Final Cut 8.5 X 11 with Full Ble

Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on

Iraq’s WMD

With Addendums

30 Septemb

volume II 
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ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072488-6 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072488-0 (Vol. 1) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072489-3 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072489-9 (Vol. 2) 

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Delivery Systems

Delivery Systems

Still, I believe that the Arab nation has a right to ask: 

thirty nine missiles? Who will fi re the Fortieth?

 Saddam Husayn
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i

Delivery Systems

Contents

Key Findings............................................................................................................................................ 1

Evolution of Iraq’s Delivery Systems........................................................................................... 3

The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline.......................................................................... 3

Ambition (1980-91) ............................................................................................................ 3

Decline (1991-96) ............................................................................................................... 4

Recovery (1996-98)............................................................................................................. 5

Miscalculation (2002-2003) ................................................................................................ 7

Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question .............................................................. 9

Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments .................................................................................... 9

Al Samud II ...................................................................................................................... 10

Al Samud Warhead ........................................................................................................... 14

Al Samud II Warhead ....................................................................................................... 16

Solid-Propellant Missile Developments .................................................................................... 17

Al Fat’h Missile Program ........................................................................................................... 17

Background ....................................................................................................................... 17

General Characteristics ..................................................................................................... 18

Propulsion.......................................................................................................................... 18

Guidance and Control........................................................................................................ 19

Warhead............................................................................................................................. 21

Testing ............................................................................................................................... 25

Material Balance ............................................................................................................... 25

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 28

Al ‘Ubur Missile Program ......................................................................................................... 28

Background ....................................................................................................................... 28

Propulsion.......................................................................................................................... 29

Guidance and Control........................................................................................................ 29

Warhead............................................................................................................................. 30

Testing ............................................................................................................................... 30

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 30

Other Composite Solid-Propellant Systems ..................................................................... 30

Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects ............................................................................. 31

Clustering SA-2/Volga Engines Designs ................................................................................... 31

SA-2 Conversions to Surface-to-Surface Missiles .................................................................... 35

Large-Diameter Solid-Propellant Missile Project ..................................................................... 35

Program Development ...................................................................................................... 35
ii

New Cruise Missile Projects ...................................................................................................... 37

HY-2 Range Extension ..................................................................................................... 37

Propulsion System ............................................................................................................ 39

Warhead ............................................................................................................................ 39

Guidance and Control ....................................................................................................... 39

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 39

The Jinin [Jenin] Project ............................................................................................................ 39

Propulsion System ............................................................................................................ 40

Warhead ............................................................................................................................ 41

Guidance and Control ....................................................................................................... 41

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 41

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) ............................. 41

Brief History...................................................................................................................... 42

MiG-21 RPV ............................................................................................................................. 42

Background ....................................................................................................................... 42

Roles and Missions............................................................................................................ 44

L-29 RPV (Al Bay’ah) .............................................................................................................. 44

Background ....................................................................................................................... 44

Roles and Missions ........................................................................................................... 44

Huwaysh’s Accounting of the L-29 RPV Program .................................................................... 45

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 46

Al Yamamah Project .................................................................................................................. 46

Background ....................................................................................................................... 46

Ibn-Firnas UAVs ........................................................................................................................ 47

Background ....................................................................................................................... 47

Characteristics ................................................................................................................... 47

Missions ............................................................................................................................ 48

Foreign Assistance............................................................................................................. 48

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 51

Al Quds UAV Program .............................................................................................................. 52

Background ....................................................................................................................... 52

Characteristics ................................................................................................................... 55

Missions ............................................................................................................................ 55

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 56

Procurement Supporting Iraq’s Delivery Systems ..................................................................... 56

Infrastructure Improvements and Technology Developments ................................................... 67

Static Test-Firing Facilities......................................................................................................... 67

Solid-Propellant Rocket Motor Case Manufacture .................................................................... 67
iii

Delivery Systems

Propellant Production ................................................................................................................. 67

Solid-Propellant Motor Casting Chambers ................................................................................ 68

Production of Solid-Propellant Ingredients................................................................................ 68

Propellant Research.................................................................................................................... 68

Graphite Technology .................................................................................................................. 69

Carbon Fiber Filament Winding ................................................................................................ 69

Ceramic Warhead Effort? .......................................................................................................... 70

Proscribed Activities .................................................................................................................. 70

Violations of United Nations Sanctions and Resolutions .......................................................... 71

Equipment Restoration .............................................................................................................. 71

Undeclared Activities ................................................................................................................ 72

Role of the MTCR ..................................................................................................................... 74

Annexes

A. Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question ................................................................... 77

B. Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments.......................................................................................... 95

C. Solid-Propellant Missile Developments.......................................................................................... 115

D. People.............................................................................................................................................. 123
iv

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1

Delivery Systems

Key Findings

Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery 

capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis 

for nearly all of its future missile system developments. The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hardware and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment.

Iraq’s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. The successful Iraqi response to the Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad, leading to the War of the Cities, probably saved Saddam.

By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase 

their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a fi rst step in this direction. The next few years of learning and experiments confi rmed that the Regime’s goal was for an effective 

long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq’s scientists and technicians.

Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the 

Iran/Iraq war. This was a forcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production 

capabilities.

Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system 

programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was 

eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force. This decision and Iraq’s intransigence during years of inspection left many UN questions unresolved.

• Coalition airstrikes effectively targeted much of Iraq’s delivery systems infrastructure, and UN inspections 

dramatically impeded further developments of long-range ballistic missiles.

• It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly. 

This forced Iraq to sacrifi ce its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bring about a quick end to the sanctions.

• After the fl ight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles and components to aid future reconstitution but asserted that these items had been unilaterally destroyed by late 1991. 

The UN could not verify these claims and thereafter became more wary of Iraq’s admissions and instituted a 

Regime of more intrusive inspections.

• The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles 

after 1991.

While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery 

systems provided their range did not exceed 150 km. This freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and technicians employed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs 

nominally in compliance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability.

• Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had declared development programs underway for liquid- and solid-propellant 

ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development. The 
2

pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with 

ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687.

• By 2002, Iraq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II—a program started in 2001—and the solidpropellant Al Fat’h to the military and was pursuing a series of new small UAV systems.

• ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 

km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and 

only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continuing desire—up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—for a long-range delivery capability.

Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after the 1998 departure of the UN inspectors. 

Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs.

• ISG uncovered evidence that technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted development of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations 

with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems.

• According to contract information exploited by ISG, Iraq imported at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant 

engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud 

II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have 

supported the longer range missiles using clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and 

control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 

(Note: FRY is currently known as Serbia and Montenegro but is referred to as FRY in this section.)

In late 2002 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN inspectors 

to return. Iraq in November accepted UNSCR 1441 and invited inspectors back into the country. In December Iraq presented to the UN its Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) in response to 

UNSCR 1441.

• While the CAFCD was judged to be incomplete and a rehash of old information, it did provide details on the 

Al Samud II, Al Fat’h, new missile-related facilities, and new small UAV designs.

• In February 2003 the UN convened an expert panel to discuss the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h programs, which 

resulted in the UN’s decision to prohibit the Al Samud II and order its destruction. Missile destruction began 

in early March but was incomplete when the inspectors were withdrawn later that month.

The CAFCD and United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspections provided a brief glimpse into what Iraq had accomplished in four years without an international presence 

on the ground.

 Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, 

skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam 

clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD.

• Iraq built a new and larger liquid-rocket engine test stand capable, with some modifi cation, of supporting 

engines or engine clusters larger than the single SA-2 engine used in the Al Samud II.

• Iraq built or refurbished solid-propellant facilities and equipment, including a large propellant mixer, an 

aging oven, and a casting pit that could support large diameter motors.

• Iraq’s investing in studies into new propellants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for 

more capable or effective delivery systems.
3

Delivery Systems

Evolution of Iraq’s Delivery Systems

Throughout its recent history, Iraq has consistently 

sought to maintain an effective long-range weapons 

delivery capability, beginning with its acquisition of 

Scud missiles in the 1970s and 80s and subsequent 

modifi cations to increase their range. After expelling 

the UN inspectors in 1998, the Regime authorized 

the development of longer-range delivery systems, 

demonstrating its commitment to acquiring these 

potential WMD delivery platforms.

• After Desert Storm, the international community 

learned that Iraq had developed CW and BW 

warheads for Al Husayn missiles, was pursuing a 

nuclear weapon for delivery by ballistic missile, 

and had pursued development of a UAV for CW/

BW delivery. WMD delivery was a central role for 

Iraq’s missile and UAV systems. 

• During the UNSCOM inspection years (1991-

1998), Iraq embarked on a number of delivery 

system programs that helped retain the expertise 

and infrastructure needed to reconstitute a longrange strike capability, although ISG has no indication that was the intent.

• After OIF, ISG found evidence for several new 

long-range delivery system designs, but has not 

found evidence for new WMD payloads for these, 

or any, delivery systems.

The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy 

choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy 

and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate 

foldout and in tabular at the back of Volume I. Covering the period from 1980-2003, the timeline shows 

specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s efforts in the 

BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and 

their chronological relationship with political and 

military developments that had direct bearing on the 

Regime’s policy choices. (These events are also provided in tabular form in the Annex section).

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion 

of each chapter, ISG has included foldout summary 

charts that relate infl ection points— critical turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—to 

particular events, initiatives, or decisions the Regime 

took with respect to specifi c WMD programs. Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the text with 

a red triangle.

Ambition (1980-91) 

In the early 1970s, Iraq embarked on a determined 

path to acquire a robust delivery system capability, 

and by 1991 Iraq had purchased the missiles and 

infrastructure that would form the basis for nearly 

all of its future missile system developments. The 

Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile systems 

in Iraq’s bid to establish a liquid-propellant ballistic 

missile force. Other countries played signifi cant roles 

in the establishment of related infrastructure. The 

Iran-Iraq War was a key spur to these missile system 

developments. In particular, Iraq needed to achieve 

longer range missiles. Iran could strike Iraqi cities 

with Scuds, but Iraq could not strike Tehran with 

similar-range systems.

• After signing contracts with the Soviet Union in 

1972, Iraq between 1974 and 1988 received 819 

Scud-B missiles; 11 MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launchers; and other ground support equipment, 

propellants, and warheads.

• In 1980 Iraq and Yugoslavia agreed to develop and 

produce a small battlefi eld artillery rocket called the 

Ababil-50 in Iraq and the Orkan M-87 in Yugoslavia. The Ababil-50 inspired an interest in solid-propellant missiles.

• In 1984, Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina signed an 

agreement (amended in 1985 and 1987) to produce the BADR-2000—a solid-propellant boosted 

two-stage ballistic missile with range capabilities up to 750 km. By 1989 deliveries fell so far 

behind schedule that the agreement, was canceled. 

However, before Iraq terminated the agreement it 

received missile designs, two large solid-propellant 

mixers, and other infrastructure.

• In 1987, unable to attack Tehran directly during the 

Iran-Iraq war using standard Scud-B missiles, Iraq 

performed a simple modifi cation to produce the Al 

Husayn with a 650-km range and reduced payload 
4

mass. At fi rst, producing one Al Husayn missile 

required three Scud airframes, but this rapidly 

evolved to a one-for-one ratio allowing recovery of 

previously consumed missiles.

In 1987, Iraq successfully demonstrated its ability to 

both modify some of its delivery systems to increase 

their range and to develop crude WMD dissemination options by 1990, with the Al Husayn being a 

fi rst step in this direction.

• After successfully undertaking the Al Husayn modifi cation project, Iraq initiated another Scud modifi cation project known as Al ‘Abbas to increase the 

range to 950 km. The Al ‘Abbas reached a range of 

about 850 km during a fl ight test in 1988, but the 

program experienced numerous problems and was 

not fl own after 1990.

• In 1989, Iraq began researching the Al ‘Abid 3-

stage space launch vehicle (SLV), consisting of 

fi ve Scud-type missiles strapped together to form 

the fi rst stage (a concept using a solid rocket fourth 

stage never moved beyond the design phase). The 

Al ‘Abid was tested on 5 December 1989 and 

successfully lifted off the launch pad; however, an 

inter-stage collapse caused the SLV to fail and there 

were no further fl ight tests. The Al ‘Abid program 

continued until late 1990.

• Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and, in the 

ensuing Desert Storm, used Al Husayn and Al 

Hijarah missiles against targets in Israel and Saudi 

Arabia.

• In 1990, Iraq successfully designed and tested crude 

“special” CW or BW agent-fi lled warheads for 

the Al Husayn missile. Serial production occurred 

between August and September 1990 producing a 

stockpile of CBW warheads.

• Also in this time frame, Iraq initiated two projects—known as Fahad-300 and Fahad-500—to 

convert an SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) into 

a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) with design 

ranges of 300 km and 500 km, respectively. The 

Fahad- program was canceled in July 1989 but 

other similar projects such as Al Rohma (Javelin) 

SAM continued. Iraq was actually fl ight-testing one 

such undeclared program, the G-1, while UNSCOM 

was undertaking inspections in 1993. ISG discovered other SA-2 conversion projects from the late 

1990s up to OIF that probably trace their origins to 

the Fahad programs.

• By January 1991, Iraq had converted a MiG-21 into 

a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) and had tested 

BW simulant dissemination from modifi ed Mirage 

F-1 drop tanks. The MiG-21 conversion program 

was canceled in 1991, but these initial steps most 

likely laid the groundwork for future RPV developments.

Decline (1991-96)

Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and 

inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system 

programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s missile 

inventory and production infrastructure was eliminated, Iraq kept some Scud variant missiles hidden 

to assist future reconstitution of the force until the 

end of 1991. This decision, coupled with the unilateral destruction of WMD, and Iraq’s intransigence 

during the inspection years left many questions unresolved for the UN. Baghdad’s prime objective was 

to rid Iraq of sanctions, which would enable Iraq 

to develop its delivery system programs at a quicker 

pace and to make their systems more accurate. 

Iraq’s fear of Iran’s growing military strength and 

Baghdad’s concern that inspections would expose 

its weaknesses to Iran led Baghdad to obfuscate the 

inspection process.

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 687 prohibited Iraq from developing 

or possessing any ballistic missiles with a range 

in excess of 150 km—a restriction reinforced by 

subsequent resolutions—and established an organization called the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) with the mandate to police these 

restrictions. In the summer of 1991, UNSCOM 

oversaw the destruction of 48 Al Husayn missiles, 

50 warheads, 6 MAZ-543 launchers and 2 Al Nida’ 

launchers.

• After the fl ight of Husayn Kamil, Saddam’s sonin-law and head of the weapons programs of the 

Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), 
5

Delivery Systems

Iraq in 1995 admitted that it had intentionally 

concealed two Scud-type missiles and associated 

equipment from the UN until late 1991 to prevent 

their destruction so that they could be used in the 

future to reconstitute the force. The Iraqi government declared it unilaterally destroyed these items, 

but the UN could not completely verify those 

claims and became much more wary of Iraq’s 

admissions and instituted a regime of more intrusive inspections.

• Husayn Kamil was the key to the delivery system 

development process being closely involved in the 

appointments of key personnel and even run-of-themill design reviews. His fl ight from Iraq effectively 

ended all work on long-range missiles until 1998.

• Documentary evidence reveals that Iraq received 

all of its Scud missiles deliveries from the Soviet 

Union. The documents also account for the disposition of Iraq’s Scud force. This information, 

apparently never provided to the UN, suggests 

Iraq did not have Scud-variant missiles after 1991, 

resolving a key question for the international community.

• In the area of solid-propellants, UNSCOM supervised the “destruction” of two remaining 300-gallon 

mixer bowls and a solid-propellant mixer meant 

for the BADR-2000 program. UNSCOM also 

supervised the “destruction” of other equipment 

associated with the BADR-2000 fi rst stage motor 

production and declared the BADR-2000 motor 

case aging oven “destroyed.” In effect, this equipment was merely disabled and much of it would 

resurface in the program later once Iraq was no 

longer under a monitoring and verifi cation regime.

UNSCR 687 prohibited chemical, biological, and 

nuclear weapons programs but permitted the development and possession of ballistic missiles with 

up to a 150 km range. Iraq kept its scientists and 

technicians employed and its missile infrastructure 

and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs nominally in compliance with the UN 

limitations. This positioned Iraq with a breakout 

capability. During the mid-to-late 1990s, 

Iraq expanded and modernized its missile-production infrastructure and had development programs 

for liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles and 

UAVs.

• Even at a time of diminishing resources and as 

the economy moved to its late 1995 low point, 

Iraq supported its missile programs as a matter 

of priority. This priority ensured that support was 

sustained up to OIF.

• Iraq’s initial foray into liquid-propellant ballistic 

missiles after Desert Storm started with the Ababil100 program (later replaced by the Al Samud) in 

1993. This missile program relied on SA-2 technology and Iraq’s familiarity with Scud manufacturing 

and was monitored closely by the UN. Research 

and development continued until 2001 when the 

program was terminated and replaced by the Al 

Samud II.

• Research for a solid-propellant ballistic missile 

under the Ababil-100 program (later renamed Al 

Fat’h) began before Desert Storm. This program 

was based in part on the Ababil-50, with an initial 

goal of achieving a range of 100 km. Research and 

development on this program continued through 

2002.

• In 1995, after the MiG-21 conversion failure 

in 1991, the Iraqis resumed efforts to convert a 

manned aircraft into a RPV, this time with L-29 

trainer aircraft. Research continued intermittently 

until 2001 when the program was terminated. 

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, the 

former Minister of Military Industrialization, stated 

that the L-29 had the same mission as the MiG-21. 

ISG judges that the purpose of the MiG-21 RPV 

program was to deliver CW/BW.

Recovery (1996-98)

Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept OFF and later in 

1998 to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA 

spurred a period of increased activity in delivery 

systems development. The pace of ongoing missile 

programs accelerated, and the Saddam Regime 

authorized the design of long-range missiles that 

were clear violations of UNSCR 687.
6

Iraq’s ballistic missile programs experienced rapid 

advancement compared to the previous fi ve years of 

stunted development and concerned new ideas for 

longer range missiles, some based on old concepts. 

Given the ever-decreasing effectiveness of sanctions, Iraq was able to consider bolder steps in areas 

where it still had technical diffi culties. If the sanctions regime remained strictly enforced, there would 

have been little or no effort by Iraq to address these 

shortfalls.

• ISG discovered that Iraq in 1997 restarted efforts to 

convert SA-2 SAMs into ballistic missiles, which 

contravened an UNSCOM letter restricting this 

kind of work. This project was canceled in 1998 

but probably restarted in 2000 with the Sa’d project 

to create a 250-km-range missile. Research for the 

Sa’d project continued up to the time UN inspectors 

returned in 2002. 

• According to a former engineer within the Iraqi 

missile program, in 1997 or 1998 during a monthly 

Ballistic Missile Committee meeting, Huwaysh 

openly stated he wanted a missile with a range of 

1,000 km. 

• According to Kamal Mustafa ‘Abdallah Sultan 

Al Nasiri, a former Secretary General of the 

Republican Guard (SRG), in the summer of 1999, 

Huwaysh, in a speech to SRG and Republican 

Guard members, promised that the range of an 

unspecifi ed missile system would be extended 

to 500 km, though this would take fi ve years to 

accomplish.

• Iraq began fl ight-testing the Al Fat’h in 2000 and 

continued through 2002, but Iraq was not able to 

acquire or develop a suitable guidance system. Iraq 

began deploying unguided Al Fat’h missiles to the 

army in late 2001. 

• In 1999-2000 the Iraqis began developing the Al 

‘Ubur SAM system, which would use a modifi ed, 

longer Al Fat’h rocket motor. Iraq considered, 

but did not pursue, using the Al ‘Ubur motor in 

a single-stage ballistic missile that could have 

exceeded 200 km in range.

• After 2000-2001, Iraq began an effort to extend 

the shelf life of FROG-7 (LUNA) and Ababil-50 

rockets by replacing their aging double-base solid 

rocket motors with composite solid-propellant, 

which also improved the performance of these rockets. Renamed Al Ra’d and Al Nida’, respectively, 

these efforts helped advance the composite solidpropellant manufacturing infrastructure in Iraq.

• Around 2000, Saddam ordered the development 

of longer range missiles. In response, Huwaysh 

asked his missile scientists to see what was 

feasible. Drawings dated August 2000 show two 

missiles using a cluster of either two or fi ve SA-2 

engines. These designs could have resulted in missiles with maximum ranges of about 500 and 1,000 

km, but the designs did not move forward because 

the program lacked written authorization from 

Saddam.

• Following Huwaysh’s orders, Iraq pursued efforts 

to develop a long-range (400-1,000 km) solidpropellant ballistic missile. Source accounts give 

various dates for this event, but it was most likely 

spring 2000. Initial concepts included using a 

cluster of Al Fat’h motors or developing a larger 

diameter motor. Iraq also pursued a motor with a 

diameter of 0.8 or one meter for use in a singlestage missile. Iraq attempted to use a barrel section 

from the pre-1991 Supergun project to create a 

prototype one-meter-diameter solid rocket motor, 

but the effort failed because of material incompatibilities when Iraqi technicians tried to weld the 

Supergun section to the motor end-dome.

• In 2001 the Al Samud II replaced the Al Samud 

program because of instability problems. Flight 

tests began in August 2001, and the Al Samud II 

was deployed to the Army in December 2001.

Iraq after 1998 continued with its HY-2 modifi cation 

efforts with the HY-2 range extension project and 

started a completely new effort to increase the range 

of the HY-2 cruise missile to 1,000 km.

• The fi rst effort was a straightforward project that 

replaced the existing rocket propulsion system with 

one that used a higher energy fuel. This change 
7

Delivery Systems

allowed an increase in range to greater than 150 

km. According to one Iraqi scientist, the fi rst 

successful fl ight test of the extended-range HY-2 

occurred in August 1999. Huwaysh commented that 

a extended-range HY-2 may have been fi red during 

OIF, targeting Kuwait.

• The second effort began in late 2001 when the 

Offi ce of the President suggested to MIC that it 

develop a 1,000-km-range cruise missile. This 

project, later named Jinin, would attempt to replace 

the HY-2’s liquid-propellant rocket engine with 

a modifi ed helicopter turboshaft engine to extend 

its range to 1,000 km. Work began in 2002, and 

Iraq had conducted some engine-related tests by 

the time UN inspectors returned. At that time, one 

offi cial working on the project judged it was three 

to fi ve years from completion.

Concurrent with the failures of the L-29 RPV program, Iraq began in 2000 to pursue new, long-range 

UAV options.

• Iraq remained interested in UAVs, and the MIC 

ordered the development of indigenous reconnaissance UAVs and target drones. Iraq’s Ibn-Firnas 

group after 1998 developed the Al Musayara-20 

UAV as a battlefi eld reconnaissance UAV. 

• Iraq began a second, more secret, indigenous 

UAV development program in early 2000, called 

Al Quds, which would focus on meeting military requirements for airborne electronic warfare 

programs. However the Al Quds UAVs were still in 

development at the start of OIF.

Delivery system-related procurement expanded in 

late 1998 after the departure of the UN inspectors. 

Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs. Money was pouring into Iraq’s 

delivery system programs, and Iraqi front companies 

took advantage of the freedom to operate without UN 

oversight.

• Iraq hired technicians and engineers from Russian 

companies to review the designs and assist development of the Al Samud II, perhaps contributing to its 

rapid evolution.

• Iraq entered into negotiations with North Korean 

and Russian entities for more capable missile 

systems. Iraq and North Korea in 2000 discussed 

a 1,300-km-range missile, probably the No Dong, 

and in 2002 Iraq approached Russian entities about 

acquiring the Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).

• According to contract information, Iraq imported 

at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant engines 

from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. Iraq 

claims these engines were for the Al Samud II program, but the numbers involved appear far in excess 

of immediate requirements, suggesting they could 

have supported the longer range missiles using 

clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and control systems from entities in 

Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(FRY).

Miscalculation (2002-2003)

The next move of the Regime commenced with Saddam’s ill-conceived reaction to the terrorist attacks 

of 9/11, allowing him to be aligned with the “Axis 

of Evil.” In late 2002, Iraq was under increasing 

pressure from the international community to allow 

UN inspectors to return. Iraq in November accepted 

UNSCR 1441 and invited UN inspectors back into 

the country. That December, Iraq presented to the UN 

its Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD). The CAFCD was largely a repeat of 

old information, but it did provide details on the Al 

Samud II, Al Fat’h, and new missile-related facilities.

• After Iraq disclosed in its CAFCD that, on at least 

13 occasions, its Al Samud II missile had reached 

ranges beyond 150 km, the UN put a stop to Al 

Samud II fl ight-testing until they could further 

assess the system’s capabilities. UNMOVIC convened a panel of missile experts in February 2003, 

which concluded that the Al Samud II violated 

UN statutes, and, therefore, the program should 

be frozen and the missiles destroyed. Beginning in 

March, UNMOVIC supervised the destruction of 

72 missiles and the disablement of 3 launchers. The 

missile destruction program was incomplete when 

the inspectors left in mid-March, leaving Iraq with 
8

Al Samud II missiles that could be used against 

Coalition forces. Iraq launched approximately 

fi ve Al Samud II missiles against Coalition forces 

during OIF before the system was recalled due to 

failures.

• The Al Karamah State Establishment, later known 

as Al Karamah General Company, detailed design 

work for long-range missiles using SA-2 engine 

clusters through 2002. Huwaysh claimed that he 

ordered one copy of these designs be given to him 

and that all other evidence of the program destroyed 

to avoid detection by UNMOVIC inspectors.

• The Sa’d SA-2 conversion project, researched by Al 

Kindi State Establishment, was abandoned prior to 

the arrival of UN inspectors. ISG learned, however, 

that another group embarked on a crash program 

to convert SA-2s to SSMs after UNMOVIC inspectors departed. Two SA-2s were converted but never 

fi red.

• Iraq declared that its Al Fat’h missile had exceeded 

150 km during fl ight tests to the UN. As with the 

Al Samud II missile, the UN ordered that Iraq cease 

all fl ight tests of the system until they could further 

evaluate the system’s capabilities. By the start of 

OIF, a guided version of the Al Fat’h was within 

weeks of fl ight-testing. Even without a guidance 

system, the Al Fat’h proved itself to be a viable 

weapon system, and the Iraqi Army fi red between 

12 and 16 missiles during OIF.

• Iraq’s small UAV programs had demonstrated some 

success, including an autonomous 500-km fl ight, 

and given time most likely would have produced 

larger UAVs with greater payload capabilities. The 

evidence uncovered by ISG suggests that the UAV 

programs active at the onset of OIF were intended 

for reconnaissance or electronic warfare.

The CAFCD and UNMOVIC inspections provided 

a brief glimpse into what Iraq had accomplished in 

four years without an international presence on the 

ground. Given Iraq’s investments in technology and 

infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already 

on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses 

that, absent UN oversight, Saddam clearly intended 

to reconstitute long-range delivery systems, potentially for WMD.

• Iraq constructed a new liquid-rocket engine test 

stand that was larger and more capable than the 

existing engine test stand. The new stand, with 

modifi cations, would have been able to support 

tests of more powerful engines or clusters of 

engines. Although ISG found no evidence that tests 

of more powerful engines had occurred, Iraq had 

clearly begun to establish the infrastructure to support such tests in the future.

• Iraq undertook efforts to improve its composite 

solid-propellant infrastructure. Iraq repaired one of 

the two 300-gallon mixers and two bowls from the 

BADR-2000 program and tried to repair the second 

mixer, although reports vary as to the success. 

According to two former Iraqi offi cials, the mixer 

was used for a short time in 2002 and then dismantled before UN inspectors returned. In addition, 

Iraq built an annealing chamber capable of handling 

rocket motor cases with diameters greater than one 

meter. Other infrastructure improvements included 

new, larger diameter casting chambers and a signifi -

cant increase in propellant component production 

capabilities.

• Iraq studied new propellants and manufacturing 

technologies demonstrating its desire for more 

capable or effective delivery systems. For example, 

a liquid-propellant rocket engine test on 18 March 

2001 used AZ-11 fuel instead of the usual TG-02, 

in an effort to enhance the engine’s performance. 

ISG learned that a Liquid Fuels Committee was 

established in August 2000 to research the performance capabilities for various propellants and 

techniques for producing candidate propellants or 

precursors, some advanced up to pilot scale.
9

Delivery Systems

Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant 

Missile Question 

ISG acquired information suggesting that after 

1991 Iraq did not possess Scud or Scud-variant 

missiles. Interviews with several former high-level 

Iraqi offi cials, visits to locations where missiles were 

reportedly hidden, and documents reportedly never 

disclosed to the UN, all appear to confi rm that Iraq 

expended or destroyed all of the 819 Scud missiles it 

acquired from the Soviet Union.

• A recently exploited document contains information 

on all of the 819 Scud missiles imported from the 

Soviet Union with a break down by serial number 

of their disposition. This document—reportedly 

never shared with the UN, although the contents 

had been discussed with UN offi cials—provides an 

Iraqi analysis for the discrepancies in the accounting for its Scud missiles to the UN. A partial translation of the document can be found in the Delivery 

Systems Annex. 

• Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, the former 

director of the National Monitoring Directorate 

(NMD), admitted to knowing about the retention 

of two missiles for reverse-engineering but said the 

missiles were destroyed in 1991. 

• According to Hazim ‘Abd-al-Razzaq Ayyubi Al 

Shihab, the former commander of the Surface-toSurface Missile (SSM) Forces, the only retained 

Scud-variant missiles were destroyed in 1991. Two 

missiles that were to be used for reverse engineering were unilaterally destroyed by December 1991. 

Hazim claimed that no other Scud missiles or 

equipment were retained.

A few former high-level Regime offi cials have provided confl icting information regarding the retention of Scud-variant missiles. Further questioning 

has not resolved these confl icts. Additionally, ISG 

has investigated several reports from sources of 

unknown credibility concerning the locations of 

Scud missiles, but we have not found evidence at 

those locations to support these claims.

• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, the 

head of MIC and Deputy Prime Minister, stated that 

he had been convinced that Iraq had retained two to 

four Scud-variant missiles as a result of a 2002 conversation with Qusay Saddam Husayn. Huwaysh 

described Qusay’s irritation with ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi, the former Minister of 

Oil then charged with resolving the Scud material 

balance, who had pestered Qusay over the difference in Scud materiel balance between UNMOVIC 

and Iraq. Huwaysh then commented that he knew 

nothing about the location of the missiles or their 

status and that his opinion was based on Qusay’s 

reaction. However, Huwaysh speculated that a 

highly restricted area near the so-called “Khanaqin 

triangle” would have been an ideal location to hide 

these missiles, since the Special Republican Guard 

(SRG) controlled the area. Huwaysh was unable to 

provide any confi rmatory evidence to his claim.

ISG believes that the balance of credible reporting 

and documentary evidence suggests that, after 1991, 

Iraq no longer possessed Scud-variant missiles. 

Though some former high-level offi cials offer speculation and suspicions that Iraq has retained Scudvariant missiles, exhaustive investigation by ISG has 

not yielded evidence supporting these claims.

Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments 

Iraq demonstrated its ability to quickly develop and 

deploy liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, such as 

the Al Samud II, against UN guidelines. ISG believes 

that, given the order to proceed, Iraq had the capability, motivation and resources to rapidly move ahead 

with newer longer range ballistic missile designs.

Iraq began its indigenous liquid-propellant ballistic 

missile efforts in the early 1990s with the Ababil100—later known as the Al Samud. These efforts 

lead to the more successful Al Samud II program, 

offi cially beginning in 2001. Through a series of 

debriefi ngs of high-level offi cials from Iraq’s missile 

programs, together with document exploitation, ISG 

has been able to build a better understanding of the 

Al Samud II program. Although the infrastructure 

and technical expertise were available, there is no 

evidence suggesting Iraq intended to design CBW 

warheads for either the Al Samud or the Al Samud 

II system.
10

Diameter Restriction 

On 17 March 1994, Rolf Ekeus, the Executive 

Chairman of UNSCOM, submitted a letter to ‘Amir 

Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi concerning designs 

for the Ababil-100 liquid engine missile.

“. . . Iraq disclosed a new design for the Ababil-100 

liquid engine missile still under research and development. . . this new design provided for a substantial 

increase of an airframe’s diameter, from 500 mm to 

750 mm. Our analysis concluded that such a large 

diameter is not appropriate or justifi ed for missiles 

with ranges less than 150 km. . . the Commission has 

to state that any increase of the diameter in the current design of the Ababil-100 liquid engine missile 

exceeding 600 mm is not permitted.” 

Early Liquid-Propellant Missile Efforts

As early as 1988, Iraq displayed ambitions to develop 

an indigenous, liquid-propellant ballistic missile. 

These early developmental efforts included the unsuccessful Fahad-300/500 and the G-1 projects. In 1992, 

an indigenous SA-2 replication (the Al Rafadiyan 

project) also failed but was tied with the Ababil-100 

project. The Ababil project—initially intended as a 

compliance measure addressing the UN sanctions of 

1991; limiting the range to 150 km and later renamed 

the Al Samud —began as a 500-mm-diameter missile designed by Dr. Hamid Khalil Al ‘Azzawi and 

Gen Ra’ad Isma’il Jamil Al Adhami at Ibn-al Haytham. The program experienced various problems, 

especially with the missile’s stability. In 1993, Dr. 

Muzhir [Modher] Sadiq Saba’ Khamis Al Tamimi, 

then Director of both Al Karamah and Ibn-al Haytham, proposed a missile design, which was deemed 

more stable due to its having an increased diameter 

of 750 mm. After reviewing various designs of the 

Ababil project, UNSCOM restricted missile programs 

to having a diameter of no more than 600 mm in 

1994. Husayn Kamil held a competitive design review 

between Dr. Muzhir’s new 600-mm-diameter design 

and Gen Ra’ad’s 500-mm design; Gen Ra’ad’s design 

succeeded. After several years of limited success at 

MIC, Gen Ra’ad was removed as the head of the 

program, and Dr. Muzhir was put in charge of the Al 

Samud program in 1999. Muzhir experimented with 

the design of the missile—increasing its reliability—

but work on this program ceased in 2000. All efforts 

were then refocused on the Al Samud II project. See 

the Delivery Systems Annex for further information on 

Dr. Muzhir and Gen Ra’ad.

Al Samud II 

Iraq researched and developed the Al Samud II missile despite UN provisions, which prohibited such a 

system with its specifi cation. Not only did the missile 

have range capabilities beyond the 150-km UN limit, 

but also Iraq procured prohibited items as well as 

received foreign technical assistance to develop and 

produce this system. ISG, which has developed a 

comprehensive history of the system, has no evidence indicating that Iraq was designing CBW 

warheads for the missile.

Huwaysh’s offi cial approval for the Al Samud II 

diameter increase to 760 mm occurred in June 2001, 

despite the 1994 letter from UNSCOM Executive 

Chairman Rolf Ekeus specifying that UNSCOM 

restricted the diameter of Iraq’s Ababil-100 missile 

to less than 600 mm. According to offi cials within 

Iraq’s missile program, the 760-mm-diameter design 

was chosen because this gave the missile more stability than the unsuccessful smaller diameter missile and 

this dimension also allowed Iraq to use HY-2 components for the missiles. 

• According to a former Iraqi missile program offi cial, 

Huwaysh approved the 760-mm-diameter design for 

the Al Samud II in June 2001. Engineers within the 

program strongly believed that the 500-mm diameter Al Samud was going to be unsuccessful from 
11

Delivery Systems

the very beginning. They had determined, based on 

their experience and knowledge of Soviet ballistic 

missile systems, the length/diameter (L/D) ratio of 

such missiles should be between 8 and 14 but that 

12.5 was the optimum. See Figure 1 for a diagram 

of the Al Samud II missile and Figure 2 for a photo 

of the Al Samud II missile.

—ISG believes that discussions of an “optimum” 

L/D are fallacious. Iraqi insistence that the 

diameter increase was intended solely to meet a 

specifi c L/D is more probably a ruse to increase 

the missile’s internal volume—ostensibly for 

increasing the fuel capacity—thereby further 

increasing the maximum range potential.

—Although the L/D of the 760-mm-diameter 

design may be an improvement over that of the 

500-mm-diameter designs, this is only one of 

many inter-dependant parameters contributing to 

the missile’s stability.

• An Al Karamah offi cial claimed that Dr. Muzhir, 

who had previously developed a 750-mm design 

by 1993, discovered that the airframe and ring 

assembly for the HY-2 cruise missile was based on 

a 760-mm diameter. Because of time constraints, 

these items could easily be used to quickly develop 

and manufacture his 760-mm-diameter missile. 

Figure 3 depicts an early Al Samud II using an HY2 airframe.

• Huwaysh stated that the larger diameter design 

allowed an additional fuel tank. ISG has not found 

evidence that Iraq intended to add an additional 

fuel tank to the Al Samud II. 

The capability of the Al Samud II missile quickly 

showed a marked improvement over the unsuccessful Al Samud program. After several fl ight tests, the 

fi rst of which occurred in August 2001, Iraq began 

a production ramp-up of the missile in September 

2001. Several sources have corroborated Iraq’s efforts 

to improve the accuracy of the system, using components, expertise, and infrastructure from other missile 

programs to accelerate fi elding the Al Samud II. The 

key parameters for the Al Samud II are listed in Table 1.

Table 1

Key Parameters of Al Samud II

Key Parameters

Propellants Fuel (TG-02) Oxidizer 

(AK20K)

Engine Modifi ed SA-2 Engine 

(Volga)

Guidance and Control C601 and C611 gyroscopes

Body Aluminum Alloy with 

Stainless Steel Rings

• A senior offi cial within Iraq’s missile program stated 

that the Al Samud II used gyroscopes taken from the 

guidance system of C601 and C611 cruise missiles. 

• Up to November 2002, a timer system was used by 

Al Karamah to provide a simple determination of 

the time for engine cut-off, regardless of the velocity achieved. After that date, the timer was replaced 

by an integrating axial accelerometer in the analog 

control system, which was designed to provide 

an accurate determination of the engine cut-off 

velocity. This consisted of an AK-5 accelerometer 

integrated into the control system, calculating the 

missile velocity using digital integration of the axial 

acceleration. This modifi ed control system would 

issue the engine shut down command signal when 

the target velocity had been reached. A range count, 

similar to that of the Scud and Al Husayn missiles, 

could be entered from the launcher to preset the 

missile range using prelaunch data.

• Al Karamah also began the design of a completely 

digital compensator to be used in place of the analog 

compensator. The compensator is an analog computer designed to calculate the corrections necessary 

to maintain missile attitude and fl ightpath to the 

target. The digital compensator is very similar to an 

onboard fl ight computer. It was to be ready for use 

by June or July 2003.

The guidance system for the Al Samud II provides 

outputs to the control system that provide corrective 

signals to the 4 graphite jet vanes, redirecting the 
12

Figure 1. Al Samud II diagram.

Figure 2. Al Samud II.
13

Delivery Systems

Figure 3. Early Al Samud II using HY-2 airframes.

Wing attachment

Large access panel

thrust vector of the modifi ed SA-2 Volga engine. This 

arrangement, similar to the Scud, provides control in 

3 axes, but only during the powered portion of fl ight. 

The missile reaches apogee as the powered portion of 

fl ight ends (approximately 83 seconds in the case of 

the Al Samud II). The missile is unguided after thrust 

termination and in a free-fall ballistic fl ight until 

impact. This limitation, coupled with the inaccuracies 

of the guidance and control system, resulted in large 

miss-distances.

A senior source at Al Karamah informed ISG of 

a developmental effort to improve the accuracy of 

the Al Samud II using aerodynamic controls on 

the inboard sections of the aft stabilization fi ns. A 

high-pressure gas bottle would be used to supply air 

pressure to drive pneumatic-controlled actuators that 

provide aerodynamic control throughout both the 

missile’s powered fl ight and through reentry. This 

improvement in control would have been incorporated 

following the completion of the initial guidance testing, most likely entering testing as early as the end of 

2003.

• Around 1999, Iraq was working to import new, 

modern, complete guidance packages from Russian 

and FRY entities.

• Iraq was intending to purchase Inertial Navigation 

Systems (INS), fi ber-optic systems, and high-precision machinery for indigenous production of guidance and control components.

Iraq relied on foreign assistance to develop the Al 

Samud II program from its early beginnings. ISG 

has uncovered Iraqi efforts to obtain technical 

expertise and prohibited items from other countries.

• Russian experts contracted through ARMOS 

assisted with indigenous production as well as the 

interface between imported guidance systems and 

the Al Samud II missile.

• A high-level offi cial admitted that Iraq received 

approximately 280 SA-2 engines through the Polish 

company Evax by the end of 2001, followed by an 

additional 100 engines from Al Rawa’a.
14

• According to a former high-level civilian offi cial, 

Iraq brought foreign experts into the country to 

assist in its missile programs.

Although advancements in the Al Samud II program 

were achieved quickly, shortage of necessary components limited production. Several sources estimated 

the number of missiles produced and delivered to the 

Army by OIF. Because these accounts vary and are 

not fully supported by documentary evidence, ISG 

has compared these claims with earlier information 

to develop a potential materiel balance for the missiles. See Delivery Systems Annex for more details.

• According to a former high-level offi cial, Iraq began 

serial production of the Al Samud II missile beginning in December 2001. The production goal was 

to yield 10 full missiles a month. ISG believes that, 

because of a lack of certain components, Iraq did 

not always meet this monthly quota, while in some 

months they may have surpassed it—the production was dependent upon their success at importing components.

Iraq declared the Samud II system to the UN in its 

CAFCD in December 2002, disclosing the 760-mmdiameter along with an 83-second engine burn time. 

Additionally, Iraq admitted in its semi-annual monitoring declarations that the system had exceeded 

150 km on at least 13 occasions during fl ight tests. 

Because of this, UNMOVIC Executive Chairman 

Hans Blix, before the UN Security Council in 

December 2002, ordered Iraq to freeze all fl ight tests 

of the Al Samud II program until technical discussions could occur to determine the capability of the 

missile.

• According to a former senior offi cial at Al Karamah, 

Iraq produced approximately 20 missiles during the 

fi rst quarter of 2003.

• Another source claimed that, after UNMOVIC 

inspectors departed the country in March 2003, Iraq 

was able to assemble about 4 Al Samud II missiles 

from remaining parts that had been placed in mobile 

trucks to avoid air strikes. These missiles were not 

delivered to the Army. 

A missile requires a SAFF system to ensure that 

the warhead is safe to handle and remains unarmed 

until it has been launched, and then detonates when 

intended. After launch the SAFF system will activate 

the fi ring system and arm the warhead. Detonation of the explosive warhead charge is initiated by 

the fuze. Common fuzes used by Iraq include timer 

switches, accelerometers, barometric devices and 

impact switches (impact switches are either inertia 

[nose and tail fuzes] or crush [nose fuze only] and 

can be used as the primary fuze or as a backup to 

ensure detonation if other fuzing systems fail). For 

the Al Samud and Al Fat’h warheads, the impact or 

crush switch was located in the nose tip and activated 

by the impact of the warhead with the ground. The 

basic design of the high-explosive (HE) warhead was 

common between the two missiles and could be interchanged if needed with minimal modifi cations. The 

most likely composition of the explosive mixture was 

60% TNT, 30% RDX, and 10% aluminum powder.

The submunition warhead developed for the Al Fat’h 

missile had an airburst fuze to ensure the effective 

dispersal of the submunitions (bomblets). The warhead contained up to 900 KB-1 anti-tank/anti-personnel (ATAP) submunitions.

Al Samud Warhead 

ISG has not discovered any information to suggest 

that Iraq had considered or designed bulk-fi lled 

CBW warheads for the Al Samud. An impact detonation would be an ineffi cient method for disseminating chemical or biological agents, as the heat and 

Al Samud II Determined To Be an Illegal System 

During a UN technical discussion in February 2003, 

an International Team of missile experts concluded 

that the Al Samud II missile had range capabilities well 

beyond the imposed 150-km limit. The UN then ordered 

Iraq to destroy the Al Samud II and associated support 

equipment specifi c to the system. UNMOVIC supervised the destruction of 72 missiles and 3 launchers in 

March. Due to the inconsistencies in source reporting 

and the lack of documentary evidence available, ISG 

has been unable to accurately reconcile the status 

of the Al Samud II inventory. Refer to the Delivery 

Systems Annex for an assessment of the Al Samud II 

missile material balance. 
15

Delivery Systems

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Warheads

Iraq developed a unitary high-explosive (HE) warhead for delivery by both the Al Samud and Al Fat’h 

missiles. Iraq also developed a submunition warhead 

for the Al Fat’h and intended to develop a cluster 

warhead for the Al Samud. 

Traditionally, the payload or warhead of a missile 

can be defi ned as an explosive or weapons package, 

the shell in which the weapons package is contained, 

and the Safe, Arm, Fuze and Fire (SAFF) system. 

shock of an explosive detonation could destroy much, 

if not all, of the agents.

• Although ISG has recovered no evidence to suggest 

that “special” warheads were developed for the Al 

Samuds, the warhead is a direct extrapolation of the 

impact warhead design for the Scud and Al Husayn 

missiles and could be modifi ed in the same way Iraq 

modifi ed the Al Husayn HE warhead to produce 

crude CBW warheads.

• Iraq retained the intellectual capital for reproducing 

these kinds of “special” warhead designs, so modifi cation and production of this crude type of warhead could be achieved in a matter of weeks with a 

relatively small team of specialized individuals. 

The Al Samud I was designed to carry a unitary HE 

warhead, and Iraq apparently intended to develop a 

conventional submunition warhead for the missile.

The Al Samud HE warhead is an extrapolation of the 

Scud warhead design and was later adopted for the Al 

Fat’h missile. Development of the warhead took about 

eight months and was completed in the summer of 

1994. The Al Samud warhead components are listed 

in Table 2. 

The original Al Samud warhead has a 500-mm-basediameter and is 2 meters long with a design payload 

mass of 300 kg. The fuze mechanism is similar to 

that of the Scud missile. The original warhead design 

contained one forward booster and two rear boosters 

at the base of the warhead, one of which serves to 

provide uniform detonation in the system, the other as 

an auto destruct mechanism in case the missile deviates from its predetermined trajectory. Because Iraq 

lacked confi dence in the accuracy of the guidance and 

control system, the backup and emergency boosters 

were never incorporated, leaving a single forward 

booster. An impact crush switch is incorporated into 

the graphite nose of the warhead (see Figure 4, Al 

Samud warhead design).

Iraq’s desire to achieve 150-km range resulted in a 

quick modifi cation to reduce the payload mass from 

300 kg to 200-250 kg with 100-120 kg of HE, according to a senior missile offi cial.

Figure 4. Al Samud warhead design.
16

• Iraq reduced the warhead mass by relocating the 

base plate and bulkhead forward into the warhead 

body, which reduced the available HE volume. 

• Warhead modifi cations continued into 2001. A fl ight 

test in late 2001 used better constructed cylindrical 

and conical parts of the warhead with a payload of 

240 kg and achieved a range of 151 km.

After succeeding with the unitary HE warhead, Iraq 

intended to develop a submunition warhead for the 

Al Samud, according to a senior Iraqi missile developer. However, no submunition warheads for either 

Al Samud or Al Samud II were manufactured. 

Al Samud II Warhead 

ISG has not discovered information to suggest that 

Iraq had considered or designed CBW warheads for 

the Al Samud II. The Al Samud II was designed to 

carry a unitary HE warhead, which is an extrapolation 

of the Scud and Al Samud warhead designs. At the 

end of June 2001, Al Karamah modifi ed the Al Samud 

warhead to accommodate the increase in diameter 

from 500 mm to 760 mm. A design payload of 

300 kg for Al Samud was agreed to with the UN, but 

the actual payload was 280 kg.

• Iraq manufactured a new warhead shell with a 

760-mm-base-diameter and a length of 2,142 mm. 

Table 2

Nose Tip Graphite

Outer shell 2-mm rolled steel

Insulation layer 3-mm Asbestos

Inner Shell 1-mm rolled steel

Fuze Impact or crush switch housed 

in nose tip

Booster x 3 The third booster acts as a 

safety mechanism, detonating 

if the missile deviates from its 

predetermined trajectory

Filler 60% RDX, 30% TNT, 10% 

aluminum powder

The HE was housed in the forward section of the 

warhead and additional space reserved in the base for 

an air bottle that would provide pneumatics to control 

surfaces yet to be implemented in the missile fi ns (see 

Guidance and Control section). To compensate for 

the additional weight of the warhead shell and guidance system, the amount of HE was reduced. 

• The booster for the emergency detonator was to be 

reinstalled, once confi dence was gained in the guidance system. Figure 5 shows a schematic diagram of 

the Al Samud II warhead with gyroscope housings 

at the base of the warhead and notional emergency 

booster rod illustrated with dotted lines.

Within two weeks, Al Karamah produced a prototype 

that was tested at Al Qayyarah, a site belonging to the 

Air Force. The test successfully demonstrated the fragmentation and blast radius, resulting in design approval 

from the Army.

Between January and November 2002, Al Karamah 

and Al Qa’Qa’a conducted a study to improve the 

effectiveness of the Al Samud warhead. 

The study was to investigate two aspects of the warhead: 

• Methods by which the density of the explosive material could be increased; and

• How the blast effect of the warhead could be 

improved. 

The theoretical fi lling requirements for the study of the 

Al Samud II warhead were:

• Total weight: 280 kg

• Explosive charge weight: 140 kg

• Warhead metal container weight: 140 kg

• Composition of explosive mixture: 60% RDX= 84 

kg, 30% TNT= 42 kg & 10% AL= 14 kg. 

Filling of the Al Samud warhead was a manual process; however, the study recommended that compressing the explosive material into the warhead by using 

a hydraulic press would improve the density and thus 

effectiveness and safe handling of the explosive material.
17

Delivery Systems

Figure 5. Al Samud II warhead.

Solid-Propellant Missile Developments 

The Iraqi composite solid-propellant missile program that developed in the 1990s supported the 

development of a short-range ballistic missile 

(SRBM) system allowed within the UN limitations 

and the refurbishment of and improvement to existing weapon systems and attempted to support the 

development of ballistic missile systems prohibited 

by the UN.

Al Fat’h Missile Program

Background

Despite the limitations imposed by the UN sanctions 

and the international arms embargo, Iraq was able 

to produce and fi eld the domestically designed Al 

Fat’h composite solid-propellant ballistic missile.

The goal of the program, which commenced in June 

1997, was to develop a missile that could deliver a 

300-kg payload to a range of 150 km with an accuracy of 150 meters Circular Error Probable (CEP). 

The accuracy requirement for an unguided version of 

the Al Fat’h was 750 meters CEP.

• The Al Fat’h program began under the Ababil-100 

project in the early 1990s. By 1994 the liquid- and 

solid-propellant missile development programs 

under Ababil-100 had split, and the solid-propellant 

program retained the Ababil-100 name. According 

to a senior Iraqi missile offi cial, the fi rst technical 

review meeting was held for the commencement of 

the Al Fat’h missile program in June 1997.

• The Al Fat’h was designed to carry unitary HE or 

submunition warheads. ISG has not found evidence to suggest the Al Fat’h was intended for use 

with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.
18

150-km limitation imposed by UNSCR 687 in fl ight 

tests and during operational launches. 

• Computer modeling of the Al Fat’h provided an 

estimated range capability of 180 km. Using lighter 

airframe materials would improve the range.

Key elements of the Al Fat’h development process 

required foreign assistance or procurement. ISG has 

discovered that the guidance for the Al Fat’h was to 

consist of a “strap-down” inertial navigation system 

(INS) with gyroscopes and accelerometers, which 

would fall well beyond the production capabilities in 

Iraq. Also, key ingredients of the composite solid-propellant could not be produced in Iraq.

General Characteristics

The Al Fat’h missile (see Figure 6) was a solid-propellant ballistic missile weighing approximately 1,200 

kg with an overall length of approximately 6.7 meters 

and a diameter of 0.5 meter for the main body and 

1.4 meters with the aft fi n assembly. While forward 

canards were used on a number of missile test fl ights, 

they were not used on the Al Fat’hs provided to the 

Army, and none have been noted on the Al Fat’hs 

captured to date.

• The airframe was primarily constructed from

4 mm thick 30CrMoV9 sheet steel. While 

30CrMoV9 proved diffi cult to form, the extensive 

use of this alloy throughout the airframe simplifi es 

missile construction. Although not available, maraging steel would have been the preferred material. 

The aft fi n assemblies and nose cones were constructed of aluminum.

The Al Fat’h was designed to be launched from a 

Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). Based upon the 

SA-2/Volga missile launcher, the Al Fat’h missile was 

mounted in a launcher-storage box with an integral 

launcher rail.

Propulsion

The Al Fat’h used a composite solid-propellant motor 

of conventional design and composition. According to 

a senior offi cial in the Iraqi missile program, the fi nal 

motor mass was 828 kg, although the motors varied 

from 820 kg to 856 kg because of variations in motor 

insulation. Other documentation retrieved by ISG 

Solid Propellants

Solid propellants can be divided into two classes: 

Double Base (DB) and Composite propellants.

• DB propellants contain two primary ingredients: 

nitro-cellulose and nitro-glycerine. DB propellants 

can be extruded (Extruded Double Base—EDB) or 

cast (Cast Double Base—CDB) to form a variety of 

shapes.

• Composite propellants are a mixture of fi nely 

ground oxidizer (commonly ammonium perchlorate), fuel (commonly aluminum powder), and 

a polymeric binder (commonly HTPB). These ingredients are mixed and cast into the motor case. The 

motors spend days at elevated temperatures to cure 

the propellant, giving it the correct physical properties. 

Composite propellants have a higher combustion 

temperature and higher performance than that of the 

DB type. They are also safer but more complex to 

manufacture than DB propellants.

By the time of OIF, Iraq had produced between 100 

and 120 Al Fat’h missiles, with up to 60 consumed 

in the development process. In late 2002, the Army 

had few alternatives and accepted the unguided Al 

Fat’h, with the understanding that the guided variant would continue to be developed. Between 50 and 

60 missiles were provided to the Army, all of which 

were unguided; fi ve were equipped with submunition 

warheads.

• During OIF, Iraq fi red between 12 and 16 Al Fat’h 

missiles at Coalition targets, and between 4 and 13 

missiles were damaged or destroyed by the Coalition. After the war the Coalition recovered at least 

10 missiles, which leaves up to 34 unaccounted for 

missiles.

Al Fat’h development allowed Iraq to create and 

refi ne the technical expertise and develop the infrastructure needed to support the design and production of missiles with ranges beyond those allowed 

by the UN. The Al Fat’h design was conservative and 

used unnecessarily heavy airframe components, yet 

the missile reached and in some cases exceeded the 
19

Delivery Systems

give a propellant mass of approximately 770 kg. ISG 

believes that the variations in propellant mass suggest 

that the fi nal design for the missile was not frozen. 

Manufacturing the Al Fat’h solid-propellant motor 

presented several challenges. Specifi cally, Iraq lacked 

preferred materials for the motor case and insuffi cient 

solid-propellant mixing capacity.

• Iraq lacked maraging steel sheets of suffi cient size 

and quantity to manufacture Al Fat’h motor cases. 

Maraging steel has the advantage of being easy 

to form in its original state but, when annealed, 

provides excellent rigidity, strength, and crack 

resistance. Without maraging steel, the Al Fat’h 

motor case had to be constructed from 30CrMoV9 

sheet steel (see Figure 7 for an Al Fat’h motor). 

Diffi culties in forming and aligning the cylindrical 

shapes needed for the rocket motor cases from this 

material led to large miss distances, according to a 

senior offi cial in the Iraqi missile program.

• Iraq lacked suffi cient propellant mixing capacity. 

The mixers and bowls acquired in the late 1980s for 

the BADR-2000 program would have suffi ced, but 

these were not available (see Infrastructure section). Instead, the Iraqis were forced to use four or 

fi ve smaller 30-gallon bowls to mix the propellant 

needed for a single Al Fat’h motor, according to a 

senior offi cial (see Figure 8). These bowls, using 

two mixers, were then poured sequentially into the 

motor casing. While one senior Iraqi offi cial stated 

the process worked well, he also admitted one out 

of every 10 motors exploded during motor burn. 

The use of multiple bowls presented the potential 

for uneven curing of the propellant and inconsistent 

motor performance. In addition, this process also 

eliminated the possibility of multiple simultaneous 

motor castings.

Rocket or Missile?

Although the Al Fat’h systems fi elded with the Army 

and fi red during OIF were unguided and therefore 

technically rockets, the Iraqi intent was to fi eld a 

missile. Because of this ultimate goal, the Al Fat’h is 

referred to throughout this document as a missile. 

Guidance and Control

The unguided Al Fat’h used simple aft stabilization fi ns. The guided version of the Al Fat’h would 

have had a relatively complicated control system, 

with canards, actuators, and a strapdown INS with 

an indigenously developed computer and imported 

gyroscopes and accelerometers. Iraq specifi ed an INS 

accuracy of 1 degree per hour drift, which is relatively 

sophisticated. Iraq also considered using Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance. 

• A highly accurate strap-down system, coupled with 

an adequate canard guidance system, would most 

likely have provided the Al Fat’h with the specifi ed 

150-meter CEP accuracy for the guided variant at 

a range of 150 km. That level of accuracy coupled 

with the submunition warhead would have made 

the Al Fat’h a formidable tactical delivery system. 

• The instrument/control section of the airframe, 

while of an unnecessarily heavy construction, is 

constructed using the same material as the rocket 

motor casing, thereby simplifying manufacture. 

• The planned guidance package for the Al Fat’h 

would have broken new ground for Iraq by attempting to incorporate aerodynamic fl ight controls onto 

a ballistic missile. While a proven concept in some 

countries, this was the fi rst attempt by Iraq to incorporate this type of control system into a ballistic 

missile. 

• Iraq attempted to acquire Guidance and Control 

(G&C) components and technology from a number 

of foreign sources. Iraq reportedly received a 

sample inertial system from the FRY, but it was 

considered inadequate and of poor quality (see the 

Delivery Systems Procurement section for more 

details). There reportedly were 50 G&C sets delivered from Belarus prior to the start of OIF, according to a source with good access, although ISG has 

no confi rmation this delivery actually occurred.

• Augmenting the Al Fat’h strap-down INS and 

canard controls with inputs from the GPS would 

have further increased system accuracy.
20

Figure 6. Al Fat’h missile.

Figure 7. Al Fat’h solid

rocket motor.
21

Delivery Systems

Despite the lag in procuring the INS and testing 

delays, design work on the G&C for the Al Fat’h was 

well under way prior to OIF. Two guided fl ight tests 

were conducted prior to the war, one with roll control 

and a second with pitch control. According to a highlevel offi cial within the missile program, in March 

2003, Iraq was only a matter of weeks from conducting a test fl ight with a full control system (equipped 

with INS and canards). ISG believes that Iraq did 

not conduct this fl ight test because, in December 

2002, the UN had ordered that Iraq cease all missile tests until further notice. While this system 

would have used a prototype guidance system built 

from available components and be less accurate than 

desired, it would have allowed the Iraqis to validate 

the concepts and techniques.

Warhead

ISG has learned through debriefi ngs of senior Iraqi 

offi cials that there were originally three warhead 

designs proposed for the Al Fat’h: a unitary HE warhead, a conventional submunition warhead, and a miscellaneous warhead initially suggested to be a Fuel 

Air Explosive (FAE) warhead. The army accepted 

both the HE and submunition warheads, but the FAE 

warhead was not pursued (see Figure 9). 

• According to documents recovered by ISG, in 2002 

the SSM Command presented a requirement for 

100 guided Al Fat’h missiles, 20 of which were to 

be equipped with submunition warheads and the 

remaining 80 with HE warheads, to the Al Rashid 

General Company.

The Al Fat’h HE warhead was the same as the Al 

Samud HE warhead discussed earlier, which had 

been derived from the Scud HE warhead. Sharing 

the same missile diameter and interface as the Al 

Samud allowed for savings on production costs and 

facilitated the interchange of warheads, although the 

Al Fat’h warhead SAFF and arm circuit required 

adaptation due to the higher acceleration profi le of the 

Al Fat’h during launch.

• The HE payload mass varied between 260 kg and 

300-kg and contained 160-170-kg of HE. Figure 10 

shows an X-ray of the Al Fat’h unitary HE warhead 

with a damaged impact or crush switch located in 

the nose tip.

Strap-Down Inertial Navigation System Tutorial

One of the major costs and maintenance factors in 

an inertial guidance system is related to the use of 

complex mechanisms required to control the attitude 

of the platform. If individual gimbaled gyroscopes are 

used, then this adds to the system error budget. One 

approach to eliminating these problems is the strapdown inertial guidance system. 

In a typical strap-down system, the gyroscopes and 

accelerometers are mounted on a very rigid structure 

on the missile. Instead of using gyroscopes to keep 

the accelerometers pointed in a constant direction, a 

strap-down system allows the accelerometers to rotate 

with the missile and uses the gyroscopes to keep track 

of where each accelerometer is pointed. Because the 

accelerometers are no longer oriented along convenient reference axes, the mathematics become more 

complex; but, with digital computers, this is no longer 

the obstacle it once was. 

Strap-down inertial guidance systems offer improved 

reliability, lower costs, and the potential for integration with other fl ight controls. The keys to strap-down 

performance are the gyroscopes and the software. 

Because of these characteristics, the strap-down inertial guidance system is ideal for short-range ballistic 

missile systems.

• The fuze, activated by the impact of the warhead on 

the ground, sends a fi ring signal to a booster charge, 

which in turn detonates the main explosive charge. 

Figure 11 shows the basic layout of the unitary 

warhead.

There is no evidence to suggest that unconventional warheads were to be developed for the Al 

Fat’h missile. However, as a direct extrapolation of 

the Scud conventional warhead design, the Al Fat’h 

HE warhead inherits the same primitive design that 

could allow modifi cation to accommodate bulk-fi lled 

chemical or biological agents.

• Iraq retained the intellectual capital for reproducing 

the crude “special” warhead (CBW) design for the 

Al Husayn missile, so modifi cation and production of this type of warhead could be achieved in 

a matter of weeks with a relatively small team of 

specialized individuals. 
22

Figure 8. 30-gallon/100-liter 

propellant mixer bowl.

Figure 9. Al Fat’h unitary 

warhead in a shipping 

container.
23

Delivery Systems

A senior Iraqi missile offi cial indicated that submunition warheads were deemed to be more effective 

than unitary HE because they would have a larger 

lethal footprint and reduce concerns over poor missile accuracy. Iraq researched a variety of different 

confi gurations for the Al Fat’h submunition warhead 

before fi nally arriving at a design containing 850-900 

submunitions.

• These submunitions were based on FRY antipersonnel/anti-tank KB-1 submunition identical to 

those used in the Ababil-50 submunition payload. 

• The submunitions are stacked on top of one another 

and held in place by foam molds (see Figure 12).

The KB-1 submunition is an open-ended tube, housing a copper-shaped charge (see Figure 13). Upon 

detonation, the body fragments and scatters the ball 

bearings surrounding the outer shell, and the shaped 

charge fi res, projecting the jet forward to penetrate 

the target. Typically, the submunitions contain 30 g of 

explosives.

• ISG judges that it is not possible to modify the 

KB-1 submunition to accommodate chemical or 

biological agents. Considering the small internal 

volume of the submunitions and risk of agent fratricide from the explosive charge, the KB-1 submunition is not a candidate for chemical or biological 

agent dissemination.

The shell case of the Al Fat’h submunitions warhead, 

manufactured by Al Rashid, was 3 mm thick and 

constructed of aluminum. The original design called 

for an aluminum warhead base, but the warheads 

produced used steel due to material shortages. The 

additional weight of the steel in the production warheads meant they could carry only 740 to 760 submunitions. Further, due to limitations in manufacturing 

technology, the warhead shell was conical rather than 

the aerodynamically optimum ogive design.

• Al Rashid General Company began Al Fat’h 

submunition warhead development in July 1998. 

Development continued through 2002, including 

fi ve static tests, three of which were successful.

Iraq used detonator cord to fragment the warhead 

and let the airstream disperse the submunitions. 

Initially, Iraq wanted to use a single burster charge 

in the center of the warhead to disperse the submunitions after the detonator cord fractured the warhead 

and aerodynamic forces peeled back the skin. Experiments using a live burster charge were conducted in 

April and August 2002 and successfully dispersed 

850 submunitions over an area of a 600-meter radius. 

During one fl ight-test, however, the burster failed 

to detonate. The airstream passing over the exposed 

submunitions dispersed the submunitions, and fewer 

munitions were damaged than experienced in previous experiments.

• As a result of this test, Iraq removed the explosive 

from the burster, but the empty burster tube was left 

in place to preserve structural support. Figure 14 is 

an X-ray of an Al Fat’h submunition warhead airshell. The black line running parallel with the sides 

of the warhead casing shows the detonator cord. 

• Figure 15 illustrates the arrangement of the submunitions about the burster tube located along the 

central axis of the warhead. 

Early attempts to use timing and barometric fuzes for 

altitude bursts of the submunition warhead failed. The 

problem was resolved (see Figure 16) by employing 

a diaphragm switch from the Scud barometric sensor 

and a battery from an Ababil-50 rocket. 

In operation, the warhead is armed by the action of 

the “G” Switch through a sustained acceleration of 

7.5 G for a minimum of 2.5 seconds. A barometric 

sensor detects altitude; when the missile ascends to 

a height of 5.5 km, a thermal battery is connected, 

charging the capacitors within the fi ring circuit. As 

the missile descends through 3 km, the capacitors 

discharge providing power to the detonator, which in 

turn initiates the detonation cord and the booster rod.

• In practice, the height of burst for submunition 

dispersal was approximately 2 km (2 km +/- 500 

m), according to an offi cial within the Iraqi missile 

program. Even with knowledge of the target terrain, such a loose tolerance is undesirable. (Figure 

17 depicts an Al Fat’h missile with a submunition 

warhead.)
24

Figure 10. X-ray of Al

Fat’h unitary HE warhead.

Figure 11. Al Fat’h HE 

warhead.

Figure 12. Lightweight foam moldings used in the Al Fat’h warhead.
25

Delivery Systems

Figure 13. KB-1 submunitions.

• Iraq intended to introduce a “strap-down” INS for 

the Al Fat’h missile in which presets that relate 

directly to predetermined burst altitudes (defi ned 

through time, velocity, and trajectory) could be confi gured before launch. Such a system has intrinsically greater accuracy in determining altitude than a 

barometric sensor. 

Testing

ISG, through document exploitation and debriefings of senior Iraqi offi cials, developed a detailed 

accounting of the Al Fat’h test program. This test 

program, conducted between early 2000 and late 

2002 consisted of approximately 50 individual fi rings, 

about 17 static motor tests and about 33 or 

34 fl ight tests. A detailed breakdown of Al Fat’h 

missile launches and motor tests is included in the 

Delivery Systems Annex.

• Between 2000 and 2001, 10 or 12 solid-propellant 

rocket motor static tests were conducted at the Al 

Musayyib Solid Rocket Motor Support and Test 

Facility at Al Mutasim. Approximately midway 

through the static testing program, missile fl ighttesting began. This approach allowed modifi cations 

to the motor design to correct errors discovered 

during the fl ight-testing.

• The testing program passed through various phases 

as the emphasis shifted from motor performance 

and basic fl ight characteristics, to accuracy, reliability, and missile acceptance testing. 

• Flight-testing began in 2000 and ended in late 2002. 

By mid-2001 to late 2002, Al Fat’h fl ight tests provided relatively consistent range performance using 

inert, submunition, and unitary HE warheads. The 

last two fl ight tests constituted the acceptance tests 

for the unguided variant of the missile.

• The fl ight-test program did have diffi culties and 

never achieved the 750-meter CEP expected for the 

unguided airframe. The system also experienced a 

high failure rate during testing with 30% ending in 

failure and 10% of the motors experiencing catastrophic failure during fi ring.

