A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports 

from Visa Waiver Countries 

to Enter the United States

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, & Special Reviews

OIG-05-07 December 2004

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Offi ce of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It 

is based on interviews with employees and offi cials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, 

and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that 

this report will result in more effective, effi cient, and economical operations. I express my 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Richard L. Skinner

Acting Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

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Contents

 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................3

 Results in Brief.................................................................................................................................3

 Background......................................................................................................................................5

 Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ...................................................................................................9

 Findings 

 Use of Stolen Passports to Enter the United States ...............................................................11

 Monitoring and Investigating the Use of Stolen Passports ...................................................20

 

 Efforts to Improve Detection of Stolen Passports .................................................................23

Appendices

 Appendix A: Management Comments .......................................................................................26

 Appendix B: OIG Evaluation of Management Comments ........................................................33

 Appendix C: Recommendations ................................................................................................37

 Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report ........................................................................38

 Appendix E: Report Distribution ...............................................................................................39

Abbreviations

APIS Advance Passenger Information System

CBP Customs and Border Protection - a BTS component

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOB Date of Birth

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center - a federal, interagency law enforcement support 

 operation

FDL Forensic Document Laboratory - an ICE component

FY Fiscal Year

GAO General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office)
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Contents

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization - a United Nations organization

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement - a BTS component

ICN Inventory Control Number

IFM Inspectors Field Manual

INA Immigration and Nationality Act

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

NCIC National Crime Information Center

NIIS Non-Immigrant Information System

NTC National Targeting Center - a CBP component

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PAU Passenger Analysis Unit

POE Port of Entry

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System

US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

VWP Visa Waiver Program
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OIG

Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

Introduction 

Our review encompassed the actions taken by Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) inspectors when aliens seeking admission into the United States attempt to 

use stolen passports. Previously, we reported on the national security implications 

of the lost and stolen passport problem in our review of the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP).1 This review examines information that we obtained during our VWP 

review relating to non-VWP matters of sufficient independent importance to 

warrant the initiation of a separate review.

Results in Brief

Aliens applying for admission to the United States using stolen passports have 

little reason to fear being caught and are usually admitted. Our analysis showed 

that it made only a small difference whether the stolen passports were posted in 

the lookout system.2 We reviewed two groups of aliens who used stolen passports 

to attempt to enter the United States. One group did not have lookouts posted 

for their stolen passports prior to their attempted entries. From this group, 79 

out of 98 aliens attempting entry were admitted. The second group had lookouts 

posted for their stolen passports prior to their attempted entries. From the second 

group, 57 out of 78 aliens attempting entry were admitted - 33 of these admissions 

occurred after September 11, 2001. Even though 39 aliens from the second group 

were referred to secondary inspections for more intensive interviews, 18 were 

subsequently admitted. 

Further, we could not determine from the secondary inspections records the 

inspectors’ rationale for admitting the aliens with lookouts for the stolen 

1 An Evaluation of the Security Implications of the Visa Waiver Program, Report Number OIG-04-26, April 2004. 2

 A lookout system contains information about an alien who is or may be inadmissible into the United States, or may be of interest to a law

enforcement agency. Reasons for posting a lookout include immigration or visa violations, alien smuggling, suspected criminal activity or 

actual convictions, and suspected terrorist affiliations. 
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passports. The records of the secondary inspections often were nonexistent or so 

sketchy that they were not useful. 

Finally, we determined that when CBP receives new reports of stolen passports, it 

does not routinely review existing admission records to determine whether any of 

the stolen passports have already been used. Even if there was such a procedure, 

there is no formal protocol for providing information concerning the use of stolen 

passports to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

While the 136 successful entries using stolen passports is a relatively small 

number, it is significant for several reasons. First, the passports were obtained 

by criminal acts. Second, though small, the number could and should be zero, at 

least for those admissions that occurred after lookouts were posted. Actionable 

information was reported and logged into the lookout systems, yet entry was 

accomplished, defeating a costly apparatus established precisely to prevent 

such an occurrence. Third, there was no law enforcement pursuit once it was 

recognized that an illegal entry had occurred. 

We are recommending that CBP develop procedures that: 

• Require primary inspectors to refer aliens to secondary inspections when 

the aliens’ passports are the subjects of lookouts; 

• Require inspectors to record in detail the results of the secondary 

inspections and justifications for any subsequent admissions; 

• Require supervisory review and approval of an inspector’s decision to 

admit an alien who was the subject of a lookout, and ensure that the 

review is recorded as part of the secondary inspections record; 

• Require inspectors to timely enter name-based lookouts for aliens found 

inadmissible.

• Initiate routine reviews of admission records to identify prior uses of 

stolen passports; and 

• Report information on the successful use of stolen passports to enter the 

United States to ICE for investigation. 
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In addition, we are recommending that ICE develop procedures to investigate, 

locate, and remove from the United States aliens who have used stolen passports 

to gain entry to the country and to report the outcomes of its investigations to 

CBP. For the aliens who used certain stolen passports that have terrorist links, 

ICE should investigate their activities while in the United States and determine 

their current whereabouts.

