2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

6-18-2004 

# S pr ui l l v . G i l li s

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 02-2659

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UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 02-2659

ROBERT SPRUILL,
Appellant

v.

FR AN K G ILL IS; G OO LIE R, C .O.; MCGLAUGHLIN, M.D. ; B ROWN, P. A.

_________________ On Appeal From The United State s Distri ct Court For The M iddle D istrict Of

Pen nsylvan ia (D.C. No. 3: 01-CV-1625) District Judge: H onorab le Thom as I. Vanaskie, Chi ef Judge

_________________ Argued January

13, 2004
Before: ALITO, CHER TOFF, and BECKER Circuit

Judges

. (Fil ed: June 18, 2004)

ERIC R. SON NEN SCHE IN (Argued) Covington & Burling 120 1 P enn sylvan ia A ven ue, N .W

. Washington, DC 20004
Attorneyfor Appell

ant MICH AEL A . FARNA N (Argued) Department of C orrections Office o f Ch ief C oun sel P.O. Box 598 Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorneyfor Appell

ees Gillis and Gooli er

ALA N S. GOL D (Argued) Sean Robins Gold, Butkovitz & R obins 7837 Old York Road Elkins Par

k, PA 19027
Attorneyfor Appell

ees McGlaughlin and Bro wn

______________________

OPI NION

______________________

BE CK ER , Circuit

Judge.
This appeal r aises important questi ons of constr uction of

the Pri son Liti gation Refo rm Act of 199 5 (PLR A), Pub. L. No. 104 -13 4, 110 S tat. 1321 at 66 (1 996). Plaintiff Rob ert Spru ill is an inmate in the
cus tody of the Pennsylvania Department of C orrections. Spruil l fil ed a civi l ri gh t s complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants atthe State Corr ecti onal Insti tuti o n at C oal T o w nship , Pennsylvania: two prison of f i cial s (Frank Gillis and Stephen Gooler 1 ); a p rison doctor ( Dr . Shawn McG laughlin); and a

1 Spruil l in hi s complaint spell s the name “Goolier, ” but we willuse the
cor rect s pelli ng, “ Go oler .”2

prisonphysi cian’s assis tant (Brian B rown ). In his comp laint, Spru il l alleges t hat, as a resul t of the delibe rate indiffere nce of the defendants, his seri ous back condition was left untreat ed, or w as inad equa tely treat ed,

r esu lti ng in excruc iati ng pain an d
susce ptibility to othe r injuries . Pursu ant to Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grie vance Sy stem Policy (th e “Gri evance Sy s tem Po licy”), Spru ill file d a seri es of t hree in mate grievances, and h e ultim ately receiv e d
som e meas ur e of m edica l care. In his grievances, Spruil l did no t se ek money damages, but i n the inst ant sui t under 42 U.S .C. § 1983, he does se ek m oney damages for the a llege d vio lation o f his rights under the Eighth Amendment to t he United Stat es Consti tuti on. 42 U.S.C . § 1997e (a), enacted as p art of th e PL RA, provides that a pris oner may not br in g a § 19 83 s ui t with respe ct to prison cond itions “u nti l su c h administ rati ve reme die s as are a vailab le
are exhausted. ” Because Spruil l had fai led to seek moneydam ages in his grievances, the Distri ct Court c oncluded that he had fail ed to meet t

he exhausti on requir ement of § 19 97e (a ), andth er efo re di smi ss ed Sp ruill’s suit

in it s enti rety . The District Cou rt also hel d in the a lter native that Spruill’s failure to nam e Bro wn in his grievanc es cons tituted a failure to exhaust his claims againstBro wn

. Spru ill appe als the di smi ss al of h is cl ai ms against G ooler, Dr. M cG laug hlin , and Bro wn . H e d oes not appeal the dismissal of his s uit against Gillis.
Co urts have o nly recen tly begun to define the cont ours of the PLR A’s exhausti on requir ement, and we have not had occasion to pass on whether the exhausti on re qui re me nt is m er ely a terminationrequirement or also includes a proceduraldefault component— that is, whethera pris onermay bring a § 19 83 su it
so lo ng a s no gr ie van ce p ro ces s r ema i ns open to hi m, or whether a prisoner must prop erly (i. e., on pain of proc edural defa ult) exhau st administrative re m edies
as a pre requ isite to a su it in fed eral co urt. This case requir es us to c onfrontthat i ssue,
an d we hold that

§ 1997e(a) includes a proceduraldefa ult co mp on en t

. We further hold that t

he dete rmination w hether a prisone r ha s “ pr op er ly” exhausted a claim (f or procedural default purposes) is m ad e byevaluat ing the prisoner ’s compli ance with the p r ison’s a dm inistrativ e regulations governing inmate gri ev a nces, and the waiver , if any, of such regul ations by prison offici als. Applyi ng this fram ewo rk to Spruill’s grievanc e s under the Gri evance Sy stem Po lic y, we hold that

(1) Sprui ll was not requ ir ed to seek mo ney dam ages in his grievances, and theref ore has no t pr oced urally def

aul te d hi s c la im f

or mone y damages; (2) Sprui ll was r equired to name Bro wn in his grievanc es, but that t he offic ials han d ling Spr uill ’s gri evances waived his de fault o n th i s requ ireme nt; and (3) Sprui ll exha us ted th e
a dminist rati ve remedies unde r th e G rie va nc e S yste m Po lic y. Fi na lly, turni ng t o the meri ts-ba sed argu men ts that t

he def endants advance as alterna te grounds for a ffirmance of t h e Distri ctCo urt, w e con clude that S p ruill3

does not state a claim for d elibera te indiff erence against

Gooler, but

tha t his alle gations against

Dr. McGlaughlin an d Bro wn are suffici ent to wit hstand a moti on to dism iss. W e will the refor e aff irm in part, revers e in part , and remand for further proceedi ngs agai ns t Dr

. McG laughlin and Brown.

I. Facts and P rocedura l History
As this case comes t o us on the Dist rict Cou rt’s grant of amot ion t o di smi ss , w e must acce pt as tru e the facts as pled in Spru ill’ s c om plain t. E.g. , Bd. of Trs . of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fun d v. Foodtown, Inc. , 296 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2002). Giv en tha t the ex haus tio n i ssue turns on th e indisp utably au th e ntic docu men ts related to Spruill’s grievances,
we hold that

we may also c onsid er these withoutconverting it t o a motion for
summ ary judg men t. 2 See Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Pris ons , 3 55 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoti ng GFF Corp . v

. Associated

Wholesale Grocer

s, I nc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 13 84 (10th C ir. 19 97) (not ing that “a def

endant may

submit an in dis putab lyauthent ic [document] to the court to be consi dered on a mo tion to dismiss”)). We now chronicle the fact s as set for th in S pruill’s c om plaint. A. Spruil l’s Complaint Spru ill is cur rently i ncarcer ated at the State Co rrection al Insti t ution at Ch ester, Pen nsylvan ia (“SCI-Chest er ”) , but he has been housed in at least

two other facilit ies. His complaint

alle ges that , shortly

after he
was transferred to the S tate C orrectio n al Instituti on at Co al Township, Penn sylvani a (“SCI-Coal”) in M ay 2001 , the de fend ants
were delibe rately i ndiffer ent to h is medica l
ne eds and s ubjec ted him to un nece ssarily painfu l medical t

reatment . Named as defe ndan ts in the c omplaint are Frank Gillis, the S uper intend ent a t S CI-C oal; Lieutenant

Ste v en G ooler, th e U nit Manager of

th e Re st

ri ct edHo us ing U nit (RH U) at SC I-Co al, wh ere S pruill w a s housed during t

he eve nts at issue; Dr. Shawn McG laughlin, a pri son phys ician; and B rian B row n, a ph ysician’s as sistant.
On M ay 2, 2 001 , Sp ruil l was trans ferredfrom the S ta t e Correct ional Instituti on at Rock view (S CI-Ro ckview ), Pen nsylvan ia t o SC I-Coal, where he was housed in the RH U. U pon his arriv al, Spru il l immediate ly

request ed to see a medical staff member about severe pain he
was experie ncing in hi s lower back ar ea and his ri ght leg. “Several hours later, ” he 2 Stri ctly speaking, the moti on acted on by t he Distr ict Court

should not

have been ca pti oned as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion t o dismis s, but rather as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for ju dgm en t o n the pl ea di ngs , b ec au se we have held that failure t o exhaust administ rati ve remedies under § 1997e(a) is an aff irma tive d efe nse