Material Balance

While there are some fi rm production numbers for 

aspects of the Al Fat’h missile program, such as the 

number of missile fl ight tests, estimates for the total 

number of missiles produced and the number of 

missiles delivered to the Army vary widely. Captured Iraqi documents and other material provided 

by senior Iraqi personnel provide a breakdown of 

warheads, motors, missile airframes, and missile 

acceptance inspections for the years 2000 through 

2002 (shown in Table 3). Based on these numbers, 

missile production probably was limited by Iraq’s 

ability to produce rocket motors.

• While the fi gures refl ect 95 missiles accepted by 

quality-control inspections by 2002, only 92 rocket 

motors had been produced. In addition, approximately 11 rocket motors were consumed in static 

testing for propulsion system development.
26

Figure 14. X-ray of Al Fat’h 

submunitions warhead 

aeroshell.

Figure 15. Design drawing of the Al Fat’h submunition warhead.

Figure 16. Submunition warhead safe, arm, fuze,

and fi re system located at the base of the warhead.
27

Delivery Systems

Figure 17. Al Fat’h missile 

with submunition warhead.

• The use of inert warheads in the early test fl ights 

may account for the relatively low number of warheads (79) produced from 2000 to 2002. Following 

OIF, several inert Al Fat’h missiles were found, 

probably used for troop training.

If true, Iraq produced about 80 combat-ready missiles 

by the end of 2002. Thirty-three or 34 missiles were 

consumed in test fl ights, leaving about 45-50 missiles available. During the fi rst months of 2003, more 

missiles probably were produced, probably no more 

than one per week. ISG judges that between fi ve and 

eight Al Fat’h missiles could have been produced in 

2003, given the typical time associated with propellant curing and missile assembly, coupled with the 

interruption in production as Iraq dispersed material 

in anticipation of or in response to Coalition attack. 

Taking these assumptions together, ISG estimates Iraq 

had between 50 and 60 Al Fat’h missiles available at 

the onset of OIF.

• These numbers generally agree with those provided 

by senior offi cials within the Iraqi missile program, 

where the number of Al Fat’h missiles provided to 

the Army varies from as low as 30 to as high as 60. 

Of these, perhaps fi ve to eight were equipped with 

submunition warheads. 

• During the war, Iraq fi red between 12 and 16 Al 

Fat’h missiles. In addition, informal assessments 

of Al Fat’hs destroyed or damaged during the war 

vary from four to 13. To date, Coalition forces have 

collected at least 10 Al Fat’hs.

• Given the above numbers, the number of Al Fat’h 

missiles unaccounted for could vary from 0 to 34 

(see Table 4). However, ammunition and weapon 

systems are being collected and destroyed all over 

Iraq, and a number of Al Fat’hs have been misidentifi ed as FROG-7 or ASTROS battlefi eld rockets. 

A full accounting of Al Fat’h missiles may not be 

possible. 
28

Table 3

Component 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total

Warheads 0 18 61 79

Motors 7 28 57 92

Airframes 13 31 66 110

Missile Accepted in 

QC Inspections

0 24 71 33 ? 95

Table 4

Worst

Case

Average Best

Case

Missiles Available to Army 60 45 30

Missiles fi red 12 14 16

Missiles damaged/destroyed 4 8 13

Missiles Captured 10 10 10

Unaccounted for 34 13 0

Conclusions

The Al Fat’h was produced with materials allowed 

under UNSC resolutions, although a number of the 

ingredients in the Al Fat’h solid-propellant were subject to monitoring and verifi cation under Annex IV of 

the Plan approved by UNSCR 715 (for a breakdown 

of specifi c propellant components listed in Annex 

IV, see the Delivery Systems Annex). Iraq attempted 

to acquire a number of these materials without the 

knowledge of the UN, and these efforts are noted in 

the Delivery Systems Procurement section. 

The range capability of the Al Fat’h exceeded the 

150-km limit imposed by the UN. A senior Iraqi 

offi cial insisted the missile was designed to have 

a maximum range of 145 km with a 260-320 kg 

warhead, but, during fl ight tests between 2000 and 

2002, the Al Fat’h fl ew beyond 150 km on at least 

eight occasions. The senior Iraqi offi cial attributed the 

fl ights with ranges greater than 150 km to inaccuracies in the rocket motor insulation, resulting in greater 

than expected propellant mass. 

• While Al Samud II tests with ranges in excess 

of 150 km were a factor in the UN’s decision to 

require that missile’s destruction, no decision by the 

UN had been made on the Al Fat’h prior to OIF. 

• At least six missiles fi red during OIF would have 

exceeded the 150 km range if not intercepted. The 

longest test fl ight declared by Iraq was 161 km, 

while the longest combat range probably would 

have exceeded this range.

Al ‘Ubur Missile Program 

Background

The Al ‘Ubur program probably began between 1999 

and 2000 after UNSCOM departed and increased 

funding was available. The basic concept was to 

produce a SAM system, possibly modeled on the 

advanced Russian S-300 SAM. While Iraqi personnel 

reportedly gained access to the S-300, such a program 

was likely beyond Iraq’s capabilities and the whole 

concept assumed an environment where there was no 

adherence to sanctions. According to one senior Iraqi, 
29

Delivery Systems

The Al ‘Ubur SAM is subject to a number of diverse 

spellings in its conversion from Arabic to English. 

While Al ‘Ubur is used here, the system can be found 

referred to as Al Ibur, Al Ubour, Al Aboor, and a 

number of other variations. 

the program involved not only the missile, but also 

radar, launcher, and ground support equipment. This 

initiative is evidence of Iraq’s belief that it would be 

able to import the required materials almost at will. 

Brigadier General Mahmud Tahir from the Al Rashid 

General Company headed the overall development effort. Other program offi cials from Al Rashid 

included ‘Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia’ Al Ta’i (DG of 

Al Rashid) and Brigadier Engineer Mar’uf Mahmud 

Salim Al Jalabi (DG of Al Fat’h General Company). 

The Al Fat’h General Company was responsible 

for the solid rocket motor and the airframe designs, 

including the warhead, fuze, structure, aerodynamics, 

as well as the G&C system. The Al Milad General 

Company was responsible for the development of the 

radar. The Al Fida’ General Company was responsible 

for the launcher. 

While some Iraqi offi cials have stated the Al ‘Ubur 

program was intended to produce a SAM, the potential for use as a SSM has been acknowledged by 

senior Iraqi missile offi cials.

• Based on the proven Al Fat’h solid-propellant 

motor, the Al ‘Ubur would have used a solid-rocket 

motor with the same diameter, but one meter longer 

than the Al Fat’h. While the Al ‘Ubur motor would 

have had a different thrust profi le optimized for use 

as a SAM, the Al ‘Ubur most likely would have 

exceeded the 150-km limitation of UNSCR 687 if 

used as an SSM, according to a few offi cials in the 

Iraqi missile program.

• Because the Al ‘Ubur and Al Fat’h solid-rocket 

motors would use the same propellant mixture, 

creation of an Al ‘Ubur motor optimized for an 

SSM role would have only required the creation of 

a different mandrel to optimize the thrust profi le.

• Flight-testing of an Al ‘Ubur SAM would have provided relevant performance data if the missile was 

to be used in an SSM role. 

Based on reporting disclosures about the development of the Al ‘Ubur, ISG judges that, Iraq most 

likely intended to modify the Al ‘Ubur motor, once 

developed, for use in an SSM mode. Based on its 

previous success in converting the SA-2/Volga into 

an SSM, Iraq possessed the techniques required to 

undertake such a project. 

Propulsion

The Al ‘Ubur solid rocket motor was the major 

system component furthest along in development by 

the time of OIF. The Al ‘Ubur motor was effectively 

an Al Fat’h motor with its length extended from 3.5 

to 4.5 m. It had the same 500-mm diameter, propellant formulation, and steel case material. The Al 

‘Ubur had a different wagon wheel grain design to 

provide a different thrust profi le and a different nozzle 

optimized for a SAM, compared to the 3-point star 

confi guration in the Al Fat’h, according to a senior 

program offi cial.

• The Al ‘Ubur thrust profi le failed to meet the calculated thrust, but the motor was considered more 

“stable” than the Al Fat’h motor, according to the 

same offi cial.

Guidance and Control

Given the ever-decreasing effectiveness of sanctions, Iraq was able to consider bolder steps in 

areas where it still had technical diffi culties. If the 

sanctions regime remained strictly enforced, there 

would have been little or no effort by Iraq to address 

these shortfalls. The Al ‘Ubur design called for a 

strap down INS that would be provided by a Russian 

company and an integrated radar seeker for terminal 

guidance, but the entire G&C system was never prototyped. The Soviet R-40 (AKRID/AA-6) AAM was 

used for simulation and parts.

• The Al ‘Ubur SAM system would have been an 

extremely complex system with an integrated radar 

seeker, phased array radar, and controlled via communication uplinks and downlinks embedded into 

the radar waveforms. The communication links 

and the radar were to be designed by the Al Milad 

General Company.
30

According to an offi cial within the Iraqi missile program, an unnamed Russian company was to provide 

eight Fiber-Optic Gyroscope (FOG) INS systems; 

four would go to Al Karamah and four to Al Milad. 

Four ring laser gyroscope (RLG) INS systems were 

also to be provided and equally divided between Al 

Karamah and Al Milad. Al Karamah received up to 

seven FOG systems by the second-half of 2002.

ISG judges that this information may be in error 

because use of a full INS on a SAM is not required. 

It is more likely that this information is associated 

with Al Fat’h or Al Samud II as specifi ed by another 

source.

Warhead

The Al ‘Ubur SAM was designed to carry a fragmentation warhead weighing 176 to 180 kg.

Testing

Al ‘Ubur motor testing began using an intermediate subscale motor contained in an Ababil-50 motor 

case. These tests had mixed test results, using various propellant grain designs. Full-scale motor testing 

probably began in 2002, but reports vary on the actual 

start date.

• One senior offi cial reported that a successful fullscale test was conducted on 12 January 2002.

• Another offi cial reported that full-scale testing was 

conducted from approximately June to November 

2002.

Following the successful static tests, Iraqi offi -

cials discussed using the Al ‘Ubur in an SSM role, 

although no formal actions were taken. Range calculations produced a variety of results.

• One calculated range is given as 220 km and a 

second gives a range of 206 km, according to two 

offi cials involved in the Al ‘Ubur program. Details 

of the missile confi gurations used in these calculations are unknown.

• There were no fl ight tests of the Al ‘Ubur, and 

activity on the program ceased with the beginning 

of OIF.

Conclusions

The manufacture of a modern phased array-based 

SAM system would have been a daunting challenge for Iraq, even with access to Russian technical 

specifi cations. Exploitation of captured documents, 

however, indicates development of the SAM elements 

of the Al ‘Ubur program by the end of 2002.

The potential use of the Al ‘Ubur SAM as a longrange ballistic missile is clear, and high-level offi -

cials in the program indicated they had considered 

using the Al ‘Ubur as an SSM. The similarities in 

the proposed rocket motor and INS indicate an Al 

‘Ubur SSM could be developed quickly, but such 

development could be detected during the inspection 

process. Further, given the longer motor and potential for lighter materials, an Al ‘Ubur SSM would 

certainly have exceeded the 150-km limit imposed 

by the UN. ISG judges that elements of the Al ‘Ubur 

SAM program were well beyond Iraq’s manufacturing capabilities. 

Other Composite Solid-Propellant Systems 

By the late 1990s, Iraq had a number of rocket systems that had reached the end or exceeded their shelf 

life and needed refurbishment, including the FROG-7 

(LUNA), Ababil-50, and some SAMs. Iraq was not 

able to acquire replacement systems from abroad or 

get help for the refurbishment effort; it had to rely 

on domestic capabilities. 

In 2000-2001, Iraq began a “re-motor” project to 

extend the shelf life of its FROG-7 (LUNA) and 

Ababil-50 battlefi eld artillery rockets by replacing 

their aging double-base solid rocket motors with 

more energetic composite solid-propellant motors. 

Renamed Al Ra’ad and Al Nida’, respectively, these 

efforts helped advance the composite solid infrastructure in Iraq. It is unclear if these projects were 

completed by the time of OIF.

• Composite propellants offer higher energy than 

double-base propellants, so the re-motor effort 

renewed the shelf life and improved performance of 

the rockets. 
31

Delivery Systems

Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 687 restricted Iraq’s delivery systems to 

ranges not in excess of 150 km. Further, UN sanctions 

and rigorous UNSCOM inspections were a serious 

constraint to Iraq’s missile research and development 

programs. Though unable to overtly develop longrange missile projects, compelling evidence suggests that Iraq, in order to reach targets like Tel Aviv 

and Tehran, never abandoned its interest in delivery 

systems with ranges well beyond 150 km. Husayn 

Kamil’s fl ight to Jordan effectively ended all work on 

long-range missiles until the efforts were reconstituted after 1998.

• A senior Iraqi missile engineer stated that the 

subject of long-range missiles (i.e., missiles with 

ranges greater than the 150 km) was not raised 

again until 1997/98 at a monthly ballistic missile meeting chaired by Huwaysh at MIC. At the 

meeting, Huwaysh reportedly stated his desire for a 

1,000-km missile.

• According to Kamal Mustafa “Abdallah Sultan Al 

Nasiri, the former Secretary General of the Republican Guard, Huwaysh in the summer of 1999 gave 

a speech to the Republican Guard and SRG audience in which he stated that Iraq was developing 

a missile with a range of 500 km and that it would 

take fi ve years to develop.

• At a June 2000 meeting, Saddam ordered Huwaysh 

to develop a missile with a range greater than the 

range of the Samud II, according to a senior offi cial 

within the Iraqi missile program.

Clustering SA-2/Volga Engines Designs 

 ISG has retrieved copies of Iraqi design drawings 

for two long-range missiles, one based on a cluster 

of two SA-2/Volga engines and the other based on a 

fi ve-engine cluster. Although dated 23 August 2000, 

the drawings are not signed and therefore the name 

of the draftsman or designer is unknown. Despite 

extensive research, ISG has not determined a single, 

clear explanation of the events leading up to and 

since the date of these drawings, but Iraqi interest in 

Historical Projects

Iraq has a history of studies, research, development, and production of various long-range ballistic 

missiles. Much of this work found its way into more 

recent studies. 

Al ‘Abid (1989)

By 1989, Iraq had designed, manufactured and 

tested the fi rst stage of a three-stage space launch 

vehicle. The fi rst stage was a cluster of fi ve Scudvariant missiles. Although the vehicle failed after 45 

seconds, it proved a successful technology demonstrator for generic clustered designs. 

• The test achieved multiengine ignition, thrust 

build-up, release, and controlled ascent during part 

of the fi rst stage trajectory. At about Mach 1, the 

aerodynamic stresses overcame the control authority and the missile inter-stage collapsed, according 

to an interview with a senior missile offi cial and 

an UNSCOM report. According to senior Iraqi 

offi cials, Iraq continued studying clustered Scud 

engines for a year after the Al ‘Abid failure, ceasing in 1991. 

Multistage Launch Vehicle Simulations (1990-95)

In 1991-92, Iraq conducted fl ight simulations of a 

three-stage missile incorporating Scud-type missiles, 

according to material obtained by the UN. According 

to an Iraqi offi cial, this was a theoretical study that 

included trajectory calculations for several clustered 

SA-2 engine confi gurations. The confi guration was 

different from that of earlier work conducted on Al 

‘Abid.

In 1993, Iraqi engineers were ordered to design 

a turbopump capable of simultaneously feeding a cluster of four SA-2 engines. Although no 

turbopumps or engine clusters were produced, the 

concepts were well understood.

At the end of 1994 through early 1995, Iraq performed studies for multi-stage launch vehicles using 

performance parameters derived from clustered 

SA-2 engines. The confi gurations studied would have 

exceeded 150 km.
32

designs containing clustered engines can be traced 

back at least as far as 1989. See Figure 18 for design 

drawings.

• One design uses a two-engine cluster mounted in a 

fl ared engine bay that supports a 760-mm-diameter 

airframe. Iraqi experts have assessed the range of 

this version to be at least 500 km. The propellant 

tanks, pressurization system, G&C, and warhead of 

this concept would be common with the 760-mm Al 

Samud II ballistic missile. 

• The second design uses a fi ve-engine cluster 

mounted in a fl ared engine bay that supports a 

1,250-mm-diameter airframe. Iraqi missile experts 

assessed this design would reach a range of at 950-

1,000 km.

Various sources have provided ISG with differing 

timelines of events for the clustered engine project 

pursued by Al Karamah, but most sources suggest 

the order to develop long-range missiles came in 

2001. The chronology of events that led to the creation of these designs is unclear. 

• According to an engineer within the Iraqi missile 

program, Huwaysh ordered work to start on an initial design of a long-range missile on 15 November 

2000 following the fi rst successful fl ight test of a 

modifi ed 500 mm Al Samud. The engineer added

that this work was completed in April 2001.

• The same source later stated that Huwaysh ordered 

the design work to begin in August 2001 and 

requested detailed design to commence the following month.

• According to another senior missile offi cial, 

Huwaysh instructed Al Karamah in July 2001 to 

start work on long-range missiles. 

• Huwaysh insisted that, at a meeting with Saddam 

at the beginning of 2002, Saddam ordered him to 

create a missile with 750-km range and that it was 

expected to be ready in six months.

Though the dates on the actual design drawings 

obtained by ISG suggest they were created in August 

2000, other information suggests that modifi cations 

were made throughout 2001. Source reports provide 

confl icting accounts as to when they were actually 

completed.

• Designs for the two-engine and fi ve-engine missiles 

were delivered to Huwaysh in December 2001 or 

January 2002, and all work on these was completed 

in January 2002. 

• A high-ranking MIC offi cial reported that these 

designs were completed in March 2003.

• In July 2002, Huwaysh ordered that all documents 

pertaining to the long-range missiles be returned to 

him. He said that Muzhir brought him two boxes 

of documents in December of that year. However, 

other documentation not forwarded to Huwaysh had 

been recovered by ISG. 

• Huwaysh ordered all the documents on the longrange missile project be destroyed at the onset of 

OIF, according to several high-level offi cials in the 

Iraqi missile program.

The evidence collected by ISG suggests Iraq had 

not completed the designs by the time UNMOVIC 

entered Iraq, although sources vary on the timing 

of the design work. Many sources refer to the project as being highly secretive with information being 

passed only in person at face-to-face meetings among 

a select few individuals, which may account for discrepancies in dates provided by individuals without 

direct access. Figure 19 depicts the timeline of missile 

developments. 

ISG’s confi rmation that Iraq was working on 

designs for long-range clustered-engine missiles, 

although this work never progressed beyond the 

design phase, is evidence that the Regime was 

covertly researching the development of missiles 

with ranges in excess of 150 km. Further, Iraq took 

advantage of existing Al Samud II designs and had 

begun to develop the infrastructure that could have 

led to rapid development of these concepts.

• The use of a 760-mm-diameter airframe could 

allow the use of Samud II jigs and fi xtures to support the two-engine cluster design. ISG judges that 

it could provide a good concealment mechanism 

for work on prohibited programs.
33

Delivery Systems

Figure 18. Design drawings for two-and

fi ve-engine cluster missile.
34

Figure 19. Liquid-propellant long-range missile 

chronology.
35

Delivery Systems

• The new test stand at Al Rafah was much larger 

than the preexisting engine test stand and could 

have been modifi ed for testing clustered SA-2 

engines. According to one Iraqi engineer, work on 

the new stand began by August 2001, suggesting 

that the requirement for the facility must have been 

drawn up much earlier. 

• Statements by various sources indicate that, before 

OIF, Iraq had over 200 SA-2 engines that had been 

scavenged from damaged missiles. Adding to this, 

at least 380 engines imported from Poland and 

possibly Russia or Belarus were more engines than 

probably required to immediately support the Al 

Samud II program. Some of these engines could 

have been available for use if Iraq had moved 

forward with a clustered-engine development program.

SA-2 Conversions to Surface-to-Surface Missiles 

Numerous sources involved in Iraq’s missile program have admitted to ISG that from 1997 until 

2003 Iraq had several undeclared programs to 

convert SA-2 SAMs into SSMs with maximum 

ranges from 250 km to 500 km. Though ISG has not 

been able to confi rm these claims, source interviews 

indicate that Iraq pursued at least four projects.

• According to a missile program offi cial, in approximately 1997 (while UNSCOM were monitoring 

in-country), Iraq initiated an effort to convert the 

SA-2 into an SSM with a range of at least 300 km. 

Iraq conducted two tests in late-1997 or early-1998 

along depressed trajectories so that they would not 

exceed 150 km. Iraqi offi cials assessed, however, 

that the missiles were capable of reaching 300 

km but with poor accuracy. Work on this program ceased and the only retained documentation 

consisted of range calculations for the missile at 

various launch angles. ISG has yet to recover these 

calculations.

• Three missile offi cials from Al Kindi disclosed 

information about the Sa’d project, which began in 

2000, to convert the SA-2 into an SSM with a theoretical range of 250 km. A MIC committee decided 

to withhold this information from the UN because 

the project had not yet reached the prototype stage, 

and all documentation was removed from Al Kindi 

prior to the return of UN inspectors in 2002. 

• The missile program offi cial also knew of another 

project initiated in 2001 or 2002 after a study by 

‘Ali ‘Abd-al-Husayn who was later transferred to 

work at the NMD. The source had no other information about this project. 

• The fi nal project was initiated either immediately 

before or during OIF, according to an Iraqi scientist. This was a ‘crash’ project under the control of 

Al Milad General Company and discussed at MIC 

during a meeting on 15 March 2003. The project 

converted two SA-2s into SSMs, but Iraq was 

unable to fl ight test them due to the speed of the 

prosecution of the war, according to a senior offi cial 

within the Iraqi missile program.

In all cases, from the evidence collected to date, 

Iraq had not undertaken the wholesale conversion 

of SA-2 missiles to SSMs, and ISG has uncovered 

no evidence that payloads designed for these missiles would be anything other than the original HE 

warheads.

Large-Diameter Solid-Propellant Missile Project 

In 2000 or 2001, Iraq began development efforts 

toward a long-range, solid-propellant ballistic 

missile that would, when fully developed, greatly 

exceed the 150-km-range limit imposed by UNSCR 

687. Further, the program appears to have been 

highly compartmented and virtually undocumented. 

Destruction of infrastructure previously associated 

with prohibited programs in accordance with UNSCR 

687 effectively limited Iraq’s pursuits to research and 

development efforts.

Program Development 

Iraqi desire for a long range, solid-propellant ballistic missile system in 2000-2001 can be traced to 

the BADR-2000 program from the mid-1980s. This 

program would have produced a two-stage, 750-kmrange ballistic missile system using a 0.8-meter-diameter solid-propellant motor as the fi rst stage. 
36

Reports vary, but, beginning in 2000-2001, and 

maybe even earlier, Iraq again decided to pursue a 

long-range solid-propellant missile. 

• Starting perhaps as early as 1998 or in 2000-2001, 

Huwaysh ordered the design of a long-range solidpropellant ballistic missile according to several 

senior missile offi cials. 

• According to Huwaysh, in early 2002, Saddam 

ordered the construction of a missile with a minimum range of 650 km. Huwaysh then directed Dr. 

Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ Khamis Al Tamimi and ‘Abdal-Baqi Rashid Shia’ Al Ta’i to conduct feasibility 

studies of such a missile, one as a liquid and one as 

a solid.

Although it is unclear when the program started 

or what the range requirements were, Huwaysh in 

2000 or 2001 formed a small, select Large Diameter 

Missile (LDM) committee and reportedly tasked the 

committee with developing a 400-km-range solidpropellant ballistic missile, according to senior Iraqi 

missile offi cials. 

• One senior Iraqi offi cial reports the committee 

consisted of Huwaysh, ‘Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia’ 

Al Ta’i (DG of the Al Rashid General Company), 

Mar’uf Mahmud Salim Al Jalabi (DG of the Al 

Fat’h General Company), Muzahim (probably 

Staff Lt Gen Muzahim Sa’b Hasan Muhammad Al 

Nasiri, Senior Deputy to the MIC Director), and 

Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ Al Tamimi (DG of the Al Karamah General Company).

• There are confl icting numbers for the required 

range of this missile. Various high-ranking former 

Iraqi offi cials have offered range requirements of 

400 km, 500 km, at least 650 km, 400 to 1,000 km, 

500 to 1,000 km, 1,000 km, or 1,000 to 1,200 km. 

Further, a payload of 500 to 1,000 kg was mandated, depending on the source of the reporting.

By the late 1990s, Iraq’s composite, solid-propellant 

ballistic missile capabilities were centered in the Al 

Rashid General Company and the Al Fat’h General 

Company, but only Al Rashid pursued development of 

the long-range missile. According to a senior missile 

offi cial from Al Rashid, Huwaysh ordered the development of a solid-propellant missile with a range of at 

least 600 km carrying a payload of 500 to 1,000 kg. 

• According to senior Iraqi offi cials, there were no 

written records of the development effort, and all 

affected computer hard-drives were reformatted 

prior to the return of UN inspectors in 2002. 

• While it appears that only one long-range solid-propellant development effort was pursued, the compartmented nature of the program led some Iraqi 

offi cials to believe there may have been multiple 

efforts. 

• The solid-propellant development effort undertaken 

by the Al Rashid General Company was augmented 

with personnel from the Al Fat’h General Company 

and other MIC entities including Hashem ‘Abd Al 

Muhammad of Al Amin factory, Brigadier ‘Abdal-Hamid of Al Karamah (warheads), Al Jalabi of 

Al Fat’h (propellant), and Brigadier Hashim of Al 

Fida’ General Company (launcher). 

• A senior Iraqi offi cial stated the Al Rashid-based 

design effort consisted of ‘Abd-al-Baqi, Dr. Sa’d 

Tami Hamidi Al ‘Anbaki (Chief of the Engineering 

Department), Sadday Ibrahim (Engineer), Dr. Sa’d 

Mahmud Ahmad (Propellant Chemist), and Sa’d 

Muhammad (senior Al Rashid offi cial). According 

to this source, Al Rashid was pursuing a 600-kmrange missile. 

The Al Rashid effort went forward in 2001. The initial 

concept based on a cluster of three Al Fat’h motors 

was rejected because of modeling limitations. The 

selected design consisted of a 0.8- or 1.0-meter-diameter motor that may have been based on the BADR2000 design.

• The design reportedly would involve a missile 6 to 

7 meters long with an accuracy of 2% of the range 

fl own for a spin-stabilized version and 3 to 5% for 

an unguided version.

• The solid rocket motor would have had a propellant 

mass of 4,000 to 5,500 kg as compared with an Al 

Fat’h motor propellant mass of 828 kg. 
37

Delivery Systems

Al Rashid moved forward with rocket motor development efforts. Iraq attempted to use a barrel section from the Supergun project to create a prototype 

1.0-meter-diameter motor case, but the effort failed 

because of material incompatibilities when Iraqi 

technicians were unable to weld the Supergun section 

to the motor end domes. 

• All associated materials were either destroyed prior 

to the arrival of UNMOVIC in 2002 or reused as 

motor casting chambers. 

• Most of the reporting on this development effort 

does not specify the type of warhead envisioned, 

with two exceptions. One senior Iraqi specifi cally 

stated the missile was developed for a chemical 

payload, while another - specifi cally stated the 

warhead would be high explosive. ISG found no 

evidence to support either claim.

While Al Rashid was pursuing the long-range design, 

a senior Al Rashid offi cial apparently had doubts that 

it could be completed. Although he reportedly never 

formally stated the missile could not be developed, he 

apparently did inform Huwaysh sometime in 2001-

2002 of limitations in Iraq’s solid-propellant infrastructure, stating that a missile with a range of 650 

km would require 5.5 tons of propellant. Huwaysh 

reportedly informed Saddam Husayn.

• Although still limited, Iraq had made substantial infrastructure improvements that would have 

improved its ability to manufacture large motors. 

At least one of the 300-gallon propellant mixers 

“destroyed” by UNSCOM was repaired; Iraq 

tried, unsuccessfully by the time of the return of 

the UNMOVIC inspectors, to repair the second. 

In addition, casting pits, annealing furnaces, and 

test stands needed for development of long-range 

solid-propellant missiles were repaired, modifi ed, 

or created.

• Had the effort continued, a long-range solid-propellant missile could have been produced within 

5 years, according to one senior Iraqi missile 

developer.

• According to an engineer in the Iraqi missile 

program, in early 2001 per directive of Huwaysh, a 

study was undertaken by the Al Fida’ General Company to design a solid-propellant missile launcher 

for a missile with a range of 500 km. Work on 

this project ceased upon the arrival of UNMOVIC 

inspectors. Documentation of this project was 

destroyed with the exception of engineering designs 

for the launcher shown in Figure 20. 

New Cruise Missile Projects 

After UNSCOM inspectors left in 1998, Iraq continued with one cruise missile project and began 

another. Both of these modifi cations were to the HY2 anti-ship cruise missile. The fi rst project, which 

was declared by Iraq in its July 1996 Full, Final, and 

Complete Disclosure (FFCD) as the Al Faw 150/200, 

was an attempt to extend the range of the HY-2 from 

about 100 km to 150 km. An attempt to build a 1,000-

km range, turbojet-powered cruise missile was a more 

ambitious second project known as Jinin that began in 

late 2001.

HY-2 Range Extension 

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, the 

Minister of Military Industrialization, created the 

Special Projects Offi ce (SPO)—directly subordinate 

to himself and with direct links to the President’s 

Offi ce—because he wanted a few key projects to 

receive high-level attention and fi nancial support. One 

such secret project (between MIC, the Iraqi Navy, and 

the Al Karamah General Company) sought to extend 

the range of the HY-2 cruise missile to 150 km using 

cannibalized components from their inventory of 

surplus C601 and C611 anti-ship cruise missiles and 

changes to the propulsion system. 

• According to an Iraqi scientist, the fi rst test was 

conducted in August 1999 at a location in Basrah. 

Though this land attack cruise missile (LACM) 

test was declared by Iraq to the UN in the Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration 

(CAFCD), Iraq did not disclose that this was part of 

a range extension project.
38

Figure 20. Designs for long-range 

solid-propellant missile launcher.
39

Delivery Systems

Propulsion System 

According to source reports, Al Karamah experimented with different engines and propellant modifi -

cations to increase the HY-2 range. A different engine 

(C-611) using higher-energy propellants would be 

required to reach the range goal for the project.

• Confl icting reports from engineers involved in the 

program indicate Iraq used engines from the P-15, 

C601, and C611 as replacements for the HY-2 

engine, and that each attempt was successful.

• According to several missile offi cials, Al Karamah 

changed the fuel used in the HY-2 from TG-02 to 

higher-energy AZ-11 (a blend of 89% DETA and 

11% UDMH). The change required adjustments to 

the engine fuel pumps to optimize the fuel/oxidizer 

mixture ratios. 

• A fl ight test of the modifi ed HY-2 achieved a range 

of 168 km, according to Huwaysh. After that, Al 

Karamah made engine and tank adjustments to keep 

the range below 150 km to avoid the attention of 

the UN. 

• ISG judges it unlikely that all three engine 

replacements were successful. Changing the fuel 

and readjusting all of the engines mentioned 

would probably not result in a range extension to 

168 km. A range extension to 150 km is more likely 

achievable by using the C-611 engine with AZ-11 

fuel.

Warhead 

Several sources have indicated the intended warhead 

for the extended-range HY-2 was a HE warhead 

consisting of 500 kg of TNT. ISG has uncovered 

no information to suggest this cruise missile would 

carry a submunition or CBW warhead.

Guidance and Control 

Iraq’s extended-range HY-2 program would depend 

upon the acquisition of navigation and guidance 

systems that were more sophisticated than the original or readily available components; acquisition of 

such systems were forbidden by UN sanctions. Iraq 

began making plans to acquire such systems, but 

this was not a priority for the program.

• An engineer in the program indicated that modifi cation and testing of the propulsion system were the 

fi rst priorities, and navigation and guidance would 

be addressed nearer the end of the program development cycle.

• In the event Iraq could not scavenge or adapt guidance systems from other missiles like the C-611, it 

planned to acquire them from outside sources.

Conclusions

Reporting from several sources consistently indicates that the extended range HY-2 successfully fl ew 

to at least 150 km, and possibly 168 km. Although 

the goal of the program was to provide a greater 

stand-off capability against ships and to make up for 

the loss of an air-launched cruise missile capability, 

the research directly contributed to the longer range 

Jinin project.

• If the extended-range HY-2 program did not exceed 

150 km during fl ight tests it likely would not have 

constituted a violation of UN resolutions.

• Huwaysh commented that Iraq targeted Kuwait 

with its deployed extended-range HY-2 missiles 

during OIF.

The Jinin [Jenin] Project 

In 2001 and 2002, Iraq attempted to convert the HY-2 

anti-ship cruise missile into a 1,000-km-range landattack cruise missile (LACM), which would build 

on the HY-2 range extension project that had already 

introduced upgrades—performed by the Al Karamah 

General Company —to the fl ight computers, engines, 

and propellants. A missile with this range would be 

able to reach targets in Iran and Israel from within 

Iraq’s borders. The Jinin project was interrupted by 

OIF before any fl ight tests occurred. 

• According to an engineer in the Iraqi missile program, the Jinin project was conceived in November 

2001 and received MIC approval in June 2002. In 

this time frame a host of other long-range projects 

involving ballistic missile systems were receiving 
40

increased attention. The project offi cially started on 

1 June 2002 and was intended to be a three-to-fi veyear development project, but it was reportedly canceled in December 2002 after UNMOVIC entered 

Iraq. However, the original airframes and rocket 

engines were reassembled and returned to storage 

about two weeks after UNMOVIC’s arrival for fear 

of the project being discovered. 

• The Al Karamah General Company was assigned 

overall project responsibility with the DG of Al 

Karamah (Dr. Muzhir), ultimately responsible for 

the project. However, Brigadier General Nadhim 

from Al Karamah was considered to be the project 

manager and systems engineer.

The initial concept involved modifying an HY-2 by 

replacing the sustainer propulsion system with a 

modifi ed helicopter turboshaft engine to sustain 

cruise fl ight, which would eliminate the oxidizer 

tanks and enable a much longer range. The program fell into four distinct phases, according a senior 

program manager, who felt a fl ight test could be 

conducted in three years. 

• Phase one would use computer simulations to 

test concepts for maintaining structural integrity 

and stability during engine integration and would 

attempt to convert surplus helicopter turboshaft 

engines to produce thrust rather than torque.

• Phase two would test and install the engines.

• Phase three would build and fl ight test a prototype.

• Phase four would work on guidance, navigation, 

and control. 

The Jinin program involved several research, development, and production organizations: Al Quds for airframes and warheads, Al Milad for G&C systems and 

aerodynamics, Al Fida’ for the launcher, Ibn-Firnas 

and Iraqi army helicopter workshops for the engine 

modifi cations, and Al Karamah for fi nal assembly. 

Propulsion System 

Iraq planned to convert the HY-2 from rocket-powered to turbojet-powered using surplus helicopter 

engines. Initially, Iraq planned to use Mi-8 “TV-2” 

helicopter turbines modifi ed to produce thrust rather 

than torque.

• Propulsion engineers at Ibn-Firnas estimated 

that the Jinin would require 2,670-Newtons (600 

pounds) of thrust, but the TV-2 engine testbed 

(captured by ISG) was capable of producing only 

2,000-Newtons (450 pounds) of thrust. As a result, 

Ibn-Firnas began studying the conversion of the Mi17 “TV-3” helicopter engine. 

• UNMOVIC inspections commenced before TV-3 

testbed demonstrations could be completed, and 

the testbed was shut down to prevent inadvertent 

observation by inspectors. 

• Both of these engines could fi t into the HY-2 airframe without extensive modifi cations, thus avoiding new aerodynamic problems caused by structural 

changes. The engine air intake would be located on 

the bottom of the missile about midway along the 

body.

Reportedly, Ibn-Firnas engineers believed the modifi cation from turboshaft to turbojet would be diffi cult 

because the stators (vanes) could not be removed 

since they were integral to the engine’s ball bearing 

assembly. They believed that, although the modifi cations would be challenging, they could solve the problems with enough time and money. However, reports 

vary as to the success and extent of the overall engine 

modifi cation program, and to the status of the design 

documentation. 

• According to a source with excellent access, engineers only reached the modeling phase of development with no tests of an operating engine for Jinin. 

Additionally, all of the engine modeling work, 

drawings, and related documents were destroyed at 

Ibn-Firnas by fi re and looting after OIF. 

• An engineer with direct access indicated that 

the design work was intentionally destroyed in 

February 2003 due to fear of UNMOVIC’s possible discovery of the project. The source believed 

it could be regenerated within a couple of weeks 

if UNMOVIC left and the leadership demanded 

the project continue. This concept is supported by 

reports of Saddam’s goal for a program reconstitution capability of less than six months. 
41

Delivery Systems

• An engineer in the Iraqi missile program stated 

that a modifi ed Mi-8 engine test succeeded, but 

with lower than expected thrust levels. These lower 

thrust levels were attributed to the poor condition 

of the older engine. Iraq expected that using newer 

Mi-17 engines would alleviate the thrust problem, 

but that work was interrupted by the arrival of 

UNMOVIC before testing could begin. 

• The same source indicated that the modifi ed Mi-8 

engine was moved to Ibn-Firnas for storage. An Mi8 turboshaft was recovered from the engine static 

test stand at Ibn-Firnas by US offi cials in late June 

2003. Multiple sources involved in the program 

indicate the engine was used in the Jinin program. 

A small diffuser, found in the Ibn-Firnas junk yard 

and identifi ed by the same source to be from the 

Mi-8 engine in coalition possession, was mated 

successfully with the engine exhaust port, adding 

some credibility to the source’s claim.

Warhead 

The Jinin missile was intended to carry a HE warhead 

consisting of 500 kg of TNT. ISG has uncovered 

no information to suggest this missile would carry 

submunitions or CBW warheads.

Guidance and Control 

According to a senior program offi cial in July 2003, 

the Jinin navigational accuracy would not be an 

important factor in the fi rst phases of the project. 

The priority was simply to get a missile to fl y 1,000 

km with an HE warhead. This approach was not 

unusual for Iraq—the Al Husayn project had adopted 

the same attitude, which is why the Al Husayn was so 

inaccurate, according to the senior program offi cial. 

• The program offi cial was initially convinced that 

the guidance system for the HY-2 could be used 

for the Jinin project. He also stated that the project had not progressed to the stage of working on 

the guidance section. The project researchers fi rst 

wanted to verify the engine would work and could 

be mounted successfully on the HY-2 airframe. Had 

these steps been successful, they would have begun 

work on the guidance and other sections. 

• The HY-2’s existing guidance system was not 

accurate enough and Iraq did not have access to any 

guidance system that would be suffi ciently accurate. The program offi cial indicated that the HY-2 

guidance system would eventually be replaced by a 

GPS acquired from abroad. As an interim solution, 

Al Milad considered using the guidance system 

from the R-40 (AA-6) missile, which uses three 

accelerometers and three gyroscopes. Clearly, Iraq 

again assumed that sanctions were not an inhibiting factor. 

• Another issue, acknowledged by the program offi -

cial, involved the control and stability of the missile 

given the internal rearrangement of the sub-system 

components necessary to accommodate the modifi ed engine (and potential additional fuel tank).

Conclusions

The Jinin project was in the early R&D phase when 

it was interrupted by the return of UN inspectors, 

and it was subsequently canceled. Although its 

inherent payload capability of 500 kg could have 

been adapted for WMD, there is no evidence of 

intent for WMD delivery. If the project had continued, it most likely would have violated UN resolutions.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely 

Piloted Vehicles (RPVs)

ISG has uncovered only limited information indicating an overall program intent for unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) to deliver chemical or biological 

warfare agents. In addition, ISG has noted that Iraq 

appears to have embarked on a number of loosely 

related UAV efforts since 1990. These efforts can be 

grouped into two major categories: efforts to convert manned aircraft into remotely piloted vehicles 

(RPVs), and efforts to design and build indigenous 

UAVs, as depicted in Figure 21. Conversion programs 

include the MiG-21 and L-29 RPVs, and indigenous 

developments include the Ibn-Firnas and Al Quds 

small UAV programs.
42

Brief History

Iraq’s UAV efforts began in the late 1980s with the 

development of small RPVs for surveillance and 

reconnaissance roles and continued in 1990 with the 

attempt to convert a MiG-21 fi ghter aircraft into an 

RPV. The Iraqis admitted to the UN that the intent for 

this program was to develop a CBW delivery platform. After the MiG-21 RPV program failed in 1991, 

Iraq started the Yamamah program to research small 

indigenous UAVs. In 1994-95, the Iraqis resumed 

efforts to convert a manned aircraft into an RPV, this 

time with the Czech L-29 trainer aircraft. 

• Reports differ on the purpose for the L-29. Some 

Iraqi offi cials report hearsay and suspicion that the 

system was being developed for CBW delivery. 

Other sources report the L-29 RPV program had 

more benign missions such as target drone and 

reconnaissance. 

• There is no defi nitive link between the L-29 and 

WMD. Ultimately, the L-29 RPV was a technical 

failure and had its funding terminated in 2001. 

In the 1999-2000 timeframe, Minister of Military 

Industrialization Huwaysh felt that small, cheap 

UAVs were better than converted manned aircraft, so 

Iraq began an indigenous reconnaissance UAV and 

target drone development program in the Ibn-Firnas 

General Company that built on the Yamamah research 

program of the early 1990s. 

• Ibn-Firnas successfully developed the Al Musayara20 UAV as a battlefi eld reconnaissance UAV, which 

was sold to the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard 

in 2002. 

• A second development program called Al Quds 

began at the instigation of former Yamamah Program Director Brigadier Engineer Dr. ‘Imad ‘Abdal-Latif Al Rida’. MIC directed that this program 

focus on larger UAVs to meet military requirements 

for airborne electronic warfare programs. The Al 

Quds program had not yet succeeded by the onset 

of OIF in 2003. 

Evidence available to ISG concerning the UAV 

programs active at the onset of OIF indicates these 

systems were intended for reconnaissance and electronic warfare. However, this evidence does not rule 

out the future possibility of adapting these UAVs for 

CBW delivery if the Iraqi Regime had made a strategic decision to do so. 

• While the Al Musayara-20 UAV and, if fully 

developed, the Al Quds UAVs had the capabilities 

required—range, payload, and programmable 

autonomous guidance—to be used as CBW delivery systems, ISG has not found evidence the Iraqis 

intended to use them for this purpose.

• ISG has obtained indirect evidence that the L-29 

RPV may have been intended for CBW delivery, 

but this program ended in 2001.

MiG-21 RPV 

Background

In November 1990, MIC and the Iraqi Air Force 

Command embarked on a program to modify the 

MiG-21 fi ghter into an RPV for use in one-way 

“suicide” missions. The operational concept was for 

the aircraft to take off under remote control, presumably by a ground station, then after reaching a certain 

altitude control would be transferred to another, 

piloted aircraft in the area. The piloted aircraft would 

then remotely fl y the MiG-21 RPV to the target area 

whereupon control would be transferred to the RPV’s 

autopilot for the terminal phase of the mission. 

• The Iraqis equipped the MiG-21 with an autopilot 

from the MiG-23 fi ghter, due to that autopilot’s 

better capability to ensure stable fl ight and to support all the necessary electrical and mechanical 

systems. The MiG-21 RPV was also fi tted with 

servo-actuators for the control surfaces, throttle, 

and brakes. The remote-control system used was 

a German system produced by the Groupner 

Company, with eight channels, and operated on a 

frequency of 27 MHz.

• At least one fl ight test was conducted on 10 January 

1991 at Al Rashid Air Base, Baghdad, but technical 

problems required the onboard pilot to take control 

of the aircraft to insure safe recovery and landing.
43

Delivery Systems

Figure 21. Iraqi UAV programs.
44

Roles and Missions

Before OIF, Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate 

(NMD) conducted an investigation into the MiG-21 

RPV program to prepare a response to UNMOVIC. 

The NMD concluded that the MiG-21 RPV program 

failed due to lack of time and expertise to develop a 

workable control system. They also concluded that 

the MiG-21 RPV had been intended for a chemical 

and/or biological weapons delivery role. 

• In the mid-1990s, Iraq declared to the United 

Nations that the MiG-21 RPV had been intended 

for a CBW role. 

• The simple onboard sprayer system tested by Iraq 

(see the Weaponization section in the BW and CW 

chapters) would have been operated by a timer 

that would be set before takeoff. This RPV was 

intended for a one-way fl ight, fl ying until its fuel 

was exhausted. 

• The program appears to have ended sometime in 

1991. The NMD reported that the absence of documentation of this fact and other program details was 

caused by bombardment of the work site (presumably during Desert Storm), which was a “shed” in 

the aircraft repair factory at Al Rashid Air Base, 

Baghdad.

L-29 RPV (Al Bay’ah) 

Background

Following the failure of the MiG-21 RPV program 

in 1991, Iraq’s Military Research and Development 

Center (MRDC) in 1995 began a program call Al 

Bay’ah to modify the Czech L-29 trainer aircraft into 

an RPV. According to a report, in 1997, MRDC’s 

Drone Directorate became the Ibn-Firnas Center and 

continued with the development of the L-29.

• Ibn-Firnas modifi ed the L-29 with a remote-control 

system using four cameras (primary and secondary forward view; primary and secondary cockpit 

view) feeding two displays at stations in a control 

van adapted from the control system of the Italian Mirach-100 UAV. Initial taxi tests of the L-29 

RPV took place at Al Rashid Airfi eld in Baghdad, 

but due to an accident (the aircraft impacted the 

runway barriers), Ibn-Firnas moved the program to 

Al Mutasim Airfi eld (also known as Samarra East 

Airfi eld). 

• The fi rst fl ight test occurred on or about 13 April 

1997 and was successful, followed by a second successful test in June 1997. These tests remained in 

the airfi eld traffi c pattern. 

• The third fl ight test was intended to test the maximum range of the video and command signals. The 

aircraft successfully fl ew 60-70 km southeast of Al 

Mutasim, but then the ground station lost the video 

signal from the aircraft and it crashed. Following 

this, Ibn-Firnas attempted to improve the aircraft’s 

controllability by installing the auto stabilizer 

system from the Chinese C-611 anti-ship cruise 

missile. This modifi cation was largely unsuccessful 

due to excessive instrument drift.

Although bombing of Al Mutasim in 1998 during 

Desert Fox delayed progress on the L-29 RPV, IbnFirnas conducted approximately 26 more fl ight tests 

between 1999 and 2001. All these tests had a pilot 

in the cockpit and focused on improving the control 

system. 

• A single source stated that in the spring of 2001, 

Ibn-Firnas attempted an unmanned fl ight that 

resulted in a crash. Following this crash, Ibn-Firnas 

recommended canceling the program. Huwaysh 

agreed and terminated funding for the program. 

• The initial program manager for the L-29 RPV 

program was Dr. Mahmud Modhaffer. Dr. Mahmud 

departed the program in 1996 and was briefl y 

replaced by Dr. ‘Imad until 1997. Dr. ‘Imad was 

subsequently replaced by MIC Deputy Director 

Muzahim Sa’b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, who, 

according to a worker on the program, had very 

little technical competence.

Roles and Missions 

Multiple sources have described different roles and 

missions for the L-29 RPV. These include acting as 

a decoy for coalition aircraft, an air defense target, 
45

Delivery Systems

reconnaissance, and potentially a CBW delivery platform. ISG has not been able to confi rm or deny that 

the L-29 had an intended CBW delivery role.

• Former offi cials of Ibn-Firnas reported that the aircraft was to be used as a decoy for coalition aircraft 

enforcing the no-fl y zones. It would lure them into 

an ambush using SAMs (colloquially referred to 

as a “SAMbush”), although this mission was never 

fl own. Ibn-Firnas personnel also reported that the 

aircraft was to be used as a target drone for the Air 

Defense Forces. 

• A management level offi cial reported that the aircraft would be used for reconnaissance and possibly 

electronic warfare. He also described the intended 

use of the aircraft in November 1997 as a “SAMbush” decoy. 

• An Iraqi aircraft engineer, with indirect access to 

the information, reported that in 1995, many Iraqi 

Air Force engineers believed the intended use of the 

L-29 RPV was to attack a US aircraft carrier with 

chemical or biological weapons. This source claims 

to have been informed by colleagues who worked 

on the L-29 RPV that the aircraft would be outfi tted 

with biological weapons to attack a US carrier in 

the Persian Gulf, but the source had no information 

on how that attack would be conducted. In addition 

to the indirect information about biological weapons, the source also speculated that the L-29 RPV 

could be armed with chemical weapons.

Huwaysh’s Accounting of the L-29 RPV Program

Huwaysh asked for a review of the L-29 RPV program shortly after taking over as MIC director in 

1997; presumably as part of a broader review of all 

MIC programs. Huwaysh said that he was briefed that 

the roles of the L-29 RPV were fi rst as a battlefi eld 

reconnaissance system and second as a lure for US 

aircraft. As a mechanical engineer, Huwaysh believed 

the program was foolish for a number of reasons.

• First, turning a manned aircraft with a 500-km 

range into an RPV with a UN-mandated maximum 

range of 150 km was an ineffi cient use of the aircraft. 

• Furthermore, at the time of the briefi ng, Ibn-Firnas 

had not been able to extend the range of the aircraft 

beyond 70 km due to line-of-sight limitations with 

the ground control station. This short range would 

limit the RPV’s utility as a reconnaissance system. 

• Finally, Huwaysh felt that there were too few L-29 

aircraft available for conversion and that they were 

too expensive to operate for the stated mission, 

believing that smaller, cheaper UAVs were a better 

option. 

Even with these concerns, Huwaysh was unable 

to immediately cancel the L-29 RPV because of 

Saddam’s personal interest in the program. However, after several crashes, combined with the Air 

Force’s refusal to provide more L-29s for conversion, 

Huwaysh convened a critical review of the program in 

late 2000 with the Ministry of Defense. At this review, 

the Ibn-Firnas DG Dr. Ibrahim Hasan Isma’il Smain 

provided a negative evaluation; following a crash in 

the spring of 2001, Huwaysh terminated funding for 

the program.

During custodial interviews, Huwaysh expressed 

skepticism of the stated mission (reconnaissance/

decoy) of the L-29 RPV. He reported that he inherited 

both the program and its program manager when he 

became MIC Director in 1997. In his engineer’s judgment, Huwaysh considered the L-29 RPV unsuited to 

the battlefi eld reconnaissance role.

• According to Huwaysh, Iraqi offi cials never tested 

reconnaissance cameras on the L-29. Further, while 

the Air Force was the most likely customer for such 

an aircraft, it was not involved in the RPV development and did not appear to be interested in the 

program.

• In November 2003, Huwaysh stated that the L-29 

was a “100 percent replacement for the MiG-21” 

RPV and was intended to fulfi ll the same mission 

as the MiG-21. When told that Iraq had declared 

the MiG-21 RPV was intended to be a CBW 

delivery platform, Huwaysh responded, “Whatever knowledge you have of the MiG-21 is directly 

related to the L-29.”
46

• Huwaysh also stated that Iraq developed the MiG21 RPV as a CBW delivery platform for use against 

Iran and that a sprayer for the aircraft had been 

developed. In his opinion, the L-29 was more suitable for CBW dissemination than the MiG-21.

• Repeated attempts (November 2003, December 

2003, and April 2004) to get Huwaysh to be more 

explicit on this point have been unsuccessful. In 

more recent interviews, Huwaysh asserted that 

he had no direct knowledge of a CBW delivery 

role for the L-29 RPP; he only suspected that that 

might be the intent because of its unsuitability for 

its stated reconnaissance mission and the publicity about the West’s suspicions about Iraq’s WMD 

programs. 

When confronted by the interviewer that the Minister 

of Military Industrialization must know such details, 

Huwaysh was adamant that, in Saddam’s Iraq, compartmentalization between organizations prevented 

full knowledge by anyone but the closest members of 

Saddam’s inner circle (“black circle,” in Huwaysh’s 

words). Huwaysh denied being a member of that 

inner circle and denied being a political or strategic 

decisionmaker. 

Conclusions

ISG cannot confi rm or deny an intended WMD 

delivery role for the L-29 RPV. The target drone mission for the L-29 RPV, as described by a former Iraqi 

Air Force offi cer who worked on the program from 

1997-2002, is consistent with Western practice for 

AAM and SAM live fi re training. Further, Huwaysh 

reported that the number-one lesson Iraq learned from 

Desert Storm was the need to signifi cantly improve 

air defenses; a target drone of this type could be used 

to test new air defense systems and to train crews. 

However, Huwaysh did not associate the L-29 RPV 

with this mission. Finally, the size, operating cost, and 

complexity of the L-29 exceed the requirements for a 

battlefi eld reconnaissance platform. 

• If the L-29 RPV mission was truly innocuous, ISG 

judges that Iraqis from the shop fl oor up to the MIC 

director would know that. Also, the small number 

of L-29s available for conversion would minimize 

its utility for missile live fi re testing and training. 

The inconsistency in reporting on intended roles for 

the L-29 RPV, from individuals who should be in a 

position to know, is troubling. Huwaysh’s CBW delivery “suspicions” may be hints of actual knowledge 

that he is unwilling or afraid to share with interviewers. This, combined with indirect reporting of a WMD 

delivery role from another source, prevents us from 

eliminating an intended WMD delivery role for the 

L-29 RPV.

• The aircraft’s payload capability and fl ight performance are suffi cient for use as either a chemical or 

biological weapons platform.

• Iraq had previously experimented with modifying 

Mirage F1 external fuel tanks into biological weapons dispensers and had used L-29 drop tanks to produce an agricultural spray system for the Hughes 

500 helicopter. 

• Iraq had the capability to develop chemical or 

biological weapon spray systems for the L-29, but 

there is no evidence of any work along these lines. 

ISG judges that, even though this program did not 

come to fruition, a foundation of knowledge and a 

technical basis was obtained from which Iraq could 

resurrect chemical or biological weapon dispensing 

system programs. 

Al Yamamah Project 

Background

In the 1990s, Iraq began research and development 

work on UAVs designed and built specifi cally as 

unmanned vehicles. The initial work was the responsibility of Iraq’s Military Research and Development 

Committee (MRDC), directed by Dr. ‘Imad from 

1993 until 1996. Between 1995 and 1997 the MRDC 

worked on the Al Yamamah UAV project, which 

formed the foundation of subsequent indigenous UAV 

development in Iraq. The Al Yamamah project consisted of three designs, the Al Yamamah 2, Al Yamamah 3, and Al Yamamah 4.

• The Al Yamamah 2 and 4 UAVs were propellerdriven with pusher piston engines.

• The Al Yamamah 3 was jet powered, using a TS-21 

turbo-starter from the Russian Su-7/FITTER aircraft.
47

Delivery Systems

Iraqi engineers realized that most UAVs were not jet 

powered because slower, propeller-driven UAVs were 

simpler to construct and control and could remain 

airborne longer. Subsequently, the Ibn-Firnas General 

Company copied the Yamamah 2 design, increased 

the size of its tail boom, and renamed it the Al 

Musayara-20 (aka RPV-20 or UAV-20). 

Ibn-Firnas UAVs 

Background

Orders by Saddam for a competition between IbnFirnas and the Iraqi Air Force to produce the fi rst 

fully autonomous UAV, combined with problems 

with the L-29 RPV, prompted Ibn-Firnas to concentrate on smaller UAVs. Saddam directed that funding 

increases slated to expand and improve the Air Force 

be transferred to building UAVs because Iraq was 

unable to acquire new fi ghter and bomber aircraft.

Ibn-Firnas, headed by Major General Ibrahim Isma’il 

Smain, had at least three UAV projects under way. 

The fi rst was a small RPV known as Sarab-1 used 

solely as an air defense artillery training target. The 

Sarab-1 had a 1-to 1 1⁄2-km range and some 60-70 

were built. The second was the Al Musayara-20, 

which was larger, powered by a 342-cubic centimeter 

(cc) motor, and used commercial GPS navigation to 

fl y a programmable fl ightpath (see Figure 22). The 

third was colloquially known as the “30-kilo airplane” 

because it was intended to have a 30-kg payload 

capacity.

• Prototypes were built and tested, but the “30-kilo” 

program experienced controllability problems and 

was not completed by the time of OIF. The “30-kilo 

airplane” may also be known as the Al Musayara30 or RPV-30 (see Figure 23).

In June 2002, an Al Musayara-20 UAV fl ew a demonstration fl ight that lasted three hours and covered 

a total distance of 500 km, although a source with 

direct access claimed the UAV remained within 15 

km of its launch point. The UAV was initially controlled by the ground control station, then switched 

to autopilot shortly after takeoff and remained on 

autopilot until recovery. 

• In addition, this successful fl ight renewed the 

military’s interest in the Al Quds UAV project, 

which was concurrently developing larger UAVs 

with greater payload capacity for other missions 

like communications and radar jamming. 

In the fall of 2002, MIC selected the Al Musayara-20 

over the Iraqi Air Force entry (called the Iraqi Hawk) 

due to its superior performance. In November 2002, 

Ibn-Firnas concluded a contract to provide 36 Al 

Musayara-20 UAVs to the Iraqi Army for battlefi eld 

reconnaissance (the Republican Guard ordered a similar number). The contract specifi ed the delivery of:

• Thirty (30) Al Musayara-20 with autonomous, programmed guidance;

• Six (6) Al Musayara-20 with remote-control capability, for training purposes only;

• Twelve (12) Yamama-11 training aircraft (probably 

targets);

• Eight (8) simulators;

• Control, navigation, and reconnaissance equipment;

• Six (6) ground control stations.

ISG has been unable to confi rm if the specifi ed 

items were delivered. 

Characteristics

Requirements for the Al Musayara-20 in the Army 

contract include “...aircraft equipped with control, 

remote control and navigation systems via GPS, and 

gyroscopic autopilot system” (i.e., automatic preprogrammed G&C using GPS and gyros). Further 

specifi cations are shown in Table 5. 

The Al Musayara-20 used a video camera for reconnaissance, but had no means of downlinking the video 

in real time. The video was recorded on board and 

could be viewed only after the aircraft was recovered. 

At one point, there was a request for Ibn-Firnas to 

develop an electronic countermeasures payload for 

this aircraft, but it lacked suffi cient payload capacity, 

according to a UAV engineer. 
48

Missions

Ibn-Firnas developed the Musayara UAV as a reconnaissance platform, according to Huwaysh, driven 

by lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war where 

many general offi cers were shot down on helicopter 

reconnaissance missions. However, other roles were 

considered. In late 2002 or early 2003, Republican 

Guard Major Anmar ‘Amil Hiza’ obtained approval 

from the Presidential Diwan to use UAVs like cruise 

missiles to attack command and control targets of 

known locations. Anmar contacted Ibn-Firnas and 

requested a fl ight test be arranged to determine if 

existing UAVs could perform this mission. Anmar’s 

requirement was for airplanes that work as cruise 

missiles, covering the distance of 120 km, carrying 20 

kg of explosives (“TNT”) and fl ying over 3 km high, 

with the accuracy of 99% after entering the coordinates of the target into the fl ight computer.

• In mid-January 2003, Ibn-Firnas performed the 

requested fl ight test at Tamuz Air Force Base southwest of Baghdad using an Al Musayara-20 UAV 

with a pre-programmed fl ightpath launched from 

the back of a truck.

• Shortly after takeoff, the UAV was switched from 

manual control to autopilot and fl ew the pre-programmed route to Muhammadi AFB, a distance of 

approximately 80 km.

• Anmar originally wanted the UAV to crash at a specifi c geographic location to prove that it could hit 

a planned target, but Ibn-Firnas engineers resisted 

this plan, insisting on recovering the UAV by parachute so it could be used again.

Reportedly, Anmar was impressed by the test and 

ordered Ibn-Firnas to build him 50 Al Musayara-20 

UAVs. Ibn-Firnas offi cials, however, were suspicious 

of Anmar’s story about using TNT and, to avoid committing to the project, advised Anmar’ they would 

need more details on the mission in order to build 

the UAVs for him. Anmar reportedly became very 

nervous at being questioned by Ibn-Firnas offi cials 

and demanded they carry out the order, but Ibn-Firnas 

refused.

• Anmar returned later to MIC with a letter from 

‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri, Saddam 

Husayn’s personal secretary, ordering Huwaysh to 

form a committee to investigate why the fi rst order 

was not carried out and who was resisting implementing it. 

• Huwaysh appointed his deputy, Muzahim Sa’b 

Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, as head of the committee, which determined that Ibn-Firnas’ refusal 

was justifi ed on technical grounds. 

• Huwaysh also expressed skepticism at the concept 

of loading the UAVs with 20 kg of TNT, believing 

that missiles could do the job more effectively. He 

feared that, with all the publicity over possible Iraqi 

possession of chemical and biological weapons, 

Anmar may have had something more deadly in 

mind.

Despite the committee’s decision, Ibn-Firnas built six 

Al Musayara-20 UAVs (one prototype and fi ve production models) but never delivered them to Anmar. 

The UAVs were built at a new UAV site near the Al 

Karamah General Company facility in the Waziriya 

district of Baghdad. These UAVs were not equipped 

with cameras or recovery parachutes. 

• Completion of these UAVs was delayed due to 

unspecifi ed problems with the autopilot. 

• After OIF, two Al Musayara-20 UAVs were 

recovered from the Waziriya site, probably two of 

the UAVs manufactured in response to Anmar’s 

requirement.

Foreign Assistance

Although the Ibn-Firnas UAVs were indigenous 

Iraqi designs, they were enabled by and dependent 

on foreign-procured components. These programs 

would not have been possible given strict adherence 

to sanctions and thus it was implicit that obtaining 

foreign material was not a problem. Examination of 

two Al Musayara-20 UAVs captured after OIF shows 

they used British WAE-342 piston engines. 

• Information provided by Huwaysh and other intelligence indicates that a Ukrainian company known as 

Orliss, headed by Dr. Olga Vladimirovna, provided 

some of the engines for the UAVs. 

• The Iraq based Rabban Safi na Company also tried 

to acquire WAE-342 engines through Australia, 

along with gyroscopes and servomechanisms from 

multiple suppliers.

In addition to the engines, Ibn-Firnas imported 

Micropilot MP2000 and 3200VG autopilots, embedded GPS cards, and industrial computers for the Al 
49

Delivery Systems

Figure 22. Ibn Firnas Al Musayara-20.

Figure 23. Ibn Firnas Al 

Musayara-30.
50

Musayara-20 from Advantech, a Taiwanese fi rm. 

Engineers at Ibn-Firnas wrote the guidance software 

for the Advantech computers incorporated in the guidance system. GPS waypoint data were programmed 

on a laptop computer and loaded into the UAV’s guidance computer prior to fl ight.

• According to a former high-level Iraqi offi cial, the 

Iraqi ambassador to Russia, ‘Abbas Khalaf Kunfadh, was directly involved in purchasing GPS components for Iraqi UAVs. He bought GPS equipment 

from Russian technicians who were employed by 

the Russian government, but who designed and sold 

the GPS devices out of their homes to make extra 

money. ‘Abbas reportedly acquired the GPS devices 

without the knowledge of the Russian government. 

• According to a high-level offi cial in the Iraqi UAV 

program, Iraq obtained four MP2000 and two 

3200VG autopilots through an Australia-based 

procurement agent. These autopilots were never 

installed in UAVs because they arrived just before 

OIF. Iraqi offi cials deny attempting to intentionally 

acquire mapping software of the United States but 

did receive mapping software that came as part of 

the package with the MP2000 and 3200VG autopilots. The source indicated that these items were 

located at Ibn-Firnas prior to OIF but was unaware 

of their current location.

Table 5

Length 3.45 m

Wingspan 4.80 m

Height 0.95 m

Gross Weight 116 kg

Empty Weight 80 kg

Maximum Takeoff Weight 115 kg

Maximum Speed 170 kph

Maximum Flying Time per Tank 3 hrs

Maximum Altitude 3,000 m

Table 5 Al Musayara-20 specifi cations

Potential UAV Control Upgrade

In 1998, the Al Razi General Company of MIC began 

experimental work on a laser control system for use 

with UAVs. The experiments culminated with a UAV 

test fl ight using the laser control system in early 2000 

at the Tikrit Air Academy. The UAV, identifi ed as an 

Ibn-Firnas “Musayara,” fl ew to a distance of 6-10 km 

at an altitude of 700 meters. 

• The Musayara UAV in this experiment was painted 

red with a yellow stripe as was the vehicle identifi ed by an Ibn-Firnas UAV technician as the “30 

kilo” aircraft. However, the dimensions provided 

for the UAV used in the laser guidance experiment 

are smaller than the Al Musayara-20. 

• The laser control system served only as an uplink 

command signal, although research was under way 

on a two-way control link. The laser control system 

required an optical tracker to track the UAV and 

keep the laser aimed at the laser receiver on the 

UAV. 

In March 2000, Al Razi Company published a report 

on the laser control fl ight test for MIC. Huwaysh was 

displeased with the results. He felt the system was not 

practical for UAV control because of the short range 

of the system, and he canceled the program.
51

Delivery Systems

Other foreign components identifi ed in the Al 

Musayara-20 (depicted in Figure 24) include:

• Remote-control unit labeled “PCM Telecommand 

System, Skyleader Radio Control Limited;”

• Feranti Technologies vertical gyro Type FS60P;

• Video recorder labeled “VCR Vinton Military 

Sytems Ltd;”

• Single rate gyro units labeled “BAE Systems;”

• Electronic unit labeled “DMS Technologies, 08/

02;”

• Sony 700X Super Steady Shot, digital eight video 

camera, model DCR-TRV530E;

• Humphrey vertical gyro, model VG34-0803-1;

• Multiplex Micro-IPD 7-channel narrowband 

receiver 35 MHz;

• Schmalband-Empfanger multiplex Uni 9, 35 MHz.

Conclusions

The Ibn-Firnas programs were Iraq’s most successful unmanned aerial vehicle programs. Although 

heavily dependent on foreign procurement, Ibn-Firnas 

successfully developed the Al Musayara-20 UAV, 

capable of long-range, pre-programmed autonomous 

fl ight and intended to perform battlefi eld reconnaissance for the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard.

• Less successful were attempts to develop a larger 

UAV with a greater (30 kg) payload. However, 

given time and the successful track record 

established by the Al Musayara-20, ISG judges 

Ibn-Firnas would most likely have succeeded in 

developing larger, more capable UAVs.

The June 2002 demonstration fl ight and the technical specifi cations in the Army purchase contract 

clearly reveal that the Al Musayara-20 may have 

violated the range restrictions imposed by United 

Nations Security Council Resolutions. Engineering 

analysis indicates the Al Musayara-20 was capable of 

a one-way fuel-exhaustion range well in excess of the 

500 km fl own in June 2002, and with the programmable GPS-based autopilot, the Al Musayara-20 was 

not “tethered” by a remote-control system. 

• It was necessary for the Al Musayara-20 UAV, in 

its reconnaissance role, to be able to remain aloft 

over the battlefi eld for extended periods and image 

a large number of targets per sortie. These performance parameters were not necessarily indicative 

of intent to use the Al Musayara-20 as a chemical 

or biological warfare delivery platform but provide 

a limited inherent capability. 

Al Razi General Company’s 1998-2000 attempts to 

develop a laser, vice radio, control system would, if 

successful, have allowed Iraq to launch and recover 

UAVs without transmitting in the radio frequency 

spectrum. The directional nature of the laser would 

make UAV control signals virtually impossible to 

detect, depriving an adversary of indications and 

warning of UAV employment via signals intelligence 

(SIGINT). Additionally, a laser control system would 

be much more diffi cult for an adversary to jam or 

spoof. 

• The account of Al Razi’s fl ight test indicates that 

it was successful within line-of-sight range and, if 

combined with a vehicle with autonomous guidance 

capability, could have provided the Iraqis the means 

to operate more covertly with their UAVs without 

laser range limitations.

