## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 11

- 3679 J OHN S CHLUETE R, Plai nt i f f

-Appe l l ant, v. E DWARD C. L AT EK an d L AT EK C APIT AL C O RP ., D efend a nts-A pp ellees
.
A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the E astern Di stricto f Wisc onsin
. No . 2:11- cv-00127- LA

—L ynnS. A delm an, Judge .
A RG UE D A PRI L 10, 2012

— D ECI DE D J UNE 6, 2012

Befo re P OSNER, R OV NER, a nd H A MI L T ON, C ircu it Judges . P OSNER, Cir cu i tJudg e . T h is a p p ea l in a d ive rs ity su it pr es en ts i ss ue s o fW i sc o ns i n l aw, b o ths ta tu to r y l aw a nd co m m o n l aw. The pl ai nt i ffs ee k s r ec o ve r y , o n a theory o fr es ti tu ti o n, o f a brok er ag e f ee tha t he pa i d the de f en dants. The di str i ct c ourt, deem i ng the part i es in p a ri deli cto ( equal l y a t f aul t) , gr anted the defendants’ m oti on to d ism iss the c o m pl aintf o r f ai l ur e to s ta te a c l ai m . The defen dants ar e a co r po r at i o n e ng ag ed i n pr o vi di ngi n-2 N o. 11

- 3679

ve st m en t ba nk i ngs er vi ce s to the e qui pm en t r en ta l i nd u s t r y , a n d th e c o r p o r a t i o n ’ s p r i n c i p a l

. S e e ww w. latekcap ital.com /services.htm l (visi ted M ay 22, 2012). W e’ l l s i m pl i fy o ur o pi ni o n b y pr et en di ngtha t th e onl y defendant i s the co rpor ati on, wh i ch w e’ l l c al l Latek ; buta t th e en d of th e o pi ni o n we’ l l di sc us s br i efl y the pla i nti ff’ s j oi nd er of M r. Latek as an add i ti onaldefendant. The pla i nti ff, J ohn S chl ueter, was the own er ofa cor pora ti on nam ed K ar l ’ s Renta l Center
. H e r eta i ned Latek to he lp him obtain eithe r an eq uity inves tor i n, or a bu yer of, K ar l ’ s. On the a d vice ofLatek, S chl ueterente re d i nto ne gotiations w ith a com p an y call ed H orizon Pa rtne rs th at cu lm inated i n a sale o f a m aj ority ofthe p lai nt iff’ s st o cki n Kar l ’ s f o r s o m e $3 0 m i l l i o n. L at ek bill e d t h e p lain tiff $ 75 8,6 75 for its se rv ice s in ne g o t i a t i n gth e d e a l

. T h e p l a i n t i ffp a i d th e fe e wi th o ut com pla i nt o r re ser vati ons but l ate r bro ug h t thi s s uitf or the r etur n ofthe enti re fee on the gro u n d t h at Latek ha d noth a d a b r o k e r a g e l i c e n s e . C h a p t e r 4 5 2 o fthe W i sco nsi n St atute s, enti t l e d “ Re a lEs t a t e P r a c t i ce, ” r equi re s that one have a l i cense to “nego ti ate a sal e” of “an i nter est ores tate in r eales tat e, a ti m e s hare , o r a busi ness ori ts go od w ill, in ve n to ry , or fix tu re s, w h et h er or n ot th e b u sine ss includ es real prop erty.” W is. Stats. §§ 4 5 2 .0 1(2)( a), 45 2.0 3. Latek doesn’ t hav e a br oke r’ s l i cense, o r at l eas t di dn’ t when ne g o ti at i ngthe de alwi thHor i zo n. Besi des defending the di str i c t cour t’ s g ro und o fdi sm i ssa l ( the in paridel ict o doctr i ne) , Latek ar gues that und er W i sco nsi n l aw , a s u nd erfedera l se curi ti es l aw , se e Land re th Tim be r C o. v. Land re th , 471 U
. S. 681, 689-91 (1985 );N o. 11

- 3679 3 S EC v
. Nat i on al Pre s t o In du s t r i e s, Inc. , 4 86 F. 3d 305, 30 9- 10 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 7) , the s al e o fs to cki n a b us i ne ss i s no t th e sal e o fa busi ness, and so Latekwas not re quir ed to have a l i cense to nego ti ate the sal e of a m aj or i ty sta ke i n K ar l ’ s. The o nl y j ud i c i a l de c i s i o ns tha twe ’ v e f o un d tha tb e ar on the i ssue ar e tw o f edera l dist ri ct cour t deci si ons, on ly on e rec en t. T h ey ag re e w ith L at ek

