens into the United States from 

their custody with a Notice to Appear18 in court at a future date.19 Aliens who 

are pregnant, elderly, or seriously ill may be released for humanitarian 

reasons. CBP and ICE also have discretion for other types of releases. 

However, some individuals must be detained, such as those connected with 

criminal activity or terrorism.20 The practice of releasing inadmissible aliens 

into the United States after their apprehension is sometimes referred to as 

“catch and release.” In January 2017, Executive Order 13767 directed DHS to 

end this practice and ensure aliens apprehended for violations of immigration 

law were detained pending the outcome of their immigration proceedings.21 To 

17 Aliens who arrive in, attempt to enter, or have entered the United States without having been 

admitted or paroled following inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port of entry 

are subject to detention pending determination of their admissibility or removal. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii), (b)(4)(ii), (c). 

18 A Notice to Appear is a document ICE, CBP, or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

issues to an inadmissible or removable alien instructing the individual to appear before an 

immigration judge on a certain date. The issuance of a Notice to Appear is written notice 

required to be given to a person in 1229a proceedings informing the individual of the nature of 

the proceedings, the legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted, the acts or 

conduct alleged to be in violation of law, the charges against the person and the statutory 

provisions alleged to have been violated, the person’s ability to secure counsel, and other 

aspects of the immigration court system. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). 19 In this context, release means parole. Parole allows the inadmissible alien to enter and 

temporarily remain in the United States pending the outcome of his or her immigration 

proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 1226(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). 

20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 21 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. 

Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

comply with this order, Border Patrol leadership set forth guidelines limiting 

releases in most circumstances.22 

2019 Southwest Border Surge 

In 2019, DHS faced one of the largest surges of migrants crossing the 

Southwest border, stretching CBP operations, and straining other DHS and 

Federal partners.23 As early as October 2018, CBP was monitoring large 

groups of migrants crossing Mexico en route to the U.S. border. As Table 1 

shows, in FY 2019, CBP’s apprehensions approached 1 million, exceeding the 

apprehensions in the two previous FYs combined. This included approximately 

527,000 people traveling as family units; 81,000 UACs; and 369,000 single 

adults. 

Table 1. CBP Southwest Border Total Apprehensions by Year, 

FYs 2015 – 2019 

FY Total Apprehensions 

2019 977,509 

2018 521,090 

2017 415,517 

2016 553,378 

2015 444,859 

Source: Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of publicly available CBP apprehension data 

This surge significantly impacted CBP’s border security operations. CBP 

described having to divert between 40 and 60 percent of its staff away from the 

border security mission to provide humanitarian care to families and children, 

impacting its ability to prevent drugs and criminals from entering the United 

States even though Border Patrol worked with local, state, and Federal law 

enforcement partners to try to address enforcement gaps. Furthermore, CBP 

temporarily shifted more than 700 OFO officers from ports of entry to help 

Border Patrol, forcing some ports of entry to close travel lanes, creating delays 

for pedestrians, passenger vehicles, and commercial trucks trying to cross the 

22 Memorandum from Ronald Vitiello, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol to all Chief Patrol Agents and 

Directorate Chiefs, “Executive Orders 13767 and 13768 and the Secretary’s Implementation 

Directions of February 20, 2017,” Feb. 21, 2017. 23 As of March 21, 2020, CBP has been enforcing a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

order, which has limited its processing of inadmissible aliens encountered at or between ports 

of entry, and has instead resulted in it immediately returning most persons to the country they 

entered from or to their country of origin. See “Fact Sheet: DHS Measures on the Border to 

Limit the Further Spread of Coronavirus,” Oct. 19, 2020, 

https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/06/16/fact-sheet-dhs-measures-border-limit-furtherspread-coronavirus. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

border.24 During this time, we documented severe overcrowding and prolonged 

migrant detention at CBP holding facilities.25 

In addition to the volume of apprehensions, the location of these 

apprehensions posed additional strains on CBP resources. Along the 

Southwest border, Border Patrol agents apprehend and transport aliens from 

remote desert locations hundreds of miles away from Border Patrol facilities. 

To illustrate, the El Paso Sector has 13 stations and 6 checkpoints but is 

responsible for apprehensions dispersed across 125,500 square miles, 

including 268 miles of international border (Figure 1). 

24 Testimony of Brian S. Hastings, Chief of Law Enforcement Operations, U.S. Border Patrol 

before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary on “Oversight of Family 

Separation and CBP Short-Term Custody Under the Trump Administration,” p. 3, July 25, 

2019. 25 Management Alert – DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at 

El Paso Del Norte Processing Center, OIG-19-46, May 2019; Management Alert – DHS Needs to 

Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio 

Grande Valley, OIG-19-51, July 2019; and Capping Report: CBP Struggled to Provide Adequate 

Detention Conditions During 2019 Migrant Surge, OIG-20-38, June 2020. OIG issues 

management alerts to notify senior DHS officials about conditions posing an immediate and 

serious threat of waste, fraud, and abuse in Department or component programs and 

operations. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 1. Map of El Paso Border Patrol Sector and Apprehension 

Locations, May 2019 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data 

Prolonged Detention of Single Adults during the 2019 Surge 

Despite the order to detain individuals until their immigration proceedings 

were complete, in accordance with several different legal requirements, DHS 

must generally release or transfer family units out of its custody in an 

expeditious manner. According to the Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997 

(Flores Settlement Agreement),26 all minors, including minors in family units, 

generally must be transferred out of CBP custody within 3 to 5 days. Family 

units may be released, or may be transferred to non-secure, state-licensed 

facilities. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act introduced 

more stringent requirements for UACs, who generally must be transferred to 

26 The Flores Settlement Agreement establishes a nationwide policy for the detention, release, 

and treatment of minors in immigration custody. It favors the release of alien minors and 

requires those in Government custody be housed in non-secure, state-licensed facilities within 

3 to 5 days. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held the Flores Agreement 

applies to both accompanied and unaccompanied minors in immigration custody. The “Flores 

Settlement” and Alien Families Apprehended at the U.S. Border: Frequently Asked Questions 

(R45297), Congressional Research Service, updated Sept. 17, 2018. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

HHS custody within 3 days.27 HHS may hold UACs in non-secure, statelicensed facilities or release them to the care of adult sponsors or foster 

families. Family unit detention is governed by both the Flores Settlement 

Agreement and ongoing litigation related to family separation.28 Specifically, 

minors traveling as a family unit apprehended between or at ports of entry 

generally cannot be held in ICE family residential centers for more than 20 

days.29 Furthermore,ICE ERO has limited space in its family residential 

centers. Across all the facilities, there are approximately 2,500 detention beds 

for family units. However, in May 2019 alone, during the height of the surge, 

CBP apprehended more than 88,000 individuals traveling as family units. 

Therefore, although individuals traveling as family units made up significant 

apprehension volume, most were released from CBP facilities relatively quickly. 

These restrictions do not apply to CBP’s detention of single adults. 

As border apprehensions increased, so did detention times among different 

demographic groups. In particular, single adults were detained in CBP 

facilities the longest. Figure 2 shows the difference in lengths of time 

individuals apprehended in May 2019 remained in Border Patrol facilities 

before being released, removed, or transferred to ICE ERO detention facilities. 

27 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110-457. 28 The Ms. L. class action litigation, filed by two asylum seekers who were separated from their 

children, created a class of adult aliens entering at or between ports of entry who are or will be 

detained by DHS and who are or will be separated from their minor children. A preliminary 

injunction in the Ms. L. case required all class members be reunited with their children. The 

“Flores Settlement” and Alien Families Apprehended at the U.S. Border: Frequently Asked 

Questions (R45297), Congressional Research Service, updated Sept. 17, 2018. 29 The Flores Settlement Agreement generally requires minors to be released in an expeditious 

fashion. The timeframe can be extended up to 20 days in the event of an influx of minors. In 

addition, the court has determined that, for those accompanied minors held in ICE family 

residential centers, detention for approximately 20 days is consistent with this requirement, if 

the government is exercising due diligence to screen family members for reasonable or credible 

fear. The “Flores Settlement” and Alien Families Apprehended at the U.S. Border: Frequently 

Asked Questions (R45297), Congressional Research Service, updated Sept. 17, 2018. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 2. Length of Time in Border Patrol Custody for Different 

Demographic Groups Apprehended on Southwest Border, May 2019 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data 

Forty percent of migrants in family units remained in Border Patrol custody 

between 72 hours and 2 weeks, but less than 1 percent remained longer than 2 

weeks. In contrast, a similar percentage — 38 percent — of single adults were 

held between 72 hours and 2 weeks, but 13 percent remained in Border Patrol 

facilities longer than 2 weeks. That month, more than 4,900 single adults were 

held between 2 weeks and 100 days in CBP facilities. 

Because the transfer of single adults out of CBP custody took the longest to 

resolve compared with other demographic groups during the surge, this report 

focuses on the reasons CBP held single adults in its custody longer than 72 

hours. Without DHS understanding and addressing the underlying reasons for its 

inability to manage the migrant surge in 2019, such conditions could occur again. 

Results of Evaluation 

A key issue preventing CBP from transferring detainees out of its facilities 

within 72 hours was insufficient ICE ERO bed space. ICE ERO also could not 

increase capacity quickly enough to keep pace with CBP’s apprehensions. 

Furthermore, ICE ERO’s available bed space was not always appropriate for the 

aliens needing placement. In some instances, ICE ERO officials exercised 

discretion not to accept all detainees even when bed space was available. 

Consequently, CBP’s Border Patrol faced rapidly increasing numbers of 

detainees — especially single adults — who remained in its holding facilities 

intended for short-term custody. 

Despite worsening conditions, with very limited exceptions, Border Patrol did 

not exercise its authority to release single adults from its custody, for fear they 

would “lose control of the border” by inducing additional migration surges. 

Border Patrol created ad-hoc solutions to manage the rising detainee 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

populations in its facilities because, despite its dependence on ICE ERO to 

accept detainees, Border Patrol’s response plans did not account for ICE ERO’s 

detention limitations. Longstanding fragmentation in immigration enforcement 

operations between CBP and ICE ERO further exacerbated the challenges in 

transferring detainees in a timely manner. 