• If the reports of Huwaysh’s cancellation of the 

project are accurate, either Huwaysh obviously did 

not appreciate this potential operational advantage, 

or he did not consider it important. 

Republican Guard Major Anmar’s attempt to use 

the Al Musayara-20 like a cruise missile shows an 

awareness of the weapon potential of UAVs; however, the use of a conventionally armed UAV raises 

questions as to its actual use. Although the information we have indicates Anmar intended to arm the 

UAV with conventional explosives (probably in place 

of the recovery parachute), this UAV does have the 
52

range, payload, guidance, and autonomy necessary to 

be used as a biological weapon delivery platform if

the Iraqi leadership made a decision to use it in this 

way and if a suitable dispenser system were available. 

ISG judges that the Al Musayara-20 does not have 

suffi cient payload capacity to serve as an effective 

CW platform. 

• A BW platform conversion would require replacing 

the recovery parachute with a dispenser system and 

agent and limiting the UAV to one-way delivery 

missions. The same guidance system that allows the 

Al Musayara-20 to be programmed to automatically 

image targets of known location would be capable 

of being programmed to activate a BW dispenser at 

a known location. 

• ISG has not found evidence of intent or research 

and development activity associated with using 

Ibn-Firnas small UAVs as WMD delivery systems.

Figure 24. Al Musayara-20 components.

Avionics bay

Parachute compartment

Nose

Camera location

Fuel tank

Radio

High-power 

signal amplifi er Tail

Al Quds UAV Program 

Background

Information uncovered by ISG reveals the Al Quds 

UAV program began in late 1999 or early 2000 when 

Dr. ‘Imad ‘Abd-al-Latif Al Rida’ submitted a proposal to Hadi Taresh Zabun, DG of the MIC Research 

Directorate, that claimed he could develop a better 

UAV than those being developed by Ibn-Firnas, 

according to Huwaysh and an offi cial in the Iraqi 

UAV program. However, in late 1999 MIC recalled 

Dr. ‘Imad from retirement and instructed him to 

renew Iraq’s development of small UAVs, which had 

stalled after Dr. ‘Imad’s retirement in 1997. 

• Huwaysh stated that at approximately the same 

time Dr. ‘Imad proposed his UAV development 

program, the Iraqi military asked MIC for a UAV 

capable of carrying 30-kg and 100-kg payloads for 
53

Delivery Systems

communications and radar jamming equipment. 

A high-level MIC offi cial confi rmed the 30-kg and 

100-kg payload goals and that they were intended 

for jamming or direction-fi nding equipment. 

• Reportedly, Dr. ‘Imad had no knowledge of the 

intended mission or payload for the aircraft he was 

developing; he was simply given a payload goal, 

and one report indicates he was not given the 100-

kg goal until August 2002. 

Huwaysh reported that, as part of Saddam’s “Long 

Arm” policy, he demanded a 24-hour endurance 

UAV (estimated range of 2,500 km) in response to 

Israel’s high-endurance UAV capability, which is 

similar to Dr. ‘Imad’s reported belief that Saddam 

wanted a UAV on par with those of the US. No direct 

evidence links the Al Quds program to these stated 

range and endurance goals; the best indication of the 

actual performance goal for Al Quds is a June 2002 

memorandum from MIC Deputy Director Muzahim 

to Huwaysh containing a project update on Al Quds 

which says, in part, “...‘Imad ‘Abd-al-Latif indicated 

that the only part left from the project is the instructions of the esteemed minister to increase the fl ying 

timing to four hours...” 

• When confronted with this memorandum, Huwaysh 

denied that he ever set such a performance goal for 

Al Quds and claimed to have never seen the memo. 

On the other hand, Muzahim authenticated the 

memo.

MIC established the Al Quds program in a hangar at 

Al Rashid Airfi eld, and development work began in 

January 2000. Dr. ‘Imad requested that the program 

not be under MIC control, but Huwaysh refused 

and instead proposed a relationship where MIC 

would maintain budgetary and administrative control 

through Ibn-Firnas, but Dr. ‘Imad would have managerial discretion over the program.

• This arrangement allowed Dr. ‘Imad to hire his own 

research and development staff of 12-20 people 

(reports differ on its size) and also obligated IbnFirnas to provide material support to Al Quds as 

required.

• It appears that the Al Quds program was placed 

under the MIC’s Special Projects Offi ce (a.k.a. 

Master Subjects Offi ce), which was created by 

Huwaysh for key projects requiring high-level 

attention and fi nancial support.

Multiple sources reported that the initial Al Quds 

efforts involved attempts to develop a jet-powered 

UAV that would meet the range and payload requirements. These efforts reportedly included evaluation 

of turbostarter engines from older Russian MiG and 

Sukhoi fi ghter aircraft in Iraq’s inventory and the 

Microturbo turbojet engine from the Italian Mirach100 RPV that Iraq had obtained prior to 1990. 

• The MiG and Sukhoi turbostarter were ruled out 

due to excessive fuel consumption, and so development proceeded with the Microturbo engine.

The fi rst Al Quds prototype, Quds-1, was 5-6 meters 

long and had a wingspan of 10-14 m. One source 

described the prototype as appearing “stealth” like 

but said radar cross-section reduction was not a goal 

of the program. Subsequent UNMOVIC photographs 

(see Figure 25) of later Al Quds prototypes reveal 

a faceted fuselage somewhat reminiscent of the US 

F-117A. Because of initial diffi culties in obtaining 

servos and associated remote-control equipment, the 

initial prototype had a cockpit, fl ight controls and 

control, system for manned fl ight tests

• Unspecifi ed diffi culties with the engine forced Dr. 

‘Imad to abandon plans to conduct a manned fl ight 

test, and the jet powered Al Quds prototype never 

fl ew. 

• Reportedly, in early 2003 this prototype was dismantled and the components spread through the 

aircraft scrap yard at Al Rashid and covered with 

palm leaves to conceal them from UN inspectors. 

One Iraqi scientist considered the entire attempt to 

produce a jet-powered UAV to be a “fraud.” 

A high-level offi cial in the Iraqi UAV program denied 

that a large, jet-powered UAV was the initial intent 

of the program, and claimed instead that, early in the 

program, engineers were having trouble fabricating 

symmetrical wings for the prototypes. Asymmetrical 

wings would cause the aircraft to roll on takeoff, pos-
54

• ISG judges that the claims for the asymmetrical 

wing testbed and the late requirement for a 100-kg 

payload are associated with the source’s unwillingness to admit initial failure with the jet-powered prototype. The weight of evidence indicates 

that the 100-kg payload requirement for electronic 

warfare applications was levied at the beginning of 

the program, not over two years later. 

• Further, Huwaysh is insistent that 30-kg and 100-kg 

payload capabilities were Al Quds program goals 

from the beginning.

In November 2002, MIC ordered the Al Quds program moved from Al Rashid airfi eld to Ibn-Firnas so 

that Dr. ‘Imad could receive additional help from IbnFirnas personnel. According to a high-level offi cial 

in the Iraqi UAV program, this move followed earlier 

complaints by Huwaysh that Dr. ‘Imad was jumping from project to project without showing signs of 

progress. This allegation is supported by a source who 

worked for Dr. ‘Imad on Al Quds and said Dr. ‘Imad 

often switched projects in mid-stream, disrupting 

employee work schedules and never seeming to fi nish 

anything. 

• According to a source associated with the Al Quds 

project, Dr. ‘Imad accepted many projects in the 

belief that the more projects his staff undertook the 

more money they could make. This tendency often 

required employees to work up to 22 hours straight 

in order to show any progress on a project. 

Saddam’s “Long-Arm” Policy

Long-range UAV programs along with long-range 

missiles formed part of Saddam’s “Long Arm” policy.

This policy was in direct response to:

• the inability of Iraq to acquire new fi ghter or 

bomber aircraft.

• Iraq’s inability to counter its enemies’ anti-aircraft 

missile technology.

• The vulnerability of Iraq’s air force.

The policy provided for the transfer of funds that were 

destined for purchases of new aircraft and equipment 

to the building of UAVS and missiles. 

sibly causing a crash before the operator could correct 

the roll. The large, jet-powered, manned vehicle 

was reportedly intended only as a testbed for wing 

symmetry with a pilot on board to correct the roll 

tendency. 

The diffi culties with the initial Al Quds prototype, 

combined with a lack of wind tunnel facilities to test 

the designs, prompted Dr. ‘Imad to construct scaleddown versions of the prototype for open-air aerodynamic testing. According to an offi cial at Ibn-Firnas, 

10 subscale prototypes were produced for testing. 

The offi cial further asserted that Dr. ‘Imad made a 

decision to focus on the smaller UAVs to compete 

with the Al Musayara-20 reconnaissance UAV being 

developed by Ibn-Firnas.

• These smaller subscale UAVs were the RPV-20a 

vehicles shown to UNMOVIC inspectors at IbnFirnas in early 2003. 

• Reportedly, Dr. ‘Imad never informed MIC management of his decision to abandon the larger UAV 

development to focus instead on the smaller RPV20a. 

Both Huwaysh and Muzahim believed Dr. ‘Imad was 

continuing to work on the large-payload UAV until 

early 2003 when they convened a program review. At 

the review, Huwaysh chastised Dr. ‘Imad for wasting money on the program, hiring personnel without 

MIC approval, and for not achieving the stated goal 

of the program. Huwaysh also questioned the utility of developing a competitor to the successful Al 

Musayara-20. 

• Huwaysh claimed that he gave Dr. ‘Imad 30 days 

to achieve progress toward the stated goal or the 

program would be terminated.

A high-level offi cial at Ibn-Firnas provided a description of events somewhat different from Huwaysh’s 

statements, claiming that the 100-kg payload requirement was not levied on the Al Quds program until 

August 2002 when Muzahim stated MIC did not 

need both Dr. ‘Imad and Ibn-Firnas to produce small 

UAVs. The source suggested that Dr. ‘Imad did not 

know what the 100-kg payload requirement was for, 

but speculated that Muzahim wanted to install the 

reconnaissance system from the Mirage fi ghter in the 

UAV. 
55

Delivery Systems

• An engineer at Ibn-Firnas reported that the reason 

for the move from Al Rashid to Ibn-Firnas was MIC 

concerns that UNMOVIC discovery of a separate, 

undeclared UAV program would cause trouble for 

the Regime.

The Al Quds program was declared to the UN in 

Iraq’s 15 January 2003 semi-annual declaration. 

Documentary evidence obtained by ISG indicates 

that the Iraqis claimed to the UN that the “unmanned 

aerial vehicles of two types 20a and 30a” were “an 

idea that began in August 2002; and they announced 

it on 2003/01/15 according to the Resolution No. 715 

(1991) of the Monitoring Plan.”

• The document further indicates that UNMOVIC 

inspected this program four times, on 19 December 

2002, 2 January 2003, 10 February 2003, and 4 

March 2003. 

• Reportedly, UNMOVIC inspected the Al Quds 

program fi ve times while it was at Ibn-Firnas. 

Another source with direct access reported that, 

during UNMOVIC inspections, Al Quds workers 

were told to each take home components from the 

Al Rashid workshop for safekeeping until told to 

return them. Similar procedures were reportedly 

used to disperse equipment prior to the anticipated 

US air strikes. Regardless, the documented pre-OIF 

Iraqi claim that Al Quds began in August 2002 when 

it actually began in late 1999/early 2000 possibly 

reveals a specifi c intent to conceal the program from 

the UN. 

Characteristics

Reportedly the eight subscale Al Quds/RPV-20a 

(please refer to Figure 25) prototypes had a 4.8 

meter wingspan, a 15-kg payload to be carried in a 

one-square-foot internal compartment with a 24-volt 

power supply, a 70-kg maximum takeoff weight, and 

were powered by a 100-cc, two-stroke, two-cylinder, 

nine-horsepower pusher propeller engine. 

• The fi rst test fl ight of the subscale prototypes took 

place in April or May of 2000. The fi rst two subscale prototypes were fi tted with landing gear and 

took off and landed from a runway.

• Subsequent prototypes were launched from the roof 

of a pickup truck and recovered by parachute. 

A high-level Ibn-Firnas offi cial referred to these eight 

prototypes as Quds-1 through Quds-8 and did not 

acknowledge the jet-powered version described by 

other sources as “Quds-1.” However, there was no 

Quds-9, and the next aircraft in the series is the Quds10 or RPV-30a which is described next.

Dr. ‘Imad began development of the Quds-10/RPV30a in November 2002 (presumably after the move to 

Ibn-Firnas). This RPV had a wingspan of 7.22 meters 

with a maximum takeoff weight of 130 kg and was 

intended to demonstrate the use of a pusher/puller 

engine confi guration. In order to speed and simplify 

construction of the aircraft, an L-29 drop tank was 

used for the fuselage. 

• This aircraft fl ew only once, on 13 January 2003, 

remaining for 12-14 minutes in the airfi eld traffi c 

pattern. Like the RPV-20a, Quds-10 was trucklaunched but landed conventionally on the runway.

An Ibn-Firnas engineer claimed that Dr. ‘Imad’s primary motivation for developing the RPV-30a was to 

surpass the performance of Ibn-Firnas’ Al Musayara20, which had fl own a 500-km circuit in June 2002. 

The engineer reported that Dr. ‘Imad claimed the 

lighter structural design of the RPV-30a, depicted in 

Figure 26, would give it a maximum fl ight time of 

over six hours, exceeding the program goal of four 

hours. 

As with the Ibn-Firnas UAV programs, the Al Quds 

UAVs were intended to be capable of autonomous 

fl ight using global positioning system (GPS) navigation and a preprogrammed autopilot. The procurement network for avionics components for Al 

Quds was through Ibn-Firnas and was the same as 

that described in the previous section. However, the 

Al Quds program never progressed to the point of 

attempting a preprogrammed autonomous fl ight and 

never actually received the Micropilot MP2000 or 

3200VG autopilots used in the Al Musayara-20.

Missions

Huwaysh, Minister of Military Industrialization, and 

a former Ibn-Firnas engineer all reported electronic 

warfare missions for Al Quds UAVs. Electronic warfare missions include direction fi nding/signal intercept or communications and radar jamming. Huwaysh 

provided the most specifi c information, saying that 

an important lesson learned from the Iran-Iraq war 
56

platforms. The overall program goal for Al Quds was 

to produce UAVs with 30-kg and 100-kg payload 

capabilities for communications and radar intercept 

and jamming missions. 

ISG has uncovered no information connecting the 

Al Quds UAV program to delivery of weapons of 

mass destruction. However, successful development 

of the Al Quds UAVs would have provided Iraq with 

vehicles inherently capable of delivering biological (30-kg or 100-kg payload versions) or chemical 

(100-kg payload version) weapons. All of the prerequisites—range, autonomous programmable guidance, 

and payload—would have been present, if the Iraqis 

made a decision to use them for this purpose and if

they developed a suitable agent dissemination system. 

However, ISG has uncovered no evidence of either 

made to order dispenser development or intent to use 

Al Quds for WMD. 

The program began in late 1999 or early 2000 

but was not declared to the UN until the January 

2003 semi-annual declaration, after Iraq agreed 

to re-admit UN inspectors. A completed Al Quds 

UAV with a range capability beyond 150 km likely 

would constitute a violation of UN sanctions. However, when terminated by OIF, the program had not 

matured to the point where it achieved its full performance goals. 

Procurement Supporting Iraq’s Delivery Systems 

Iraq used covert procurement methods to acquire 

materiel that was either banned or controlled 

under UNSCRs 661, 687, the Annexes to the Plan 

approved by UNSCR 715, and the Export/Import 

Mechanism approved by UNSCR 1051. ISG judges 

that these efforts were undertaken to reestablish 

or support Iraq’s delivery systems programs. The 

period from 1998 to the start of OIF showed an 

increase in Iraq’s procurement activities, and it is in 

this period that ISG believes Baghdad made its most 

serious attempts at reconstituting delivery system 

capabilities similar to those that existed prior to 

1991.

Desert Storm and the various UNSC Resolutions led 

to the near destruction of Iraq’s surface-to-surface 

(SSM) missile force and production infrastructure. 

was the importance of being able to intercept and jam 

enemy communications and radar signals. 

• Huwaysh provided a credible description of the 

value of UAVs for this role, discussing how they 

can be fl own over enemy territory to get close to 

their targets, improving intercept and jamming 

effectiveness. Also, being cheap and unmanned, 

it would not be a major problem if they were shot 

down. 

• An Ibn-Firnas engineer speculated that either the 

Al Milad or Al Salam companies would develop the 

electronic warfare payloads; Huwaysh was specifi c 

that Al Milad was the developer. 

A number of other sources indicate the intended 

payloads for the Al Quds UAVs were direction fi nding, communications, and radar jamming, as well as 

reconnaissance equipment. 

• Reportedly Dr. ‘Imad did not know the intended 

payloads for his vehicles. Dr. ‘Imad was only 

involved in developing the fl ight vehicle, but speculated that the payload would be reconnaissance 

equipment adapted from the Mirage fi ghter aircraft. 

• ISG judges the 30-kg payload variant would 

probably be suffi cient for a passive receiver for 

communication or radar signal interception and 

direction fi nding, but the 100-kg payload would 

probably be required to house the transmitter and 

receiver required for a jamming platform.

• Two lower level sources, one with direct and the 

other with indirect information on Al Quds, agreed 

with the reconnaissance mission of Al Quds, but the 

indirect source added that the Al Quds engineers 

were directed to leave an empty compartment in 

the fuselage approximately 40 cm wide by 70 cm 

long by 50 cm deep for an unspecifi ed purpose. 

ISG judges this is probably the recovery parachute 

compartment. 

Conclusions

The evidence accumulated by ISG indicates the Al 

Quds program was an initiative to meet an Iraqi 

military desire for airborne electronic warfare 
57

Delivery Systems

Figure 25. Al Quds RPV20a.

Iraq began building its permitted missile design and 

manufacturing capabilities, including the ability to 

produce limited quantities of certain chemicals used 

in rocket propulsion. 

• By the end of the 1990s, as was the case prior to 

Desert Storm, Iraq had the ability to design and 

build many of the necessary systems for an SSM 

with the exception of complete liquid-propellant 

rocket engines and guidance and control systems. 

• According to a former MIC executive with direct 

access to the information, Iraq overcame these 

defi ciencies by implementing a covert procurement 

system. Iraq used this system to buy restricted items 

from foreign sources through third party countries. 

These items were controlled by UNSCR 661 and 

687, which put sanctions in place to prevent the 

export of certain goods, particularly military equipment, to Iraq. 

• Many of these procurement activities started in 

1998 after the UN inspectors were expelled from 

Iraq. (NOTE: For a complete description of Iraq’s 

procurement process, refer to the “Procurement: 

Illicit Finance and Revenue” section of the ISG 

report.) 

From 1991 to 1996, Iraq began establishing contacts and making limited purchases of controlled 

delivery system-related items. The initial efforts 

were undertaken in an environment of massive civil 

engineering work to rebuild Iraq’s war-damaged 

infrastructure and while the UN inspection Regime 

was still an unknown quantity. In addition, strenuous efforts were devoted to rebuilding Iraq’s armed 

forces to counter any threat from Iran. 

ISG has uncovered documentary evidence and 

personal statements suggesting that, despite UN 

restrictions, Iraq entered into discussions with 

both Russian entities and North Korea for missile 

systems, though there is no evidence to confi rm that 

any deliveries took place. 

• Sources and documents suggest that Iraq was 

actively seeking to obtain the SS-26/Iskander missile from Russia. 

• Document exploitation has revealed that Firas Tlas, 

the son of former Syrian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Mustafa Tlas, visited Iraq in July 

2001 and discussed a variety of missile systems and 

components that he could supply through Russia. 

Firas offered to sell Iraq the S-300 SAM and the 

270-km-range SS-26/Iskander-E short-range-ballistic missile, or to provide assistance to help Iraq 

produce the Iskander. Firas claimed that he had 

previously met with Izakoff, the former Defense 

Minister of the Soviet Union, who told him that his 

[Izakoff’s] friend owned documents for “TEMPS” 

missiles, called “Sterlite” in the West. Reportedly, 
58

Izakoff said the missiles had a range of 1,500 km 

and were very accurate. Tlas said Izakoff claimed 

that Mikhail Gorbachev destroyed the missiles, 

but that Izakoff could supply the documents so 

that Iraq could produce them. According to Firas, 

Izakoff said that Dimitrof (sic) (a close friend of the 

President) presented the subject to Russian President Putin, and President Putin agreed to provide 

assistance. 

• Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had contacted both 

Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraq acquiring the Iskander missile in 2002. Russia would not 

export any military hardware without an end user 

certifi cate signed by the issuing government agency, 

which is the capacity in which Syria would have 

served.

NOTE: The TEMP-S is known in the West as the 

SS-12 Scaleboard and has a range of 900 km. These 

were destroyed under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 

Treaty signed in the late 1980s.

• ISG recovered documents containing contract and 

money fl ow information concerning illicit trade 

between Iraq and North Korea. These documents 

show that, late in 1999, senior offi cials in Iraq, 

including ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al 

Nasiri (the presidential secretary), the Director of 

the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) began to discuss 

establishing trade with North Korea. In December 

1999, Huwaysh formally invited a North Korean 

delegation to visit Iraq. The Iraqis and North Koreans decided that a face-to-face meeting would be 

held on or about 8 October 2000 in Baghdad. The 

North Korean Chang Kwang Technology Group 

was identifi ed as the technology supplier and the 

prime technical mediator for the North Korean side. 

After an exchange of several communiqués, the 

representatives from both countries agreed to a list 

of specifi c subjects that would be discussed at the 

meetings, including technology transfer for SSMs 

with a range of 1,300 km, coastal protection missiles with a range of 300 km, and the possibility of 

North Korean technical experts working inside Iraq.

• A set of memoranda recovered by ISG shows that 

a high-level of dialogue between Iraq and North 

Korea that occurred from December 1999 to 

September 2000 led to plans for a North Korean 

delegation to secretly visit Iraq in October of 2000. 

Among the topics for discussion was the supply of 

“technology for SSMs with a range of 1,300 km 

and Land-to-Sea Missiles (LSMs) with a range of 

300 km”. During the course of discussions with 

Iraq, the North Korean side acknowledged the 

sensitivity of transferring technologies for these 

missiles but indicated North Korea was prepared 

“to cooperate with Iraq on the items it specifi ed”. 

There is no evidence, however, that the missiles 

were ever purchased.

To improve its delivery system capabilities, Iraq 

sought technical experts from other countries to provide assistance. Much of the foreign assistance for 

the Al Samud missile program came from experts in 

Russia, but Iraq did receive assistance from other 

countries. According to some sources, this assistance 

was often not sanctioned by the home countries of 

the missile experts providing the aide.

• According to Huwaysh and an Iraqi computer specialist with direct access to the information, in 1998 

MIC entered into a contract with a company called 

Babil to hire Russian missile experts as consultants. 

Babil would hire the experts, who then traveled to 

Iraq and worked on Iraqi missile programs, particularly the Al Samud. The initial value of the contract 

was approximately $11 million. That September, 

the Babil Company sent to Iraq missile experts 

from Russia who came from various universities, 

research institutes, factories, and production organizations. The experts were paid a cash salary of 

$2,000 each month they worked in Iraq. 

• These individuals were in Baghdad for approximately three months starting in September 1998 

and worked at locations physically separated from 

the actual production facilities. While there, they 

engaged in discussions with the Iraqis and drew up 

plans related to missile development and production. Upon returning to Russia, they continued to 

assist Iraq and were visited in Russia by various 

Iraqis.

• Huwaysh claimed that experts from Russia provided assistance to Iraq’s missile programs beginning in 1998. In October 1999, the Russian experts 

provided technical reviews for the Al Samud program over a six-month period. This review included 

evaluations of the entire missile production system. 

These experts continued to provide assistance to the 
59

Delivery Systems

Al Samud program even after the review by providing a package of design calculations for liquidpropellant missiles and drawings for an inertial 

navigation system (INS). Huwaysh said UNMOVIC 

inspectors did not detect the experts from Russia 

during a site visit in 2002. Huwaysh speculated 

that if the Russian government found out that the 

experts were working in Iraq, they would probably have been punished, implying that the Russian 

government had not sanctioned these activities.

• A former Iraqi rocket motor test engineer claimed 

that experts from the FRY were involved in the 

development of the Al Fat’h missile system. Their 

involvement included analyzing instruments on the 

rocket motor test stand and providing an INS that 

was considered inadequate and of poor quality. 

• A former senior executive in MIC who had direct 

access to the information admitted that, in 1999, 

Iraq signed a technical assistance contract with a 

commercial cover company, that operated outside 

of Belarus. The assistance included providing 

improvements to unidentifi ed Iraqi missile systems. The contract also stipulated that experts from 

Belarus would maintain a semi-permanent presence 

in Iraq while the contract was in effect. According 

to the source, the head of the Belarusian delegation 

was an individual related to the offi ce of the president of Belarus, that suggests that the government 

of Belarus may have been aware of this activity. 

Numerous source admissions and documents have 

surfaced, which show some of Iraq’s efforts at 

acquiring guidance and control components for its 

various missile systems. Because of its inability to 

successfully indigenously produce such complete 

components, Iraq was heavily reliant upon foreign 

suppliers to provide such items as accelerometers 

and gyroscopes.

• Two scientists in the Iraqi missile program provided 

information concerning Iraq’s attempts to improve 

missile accuracy to ISG, both of whom had direct 

access to the information. In 1999, Al Karamah 

signed three contracts with companies from Russia 

for G&C technical assistance and equipment. The 

contracts’ terms were as follows:

— The fi rst contract was for approximately 25 inertial navigation systems designed to input to the Al 

Samud guidance system. They were a modernized 

version of the Scud guidance system and contained 

two MG-4, dual-axis fl exible gyroscopes, two AK-5 

Figure 26. Al Quds RPV30a.
60

Possible Connections to 

Terrorist/Insurgent Groups

ISG uncovered evidence of a possible connection 

between Al Quds program director ‘Imad ‘Abd-alLatif Al Rida’ and terrorist/insurgent organizations. 

In December 2003 after Coalition forces captured 

Saddam Husayn, a source who worked on Al Quds 

claimed that Dr. ‘Imad had told him that four Al Quds 

UAVs were to be used as “fl ying bombs” to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. 

• According to the source, four UAVs were to be 

given to a former Hamas member named “Abu 

Radin” who was a friend of Saddam Husayn. Abu 

Radin, who was no longer loyal to Hamas, would 

take the UAVs to Jordan, install 5 kg of C4 explosive, and use them to attack Sharon at the Wailing 

Wall in Jerusalem. 

• Although uncorroborated, this story is similar 

to the well-documented Iraqi plan to use the Al 

Musayara-20 UAV as a “fl ying bomb.”

Additionally, a document obtained by ISG reveals that 

on 23 December 2000, Dr. ‘Imad signed a memorandum with the Air Force and senior members of 

the Fedayeen Saddam agreeing to develop helicopter 

UAVs for the Fedayeen Saddam. This memo stated 

that the project had been coordinated with Huwaysh 

and the work would be a cooperative effort of MIC, 

the Air Force, and Fedayeen Saddam. 

• During initial testing, the UAV was diffi cult to control and the test deemed a failure. As a result, all 

work was suspended on the helicopter UAV project. 

The prototype was destroyed by cruise missiles on 

the third day of OIF.

Huwaysh vehemently denied that he was aware of this 

effort, that he had authorized Dr. ‘Imad to engage in 

it, or that it was an approved MIC project.

accelerometers, one aligned on the yaw (lateral) 

axis to correct for the effects of wind drift in the 

trajectory, and the other aligned along the axial 

(thrust) axis to derive the cut-off velocity for thrust 

termination to control the missile’s range. The 

contract also required delivery of approximately 

fi ve assembled and 20 unassembled pseudo-Inertial 

Measurement Units (IMUs) in addition to some 

guidance test equipment. 

— The second contract was for approximately 100 

modern, strapped down G&C systems that incorporated two, dual-axis fl exible gyroscopes and three 

orthogonally confi gured accelerometers, which 

were also to have a digital output. The contract 

was amended to include an on-board fl ight computer and control system. The G&C systems on 

this contract were also designed to work in the Al 

Samud guidance units and were smaller than the 

ones listed in the fi rst contract. Other items specifi ed in the contract include individual parts such as: 

MG-4 gyros (approximately 30) and AK-5, A-15 

and A-16 accelerometers (between 50 and 60). 

NOTE: Approximately 10 AK-5 accelerometers 

were received in June 2000 and another fi ve to 10 

in January 2001. The contract also included test 

equipment; e.g., servo test units, a single axis rate 

table, a single axis vibration tester, an environmental chamber, and a test unit for an optical dividing 

head. 

— The third contract was for the purchase of eight 

IMUs, with fi ber-optic gyroscopes, and four IMUs 

with ring laser gyroscopes. These systems were 

destined for the Al Karamah and Al Milad companies and were intended for use in the Al Samud 

and the Al Fat’h missile systems. Up to seven of 

the guidance systems were delivered to the Al 

Karamah General Company in the second half of 

2002. All of the G&C systems and related components were stored at the Al Quds Factory of the Al 

Karamah General Company immediately before 

OIF. Although some examples of this hardware 

were recovered, the Al Quds Factory itself has been 

completely looted and no items remain. 
61

Delivery Systems

Figures 27 and 28 depict some of the many guidance 

items recovered by ISG; Figure 29 Shows an Actuator 

stepper motor.

• Recovered documents provide details of Iraqi 

contracts for SSM technical assistance and missilerelated hardware. According to these documents, 

in 1999 the Al Basha’ir Trading Company of Iraq 

began a series of contracts for G&C equipment, 

technology, training, and missile design training 

with the Infi nity DOO Company from the FRY. ISG 

has not been able to confi rm the delivery of the 

items specifi ed in the contracts. 

• A former high-ranking offi cial in MIC recalled 

that, at the end of 2000, Iraq signed contracts with 

North Korea worth at least $9 million. Iraq made a 

downpayment of $1.3 million. Some of the contracts specifi ed providing G&C systems, inertial 

navigation systems, and on-board computers 

intended to improve the accuracy of SSMs having 

an operational range of 150 km or less. Iraq also 

sought to purchase gyros and accelerometers and 

asked if they could purchase existing SS-21 Tochka 

components. According to the source, Iraqi missile 

personnel believed that Tochka components would 

provide greater benefi t to the solid-propellant Al 

Fat’h system than the liquid-propellant Al Samud.

— ISG recovered contracts between North Korea and 

Iraq related to guidance and control components. 

According to the contracts in late in 2001, an eightperson delegation from North Korea visiting Iraq 

reached agreements to sign six contracts to improve 

Iraq’s missile system capabilities. One of the contracts was between the Al Karamah General Company and the Hesong Trading Corporation, North 

Korea, for the purchase of potentiometers (used in 

G&C systems), missile alignment equipment (prelaunch), batteries, and test stands for servos and jet 

vanes used on SSMs. Also, technical assistance was 

to be made available if required by Iraq. The equipment was to be delivered via Syrian ports within 9 

months of contract initiation. ISG has been unable 

to locate any of the delivered equipment. 

— ISG gleaned the following information from 

acquired documents concerning contract number 

six between Al Basha’ir Trading Company Ltd 

of Baghdad and Infi nity DOO of Belgrade, FRY. 

Contract number six, apparently signed 19 January 2001, for a total cost of $2,600,251, was for 

guidance and control testing equipment and training 

courses. ISG has been unable to confi rm that these 

items were ever delivered. The test equipment was 

as follows:

— test stand designed for static testing of dynamically 

tuned gyros.

— test stand for solid state accelerometer static testing.

— an OMEGA-5 interference test stand for testing 

gyro rigidity and drift.

— equipment for developing homing and proximity 

fuzes.

— software for research and development of all systems.

— hardware-in-the-loop simulation software.

— and SSM simulation software.

• The following are excerpts from documents 

received by ISG. The information is related to 

contract number eight which is between Al Milad 

General Company of Baghdad and Infi nity DOO 

of Belgrade, FRY concerning guidance and control 

equipment. ISG has been unable to confi rm that 

these items were ever delivered. Contract number 

eight, signed on 19 January 2001, for a total cost of 

$183,480, was for:

— the design of an on-board computer system capable 

of withstanding 20 G’s of acceleration and 40 G’s 

of shock.

— a two-week training course for customer experts.

— a complete set of design (calculations), technical 

and technological documentation along with qua

fi cation testing procedures for the computer.

• A former high-ranking offi cial in MIC said that, 

in mid-2001, the Technology Transfer Department of the IIS procured between 10 and 20 gyros 

and accelerometers from China for approximately 
62

$180,000. The items were intended for the G&C 

system of the Al Samud missile. The gyros were 

of the resonant type with a drift rate of 1⁄2 degree 

per hour. The source indicated that the Iraqis were 

never able to use the gyros and accelerometers 

because the packages were incomplete and therefore inoperable.

• An Iraqi scientist with direct access to the information claimed that entities in the FRY in 2002 offered 

to supply Al Milad with a navigation system for the 

Iraqi Jinin program (a cruise missile based on the 

HY-2). All requirements for the Jinin project were 

communicated to the foreign vendors directly.

• According to an Iraqi national with indirect knowledge of proscribed equipment smuggling, Wi’am 

Gharbiyah, a Palestinian businessman, successfully 

smuggled missile gyros into Iraq from Russia via 

Syria in 2002. Gharbiyah, whose earlier attempt to 

illegally import gyros from Russia to Dr. Muzhir of 

Al Karamah was foiled in Jordan due to detection 

by the UN in late 1995, used one of his contacts 

to propose to the Iraqi government to sell approximately 400 components containing gyroscopes and 

accelerometers in 2001. Using the IIS front company Al Karradah, the components were successfully delivered to Al Karamah through Syria in July 

2002. ISG has not been able to confi rm that this 

transaction occurred. 

• ISG has uncovered evidence that Iraq had numerous contracts with Dr. Degtaryev, a Russian missile 

guidance expert and the head of SystemTech. ISG 

has been unable to confi rm whether these contracts were fulfi lled.

— Huwaysh claimed that Dr. Degtaryev was subcontracted through the Belarusian fi rm Infobank to 

build 3 guidance sets for the Al Samud, but these 

were detained during shipment through Jordan. 

Iraq then placed an additional order for 3 guidance 

sets, that were successfully delivered. Huwaysh 

stated that these sets were never used because they 

were sent to a facility for replication but they were 

unable to duplicate them by the time of OIF. 

— A former Iraqi senior executive in MIC stated that 

the Al Karamah General Company signed and 

executed several contracts with Dr. Degtaryev. 

Through the ARMOS Company, Al Karamah 

signed contracts with Degtaryev. He visited Iraq 

several times along with other experts and executed 

several contracts with the Al Milad, Al Karamah, 

and Al Harith companies valued at $20 million. 

— According to documents ISG retrieved from the 

offi ce of MIC, Iraq signed contracts for missile 

guidance electronics with the fi rm SystemTech 

run by Degtaryev. Although ISG has been able to 

recover some of the delivered components, ISG 

has not confi rmed that these contracts were fully 

executed. 

Iraq relied on foreign suppliers for productionrelated machinery for use in its Al Samud programs. 

Iraq’s success at acquiring this machinery probably 

affected the production rate of these missiles. Russian entities were the main suppliers of machinery 

and tooling, though other suppliers may have played 

a role. 

• A high-level Iraqi offi cial and an Iraqi scientist 

claimed that, beginning in 1998, in addition to 

engineering and technical support, experts signed 

contracts to supply many of the pieces of equipment for the Al Samud program. This equipment 

included many of the production machines along 

with related dies, moulds, and fi xtures for the Al 

Samud program. Two small automatic circumferential and longitudinal welding machines were sent 

from Russia. The Russians also provided jigs and 

fi xtures that were made in Russia and then imported 

into Iraq. 

• ISG learned through interviews with a former 

high-ranking offi cial in MIC that, in June 2001, 

Iraq signed a contract with a company from Russia 

for machinery and equipment that was worth $10 

million. The machinery included a fl ow former, 

furnaces, and welding machines. The fl ow former 

was tested in Russia and installed at the Al Samud 

site in Abu Ghurayb but was not used before the 

war. The original contract length was 18 months; 

however, it was extended because the work specifi ed in the contract was incomplete. At the start of 

OIF, work on the engine fi xtures for Al Samud II 

was 60-70% complete, work on the airframe design 
63

Delivery Systems

was 50 percent complete, and work that would 

have contributed to the test and assembly of new 

engines was 40 percent complete. These projects 

were intended to help establish a proper production line for the Al Samud II because the missiles 

produced before June 2001 were not of consistent 

quality, which made them unreliable. The experts 

co-operated with the Iraqis until OIF. ISG has no 

evidence that the government of Russia sanctioned 

or approved these contracts. 

• A former high-ranking offi cial in Iraq’s ballistic 

missile program stated that, in 1999, Al Karamah 

signed a contract worth $1.6 million with a Russian company for Al Samud airframe production, 

assembly, and testing. According to the contract, 

the payments would be tied to item deliveries. 

The fi rst payment of $100,000 would be paid after 

receiving the design drawings. The contract was 

modifi ed in 2001 when the Al Samud missile diameter increased to 760 mm. By 2003 only 65% of the 

design drawings were received.

ISG judges that Iraq received at least 380 SA-2/

Volga liquid-propellant engines from Poland and 

possibly Russia or Belarus. Source claims corroborated by contract information support this judgment. This fi gure is also consistent with what Iraq 

declared to the UN. 

• According to a high-level offi cial in Iraq’s missile 

program, Iraq received 280 SA-2 engines, some 

of which were secondhand and some damaged, 

from Poland through a company known as Evax. 

A majority of these engines reportedly arrived in 

2002. Additionally, the source speculated that Iraq 

had possibly imported 100 SA-2 engines from 

Russia through an Iraqi company known as Al 

Rawa’a. 

• A letter dated 2 July 2001 signed by Dr. Hadi 

Taresh Zabun, the head of MIC’s procurement 

department, indicated that MIC had received 

approval to enter into contract with Evax for an 

additional 96 SA-2 engines under the same terms 

and prices as their earlier contract for 38 engines. 

Another document referenced a subsequent contract 

for Iraq to receive the remainder of the 200 engines 

they had ordered, 96 of which they had already 

received. This was followed by a letter dated 11 

April 2002 from the Polish company Evax to the 

Deputy Minister of Military Industrialization, 

which states that a third shipment has arrived at the 

port of Tartus and is on its way to Baghdad (the Al 

Karamah General Company), comprising 32 Volga 

rocket engines and 750 pieces (pressure valve, 

air valve, servo, and miscellaneous other materials). The letter also states that a shipment of 104 

samples is delayed in Poland awaiting the required 

inspection before they can be exported (comment: 

this may refer to the rest of the 200 engines in the 

contract).

• A source with indirect access to information 

claimed that, in December 2002, Iraq successfully procured either from Belarus or Russia, 

approximately 100 Volga engines and 380 missile 

thermal batteries. They then imported these items 

via Sudan and Syria by using a front company 

called Al Rawa’a. ISG has no evidence that these 

East Europeans countries either sanctioned or 

approved these transactions. 

Offi cials within Iraq’s missile programs have disclosed information about Iraq’s pursuit of carbon 

fi ber technology for use in its solid rocket motor 

programs. Companies from Russia were Iraq’s main 

targets for the acquisition of this technology.

• A former senior-level offi cial in Iraq’s missile program provided information about Iraq’s attempts to 

obtain carbon fi ber technology that is used for solid 

rocket motors such as the Al Fat’h. MIC began 

pursuing carbon fi ber technology from Russia in the 

last quarter of 2002; this effort ran in parallel with 

work being accomplished by the Military Engineering College under contract to the Al Rashid General 

Company. Iraq’s Military Engineering College 

and the Al Rashid General Company were responsible for Iraq’s indigenous carbon fi ber production 

efforts. Al Rashid was responsible for the solid-propellant motor case and the Iraqi Military Engineering College was responsible for the carbon fi ber 

production lines. The contract, which included one 

carbon fi ber fi lament winding machine, one mandrel manufacturing machine, one mandrel extraction machine, one high-powered cleaning machine 

used to remove the gypsum from the mandrel, 

and one curing furnace was not completed by the 

required date and an extension was granted. By the 

start of OIF, the majority of the components were 

fi nished.
64

Figure 27. A-16 shipping container.

Figure 28. MG-4 gyroscope, 

AK-5 and A-15 accelerometers.
65

Delivery Systems

• A former high-level offi cial in MIC claimed that 

during the fi rst quarter of 2003, an unidentifi ed 

Russian company contacted the ARMOS Company to facilitate a visit by Iraqi researchers to the 

Russian carbon fi ber production lines and have the 

experts from Russia provide technical assistance. 

MIC created a delegation, authorized by Huwaysh, 

to travel to Russia to speak with the technicians and 

visit the lines. The Iraqi delegation was canceled 

due to the start of OIF.

Iraq’s inability to successfully produce all the 

chemicals necessary for propellants for its missile systems forced Iraq to acquire these chemicals 

from foreign entities. Iraq attempted to use a front 

company to mask these activities from international 

attention. ISG discovered numerous occasions in 

which Iraq attempted to acquire chemicals for use in 

their liquid-propellant missile program. ISG has not 

been able to confi rm that contracts were ever agreed 

to for all these chemicals or if any agreed contracts 

were ever fulfi lled.

• Documents ISG recovered from the Baghdad 

offi ces of the Arabic Scientifi c Bureau (ASB) and 

Inaya Trading company describe solicited quotes 

from Chinese and Indian companies (including the 

Inaya Trading Company) for chemicals and materials used with liquid-propellant missiles. Some 

of the chemicals in which the ASB was interested 

were: Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), 

Diethylenetriamine (DETA), Hydrazine, Hydrogen Peroxide, Xylidene, and Triethylamine. These 

chemicals are common fuels and oxidizers used 

in liquid-propellant engines. The documents do 

not, however, indicate whether any contracts were 

signed or material delivered, and, since the dates 

reported are late 2002, purchase of the chemicals 

may have been stopped by OIF. 

• ISG has learned that in 2002 proposals were placed 

before MIC by the Al Anas Trading Agency Co., 

Ltd., through Dr. Nazar ‘Abd-al-‘Amir Hamudi, for 

amounts totaling hundreds of tons of many different 

liquid propellants, their constituents or pre-cursor 

chemicals. The information states not only was 

Iraq actively looking for stocks of propellants that 

were currently in widespread use but also that they 

were seeking tens of tons of more advanced, higher 

energy liquid propellants. ISG believes that, due 

to the start of OIF, these chemicals were never 

delivered. 

• A former executive in MIC told ISG that Iraq 

had wanted to purchase or produce AZ-11 liquid 

propellant because it is a more energetic fuel and 

produces greater thrust. Therefore, the Iraqis made 

several attempts to acquire AZ-11 fuel from the 

Ukraine but they were never successful. 

Iraq also undertook efforts to improve its solid-propellant program by importing chemicals needed in the 

production of solid-propellants. Though ISG has not 

been able to confi rm that contracts were ever agreed 

to for all these chemicals or if all of the contracts 

were ever fulfi lled, ISG did discover large amounts 

of imported aluminum powder during a site visit 

to Al Amin Factory, part of the Al Rashid General 

Company.

• Some 60 tons of imported aluminum powder, suitable for use in solid-propellant rocket motors, were 

discovered during an ISG site exploitation inspection of Al Amin Factory. At the then current rate of 

demand, this would have satisfi ed the requirement 

for hundreds of motors. Considerable quantities of 

other propellant materials had also been imported 

and were potentially available for use. 

Figure 29. Actuator stepper motor.
66

• A former high-ranking offi cial in the Iraqi missile 

program who had direct access to the information claimed that Iraq purchased chemicals used in 

solid-propellant rocket motors. The offi cial reported 

that, in 1999, the Al Rashid General Company 

purportedly placed orders for raw materials that are 

used in the production of solid-propellants for missiles. Among the orders was a purchase made from 

the Al ‘Ayan Company, owned by Jabir Al Dulaymi, 

for six tons of ammonium perchlorate (AP) and six 

tons of aluminum powder. The Al ‘Ayan Company 

purchased these items from a French company for 

Al Rashid. ISG has no evidence that the French 

government either sanctioned or approved this 

transaction.

• A few offi cials have provided information about 

Iraq’s dealings with the Indian fi rm NEC for chemicals for solid-propellants. ISG has no confi rmation 

that the government of India either sanctioned or 

approved these activities, and Indian authorities 

arrested NEC’s director, Hans Raj Shiv, in 2003 

for his illicit activities. 

— According to Huwaysh, former Director of MIC, 

he had many business dealings with the Indian fi rm 

NEC. Huwaysh says that as late as April 2003, 

Hans Raj Shiv, the director of NEC, was working 

in NEC’s Baghdad offi ce. Examples of the IraqiNEC business relationship are: NEC supplied the 

Al Qa’qa’a General Company with a nitric acid 

production capability used in the production of 

explosives. Between 1999 and 2002, Iraq purchased 

from NEC at least 10 cells that were used to process 

sodium chloride, probably related AP production. 

— ISG has learned from an Iraqi scientist with direct 

access to the information that, from 1999 to April 

2003, Iraq procured from NEC Engineers Private, 

Ltd., the design and construction of AP processing 

facilities. AP is a major constituent of solid-propellants. The procurement included machine equipment, tools, and direct engineering assistance. This 

contractual relationship resulted in the construction 

of two AP production facilities. The Iraqis did most 

of the work on the fi rst facility but NEC provided 

technical assistance, the electrolytic cells, and the 

centrifuges. This facility had an output capacity of 

50 tons per year (NFI). The second AP facility, with 

a capacity of 180 tons per year, required much more 

involvement by NEC who provided the equipment, 

production technology, and engineering support. 

The Iraqi Al Faw Company was involved with the 

physical construction of this facility. ISG judges 

that these two facilities, if run at full capacity, 

would have produced suffi cient oxidizer a year to 

manufacture 300 tons of propellant – more than 

suffi cient to support Iraq’s declared solid-propellant programs and enough to facilitate work on 

motors for new missiles.

• According to a former high-ranking offi cial in the 

Iraqi missile program, the Al Rashid General Company purchased raw materials for solid-propellant 

motors beginning in 1999. Among the items were:

— 356 tons of AP. Six tons of AP from the Al Rayan 

Company, which was purchased from France; an 

additional 350 tons purchased from the following 

entities: NEC, which purchased the AP from an 

unnamed source; Al Sharqiyah, which purchased 

the AP from an unnamed purchased the AP from 

China; and Al Maghrib, which purchased the AP 

from France;

— 126 tons of aluminum powder. An initial order of 

six tons of aluminum powder from an unidentifi ed source; an additional 120 tons purchased from 

NEC and three Iraqi companies (Al Sharqiyah, 

Al Maghrib, and Al ‘Ayan) who purchased it from 

France; 

— 104 tons of HTPB. An initial order of four tons 

of hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), a 

binder, purchased from the Al Taqaddum Company, 

which purchased it from an Italian company; and 

an additional 100 tons of HTPB from NEC, which 

purchased it from a United States company, 

— 2 tons of methyl aziridinyl phosphine oxide 

(MAPO) from NEC, which purchased it from 

China;

— 60 tons of dioctyl azelate (DOZ) from Al Sharqiyah, 

which purchased it from a Japanese fi rm.
67

Delivery Systems

Infrastructure Improvements and Technology 

Developments 

The steady improvement in Iraqi missile infrastructure seen during the Regime’s “Decline” phase 

was accelerated after 1996 in the: “Recovery” and 

“Transition” periods. Iraq expended great efforts 

reconstituting destroyed or unusable equipment in 

order to restore required production and deployment 

capabilities for the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h. These 

capabilities could have been used to develop and 

produce missiles with ranges longer than allowed 

under UNSCR 687. No restraints were applied to 

achieving this objective, including clear breaches of 

international treaties and the use of foreign expertise 

and assistance.

Static Test-Firing Facilities

ISG judges that Iraq’s existing static test facilities 

for liquid rocket engines and solid rocket motors 

were in no physical condition to continue to support 

development and testing of Iraq’s liquid-propellant 

rocket engines. 

• Iraq’s existing liquid-propellant engine test stand 

at Al Rafah was designed to handle a single Scudclass engine of 13.5 tons of thrust, but, due to more 

than a decade and a half of usage, age, and bombing, was probably not capable for Iraq’s needs. 

According to one Iraqi engineer, construction on 

a new test stand began by August 2001, and it was 

sized to handle an engine larger than the SA-2-class 

or Scud-class engine. However, while physically 

able to accept a larger engine, the facility was not 

capable of withstanding the thrust that such a large 

engine would normally be expected to produce. The 

engineer suggested the test stand could have been 

used to test clustered SA-2 engines. The facility 

was not commissioned by the time of OIF. ISG 

assesses the new stand with modifi cations was 

suitable for clustered engines.

• Although various static test-fi ring facilities for 

solid-propellant motors existed at the Al Qa’qa’a 

General Company (Nu’man site), these were of 

smaller capacity in terms of both explosive and 

thrust rating than those at Al Mutassim (Yawm Al 

Azim). At Al Mutassim, the largest of 5 test cells 

had been upgraded to allow thrust levels of 50 tons 

to be safely tested.

Solid-Propellant Rocket Motor Case Manufacture

At Al Amin, an aging oven originally installed for 

the fi rst stage of the proscribed BADR-2000 ballistic 

missile, which was “destroyed” by UNSCOM, was 

repaired. Iraq constructed a much larger annealing 

furnace, and an existing annealing furnace at a nearby 

Saddam General Company (now known as Al Ikha’ 

Company) was used in the manufacturing process for 

the Al Fat’h motor. This annealing capacity greatly 

exceeded the requirements of the Al Fat’h and Al 

‘Ubur missile systems and provided Iraq with the 

ability to create motor casings greater than 1 meter 

in diameter and 6.5 meters in length, consistent with 

the plans now revealed for a larger, longer range 

missile.

• During a site exploitation visit to Al Amin, ISG 

investigated the BADR-2000 aging oven that had 

been ‘destroyed’ by the UN and had been recomissioned for use in the production process for the 

Al Fat’h motor. To do this effectively, a cylindrical sleeve was inserted into the furnace to enable 

a better match with the 500-mm-diameter motor 

case. The aging oven was incapable of annealing 

30CrMoV9 material of the Al Fat’h motor case.

• Iraq built a new furnace that was capable of heattreating a motor case about 1.25 meters in diameter 

with a length in excess of 6.5 meters. This furnace 

contained a fi xture that could hold a motor case 1-

meter in diameter. ISG could not determine if this 

furnace had been used or even commissioned.

• Large annealing furnaces at an existing facility of 

the Saddam General Company were used to anneal 

solid-propellant rocket motor cases for the Al Fat’h 

missile.

Propellant Production

Iraq attempted to increase its solid-propellant production capability by repairing the prohibited 300-

gallon mixers declared “destroyed” by the UN. 

• While accounts differ, Iraq was reportedly able to 

repair at least one of the two 300-gallon mixers and 

two mixing bowls. Reports indicate that either one 

mixer was repaired to increase the existing mixing 

capability, or that both mixers were brought on line 
68

to support the requirement for a larger motor for the 

long-range missile program. 

• A cooperative source stated that the Iraqis immediately prior to the entry of UNMOVIC inspectors 

destroyed the 300-gallon mixers. Despite extensive 

searches, that included active source participation, 

ISG has not found physical evidence of mixers, 

parts, or debris.

Solid-Propellant Motor Casting Chambers

The capability to cast large solid-propellant rocket 

motors increased with the repair of two previously 

destroyed (and prohibited) casting chambers and the 

construction of an even larger chamber. 

• A new, even larger casting chamber, approximately 

1.56 meters external diameter by 6 meters deep, 

had been built for possible use in the production of 

a motorcase up to 1.25 meters in diameter. Because 

the chamber was built by Iraq and had not been 

used to produce proscribed items, UNMOVIC 

chose only to monitor the facility. 

Production of Solid-Propellant Ingredients

Ammonium perchlorate (AP) constitutes the greatest 

mass of composite solid-propellant, and its availability was crucial to the future of all of Iraq’s major 

solid-propellant missile programs. Planned production of propellant constituents would have enabled 

the production of motor quantities larger than 

known program requirements. 

• Iraq obtained assistance in the expansion of its AP 

production capabilities from NEC Engineers Pvt 

Ltd., an Indian Company, according to multiple 

sources. This facility was located at the former 

nuclear plant at Al Athir and was designed to produce 180 ton per year. However, this plant was not 

fully operational prior to OIF and produced only a 

limited quantity of AP. 

• According to a high-ranking offi cial in the Iraqi 

missile program, Iraqi universities attempted to 

revive the Hydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadiene 

(HTPB), a solid-propellant binder, plant at Al 

Ma’mun. This plant, purchased from Egypt in 1987, 

was supposed to supplement existing stockpiles. 

The source claimed that, although the plant had the 

necessary equipment, it never had the technology 

to use the equipment in HTPB production. If Iraq 

had been able to bring this facility on line, they 

would have reduced if not eliminated reliance on 

imported HTPB.

• Some 60 tons of imported aluminum powder, suitable for use in solid-propellant rocket motors, was 

discovered during an ISG site exploitation inspection of Al Amin. At the current rate of demand, 

this would have satisfi ed the requirement for 

hundreds of motors. Considerable quantities of 

other propellant materials had also been imported 

and were potentially available for use. 

Propellant Research

Iraq was undertaking a planned, long-term research 

program into solid and liquid propellants, in order 

to be self-suffi cient in propellant-related chemicals denied to them by UN sanctions and to create 

higher energy propellants, which could enhance the 

performance of existing and future ballistic missile 

systems.

• In 2001, Iraq began an extensive program researching higher energy composite solid-propellant 

ingredients including nitronium perchlorate (NP), 

nitro-hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), 

azido-HTPB, and ammonium dinitramide (ADN). 

The research was conducted in Basrah University 

and the Ibn Sina’ Company. Only a few grams of 

each were manufactured and possibly delivered 

to Al Rashid, but no serious production efforts 

were undertaken. ISG has found no evidence that 

research into NP, nitro-HTPB, or azido-HTPB 

was ever declared to the UN. ISG judges that Iraq 

was unlikely to develop missiles in the near term 

using any of these higher energy solid-propellant 

ingredients. 

• Starting in the late 1990s, Iraq also conducted 

research, testing, and limited production of higher 

energy liquid propellants such as unsymmetrical 

dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH), AZ-11, AK-40, and 

95%-99% pure hydrogen peroxide. This research 
69

Delivery Systems

and pilot production was conducted at several 

facilities including Ibn Sina’ Company, Mosul 

University, Al Kindi General Company, and Al 

Raya’ Company. From all available evidence, ISG 

believes that Iraq was not able to manufacture 

large quantities of these propellants.

• Starting in the late 1990s, Iraq also began research 

into production of propellants for its missile 

forces. These attempts at pilot production included 

xylidene, triethyl amine (TEA), nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), and inhibited red-fuming nitric acid 

(IRFNA). While Iraq was somewhat successful at 

regenerating or producing some AK-20 (mixture 

of 80% nitric acid and 20% N2

O4) and TG-02 

(50-50 mixture of xylidene and TEA), they were 

unsuccessful at producing large quantities of 

these propellants or any new propellants. Iraq was 

reportedly successful in acquiring quantities of 

these chemicals from abroad for use in propellant 

production.

Graphite Technology

Through its efforts to reverse-engineer SCUD 

missile designs before 1991, Iraq gained an understanding and ability to produce graphite nose tips 

that would satisfy the technical requirements of 

warheads that could be used on systems from short 

to very long ranges.

Graphite is used in ballistic missiles in areas that 

suffer high thermal and erosive stresses such as nose 

cone tips, solid-propellant nozzle throat inserts, and 

thrust vector control vanes. 

• According to a high-ranking offi cial in Iraq’s missile program, the nose of the warheads for the Al 

Samud and Al Fat’h missiles were graphite and 

based on the warhead design for the Scud missile. 

ISG retrieved three Al Samud II graphite-tipped 

nose cones during site exploitations. 

• A former military offi cer and engineer claimed 

that the graphite of the jet control vanes for the Al 

Samud proved capable of withstanding the intense 

heat and erosion during a vertical static test of the 

engine.

The procurement of graphite for the Iraqi ballistic 

missile program is well documented. The Arab Scientifi c Bureau, which was a front company seeking 

aerospace parts and chemicals for Iraqi state companies, tendered offers for graphite blocks. The Al 

Rashid General Company ordered 7.5 tons of graphite 

for 2003 and 2004, according to a contract document, 

and, during a site exploitation of the Al Amin Factory, 

ISG discovered two large wooden boxes containing 

two to three tons of graphite blocks.

Carbon Fiber Filament Winding 

Starting in 2001, Iraq began a program to develop 

carbon fi ber fi lament winding capabilities for use 

in weapons-related applications. This initiative only 

proceeded as far as the production of plain cylinders.

• According to several offi cials in the Iraqi missile 

program, Iraqi interest in carbon fi ber technology was aroused in the 1980s when an Iraqi team 

including Husayn Kamil went to Brazil and paid 

approximately $80 million for the technical specifi -

cations and training for the ASTROS-II carbon fi ber 

fi lament winding technology.

• A recovered memo dated 19 January 2001 documents a request by the Iraqi Al Basha’ir Trading 

Company to the FRY Company, Infi nity DOO, for 

a fi lament winding production line with technology 

transfer.

• An Iraqi engineer stated that, in 2001, the Iraqi 

Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) possessed an 

incomplete carbon fi ber fi lament-winding machine 

that had not been used since 1990. The machine 

was moved from the Al Athir complex to the Military Technology College (MTC) in 2001 where it 

was to be repaired and then copied.

• By mid-2001, Huwaysh approved a missile-related 

carbon fi ber winding production program and 

selected the 500-mm Al Fat’h solid-propellant 

motor case, nozzle, and end dome as the candidate 

for the carbon fi ber fi lament winding initiative. 

• During a meeting in February 2002, Huwaysh initiated an effort to seek foreign assistance in carbon 

fi ber composite production, using the ARMOS 

Company.
70

• A high-ranking offi cial in the Iraqi missile program 

recalled that, by the summer of 2002, a contract 

was awarded to the MTC to develop fi ber winding 

machines with the ability of winding objects one 

meter in diameter and seven meters long, and the 

mandrel capacity was to support a 500-mm diameter 4 to 41⁄2 meters in length. By the start of OIF 

the contract was still not complete.

• A former MIC offi cial claimed that concurrent 

to the MTC fi lament winding machine contract, 

MIC pursued assistance from Russian entities in 

carbon fi ber technology. In September or October 

2002, a Russian expert reportedly visited MIC and 

agreed to a reciprocal visit in Russia on carbon fi ber 

technology. A trip was planned for Iraqi researchers 

to visit Russian carbon fi ber production lines and 

receive technical assistance. The trip did not take 

place due to OIF.

• MIC also examined importing carbon fi ber raw 

materials from Europe while at the same time tasking a postgraduate student at Babylon University 

to research making carbon fi ber raw materials from 

petroleum.

The properties of carbon fi ber could provide a 30-

40% weight savings over components made from 

steel. As an example, the Al Fat’h steel motor case, 

nozzle and end dome make up approximately 200 kg 

of the 1,050 kg total mass of the motor. A carbon fi ber 

design could save approximately 60-80 kg of weight 

from the roughly 1,050 kg total weight. This savings 

could be applied to additional warhead capacity or 

towards increasing the range. 

Ceramic Warhead Effort? 

ISG has no credible evidence that Iraq was pursuing ceramic warheads for use as CBW warheads. 

Ceramic’s poor heat-resistant properties negate its 

use with conventional, chemical, and biological warheads. While ceramic warheads may retain dimensional stability during aerodynamic heating, they also 

transfer this heat directly to the payload. Therefore, 

extremely elaborate techniques would be required to 

cool any CBW warhead and would, at least, require 

thermal insulation for conventional warheads. One 

source assessed by the collector as likely being 

motivated by fi nancial incentives claimed that Iraqi 

scientists were working on developing ceramic warheads designed for fi lling with chemical agents and 

mounting on missiles within a few hours. The source 

added that the Badr General Company made “a few” 

of these warheads. There is no evidence to support 

these claims, and ISG judges that the source’s statements are not credible.

• While ceramic materials are heat resistant and 

relatively inert to most chemicals, working with 

this material is complicated. The US and the UK 

investigated using ceramic warheads for ballistic 

missiles in the 1970s, but these investigations were 

not pursued.

• A ceramic warhead would have better in-fl ight 

dimensional stability during re-entry compared to 

ablative warheads. Dimensional stability during 

fl ight directly relates to aerodynamic stability and 

increased accuracy. However, increased costs associated with manufacturing and handling ceramic 

warheads outweigh the benefi ts. 

• Producing consistent ceramic formulations is still 

an art, and machining ceramic materials to a desired 

shape on a consistent basis is notoriously diffi cult. 

Ceramic warheads must also be handled with care, 

which necessitates entirely new procedures for use 

and training.

ISG recovered ceramic nose cone pieces which were 

not suffi cient to form a complete nose cone. However, 

initial examination of these ceramic pieces shows 

a right cone at the tip followed by a transition to an 

ogive shape, which is similar to a SA-6 nose cone. 

These may have been subscale models or may be 

totally unrelated to ballistic missiles.

Proscribed Activities 

ISG has substantial documentary evidence and 

source reporting indicating that the Regime intentionally violated various international resolutions 

and agreements in order to pursue its delivery 

systems programs. Sources with direct access have 

described missile projects with design ranges well 

beyond UN limits and ISG has research documents 

to corroborate these claims. Additionally, ISG has 
71

Delivery Systems

exploited documents that confi rm Iraq circumvented 

UN sanctions by illicitly importing components for 

use in its missile programs. 

Violations of United Nations Sanctions and 

Resolutions 

ISG has uncovered numerous examples of Iraq’s 

disregard for UN sanctions and resolutions in an 

effort to improve its missile and UAV capabilities. 

These violations repeatedly breached UNSCR 687, 

707, 715, 1051, 1284, 1441 and pursuant annexes 

and enabled Iraq to develop more robust delivery 

system programs. 

Equipment Restoration 

Multiple sources have highlighted Iraq’s efforts to 

reconstitute equipment associated with past missile 

programs previously disabled or declared destroyed 

by UNSCOM. Accounts for the actual use of these 

restored items vary. ISG has been able to confi rm 

the existence of some of this equipment, but not all 

of it. 

Several sources with direct access have provided 

information about the successful repair of one of the 

300-gallon solid-propellant mixers associated with the 

BADR-2000 missile project that were destroyed by 

UNSCOM in 1992 at Al Ma’mun. ISG has conducted 

site exploitation visits to the last reported locations of 

these mixers but has been unable to locate them. 

• According to two high-level offi cials within the 

Iraqi missile program, one of the two 300-gallon 

mixers destroyed by the UN was repaired in 2002, 

but the other could not be repaired. The offi cials did 

not elaborate on what the mixer was used for. 

• Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, the former 

director of the NMD, stated that Huwaysh ordered 

the repair of the mixers around 2001 but later stated 

this order came in 2002. Amin claimed that the 

Iraqis used the one repaired mixer for about two 

months. Amin then convinced Huwaysh to allow 

him to destroy the mixer because it was a violation 

of UNSCR 687. According to Amin, this information was not disclosed to UNMOVIC. 

• According to Huwaysh, in 2002 ‘Abd-al-Baqi 

Rashid Shia’ Al Ta’i of the Al Rashid General 

Company was given permission to repair one of the 

two 300-gallon solid-propellant mixers. One of the 

mixers had been completely destroyed so ‘Abd-alBaqi restored the partially destroyed mixer.

A few sources have disclosed information about 

Iraq’s efforts to rebuild the BADR-2000 aging oven, 

which was declared, destroyed by UNSCOM. An ISG 

site exploitation mission has confi rmed these claims. 

• An Iraqi scientist claimed that Iraq had rebuilt the 

aging oven associated with the BADR-2000 program at the Al Amin factory. He added that, since 

the maximum temperature in the furnace could not 

reach the required temperature of 1,000 degrees, the 

Iraqis built an even bigger furnace. 

• An ISG site exploitation visit to Al Amin confi rmed 

this claim, and ISG was able to inspect the restored 

BADR-2000 aging oven and a larger, built-in 

annealing furnace. ISG judges that both furnaces 

could be used in the production of motor cases 

with diameters larger than one meter, which is 

beyond the requirements for any rocket or missile 

permitted by the UN.

In addition to the mixer and aging oven, ISG has 

identifi ed two other areas where Iraq rebuilt or reused 

equipment that had been disabled, destroyed, or 

banned. 

• According to a “certifi cate of machine repair” 

recovered by ISG, one of the three fl ow-forming 

machines at Al Karamah that had been destroyed 

by UNSCOM was rebuilt by February 2001. The 

document was signed by several department heads 

within the Al Samud program and included a statement that the machine’s intended use was for the 

production of Al Samud rocket engine covers. ISG 

has been unable to locate this piece of equipment. 

• Coalition forces recovered a letter from ‘Abd-alBaqi Rashid Shia’, the director of the Al Rashid 

General Company, requesting a piece of steel one 

meter in diameter from a canceled project. The steel 

was a part of the Gerald Bull Supergun project, 

which Iraq was forced to terminate in order to 

comply with UNSCR 687. The letter from ‘Abd-alBaqi was in reference to the large diameter motor 
72

project. Iraq attempted to use a barrel-section from 

the Supergun Project to create a prototype 1 meter 

diameter motor case but the effort failed because of 

material incompatibilities. Iraqi technicians were 

unable to weld the motor end domes to the Supergun barrel.

Iraq’s restoration of prohibited equipment associated with past missile programs directly violated UN 

restrictions on Iraq’s missile programs. Iraq chose 

to deliberately ignore these restrictions to improve its 

missile production infrastructure. 

Undeclared Activities 

Several former high-level Regime offi cials and scientists directly affi liated with Iraq’s military industries 

have indicated that Iraq intentionally withheld information from the UN regarding its delivery systems 

programs, to include research into delivery systems 

with design ranges well in excess of 150 km.

• According to one former high-ranking government 

offi cial, Huwaysh restricted the NMD’s access 

to MIC when the NMD was preparing the 2002 

CAFCD. As a result, some MIC work was omitted, 

which violated UNSCR 1441. 

• Several sources have admitted their direct involvement in the destruction of documents related to 

delivery systems programs to prevent divulging 

them to the UN.

This pattern of activity occurred at all levels and indicates a widespread effort to protect certain activities 

and to deceive the international community. According to numerous sources, Iraq worked on several 

delivery system projects that were never declared to 

the UN, violating UNSCR 1441. Some of these projects were designed to achieve ranges beyond 150 km 

and if developed would have violated UNSCR 687 

and 715. Many missile specialists directly involved in 

these projects have admitted to destroying documents 

related to these programs to prevent the UN from 

discovering them, which violates UNSCR 707.

• Through a series of interviews with former MIC 

and NMD offi cials, ISG has discovered that Iraq 

since 1991 did not disclose the IRFNA production capability at Al Qa’qa’a to the UN. One NMD 

offi cial claimed that Husayn Kamil had passed an 

order not to declare this capability to the UN and 

this order was observed even after Husayn Kamil’s 

death. Other offi cials claim that Iraq decided to 

withhold the IRFNA production capability of Al 

Qa’qa’a for fear that the UN would destroy the 

plant, virtually closing Iraq’s extensive munitions 

industries. 

• Former high-ranking MIC offi cials and scientists 

in the Iraqi missile program claim that, between 

2000 and 2002, Huwaysh ordered Dr. Muzhir of Al 

Karamah to design a long-range liquid-propellant 

missile (see the Long-Range Missile chapter for 

more information). Huwaysh retained all the hardcopy evidence of this project and later destroyed it 

to prevent detection by the UN, although ISG has 

been able to uncover some design drawings for two 

long-range missile projects—the two- and fi veengine clustered engine designs. 

