Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, July 13, 2004 BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed 

to Eliminate Weaknesses in 

the Visa Revocation Process

Statement of Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-04-899T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-899T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-899T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

July 13, 2004

BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate 

Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation 

Process 

GAO’s analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security 

took some actions in summer 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa 

revocation process that we identified in June 2003. However, GAO’s review 

of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed 

review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained. 

• Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of 

visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to consular 

officials at State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or 

longer to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. 

• In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to 

post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not 

know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. 

• In 10 cases, DHS either failed or took several months to notify 

immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in 

the country. It then took more than 2 months for immigration 

investigators to initiate field investigations of these individuals. 

After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional 

actions were taken to improve the process. DHS and State believe these 

actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, 

State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa 

revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and 

acted to ensure that immigration investigators were aware of all individuals 

with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took 

some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. 

Further, in April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group 

organized under the Federal Bureau of Investigation, identified the visa 

revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and 

developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. 

However, weaknesses remain. For example, State’s and DHS’s procedures 

are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific 

time frames for completing each step of the process. Moreover, outstanding 

legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding removing individuals 

based solely on their visa revocation. 

Points of Delay Observed in the Visa Revocation Process 

The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security calls for 

preventing foreign terrorists from 

entering our country and using all 

legal means to identify; halt; and 

where appropriate, prosecute or 

bring immigration or other civil 

charges against terrorists in the 

United States. GAO reported in 

June 2003 that the visa revocation 

process needed to be strengthened 

as an antiterrorism tool and 

recommended that the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), in 

conjunction with the Departments 

of State (State) and Justice, 

develop specific policies and 

procedures to ensure that 

appropriate agencies are notified of 

revocations based on terrorism 

grounds and take proper actions. 

GAO examined whether 

weaknesses in the visa revocation 

process identified in our June 2003 

report were addressed. 

To improve the visa revocation 

process as an antiterrorism tool, 

we recommend that the Secretaries 

of Homeland Security and State 

jointly (1) develop a written 

governmentwide policy that clearly 

defines agencies’ roles and 

responsibilities and sets 

performance standards and (2) 

address outstanding legal and 

policy issues in this area or provide 

Congress with specific actions it 

could take to resolve them. DHS 

generally concurred with these 

recommendations. State agreed to 

consult with DHS regarding our 

recommendations. 
Page 1 GAO-04-899T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report1

 we are issuing today on the 

visa revocation process and the steps that the Departments of State (State) 

and Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies have taken to 

improve the use of this process as an antiterrorism tool. In June 2003 we 

reported2

 that agencies lacked written procedures to ensure that 

appropriate personnel are notified and take specific actions when the 

Department of State revokes visas3

 on terrorism grounds.4 As a result, 

lookouts were not always posted, other agencies were not always notified 

of visa revocations, and there were potential investigative gaps on 

individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns who were in 

the United States. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney 

General, develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa 

revocation process to ensure that information is transmitted to the 

appropriate immigration and law enforcement agencies in a timely 

manner. We also recommended that they develop a specific policy on 

actions that immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to 

investigate and locate individuals who remain in the United States after 

their visas are revoked. 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to 

Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-04-795 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 13, 2004). 

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are 

Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 

18, 2003). 

3

In this testimony, we use the term “visa” to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. The United 

States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. A visa is a 

travel document that allows a foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry 

for admission to the United States. 

4

The Department of State revokes a person’s visa as a precautionary measure after it learns 

that person may be a suspected terrorist. The purpose of this revocation is to obtain 

additional information from the person to determine if the individual is the same person 

who is suspected of being a terrorist by requiring him or her to return to the consulate that 

issued the visa. According to State officials, this authority is an important and useful tool 

for more closely scrutinizing the individual as he or she reapplies for a new visa. State also 

revokes visas for reasons other than terrorism, such as alien smuggling, drug trafficking, 

and misrepresentation. State officials told us that visas revoked on terrorism grounds 

account for the vast majority of all visas revoked on national security grounds. 
Page 2 GAO-04-899T 

At your request, we examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation 

process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. To accomplish 

our objective, we obtained information on policies and procedures put in 

place to improve the visa revocation process; interviewed key State and 

DHS officials responsible for visa revocations; determined the steps taken 

to resolve legal and policy issues raised in our June 2003 report; and 

analyzed data on all visas revoked on terrorism grounds over a 3-month 

period,5

 including detailed information on a random sample of 35 cases 

selected from data provided by State in February 2004. We did not review 

activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate 

suspected terrorists. This testimony is based on a published report that 

was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

The Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the 

summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses identified in our June 2003 

report. State and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component 

of DHS, developed procedures outlining their respective processes for 

handling visa revocations. However, our analysis of visas revoked based 

on terrorism concerns from October through December 2003 revealed that 

weaknesses remained in the implementation of the visa revocation 

process, especially relating to the timely transmission of information 

among federal agencies. For instance, we found that backlogs or long 

delays sometimes occurred in: 