DHS was aware of a potential land migration surge and the challenges it would 

pose. As early as November 2018, DHS was publicly discussing the large 

number of migrants, at least half of which were single adults, heading to the 

U.S. border with Mexico. DHS had both a multi-component task force in place 

at the border and a plan for land migration surges, but used neither during the 

2019 surge. Instead, DHS created and dissolved various interagency groups at 

its headquarters. We remain concerned that, if the Department does not 

develop a DHS-wide framework for surges and address day-to-day 

fragmentation, CBP and ICE ERO will face the same challenges in future 

surges. 

Insufficient ICE ERO Resources Led to Prolonged Detention of 

Single Adults in CBP Facilities 

ICE ERO’s difficulty placing detainees in its facilities contributed to aliens 

remaining in CBP custody for more than 72 hours. Before ICE ERO can place 

a detainee in a facility, it must have funding for a bed. However, at the 

beginning of the 2019 migrant surge, ICE ERO was already housing more 

detainees than its funding permitted. When ICE ERO identified additional 

funding, it could not add bed space quickly enough to accept CBP’s 

inadmissible aliens, contributing to significant overcrowding in CBP facilities. 

Furthermore, detainees’ gender, risk classification, and medical concerns 

created challenges identifying bed space in appropriate facilities. 

ICE ERO Did Not Have Sufficient Funding to Meet the Demand for More 

Detention Capacity 

ICE ERO’s detention capacity is determined on an annual basis. Each fiscal 

year, ICE ERO submits to Congress a projection of how many beds it will need, 

the average daily cost of a detention bed,30 and the overall budget requirement 

for detention. For FY19, ICE ERO projected a need for 44,500 adult beds at an 

30 Detention bed costs include costs directly attributable to an alien in ICE custody. These 

costs include detention bed and guard contracts; healthcare; and other costs directly tied to 

implementing the detention program such as clothing; food, beverages, and meal preparation 

materials; detainee pay; utilities and telecommunication services; operation and maintenance 

of facilities; supplies and equipment; postage; and miscellaneous contractual services such as 

inspection contracts. ICE FY20 Congressional Budget Justification. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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average daily cost of $123.86 per bed, requiring an appropriation of $2.011 

billion. 

Congress then provides ICE a dollar amount for detention funding through 

appropriations, which generally is less than ICE’s request. Congress allows 

ICE to supplement detention funding in two ways: 1) internally, with limited 

reprogramming from other ICE programs; and 2) externally, with DHS 

transferring funds to ICE from other DHS programs.31 ICE ERO’s funded 

detention capacity can be calculated by dividing the appropriated detention 

funding by its average daily cost for a detention bed. ICE ERO monitors its bed 

usage by tracking its average daily population (ADP).32 Until February 2019,33 

ICE ERO’s congressionally authorized detention capacity for single adults was 

38,020. In FY 2018 adult detention funding level was $1.9 billion. With the 

enactment of the FY 2019 budget on February 15, 2019,34 ICE ERO’s single 

adult detention funding was set at $2.0 billion, increasing its congressionally 

authorized detention capacity for single adults to 42,775. 

However, even before the increase in detention capacity in February 2019, ICE 

ERO was already housing more detainees than its congressionally authorized 

capacity allowed by reallocating funds from other ICE programs. Figure 3 

shows the congressionally authorized, funded single adult detention capacity 

and the additional ADP for each month in FY 2019. In the first month of the 

fiscal year, ICE ERO averaged a single adult ADP of 43,502, exceeding its 

funded capacity, and its ADP kept increasing.35 In fact, by the end of FY19, 

31 Under section 503 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, DHS generally was allowed 

to transfer up to 5 percent of any of its appropriations if it provided Congress 30 days’ notice. 

However, any transfer could not increase ICE’s Operations and Support appropriation, which 

includes Custody Operations, by more than 10 percent. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 

2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 503. A transfer is the movement of appropriated funds from one 

account to another. 

32 Average daily population measures the number of individuals in ICE custody on an average 

day. It can be used to describe any period (such as a week, month, or year) by dividing the 

number of detainees present for a facility’s midnight population count during the period being 

measured by the number of days in the period being measured. 

33 A series of three continuing resolutions provided funding through February 15, 2019, with a 

35-day appropriations lapse between December 21, 2018 and January 25, 2019. See Pub. L. 

No. 115-245 (October 1, 2018 through December 7, 2018); Pub. L. No. 115-298 (December 7, 

2018 through December 21, 2018); and Pub. L. No. 116-5 (January 25, 2019 through February 

15, 2019). 34 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6. 

35 As of November 6, 2020, the ICE detainee population was 17,163, a reduced number from 

normal detention levels. In March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ICE evaluated its 

detainee population levels based upon the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance 

for individuals at higher risk from COVID-19, and released more than 900 of these individuals 

after evaluating their immigration history, criminal record, potential threat to public safety, 

flight risk, and national security concerns. ICE continues to apply this assessment and, 

combined with continued repatriations of illegal aliens, has reduced its existing and incoming 

detainee population. See https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ICE ERO’s average adult ADP for the year was 48,850 and it had spent 

approximately $2.3 billion on single adult detention, exceeding the enacted 

2019 budget and authorized detention capacity for single adults. 

Figure 3. Single Adult Average Daily Population in ICE ERO Facilities 

Compared with Its Funded Detention Capacity, by Month, FY 2019 

60,000 

50,000 

40,000 

30,000 

20,000 

10,000 

0 

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 

Additional Adult ADP Funded Adult Detention Capacity 

Source: OIG analysis of ICE data 

When ICE had no more funds it could transfer internally, ICE ERO could not 

acquire additional bed space to respond to CBP’s needs, but instead needed 

DHS to reallocate funds from other DHS mission areas. While this process 

took place, detainees continued to remain in CBP custody. 

ICE ERO Added Substantial Bed Space during FY 2019 but Not Quickly 

Enough to Meet CBP Demand 

By January 2019, following a 35-day partial government shutdown, ICE ERO 

recognized it needed more capacity to meet the demand for single adult 

detention space resulting from the surge in apprehensions at the Southwest 

border. At that time, ICE ERO estimated it needed to add more than 1,900 

beds; these additional beds would require DHS to reallocate $65.6 million from 

other programs. ICE ERO received DHS’ permission later that month and 

began the acquisition process to add bed space. 

However, as explained by an ICE acquisition official, the process for the most 

common detention bed space contract typically takes 2 to 3 months to 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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complete. This process includes conducting research into the location’s access 

to medical services, determining transportation needs, and ascertaining ICE 

ERO staffing levels. The additional bed space is also vetted internally to verify 

the need is supported and the costs are in line with the market. Additionally, it 

can take 6 to 8 weeks to complete contractor personnel security requirements. 

Although ICE ERO officials explained they were able to get the contracts in 

place quickly — in about 6 weeks — and were placing detainees in newly 

acquired bed space by March 2019, this speed could not match CBP’s need for 

detainee transfers to ICE ERO. Between the first week of January and the first 

week of March 2019, CBP’s single adult detainee population rose by about 

1,200 people, from 2,094 to 3,304. 

As the surge progressed, ICE ERO continued adding bed space. Ultimately, 

during FY 2019, ICE ERO added 14,574 beds to its detention capacity. 

However, the majority of these beds — 9,884, or more than 67 percent — were 

added between June and September, after the height of CBP apprehensions in 

May. With insufficient bed space during the peak of CBP apprehensions in the 

spring of 2019, ICE ERO continued to reject CBP bed space requests. For 

example, in March 2019, ICE ERO rejected 2,632 (13 percent) of CBP’s 19,520 

bed space requests. By May 2019, although CBP’s bed space requests 

increased by 33 percent (25,945 requests), ICE ERO’s rejections increased by 

almost 150 percent to 6,531. These rejected bed space requests again resulted 

in detainees remaining in CBP’s short-term holding facilities for longer periods. 

During the surge, ICE’s ongoing interior immigration enforcement mission also 

required using some of its detention capacity.36 ICE had to balance its interior 

enforcement detention needs with providing detention capacity for CBP’s 

apprehended inadmissible aliens. Even though ICE was rejecting many of 

CBP’s requests for bed space, ICE was using an increasing majority of its 

detention capacity to place CBP’s apprehended inadmissible aliens. To 

illustrate, in FY 2018, 61 percent of ICE ERO detention facility placements 

resulted from CBP apprehensions while 39 percent were from ICE ERO 

enforcement actions. However, in FY 2019, placements from CBP 

apprehensions increased to 73 percent of ICE ERO detention facility 

placements. In contrast, ICE ERO’s placement of its own apprehended 

individuals decreased to 27 percent of detention placements.37 

36 Interior enforcement involves ICE ERO arresting aliens within the United States for violations 

of U.S. immigration law. These arrests include at-large arrests based on leads, and custodial 

arrests when ICE ERO works with jails to identify removable aliens arrested by state and local 

authorities for criminal activity. 

37 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year 2019 Enforcement and Removal 

Operations Report. 

www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ICE ERO Struggled to Match CBP Detainees with, and Transport Them to, 

Appropriate and Available Detention Space 

Compounding ICE ERO’s difficulty acquiring additional detention space to meet 

the extraordinary demands of surging CBP apprehensions, was the need for it 

to align the demographics, security risks, and medical concerns of inadmissible 

aliens with available space at the existing facilities. These criteria for 

placement further complicated ICE ERO’s ability to find appropriate bed space 

for detainees. Specifically, we found ICE ERO struggled to find available beds 

by: 

• Gender. ICE ERO detention standards require male and female 

populations be housed separately, and outline gender-specific standards 

for care. Starting in 2008, standards began instituting certain 

requirements for same-gendered staff to conduct hands-on searches of 

detainees and specifying certain medical care for female detainees. 

Facilities are designated to hold specific genders, and the contracts for 

these facilities are written to meet these standards. Facility 

designations, therefore, cannot easily be changed to meet surges in 

demand. For example, an official in El Paso told us that changing the 

designation of beds in his facilities from male to female required several 

steps, including hiring new contractors, changing medical capabilities, 

and altering the schedules of existing staff. Therefore, the facilities chose 

not to change their designations, even as it became more difficult to 

place female detainees in beds during the surge. 

In May 2019 alone, at the height of the surge, CBP apprehended 6,789 

single adult females. However, in FY19, ICE ERO had 6,462 detention 

beds assigned for single adult females across the country, most of which 

would have already been occupied. Furthermore, some of those beds 

were in facilities located far from the Southwest border, such as in 

Washington (with 230 beds) and New Jersey (with 109 beds). Insufficient 

space for females at ICE ERO facilities contributed to 65 percent of the 

single adult females CBP apprehended in May 2019 remaining in CBP 

custody more than 72 hours. 