• An engineer associated with the Iraqi missile program claimed that, in early 2001, Huwaysh directed 

‘Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia’ of the Al Rashid General 

Company to pursue a long-range solid-propellant 

missile. The engineer also provided a diagram for 

a launcher for a long-range solid-propellant missile, that Al Fida’ engineers had been working on. 

The engineer claimed that research into this missile 

project ceased upon the arrival of UNMOVIC in 

late 2002 (see the Long-Range Missile chapter for 

more information). 

• Much of Iraq’s work on SA-2 conversion projects 

was never disclosed to the UN, according to offi -

cials associated with these projects. MIC offi cials 

decided to withhold all information from the UN 

about the Sa’d project, headed by Al Kindi, in part 

because it had not yet reached the prototype stage. 

Ra’ad Isma’il Jamil Al Adhami’s SA-2 conversion 

efforts were not declared to the UN although the 

fl ight tests were manipulated so that the missiles 

would not exceed 150 km. 

• Iraq withheld information about its efforts to extend 

the range of its HY-2 cruise missiles. Two individuals within MIC claimed that the 1,000 km Jinin 

cruise missile project ceased at the end of 2002 

before the resumption of UNMOVIC inspections. 

One source said that the airframes were transferred from Al Karamah where the modifi cations 
73

Delivery Systems

were being made to a storage warehouse before 

UNMOVIC arrived for fear of the project being 

discovered. Iraq’s attempts to extend the range of 

the HY-2 anti-ship cruise missile to beyond 150 km 

in a land-attack role were not declared to the UN 

(see Cruise Missile chapter for more information). 

• A few sources have admitted that at least one Iraqi 

UAV fl ew beyond 150 km, and Huwaysh claimed 

that Iraq had tested UAVs to a range of only 100 km 

but that the range could easily be increased to 500 

km by adding a larger fuel tank. Huwaysh also suggested that the L-29 program was a 100% replacement for the MiG-21 RPV program, implying—but 

never directly saying—that the mission of the L-29 

was to deliver CBW. ISG has no other evidence 

to support this statement (see the UAV section for 

more information). 

• A high-level offi cial within the Iraqi missile 

program claimed that, in an effort to make Iraq’s 

missile infrastructure less dependent upon foreign suppliers, MIC directed university projects 

to research ingredients used in solid and liquid 

propellants. Because of the sensitivity of this 

research, Iraq never disclosed these efforts to the 

UN. Former university students and individuals 

associated with the missile program alleged that 

this undisclosed research occurred at universities in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra. Researchers 

claim their attempts to produce such materials, 

as Hydroxy Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB), 

Nitronium Perchlorate (NP), Nitroglycerine, and 

Hydrogen Peroxide at high concentration levels 

were unsuccessful.

ISG has exploited dozens of contracts that confi rm 

the requests, orders, and deliveries of UN-restricted 

components and equipment involving facilities associated with Iraq’s missile and UAV programs. Iraq’s 

use of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, front companies, and false end user certifi cates indicate Iraq 

knew these activities violated international sanctions. Iraq also negotiated with other countries for 

complete missile systems, but there is no evidence 

any shipments were ever made (see the Procurement 

chapter for more information).

Graphite

Graphite is well known for its property of withstanding high temperatures and thermal shock, especially 

in nonoxidizing environments.

For missile applications, the denser it is, the more 

useful it is as a temperature-resistant material. 

Graphite densities below about 1,600 kg/m3

 (1.6 g/cc) 

are only useful for nonnuclear or nonrocket application. Densities above 1,700 kg/m3

 are useful for missiles and above 1,800 kg/m3 for nuclear applications. 

Uses of high-density graphite include:

• High-temperature crucibles.

• Anodes for electric steelmaking.

• Nuclear applications (graphite is a moderator).

• Missile and propulsion application.

Missile applications include the nose tip, jet vanes, 

and nozzle throat inserts. High-density graphite is 

used in nose tips because it is temperature resistant and can withstand high dynamic pressure and 

thermal effects better than lower density graphite. 

High-density graphite can be used as a liner for the 

extreme thermal and erosive environment experienced 

in the throats of solid-propellant motor nozzles where 

the high temperature environment is made worse by 

the presence of alumina particles (from propellant 

combustion) in the exhaust. Graphite inserts are not 

commonly used in liquid-propellant engines. 

High-density graphite is also used in thrust vector 

control vanes, where aerodynamic surfaces are used 

to defl ect the exhaust gas fl ow path, thus changing the 

direction of thrust. Although this method incurs drag 

losses, it is effective in providing a control mechanism 

for missiles. 
74

• Former high-level offi cials admit MIC procured 

ballistic missile engineering assistance, gyroscopes, 

SA-2/Volga missile engines, and SA-2 batteries 

from companies in Eastern Europe. ISG has recovered contracts and other documents to corroborate 

these admissions.

— Huwaysh admitted that Iraq had imported hundreds 

of SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant engines from 

companies in Poland—activities that were disclosed 

to UNMOVIC. ISG has exploited several offi cial 

documents containing the contractual details (e.g., 

serial numbers of these engines).

• Former high-level MIC offi cials disclosed that Iraq 

received missile components such as gyroscopes 

and accelerometers from China. 

• Huwaysh and an Iraqi scientist both asserted that 

Iraq received assistance and materials for missile 

propellants from Indian fi rms, particularly NEC. 

• Several documents have been recovered that include 

information about Iraqi negotiations with North 

Korea for missile materials and long-range missile 

systems, probably including the 1,300-km-range No 

Dong. There is no evidence to confi rm the delivery 

of any ballistic missile systems. 

• Statements from former high-level Regime offi cials 

and documentation indicate Russian entities provided assistance to Iraq’s missile programs. Russian 

entities exported numerous key pieces of equipment 

to Iraq through illegal channels and also supplied 

technical experts. Iraq also negotiated for complete 

Iskander-E missiles systems, although no missiles 

were ever purchased or delivered, according to 

Huwaysh. 

• Captured documents show Iraq’s reliance on FRY 

assistance to develop a domestic G&C design, 

manufacture, calibration, and test capability. Iraq 

also imported guidance instruments from FRY. 

• Former high-level MIC offi cials provided information about Iraq’s procurement efforts through 

Ukraine. Iraq received missile and UAV components as well as technical assistance from the 

Ukraine.

Benefi ts of Carbon Fiber Filament Winding in 

Missile Construction

Carbon Fiber Filament Winding is ideal for missile 

construction because of the superior material properties of carbon fi ber and the repeatability and consistency of the fi lament winding process. 

Carbon fi ber materials have superior material 

properties to glass fi ber, aluminum, and steel in 

the areas of specifi c strength, specifi c stiffness, and 

relative density. Carbon fi ber composites are fi ve 

times stronger and fi ve times lighter than 1020 steel 

with a specifi c strength (a combined measure of both 

strength and density) 13 times that of aluminum and 

1.4 times that of glass fi ber composites. The chart at 

the end of this section highlights the superior carbon 

fi ber material properties.

The Iraqi missile and UAV programs benefi ted 

from Iraq’s defi ance of UN sanctions because they 

were able to obtain material and technical expertise 

they otherwise could not have developed. Several 

sources and documentary evidence confi rm that Iraq 

participated in such activities. The measures taken 

to conceal these activities from the UN are evidence 

that Iraq was well aware these activities were illegal.

Role of the MTCR 

Although Iraq is not a signatory of the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—a voluntary 

agreement among member states whose goal is to 

control missile proliferation—ISG uncovered substantial evidence that companies in MTCR member 

states provided missile components and technical 

assistance—some of these components and assistance may be controlled under the MTCR— to 

Iraq’s delivery system programs.

• Sources within the Iraqi missile program disclosed 

that Iraq had contracts with Russia for fl ow-forming 

machines that may have been MTCR controlled, but 

ISG has been unable to confi rm the delivery of such 

items. Computer numerically-controlled fl ow-forming machines with more than two axes, which can 

be coordinated with simultaneously for contouring 

control—useful for making rocket motor cases, end 

domes and nozzles—are controlled under Category 

II of the MTCR annex. 
75

Delivery Systems

• Individuals within MIC stated that Iraq received 

gyroscopes from Russia for use in their missile 

programs, specifi cally the Al Samud II. Contractual 

evidence also exists that corroborates source claims 

that Al Karamah imported gyroscopes from Russian 

companies. Coalition forces recovered gyroscopes 

with Cyrillic letters on them and documents in Russian at both Al Karamah and Al Milad, which suggests that these items were imported from Russia. 

Russia may have been in breech of the MTCR 

because gyroscopes, which measure rotation at 

about one or more axes, are Category II–controlled 

items if they have a drift rate of less than 0.5 degree 

per hour. 

• ISG recovered a contract between a Russian entity 

and Iraq for Russian technical assistance for missile 

unidentifi ed designs as well as Global Positioning 

System (GPS) equipment for unidentifi ed missiles. 

GPS devices, if used to supplement or update the 

guidance set and increase the accuracy of a ballistic missile, are controlled under Category II of the 

MTCR annex. 

A high-ranking offi cial in the Iraqi missile program 

alleged that Iraq received AP and aluminum powder 

from a France fi rm via the Al ‘Ayan Company. Iraq 

also received HTPB from an Italian fi rm via the Al 

Taqaddum Company, from a Japanese fi rm via the 

Al Sharqiyah Company and an unidentifi ed source in 

the United States via the Indian fi rm NEC Engineers 

Private, Ltd. ISG has been unable to corroborate 

this information with any other source reporting or 

contracts.
76

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77

Delivery Systems

Annex A

Resolving the Retained 

Scud-Variant Missile Question 

Introduction

The data in this Annex are complementary to and in 

support of the material found in the Delivery Systems 

Report and as such should be referenced only in conjunction with that Report. Items in this Annex address 

specifi c topics that are presented in the Report but 

include greater detail or additional data, and provide 

more information to support the contentions and arguments in the main text. 

1.1 Scud Missile Material Balance 

Documentation recovered by ISG appears to be an 

Iraqi attempt to account for its Scud missiles. This 

material reportedly was never disclosed to the UN.

The documentation includes the serial numbers for 

all 819 Scud missiles Iraq received from the Soviet 

Union between 1972 and 1988, contract numbers, 

and the disposition of these missiles broken down by 

serial number. Also included are two fi gures: the fi rst 

entitled “Inventory Account of Used Rockets Provided by Russia (Declaration)” represents the Scud 

missile account as given to the UN; the second fi gure 

entitled “Inventory Account of Used Rockets Provided by Russia (Facts)” is, according to the engineer, 

the most accurate accounting for Iraq’s Scud missiles. The numbers in this second fi gure vary from 

the numbers Iraq disclosed in its 2002 Currently 

Accurate Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) 

to the UN, and the explanation for the discrepancy 

in the numbers is provided in these documents. 

According to the source of this information, these 

documents represent the full story on Scud missile material balance. This material was most likely 

prepared to support a presentation at the Technical 

Evaluation Meetings (TEMs) held in Baghdad in 

early 1998. 
78

Figure 1. Inventory account of used rockets provided by 

Russia (declaration).

Available data suggest that Iraq’s declaration of its 

unilateral destruction to the UN was assembled from 

eyewitness accounts rather than by matching up serial 

numbers. The Regime offi cials who participated in 

this effort supposedly interviewed more than 100 

army personnel and other individuals who saw or 

claimed to have seen the disposition of the Scud missiles at some time. The method in which this information was derived was susceptible to error and, as such, 

should likely not have been forwarded to the UN as 

the offi cial position.
79

Delivery Systems

Figure 2. Inventory account of used rockets provided by 

Russia (facts).

Figure 2 reportedly contains Iraq’s most accurate 

accounting for its Scud missiles. The fi gures in the 

chart are supported by the serial numbers contained 

in some of the other documents. The total number of 

missiles listed in the accounting is 816 vice 819, and 

an explanation was attempted, shown in the following 

inset. 
80

ISG assesses that the accounting for missiles 853648 

and 866417 is still incomplete. 

The 3 Missing Scud Missiles 

ISG derived the following information from recovered 

documents. This explanation was part of the overall 

effort to provide the most accurate accounting for 

Scud missiles, which the UN has reportedly not seen. 

• Engine for Missile Serial Number 853667. Engine 

serial number 85366, was used to replace engine 

878426 in a fl ight test on 28 December 1990. 

According to the source’s diary, remnants of engine 

878426 appeared in debris of Iraq’s unilaterally 

destroyed missiles, and tests of these remnants indicated that the engine had never been fi red. Engine 

878426 had been given to Project 144/2 for use in 

an Al Husayn, but, confusingly, the diary records 

that the engine was also used in the December test. 

878426 had in fact been unilaterally destroyed, 

which is why forensic tests of the remnants showed 

that the engine had never been fi red.

• Engine for Missile Serial Number 853648. The 

warhead for the engine with serial number 853648 

appeared under serial number 8507101 in 1992 as 

part of the unilaterally destroyed debris, but, when 

the debris was rechecked in 1996, they were unable 

to locate this item again and was therefore considered unaccounted for.

• Engine for Missile Serial Number 866417. In 1992 

among the remnants of the unilaterally destroyed 

material, a nozzle was encountered, which had an 

illegible serial number. The number read 8-2-16. 

The number was thought to be 852016 or 8552216; 

however, missiles with these serial numbers were 

never delivered to Iraq. As with the previous engine, 

this nozzle was not found among the debris when it 

was rechecked in 1996. A document recovered from 

Project 144/2 noted that engine 866417 was present 

for modifi cation for the Al Husayn. 
81

Delivery Systems

Below is the breakdown for all 819 SCUD-B missiles 

according to the year of delivery and serial number. 

This information is refl ected in Figure 2.

Year of Delivery-1974

1 742504 Training

2 742509 Iran-Iraq War

3 742516 Iran-Iraq War

4 742519 Iran-Iraq War

5 742524 Training

6 742527 Iran-Iraq War

7 742530 Iran-Iraq War

8 742532 Iran-Iraq War

9 742536 Iran-Iraq War

10 742540 Iran-Iraq War

11 742543 Training

12 742547 Iran-Iraq War

13 742552 Iran-Iraq War

14 742559 Iran-Iraq War

15 742562 Iran-Iraq War

16 742565 Iran-Iraq War

17 742568 Training

18 742570 Iran-Iraq War

19 742571 Iran-Iraq War

20 742577 Training

21 742581 Training

22 742587 Iran-Iraq War

23 742591 Iran-Iraq War

24 742595 Iran-Iraq War

25 742598 Iran-Iraq War

26 742602 Iran-Iraq War

27 742606 Iran-Iraq War

28 742614 Iran-Iraq War

29 742618 Iran-Iraq War

30 742620 Iran-Iraq War

31 742626 Iran-Iraq War

32 742629 Iran-Iraq War

33 742634 Iran-Iraq War

34 742638 Iran-Iraq War

35 742645 Iran-Iraq War

36 742650 Returned

37 742655 Iran-Iraq War

38 742657 Iran-Iraq War

39 742673 Iran-Iraq War

40 742675 Iran-Iraq War

41 742679 Iran-Iraq War

42 742684 Iran-Iraq War

43 742689 Iran-Iraq War

44 742693 Returned

45 742699 Iran-Iraq War

Year of Delivery-1978

46 784018 Iran-Iraq War

47 784020 Iran-Iraq War

48 784023 Iran-Iraq War

49 784026 Iran-Iraq War

50 784029 Iran-Iraq War

51 784031 Iran-Iraq War

52 784034 Iran-Iraq War

53 784037 Iran-Iraq War

54 784040 Iran-Iraq War

55 784045 Iran-Iraq War

56 784048 Iran-Iraq War

57 784053 Iran-Iraq War

58 784056 Iran-Iraq War

59 784059 Iran-Iraq War

60 784064 Iran-Iraq War

61 784067 Iran-Iraq War

62 784093 Iran-Iraq War

63 784103 Iran-Iraq War

64 784106 Iran-Iraq War

65 784110 Iran-Iraq War

66 784111 Iran-Iraq War

67 784113 Iran-Iraq War

68 784117 Iran-Iraq War

69 784119 Iran-Iraq War

70 784121 Iran-Iraq War

71 784124 Iran-Iraq War

72 784127 Iran-Iraq War

73 784130 Iran-Iraq War

74 784133 Iran-Iraq War

75 784136 Iran-Iraq War

76 784139 Iran-Iraq War

77 784142 Iran-Iraq War

78 784144 Iran-Iraq War

79 784147 Iran-Iraq War

80 784150 Iran-Iraq War

81 784155 Iran-Iraq War
82

82 784158 Iran-Iraq War

83 784161 Iran-Iraq War

84 784166 Iran-Iraq War

85 784169 Iran-Iraq War

86 784174 Iran-Iraq War

87 784180 Iran-Iraq War

Year of Delivery-1979

88 794532 Iran-Iraq War

89 794535 Iran-Iraq War

90 794537 Iran-Iraq War

91 794539 Iran-Iraq War

92 794541 Iran-Iraq War

93 794544 Iran-Iraq War

94 794548 Iran-Iraq War

95 794551 Iran-Iraq War

96 794556 Iran-Iraq War

97 794559 Iran-Iraq War

98 794564 Iran-Iraq War

99 794569 Iran-Iraq War

100 794573 Iran-Iraq War

101 794576 Iran-Iraq War

102 794578 Iran-Iraq War

103 794581 Iran-Iraq War

104 794590 Iran-Iraq War

105 794592 Iran-Iraq War

106 794599 Iran-Iraq War

107 794602 Iran-Iraq War

108 794612 Iran-Iraq War

109 794614 Iran-Iraq War

110 794617 Iran-Iraq War

111 794621 Iran-Iraq War

112 794624 Iran-Iraq War

113 794628 Iran-Iraq War

114 794634 Iran-Iraq War

115 794636 Iran-Iraq War

Year of Delivery-1982

116 827615 Iran-Iraq War

117 827618 Iran-Iraq War

118 827621 Iran-Iraq War

119 827624 Iran-Iraq War

120 827627 Iran-Iraq War

121 827632 Iran-Iraq War

122 827637 Iran-Iraq War

123 827640 Iran-Iraq War

124 827643 Iran-Iraq War

125 827645 Iran-Iraq War

126 827648 Iran-Iraq War

127 827653 Iran-Iraq War

128 827656 Iran-Iraq War

129 827660 Iran-Iraq War

130 827663 Iran-Iraq War

131 827668 Iran-Iraq War

132 827671 Iran-Iraq War

133 827676 Iran-Iraq War

134 827679 Iran-Iraq War

135 827682 Iran-Iraq War

136 827684 Iran-Iraq War

137 827688 Iran-Iraq War

138 827691 Iran-Iraq War

139 827694 Iran-Iraq War

140 827697 Iran-Iraq War

141 827702 Iran-Iraq War

142 827703 Iran-Iraq War

143 827705 Iran-Iraq War

144 827706 Iran-Iraq War

145 827708 Iran-Iraq War

Year of Delivery-1983

146 838648 Iran-Iraq War

147 838650 Iran-Iraq War

148 838653 Iran-Iraq War

149 838656 Iran-Iraq War

150 838658 Iran-Iraq War

151 838661 Iran-Iraq War

152 838664 Iran-Iraq War

153 838666 Iran-Iraq War

154 838669 Iran-Iraq War

155 838671 Iran-Iraq War

156 838673 Iran-Iraq War

157 838676 Iran-Iraq War

158 838679 Iran-Iraq War

159 838682 Iran-Iraq War

160 838686 Iran-Iraq War

161 838693 Iran-Iraq War

162 838695 Iran-Iraq War

163 838706 Iran-Iraq War
83

Delivery Systems

164 838710 Iran-Iraq War

165 838713 Iran-Iraq War

166 838716 Iran-Iraq War

167 838721 Iran-Iraq War

168 838724 Iran-Iraq War

169 838730 Iran-Iraq War

170 838733 Iran-Iraq War

171 838993 Iran-Iraq War

172 838996 Iran-Iraq War

173 838997 Iran-Iraq War

174 838999 Iran-Iraq War

175 839021 Iran-Iraq War

176 839024 Iran-Iraq War

177 839027 Iran-Iraq War

178 839033 Iran-Iraq War

179 839036 Iran-Iraq War

180 839039 Iran-Iraq War

181 839042 Iran-Iraq War

182 839045 Iran-Iraq War

183 839048 Iran-Iraq War

184 839051 Iran-Iraq War

185 839054 Iran-Iraq War

186 839057 Iran-Iraq War

187 839060 Iran-Iraq War

188 839065 Iran-Iraq War

189 839068 Iran-Iraq War

190 839073 Iran-Iraq War

Year of Delivery-1984

191 841101 Iran-Iraq War

192 841104 Iran-Iraq War

193 841107 Iran-Iraq War

194 841110 Iran-Iraq War

195 841112 Iran-Iraq War

196 841118 Iran-Iraq War

197 841123 Iran-Iraq War

198 841126 Iran-Iraq War

199 841129 Iran-Iraq War

200 841131 Iran-Iraq War

201 841134 Iran-Iraq War

202 841137 Iran-Iraq War

203 841140 Iran-Iraq War

204 841143 Iran-Iraq War

205 841146 Iran-Iraq War

206 841149 Iran-Iraq War

207 841152 Iran-Iraq War

208 841155 Iran-Iraq War

209 841158 Iran-Iraq War

210 841161 Iran-Iraq War

211 841164 Iran-Iraq War

212 841166 Iran-Iraq War

213 841169 Iran-Iraq War

214 841202 Iran-Iraq War

215 841214 Iran-Iraq War

216 841220 Iran-Iraq War

217 841225 Iran-Iraq War

218 841228 Iran-Iraq War

219 841233 Iran-Iraq War

220 841238 Iran-Iraq War

221 841245 Iran-Iraq War

222 841250 Iran-Iraq War

223 841253 Iran-Iraq War

224 841342 Iran-Iraq War

225 831347 Iran-Iraq War

226 841354 Iran-Iraq War

227 841357 Iran-Iraq War

228 841360 Iran-Iraq War

229 841363 Iran-Iraq War

230 841370 Iran-Iraq War

231 841373 Iran-Iraq War

232 841376 Iran-Iraq War

233 841379 Iran-Iraq War

234 841384 Iran-Iraq War

235 841388 Iran-Iraq War

236 841389 Iran-Iraq War

237 841392 Iran-Iraq War

238 841394 Iran-Iraq War

239 841395 Iran-Iraq War

240 841398 Iran-Iraq War

241 841414 Iran-Iraq War

242 841417 Iran-Iraq War

243 841420 Iran-Iraq War

244 841423 Iran-Iraq War

245 841426 Iran-Iraq War

246 841429 Iran-Iraq War

247 841432 Iran-Iraq War

248 841435 Iran-Iraq War

249 841438 Iran-Iraq War

250 841441 Iran-Iraq War

251 841444 Iran-Iraq War
84

252 841447 Iran-Iraq War

253 841450 Iran-Iraq War

254 841453 Iran-Iraq War

255 841456 Iran-Iraq War

256 841459 Iran-Iraq War

257 841462 Iran-Iraq War

258 841465 Iran-Iraq War

259 841468 Iran-Iraq War

260 841471 Iran-Iraq War

261 841474 Iran-Iraq War

262 841477 Iran-Iraq War

263 841482 Iran-Iraq War

264 841485 Iran-Iraq War

265 841489 Iran-Iraq War

266 841494 Iran-Iraq War

267 841592 Iran-Iraq War

268 841598 Iran-Iraq War

269 841602 Iran-Iraq War

270 841605 Iran-Iraq War

271 841608 Iran-Iraq War

272 841616 Iran-Iraq War

273 841621 Iran-Iraq War

274 841624 Test for dev. missile

275 841630 Iran-Iraq War

276 841636 Iran-Iraq War

277 841642 Iran-Iraq War

278 841645 Iran-Iraq War

279 841648 Iran-Iraq War

280 841651 Iran-Iraq War

281 841654 Iran-Iraq War

282 841658 Iran-Iraq War

283 841661 Iran-Iraq War

284 841666 Iran-Iraq War

285 841669 Iran-Iraq War

286 841672 Iran-Iraq War

287 841683 Iran-Iraq War

288 841686 Iran-Iraq War

289 841691 Iran-Iraq War

290 841693 Iran-Iraq War

291 841854 Iran-Iraq War

292 841857 Iran-Iraq War

293 841860 Iran-Iraq War

294 841862 Iran-Iraq War

295 841865 Iran-Iraq War

296 841870 Iran-Iraq War

297 841877 Test for dev. missile

298 841888 Iran-Iraq War

299 841891 Iran-Iraq War

300 841896 Iran-Iraq War

301 841899 Iran-Iraq War

302 841901 Iran-Iraq War

303 841911 Iran-Iraq War

304 841916 Iran-Iraq War

305 841919 Iran-Iraq War

306 841922 Iran-Iraq War

307 841925 Iran-Iraq War

308 841928 Iran-Iraq War

309 841931 Iran-Iraq War

310 841935 Iran-Iraq War

311 841942 Iran-Iraq War

312 841945 Iran-Iraq War

313 841949 Iran-Iraq War

314 841952 Iran-Iraq War

315 841959 Iran-Iraq War

316 841964 Iran-Iraq War

317 841967 Iran-Iraq War

318 841972 Iran-Iraq War

319 841978 Iran-Iraq War

320 841983 Iran-Iraq War

321 841986 Iran-Iraq War

322 841989 Iran-Iraq War

323 841992 Iran-Iraq War

324 841995 Iran-Iraq War

325 841998 Iran-Iraq War

Year of Delivery-1985

326 853203 Iran-Iraq War

327 853208 Test for dev. missile

328 853215 Unilaterally destroyed

329 853222 UNSCOM destroyed

330 853225 Iran-Iraq War

331 853233 Iran-Iraq War

332 853238 UNSCOM destroyed

333 853242 Iran-Iraq War

334 853249 Iran-Iraq War

335 853252 Iran-Iraq War

336 853255 Iran-Iraq War

337 853259 Desert Storm

338 853261 Iran-Iraq War
85

Delivery Systems

339 853265 Iran-Iraq War

340 853268 Test for dev. missile

341 853271 Unilaterally destroyed

342 853272 Iran-Iraq War

343 853275 Desert Storm

344 853341 UNSCOM destroyed

345 853344 Desert Storm

346 853347 Iran-Iraq War

347 853350 UNSCOM destroyed

348 853354 UNSCOM destroyed

349 853357 UNSCOM destroyed

350 853363 Desert Storm

351 853367 Unilaterally destroyed

352 853370 Iran-Iraq War

353 853374 Desert Storm

354 853379 Iran-Iraq War

355 853382 UNSCOM destroyed

356 853387 Test for dev. missile

357 853390 Desert Storm

358 853392 Desert Storm

359 853399 Unilaterally destroyed

360 853402 Iran-Iraq War

361 853405 Iran-Iraq War

362 853409 Test for dev. missile

363 853411 Iran-Iraq War

364 853413 Iran-Iraq War

365 853417 Test for dev. missile

366 853421 Test for dev. missile

367 853423 Iran-Iraq War

368 853426 UNSCOM destroyed

369 853428 Iran-Iraq War

370 853434 Test for dev. missile

371 853440 Iran-Iraq War

372 853443 Iran-Iraq War

373 853446 Test for dev. missile

374 853448 Iran-Iraq War

375 853449 UNSCOM destroyed

376 853451 Test for dev. missile

377 853453 Iran-Iraq War

378 853458 Iran-Iraq War

379 853462 Test for dev. missile

380 853469 Unilaterally destroyed

381 853473 Iran-Iraq War

382 853478 Unilaterally destroyed

383 853481 Iran-Iraq War

384 853484 UNSCOM destroyed

385 853489 Iran-Iraq War

386 853491 Test for dev. missile

387 853494 Engine test

388 853497 Unilaterally destroyed

389 853501 Unilaterally destroyed

390 853503 Desert Storm

391 853507 Desert Storm

392 853510 Desert Storm

393 853512 Test for dev. missile

394 853514 Desert Storm

395 853518 Unilaterally destroyed

396 853520 Unilaterally destroyed

397 853523 Desert Storm

398 853525 Desert Storm

399 853528 Unilaterally destroyed

400 853530 Unilaterally destroyed

401 853534 Unilaterally destroyed

402 853538 Unilaterally destroyed

403 853541 Test for dev. missile

404 853546 Unilaterally destroyed

405 853553 Desert Storm

406 853557 UNSCOM destroyed

407 853561 UNSCOM destroyed

408 853565 Desert Storm

409 853573 Unilaterally destroyed

410 853575 Test for dev. missile

411 853581 UNSCOM destroyed

412 853587 Unilaterally destroyed

413 853591 Unilaterally destroyed

414 853595 Unilaterally destroyed

415 853596 Unilaterally destroyed

416 853598 Desert Storm

417 853602 Desert Storm

418 853604 Test for dev. missile

419 853606 Unilaterally destroyed

420 853608 Desert Storm

421 853611 Test for dev. missile

422 853613 Unilaterally destroyed

423 853616 Test for dev. missile

424 853622 Desert Storm

425 853626 Unilaterally destroyed

426 853633 Unilaterally destroyed

427 853636 Test for dev. missile

428 853640 Unilaterally destroyed
86

429 853643 UNSCOM destroyed

430 853645 Desert Storm

431 853648 **See insert

432 853651 Unilaterally destroyed

433 853655 Desert Storm

434 853659 Unilaterally destroyed

435 853663 Desert Storm

436 853667 **See insert

437 853676 Unilaterally destroyed

438 853679 Desert Storm

439 853683 Unilaterally destroyed

440 853685 UNSCOM destroyed

441 853689 Unilaterally destroyed

Year of Delivery-1986

442 863692 Iran-Iraq War

443 863694 Unilaterally destroyed

444 863697 Iran-Iraq War

445 863699 Iran-Iraq War

446 863701 Iran-Iraq War

447 863702 Iran-Iraq War

448 863703 Iran-Iraq War

449 863707 Test for dev. missile

450 863708 Unilaterally destroyed

451 863710 Iran-Iraq War

452 863711 Iran-Iraq War

453 863715 Iran-Iraq War

454 863716 Iran-Iraq War

455 863719 Iran-Iraq War

456 863721 Iran-Iraq War

457 863723 Iran-Iraq War

458 863724 Iran-Iraq War

459 863726 Iran-Iraq War

460 863729 UNSCOM destroyed

461 863730 Iran-Iraq War

462 863736 Iran-Iraq War

463 863739 Iran-Iraq War

464 863743 Iran-Iraq War

465 863751 Iran-Iraq War

466 863752 Iran-Iraq War

467 863755 Unilaterally destroyed

468 863756 Iran-Iraq War

469 863762 Iran-Iraq War

470 863764 Iran-Iraq War

471 863772 Iran-Iraq War

472 863778 Iran-Iraq War

473 863780 Unilaterally destroyed

474 866131 Unilaterally destroyed

475 866134 Iran-Iraq War

476 866137 Iran-Iraq War

477 866139 Iran-Iraq War

478 866140 Iran-Iraq War

479 866141 Iran-Iraq War

480 866146 Iran-Iraq War

481 866149 Iran-Iraq War

482 866151 Test for dev. missile

483 866156 Iran-Iraq War

484 866158 Iran-Iraq War

485 866161 Iran-Iraq War

486 866163 Desert Storm

487 866169 Iran-Iraq War

488 866175 Iran-Iraq War

489 866187 Iran-Iraq War

490 866193 Iran-Iraq War

491 866197 Iran-Iraq War

492 866203 Iran-Iraq War

493 866205 Iran-Iraq War

494 866209 Test for dev. missile

495 866212 Test for dev. missile

496 866215 Desert Storm

497 866217 Iran-Iraq War

498 866219 Unilaterally destroyed

499 866221 Iran-Iraq War

500 866224 Iran-Iraq War

501 866227 Unilaterally destroyed

502 866229 Iran-Iraq War

503 866231 UNSCOM destroyed

504 866232 Test for dev. missile

505 866235 Test for dev. missile

506 866237 Iran-Iraq War

507 866242 Unilaterally destroyed

508 866247 Iran-Iraq War

509 866250 Iran-Iraq War

510 866252 Iran-Iraq War

511 866256 Unilaterally destroyed

512 866260 Iran-Iraq War

513 866264 Iran-Iraq War

514 866269 Iran-Iraq War

515 866270 Unilaterally destroyed

516 866274 Iran-Iraq War
77

Delivery Systems

Annex A

Resolving the Retained 

Scud-Variant Missile Question 

Introduction

The data in this Annex are complementary to and in 

support of the material found in the Delivery Systems 

Report and as such should be referenced only in conjunction with that Report. Items in this Annex address 

specifi c topics that are presented in the Report but 

include greater detail or additional data, and provide 

more information to support the contentions and arguments in the main text. 

1.1 Scud Missile Material Balance 

Documentation recovered by ISG appears to be an 

Iraqi attempt to account for its Scud missiles. This 

material reportedly was never disclosed to the UN.

The documentation includes the serial numbers for 

all 819 Scud missiles Iraq received from the Soviet 

Union between 1972 and 1988, contract numbers, 

and the disposition of these missiles broken down by 

serial number. Also included are two fi gures: the fi rst 

entitled “Inventory Account of Used Rockets Provided by Russia (Declaration)” represents the Scud 

missile account as given to the UN; the second fi gure 

entitled “Inventory Account of Used Rockets Provided by Russia (Facts)” is, according to the engineer, 

the most accurate accounting for Iraq’s Scud missiles. The numbers in this second fi gure vary from 

the numbers Iraq disclosed in its 2002 Currently 

Accurate Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) 

to the UN, and the explanation for the discrepancy 

in the numbers is provided in these documents. 

According to the source of this information, these 

documents represent the full story on Scud missile material balance. This material was most likely 

prepared to support a presentation at the Technical 

Evaluation Meetings (TEMs) held in Baghdad in 

early 1998. 
86

429 853643 UNSCOM destroyed

430 853645 Desert Storm

431 853648 **See insert

432 853651 Unilaterally destroyed

433 853655 Desert Storm

434 853659 Unilaterally destroyed

435 853663 Desert Storm

436 853667 **See insert

437 853676 Unilaterally destroyed

438 853679 Desert Storm

439 853683 Unilaterally destroyed

440 853685 UNSCOM destroyed

441 853689 Unilaterally destroyed

Year of Delivery-1986

442 863692 Iran-Iraq War

443 863694 Unilaterally destroyed

444 863697 Iran-Iraq War

445 863699 Iran-Iraq War

446 863701 Iran-Iraq War

447 863702 Iran-Iraq War

448 863703 Iran-Iraq War

449 863707 Test for dev. missile

450 863708 Unilaterally destroyed

451 863710 Iran-Iraq War

452 863711 Iran-Iraq War

453 863715 Iran-Iraq War

454 863716 Iran-Iraq War

455 863719 Iran-Iraq War

456 863721 Iran-Iraq War

457 863723 Iran-Iraq War

458 863724 Iran-Iraq War

459 863726 Iran-Iraq War

460 863729 UNSCOM destroyed

461 863730 Iran-Iraq War

462 863736 Iran-Iraq War

463 863739 Iran-Iraq War

464 863743 Iran-Iraq War

465 863751 Iran-Iraq War

466 863752 Iran-Iraq War

467 863755 Unilaterally destroyed

468 863756 Iran-Iraq War

469 863762 Iran-Iraq War

470 863764 Iran-Iraq War

471 863772 Iran-Iraq War

472 863778 Iran-Iraq War

473 863780 Unilaterally destroyed

474 866131 Unilaterally destroyed

475 866134 Iran-Iraq War

476 866137 Iran-Iraq War

477 866139 Iran-Iraq War

478 866140 Iran-Iraq War

479 866141 Iran-Iraq War

480 866146 Iran-Iraq War

481 866149 Iran-Iraq War

482 866151 Test for dev. missile

483 866156 Iran-Iraq War

484 866158 Iran-Iraq War

485 866161 Iran-Iraq War

486 866163 Desert Storm

487 866169 Iran-Iraq War

488 866175 Iran-Iraq War

489 866187 Iran-Iraq War

490 866193 Iran-Iraq War

491 866197 Iran-Iraq War

492 866203 Iran-Iraq War

493 866205 Iran-Iraq War

494 866209 Test for dev. missile

495 866212 Test for dev. missile

496 866215 Desert Storm

497 866217 Iran-Iraq War

498 866219 Unilaterally destroyed

499 866221 Iran-Iraq War

500 866224 Iran-Iraq War

501 866227 Unilaterally destroyed

502 866229 Iran-Iraq War

503 866231 UNSCOM destroyed

504 866232 Test for dev. missile

505 866235 Test for dev. missile

506 866237 Iran-Iraq War

507 866242 Unilaterally destroyed

508 866247 Iran-Iraq War

509 866250 Iran-Iraq War

510 866252 Iran-Iraq War

511 866256 Unilaterally destroyed

512 866260 Iran-Iraq War

513 866264 Iran-Iraq War

514 866269 Iran-Iraq War

515 866270 Unilaterally destroyed

516 866274 Iran-Iraq War
87

Delivery Systems

517 866277 Unilaterally destroyed

518 866280 Iran-Iraq War

519 866288 Iran-Iraq War

520 866293 Iran-Iraq War

521 866302 Iran-Iraq War

522 866304 UNSCOM destroyed

523 866309 Iran-Iraq War

524 866311 Iran-Iraq War

525 866313 Iran-Iraq War

526 866314 Test for dev. missile

527 866318 Iran-Iraq War

528 866320 Iran-Iraq War

529 866322 Iran-Iraq War

530 866325 Iran-Iraq War

531 866328 Desert Storm

532 866331 Iran-Iraq War

533 866333 Iran-Iraq War

534 866337 Iran-Iraq War

535 866340 Iran-Iraq War

536 866341 Iran-Iraq War

537 866345 Test for dev. missile

538 866348 UNSCOM destroyed

539 866353 Desert Storm

540 866357 Desert Storm

541 866359 Desert Storm

542 866363 Desert Storm

543 866366 UNSCOM destroyed

544 866368 Desert Storm

545 866373 Unilaterally destroyed

546 866405 UNSCOM destroyed

547 866406 Desert Storm

548 866412 Iran-Iraq War

549 866417 **See insert

550 866423 Unilaterally destroyed

551 866427 Desert Storm

552 866432 UNSCOM destroyed

553 866434 Iran-Iraq War

554 866442 Iran-Iraq War

555 866444 Iran-Iraq War

556 866449 Unilaterally destroyed

557 866454 Desert Storm

558 866458 Iran-Iraq War

559 866460 UNSCOM destroyed

560 866467 Unilaterally destroyed

561 866469 Iran-Iraq War

562 866470 UNSCOM destroyed

563 866471 Unilaterally destroyed

564 866474 Unilaterally destroyed

565 866476 Iran-Iraq War

566 866477 Unilaterally destroyed

567 866481 Iran-Iraq War

568 866484 UNSCOM destroyed

569 866487 Desert Storm

570 866490 Desert Storm

571 866504 Desert Storm

572 866507 Engine test

573 866508 Unilaterally destroyed

574 866513 Test for dev. missile

575 866516 Desert Storm

576 866519 Desert Storm

577 866524 Test for dev. missile

578 866527 Unilaterally destroyed

579 866530 Desert Storm

580 866533 Desert Storm

581 866535 Desert Storm

582 866539 Desert Storm

583 866543 Unilaterally destroyed

584 866544 Desert Storm

585 866547 Unilaterally destroyed

586 866550 Desert Storm

587 866552 Unilaterally destroyed

588 866557 Test for dev. missile

589 866564 Unilaterally destroyed

590 866570 Unilaterally destroyed

591 866573 UNSCOM destroyed

592 866585 Test for dev. missile

593 866590 Desert Storm

594 866593 Test for dev. missile

595 866595 Iran-Iraq War

596 866597 Desert Storm

597 866598 Iran-Iraq War

598 866599 Test for dev. missile

599 866602 Desert Storm

600 866605 Unilaterally destroyed

601 866614 UNSCOM destroyed

602 866620 Test for dev. missile

603 866628 UNSCOM destroyed

604 866634 Iran-Iraq War

605 866641 Test for dev. missile

606 866649 Desert Storm
88

607 866654 Iran-Iraq War

608 866658 Desert Storm

609 866664 Desert Storm

610 866667 UNSCOM destroyed

611 866669 UNSCOM destroyed

612 866674 UNSCOM destroyed

613 866677 Iran-Iraq War

614 866679 Desert Storm

615 866682 Desert Storm

616 866684 Desert Storm

617 866686 Iran-Iraq War

618 866688 Iran-Iraq War

619 866689 Desert Storm

620 866691 UNSCOM destroyed

621 866692 Desert Storm

622 866693 Desert Storm

623 866694 Unilaterally destroyed

624 866695 Unilaterally destroyed

625 866697 Unilaterally destroyed

626 866698 Desert Storm

Year of Delivery-1987

627 876704 Unilaterally destroyed

628 876711 Unilaterally destroyed

629 876716 Desert Storm

630 876723 UNSCOM destroyed

631 876726 Unilaterally destroyed

632 876734 Desert Storm

633 876739 Desert Storm

634 876743 UNSCOM destroyed

635 876746 Desert Storm

636 876754 Desert Storm

637 876758 Test for dev. missile

638 876762 Unilaterally destroyed

639 876766 Engine test

640 876768 Desert Storm

641 876771 Unilaterally destroyed

642 876773 Desert Storm

643 876776 UNSCOM destroyed

644 876778 Desert Storm

645 876782 Engine test

646 876784 Desert Storm

647 876786 UNSCOM destroyed

648 876789 Unilaterally destroyed

649 876790 Unilaterally destroyed

650 876792 Test for dev. missile

651 876794 Desert Storm

652 876795 Test for dev. missile

653 876797 Engine test

654 876798 Desert Storm

655 876799 Test for dev. missile

656 878303 Test for dev. missile

657 878306 UNSCOM destroyed

658 878312 Test for dev. missile

659 878315 Desert Storm

660 878318 Desert Storm

661 878321 Test for dev. missile

662 878324 Unilaterally destroyed

663 878327 Test for dev. missile

664 878329 Test for dev. missile

665 878333 Test for dev. missile

666 878336 UNSCOM destroyed

667 878338 Unilaterally destroyed

668 878341 Desert Storm

669 878343 Desert Storm

670 878346 Test for dev. missile

671 878349 UNSCOM destroyed

672 878351 UNSCOM destroyed

673 878354 UNSCOM destroyed

674 878357 Test for dev. missile

675 878361 Desert Storm

676 878363 Unilaterally destroyed

677 878368 Test for dev. missile

678 878371 UNSCOM destroyed

679 878374 Desert Storm

680 878379 Desert Storm

681 878382 Unilaterally destroyed

682 878386 Desert Storm

683 878392 Desert Storm

684 878396 Test for dev. missile

685 878401 Desert Storm

686 878405 Desert Storm

687 878409 Test for dev. missile

688 878414 Unilaterally destroyed

689 878416 Test for dev. missile

690 878419 Desert Storm

691 878423 Desert Storm

692 878426 Unilaterally destroyed

693 878430 Unilaterally destroyed

694 878434 Test for dev. missile
89

Delivery Systems

695 878435 Desert Storm

696 878439 Desert Storm

697 878442 Test for dev. missile

698 878445 Engine test

699 878453 Unilaterally destroyed

700 878456 Unilaterally destroyed

701 878463 Desert Storm

702 878466 Iran-Iraq War

703 878470 Iran-Iraq War

704 878473 Iran-Iraq War

705 878476 Iran-Iraq War

706 878484 Unilaterally destroyed

707 878485 Iran-Iraq War

708 878488 Iran-Iraq War

709 878491 Iran-Iraq War

710 878494 Iran-Iraq War

711 878497 Iran-Iraq War

712 878499 Iran-Iraq War

713 878502 Iran-Iraq War

714 878504 Iran-Iraq War

715 878507 Iran-Iraq War

716 878511 Iran-Iraq War

717 878513 Unilaterally destroyed

718 878517 Iran-Iraq War

719 878520 Iran-Iraq War

720 878528 Iran-Iraq War

721 878531 Iran-Iraq War

722 878537 Iran-Iraq War

723 878544 Unilaterally destroyed

724 878547 Iran-Iraq War

725 878552 Iran-Iraq War

726 878559 Iran-Iraq War

727 878562 Iran-Iraq War

728 878567 Iran-Iraq War

729 878569 Iran-Iraq War

730 878572 UNSCOM destroyed

731 878575 Iran-Iraq War

732 878577 Iran-Iraq War

733 878581 Iran-Iraq War

734 878583 Test for dev. missile

735 878589 Iran-Iraq War

736 878590 Iran-Iraq War

737 878593 Iran-Iraq War

738 878595 Iran-Iraq War

739 878596 Iran-Iraq War

740 878597 Iran-Iraq War

741 878599 Iran-Iraq War

742 878601 Iran-Iraq War

743 878608 Iran-Iraq War

744 878610 Iran-Iraq War

745 878615 Iran-Iraq War

746 878619 Iran-Iraq War

747 878622 Iran-Iraq War

748 878625 Iran-Iraq War

749 878627 Iran-Iraq War

750 878629 Iran-Iraq War

751 878632 Iran-Iraq War

752 878635 Unilaterally destroyed

753 878640 Iran-Iraq War

754 878642 Iran-Iraq War

755 878648 Iran-Iraq War

756 878651 Iran-Iraq War

757 878653 Iran-Iraq War

758 878656 Iran-Iraq War

759 878658 UNSCOM destroyed

760 878660 Test for dev. missile

761 878663 Iran-Iraq War

762 878666 Iran-Iraq War

763 878671 Iran-Iraq War

764 878673 Iran-Iraq War

765 878678 Unilaterally destroyed

766 878682 Iran-Iraq War

767 878685 Iran-Iraq War

768 878687 Test for dev. missile

769 878691 Desert Storm

770 878694 Test for dev. missile

771 878696 Desert Storm

772 878704 Iran-Iraq War

773 878707 Iran-Iraq War

774 878711 Iran-Iraq War

775 878716 Iran-Iraq War

776 878720 Iran-Iraq War

777 878723 Iran-Iraq War

778 878726 Iran-Iraq War

779 878731 Iran-Iraq War

780 878734 Iran-Iraq War

781 878737 Unilaterally destroyed

782 878739 Engine test

783 878744 Unilaterally destroyed

784 878747 Unilaterally destroyed
90

785 878750 Unilaterally destroyed

786 878752 Iran-Iraq War

787 878755 Unilaterally destroyed

788 878759 Iran-Iraq War

789 878762 Unilaterally destroyed

790 878764 UNSCOM destroyed

791 878767 Iran-Iraq War

792 878770 UNSCOM destroyed

793 878772 UNSCOM destroyed

794 878775 UNSCOM destroyed

795 878779 Iran-Iraq War

796 878809 Iran-Iraq War

797 878811 Iran-Iraq War

798 878817 Iran-Iraq War

799 878822 Desert Storm

800 878825 Iran-Iraq War

801 878829 Iran-Iraq War

802 878833 Iran-Iraq War

803 878836 Iran-Iraq War

804 878840 Iran-Iraq War

805 878845 Desert Storm

806 878850 Iran-Iraq War

807 878858 Iran-Iraq War

808 878861 Iran-Iraq War

809 878866 Desert Storm

810 878869 Desert Storm

811 878873 Desert Storm

812 878877 Iran-Iraq War

813 878878 Iran-Iraq War

814 878880 Iran-Iraq War

815 878883 Desert Storm

816 878886 Iran-Iraq War

817 878887 Iran-Iraq War

818 878890 Iran-Iraq War

819 878891 Iran-Iraq War
91

Delivery Systems

1.2 Scud Warhead Material Balance 

ISG has collected an offi cial National Monitoring 

Directorate (NMD) document, dated 12 December 

1997, on the expenditure of Scud warheads imported 

from the Soviet Union, which differs from the 

fi gures provided in the 1996 Full, Final, and 

Complete Disclosure (FFCD). These FFCD data 

are also repeated in the 2002 CAFCD. The NMD 

document is most likely part of that organization’s 

effort to reconcile the material for imported Scud 

warheads. Although unable to verify information, 

ISG judges that this is a factual accounting for the 

819 Scud warheads Iraq imported from the Soviet 

Union.

As with the data in for missile consumption (Section 

1.1), this material was most likely prepared to support 

a presentation at the Warhead Technical Evaluation 

Meeting (TEM) held in Baghdad between the 1st and 

6th February 1998.

Following the acceptance of UNSCR 687, Iraq was 

forced to destroy its remaining inventory of Scud 

missiles, warheads, and related equipment. Iraq had 

imported 819 warheads from the Soviet Union and 

had succeeded in producing warheads indigenously. 

During the period of warhead destruction, the distinction between the imported warheads and the indigenously produced warheads became unclear, and thus 

a full and accurate accounting for the destruction of 

imported and indigenously produced Scud warheads 

has never been reconciled.

• According to the NMD accounting (Tables 1 & 

2), Iraq fi red 87 imported warheads and six indigenously produced warheads (presumably concrete 

warheads for the Al Hijarah missiles) during the 

1991 Gulf War. In the 1996 FFCD and the CAFCD, 

Iraq declared that it had fi red 88 imported warheads 

and 5 indigenously produced Al Hijarah warheads. 

This leaves a discrepancy of one imported warhead.

• In the 1996 FFCD and the CAFCD, the Iraqis 

declared that they unilaterally destroyed 119 

imported warheads. This NMD document shows 

only 118 had been destroyed.

• The disagreement between the numbers provided 

in the 1996 FFCD and the CAFCD, and this 

NMD document for the “special” CBW warheads 

destroyed by the Chemical Destruction Group, 

(CDG), is the largest. During this destruction of 

warheads, an accurate accounting for the number of 

imported versus indigenously produced warheads 

was never achieved. 

Table 1

Accounting for Imported Soviet Scud Warheads (819 total)

1996 FFCD & 2002 CAFCD

Returned to USSR 2 2

Fired during Iran-Iraq War 516 516

Test fi red 57 57

Fired during 1991 Gulf War 87 88

Unilaterally destroyed 118 119

Destroyed under UN supervision 17 17

Special Warheads destroyed by 

CDG 22 19

Used in analysis --- 1

Total 819 819

This is a comparison of the fi gures derived from the NMD document and the 2002 CAFCD.
92

Table 2

Warheads Used by Purpose and Year

Year Document Warheads 

Exhausted Remarks # Date

1. Warheads used against Iran

1980 2 20 Nov 1980 53 No indication to the number of warheads or code 

numbers

1981

5 21 Nov 1980 16 No indication to the number of warheads or code 

numbers

7 03 Mar 1981 1 No warhead number or code. Launch failed and will 

be used for reverse-engineering

8 07 Apr 1981 5

10 24 June 1981 3

13 27 Nov 1981 2

15 18 Dec 1981 2

1982

3 04 May 1982 2

4 07 Jul 1982 8

7 21 Sept 1982 11

8 11 Sept 1982 3

10 19 Dec 1982 2

1983

3 02 Feb 1983 4

9 19 May 1983 7

12 17 Aug 1983 2

13 08 Oct 1983 4

15 01 Nov 1983 10

16 18 Nov 1983 4

18 22 Dec 1983 5

19 30 Dec 1983 1

1984

8 22 Feb 1984 15

9 05 Mar 1984 11

14 15 June 1984 9

21 06 Oct 1984 18

1985

10 21 Mar 1985 54

11 03 Apr 1985 9

12 15 Apr 1985 13

16 03 May 1985 2

18 09 June 1985 4

22 14 June 1985 11

1987 2 19 Jan 1987 27

7 27 Mar 1987 9

1988 18 19 May 1988 189

Total 516

Year Document Warheads 

Exhausted Remarks # Date

2. Warheads Launched During the 1991 Gulf War

1991 1 08 June 1991

87

No documents mention the [serial] numbers of the 

warheads. 93 total were launched, of which 6 were 

Iraqi made 2 08 June 1991

Total 87
93

Delivery Systems

3. Warheads Launched in Training, Flight Tests, and Mineral Analyzation

1977 6 Oct 1977 6 No warheads [serial] numbers mentioned in documents

1985 29 09 Aug 1985 1 No warheads [serial] numbers mentioned in documents

1987

16 04 May 1987 2 No warheads [serial] numbers mentioned in documents

19 07 Aug 1987 1 No warheads [serial] numbers mentioned in documents

25 05 Oct 1987 3

26 09 Oct 1987 1

27 18 Oct 1987 1

28 23 Nov 1987 2

1988 1 02 Jan 1988 2

2 06 Jan 1988 1 Used for metal analysis

16 15 June 1988 7

17 07 July 1988 3

19 03 Sept 1988 2

25 20 Nov 1988 3

26 02 Dec 1988 3

1989 1 24 Feb 1989 2

3 07 July 1989 1

4 24 Aug 1989 1

1990 1 07 Jan 1990 4

3 18 Apr 1990 1 No defi nition if warhead is Iraqi or Russian—suspect latter

5 18 Apr 1990 1

11 09 May 1990 1

Year Document Warheads 

Exhausted

Remarks

# Date

12 09 July 1990 1

10 28 June 1990 1 No code or indication about the warhead

21 02 Dec 1990 3

* 26 Dec 1990 1 * 2nd Division Orders doesn’t refl ect warhead code

* 26 Dec 1990 2 * 2nd Division Orders doesn’t refl ect warhead code

Total 57

4. Warheads Destroyed by UNSCOM

1991 5 31 July 1991 17

5. Special Warheads Destroyed by UNSCOM /CDG at Al Muthanna (Sept 1992 and April 1993)

1992/3 ** Sept 92/Apr 93 22

**Verifi cation certifi cate for the warhead destruction 

by UNSCOM in Sept 1992 and April 1993. Warheads were not indicated at the time but were later 

by both UNSCOM and Iraq. Now with UNSCOM 

(Bahrain)

6. Conventional Warheads Destroyed by Iraq in 1991 (Unilateral)

1991 10 21 July 1991 118 13 22 Oct 1991

7. Conventional Warheads Returned to Russia

1980 3 03 April 1980 2

Overall Total 819

Offi cial NMD document with the expenditure of 819 imported Scud warheads.
94

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95

Delivery Systems

Annex B

Liquid-Propellant 

Missile Developments

2.1 Al Samud Program

In 1993, Iraq began developing liquid-propellant 

ballistic missiles. The program began as the Ababil100 liquid-propellant missile program, which later 

became known as the Al Samud. This missile was 

based on SA-2 and Scud technology and manufacturing techniques; it was monitored closely by the UN. 

Research and development continued until 2001 when 

the program was terminated and replaced by the Al 

Samud II. 

Figure 3. Al Samud short diagram.

Figure 4. Al Samud long diagram.
96

Table 3 

Original Al Samud Parameters

Subsystem Parameter Characteristic Units Data Notes

Missile Overall Length m 7.6

Diameter mm 500

Lift-off mass kg 1,500 Approximate fi gure

Inert mass kg 340 +/- 30kg

Warhead Mass Total kg 270

Explosive kg 160 60% TNT, 30% RDX, 10% Al

Length Overall m 1.68

Cylindrical m 0.23

Conical m 1.45

Material Wall mm 3 Carbon steel

Propulsion Engine Thrust t 3.5

Burning time s 68* Nominal

s +2* Contingency

Tanks Ullage volume % 5 Up to 8%

Ox, length, overall m 2.600 Domes each 0.335 high

Ox, length, parallel m 1.930

Fuel, length, overall m 1.691 Domes each 0.335 high

Fuel, length, parallel m 1.021

Thickness mm 2 Aluminum

Propellant Oxidizer ----- AK-20K

Oxidizer fl ow rate kg/s 11.5*

Total mass kg 724* Usable, for 63s burning time

Fuel ----- TG-02

Fuel fl ow rate kg/s 3.5*

Total mass kg 220* Usable, for 63s burning time

Air supply Air bottle Diameter mm 300 Spherical, one only

Pressure bar 300-360

*Parameters are known to be inconsistent.
97

Delivery Systems

Table 4 

Static Tests Supporting the Al Samud Program

# Date Fuel Oxidizer Filling Site Notes

(residual fuel, oxidizer) Filled Fired Type Source Vol. 

(l)

Type Source Vol. (l)

01 00.10.96 00.10.96 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 IZ chamber & injector head

02 14.04.97 00.04.97 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Structural test of missile

03 00.08.97 00.08.97 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Structural test of missile

04 10.04.98 15.04.98 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76

05 20.04.98 22.04.98 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76

06 00.06.99 07.06.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check IZZ engine

07 00.07.99 00.07.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check IZZ engine

08 21.07.99 22.07.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360

09 06.08.99 07.08.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check IZZ purge system

10 22.11.99 23.11.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check telemetry

11 04.12.99 05.12.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check telemetry

12 13.07.00 15.07.00 TG-02 Karamah 210 AK-20K Karamah 360 Bat. 76

13 05.08.00 08.08.00 TG-02 Karamah 242.5 AK-20K Karamah 402.5 Bat. 76 (10, 41)

14 06.09.00 07.09.00 AZ-11 China 267 AK-20K USSR 463 Bat. 76 Tb 61s, (2, 2.5)

15 11.10.00 12.10.00 AZ-11 ? 267 AK-20K USSR 430 Bat. 76 IZ regulator, tb 69s (2.5, 2)

16 16.10.00 17.10.00 TG-02 USSR 267 AK-20K USSR 431.5 Bat. 76 Tb 61s

17 17.03.01 18.03.01 AZ-11 266 AK-20K USSR 428 Bat. 76 Repeat of 16

18 03.04.01 03.04.01 TG-02 USSR 275 AK-20K USSR 442 Bat. 76 IZZ turbo-pump

19 25.04.01 26.04.01 TG-02 USSR 285 AK-20K USSR 460 Bat. 76 IZZ vanes [TVC]

20 11.06.01 12.06.01 TG-02 USSR 271 AK-20K USSR 451 Bat. 76 Tb 58s, original engine

21 16.10.01 17.10.01 TG-02 USSR 216 AK-20K USSR 357 Bat. 76 IZZ turbo-pump, tb 49s, 

(22, 8)

22 28.11.01 29.11.01 AZ-11 ? 191 AK-20K USSR 352 Bat. 76 Tb 45s, (10, 40)

23 16.02.02 17.01.02 AZ-11 ? 190 AK-20K Al Qa’qa’a 350 IAH Tb 49s, (8, 19)

24 01.04.02 02.04.02 TG-02 USSR 210 AK-35K Ibn-Sina’ 350 Bat. 76 Test effects of AK-35K

2.2 Al Samud Static Test Data
98

Figure 5. Al Samud fl ight tests 

(1997-2000).

Al Samud Flight Tests

Date 

Launched

ZTime Range 

(km) 

Date 

Filled

TG-02

(liters)

AK-20K

(liters)

1 24-Oct-1997 unk 92 210 360

2 20-Feb-1998 1323 93 210 360

3 21-Feb-1998 1000 0 210 360

4 22-Feb-1998 unk 0 210 360

5 30-Mar-1998 unk 15 

6 1-May-1998 15km 210 360

7 1-Jun-1998 Failed 210 360

8 4-Aug-1998 600 0 

9 11-Aug-1998 940 71.8 

10 20-Oct-1998 715 0 

11 20-Oct-1998 1250 0 

12 1-May-1999 unk n/a 30-Apr-99 210 360

13 10-May-1999 unk 20 

14 30-Aug-1999 n/a 210 360

15 5-Sep-1999 415 n/a 

16 23-Dec-1999 Failed 210 360

17 28-Dec-1999 1315 55 28-Dec-99 210 360

18 17-Feb-2000 938 72 15-Feb-99 210 360

19 12-Mar-2000 1315 90 11-Mar-99 210 360

20 25-Apr-2000 1201 70 24-Apr-00 212 365

21 23-May-2000 1030 100 22-May-00 212 365

22 1-Sep-2000 606 0 

23 26-Oct-2000 unk n/a 

24 13-Nov-2000 n/a 11-Nov-00 281 453

25 20-Nov-2000 1215 151 20-Nov-00 279 452

26 12-Dec-2000 830 50 10-Dec-00 286 461

Multiple source entrees

Single source entrees
99

Delivery Systems

Al Samud Flight Tests

Date 

Launched

ZTime Range 

(km)

Date 

Filled

TG-02 AK-20K

27 13-Jan-2001 802 120 11-Jan-01 286 463

28 14-Jan-2001 1039 n/a 

29 21-Jan-2001 1125 Failed 20-Jan-01 278 452

30 12-Feb-2001 907 56 8-Feb-01 278 452

31 16-Feb-2001 846 150 16-Feb-01 279 450

32 20-Mar-2001 842 150 20-Mar-01 279 452

33 28-Mar-2001 30km 27-Mar-01 279 452

34 28-May-2001 unk Failed 25-May-01 280 460

35 28-May-2001 87km 25-May-01 280 460

36 28-May-2001 90km 26-May-01 280 460

37 29-May-2001 85km 29-May-01 240 355

38 11-Jul-2001 314 88 11-Jul-01 230 376

39 12-Jul-2001 340 Failed 12-Jul-01 230 376

40 17-Jul-2001 n/a 15-Jul-01 230 376

41 20-Aug-2001 359 n/a 19-Aug-01 230 376

42 20-Aug-2001 85km 19-Aug-01 230 375

43 20-Aug-2001 45km 19-Aug-01 217 357

44 24-Sep-2001 n/a 23-Sep-01 217 355

45 24-Sep-2001 n/a 

46 26-Sep-2001 74km 26-Sep-01 217 358

Multiple source entrees

Single source entrees

Figure 6. Al Samud fl ight tests 

(2001).
100

2.4 Al Samud II Static Test Data

Table 5 

Static Tests Supporting the Al Samud II

# Date Fuel Oxidizer Filling Site Notes

(residual fuel, oxidizer) (in liters) Filled Fired Type Source Vol. 

(l)

Type Source Vol. (l)

01 31.07.01 01.08.01 TG-02 AK-20K 347 AK-20K USSR 557 Bat. 76 Tb 74s, (15, 12)

02 07.03.02 08.03.02 AZ-11 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 597 IAH Tb 85s, (14, 18)

03 26.03.02 27.03.02 TG-02 Raya 364 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 601 IAH Tb 75s, (33, 10)

04 07.04.02 08.04.02 TG-02 Raya 386 AK-20K Raya 605 IAH Stabilizer test (70, 35)

05 15.05.02 16.05.02 TG-02 Raya 371 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 603 IAH T-pump test, tb 30, leak!

06 01.07.02 01.07.02 TG-02 Raya 375.5 AK-22K Qa’qa’a 612 IAH IZZ chamber, (66, 15)

07 08.07.02 08.07.02 TG-02 Raya 375 AK-20K Qa’qa’a ? IAH Failed, oxidizer pipe leak

08 16.07.02 16.07.02 TG-02 Raya 370.9 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 609 IAH IZZ vanes, orig engine - Fail

09 31.07.02 01.08.02 TG-02 Raya 371 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 609 IAH Tb 81s, IZZ vanes (36, 2)

10 07.08.02 07.08.02 TG-02 Raya 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 607 IAH IZZ gas generator

11 29.08.02 30.08.02 TG-02 Raya 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 614 IAH IZZ chamber, ok

12 05.09.02 06.09.02 TG-02 Raya 375 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 614 IAH Engine burnt - Fail

13 09.11.02 n/a TG-02 Raya 372 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 598 IAH IZZ t-pump, (13, 20) OK

14 16.11.02 16.11.02 TG-02 Raya 372 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 598 IAH IZZ t-pump (37, 36)

15 24.11.02 25.11.02 TG-02 Raya 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 605 IAH IZZ engine, tb20s,(436 ox) F

16 04.12.02 05.12.02 TG-02 Raya 368 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 601 IAH Tb 78s, (3, 12) OK

17 02.01.03 02.01.03 TG-02 Raya 368 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 601 IAH Orig engine, IZZ vanes (25, 27)

18 11.01.03 12.01.03 TG-02 Karamah 369 AK-20K Raya 606 Taji IZZ engine, (15, 55) OK

19 26.01.03 27.01.03 TG-02 Karamah 365 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 602 IAH IZZ engine, (0, 48.5) OK

20 03.02.03 04.02.03 TG-02 Karamah 368 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 605 A Ghraib Tb 81s, IZZ vanes (28, 26.5) 

21 22.02.03 23.02.03 TG-02 Karamah 366 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 605 A Ghraib New TVC vane material
101

Delivery Systems

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102

2.5 Al Samud II Flight Test Data

Figure 7. Al Samud II fl ight tests.

Al Samud II Flight Tests

Date 

Launched

ZTime Range 

(km) 

Date 

Filled

TG-02 

(literes)

AK-20K 

(liters)

Propellant 

Temp

Temp 

of Air

Wind 

Speed 

(m/s)

Wind 

Direction

1 24-Aug-2001 n/a 23-Aug-01 344 555 

2 26-Sep-2001 1332 154 25-Sep-01 357 613.5 28°C 22°C 10 246°

3 11-Oct-2001 unk 142 9-Oct-01 612 381 28°C 20°C 14 169°

4 6-Nov-2001 unk Failed 4-Nov-01 376 611.5 

5 7-Nov-2001 630 154.2 6-Nov-01 375 604.5 22°C 28°C 21 306°

6 29-Dec-2001 unk 33 27-Dec-01 369 ® 600 (Q) 

7 9-Jan-2002 949 155.9 7-Jan-02 370 ® 600 (Q) 15°C 20°C 6 206°

8 10-Jan-2002 unk 140 8-Jan-02 367 ® 596 (Q) 11°C 15°C 7 212°

9 31-Jan-2002 1229 171 30-Jan-02 367 ® 600.5(Q) 12°C 15°C 12 122°

10 14-Mar-2002 unk 180.5 12-Mar-02 370 ® 598 ® 24°C 20°C 12 202°

11 11-Apr-2002 unk 164 11-Mar-02 370 ® 604 ® n/a n/a n/a n/a

12 10-May-2002 unk 183 8-May-02 398* 632 n/a n/a n/a n/a

13 6-Jun-2002 unk 145 5-Jun-02 386 ® 636 ® 30°C 25°C 15 208°

14 17-Jun-2002 307 156.6 16-Jun-02 387 ® 632 ® 31°C 9°C 10 192°

15 18-Jun-2002 312 136.7 31°C 10°C 12 226°

16 18-Jul-2002 354 153 17-Jul-02 376 ® 612 (Q) 37°C 31°C 12 311°

17 18-Jul-2002 unk n/a 

18 23-Jul-2002 256 152.2 n/a 376 ® 620 (Q) n/a n/a n/a n/a

19 25-Aug-2002 345 174 n/a 375(K) 607 (Q) 

20 25-Aug-2002 unk 163 n/a 375(K) 614 (Q) 

21 30-Oct-2002 604 124 24-Aug-02 375(K) 612 (Q) 

22 30-Oct-2002 812 25 24-Aug-02 375(K) 612 (Q) 

23 16-Nov-2002 unk 166 14-Nov-02 374(K) 612 (Q) 

Multiple source entrees

Single source entrees
103

Delivery Systems

Al Samud II Flight Tests (continued)

Lateral Deviation Source Comments and Deviations

1 “Result n/a. & Filled at Battery 76”

2 1°-Left “Filled at Battery 76, Flight date 25-Sep-2001 & Range 145km”

3 0.5°-Left “Filled at Battery 76”

4 “Failed on the pad. & Filled at Bat. 76”

5 1.76°-Left “Filled at Battery 76 & Range 154km”

6 “Filled at Ibn al Haytham & Range 35km”

7 2°-Right “Missile # 020214 & Range 154km”

8 10°-Right “Missile # 010203”

9 0.68°-Left “Range 170km”

10 3.07°-Left “Range 181km” & “9th Al Samud 2 luanch”

11 n/a “Range 165km”

12 1°-Left “*Used AZ-11 & Filled at Ibn al Haytham” & “Range 184km”

13 3.67°-Left 

14 1.63°-Right “Result n/a”

15 2.06°-Right 

16 0.75°-Left “Missile #63”

17 

18 0.14°-Left “83s burning time, Missile #66 & Range 152km”

19 “174km (vs 125 theoretical), Missile #67 & 80s burn time”

20 “163km (vs 100 theoretical), Missile#68, & 82.4s burn time”

21 “Missile #69” & “Range 75km”

22 “Missile #70” & “Range 24km”

23 “Result n/a”

Figure 7. Al Samud II fl ight tests (continued).
104

2.6 Al Samud II Missile

Material Balance

Materials Balance

To determine the likely number of missiles that could 

potentially remain in an inventory, the technique of 

materials balance can be employed. This involves the 

collection of data associated with all aspects of the 

production and consumption of the missiles 

concerned. The production numbers may be gleaned 

from the factory producing the hardware or where the 

missiles are integrated or even loaded with 

propellants. Consumption numbers can be derived 

from tests, either static or fl ight, deliveries to the 

armed forces or those withdrawn due to damage or 

other causes. 