. Ber t ha v
. Re m y Int ’ l, Inc ., 41 4 F . Su p p . 2d 86 9, 87 7-8 1 (E .D . W is. 20 06 ); Sc hal l e rv. Litt on Indust ri es, Inc. , 30 7 F . Su p p . 12 6, 13 3- 35 ( E.D. W i s. 1 9 6 9 )
. T he o pi ni o ns a r e w el l r e a s o ne d, b utb e i ngfe der altr i alco urt op i ni ons they ar e no t a uthor i tat i ve const rual s o fthe W i sco nsi n sta tute. Even a f edera l cour t o fap p ea ls opi ni on would notbe author i tat i ve on a qu e s t i o n o fs t a t e l a w. The sta tute w as am ended aft erthe Ber t ha de ci sio n, m or eov er, and i t i s the am ended statute thatappli es to th is c as e. T h e p ro vis ion on w h ich th e c o u rtfoc u se d in Ber t ha , see 414 F. Supp. 2d at 874, 877, w as n ot se c tio n 452.01(2)(a) , qu ote d a bove , bu t section 452.01(2)( d ), whi chde fi ne s ( o r, r athe r, de fi ne d) “ br o k er ” as s o m eo ne w h o “ n eg ot iat e[s ] a sa le . .

. of a n y b u si n e s s , i t s g oo d w ill, i nventor y, fi x ture s o r an i nter estther ei n. ” That sect i on has be en del ete d, w h i l e s ecti on 4 52. 01( 2) ( a) , wh i ch further defi ned a bro ker to i ncl ud e one w ho “n ego ti ate [ s] a sale .

. . of a n in teresto r est ate i n re ales tat e, ” no w r eads, as w e know, “nego ti ate [ s] a sal e . . . of

. . . a n in t eresto r estat e in real e s t a t e , a ti m e sha re, or a busin ess ori t s g o o dw i l l, i nventor y, o r fi xtures , wh ethero r not the b usin ess includ es real prop e r t y .” T he w ord s w e’ve ital ici zed are the k ey to the pl ai nti ff’ s a rg um ent; on e w h o ow ns st ock in a c or p or at ion , he arg u es , ow n s “ an in t er es t” in a bu si-4 N o. 11

- 3679

ness and ther ef or e a nyone w ho n eg oti ate s a sa l e o f sto ck re quir es a l i cense. T his can ’t be ri gh t, bec au se it w ou ld req uire every secur i ti es bro keri n W i sco nsi n to have a re al e sta te bro ker ’ s l i cense as w el l as a secur i ti es l i cen se , which secur i ti es bro ker s a re al re ady r equi re d to have. W i s. St at. § 5 51. 401( 1)
. W e don’ t know wh et h er L ate k has a secu riti es li cen se, an d i t d oesn ’t m a t t er; the p lai nt iff d oe sn ’t a rg u e t h at it m at te rs an d p r o b a b l y L at ek is exem pt fro m havi ng to have o ne because i t was bro ker i ng a deal i nvol vi ng the i ssuero fthe secur ities th atwer e so l d ( Kar l ’ s Re nt alC ent er ) , a nd s uchb r o k er i ng is exem p t. W is. Stat. § 551.401(2)(a)
. Th e s t a t ut o r y c ha ng es t o wh i c h the p l a i nt i ffp o i nt s do not und er m i ne the anal ys is i n the Ber t ha o pi ni o n. The questi on w hethero w ners hi p ofst ocki s o w ners hi p ofan i nteres t i n a b usi ness w as the pr eci se questi on that th e co ur t addr es se d i n Ber t ha ( as w ell as i n the ear l i er di s t ri c tc o ur to pi ni o n tha twe c i t e d) a nd the a men dm en ts o n whi chthe pl ai nt i ffr el i es mer el y s hi fte d the l an g ua g e i nt erpr et ed i n Ber t ha (“in te re st
. . . in . . . a busi ness” ) fro m subse cti on 2 ( d), wh i ch w as repeal ed, to s ub s e c t i o n 2 ( a ) , wh i c h wa s e nl a r g e d. A co nsi derabl e co m pli cati on, however, i s that Late k was hi r ed to se l l e i th erthe b us i ne ss o rthe pl aintiff’s st oc k in it. H ad h e d on e th e fo rm er , as h e in itia lly tr i e d t o do , c l e a r l y h e wo ul d h a v e n e e de d a l i c e nse. H e d i dn ’ t consum m ate a sal e ofth e b us i ness, but a f ai l ed nego ti ati on i s s ti l l a nego ti ati on; the sta tute defi nes “ nego ti ate ” broa dly, to m ean “ to provi de toN o. 11