• Security risk. Both the NDS and the PBNDS require detainees be 

classified and housed according to security risk. This risk is based, in 

part, on criminal history. Detainees who have a history of felonies or 

violent crimes such as assaults are considered high risk and cannot be 

housed with detainees with no criminal history or a history of non-violent 

crimes. Changing the risk classification mix of detainees could require 

facilities to change employee work schedules or hire new staff because 

higher risk detainees require additional supervision. In a few instances, 

ICE ERO was able to rearrange bed spaces within facilities already 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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designated for certain mixes of risk classification. For example, in the El 

Paso Processing Center, ICE ERO started placing aggravated felons in 

smaller barracks to leave more beds available in the larger barracks for 

non-criminal detainees. However, this solution could not be applied on a 

broad scale. 

ICE ERO bed space was further constrained by the need to separate 

known gang members from one another. For example, in El Paso, staff 

told us that they separated gang members to avoid conflict or organized 

disruptions. Therefore, even if a facility had space for a certain risk 

classification of detainees, introducing detainees with the same risk 

classification, but from rival gangs of those already housed would create 

security problems at the facility. 

• Medical concerns. The PBNDS require facilities to isolate detainees who 

have contracted contagious diseases. Disease outbreaks among 

detainees posed considerable constraints on bed space availability since 

it resulted in beds becoming unavailable if an infectious disease 

quarantine was in effect. Also, according to ICE ERO medical staff we 

interviewed, when a detainee has a serious medical condition, ICE ERO 

needs to ensure that a particular facility with an available bed can 

provide appropriate treatment. Therefore, before ICE ERO accepts a 

detainee from CBP, the alien has to be medically “screened,” meaning 

ICE ERO sought to identify any infectious diseases or serious medical or 

mental health conditions. While ICE ERO’s caution in accepting ill 

detainees prevented the medical services in its facilities from being 

overburdened, it contributed to aliens remaining in CBP facilities, which 

were considerably less equipped to provide adequate medical treatment 

or quarantine sick individuals. Additionally, Border Patrol staff told us 

that agents were required to stay with aliens at local hospitals, reducing 

Border Patrol’s manpower at stations. 

ICE ERO Exercised Discretion When Accepting Certain Detainee Groups, 

Leaving Other Groups in CBP Custody for Longer Periods 

Adding to this challenge, ICE ERO personnel also used discretion when 

deciding whether to accept certain groups of aliens into their facilities, even if 

there was available bed space. As described in the Background, ICE ERO had 

the authority not to detain certain inadmissible aliens. According to ICE ERO, 

because it has limited detention capacity, which it has to balance between 

interior immigration enforcement and CBP’s apprehensions, it focused its 

resources on aliens “who represent a threat to public safety, for whom 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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detention is mandatory by law, or who may be a flight risk.”38 ICE ERO used 

its authority to prioritize which of CBP’s apprehended aliens it placed in its 

detention facilities, preferring to accept those whom it believed would be moved 

quickly or posed less risk. Examples we heard of ICE ERO exercising this 

discretion included: 

• ICE ERO prioritized placing Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadorian 

aliens since they could be enrolled in programs that made their 

repatriation easier.39 Our analysis of CBP apprehension data from May 

2019 determined detainees from these countries spent, on average, 100 

hours in Border Patrol custody. In contrast, other non-Mexican 

detainees40 spent an average of 215 hours in CBP custody — more than 

twice as long. 

• An ICE ERO field office rejected any alien younger than 25 years because 

of previous errors in incorrectly identifying juvenile aliens as adults and 

exposing ICE ERO to liability for holding a juvenile in an adult facility. 

Our analysis of May 2019 CBP apprehension data revealed, on average, 

detainees 17 years old and younger spent less than 86 hours in Border 

Patrol custody; individuals 25 years and older spent, on average, 110 

hours in custody. However, individuals between the ages of 18 and 24 

spent, on average, 141 hours in custody — almost 30 to 64 percent 

longer than other groups. 

• ICE ERO personnel limited the numbers of aliens from certain countries 

in facilities to avoid creating a security risk. Our analysis of length of 

time in custody in May 2019 showed Cuban nationals spent almost four 

times longer in CBP custody (388 hours) than Guatemalan (94 hours) or 

Honduran detainees (100 hours). 

ICE ERO’s inability to quickly increase its detention capacity to accommodate 

the large volume of aliens CBP was apprehending played a major role in CBP 

keeping single adult detainees in custody for more than 72 hours. As the crisis 

was unfolding, ICE ERO did not have a surge plan to increase additional 

detention capacity quickly. A senior ICE ERO official explained ICE ERO did 

not have any formal surge plan because, in the past, ICE ERO has been able to 

identify extra beds when needed with local partners, but has never had to 

acquire 10,000 beds in a short period of time as happened during the 2019 

38 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year 2019 Enforcement and Removal 

Operations Report. 

www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf 

39 Under these programs, source country consulates issue electronic travel documents so ICE 

could repatriate detainees who did not have physical travel documentation. 

40 Mexican nationals can be repatriated quickly because their removals do not generally require 

flights. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

surge. Without a pre-existing capacity for surge bed space, delays caused by 

ICE ERO’s funding shortages, the lengthy acquisition process, and inherent 

difficulties involved with placing different demographics of aliens in appropriate 

beds at this scale would most likely occur again if ICE ERO has to acquire bed 

space for large numbers of inadmissible aliens on short notice. 

CBP’s Border Patrol Detained Single Adults for Extended Times 

in Crowded Conditions Despite Having the Authority to Release 

Them Due to Border Security Concerns 

With apprehensions continuing to rise, and ICE ERO increasingly refusing CBP 

detainees due to insufficient bed space, CBP faced the extraordinary challenge 

of managing unsustainable numbers of detainees in its short-term facilities 

across the Southwest border. This rise in apprehensions affected Border Patrol 

more acutely than OFO. Despite worsening conditions, Border Patrol generally 

did not exercise its authority to release single adults from its custody, for fear 

they would “lose control of the border.” This resulted in Border Patrol 

detaining single adults in short-term facilities well in excess of the 72 hours 

generally allowed by TEDS standards. 

Border Patrol Faced an Extraordinary Challenge with Increasing Numbers 

of Detainees, while OFO Was Less Affected 

During the surge, CBP’s apprehensions rose to unprecedented levels. As 

Figure 4 shows, in January 2019 the number of migrants attempting to cross 

the Southwest border both through and between ports of entry without proper 

documentation began to increase compared to previous years’ levels. At the 

height of the surge in May 2019, CBP apprehended more than 144,000 

migrants, almost triple the number apprehended in May 2018. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 4. CBP Apprehensions along the Southwest Border, FY19 Compared 

with the FY14 through FY18 Average 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP publicly available data 

After sustained increases in apprehensions for months, by June 2019, CBP 

held more than 19,000 individuals in its custody. For context, CBP facilities 

across the Southwest border have an estimated capacity of 16,000 for shortterm holding, based on providing 7 square feet of space per detainee. If longerterm holding and sleeping space are required, the space required for each 

detainee increases to 50 square feet, reducing the estimated capacity to less 

than 5,000. 

Within CBP, this increase in inadmissible alien custody levels affected Border 

Patrol more acutely than OFO. Border Patrol, which cannot control the 

number of individuals its agents encounter crossing illegally between ports of 

entry, made the majority of these apprehensions. In contrast, OFO limits the 

number of individuals entering through the port with a practice known as 

“queue management.”41 As Figure 5 shows, the result was an increase of 

detainees in custody, overwhelmingly in Border Patrol facilities. 

41 During queue management, an OFO officer stands at the international boundary line of a 

pedestrian footbridge, such as those between the United States and Mexico, and intercepts 

migrants before they can cross into U.S. territory. If an individual does not have facially valid 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 5. Comparison of Border Patrol and OFO Average Weekly Custody 

Numbers on the Southwest Border during the 2019 Surge 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data 

Border Patrol Did Not Exercise Its Authority to Release Single Adults Due 

to Concerns of Losing Control of the Border 

As described in the Background, by law CBP has the discretion to release 

single adult detainees from its custody.42 However, to comply with Executive 

Order 13767 and supplemental direction from Border Patrol leadership, with 

very limited exceptions, Border Patrol did not release single adults during the 

travel documentation, the OFO officer checks with the port of entry staff to determine if they 

are accepting more individuals for processing before allowing the individual to proceed. We 

describe this practice in more detail in Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues 

Under the Zero Tolerance Policy, OIG-18-84, Sept. 2018, as well as our recently issued report 

CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry, OIG-21-02, 

Oct. 2020. 42 Aliens may be released pending a decision on whether they are to be removed from the 

United States. Releases are generally justified on a case-by-case basis if there is no security 

risk or risk of absconding for aliens with serious medical conditions, pregnant women, and 

aliens “whose continued detention is not in the public interest.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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surge despite increasingly dangerous 

overcrowding conditions in its facilities. 

Border Patrol officials believed the ability to 

control the border depended on penalties for 

individuals violating immigration laws. 

Because family units can only be detained 

for short periods of time before generally 

being released into the United States while 

they await the outcomes of immigration 

proceedings, and UACs must be transferred 

to HHS, Border Patrol considered single 

adults the only group for whom it could 

sufficiently enforce the law. In May 2019, 

the Chief of the Border Patrol testified that, 

of the three demographic groups — UACs, family units, and single adults — 

single adults were the demographic group to whom it could have the “greatest 

ability to deliver consequences” for violating immigration laws.43 The Chief 

further explained that with ICE ERO running out of room to detain single 

adults during immigration proceedings, the greatest concern was that Border 

Patrol would have to begin releasing single adults. DHS also expressed these 

concerns in its requests to Congress for assistance for addressing the migrant 

crisis, stating the Department was “witnessing the real-time dissolution of the 

immigration system.”44 

Despite public pronouncements of concern that single adult releases would 

undermine immigration laws, Border Patrol was willing to accept such releases 

— so long as they were performed by ICE ERO. CBP senior officials, both in 

the field and at headquarters, told us detention and removal decisions were 

ICE ERO’s responsibility. Border Patrol wanted ICE ERO to accept the single 

adults from its facilities and make decisions on whether to detain or release 

them. However, as previously discussed, ICE ERO does not accept physical 

custody of detainees from CBP for whom it does not have bed space. In some 

locations, ICE ERO released detainees directly from Border Patrol facilities by 

accepting custody of the detainee on paper and processing the release. 