• screening names of terrorists against State’s database of current visa 

holders, 

• transmitting recommendations to revoke individual visas, 

• revoking individual visas after receiving a recommendation to do so, 

 5

Our review covered only nonimmigrant visas that State revoked on terrorism grounds 

from October 1, 2003, through December 31, 2003. In this testimony, when we refer to 

individuals whose visas have been revoked, we are referring to those individuals for whom 

the Department of State has issued a visa revocation certificate. According to the terms of 

the certificate, the revocation is effective immediately on the date the certificate is signed 

unless the alien is already in the United States, in which case the revocation becomes 

effective immediately upon the alien’s departure from the United States. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-899T 

• posting appropriate lookouts used to alert border inspectors of the 

revocation, 

• notifying DHS of visa revocations, and 

• requesting that field offices investigate individuals with visas revoked on 

terrorism grounds who may be in the country. 

We also found that agencies involved in the visa revocation process had 

conflicting records of how many visas were revoked for terrorism 

concerns and whether individuals who held these visas may be in the 

country. In addition, officials from DHS’s Customs and Border Protection 

could not document that they consistently notified immigration officials of 

individuals with revoked visas who were present in the United States. Our 

review of visa revocations shows that DHS has located individuals in the 

country whose visas were revoked because they may be suspected or 

actual terrorists. DHS officials told us that some are still being 

investigated, three have been arrested on immigration charges, and others 

have been cleared. With respect to an alien already present in the United 

States, the Department of State’s current visa revocation certificate makes 

the revocation effective only upon the alien’s departure. Therefore, 

according to DHS officials, if U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) special agents locate an alien for whom State has issued a 

revocation certificate that states the revocation is effective upon his or her 

departure, ICE would be unable to place the alien in removal proceedings 

based solely on a visa revocation that had not yet taken place.6

After we initiated our inquiry for this report in January 2004, State and 

DHS took additional actions to address the weaknesses we identified 

through our analysis. State and DHS believe these actions will avoid delays 

experienced in the past. In April and May, State made significant revisions 

to its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation 

cases. Between January and May, DHS took steps to develop additional 

written procedures, improve the sharing of information on visa revocation 

cases, and ensure that immigration investigators are aware of individuals 

whose visas were revoked and who may be in the country. Finally, State 

and DHS began discussing how to address the legal and policy issues 

regarding the removal of individuals with revoked visas. In addition, the 

 6

DHS could also attempt to remove these aliens based on the derogatory information that 

led State to revoke the individual’s visa. 
Page 4 GAO-04-899T 

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency organization established 

under the FBI in December 2003, recently took some steps to improve the 

visa revocation process, including developing written standard operating 

procedures related to the screening of intelligence information and 

training additional staff to perform this function. We did not fully assess 

the effectiveness of these actions because they were taken after the 

October to December 2003 time period that we reviewed. Nonetheless, 

additional measures are needed to further improve the process. The 

written policies and procedures often neither contain performance 

standards such as time frames for completing individual steps of the visa 

revocation process, nor do they reflect a fully coordinated approach to 

implementing the process. Further, State and DHS have not concluded 

their discussion of legal and policy issues related to removing individuals 

with revoked visas from the country. 

In light of our past work and the weaknesses we identified through our 

review, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security 

and State work jointly and with other appropriate agencies to develop a 

written, governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles and 

responsibilities and sets performance standards for the agencies involved 

in the visa revocation process. We also recommend that DHS and State 

address outstanding legal and policy issues related to removing individuals 

with revoked visas from the country or, by October 1, 2004, provide 

Congress with a list of specific actions that could help resolve them. 

Our nation’s border security process involves multiple tools for addressing 

potential terrorist threats to the United States. These tools generally 

include (1) preventing potential terrorists from entering the country and 

(2) identifying, locating, and investigating potential terrorists already in 

the United States. One such tool is the visa revocation process, which 

involves multiple federal agencies including the Terrorist Screening Center 

and the Departments of State and Homeland Security. The visa revocation 

process typically begins with the development of derogatory information 

about individuals by various federal agencies. This information is then 

forwarded to TSC, which, along with State, identifies visa holders who 

may be suspected or actual terrorists. State then posts lookouts regarding 

the revocation for these individuals; revokes their visas; and notifies the 

overseas post that issued the visa, DHS, and other agencies. Based on the 

notification from State, DHS then determines if any of these individuals 

may be in the country. If so, DHS attempts to locate, investigate, and, as 

appropriate, remove them from the country. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-899T 

Mr. Chairman, following our June 2003 report, State and DHS’s U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection developed written policies outlining their 

respective processes for handling visa revocations. However, our analysis 

of subsequent visa revocations shows that weaknesses remained in the 

implementation of the visa revocation process. 