- 3679 5

a p a r t y a s s i s t a n c e wi th i n th e s c o p e o f th e k n o wled ge , s k i lls, an d tra in in g re q u ire d u n d er th is c h ap te r in devel opi ng a propos alo r agr eem ent r el ati ng to a tr ansac ti o n, i nc l udi ng. . . pa r ti ci pat i ngi n c o m m uni ca ti o ns between p ar ti es re l ate d to the parti es’ inte re sts i n a t ra nsacti on. ” W is. S tat
. § 452. 01( 5m ) ( a)
. Lateknego ti ate d on Schl ueter ’ s be h alf the l ett ero fi ntent to sel l the ass ets of h is b u sin es s, an d th is w as “n eg ot iat in g ” f or th e s ale ofthe busi ness, albei t that s al e fel l thr ou gh i n f avo r of a s al e o fst ock

. I s a l i cense req u ired f ora f ai l ed att em pt? W ho know s? There’ s e nough u ncer tai nty about the pr operi nter preta
ti on ofthe am ended statute thatwere i t e sse nti alf or o ur de ci di ngthi s ca se corr ec tl y t o c ho o se b etwee n the rival interp retations , w e w ou ld be inc li ne d t o c ertify the quest i on t o the S up re m e Cour t o fW i sco nsi n foran au th oritative answ er. B ut i t is not essen tial. For there i s an o th erpo te nt i al l y di spo si ti ve i ssue, c o nc erni ngthe re l i efso ught byth e pla i nti fff orthe al l ege d vi ol ati on o f the b ro ker age st atute
. A l though there i s no i nd i cati on th at Latek w as aw are th at i t m i g htb e vi o l at i nga s ta tu te i n n eg o ti at i ng th e sale ofthe p lai nt iff’ s stock i n K arl’ s Re nt al Cen ter, an d no c o m pl ai ntabo utthe qua l ity ofthe s er vi ce i t r en d ered or th e reason ablen ess of i ts fee, the p lai n t iff arg ue s th athe ’ s en ti tl ed to r es ti tu ti o n o fthe fee as puni sh

m ent f orLatek ’ s viola tion, i fther e was a vi ol ati on a s we a r e no w as su m i ngf o r the s ak e o fa r g um en t. The ass um pti on is the prem i se ofan a l ter nati ve gr ound fo r affi rm ance

— th at the pla i nti ffi s no t e nti tl ed to the re l i ef he i s se ek i nge ve n i fthe r e was a v i o l at i o n.6 N o. 11

- 3679 The f ac t th athe was he l p ed rat he r tha n h ur t bythe al l ege d v i ol ati on and s o i s not enti tl ed to da m ag es is no t di spo si ti ve. R es ti tu ti o n a nd da m ag es a r e di ff er en t re m edi es. Dam age s a re m eas ured b y th e pl ai nti ff’ s l oss , re st itu tio n by th e d efe n d an t’s ga in
. M a na gem ent C o m pu ter Se r vi ce s, Inc . v . Hawkin s , As h, Bapt i e& Co. , 55 7 N
. W
. 2d 67, 79 -80 (W is. 19 96 ); R yerso n Inc . v. Fe de r al Ins . Co. , N o. 10

- 3522 , 20 12 W L 12162 82, at * 2 ( 7th Cir
. A pr. 12, 2012 ) ; 1 Dan B. Dobbs , Law of R em edies § 4. 1(1), p. 555 (2d ed

. 1993). O ften th ey’re eq u iv a lent, as w he n th e plaintiffhad overpai d the defendant by m i stake a n d se eks to r eco ver th e o ve r pay m en t. Butno t al ways. A defen dan t who ta k es s o m ethi ng( an d no t be ca us e o fa n i nno ce nt m i sta ke, ei ther ) thatbel ongs to the plain tiff m ust g i ve i tba c kt o g e the r wi th a nyp r o fi tfr o m t he u nl a wfula ppr o pr i at i o n e ve n i f th atpr o fi t ex ce ede d whatthe pla i nti ffwould have ear ned h ad hi s pro pertynotbee n ta ke n . City of