If a materials balance of complete missiles cannot be 

accomplished, an equivalent might be derived from 

the many subsystems that make up the complete missile—such as warheads, engines, or even propellants. 

This latter approach has been used in an attempt to 

account for both Scud and Al Samud II 

missile inventories.

ISG believes that a complete material balance for 

the Al Samud II missile may not be possible due to 

various factors. Documentary data indicating the 

total number of missiles produced have not been 

recovered by ISG and the disposition of the missiles 

is unknown. However, a very good estimate of the 

total number produced can be achieved based on the 

knowledge that the Iraqis had a production rate goal 

of 10 per month, according to an offi cial in Iraq’s 

missile program. This rate varied month to month due 

to availability of parts. The missile began production 

in late 2001 with the fi rst 10 being delivered to the 

Army in December 2001. Assuming these production 

fi gures were maintained between December 2001 

and December 2002, ISG believes a likely total of 

130 Al Samud II missiles may have been produced 

during this period. According to a former senior 

offi cial at Al Karamah, Iraq produced approximately 

20 missiles during the fi rst quarter of 2003. Another 

source claimed that, after UNMOVIC inspectors 

departed the country in March 2003, Iraq was able 

to assemble about 4 Al Samud missiles from remaining parts, which had been placed in mobile trucks to 

avoid destruction. These 24, in addition to the 130 

previously mentioned, yield a total of 150 Al Samud 

II missiles produced.

According to multiple sources, Iraq expended up to 

27 missiles during experimental tests (fl ight and static 

tests). Beginning 1 March 2003, UNMOVIC began a 

destruction program, which accounted for 72 missiles 

destroyed. ISG have obtained information given in 

Table 6, which shows serial numbers associated with 

62 of the 72 missiles destroyed. However, the dates of 

destruction do not appear to correlate to those dates 

provided by the UNMOVIC spokesman during the 

period of destruction. According to reporting, Iraq 

launched fi ve Al Samud II missiles during OIF. Table 

7 details some of the additional al Samud subsystems 

destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Coalition 

forces may have been responsible for the destruction 

and recovery of up to 15 missiles based on available 

data. According to a foreign government service, two 

Al Samud II missiles were taken to Iran. ISG has not 

been able to confi rm this claim. Taking these fi gures 

into account, ISG has developed possible scenarios 

for material balance for the Al Samud II missile 

given in Table 6
105

Delivery Systems

Date Serial No. Date Serial No. Date Serial No.

03 Mar 03 020279 06 Mar 03 020294 TE 11 Mar 03 020233

03 Mar 03 020272 06 Mar 03 020297 TE 11 Mar 03 020283

03 Mar 03 020228 06 Mar 03 020302 TE 11 Mar 03 020232

03 Mar 03 020226 07 Mar 03 010206 TL 12 Mar 03 020237

03 Mar 03 020236 07 Mar 03 020310 TL 12 Mar 03 020236

03 Mar 03 020229 07 Mar 03 020308 TL 12 Mar 03 020292

04 Mar 03 020296 08 Mar 03 020280 13 Mar 03 020314

04 Mar 03 020295 08 Mar 03 020288 13 Mar 03 020313

04 Mar 03 020286 08 Mar 03 020287 13 Mar 03 020316

05 Mar 03 020217 TE 08 Mar 03 020306 14 Mar 03 020311

05 Mar 03 010227 TE 08 Mar 03 020209 14 Mar 03 020312

05 Mar 03 020264 TE 08 Mar 03 020303 14 Mar 03 020299

05 Mar 03 020284 TE 09 Mar 03 020285 14 Mar 03 020315

05 Mar 03 020277 09 Mar 03 020282 15 Mar 03 020235

05 Mar 03 020278 09 Mar 03 020281 15 Mar 03 020234

05 Mar 03 020273 09 Mar 03 020304 TE 15 Mar 03 020290

05 Mar 03 020274 09 Mar 03 020291 TL 16 Mar 03 020220

05 Mar 03 020293 09 Mar 03 020289 TL 16 Mar 03 020242

06 Mar 03 020222 10 Mar 03 020225 17 Mar 03 020240

06 Mar 03 020227 10 Mar 03 020224 17 Mar 03 020221

06 Mar 03 020275 10 Mar 03 020298

Table 6 

Al Samud II Missiles Destroyed Under

UNMOVIC Supervision in 2003
106

No. Engine 

Serial No.

Fuel Tank 

Serial No.

Oxidizer 

Serial No.

Tail

Serial No.

Warhead 

Serial No.

1 57013 FU-125 Ox-115 109 130

2 56820 FU-132 Ox-120 118 133

3 89834 FU-113 Ox-127 121 134

4 88240 FU-123 Ox-102 120 135

5 50413 FU-115 Ox-126 102 136

6 57007 FU-129 Ox-132 111 122

7 82439 FU-117 Ox-121 112 124

8 57918 FU-111 Ox-124 113 120

9 82551 FU-134 Ox-123 119 121

10 27736 FU-114 Ox-125 126 115

11 31414 FU-121 Ox-118 117 132

12 53005 FU-130 Ox-140 124 131

13 53401 FU-138 Ox-135 126 128

14 82626 FU-142 Ox-138 128 118

15 54115 FU-139 Ox-136 131 116

16 82414 FU-140 Ox-129 123 119

17 89720 FU-145 Ox-122 132 126

18 55404 FU-116 Ox-131 130 113

19 51725 FU-133 Ox-117 127 117

20 54108 FU-135 Ox-128 125 103

21 80120 FU-127 Ox-130 114

22 89925 FU-126 Ox-133

23 113741 FU-128 Ox-134

24 52916 FU-103 Ox-141

25 55017 Ox-092

26 54418 Ox-104

Table 7 

Additional Al Samud II 

Subsystems Destroyed 

Under UNMOVIC 

Supervision

Worst Case Likely Case Best Case

Missiles Produced 150 130 121

Used in tests 22 25 27

Destroyed under UNMOVIC 72 72 72

Launched during OIF 5 5 5

Damaged/Captured/to Iran 15 15 17

Unaccounted for 36 13 0

Table 8 

ISG Assessment of 

Al Samud II Missile 

Accountability
107

Delivery Systems

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC)

Until April 1998, both the Air Defense and the Naval 

Defense and the Naval Defense forces had supplied 

Al Karamah with whatever propellant was required 

for testing on an ad hoc basis. Both felt unable to 

continue this relationship as it was adversely affecting their own propellant stocks. On hearing this news, 

Staff Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b Hasan Muhammad Al 

Nasiri called a meeting of representatives from the 

Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), the 

Army (Surface-to-Surface Missile [SSM] Command), 

Air Defense Forces, Al Karamah, and the Naval 

Defense Forces. The armed forces could satisfy their 

own propellant requirements but, for Al Karamah’s 

new development program, there was none available. 

Thus, arrangements had to be made to satisfy this 

need whilst maintaining stock availability to the other 

armed services. To do this, a committee called the 

LFC was set up by the MIC in 1998 to manage and 

coordinate the requirements of all 

Name From, Position Notes

Dr. Muzhir [Modher] Sadiq Saba’ 

Khamis Al-Tamimi

Al Karamah, DG Chairman

Jasim Muhammad Salman al-Tamimi Al Karamah Deputy 

Chairman

Dr. Yusif ‘Ulwan Hammadi Al ‘Ithawi Ibn-Sina’, DG

Dr. Hikmat Na’im Al Jalu Ibn-Sina’, former DG

Dr. Thabit Jasim Ibn-Sina’, former DG

Ghazi Faysal Najm-al-Din Al Basil

Dr. Zuhayr Mahmud Al Qazzaz Al Basil

Dr. Jalil Rahif’ Akal Al Basil

Dr. Agil ‘Awad Al Basil

Dr. Jasim Al Kindi

Fu’ad Muhammad Basim Al Qa’qa’a

Sami Da’ud Sa’d Company Al Zahrawi 

Center

Dr. Hamzah Yasin ‘Issa MIC Center

Dr. Ghanim Maqbul ‘Ulwan Al Amin

liquid-propellant research, production, and supply 

(regeneration, manufacture, or importation) to the 

various users.

There were three goals of the LFC:

1. Now - To ensure the continued supply for current 

requirements of TG-02 and AK-20K

2. Near Term - The production of AZ-11 and AK-27P

3. Far Term - The production of Hydrazine, 

Unsymmetrical Di-Methyl Hydrazine (UDMH), 

Nitrogen Tetroxide, and Hydrogen Peroxide

By the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 

objective 1 was achieved, some movement was in 

progress toward objective 2, and most of the 

candidate propellants in objective 3 were at least 

being researched. 

The LFC consisted of the following personnel:
108

2.7 Liquid-Propellant Material Balance 

Closure of the material balance for liquid propellants is extremely diffi cult because of the amount of 

regeneration due to the effects of aging on propellants. The records kept concerning regeneration do 

not make reference to the sources of fresh material 

acquired in the regeneration process. Instead, they 

provide only an input-output picture.

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC) was initiated in 

August of 2000 to analyze performance capabilities for various propellants, research techniques for 

producing candidate chemical propellants or their precursors, and study synthesis routes and manufacturing 

capabilities of various companies. Through studies 

of companies and capabilities, the LFC awarded 

contracts to companies to begin manufacturing. The 

projected production capabilities were 50 tons/yr of 

Di-methyl amine (DMA), 20 tons/yr of DETA, 50 

tons/yr of TEA, and 50 tons/yr of xylidine. Schematics of liquid-propellant production and research 

are shown in Figures 8 and 9. This production when 

combined with the imported quantities of propellant 

far surpassed the requirements of the Al Samud II 

program. A schematic materiel balance of the liquid 

propellant used for the Al Samud II program is shown 

below in Figures 10 through Figure 12, with the production or sources along the top, above the total and 

consumption along the bottom of each table.
109

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Figure 8. Liquid-propellant production.
110

Figure 9. Liquid-propellant research.
111

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Figure 10. Oxidizer materiel balance (1995-2003).
112

Figure 11. Fuel materiel balance (1995-2003).
113

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Figure 12. High-energy propellant materiel balance (1995-2003).
114

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115

Delivery Systems

Annex C

Solid-Propellant 

Missile Developments 

3.1 Iraqi Composite Solid-Propellant

Composition 

The composite propellants fi elded by Iraq were “conventional,” being formulations widely used throughout the industry and based on a hydroxyl-terminated 

poly butadiene (HTPB) binder heavily loaded with 

ammonium perchlorate (AP) and aluminum powder. 

In addition to these main chemicals, a number of 

other chemicals are used, such as plasticizer, burning 

rate modifi ers and curing agents.

Table 9 

The Al Fat’h and Al ‘Ubur Propellant Formulation

Compound % by mass

Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) (200-Micron Particle Size) 35

Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) (50-80 Micron Particle Size) 35

Aluminum Powder (< 200 Micron particle Size) 14

Hydroxy Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB) 11-12

Dioctyl Azelate (DOZ) - or - Dioctyl Adepate (DOA) 3.5

Ferric Oxide 1

2,4-Toluene Diisocyanate (TDI) ~1

Tri[1-(2-Methyl Aziridinyl)] Phosphine Oxide (MAPO) 0.3

Of these ingredients, none are explicitly prohibited. UNSCR 715 Annex IV references chemicals 

subject to monitoring and verifi cation, although the 

Import/Export Mechanism approved by UNSCR 

1051 requires prior notifi cation of imports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) refers to 

Category II chemicals, which are subject to case by 

case review. Many of these chemicals are classifi ed as 

“Dual Use,” meaning they may have other uses. The 

primary components of the Iraqi composite solid-propellant ingredients fall within these control classifi cations as shown in Table 10.
116

Table 10 

The Al Fat’h and Al ‘Ubur Propellant Control

Classifi cations

Chemical UNSCR 

715/1051

MTCR

Cat II

Dual

Use

Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) Y Y N

Aluminum Powder N Y Y

Hydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB) Y Y Y

Dioctyl Azelate (DOZ) N N Y

Ferric Oxide (FE2O3) Y Y Y

2,4-Toluene Diisocyanate (TDI) N N Y

3.2 Iraqi Composite Solid-Propellant 

Infrastructure 

To support its solid-propellant program, Iraq 

constructed, rebuilt, or repaired equipment and 

facilities destroyed by UNSCOM or Coalition 

forces. The Iraqi effort was relatively successful at 

indigenous production, although some key materials still had to be imported. The Iraqi composite 

solid-propellant capabilities were centered initially in the Al Kindi General Company and the 

Al Rashid General Company. Due to the lack of 

involvement with ballistic missile developments, 

Al Kindi and its associated facilities will not be 

discussed in detail in this document.

The Al Rashid General Company (see Figure 13) 

controlled most if not all of the major solid-propellant missile initiatives and the related production 

facilities.

The Al Fat’h Company functioned primarily in a 

design, project management, and oversight role for 

the Al Fat’h missile. Headquartered in the Al ‘Amiriyah section of Baghdad, the company was founded in 

1996 at Ibn-al-Haytham and moved to Al ‘Amiriyah 

in the late 1990’s.
117

Delivery Systems

Within the Al Rashid State Company, the Al Ma’mun 

Factory was the center of composite solid-propellant 

research and production. Within the complex were 

facilities for composite propellant mixing, casting 

and curing. In addition, R&D efforts in the area of 

composite propellants were conducted. 

The Al Musayyib Solid Rocket Motor Factory at Al 

Mutasim contained horizontal rocket motor test cells 

and motor assembly buildings. All of the known Al 

Rashid associate solid-propellant static tests were 

conducted at Al Musayyib. 

The Al Amin Factory and Thu-al-Fiqar [Tho-al-Fekar] 

Factory produced motor casings and nozzles. 

Figure 13. Al Rashid organizational structure.

3.3 Al Fat’h Missile Technical Specifi cations 

The Al Fat’h was originally intended to be produced 

in two variants, guided and unguided. The missile was 

a solid-propellant ballistic missile weighing approximately 1,200 kg with an overall length of approximately 6.7 m and a diameter of 0.5 m for the main 

body and 1.4 m with the aft fi n assembly. During the 

development of the system, large inaccuracies in the 

unguided variant were encountered. All the Al Fat’h 

missiles recovered to date are unguided. The Al Fat’h 

was designed to be launched from a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) based upon the Volga (SA-2) 

missile launcher. The composite propellants utilized 

in the Al Fat’h are “conventional,” being a general 
118

formulation widely used throughout the industry. 

The propellant is based on a Hydroxyl Terminated 

Poly Butadiene (HTPB) binder heavily loaded with 

Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) and aluminum powder. 

In addition to these main chemicals, a number of 

other chemicals are used, such as plasticizer, burning 

rate modifi ers, and curing agents.

3.4 Al Fat’h Missile Manufacturing

Diffi culties 

There were apparently three aspects of the Al Fat’h 

manufacturing process that presented the Iraqis with 

signifi cant challenges. The fi rst was the unavailability of maraging steel sheets of suffi cient size. Maraging steel has the advantage of being easy to form 

in its original state, but when annealed, to provide 

excellent properties as far as rigidity, strength, and 

crack resistance. Without maraging steel, the Al Fat’h 

had to be constructed from 30CrMoV9 sheet steel. 

Forming this sheet steel into the cylingrical shapes 

needed for the rocket motor casing and airframe was 

diffi cult and created problems. 

A second manufacturing issue in the construction of the Al Fat’h was the lack of large propellant mixing capabilities. The original 1,200-liter 

(300 gallon) propellant mixers acquired through the 

BADR-2000 program were destroyed by the UN. 

Although at least two of the bowls and one or both 

mixers were restored by Iraq, these were in turn 

destroyed by the Iraqis prior to the return of the UN 

in 2002 and hidden. Either way, the equipment was 

unavailable for use in the propellant mixing for the Al 

Fat’h rocket motor. The Al Fat’h contained approximately 830 kg of propellant. While the BADR-2000 

bowls would have provided the capability of easily 

fi lling the Al Fat’h motor in a single pour, the lack 

of these bowls forced the Iraqis to use four or fi ve 

smaller 120-liter (30 gallon) bowls. These bowls, 

mixed in two available mixers, were then poured 

sequentially into the motor casing. A senior Iraqi offi -

cial stated the process worked well but admitted that 

one out of every 10 motors exploded during motor 

burn. In addition, this process also eliminated the possibility of multiple simultaneous motor castings. 

The fi nal major manufacturing issue was the 

inability to completely indigenously manufacture 

the G&C system for the Al Fat’h. The Al Fat’h was 

intended to use a strap-down inertial guidance system. 

A highly accurate strap-down system with digital 

fl ight computer, coupled with an adequate canard 

terminal guidance system, would most likely have 

provided the Al Fat’h with an accuracy that met the 

specifi ed 150 m CEP accuracy for the guided variant 

at a range of 150 km. This level of accuracy, coupled 

especially with the submunition warhead, would have 

made the Al Fat’h a more accurate and lethal tactical 

weapon system. 
119

Delivery Systems

3.5 Al Fat’h Missile Program Organization 

As previously mentioned, while the Al Fat’h General 

Company was responsible for design and program 

management aspects of the Al Fat’h program, the Al 

Rashid General Company was primarily the manufacturer. The Al Rashid General Company utilized a variety of subordinate companies and contracted sources 

in the manufacturing process. The general organization of Al Rashid is presented in Figure 14 below.

Figure 14. Al Rashid structure.
120

Within the Al Rashid Company, the Al Ma’mun 

Composite Solid-Propellant Plant at Latifi yyah was 

the center of composite solid-propellant research and 

production. Within the complex were facilities for 

composite propellant mixing, casting, and curing. 

Motors for existing systems, like the LUNA-M, were 

reengineered with composite propellant. Motors for 

new systems, like the Al Fat’h, were also assembled 

and inspected here. In addition, research and development efforts in the area of composite propellants were 

conducted at both Ma’mun and Al Kindi.

The Al Musayyib Solid Rocket Motor Support and 

Test Facility at Al Mutasim contained horizontal 

rocket motor test cells and motor assembly buildings. 

All of the Al Rashid associated solid-propellant static 

tests were conducted at Al Musayyib. 

The Al Amin Solid Rocket Motor Case Production 

Plant at Habbaniyah produced motor casings and nozzles and undertook hydrostatic testing of the motor 

case. Figure 15 shows an Al-Fat’h motor nozzle.

3.6 Al Fat’h Test Launches

ISG has compiled data concerning fl ight tests for 

the Al Fat’h missile from various sources shown in 

Figure 16 .

Figure 15. Al Fat’h rocket motor nozzle.
121

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Figure 16. Iraqi accounting of Al Fat’h missile testing.

Al Fat’h Flight Test Launches

B. 

Count

Missile

No.

Motor

No.

Action Date Range

(km)

Lateral 

Dev.

(km)

Results Purpose

1 F6 TEST FLT 1 9/1/2000 4 ? F Motor Perform.

2 F8 TEST FLT 2 10/23/2000 83.4 ? S Motor Perform.

3 F9 TEST FLT 3 11/18/2001 118?? ? S to confi rm last test (2000???)

4 F?? TEST FLT 4 3/17/2001 117.7 11.5R S Motor Perform.

5 F12 TEST FLT 5 3/27/2001 133 10L S Motor Perform.

6 F13 TEST FLT 6 4/29/2001 88 34o F PRELIM TEST R-40 CONTROLS

7 F14 TEST FLT 7 9/30/2001 7 n/a F PRELIM TEST R-40 CONTROLS

8 F17 TEST FLT 8 8/8/2001 161 13.5R S Rocket Perform. & Range

9 F18 TEST FLT 9 8/8/2001 6 n/a F 1st spin mtr test

10 F19 TEST FLT 10 8/22/2001 7 n/a F perform. using frontal fi ns

11 F20 TEST FLT 11 9/6/2001 103 n/a P.S. perform. & range with spin motor

12 F21 TEST FLT 12 11/3/2001 90 n/a P.S. perform. & range with spin motor

13 F22 TEST FLT 15 12/5/2001 103 20L S perform. & range with spin motor

14 F23 TEST FLT 13 11/22/2001 134 13o S perform. & range

15 F24 TEST FLT 14 12/5/2001 160.5 13R S perform. & range

16 F25 TEST FLT 16 12/5/2001 ??? 50+ P.S. perform. & range

17 F26 TEST FLT 17 ????? 158 2.4L S perform. & range

18 F37 M24 TEST FLT 18 1/26/2002 151 4.2 S perform. & range

19 F39 M24 TEST FLT 19 3/14/2002 143 ? P.S. 1ST CLUSTER WARHEAD TEST

20 F43 TEST FLT 32 11/25/2002 131 4.4L S approval of cluster warhead

21 F46 M55 TEST FLT 20 4/22/2002 147 8o S testing warhead fuze

22 F59 TEST FLT 21 9/6/2002 ukn ukn F accuracy & range

23 F60 TEST FLT 22 9/6/2002 ukn ukn F accuracy & range

24 F67 M71 TEST FLT 23 7/22/2002 145 8R S accuracy & range

25 F70 TEST FLT 27 9/30/2002 158.2 6R S accuracy & range

26 F74 M80 TEST FLT 26 8/24/2002 151.1 13R S accuracy & range & warhead

27 F75 M78 TEST FLT 24 8/18/2002 4 n/a F accuracy & range & warhead

28 F76 M90 TEST FLT 25 8/22/2002 145 15L S accuracy & range

29 F78* M87 TEST FLT 31 8/22/2002 151.1 ukn S approval of rocket

30 F79 TEST FLT 28 9/30/2002 154.4 6.3R S accuracy & range

31 F80 TEST FLT 29 9/30/2002 114.6 n/a F accuracy & range

32 F84 M90 TEST FLT 30 10/28/2002 147 ukn S approval of rocket

Note 1: Apparent transition of date, 9 June or 6 September.
122

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123

Delivery Systems

Annex D

People

Ra’ad and Muzhir

Beginning before the 1990s, the changes in career 

of two people, Maj. Gen. Ra’ad Jasim Isma’il Al 

Adhami and Brig. Gen. Dr. Muzhir Saba’ Sadiq alTamimi, have been cloaked in mystique and intrigue. 

They have competed for supremacy on many occasions, one often replacing the other in key technical 

positions in the Iraqi ballistic missile program after 

undercutting the others efforts. Dissecting the plot 

tells much about the relationships within the Iraqi 

hierarchy and the strong family and religious ties that 

directly affected the outcome of the efforts to build a 

successful ballistic missile program.

The fi rst clash came when Muzhir is directed by 

Husayn Kamil (HK) to review the Rafi diyan project 

(a conversion of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile to a 

surface-to-surface role). The report is critical and the 

project canceled. Ra’ad was fi red, and, as a result, 

Muzhir took control of the responsible establishment, 

Al Karamah. Ra’ad spent his time fruitlessly at MIC, 

later supporting the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) in its role as the Iraqi counterpart of 

UNSCOM.

With support from Dr Hamid Khalilal-Assawi, Ra’ad 

designed a 500-mm-diameter missile, which they 

claimed could maintain Iraq’s missile liquid-propellant expertise and infrastructure whilst remaining within the 150-km-range limitation imposed by 

UNSCR 687. A presentation to HK was successful, 

and Ra’ad was reinstated as Head of Al-Karamah. 

Muzhir, being retained as Head of Ibn al Haytham, 

proposed a competitive design at a 750-mm diameter, which is soon banned by UNSCOM as being 

too diffi cult to monitor and capable of being fi tted 

with 2 SA-2 type engines. Undaunted, Muzhir proposed a 600-mm design, which in late 1995 competed 

with Ra’ad’s design in a design review competition. 

Ra’ad’s design was successful, and Muzhir was 

forced to work on this project under Ra’ad. 

This situation did not last long as Muzhir was jailed 

for 25 months for allegedly importing gyros from 

Russia (an allegation vigorously denied). Ra’ad continued developing the Samud but could not achieve 

consistency or reliability.

One of Huwaysh’ primary responsibilities when he 

became head of MIC was to successfully complete 

the development of the Al Samud ballistic missile. 

Soon after assuming control of MIC, in an attempt to 

fi x the ballistic missile problems, Huwaysh worked 

to obtained Muzhir’s release from jail. With Ra’ad 

showing little progress, Huwaysh, who had heard of 

Muzhir’s past experience in this fi eld, appealed to 

Saddam and obtained his release. Muzhir who on 

release, had begun working under Huwaysh at MIC, 

was tasked to review the Al Samud program—his 

report was unfavorable. After another failed test 

fl ight, Huwaysh fi red Ra’ad in June 1999, replacing 

him with Muzhir. Ra’ad, along with Dr Hamid, was 

transferred to the MIC. Ra’ad spent the remainder of 

1999 at MIC before Huwaysh transferred him to head 

up the Samarra Electronics Plant, the Salah al-Din 

State Company. On 15th June 2001, Huwaysh accedes 

to Muzhir’s request to replace the 500-mm diameter 

Al Samud with a 760-mm design, 

Ra’ad Ismail Jasim Isma’il al-Adaml (left) and Muzhir 

Sabah Sadiq al-Tamimi (right).
124

called the Al Samud II. The fi rst experimental test 

fl ight of Al Samud II occurred on 18th August 2001, a 

surprisingly short time from go-ahead.

The fi rst 10 Al Samud II ballistic missiles were 

delivered to the Iraqi Army in December 2001.

Drawing dates (August 2000) on designs for a longer 

range liquid-propellant ballistic missile, both 2- and 

5- engine cluster types, suggest that, by OIF, Muzhir 

might have been well along the road to developing 

these systems. However, no evidence has been found 

by ISG that suggests that a development program was 

instigated.
Nuclear

Nuclear

Keep nuclear scientists together at IAEC 

in order to pool their skills and have 

them available when needed . . .

 Saddam Husayn 
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i

Nuclear

Contents

Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons Program............................................................................................ 3

The Regime and WMD Timeline ................................................................................................. 3

The Early Years: Ambition .......................................................................................................... 3

Decline (1991-96)......................................................................................................................... 4

Recovery and Transition (1996-2002).......................................................................................... 5

Miscalculation (2002-2003) ......................................................................................................... 6

Results of ISG’s Investigation on Nuclear Issues .................................................................................... 7

Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities ....................................... 9

Foreign Pursuits ........................................................................................................................... 9

Indigenous Production Capabilities ........................................................................................... 11

Iraq’s Known Uranium Holdings .............................................................................................. 13

Iraqi Uranium Conversion Program....................................................................................................... 15

Aluminum Tube Investigation................................................................................................................ 21

Elements of ISG Investigation ................................................................................................... 21

Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum Tubes .................................................................. 22

Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes ................................................. 22

Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements ..................................................................... 23

Indigenous Tube Manufacture—A Possible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need 

 High-Specifi cation Tubes ....................................................................................................... 27

Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes ................................................................................................... 30

Carbon Fiber .......................................................................................................................................... 30

Carbon Fiber and Iraq’s Pre-1991 Gas Centrifuge Program ..................................................... 30

Iraqi Concealment of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, and Documents 

 After Operation Desert Storm ........................................................................................................... 31

The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/2002............................................................................. 32

Flow-Forming Machinery ..................................................................................................................... 33

Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi .................................................................................... 34

Procurement Details .................................................................................................................. 36

Rotating Machinery Department............................................................................................................ 36
ii

Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities ........................................................................ 38

Support Facilities........................................................................................................................ 38

Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility................................................................................. 39

Al Karama State Company ...................................................................................... 39

Al-Wazeriya Site ...................................................................................................... 39

Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center)....................................... 39

Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility) .......................................................... 39

Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)....... 39

Al-Tahadi State Company ................................................................................................. 40

Salah Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)................................................ 40

Al-Nida State Company .................................................................................................... 40

Rashid State Company’s Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State 

 EstablishmentMechanical Plant) ................................................................................... 40

Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant) ..................................... 40

Uranium Enrichment—EMIS ............................................................................................................... 42

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS).............................................................................. 42

Facilities ..................................................................................................................................... 42

Al Safa’a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya ............................................................................ 42

Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat ......................................................................... 45

Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility) ............................................ 45

Al-Zawra State Company......................................................................................... 45

Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop Al-Rabiyah) ............ 45

Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility) ..................................................... 47

Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company......................................................................... 47

Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment................................................................................... 47

Laser Research in Iraq .......................................................................................................................... 50

Laser Related Work After Operation Desert Storm ................................................................... 50

Current Status and Future Potential............................................................................................ 51

Iraq’s Pre-1991 LIS Efforts ........................................................................................................ 51

Rail Gun Summary ............................................................................................................................... 52

Rail Gun Efforts ......................................................................................................................... 52

ssues Related to NuclearWeapons Design and Development ................................................................ 59

Casting Technology ................................................................................................................... 59

Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities ............................................................................. 59

High-Speed Switches ................................................................................................................. 60

Fireset Development and Testing .............................................................................................. 60

Neutron Generators .................................................................................................................... 60
iii

Nuclear

Migration of the Capabilities From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons Project............................................... 61

IAEC Modernization ............................................................................................................................. 66

Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn ....................................................... 66

Increased Funding and Publicity of IAEC Activities ................................................................. 67

Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: The Modernization Project ..................................... 67

Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program ................. 69

IAEC Work on Neutron Generators ........................................................................................... 69

University Programs .............................................................................................................................. 70

Hidden Enrichment Technology ........................................................................................................... 73

Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center .................................................................. 75

Annexes

A. Defi nitions Used by Teams During Survey....................................................................................... 81

B. Team Results ..................................................................................................................................... 83

C. Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled From Video Recce Mission 5/6 November 2003 ................. 91

D. Results of Mission Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear ComplexOver the Period 20-22 November ....... 107

E. Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment .................................................................................. 113

F. Photography Highlights: Tuwaitha Mission, 20-22 November 2003 .............................................. 117

G. Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers ...................................................................................... 127
iv

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1

Nuclear

Key Findings

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991 

Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date.

• Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.

• Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up 

to the 1991 war, the program ended and the intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years.

Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed 

during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis—several of them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG 

they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended.

• Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat.

Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did with Iraq’s BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program and destroy or surrender components of the program.

In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements of its program and to preserve 

what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientifi c community.

• Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from successive 

UN inspectors, including specifi c direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and preserve documentation associated with Iraq’s nuclear program.

• ISG, for example, uncovered two specifi c instances in which scientists involved in uranium enrichment kept 

documents and technology. Although apparently acting on their own, they did so with the belief and anticipation of resuming uranium enrichment efforts in the future.

• Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program, Baghdad 

transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work 

undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base.

As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions.

• Iraq, especially after the defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995, sought to persuade the IAEA that Iraq had met 

the UN’s disarmament requirements so sanctions would be lifted.

ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the 

nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.

• The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent and limited research with potential relevance to a reconstituted nuclear program.
2

• Specifi c projects, with signifi cant development, such as the efforts to build a rail gun and a copper vapor 

laser could have been useful in a future effort to restart a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no indications of such purpose. As funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the introduction of the Oil-forFood program, there was some growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and 

engineers.

• The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or 

Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received signifi cant pay raises in 

a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that 

Iraq retained technical knowledge.
3

Nuclear

Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons 

Program

The Regime and WMD Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy 

choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy 

and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate 

foldout and in tabular form at the back of Volume I. 

Covering the period from 1980-2003, the timeline 

shows specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s efforts 

in the BW, CW, delivery systems, and nuclear realms 

and their chronological relationship with political 

and military developments that had direct bearing on 

the Regime’s policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion 

of each volume of text, we have also included foldout 

summary charts that relate infl ection points—critical 

turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—

to particular events/initiatives/decisions the Regime 

took with respect to specifi c WMD programs. Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the body of 

the text with a gray triangle.

The Early Years: Ambition 

Saddam demonstrated his commitment to obtain a 

nuclear weapon over two decades. Saddam’s close 

association with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 

(IAEC) stems from his service as Vice President of 

the Republic from 1968 until 1979 when he became 

President of Iraq. From 1973 to 1979, he also served 

as President of the IAEC and sponsored its acquisition of foreign-supplied facilities with which to support a nuclear weapons program.

In 1968, Iraq commissioned a Russian supplied IRT2000 research reactor and commissioned a number 

of other facilities that could be used for radioisotope 

production at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, 

home of the IAEC. In the 1970s, through contracts 

with French and Italian fi rms, the IAEC built facilities 

at Tuwaitha that, if operational, could have allowed 

Iraq to attempt to produce plutonium for a weapons 

program. The Israeli destruction of the Tammuz 1 

(Osirak) research reactor on 7 June 1981 and Iraq’s 

subsequent failure to replace or rebuild it compelled 

the Iraqis to pursue a more clandestine uranium 

enrichment program for a nuclear weapon by the 

mid-1980s.

Between 1979 and 1982, Iraq bought large quantities 

of uranium in various forms including yellowcake 

and uranium dioxide from several countries. Some of 

the purchases were reported to the IAEA and some 

were not. Iraq’s uranium purchases are detailed in its 

CAFCD in 2002 and in other, earlier disclosures. 

Not long after the start of the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq 

began to formally pursue uranium enrichment. In 

January 1982, the Offi ce of Studies and Development (OSD) was established in the IAEC to conduct 

research and development in uranium enrichment. 

The staff of OSD was drawn largely from the staff of 

IAEC and numbered no more than several hundred. 

In late 1982, the IAEC was restructured and OSD 

became known as Offi ce 3000.

During the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq studied a variety of uranium enrichment techniques. It was not until near the 

last year of the war in the late 1980s that Iraq began 

to make decisions and take serious steps to develop a 

nuclear infrastructure.

In April 1987, the IAEC created a group structure that 

assigned responsibility for gaseous diffusion research 

projects to Group 1, EMIS research and development 

to Group 2, and support activities to Group 3 in the 

Offi ce of Studies and Development, or Offi ce 3000. 

Also in April 1987 a program, codenamed the AlHusayn project (HP), was formed under Husayn 

Kamil, supervisor of the State Organization for 

Technical Industries at the time, to study the steps 

required to start a nuclear weapons program in Iraq. 

The fi nished report outlined a range of projects and 

served as the basis of a formally constituted nuclear 

weapons program. In November 1987, the project 

team was transferred to the IAEC and in April 1988 

became Group 4 in Offi ce 3000. The program was 

implemented in June 1987 and construction began on 

a nuclear weapon research, development, and production complex at Al Athir in August 1988.
4

In August 1987, Group 1 formally left the IAEC 

and Tuwaitha to act independently as the Engineering Design Directorate (EDD) in the Ar Rashidiyah 

District of Baghdad. At that time the EDD began 

to develop centrifuge enrichment technology and 

throughout its existence was directly responsible to 

Husayn Kamil.

Nearly all avenues of uranium enrichment were 

considered, but by late 1987 Iraq began construction 

of a large electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) 

plant at Tarmiya. To support the large investment in 

EMIS technology, a network of facilities was created to concentrate uranium, convert uranium to feed 

materials, fabricate EMIS equipment, and chemically 

recover product. 

As the Iraq-Iran war drew to a close, further 

changes were made in the Iraqi Nuclear Program 

structure that would ultimately place the nuclear 

weapons program under Husayn Kamil. In May 

1988, when the Ministry of Industry and Military 

Industrialization (MIMI) was offi cially established, 

EDD, renamed the Engineering Design Center 

(EDC), became one of the institutions of the Military 

Industrialization Commission (MIC), under MIMI. 

In November 1988, Offi ce 3000 (Groups 2, 3, and 

4) was transferred to the MIMI and in January 1989 

offi cially given the name Petrochemical Project 3 

(PC-3) under Dr. Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far. Husayn Kamil, 

Director of MIC and MIMI, assumed control of the 

Iraqi Nuclear Program.

In August 1988, German engineers traveled to 

Baghdad and presented European centrifuge design 

data that EDC immediately copied to advance its 

otherwise slow progress in developing centrifuge 

enrichment. In the years before the 1991 Gulf war, 

several more German engineers became involved, and 

centrifuge design documents based on technology 

developed for the European enrichment consortium 

URENCO were transferred to EDC. Contracts were 

signed with a number of European fi rms to acquire 

key component manufacturing technology and critical 

equipment for the centrifuge program.

After the invasion of Kuwait and the UN economic 

embargo, Iraq initiated an accelerated, or “crash 

program.” to produce a nuclear weapon that called 

for the diversion of IAEA-safeguarded research 

reactor fuel at Tuwaitha. Iraq planned to further 

enrich some research reactor fuels using an envisioned 50-machine centrifuge cascade to produce 

enough weapon-grade uranium for one nuclear 

weapon. There were numerous obstacles—such 

as defi ciencies in cascade development, uranium 

recovery capability, and weapons design and development—that prevented the Iraqis from succeeding. 

At the time the program ended in early 1991, the 

Iraqi Nuclear Program (INP) had several thousand 

personnel, and Iraq was commissioning EMIS 

equipment at Tarmiya and producing micrograms 

of enriched uranium. The centrifuge enrichment program was successfully operating a single machine in 

a test stand and building facilities for a small enrichment cascade. The Iraqis were working on a fi rst-generation nuclear weapon design, which they intended 

to make into a device deliverable by missile.

Decline (1991-96)

Following the invasion of Kuwait, nearly all of the 

key nuclear facilities—those involved in the processing of nuclear material or weapons research—were 

bombed during Desert Storm. Many of the facilities 

located at Tuwaitha were devastated, and the EMIS 

enrichment plants at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat were 

largely destroyed. Iraq’s yellowcake recovery plant 

at Al-Qa’im and feed material production plant at 

Mosul (Al Jazira) also were bombed during the war. 

Al-Athir—a high-explosives testing site revealed after 

the war to be Iraq’s planned nuclear weapons development and assembly site—was also damaged. Iraq’ s 

centrifuge research and development site at Rashdiya 

and the planned centrifuge production and operations 

site at Al Furat were neither found nor targeted in the 

1991 war, but industrial sites, found after the war to 

be supporting nuclear weapons efforts, were attacked 

and damaged.

The Iraqis fi rst chose not to disclose the extent of 

their clandestine nuclear program in their April 

1991 declaration. As part of a denial and deception 

effort at the end of May 1991, Kamil issued orders 

to collect all documents and equipment indicating 
5

Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty violations. Equipment and 

documentation were moved to a variety of locations to hide program elements from the IAEA. Iraqi 

researchers were instructed by their managers to 

dispose of their laboratories, some of which were then 

set up in universities and institutes. In addition, Kamil 

ordered that at least one set of all nuclear-related 

documents and some equipment be retained by a 

senior scientist. 

It was not until the Iraqis were confronted with evidence and IAEA successfully seized EMIS components in June/July 1991 that the Iraqis admitted to the 

large enrichment program. Large quantities of EMIS 

equipment were unburied and delivered to IAEA for 

destruction later that year.

Even though the existence of their centrifuge 

enrichment program was known before 1991, the 

Iraqis did not fully declare its extent and maintained 

that it was only a limited research and development 

activity located at Tuwaitha, rather than Ar Rashidiyah. In 1991 the Iraqis also declared the planned 

centrifuge facility at Al Furat as under construction.

• After the seizure of documents pertaining to Iraq’s 

nuclear weapons program in late September 1991, 

the Iraqis admitted to the existence of the Al Athir. 

The facility was destroyed by IAEA in April-June 

1992. 

Starting in 1992, MIC Director Husayn Kamil distributed PC-3 and EDC personnel and work centers 

around various military research and production 

facilities. The intention, according to one scientist 

from the pre-1991 nuclear program, was to keep 

researchers together in anticipation of a reconstituted 

nuclear weapon program. 

Former PC-3 or EDC personnel working at the Pulse 

Power Research Center, which became Al Tahadi 

State Establishment in 1995, created an ion implantation lab with components from former IAEC and 

PC-3 projects (1994) and a rail gun experiment for air 

defense, which also used equipment from IAEC and 

PC-3 (1993-95).

Iraq resisted a more comprehensive disclosure 

of its nuclear program until after the defection of 

Husayn Kamil in August 1995, when a large collection of centrifuge and nuclear program documents 

and equipment was given to UNSCOM and IAEA. 

From that point onwards, the Iraqis appear to have 

cooperated and provided more complete information. 

The centrifuge program appears to have largely been 

declared, though a full set of documents delivered by 

German engineers was not supplied to IAEA inspectors.

Efforts that could preserve the progress and talent 

that had been developed up to the 1991 war included 

keeping the nuclear cadre engaged in a variety of 

projects, such as rebuilding of Iraq’s infrastructure. However, the nuclear program was ended and 

the intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding 

years. The economy had declined, and the talent had 

been focused on rebuilding the country as well as 

other military priorities. In some cases, extraordinary 

measures had to be taken to retain scientists, such as 

restricting foreign travel or seeking other jobs.

Recovery and Transition (1996-2002)

Iraq collaborated with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) to produce a series of Full, 

Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) statements, 

including a “fi nal” presented to the IAEA in September 1996, which reported its review fi ndings to 

the UN Security Council in October 1997. The IAEA 

concluded that it had a technically coherent picture 

of the pre-1999 nuclear weapons program, although 

it was troubled by the absence of centrifuge program 

documentation and there were gaps in knowledge 

about nuclear weapon design and development activities and the role of foreign assistance—the latter point 

also a reference to a pre-1991 offer by a representative of Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan to assist Iraq in developing nuclear weapons.

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh 

became director of the MIC in 1997 and appeared to 

bear no loyalty to the former nuclear program and 

IAEC personnel. He standardized salaries, eliminating the preferential pay differential given former PC-3 

workers, and instituted measures to emphasize and 

monitor performance throughout MIC.
6

With the infl ux of funds from the Oil For Food 

(OFF) Program and later the suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM, Saddam’s attention began to 

return to the former employees of the Iraqi Nuclear 

Program. In the late 1990s, raises in salaries were 

given to the employees of both the MIC and the 

IAEC. New programs were initiated, which would 

employ the talent of former Iraqi Nuclear Program 

employees, and both the MIC and IAEC expanded. 

Joint programs with universities were started not only 

to support a deteriorating university system but also 

to encourage involvement in MIC and IAEC efforts, 

offering the opportunity to pass knowledge on to new 

generations of scientists.

After 1998, interest by Saddam in air defense 

stimulated projects involving a former nuclear 

researcher—including one project that had the 

prospect of supporting a renewed nuclear weapons 

effort. The IAEC started a rail gun project in 1999, 

and the MIC was sponsoring a rail gun project at Al 

Tahadi in 2000. Both projects, and other air defense 

projects at IAEC, had poor prospects for success 

as weapons. The IAEC rail gun effort—led by the 

former head of the pre-1991 nuclear weapons design 

and development effort, Khalid Ibrahim Sa’id—

could, with signifi cant further development, be useful 

for future nuclear weapons design and development 

research.

New departments were established in the Physics 

Department of the IAEC. While primarily supporting the IAEC rail gun project, a Technical Research 

Branch—with laboratories for high-speed imaging, 

fl ash X-ray, impact studies, electronics, and computing—was established in 2001 in newly created laboratories outside the gates of Tuwaitha. A new laser 

division was created in 1999, and other departments 

were modernized through purchases of new equipment. Efforts were made to expand ties to universities and train more students at IAEC. Procurements 

were made through MIC to improve the equipment at 

IAEC’s machine tool workshop.

Miscalculation (2002-2003)

In the year prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 

MIC undertook improvements to technology in several areas that could have been applied to a renewed 

centrifuge program for uranium enrichment. These 

dual-use technologies included projects to acquire 

a magnet production line at Al Tahadi, carbon fi ber 

fi lament winding equipment for missile fabrication at 

al Karama, and the creation of a new Department of 

Rotating Machinery at Ibn Yunis. All of these projects 

were created to improve specifi c military or commercial products, but the technologies could have 

help support a centrifuge development project. ISG, 

however, has uncovered no indication that Iraq had 

resumed fi ssile material or nuclear weapon research 

and development activities since 1991.
7

Nuclear

Results of ISG’s Investigation on 

Nuclear Issues

Iraq did not possess a nuclear device, nor had it 

tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear 

weapons after 1991. 

ISG has uncovered no information to support allegations of Iraqi pursuit of uranium from abroad in 

the post-Operation Desert Storm era.

• In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Iraq had an 

aggressive program to acquire uranium. Iraq’s 

known inventory of safeguarded uranium has been 

accounted for by the IAEA and Coalition in June 

2004. These issues are described in detail in the 

uranium pursuits section of this paper. 

Iraq did not reconstitute its indigenous ability to 

produce yellowcake. As a result of Desert Storm 

and IAEA inspection efforts, Iraq’s indigenous yellowcake production capability appears to have been 

eliminated. Bomb damage in 1991 destroyed the 

uranium extraction facility at the Al Qaim Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant. During the years of intrusive 

inspections, the IAEA also closed and sealed the Abu 

Skhair mine to curtail Iraq’s secondary pilot plant 

production capability for acquiring uranium. 

• ISG also investigated the former nuclear facility at 

Tarmiya but found no indicators that the processes 

being developed there had produced more than 

a few kilograms of uranium-bearing wastes as a 

byproduct of phosphoric acid purifi cation. 

• These issues also are further described in the uranium pursuits section of this paper.

Post-1991, Iraq had neither rebuilt any capability to 

convert uranium ore into a form suitable for enrichment nor reestablished other chemical processes 

related to handling fi ssile material for a weapons 

program. Prior to the 1991 war, Iraq had established 

uranium conversion and feed material capabilities at 

the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center—Baghdad’s 

premier nuclear center—as well as a feed material 

plant near Mosul called Al-Jazira. Iraq also was establishing chemical processes at Tarmiya, and Al-Sharqat—its two primary sites for uranium enrichment 

using the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) 

technique. Baghdad also planned to produce feed 

materials for its centrifuge program at its main centrifuge research site Rashidiyah and planned a pilot 

plant at Al Furat. Uranium metal production planned 

for the pre-1991 program was planned for the AlAthir nuclear weapons assembly facility. These issues 

are described in the EMIS and uranium conversion 

sections of this paper. 

Available evidence leads ISG to judge that Iraq’s 

development of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment essentially ended in 1991. Prior to 1991, gas 

centrifuge technology was one of the primary methods being pursued for uranium enrichment, with 

emphasis being placed on carbon-fi ber composite 

centrifuge rotors. 

• According to Iraq’s disclosures to IAEA, ISG interviews and documentary evidence, Iraq’s centrifuge 

program by June 1990 had built—with foreign 

assistance—two magnetic-bearing centrifuges, one 

of which was tested with uranium hexafl uoride 

(UF6

) feed. Two oil-bearing centrifuges had also 

been built by the Iraqis as of June 1989. 

• ISG believes a reconstituted program for the purpose of producing material for nuclear weapons 

would have required redevelopment and testing of centrifuge manufacturing technology, the 

manufacture of thousands of machines required 

for a production plant, effort to gain experience in 

enrichment operations, and production of metricton quantities of uranium hexafl uoride (UF6

) feed. 

However, the initial research and development 

stages might use only a single centrifuge. 

• Former Presidential Scientifi c Advisor Amir 

Hamudi Hasan al-Sadi stated that he neither 

received nor issued orders to resume any centrifuge-related work and could not have done so 

because the war had destroyed the equipment and 

facilities. 

• The head of design implementation in the former 

centrifuge program, Faris ‘Abd Al ‘Aziz Al 

Samarra’i, did not believe that there was a reconstituted nuclear weapons program in Iraq after 1991. 

He stated that he did not believe that the universities 
8

had the resources or ability to undertake weaponrelated research. Since 1992, Dr. Faris had worked 

for MIC, in Studies and Planning, and as Director 

General of the Al-Shaheen Company since 1996 

and of the al Samud State Company since 2002.

• Jamal Ja’far, the designer of the pre-1991 magnetic 

centrifuge program, stated in an interview that he 

also did not believe that it was possible, given the 

conditions in Iraq in 2002, to reconstitute such a 

complicated and serious effort. 

• Additional details on ISG’s investigation into 

centrifuge-related issues can be found in sections 

dealing with aluminum tubes, carbon fi ber, fl ow 

forming, magnet production, potential centrifugerelated facilities, and rotating machinery. 

ISG also judges that Iraq continued work on none 

of the many other uranium enrichment programs 

explored or developed prior to 1991, such as EMIS 

or lasers. However, many of the former EMIS 

engineers and scientists continued to work for either 

the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) or the 

Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) in roles 

that could preserve their technical skills. 

• Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, signifi cant looting 

and damage have occurred at most of the dual-use 

manufacturing facilities that supported the pre-1991 

EMIS program. ISG has not been able to confi rm 

that the Iraqi Regime attempted to preserve the 

EMIS technology, although one scientist with this 

pre-1991 program kept documents and components 

that would have been useful to restarting such an 

effort.

• Additional details can be found in the EMIS and 

Laser Research sections of this report. 

It does not appear that Iraq took steps to advance its 

pre-1991 work in nuclear weapons design and development. ISG has not identifi ed a materials research 

and fi ssile component manufacturing capability that 

would be required to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Working with molten highly enriched 

uranium requires special consideration for criticality 

during the melting and solidifi cation process. ISG 

found no evidence that Iraq had acquired or developed the technology dealing with casting and machining issues of highly enriched uranium. 

• While ISG has not identifi ed any explosive lens 

development effort in Iraq that was associated with 

a renewed nuclear weapons program, we do believe 

that the Al Quds Company—a MIC establishment 

created in 2002—had a technical department, which 

built a facility capable of conducting research. Such 

a facility appears well suited for types of explosives research that could be applicable to conventional military and nuclear weapons research.

• ISG obtained evidence from recovered documents 

and from debriefi ngs of Iraqi scientists that Iraq 

utilized high-speed switches—like those of potential interest for nuclear weapons development—in 

support of rail-gun projects that we believe were 

intended for air defense. ISG has found no links 

between Iraq’s interest in special high-speed 

switches after 1991 and a nuclear weapons program. 

• ISG also was not able uncover indications that 

Iraq had resumed any work related to neutron 

initiators/generators for a renewed weapons program. The only neutron generation capability found 

by ISG pertained to known non-weapons-related 

research under way at the IAEC at Tuwaitha. 

• These activities are described in further detail in 

Potential Weapons Development Issues, IAEC 

Modernization, and Rail Gun portions of this 

report. 

ISG has uncovered two instances in which scientists linked to Iraq’s pre-1991 uranium enrichment 

programs kept documentation and technology in 

anticipation of renewing these efforts—actions that 

they contend were offi cially sanctioned. 

• A former engineer in the pre-1991 EMIS program 

claimed he was told by the head of MIC in 1997 to 

continue his work with ion implantation at his Al 

Tahaddi lab as a way to preserve EMIS technology. 
9

Nuclear

• The former head of Iraq’s pre-1991 centrifuge 

program also retained prohibited documents and 

components in apparent violation of the Regime’s 

directives. Though this activity was isolated, it also 

had the potential to contribute to a possible restart 

of Iraq’s uranium enrichment programs.

• Additional details on the disclosures of these two 

former enrichment offi cials can be found in the 

section of the report concerning Hidden Enrichment 

Technology. 

Furthermore, although all of the offi cials interviewed by ISG indicated Iraq had ended its pursuit of nuclear weapons in 1991, some suggested 

Saddam remained interested in reconstitution of the 

nuclear program after sanctions were lifted. Specifi c details concerning Saddam’s continued intent to 

develop weapons of mass destruction can be found in 

the section of this report concerning Regime Strategic 

Intent.

Consistent with Saddam’s nuclear ambitions, starting around 1992, Iraq directed scientifi c expertise to 

several Iraqi establishments. This action would be 

consistent with either preserving knowledge for the 

eventual reestablishment of the nuclear weapon program or with simply utilizing Iraq’s technical expertise in areas where it was most needed. In either case, 

some of the work performed by these former PC-3 

scientists inherently preserved some capabilities that 

would be needed for a reconstituted nuclear weapon 

program. Details on these activities can be found in 

the sections of the report concerning IAEC Modernization, University Programs, and Migration of PC-3 

Capabilities. 

Investigation Into Uranium 

Pursuits and Indigenous 

Production Capabilities 

Foreign Pursuits 

ISG has not found evidence to show that Iraq sought 

uranium from abroad after 1991 or renewed indigenous production of such material—activities that 

we believe would have constituted an Iraqi effort to 

reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. As part of 

its investigation, ISG sought information from prominent fi gures such as Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far—the head of 

the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.

• According to Ja’far, the Iraqi government did not 

purchase uranium from abroad following its acquisition of yellowcake from Niger in 1981. However, 

Iraq also purchased uranium dioxide from Brazil in 

1982. Iraq declared neither the Brazilian purchase 

nor one of the Niger purchases to the IAEA—demonstrating that the Iraqi Regime was willing to 

pursue uranium illicitly. 

Regarding specifi c allegations of uranium pursuits 

from Niger, Ja’far claims that after 1998 Iraq had 

only two contacts with Niamey—neither of which 

involved uranium. Ja’far acknowledged that Iraq’s 

Ambassador to the Holy See traveled to Niamey to 

invite the President of Niger to visit Iraq. He indicated 

that Baghdad hoped that the Nigerian President would 

agree to the visit as he had visited Libya despite sanctions being levied on Tripoli. Former Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See Wissam Zahawie has publicly 

provided a similar account.

• Ja’far claims a second contact between Iraq and 

Niger occurred when a Nigerian minister visited 

Baghdad around 2001 to request assistance in 

obtaining petroleum products to alleviate Niger’s 

economic problems. During the negotiations for 

this contract, the Nigerians did not offer any kind of 

payment or other quid pro quo, including offering 

to provide Iraq with uranium ore, other than cash in 

exchange for petroleum. 
10

Figure 1. Letter rejecting opportunity to 

purchase uranium.
11

Nuclear

• ISG recovered a copy of a crude oil contract dated 

26 June 2001 that, although unsigned, appears to 

support this arrangement.

So far, ISG has found only one offer of uranium to 

Baghdad since 1991—an approach Iraq appears to 

have turned down. In mid-May 2003, an ISG team 

found an Iraqi Embassy document in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) headquarters related to an offer 

to sell yellowcake to Iraq. The document reveals that 

a Ugandan businessman approached the Iraqis with an 

offer to sell uranium, reportedly from the Congo. The 

Iraqi Embassy in Nairobi—in reporting this matter 

back to Baghdad on 20 May 2001—indicated it told 

the Ugandan that Iraq does not deal with these materials, explained the circumstances of sanctions, and said 

that Baghdad was not concerned about these matters 

right now. Figure 1 is the translation of this document. 

Indigenous Production Capabilities 

As a result of Desert Storm and IAEA inspection 

efforts, Iraq’s indigenous yellowcake production 

capability appears to have been eliminated. ISG has 

uncovered no indicator Iraq had reconstituted production processes to refi ne uranium or produce yellowcake on a scale needed for a weapons program. 

• Iraq’s main plant for yellowcake production prior 

to 1991 was at Al-Qa’im. The plant was designed, 

erected, and commissioned by Mechim Company of Belgium during the period 1982 to 1984. 

Using phosphate ore from the Akashat mine and 

the Prayon process, the fi rst batch of yellowcake 

was delivered to the IAEC in December 1985 with 

approximately 168 tons delivered through 1991.

• Bomb damage in 1991 destroyed the uranium 

extraction facility at the Al-Qa’im Superphosphate 

Fertilizer Plant. In 1991, inspectors found that AlQa’im had been heavily damaged in the war and 

the structure was unsafe. Visits to the site in interim 

years did not reveal any attempt to reestablish the 

plant to produce yellowcake.

Figure 2. Al Qaim uranium extraction facility destroyed.
12

Figure 3. Graphite furnace (top left); 

mixer-settlers (top right); atomic absorption-fl ame emission spectrometer (bottom 

left); gas chromatography (bottom right).

Figure 4. Monitoring containers of “yellowcake.”
13

Nuclear

• During the years of intrusive inspections, the IAEA 

also closed and sealed the Abu Skhair mine to curtail Iraq’s secondary pilot plant production capability for acquiring uranium. A year before the closure 

of the Abu-Sha’ir mine under IAEA supervision in 

1993, the processing plant was converted to produce “Alum” from kaolin ore. Subsequent visits by 

UNSCOM/IAEA continued to report inoperability 

of the mine. The operation established at AbuSha’ir in September 1988 produced 800 tons of 

ore, 10 tons of which were delivered to a pilot plant 

at the Geological Survey State Enterprise (GSSE) 

prior to 1991. Despite this effort, only 0.5 kg of yellowcake was obtained. 

• Ja’far also claims that Iraq did not attempt to build 

another yellowcake production plant after 1991 (see 

Figure 2).

In May 2003, coalition forces visited the former 

yellowcake extraction plant at Al-Qaim and discovered 16 drums of yellowcake and radioactive 

waste—materials we believe were associated with 

the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. These 

drums were transferred in late June 2003 to the yellowcake storage facility located at Tuwaitha. There is 

no evidence that this material had been produced after 

Desert Storm

ISG also investigated the Ibn-Sina’ Facility—which 

in 1991 was part of Iraq’s EMIS uranium enrichment program—but found no indicators that the 

chemical processes being developed there had 

produced more than a few kilograms of uraniumbearing wastes as a byproduct of phosphoric acid 

purifi cation. ISG believes that the Ibn-Sina’—which 

concentrated much of the chemical engineering staff 

from the former PC-3 nuclear weapons program—

would most likely have been involved in an effort to 

reestablish a uranium recovery capability, had such an 

effort been under way.

Iraq’s Known Uranium Holdings 

Known Iraqi uranium holdings have been accounted 

for by the Coalition and the IAEA. In June 2004, a 

joint IAEA and Coalition team verifi ed the inventory 

of Iraqi uranium compounds—an inventory comprising both imported material and that indigenously 

produced prior to 1991 (see fi gure 4).

• During the 1970s and early 1980s, Iraq bought 

uranium in various forms from the international 

market. These materials included about 486 tons 

of yellowcake, 33,470 kg of “natural” uranium 

dioxide, 1,767 kg of “low-enriched” uranium dioxide (2.6 percent 235U), and 6,005 kg of “depleted” 

uranium dioxide from Portugal, Italy, Niger, and 

Brazil.

Prior to 1991, Iraq also acquired highly enriched 

uranium for its research reactors from France and 

Russia—material that was removed from Iraq following the 1991 Gulf war. Following the Husayn Kamil 

defection in 1995, Iraq admitted that in 1991 it had 

intended to use this highly enriched fuel as part of a 

“crash program” to develop a nuclear weapon (see 

Table 1).
14

Table 1

Declared Iraqi International Uranium Purchases 

Country Organization/

Company

Time-frame Uranium Form Amount Comment 

Portugal Emprese National 

de uranio EP

20 Jun 1980 “Yellowcake” 138.098 tons 

(uranium content 

approximately 

103 tons)

IAEA notifi ed 

through “ICR” 

report (29 Jun 

80) (not subject 

to safeguards 

according to 

INFCIRC/153 corrected.)

17 May 1982 “Yellowcake” 148.348 tons 

(uranium content 

approximately 

110 tons)

No IAEA notifi cation (not subject 

to safeguards 

according to 

INFCIRC/153 corrected.)

31 May 1982

20 Jun 1982

Italy SNIA-TECHINT 

through CNEN

12 Dec 1979 “Depleted” uranium dioxide6,005 kg Under IAEA safeguards

12 Dec 1979 “Natural” uranium 

dioxide

4,006 kg

12 Dec 1979 “Natural” uranium 

dioxide (pellets & 

fuel rods)

500 kg

18 May 1982 “Low-Enriched” 

uranium dioxide 

(2.6% 235U)

1,767 kg

Niger ONAREM 

(Offi ce National 

Des Resources 

Minieres)

08 Feb 1981 “Yellowcake” (uranium content 

199.9 tons) 

IAEA notifi ed (not 

subject to safeguards according 

to INFCIRC/153 

corrected.)

18 Mar 1981 No IAEA notifi cation (not subject 

to safeguards 

according to 

INFCIRC/153 corrected.)

Brazil Through CNEN 

(Commisao Nacional de Energia 

Nuclear)

Sep 1981 “Natural” uranium 

dioxide

7,964 kg No IAEA notifi cation

Jan 1982 “Natural” uranium 

dioxide

21,000 kg
15

Nuclear

Iraqi Uranium Conversion 

Program

Iraq’s pre-1991 uranium conversion program was 

established at different sites to produce the necessary uranium compounds for the enrichment, 

reprocessing, and metallurgy programs to support 

its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Iraq had 

established much of its uranium conversion basic 

research and development at Tuwaitha. As processes 

were developed, they were adapted for production at 

Tuwaitha and other sites as appropriate 

(see Figures 5 and 6).

• Iraq produced a variety of uranium compounds to 

support its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program at a 

number of facilities, including Tuwaitha, al Jazira, 

Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat, Rashdiya, and Al Athir. 

At the time of Desert Storm, Iraq’s capabilities to 

produce uranium compounds/metal varied as noted 

in Table 2. 

Figure 5. Forms of uranium.
16

Figure 6. Tuwaitha (Baghdad Nuclear 

Research Center) (top); Tarmiya (Ibn 

Sina) uranium recovery facility (bottom).
17

Nuclear

Table 2

Iraq Uranium Conversion Program (Pre-Operation Desert Storm)

Site Bldg Activity/Capability Status at ODS

Tuwaitha 9 Reprocessing of irradiated fuel Operational

10 Uranium purifi cation Operational

15B UO2

 to UCl4 lab production for EMIS; UF4 to U metal preparation experiments; UF4

 and UF6 production & lab scale 

preparation

Operational

22 Reprocessing Operational

38 (G1 wing) UF4

 production Operational

64 Uranyl nitrate to U metal; UO2

 to UF4 to U metal Operational

73A&B UF4

 to U metal production; U metal purifi cation; 

UF4 preparation

Operational

73A Dissolution of U pellets & fuel; nuclear-grade UO2

 conversion.Operational

73B “Yellowcake” purifi cation & conversion to UO2

 experiments. Operational

85 UO2

 to UCl4 lab & pilot plant production for EMIS; Pilot plant 

recovery of U from R-100 & R-50 graphite collectors; Purifi -

cation of UF6

Operational

RWTS Pilot plant U recovery from R-100 & R-50 liners Operational

Al-Jazira 000 AYC to UO2

 production for EMIS. Operational

510 Utilities & storage tanks for Project 212 Operational

400 UO2

 to UCl4 production for EMIS Operational

401 Utilities for Project 244 Operational

3 Underground 

Facilities

Spare parts storage for U program construction phase Operational

Tarmiya 210 U recovery from R-120 (nongraphite) Precommissioning

220 U recovery from R-120 (graphite) Incomplete

230 Recovered U to Ucl4 (nongraphite) Incomplete

240 Lab support for Project 266

265 Pilot scale U recovery from R-120 (graphite & nongraphite) Operational

AlSharqat350 Chemical recovery for natural U from components of R120 80% constructed; 

60% checked out

360 U recovery (HEU & depleted U) from R120 &R60 collectors 85% constructed; 

50% checked out

370 U recovery from R60 collector components 80% constructed; 

60% checked out

Rashidiya Hall C Lab scale UF6

 preparation & purifi cation; UF4 production

9 UF6

 and UF4 R&D

10 UF6

 and UF4 R&D; UF6 purifi cation

22 UF6

 production Operational
18

As a result of Desert Storm and the UN and IAEA 

efforts afterwards, many of the Iraqi uranium conversion facilities were destroyed or damaged and the 

program crippled. Many of the facilities of Tuwaitha, 

Al-Athir, al Sharqat, Rashidiyah, and Al-Athir were 

destroyed during Operation Desert Storm or subsequently through IAEA inspections. Table 3 indicates 

the destruction of facilities at the original sites and by 

whose action. 

As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom and its 

aftermath, much of Iraq’s residual potential uranium conversion capability was destroyed. ISG site 

visits to many locations found not only destruction 

resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom, but also 

looting that rendered many facilities inoperable. ISG 

investigations, including sampling and radiation surveys, during these visits uncovered no indications of 

nuclear weapons-related activity. 

• Tuwaitha (Baghdad Nuclear Research Center). ISG 

conducted a series of visits to Tuwaitha. During 

these visits, 151 structures were surveyed and 

cleared, 28 structures judged destroyed, and eight 

structures deemed hazardous (see fi gure 7). 

• Al-Athir. US military forces found Al-Athir abandoned and heavily looted. ISG visited and found no 

evidence of uranium conversion activities.

• Al Zahf Al Kabeer (Taji Metallurgy). ISG visits 

to Al Zahf Al Kabeer found that all research and 

production buildings showed extensive evidence of 

looting. They found no evidence of uranium metal 

production or weapon component production and 

received no positive readings from radiation surveys.

• Al Raya. ISG visits to Al Raya found extensive 

bomb damage and widespread looting. They 

found no evidence of uranium metal production 

or weapon component production and received no 

positive readings from radiation surveys.

• Ibn Sina (Tarmiya). An ISG visit to Ibn Sina found 

the facility to be closed since major ground combat 

operations. The facility had been subject to some 

looting and was apparently in the process of restoring operations. No indicators or evidence of WMD 

activity was found (see Figure 8).

• Exceptions to the general destruction and looting 

were Al Amal and Al Salaam. Al Amal was active 

24 hours a day, seven days a week to support an oil 

refi nery at Basrah. Al Salaam was not damaged but 

showed evidence of minor looting 

(see Figures 7 and 8).

Table 2

Iraq Uranium Conversion Program (Pre-Operation Desert Storm) continued

Site Bldg Activity/Capability Status at ODS

Al-Atheer 6830 U metallurgy Incomplete

6520 U metallurgy Operational

6580 U chemistry 50% complete

Al-Rabee U metallurgy Transferred to AlAtheer

References: Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration of the Past Iraqi Nuclear Program, 3 Dec 2002
19

Nuclear

Table 3

Iraq’s Uranium Conversion Program (Post-Operation Desert Storm Iraqi & 

UN/IAEA Activities - Facilities)

Site Bldg ODS Impact Iraqi Actions IAEA Actions

Tuwaitha 9 Destroyed 

10 Destroyed Leveled by Iraq

15B Destroyed Leveled by Iraq

22 Destroyed

38 (G1 wing)

64 Destroyed

73A&B Destroyed Leveled by Iraq

73A Destroyed Leveled by Iraq

73B Destroyed Leveled by Iraq

85 Destroyed Leveled by Iraq IAEA destruction

RWTS Destroyed

Al-Jazira 000 Destroyed Leveled by Iraq

510 Destroyed

400 50% destroyed; 

40% equipment 

destroyed

401 Destroyed

3 underground 

Facilities

Closed and sealed

Tarmiya 210 Partially destroyed

220 Not destroyed

230 80% destroyed

240 Not destroyed

265 Not destroyed

Al-Sharqat 350 Destroyed

360 Destroyed

370 Destroyed

Rashidiya Hall C Evacuation and/or 

destruction of signifi cant materials

Transfer and/or 

destruction of signifi cant materials 9

10

22

Al-Atheer 6830 Destroyed by IAEA

6520 Destroyed by IAEA

6580 Destroyed by IAEA

Al-Rabee

References: Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration of the Past Iraqi Nuclear Program, 3 Dec 2002.
20

Figure 7. Tuwaitha Building 15 area (top left); Tuwaitha 

Building 15 area (top right); Tuwaitha Building 73 area 

destroyed (bottom left); Tuwaitha LAMA Facility (Building 

22 destroyed) (bottom right).