Background 

CBP inspects all aliens arriving at ports of entry (POEs) to determine their 

eligibility for admission into the United States. The inspection process consists 

of primary inspections for all arriving aliens, and when required, more detailed 

secondary inspections for certain aliens. Inspectors use the Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System (TECS) to conduct queries of lookout databases 

concerning aliens applying for admission.3 

Pre-arrival Passenger Screening

Airlines submit Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) data to CBP 

prior to the arrival of the aircraft at a U.S. POE. APIS data contains the names, 

passport numbers, and other biographical information about the passengers on 

the aircraft. The data is provided simultaneously to analysts at CBP’s National 

Targeting Center (NTC), and the POE’s Passenger Analysis Unit (PAU). NTC 

and PAU analysts review the APIS data and conduct database queries using 

TECS. If the NTC or PAU analysts discover potentially derogatory information 

about certain passengers or otherwise believe particular passengers require more 

intensive scrutiny by the POE inspectors, the analysts will enter lookouts for the 

passengers into TECS. These lookouts notify the primary POE inspectors that 

certain passengers are to be referred to secondary inspections. 

Lookouts

CBP inspectors have several database systems available for their use during 

primary and secondary inspections. Some of these database systems contain 

lookouts. A lookout is an entry into a database system when a determination 

has been made that an alien is or may be inadmissible into the United States, or 

may be of interest to a law enforcement agency. Reasons for posting a lookout 

include immigration or visa violations, alien smuggling, suspected criminal 

3

 TECS is an interagency lookout and inspections support system that was designed to facilitate and control more effectively the entry of 

persons into the United States. Nine cabinet level departments and additional independent agencies participate in TECS. TECS is used in 

CBP primary inspection processing and collects the results of CBP secondary inspections.
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activity or actual convictions, and suspected terrorist affiliations. Inspectors 

access the database systems using TECS. When an inspector conducting primary 

inspections enters the alien’s name, date of birth (DOB), passport number, or 

other information into TECS that matches a lookout, a message automatically is 

sent to the inspector advising that a match or “hit” has occurred. The message 

warns the inspector that the alien may be ineligible for admission.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported 

in February 2003 that many inspectors were not knowledgeable about lookout 

query requirements and procedures and did not always perform the required 

lookout queries.4 DOJ OIG concluded that POE management or local training 

staffs needed to reiterate the policies to ensure complete understanding of and 

compliance with requirements.

Additionally, DOJ OIG also reported that the inspection disposition data in TECS 

for fiscal year (FY) 2002 was inaccurate and incomplete. TECS reflected more 

than 41,000 unknown inspection dispositions for aliens referred to secondary 

inspections in FY 2002. Of these 41,000 unknown dispositions, primary 

inspectors identified more than 2,800 as lookout matches. DOJ OIG determined 

that management needed to ensure that inspectors accurately report the results of 

secondary inspections in TECS.

Primary Inspections

The goal of primary inspections is to admit legitimate aliens into the United States 

quickly while identifying and referring high-risk or possibly inadmissible aliens 

for more detailed secondary inspections. When an alien goes through primary 

inspections, the inspector scans the machine readable portion of the passport into 

TECS. If the passport is not machine readable, the inspector manually enters the 

passport number.5 The inspector establishes the identity of the alien and inspects 

the documents for validity and authenticity. 

If the inspectors identify inconsistencies between the TECS records and the 

documents presented, they attempt to resolve or clarify them immediately. They 

usually do this by asking aliens some additional questions. If the inspectors 

4 The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Primary Inspections at Air Ports of Entry, Report Number 03-15, February 2003. 5

 Beginning September 30, 2004, all travelers entering the United States under the VWP must present a machine readable passport. 

This should reduce the number of times that an inspector will have to manually enter passport numbers, thus reducing data entry errors.

However, inventory control numbers (ICN) on the passports will not be read with the machine readable passport number. The ICN is the 

number used to post stolen blank passport lookouts. We will address this issue later in our report.
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cannot quickly resolve the issues, the aliens are sent to secondary inspections for 

more thorough examinations. 

If there is a lookout “hit” indicating that the passport is stolen, the alien is sent 

immediately to secondary inspections. The inspector creates an inspections 

referral report in TECS in which the inspector specifies the grounds for potential 

inadmissibility and any other comments regarding the alien. The inspections 

referral report is transmitted to an inspector in secondary inspections.

Secondary Inspections

Secondary inspections, unlike the few seconds or minutes for primary inspections, 

may last hours while inspectors verify the aliens’ identities and travel documents. 

During secondary inspections, the inspectors verify that the lookout for the 

passport is valid often by contacting the NTC by telephone. If the inspectors 

determine that the passport is stolen, the alien is inadmissible. The inspection 

referral report is annotated with the final disposition of the case, and the alien is 

returned to his or her home country, referred for prosecution, or may apply for 

asylum. 

Reporting Lost and Stolen Passports

During our recent review of the VWP, we reported on the lack of a centralized 

mechanism for foreign governments to report lost and stolen travel document 

data to the U.S. government. In May 2004, the U.S. National Central Bureau of 

the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) announced that the 

United States was joining 40 other countries in providing current information 

on lost or stolen travel documents to the INTERPOL database. The INTERPOL 

lost and stolen passport database has been operational since July 2002 and is 

available to law enforcement and immigration authorities worldwide. The United 

States agreed to transfer 320,000 records of lost or stolen U.S. passports reported 

since 2002. INTERPOL’s database presently contains approximately 1.6 million 

records reported by 41 INTERPOL member countries. Of the 1.6 million records, 

approximately 60% are passports, predominantly lost or stolen from the bearer, 

while 40% are national identification documents.6

 Although the passport is the 

only document required of aliens under the VWP, just 7 of the 27 VWP countries 

currently participate in the stolen travel document database.