M i l wauke ev. Knox , 26 6 N
. W
. 91 1, 91 4 (W is. 19 36 ); Wa rren v. C entu ry B a nk co rpo r a t i o n, Inc., 74 1 P .2d 84 6, 85 1-5 2 (O kla . 1 9 8 7 ) ; R es tate m ent( Third) of Res ti

t ut i on & U nj us tEnr i ch m e nt §§ 51(4), (5)( a), an d com m en t f; and § 53 ( 2011 ) ; 1 Dobbs, s up ra , § 4
. 1 ( 1 ) , p . 5 5 4 ; Do ugl as L ay c oc k, “T h e Sc o p e a n d Sign ifica n c e o f R es tit u tio n,” 67 Tex. L. R ev. 12 77, 128 8-8 9 (1 98 9). If som eo n e s te als yourpre gn ant co w , yo u ar e e nti tl ed to ge t the co w bac k but al so the c al fev en i fthe thi ef incur re d expenses i n a s s i s t i ng the b i r th o f the c a l f a nd hi s a s s i s t a nc e was es se n tia l to it s s u rv iva l. Sp eaking of thieves, “sup p ose a th ief takes the p lai nt iff’ s $10 w atch and s el l s i t f or $20. The thi ef i s l i able for $20, as ‘res tit u tio n .’ O n e p os sib le jus tific at ion for t h is re su ltN o. 11

- 3679 7 i s that we thi nk the thi ef’ s s al e pr i ce i s g oo d evi dence of th e a c tu al v alu e o f th e w at c h, i n w h ich ca se $2 0 w ou ld re prese nt da m ages f o r the pl ai nti ff’ s l o ss . Bute ve n i fthe pla i nti ffco ncedes that the watch w as only w or th $1 0, he c a n r e c o v e r th e $ 2 0 a s r e s t i t u t i o n . . . . T h e d ef en dan t i s li ab le forthe $20 because the

. . . $2 0 i s per cei ved as [i nc lud ing] a gain [ $ 2 0 –$10] prod uc ed by the plaintiff’s pr o per ty
. By i den ti fy i ngthe $2 0 a s a pr o ducto fthe pl ainti ff’ s pro perty, w e c an thi nk o fi t a s a r epl acem ent o r substi tute f orthe proper ty. ” 1 Dobbs, s up ra , § 4. 1( 1) , p. 55 4 (em p h as is in orig in al). T h e r e is n ’t a n yt h in g like th at in thi s ca se. Latekdi dn ’t ta ke som ethi ng tha t be l onge d to th e p l a i n t i ff

. I t me r e l y r e n d e r e d a s e r v i c e a n d t he pl aint i ffpai d wi th o utc o m pl aintthe fee f o r whi chhe w as bi l l ed pursuant t o thei r ser vi ce c ontr act. I fanyo ne would be enti tl ed to r est i tu tio n, i t would be Latek i fthe c o nt r ac t wer e une nf o r ce ab l e be ca us e o fthe ab se nc e o fa l i ce ns e; f o r La te kc o ul d the n a r g ue f o r b eing able to sue f or q u an t u m m e rui t (“w hat he deser ves” ) , that i s, to su e for the val ue o fthe ser vi ce r endered ( provi ded it w as less tha n t h e a greed -up on fee), w hich i s a for m o fr es ti tu ti o n be cau se de si g ne d t o pr ev en t unj us t en r i ch

m en t. Se e, e.g, Schei be r v. D olby L a borator ie s, Inc. , 29 3 F
. 3d 10 14 , 1 02 2- 23 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 2)
. Ofte n quantu m m er uit i s a wa r d e d e v e n i n c a s e s i n wh i c h th e c o n t r a c t i s une nfor c ea b le b ec au se illega l. D eLa Ve rgneRe f r ige r at i ng M ac hi neCo. v. Ge r m an Savi ngs Ins t i t ut i on , 175 U .S. 40 , 5 8 (18 99 ); Schei be r v. D olby Laborator ie s, Inc. , sup ra , 293 F. 3d at 10 22 -23 ; U ni t e d S ta te s v. Am dahl Corp. , 78 6 F
. 2d 387, 39 3 (Fe d . C ir. 19 86 ); Zbi ch ors kiv. Thom as , 10 3 N
. W
. 2d 536, 537 (W is. 1960).8 N o. 11