Figure 8. Tarmiya (Ibn Sina) uranium recovery facility.
21

Nuclear

Aluminum Tube Investigation

Baghdad’s interest in high-strength, high-specifi cation aluminum tubes—dual-use items controlled 

under Annex 3 of the Ongoing Monitoring and Verifi cation Plan as possible centrifuge rotors—is best 

explained by its efforts to produce 81-mm rockets. 

ISG conducted numerous interviews related to Iraq’s 

interest in acquiring these tubes—information that 

regularly pointed toward similar tubes being used in 

the Nasser-81 ground-to-ground rocket system.

• Postwar interviews included prominent fi gures 

from Iraq’s pre-1991 centrifuge effort, including its 

director, the project manager for rotor manufacture, 

other former staff, as well as the head of the overall 

nuclear weapons program. ISG also interviewed 

numerous offi cials directly involved in the 81-mm 

rocket effort and Iraq’s Military Industrialization 

Commission (MIC). None of these offi cials admitted to any intended end use of the tubes beyond 

rockets. 

Although ISG also uncovered inconsistencies that 

raise questions about whether high-specifi cation 

aluminum tubes were really needed for such a 

rocket program, these discrepancies are not suffi -

cient to show a nuclear end use was planned for the 

tubes. For example, ISG has found technical drawings 

that show the 81-mm rocket program had a history 

of using tubes that appear to have fallen short of the 

standard demanded in procurement attempts in the 

years before the war. Iraq also accepted lower-quality, 

indigenously produced aluminum tubes for 81-mm 

rockets in the months before the war despite continued foreign procurement attempts for high-specifi cation tubes.

• ISG believes that bureaucratic momentum made it 

diffi cult to abandon the perceived need for highspecifi cation tubes from abroad. These foreign 

pursuits probably also were affected by a lack of 

suffi cient indigenous manufacturing capabilities—

an effort Iraq reportedly began only in mid-2002—

the high cost of that production, and pressure of the 

impending war. 

• Efforts to press the Iraqis on other inconsistencies 

in individual recollections on history, production, 

questionable engineering practices, or accomplishments also did not produce statements to link the 

tubes to any effort other than 81-mm rockets. 

Elements of ISG Investigation 

ISG investigated key indicators that suggested a possible centrifuge end use for the tubes—questioning 

that revealed plausible explanations for use of the 

tubes in 81-mm rockets, notably:

• Purported high-level interest in aluminum tubes 

by Saddam and Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister—a 

potential indicator of a program of national importance, such as a centrifuge program.

• Possible association of Iraqi nuclear entities with 

the tubes it sought to procure—reporting suggestive 

of a nuclear end-user. 

• Tube characteristics and shipping requirements—

reporting that showed the tubes were subject to 

nuclear controls and seemed to be over specifi ed for 

conventional rockets. 

• Iraqi effort to indigenously manufacture tubes for 

an 81 mm-rocket program and its continued effort 

to acquire tubes with higher specifi cations.

• Alleged Iraqi interest in 84-mm tubes—a size that 

would have been inconsistent with the 81-mm 

rocket program.

In the course of this investigation, ISG did not 

uncover evidence of a program to design or develop 

an 81-mm aluminum rotor centrifuge. Other sections 

of ISG nuclear report describe fi ndings concerning 

equipment and materials that could have supported a 

renewed centrifuge effort. 
22

Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum 

Tubes 

ISG has found that high-level Iraqi interest in 

aluminum tubes appears to have come from efforts 

to produce 81-mm rockets, rather than a nuclear 

end use. Multiple reports indicate Dr. Huwaysh was 

keenly interested in high-strength, high-specifi cation 

aluminum tubes for rocket production. Dr. Huwaysh 

attributes his pursuit of 81-mm rockets to the delivery of some launchers to the military shortly after 

he became the head of MIC in 1997. As a result, Dr. 

Huwaysh claims he was bound by requests from the 

Minister of Defense to produce rockets for those 

launchers—a task he regularly pressed on MIC leadership at quarterly meetings.

• Dr. Huwaysh’s advocacy of 81-mm rockets appears 

to explain why he sought the delivery of items that 

were probably sample aluminum tubes. In early 

2002, Dr. Huwaysh sought two shipments of highstrength aluminum from an Iraqi procurement fi rm 

in Syria.

Several Iraqi offi cials also commented on Saddam’s 

potential interest in rockets. One offi cial indicates Dr. 

Huwaysh told MIC engineers that Saddam asked him 

to make 81-mm rockets. But this link between the 

tubes and Saddam remains uncorroborated, even by 

Dr. Huwaysh.

• Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far, the head of Iraq’s pre-1991 

nuclear weapons program and most recently a 

Presidential Science Advisor, has offered somewhat 

confl icting accounts regarding Saddam’s awareness 

of the aluminum tubes. While discussing 81-mm 

rockets, Ja’far claimed Saddam was very interested 

in aerial weapons. Ja’far has also stated, however, 

this rocket program was unimportant and that work, 

including procurement, was known only to lowerlevel offi cials. Ja’far—whose debriefi ng accounts 

have been known to vary—also doubted Saddam 

understood the technical specifi cations of the tubes.

Other interest by senior offi cials in the 81-mm rocket 

can be traced to around 1984, when Husayn Kamil 

reportedly approved a proposal to reverse-engineer 

and build the weapon system. The proposal, made 

by an Iraqi Army Aviation offi cer was based on the 

premise that it was too expensive to continue importing 81-mm rockets from Italy. 

Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With 

the Tubes 

The limited information found by ISG that ties Iraqi 

nuclear entities to the tubes also appears related 

to the 81-mm rocket program. A 6 March 2003 

letter from the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate 

(NMD) to the IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear Verifi cation Offi ce 

(INVO) notes that the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) conducted material composition testing 

on a sample aluminum tube in early 2001. According 

to that letter given to ISG, the Rashid State Company—one of the entities involved in 81-mm rocket 

production—obtained the sample tube through the 

Ahmed Al-Barrak Bureau, an import/export fi rm in 

Baghdad. 

• The tube tested by the IAEC reportedly measured 

900 mm in length and 81 mm in diameter—a size 

consistent with prewar procurement attempts. The 

Rashid State Company requested other physical 

property tests, but the IAEC did not have capabilities to do the work.

A leading Iraqi nuclear expert measured the tubes 

to answer questions posed by the IAEA, but ISG has 

found no indication that this represented interest 

by Iraq in the tubes for centrifuge applications. In 

the months before the war, Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far admits 

calling on a leading technical fi gure in the former 

centrifuge effort, Dr. Faris ‘Abd Al-Aziz Al-Samarrai, 

to measure dimensional variances on several 81-mm 

rockets. Multiple offi cials interviewed by ISG confi rm 

Aziz’s work for Ja’far to address questions from 

IAEA inspectors about the tubes. 

• Nonetheless, the letter to the IAEA incorrectly 

claims that measurements of rockets made with the 

original pre-1991 tubes met the higher specifi cations for tubes set by the 2000 committee.

Ja’far’s study for the IAEA inspectors apparently 

acknowledged it was possible to make a centrifuge 

from the tubes, although he thought doing so was 

impractical. Ja’far thought the IAEA offi cials agreed 

with his assessment but notes they did not make a 

defi nitive statement on the utility of the tubes for 

centrifuges. Ja’far thought the size of the rocket tubes 

would cause the enrichment output to be far lower 
23

Nuclear

than the centrifuge design Iraq had pursued as of 

1991. ‘Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya, a former Director General of the Rashid State Company and a key 

fi gure in the 81-mm rocket program, told ISG that he 

informally heard that Ja’far and Al-‘Aziz determined 

that the tubes could not be used for centrifuges.

• In his postwar debriefi ngs, Ja’far also opined that 

using 81-mm rockets as a cover story for a centrifuge program would not have been very useful 

because Iraq had diffi culties importing any goods. 

Ja’far also told debriefers that developing an 

indigenous carbon-fi ber fi lament winding capability 

would have been much more useful if Iraq intended 

to resume a centrifuge effort.

Dr. Mahdi Shukur Al ‘Ubaydi, the head of the pre1991 centrifuge program, similarly did not consider 

it reasonable that Iraq could have pursued a centrifuge program based on 81-mm aluminum tubes. Al 

‘Ubaydi believes that, besides himself, the only Iraqis 

capable of assessing the suitability of aluminum tubes 

for centrifuge use were Jamal Ja’far, Dr. Farid Bashir 

Yusef, and Dr. Makki Kadhim Rashid—the latter 

two having fl ed Iraq years before the war. Al ‘Ubaydi 

assessed that no one in Iraq could have redesigned the 

centrifuge to use an 81-mm aluminum rotor. 

• Al ‘Ubaydi stated that Iraq was able to quickly 

develop its pre-1991 centrifuge program because 

of the raw intelligence of Jamal, Farid, Makki, and 

himself—an underestimation, we believe, of the 

contribution of technology, designs, and expertise 

provided by a few experts from the European uranium enrichment consortium, URENCO. Nonetheless, Al ‘Ubaydi stated it still took Iraq 2.5 years 

to understand the working design it obtained from 

abroad. 

• Al ‘Ubaydi assessed that redesigning a centrifuge 

by scaling it up or down in size would have been 

a completely different task, and he would have 

hesitated “a million times” before attempting to 

do so. Al ‘Ubaydi opined that a renewed effort 

would more likely build on this earlier work with 

URENCO-type machines and utilize carbon fi ber. 

• Another offi cial from the former centrifuge program similarly told ISG that Iraq lacked the 

necessary expertise to design a centrifuge using 

81-mm diameter high-strength aluminum tubes.

The offi cial noted Iraq’s prewar expert in centrifuge 

modeling left the country around 1996 and now 

most likely is a university instructor. The same 

source describes other losses of personnel with one 

colleague having left to work in private industry 

while a third moved to a MIC center. 

ISG also has not found a nuclear connection that 

infl uenced the evolution of the design or tolerances 

for the 81-mm tubes. According to reporting, ‘Arif 

Kaddur Al-Kubaysi, former al Fatah Director of 

Engineering Affairs and lead 81-mm rocket designer, 

freely set the design of the metal parts of the rocket as 

he saw fi t. This reporting claimed no one changed any 

specifi cations for the aluminum tube rocket body after 

2000—notably not Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far, ‘Abd-al-Tawab 

Huwaysh, ‘Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya, or Faris ‘Abd 

Al-Aziz Al-Samarrai. 

ISG found only one former nuclear offi cial connected—the connection may be coincidental—to 

the design of the 81-mm rocket. As the former head 

of al Qa’Qaa’, Sinan Rasim Sa’id reportedly was 

involved in developing propellant for the rocket—one 

of the alleged underlying causes of the inaccuracy of 

the weapon. Prior to 1991, reporting indicates Sa’id 

helped maintain electrical equipment for the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and centrifuge 

uranium enrichment efforts.

Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements 

ISG’s investigation into why Iraq sought aluminum 

tubes with such high specifi cations before the war—

a key factor that raised concerns that the Regime 

had restarted a centrifuge effort—has uncovered 

plausible but not always consistent accounts that 

link the tubes to 81-mm rockets. Multiple offi cials 

involved with the Iraqi rocket program claim that 

the tight specifi cations on the aluminum tubes were 

driven by efforts to improve the accuracy of this barrage-type weapon. These sources report that in 2000, 

Dr. Huwaysh formed a committee to set fi nal rocket 

specifi cations and address problems with its accuracy. 
24

Varied Reactions to the Tube Seizure in 2001 

ISG has uncovered mixed and sometimes confl icting 

reactions by Iraqi offi cials to the June 2001 seizure 

of high-strength aluminum tubes—items reportedly stopped based on concerns the tubes violated 

sanctions and nuclear export controls. Ja’far told 

debriefers that the seizure did not capture his attention because he thought the tubes simply were stopped 

as a result of sanctions. He claims he was not aware 

of any MIC inquiries in the wake of that seizure to 

suggest the tubes were intended for centrifuge use and 

deemed foreign government claims in 2002 that the 

tubes were suitable for centrifuges as insignifi cant. 

He also claims he did not become concerned about 

centrifuge allegations until early 2003 when the issue 

arose in the United Nations Security Council.

• Ja’far’s reported efforts to gather information in 

early 2003 to deal with IAEA inspectors from Faris 

Aziz and others seem to be the extent of his concerns with the tubes prior to the war. ISG believes 

that Ja’far is a likely candidate to have known 

of renewed nuclear work—had any been under 

way—given his preeminent role as the head of the 

pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. 

Similarly, the head of Iraq’s pre-1991 centrifuge 

program reportedly had no knowledge of a nuclear 

connection to the aluminum tubes until the issue 

surfaced months before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

According to interrogation interviews, he was not 

part of Ja’far’s review for inspectors, and he was not 

tasked to consider the suitability of the aluminum 

tubes for centrifuges. Reportedly Al ‘Ubaydi said he 

learned the tubes were destined for a rocket program 

in late 2002 when Dr. Amir Al-Sa’di, a Presidential 

Advisor, queried him if the pre-1991 centrifuge program had used aluminum.

• Al ‘Ubaydi reportedly learned from Jamal Ja’far, 

a technical expert from the pre-1991 centrifuge 

program, that aluminum could be used in magneticbearing centrifuges—and passed this point to Sa’di.

Dr. Huwaysh, however, claims he took several 

actions in the wake of the 2001 seizure—one of 

many claims he makes that are inconsistent with 

other debriefi ng accounts. Dr. Huwaysh indicates 

that it was the procurement front company that fi rst 

informed MIC that the tubes were stopped because 

of centrifuge concerns. Dr. Huwaysh then claims he 

asked Al ‘Ubaydi to investigate and received word 

in early 2002 from Hussam Muhammad Amin, the 

head of Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate that 

Al ‘Ubaydi concluded the tubes could be used for 

centrifuges. Dr. Huwaysh then claims he ordered 

‘Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya, then Director General 

of the Al-Rashid State Company, to fi nd an alternate 

metal—not subject to nuclear export controls—that 

would still be strong enough to make the motor cases 

for the 81-mm rockets.

• Dr. Huwaysh adds that he trusted Baqi to change 

the alloy and did not confi rm the order was followed.When shown a copy of a 2003 fax from a 

procurement company that specifi ed the prohibited 

alloy, Dr. Huwaysh adamantly claimed it was a 

mistake, as Baqi would never have disobeyed his 

order. 

Baqi claims that Dr. Huwaysh did not ask him to 

make any changes after the capture of the tubes 

during the summer of 2001, adding that other key 

rocket program offi cials would have known of such 

a modifi cation if it had been ordered. Baqi reportedly heard indirectly that Dr. Huwaysh did not think 

the tubes were suitable for centrifuges and that news 

reporting in this regard was mistaken.

• Engineer Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya, then Director 

General of the al Rashid State Company, led the 

17-member committee, supported by his deputy 

and head of the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) at al Rashid, Sa’ad Ahmad Mahmud. 

NMD head Lt. Gen. Husam Amin also participated, 

ostensibly due to his rocket engineering expertise, 

as did Arif Kaddori Atawi Al-Kubaysi, the lead 

engineer for the 81-mm rocket program. (See inset 

on insights.) 

• The committee reportedly completed its work in 

September 2000, concluding that inconsistencies 

between rockets resulted in variations in range and 

accuracy—a problem they chose to address, in part, 

by reducing mass differences between rockets and 

components by tightening specifi cations. The committee also reportedly considered propellant-related 

problems and quality-control issues.
25

Nuclear

Comments From the Head of the “2000 Committee” 

ISG interviews with ‘Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya 

revealed insights into the thinking of the 2000 Committee, which he led in an attempt to improve the 

accuracy of the 81-mm rocket. Baqi claims that the 

2000 committee noticed that the engineering drawings for the 81-mm rocket had undergone many ad 

hoc revisions over the years, changes ostensibly made 

to ease its manufacture. Baqi told postwar debriefers that one goal of the 2000 committee was to return 

the 81-mm rocket to its original Italian-based design 

by setting new specifi cations for imported tubes—an 

unrealistic goal given that Iraq had made changes in 

the late 1980s that affected propellant performance 

and lifetime. 

According to Baqi, the committee checked all the 

parts of the rocket and found that unwanted dispersion was caused by problems with the nozzle and the 

nonalignment of the propellant, nozzle, and motor 

case—a slightly different cause than the mass differences noted by other offi cials. Baqi also described 

that the committee examined problems with the propellant, manufactured by the Al-Qa’ Qaa’ State Company, because this would occasionally cause rockets 

to explode during fl ight. The committee reportedly 

concluded these misfi rings were caused by pitting of 

the tubes—probably a reference to corrosion marks 

caused by improper storage—and problems with the 

insulator between the propellant and the tube. Baqi 

also claimed that the launcher was not a signifi cant 

part of the rocket’s scatter problems—a conclusion 

also reached by the 2000 Committee. 

• A separate source associated with the rocket 

program claimed the 81-mm rocket accuracy was 

adversely impacted by a number of factors—some 

resulting from its conversion from an air-to-ground 

into a ground-to-ground system. This source 

claimed that down-range accuracy problems were 

caused by a lack of initial velocity, instabilities from 

the ground launch platform, and insuffi cient design 

features that would have produced more spin. 

• This source also claimed the quality of Iraqi propellant adversely affected the range of the 81-mm 

rocket. Iraq reportedly modifi ed its 81-mm rocket 

propellant in 1988 or 1989 when Amir Al-Sa’di,

then Director of the MIC, commissioned a group at al 

Qa’ Qaa’ to examine why some Italian-made rockets 

prematurely exploded. The group discovered droplets 

of nitroglycerine formed on the propellant inside the 

rocket body, causing the malfunction. By modifying 

the propellant, Iraq increased rocket shelf life from 1 

to roughly 5 years but at the cost of consistent propellant performance that affected accuracy. 

Baqi claims he was not alone on the 2000 committee 

in questioning why the military wanted the 81-mm 

rocket, adding that the 107-mm rocket was easier 

to produce, had fewer parts, and a bigger warhead.

Baqi notes the lead production engineer and Kubaysi 

as two of the 2000 committee members who shared 

his views that it was a bad idea for Iraq to make the 

81-mm surface-to-surface rocket by attempting to 

copy the Italian air-to-surface rocket. Baqi claimed 

many engineers wanted to end the 81-mm rocket program in favor of the 107-mm rockets.

• Baqi echoed claims by Dr. Huwaysh that the military apparently wanted the 81-mm rocket because 

they already had launchers for them. Additionally, 

Baqi noted quality control was a general problem 

with the 81-mm rocket program.

• Reporting indicated that the 81-mm rocket program 

should have been canceled because other rockets in 

Iraq’s arsenal were capable of fulfi lling its role and 

posed fewer problems.According to this reporting, the nominal 9.5-kilometer range of the 81-mm 

rocket could be covered by the 107-mm and 122-

mm systems with ranges of 1-8 kilometers and 5-20 

kilometers, respectively. According to reporting, 

many military offi cers were opposed to the 81-mm 

rocket system, but they allegedly were overruled by 

more senior leadership. According to reporting, the 

81-mm rocket suffered about twice as much scatter 

as the 122-mm rockets Iraq produced. 
26

Nearly all critical linear dimensions and related 

tolerance specifi cations that raised prewar concerns 

over possible centrifuge end use can be linked to 

decisions reportedly made by the 2000 Committee 

for rockets. While participating in the work of the 

2000 Committee, multiple offi cials indicate the lead 

design engineer tightened the inner and outer diameter specifi cations for imported tubes. In his interviews 

with ISG, the lead design engineer noted that the 

2000 Committee decided that the rocket body mass 

could vary by only 30 grams—a tight requirement 

that led to the setting of diameter specifi cations used 

in Iraqi procurement attempts since April 2002 –the 

same values Iraq’s NMD declared to the IAEA in the 

6 March 2003 letter. (see Table 4.) 

• The lead design engineer also reportedly sought to 

reduce the total allowed mass variation between 

rockets to 300 grams out of 8.5 kilogram total 

weight, with only 150 grams allocated to differences stemming from metal parts.Reportedly, 

pressure testing confi rmed that trimming wall mass 

from the rocket tubes did not adversely affect the 

strength of the tube.

Reporting indicates the shipping requirements originated from recommendations by Dr. Sami Ibrahim of 

the Baghdad University of Technology, who investigated why the aluminum tubes, purchased from 

Germany in the 1980s for the 81-mm rocket program, 

corroded when stored outdoors at Tho Al-Fiqar. 

• Ibrahim concluded that the unanodized German 

tubes corroded from a galvanic reaction made possible by stacking the tubes horizontally in direct 

contact with each other and outdoors. Ibrahim 

reportedly noticed other unanodized 7075 alloy aluminum tubes also stored outdoors since 1989 at Tho 

Al-Fiqar, a fl ow-forming facility. These tubes were 

stored upright and separated from each other with 

nylon mesh—factors that infl uenced his recommendations on how to prevent tube corrosion.

Baqi’s requirements seem to have grown out of a 

desire to avoid angering Dr. Huwaysh, who reportedly was upset when he saw the corroded tubes at 

Tho Al-Fiqar during a visit in 1998. Iraq also took 

a further precaution of reanodizing aluminum parts 

after machining to ensure that no further corrosion 

would occur. 

Tho Al-Fiqar also seems to have set other specifi cations for the rocket program that were not 

directly addressed by the 2000 Committee in its 

procurement specifi cation document.

 According to 

a former offi cial in the 81-mm rocket program, the 

Tho Al-Fiqar specifi cations document was prepared 

to assist procurement offi cials in acquiring highstrength aluminum tubes. In that document, the lead 

production engineer reportedly set an artifi cially tight 

specifi cation of 0.05 mm for eccentricity—one of the 

properties related to uniform tube wall thickness. Tho 

Al-Fiqar offi cials insisted on the specifi cation—twice 

as tight as the 0.1 mm reportedly actually needed—to 

ensure that imported tubes would pass military 

quality-control requirements after the tubes were 

machined. 

• The lead design engineer has also claimed that he 

determined the maximum value for eccentricity of 

the raw aluminum tubes as needing to be between 

0.05 mm and 0.1 mm.

With the reported exception of latitude given to the 

Director General of Tho Al-Fiqar to further tighten 

tolerances, few changes reportedly were made to 

the imported tube requirements specifi ed by the 

2000 Committee. According to an offi cial from 

the Iraqi rocket program, no one was permitted to 

loosen the specifi cation set by the 2000 Committee. 

However, the lead production engineer reportedly 

had the authority to further tighten specifi cations in 

order to ensure that usable parts were received from 

vendors. Otherwise the parts received might not meet 

the requirements stated in the pertinent procurement 

documents.

• The latitude reportedly available to the lead production engineer could explain why Iraq tightened 

the eccentricity specifi cation on the tubes in early 

2002—an action viewed at the time to be unnecessary for a rocket program. Tight eccentricity specifi cations reportedly were needed to pass military 

quality-control inspection—a check that could not 

be overruled by production personnel, according to 

reporting. 

• Reporting indicates the hardness requirement for 

the nozzle was one of the few changes made after 

the committee completed its work, adding there 

were no other changes to the metal part specifi cations, including the rocket motor tube.
27

Nuclear

Table 4

Rocket Tube Dimensions

Iraqi Technical for year Drawing

Rocket Chamber/

Tube Characteristic

1989 1993 1997 Specifi cation After 

2000 Committee

Outer Diameter 81.0 mm 81.0 +/- 0.2 mm 81.0 +/- 0.2 mm 81.0 + 0 / - 0.1 mm

Inner Diameter 74.4 mm 74.4 + 0.1 – 0.3mm 74.4 + 0.1 – 0.3mm 74.4 + 0.1 / - 0 mm

Final Length 868 mm 868 + 0.2/-0 mm 868 +/- 0.2/-0 mm 868 +/- 0.3 mm

Mass 1812g 1820 +/- 100g 1820 +/- 150g 1828 +/- 30g

A summary of Iraqi tube linear dimension specifi -

cations as found on 81-mm rocket drawings before 

and after they were reportedly tightened by the 2000 

Committee. 

Indigenous Tube Manufacture—A Possible Sign 

Baghdad Did Not Need High-Specifi cation Tubes 

Frustrated by its inability to import tubes, Iraq 

began indigenous production efforts in mid-2002 

that ultimately raise questions about whether highspecifi cation tubes really were needed for rockets.

Dr. Huwaysh reportedly formed a committee in May 

or June of 2002 to study how to indigenously produce tubes for 81-mm rockets. One report indicates 

the committee—led by the heads of the al Nida and 

Tho Al-Fiqar State Companies—considered using 

the extruder at the Ur Establishment in Nasiriyah 

and two fl ow-forming machines at Tho Al-Fiqar to 

produce tubes. This committee conducted its work 

while foreign procurement attempts continued as well 

as indigenous manufacture of rockets using corroded 

tubes.

• Efforts to extrude tubes reportedly failed after 

four to six weeks despite assistance from the Badr 

and al Shahid State Companies and the University 

of Technology in Baghdad—including Dr. Sami 

Ibrahim. Multiple reports indicate the Ur extrusion 

press was too weak to handle high-strength 7075 T6 

alloy. An effort by Badr to develop a special tool for 

the press reportedly ended with the war. 

• Accounts differ on those responsible for developing 

the fl ow-forming techniques that successfully produced about 50 tubes per day through continuous 

operations at Tho Al-Fiqar. One piece of information credits the University of Technology and the 

2002 Committee for developing the necessary heat 

treatment procedures while another indicates that 

the Director General of the al Nida State Company 

devised the production process. MIC reportedly 

envisioned the Sabah Nisan (Seventh of April) 

Company would make forgings for future operations, but this plan also was interrupted by the war. 

The indigenous effort to produce tubes in the last 

months before the war resulted in production and 

handling standards that fell short of those required 

for the imported tubes. Reporting indicates that the 

lead production engineer gave Dr. Huwaysh some 

sample fl ow-formed tubes in late September or 

October 2002, noting that the production process 

was costly and time consuming. The lead production 

engineer also indicated that the best possible tolerance achievable on the outer diameter of fl ow-formed 

tubes was 81 + 0.2 / -0.1 mm—a fi gure that falls short 

of the requirements set for imported tubes. Another 

source indicates these aluminum tubes reportedly 

were fl ow-formed to a diameter of about 82.5 mm 

then machined to their fi nal dimensions. To accommodate for the limitations in fl ow-forming technology, a separate, looser set of technical specifi cations 

reportedly were produced for indigenously produced 

rocket bodies (see Table 5). 
28

• Reporting also indicates indigenously produced 

tubes were also handled differently than those that 

would have been imported. Between fl ow-forming 

steps indigenously manufactured tubes reportedly 

were shipped in ordinary wooden boxes or simply 

stacked for storage—a sharp contrast to the packaging and anodization requirements demanded by 

the 2000 Committee for imported tubes. The same 

reporting also indicates the tubes also reportedly 

were not individually wrapped or separated from 

each other and were sometimes positioned horizontally—again contrary to the 2000 Committee 

recommendations.

In late 2002, the lead production engineer informed 

Dr. Huwaysh that the indigenously produced fl owformed tubes could be used without affecting rocket 

performance—a signifi cant shift from the 2000 

Committee fi ndings and one that the MIC director 

reportedly accepted. The lead production engineer 

reportedly passed this view to Dr. Huwaysh in a 

meeting attended by lead engineer Kubaysi, another 

member of the 2000 Committee. 

• Reporting also indicates indigenously manufactured 

fl ow-formed tubes were successfully used in fl ight 

tests completed at the end of 2002 with the Iraqi 

Army approving the looser specifi cation design in 

January 2003.

Iraq’s Interest in Steel Rocket Body Tubes 

About a year before Iraq reportedly began its effort 

to indigenously produce aluminum tubes, the head 

of Tho Al-Fiqar reportedly explored the option of 

making 81-mm steel bodies for rockets instead. Baqi 

claims that he approved a proposal from the lead 

production engineer to study steel for the 81-mm 

rocket body as Iraq was struggling to import aluminum tubes. The lead production engineer reportedly delivered his proposal after a few months, but 

Baqi rejected it as it would have required almost a 

complete redesign of the rocket. Baqi claims he did 

not raise the issue with the lead production engineer 

again and that no 81-mm steel rockets were produced.

• Separate information confi rms that Baqi rejected 

the notion of steel tubes for an 81-mm rocket on 

the basis that the modifi cation was too signifi cant 

for Dr. Huwaysh to accept. This reporting claims, 

however, that Baqi asked the lead production 

engineer to restart his work around 2002 because 

of the diffi culties in acquiring aluminum tubes. The 

lead production engineer reportedly was insulted 

by Baqi’s previous rejection, and refused to do the 

work. 

• This reporting indicates that, around 2002, the lead 

production engineer produced some fl ow-formed 

steel tubes for use in 81-mm rocket bodies. The 

lead production engineer reportedly found the steel 

bodies weighed too much and the effort halted. 

Table 5

Tube Specifi cation Comparison

Rocket Chamber/ 

Tube Characteristic

Specifi cation 

Required After 2000

Indigenously Produced Tube 2003Tubes Imported 

From Germany in 

Late 1980s

Original Italian 

Rocket 

Outer Diameter 81.0 + 0 / - 0.1 mm 81.0 + 0.2 / - 0.1 mm 81.0 +/- 0.2 mm 81.0 + 0.4 / - 0 mm

Outer Diameter at 

30.5 mm from ends

81.8 + 0.3 / -0.1 mm

Inner Diameter 74.4 + 0.1 / - 0 mm 74.4 + 0.2 / - 0 mm 74.4 + 0.1 / - 0.3 mm 74.4 + 0.5 /- 0 mm

Final Length 868 +/- 0.3 mm 869 +/- 0.3 mm 868 +2 mm 868 + 0 /- 1 mm

A summary of Iraqi tube linear dimension specifi cations showing tighter specifi cations required after 2000 

compared to those accepted for use from indigenous production in 2003. A second outer diameter specifi cation 

for the indigenously produced fl ow-formed tube covers a 30.5-mm length on either end of the tube where the 

Iraqis allowed the tube diameter to signifi cantly increase. Information on the imported German tubes—taken 

from an Iraqi quality-control document captured by ISG—provides fi gures inconsistent with Iraqi claims that 

it measured these tubes in 2003 and found them to be tighter than the 2000 Committee specifi cations.For comparison, the specifi cations of the Italian rocket that the Iraqis reverse-engineered is included.
29

Nuclear

Despite relaxed standards for indigenously produced 

tubes and increased international attention on the 

prospect of a renewed nuclear program, Baghdad 

continued to pursue high-specifi cation aluminum 

tubes from abroad. According to reporting, in late 

2002 or early 2003, the lead production engineer 

provided a representative of the Syrian-based Awad 

Amora Company with the same high-specifi cation 

requirements for tubes as had been used with other 

prospective suppliers. Separate reporting confi rms the 

Awad Amora procurement attempt, noting that Sa’ad 

Ahmed Mahmoud, the NMD representative at the AlRashid State Company, was told by MIC in 2003 to 

contact the company. 

• Sa’ad also reportedly told the director of the NMD, 

General Husam Muhammad Amin about the ongoing procurement attempt. Amin reportedly became 

nervous about this continued effort to acquire 

goods subject to the nuclear controls under Annex 

3 of UN Resolution 1051 and raised his concerns 

with Dr. Huwaysh. Nonetheless, the Awada Amora 

deal was still being negotiated at the time the war 

started, according to the reporting—a point ISG 

can independently confi rm through captured documents.

• Dr. Huwaysh is the lone dissenter again in describing the events surrounding the dealings with Awad 

Amora, claiming the open bid was probably issued 

in 2002, not 2003.

Systemic problems such as bureaucratic ineffi ciencies and fear of senior offi cials seem to have played 

a signifi cant role in the history of the 81-mm rocket 

and probably infl uenced why Iraq persisted in its 

effort to seek tubes with high specifi cations. Reporting suggests Dr. Huwaysh exhibited a rigid managerial style. For example, on hearing that the lead 

production engineer had succeeded in producing 50 

tubes a day by continuously operating the two fl ow 

formers at Tho Al-Fiqar, Huwaysh reportedly insisted 

the production be doubled. The stress of working on 

the fl ow-forming project ordered by Dr. Huwaysh 

reportedly caused the Tho Al-Fiqar Director General 

to have a heart attack. Dr. Huwaysh also insisted on 

fi nal approval of any changes to the rocket design 

after the 2000 Committee issued its results. Reportedly, the staff of Al-Fiqar feared Dr. Huwaysh’s anger 

if modifi cations caused rocket failures.

• Fear of senior offi cials also traces back to the 

origins of the 81-mm rocket program in 1984 when 

Army offi cials reportedly were loath to challenge 

the decision by Husayn Kamil, then Saddam’s sonin-law and head of MIC, to reverse-engineer and 

produce the weapon. Reporting indicates the Iraqi 

Army actually wanted 81-mm rockets for helicopters because they preferred the existing 122-mm 

and 107-mm rockets for ground-to-ground use. 

• Reporting also reveals how the results of the 2000 

Committee may have been infl uenced by a need 

to avoid problems with Dr. Huwaysh. One report 

claims the committee focused on specifi cation and 

material problems to gain time to solve production 

problems at manufacturing facilities.Another report 

indicated Dr. Huwaysh wanted results quickly from 

the 2000 Committee; therefore, they did not attempt 

in-depth, detailed engineering analyses of rocket 

scatter. Instead, this report noted that the committee tightened some design specifi cations based only 

on the notion that doing so would improve rocket 

performance—a questionable engineering practice. 

• Another report from the rocket program notes that 

many of the changes made by the 2000 Committee did not make technical sense, as members were 

simply tightening specifi cations in order to appear 

effective in addressing problems. The lead design 

engineer also told debriefers that rocket assembly 

was plagued by a lack of personal integrity, as 

people were more concerned with avoiding punishment or achieving quotas. The lead design engineer 

also claimed engineers and scientists would often 

make false claims or infl ate their results in order to 

garner favor with Dr. Huwaysh.

• Fear of being held responsible for the cost of 

rejected tubes, components, or rockets also reportedly affected the lead production engineer and his 

decision to tighten tube specifi cations for the rocket 

program. A reportedly such punitive accountability 

practices were common for engineers or managers 

in Iraq when projects failed. With the high number 

of procured tubes involved, the cost to reimburse 

MIC would be excessive, probably leading to 

individuals being imprisoned until the debt could be 

repaid. 
30

Carbon Fiber

ISG investigations have revealed that MIC’s carbon 

fi ber project was ultimately aimed toward the production of components for missiles; specifi cally, 

the combustion chambers of the al Fat’h missile. 

ISG has found no evidence to suggest that the MIC’s 

carbon fi ber project in 2001/2002 was connected to a 

program to restart uranium enrichment gas centrifuge 

production; however, the project would have allowed 

Iraq to acquire valuable carbon-fi ber-related knowledge that could be used in the future reconstitution of 

a centrifuge program. 

Carbon Fiber and Iraq’s Pre-1991 Gas 

Centrifuge Program 

Iraq’s magnetic-bearing centrifuge uranium enrichment program began in mid-1988 when German engineers brought European centrifuge design information 

to Baghdad. Further deliveries by additional German 

engineers gave the Engineering Design Center (EDC) 

a signifi cant body of centrifuge design details. These 

German contacts also arranged procurement and technology transfer applicable to the design, production 

and operation of centrifuge cascades. 

• In 1989, maraging steel cylinder fabrication proved 

diffi cult, and the EDC acquired a consignment of 

about 20 carbon fi ber cylinders from a German supplier in 1990. Iraq used some of these cylinders to 

develop test machines for its centrifuge program. 

• Iraq was arranging for a shipment of winding 

equipment and materials when sanctions were 

imposed in 1990. A winder and large quantity of 

carbon fi ber for EDC never reached Iraq. 

After adopting UNSCR Resolution 687 in April 

1991, Iraq ceased work on centrifuge development, 

although the Iraqi Concealment Committee took the 

decision to hide documents and equipment related to 

this program Although IAEA inspections were able to 

expose signifi cant activities related to the centrifuge 

program, Iraq continued to conceal signifi cant centrifuge documents and materials until the defection 

of Husayn Kamil in 1995. This defection triggered 

additional disclosures to IAEA inspectors. 

• Timing also could have affected why Iraq continued 

to use the tight specifi cation requirements when 

dealing with Awad Amora. The acceptance testing 

by the Iraqi Army occurred around the same time 

that the Awad Amora deal was being broached—

probably too soon for the new technical drawings 

from the fl ow-forming work to be forwarded to 

prospective foreign suppliers.

Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes 

ISG has been unable to corroborate reporting 

that suggested Baghdad sought 84-mm-diameter 

tubes—a diameter that would be too large for the 

81-mm rocket launcher and a possible sign that Iraq 

intended some other nonrocket use for high-strength 

aluminum tubes. Information from a foreign government service received in mid-2004 indicates that the 

potential supplier was asked about supplying 84-mm 

diameter tubes—a change that would have resulted in 

a 3-mm increase in outer diameter as compared to the 

81-mm size consistent with earlier purchase attempts. 

We have investigated this report further, and the connection with Iraq is unclear, as is the intended use of 

the 84-mm tubes.

A captured document reveals that Iraq already had 

500 tons of 120-mm-diameter 7075 aluminum shafts 

at the Huteen State Establishment—stock that ISG 

believes Iraq could have used to produce tubes even 

larger than 84 mm if it intended to renew its centrifuge program. Reporting indicates Iraq imported 

120 mm and 150-mm-diameter 7075 aluminum shafts 

before sanctions were imposed in 1990. Iraq had been 

using the material in the months before the 2003 war 

to support the Tho Al Fiqar fl ow-forming operations 

related to the 81-mm rocket program. 
31

Nuclear

• Mahdi Shakur Al ‘Ubaydi—the former head of 

the pre-1991 centrifuge program—continued to 

hide centrifuge components and documentation 

for future effort after the Husayn Kamil defection. 

We cannot link Al ‘Ubaydi’s efforts to hide these 

materials after 1994 to any instruction from Regime 

offi cials. 

The EDC successfully produced two centrifuges 

using imported carbon fi ber rotors and foreign 

assistance by mid-1990, one of which was tested with 

UF6

 feed. In 1989, the EDC began seeking machinery 

and raw materials to establish an indigenous carbon 

fi ber production capability in support of a centrifuge 

production effort.

• This included the attempted procurement of a fi lament winding machine from the ALWO company 

in Switzerland and carbon fi ber, which was sought 

through an order placed with the German company 

ROSCH (see Figures 9, 10, and 11).

However, ISG analysis suggest that, at the time of 

Desert Storm, Iraq did not have the capability to 

indigenously produce carbon fi ber suitable for use 

in gas centrifuges. 

• A former senior MIC executive revealed to ISG 

that, although Iraq had the capability to produce 

epoxy resin for carbon fi ber applications, it had no 

capability to produce carbon fi ber. The That AlSuwari Company E-Glass plant could produce only 

low-strength fi ber glass.

• An ISG site survey of South Taji, conducted in 

January 2004, found no evidence of carbon fi ber 

production or a latent capability to produce carbon 

fi ber. 

Iraqi Concealment of Carbon 

Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, 

and Documents After Desert 

Storm 

In the short period between the end of Desert 

Storm and Iraq’s acceptance of Resolution 687, the 

EDC continued its development of gas centrifuges 

and resumed work on a 50-machine cascade—an 

effort that was part of a crash program to produce 

enriched uranium for a weapon by further enriching 

uranium from its safeguarded research reactor fuel. 

A senior nuclear scientist told ISG that, as soon as the 

1991 Gulf war ended, a Presidential Scientifi c Advisor ordered the resumption of work on a 50-machine 

test cascade. 

On adoption of Resolution 687, work ceased on the 

test cascade, and the Iraqi Concealment Committee 

took the decision to hide documents and equipment 

regarding gas centrifuge research from the UN. ISG 

analysis suggests that this was motivated by a desire 

to restart gas centrifuge research and production at 

a time when sanctions were lifted. However, by late1991 the IAEA was actively removing and destroying 

the majority of Iraq’s centrifuge research program.

• A senior Iraqi nuclear scientist recalled that one of 

the committee’s fi rst decisions was to hide both the 

EDC’s Rashdiyah and Al Furat facilities and strip 

all nuclear-related material from them. The SSO 

was responsible for the removal and packaging of 

EDC documents and equipment. 

• The scientist also revealed that Iraq intended to 

build a 100-machine cascade when sanctions were 

lifted and that the EDC documents and components 

collected by the SSO in 1991 were to be used in 

this effort (see Figure 11).

In a separate action, Husayn Kamil ordered the 

retention of at least one copy of all nuclear-related 

documents and some centrifuge components by a 

senior nuclear scientist. In 1995, following Husayn 

Kamil’s defection, the IAEA seized a number of 

WMD-related documents and items of equipment 

from the Haidar Chicken Farm. The equipment seized 

included spools of high tensile, carbon fi ber, and other 

centrifuge-associated components.
32

In 2003, Al ‘Ubaydi publicly revealed that he had 

retained centrifuge-related equipment and documents at his home throughout the 1990s and during 

many UN inspections. Al ‘Ubaydi stated that this 

had been done in response to Husayn Kamil’s order to 

keep a copy of all centrifuge-related documents. 

The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/2002

The MIC carbon fi ber project in 2001/2002 began 

exploring carbon fi ber technology for use in the 

Iraqi Missile Program and was managed by the 

MIC-owned Al Rashid State Company. The material researched was specifi cally for use in the al Fat’h 

missile, and possibly the Al Naqwa anti-tank guided 

missile (ATGM). The project aimed to create an 

indigenous carbon-fi ber-based production capability, based on previous experience with the Brazilian 

ASTROS Rocket in the 1980s, and included the refurbishment of one fi lament winding machine already 

within Iraq and the production of a second. At the 

time of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the refurbishment 

of the fi rst machine was 50 percent complete, and the 

production of the second had not started.

Al ‘Ubaydi, the former head of the Iraqi centrifuge 

project, played a role in the MIC carbon fi ber project. ISG has not found any evidence to suggest that Al 

‘Ubaydi was involved in the project at the technical 

level. His main role was to head the committee that 

selected the company to build the fi lament winding 

machine.

In mid-2002, the Al Rashid State Company took 

delivery of a fi lament winding machine from the 

IAEC. This machine was to be refurbished because 

it was in a nonoperational state, and the design then 

copied for the second fi lament winding machine. 

According to a former MIC scientist the IAEC, the 

carbon fi ber fi lament winding machine had not been 

used since 1990. The scientist was not aware of why 

the IAEC had such a machine. 

ISG investigations and debriefs with multiple offi -

cials reveal that the minimum production diameter 

of the fi lament winding machines under development by MIC was 500 mm. This is consistent with 

the al Fat’h missile. This is signifi cantly wider than 

Figure 9. Horizontal fi lament winding machine.

Figure 10. Carbon fi ber tubes.

Figure 11. Example of horizontal 

fi lament winding machine.
33

Nuclear

the carbon fi ber rotor used in the pre-1991 Iraqi gas 

centrifuge, which had a diameter of approximately 

145 mm.

Limited information indicates that the fi lament 

winding machines may have been used in the manufacture of components for the Al Naqwa ATGM. 

This missile has a diameter of between 150-200 mm 

and is much more closely matched to that of the 

pre-1991 carbon fi ber rotor. However, ISG has been 

unable to fi nd information to corroborate this claim, 

and a second report stated that the Al Naqwa ATGM 

motor case was made on a turning machine and not a 

winding machine.

With the exception of the fi lament winding machine 

that the Al Rashid State Company received from 

the IAEC, ISG has not found any further evidence 

of cooperation between MIC and the IAEC on the 

carbon fi ber project, or any instances of the IAEC 

taking an interest in the progress or results of 

the research undertaken by MIC. Multiple source 

debriefs support this in that numerous former IAEC 

and MIC employees attest to the fact that the IAEC 

and MIC rarely worked together on joint projects. 

Flow-Forming Machinery 

ISG did not fi nd evidence that fl ow-forming equipment was used to produce rotors for a reconstituted 

nuclear centrifuge program. As a result of IAEA 

inspections and Iraqi mishandling of equipment—in 

an effort to avoid potential military strikes—Iraq 

effectively lost its capability to conduct fl ow-forming 

operations of the type needed to support a centrifuge 

program. 

• On 23 June 2003, an ISG team inspected the Umm 

Al Marik site. It was severely looted and vandalized. The team saw several of the machine mounts 

where the fl ow formers had been mounted prior 

to the war. The remains of one large fl ow former 

remained, stripped of all usable parts.

Beginning in 1989, Iraq was pursuing advanced 

fl ow-forming technologies and equipment from 

foreign sources. One company that provided considerable technical support and machinery to the Iraqi 

industrial base was the H&H Metalform Company 

of Germany. Iraq’s Engineering Design Center failed 

to develop a maraging steel centrifuge rotor due to 

manufacturing limitations, which helped precipitate 

the shift to trying to acquire a carbon fi ber production 

capability. 

• As of 1991, H&H Metalform had sold nine fl owforming machines to Iraq. 

• In February 1993, a UN Inspection Team visited 

the Nassr Plant; they inventoried and recorded the 

serial numbers of eight Flowtronics, H&H fl owforming machines. Iraqi offi cials contend that these 

machines were used to produce 122-mm rockets 

and components (see Figures 12 and 13). 
34

Figure 12. H&H fl ow formers.

Figure 13. Dispersed and destroyed fl ow-forming 

machines (Tho Al Fiqar).
35

Nuclear

Planned Magnet Production Lines 

at Al Tahadi 

ISG has not uncovered information indicating that 

the magnet production capability being pursued by 

Iraq beginning in 2000 was intended to support a 

gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, but 

the magnet production lines would have allowed the 

Iraqis to preserve their skills for a centrifuge magnet 

program. 

• Iraq investigated use of centrifuges as one approach 

to manufacturing enriched uranium in their pre1991 nuclear program. One of the centrifuge 

designs investigated included use of magnetic bearings to support the rotor. The pre-1991 Iraqi nuclear 

program was able to successfully test a magnetically supported rotor.

• Iraq purchased Aluminum-Nickel-Cobalt (AlNiCo) 

and Cobalt-Samarium (CoSm) ring magnets for 

their pre-1991, magnetic-bearing centrifuge program. Centrifuges can be designed to use a variety 

of ring magnets of different dimensions and materials. 

ISG also cannot refute Iraq’s claim that the magnet 

production lines it sought beginning in 2000 were 

intended for other than routine industrial and 

military uses. The declared use of the magnet production lines were for production of ring magnets in 

the Saham Saddam Missile and for fi eld telephones. 

According to Iraqi offi cials, the Iraqis chose to 

purchase the production lines in lieu of buying the 

magnets, which would have been cheaper. In addition, the Iraqis wanted the experience and knowledge 

that would eventually come with operating the lines. 

The Al Tahadi site was heavily looted after Operation Iraqi Freedom, and no documents or equipment 

remained at the site.

Procurement Details 

The Al Tahadi Company contracted to purchase 

magnet production lines on two occasions beginning in 2000—neither of which were completed or 

delivered. Iraqi specifi cations for the magnet production lines were typically vague. The Al-Sirat Company, a trading company responding to MIC requests, 

initiated the fi rst of two procurement efforts in 2000. 

The procured line would include cast or powered 

magnets of all types, including Aluminum-NickelCobalt (AlNiCo) and Samarium Cobalt (SmCo)—the 

latter was used in Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear program. 

According to a MIC engineer experienced in magnet 

production, this contract for magnet production lines 

was signed in 2000 with a Romanian company. 

• The contract included equipment to manufacture 

AlNiCo ring, cubicle and cylindrical magnets ranging in mass from 0.5 to 500 grams—a range that 

could have supported production of magnets needed 

for centrifuges. Such magnets, however, also would 

have had to conform to specifi c density and morphology requirements for use in centrifuges. 

The second contract for magnet production lines was 

signed in 2001 with a Belarusian company. Only 

some of the equipment specifi ed in the contract was 

received, including a press machine and a mixer. The 

contract had included equipment to produce permanent ferrite magnets.
36

Rotating Machinery Department

ISG has not been able to fi nd evidence to show that 

the machine tools ordered in 2002 by a new department in MIC’s Saad Company called the Rotating 

Machinery Department were intended for a renewed 

centrifuge program, and available information suggests that the equipment was not capable of supporting such work. The equipment sought included 

machines for rotary balancing and spin testing, as 

well as a milling machine and a lathe. 

• Such machines can be used to balance equipment 

such as turbines, pumps, and compressors. They 

are also applicable to developing skills useful for 

centrifuge design and testing. Iraq’s pre-1991 

nuclear program used rotary balancing machines, a 

technology used widely in industrial applications, 

in development of centrifuges for enrichment of 

uranium. 

• The Ibn Younis Center, part of the MIC’s Saad 

Company, formed the new Rotating Machine 

Department in mid-2002. The department was 

small—only four engineers—when it was set up. 

The intention was to establish a profi t center to 

perform repair and maintenance work on the many 

compressors, turbines, and other rotating machines 

in Iraqi industry.

In mid-2002, Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa’id, a former 

PC-3 scientist, asked about the capability of the 

balancing machine ordered for the newly formed 

Rotating Machinery Department. ISG has received 

confl icting information as to whether the inquiry 

shows interest in its potential use for a centrifuge program or was an attempt to ensure that the equipment 

did not violate provisions of UN Security Council 

Resolution 1051, Annex 3 of the Ongoing Monitoring 

and Verifi cation Plan.

• Dr. Sa’id, a high-ranking Baathist and Secretary 

of the Industrial Committee at the time, asked the 

Director General of Ibn Younis Center whether the 

equipment being sought would violate the provisions of Annex 3.The Director General asked 

engineers in the Rotating Machinery Department 

whether the equipment could be used for centrifuges. The response from the engineers was “no” 

because the equipment did not meet the specifi cations required for centrifuge use.

• The Ibn Younis director, however, reported that 

Sa’id’s involvement stemmed from his role as 

the secretary of the Industrial Committee, which 

gave him responsibility for allocations of foreign 

currency for procurements. MIC Deputy Director 

Dagher sought non-MIC currency allocations for 

the Department of Rotating Machinery purchases, 

and Sa’id reportedly selected un-used IAEC funds 

for these purchases. Huwaysh told ISG that it 

would make no sense for the IAEC to have used its 

budget to buy equipment for the MIC. 

• Al ‘Ubaydi stated in an interview that he was suffi ciently curious about Sa’id’s interest to press a 

friend, a former engineer in the pre-1991 centrifuge 

enrichment program and member of the Rotating 

Machinery Department, for information on potential inquiries he may have received concerning the 

reconstitution of a centrifuge program.
37

Nuclear

The purchase by the Rotating Machinery Department machinery used purchasing channels that were 

not the norm—adding to the suspicion surrounding 

the order. The MIC, of which the Rotating Machinery Department was part, had its own purchasing 

procedures. The order for the machines was placed 

using IAEC resources for the purchase—a procedure 

that would be outside the normal MIC purchasing 

procedures. ISG has not discovered the reason for the 

alternate purchasing arrangement. 

• Huwaysh told ISG that it would make no sense for 

the IAEC to have used its budget to buy equipment 

for the MIC.

The Rotating Machinery Department also sought a 

balancing machine, which, at the minimum, would 

have helped Iraq maintain important skills that 

could have been applied to a renewed centrifuge 

program. It is not clear whether this machine could 

balance centrifuge rotors, given that the machine 

specifi cations called for balancing much heaver 

components, up to 500 kgs. The balancing machine 

that was ordered by the Ibn Younis Center for the 

Rotating Machinery Department was never received.

Table 6

Comparison of Rotating Machinery Department-Ordered Balancing Machine With UN Sanctions Detailed in 

the UN Nuclear Controls Known as Annex 3

Specifi cation Balancing Machine Ordered Annex 3 Restrictions

Rotor Lengtha 1500 mm > 400 mm

Swing/Journal Diametera

,

b 10-120 mm >75 mm

Mass Capabilitya 750 kg 0.9 to 23 kg

Balancing Speeda 3000 rpm >5,000 rpm

Residual Imbalanceb 0.0015 kg/mm/kg Better than 0.010 kg/mm/

kg

Drive Typeb Drive and belt options supplied Belt

a

 Centrifugal balancing machines designed for balancing fl exible rotors (Annex 3, item 57.1)—all conditions must be 

met to be prohibited.

b

 Centrifugal balancing machines designed for balancing hollow cylindrical rotor components 

(Annex 3, item 57.2)—all conditions must be met to be prohibited. 

Balancing machines were purchased by at least 

two other organizations in the MIC—which Iraq 

declared to the IAEA as not being covered by 

Annex 3 (see Table 6).

• The Specialized Institute for Engineering Industries 

(SIEI) purchased a vertical-type balancing machine 

with a maximum balancing speed of 1,200 rpm. 

This is an engineering support company that provides resources for the engineering and industrial 

sector.

• The Factory for the Repair of Jet Engines (FRJE) 

purchased a vertical-type balancing machine with 

a maximum balancing speed of 4,000 rpm. The 

mission of FRJE is to repair various types of jet 

engines used in the Iraqi Air Force (see Figure 14).
38

Figure 14. Typical horizontal balance machine.

Investigation of Potential 

Centrifuge-Related Facilities

ISG investigations of sites related to the pre-1991 

centrifuge program did not uncover any attempt to 

utilize these facilities to support a renewed centrifuge effort. ISG site visits revealed signifi cant looting 

and destruction, which have rendered the sites inoperable. 

• Site exploration of the Al-Furat site conducted in 

September 2003 revealed looting and occupation 

by squatters. In the pre-1991 program, a centrifuge 

assembly hall and cascade had been planned for 

Al-Furat. The IAEA removed the centrifuge-related 

equipment from this site in the 1990s. 

Support Facilities

ISG investigation into known or potential support 

facilities also found no evidence these sites had 

been involved in any renewed enrichment work.

Along with research and development and production 

facilities, a centrifuge program would require a large 

infrastructure for fabrication, assembly, testing, and 

material support. The following sites were investigated because of their potential as locations where 

key elements of the reconstitution could take place:

- Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility 

- Al Karama State Company

(Al-Waziriya Site (al Samud Factory, Khadimiyah 

Site (Ibn Al-Haytham), Al-Fatah Factory (Al Quds 

Factory)

- Basdr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies

(Khan Azad Military Production Plant)

- Al-Tahadi State Company

- Salah al-Din State Company

(Samarra Electronics Plant)

- Al-Nida State Company

- Nassr State Company

(Taji Steel Fabrication Plant)

- Ur State Company

(An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)
39

Nuclear

Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility

Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility—prior to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom—had stocks of fl uorine, Anhydrous 

Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF), and UF6

 cylinders in 

Building 27A. Building 27B also contained a specialized ventilation system with scrubbers, which would 

be ideal for pilot-scale development of UF6

 production process. In the early 1990s, the IAEA either 

destroyed or collected centrifuge components from 

various sites across Iraq and placed them in storage at 

Ash Shaykhili. The IAEA inspectors, upon returning 

to Iraq in late 2002, performed a detailed inspection 

of the Ash Shaykhili storage site and made several 

more inspections of the site in early 2003. 

In late April 2003, the site was surveyed by Coalition forces, which found it damaged and burned 

from bombing and looting. Also in early July 2003, 

an ISG team returned to Ash Shaykhili to assess the 

condition of Buildings 27A and 27B. They found that 

the contents of Building 27A had been burned and 

everything inside Building 27B had been removed, 

except for portions of the air-handling duct work (see 

Figure 15). 

The results of environmental samples taken at Building 27B, during the April 2003 ISG site visit, indicated the presence of fl uorides at the site, which we 

suspect are the result of pre-1991 activities. ISG did 

not fi nd that any nuclear-related activity had been 

established here and based on the current condition of 

the Ash Shaykhili, ISG concludes that it would not be 

able to support any centrifuge activities without major 

rework. 

Al Karama State Company 

The al Karama State Company consists of several 

facilities that have precision machining capabilities. 

Al Karama’s subordinate facilities are:

• Waziriyah Site (al Karama Missile and Electronics 

Plant).

• Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile Production and RDT&E Center).

• Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile and GSE 

Support Facility).

• Al Fatah Factory.

• Al Quds Factory. 

Although the facilities associated with the Al Karama 

State Company continued to function during the 

1990s, ISG did not fi nd that any of these sites were 

used to support a uranium enrichment program. 

Al-Wazeriya Site

An ISG exploitation team visited the Karama Al-Wazeriya Site in early August 2003 and concluded that 

the site appeared to have been abandoned for at least 

several months. According to one source at this site, 

no missiles were produced at the facility after the site 

was bombed during Operation Desert Fox in 1998. 

Iraq did not rebuild the missile production capability 

at Al-Wzaeriya after Desert Fox, and instead used the 

site as the headquarters for Al Karama. 

Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D 

Center)

The Khadimiyah Site was part of the al Karama State 

Company and Iraq’s primary production and integration facility for the al Samud and al Samud II ShortRange Ballistic Missile (SRBM). The facility suffered 

damage from Coalition air strikes in late March 2003.

Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility) 

Al Samud Factory was Iraq’s primary al Samud component production facility. The al Samud Factory was 

signifi cantly damaged during Operation Iraqi Freedom by Coalition air strikes in late March 2003. ISG 

visited the site on 28 September 2003 and verifi ed 

both the bomb damage and the effects of the massive 

looting.

Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan 

Azad Military Production Plant) 

Badr fabricated mechanical components for the pre1991 gas centrifuge program and initially retained 

fl ow-forming capability after Operation Desert Storm. 

Such fl ow-forming machines—had they been maintained through the years—could have been used for 

making metal rotors. ISG has not found that these 

machines were used for fabrication of rotors for gas 

centrifuges in a renewed centrifuge program. Site 

visits conducted in May 2003 revealed that the site 

was in severe disarray (see Figure 16) and could not 

function again without extensive renovations.
40

Al-Tahadi State Company

Al-Tahadi was established in 1995 by the MIC. 

Former PC-3 engineers from Tarmiyah were transferred to this facility where they continued their work 

on electromagnetic devices and transformers and 

their research on permanent magnets. Al-Tahadi had a 

good lab for measurement of magnetic properties that 

included a computerized system that could measure 

the magnetic properties of hard and soft materials. AlTahadi was looted, and no documents or equipment 

remain at the site.

Salah Al Din State Company 

(Samarra Electronics Plant)

The Salah al-Din Company is an electronics company 

located near Samarra that produced radar equipment, 

antennae for various purposes, communication equipment, printed circuit boards for electronic equipment, 

and plastic covers for agricultural purposes. Exploitation of this site in July 2003 confi rmed that the plant 

appeared to produce different types of electronics and 

electronic components for various uses. The presence 

of certain industrial chemicals seems to be consistent with the types of industry found at the facility. 

The facility itself appeared to be in reasonably good 

shape. This site did not suffer from some of the 

large-scale looting and scavenging prevalent in other 

facilities.

Al-Nida State Company

This facility, along with the Rashid State Company’s 

Tho Al-Fiqar Factory, had general-purpose machine 

shops utilizing CNC lathes, CNC milling centers, 

hydraulic presses, welding equipment, coordinate 

measuring machines, quality-control laboratories, 

nondestructive testing equipment, and CAD/CAM 

computers prior to the recent war. Such facilities 

would be necessary for a reconstituted centrifuge 

program. An ISG team visited the Al-Nida site in late 

August 2003 and found that the entire plant had been 

systematically looted of all equipment, computers, 

and documents. 

Rashid State Company’s Tho Al-Fiqar Factory 

(formerly the Nassr State Establishment

Mechanical Plant)

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the machining plant 

at Nassr produced centrifuge and EMIS components 

for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. After Operation 

Desert Storm, an IAEA inspection team found vertical fl ow-forming machines. In August 2003, an ISG 

exploitation team visited this site. The team found 

four fl ow formers, none of which were functional 

because they lacked parts. 

• Also found were seven, fi ve-axis machine tools. 

The Iraqis assisting the team mentioned that the 

fi ve-axis machine tools could not function as 

designed. The team also found two-axis milling 

machines, four Hartford milling machines (two 

vertical and two horizontal), and large stamping and 

press machines for serial production of tail fi ns for 

rockets.

The team also found thousands of 81-mm aluminum 

tubes. The Iraqis stated that on the site approximately 90,000 tubes were classifi ed as rejected tubes 

or tubes that did not pass prescribed testing. The 

Iraqis stated that they had a 10-percent acceptance 

rate of domestically made 81-mm tubes. Figure 17 

shows a nonfunctioning fl ow former at Tho Al-Fiqar, 

aluminum tubes for 81-mm rockets, and a fully 

assembled 81-mm rocket.

Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum 

Fabrication Plant)

Iraq attempted to indigenously produce aluminum 

tubes for its 81-mm rocket program by using the 

extrusion facilities at Ur State Company. The extrusion equipment reportedly was designed to extrude 

only 6063 type aluminum alloy; thus, attempts made 

to extrude 7075 aluminum alloy (the type required for 

centrifuges) were unsuccessful. 
41

Nuclear

Figure 15. Damage at Ash Shaykhili Building 27B 

and remaining air ducting in July 2003.

Figure 16. Destruction at Badr and Umm Al Marik State 

Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant), 

May 2003.

Figure 17. Flow-former (left); aluminum tubes 

(center); 81-mm rocket (right) found at Rashid State 

Company’sTho Al Fiqar factory.
42

Uranium Enrichment—EMIS 

ISG judges that the Iraqi Regime did not attempt to 

reconstitute the EMIS program after 1991, although 

many of the former EMIS engineers and scientists 

still worked for either the IAEC or MIC in roles 

that could preserve their technical skills. These 

technical skills, if maintained, would have helped 

build the foundation for a future nuclear weapons program and would have allowed scientists to 

reenter a nuclear program further up the learning 

curve. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, signifi cant 

looting and damage have occurred at most of the 

dual-use manufacturing facilities that supported the 

pre-1991 EMIS program. There are no indications 

that the Iraqi Regime attempted to preserve the EMIS 

technology either through former EMIS scientists and 

researchers or by retaining technical documents and 

historical fi les on the former EMIS program, although 

one scientist associated with this pre-1991 program 

appears to have unilaterally kept relevant records and 

some parts that would have been useful to restarting 

such an effort.

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)

The electromagnetic isotope separation process 

(EMIS) was the primary technology used by the 

Iraqis for uranium enrichment in their pre-1991 

nuclear program. This process was chosen because 

of the availability of this technology in open literature 

and the technical capabilities of the Iraqis. In EMIS, a 

source containing solid uranium tetrachloride (UCl4

) 

is electrically heated to produce U+

 ions. The ions are 

accelerated by an electrical potential to high speed. 

These charged particles follow a circular trajectory in 

a magnetic fi eld as shown in Figure 18. The diameter 

of the circle depends upon the strength of the magnetic fi eld, the velocity of the ion, and the mass of the 

ion. The ions accumulate after passing through slit 

apertures at the collector. 

An EMIS system includes the following processes:

• Isotope separation—electromagnetic equipment 

used to separate the uranium isotopes (see Figure 

19).

• Chemical recovery—chemical processes used to 

remove uranium from separator collectors (see 

Figure 20 for type of collector used in Iraqi program).

• Uranium conversion—used to convert the uranium 

removed from the separator collectors to a form that 

is usable either in further enrichment equipment or 

other downstream processes. 

A fl ow diagram of the pre-1991 Iraqi EMIS process, 

shown in Figure 21, demonstrates the various steps. 

Iraq conducted its research and development into 

the EMIS process at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research 

Center and was outfi tting a production-scale uranium 

enrichment facility at Tarmiya, a duplicate site under 

development at Ash Sharqat, and a feed material production plant near Mosul called Al-Jazira. 

A schematic of the Iraqi EMIS separators setup is 

shown in Figure 22. 

Facilities

The pre-1991 EMIS project consisted of three 

primary production sites. These sites included the 

Al Safa’a EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at 

Tarmiya (isotope separation and uranium recovery), 

the Al Fajr EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at 

Ash Sharqat (isotope separation and uranium recovery), and the Al-Jazira feed material production plant 

near Mosul. Ash-Sharqat was being built as a backup 

facility to Tarmiya. Also, several sites were utilized 

for fabrication of equipment needed for EMIS, 

including the Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop, the 

Zaafaraniya Power Supply Production Facility, and 

Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Feed Plant). 

Al Safa’a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya 

The Al Safa’a EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at Tarmiya was designed to produce enriched 

uranium for the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, using 

the EMIS process. It was externally complete by 

January 1991 but was not fully operational. The plant 

had two types of EMIS buildings: alpha units (R120s) 

for primary uranium enrichment and beta units (R60s) 

for enriching material produced by the alpha units to 

weapons-grade.
43

Nuclear

Figure 19. Photograph of Iraqi EMIS electromagnet.

Figure 20. Collector plate removed from Iraqi scientist’s home, July 2003.

Figure 18. Example of EMIS separator and

vacuum system.
44

In 1991, the Al Safa’a EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at Tarmiya was in the process of bringing online R-120 separation units, with eight units 

completed and functioning. An Iraqi mechanical 

engineer, working at the site, estimated that 70 to 

80 percent of the equipment in the building was 

destroyed by the 1991 Gulf war. IAEA inspectors also 

supervised the destruction of EMIS equipment beginning in mid-1991. 

The EMIS facilities occupied most of the central 

portion of the Tarmiya site. The shell of the large 

alpha-enrichment building is located near the northern 

entrance of the facility (see Figure 23). The damaged 

shell of the smaller beta enrichment building is in the 

south-central portion of the facility.

Most of the major buildings at Tarmiya were extensively damaged by coalition air strikes during Desert 

Storm. In late 1992, it was rendered inoperable under 

the UN-mandated destruction. Since 1991, the plant 

engaged ostensibly in chemical pilot plant construction, design, and low-volume production of a number 

of specialty chemicals for Iraq’s weapons programs 

(see Figure 24).

Figure 21. Flow diagram of the Iraqi EMIS process.

Figure 22. Schematic of the Iraqi EMIS machines.
45

Nuclear

In late October 2003, a senior Iraqi researcher at Ibn 

Sina stated to an ISG team that, from 1993 to 1994, 

he had created a small processing line consisting of 

15 mixer-settlers in which he produced “very pure” 

phosphoric acid. After 1995, he claimed to have 

designed a second phosphoric acid purifi cation line 

using packed columns instead of mixer/settlers (see 

Figure 25). According to the researcher, the purifi cation line was dismantled in 1997, and the equipment 

(the mixer-settlers) was placed in storage (see Figure 

26). The researcher claimed that any extracted 

uranium was treated as an impurity and disposed of as 

part of the waste generated by the processes.

There were no indications of any renewed uranium 

enrichment operations at Tarmiya. ISG did learn, 

however, of a phosphoric acid purifi cation study 

conducted in the mid-1990s at the site that recovered what Iraqi staff described as an “insignifi cant” 

amount of uranium that was diluted and discharged 

downstream as waste. 

Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat 

The Al Fajr EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at Ash Sharqat was constructed to be a replica 

of the Tarmiya site. The Iraqi’s decided late in 1987 

to execute this project to serve two purposes: 1) to 

replace Tarmiya if the latter is rendered completely 

nonoperative for whatever reason, or 2) to serve as 

a backup to enhance production when required. The 

Al Fajr EMIS Plant main production buildings were 

destroyed during Desert Storm and in accordance 

with UN Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991. 

According to Iraq’s declarations, initial installation 

of EMIS separators at Ash Sharqat was to begin only 

after Tarmiya separators had been installed. The site 

has not been rebuilt as of March 2003.

Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production 

Facility) 

Al-Jazira (a.k.a. Mosul Feed Materials Production 

Facility) was established to produce nuclear feed 

materials for the EMIS program, namely UO2

 and 

UCl4

. The facility was built in the 1980s and put into 

operation in 1989.