. See Ray v. Kertes , 285 F.3 d 28 7, 29 5 (3 d C ir. 20 02)

. There is no mat erialdiffere nce in the applic able l egal st andards, so for the sake of famili arit

y, we shall us e the “moti on to dis miss” for

mulati on of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).4

was inter viewed by anurse. Af

ter Sp ruill described his pai n, and sta ted that he “suffers from a chro nic an d deb ilitati n g lowerbac k disorde r, s pondyl otic s pinal steno sis with re current c ompre ssi on of L3 and/or L4 nerve root on right,” the nurse said, “There is noth ing I ca n do , you w ill
nee d to sign up for sic k ca ll.” Spru ill signed up for

sick cal l on Ma y 3, but the next m orn ing, he fell due to a
severe pain in his leg and back, striking the le f t side o f his face o n the m etal toilet in his cell . Sprui ll bel ieves he was knocke d unconscious and also injured hi s right thumb. Th at s am e d ay, Ma y 4, he informedthe nu rse of his fall, his additi onal inj uri es, and continuous back pain; the nurse said that sh e wo uld inform the docto r. Spru ill als o informed Gooler abouthis fall , to whic h Gooler res ponded, “so, what do you want me t o do?” Spru ill file d an offici al inmat e grievance o n May 4 complaini ng about the fall and new in ju ry. Gooler did not

no tify health care providers once h e was informed of Spruill’s injuries; at that point, Spruil l had yet to be examin ed by a med ical doctor. 3

3 The grievance file d by Sprui ll dat ed May 4, 2001, reads as follows:

On the above stated dat e at approx. 5: 35 a.m., this writer attem pted to g et up out of th e be d. I took perh aps a ppro xima tely 3 to 4 short s teps, wherein, at that junctur e, this writ er rece ived and/o r exp erienc ed an extrem ely sharp pai n in the l ower back & as wel l a s s ev er e p ai n up an d do wn the front and back side s of the right leg . It was at that p oint this writer fellto the f

loor i n a forceful

mann er , h it

ti ng t he l eft si de o f my face on th e edg e of th e “m etal” toilet in the cell. Th is write r did as well al so jammed and/or injur ed his r ight t

humb in the same fall . This wri ter has reason to beli eve that

he may have pas sed out due to t

he forcefulblow he recei ved to the left

side of hi s face when he fell. This writ er has mad e repe ated re ques t, prior, to see the doc tor, only

to be tol d that the d octo r do es n ot v isit the RH U. To d ate, and even in light o f this writer’s si ck call request and most recent fall incide nt, t

his writ er has yet to be e xam ined b y this in st it ut io n’ s d oc to r and/orRHU security staff. This writer

also informed RHU Lt. Goolier, about the aforem ention ed fa ll. His rep ly
wa s: so, w hat do you w ant m e to do. The writ er finds Lt. Gooli er said re mark s to be high ly unp rofes siona l. He is re quired to notify m edica l respe cting th is
wr iter’s fall a nd b low to th e he ad. What must I do, die, before I can get medicalatte ntion?
In respons e to the prompt on the grievanc e form to “[l ]ist acti ons taken and staff you h ave con tacted, before submitting thi s grie vance,” Spr uillwrote:5

On M ay 5, D r. M cG la ugh lin cam e to Spruill’s cellregardi ng the sick call requ est. D r. M cG laugh lin refu sed to examine S pr uill and stated th at Sp ruill
wo uld neve r go to the inf irmary. Sp ruill file d a second gri evance on Ma y 6 complaini ng that McGlaughlin had fail ed to cond uct a physi cal examinationof h im. 4 Spru ill was se en by the physician’s
as sista nt, Brown, on May 7. At that
encou nter, Brown a cc used Spruil l of faking his i njuri es and did not examine hi m. On May 9, Sprui ll compl ained t o the
nurse tha t the pai n medicati on he was prescr ibedfor his back 5 “w asn ’t w ork ing ,” and late r that

morning Spru ill experie nced another “extre mely s harp pain” in his Submitted sick call request (s) about back pai n, spoke t o the nurse(s ) about my

back pain and seeing t he doctor—they

said t hat it was not

hing they

could do, and that the docto r will no t com e to the R HU to see m e. I spo ke to L t. Goolier about

my si tuati on, he demonstrat ed no “care” or
conc ern reg arding my hea lth and/or wellbeing.

4 The grievance file d by Sprui ll dat ed May 6, 2001, reads as follows:

This writer avers the fo llow ing: I

w as se en on 5- 5- 20 01 , by a member of the medicalstaff whom identifi ed himself as the inst itutional medi cal “doct or.” I expla ined to the do ctor tha t I suffer fr om a “chronic bac k disorde r” and curr ently

experie nce severe pain around my l ower back & right l eg. And that

I had fal len in the c ell t

he day prior, “hitting my face on the metal toilet & also hur ting my rig ht h and in sa id fa ll. Moreover, I advi sed the doctor that m y fall wa s direc tly related to my no t being able to wa lk— due to the cont inued sever e pain I am having. More pointedl y, the aforementi oned doctor ne ver once conducted a phy sicalexaminati on in w hich to determ ine the full extent of my pre- exist ing back condition or the inj uries I sustained relative to my fal l on 5- 4-2001 . In addition, said doc tor’s visi t to t he RHU with me lasted approximat ely

30 seconds may

be less. To date, I a m still expe riencin g a co nside rable amount of pain.
In respons e to the prompt on the grievanc e form to “[l ]ist acti ons taken and staff you h ave con tacted, before submitting thi s grie vance,” Spr uillwrote:
Spoke to nurse s and RHU staff
mem bers w ho stated there’s nothing t hey can do. I wil l need to submit

a grievance.

5 It is not clear from S pruill’s complaint

whether thi s medicat ion was prescr ibed by

an SCI-Coal phy sici an, or by a phy sici an from SCI-Rockview, fr om which Spruil l had jus t been transfer red.6

lowerback and le g w hich c ause d him to fall again. S pruil l submit ted another si ck call request , and was seen on May 10 b y Bro wn in response to th at req ues t. Spru ill told Brown that “the current medicati on
was not working t o red uce hi s pain, ” but Bro wn did not t ake an y a ctions to help hi m. Spruil l submit

ted a nothe r sick c all

r equest on May 11, fol lowing whi ch h e
was seen by Dr. M cG laugh lin on May 12. Dr

. McG laughlin stat ed that he did n o t belie ve t h ere w as an ything w rong with Spruill’s back, and accuse d Sp ruil l of “play ing game s.” Spruill filed a third gr iev an ce th at d ay. 6 On May 14, Dr. McGlaughli n had Spru ill br ough t int o the medica l examinati o n r oom , w h e r e Dr

. M cG laugh lin de l iberat ely bent and twisted Spruill’s legs “as if he was tr yi ng to shape

a pretze l.” Dr. McGlaughlin di d not examine Spruil l’s f

ace or thumb for injuries sustained on the morning of May 4. The grievance s were consol idate d and deniedupo n I ni ti al Rev ie w, and S pruill file d administrati ve appeals. The first appeal wa s den ied, an d Sp ruill file d a final appe al, which w as also denied. The stat ed

6 The grievance file d by Sprui ll dat ed May 12, 2001, reads as follows:

This writ er avers that at approximat ely

8:34 a. m. on the above indi cated dat e, SCI-Coal Chief M edical Directo r Dr. M cG laugh lin, cam e to m y cell reg ard ing my sic k ca ll req ues t. Dr. McGlaughlin st ated t o me: that I ha d bee n eva luated back in “February

2001,” by

Dr. Osgood, who has said that I am pai n-free, and that there’ s nothi ng wrong with my bac k.

In addition: Coal ’s Chief Medical Director stat ed to thi s write r that this: “brin gs an end to your little back playing games. ” This writ er contend s that Dr. M cGlau ghlin’s remarks as stat ed herei n above
we re high ly unpro fessio nal in th is parti cular instance, since he ha s never conduct ed any phy sical
exam ination on this w riter.