6

 Testimony of James Sullivan, Director of the U.S. National Central Bureau of INTERPOL, before the House International Relations 

Committee, June 23, 2004.
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Because of weak reporting procedures, the exact number of lost and stolen travel 

documents potentially available to male fide aliens is unknown. The Department 

of State (DOS) receives most of the stolen passport reports from foreign 

governments. Based on DOS reports from January 2002 to June 2004, 28 foreign 

governments reported 56,943 stolen blank foreign passports. In June 2004, the 

Director of the U.S. National Central Bureau of INTERPOL said that for 55 of 

the 181 INTERPOL countries, there probably were over 10 million lost and stolen 

passports that might be in circulation. In August 2004, according to CBP data, 

there were records of 1.2 million stolen passports in TECS.

National Security Concerns

The vast numbers of stolen passports available present significant challenges for 

controlling entry across U.S. borders. While most persons using stolen passports 

to enter illegally into the United States may be simply violating immigration laws, 

some could have more sinister intentions. Persons seeking to enter the United 

States can obtain stolen blank passports from criminals, have their biographical 

information and pictures attached to the blank passport, and present themselves at 

POEs for admission to the United States.7 

High quality biographical and photographic forgeries make detecting male fide

aliens difficult. However, if a foreign government has reported the stolen passport 

data and that information is entered into the lookout system, the POE inspectors 

have an invaluable tool to assist them in detecting stolen passports. 

The table below depicts the number of aliens that CBP inspected between 1998 

and 2003. It also shows that about one third of inspections involved aliens 

traveling from VWP countries. Finally, the table depicts the total number of 

fraudulent passports intercepted by inspectors at the POEs. 

7

 Aliens may also obtain passports that were stolen from individuals. The stolen passports are often modified by replacing the existing 

photographs and biographical data with that of the intended users of the stolen passports. These “substitutions” are usually easier for an 

inspector to detect. However, unlike substitutions, stolen blank passports modified with high quality photographs and biographic data are 

very difficult to detect. 
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Inspections at U.S. POEs

Year Total Aliens 

Inspected

Total VWP 

Travelers 

Inspected

Total Fraudulent 

Foreign Passports 

Intercepted

1998 40,400,012 15,307,084 7,088

1999 42,184,510 16,035,297 8,123

2000 44,596,364 16,944,988 8,288

2001 43,069,684 15,839,057 11,399

2002 36,678,082 12,804,891 8,588

2003 35,828,356 12,708,910 4,368

Source: CBP Performance Analysis System

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

During our fieldwork for the VWP review, Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) analysts told us about stolen blank passports that were used by aliens 

to enter the United States illegally. This information was developed initially 

in support of the VWP country assessment process.8

 After the initial discovery 

of the use of stolen passports, the DHS analysts conducted further queries to 

identify uses of other stolen passports. This review examines information that we 

obtained from DHS analysts during our VWP review. Our review assesses the 

efficacy of CBP’s efforts to identify users of stolen passports and prevent them 

from entering the United States.

During the period February 10, 1998, to February 12, 2003, several foreign 

governments reported 3,987 stolen blank passports to the U.S. government.9 

Using the reported stolen passport information, DHS analysts conducted extensive 

database queries on all 3,987 stolen passports and identified 176 uses of the stolen 

passports to attempt entry into the United States. Some of these entries were 

made before the stolen passports were reported to the U.S. government, while 

8

 The VWP enabling legislation required that the Attorney General periodically evaluate the effect of each country’s continued VWP 

participation from a law enforcement and security perspective. The purpose of these reviews is to make in-depth assessments of relevant 

conditions and practices in VWP countries from the perspective of U.S. law enforcement and national security interests. One factor that is 

examined is the country’s passport security, especially the frequency and volume of thefts of blank, unissued passports. 

9

 The 3,987 stolen passports are a subset of all stolen passports reported during this time. The subset is not a random or statistically based 

sample. These passports were selected by DHS analysts for closer examination because stolen passports from these countries posed the 

highest potential risk, in part because these countries were also VWP countries. Certain travelers from VWP countries are permitted to 

enter the United States without first applying for visas; this makes VWP passports more vulnerable to fraudulent use by male fide travelers. 
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some of the entries were made after lookouts were posted for the stolen passports. 

DHS provided us with the results of these queries, including the aliens’ names, 

DOBs, POEs, passport numbers, and dates of entry associated with the uses of 

these stolen passports. The table below summarizes the attempted entries using 

stolen passports.

 Attempted Entries Using Stolen Blank Passports 

Issuing 

Country 

Number of Stolen 

Blanks Reported

Number 

of Entries 

Attempted 

Before Lookouts 

Posted

Number of Entries 

Attempted After 

Lookouts Posted

France 1,300 0 11

Spain 1,102 26 15

Germany 500 19 15

Portugal 500 9 10

Belgium 450 44 25

Italy 135 0 6

TOTAL 3,987 98 7810

The following table shows in which years the 176 uses of the stolen passports 

occurred between 1998 and 2003. 

 Number of Attempted Entries by Year Using Stolen Blank Passports

Issuing 

Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

France 0 0 0 1 7 2

Spain 0 14 12 1 1 11

Germany 0 0 5 19 10 0

Portugal 0 0 9 9 0 0

Belgium 1 10 17 31 3 7

Italy 0 0 0 0 3 3

TOTAL 1 24 43 61 24 2311

10 Four additional aliens using stolen passports who were sent to secondary inspections requested asylum hearings. They were temporarily 

paroled into the United States for the purposes of attending their credible fear hearings. We did not include their “admissions” in our 

analysis.