ICE ERO also questioned why CBP could not perform the releases since CBP 

had the same legal authority to release single adults into the United States as 

ICE did. ICE ERO officials explained to us that Border Patrol was better 

equipped to release detainees because of its additional manpower, compared to 

ICE ERO’s limited staffing, which was already stretched due to the surge. For 

43 Testimony of Carla Provost, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, At the Breaking Point: the 

Humanitarian and Security Crisis at our Southern Border, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Border Security and Immigration of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 8, 2019. 44 Letter from DHS Secretary Nielsen to the House Committee on Homeland Security, March 

28, 2019. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

example, according to its FY 2019 enforcement 

reporting, ICE ERO’s interior immigration 

enforcement activities decreased by 10 percent 

due to reallocating resources, including 

approximately 350 ICE ERO officers, to assist 

with responding to the migrant surge on the 

southwest border. An ICE official explained ICE 

ERO’s entire El Paso jurisdiction had only 149 

positions, some of them vacant, which were 

fewer personnel than the number of staff at just 

one of Border Patrol’s 11 stations in El Paso.45 

With such limited staff, ICE ERO asserted it 

could not manage the additional workload for 

releases during the surge, not even for family units. 

DHS Headquarters was aware of the increasingly unsustainable number of 

single adults in Border Patrol facilities, as well as the dispute regarding 

whether ICE ERO or Border Patrol should perform the releases. Nevertheless, 

DHS did not make any decisions or direct either party to take any actions to 

alleviate the situation. 

In very limited cases, Border Patrol released single adults from its custody 

without first transferring them to ICE ERO, and, except during the height of 

the surge, these releases were individually approved by Border Patrol 

headquarters. Of the 30,172 single adults it apprehended in June 2019, 

Border Patrol released 217, and only 99 of these releases were for reasons 

related to lack of space as opposed to humanitarian or law enforcement 

reasons. With ICE ERO unable to accept single adults it had no room for, and 

Border Patrol not releasing them, the result was a steady increase in the 

number of single adults in Border Patrol custody, as shown in Figure 6. 

45 The Border Patrol Sector in El Paso has 11 stations and 7 checkpoints. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 6. Number of Single Adults in Border Patrol Custody on the 

Southwest Border during the 2019 Surge 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data 

Border Patrol had a responsibility to enforce immigration laws, but was still 

required to make every effort to transfer single adults out of its short-term 

detention facilities within 72 hours. Border Patrol facilities are not properly 

resourced for longer term detention, and these migrants were denied or delayed 

access to services mandated during long-term detention under applicable ICE 

standards, such as beds, regular hot meals, showers, access to legal materials, 

and routine medical care. Given that long-term detention of single adults is 

not CBP’s area of responsibility, CBP and ICE must actively coordinate plans 

on accepting detainees during future surges, and DHS has to provide greater 

leadership and assistance to CBP in such crisis situations. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Border Patrol Sectors Created Ad-Hoc Solutions to Manage 

Detainees ICE ERO Could Not Accept 

With ICE ERO not accepting many of the apprehended aliens, Border Patrol 

had limited options to quickly respond to rising custody numbers in its 

facilities. To manage the populations in custody, Border Patrol: 

• Set up temporary staging spaces outside its stations as holding and 

processing shelters. For example, during the height of the surge, the 

McAllen Station’s apprehensions peaked at nearly 2,000 a day. McAllen 

Station’s capacity is 382; in May 2019, it had 3,000 people on the 

grounds. The station closed off its garage, and eventually set up four 20-

foot by 65-foot tents in the parking area with fencing around the tents. 

Each tent was air conditioned and contained portable toilets. As seen in 

Figure 7, the station also added plumbing to its parking area to service 

the toileting facilities. 

Figure 7. Plumbing Added to McAllen Station Parking Structure during 

2019 Surge 

Source: OIG 

Sector personnel created mobile carts that allowed processing in the 

tents outside of the stations (see Figure 8). They also created mobile 

processing units for the backs of vehicles, which allowed agents 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

encountering large groups of migrants far away from stations to start 

processing individuals while waiting for transportation. This reduced 

processing times, and helped provide a more accurate assessment of 

detention space needs. 

Figure 8. Mobile Processing Cart at McAllen Station 

Source: OIG 

• Moved sick individuals to one location to allow other stations to 

maximize their holding spaces. Like ICE ERO, Border Patrol has to 

segregate sick detainees based on their illness. In Rio Grande Valley, 

Border Patrol turned its Weslaco Station into a “sick bay.” The station 

also developed an electronic system for stations in its sector to request 

bed space for sick individuals. The electronic system streamlined the 

process instead of sending emails back and forth, and ensured required 

information was included so Weslaco could prepare to accept the 

detainee. Collected information included the detainee’s demographics; 

any diagnoses made by the sending facility or a health care provider; 

whether the individual had his or her medicine and documents; and 

whether the detainee had already been processed. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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• Examined existing contracts for service and supplies and worked with 

local officials to secure or increase access to reusable tents, netting, 

water, paper shredding, increased trash pick-ups, toothbrushes, and 

other amenities. For example, the McAllen Station’s contract for 2 

portable toilets to be cleaned once a week was revised to allow for 30 

portable toilets to be cleaned twice a day. In addition, Border Patrol used 

supplemental funds to purchase shower stalls, air conditioning units, 

and other temporary facilities to manage surge conditions. Border Patrol 

officials said, with the equipment on hand, they could recreate the 

footprint at their facility to manage future surge conditions within 24 to 

48 hours. 

In contrast to the quick changes that could be made with existing facilities, 

Border Patrol remained constrained in its ability to put up temporary facilities 

quickly to manage the populations. Border Patrol officials expressed 

frustration in their inability to contract for temporary facilities timely and use 

their existing facilities as needed. Specifically, in July 2019, Border Patrol 

received supplemental funding to address its operational needs for the surge, 

and contracted for a temporary soft-sided tent in Tornillo, TX, to hold single 

adults. The contract to build and run the facility for the first 3 months cost 

$47 million, and it began holding adults in August 2019, but by this time the 

bulk of the surge had passed. The U.S. Government Accountability Office 

reported the facility never held more than 66 adults on any day, which was 

significantly less than the 2,500-person capacity it was contracted to hold.46 

One Border Patrol official told us the facility was 6 months too late to address 

overcrowding of single adults. 

The use of other temporary facilities was not flexible, preventing Border Patrol 

from utilizing additional capacity in the most optimal way. During the surge, 

Border Patrol secured soft-sided tents to temporarily hold inadmissible alien 

family units. The first set of soft-sided tents cost $37 million and opened in 

May 2019 in Donna and El Paso, TX. However, while family units were 

released from CBP custody in large numbers during the surge, the single adult 

population in custody continued to increase. A Border Patrol official told us 

when the family units’ volume subsided, CBP was not allowed to use the softsided tents to move single adults out of overcrowded brick-and-mortar facilities 

because the contracts for the soft-sided tents were written specifically for 

families.47 

While the surge was overwhelming, Border Patrol sectors and stations created 

unique solutions to try to meet the challenge. During our fieldwork in 

46 Border Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of a Temporary Facility in 

Texas Raised Concerns about Resources Used, GAO-20-321R, p. 4, Mar. 11, 2020. 

47 This is also possibly due to the facilities’ open air design which limits the populations that 

can co-mingle. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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November 2019, we asked whether CBP had conducted a comprehensive review 

of the measures all the sectors and field offices had taken to manage the surge, 

including the various measures just described. A Border Patrol official told us 

that all the sectors were in the process of conducting a bottom-up review of 

training gaps, transportation issues, and methods to quickly expand capacity 

but the review was not yet complete. We also asked whether solutions, such as 

the mobile processing carts and the medical request system, had been shared 

with other sectors during the surge, and Border Patrol officials said they had 

not. Conducting after-action reviews to identify any successes and missteps is 

a best practice in incident management and should be done as soon as 

possible after an event.48 Border Patrol must take stock of both the best 

practices and infrastructure it acquired during the 2019 surge, and incorporate 

these into planning and staging for the next migrant surge. 

CBP’s and ICE ERO’s Fragmented Approach to the Migrant 

Surge Hindered an Efficient Response 

Agencies that conduct operations in a fragmented and uncoordinated way 

“waste scarce funds..., and limit the effectiveness of the [F]ederal effort.”49 

Despite interdependent mission sets, CBP and ICE ERO often operate 

independently of each other. Under normal conditions, the resulting 

inefficiencies and fragmentation are manageable and migrants are transferred 

timely. However, under surge conditions this disharmony exacerbated an 

already challenging situation and contributed to prolonged detention in CBP’s 

short-term facilities. First, CBP and ICE ERO did not create response plans 

together. Second, other long-standing friction points such as different 

prioritization of detainees for transfer from CBP to ICE ERO; inconsistent 

standards for immigration paperwork and handling of property; separate 

transportation contracts; and disparate information systems added to the 

challenge. 

CBP Plans Did Not Account for ICE ERO’s Long-Term Detention Space 

Limitations 

When planning responses to risk, agencies are expected to consider all 

significant interactions with external parties and changes within their external 

environment.50 Border Patrol officials recognized the risks a land migration 

surge would pose; namely that the surge could overwhelm processing 

capabilities, affect available detention space, and divert critical personnel and 

48 G0402 - National Incident Management System and Incident Command System Overview for 

Senior Officials (Executives, Elected, and Appointed) - Resources for Senior Officials, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, pp. 39–40, May 2019. 49 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and 

Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP, pp. 9–10, Apr. 2013. 

50 Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G, p. 38, Sept. 2014. 

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resources away from enforcement operations along the border. However, 

although Border Patrol officials developed surge response plans in early 2019, 

they focused only on CBP actions and did not include ICE ERO as an active 

partner in managing this problem. 