State’s July 7, 2003, standard operating procedures outlined its internal 

process for handling visa revocations, including posting lookouts and 

notifying other agencies of the visa revocation. U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s procedures developed following our June 2003 report 

explained the process for determining whether an individual with a 

revoked visa may be in the country and, if so, taking appropriate steps to 

notify investigators. Despite these initial efforts, our review of visas 

revoked on terrorism grounds from October through December 2003 

showed that weaknesses remained in the visa revocation process, 

especially regarding timely transmission of information among federal 

agencies. As shown in figure 1, we found delays in agency efforts to: 

• Identify individuals whose visas should be revoked. In August and 

September 2003, there was a backlog of approximately 5,000 names of 

suspected terrorists that had not been screened to identify any visa 

holders. 

• Transmit recommendations to consular officials to revoke certain 

individuals’ visas. Instead of sending the typical average of 2 to 6 

recommendations to revoke per day, intelligence screeners waited until 

they had large batches of nearly 100 recommendations or more before 

sending them to consular officials at State. 

• Post lookouts to alert border inspectors of visa revocations. Although 

State’s standard operating procedures directed Consular Affairs officials to 

post lookouts regarding the revocation before finalizing it, we found that 

in 6 of the 35 cases we examined in detail, Consular Affairs did not do so 

until after the revocation was finalized. 

• Revoke individual visas. State officials told us it should take no more 

than a week to revoke an individual’s visa after receiving a 

recommendation to do so. In 6 cases, we had sufficient information to 

determine how long it took State to revoke a visa after receiving a 

recommendation to do so. In 3 of these cases, it took State at least 6 

months and, in one case, as long as 17 months to revoke the individual’s 

visa. 

Initial Actions Taken 

to Address 

Weaknesses Were 

Inadequate 

Delays Occurred at Many 

Steps in the Visa 

Revocation Process 
Page 6 GAO-04-899T 

• Notify DHS of visa revocations. Of the 35 cases we reviewed in detail, 

DHS received notification from State the same day a revocation was 

finalized in 9 cases; in 1 to 6 days in 23 cases; and in 7 days or longer in 3 

cases. It is particularly important that these notifications are timely when 

the alien may already be in the country so that DHS can locate and 

investigate him or her. 

• Investigate individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds who 

may be in the country. After receiving notification from State, DHS’s U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that field offices 

should investigate 8 of the 35 cases we examined in detail. In all 8 of these 

cases, ICE waited more than 2 months to initiate field investigations. 
Page 7 GAO-04-899T 

Figure 1: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process 

We also found that for the October to December 2003 time period, State, 

CBP, and ICE reported different numbers of revocations based on 

terrorism concerns. As shown in figure 2, State listed 338; ICE, 347; and 

CBP, 336. We found that only 320 names were on all three lists and that 

some lists contained names that were not on either of the other lists. 

Instances where a name did not appear on all three lists show a potential 

breakdown in the visa revocation process and raise concern because DHS 

may not have been able to take timely action to determine if these 

individuals were in the country and, if so, to locate and investigate them. 

Conflicting Data among 

Agencies 
Page 8 GAO-04-899T 

Figure 2: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked from 

October through December 2003 

Our detailed review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds also 

showed that CBP’s7

 and ICE’s records conflicted on whether certain 

individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the 35 cases, CBP and 

ICE disagreed about whether an individual might have been in the country 

at the time of visa revocation and whether he or she might still be in the 

country. In 2 of the cases, CBP did not believe the individual was in the 

country and, therefore, did not refer the cases to ICE for investigation. 

However, ICE special agents determined that both of these individuals 

were and still are in the country—one is awaiting adjudication of a 

political asylum claim, and the other has a pending application to become 

 7

CBP’s data come from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), which does not have 

complete arrival and departure records for all non-U.S. citizens. NIIS records arrivals and 

departures of foreign citizens through the collection of I-94 forms. Some aliens are required 

to fill out and turn in these forms to inspectors at air and sea ports of entry as well as at 

land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are not required to fill out I-94 

forms when they enter the United States.) NIIS does not have departure data for aliens if 

they fail to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 when they depart. 
Page 9 GAO-04-899T 

a lawful permanent resident of the United States.8 In another instance, 

CBP believed an individual was in the country when his visa was revoked 

and subsequently notified ICE of the need to locate and investigate him. 