11 Four additional aliens using stolen passports who were sent to secondary inspections requested asylum hearings. They were temporarily 

paroled into the United States for the purposes of attending their credible fear hearings. We did not include their “admissions” in our 

analysis.
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Using this information, we reviewed electronic admissions records in TECS to 

confirm the dates of the posting of the lookouts, the dates the stolen passports 

were presented at the POEs, the dates of admission of the aliens, and the dates 

of departure. More importantly, we sought to determine the rationale used by 

the inspectors to “resolve” the stolen passport lookout “hits” and admit the 

aliens. Using TECS, we accessed and reviewed the reports of both primary and 

secondary inspections associated with the use of the stolen passports. Finally, 

we reviewed the actions taken by CBP and ICE to identify entries into the United 

States using stolen passports and the subsequent follow-up investigations to locate 

and remove the aliens.

We reviewed the Inspectors Field Manual (IFM) and other documents provided 

by CBP that governed procedures that inspectors must follow during the primary 

and secondary inspections processes, as well as actions that they must take when 

intercepting aliens with stolen passports. We interviewed analysts at DHS, NTC, 

and the Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL). We also interviewed senior 

managers at CBP and ICE.

This inspection was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended, and according to the “Quality Standards for Inspections” 

issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Findings

Use of Stolen Passports to Enter the United States

Aliens applying for admission into the United States using stolen passports 

were usually admitted. It made little difference whether lookouts for the stolen 

passports existed because the aliens were often admitted even after the lookouts 

were posted. 

We verified the stolen passport data that DHS provided to us by performing 

the same actions required of the POE inspectors and using the same computer 

systems available to POE inspectors. Using TECS, we entered the passport 

numbers provided by DHS. The results of our queries confirmed that entries 

were made, the dates of the entries, and the dates the lookouts were posted for 

the stolen passports. Then, again using TECS, we entered the aliens’ names and 

DOBs provided by DHS that were associated with the stolen passports to review 
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the electronic inspection records for all aliens attempting to use stolen passports. 

The inspection records provided us with information concerning the inspectors’

actions during primary and secondary inspections and the final admission 

decisions. From these records we were able to determine whether the aliens were 

successful in entering the United States. Again, using TECS and the names of the 

aliens who were admitted, we queried the Non-Immigrant Information System 

(NIIS) to reconfirm the dates of entry, the reasons for admission, and the dates of 

departure, if available. Finally, we queried the lookout systems using the names 

of the aliens to determine whether there were any additional lookouts for the 

aliens.

We examined two groups of aliens using stolen passports. The first group 

attempted to enter the United States prior to lookouts being posted for the stolen 

passports. The second group attempted their entries after the lookouts for the 

stolen passports were posted. The table below depicts the results of our analysis 

of reported incidents of stolen blank passports used to attempt entry into the 

United States. 

Attempted Entries Using Stolen Blank Passports

Entry Attempted 

Before Lookouts Posted

Entry Attempted 

After Lookouts Posted

Issuing 

Country 

Attempted 

Entries

Successful

Entries

Attempted 

Entries12

Successful

Entries

France 0 0 11 7

Spain 26 24 15 3

Germany 19 7 15 14

Portugal 9 6 10 5

Belgium 44 42 25 22

Italy 0 0 6 6

TOTAL 98 79 7813 57

From the first group of aliens who applied for admission before the lookouts were 

posted, 98 presented stolen passports and inspectors subsequently admitted 79. 

This represented an 81% success rate. 

12 Two aliens made nine subsequent successful entries using passports other than the stolen passports first used to enter the United States. 

We included these attempts in our analysis because they occurred even after name based lookouts had been posted following the first 

entries using the stolen passports.

13 Four additional aliens using stolen passports who were sent to secondary inspections requested asylum hearings. They were temporarily 

paroled into the United States for the purposes of attending their credible fear hearings. We did not include their “admissions” in our 

analysis.
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We focused our examination on the second group of aliens who attempted entry 

after the stolen passport lookouts were posted. For all records of entry, we 

verified that lookouts had been posted for the stolen passports prior to the date 

of entry.14 Starting with the names of the aliens provided to us by DHS, we ran 

checks using TECS. In all cases, there was an admission record for the alien 

showing the attempted entry into the United States using a passport that had been 

reported stolen. To verify that a lookout had been posted prior to the date of entry, 

we entered the passport number in TECS. In every case, a lookout had been 

entered for the stolen passport prior to the entry date of the alien.

For the group with the posted lookouts, 57 of 78 aliens were admitted - 73% 

success rate. Of the 78 aliens attempting entry, 39 were admitted directly from 

primary inspections, while the other 39 were referred to secondary inspections. 

Of those referred to secondary inspections, 18 were admitted. Of the 57 aliens 

who were admitted, 33 were admitted after September 11, 2001.

Some aliens entered the United States multiple times using stolen passports:

• An alien using a Belgian passport reported stolen entered the United 

States four times after the lookout was posted. The alien was referred to 

secondary inspections once. According to the entry in the TECS records 

of the alien’s secondary inspections, “subject never had problems before; 

never had PP stolen or lost; subject has many prior entrys [sic] and 

secondary evidence.” After the fourth entry, the alien obtained a different 

passport and entered the United States seven more times despite a name 

based15 lookout. 

• An alien using a stolen Belgian passport for which a lookout was posted 

entered the United States twice using the stolen passport. The alien 

was not referred to secondary inspections either time. Again, the stolen 

passport was never detected or the inspectors failed to take appropriate 

actions. After the second entry using the stolen passport was discovered 

14 For some entries, an alien entered using a passport number slightly different from that in the lookout. For example, the lookout in 

TECS may have been for passport number 123456, but the passport number recorded in TECS that was used by the alien for this entry 

was 123465. However, there was also an admission record in TECS that, either previous or subsequent to this entry, the same alien used 

passport number 123456, which was the subject of the lookout. Therefore, we concluded that the inspector made a data entry error and 

entered the passport number as 123465 into TECS when it should have been 123456. We counted the entry using passport number 123465

as an entry after a lookout was posted.