To d ate, this w riter rem ains in constant sev er[e] pain. A nd D r. McG laughlin’s cont inued
co ur se of tr ea tm en t t

ha t h e know s is pai nful & ineffective maysoon ent ai l asub st antia l ris k of me seriou sly harm ing m yself in this cell “ fallin g.”
In respons e to the prompt on the grievanc e form to “[l ]ist acti ons taken and staff you h ave con tacted, before submitting thi s grie vance,” Spr uillwrote:
Spoke to offi cer Shay

—“Pod offic er” w ho in dicate d that it is very lit tle i f anyt

hing at a ll he could do, the matte r will ne ed to be address ed by medi cal or by wayof t he g ri evance sy st em.7

reason s behind the denial s were that Spru ill was, at t

he time, rece i ving appropr i ate medical care. As our rescrip ti on of the grievances demonstrates,

see supra not es 3, 4 & 6, Sprui ll di d not seekmonetary

reli ef from the prison, nor do th e grie van ces id entif yBro wn by

name or bydescription.
B. Proce edings in the D istrict Court
S pruill file d the pres ent sui t seekin g
mon etaryand injunc tive r elie f

. Because Spru ill had by t

hen been tr ans fe rred to SCI-C hester, t he D istrict Court held t

hat his clai m for injunctive rel ief against offic ials at SCI-C oal was moot under Abdul-Akbar

v. Watson , 4 F .3d 1 95, 2 06- 07 (3d Cir . 199 3). Th e District Cou rt granted all four d e fend ants’ m otions to dismiss on severalgrounds, holding, inter alia , that (1) S pruill ’s fail ure to s eek money damages in his g rievanc e s consti tuted a fa ilur e to exhaus t
a dminist rati ve remedies; (2) becau s e Spru ill recei ved a dequate medic a l treatm ent, he had stat ed no c laim for a violation of h is Eighth Am endment rights;

an d (3) Sp ruill had failed to exh aust h is claim again st Bro wn beca use th e grievanc es did not

name Brown. C. This Appeal Spru ill appeals t

he dismis sals of

Lt

. Goo ler, Dr. McG laughlin, and Brown, but does not appeal t

he di smiss al o f Superint endentGilli s. The D istrict Court had juri sdict ion over t

his action pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 133 1 and § 13 43, as a suit aris ing under a federal law securi ng ci vil rights, 42 U .S.C. § 198 3. Sp ruill f il ed a timely notice of appeal fr om the fi nal order

d ismis sing the act ion and we hav e juri sdict ion un de r 28 U. S. C. § 1 29 1. We
exe r cise plenary

review over a

district court’s decisi on to grant a m o tion to dismiss. Bros e low v. Fis her , 319 F.3d 605, 607 (3d Cir. 2003). To the extent that
our revi e w turns o n the statutory constr uctionof the exhaust ion requirement in § 1997e(a), our r ev iew is a lso pl en ar y. Co nce pcion v. Morton , 306 F.3d 1347, 1352 (3d Cir. 200 2) (h old ing that “the scope of § 19 97e(a)’s ap pl ica bi lity, which is a que stion o f law ” is sub ject to ple nary review); see als o Nyhuis v. Reno , 204 F.3d 65, 66 (3d Cir. 2000 ).
The defendants advance s ev eral grounds on which to affi rm the judgment of the Dist rict Court. First, they

argue that Spruill’s failure to seek mo ney dam ages in his grievanc es precludes him from now seeking damages in feder al court . Second, Bro wn argues th at Sp ruill’s failu re to
name him in the grievances is a failu re to exha ust. Third, all de fenda nts a rgue that S pru ill has n ot alleg ed fa cts sufficien t to establisha viola tion of his E ighth Amendment rights. 7 We will t reat e ach of these arguments in t

urn.

II . Exhau st io n Und erth e PLRA

7 Gooler captions this is sue as a qualif ied im mu nity defe nse, w hich it is not. T he su bstan ce of

his arg um ent is that Spr uill ’s complaint does not establ ish t

hat Gooler a cted with a mental stat e of deliberate indiff erence.8 A. The CRIPA
In 198 0, Co ngre ss ena cte d the C ivil Righ ts of Inst itutional i zed Persons Act (CR IPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 St at. 349 (1980). CRIPA § 7 (ori ginally codi fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e) took sever al st eps to foster the devel opment of adminis trative g rievanc e systems in prison s: First, it direct ed t he A tto rn ey Ge neral t o promulgate , after consultat ion with others, “minimum standar ds for the devel opment of a plai n, speedy , and effec tive s yst em for the resol ution o f [inm ate] g riev anc es.” CRIPA § 7(b)(1) . Second, it directe d the Attorney G eneral to set

up a cert ific ation program for inmat e grievance s ys tems. CRIPA § 7( c) . T hi rd , it g av e Di s tri ct Co urts discre tio n t o continue (i.e. stay) § 1983 cases brough t by prisoners “in order to requir e exhausti on of such plain, sp ee dy, and effective administ rati ve remedies as are avai lable .” CR IPA § 7(a). The Supreme Court “desc r i bed th is prov is ion as a ‘l imit ed ex haus tio n requir emen t. ’” Por ter v. Nussle , 534 U. S. 516, 523-24 (2002) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U .S. 140, 150 -51 (199 2)); see also Concepcion , 306 F.3d at 1352.
B. T he P LRA
This regime of di scr etiona r y contin u ance to exhaust administ

rati ve remedies last ed untilthe 1996 enact ment of t he P rison Li tigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104 -134 , 110 S tat. 1321 at66 (199 6). Section 803( d) of th e PLRA amended CRIPA § 7 to, inter alia , remove the standar ds-set

ting and c erti fication role s of the Attor

ney General , and r eplac e the discretionary continuance provisi on with a mandatory

dismis sal pr ovisi on: No action shall be brou ght w ith respect to pri son condit ions under
s ecti on 1979 of the Revi se d Sta tutes of the U nited States (4 2 U.S .C. 1983), or

any ot her Feder a l law, by a prisoner

confi ne d in any jail, prison , or oth er correctional facility untilsuch adminis trative remedies as are ava ilabl e a re exhausted.
PLRA § 803(d ) (co difie d at 4 2 U .S.C . § 1997e(a) a n d ame nding C RIPA § 7(a)). As the S upre me C ourt ex plaine d in Nu ssle : [This] exhau stion provision d iffers

ma r kedly from its pred ecessor. Once within t

he discr etion of

the district court, exhausti on i n c ases coveredby § 199 7e (a) i s now
ma nd ato ry. A ll “ava ilable ” remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies ne ed not meet federalstandar ds, nor

must they

be “plai n, spee dy, and e ffec ti v e.” Even when the pris oner seeks reli ef not avail able i n gr ievanc e proceedings, not abl y mo n e y damages, exhaustion is a prereq uisite to suit . And unlike t he prev io us prov ision, w hic h
en c ompassed only § 1983 suits, exhausti on is now re quir ed fo r all “acti on [s] . . . brought with res pect to prison c onditi ons,” whether under§ 1983 or “any

other Feder al law .”
534 U.S. at 524 ( citing Booth v. Churner ,9

532 U .S. 731, 739 -41 & n.5).
Several courts have recount ed the legis lative hist oryof the P LRA, an d we
ne ed no t do so o nce aga in. See, e. g. , Johnson v. Daley , 339 F.3d 582, 598-99 (7th Cir. 20 03) (R ipple, J., co ncur ring in the judg men t); Nu ssle v. Willette , 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 200 0) , re v’d s ub n om. Porter v. Nu ssle , 534 U .S. 516 (200 2); Alexander

v. Hawk , 159 F.3d 1321, 1324- 2 5 (1 1th Ci r. 199 8) . Th e Supr eme Cour t summarize d the ob jecti ves o f th e exhausti on requi rem ent of the P LR A in Nu ssle : Beyond doubt, Congress enact ed § 1997e(a) to reduce the quant ity and i mpr ove the qual ity

of pris oner suits; to th i s purpose, Congress affordedcor

re ct io ns o ffi ci al s t ime and oppo rtuni ty to addres s
com plaints i nternal ly be for e allowing the initiation of a feder al
case. In some instances, c orrective acti on taken in response to an inmate’s grievanc e might i mprove prisonadminist

rati on and sati sfy the inmate, thereby

obvi ati ng the need for litig at ion. I n other instances, the int ernal review might “fil ter out som e fri vol ous claim s.” And for ca ses ultim ately brou ght to
c our t, adjudic ation c ould b e facil itat ed by an admi nistrati ve record that