In 1992, the MIC took control of this facility, and it 

was subordinated to the General Establishment for 

Extraction Operations. The primary purpose for this 

facility was to extract raw iron from the iron-rich 

ores around the area of Mosul. We know from IAEA 

inspections that the facility had also been converted 

since 1991 to make pigments for paint. In October 

1996, control of the plant was transferred from the 

State Establishment for Extraction and Mining Operations (SEEMO) to Al-Kindi State Establishment in 

Mosul. In 1997, the name of this facility was changed 

to the Center for Extraction. The purpose of the facility continued to be the extraction of iron oxide from 

scrap metal. Additionally, the facility engaged in the 

research for the production of hydrochloric acid. In 

2003, this facility was renamed the Al-Ramia Factory. 

 As of late April 2003, the facility included buildings 

associated with administration, electricity generation, 

ammonia production, hydrochloric acid production, 

waste storage, and chemical laboratories. Extensive 

looting had occurred throughout the buildings and 

some structural components (such as piping) had been 

ripped out. Although portions of this site remained 

active, ISG has not uncovered any evidence that this 

site has been used for any fi ssile material processing 

since 1991. 

Al-Zawra State Company

The Zaafaraniyah Power Supply Production Facility 

(also known in 1991 as Al-Dijjla and renamed Zawra 

Electronics Plant in 1992) was designed to produce 

electronic components for the Iraqi uranium enrichment program using the EMIS method. The factory 

became operational by June 1988. The facility was 

capable of manufacturing electronic switch gear and 

high-voltage power supplies for EMIS. 

The Zawra facility was inspected by ISG in August 

2003. It had been severely damaged by vandals and 

looters. Several industrial machines were found on 

site and there was a warehouse for parts. Most of the 

warehouses and machine shops were empty at the 

plant. The Zawra site does employ civilian workers 

and is trying to become productive again.

Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical 

Workshop Al-Rabiyah)

The Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniyah Mechanical Workshop Al-Rabiyah), also known in 1991 as 

Zaafaraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facility Al-Rabiyah, produced vacuum chambers and components 
46

Figure 23. Destroyed AlphaEnrichment building at 

Tarmiya (photo taken by ISG 

Team, December 2003).

Figure 24. Building at Tarmiya where phosphoric acid 

purifi cation occured at Ibn Sina in the 1990s (photo taken 

by ISG Team, December 2003).
47

Nuclear

for Iraq’s EMIS program. The facility was capable of 

manufacturing major metal components for the EMIS 

process. The status of the facility as of March 2003 is 

shown in Figure 27. 

An ISG team visited the Al-Nida State Company site 

in late August, 2003 and found that the entire plant 

had been systematically looted of all equipment, computers, and documents.

Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility)

The Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility) produced components for Iraq’s EMIS program. 

This facility was not damaged during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom; however, since early summer of 2003, the 

installation was subjected to massive looting, which 

destroyed or damaged the critical elements needed 

to restart production operations. At least 60 percent 

of the fabrication and production buildings had their 

roof material stripped and their internal components 

removed. The remaining buildings were lightly to 

moderately damaged during the looting. 

Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company

Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company, known prior to 

1997 as the State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering 

Equipment (SEHEE) and also known as Daura, is a 

large heavy equipment fabrication and metallurgical 

facility that was used to produce vacuum chambers 

for the pre-1991 600-mm and 1,200-mm separators. 

This facility was not damaged during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. ISG exploitation teams visited the site in 

January 2004 and observed process equipment (tanks, 

piping, industrial materials, and chemicals) stored at 

the site but did not uncover any evidence of activities 

associated with a uranium enrichment program. 

Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment

Equipment and components from Iraq’s pre-1991 

EMIS enrichment program remained in Iraq after 

1991. ISG has not discovered any effort by the Iraqi 

Regime to use these items to reconstitute an EMIS 

enrichment program. The pre-1991 EMIS project 

required several types of components and equipment, such as power supplies, ion sources, control 

systems, magnet fi eld coils, magnets, magnet poles, 

return iron, ovens (for vaporizing the UCl4

), vacuum 

systems (pumps, liners, vacuum chambers, piping), 

and material collector assemblies. In the early 1990s, 

IAEA inspectors collected and either destroyed or 

had the equipment transferred from the various EMIS 

facilities (i.e., Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat, AlJazira) to Ash Shaykhili and Al-Nafad (open area 

adjacent to Ash Shaykili) for storage. In early 2000, 

the Iraqis transferred some of the EMIS components 

(ring-shaped coils; no disks) stored at Ash Shaykhili 

to the Al Shaheed State Company, a brass and copper 

products company. Most likely, this transfer was 

accomplished to salvage copper from the EMIS coils 

for other industrial needs. ISG found an Iraqi video 

that showed scrap material identifi ed as copper and 

coils at Al-Shaheed State Company in April 2002 

being collected and disposed of in a smelter. 
48

Figure 25. Packed columns 

used in phosphoric acid 

purifi cation studies 

conducted at Ibn Sina in the 

mid-1990s (photo taken by 

ISG Team, December, 

2003).

Figure 26. Mixer-settlers in storage at Ibn Sina 

(photo taken by ISG Team, December 2003).
49

Nuclear

Figure 27. Facility, Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniyah 

mechanical workshop) in March 2003 prior to start of OIF.

Figure 28. Items stored at former EMIS scientist’s 

home—high-purity tantalum sheets (left), technical 

papers (center), and mass spectrometer (right).
50

Laser Research in Iraq 

The Iraqi government at the time of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom was supporting laser research and development work in military and industrial applications. 

ISG found no evidence of a renewed laser isotope 

separation (LIS) program to enrich uranium. 

• ISG believes that only a few Iraqi scientists have 

the knowledge and experience to recommence 

an LIS project. Furthermore, the technology and 

infrastructure to support an LIS program does not 

appear to exist in Iraq. 

Laser Related Work After Desert Storm 

After Operation Desert Storm, laser work that had 

been under way in the IAEC as part of an effort to 

enrich uranium in the 1980s was transferred to universities and to the MIC. The various laser projects 

conducted at these organizations allowed the Iraqis 

to retain much of their technical know-how in laser 

technology.

• In 1992, Dr. Falah Hamza—the former head of 

pre-1991 research efforts to enrich uranium with 

lasers—asked Husayn Kamil to provide additional 

funding for the IAEC Laser group. Hamza claimed 

high-power lasers could be used for air defense as 

well as for enrichment, seeming to imply that there 

were other, valuable uses of lasers and laser technology in the Iraqi military and industrial complex. 

Husayn Kamil agreed to the additional funding, 

perhaps to learn if Hamza could further develop 

laser technology into a usable uranium enrichment 

method. 

• In 1993, an IAEC Optical Center was established 

at the University of Baghdad. Hamza’s laser project 

was transferred to the Optical Center, and Hamza 

became one of the Center’s Group Leaders. 

• In 1994, laser projects in Iraq were organizationally moved from the IAEC to the MIC and in 1997 

were physically consolidated at the Laser Research 

Center. It was later named the Al-Razi State Company and became known as the Ibn Khaldun Laser 

Center. Al-Razi was co-located at the Alwiyah Drug 

Industrial Center Ibn Al Baytar.

• According to the MIC Director Dr. Huwaysh, AlRazi engaged the Technology University to assist in 

laser projects. The Dean of the Physics Department 

received a 6-million-dinar contract, which was the 

largest contract MIC had with a university professor. This occurred sometime after laser research 

was started at Al-Razi in 1997. 

• The former Minister of Education, Dr. Humam 

‘Abd Al-Khaliq Abd Al-Ghafur, stated that the 

Dean of the Plasma and Laser Institute at Baghdad 

University, up until Operation Iraqi Freedom, was 

Dr. Nafi ‘Abd Al-Latif Tilfah and that the Baghdad 

University of Technology also conducted laser 

research. In October 2003, he stated that he was not 

aware of any nuclear-related research being conducted at these institutes. 

• According an interview with Dr. Nafi ‘Abd Al-Latif 

Tilfah, Dean of Baghdad University’s Institute for 

Laser and Plasma Studies in November, 2003, post1991 laser research was conducted at several locations including the Baghdad University Institute for 

Laser and Plasma Studies, the Baghdad University 

of Technology, Mustansiriyah University, and at the 

Al-Razi Company. Tilfah stated, however, that he 

was not aware of any LIS-related laser work being 

conducted at these institutions.

A knowledgeable source indicated that some of the 

important team members of the 1980s LIS team 

were working on the development of a copper vapor 

laser (CVL) in 1997 at Al-Razi—a technology with 

potential applications to LIS. This work continued 

until mid-2002 with the successful development 

of a CVL designed to pump a dye laser. The CVL 

development effort was led by an Iraqi scientist, who 

successfully operated a CVL in March or April 2001. 

The scientist hosted a demonstration of the 10-watt 

CVL to MIC Director Huwaysh on 5 July 2002. The 

CVL system reportedly was placed into storage in 

2002 in an adjacent underground facility. In April or 

May of 2003, the underground facility adjacent to the 

main Al-Razi facility was visited and found to have 

been looted, and equipment was missing. The Iraqi 

scientist stated that after the CVL demonstration he 

worked on a barium vapor laser up until Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. 
51

Nuclear

• The Iraqi scientist said LIS work was never done at 

Al-Razi. He also stated that Huwaysh expressly forbade such work and, therefore, no one would have 

attempted LIS. The Iraqi scientist also indicated he 

would have been aware of any such work at other 

facilities because he was the only laser researcher in 

Iraq with a functioning CVL. 

• The Iraqi scientist indicated no written reports were 

produced on the Al-Razi CVL work. Exploitation 

of documents from Al-Razi contains very few mentions of LIS or uranium isotope information, and 

no mention of the CVL development work has been 

found in these documents.

In the 1990s Iraq pursued various laser application. 

However, LIS and its nuclear application does not 

appear to have been part of this work.

• According to one scientist, who started working at 

Al-Razi in 2002, laser work for military applications such as jamming, range fi nding, communications and guidance was being conducted at Al-Razi. 

Also, according to the same scientist, one group at 

Al-Razi was working on a carbon dioxide (CO2

) 

laser for an antimissile defense project. This project 

reportedly was abandoned because of technical 

problems.

• Laser work also was being done with Nd-YAG and 

Nd-Glass lasers at Al-Razi. Additionally, an investigation using hydrogen fl uoride and deuterium 

fl uoride lasers for an antimissile defense program 

was being studied.

Current Status and Future Potential

A few former LIS scientists remain in Iraq, but the 

equipment and facilities needed to reconstitute an 

LIS program are extremely limited. For example:

• Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CVL that 

had been demonstrated to the MIC Director in mid2001 was reportedly stolen from the underground 

facility in which it was placed. ISG was unable to 

determine the location or the current status of the 

CVL. 

• Although Al-Razi was not damaged during Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was heavily looted afterward. 

Iraq’s Pre-1991 LIS Efforts

Beginning in 1981, Iraq committed signifi cant 

resources to exploring the use of LIS techniques for 

enriching uranium. This work was prompted by then 

Vice President of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Humam ‘Abd Al-Khaliq ‘Abd Al-Ghafur. 

LIS techniques that were under development included 

atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and 

molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS).

These pre-1991 LIS efforts were under the auspices 

of the IAEC, rather than the PC-3. The LIS program 

was terminated in 1988.

• The results of the 26th IAEA On-Site Inspection in 

Iraq led to the conclusion that the level of skills, 

equipment, and infrastructures available in Iraq was 

totally inadequate in the pursuit of any meaningful 

activity in LIS.

• A report written by Dr. Faleh Hassan Hamza has 

revealed the results of the former Iraqi AVLIS effort 

were inconclusive—his team could not confi rm that 

uranium was actually separated. The MLIS experiments successfully enriched sulfur but could not 

achieve repeatable results with uranium. Based on 

these experiments, Dr. Hamza wrote a review of 

the state-of-knowledge of LIS, concluding that Iraq 

had neither the technology infrastructure nor the 

capability to purchase the necessary equipment to 

achieve success with LIS. The laser work stopped 

in 1988.
52

Rail Gun Summary 

Iraq’s efforts to develop rail guns appear to have 

been for air defense, but ISG found that laboratories established to partly support an IAEC project 

led by Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa’id—the head of 

Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons design and development program—also could build skills needed 

for a renewed nuclear weapons effort.

• ISG has not uncovered information that shows that 

Iraq’s work on rail guns in the late 1990s was part 

of a renewed nuclear weapons effort—although 

some of the reporting acknowledges this potential. 

• Rail gun equipment and materials uncovered by 

ISG similarly do not appear to have been part of a 

nuclear weapons design and development effort, 

even though a few items—with further development—had the potential of supporting such work. 

• Theoretically, the rail gun could provide the range 

and altitude capability to shoot down aircraft in the 

no-fl y zone, a reported goal of Saddam’s (see inset).

Rail Gun Efforts 

Multiple sources and captured documents indicate 

that, in early 1999, Sa’id initiated a project under 

the IAEC to develop a rail gun, an experimental 

device that, if further developed, could, in theory, 

have applications including nuclear weapons 

research and antiaircraft weapons. The IAEC rail 

gun project—named Al Muharek al Khati or “The 

Linear Engine”—occupied two primary locations, 

a laboratory at the Roland Missile Facility near the 

Rashid Air Base and a small facility within former 

residential compound outside the Tuwaitha Nuclear 

Research Center. The Roland site was destroyed by 

Coalition bombing in March 2003, while the facility 

outside of Tuwaitha—called the “Technical Research 

Branch”—was the subject of an ISG site visit in 

August, 2003. 

• We know from postwar debriefi ngs that Sa’id used 

the Technical Research Branch as headquarters of 

the IAEC rail gun project. Documents found at the 

site and former scientists involved in the work indicate that Dr. Karim Kalif Mohamid was the head 

of the photography unit of the Technical Research 

Branch. 

Numerous Iraqi scientists interviewed by ISG stated 

that the IAEC rail gun was an effort to develop 

an antiaircraft weapon—a point that we believe is 

supported by documents captured at the Technical 

Research Branch and at IAEC’s headquarters at 

Tuwaitha. A set of papers found at the site—which 

we have determined were written by Sa’id—connect the rail gun to antiaircraft work for the Ministry 

of Defense. Former scientists involved in the effort 

indicate at least two progress reports were submitted 

to the Air Defense Commander, Lieutenant General 

Shaheen. These same sources, as well as documentary 

information found by ISG, indicate Shaheen visited 

the IAEC rail gun project (see inset on Saddam’s 

Interest in Antiaircraft Weapons). 

• Other indications the rail gun project was intended 

for antiaircraft applications include the need for a 

technical cadre specialized in air defense, a plan 

to locate the work at the air defense site at the al 

Rashid Military Camp, and the intent to use a visual 

device to target the projectile—according to notations in Sa’id’s papers. The document also notes 

plans in early September 1999 to test the rail gun 

on what appears to be salvaged military aircraft 

from an airplane repair company. 

• An Iraqi scientist told ISG that the IAEC rail gun 

project was one of many projects at the Tuwaitha 

Nuclear Research Center that were supported by the 

Ministry of Defense. The same source indicates any 

scientist could suggest an air defense project—purportedly a means to obtain extra funding and recognition.

Despite indications that the IAEC rail gun was 

intended for antiaircraft use, the project preserved 

skills that could support a renewed nuclear weapons 

design effort. Given his past leadership in the nuclear 

weapons program, ISG believes that Sa’id clearly 
53

Nuclear

understood that his rail gun project also dealt with 

technical subject areas applicable to nuclear weapons research. In one section of text that we suspect 

was part of his proposal to build the IAEC rail gun, 

Sa’id refers to work on gas guns—technically simpler 

devices that also can accelerate projectiles to high 

speeds. 

• Sa’id’s notes describe that gas gun work had been 

planned for al Atheer—a site where he and his 

staff had planned to design, develop, and assemble 

nuclear weapons as part of the pre-1991 weapons 

program. Iraq planned to use gas guns as a research 

tool for its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. 

According to a scientist involved with the rail gun 

program, Sa’id also indicated one of the objectives 

of the project was to train a new generation of IAEC 

scientists in applied physics. One source indicated 

that working on the rail gun project was like attending a seminar where staff could learn new subjects 

such as plasma physics, electrical engineering, motion 

physics, high-speed photography, and fl ash radiography. 

• Documentation found at the Technical Research 

Branch also describes work in each of these areas 

but noted in the context of an air defense project 

(see inset on Technical Research Branch). 

• A proposal for a 10-year effort to recruit and train 

university students was also found at the Technical 

Research Branch site. 

The IAEC Technical Research Branch 

According to a document captured by ISG, the IAEC 

Technical Research Branch consisted of various laboratory units, which include:

• Photography Unit: The aim of this unit was to 

strengthen the scientifi c tests on various physics 

phenomena for the purpose of treating the photographic montage and also to study the specifi cations of standard and digital cameras.

• Pressure Measuring Unit: Aimed at counting the 

pressure of various materials and their mechanical 

specifi cations.

• X-ray Unit: Aimed at studying matter specifi cations, counting the speed of moving bodies, and 

the natural behavior of movement of these bodies 

through x-ray photography.

• Electronic Unit: Aimed at testing and measuring electrical specifi cations (resistance, induction, 

voltage, and current) and also repair of electronic 

instruments and computers.

• Programming: This unit dealt with the physical 

problems and factors that affect scientifi c programming. 

One Iraqi scientist told ISG that Sa’id’s rail gun 

pursuits were more personally motivated because he 

was nearing the end of his professional career and 

he wanted to increase his stature with Saddam. This 

source indicates Sa’id may have wanted to leave his 

mark with a high-profi le project—like shooting down 

Saddam’s Interest in Antiaircraft Weapons 

The antiaircraft application is consistent with 

Saddam’s reported intense interest in air defense 

technologies. One scientist told ISG that Saddam 

became obsessed with achieving a capability to shoot 

down an enemy aircraft in the no-fl y zone and had 

challenged the scientifi c community to rally around 

that goal. Saddam reportedly believed that achieving 

such a capability would render the no-fl y zone ineffective and foster a change in political climate that 

would hasten the lifting of sanctions. 

• Fadil al-Janabi, head of the IAEC since 1996, 

indicates that Saddam would often attend monthly 

meetings with his son Qusay to discuss air defense 

projects—meetings Janabi also claims to have last 

attended in February 2003. 

Fadil al-Janabi indicates that Saddam tasked him to 

develop knowledge in atomic energy areas and support air defense projects. Air defense was the IAEC’s 

number-one priority.
54

a Coalition aircraft. Another Iraqi scientist noted 

that, even though Sa’id had been removed from the 

IAEC after reaching the compulsory retirement age in 

mid-2002, he continued to run the rail gun project and 

eventually Saddam reinstated him at the IAEC. 

• Postwar document exploitation efforts reveal Sa’id 

applied–probably in late 2002—for a position as the 

Director General of the Industrial Committee. His 

application details work experience from 1989 to 

2001, noting his work on the IAEC rail gun project as well as work on Iraq’s “complete, fi nal, and 

inclusive document for the canceled project/Group 

4.” ISG doubts that Sa’id would have needed to 

pursue the new job or need reinstatement if he 

had been part of a concerted Iraq effort to restart 

Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. 

Sa’id managed, nonetheless, to initiate his IAEC 

project despite a more experienced rail gun effort 

having been reinitiated under the MIC at Al Tahadi 

in 2000. Reporting from former scientists in the rail 

gun program suggests that the IAEC project seems to 

have been the favored effort as the leaders of the MIC 

project reportedly were asked to join the IAEC rail 

gun program. At least one scientist from the Al Tahadi 

rail gun project reportedly also was tasked to assist 

the IAEC, participating in three meetings between 

late 2001 and June, 2002. The same source indicates 

the Al Tahadi effort also provided equipment to the 

IAEC rail gun (see inset on MIC’s Rail Gun Projects 

and Figure 29). 

Documentation found at the Technical Research 

Branch also indicates an agreement was being 

discussed to have Al Tahadi repair and examine the 

IAEC rail gun.

ISG has found only tenuous indicators that would 

suggest the rail gun was part of an effort to renew 

a nuclear weapons program. One Iraqi scientist 

recalled Sa’id’s role in gas gun work for the pre-1991 

nuclear weapons program and thought it possible that 

the rail gun would be applied to a similar research 

effort. Documents found by ISG also indicate the 

IAEC rail gun effort was associated with a number 

of scientists from the former nuclear weapons design 

and development program including other former 

members of Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program 

(see inset on Tapping PC-3 Expertise). 

MIC Rail Gun Projects

Iraq’s interest in rail guns for air defense, according 

to a senior offi cial involved in the program, traces 

to around 1993, when an Iraqi scientist recently 

returned from his Ph.D. studies in Russia, wrote to 

the MIC to advocate the development of rail guns.

This letter reportedly generated research and development efforts at the High Voltage Establishment—an 

outgrowth of the electromagnetic isotope separation 

(EMIS) portion of the pre-1991 nuclear weapons 

program at Tarmiya. The High Voltage Establishment 

was renamed Al Tahadi in 1995. Rail gun efforts fell 

under the direction of Dr. Khaluq Rauf Hamdi, who 

arrived at the establishment in 1994. 

• The MIC program at the High Voltage Establishment succeeded in producing a rail gun with a 

barrel 1 meter long, capable of shooting a 1-gram, 

quadrilateral-shaped polycarbonate projectile to a 

speed of 400 to 450 meters per second, according 

to an offi cial involved in that program.

• ISG found other evidence that the rail gun at Al 

Tahadi had reached a speed of 1 km/sec in March 

2000. The so-called Iraqi Electromagnetic Rail Gun 

used a capacity of 55 kJ to accelerate a 1.5-gm 

projectile to the 1-km/sec speed. 

Although well under the limits of Annex 3 (2,000 

meters per second), the MIC rail gun project was 

routinely hidden from inspectors. According to a 

former senior offi cial involved with the work, before 

UN/IAEA inspectors would visit the site, Iraqi personnel took efforts to conceal equipment associated with 

the project. The project was killed in 1995 when MIC 

Offi cial Amir Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi became concerned 

that the research and development effort would be 

discovered. 
55

Nuclear

• Based on information gathered through debriefi ngs 

and documents, ISG has determined that the IAEC 

rail gun effort was a classifi ed program, and at least 

part of it was code-named Project 505—actions 

reminiscent of how Iraq classifi ed its pre-1991 

nuclear weapons programs. A scientist associated 

with the rail gun project claims the rail gun project 

was classifi ed not because of the sensitivity of its 

application or technology—which appears to have 

been drawn from open literature—but to create an 

aura of importance. 

• Another source associated with the rail gun effort 

recalled an emergency meeting called by Sa’id 

in 1995—under the authority of Husayn Kamil, 

the former head of Iraq’s WMD programs–to ask 

about the feasibility of manufacturing man-made 

diamonds. When told the project was impractical, 

Sa’id reportedly indicated this was why the rail gun 

project was needed. Some types of artifi cial diamond production technology utilize skills similar to 

those needed in developing nuclear weapons.

An ISG inspection of the Technical Research 

Branch facility in August 2003 found evidence of 

new dual-use laboratories and equipment. When 

further developed, these dual-use technologies could 

possibly have been used in a nuclear weapons development program, especially in the area of hydrodynamic testing. Other activities discovered at the 

laboratory were clearly devoted to the IAEC rail gun 

project. 

Rather than using offi cial IAEC channels, Sa’id 

privately contacted outside contractors to acquire 

several key pieces of equipment for the Technical Research Branch laboratory—a suspicious 

approach but one that we cannot link to a renewed 

nuclear weapons effort. To acquire a 300-kV fl ash 

X-ray machine, for example, Sa’id contracted with 

a trusted colleague, a former PC-3 Group 4 scientist 

who was working at the University of Technology 

in Baghdad. This colleague contracted with former 

coworkers at the Ibn Firnas Company for work done 

under contract to the university. The project reportedly was kept secret from the director of the Ibn 

Firnas Company as a means to provide Sa’id with 

fi nancial cover.

• A colleague of Said also contracted with the Al 

Qaswar Company to provide a timing device using 

laser diodes to measure the speed of the rail gun 

projectile. The Al Qaswar Company is registered 

in the name of the wife of one of the Ibn Firnas 

employees that had worked on the fl ash X-ray 

system. 

• One colleague of Sa’id—an expert in materials 

analysis—received a contract from Sa’id to outfi t 

a laboratory for impact behavior studies. Part of 

this contract included a gun device to measure the 

impact of projectiles on various materials. This 

became the pressure measuring unit of the Technical Research Branch. Information from a senior 

offi cial in the rail gun program indicates this unit 

was limited in its ability to gather material property data—the kind of data of interest in a renewed 

nuclear weapons effort—because of the lack of 

diagnostic equipment (see Figures 30 and 31). 

Figure 29. Cross-sectional view of Al-Tahadi rail gun 

showing how the rails are held with insulators and metal 

supports in a photo obtained from Hahdi Hadi Jasim.
56

According to a former senior offi cial involved with 

the effort, the IAEC antiaircraft project was focused 

on improving the effi ciency of the rail gun and 

making it more transportable in the years before the 

war, rather than conducting materials experiments 

like those used in nuclear weapons research. Overall 

effi ciency for converting electrical energy into projectile speed was poor, estimated at only one to three 

percent, according to a former senior offi cial involved 

with the program.

• In an effort to reduce the size of the rail gun so it 

could be weaponized for use on the back of a vehicle-mounted 100-mm antiaircraft gun frame, the 

Iraqis considered the use of homopolar generators 

to replace the bulky capacitors—390 of them—that 

made up the research device. Iraq planned a steady 

progression of building homopolar generators in 

sizes from 0.15 mega joules, to 1.5 mega joules, to 

15 mega joules, but none of these items reportedly 

were completed because of the lack of precision 

machinery. 

• The same offi cial indicates that materials work was 

limited at the Technical Research Branch and that, 

because of limitations in the availability of diagnostic equipment, these tests primarily consisted of 

studying the impacts caused by projectiles on steel 

plates. Crude approaches to the study of materials 

using piezoelectric materials were reported.

Sa’id’s documents refer to the need to conduct 

experiments above the 2,000-meter-per-second limit 

posed by the Annex 3 nuclear controls, specifi cally 

calling for speeds as high as 10,000 meters per 

second. ISG believes that this velocity range was 

used for calculations to estimate the electrical equipment needed to power a laboratory research tool for 

exploring the relationships between projectile mass 

and barrel length as found in references made later in 

the document. 

• The IAEC project reportedly used three different 

barrels—two square annulus barrels measuring 15 

mm and 30 mm, as well as a circular barrel measuring 32.5 mm in diameter. According to a senior 

offi cial involved in the project, Iraq attained its best 

results with the circular barrel, which was able to 

accelerate a 28 gram polycarbonate projectile to a 

speed of 885 meters per second (see Figure 32 summarizing the Iraqi Rail Gun progress).

Tapping PC-3 Expertise for the IAEC Rail Gun

Sa’id may have turned to former members of the 

pre-1991 nuclear weapons program, codenamed PC3, for a variety of reasons—ranging from established 

competence, personal and professional relations, 

or even some hidden intent to tap this expertise to 

train a new cadre of nuclear scientists. Debriefi ngs 

of Iraqis associated with the rail gun project and 

captured documents reveal the following former PC-3 

personnel were connected to the effort: 

• Dr. Khalluq Ra’uf Hamdi—Former head of PC-3 

Group 2B, responsible for Electromagnetic Isotope 

Separation (EMIS). Hamdi served as Sa’id’s deputy 

on the rail gun project and the head of the IAEC 

Technical Research Branch. 

• Dr. Sabah al-Noor—A trusted colleague of Sa’id 

and another former PC-3 Group 4 powder metallurgy specialist. Sabah reportedly contracted with 

Sa’id for the production of projectiles for the IAEC 

rail gun, a fl ash X-ray machine, and shock physics 

laboratory. 

• Dr. Abdullah Kandush—Former head of PC-3 

Group 4B (Applied Physics) and weaponization 

theoretician. Kandush had responsibilities for heat 

transfer issues. 

• Basil al-Qaisi—Former Director at the Saad 

Center, al-Qaisi was associated with the funding of 

the rail gun project. 

• Dr. Faris Aziz al Samarra—A former offi cial in the 

pre-1991 centrifuge program–an effort administratively outside of PC-3 and the nuclear weapons 

design effort. Dr. Faris was the director general 

of Al-Shahid Company that produced copper and 

brass products. According to a captured document, 

he was to provide oxygen- free copper for the rail 

gun project.

• Jamal Ja’far—A former pre-1991 centrifuge design 

engineer who, according to a captured document, 

reviewed designs for the rail gun project in August, 

1999. A senior scientist associated with the rail gun 

project indicates that Jamal Ja’far was one of two 

highly regarded engineers in Iraq who could be 

brought into a variety of projects for consultation.
57

Nuclear

Figure 30. Technical Research Branch facility 

inspection—velocity measuring device for rail 

gun projectiles.

Figure 31. Technical Research Branch facility 

inspection—shock impact materials test rig.
58

Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa’id

Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa’id was a senior Ba’ath Party 

leader with ties to the Presidency. Prior to the fi rst 

Gulf war, he had served as head of PC-3 Group 4, 

the nuclear weapon design and development group, 

and, after spending most of the 1990s as Director of 

Research in MIC, became Secretary to the Industrial 

Committee, which coordinated projects between the 

production ministries. Sa’id was reportedly killed 

running a Coalition roadblock on 8 April 2003. 

Alternate View Of Science Projects and 

The Rail Gun

It should be noted that some senior scientists 

believed the Rail Gun project had neither scientifi c merit nor utility as an air defense weapon. In 

September 2003, Dr. ‘Amir Hammudi Hasan al-Sa’di, 

former Presidential Scientifi c Advisor, commented 

on science projects and the Rail Gun in particular. 

‘Amir said that the state of scientifi c research in Iraq 

had declined after the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq 

following the 1991 Gulf war—the new generation of 

scientists could not distinguish between validating 

an idea and being able to mass-produce and deliver 

systems. He further said that Saddam had decreed 

that any scientist with an idea could make that idea 

a present to the presidency. Special-interest groups—

those who stood to benefi t from the project—would 

then press for its adoption. 

If a knowledgeable person did not step in to put a 

halt to a scientifi cally invalid project, the project 

would proceed. Specifi cally, ‘Amir mentioned the 

rail gun and certain decoys as examples of poorly 

developed concepts crafted to win Saddam’s support 

and garner funds. ‘Amir lamented that such programs 

wasted resources and efforts. In an earlier interview 

‘Amir assessment was more direct; he stated that the 

rail gun was “obviously not” for use against aircraft 

and viewed the idea as ridiculous. ‘Amir said he did 

not know what the purpose of the rail gun was but 

suggested that it was probably a worthless project 

that someone thought up just to get more funding.

Figure 32. Iraqi rail gun progress.
59

Nuclear

Issues Related to Nuclear

Weapons Design and 

Development

ISG judges that Iraq has not worked on nuclear 

weapons design since 1991. ISG investigated Iraq’s 

nuclear weapon design and component manufacture 

capabilities through interviews with scientists and 

other government employees, site visits of historically-associated Iraq nuclear weapon facilities, and 

exploitation of captured documents.

Casting Technology 

ISG has not identifi ed a materials research and fi ssile component manufacturing capability that would 

be required to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Working with molten highly enriched uranium 

requires special consideration for criticality during 

the melting and solidifi cation process. ISG found no 

evidence that Iraq had acquired or developed the technology of dealing with casting and machining issues 

of highly enriched uranium. 

• Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear programs experimented 

with crucibles and with vacuum induction furnaces, 

both imported and indigenously constructed, to 

varying degrees of success, to produce components 

in molds. Several types of crucibles and crucible 

materials were used in casting experiments with 

metallic uranium. 

• An Iraqi scientist provided information to ISG that 

is consistent with other sources that Iraqi nuclear 

program work at Al Atheer was just getting started 

in January 1991 and that uranium metal casting 

work was accomplished within the limitations of 

the equipment at hand. Iraqi scientists encountered 

diffi culties in use of vacuum casting furnaces to 

melt uranium metals prior to pouring into molds 

and with the molds. According to inspections, 

several small spherical and cylindrical pieces were 

produced, but of relatively poor quality as pertaining to void and impurity inclusions. 

• According to Iraq’s CAFCD addendum in 2002, a 

new Ceramics and Alloys Section had been formed 

under the IAEC Physics and Materials Directorate 

in 2000 to investigate ceramic coating of metals. 

ISG was unable to determine if the investigations 

were directed toward solving pre-1991 problems 

that Iraqis encountered in pouring of uranium metal 

into molds during the casting process. 

• An ISG inspection team visited the South Taji 

industrial complex and searched for evidence of 

uranium metal production capabilities and nuclearweapon-related component production. As a result 

of building damage, looting, and prior removal of 

equipment, ISG was not able to accurately assess 

the prewar functions of the facility.

• An ISG inspection team visited the south Taji 

industrial complex and searched for evidence of 

uranium metal production capabilities and nuclearweapon-related component production. As a result 

of building damage, looting, and prior removal of 

equipment, ISG was not able to accurately assess 

the prewar functions of the facility.

Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities

ISG has not identifi ed any explosive lens development effort in Iraq that was associated with 

a renewed nuclear weapons program. ISG has 

found, however, that the Al Quds Company—a new 

MIC establishment created in 2002—had a technical department, which built an explosive test facility capable of conducting research. Such a facility 

appears well suited for types of explosive research 

that could be applicable to conventional military and 

nuclear weapons research. 

• According to a captured letter, the General Manager of the IAEC Technical Research Branch sent a 

three-person group to the new Al Quds Company to 

“conduct tests and checks” in December 2002.

Iraq has maintained explosive development activities 

supporting conventional military weapons systems. 

This could be considered a dual-use activity, and 
60

although not as exacting in tolerance requirements, 

the technology could be reapplied to explosive lenses 

for nuclear applications. 

• ISG has not resolved the issue of missing explosive 

lens mold drawings of concern to IAEA inspections in March, 2003. A letter from Maj. Gen. 

Eng. Hussam M. Amin, Director General, National 

Monitoring Directorate, from February 2003, and 

acquired by ISG, indicated continued concern with 

missing explosive lens mold drawings that supposedly contained critical information.

High-Speed Switches 

ISG obtained evidence from recovered documents 

and from debriefi ngs of Iraqi scientists that Iraq 

utilized high-speed switches—like those of potential interest for nuclear weapons development—in 

support of its rail gun projects. ISG has found no 

direct evidence that the interest in special high-speed 

switches after 1991 was in support of a nuclear weapons program. 

• In July 2003, ISG obtained information that in 2002 

a graduate student at the Mustanseriya University 

was working on an electrothermal accelerator using 

the rail gun under development at al Tahadi. This 

igniter could be considered a type of specialized, 

high-speed switch. 

• Iraqi documentation recovered by coalition forces 

describes prototype testing of a gas switch with 

breakdown times that are likely less than one 

microsecond. The gas switch experiments proceeded within the rail-gun project. An ISG subject 

matter expert determined that the described switch 

was probably in violation of the Annex 3 guidelines 

of prohibited items. 

ISG has found other indirect and fragmentary 

evidence of interest in specialized switches. However, 

ISG has not found this information to be connected to 

research into nuclear weapons.

• The Military Industrial Commission in 2000-2001 

was interested in electromagnetic pulse generation 

that was described as a box containing a laser-controlled thyristor, a type of specialized switch.

• A CD-ROM recovered in 2003 from the Religious 

University in Baghdad contained fi les regarding 

spark-gap switches and electrothermal accelerators.

Fireset Development and Testing 

ISG obtained limited corroboration of previously 

reported, pre-1991 fi reset development status. No 

new information regarding fi reset development was 

found. ISG found no evidence that Iraq continued 

fi reset development or testing after 1991.

• An Iraqi scientist reported to ISG that development 

of one complete 32-point fi reset directly applicable to nuclear weapon detonation initiation was 

completed prior to February 1990. A second fi reset 

was being assembled and environmentally hardened 

in 1990 but was never completed. Work on both 

fi resets was ceased in April 1991, and the fi resets 

were evacuated to a safehouse and later returned to 

Al Atheer. One fi reset was reported to be exhumed 

from rubble at Al Atheer in 1996 or 1997 and 

was turned over to inspectors. ISG confi rmed that 

this information is consistent with that previously 

reported by Iraq. ISG has not been able to independently confi rm the disposition of the second fi reset 

reported to have been assembled in the pre-1991 

nuclear program. 

Neutron Generators

ISG was not able to fi nd that Iraq had resumed any 

work related to neutron initiators/generators for a 

renewed weapons program. The only neutron generation capability found by ISG pertained to a previously known capability used for non-weapons-related 

research under way at the IAEC at Tuwaitha. This 

project is described in more detail in the IAEC Issues 

portion of this report. 
61

Nuclear

Migration of the Capabilities 

From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons 

Project

Starting around 1992, Iraq transferred many scientists from the defunct nuclear weapon program into 

several Iraqi scientifi c establishments. We have not 

found clear indications of the intent behind these 

personnel moves, but some of the work they pursued 

would have inherently preserved skills that could be 

applied to possible future nuclear weapon work.

PC-3 was offi cially dissolved in March 1992. Several 

senior Iraqi offi cials stated that there was an initial 

program to move PC-3 personnel into matching skill 

centers within the MIC to sustain skills. Some personPC-3 Comprised Four Main Groups

Group Focus

1 Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment and 

Centrifuge Enrichment

(Group One is later detached to 

become the Engineering Design 

Center)

2 EMIS, Chemical Enrichment, Chemical Engineering (Feed Products)

3 Administrative Support, Models, Studies, and Databases

4 Weaponization (High-Explosive Lenses 

and Neutron Generator Development)

Examples of Former PC-3 Scientists Migrating to New Positions by the Late 1990s

Person Position Late 1990s Pre-1991 PC-3

Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Said Secretary Industrial 

Committee Former Head of Group 4

Dr. Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far Presidental Advisor Industrial Committee Former Head of PC-3

Dr. Mahdi Shaqr Al ‘Ubaydi Director General Saad Center Former Head of Group 1/EDC

Dr. Muhammad Habib Razi State Company Formerly of Group 4

Dr. Hikmat N’aim Al-Jalu Director General Ibn Sina Formerly of Group 4 

Dr. Faris Al-Samarra’i Director General Al Samud State Company Former Engineer Group 

1/EDC

Dr. Dhafi r Al-Azzawi Director General 

Al Raya Zahfal-Kabir Formerly of Group 4

Dr. ‘Abdallah Kandush IAEC International Div Head Formerly of Group 4

Dr. Fadil Al-Janabi Director IAEC

Dr. Abd Al-Rizaq Hammudi 

Al-Karaguli Ibn Sina Center Formerly of Group 2

Dr. Ahmad Abd Al-Jabbar 

Shanshal Director Al-Jazira Formerly of Group 2

Dr. Abdul Halim Ibrahim Al Hajjaj VP IAEC Formerly of Group 2

Dr. Thamer Mawlood Director General Al-Tahadi Formerly of Group 2

Dr. Munqith Hikmat Shawkat 

Al Qaisi Deputy Director General Ibn Yunis/Saad Center Formerly of Group 2 

Dr. Saad Shakir Tawfi q Director General Al Khazin Center Formerly of Group 2

Dr. Faia Ali-Husayn Berqudar IAEC Formerly of Group 4

Dr. Ala Abas Director General Diwaniya Formerly of Group 2

Y.M. Al Jabouri Director General Nida Formerly of Group 3

Dr. Wadah Jamil Rauf Director Raya Center Formerly of Group 2 

Ali Hussain Alwan Director General Al-Zafh Al Kabeer Formerly of Group 1/EDC
62

nel were also moved to the Ministry of Industry and 

Minerals (MIM), the Electricity Commission, and the 

IAEC. 

• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdullah Al Mullah Huwaysh, 

former Director of the MIC, confi rmed PC-3 scientists moved into the numerous companies in the 

MIC including Al Razi, Al Zawrah, Al Nida, Um alMa’rik, Al Majd, Al-Zahf Al-Kabeer, Al Radhwan, 

Abu Al Rushd, Al Rayah, al Tahadi, and Ibn Sina. 

It was Huwaysh’s contention that skill sets dictated 

the placement of scientists. 

A senior MIC scientist stated that scientists associated with Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program 

were often transferred en masse to one of several MIC 

companies, including the Al-Raya Company and the 

Ibn Sina Company. These scientists would participate 

in research projects that would help them maintain 

their knowledge of their former nuclear weapons 

research. An ISG site visit to Ibn Sina corroborated 

such activities, including phosphoric acid purifi cation 

and lanthanide separation by ion exchange and solvent extraction—processes similar to those required 

for uranium extraction and reprocessing techniques 

(see Figure 33). 

The reassignment of scientists to nonnuclear projects 

over the years is also refl ected in comments provided 

by IAEC Chairman Al-Janabi to ISG. Janabi claims 

that he asked Saddam around March 2001 to gather 

former IAEC scientists and researchers at the IAEC in 

Tuwaitha. However, Saddam told Al-Janabi not to ask 

for them at this time because the MIC needed these 

scientists for other programs.

In the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert 

Storm, Iraq also tried to save some of its equipment and capability from the PC-3 program as part 

of a denial and deception effort. In some cases, 

preservation of the equipment and capability may 

have been intended for eventual reconstitution of a 

nuclear program but also were used to support other 

nonuclear programs. The “Denial and Deception” 

program included the movement and/or destruction 

of equipment, movement of personnel, and destruction of facilities. Many actions were directly related 

to the degree of incrimination provided by equipment 

and facilities with respect to NPT violations. Table 7 

indicates the deliberate destruction of some facilities 

by Iraq. Table 8 indicates some of the movements and 

actions undertaken by Iraq with respect to the uranium conversion program equipment. 

• According to Iraq’s FFCD, “An order was issued 

to PC-3 and EDC [Engineering Design Center] at 

the end of May 1991 to hand over the main equipment and non-nuclear materials (that indicate NPT 

violation) of the nuclear program to SAP [Security 

Apparatus for the Protection of Military Industrialization Establishments] for protection.... The order 

covered only the equipment and nonnuclear materials which indicated violations of NPT.” “The main 

equipment and nonnuclear materials of the nuclear 

program were transferred through SAP to the army 

from the different sites during the period May 28, 

1991 until June 9, 1991.” “The purpose of the above 

equipment and nonnuclear materials transfer was to 

avoid detection by IAEA Action Team-2.” 

• Iraq’s declarations provide many examples where 

it salvaged equipment from sites formerly associated with its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program—a 

move ISG suspects was as much to conceal possible NPT violations as to preserve a reconstitution 

capability. Iraq’s declarations and IAEA inspections 

indicate that the early 1991 concealment activities 

resulted in some equipment being damaged or unilaterally destroyed. Ultimately, some items associated with the pre-1991 program were moved to a 

storage site at Ash Shaykili or utilized at several 

universities or state establishments. 

• In the early years of inspections, Iraq also tried to 

claim its Al-Athir nuclear weapons assembly site 

was a materials development center.

The decision to destroy or salvage equipment 

appeared to have a simple criterion: the degree of 

incrimination with respect to NPT violation by Iraq.

In general, much equipment specifi c to a nuclear 

weapons program was to be destroyed, while dual-use 

equipment was to be salvaged. For example, Tuwaitha 

Building 64 was severely damaged during Operation 

Desert Storm. The undamaged plant equipment was 

salvaged and stored. The unit components that were 

contaminated with natural uranium were unilaterally 

destroyed while other general purpose components 

were retained for subsequent use in nonnuclear 

activities. 

• Another example is the equipment at Rashidiyah. 

Equipment directly related to the nuclear program 

was to be destroyed while indirectly related or 

general purpose equipment was moved to General Establishment for Engineering Technologies 
63

Nuclear

This page intentionally left blank.
64

Figure 33. Evolution of Iraq nuclear weapons 

organizations since 1991 (Colors indicate 

organizational continuity).

PC-3 Group 3

Design and 

Production 

Facilities

PC-3 Group 2

Electro-Magnetic 

Isotope Separation

(EMIS) Tarmiyah,

Tuwaitha, Jesira

PC-3 Group 4

Weapons Design 

and Production 

Facility

Al Atheer, Tuwaitha

State Establishment for 

Production Process 

Design (SEPPD)

PC-3 Group 1

Engineering

Design Center

Centrifuge/gaseous 

diffusion

Rashdiyah, Al furat

MechanicalEngineering 

Design Center (MEDC)

Electrical Engineering 

Design Center (EEDC)

Center for Theoretical 

Applications

Group 4/40A TM 1, 

subordinate to SEPPD

Engineering Materials 

Center

Group 2/2F

Baghdad University

Group 4

SEPPD Tahaddi

(Tahaddi Engineering 

Material Center 

subordinated, October)

Center for 

Industrial 

Chemical 

Research

All chemists,

Groups

1, 2, 4

Al Tahaddi Scientifi c 

Applications Center

Umwayrij

(Independent)

4 October

State Establishment for 

Metalurgical Industries

Group 4/40 CF upgrade 

teams, 11 September,

South Taji

State Establishment for 

Extraction Processes 

Uranium metallurgists

Old PC-3 HQS

General Establishment for 

Engineering Technology

(GEET)

Group 1/EDC

State Establishment 

for Designs and 

Consultation (SEDC)

14 February

Casting Research 

Center

Group 2F, subordinated 

to SEPPD

Khalid Ibrahim Said

leaves SEPPD Group 4

(Al Beiruni gain)

No physical 

move

Materials 

science

Chemists

Hydrodynamic calculations 

and bomb design

Rest of 

material 

science

Uranium 

Metallurgy, Group 

4/40 CF

New 

HQS

Chemists Chemical Engineering 

Design Center (CEDC)

New 

HQS

New 

HQS

Detached 

from

SEPPD

Group 4A

Chemists

Chemists

New organization

Detached from 

SEPPD

Upgrade

Subordinated to SEDC

Upgrade

Upgrade

1991 1992 (April-May) (October) 1994 1995

EMIS

Nida State Establishment

Zawra’a State 

Establishment

Ameer Factory

Radwan Factory

Material Selection 

Center

Group 2G, October

Chemists

Move

High Voltage 

Establishment

EMIS personnel, Groups 

2A and 2B
65

Nuclear

Figure 33. Evolution of Iraq nuclear weapons 

organizations since 1991 (Colors indicate 

organizational continuity) (continued).

State 

Establishment 

for General 

Metalurgical 

Industries

Group 4/40 CF 

merger

4 September

Al Tahaddi 

Establishment 

for Scientifi c 

Applications

Group 4/4A

Umwayrij

4 September

Material 

Selection 

Center

Group 2G

Umwayrij

August

State 

Establishment for 

Metalurgical 

Industries

19 October

Al Tahaddi 

Establishment for 

Scientifi c 

Applications

Group 2A+B, Group 

4A

Move to Baghdad

March

Al ZaherCenter

Group 2G

Al Beiruni 

Casting Center

Group 2F

GEET

Group 1/EDC

Move to MIC 

Jadriyah compound, January

Al Majd Company

Group 1/EDC

centrifuge

Al Raya 

Company

All materials 

scientists, 

Groups 2G, F, 

4M, H, G, S

Ibn Sina 

Company

All Chemists,

Groups 1, 2, 4

Sa’ad Company

All design

Al Tahaddi 

Company

Groups 4A, 

2A+B

Ibn Fernas 

Company

(No PC-3)

Al Zahf al 

Kabeer 

Company

Uranium 

metallurgists

Al Majd

Group 1/EDC 

centrifuge

Al Raya 

Company

All materials 

scientists

Saad Center, Al 

Zahrawi Center, 

CEDC, Ibn 

Yunis Center, 

MEDC, Khazin 

Center, EEDC

Ibn Sina State 

Establishment

All chemists, 

Groups 1, 2, 4

Al Tahaddi

State 

Establishment

Groups 4A, 2A, B

Ibn Fernas State 

Establishment

Group 4/40 M, H, G, S

Al Zahf al Kabeer 

State Establishment

Uranium metallurgists

Move

Name

Move

No PC-3 personnel left

1996 1997 1997 (March) (Late) 1998 (Early) 1 August

Nida State

Company

Zawra’a State 

Company

Ameer Factory

Radwan Factory

1995 (cont.)

State 

Establishment

for Industrial 

Chemical 

Research

24 July
66

(GEET) storage. Iraq did not consider it relevant 

to declare these stores because Iraq considered 

this equipment neither nuclear nor nuclear related. 

Some of the equipment and materials were used in 

the reconstruction program while others were given 

to some establishments in need of the equipment.

In the early 1990s, Iraq retained residual capabilities that could support a nuclear program by 

adapting personnel and dual-use equipment to nonnuclear activities but display the generic capabilities 

applicable to their previous nuclear-related efforts.

In the full accounting of program equipment, some 

equipment could only be accounted for as “lost.” 

• According to one high-level scientist, workers at 

PC-3 sites were instructed to remove materials, 

equipment, and documents from their workplace 

prior to the UN inspections in May 1991. The laboratory from the Tarmiya EMIS uranium enrichment 

site was used to outfi t a laboratory at the University 

of Baghdad College of Education (Adhamiya district) where research on Freeman ion sources was 

continued. Other researchers at Tarmiya also built 

a vacuum system laboratory at Baghdad University 

(Jadriya district). 

• An example of “lost” equipment includes equipment at Al-Athir that was shipped for destruction. 

Although some boxes were destroyed by the army, 

the remaining boxes were returned. The items that 

were not found in these boxes and parts of which 

could not be located at the destruction sites were 

considered to be lost during evacuation.

IAEC Modernization 

Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam 

Husayn 

From at least 1999 onward Saddam became increasingly interested in the activities of the IAEC and 

began holding regular meetings with representatives of the IAEC. Saddam also began to personally 

intervene in matters related to the IAEC, ranging from 

internal personnel issues, to prompting other organizations to work with the IAEC and utilize the IAEC’s 

scientifi c capabilities. In late 1996, Saddam agreed 

to the Oil-for-Food program, resulting in signifi cant 

fund, which he was able to use to bolster his scientifi c 

base.

• A former scientist at the IAEC spoke of many 

scientists leaving the IAEC in 1999 because 

conditions were so poor. The scientist claims that 

Saddam personally intervened, beginning in 1999, 

to improve conditions and raise salaries. He also 

made what the scientist called “a blanket rule” at 

this time forbidding scientists from leaving their 

posts. 

• Dr. Huwaysh recalled that in 2001 and 2002 the 

frequency of meetings between Saddam and Iraqi 

nuclear scientists increased. During the same time 

frame, Saddam also issued a Presidential Order to 

the President of the IAEC, Dr. Fadil Al-Janabi, that 

he should keep nuclear scientists together at the 

IAEC in order to pool their skills and have them 

available when needed for starting numerous new 

projects. Dr. Huwaysh did not know the specifi c 

details of any of these projects. 

• Dr. Huwaysh also recalled that, circa 2000, when 

Saddam found out that former nuclear workers in 

the IAEC were not being paid as well as those in 

the MIC, he met with Al-Janabi, initiated raises in 

their salaries, and instituted a bonus scheme. 

• A former MIC offi cial stated that, in January 2002, 

Saddam issued an order requiring the MIC to cooperate with the IAEC and to implement projects in 

the areas of physics, machining, and electronics. 
67

Nuclear

Saddam also began to take an increased interest 

in the welfare of former nuclear scientists in the 

MIC. Dr. Huwaysh stated that in 2000 Saddam began 

asking about the welfare of former PC-3 scientists 

within the MIC and referred to them as “my people.” 

Saddam, a former IAEC Chairman in the mid-1970s, 

reportedly made it clear that he cared greatly about 

the former nuclear program and began showing a 

renewed level of interest in it at this time. 

Increased Funding and Publicity of 

IAEC Activities

In the last years before the war, the IAEC received 

increased publicity for its achievements and a larger 

budget, prompting many former PC-3 scientists to 

want to return to the IAEC from the MIC. This was 

partly due to the perceived improvements in conditions and salary increases. More money also became 

available to the IAEC through direct funding by 

Saddam.

• The former MIC Minister recalled the budget of 

the IAEC increasing in 2001/2002 and that Saddam 

overruled the Finance Minister’s opposition to the 

budget increase. The MIC Minister did not know by 

how much the budget increased.

• A former IAEC scientist stated that the IAEC 

budget increased through the 1990s in line with 

standard infl ation but then increased sharply beginning in 2000. 

Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: 

The Modernization Project

New computer numerically controlled (CNC) 

machine tools sought for IAEC’s Tuwaitha workshop in what has come to be known as the Modernization Project were not subject to nuclear 

export controls and were reported as required by 

the UN’s Ongoing Monitoring and Verifi cation 

(OMV) Regime. In 2001/2002, following meetings 

with Saddam, Al-Janabi and Dr. Khalid Ibrahim 

Sa’id embarked on a plan to improve the machine 

tools workshop at Tuwaitha and supply it with new 

machines—an activity that was not completed before 

the war.

• Former MIC Minister Huwaysh recalled that in 

2001, Al-Janabi and Dr. Sa’id approached him and 

requested support for a special project. He was 

not told the nature of the project but learned that it 

involved the procurement of very precise machines. 

Huwaysh, after consulting with Saddam, agreed 

with the understanding that the purchase would be 

conducted through MIC’s Al-Basha’ir Company.

• Due to reluctance on the part of international dealers to sell to the IAEC, Al-Janabi used the MIC to 

purchase the machines to conceal the fact that the 

IAEC was buying the machines. Al-Janabi also 

recalled that the contract for the high-precision 

machines was between the Al-Badr Company and 

a Taiwanese supplier. The Deputy Director General for Engineering was responsible for machine 

selection. Sa’id assisted in the project because of 

his extensive experience within the IAEC and his 

good managerial abilities. Sa’id’s main role was 

to coordinate with the Finance Ministry to receive 

approval for the purchases and draw the hard currency from state funds when necessary. 

• Al-Janabi also stated that he approved the purchase 

of the machines as part of an initiative to modernize the IAEC. He believed the machines were more 

accurate than Iraq’s existing capability. 

• While there is no question that the IAEC pursued 

these machines, there are confl icts in the information regarding the actual purchasing agent, the 

Al-Badr Company or the Al-Basha’ir Company. 

ISG believes that it is most likely the specifi cations 

and order were made by the Al-Badr company, 

on behalf of the IAEC, and the order was placed 

through the Al-Basha’ir Company, which was the 

actual purchasing agent. 

Dr. Huwaysh told ISG that, although he was not 

explicitly aware of what was being purchased, 

in his opinion the machines that the IAEC were 

buying were more accurate than those at any MIC 

owned companies and that the IAEC was supply-
68

Modernization Project—Machine Tools

Machine Type Model Country of Origin Cost (US $)

CNC Milling Machines 2 x MCV- 600E Taiwan 160,020

Surface smoothing 1 x KGC-84MSI Taiwan 83,717

Wire-Cutting Machine 1 x A300 Taiwan 155,228

 Spark Machine 1 x M50F Taiwan 86,427

CNC Milling Machines 2 x MCV-1200 Taiwan 225,000

CNC Copy Milling Machine 1 x VTC-1400 CTC Taiwan 395,000

Lathe Machine 1 x MT52S Taiwan 90,000

Lathe Machine 1 x MT52L Taiwan 95,000

Vertical Lathe Machine 1 x VL-12 Taiwan 268,926

Plasma-Cutting Machine 1 x 315A ROSSA Bulgaria 165,400

3D Measuring Tool 1 x 3D DEA10 Italy 115,000

 Sorting Machine 1 x MI-400 Unknown Unknown

 Lathe Machine TNC-30NL Unknown Unknown

Punching Machine Unknown Taiwan 67,000

 Laser Pointed Drill Unknown Spain 67,000

ing its workshop with high-precision machine tools. 

Furthermore, he stated the Modernization Project 

was classifi ed to the extent that even he was not 

made aware of its details. This compartmentalization 

was evident at the top levels of the Regime, including 

Saddam, who personally verifi ed that the MIC Minister was to assist the IAEC. However, none of the 

sources debriefed have been able to explain why the 

MIC Minister was excluded from the technical details 

of the project.

• Dr. Huwaysh’s assertion that the purchase of the 

machines was a secret program is puzzling, given 

that the machines were reported to the UN/IAEA 

and were thereby subject to inspection. Other 

sources have commented that it would have been 

impossible for Dr. Huwaysh not to know what was 

being procured because it was his organization 

doing the procurement and that the project may 

not have been classifi ed. A high-level Iraqi scientist stated that these high-precision machines were 

installed at Tuwaitha, and information regarding the 

machines was provided to the UN and IAEA in the 

declaration given in December 2002.

In contrast, former IAEC employees directly 

responsible for the selection and installation of the 

machines told ISG that the machines the IAEC purchased were the same as those already operating at 

Badr and were not particularly high precision. The 

same former IAEC employees went on to suggest that 

the machines were, in fact, of poor quality, cheaply 

made, and were prone to break.

• Former IAEC employees, Diya’ Jalil Husayn and 

Zuhair Al Yassiri, selected the machines based on 

generic workshop requirements. The majority of 

the machines were Asian in origin, and they were 

described as “cheap Taiwanese machines.” 

ISG also received confl icting information regarding the specifi c use of the machine tools workshop 
69

Nuclear

beyond general machining capabilities.The former 

President of the IAEC described the procurement 

of the machines as the development of Iraq’s “nonnuclear scientifi c infrastructure.” The machines would 

enable the IAEC to create molds and manufacture 

specialty parts for machinery in-house rather than 

outsourcing the work. 

• A former IAEC employee with close ties to the 

project told ISG that the machines were to be used 

to manufacture equipment for use by the IAEC in 

R&D (primarily for the Physics Directorate) and 

were not to be used for the manufacture of items for 

outside organizations. 

• A senior executive in the MIC described how the 

Center for Mechanical Design was to receive the 

equipment, reverse-engineer it, and send it to the 

Badr, which would then produce high-precision 

tools from it. 

Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for

Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program

Saddam’s increased interest in the IAEC and publicity of IAEC achievements, increased funding, and 

infrastructure improvements prompted Dr. Huwaysh 

to speculate that Saddam was interested in restarting 

a nuclear weapons program. 

• Dr. Huwaysh was suspicious this procurement was 

part of an attempt to restart the nuclear weapons 

program because both Janabi and Sa’id were part of 

the pre-1991 nuclear weapon program. He also was 

suspicious of Sa’id’s involvement because Sa’id 

was close to retirement. Furthermore, Dr. Huwaysh 

knew that high precision machines are needed to 

make centrifuges, although he admitted he only 

had the general notion of the capabilities of the 

machines. 

• Dr. Huwaysh believed these factors may have been 

an indication that by 2000 Saddam had run out of 

patience waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to 

renew the nuclear program, though he could offer 

no concrete evidence to support this view. Alternatively, Dr. Huwaysh speculated that Saddam may 

have had a small group of people advising him on 

nuclear power issues, although Dr. Huwaysh had 

never heard about it.

Alternatively, Al-Janabi says he approached the 

Presidential Secretary, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud AlKhatab, in late 2001 with a proposal to modernize 

the IAEC in order to develop Iraq’s nonnuclear scientifi c infrastructure. Khatab approved the idea and 

authorized the use of state funds through the Ministry 

of Finance. It was commonly understood that Khatab 

spoke for, and with the authority of, Saddam. As a 

result, Janabi began a broad effort to raise salaries and 

modernize departments, including procurement of the 

CNC machines.

• Other interviewees also were consistent in suggesting the new equipment was needed to fi x 

a degraded, or lost manufacturing capability at 

Tuwaitha. A former vice president of the IAEC 

stated that the purchase of these machines was not 

intended to modernize the IAEC’s manufacturing 

capability, but to re-create practical research capabilities. 

• A MIC scientist working at the IAEC glass workshop described the machine purchase as a means of 

improving the machines of the tool room workshop 

because the existing machines in 2001 were no 

longer functioning or not functioning properly. 

• Dr. Huwaysh also has quoted Saddam as saying 

“We do not intend or aspire to return to our previous programs to produce WMD, if the Security 

Council abides by its obligations . . . .”

IAEC Work on Neutron Generators

ISG has found no evidence of neutron generator 

or initiator research as part of a post-1991 nuclear 

weapons development program. Programs involving 

a French-supplied neutron generator are probably 

related to ongoing IAEC improvement efforts, which 

started by 2000.

• In 1984, the IAEC acquired a large neutron generator from a French company. In 2002, targets were 

bought for the neutron generator from the German 
70

company Siemens because the United States would 

not sell to them. The generator has been used for 

research projects related to geology, food, and environmental studies. As of May 2003, some parts of 

the neutron generator had been looted. Iraq also had 

small Americium-Beryllium and Plutonium-Beryllium neutron sources. 

• Dr. Shaker Al-Jabouri, Director of the IAEC 

Nuclear Physics Department from 1992 to 2003, 

was in charge of the neutron generator at Tuwaitha 

as well as being a professor in the Department 

of Physics, University of Baghdad, from 1987 to 

2003. He supervised numerous graduate students at 

the University of Baghdad whose theses included 

“Measurement of Neutron Activation Cross Section Using Neutron Angular Distribution Produced 

by 14 MeV Neutron Generator” and “Calculation 

and Measurement of Neutron Cross-Section for 

Energy Range 0.5 to 3 MeV.” These studies indicate 

Jabouri and the University of Baghdad remained 

involved in material cross-section work—a subject 

area with applications to civil radiological programs 

and nuclear weapons research. 

• According to translated Iraqi documents—specifi cally a 2002 memo from Jabouri—a neutron 

generator was used in his laboratory in several postgraduate nuclear activation projects. The projects 

included radiation effects on materials, development of control systems, design of a rotating target, 

design of a magnetic analyzer, and design of an ion 

source. 

• The IAEC/Physical Research and Materials 

Directorate/Nuclear Applications Section carried 

out various research activities using a neutron generator and related technologies. ISG has not been 

able to identify any neutron generator activities 

by this organization related to a nuclear weapons 

program. 

University Programs

Universities played a supporting role to preserve 

Iraq’s nuclear knowledge base. While ISG has found 

no information that universities supported any pursuit 

of nuclear weapons, ISG did fi nd that universities 

offered a haven for some former PC-3 personnel and 

dual-use equipment after Operation Desert Storm and 

were being reestablished as a source of knowledgeable support for the IAEC and MIC after 1999.

ISG found that Iraqi educational institutions 

accepted equipment salvaged from the pre-1991 

program, but we are unable to show that universities 

played a role in any renewed Iraqi nuclear weapons effort. The following are examples of instances 

where Iraqi institutions received equipment from the 

former nuclear weapons program: 

• Tuwaitha. Iraq admitted that educational institutions that received equipment from Tuwaitha 

for storage and/or incorporation include Teachers Training Institute, Institute of Technology in 

Zaafaraniya (student dormitories in Al-Waziriya), 

University of Baghdad (dormitories in Jadiriah), 

and the College of Physical Education. 

• Tarmiya. Iraq also declared that educational institutions that received equipment from Tarmiya—

such as general laboratory devises and spare 

vacuum system parts—for storage and/or incorporation include University of Mustansiriya, University of Baghdad (College of Science), Saddam 

University (College of Science), and the Institute of 

Technology (Department of Chemical Industries). 

• Al Atheer. The Al Karama secondary school and 

Al-Anwar primary school received equipment 

evacuated from Al Atheer around February 1991, 

according to Iraq’s declarations. Similarly, some 

equipment not associated with any NPT violation was transferred to Saddam University and 

the University of Technology. According to Iraq’s 

declarations, the Babil University also received an 

unidentifi ed number of boxes of unidentifi ed equipment—allegedly most of which contained damaged 

and mixed components from the former nuclear 

weapons program at al Atheer. 
71

Nuclear

• Rashdiya. The University of Baghdad also received 

equipment and materials from the former centrifuge 

program.

In the early 1990s Iraqi nuclear program personnel found temporary homes in educational institutions—moves that occasionally involved shifting 

of groups of scientists from the former weapons 

program. University programs offered a means to 

preserve the existing knowledge base by providing 

an opportunity for former PC-3 personnel to pass on 

their basic, fundamental knowledge to new generations of scientists.

• According to one high-level scientist, workers at 

PC-3 sites were instructed to remove materials, 

equipment, and documents from their workplace 

prior to the UN inspections in May 1991. The laboratory from the Tarmiya EMIS uranium enrichment 

site was used to outfi t a laboratory at the University 

of Baghdad College of Education (Adhamiya district) where research on Freeman ion sources was 

continued. Other researchers at Tarmiya also built 

a vacuum system laboratory at Baghdad University 

(Jadriya district). 

• Another high-level scientist confi rmed that staff 

from PC-3 projects at Tuwaitha received the same 

instructions. As a result, Dr. Qais Abdul Hamin 

established Electronics Laboratories and Departments for Power Electronics, Instrumentation, and 

Distribution Control at the Technical University 

in Baghdad with equipment and staff from PC-3. 

A laboratory was established at the University of 

Baghdad led by Dr. Hamid Al Mundiri and staffed 

by PC-3 materials scientists. A Surface Inspection 

and Measurement Laboratory was established at the 

University of Baghdad led by Dr. Nabil Ramu.

• Documentary information collected by ISG indicates that Dr. Saadi Ja’far Hasan left Al Atheer in 

June 1991 and transferred equipment to Saddam 

University. Ja’far taught atomic physics, nuclear 

physics, nuclear spectroscopy, and advanced physics. The equipment was used to establish an atomic 

physics lab for second year students, a preliminary 

lab for undergraduates/third-year students, and a 

more advanced lab for fourth-year students.

Through the 1990s, educational institutions shared 

some personnel with MIC and the IAEC—activities that seem to be motivated most by the need 

for former weapons program offi cials to fi nd new 

employment, but steps that inherently preserved 

access to scientifi c knowledge and capabilities from 

the pre-1991 program. Offi cials have indicated that 

former PC-3 scientists were unhappy with MIC 

employment, dissatisfi ed with IAEC pay, and used 

the universities as a way to supplement pay and create 

more interest in their work.

• According to Huwaysh, most PC-3 personnel were 

kept in the MIC after 1991. However, some nuclear 

physicists went to the universities because there 

was no nuclear work for them in the MIC.

• Al-Janabi stated that “most IAEC researchers also 

taught at universities or advised doctoral students, 

both for scientifi c and fi nancial reasons.” However, 

there was no placement program to place IAEC 

scientists into university positions. Each scientist 

had to fi nd a university position on his own and 

was permitted to work only one day a week at the 

university. Al-Janabi also stated that the IAEC 

provided approximately one million dinars per year 

to universities for research and that, during the 

universities’ summer break, many faculty members 

worked at the IAEC or the MIC to make additional 

money. 

• According to Dr. Nafi ‘Abd Al-Latif Tilfah, Dean 

of Baghdad University’s Institute for Laser and 

Plasma Studies, post-1991 laser research was 

conducted at the Baghdad University Institute for 

Laser and Plasma Studies, the Baghdad University 

of Technology, Mustansiriyah University, and the 

al-Razi Company. While most of the research was 

paid for by the universities and the Ministry of 

Higher Education, the Al-Razi Company—which 

was subordinate to the MIC— also fi nanced some 

postgraduate research projects. A number of key 

scientists from the pre-1991 laser uranium enrichment effort—including the head of that effort, Dr. 

Faleh Hamza—worked at Al-Razi after the 1991 

war.
72

Reporting indicates the relationship between the 

universities and the MIC and IAEC was relatively 

ad hoc until the late 1990s, until efforts were made 

to send MIC and IAEC projects to the universities.

With Saddam’s support, MIC and IAEC dramatically 

increased joint university activities. The infl ux of 

funds would not only bolster a deteriorating university system but would also tend to focus university 

programs on MIC and IAEC issues. The result would 

be a new generation of scientists with a focus and 

understanding of MIC and IAEC pursuits. 

• According to Huwaysh, cooperation between the 

MIC and Iraqi universities was largely a formality prior to 1999. Huwaysh claims that in 1999, he 

called a meeting of all Iraqi university heads to discuss the loss of professors to higher-paying industry 

jobs, which was crippling the university system. As 

a result of the meeting, he approved all professors 

to perform research for up to four MIC contracts 

each. Saddam liked his initiative so much that in 

late 1999 he ordered each of the ministries, including the IAEC, to implement a similar program of 

sending research projects to the universities. As a 

result, MIC-sponsored research projects in Iraqi 

universities jumped from approximately 40 in 1997 

to approximately 3,200 in 2002. 