- 3679 Bu t thi s m ay not be a go od ar gum en t in a case gov er ned by W i sco nsi n l aw ; f or a W i sco nsi n case w hi ch ho l ds th ata b r o k erc an ’ t r ec o ve r in quantum m er uitf o r the va l ue o f hi s pe r f o r man c e o f a c o nt r a c t tha t f a i l s t o com ply w i th the sta tute of f ra ud s sta tes that “the re can be no r eco ver y i n the nature o fco m m i ssi ons by re al estat e b ro ker s o r othe rs upon quantum m er uitf or ser vi ces re nd er ed i n buyi ng o r sel l i ng r eal est ate
. ” H ale v. K reisel , 2 1 5 N. W
. 2 2 7, 2 2 8 ( W i s . 1 9 2 7 )
. The c a s e i s o l d, an d d eal s with a s al e o fr eales tat e r atherthan a s al e o f st oc k or of a b u sin es s, b u t it s la n gu ag e is b r oa d an d it has never been ove rr ule d. A nother ol d c ase , also neve r ov er ru led , H i ckey v . Su t t on , 210 N
. W
. 704, 704 (W is. 1926), hold s regard ing an un li cen sed arch itect tha t “th e fai lure to p ro c u re a lice n se ba rs re c o ve ry w h er e t h e lic en se is ex ac ted as a po l i ce meas ur e f o r the pr o te ct i o n o fthe pu bl i c, ” a nd adds that thi s r ule “a pp lies with e qual f or ce w hetherthe re quir em ent i s soughtupon contr act orupon quantum m er uit
. ” An unl i censed a rchi tectso und s a goo d deal m or e danger ous than an unl i censed r eal es ta te br ok er , bu t if re q u irin g a br ok er to be lice n se d is i ntended fo r the pr ote cti on o fthe p u b lic

— albei t no t f r o m the f al l of a p o o r l y de si g ne d b ui l di ng

— ra therthan j ust f or prot ecting bro ker s f ro m com peti tion , m aybe H ick eybea rs o n ourcas e. I n r e s po ns e La t e k ne e dl e s s l y c o mpl i c a t e s mat t er s by ar g ui ngtha t th e r el i efs o ug htb y the pl ai nt if f

— th e return ofhi s fee

— i s bar re d b ecause he i s in paridel ict o with Late k. The pla i nti ffres p on ds that he cannotbe in paridel ict o because he has com m i tte d no “del i ct”; the sta tute doesN o. 11

- 3679 9

n ot forb id th e h irin g of a n u n lice n se d br ok er , bu t o n ly the b ro ker ’ s f ai l ure to have obt ai ned a l i cense. The co m m o n l aw te ac he s th at i f th e op p o sing parti es i n a l aw sui t a re equally in t h e wrong and as a r es ul t ne i th erha s a co l o r ab l e cl aim a g ains t th e othe r

— m ore prec isel y, ifaw ard ing reli ef to th e plaintiff woul d r ewa r d wro ng do i ng

— cour ts w i l l notadj ud i cate thei r dispute. The cl ass i c i l l ustr ati on i s E v e r e tv . Wi l l i a ms ( Ex
. 17 25) , bet terkno w n as The H igh w a ym a n’s C a se a nd re port ed ( l ong after w ar d) i n a note by that nam e in 9 L
. Q. R ev . 197 (1 8 9 3). A h igh w ay m an su ed h is p ar tn er in c rim e fo r an ac c ou n ti n g o f th e illeg al p ro fits of th eir cr i m i na l a ctivi ty
. The c o ur t r efus ed to a dj udi ca te the c as e, an d b ot h p ar tie s w er e ha n ge d

. A m od e r n e x a m p le w ou ld be a s ui t bythe o wnero fa mis l ea di ngt r ade m ar k f ori nfr i ngem ent o fthe m ar k. The sui t would be di s mi s s e d, a l thou g h the p a r t i e s wo ul d n o tb e h a ng e d. Bo the xa m pl es a nd a no th era r e di sc us se d i n Shon de l v. M cD er m ott, 775 F.2d 859 , 868 (7th C ir. 1985). W h en a s i n such cas es the pl ai nti ffi s a ski ng f or equi tabl e r el i ef, the in paridel ict o defense i s r efer re d t o as th e un clean -han d s d efense

. Bu t the l abel d oesn ’t m atter, an d the de fe ns es wer e equa te d i n M cKennon v. Nashvill e Ban n e rPu b l i s hi n g Co
. , 51 3 U.S
. 352 , 3 60- 61 ( 1995 ) ; se e a l so Byro n v . Cl ay, 867 F.2d 104 9, 1052 ( 7th Cir. 1989); Sc he i b e rv. D ol b y L ab or at or i e s , Inc ., sup ra , 29 3 F.3d at10 22. T h e p oin t is on l y t h a t a co u rtw ill no t a d j u d ica te a c as e if a j ud gm en t fo r t he plaintiffw ou ld en cou rage or rew ard cri m i nal o r othe r unlawfulact i vi ty