clarifies the contou rs of th e c on tro ve rsy. 534 U.S. at 524- 25 (quoti ng and cit ing Boo th , 532 U .S. at 737 ). With this backgroundto gu ide us , we tu rn ne xt to inter preting § 1997e(a)’ s exhaust ion requ ireme nt. C. E xhau stion an d Pro cedu ral D efau lt
We have pr ev iousl y addr essed the applic ability of § 1997e (a) t o acti ons by prisoners who have fil ed suit in feder al court before purs uing all avenues of reli ef availa ble to th em w ithi n their prison’s inma te grievanc e sy stem. In Nyhui s , 20 4 F. 3d 65 , we held t

hat an i nmate seeki ng reli ef that t he pris on’s admini strative gri ev ance system c anno t prov ide (in Nyh uis , it was money damages) must nonetheless pursue the grievance process to its end b efore com ing to federa l court. We conc lud ed that

the PLR A “make[s]
ex h austi on of alladminist rati ve remedies

ma nda tory.” Id. at 67 (emph asis added ). The questi on we now consider is whether “all administrative re medies ” ar e exhausted wh enever there is no further pr o cess avail able t o the inmat e within t he grievanc e sys tem (wh ich w ould happen if,
sa y, an inmate fai ls t o fi le a n ad min ist rati ve appe al), or w hethe r it is necessary that the inma te reac h th i s endpoint having av aile d himself o f every process at every turn (w hich w ould require all appe als to be timely pur sued, etc. ). Put another way , we as k whe th erth e PLRA

r equires simp le exh austion or som ethin g
more— “proper” exhausti on , a s it were. To borrow ter

ms from other ar eas of the law that r ecog nize a n exh austio n requ ireme nt, we consider whethe r the PLR A’s exhausti on requir ement is mer ely

a termination r equirement , oralso i ncludes a pro cedu ral default co mp onen t.10

We recog nize th at there is an emerging split among the circuits o n whether the PLRA includ es a p roced ural d e fault
com pon ent. Compare R o ss v. County of Bern alillo , 365 F.3d 1181,1186 (10th Cir. 2004 ) (“ [T] he P LRA, l ik e 28 U.S .C. § 2254, c ontain s a pro cedu ral default concept w ithi n its exha ustio n requireme nt.”), and Pozo v. McC aughtry , 286 F.3d 102 2 (7th Cir

. ) (sam e), cert. denied 537 U.S. 949 (20 02) , with Thomas

v. Woolum , 3 37 F. 3d 720 , 723 (6th C ir. 2003) (“[W]e hold t

hat so l ong a s an in m ate prese nts his o r her g rievan ce to prisonoffic ia l s and appeal s through t he availa ble procedures , the inmate has exhausted

hi s or

her admin istrati ve
rem edies, and a prison ’s dec ision n ot t o addres s th e grievance because i t was unt imel yunder pri son rule s shallnot bar the federal su it.”).
1. The Procedur al Default Component of th e PLRA
The Sup reme Co urt has obse rved in the federalhabeas corpus context that an exhaust ion requir ement with out a proceduraldefault

com po nent is q uite toothless. To “pro tect the in tegrity of the federalexhausti on rule, [federalhabeas courts] ask notonly

whethera pris oner has exhausted

his st ate re medi e s, but also whetherhe has p rope rly exhausted those remedies, i.e

. , w hethe r he h as fairly present ed his claim s to th e st ate c our ts.” O’Sulli van v. Boerckel , 526 U. S. 838, 848 (1999) (quotation marks andci tati ons omitted) (em phasis in original). [A] habe as pe ti ti one r wh o h as fail ed to me et t he State’ s procedur al requir ements fo r present ing hi s federalclai ms has deprived the st ate courts of an opp ortun ityto address th ose cl ai ms in the fi rst instance. A habeas pet iti onerwh o has defa ulted h is fed era l claim s in state c ourt m eets the techni cal re quirement s for exhausti on; there a re no state remedies any long er “av ailable” to hi m. In the abs enc e o f the independent

and a dequ ate state ground doctrin e in federal habeas, habeas petition ers w ould be ab le to
a void the exhaustion requirement bydefault ing their federalclaim s in state co urt. Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U. S. 722, 732 (1991) (c itin g 28 U.S .C. § 22 54(b ); Eng le

v. Isaac , 456 U.S . 107, 125- 26, n.28 (1982)).
The value of a p roced ural de fault ru le for enfo rcing a n exh austion requ ireme nt is obvious. For example, bot h stat e crimi nal processe s and prison administ rati ve grievanc e sys tems normal ly includ e t ime bars; without t

he backstop of a procedura l defa ult rule, an aggr ie ved p risone r cou ld evade § 19 97e(a)’s exhaust ion requiremen t bysimply

letting the time to p rese nt his grievanc e expire , and a habe as pe tit i oner could likew ise e vad e 28 U.S .C. § 2254(b )’s exhausti on requir ement bynot timely appealing within the state co urt sy st em. There ar e ma ny ot her point s at which an aggrie ved pris oner or a habe as petitioner

could sim il arly

deprive t

he p risongrievanc e sy stem or state c our t11

sy st em, respectively , of the op portu nity to fairl ycon si der

hi s c la im.
The analogy is far fro m perfe ct, though. For one thi ng, the Sup reme C ourt has co n sist ently

locat ed the proc edural defa ult component of federa l hab ea s law in t he “independent

and adequate s tat e ground” doc trine , see, e. g. , Lee v. Kemna , 534 U.S . 362, 3 75 (2 002 ); Coleman , 501 U.S. at 729, a doctrine that , in t he habeas
con text at le ast, “is gr ounded in concer ns of com ity and federal ism,” id. at 730 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter , 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000); Lambrix v. Singl e tary , 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997). It is at l east poss ible that t h e com ity-and-fe deralism rationa le (and hence the “i ndependent andadeq uate state ground” rul e) ap p lies with great er force to defaul ts i n stat e jud ici al proceedi ngs than it d oes to defa ults in state administ rati ve proceedi ngs. Another prob le m wit

h un cr itic al ly

imp ortin g princip le s f

rom federalhabeas doctrine into this con text is tha t in other fe deral statutorysc he m es

— m os t p ro m in en tly, employm entdiscr iminat ion cla ims under the Age Discrimination in Employ ment Act (ADEA )—the Supreme Court has not inter preted an exhausti on-li ke requi remen t to imply a procedura l defa ult com pon ent. 8

8 Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) , provi des that , in s tate s that have a “Stat e authority ” authori zed to enforc e stat e laws agai nst age discr iminat ion (known as “defer ral stat es”), an ADEA privat e plai ntiff may not bri ng a federallawsuit “before t

he expiration of si xty

days after

proceedi ngs have been com men ced [ befo re the S tate

authori ty ].” I n Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans , 4 41 U. S. 750 (1 979 ), th e Supr eme Court concl uded that

this provisi on (wh ich is pa rallel to § 706 (c) of Title VI I, see Oscar Mayer , 441 U.S. at 755- 56) makes “res ort t o administ rati ve remedies in deferralStates by i ndividual clai mants . . . mandator y, not opti onal. ” Id. at 758. In subst ance, t hen, section 14(b) i mplies a s ort of exhausti on requ ireme nt, bec ause aggr ieved parties in deferralstat es must at

least commence the avai lable stat e administ rati ve proceedi ngs. The Oscar Mayer Cou rt went on, however, to als o hold that secti on 14(b) does not

authori ze the denialof federalreli ef in the face of a stat e procedura l defaul t. 441 U.S. at 758-65. Thus, secti on 14(b) does not bar a suit by an ADEA plainti ff in a defer ral stat e who does not avai l himsel f of the avail able st ate admini strative process, or only seeks to invok e that process a fter a state time limit for d oin g so has exp ired

. In sho rt, the C ourt ex plaine d, “state procedural defaults cannot foreclose federalreli ef.” Id. at 762. Thus, the ADE A has an exhausti on requir ement but n o pro cedu ral default co mp onen t. But like the feder al habeas corpus analogy , the Oscar Mayer analo gy is imp erfe ct. Oscar Mayer emphasizes t hat reli ef before a s tate agencyis base d on state law, and “i ndependent [of] federal rel ie f. ” 441 U.S. at761. Thus, ADEA reli ef operat es subst antive ly in paral lel with st ate re lief