15 A name based lookout will match or “hit” an alien applying for admission using the same name and date of birth. The lookouts may 

describe potential reasons for inadmissibility such as suspected terrorist, possible alien smuggler, suspected of narcotics smuggling, etc. 

Therefore, if the alien again attempts to enter the United States, two “hits” will occur. One hit will occur for the stolen passport number 

and the other for the name. 
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by a DHS analyst, three separate name based lookouts were posted. The 

lookouts were very specific about referring the individual to secondary 

inspections if encountered because he had used a stolen passport.16 

However, the individual successfully entered the United States two more 

times. During one attempt, he was referred to secondary inspections 

because, according to the secondary inspections report, “he [the alien] 

did not know where or how long he would be staying and was a possible 

immigrant without visa” and “pax [the alien] traveled to the U.S. before; 

systems check neg [negative]; was able to obtain address; has return 

tickets.” 

• An alien using a stolen Belgian passport was admitted three times after 

the passport number lookout was posted. He was referred to secondary 

inspections three times and admitted. On his second visit, the secondary 

inspections record indicated that DHS records showed that he had 

overstayed his first visit to the United States by four months. 17 The 

secondary inspections records stated: “subject had numerous valid IDs to 

also back-up story.” Despite the lookout for the stolen passport and the 

fact that he was a previous visa overstay, the inspector admitted the alien 

to the United States. 

Once we had specific information about aliens who had been admitted to the 

United States bearing stolen passports, we attempted to review the actions 

taken by the inspectors to determine what occurred at primary and secondary 

inspections. 

Actions During Primary Inspections

Thirty-nine aliens were admitted directly from primary despite a lookout posted 

for their stolen passports. We concluded that aliens were admitted directly from 

primary inspections because the inspectors either did not heed the lookouts or did 

not detect the forged information on the stolen passports, or both. 

16 This is an excerpt from the lookout entry: "Refer immigration SRI [senior inspector] on site for search & to make +I.D. [positive

identification], search for additional passports or I.D., call HQS [headquarters]...there is a Headquarters order that exists mandating all

[country name omitted] passport#s will be run in TECS, insure that this is accomplished, “zero-tolerance”, do not be mis-lead by the 

person’s having traveled to the U.S. multiple times in the past, this is not a reason or excuse for admission !! A person could be a [country 

name omitted] citizen and still be in possession of stolen property, e.g., stolen Belgian passports! ...” 17 Overstaying less than one year is normally not a legal ground for denying admission to an alien with a visa. But the VWP has several 

specific criteria for ineligibility, and one of these is a previous overstay of any length, no matter how brief. As a legal matter, no alien who 

has previously overstayed should ever be admitted under the VWP.
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The IFM requires that inspectors conduct TECS queries for all aliens during 

primary inspections using the aliens’ last name, first name, DOB, and passport 

number. We confirmed that entering these data into TECS resulted in lookout 

“hits” for all 78 attempted entries, including the 39 admitted directly from primary 

inspections. 

We could not determine why the primary inspectors admitted the aliens with the 

stolen passports. While some CBP officials insisted that all stolen passport “hits” 

are automatically sent to secondary inspection, our research did not confirm this. 

CBP officials discussed a number of reasons why an inspector at primary 

inspections might miss a lookout for a stolen passport. One reason is human 

error, such as the inspector entering the wrong passport number into TECS. 

Another reason may be that the inspector did not detect the forged information on 

the passport. However, CBP officials asserted that inspectors are “so well trained 

and vigilant” that they would catch even the very best forgeries. 

Some countries issue passports with two numbers. One number, the inventory 

control number (ICN), is placed on the blank passport at the time of production. 

When the passport is issued to an individual, a second number, the passport 

issuance number, is added to the passport. CBP officials said that blank stolen 

passports are reported to the U.S. government by their ICNs. The lookouts 

posted for the stolen blank passports are based on the blank passports’ ICNs. If 

inspectors do not detect the forgery, they will enter the forged passport issuance 

numbers rather than the ICNs, and the lookouts will not be detected. The ICN 

issue has been identified in previous DOJ OIG reports.18 

Immigration officials have attempted to correct this problem by issuing new 

guidance. However, the new guidance, issued in 1999, requires that inspectors 

enter the perforated passport issuance number and enter the ICN number only if 

the passport does not have a perforated passport issuance number. This guidance 

does not address the problem. If the inspector does not detect the fraud, the 

falsified perforated number on the stolen passport will be entered into TECS, not 

the ICN. Therefore, the lookout will not be discovered, the stolen passport will go 

undetected, and the alien will likely be admitted. 

18 The Potential for Fraud and INS’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, Report Number 

I-99-10, March 1999, and Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver Program, Report Number I-2002-002, December 2001.
Page 16 A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from 

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Actions During Secondary Inspections

We attempted to determine what actions the POE inspectors took when aliens 

using suspected stolen passports were referred to secondary inspections. The IFM 

offers little guidance to inspectors as to what information collected during the 

secondary inspections process must be recorded in TECS. The inspection records 

were often non existent or were so incomplete and sketchy as to be of little value. 

We could not ascertain why one alien was referred to secondary inspections while 

another was not, even though both used passports that had been reported stolen. 