— a n d b y th e s a me t o ken i t w il l not enforce a d efense of in paridel ict o i ft he10 N o. 11

- 3679 eff ect w oul d be t o encour age o r re w ar d a gr eat erwrong. The seco nd gr ound is the one on wh i ch the defen se w as r ej ec te d i n B a tem a n E ich ler, H ill R ich a rds, Inc . v. B erner, 47 2 U. S
. 2 9 9 , 3 1 2

- 1 4 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , a nd Per m a L if eM uf f l e rs , Inc . v. Intern a tio na l P a rts C o rp ., 39 2 U .S. 13 4, 13 7-3 9 (1 96 8) (p lu ra li ty) , the l atter a case i n w hi ch the pla i nti ffchal l enged, as a vi ol ati on o fanti tr ust l aw , r est ri cti ons on i ts com peti ti ve f re edom , to w h ich i t had ag re ed i n contr acts with the de f e nd a nt
. T he de f e nd ant p l e a de d in paridel ict o as a d efense to the p lai nt iff’ s su it for da m ages. Th e C ou rt rej ected the defe nse, hol ding that anti tr ust l aw , wh i ch wo ul d b e di s s e r v e d by e nf o r c i ngthe c o nt r a c t s , t r umps c o n t r a c tl a w. The l aw c o ul d e a s i l y do wi tho uta n un c l e a n- ha nd s do ct r i ne a nd a n in paridel ict o doctr i ne, sin c e th ey re du ce to th e p rin c ip l e t h at a c ou rtw ill no t e n te rt ain a c laim o r d efens e th atwoul d c r ea te a g r ea te r l eg alwro ng th anv i ndicating the c l ai m o r de f en se woul d a ve r t. The pri nci ple cannothel p Latek. The pl ai nti ffcan hardl y b e th ou gh t t o h av e b ee n eq u ally atfau lt w ith L at ek, i f Lat ekv i o l at ed ( as w e’ r e as su m i ng, tho ug h o nl y f o r the sa k e o fa r g um en t) the broke r ag e st atut e, whi l e th e pl ainti ff, so f ara s an y o ne i s su g g es ting, v i o l at ed no th i ng by con tractin g w ith L atek. T he statu te d id n ot requ ire th e plaintiff

— th e br o k er ’ s cl i en t

— to geta l i cense , o r f orbi d i t t o deal with an u n license d bro ker

. A nd i t’ s no t as i f by contr acti ng with Latek the pl ai nti ffhar m ed so m eo ne e l se . To puni shthe pl aint i ffwoul d b e th e equi valent o fde emi ngthe v i ct i m o fa the ft ana ccom p li ce o fthe th ief on t h e t h eo ry th at w ith ou t a vic tim th er e w ou ld have be e n no the ft, a nd thu s o fb a r r i ngthe v i c t i m f r omN o. 11

- 3679 11

su ing to recover w ha t had b e e n s tolen from him

. Cf. Badge rC oal & C okeC o. v. St e r l i ng M i dl and Coal Co. , 1 9 2 N
. W. 461-62 (W is. 1923). B ut to bar rel ieff or this pl aintiffc anha r dl y b e th o ug ht a p un ishm en t for a victim of a viol ation. Th e pla in t iff a l l e g e s n o h a r m fr o m t he v i o l a t i o n . H e i s s e e k i n gc o mpensati on f orhavi ng spot ted a viol ati on o fthe sta tute and i ncurr ed l ega l expenses to punish the v iol ato r