Border Patrol sectors developed sector-specific response plans to the migrant 

surge, which included trigger points to induce certain operational responses 

within the sector. While most plans used the number of apprehensions as 

their trigger points (such as 1,000 apprehensions a day for 5 consecutive days), 

other plans included trigger points based on the size of groups amassing near 

the Southwest border; Border Patrol’s holding space capacity; and aliens’ time 

in custody. These plans detailed how Border Patrol stations in each sector 

would address the migrant surge, including: 

• deploying Border Patrol personnel to different parts of the sectors; 

• increasing transportation; 

• reaching out to the Department of Defense for assistance; 

• incorporating other CBP offices such as the intelligence unit and foreign 

relations branch; and 

• using public relations and communications strategies. 

However, these plans did not fully reflect Border Patrol’s dependence on ICE 

ERO to accept detainees or detail the role ICE ERO would play in a response. 

We reviewed 18 planning documents from 9 Border Patrol sectors created to 

respond to the increasing numbers of apprehensions on the Southwest border. 

Only two of the nine sectors detailed their expectations of ICE ERO, while most 

made general references to coordination and requesting assistance. For 

example, in the El Centro Sector plan, Border 

Patrol only references ICE ERO as a “friendlyforce” from whom it would request assistance 

with its holding facilities. It did not integrate 

ICE ERO as a major partner from the same 

department responsible for longer term 

detention. When outlining specific 

responsibilities, under “Detention” the plan 

stated the sector would use “Border Patrol 

stations to maximize detention capabilities. 

However, current detention capabilities...are 

substantially inadequate for 11,000+ 

migrants.” In light of this limitation, instead of 

including enhanced outreach with ICE ERO to 

find detention solutions, the plan stated the 

sector would establish a temporary, large-scale 

detention facility, potentially in Calexico, CA, 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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and request resources such as cots, portable toilets, and shower trailers. 

The sector plans also did not explicitly consider ICE ERO’s resource limitations 

and how those limitations would affect Border Patrol. Only two sectors 

acknowledged detainee transfer to ICE ERO as a constraint or necessary for the 

success of their operations. For example, the San Diego Sector’s plan explicitly 

recognized the sector’s reliance on other agencies for an effective response to a 

mass migration event, stating “there is a need associated with partner 

agencies...to increase their logistical operations and overall operational tempo 

in direct support of our enforcement actions and humanitarian response to 

mass migration events. Tasks immediately associated with any...response(s) 

are intake, medical screening, and custody transfer operations for U.S. 

Marshalls [sic] (USMS)/Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), Health and 

Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee and Resettlement (ORR).” However, 

these were not explicitly considered in their plan as a serious risk to their 

operations. In fact, while eight of the nine sectors’ plans, including San Diego, 

included explicit descriptions of the risks associated with the mass migration, 

none of them included the risk of ICE ERO potentially running out of detention 

space. 

In another example, the Rio Grande Valley Sector’s response plan assumed 

continuous transfers to both ICE ERO and HHS. Local CBP officials that we 

spoke to stated they attempted to incorporate ICE ERO’s limited detention 

capacity as one of the trigger points instead of solely Border Patrol 

apprehensions. According to local Border Patrol officials in the Rio Grande 

Valley Sector, Border Patrol headquarters instructed them not to include ICE 

ERO, because ICE ERO is not under CBP control. The original sector-specific 

plan envisioned its maximum trigger point as 1,000 apprehensions a day for 10 

consecutive days. However, by March 2019, Rio Grande Valley Sector 

surpassed this trigger point, apprehending a total of 33,763 individuals or an 

average of 1,089 a day, and the numbers kept rising, ultimately peaking at an 

average of 1,607 a day in May 2019. Furthermore, the sector had almost 5,000 

individuals in its short-term holding facilities, which was 63 percent more than 

their designed capacity. Local CBP officials we interviewed said they updated 

the plan in May 2019, and again attempted to incorporate ICE ERO detention 

capacity as a trigger point to adjust Border Patrol’s operations. They told us 

that Border Patrol headquarters again removed the language specifying ICE 

ERO detention capacity as a trigger point. 

Fragmentation and Inefficiencies Further Exacerbated the Challenge 

In addition to the inadequate planning, pre-existing internal friction points 

added another layer of difficulty to CBP and ICE ERO’s response to the migrant 

surge. Disparities and inconsistencies in several aspects of immigration 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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enforcement operations, navigable when apprehensions are low, were 

magnified during the surge. 

• Prioritization. CBP officials told us they prioritize the transfer of detainees 

they have had in custody the longest. On the other hand, ICE ERO 

prioritizes which aliens it can accept based on the efficiency of movement 

and the impact on detention space. For example, ICE ERO may focus on 

placing detainees of similar ages and genders at specific locations based 

on their limitations on bed space. However, without an overarching 

prioritization strategy that both agencies agreed to, Border Patrol and 

ICE ERO adhered to their own philosophies and expressed frustration 

with each other during the surge. 

• Immigration Paperwork. Both CBP and 

ICE ERO officials reported instances of 

delayed custody transfer because ICE 

ERO rejected CBP’s paperwork as 

incorrect, incomplete, or missing. ICE 

ERO officials cited instances where CBP 

paperwork had an incorrect address for 

an immigration court, did not include 

information necessary to support the 

charge of inadmissibility, or was 

missing signatures. CBP officials noted 

no standard exists for what is included 

in an alien file;51 and so each Border Patrol sector has adapted its 

processing requirements to meet local ICE ERO field office standards. 

During the surge, this fragmented set of paperwork requirements became 

especially problematic as Border Patrol agents on detail from other 

sectors, including detailees from the Northern border, faced a steep 

learning curve meeting local ICE ERO immigration paperwork 

requirements. 

• Property. Paperwork accounting for property was another challenge. In 

some instances, CBP discarded property such as backpacks and luggage, 

and in others, property was misplaced when detainees were transferred 

to and from court for prosecution. ICE ERO officials said that under its 

detention standards and the requirements of ICE ERO’s charter 

repatriation flights, ICE ERO must account for detainee property. 

During the surge, ICE ERO was reluctant to accept detainees who were 

missing property or a property inventory, further slowing down the 

transfers from CBP to ICE ERO. 

51 Alien files contain records of aliens as they move through the immigration process. The files 

may contain visas, photographs, affidavits, immigration forms, and correspondence. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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• Transportation. Both CBP and ICE ERO use separate contracts and 

vendors52 to transport detainees. CBP did not have sufficient 

transportation capacity in its contract to meet its needs during the surge, 

and did not have the flexibility to increase that capacity — such as 

increasing the number of buses and drivers — due to overtime limits and 

background check timeliness. Furthermore, CBP could not generally rely 

on ICE ERO to assist with transportation issues because of their 

separate contracts and arrangements. CBP officials explained that, in 

some instances, at the local level, Border Patrol and ICE ERO would 

work around these constraints by making “handshake agreements,” but 

these were informal and inconsistent arrangements. 

• Information systems. DHS’ challenges with streamlining its existing 

information systems are not new. In November 2019, OIG recommended 

improvements to DHS information technology systems.53 These 

challenges were apparent during the surge as transferring detainees from 

CBP custody to ICE ERO or HHS custody involved agents and officers 

using four distinct data management systems whose interconnectivity 

varied: 

o Border Patrol agents processed aliens using ENFORCE 3 (e3). 

o Border Patrol agents also used the HHS Unaccompanied Alien 

Children Portal (UAC Portal) for requests for UAC bed space. 

o CBP officers processed inadmissible aliens through a different system, 

the Secured Integrated Government Mainframe Access (SIGMA). 

o ICE ERO field officers used the Enforce Alien Removal Module (EARM) 

to track ICE custody decisions, detention, and release or removal. 

Some information from e3, SIGMA, and EARM, such as biographical 

and biometric information, and apprehension and case processing 

dates, transferred to ICE’s centralized Enforcement Integrated 

Database. 

52 For alien transportation services, CBP utilizes G4S while ICE separately contracted with 

Trailboss Enterprises and MVM Incorporated. 

53 In DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families, 

OIG-20-06, Nov. 2019, DHS OIG recommended the DHS Chief Information Officer work with 

ICE and CBP to ensure system interoperability to improve cross-component information 

sharing and coordination on border security operations. DHS concurred with this 

recommendation, and agreed to implement corrective actions by July 31, 2020. 

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Compounding the difficulty of using multiple data systems to track 

movement of detainees in the immigration process, key communication 

between the various responsible parties still required extensive emails 

and numerous phone calls. For example, 

CBP requested custody transfers to ICE by 

email. To do so, CBP generated manifests 

(lists of detainees ready for transfer), and 

sent them by email to ICE ERO. Similarly, 

OFO’s SIGMA was not connected to the 

HHS UAC Portal, and requests for bed 

space were made by email. ICE ERO, 

which facilitated UAC transfers to HHS, 

had read-only access to the UAC Portal, 

and tracked UACs separately in EARM. 

Questions about detainee bed space 

requirements and medical conditions were 

resolved by email or telephone. As ICE 

ERO officials explained, key documents, 

including alien files, detainee travel and 

identity documents, and property receipts, 

were transferred in hard copy, and some 

documents were lost in transfer. 

One area where CBP and ICE appeared to have worked together effectively is in 

their coordination with consulates to repatriate aliens without travel 

documents. During the surge, CBP and ICE initiated a pilot program with 

Northern Triangle countries54 to repatriate aliens without travel documents 

based on electronic nationality verification.55 Under the program, aliens in 

expedited removal proceedings and with no medical concerns were repatriated 

directly from Border Patrol custody to their native countries. ICE Air 

Operations provided charter flights scheduled daily based on need and 

availability. The first flights to El Salvador and Guatemala were on July 25 

and 26, 2019, respectively; the first flight to Honduras was scheduled in 

September 2019. Between July 25 and September 30, 2019, CBP and ICE 

repatriated 8,618 inadmissible aliens under this program. Multiple CBP and 

ICE ERO officials in the field considered the program, as well as other 

initiatives such as the Migrant Protection Protocols,56 key to reducing the 

numbers of aliens in their custody. 

54 The Northern Triangle of Central America includes El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 

55 CBP and ICE already had agreements with these countries to repatriate aliens lacking 

physical travel documents. Under the previous initiatives, consulate officials would interview 

the aliens and issue electronic travel documents within 24 hours. Under the new initiative, 

aliens were allowed to travel without any travel documents. 