Nor was it always ascertainable from the TECS records what factors led the 

secondary inspector to deny or grant admission in each case. 

The inspection records for 39 referrals to secondary inspections indicated that 

31 were for reasons other than the stolen passports, while only 8 appear related 

to stolen passport number lookout matches. Examples of inspection records that 

relate to other issues include: 

• An alien using a stolen passport was referred to secondary inspections 

because he was born in Morocco, but carried a Portuguese passport. The 

alien was subsequently admitted; however, there were no secondary 

inspections record in TECS explaining the admission. 

• An alien was referred to secondary inspections because he “also 

answered yes on back of I-94W.” His secondary inspections record 

showed “[the alien] stated was arrested for DUI [driving under the 

influence]; NCIC [National Crime Information Center] ck [check] 

negative; ... admit WT. Suspect.” The code “WT” indicates he was 

admitted as a tourist under the VWP. We cannot conclude what the 

inspector meant by “suspect.” 

• An alien presenting a stolen Belgian passport was referred to secondary 

inspections because “poss[ible] direct prim[ary] lookout; fraud/

misrep[resentation].” His secondary inspections record indicated that he 

was a “confirmed overstay; ....admit WB...” The code “WB” indicates 

he was admitted as a business traveler under the VWP, even though 

his passport was suspect and the inspection records indicated he had 

previously violated the terms of his admission.
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Of the eight referrals to secondary inspections for reasons related to the stolen 

passport, six were ultimately refused admission into the United States. Examples 

of those aliens who were refused admission include:

• An alien using a stolen Spanish passport attempted entry, applied for 

admission under the VWP, and was referred to secondary inspections for 

a One-Day Lookout match19. According to the secondary inspections 

notes, “subject had Customs 1 day lookout for a 100% inspection and 

also had a lookout on the Spanish PP# reported as stolen.” The subject 

admitted under oath that he was a citizen of Peru and that he purchased 

the passport at the Spanish embassy in Lima. The alien was refused 

admission.

• An alien using a stolen Belgian passport attempted entry and was referred 

to secondary inspections for a stolen passport number lookout match. 

On his I-94, the subject listed Syria as his country of citizenship and 

residency. He was refused admission.

• An alien using a stolen French passport attempted entry and was 

referred to secondary inspections for a TECS match. During secondary 

inspections, the subject admitted that his country of citizenship was 

Algeria. The alien was placed in expedited removal and removed to 

Algeria.

However, two aliens with secondary inspections referral records that indicated 

stolen passports were admitted:

• An alien using a stolen Belgian passport was referred to secondary 

inspections because of a TECS lookout match. According to the entry in 

the secondary inspections records, “subject never had problems before; 

never had PP stolen or lost; subject has many prior entrys [sic] and 

secondary evidence.”

• An alien using a stolen German passport was referred to secondary 

inspections to “verify genuinity [sic] of PP and holder of PP.” According 

to the secondary inspections notes, the passport was determined to be 

genuine, and the alien was admitted.

19 A One-Day Lookout identifies certain travelers who should be referred to secondary inspections upon their arrival at a U.S. POE. The 

lookout is usually the result of analysis conducted on passenger information submitted by the airline prior to the aircraft’s arrival in the 

United States. The POE PAU and the NTC conduct the analysis and either may issue the One-Day Lookout. 
Page 18 A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from 

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The IFM provides limited guidance for inspectors on how to respond to a “hit” on 

a lookout in general and no specific guidance for responding to a “hit” for a stolen 

passport. It provided no guidance on how the inspector in secondary inspections 

should resolve the “hit” and does not include possible scenarios under which 

the “hit” could be favorably resolved and the alien permitted to enter the United 

States. 

CBP officials said that the burden of proof is on the aliens to provide evidence of 

their admissibility. They also said that the inspectors must have no doubt about 

the authenticity of the passports in order to admit the aliens, and that decisions 

to admit aliens with suspected stolen passports will almost always involve 

independent verification by some other source. These other sources may include 

ICE’s FDL, DOS, or officials from the alien’s home country. From the inspection 

referral reports, we found two cases where there were apparent attempts for 

independent verification: 

• According to the secondary inspections record for an alien presenting 

a suspected stolen passport, “...attempted to contact State Dept...no 

success.” The alien was admitted “WB,” indicating a VWP admission 

for business purposes.

• According to the secondary inspections record for an alien presenting 

a suspected stolen passport, “...subject presented stolen passport. 

UK authorities confirmed same. FDL unavailable...” The alien was 

determined to be inadmissible and was removed from the United States. 

CBP officials said that a supervisor’s review is required for all adverse actions 

taken against aliens or when discretionary decisions are made regarding 

admissibility. They said that it is normal practice to have a supervisor review any 

decision to admit an alien from secondary inspections, although there is no formal 

or written guidance requiring this action. Our research did not validate these 

assertions. We found evidence of non-compliance with procedures even though 

CBP officials said that supervisors monitor the inspectors’ actions to ensure that 

all secondary inspection referrals are closed out and that all lookout queries were 

conducted. 

CBP officials said that a name based lookout should be created for aliens detected 

attempting to use a stolen passport to enter the United States. While the IFM 

stipulates that lookouts must be entered within three days of the encounter, it does 

not specify situations when the lookouts must be created. We found name based 
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lookouts posted by the POEs for 15 of the 21 aliens who were found inadmissible. 

The lookouts were posted anywhere from one day to 20 weeks from the date 

when the aliens were found inadmissible. 