— a b o un t y - hu nt e r o r “ pr i v a t e a t t o r ne y g e ne r a l ” the o ry o f l i abi l i ty. There i s no co m m on l aw pri nci ple that som eone wh o disc overs a vi ol ati on o fl aw thatcause d hi m no ha r m c an n ever th el es s su e th e vi o l at o r f o r the l att er ’ s pro fi t fro m the vi ol ati on. There ar e pl enty of bounty- hunter sta tutes , se e, e. g. , 25 U
. S. C. § 2 01 ( vi ol ati on ofI nd i an pro tect i on l aw s) ; 31 U
. S. C. § 3 730( d) (F al se Clai m s Act); 47U .S
. C. § 8 0103 ( re m ovi ng wrecke d pr o per tyfrom Fl o r i da co as t to f o r ei g n n at i o ns ) , a nd pl en tyo fstatut es tha t pr o vi de bo unty - l i k e r el i efi n the f or m o fst atuto rydam age s t o w hi ch a pla i nti ffi s en tit l ed wi th o u t p r o o f o f i nj u r y . S e e , e . g . , 1 5 U. S
. C
. § 1 6 4 0 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A) ( Truth i n Lend i ng Act); 1 5 U.S
. C. § 1 681n( a) ( 1) ( A ) , ( 3) ( F a i r a nd Ac c ur a t e Cr e di tT r a ns a c ti o ns Ac t ) ; 1 7U. S
. C. § 5 0 4 ( c ) ( c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e me n t ) ; 1 8 U. S
. C
. § 2 7 1 0 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( A) ( w ro ngful disc l osur e o fvi deo t ape r entalo r sal e r ec or d s); 29 U
. S. C. § 1 854( c) ( 1) ( M i gr ant a nd S eas onal A gr i cul tura l W or kerPro tect i on A ct) ; 47 U
. S. C. § 2 27( b) ( 3) ( Te l eph o ne Co ns um erPr o te ct i o n Act ) ( unsoli ci te d t ex t m es sa ge s o r fax ad ve rt ise m en ts ). B u t n o W isc on sin sta tute author i zes the bounty that the pl ai nti ffi s s eek i ng. So hi s o nl y ho pe i s t o show that the br oke ra ge sta tute cre ate s a n i m pli ed ri gh t t o see k s uch a bo unty. U nd er12 N o. 11

- 3679 W i sco nsi n l aw as under fe d er al l aw , i m pli ed ri ghts of a c t io n to en force statu tes th at d o not sp ecify a m one tary re m ed y a re oc c as ion ally rec og n ize d

. G reen v. Jo nes , 12 8 N .W .2d 1, 5 (W is. 19 64 ). B u t a ga in as in f e d e r al la w , e.g., M al l e t tv. Wi s co ns i n Divi s i on of Voc at i onal Re hab i l i t a ti on , 13 0 F .3d 12 45 , 124 9 ( 7 t h C ir. 19 97 ), th e p re su m p tio n is aga i nst them

. S ee M cNei l l v. Jac ob s on , 198 N
. W
. 2d 611, 6 14 (W is. 19 72 ); M i l l e rAv i at i on v . M i l wau ke eCo u nty B o a rd o f Su perv iso rs , 273 F. 3d 722, 728- 29 ( 7th Cir. 20 01) ( W i sc o nsinl aw)
. W e’ ve ne ve r he ar d o fa n i m pl i ed r i g ht to re stitu ti on o fa vi ol ato r’ s pro fi t that was nota conse qu en ce of an inj ury of som e sort to the p lai nt iff. I f a sta te cre ate s a ri ght of acti on , resti tuti on

— th e co ndi ti o ns f orwh i ch, w e em phasi ze, are not sati sfi ed i n thi s ca se

— is a per m i ss ibl e r emedy

. Butwhat th e pl aint i ffi s se ek i ng i n thi s ca se i s no t r es ti tu ti o n. A l l o thero bj ecti ons to one si de, so nove l an i m pli ed ri ght o fact i on as the pla i nti ffas ser ts cannot be defended as necess ar y t o prom ot e c om pli ance with the bro ker age sta tute. The “Rea l Estat e Pr acti ce” act, as i t i s s ti l l cal l ed despit e i ts h aving been bro adened beyo nd r eales tat e, pr o vi des mis demea no r c r i m i na l r emedi es f o r v i o l at i ng the s tatute, § 452. 17, and, m or e i m port ant, f orbi ds a vi o l at o r t o s ue ( perha ps i nc l udi ng f orquantum m er uit ) to col l ect an y c om pensati on f orhi s br oke ra ge ser vi ces. § 4 52. 20. S o had the pl ai nti ffnot p aid Latek ’ s fee, Latek coul d n ot have sued hi m f ori t ( al w ays as sum i ng tha t the s ta tu te was vi ol ate d). The f act that an unl i censed bro kercannotsue f orh is f ee i s a si gni fi cant det er re nt to vi o l at i ngthe b r o k er ag e l aw, a nd c om bi ne d wi ththe cri m i nal sa nctions shoul d provi de adequate det er re nce,N o. 11

- 3679 13

w i thout need to add the s ancti on that the p laintiffadvoc a t es . In a c as e d ec id ed aft er th e o ra l arg u m en t in the pr ese nt app eal, W i sco nsi n’s i nter m edi ate appel l ate c ou rth eld , con sis te n t w ith th is p o i n t, th at “t h e o n ly co ns eque nc es f o r v i o l at i ngW i s. S ta t. § 4 52
. 03 b y a ct i ng as a rea l