, even t hough secti on12

Th e competing anal ogies of fede r a l habeas corpus and federalcivilright s law
are developed i n greate r detai l in t he majori t yand disse nting opinions i n the Cou rt of A ppeals fo r the Sixth C ircuit’s opinionon the same exhaus tion ques tion
we con side r he re. See Thomas , 337 F.3d 720 (Moore, J.); id. at 73 7 (R ose n, J., dissenting in part

and concurring in the judg ment). Suffice i t to s ay t hat we find
ne i ther posit ion entirely

sati sfactor

y. But the foreg oing discu ssion a t least sug gests that an exhausti on rule can (though need not) be fairly r ead to i nclude aprocedural defa ult co mpo nent. Therefore, the best course, we think, is t o examine Con gress’s policy objectives in en acting § 19 97e(a), and to eval uate whether those ar e bett er servedbya pro cedu ral default rule, or the absence of one.
We belie ve that

Congress’s policy object ives will be s ervedby i nterpr eting § 19 9 7e(a)’s exha ustion requ ireme nt to include a procedura l defaul t co m pon ent. Based on o ur earlie r dis cussi on of the PLR A’s legis lativ e his tory, see supra Part II I. B, Congress seems t o h ave had thr ee inter relat ed object ives r elevant to ou r inquiry here: (1) t o retur n controlof the inma te grievanc e process to pri son administra tors; (2) to encou ra g e de ve lopmentof an adminis trative rec ord, and perh aps se ttlemen ts, within the inm ate grievanc e process; and (3) t o reduce the burden on the feder al courts by er ecti ng barriers to frivolous pris oner lawsuits. Each of these goa l s is better s erved by inter preting § 1997e(a)’ s exhaust ion language to includ e a pro cedu ral default component than b y interpretin g it me rely to requir e termi nationof all administ rati ve grievance proceedings.
All three goa ls ar e obviously se rved by

a proce dural def

ault r ule becaus e such a rule p revents an end-run around the exhausti on requir ement, and t hereby
cr eates an overwhelming i ncenti ve fo r a prisone r to pur sue hi s c la ims to the fullest with in the ad minis trativ e g rievanc e sy st em. The re are s ubtler b enefits too: A proceduraldef

a ult r ule enhances the integrity of

prisonadministrati on because it ens ur es pr is one r c omp l iance wit h the
s pecif ic requir ements of the grievance sy st em. A procedural de fault rule ens ures that an adm ini strative record willbe developedin the best

fashion(i.e., under a grievanc e sys tem designe d to creat e just such a record) , and that the pos sib ili ty of sett lementwill be e xplored wit hin a 14(b) encour ages that , procedurally , the y be p ursu ed c ons ecu tivel y. In co ntra st, § 1997e(a) i s address ed only to “[§ 1983 and] any othe r Fed eral law .” W hile relief is to be pu rsued cons ecutiv ely under § 1997e(a) (fir st i n the pri son grievanc e sy stem, and then in f ederal court), the substantive righ ts are exclusively f

ederal in chara cter. If the PLRA charged st ate pri son author iti es with remedy ing only

stat e law, we might find the pa rallel to the AD EA more persu asive; b ut in the PL RA regim e state prison autho rities are c alled u pon to remedy vi olati ons of federal law.13

fr ame wo r k whe re prison adm inistrators wi ll b e r ec ep tiv e to se ttle m en t. F in all y, Co ngress wan ted to erect any barrier i t could to sui ts by

prisone rs in f

ederal cour t, and a procedur al d efau lt rule sur ely reduces caseloa ds (eve n th ough it may be a blunt instrum ent for do ing so).
2. M easu ring P roced ural D efau lt Having concl ude d that, as a matt er of statutorycon struc tion , § 1997e(a) i ncludes

a proceduraldefaul t c omponen t, we must identi fythe sour ce of the r ul es that a prisone r must follow to avo id proc edur ally default ing his cl aim. Judge Easterbrook has aptly referr ed to thi s questi on as “the choice of law issue. ” Strong v. Da vid , 297 F.3d 646 , 649 (7 thCi r. 200 2) . H e elaborates: Very few courts have addresse d what things an a d minist rati ve grievanc e must contain, and none has atte n d ed to the choice- of-law issue. Courts—and pres u mab ly l itigants too—have assumed that the general object ives that inspire d § 1997e( a) al so de te rmine how a prisone r must go about exhausting state reme dies. T he six th circu it, for example, de mands that t he adm inis trative gri evance name eac h p erson who u ltimate ly

bec ome s a defe ndan t. Curry v. Scott , 249 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6t h Cir. 200 1). In contra st, the el ev enth circui t requir es only that a

prisone r include in a gr ievance al l the informati on the prisone r reasonably can be expectedto kn ow ; failin g t o identi fya spe cif ic person does not preventa later s ui t agai nst that person. Brown v. Sikes , 212 F.3d 1205, 120 8 (11 th Cir. 2000 ). Pr es um ably the si xth cir cui t likewise would requir e legalcl ai ms to be identif

ied, w hile the eleve nth
wo uld not

. Y et both of these decisi ons skip over

a vita l quest ion:

w hatbody of l aw governs the sp ec ifi cit y in qu iry?
Id.
We agree that thi s is a c rit icalquesti on: Is proceduraldefault

under § 1997e(a) go vern ed by expr ess feder al law, federal
common law , or by the “ law” of the state prisongrievanc e sy stem (as stat ed in this
case in the Grievance Sy st em Po li cy )? By “federalcommon law” we r e fer to som e puta tive set of r

ules, or at l east gene r a l stan dards, f

or assessing w hether a grievanc e was timely , inc luded a suff iciently detailed factu al acco unt, reques ted a ppro priate re lief, etc. A t all events, we agree with Judge Easterbroo k’s conclusi on that pr ison gri evanc e procedures supply

the y ardst ick f

o r measuring pro ced ura l default. Accord Pozo , 286 F.3d a t 1025. This result is

m ore in harmony

with Congressi onal policy than cre ating ad hoc federal
common law , and it is also fa irer to inmates.
To begin with , there sim ply is no express federal law desc ribin g the proceduralrequi r ements with whic h prisoners must comply in sati sfy ing § 1997e (a)’s exh aus tion req uire me nt. See14

Strong , 2 97 F.3d at 649. As between craft ing judge-made l aw on th is subj ect and lo oking to s tate prison grievance procedures, th e latt er willfar better s erve the policy

inter ests of

the PL RA

. We have repea tedly noted above that t he legi slat ive history is cl ear

th atth e PLRA wa s inte nded to return controlof prisons t o wardens; one asp ect o f this was a comp re h ensive program of ret urning control of t he grievance process

. Ma ndatory exha ustio n ( with a proce dural defa ult component) ensur es that inm ate grievanc es wil l be ad dresse d first w ithin the prison’s o wn system— in this res pect, th e PLRA is thus appr opriat el y defederal izing. Moreover , Congress repeal ed the po rti ons of CRIPA that
e stabl ishedfederalstandar ds-set ting an d certi ficat ion for pri son grievanc e syst ems. It wo uld b e ano malo us, to saythe least, to refuse to give e ffect t o the very rules that the PLRA encourages st ate pr ison authori ties to enac t. 9 Indeed, t he unintende d result of ma king fed era l
common law on this subject might even be that prisons would acquiesc e in that federalcom mo n law by incorp orating it into their grievance syst ems. We also bel ieve that, from a noti ce and due pr oc es s p oi ntof

vi ew, it is fairer to hold inmates to a singl e, consist ent set of pro cedural rules in pursui ng thei r grievances. If

we we re to cr ea te our

own
common law o n th e sub ject, w e w ould in effectbe asking p risone rs to bo th com ply with prison grieva nce p roced ures (to
ensure that the prison will he ar their grievance s), while keepi ng an eye on a sepa rate set of fede ral r equiremen t s (to ensure t hat the y wil l pres erve a remedyin fe deral court i f it c omes to it). The bet ter approach is t o have fe dera l courts recogniz e prisone rs’ pr oce du ral defaults with in the appl icabl e pris on grievanc e sy st em. 10

9 Simply becau se the rules are proceduraldoes not somehow les sen the importanc e to the prison a uthori ty of hav ing fed eral c our ts ho nor them

. Cf. Coleman , 501 U.S. at 730 (expl aining that when a federal habeas court i gnores a stat e procedura l ground for rejec ting a federalclai m, “the habe as court ignores the Stat e’s l egitimate reas ons for hol ding the prisoner”). 10 To b e sure , we h ave p reviou sly
su gge st edth at

inen ac ting t

he PLRA, “Congress i ntended t o save court s from spending countless hour s, educating themselve s in ever

y cas e, as t o the vagarie s of pri son adminis trative processe s, st ate or f

ederal .” Nyh uis , 204 F.3d at 74. This aros e, however, in a discuss ion of the reasons t hat § 1997e(a ) does not i nclude a futili ty excepti on (wh ich w ould requ ire fed eral co urts to make predictive inquiries about what grie van ces mig ht o r mig ht n ot b e fu tile). We are comfortabl e that evaluat ing a proceduraldefault

in the c ourse of an exist ing and ful ly

developed gr ievance will be an order of magnitude less complex and les s fact- intens ive than ascertaining w hether a prison er’s undeveloped gr ievance would be futile.15