56 DHS announced the implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols on December 20, 

2018. Under the program, certain applicants for admission arriving on land to the United 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The fragmented day-to-day operations between CBP and ICE ERO and their 

effects on immigration enforcement are not new. In 2005, our office reported 

that: 

• ICE ERO prepared detention capacity and staffing without insight or 

forecasts from CBP on apprehensions; 

• CBP developed apprehension initiatives without insight into whether ICE 

ERO had the detention and repatriation capacity to manage the 

apprehended aliens; and 

• any productive relationships are local in nature.57 

Furthermore, in 2018, at least two of CBP’s internal working groups noted the 

day-to-day inefficiencies in paperwork, technology, and transportation we 

outlined previously.58 The 2019 migration surge highlighted the continued 

need for DHS’ unity of effort and the breakdowns that still occur when, despite 

the best efforts of personnel on the ground, policies, plans, and processes are 

not coordinated. CBP and ICE ERO need to reduce their fragmented approach 

at the border during normal operations so that the system does not break 

down during a surge. 

DHS Did Not Implement a 2015 Plan Created to Respond to 

Migrant Surges and Did Not Develop New Department-level 

Operational Solutions 

Although the increase in apprehensions during the 2019 surge was significant, 

migrant surges at the Southwest border are not unprecedented. In 2014, the 

United States experienced a surge of migrants crossing its Southwest border, 

including approximately 60,000 UACs. In response, DHS created a multicomponent task force and a land migration plan to guide a whole-of-DHS 

response to such an event. However, during the 2019 migrant surge, DHS 

used neither the task force nor the land migration plan and did not adopt a 

new plan. Instead, as conditions worsened at the border, DHS leadership 

created and dissolved a series of multi-component groups at headquarters, 

none of which exerted command or control over CBP or ICE. Although DHS 

has since created a coordination group to advise leadership and to help 

manage homeland security emergencies, it is unclear whether a headquarters 

States from Mexico — illegally or without proper documentation — may be returned to Mexico 

to wait there for the duration of their removal proceedings. Memorandum from Secretary 

Kirstjen Nielsen, “Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols,” Jan. 

25, 2019. 

57 An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04, Nov. 2005. 58 Rio Grande Valley Sector Centralized Processing Center (CPC) Evaluation, July 2018; CBP – 

ICE Joint Facilitated Offsite Session Output Briefing, Oct. 2018. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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group, as opposed to an integrated multi-component operational team at the 

border, would best address future migrant surges. 

Before 2019, DHS Had a Task Force and a Plan to Address Land Migration 

Surges 

In the wake of the 2014 surge, DHS took two notable steps toward managing 

future migration emergencies. The Department: 

Created Joint Task Forces. In November 2014, then-Secretary Jeh Johnson 

created three pilot Joint Task Forces (JTF) – JTF-East, JTF-West, and JTFInvestigations.59 The JTFs were established to enhance DHS’ “unity of effort” 

in securing the Southwest border and maritime approaches, and drew 

permanent and rotational staff from multiple DHS components, including 

Border Patrol, ICE ERO, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services.60 Of the three, JTF-West was responsible for securing 

the southern land border between the United States and Mexico. JTF-West 

conducted activities through four corridors: (1) the South Texas Corridor; (2) 

the New Mexico/West Texas Corridor; (3) the Arizona Corridor; and (4) the 

California Corridor. This model was meant to enable components to execute 

targeted border security operations in each corridor. In 2016, Congress 

authorized DHS to formally establish the JTFs.61 

Created a Land Migration Plan. In August 2015, Secretary Johnson signed the 

DHS Southwest Border Land Migration Contingency Plan (“Plan”). The Plan was 

created “to ensure DHS has a comprehensive and synchronized approach to 

prevent and respond to an attempted land migration surge.” The Plan provided 

a framework for DHS to recognize and respond to increased migration through 

a cycle of five phases (Figure 9). Key elements of the Plan included: 

• JTF-West leading and coordinating DHS activities during a land 

migration surge along the Southwest border; 

• roles and responsibilities for DHS entities, including CBP, ICE, and the 

Executive Staff of the DHS Secretary; 

59 Per the September 2020, DHS Joint Task Force Modernization Plan, JTF-West and JTFInvestigations were dissolved effective October 1, 2020. All resources, including personnel, 

funds, equipment and facilities, were returned to the source components. 

60 JTF-West also had staff from CBP’s OFO, Air and Marine Operations, and Office of 

Intelligence; ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations; DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office; and the Department of Defense. The 

Federal Emergency Management Agency also had a billet but was not staffed. 

61 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017, Pub. L. No. 114–328, § 1901 (2016). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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• phases defined by requirements for increased oversight, direction, and 

sheltering capacity with trigger points based on the number of migrants 

in custody;62 and 

• phase changes directed by the DHS Secretary or Deputy Secretary but 

informed by recommendation of the JTF-West and component 

leadership. 

The Plan also contained an intelligence assessment for FY 2015, and discussed 

other trends affecting processing. 

62 The Plan established weekly reporting for other potential indications of increased migration, 

including changes in economic and political stability; crime and violence; environmental 

conditions; migration route activity; smuggler tactics; and U.S. socio-economic opportunities. 

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Figure 9. Phases of the 2015 Plan and Relevant Single Adult Population 

Triggers and Actions 

Source: OIG analysis of DHS information 

DHS Did Not Use the Plan during the 2019 Surge 

Despite DHS creating the Plan in 2015, it did not use the Plan to respond to a 

surge event that started slightly more than 3 years later. As previously 

discussed, DHS entered FY 2019 with ICE ERO already exceeding funded 

detention capacity and struggling to identify and acquire more bed space. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Although detention capacity is not the only 

factor the Plan uses to define phases, under 

the terms of the Plan, DHS likely was in phase 

3 — major influx — status as early as 

December 2018. At this point, had DHS 

followed the 2015 Plan, ICE would already 

have been working with the JTF-West to 

increase its single adult operations and obtain 

support from other DHS components and 

external partners (per phase 2) and would 

have begun to intensify these efforts. DHS’ 

surge operations would have intensified to 

support ICE in managing increased detention capacity demands. 

By the end of March 2019, in addition to ICE being over capacity, Border Patrol 

facilities, on average, exceeded their capacity across the Southwest Border, 

with the most severely affected sectors reporting numbers almost two to three 

times their capacity. This would have likely indicated DHS was in phase 4 — 

land migration surge status — characterized by all available holding and 

sheltering capacity being exhausted. At this point, ICE would be expected to 

increase bed space to meet the demands of increased CBP apprehensions. Yet, 

as described earlier in this report, while ICE began to add bed space in March, 

the majority of these beds did not become available until June 2019 or later. 

The DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, which is responsible for DHS’ 

operational planning, did not implement the 2015 Plan or create a new 

framework when the number of migrants in detention increased. According to 

these officials, their role during the crisis was limited to connecting DHS to the 

White House, Department of Defense, and sometimes to coordinating with the 

components’ policy offices. We could not identify an official within the Office of 

Strategy, Policy, and Plans who would acknowledge the office’s responsibility 

for DHS-level operational planning for migrant surges. Instead we were told to 

consider component plans, and that DHS develops plans to provide coherent 

information to the Secretary, but execution rests with the components. 

DHS Headquarters officials we spoke with were familiar with the 2015 Plan at 

the time of the surge, but unable to provide satisfactory information about why 

DHS did not implement it. Although multiple officials indicated the Plan 

remained an active or “working” plan, one official told us DHS did not 

necessarily use a certain plan even when circumstances suggested the plan be 

used. Another DHS official suggested the Plan was “overtaken by events,” and 

that the 2019 surge presented an unprecedented number of migrants and a 

demographic mix that was not contemplated by existing plans. 

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Yet the Plan, by definition, includes high numbers of migrants as one of its 

considerations. The Plan also included specific triggers for the three broad 

demographic groups of migrants — UACs, family units, and single adults. DHS 

officials also often cited a shift in source countries for migration — from Mexico 

in prior surges to Northern Triangle countries in the 2019 surge — as a factor 

that made the surge difficult to manage and a reason for not implementing the 

Plan. Specifically, DHS officials testified undocumented migrants from Mexico 

can be repatriated quickly; however, undocumented migrants from noncontiguous countries cannot and put a strain on detention resources. 

Nevertheless, one of the critical assumptions in the Plan was that the primary 

source countries would be Northern Triangle countries. Therefore, this shift in 

source countries was not unforeseen. Finally, the Plan called for its review 

within 2 years. This review would have allowed DHS to amend the Plan in 

2017 if DHS believed the Plan was obsolete. Based on our review of 

subsequent plans and on discussions with Office of Policy officials, DHS has 

not reviewed or amended the Plan since its signing in 2015. 

DHS Did Not Use the JTF Structure to Coordinate a Unified DHS Response 

to the 2019 Surge 

The 2015 Plan established a significant role for JTF-West in responding to 

migrant surges.63 In the event of a land migration surge, the JTF-West would 

be responsible for coordinating: 

• component operations aimed at prevention and response to a land 

migration surge; 

• response efforts to the phases triggered by indicators and warnings; 

• air transportation efforts to expeditiously repatriate migrants to countries 

of origins; and 

• ground transportation resources to transfer aliens from short-term 

temporary holding facilities to long-term detention facilities. 

During the 2019 surge, DHS did not use JTF-West’s existing structure to 

respond to the crisis although JTF-West was already positioned in the field 

near the border and had representatives of responsible agencies. JTF-West 

instead, according to the officials we interviewed, focused on human trafficking 

and other law enforcement activities during the surge while the Secretary 

recalled the JTF-West’s Director to DHS headquarters to coordinate a response 

using a different, newly created, emergency response group. When we asked 

why the JTF-West did not take a leading role in addressing extended migrant 

holding during the surge, DHS officials said activities associated with leading 

the response to a surge, such as directing resource movements, were a better 

fit for headquarters offices. However, another DHS official suggested that CBP 

63 JTF-West’s responsibilities were not limited to responding to migrant surges. 

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and ICE have little incentive to cooperate under a DHS-created structure such 

as the JTF-West. DHS officials explained the Department has limited control 

over CBP and ICE’s funding or operations. Rather, the components report 

directly to Congress on these matters. Therefore, although senior leaders know 

coordination leads to better results, CBP and ICE choose to protect their own 

resources instead of working together with DHS on operational planning or 

needs. 