- est ate br oke r i n W i sco nsi n w i thout a l i cense ar e: (1) th e viol ator m ay not sue in a W is c o n sin cou rt fora bro ker ag e com m i ssi on; and ( 2) the vi ol ato r m ay be su b j ec t t o c rim in al p en alt ies
. . . . P ro te c tio n of W isc on sin r es i den ts fr o m unl i cen se d r ea l

- es ta te b r o k er s i s, a s th e l eg i sl atur e det er m i ne d, s uffi ci en tl y en fo r ce d b y de ny i ng th o se br o k er s th e r i g ht to su e f o r th eir co m m i ss i o ns i n W i sco nsi n cour ts and by s ubj ecting t h em to pote nti al cri m i nal penal ti es. ” H e r nan dez v. BN G M anage m e nt L im it ed Partnership , No
. 2 0 1 1 AP3 6 2 , 2 0 1 2 WL 1 4 9 9 8 26 (W is. A p p . M ay 1, 2012 ). For the s a k e of com p letenes s, w e ad d ress L atek’s arg um en t th atthe s ui t f ai l s f o r s ti l l a no ther r ea so n: the “v olu n ta ry p ay m e n t” d oc tr in e, re c og n ize d in W isc on sin as in o t h er st at es . I f you p ay a b ill volu n ta rily

— that i s, on dem an d , r atherthan afterbeing sued o r thre ate ned w ith su it

— y o u c a n’ tl a t e r s ue t o r e c o v e r wh at you pa i d, on th e b as is of fa c ts kn ow n to you (or t h at you sh ou ld h av e k n ow n ) w h en you p aid

. P utnam v. Tim e WarnerCa ble, 6 4 9 N .W .2d 62 6, 63 1-3 7 (W is. 20 02 ); But c he rv . Ame r i te ch Corp
. , 727 N .W .2d 54 6, 55 2-5 6 (W is. A p p . 200 6); Ant hony v. A m er ican General Financial Se rvic es, Inc. , 69 7 S
. E.2 d 16 6, 17 5 (G a. 20 10 ); H uch v. Ch arte r C om m unicati ons, Inc. , 29 0 S.W .3d 7 21 , 7 26 (M o. 20 09 ); Kin g v . Fi rs tCapi t al Fi nan ci al Se r vi ce s Corp. , 8 28 N. E. 2d 11 55 , 1171 ( I l l

. 2 00 5)
. The re aso n i s t o re du ce un cer tai nty in com m er ci altr ansac-14 N o. 11

- 3679 tions; the recipien t of th e volun tary p aym en t d oesn ’t ha ve t o c r ea te a r es er ve a g ains t th e po ss ibi l i tyo fha vi ng to r etur n the pa y m en t. The plaint i ffa r g ue s th athe di dn’ t k no w tha t Lat ekha d no l i ce ns e. I fi ns te ad he w er e a rg uing t h at h e di dn ’ t know thatLatek need ed to ha ve a l icens e, tha t woul d b e a m i st ak e o fl aw; a nd m i sta ke ofl aw i s no t a defense to the v ol untary
p ay m en t ru le, P utnam v. Tim e Wa rne r C able, sup ra , 64 9 N .W .2d at63 2; Butc he r v. Am e r i t e ch Corp. , sup ra , 72 7 N
. W
. 2d at 55 5; St onev. M e l l on M or tgageCo. , 77 1 S o. 2d 451, 45 8 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , b e c a us e the l a w i s e qu a l l y a c c e s s ib l e t o both pa rties to the tran sact ion
. A m istake of fact is d if

f er ent; i ts abse nce i s a prec on dit i on t o the a pp l i cati on o f th e do ct r i ne , a s th e st at ement s o fthe d octri ne i n the case s w e’ve cited m ake clear. So the vol untary
- paym en t d oct ri ne i s i napp l i cabl e, and the in paridel ict o d oct ri ne u nhel pful, but never thel ess Latek w i ns. I t rem ains to say j us t a w o r d a b o ut the j oind er of M r. Latek as a defe nd ant. H e shoul d no t have been j oi ned, f or w hen, as in t h i s ca se, “a n age nt m er el y c ontr acts o n behal fo fa disc l ose d pri nci pal, the age nt d oe s not bec om e p e r s o n ally liab le t o t h e o th er co n tr ac tin g p ar ty .” B enja m in P lum bing, Inc. v. B a rnes , 47 0 N
. W
. 2d 888, 89 3 (W is. 1991). T h e jud gm en t o f d ism iss al is A FFI RMED .
6- 6- 12