Fi na lly, we note that

just as procedur al defa ult in the f

ederal habeas corpus context must be predi catedon an adeq uate (and i ndep end ent) state gro und , see Ford

v. Ge orgia , 498 U .S. 411, 423 -24 (199 1),
so too must a prison gri evance syste m’s proceduralrequir ements not be imposed in

a way that

offends the Fede ral Const itution
or the fe deral p oli cy embodi ed in § 1997e (a). We made the same observat ion (albeit in som ew hat differen t terms) in Nyh uis , 204 F.3 d a t 7 7- 78, whe re we explai ned that the polic y of § 199 7e(a) is that “compliance with the a dminist rati ve remedyscheme willbe satisfac tory if it is sub stan tial.” As the next Part m akes clear, though, we have no occa sion in this case to further elabo rate on this aspect of §1997 e(a).
D. Ex hau st io n of

Spr ui ll ’s Cla ims
The firs t “e x haus tion” q uestion is whether Spruil l ha s exhaus ted hi s administ rati ve remedies in t he lit eral
sense— whe ther

further avenues of rel ief
are ava il abl e t o hi m w i thin the prison’s inma te grie van ce p roc ess. None ar e. DCA DM -804 Part VI provi des for t hr e e stages of review within Pe nnsylvania’s Grievance System : I ni ti al Revi ew ( DCADM -804 Part VI. B), which addre sses t he inmate’s file d griev a nce; the firs t appeal from the In itia l R ev ie w, kno wn as Appeal to Facility

Manage r ( DC -AD M-8 04 Part V I.C); and a seco nd an d fina l appe al, th e Appeal to Secr etary’s O ffice of In mate Grievances and Appeals (DC-ADM -804 Part VI.D). Sprui ll’ s grie vances went thro ugh a llst ag es an d we re de ni ed . H e has no further administrative process avail able.
We turn, the n, to the proc edur al default
com pon ent. Unlike federalhabeas corpus pr o cedural default

inquiries under

28 U.S .C. § 2254(b) and Coleman , where the federalcour t typically will have the be nefit of a state-c ourt ru lin g on whe ther a petitioner

has p ro cedu rally defau lted his federalclai m under st at e p ro ce dural law, a court reviewing a prisoner’s § 198 3 claim for compliance wit

h § 1997e(a) wil l have, atbest, a ru ling fro m a p rison g rie v ance appe llate body on whether the pri soner compliedwith the prison gri ev a nce system’s procedural rules. 11 At worst, the stat e administ

rati ve body wil l not have passedat al l on the prisoner ’s proce dural compliance vel non , and the federal cou rt must undertake an independent procedural d efau ltinquir

y. This is what we m ust d o here, fo r no rul ing from the prison administrators addresse s the pr o cedural impli cati ons of Sp ruill ’s failur e to spec ifically ask for m oney da mag es or h is failure to name Brown in his grievances.
Beca us e th is e xe rc ise is e ss en tia lly a matter of s t atutor

y cons truction—it tur

ns

11 Aside from our comments a bove about the need for admini strative grievanc e sy stems t o comport with t he Federal Constitution and the federal policy of § 19 97e( a) to be given effe ct, we express no vi ew as to whether, or und er w hat stan dard , any such state administ rati ve deter

minati ons of proc edur al default w ould be rev iewa ble by a fed eral co urt.16

on the int e rpret ation of the Grievance Syst em Policy— it is a questi on of law over which we h av e p le na ry

re vi ew. See Stokes

v. Dist. Attorney , 247 F.3d 539, 540- 41 (3d Cir. 2001) . It is therefore a ppropri ate for this Court to under

take the inquir

y i n the first insta nce

. See Hudson United Bankv. LiTenda Mortgag e Corp. , 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (“When a district court h as failed to reac h a qu estion b elo w tha t bec omes criticalwhen reviewed on appeal , an appell ate court maysometimes r esolve the issue o n app eal rath er than rema nd to th e d istrict cou rt. This p roced ure is gene rally appropri ate when the fac tual record is devel oped and the i ssues pr ovide pure lylegalquesti ons, upon which an appe llate court exe rcis es plen ary rev iew .” (citations omitted)). 1. Sprui ll’ s Failure to Ask for Money Damages
We have reproduc ed in fullthe te xts of Spruill’s three grie van ces

. See supra notes 3 , 4 & 6. N one r eque sts mone y damages—or any other s pe cifi c reli ef for that matte r . As noted above, the defe ndan ts assert

that Spr uillcannot now in federal cou rt se ekmon ey da mag es . A s
we concludedin the di scussi on ab ove , w e must look to t

he rules governi n g the prison’s grieva nce s ystem to a scertain whetherSpruil l has pr ocedural ly default ed his clai m for monetary

reli ef. The portion of the G rievan ce System Policy tha t details what “shall ,” “shoul d, ” and “may” be included in a grievance reads:
The inma te shall i n clude a stat ement of the facts r eleva nt to the claim

. The t ext of th e grievance sh all be leg ible , presented in a court eous manner,
an d the sta tem ent o f facts s hall not ex cee d tw o (2 ) pa ges . The inma te shou ld identi fy any persons who may have i nformati on that could be helpfulin res olvi ng the grievanc e. The inmate should also include informat ion o n attem pts to
re so lv e th e m att er in fo rm all y. The inma te may also specifical ly s t a te
a ny c laims he/ she wishes t o make
conc ernin g violat ion s o f Departmentdirectives, regulations, court orders, or other

law. The inma te may inc lude a re quest for compensati on or o th er lega l rel ief
norm ally availab le from a cou rt. DC- ADM 804, Part VI.A .1.d (em phas is in original).
The ve rbs in this par agraph establish three tier s of

grievance componen ts: it ems that are mand atory (“shall”); items that are require d to the e xtent pr act icabl e (“should” ); and items t ha t are optional (“may”). A re quest for money damages falls in the t

hird cat egory . Since an optionalproceduralprovisi on cannotgive rise to a proce dural defa ult, it appears t hat Spru ill is not

now precluded from se eking money damages.
There is , how ever, a poss ible alte rna t ive reading: The sentence at is sue
ma y be addresse d not to t he writt en conte nts of

a grievanc e, but

rather to the scope of reli ef avail able withi n the grievanc e syste m . This i s not an17

unre ason able matter

for a pri son grie vance sys tem policy to address; indeed, it was t he absence of a mechanism to recover monet ar yreli ef—in a prior ver sion of t he very grievanc e sy stem here at is sue—that generat ed the controversy in Boo th , 532 U.S. 731 (holdi ng that t

he unavail ability

of
mon etaryreli ef through aprison grievance sys tem does not excus e a prisone r seeki ng only m one y damages f rom the P LR A’s exhausti on req uire me nt). See also id. a t 734 & n.1 (no ting that Penn sylvania’s grievanc e sys tem did not provi d e for recovery of money damages at the time of Boo th’s grievance , but t hat it had since been mod ified to perm it such recove ry). Inter preting the pro visio n above as establ ishi ng t he sc ope o f ava ilable reli ef