One CBP official said that while “errors [improper admissions] do occur” they 

are not systemic, but rather the result of performance or training deficiencies 

associated with the individual inspectors. CBP officials acknowledged that the 

inspection referral records provide an inadequate accounting of some actions 

taken in secondary inspections. They also said that previous immigration policy 

required that a paper-based log be kept of all secondary inspections actions. 

According to the officials, while the logs contained more details of the inspection, 

their use has been discontinued. They said that new policies are being developed 

that will require more details in the inspection referral reports.

Departure Verification

We attempted to determine whether the aliens who were improperly admitted had 

later departed the United States. CBP provided us with records that indicated 

22 of the 57 admitted aliens departed the United States. However, we could not 

confirm this because, at the time of our review, the United States does not have 

an adequate exit system. Previous reporting on this subject has detailed problems 

with the entry-exit system and the associated record keeping.20 Because exit 

records are unreliable, we do not know whether any of the aliens who entered the 

United States using stolen passports departed or remain in the country.

21

We recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection:

• Recommendation 1: Require primary inspectors to refer aliens to 

secondary inspections when the aliens’ passports are the subjects of 

lookouts. 

• Recommendation 2: Require inspectors to record in detail the results of 

the secondary inspections and justifications for subsequent admissions.

20Refer to the following reports: General Accounting Office report, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a 

Layered Defense, GAO-04-82, May 2004; and DOJ OIG report, Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant 

Overstays, Report Number I-2002-006, April 2002. 21 The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) is the DHS program that will electronically record 

the entry and exits of certain foreign travelers. US-VISIT is currently recording the entries of air passengers. DHS is piloting the exit 

component at selected airports.
Page 20 A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from 

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• Recommendation 3: Require supervisory review and approval of 

an inspector’s decision to admit an alien who was the subject of a 

lookout; and ensure that the review is recorded as part of the secondary 

inspections record. 

• Recommendation 4: Require inspectors to timely enter name-based 

lookouts for aliens found inadmissible.

Monitoring and Investigating the Use of Stolen Passports

CBP does not have routine procedures to review admission records to determine 

whether stolen passports have been used to gain entry into the United States. 

Further, when entries using stolen passports are discovered, CBP does not have 

formal procedures to convey this information to ICE for further investigation. 

Monitoring Admission Records

According to CBP officials, there is no procedure to screen the numbers of newly 

reported stolen passports against admission records to determine whether the 

stolen passports were used to enter the United States. CBP officials said that 

there was some analysis on reports of stolen passports; however, CBP officials 

characterized this activity as “ad hoc” rather than routine. They said that this 

activity would be a labor intensive effort because several databases would have to 

be individually searched to determine whether stolen passports were used. CBP

has considered making software modifications that would permit simultaneous 

multiple database searches. However, there is no near-term solution. 

CBP officials said that there is no procedure to analyze the use of stolen passports 

to identify trends or patterns associated with their use, such as users’ countries 

of origin, linkages between users, and linkages between users and POEs and 

carriers. However, they said that NTC is now doing some of this work and that 

new guidance is under development to require the screening of stolen passport 

numbers against admission records.

We recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection:

Recommendation 5: Require routine reviews of admission records to identify 

uses of stolen passports.
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Recommendation 6: Disseminate information on the use of stolen passports to 

ICE for further investigation. 

Investigating the Use of Stolen Passports

The DHS analysts who originally discovered the uses of stolen passports 

generated at least four intelligence reports detailing these incidents. The 

intelligence reports were disseminated to intelligence units within DHS, ICE, and 

CBP; the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC);22 DOS; and NTC. 

ICE officials said that there is informal sharing of stolen passport information 

between CBP analysts and ICE’s liaison at NTC. However, they acknowledged 

that the processes have not been formalized into specific procedures or protocols. 

Further, they had no knowledge of having received any previous information 

concerning the incidents identified by DHS analysts.

ICE officials said that its National Security Threat Protection Unit would be 

responsible for investigating any information concerning the use of stolen 

passports by persons with a “national security interest.” However, the officials 

said they had never received any information of this type from CBP.

National Security Concerns

The lack of routine reviews to determine whether stolen passports have been 

used successfully and the lack of subsequent follow-up investigative actions 

were particularly alarming to us when we examined two groups of stolen VWP 

passports that may have a connection to known terrorist activity. 

Assassination in Afghanistan

In June 1999, 46 blank passports were stolen from a VWP country. Lookouts 

were posted for the stolen passports in March 2000.23 Between October 1999 and 

May 2000, six aliens using some of these passports attempted to enter the United 

22The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was established in 1974 in El Paso, Texas. The Drug Enforcement Administration is the lead 

federal agency at EPIC. Representatives from 15 other federal agencies, including ICE and CBP, as well as other organizations staff EPIC. 

EPIC conducts analysis of information and intelligence pertaining to drug movement and immigration violations in the Western hemisphere 

to provide intelligence support to law enforcement agencies. 

23 Although the lookouts were posted as soon as the stolen passport report was received from DOS, we were unable to determine the reason

for the delay in reporting the theft. 
Page 22 A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from 

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States. Five were subsequently admitted. One admission occurred after the 

lookout was posted. 

What is disturbing about this incident is that one of this group of 46 stolen 

passports was found in the possession of a terrorist with links to Al Qaeda. On 

September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11th attacks, Commander 

Ahmad Shah Massoud, military chief of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, 

was assassinated in a suicide bombing carried out by two Moroccan terrorists 

posing as journalists. Al Qaeda later claimed responsibility for the assassination. 