One of the critical assumptions outlined in the Plan was that the JTF-West and 

the operational components would possess the capability to execute the 

responsibilities outlined in the Plan. In 2017, our office published initial 

observations that the JTFs were a step forward for DHS but that relying on 

components for funding and staff was a challenge.64 DHS officials explained 

that when the JTFs were initiated, there was a direct relationship between their 

directors and the Secretary and this relationship facilitated coordination 

activities between components. However, the JTF-West Director is a CBP 

employee who reports to the CBP Commissioner65 and any management of a 

DHS-wide response would be influenced by this chain of command. DHS 

officials also said by the time of the 2019 surge, JTF-West was not resourced or 

empowered to direct a multi-component response at the border. Furthermore, 

JTF-West officials confirmed that the JTF structure was not being routinely 

used to address border surge emergencies as envisioned when the JTFs were 

created. 

Instead of using the JTF-West to manage the surge, DHS created and dissolved 

various interagency groups at its headquarters as conditions in CBP facilities 

worsened. All had similar missions as the JTF-West, yet none exerted 

meaningful influence, coordination, command, or control over CBP or ICE. 

Our review of emails indicated some officials were confused as to the actual 

purpose of these headquarters groups. To illustrate, in January 2019, DHS 

created the Unified Coordination Group Southwest Border (UCG SWB) to 

“ensure that Southwest Border operations are unified, including assessing the 

necessary personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities [and] interagency 

support....” However, emails indicated UCG SWB officials believed JTF-West 

was the proper agency to conduct this coordination. Shortly thereafter, in April 

2019, then-Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen dissolved the UCG SWB in favor of an 

Interagency Border Emergency Cell (IBEC), and recalled the Director of JTFWest to DHS headquarters to lead this new group. 

64 DHS’ Joint Task Forces, OIG-17-100, Aug. 2017. In a more recent report, our office describes 

DHS’ inefficient management of JTFs, including not providing clear, consistent guidance and 

direction, and not identifying optimal staffing and resources for the JTFs. DHS Cannot 

Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces, OIG-20-80, Sept. 

2020. 

65 While the head of the JTF-West was presidentially appointed, he or she reported directly to 

the CBP Commissioner. 

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In May 2019, then-Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan66 dissolved the IBEC, 

using some of its staff and resources to create a joint Department of 

Defense/DHS Southwest Border Interagency Planning Team (IPT). The IPT was 

tasked with creating a plan for responding to migration surges, and was led by 

senior officials from the Department of Defense and the Border Patrol. The 

team’s planning was led by a senior official detailed from the Office of Policy. 

The team was augmented by six Department of Defense planners and a new 

DHS headquarters coordination group — the Joint Incident Advisory Group 

(JIAG) — formed “to create better operational outcomes during multicomponent contingencies.”67 Between July and August 2019, when their 

planning tasks were complete, former IBEC staff returned to their DHS 

components or transitioned to the JIAG, and the Department of Defense 

officials returned to their parent organizations. The detailed official from the 

Office of Policy became the Director of the JIAG. Figure 10 shows how the 

number of single adults in CBP custody increased while DHS created and 

dissolved these coordination and planning groups. 

66 On August 14, 2020, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a decision that 

concluded Kevin McAleenan had not been eligible to become Acting Secretary when Secretary 

Nielsen retired. GAO referred related issues to our office for further review. GAO B-331650, 

Aug. 14, 2020. After reviewing GAO’s report, we declined to take up the matter and instead left 

it to the courts to resolve this inter-branch disagreement. 

67 JIAG conceptualization and development began in 2018. It officially began as a pilot in 

February 2019 and was transferred from the Office of Policy to the Office of Operations 

Coordination in April 2019. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 10. Evolution of DHS Coordination Groups during 2019 Land 

Migration Surge 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data and DHS documents 

JIAG officials explained that, as a stable advisory group, they would provide 

leadership and continuity, and address DHS’ history of creating and dissolving 

small groups to react to crises. Per the September 2020, DHS Joint Task Force 

Modernization Plan, an Operational Deputies Board, supported by the JIAG, 

would provide a “headquarters level, joint operations coordination capability” to 

develop solutions when there are multi-component issues. The officials 

explained that while the JTFs relied upon the willingness of components to 

support and use them as intended, the JIAG is a DHS headquarters element 

where all the components are involved and can ensure the DHS Secretary and 

component leaders get “vetted options” to respond to crises. Furthermore, 

having well-connected individuals at the JIAG would make it easier to get 

information from various levels within components. 

While JIAG officials asserted the group has been successful in providing the 

DHS Secretary with policy options related to other homeland security issues, 

we remain skeptical that it can direct CBP and ICE ERO to respond in a 

coordinated way to a future border crisis. For example, officials said during the 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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surge, DHS headquarters coordination groups reached out to CBP and ICE 

ERO to assist with improving medical coverage, transportation, and detainee 

bed space. DHS officials that we spoke to told us these efforts were fruitless: 

the coordination groups were viewed as outsiders and their ideas and proposed 

solutions did not get traction. 

We are also concerned about an over-reliance on connections and relationships 

to ensure the necessary information sharing to inform policy decisions during a 

crisis. If those relationships sour, or individuals are no longer part of the JIAG, 

the stability and value of the group as described would be jeopardized. Our 

office and others68 have long noted disjointed operations, mismatched 

priorities, competition, insular perspectives, and an unwillingness to 

compromise between CBP and ICE ERO that have undercut DHS’ 

apprehension, detention, and repatriation efforts. Poor coordination between 

CBP and ICE ERO during a surge is unlikely to be improved by an outside 

group, but requires a foundation of cooperation on daily operational matters. 

Efforts to Update DHS-wide Plans for Migrant Surges Have Stalled 

While the IPT existed in 2019, the members were tasked with developing a 

mass migration mitigation “campaign plan.”69 The plan was drafted between 

April and August 2019, and distributed for comment in September 2019. The 

campaign plan was meant to inform component leadership about how DHS 

would sustainably secure and manage the Southwest border while deterring 

unlawful immigration, encouraging legal immigration, and facilitating trade 

and travel, with initiatives identified for the following 3 years. 

The campaign plan included a list of “capability gaps” within DHS that 

hindered an effective response to the 2019 surge on the Southwest border. The 

plan noted DHS had: 

• limited and fragmented transportation systems; 

• inadequate detention space for migrant demographics; 

• no consolidated immigration data system; and 

• no surge capacity for transportation, case processing, medical 

evaluations, or detention. 

68 For example, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04, Nov. 2005; James J. Carafino and D. 

Heyman, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security (SR-02), The Heritage 

Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec. 13, 2004; and BP and 

ICE: Does the Current Organizational Structure Best Serve U.S. Homeland Security Interests? 

Parts II and III, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, 

House Committee on Homeland Security, November 15, 2005, and May 11, 2006. 69 DHS Southwest Border Mass Migration Mitigation Campaign Plan (Draft), Sept. 2019. In 

contrast to a contingency plan, which may be in force until it is replaced, a campaign plan is 

intended as a short-term response to a specific situation. 

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Although most campaign plan recommendations would have required changes 

in legislation or actions from other Federal agencies, some recommendations 

required only internal DHS process improvements. For example, 

recommendations included streamlining immigration processing and reviewing 

ICE ERO staffing levels. 

The IPT obtained and incorporated DHS component comments on the 

campaign plan and forwarded the consolidated document to the Office of Policy 

by early December 2019, but the campaign plan was not finalized. Although 

we observed the same capability gaps as causes of prolonged detention in CBP 

facilities during the 2019 surge, when we asked for a status update on the 

campaign plan, officials from the Office of Policy said the plan was “no longer 

being worked” because it was no longer seen as beneficial or having utility to 

the Department. 

According to a senior CBP official, during the surge, “everyone was just trying 

to survive within their own mission set” and the entire system was 

overwhelmed. At the time of our fieldwork, the official suggested that since the 

apprehension volume had decreased, it was an opportune time to plan and 

consider DHS-wide challenges for future surges. It remains to be seen whether 

DHS will rise to the challenge and create a plan to address the friction points 

and capability gaps, identified at this point by multiple parties, before the next 

migrant surge. 

Conclusion 

While migrant surges require a whole-of-government approach, DHS manages 

a major part of the border security and immigration enforcement mission set. 

ICE ERO and CBP’s interdependencies meant the 2019 migrant surge required 

forethought, multi-component planning, and a coordinated response, which 

ultimately did not occur. The inefficiencies created by DHS’ fragmented 

approach to migrant processing are not new, and they will continue to recur 

without strong leadership and vision for truly unified operations within DHS. 

At almost 20 years old, DHS must mature past individual agreements and 

relationships created to accommodate systemic fragmentation, and truly 

approach its border mission as “one DHS.” 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendations 

We recommend the Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 1: Create a comprehensive surge detention capacity 

contingency plan that considers Customs and Border Protection apprehension 

levels, and ensure a process exists for its implementation during future surges. 

Recommendation 2: Standardize documentation required in alien files that 

Customs and Border Protection needs to include for transfer of aliens from 

Customs and Border Protection to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

Enforcement and Removal Operations custody that will apply to all field offices. 

We recommend the Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation 3: Identify strategies and solutions Customs and Border 

Protection’s Border Patrol sectors and Office of Field Operations field offices 

used during the 2019 surge to manage delays in detainee transfers to partner 

agencies, determine the best practices that can be implemented during future 

surges, and communicate these best practices across the organization, and 

ensure a process exists for their implementation during future surges. 

Recommendation 4: Conduct an inventory of infrastructure enhancements 

acquired during the 2019 surge and incorporate these into planning and 

staging for future migrant surges. 

Recommendation 5: Provide guidance to Border Patrol sectors to incorporate 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations 

and Health and Human Services capacity in risk assessments for future 

migrant surge planning. 

We recommend the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation 6: Ensure Customs and Border Protection and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement establish, draft, and coordinate thresholds, in 

consultation with the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans with approval 

from the Secretary, for when DHS will request a whole-of-government approach 

to address transportation, case processing, and detention gaps during migrant 

surges. 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We have included a copy of DHS’ Management Response in its entirety in 

Appendix B. We also received technical comments to the draft report and 

revised the report where appropriate. 