— and impli citly r equiring that t he prisone r ident ify the reli ef h e
s ee ks— wo uld lead t o the conclusion that Spru ill did p roced urally default his c laim for monetar

y r elie f.
We reject this scop e-of- availa ble-rel ief reading fo r seve ral reaso ns. First, gra m matic ally the regul ation r eads “may incl ude a request

for” and not

“may req ues t.” Second, the sentenc e appears a s part of a regu lation d irecting the co ntents of the writ

ten gri evance , not one that otherwise sets t

he sc ope o f perm issible reli ef. Third , t he form it self on which grievanc e s are fi led does not include any pro mpt for sta ting the relief so ugh t. Further more, the re gu lati on does not r ead lik e a regu lation th at cou ld give rise to a procedu ral default

for failure to pl ead prop erly for rel ief. The regulation quoted above is far cr y fr om , sa y, a regulation that reads, “If the inmate des ires compensati on
or other l ega l relief n orm ally availab le from a court, the inmat e shallrequest the reli ef with speci fici ty

in his /her initi al grie van ce.”
In sum , Spruil l cannot

be said t o have fail ed to foll ow the regulations —and thus proc edur ally defaulted— in this re sp ect. No thin g in the Grievance Sys tem Poli cy
wo uld have put Spruill o n notice that he had to as k f

or m on ey d amages—or any parti cular

for m o f rel ief a t all. There fore
we conc lude th at he h as satisf ie d § 1997e (a), and we ca nnot affi rm the Dist rict Co urt’s dismis sal on t

his failure-to-exhaus t ground. 2. Sp ruill’s Fa ilure to N ame Bro wn in His Grievances
The passage quot ed above regar ding the content s of the grievance i s also t he onl ysection of the Grievance Syst e m Policy requiring that

the gri evance identi fy spec ific per son s. On this matte r, the tex t is

m an da to ry, or nearly so: “The inma te shall include a statem ent of

the fa cts relev ant to the cl aim. . . . The inmate should i dentif y anypersons who may have informat ion that could be helpfu l in resol ving the grievanc e. The inma te sho uld also i nclude inform atio n on atte mpts to r esolve t he matter info rma lly.” D C-A DM 804 , P a rt VI.A.1.d. To the e xtent that Brow n’s identity is a “fa ct[] rele vant t o the clai m”— and i t is —it was mandatory for Spru ill to include it. To the extent that Bro wn was a “per son [] who may have informat ion” or someone with whom Sprui ll made “atte mpts to r esolve t he18

matter i nfo rmally”— and h e w as— Spru ill
was require d t o iden tify Brow n if practi cable. Spruil l did not , and has offeredno ex plana tion fo r his fa ilure to do
so. An y grievan ce ag ainst B row n w ould
now be tim e-b arre d. See DC-AD M 80 4 , Part VI.A.1.e ( “Grievances mus t be submitt ed by t

he inm ate . . . within fi fteen (15) working day s after the even ts on which t he clai ms are based. ”). Thus Spru ill has p roced urally default ed a claim aga in st Bro wn by

fai li ng t o i den ti fy

hi m. But the pris on ’s grievance process
excuse d t his proc edural de fault : The grievanc e offic er’s “In iti al Re vie w Response” (the first- leveldetermi nation underthe G rie van ce Sys tem Po lic y) identi fiedBrown by name. Alt hough the respons e identi fied Brown only as
someone who had se e n Spruil l in t he
cour se of his med ical visits, it is no t to be expect ed that a response rejecting Spru ill’s grievanc es on the meri ts would i dentif y anymalfeasance on Brown’s part. The purpose of the regu lation h ere is to put the prisonoffici al s o n notice of the per sons clai med to be guilt yof wro ngd oi ng. As such, the pri son can excu se a n inmate’s failure to do s o by identi fyi ng the unidenti fiedpersons and a cknowledging that they were fairly wit

hin the compass of the pri soner’s grievanc e. The point i s close , but we conclude that the prison grieva nce o ffic er ’s rec ogniti on that Brown was involved in the e vents t hat Spr uil l complained of e xcused any proceduraldefects in Spruill ’s ini tial grievances. Spru ill’s grieva nces and s uit
are not about s pecifi c inst an c es of in s ulting treatment by Bro wn— there
wo uld be no consti tuti onal violation there

an yw ay. Rather, the gri evances and t he sui t are about a l arger- scale de nial of adeq uate medical care, in which pris on offic ials clear ly

knew Brown w as all eged to be impl ic at ed . T hus we reje ct the Distri ctCou rt’s dismis sal of Spru ill’s suit against Brown on these ground s.

* * *
In clos ing this P art, we stre ss that under § 1 997e(a), the warden i s respo nsible for the gri evanc e system. If the warden (or whoever t he ap prop riate state offic ial ma y be) is dissa ti s fied w ith the pro cedu ral default rulings in this Pa rt, he or she may al ter

the grie vanc e system to require more (orless) of inmates by

way of exhausti on. Suc h measures, we reite rate, must be cons iste nt with t he Federal Co nsti tuti on and the feder al poli cy embodied in § 1997 e( a) to be e nforced as grounds for procedur al defaul t in a subsequent

fed eral lawsu it . A s we observedin Ny huis , 204 F .3d at 7 7, “if in the long run, something of a cooperat ive ethos can b e ach ieved betw een in mate and jailer, the internaladministrati ve process could prove a le ss host ile and adversarial forum than thatof federalcourt.” W e are likewise h opef

ul that our holdi ngs today
o n proc edur al default an d w aiver w il l no t engendera pris on grievance revie w cu lture marked by tec hni calitie s, but will instead f oster the cooper ative resol ution o f legitim ate grievanc es by furthe r encouragi ng prisoners to availthemselve s of the forum usually best s uited to redress those grievances.19

II I. Spr ui ll ’s Eig hth Amen dment Cl ai ms Because t h ere is no exhausti on or proceduraldefault

barto Spr

ui ll ’s su it , w e turn to the mer its of his Const itutional claims. We have on se veral occas ions discuss ed the conditions u nd er which de p rivation of medical t reatment violat es
a p risone r’s Ei ghth Amendment right not to be subject ed to crue l and unusual pun ishm ent. “Only ‘ unnecessar y and wanton infliction of p ain’ or ‘delibe rate indiff erence to the s erious medical needs’ of p r isone rs are su fficien tly egregio us to ri se to the le vel of

a con stituti ona l vio latio n.” White v. Napoleon , 897 F. 2 d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir . 1990) ( quo tin g Estelle v. Ga mb le , 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoti ng Gre gg v. G eorg ia , 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) ). Allegat ions of medica l malpract ice are not sufficient t o establish

a Co nstitu tion al vio latio n. See id. (citing Estelle , 429 U.S . at 106 ); Mo n mo uth Co unty Correcti onal Institutional I nmates
v. Lanzaro , 834 F.2d 3 26, 346 (3 d Cir. 1987) (MC CII

) (citing Estelle , 429 U.S. at 106 & n.14; Gittlemacker v. Prasse , 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 19 70)); see also D aniels

v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (hol ding that neglige nce is not

compensable a s a Constit ut io nal deprivation). “[M ]ere disagr eement as to the pro p er medical treatm ent” is als o in sufficie nt. MC CII , 834 F.2d at 346 ( citing Bowring v. Go dw in , 551 F .2d 44, 48 (4 th Cir. 1977 ); Massey v. Hu tto , 545 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1976) (p er curiam)).
As we e xpla ined in Wh ite , the Estelle “delib erate indifferenc e to seri ous medical need s” s tandard i s clearly met when a doctor is “i ntenti onally

infli cting pa in on [a] prisone r[]. ” 897 F.2d at 109. I n MC CII , we identi fieds everal other scenari os th at sa tis fy Estelle . Most relev antto this case are (1) “[ w]here prison authori ties den y reason able re ques ts f or med ical treatm ent . . . and such denia l exposes the inma te ‘to undue s uffering or the threat of tangible res idual injury,’” MC CII , 834 F.2d at 346 ( quoting Westlake

v. Lucas , 537 F.2d 8 5 7, 860 (6th C ir. 1976)), and (2) “where ‘knowledge of the need for me dical care [is acc ompanied by the]

. . . int entiona l refusalto provi de that care,’” id. (q uot ing Ancata v. Pri son He alth Servs ., 769 F .2d 70 0, 704 (11th Cir. 1985 )) (alterations in original).
The Estelle standar d “‘requi res delibe rate indif

fer ence on the par

t of the prisonoffic ials and it requir es the pr isoner’s me dica l nee ds to be s erio us.’ ” I d. (quoti ng West v. Keve , 571 F.2 d 158 , 161 (3d C i r. 1978) ). Spr uill ’s complaint sati sfies the second

pron g. First, his back conditi on itself ha s alle ge dly requir ed sig nific antand conti nuous med ication, an d has causedhim excruci ating pa in. Sec ond, wi thin the brie f perio d des cribed in his
com plaint, Spr

ui llcl ai ms to have fal len or
co llaps ed from the pai n twice (f irst on M ay4, and again on M ay 9), exposi n g hims elf to fur th erin jury . Th e ex tr eme pai n and real possibi lit y of per

manent injurycould qual ify

Spruil l’s c onditi on as
a seriou s me dical need . Natu rally, this will need to be fl eshed ou t w ith fur ther evidence (e.g ., expert medica l testimony), but at the m ot ion-t o-dismi ss st age, t he complaint

is c er tai nl y ade quate in this20

respe ct. The clo ser q ues tion i s whether Spru ill has all eged facts supp o rti ng the infere nce that Goole r, Dr. McG laughlin, and Bro wn we re deliberate ly indiff erent (orintentionally mali cious) with res pectto his condi ti on. Fo r r easo ns tha t will bec o me appa rent, w e treat G ooler first, and then Dr. McGlaughl i n a nd B ro wn together. A. Claims Against