• According to Iraqi declarations, the Institute for 

Training and Employee Development in the IAEC’s 

Scientifi c Policies and Programs Department is 

described as providing a variety of coordination 

activities with universities. This includes both the 

opportunities for scientists to take advantage of 

university activities as well as the opportunity for 

university personnel to support IAEC facilities.

The historical relationship between former PC-3 

scientists and Iraqi universities suggests that some 

nuclear-weapons-related research could have taken 

place within the universities, although ISG has 

uncovered no direct information that such work was 

under way. A number of highly placed individuals 

in the former Regime have stated that no nuclearweapons-related research took place at universities. 

However, some research activities display obvious 

dual-use application to nuclear weapons development. 

• Laser Research. Baghdad University’s Institute for 

Laser and Plasma Studies researched and developed many types of lasers, including Copper-Vapor 

Lasers (CVL) as recently as 2002. This research 

was done in conjunction with al-Razi, with the 

stated purpose of research and development in laser 

targeting systems and directed energy weapons. 

CVL technology is relevant to Atomic Vapor Laser 

Isotope Separation (AVLIS) as well as many civil 

applications, and at least one of the researchers 

involved in this project was Dr. Faleh Hamza. ISG 

believes that this work does not indicate a reconstitution of a laser isotope separation program but 

offers an opportunity to preserve CVL knowledge 

and capabilities that could support future reconstitution. ISG has also uncovered reporting that indicates there was a prohibition of continuing nuclear 

weapons work including laser isotope separation.

• Tarmiya Equipment. ISG interviews of a highlevel Iraqi offi cial indicate that equipment from the 

PC-3 EMIS facility at Tarmiya was moved to Baghdad University after the 1991 war and prior to the 

start of intrusive inspections. At the university, studies reportedly were done in Freeman ion sources, 

and the Tarmiya employees built a vacuum system 

at the university. This work—while relevant to 

EMIS technologies—does not indicate a reconstitution of such a program, but offers an opportunity to 

preserve knowledge and capabilities that could have 

supported future reconstitution. 

• Other Examples. A group of PC-3 materials scientists set up and staffed a laboratory at the University of Baghdad with equipment from Group 2FE. 

The laboratory was led by Dr. Hamid Al Mundiri. 

A surface inspection and measurement laboratory 

was also set up at the University of Baghdad and 

was led by Dr. Nabil Ramu. This laboratory later 

worked on stealth technology. Alternately, the head 

of PC-3 Group 2E attempted to set up a programmable logic control laboratory at the technical 

University of Baghdad, but the university refused 

to accept the laboratory because of the risk of 

being discovered by IAEA inspectors. All of these 

examples represent maintenance of knowledge and 

capabilities, but ISG has found no evidence that the 

laboratories continued work in support of a nuclear 

weapons program after 1991.
73

Nuclear

Hidden Enrichment Technology 

Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, two scientists from 

Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program have 

emerged to provide ISG with uranium enrichment 

technology and components, which they kept hidden 

from inspectors. In August 2003, a former EMIS scientist told ISG during an interview that he had taken 

material and equipment that was related to EMIS 

and hid them in various places near his home in the 

1990s. The scientist had not been specifi cally told to 

do this but believed his supervisors were cognizant of 

his actions. He chose items to hide that could be used 

in future reconstitution of the EMIS program. The 

scientist turned over to the Coalition a broad range of 

items that had been withheld from the UN inspectors, 

including technical reports on EMIS, a collection of 

foreign EMIS-related patents, a mass spectrometer, 

blocks of high-purity graphite, high-purity tantalum 

shielding sheets, and an indigenously designed collector piece from inside the EMIS machine. Some of 

these items are shown in Figure 34. 

The former head of Iraq’s pre-1991 centrifuge 

program also retained prohibited documents and 

components in apparent violation of the Regime’s 

directives. Though this activity was isolated, it also 

had the potential to contribute to a possible restart of 

Iraq’s uranium enrichment programs. 

• In mid-2003, Dr. Mahdi Shakar Ghali Al ‘Ubaydi 

provided Coalition forces with centrifuge components and a complete set of workable centrifuge 

blueprints, which he, reportedly, had hidden at his 

home for the purpose of reconstituting the centrifuge enrichment program after sanctions were 

lifted. 

• Al ‘Ubaydi reportedly hid these items in 1991, a 

move approved later that year by Husayn Kamil—

Saddam’s son-in-law and former head of Iraq’s 

WMD programs. Qusay reportedly confi rmed the 

order in 1992, but al ‘Al ‘Ubaydi had not been contacted since. ISG is not able to show that the Iraqi 

Government continued to be aware of Al ‘Ubaydi’s 

concealment activities or otherwise planned to use 

them as part of a plan to reconstitute the centrifuge 

program. 

• According to a former PC-3 nuclear design scientist, he was surprised when he learned that Al 

‘Ubaydi had retained centrifuge program documents in his home. The scientist was very skeptical that orders were given to retain the documents 

and material associated with the former centrifuge 

program. 

• Former Presidential Scientifi c Advisor Amir 

Hamudi Hasan al-Sadi stated that any Iraqi scientists that kept nuclear related material at their 

homes were acting on their own. 
74

Figure 34. Items stored at former EMIS scientist’s 

home—high-purity tantalum sheets (left), technical 

papers (center), and mass spectrometer (right).
75

Nuclear

Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha 

Nuclear Research Center

Scope

This report presents the fi ndings of an Iraq Survey 

Group (ISG) survey mission between 20-22 November 2003, designed to clear all buildings at the 

Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex prior to their use by 

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) personnel. The survey investigated the buildings’ probable 

research functionality, looked for any nuclear relevant 

or UN-labelled equipment, exploited documentation/

electronic media, and determined the buildings physical status. The mission was one of the larger activities undertaken by ISG and the largest undertaken by 

ISG’s nuclear team. This site was the most important 

to Iraq’s nuclear research program and was one of 

hundreds of sites examined by ISG. The comments 

cited under the Team sections are from team notes 

taken on site and should not be considered authoritative, but indicative of the type of information 

collected.

Summary

• The status of all buildings and structures at the 

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, known at 22 

November 2003, has been determined (see Conclusions and Annex B).

• Certain structures pose hazards from a radiological and unexploded ordnance point of view. These 

structures were not entered, and the precise hazards 

were not determined (see Annex D).

• A quantity of UN-labeled equipment was identifi ed as well as other dual-use equipment including 

Anderson Samplers (see Results section and Annex 

E).

• Some 66 boxes of documentation and a large 

quantity of electronic media were collected and 

subsequently handed over to ISG for translation and 

exploitation (see Main Survey Procedure section 

and Results).

• The mission completed its objectives and at present ISG has no plans for further exploitation at the 

complex. However, it is possible that, if further 

information comes to light, ISG may need to revisit 

Tuwaitha.

Introduction

Tuwaitha is located on the east bank of the Tigris 

River, 18 kilometers southeast of Baghdad, 2 kilometers southwest of Zaafaraniyah, and approximately 1 

kilometer west- southwest from a two-lane improved 

highway. The facility is protected by large berms that 

surround and divide it into four distinct areas: the 

former Soviet Reactor Complex and Administration/

The Agricultural and Biological Research Center 

(TABRC) area in the northern quadrant, the former 

French Reactor Complex area in the eastern quadrant, 

the Research and Development area in the western 

quadrant, and the former Italian Laboratory area 

in the southern quadrant. For the purposes of this 

survey, the area within the berms was divided into 

fi ve zones, A to E; the area immediately outside the 

berms was zone F; and the wider area surrounding the 

complex was zone G. A workshop facility near the 

site entrance was zone H, (see Figure 36).

ISG representatives were asked to produce a series of 

maps from imagery to support the mission as there 

had been a number of differing building numbering schemes; these were rationalized into the existing building numbering system used as a reference 

standard for the mission. The comprehensive nature 

of the products assisted greatly in accomplishing the 

mission.

The mission was conducted in a number of stages. 

Initially, a series of consultative meetings were 

held. These accumulated available knowledge of 

the Tuwaitha site. They were followed by a two-day 

video reconnaissance (VR) of the site with the aims of 

identifying any unknown hazards and to assist in the 

planning of a fi nal document exploitation (DOCEX) 

mission as well as the main survey (MS) . 

The initial stage of the main mission was also 

assisted by a meeting with Black List #99, Dr. Fadil 

Muslim Abd Al-Janabi, current head of the Iraqi 

Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), which had its 
76

headquarters at Tuwaitha. Dr. Fadil was asked about 

the location and functionality of various assets at 

Tuwaitha, and his information was assimilated into 

the list of targeted buildings for Tuwaitha. He was 

also asked, and he agreed, to accompany the author to 

the Tuwaitha site and provide information that was of 

signifi cant assistance to the planning of the mission.

Prior to the VR, a target list of buildings was compiled, and those facilities (surface and subsurface), 

where it was safe to do so, were visited during the 

VR. The fi nalized target list was used as a database to 

record the mission progress.

The video reconnaissance (VR) of a number of buildings at the site was undertaken on 5-6 November 

2003 using four multidisciplinary teams to cover the 

site quickly on a zone-by-zone basis. Analysis of the 

videotapes and commentary produced is included 

at Annex C, which was instrumental in the detailed 

planning of the main mission.

During the VR, an optical spectrometer and Andersen 

samplers were identifi ed, and a one-day mission was 

mounted to recover that equipment and to carry out 

a DOCEX on three target buildings on 11 November 

2003. The one-day mission also provided the facility 

to test some of the procedures planned for the main 

survey. Following analysis of the VR results, the 

buildings’ target list was revised, and relevant discipline subject matter experts (SMEs) lead teams were 

tasked to review those buildings in the main survey 

(MS).

The MS was conducted by moving 61 ISG personnel, 

SMEs, and force protection staff to create 5 teams 

with delegated responsibility for a set of buildings. 

The teams lived on site for 3 days in order to avoid 

force protection risks of daily travel.

The teams were tasked to pretriage any documents 

in their buildings and the team leaders were asked to 

sign preprinted sheets to confi rm the status of each 

building for ISG purposes. Over the 3 days of the 

MS duration, an up-to-date list of building status 

was compiled, which is presented as Annex D to this 

document.

Factors Affecting the Survey

 All buildings identifi ed at the Tuwaitha complex 

whose status was uncertain were included in the 

target list as pending survey. Buildings that were 

hazardous in respect of their structural status from 

bomb damage, radiological, or other reasons were not 

entered and were marked as a hazard on the target list. 

Areas or underground facilities (UGFs) fl ooded with 

water possibly contaminated with coolant from the 

damaged reactors were also not visited. Where possible, visual inspection was made using a video camera. 

Sealed containers were examined by drilling small 

holes and inserting optical fi ber-viewing aids into the 

container to examine the contents and, if necessary, 

the provision of larger holes to enable SME access.

Figure 36. Tuwaitha Complex showing survey zones.
77

Nuclear

Main Survey Procedure

DOCEX Procedures for Combined 

Media-Processing Center, Baghdad (CMPC-B)

It was important to use the limited linguist resource 

effectively in the triage of documents and to minimise 

the duration of this process. Consequently, a new 

list of mission-relevant keywords was produced and 

procedures introduced to locate precisely any media 

identifi ed as sensitive. The teams were told to collect 

any form of electronic media and personnel fi les if 

seen. Blueprints and management diagrams were also 

targeted.

Mission planning allowed one CMPC batch number 

per building; document boxes were identifi ed by: 

batch number, building number, and serial number of 

box. Separators were used to link documents to room 

numbers. The boxes were assigned a starting batch 

number of 3326 – 2, which would increment with 

building number so, for example, the Nth building 

would be 3326 – (N + 1).

A US Army Major was given the responsibility of 

monitoring and, if necessary, driving the DOCEX part 

of the mission. A US Air force LTC was asked to run 

the Command Post (CP) and to issue building targets 

to the teams as required.

The mission was conducted by fi elding fi ve survey 

teams, all of which were led by a nuclear technology discipline SME. Four of the teams contained 

a linguist, a second discipline SME, a document 

gatherer, and a force protection person. On arrival on 

site, each of the teams was allocated a large DOCEX 

task and a caution task. Following the clearing of 

those buildings, the teams were allocated buildings on 

a team-availability basis designed to work around the 

outstanding buildings of the Tuwaitha inner zones on 

a clockwise basis. The mission was controlled via the 

CP and the target list updated as the building status 

survey proceeded. A mission log of all signifi cant 

events was maintained by the CP.

Four teams were deployed in zones A to E; a fi fth 

team, led by the Author, surveyed zones F, G, and H 

with the aim of dealing with the more diffi cult building targets, until such time as it could be supported by 

other teams on an availability basis.

Using the given defi nitions (found in Annex A), 

building status was updated from pending or caution 

to either clear or triaged, and the presence of any mission-relevant equipment similarly recorded.

Results

It is quite possible that some sensitive information 

will be forthcoming once all exploitation is completed. However, the primary results of the mission 

are:

• Some 66 boxes of documentation and a quantity of 

electronic media were found, which were handed 

over to CMPC-B for exploitation post mission. 

• Three Andersen Sampler bases and two tops were 

recovered.

• A quantity of UN-labeled equipment was identifi ed. 

The information obtained was included in and used 

to update the “Summary of Known UN Tagged 

Equipment” presented at Annex E.

• All personnel completed the mission safely and free 

from any radiological contamination.

[ISG Note: Further exploitation produced no additional information to contradict these results.]

Discussion

A group of unknown Iraqis were spotted by Team 

Bravo loading documents and equipment onto a 

vehicle on the morning of 22 November. Detail is provided under Team Bravo comments in Annex B. 

The initial planning commenced with a list of 

approximately 206 structures; 58 of these had been 

previously surveyed and cleared by ISG video reconnaissance and/or previous missions. Furthermore, 28 

structures had been previously destroyed, 8 deemed 

hazardous, and a number were not applicable for 

exploitation, such as air defense sites, and areas 

outside the Tuwaitha complex region. As such, 93 

structures remained pending for exploitation. During 
78

the main mission, these 93 structures were surveyed. 

ISG members also returned to a number of previously 

surveyed and unidentifi ed structures. In all, the main 

three-day mission surveyed 106 structures, all but two 

were certifi ed as either clear or triaged.

The buildings that were not cleared were the library 

(Building 42) and the fi re station (Building 151). In 

the case of the former, the quantity of documents is 

vast, and all survey teams as they completed their 

normal task list, were dispatched to the library to 

facilitate the process. The teams were specifi cally 

instructed to target Ph.D. theses and to search for 

unusual document positioning or storage. Using this 

process, a best endeavors attempt was made to clear 

the library.

Building 151 is the fi re station, which is operational. 

During the VR, a room full of binders was identifi ed, 

and a team was dispatched on the last day of the MS 

to triage the binders. Initially, there was some diffi culty in identifying the location of the room, and 

the fi re station personnel denied the existence of any 

such room. The team withdrew to check their facts 

and then returned and identifi ed the room, which was 

secured by a locked glass paneled door. Staff claimed 

that the material was commercial, belonged to the 

MOST, and that they did not have a key. They offered 

to contact MOST to ask for a representative to appear 

and give access.

After some discussion it was decided to approach 

MOST via ISG in order to gain access to the room as 

the team had no wish to force entry to an operational 

facility or indeed to damage one of the few undamaged buildings at Tuwaitha. 

Postmission Activity

A mission was set up to go to Tuwaitha on 2 December 2003 with the aim of gaining access to the room 

of documents (Building 151). The party arrived 

at approximately 0815 and asked for MOST to be 

contacted for a keyholder to attend and open the door. 

After some discussion it was agreed to gain access 

to the room, and a full triage of the documents was 

undertaken. Prior to entry, a series of photographs 

was taken to verify the status of the room, and this 

was repeated after the door was secured to demonstrate that no damage had been caused to the room or 

its fi ttings.

The records were drawings relating to the Tammuz 

reactor with little more recent than 1988. Nothing of 

signifi cance to ISG was found, although a few documents were taken for further exploitation.

Another locked room containing documents was 

also entered and a full triage undertaken, using the 

procedures mentioned above. Again, nothing of 

signifi cance to ISG was found although a few documents were taken for further exploitation. In view of 

the physical condition of the documents, covered with 

dust and vermin droppings, it was evident that the 

documents had been undisturbed for some time and 

no attempt had been made to introduce other documents into their content. Building 151 complex was 

considered clear.

Postmission action was also required on a number of 

issues, specifi cally:

• UN-labeled equipment.

• Unidentifi ed equipment.

• Testing of samples collected.

• Use of the iridium pellets.

• Document referencing “heavy water.”

Note: These issues have since been resolved and 

found to be of no concern.

In view of the physical hazards at the Tuwaitha site, 

the planning detail, terminology, and methodology 

required to minimize risk to ISG personnel may be 

used as a template for future ISG missions to complexes of this nature.

The mission has demonstrated that ISG is capable 

of planning and undertaking the most complex of 

technical missions. The ability to mount a mission of 

this nature in such a hazardous area as the Tuwaitha 

Nuclear complex, without casualties and with the 

achievement demonstrated, is seen as a contribution 

to ISG’s reputation.
79

Nuclear

Conclusions

Following the three-day mission to Tuwaitha and a 

postmission visit on 2 December, the status of all 

buildings and structures known on 22 November 

2003 has been determined, and it is suggested that the 

complex may be accepted as clear on the basis of best 

endeavours.

Best endeavours implies the best that could be 

achieved with available resources and equipment. The 

Tuwaitha site occupies some 20 km2, and there are 

plenty of places; e.g., under radioactive water in basements or damaged buildings where documents, electronic media, or equipment could be hidden by those 

determined and where some risk to personnel would 

be involved in order to retrieve them. Without sound 

supporting HUMINT, missions surveying hazardous 

locations would be speculative and diffi cult to justify.

Future Work

This mission has attempted to incorporate HUMINT 

support suggesting the presence of hidden documents 

and equipment. The strongest hints were regarding 

a Building 6, which has not been found, and in the 

basement of Building 42/43, which has been burned. 

If additional HUMINT is forthcoming, then a ground 

radar survey may be appropriate for the future or the 

use of other high-tech equipment in order to examine 

all the fl ooded basements and water tanks.
80

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81

Nuclear

Annex A

Defi nitions Used by Teams During Survey

Clear Room has been inspected, is empty of mission-relevant items, and is certifi ed by the team leader 

as ready for hand back to Ministry of Science and Technology. The same category may be used to 

categorize a building.

Triaged Room has been triaged (documents, or a representative sample of documents in the room has been 

examined) and is certifi ed by the Team Leader as ready for hand back to the Ministry of Science and 

Technology. The same category may be used to categorize a building.

IOIC Item(s) of interest identifi ed or possible controlled items(s) (an item that is controlled under Export 

regulations should have been declared or is a potential sanctions breach). Action: still photos taken, 

Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) geocoords, if possible; relevant ISG Dept. informed; and 

appropriate action initiated. Details to be entered in comments column.

IOIL Item(s) containing a UN or UNSCOM label. Action: still photos taken; use of macro setting to 

ensure clarity of label details; MGRS geocoords, if possible; relevant ISG Department informed; 

and appropriate action initiated. Details to be entered in comments column.

IOIU Item or items not identifi ed. Action: still photos taken, MGRS geocoords if possible, ISG informed, 

details fed back to ISG for identifi cation by other SMEs, and appropriate action initiated. Details to 

be entered in comments column.

IC Items inconsistent with the advertised functionality of the Department or room. Action: still photos 

taken; MGRS geocoords, if possible; relevant ISG Department informed; and appropriate action 

initiated. Details to be entered in comments column.

Hazard Hazard found in room; e.g., source or chem. 

Action Team extracted without further action. Team checked for possible contamination or injury. Details 

of hazard to be entered in comments column together with note of action taken.

Caution Following the offer and availability of a specialist team from ISG, the word caution was introduced 

to defi ne a building where it was decided as safe for an exploitation team to enter, provided they 

were escorted by ISG team.
82

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83

Nuclear

Annex B

Team Results

Team Alpha Results/Comments

Building 37

Room 1: Contained motor components and fl anges, 

probably water pumps. Two x Bergeron from Paris 

UNELEC FA225M4 37kW 50 HP, 4 x smaller water 

pumps F059675 Vitesse 1485 tpm, Nauteur Mano 

31m, Puissance 132 kW. Two x smaller cranes with 

2,500-kg capacity, water demineralizer T43401 

Bignier Schmidt Laurent (French), made for Technicatome 710027.2 1978.

Figure 37. Building 37, associated mesh storage area 

and equipment.
84

Figure 38. Equipment contained in mesh storage area 

associated with Building 37.

Room 3: Storage of equipment probably for the 

Tammuz reactors, secondary equipment. Two x heat 

exchanges (180 sq m, 1986) of Russian heat exchangers, water demineralizer 1978, Bignier Schmidt Laurent (French), 4 x large (1.25m diameter, 8 m long) 

distillation columns. Two x columns (0.7-m diameter, 

8 m long). Crate of unknown items received from 

Technicatome; miscellaneous valves and fi ttings to 

support these columns.

Room 4: Five x B-9 and B-10 permeators.

Room 6: Cable and electric diagrams for Tammuz 1 

and 2 reactors.

Building 163, Connex OUTSIDE Building 37

Contained digital-processing equipment, scalers, multiscalers, integrators, I/O analogue boards, computer 

data racks, 40-channel high-voltage system. Vacuum 

pumps; Turbo Vac 1500 from Leybold and Heraeus, 

Figure 39.

Building 53

Is very close to Building 52 and may be included in 

that complex. The building is a multifunctional building in terms of chemical and biological functionality 

and was the subject of earlier reporting by CBIST. 
85

Nuclear

Figure 39. Container adjacent to Building 37 and 

sample of contents.

Figure 40. Building 53 laboratory-scale process.
86

Figure 41. Spray dryer and other process equipment in 

Building 53.

Figure 42. Tuwaitha Complex—Zone A (status of buildings before the

20-22 November 2003 survey mission).
87

Nuclear

Room 1: Chemical-processing pilot plant laboratory, confi gured for water fi ltration; plant for clove 

oil production, well water distillation, and softening 

of fi ltered water, distillation of boiler water, and a 

process for Lipton wax. A substitute, formula, and 

picture of layout obtained. A production scheme 

also existed for KCl, NaOH, NaCl and ZnO. Seven 

items of UN-labeled equipment (Annex E). Other 

similar equipment and other less sophisticated equipment were present, which did not have labels. It was 

noticed that certain equipment was missing from the 

chemical processes mentioned above.

Room 9: Laboratory-scale process for producing new 

chemical products and product purity testing.

Room 15: Directors offi ce (Mawan Fuad Aziz) had 

iridium pellets in varying sizes and in vials scattered 

over his desk. There is postmission speculation over 

the use of these pellets.

Building 59: Identifi ed as health physics lab but also 

contained biological and chemical laboratories. 

Rooms 1, 2, 29-45: Were health physics, remainder 

were bio/chem related. Also pilot plant for reverse 

osmosis system (RO). Some bioresearch was marine 

oriented.

Room 1: Was where liquid scintillation counter 

should have been (sampling trays seen); counter had 

been moved into the bunker next door. Contained 

smallscale UNSCOM- labeled powder dispenser, 

model 3433, Annex E.

Room 5, 22 and 29: Rooms for RO.

Room 9: Miscellaneous laboratory-scale bio-related 

equipment, nutrient media, and chemicals.

Room 15 and 17: Chem/bio laboratories, multiple 

chemicals all over the fl oor, photos of scene and listings from cabinets taken.

Room 14: Bacteriology laboratory. Life studies of 

bio in Tigris River, Legionella and Bacillus Subtillis. 

Photo reference DSCO1593.

Room 23: Probable autoclave Hirayama HA30 picture.

Room 32: Soil-sampling laboratory. Some unidentifi ed instrumentation.

Photo references DSC01603 - DSC01631 and DSCO 

1565 – 1593 1594 to 1600. Some laboratories had 

been looted, burned, fl ooded, and doors damaged.

Building 119

Personnel bunker: Storing liquid scintillation counter, 

and supporting chemicals. Also contained 0.5-dia x-1-

m furnace (photo references DSCO 1557 and DSCO 

1554–1563).

Building 167 

Computer-processing center, programs, support 

systems. No equipment, computer media (exploited), 

Open-source literature on rail gun.

Side Building (167/1) 

Room 1 and 2: Nondestructive test center, X-ray, 

Dye Penetrant, and Magafl ux penetrant. 

Room 3: Former photography development laboratory at the rear.

Photo references for above DSCO 1534 – DSCO 

1538. Signifi cant quantity of documents collected in 

DOCEX of 11 November 2003.

Building 181

Functionality does not match given description. 

Building was fi tted as a branch of the Al Rashid bank 

(letter heads). Years of branch records going back to 

1998.

Team Bravo Results/Comments

Building 7

Training building.

Rooms 1–31: Recovered electronic media. Documents relevant to keyword list were taken for exploitation. Some rooms had been systematically burned; 

evidence of destruction of large quantity of 
88

documents. Signifi cant numbers of folders were seen 

containing receipts for correspondence. Many ledger 

books, duty rosters. Nothing relevant to ISG identifi ed 

at this time.

Building 3 

Medical reception/health physics.

Room 24: Cryostat examined, cryostat serial number 

2130, type CPVDS 30 – 20190 photo reference 

DSCN 0437. Protective clothing and decontaminant 

aerosol seen. 

Rooms 1 – 30: Documents taken for exploitation 

from rooms 3, 17, and 30.

Building 82 

Electronic Design Center. Computer media and a 

box of documents collected for future exploitation. 

Extensive fi re damage on fi rst fl oor; cylinder identifi ed—possible missile transportation canister. Photographs DSCN 0449 and DSCN 0450.

Building 60 

Pharmaceutical medical kit and Diagnostic Center. 

Computer media recovered throughout the building, 

no documents taken for triage. Burst plasma bags and 

other items consistent with building function. Chemicals on the fl oor.

Building 42/43 

Technical library and conference facility. Extensive 

range of Ph.D. theses located in basement and fi rst 

fl oor. Building contained in basement a publication 

production and photographic capability. One box 

of documents retrieved and a substantial quantity of 

electronic media, including fl oppy disk, VHS media, 

tape cassettes, and photographic negatives recovered 

from basement, for exploitation.

Iraqi Document Collection:

At 1225 on 22 November, Team Bravo noticed 15 

Iraqis removing documents and boxes from building 

82. Team Bravo challenged the Iraqis, and their 

linguist screened the documents and determined then 

to be professional and scientifi c publications that were 

being moved to another building within Tuwaitha for 

protection. Dr. Saleh Ahmed Hassan was leading this 

effort for MOST. Building 82 had previously been 

exploited and cleared by Team Bravo. At the request 

of the lead SME, Team Bravo also obtained the names 

of all the Iraqis and the name of the person to whom 

they reported in MOST.

Team Charlie Results/Comments

Connex Adjacent to Building 182 

Contained 2 British Aircraft Corporation infrared 

laser systems and other related items. Some documents taken for exploitation.

Building 54 

Contained growth media, corn meal, agar, and date 

syrup. Provided access to Building 171 UGF. This 

building (54) and underground complex (171) were 

the subject of CBIST survey. UN-labeled bioreactors 

(4) were identifi ed (Annex E) and a quantity of mission-relevant documents taken for exploitation.

Building 103 

Underground water tank, no large exposed entrances. 

NSTR without diving capability.

Building 75 

Environmental radiation monitoring. Some missionrelevant documents taken for exploitation.

Building 56 

Biological Fertilizer Plant/Quality-Control Laboratory. Blueprint of facility found, building in accordance with that document. Equipment list found, 

most of equipment missing. Some mission-relevant 

documents taken for exploitation.

Building 8 

Administration building, quantity of documents taken 

for exploitation.
89

Nuclear

Team Delta Results/Comments

Building 12

Divided through middle referred to as 12/1 and 12/2. 

Visit was carried out with security team in attendance, 

as this building was identifi ed as a CAUTION.

12/1: Neutron generator building. Offi ces upstairs; 

e.g,. health physics, radioisotope study, and fl ash Xray.

Ground fl oor contained:

Rooms 2 and 4: Dr. Jobori, head of neutron source 

projects offi ce. Offi ce contained documents pertaining to beryllium (Be) and other neutron generators. (Physics was relevant to neutron initiator for a 

WMD). 

Room 7: Contained neutron generator in pristine 

condition, covered with PVC drapes. Also glove box 

with U / Pu source.

Room 12: Chemical laboratory containing various 

acids and a cerium (Ce) source embedded in the fl oor.

12/2: Sign on outside labeling as Chemical Directorate. Rooms found relating to PCB development, fi lm 

laboratory, cryogenics; single offi ce had documents 

relating to laser research. 

Room 4: Bottle of Fomblin oil found, used for 

lubrication of centrifuge bearings, not big enough for 

a complete centrifuge enrichment farm but could be 

relevant to laboratory-scale facility.

Room 5: Medical room, contained documents relating to various pathogens documents removed for 

exploitation.

Room 6: Contained folders and binders of records 

for pharmaceutical equipment purchase/procurement. 

Sample taken for exploitation.

Building 10

Cryogenics production. Generators for nitrogen (N2

) 

and helium (He) seen, not signifi cant in themselves.

Building 43

Auditorium facility NSTR. 

During an interview with a source, there were 

indications of the presence of a large quantity of 

hidden documents in the basement of this facility. On 

inspection by members of ISG’s Nuclear team in July 

2003, it was found that the document store had been 

systematically burned.

Building 5

Contained offi ces of IAEC.

Ground fl oor, mostly burned, could have started in 

small conference room. Magnetic media taken but no 

exploitable documents recovered.

Room 37 basement: Document storage for IAEC. 

Documents found from 2002 dealing with UNSCOM 

and IAEA inspections; documents gathered and submitted for exploitation.

Building 4 

Document storage and reactor operations building, 

also contained a heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) system. 

Room 4: Interesting fi nd made of a document referencing “heavy water.” This document was among 

other documents dealing with water for HVAC 

applications. Specifi c checks on translation are being 

made to clarify this reference in view of its possible 

relevance to a WMD program.

Room 41: Electronics repair offi ce, document found 

relating to thyristors; document taken for exploitation. Thyristors are relevant to nuclear device trigger 

systems.

Team Golf Results/Comments

Team Golf, the fi fth team, was responsible for visiting 

all the target structures outside the berms in zones 

Foxtrot, Golf, and Hotel. During the 3 days of the 

mission, the team visited 69 structures some not 

previously identifi ed, confi rming MGRS, where possible functionality, and ISG status relevance. With one 
90

exception, Building 151, all the sites were clear, some 

were destroyed or vandalized, some were the remains 

of air defense sites, and others were watch towers. A 

number were inhabited by squatters.

Building 134

May have been an old guard building. Building was 

wrecked, but among the rubble was found the remains 

of a water distillation set and steam generation equipment, parts of a laboratory cold chamber, the cabinet 

of an environmental chamber, and the remains of a 

centrifuge capable of more than 10,000 rpm.
91

Nuclear

Annex C 

Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled 

From Video Recce Mission 

5/6 November 2003 

Team 

Delta Tape 1

Tape

Reference

MGRS/

Room 

Number

Object Comment

01:39:19 MB 55551 

74359

Rubbish dump, with discarded scientifi c equipment including Andersen 

samplers and 3-channel analyzer. Exploit

08:42:16 MB 55512 

74351 Collection of documents. Collected on 11 November 2003. Exploit

09:34:01 MB55520 

74367 Biological fi les and documents. Collected on 11 November 2003 Exploit

11:31:00 MB 55653 

74336 Unconfi rmed Russian smoke generators?

14:55:00 MB 55545 

74016

ISO container, fertilizer and laboratory equipment. Environmental cabinet 

by Horaius, imported by Kharl Khob.

16:40:00 MB 55510 

74181 Camera Tower

17:57:00 MB 55457 

74006

With exception of Fire Station at this location associated block at the end of 

the FS and some temporary buildings containing FS stores, all other buildings at complex of Building 151 have been destroyed and are clear. NFA no 

further action required.

NFA

19:10:07 MB 55371 

73980

Ruined barrack buildings vicinity of 151, no equipment. Connect with steps, 

which lead to top of berm. AA positions.

20:39:20 MB 55467 

73920

Expended shell cases burned in a dump, adjacent water tank, and Fire station across road. Some other stores buildings at back of complex. Room 

containing fi les and neatly arranged records.

Should briefl y 

look at these 

with a linguist

30:21:00 MB 55608 

73719 Camera Tower

31:08:15 MB 55460 

73419 Camera Tower

32:14:04 MB 55429 

73420 Bomb crater, estimated 2,000 lbs Israeli.

33:05:15 MB 55438 

73358 Bomb crater

33:45:00 MB 55395 

73326 Remains of Building 140, no building remains. Bldg 140 destroyed.

35:40:00 MB 55358 

73208 Manhole and cable run, down about 6 feet.
92

Team 

Delta Tape 1 (continued)

36:28:08 MB 55299 

73129

Electricity pylon, surrounded by scrap metal and shelving adjacent to site of 

Building 140.

37:26:00 MB 55247 

73070

Metal and building rubble. Junk removed from Tuwaitha bombed building 

in 1991.

38:10:00 MB 55010 

73054 More piles of junk building rubble.

39:04:28 MB 54760 

73099 Bomb crater, another 2000, explosion caused pinnacle in the middle.

39:38:03 MB 54728 

73132 Camera Tower, identifi es boxes in junk yard.

40:35:00 MB 54865 

73413 Number of ruined probable guard shacks.

41:35:00 MB 54868 

73453 Ruined guard shack. Barrack garden.

42:40:00 MB 55155 

73566

Full face respirator. Symbol bent minaret at Mosel indicating G Bin Hyer. 

Two or three symbol of local manufacture in Mosel.

Team 

Delta Tape 2

Tape 

Reference MGRS Object Comment

00:52:13 MB 54380 

73136 Camera Tower

02:27:29 MB 54272 

73283 Possible Smoke Canisters

03:09:27 MB 54163 

73483 Camera Tower

03:48:01 MB 53981 

73832 Camera Tower

05:02:06 MB 53949 

73892 Unknown Structure

06:44:00 MB 53801 

74180 Camera Tower

08:06:29 MB 53938 

74363 Camera Tower

08:50:00 MB 54233 

74636 Camera Tower

10:25:21 MB 54301 

74931 Possible concrete tanks.
93

Nuclear

Team 

Delta Tape 2 (continued)

11:39:24 MB 54476 

74866 Camera Tower

13:07:14 MB 54522 

74793 Cluster of buildings in area of Building 115. Collected 11 November 2003. Exploit

17:06:12 MB 54527 

74770

Unused fi lter system and documents in cluster of buildings in area of Building 115. Collected 11 November 2003. Exploit

17:17:58 MB 54503 

7465?

Adjacent to health center (inside perimeter). Side road blocked with 

wrecked bus 

18:33:02 MB 54695 

74838 First of a cluster of buildings at Building 90 complex.

20:27:21 MB 54685 

74889

Outbuildings at building 90 complex showing manhole cover and highcapacity rectifi ers and document. Exploit

22:00:22 MB 54679 

74916

Part of substation complex, showing digging for looters to steal copper 

cables.

23:04:07 MB 54692 

74925

Substation control room, showing “vynconstruct” equipment. Shot of looters digging to steal cable and water system. Shot of room behind control 

room and more cable looting.

28:52:09 MB 54720 

74893

Large building at substation, small entrance and large swimming pool type 

tanks at each end (20 x 6 x 5 deep meters). Sill at Building 90 complex.

32:28:15 MB 54732 

74891

Entry to main building at Building 90 complex. Large hole going down. 

Evidence of laser, optical, and possible rail gun research. Some documents 

recovered for CMPC, some video-ed. Shot of jar containing Strontium compound.

Exploit. Nuclear 

and Chemical.

Team 

Delta Tape 3

Tape 

Reference MGRS Object Comment

MB Video of rooms in 90 complex main building. Photon optical bench Cambridge UK. Photos of laser impact on targets. Faraday cage (large).

25:07:25

31:46:24

MB 54799 

74841

Electrical control equipment presumed to have come from main building in 

90 complex. 

Another part of Alcatel equipment, presumed from main building in 90 

complex and possibly linked with previous Alcatel device. Presumed important as the equipment was sandbagged for protection.

Jobin Yvon equipment looks expensive.

Expensive looking new Australian equipment in a wooden case, GBC Scientifi c Equipment, 12 Monterey Road, Dandenong, Victoria 3175 Australia. 

Passed QA, 29 Oct 2002. Serial Number E1183, passed by “Marg.” GBC 

Integra, XL, shipped to Medical Scientifi c Corporation.

Optical spectrometer.
94

Team 

Delta Tape 4 (continued)

33:10:06 MB 54823 

74912

Entered building as continuing part of 90 complex with autoclave (large) 

and incubator/shaker with UNSCOM label B002236.

43:15:15 MB54013 

74969 Oil fi red boiler used for steam generation to power autoclave.

44:42:24 MB 54840 

75003 Camera Tower

46:14:06 MB 54820 

75017

Small building at rear of 90 complex with equipment junk inside. Adjacent container with more junk and an object, which looked like part of HT 

equipment.

More detailed 

examination

51:35:17 MB 55150 

74914 Camera Tower

52:33:27 MB 55268 

74721 New building not yet completed.

Not readable New building not yet completed.

56:24:19 MB 55293 

74244 Wrecked buildings on top of berm.

Team 

Delta Tape 4

Tape 

Reference MGRS Object Comment

02:56:15 MB 55270 

73636 View from berms over Tuwaitha complex.

05:08:28 MB 54962 

73609 View from berms over Tuwaitha complex.

01:25:15 MB 54418 

73191 View from berms over Tuwaitha complex.

03:03:18 MB 54167 

73724 View from berms over Tuwaitha complex.

07:44:14 MB 55975 

75412 Area H Trashed Workshop area.

11:06:05 MB 55949 

75488 Area H Trashed Workshop area.

13:33:29 MB 56070 

75324 Area H Trashed Workshop area.
95

Nuclear

Team 

Alpha Tape 5

Tape 

Reference

MGRS/

Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:33:19 MB 54832

74042

Building 189, underground bunker with surrounded by damage. Entrance 

located on top and descends into the bunker.

System empty 

NFA.

02:21:08 MB 54839

74060

Building 188, underground emplacement with entrance at the top. UGF 

completely empty. NFA.

03:44:13 MB 54816

74043 Water Tower. (No particular building number) NFA

04:09:08 Not provided Evaporative Cooling Tower NFA

04:45:29 MB 54789

74039 Underground structures 190 and 191. Steps going down, not explored. Better look?(NFA)

05:42:15

08:37:13

09:50:00

15:45:00

17:40:40

21:20:00

26:36:00

29:30:00

39:30:00

42:

46:40:00

48:20:00

51:30

52:13

57:22

MB 54875

74024

1021

1023

1023, 1025

1030, 60,

1003

!,

4, 5, 

2018

2006, 2002, 

2005

1001, 

3rd LHS.

Glove box

1007

Laser Laboratory

Building 12, large brick, two-story structure.

Note windows on the bottom fl oor are barred. Extensive looting throughout with rooms randomly containing what remains of original equipment, 

chemical containers and chemical waste storage, evidence of fi lm-processing operation, electrical power equipment and devices, work tables and 

work stations, laboratory glassware, some offi ce furniture, notebooks, binders and fi les strewn about, and debris. At least, room was designated as a 

Spectroscopes Laboratory.

The south end of Building 12 contained new areas under construction, 

which contained nothing.

Section of Building 12 adjacent to new construction contained much of the 

same as primary building area. 

Southwest end of Building 12 contained vacant rooms with new construction, probably never occupied. 

44:00:00 Hazard symbol on door.

Grey building to south of Building 12.

49:00:00 remote manipulator and room with PVC.

Some exploitation required.

Room 5, 2018

No exploit.

2001, 2002, 

2004

1001, laser 

laboratory

Team 

Alpha Tape 6

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:00:13 Complex of buildings number 167

00:25:11 55010 74429 Two-story brick structure, northernmost building

01:15:00 Room 4 Exploit
96

Team 

Alpha Tape 6 (continued)

03:18:00 Room 3 Exploit

05:10:00 Room 11 Exploit

Room 9

07:10:00 Room 7 Upstairs binders Exploit

07:14:00 Room 14 computer media Exploit

08:00:00 Room 15 / 16 Design of Information systems Exploit

09:25:00 Room 17

10:00:00 Room 18 computer media Exploit

Room 19

11:59:00 Room 20 Computer/Maths techniques Exploit

13:06:00 Room Technical manuals IMB token ring map of Tuwaitha taken back. Exploit

14:25:00 Eastern building of Complex Exploit

15:00:00 Western Admin Block piled high with documents. Exploit

17:35:00 Documents Exploit

18:20:00 Rabbit warren of offi ces Exploit

21:00:00 Agricultural program

21:20:00 Blueprints.

26:00:00 Papers and ledger

26:15:00 Document storage area Exploit

30:00:00 Last building of 167 Complex

30:29:00 Pieces of paper on the fl oor, torn up. Exploit

32:30:00 Organizational chart

33:42:00 Ledgers on bookcase. Exploit

35:35:00 54794 73862 Connex Container large, end of road in section E, underground storage/ 

Building 192 / 76 Exploit

36:50:01 54605 73502 Boiler House NFA

38:38:19 54527 73391 Building 72 Transformer station. Electrolyte production of H2 NFA
97

Nuclear

Team 

Alpha Tape 7

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:10:00 Area 41? 1015, 1016 & 1017.

01:21:115 54870 73969 Group of structures number 38. Exploit

01:45:16 54942 73935

02:14:00 Equipment outside.

04:10:00 54951 73928

04:45:00 Building 37 Storage Containers. Welded shut. Exploit

05:05:00 Storage containers 9 feet long.

06:00:00 54917 73896 Connex Container with soil blocking each end Open/Exploit

54930 73770 Building 40, 800 mRem/Hour. Do not enter radiation. NFA

07:17:15 Correction to count rate. 800–1,000 cpm

07:35:00 54999 73833 Underground facility Building 200. Radioactive source at far end. 800–

1,000 cpm Gamma.

08:53:00 55018 73846 Building 31 Water-cooling tower. Building destroyed. NFA

09:30:00 55228 73797 196 underground facility personnel bunker. NFA

10:16:10 55229 73780 Building 30, completely destroyed. NFA

10:41 55229 73734 Building 19, completely destroyed. NFA

11:00:00 55341 73770 Structure 170. NFA

11:37:20 55099 73809 Building 32 storage buildings. NFA

12:10:00 55239 74060 Building 168, small, with two rooms. Water fi ltration system, second room 

empty. NFA

Team 

Beta Tape 8

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:00:00 54676 

73819

Building 65 & 66 used to be one large building, behind is another building 

not on map, at end of 65. NFA

01:11:25 54657 73866 Storage Tank writing on blackboard. Building 64 Linguist

01:35:17 54656 73867 Building 64 Storage Tank writing on blackboard. Linguist
98

Team 

Beta Tape 9

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:05:00 54931 74297 Building 118 UGF NFA

03:40:08 54750 74166 Building 187 NFA

06:35:23 54692 74122 Building 14 NFA

08:57:25 54692 74189 Building 186 UGF Entrance blocked NFA

12:42:27 54661 74215 Bldg 184 NFA

15:31:28 54637 74283 Bldg not on map entrance. Above ground bunker 54639 74288, 54649 

74286, 54638 74277, 54631 74286 NFA

18:00:00 54639 74289 Liquid Scintillation analyzer 1600CA Tri-Carb

18:13:11 54638 74288 North East Corner

18:34:28 54649 74286 Corner 2

18:56:26 54638 74276 Corner 3

19:40:00 54631 74287 Corner 4

20:08:25 54795 74562 Bldg 194 is in fact not a UGF but is a huge water tank fl owing approx 3 m 

deep. NFA

22:21:19 54815 74498 Bldg 195 Cylindrical Tank. NFA

24:02:21 54638 74488 Bldg 171, both entry doors were locked but opened Exploit

30:19:08 54516 73642 Building 76 NFA

33:16:12 54530 73571 Building 71 NFA

36:11:01 54463 73590 Building 75 Exploit

37:00:00 75/1 Floppy disks some documents Exploit

38:50:00 75/2 Floppy disks some documents Exploit

39:50:00 75/3 Blueprint of building Exploit

41:42:00 75/4 Lead bricks, protecting source? And Filters? D & E

42:15:00 75/5 Empty room.

45:41:06 75/9 Few documents. Exploit

46:45:19 75/11 Few documents. Exploit

47:41:28 75/12 Few documents.

48:31:00 75/13

48:54:00 75/14

49:15:13 75/16 Upstairs, some documents, box of fl oppy disks. Exploit
99

Nuclear

Team 

Beta Tape 10

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:04:06 55201 73986 UGF Building 197, radiation from wall crack. Empty, NFA

02:04:14 55247 73892 Building 198, building empty. Empty, NFA

03:25:26 55118 73792 Building 32 Second Part, 4 trailers side by side Empty, NFA

Team 

Beta Tape 11

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:00:00 54810 74115 Building 13

01:00:12 13/1 Some documents. Exploit.

01:28:03 Device on desk ? ?

01:40:00 Some documents. SAER device. Exploit.

02:29:12 13/4 Few papers. Exploit.

03:16:07 13/5 Few papers. Personnel File, photo and disk. Exploit.

04:20:00 Steam generator–hot air . Ets LEQUEUX sa

04:45:04 13/6

05:25:00 13/7

05:54:00 Contamination Danger Notice. Drum of Ethanol. Lead bricks. Visit.

06:40:00 13/8

09:00:28 13/9

09:56:00 Barrel of Acetone.

10:46:00 13/10 Stairs down to basement of Building 13.

12:40:00 13/11 Drawing Board.

15:00:00 Heat Exchanger, Stainless Steel Tubing.

16:00:00 13/13 Mono Chloro Di Floro Methane container (Freon).

17:00:00 O/S 13 X-Ray Fluorescence Spectrometer. VF-320 Shimadzu

18:05:00 13/14

19:42:00 13/16
100

Team 

Beta Tape 11 (continued)

20:30:00 13/17

21:00:00 13/18

21:33:00 13/19

22:00:00 13/20 Oven/kiln, notebook.

23:25:00 13/21

24:47 Stairs To roof of 13.

26:00:00 Access to rest of building denied.

30:06:00 Stairs Pile of lead bricks.

31:50 Room 7 & 8

00:05:00 55118 73959 Building 24

01:45:00 24/1 upstairs Room piled full of equipment spares.

03:55:00 24/2 Some ledgers and notebooks. Exploit

04:47:00 24/3 Quantity of documents on bookshelf Exploit

05:43:00 OSIRIS Certifi cate. Exploit

06:00:00 24/4 Documents Exploit

06:30:00 24/5 Documents Exploit

07:08:00 Manufacturing Plant for X-ray Sonar High Speed Centrifuge Exploit

07:23:00 24/6 Documents Exploit

08:25:00 24/7 More documents and laboratory notebooks. Exploit

09:19:00 24/8 Documents Exploit

10:25:00 24/9 Documents Exploit

11:07:00 24/10 Documents Exploit

11:33:00 24/11 Documents Exploit

12:25:0 24/12 Empty

13:00:00 24/13

13:44:17 24/14 Quantity of Documents on fl oor and book case. Exploit

14:17:00 24/14 Closeup of bookcase and ledgers. Exploit

15:18:00 24/15

16:00:00 24/16

16:39:00 24/17 No outside door to latter. Few documents
101

Nuclear

Team 

Beta Tape 11 (continued)

17:31:00 High Voltage Trigger Type US-4

17:50:00 Farnell Stabilized Power Supply

17:59:00 24/18

19:30:00 Exit building.

Team 

Charlie Tape 12

Tape 

Reference

MGRS 

/ Room 

Number

Object Comment

00:00:00 55055 74134 Building 7

00:34:00 SE entry, documents Exploit

00:40:00 7/1 Documents Exploit

00:45:00 7/2 Burned out

00:50:00 7/3 Burned out

00:58:00 7/4 Documents Exploit

01:10:00 7/5 Documents and ledgers in bookshelf. Exploit

01:23:00 7/6 Safe, some papers on the fl oor. Exploit

01:25:00 7/7 Documents and ledgers in bookshelf, large quantity. Exploit

01:50:00 7/8 Safes and documents on fl oor.

02:14:00 7/9 Papers on the fl oor. Exploit

02:18:00 7/10 Some papers on the fl oor, binders in bookshelf Exploit

02:43:00 7/11 Papers on fl oor. Exploit

02:46:00 7/12 No documents.

7/13 Bathroom.

02:54:00 7/14 Some papers. En suite facility. Exploit

03:28:18 7/15 Some papers. Exploit

03:40:00 7/16

03:48:00 7/17 Some papers. Exploit

0404:07 7/18 Papers. Exploit

04:13:00 7/19 Some ledgers under desk. Exploit
102

Team 

Charlie Tape 12 (continued)

04:30:00 7/20 Papers on fl oor, ledgers in bookshelf. Exploit

04:58:00 7/21 Ledgers and papers on fl oor. Exploit

05:07:00 7/22 Documents on fl oor. Exploit

05:15:08 7/23 Large bookshelf full of ledgers. Exploit

05:28:00 7/24 Some ledgers behind desk. Exploit

05:35:00 7/25 Papers on fl oor. Exploit

05:48:00 7/26, 27, 28, 

29, 30 Staircase, bathroom and burned offi ces, ash from papers. Anything readable?

06:36:00 7/31 Some papers on fl oor. Exploit

7/32 & 33 Restrooms.

06:50:00 View of burned corridor, facing West.

07:00:00 One room upstairs, building services and views of roof.

07:22:24 55096 74081 Building 8

07:53:03 8/8 First room on the left, papers in entrance hall.

08:23:11 8/6 Papers on fl oor. Exploit

08:55:28 First room On LHS following Security Barrier, papers. Exploit

09:03:00 Second Papers on fl oor.

09:07:00 Third Papers on fl oor, plus fi ling cabinet with documents. Exploit

09:17:00 Fourth Papers on fl oor. Exploit

09:24:07 Fifth Papers on fl oor Exploit

09:36:00 Sixth Papers on fl oor. Exploit

09:44:00 Seventh Papers on fl oor. Exploit

09:50:00 Restrooms

09:56:00 West end of security area.

10:16:24 Papers on fl oor exploit. Exploit

10:20:00 Last room on LHS, papers on fl oor, en suite facility. Storage nook full of 

ledgers. Exploit

10:44:00 North side of hall way east end of Building 8. Exploit

11:13:21 Some papers. Exploit

11:20:03 Some papers on fl oor. Exploit

11:28:11 Some papers on fl oor. Exploit
103

Nuclear

Team 

Charlie Tape 12 (continued)

11:40:05 Large quantity of documents on fl oor. Exploit

11:57:00 Next room Quantity of documents on fl oor. Exploit

12:06:02 Filing cabinet with ledgers and documents on fl oor. Exploit

12:15:23 Wrecked copier, documents on fl oor. Exploit

12:36:08 5 First left after security barrier. Few documents. Exploit

12:43:04 4 Papers on fl oor. Exploit

12:49:00 3 Junk no papers.

12:58:28 2 Few papers. Exploit

13:10:17 Next on 

LHS Some papers. Exploit

13:28:21 Last room Documents. Exploit

13:40:00 Stairs up to 

roof Door to utility area housed in small room on roof.

14:25:00 55024 74046 Building 181 Door on north side, all doors and windows were fi tted with 

additional security bars.

15:13:00 1st on LHS Papers on fl oor. Cubicles, papers in back room. Exploit

16:05:00 2nd Papers on fl oor. Filing cabinet full of documents. Large quantity of documents in small room. Exploit

17:00:00 Views of safes, broken open and empty.

17:25:00 Building 11, exterior shot of building and associated shed and transmission 

tower. NFA

17:40:00 Small building south of Bldg 11, no papers. NFA

17:57:00 54887 74001 Building 11. Occupied by Security Guards. NFA

18:41:25 Room off room , some documents, blocked in. Exploit

18:50:00 Found AK47, called for advice.

20:00:00 Offi ce / Substation Few documents Exploit

20:35:26 Diagram Substation switching system.

21:00:00 North side of Building 11.

21:10:00 Missing East end of Building 11.

22:00:00 Stairs Leading to small storage room, with racking, no documents.

22:27:00 Exterior shots of Building 10.

22:41:11 54918 74045 MGRS of Building 10 and entry wing. Some documents. Exploit
104

Team 

Charlie Tape 12 (continued)

23:00:00 Cryogenic equipment.

25:44:11 Shot of Unit 25, liquid N2 generator.

26:10:00 Small offi ce, some documents. Exploit

26:25:00 Danger Toxic sign.

27:05:00 Shot of some instructions relating to equipment.

27:31:28 Restrooms and Room with storage of equipment.

27:40:00 Liquid helium equipment.

28:06:12 Shot of BOC TurBOCool helium Liquifi er.

28:29:22 Building 24 adjacent to OSIRAC bombed by Israeli’s

28:53:13 55115 73961 Building 24 MGRS, followed by shots of entrance and foyer.

24/1 Odd papers on fl oor Exploit?

29:49:21 Management notice in Arabic. Translate

Few binders on desks and fl oor of rooms viewed. Exploit

30:34:15 24/8 No documents.

30:50:00 24/9 Few documents.

31:22:00 1st of east 

end. Binders on fl oor. Exploit

31:33:00 2nd Some drawings. Exploit

31:48:00 Drawing of Central Workshop by Bilcon Projects, Ltd., England 0226 

71262.

32:00:00 Drawings of administration building. Exploit

32:25:00 24/25 No papers.

33:00:00 Un-num 

rooms Some binders, Arabic notes on drafting table. Exploit

33:25:00 Restrooms, followed by stairs leading down.

33:55:00 Archive of documents Vast quantity. Exploit

34:15:11 Basement facing east. Numbered pumps, electrical services and HVAC 

system.

35:41:00 Subbasement, 40 m long, fl ooded to 2 feet. Further examination?

36:38:00 Blocked off end of building, bomb damage, not entered.

37:20:00 Small building to east of 24, serious damage.

37:31:12 55150 73916 MGRS of little building behind 24. Serious bomb damage. NFA
105

Nuclear

Team 

Charlie Tape 12 (continued)

37:44:00 Elevator shaft into subbasement.

38:14:09 Spiral staircase leading down.

38:25:00 Shots of destroyed building.

39:57:00 Buildings 22 and 23. NFA

40:00:00 55123 73843 MGRS for small Building 23.

40:35:00 Both parts of Building 22

41:25:00 Shots of hot cells and remains of manipulators.

Shots of bombed out sections of Bldg 22.

Building dangerous, no further exploration.

Shot of access way between 22 and 23, is this remains of pneumatic rabbit 

system? NFA

43:00:00 55231 73853 MGRS of between Buildings 22 and 23.

44:30:00 55192 73874 Large underground basement. NW corner. Grids of all four corners.

44:40:00 55221 73892 North East Corner. NFA

44:56:04 55242 73854 South East Corner. NFA

45:05:00 55214 73839 South West Corner NFA

45:10:00 55242 73842 SW corner of building with substation station facility NFA

45:24:00 Utility/power control or supply building.

46:41:06 SE corner of building 34. NFA

49:11:04 Various 

rooms. East side of building, high indicated count rate, sacks of Portland cement.

49:58:09 Bottle of Halon 1301

50:07:0 55094 73719 Building 34, tin shed full of scrap metal, cable, etc.
106

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107

Nuclear

Annex D 

Results of Mission Survey of 

Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex

Over the Period 20-22 November 

Results of mission survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex over the period 20-22 November 2003.
108

Results of mission survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex over the period 20-22 November 2003. (continued)
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Results of mission survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex over the period 20-22 November 2003. (continued)
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Results of mission survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex over the period 20-22 November 2003. (continued)
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Results of mission survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex over the period 20-22 November 2003. (continued)
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Annex E 

Summary of Known 

UN-Tagged Equipment

UN Tag Equip Location Current 

Status Remarks

B000194* Biosafety Cabinet, 

Class II

Bldg 18 Rm 

202 Not Found

Past Use: 4 years’ research work Hydrocarbon 

degradation, Present Use: As in the past, Future 

Use: As in the past. This item not listed by 

UNSCOM 87 and not declared.

B000195* Incubator, shaker 

20L

Bldg 18 Rm 

202 Not Found

Past Use: Used for hydrocarbon degradation 

(research), Present Use: As in the past, Future 

Use: As in the past.

B000196* Incubator, shaker 

6L

Bldg 18 Corridor 1st Floor 

Rm 3

Not Found

Past Use: For Rhizobium cultivation/

production—for research, Present Use: Out of 

order, Future Use: To be repaired for use as in 

the past.

B000197* Biosafety Cabinet, 

Class II Bldg 4 Rm 120 Not Found

Past Use: Analyze production and research and 

other enzymes, Present Use: As in the past, 

Future Use: As in the past.

B000198* Incubator (tagged 

in error) Bldg 4 Rm 120 Not Found

Past Use: Enzyme production research, Present 

Use: As in the past, Future Use: As in the past. 

Tagged in error. (not a SHAKER incubator as 

reported by UNSCOM 87).

B000199* Biosafety Cabinet, 

Class II

Bldg 47 Rm 

- UNKNOWN Not Found

Past Use: Vaccine production from egg embryos, 

Present Use: As in the past, Future Use: As in 

the past.

B000200* Dryer, freeze Bldg 50 Rm 15 Not Found

Past Use: Drying of food samples, baby food etc, 

Present Use: As in the past, Future Use: As in 

the past.

B000201* Dryer, freeze 2L Bldg 60 Rm 33, 

ground fl oor Present

Past Use: Radio Pharmaceuticals freeze drying, 

Present Use: As in the past, Future Use: As in 

the past.

B000202* Dryer, freeze 2-3L Bldg 18 Rm 3 Not Found

Past Use: Rhizobium freeze-drying research, 

Present Use: As in the past, Future Use: As in the 

past. Earlier UNSCOM team stated machine not 

taggable.

B000304

Shaker, Orbital 

10L (Top Opening/

Steel)

Bldg 4 Corridor Not Found

Past Use: Rennin production from bacteria. Present Use: Rennin production from bacteria. Future 

Use: Rennin production. Origin: Purchased new, 

over 10 years ago.

B000305

Incubator, illuminated Cooled 

Orbital

Bldg 4 Corridor 

across from Rm 

106

Not Found

Past Use: Used for starter cultures for B. thereigersis and single cell protein. Present Use: 

Autrophic bacteria for metal leaching. Future 

Use: Autrophic bacteria for metal leaching.

B000306

Shaker, Incubator 

5L (Front Opening)

Bldg 50 Corridor Not Found

Past Use: Growing cultures. Present Use: Not 

working. Future Use: If spare parts become 

available, will repair. Origin: Bought new around 

1974, imported.
114

Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment (continued)

B000307

Shaker, Incubator 

0.01-0.02 m3 (Top 

Open)

Bldg 18 Rm 

208 Not Found

Use: For thermophilic bacteria, thermos table 

enzyme production, particularly heamocelluloses. Origin: Arrived 10 years ago. Note: 

Although model no. is overwritten by 101, 141 is 

seen and correct.

B000399 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000400 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000401 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000402 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000403 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000404 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000405 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000406 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B000407 Vessel, Double 

Jacketed

Biological Pesticide Building Not Found Awaiting tag sheet for further record input

B001501* Biosafety cabinet, 

Class II Bldg 4 Rm 104 Not Found 

B001502*

Sequencer, DNA 

(Electrophoresis 

Unit)

Bldg 4 Rm 108 Not Found

The unit will be used for DNA sequencing as 

soon as some ordered parts arrive. Equipment 

was imported 5 yrs ago. Never used.

B001503* Fermenter, 18 L. Bldg 4 Rm 106

Bldg 171, 

Underground 

Store, Damaged

B001504* Fermenter, 5 L. Bldg 4 Rm 106

Bldg 171, 

Underground 

Store, Damaged

*

B001505* Fermenter, 20 L. Bldg 4 Rm 106 Found 

B001506* Fermenter, 20 L. Bldg 4 Rm 106 Found 

B001507* Fermenter, control 

unit Bldg 4 Rm 106 Not Found

Consists of 5 components: peristaltic pump; 

temp control unit; Pl4 control unit; PO2 control 

unit; stirrer speed control and fl ow control

B001508* Dryer, Freeze Bldg 4, Corridor Not Found 
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Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment (continued)

B001510* Dryer, freeze 

(small) Bldg 4 Corridor Not Found 

B001511* Fermenter, 3 x 

15 L.

Bldg 18 Rm 

206 Not Found 5N control: 58244; chamber 58507(F7-100); 58508(F7-100); 58509(F7-100)

B001512*

Dryer, Lyophilizer 

(small) Stoppering 

Tray

Bldg 60 Rm 24, 

1st fl oor Not Found 

B001513* Dryer, freeze, 

bottom

Bldg 60, Rm 

24, 1st fl oor Not Found 

B001514* Dryer, freeze (1 

m3) Bldg 56 Not Found 

B002012 Shaker, Water Bath 

5L +

Bldg 4 Rm 104 

Laboratory Not Found

Past Use: Growing molds and bacteria for 

enzymes. Present Use: Not working. Future Use: 

Easily repaired when spare parts become available. Origin: Unknown.

B002103 Dryer, Spray 1.5 

cu m

Bldg 53 Chemical pilot plant In Situ

Past Use: Not used, made at Tuwaitha workshops. Present Use: not used. Future Use: 

Unknown

B002104 Centrifuge, Continuous Flow

Bldg 53 Chemical pilot plant In Situ Past Use: Date syrup purifi cation. Present Use: 

Stored. Future Use: Unknown

B002113 Shaker, Incubator

Bldg 60, Rm 

11, ground 

fl oor

Found

Past Use: Found in destroyed buildings. Present 

Use: Not in use. In the future: Shaking of liquids 

only (No microorganisms)

B002123 Dryer, Freeze Bldg 4 Not Found 

B002146 Particle Sizer, 

Aerodynamic

BLDG 59, 

RM 8 Not Found 

B002147 Dispenser, Powder, 

Small Scale Bldg 39, Rm 8 Bldg 59, Room 1

Measures concentration of particle sizes, for dust 

concentrations.

B002218

Computerized 

Central Control 

Unit for Feri

Bldg 59 Rm 5 Not Found 

B002228 Filter Press Bldg 71 Found

B002236 Incubator, Shaker Bldg 90 Not Found

B002435

Shaker, Reciprocating (Two tiered 

for 8L)

Bldg 18 First 

Floor - Microbiology (Room 

3)

Not Found

B002443

Fermenter, double 

jacketed, Steel(400 

L)

IAEC Workshop, outside 

the site

Not Found
116

Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment (continued)

B002444

Fermenter, double 

jacketed, Steel 

(150 L)

IAEC Workshop, Bldg 53 In Situ 

B002445

Fermenter, double 

jacketed, Steel 

(150 L)

IAEC Workshop, Bldg 53 In Situ 

B002446

Fermenter, double 

jacketed, Steel 

(700 L)

IAEC Workshop, Outside 

bldg 53

Inside Bldg 53 

B002493

Fermenter, double 

jacketed, Steel 

(120 L)

Bldg 53 In Situ Used in the purifi cation of ethanol.

B002497 Dryer, Freeze, 

Lyophilizer

Bldg 18, 1st 

Floor Rm 206 Not Found Dr Alaa Sharif is responsible for this freeze dryer.

B002498 Vessel, double 

jacketed, steel Bldg 53 In Situ

B002419 Incubator, shaker

Media Prep 

Bldg, Hall, 

Plant Tissue 

Station

Not Found

This piece of equipment appears to be declared 

by Tuwaitha and is stated to be untagged and not 

functional.

B002471 Shaker, orbital Incubation 

Room Not Found 

B002472 Shaker, orbital Bldg 50 Section B Not Found 

Note: Not found implies that a particular item was not positively identifi ed. This may have been due to the 

removal of the label or the fact that the equipment was not present or may have been destroyed/relocated.
117

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Annex F 

Photography Highlights: 

Tuwaitha Mission, 

20-22 November 2003

Building 37, Room 1. Crane outside room 1, 

pans/base, and water pumps.

Building 37, Room 3. Distillation

columns, technicatiome items, and 

heat exchangers.
118

Building 163 (connex): Shipping crate (connex) (top 

left), digital equipment (top center and top right),

high-voltage system (bottom left), and vacuum pumps 

(bottom right).

Building 53, Room 1. Water fi ltration 

system, processing tank, and press.
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Building 53, Room 1. Bathtubs and dryer (left); clove oil production equipment (center and right).

Building 53, Room 1. Water-processing system (left and center); press (right).

Building 53, Room 1. Production of lipton wax (left and center); zinc oxide production (right). 
120

Building 53, Room 1. Dryer (left) and pressure vessel (right). 

Building 53, Room 9. Chemical laboratory (left) and lab-processing equipment (right). 
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Building 16: Festo pneumatic valves, table saw (bottom left), and liquid nitrogen bottle .

Building 59: Power dispenser (R1), reverse osmosis schematic (R3), and oven/incubator (R9).

Building 59: Stirrers (R9), hotplates and fermaldehyde (R9), and biohazard sticker (R11).
122

Building 59: Bacteriology laboratory (R14), chem/bio laboratory (R15), and chemicals (R15).

Building 59: Fume hood (R17), protected lab (R19), and brucella medium base (R20).

Building 59: Unidentifi ed equipment 

(R23), water softener (R23), and 

autoclave? (R23).
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Building 59: Reverse osmosis laboratory (R29) (left and center); burnt metal cases (R31) (right).

Building 59: Unidentifi ed burnt equipment (R32), unidentifi ed equipment (R40), and distilation equipment (R42).

Building 59: Rad. source-led cave (R45).
124

Building 59: Hallway; unidentifi ed 

equipment, dose rate meter, and 

unidentifi ed equipment.

Building 167, Room 2. Americium-241 radiological source on desk.

Building 17, Room 2. Mechanical/plumbing workshop.
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Building 17: Mechanical/woodwork workshop (R19) (left and center); unidentifi ed gas bottle (R16) (right).

Building 17: Tammuz/cooling tower (Osirak) (left and center); Tammuz-2 (ISIS) (right).

Building 3: Germanium detector cryostat (R24).

Building 82: Possible missile transportation canister (R4).

Building 7: Burned room.
126

Library (from berm), bunker (behind building 167), and view from berm.

11 November 2003 Mission: Optical spectrometer (near 

building 90; in report), Anderson sampler

(dump near main entrance).
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Figure 43. Tuwaitha Complex—Zone B (status of buildings before 

the 20-22 November 2003 survey mission).

Annex G 

Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, 

and Numbers 
128

Figure 44: Tuwaitha Complex—Zone C (status of buildings before 

the 20-22 November 2003 survey mission).
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Figure 45: Tuwaitha Complex—Zone D (status of buildings before the 

20-22 November 2003 survey mission).
130

Figure 46: Tuwaitha Complex—Zone E (status of buildings before the 

20-22 November 2003 survey mission).

Team Safety

• All entry team members were fi tted with dosimeters 

set to a minimum alarm level of 0.1 mR/Hr. Team 

Leaders carried a second dosimeter issued by civilian consultants. 

• All personnel were instructed fi rmly not to enter 

any Hazard areas and to leave any building immediately, if their dosimeter alarms were triggered,

and to call out the radiation Quick Response Force 

(QRF) established in the CP at the living 

accommodation on site. Teams were allowed to 

enter buildings defi ned as a caution only with an 

approved ISG escort.

• All persons, leaving the vicinity of Building 2 (our 

accommodation), were monitored for contamination before entering living area on return.

Dosimeter readings were recorded as the dosimeters 

were collected at the end of the mission.
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