However, ICE performed its own search of immigration records based on 

State’s notification and concluded that the individual was not in the 

country. Therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP data, this 

individual has been in the country for more than a year. 

We further found that although Customs and Border Protection officials 

are supposed to immediately notify Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement of individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country, 

CBP could not document that it had notified ICE promptly or, in several 

cases, that it notified ICE at all. According to CBP data on the 35 cases in 

our sample, 10 aliens might have been in the United States at the time of 

their revocation. In 3 of these cases, CBP records indicate that ICE was 

never notified; in the other 7 cases, CBP notified ICE but could not 

document that the notification occurred until at least 3 months after the 

revocation. 

In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials stated that 

they often received no derogatory information showing that individuals 

whose visas State had revoked on terrorism concerns may pose a national 

security threat. Without this information, ICE may expend resources 

conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may pose little 

or no threat to national security. According to ICE officials, the growing 

number of visa revocation cases based on terrorism concerns places a 

significant strain on their investigative resources, forcing ICE to pull 

agents off active investigations of known national security threats to 

investigate visa revocation cases. 

State officials told us that the vast majority of visa revocations on 

terrorism grounds are based on derogatory information in the TIPOFF 

database. However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that they were not 

aware that most of State’s visa revocations on terrorism grounds are based 

on information in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases we examined 

in detail, 32 of the individuals appeared in TIPOFF. In June 2004, ICE 

 8

On June 8, 2004, ICE investigators told us that they have no specific derogatory 

information that would indicate that any of the individuals remaining in the United States 

currently represent a threat to national security. 

Lapses in Notification, 

Provision of Derogatory 

Information 
Page 10 GAO-04-899T 

informed us that its records check located only 6 of the 35 individuals 

from our sample in TIPOFF. Also in June, State officials told us they 

recently began providing the TIPOFF record number to DHS for each 

individual whose revocation was based on derogatory information in 

TIPOFF. 

Separate from our detailed review of 35 visa revocation cases, we obtained 

information on the more than 330 visa revocations on terrorism grounds 

from October through December 2003. According to ICE records, ICE 

identified 64 individuals whose visas were revoked on national security 

grounds between October and December 2003 and may be in the country, 

initiated investigations of all these individuals, and concluded a majority of 

these investigations. Data provided by ICE show that these investigations 

resulted in confirming departure of some aliens, clearing others, and 

arresting 3 on administrative immigration charges.9

 On June 8, 2004, ICE 

investigators told us that they have no specific derogatory information that 

would indicate that any of the individuals remaining in the United States 

currently represent a threat to national security. We also noted several 

cases where the visa revocation process prevented individuals with visas 

revoked based on terrorism concerns from entering the United States or 

helped remove them from the United States. 

While ICE has investigated individuals with visas revoked on terrorism 

grounds, if ICE special agents told us that if they locate an alien in the 

United States for whom State has issued a revocation certificate using its 

current wording, ICE would be unable to remove the individual based 

solely on the visa revocation. State’s current visa revocation certificate 

states that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date 

the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United States, in 

which case the revocation will become effective immediately upon the 

alien’s departure. 

 9

ICE provided us a breakdown of results of the 64 investigations, but we have not included 

these data because DHS classified them as law enforcement sensitive. 

Majority of ICE 

Investigations Concluded, 

but Legal and Policy Issues 

Regarding Removing 

Aliens Remain 
Page 11 GAO-04-899T 

Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have taken 

additional steps to address identified weaknesses in the visa revocation 

process. These include revising procedures, reviewing past visa revocation 

cases, and taking steps to address legal and policy issues. In addition, in 

mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a potential homeland security 

vulnerability and developed an informal process for coordinating actions 

and sharing information on visa revocations. However, we identified some 

weaknesses that still need to be addressed. 

In the course of responding to our inquiries, State’s Visa Office discovered 

that its standard operating procedures had not always been followed 

correctly. As a result, in April and May, State made significant revisions to 

its procedures to provide more explicit instructions for each step in the 

process.10 Also in April, a State official told us that the Visa Office planned 

to formalize its previously informal system for tracking visa revocations to 

make it a definitive reference point for information about all visa 

revocations. 

DHS also took several actions following the initiation of our inquiry. In 

January, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP to assist with information 

exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues and in March issued 

written standard operating procedures for visa revocation investigations. 