Gooler
Durmer v. O’C arro ll , 991 F.2d64 (3d Cir. 1993), resem bles the case a t bar i n that the pla in t iff-prisoner

(Durmer) sued both med ical a nd non-medicalprison officials. With respec t to the non- medical p risonoffici als, Barker and Fauver , w e explai ned: [W ]e believe that summ ary judgmentwas proper wit h respect to defendant s Barke r and Fa uver. The only alle gation a g a inst

eithe r of th es e two defendants was that they f ailed to respon d to letters Durmer sent to th em e xplain ing h is pred ic ame nt. Neither of these defendants, however , is a physi cian, an d neithe r can be consider ed de lib er ate ly i n differe nt simp lyb ec ause they failed to responddirectly

to the me dical
com plaints of a pris oner who was alrea dybein g tr eated by the pri son doctor.
Id. at 69 (foot

note omitted). Although Dur me rwas d ecided at the su mm ary judg men t stage, its holding can b e read ily imported into t he motion-to-dismiss stage: If a pris oner is under the c are of m edica l expe rts (Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown i n this cas e), a non- medical prison offi cial will general ly

be justified in belie ving that the prison er is in ca pable hand s. This fol lo ws natural ly

from the di visi on of labor within a prison. Inmate heal th and safety is prom ote d by div idin g respo nsibility for various asp ects of inma te life a mo ng g uar ds, administrators , physici ans, and so on. Holdi ng a no nme dical prison official l iable in a case whe re a pr iso ner wa s under a p hysician’s
care would stra in th is division of labo r. Mo reover, under such a r eg i me, nonmedical offici al s could even have a perverse incent ive notto dele gat e treat ment resp ons ibility

to the very physi cians mo st likely to be able to help pr iso ne rs, fo r f

ea r o f v ica rio us lia bi lity.
A cc or di ng ly, we conclude that, absent

a reason t o belie ve (or act ual knowledge) that prison doc tors or their assistants are mist reat ing (or n ot tre ating ) a p rison er, a non-medicalpr iso n offici al like Gooler will not b e cha rgeab le with the E ighth Am endment scient er requi rement of delibe rate indiff

erence. Thus dismis sal of Spruill’s claims again st Gooler after the pointat which Sprui llwa s fir st under medical care is approp riate because S pru i ll bears the burde n of proving ( and hence pleadi ng) facts supporting the defendants’
me ntal state s, see Singletary v. Pa. D ep’t of Corr. , 266 F.3d 18 6, 192 n.2 (3 d Cir. 2001), and he has fai led to so plead with respect to G ooler. 12

12 We do n ot find our a dm onition in Alston v. Parker , 363 F.3d 229, 233-3421

With respect

to Spruill’s cl aims against Goolerin the pe riod before he was u nder medical care— i.e., from his May 2 arri val atSC I-C oal, t h rough his f all and face injuryon M ay 4, to Dr. M cGlau ghlin’s first visi t to hi s cel l on May 5— we also conclude that Sp ruill has n ot stated a claim again st Go oler. First , Sprui ll di d sign up for sick cal l on May 3, and he was seen by

an (unidentified) nurse on May 4; hence he
was recei ving a mini mal measure o f medical att enti on. Se cond, Sp ru illdoes not alle g e t hat his cond ition was so dire and obv ious th at Go oler’s failure to
summon immediate medica l atte ntion on May 4 (an d to ins tead le t the s ick ca ll process run its course) a mou nted to delibe rate indiff

erence. The facts as Spru il l himself de scri bes them si mply do not amount to t

he MC CII e xamples of “deny[ing] rea sona ble req uests for m edic a l tr eatm ent. . . expos [ing] th e inm ate to undue sufferi ng ” or “knowledge of t he need for medicalcare” coupl ed with an “i nten tionalrefu sal to pro vid e tha t care .” 834 F.2d at 346 ( quotati on mar ks and citations omitt ed). Ther efore, Spruil l has not stat ed a c la im ag ai ns t Go ol er an d we will affirm the ju dgmen t of the Distri ct Cou rt dismissing the suit aga inst Goo ler. B. Claims Agains t Dr. McGlaughli n and

Bro wn Though Spruill’s alle gations about D r. Mc Glaug hlin’s and Brow n’s c ourse of treat ment (or nontreatment) pale n ex t to the allega tions in such cases as Wh ite , 897 F.2d 10 3, Spruill’s complaint nonetheless
su ff iciently attributes a mental s tate of delibe rate indifferenc e (or wo rse) t o bo th Dr. McG laughlin and Brow n. Esp ecially when read in l igh t of Alston , 363 F.3d at 23 3-34 & n.6, sever al excer pts fr om Spruill’s complai nt suffice to make the poi nt: Spruill asserts that due to D r. Mc Glaug hlin’s and Brown’s “lack of propermedical care, t he plai ntiff

was subj ectedto the pos sibl e ris ks of a permanentdisabi lit

y or an fatalor seri ous inju ry.” We h ave held that “the threat of tangib le resi dua l i njury” can est ablish delib erate ind iffe ren ce. MC CII , 834 F.2d at346 ( quoting Westlake , 537 F.2d at 860). Spruill further claim s that Dr. M cG laugh lin and B row n acte d “ma liciously and sadis tica lly ,” and t hat those action s we re “inte nded to infli ctpain
on the pla inti ff w i thout any medical justificatio n.” If proven , intentional conductof this sort pl ai nl y ma kes out an Eigh th Am end me nt v iolat ion . A nd fi na lly, & n .6 (3d Cir. 20 04), ap plicab le to this specifi c point. In Alston , we reaffi rmed that pro se complaint s (espec ially fr om civilright s plai ntiff

s) shoul d be read liberally, and noted that priso ners in parti cular are ofte n at an i nformati onal disadvant age that

may preve nt them fr om pleadi ng the ful l fact

ual predi cate for their claim s. Id . Spru ill’s com plaint is lacki ng not because it fa ils to all ege specifi c facts to support Gooler’s ment al stat e (which, at allevents, would be
unnecessar

y under our noti ce pleading stan dar d, see id. ), but rath er bec ause it does not so much as suggest t hat Gooler
wa s aw are of

the alleg ed ina dequ acies in Spru ill’s med ical treatm ent.22

accordi ng to Spruill, Brow n and D r. M cG laugh lin refused t o e x amine him on
mu ltiple occa sions a nd D r. M cG laugh lin inst ead a cc used him of “pl ayi ng games”; when Dr. M cG laugh lin ultim ate l y did examine him, he tw isted Spruill’s legs “as if he was trying to s hape a pretzel, ” and Spru ill “repe atedly to ld Defendan t M cG laugh lin that t

he e x aminati on was causing additi onal pai n to his back and leg.”
In s um , Spru ill has co nnec ted his factualalle gations to the a lleg e d mental stat es of Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown. That he beli eves their acti ons were not only delib erate ly indiffere nt, bu t mali cious and sadistic, rei nfo rces t he suffici ency of his com plaint. Sinc e at this stage w e are making no judgment abo ut wh at actu ally happened, but only

about the suffici en c y of the pl eadings, w e must take Spruill’s factualallega tions, an d the re ason able infere nces theref

rom , as true. W e w ill therefore revers e the District Cou rt’s dismis sal of Spruil l’s s uit aga ins t Dr. McG laughlin and Brown.

IV. Conclusi on The judg me nt of the D istrict Court with respect

to Gooler wil l be affi rmed on the ground that

Spruil l has fai ledto stat e a claim upon which reli ef can be grant ed for

a violation of his E ighth Amendment rights by G ooler. With resp ect to Dr. M cG laugh lin and B row n, w e hold t hat Spru ill has met the exhausti on requir ement of § 199 7e(a), and that

he has st ated a claim for viol ation of h is Ei ghth Amendment righ ts. W e will therefore

reverse the judgment

of the Dist

rict Co urt, and remand for furthe r proc eedin gs, w ith respect to Dr. McGlaughli n and Brown.23