DHS concurred with our six recommendations, which are resolved and open. It 

also expressed concerns with our discussion of ICE’s considerations when 

placing detainees in detention centers. Specifically, ICE stated that placement 

considerations are critical to promoting a safe and secure environment for both 

detainees and staff and should not, in anyway, be viewed as impediments. We 

agree that ICE’s placement considerations are in place to ensure the safety of 

detainees and staff. We also acknowledge that addressing these considerations 

at the scale required during the surge was a challenge and resulted in 

placement delays. Our description of the challenges ICE faced was not a 

critique of the considerations, but a description of the context within which ICE 

had to find appropriate facilities for thousands of detainees in short order. 

A summary of the Department’s responses to our recommendations and our 

analysis follows. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 1: Concur. ICE ERO is developing a 

detention system that will more quickly adapt and respond to major surges in 

migrant populations. The current system, which requires a minimum of 90 to 

120 days to activate new bed space, does not easily allow for immediate 

response to rapid increases in migration patterns at the Southwest Border. 

Consequently ICE ERO worked with the ICE Office of Acquisition Management 

to negotiate and modify ten existing agreements to establish surge beds 

nationwide. These modifications were awarded between January 30, 2020 and 

May 19, 2020, and the additional beds are available for use when directed by 

ICE. ICE ERO field offices will also work with their local CBP counterparts, 

including Border Patrol and OFO, to review detention requirements and 

logistics needed for ICE to provide bed space for individuals in CBP custody at, 

or approaching, 72 hours. ICE expects these actions to be completed by 

December 31, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of 

Recommendation 1, which is resolved and open. We will close this 

recommendation when we receive documentation showing that ICE has 

implemented a process whereby it can increase capacity rapidly in response to 

surges and that it considers CBP apprehensions during implementation. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 2: Concur. ICE ERO Field Operations 

will consult with Border Patrol and OFO, as well as the Department of Justice 

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Executive Office for Immigration Review, and will develop and distribute 

guidance to all field offices standardizing the information required in an alien 

file in order to accept the transfer of an alien from CBP. ICE expects these 

actions to be completed by December 31, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of 

Recommendation 2, which is resolved and open. We will close this 

recommendation when we receive documentation showing that ICE has 

standardized the information required in an alien file to accept the transfer of 

an alien from CBP, that this guidance has been distributed to all field offices, 

and that, in turn, this guidance has been provided to ICE’s local CBP 

counterparts. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 3: Concur. Border Patrol and OFO are 

updating the CBP Surge Plan, and already established an incident command in 

November 2020 that is collaborating internally within DHS, as well as with 

other strategic partners, such as HHS, to increase communication and 

coordination in anticipation of future surges. Border Patrol established an 

Incident Command Structured Immigration Surge Team on November 19, 

2020, to address multiple lines of efforts, including illegal migration and 

detention capacity-related matters in real time. Border Patrol leadership also 

engaged with ICE ERO and HHS during face-to-face meetings and as part of 

the Unified Command Group to further its whole-of-government approach that 

addresses migration surges in a unified manner. 

Border Patrol and OFO are collaborating with CBP Office of Information 

Technology and ICE ERO on an integrated information system, the Unified 

Information Portal, which provides component-specific data across DHS and is 

shared with partners, such as HHS. 

Further, Border Patrol and OFO participate in planning through the Unified 

Command Group that includes DHS, the Department of Defense, HHS, ICE 

ERO, and various other stakeholders. CBP expects these actions to be 

completed by December 31, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of 

Recommendation 3, which is resolved and open. We will close this 

recommendation when CBP provides documentation showing that it has 

communicated best practices for surge response across the organization and 

that there is a process in place to implement these best practices during future 

surges. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 4: Concur. The CBP Office of Facilities 

and Asset Management is finalizing the Soft-Sided Facilities After Action Review 

and Playbook Team to: (1) identify key lessons learned for continuation or 

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improvement; (2) conduct an inventory of existing and planned permanent 

holding capacity; and (3) develop a Surge and Emergency Construction Task 

Force Playbook that will document a standardized process for future emergency 

construction during migrant surges. CBP expects these actions to be 

completed by December 31, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of 

Recommendation 4, which is resolved and open. We learned that during the 

surge, CBP not only acquired large-scale holding facilities, but also purchased 

portable shower stalls, air conditioning units, and other temporary facilities to 

manage surge conditions; developed technological solutions such as the 

electronic sick bay space request system at Weslaco; and created mobile 

processing units and carts. We expect these and any other solutions identified 

at locations we did not visit to be included in an inventory of solutions 

developed during the surge and to be assessed for feasibility of implementation 

in future surges. We will close this recommendation when we receive 

documentation showing that CBP performed a full inventory of physical and 

technological enhancements the field developed to address the 2019 surge and 

evaluated these enhancements for incorporation in planning and staging for 

future migrant surges. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 5: Concur. Border Patrol said it 

continues to provide guidance to sectors to incorporate ICE ERO and HHS 

surge planning protocols. Border Patrol collaborates with DHS components 

such as ICE ERO in an integrated information system, the Unified Information 

Portal. This system is complete, but is continually upgraded and provides 

component-specific data across DHS and is shared with partners such as HHS. 

Border Patrol currently coordinates with DHS, ICE ERO, and HHS Office of 

Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in planning and coordinating response to 

anticipated surges, which is an ongoing and current effort. Further, Border 

Patrol stood up a surge planning team on November 19, 2020 that is currently 

coordinating with ICE ERO, HHS ORR, and other stakeholders to coordinate a 

response to the current surge of family units and unaccompanied alien 

children occurring on the southern border. Such planning and coordination 

efforts are currently distributed via the Border Patrol Law Enforcement 

Operations Directorate to Sector representatives for the current surge. CBP 

expects these actions to be completed by April 30, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to Recommendation 5, 

which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we 

receive guidance issued to Border Patrol sectors that they should incorporate 

ICE ERO and HHS detention capacity in their risk assessments when planning 

their operational responses to migrant surges. 

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DHS Comments to Recommendation 6: Concur. In consultation with the 

DHS Office of Policy Border Security and Immigration, CBP Operations Support 

and ICE ERO will jointly develop proposed thresholds to address 

transportation, case processing, and detention gaps during migrant surges. 

This effort will build upon existing CBP surge response plans and ICE guidance 

related to operations for managing a migration surge. By December 31, 2021, 

CBP and ICE will forward senior component leadership-cleared results of their 

threshold determination efforts to the Under Secretary for Policy, who will then 

seek DHS Secretary approval for implementation, as appropriate. DHS 

anticipates these actions to be completed by February 28, 2022. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to Recommendation 6, 

which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we 

receive documentation showing a jointly developed set of thresholds for when 

DHS will request a whole-of-government approach to address transportation, 

case processing, and detention gaps during migrant surges. 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107−296) by amendment to 

the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

Our objective was to identify issues CBP faced in its efforts to comply with the 

general requirement to hold detainees in its custody no longer than 72 hours, 

as specified in the TEDS standards. 

We reviewed policies, procedures, guidance, and planning documents 

developed by CBP, ICE, and the DHS Office of Operations (OPS), Office of 

Policy, and various task forces and working groups with relevant 

responsibilities. We reviewed documentation on Border Patrol and OFO efforts 

to process and transfer detainees from custody, including decisions on custody 

management and efforts to secure ICE ERO and HHS bed space. We reviewed 

documentation on ICE ERO’s bed space management, including budget, 

forecasting, and transfer and removal information. We reviewed email 

correspondence from senior DHS, CBP, and ICE officials from FY 2019. We 

also reviewed available information from CBP and ICE data systems. 

Within CBP, we interviewed senior headquarters officials; senior field Border 

Patrol agents, OFO officers, and juvenile coordinators; attorneys from the Office 

of Chief Counsel; representatives of the CBP Emergency Operations Center; 

and officials responsible for database development. 

Within ICE, we interviewed officials from the San Antonio, New Orleans, 

Phoenix, El Paso, and Houston field offices; headquarters ICE ERO officials 

responsible for budget, acquisitions, forecasting, and bed space management; 

juvenile coordinators; and officials from the Detainee Operations Coordination 

Center, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, ICE Health Services Corps, and 

Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis. 

We interviewed participants in joint DHS operations and task forces, including 

the JTF-West, Migration Crisis Action Team, UCG SWB, IBEC, and JIAG. We 

also interviewed participants in two joint CBP and ICE process improvement 

initiatives facilitated by consultants. 

Within DHS headquarters, we interviewed an official from the Office of the 

Chief Financial Officer. We interviewed senior OPS officials, including those 

responsible for drafting the 2015 Plan and the September 2019 draft campaign 

plan. We interviewed officials from three Office of Policy Offices: (1) 

Immigration Statistics; (2) Immigration Policy; and (3) Strategy, Plans, Analysis, 

and Risk. 

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To obtain more information about DHS’ response to the 2019 surge, we 

conducted interviews with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 

non-governmental organizations with a presence on the Southwest border. We 

interviewed headquarters and field officials from the HHS Office of Refugee 

Resettlement, and obtained a demonstration of the UAC Portal used to refer 

UACs from DHS to HHS custody. 

We conducted field site visits to the following border areas: 

• El Paso (October 2–4, 2019); 

• Phoenix (November 4, 2019); 

• Houston (November 5–6, 2019); 

• San Antonio (November 6–7, 2019); and 

• the Rio Grande Valley (November 12–15, 2019). 

At these locations, we interviewed CBP Border Patrol agents, OFO officers, and 

ICE officers responsible for juveniles, custody management, transportation, 

data quality and integrity, intra-agency coordination, and coordination with 

HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement. In the El Paso area and Rio Grande Valley 

area, we toured detention facilities that had held detainees longer than 72 

hours during the 2019 surge. 

We conducted our fieldwork between August 2019 and June 2020 under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of 

the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Overview of Immigration Process after Border Apprehension 

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Appendix D 

Roles of Federal Government Stakeholders in Immigration 

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Appendix E 

FY 2019 Detention Facilities Used by ICE ERO 

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Appendix F 

Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations Major Contributors 

to This Report 

Tatyana Martell, Chief Inspector 

Erika Lang, Chief Inspector 

Brendan Bacon, Lead Inspector 

Lorraine Eide, Lead Inspector 

Kimberley Lake de Pulla, Lead Inspector 

Paul Lewandowski, Senior Inspector 

Ryan Nelson, Senior Inspector 

Anthony Crawford, Intelligence Officer 

Brittany Scott, Independent Referencer 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

ICE Liaison 

CBP Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305