In May, CBP reviewed all visa revocations in its lookout database to 

ensure that all appropriate notifications had been sent to ICE and sent 

additional notifications. This review identified 656 individuals with 

revoked visas who may be in the country. We reviewed these data and 

determined that 34 of these individuals’ visas were revoked on terrorism 

grounds during the period of our review. 

In February 2004, DHS officials also told us that they were considering a 

regulation relating to visa revocations that could allow the removal of 

individuals from the United States because their visas have been revoked 

by State. In June 2004, DHS officials told us that they were still considering 

this regulation and were coordinating with State and the Department of 

Justice. Also in June 2004, DHS officials told us that they had reached an 

informal understanding with State that, on a case-by-case basis, DHS may 

 10State officials told us that, in light of the evolving relationships among the agencies 

involved in the visa revocation process, they revise their procedures as necessary. 

Actions Have Been 

Taken Recently to 

Address Identified 

Weaknesses 

State Revised Standard 

Operation Procedures and 

Formalized Its Revocation 

Tracking System 

DHS Acted to Improve 

Policies and Information 

Sharing, Review Visa 

Revocations, and Resolve 

Legal and Policy Issues 
Page 12 GAO-04-899T 

ask that State change its revocation certificate related to an admitted alien 

to make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of issuance of 

the visa, and State will consider such a request in consultation with DHS 

and the Department of Justice. State and DHS further agreed that should 

the wording of the revocation certificate be changed, it would not be 

changed in all instances, but only on a case-by-case basis. According to 

DHS officials, if State changed the wording of the certificate to make the 

revocation effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the visa, the 

government would no longer be effectively barred from litigating the issue. 

Nonetheless, revocation of a visa is not explicitly a stated grounds for 

removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act.11 Moreover, the issue 

of whether, under current statute and regulations, DHS would have the 

authority to initiate removal proceedings solely on the basis of a visa 

revocation has not been litigated and remains unresolved legally. As of 

June 2004, DHS did not have any specific time frame for completing 

discussions with State and other agencies regarding legal and policy issues 

relating to visa revocations. 

Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify its 

role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and analyze the 

visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, in March 

2004, TSC developed written standard operating procedures outlining the 

process for screening intelligence information to identify visa holders who 

may be terrorists. TSC also recently began training additional staff to 

screen terrorism intelligence for matches with visa holders.12 TSC officials 

told us that, in mid-April 2004, TSC identified the visa revocation process 

as a potential vulnerability to homeland security. As a result, it developed 

a process to enable the Center to coordinate the sharing of information on 

visa revocation cases without relying on formal notifications transmitted 

among the agencies. 

While steps have been taken to improve the visa revocation process, 

which State and DHS believe will help avoid delays experienced in the 

past, additional actions are needed to further improve it. There is no 

governmentwide policy outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa 

 118 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 

12Previously, the center had one full-time staff member dedicated to performing this 

function. 

TSC Developed 

Procedures, Trained 

Additional Staff, and 

Assessed the Visa 

Revocation Process 

Additional Actions Still 

Needed 
Page 13 GAO-04-899T 

revocation process. Although CBP and ICE have written internal 

procedures related to their respective roles and responsibilities in the visa 

revocation process, DHS has still not developed an agencywide policy 

governing the process. The written procedures also often lack specific 

time frames for completing individual steps in the process. For instance, 

State’s procedures lack guidance on how quickly Consular Affairs officials 

should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke individuals’ visas, and 

ICE’s written procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases to 

field offices. In addition, State and DHS have not concluded their 

discussions on legal and policy issues related to removing individuals with 

revoked visas from the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, in light of the weaknesses we identified in our most recent 

review of the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with 

the Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to take the following 

two actions: 

• Develop a written, governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles 

and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation 

process, including the Terrorist Screening Center. This policy should 

include directions for sharing information and tracking visa revocation 

cases throughout the interagency visa revocation process. It should 

incorporate performance standards (e.g., time frames for completing each 

step in the process) and periodic interagency assessments to determine 

whether information is being shared among the agencies involved, 

appropriate follow-up action is being taken, and data differences, if they 

occur, are being reconciled; and 

• Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of aliens 

with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the United 

States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be addressed, 

the executive branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide Congress with a 

list of specific actions (including any potential legislative changes) that 

could help resolve them. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Homeland 

Security said it generally concurred with the report and its 

recommendations. It added that our identification of areas where 

improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen 

the visa revocation process. The Department of State indicated that it 

believes that its handling of the revocation process overall has been 
Page 14 GAO-04-899T 

excellent and has improved over time. State indicated that it would 

consult with DHS regarding implementation of our recommendations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may 

have at this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please call Jess Ford or John 

Brummet at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include Jason Bair, Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos, Janey 

Cohen, and Etana Finkler. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548