Both terrorists were killed. Both terrorists were in possession of stolen passports, 

and DHS analysts later determined that one of those was from the block of 46 

stolen passports.

Given the association of one passport from a relatively small block of stolen 

passports with Al Qaeda, we would expect that for national security reasons ICE 

and CBP would want to know more about the whereabouts and activities of the 

five aliens who entered the country using the other stolen passports from that 

same block.

Al Qaeda Operations

On June 6, 2001, thieves stole 708 blank passports from a VWP country.24 The 

theft was not reported to the U. S. government until April 2004. On April 23, 

2004, CBP posted stolen passport lookouts for the stolen blank passports.

The potential significance of the stolen passports is that they were stolen in the 

city that was also the location of the Al Qaeda cell that played a significant role 

in providing financial and logistical support for the September 11th terrorists. 

Between December 2001 and March 2004, 21 of these stolen passports were used 

by aliens attempting to enter the United States. In all cases, the attempted entries 

occurred before the stolen passports were reported to the U.S. government and 

before the lookouts were posted. 

Twenty of the aliens successfully entered the United States using the stolen 

passports. Only one alien was denied admission because the inspector concluded 

that the alien intended to violate the VWP requirement to leave the United States 

after 90 days. 

24 This group of stolen passports was not part of those described previously.
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CBP had departure records for only two of the aliens. We could not confirm, 

however, that any of the aliens actually left the country, nor can we confirm that 

any are still here. Because of the geographic association of where the theft of the 

passports occurred and the Al Qaeda terrorist cell, we believe that the activities 

of these 20 aliens while they were in the United States and their current locations 

warrant further investigation. 

After CBP develops information that newly reported stolen passports were 

used to enter the United States and passes this information to ICE, ICE should 

appropriately prioritize this actionable information and add the leads to its 

caseload for further investigation.

 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement:

Recommendation 7: Investigate, locate, and remove from the United States, 

persons who have used stolen passports to gain entry to the country and to report 

the outcomes of its investigations to CBP. 

Recommendation 8: Investigate the activities of aliens who used the stolen 

passports with the Al Qaeda links while in the United States and determine their 

current whereabouts.

Efforts to Improve Detection of Stolen Passports

CBP has made some progress addressing the problem of stolen passports. For 

example, NTC is now the designated lead organization responsible for collecting 

reports of stolen passports received from foreign governments (through DOS) 

and is responsible for posting the stolen passport lookouts in TECS. This 

consolidation of responsibilities within CBP has reduced the lag time from the 

receipt of a stolen passport report to entering the lookout to less than 24 hours. 

CBP is undertaking other initiatives to improve its capability to detect or prevent 

the uses of stolen passports, including additional training, developing new 

policies and procedures, and an initiative with the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO)25 to limit passports to one number.

25 ICAO is a United Nations organization that promulgates international aviation law.
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Training

CBP officials said that a training program was conducted in April 2002 to enhance 

inspectors’ skills in identifying suspected stolen passports. They commented 

that some of the data that we analyzed for our report predated this training and 

that improvement in the inspectors’ skills would have prevented some of the 

successful entries using stolen passports. 

While some of our data preceded the training, new information that we obtained 

as late as August 2004 indicated that the problems persist. For example, three 

aliens successfully used passports stolen from the Spanish embassy in Damascus, 

Syria, to enter the United States in June 2003. While lookouts had not been 

posted for these passports prior to the entries, the inspectors failed to detect the 

forgeries. Further, Spanish passports stolen from the Spanish consulate in Rio 

de Janeiro, Brazil, in September 2003 had lookouts posted in TECS in October 

2003. However, nine aliens used these stolen passports to enter the United States 

successfully between December 2003 and August 2004. Again, using French 

passports stolen in July 2003, 32 aliens entered the United States between August 

2003 and February 2004.

New Policies and Procedures

CBP recognizes the problem associated with multiple passport numbers. 

However, they said that the time it takes to query both the passport issuance 

number and the ICN would cause significant delays at the POEs. In order to 

address the ICN problem and to mitigate negative impacts on POE processing 

times, CBP is considering a risk management approach as an interim solution. 

The concept is that CBP would identify certain passports, POEs, flights, etc. 

where there is a high probability that stolen passports will be encountered. In 

these situations, inspectors would be required to conduct the multiple passport 

queries as part of the inspection process. CBP officials expected a draft policy to 

be developed in the fall of 2004. 

ICAO Initiative

The long-term solution to this problem is to require that all passports have a single 

passport number. CBP is working with ICAO to develop such a rule. Shortly, 

CBP expects to have an agreement signed that requires all signatories of the 

ICAO standards to begin producing passports with a single number. After the 
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agreement is signed, however, it will take years before passports with multiple 

numbers are completely replaced by those with single numbers.
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Appendix A

Management Comments
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Appendix A

Management Comments
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Appendix A

Management Comments
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Appendix A

Management Comments
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Appendix A

Management Comments
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Appendix A

Management Comments
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Appendix B

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments

We evaluated CBP’s and ICE’s written comments and have made changes to the report where we 

deemed appropriate. Below is a summary of CBP’s and ICE’s written responses to the report’s 

recommendations and our analysis of the responses. 

BTS is concerned about our conclusions that were based on “a small and nonstatistical sample.” 

Further, CBP “believes that no general conclusions can be drawn from the report due to the limited 

size of the studied sample” and that “any conclusions do not reflect a comprehensive study of all 

relevant data.” We agree that the number of stolen passports that we studied in our review was small in 

comparison to the total number of passports presented to inspectors at POEs. Further, we recognize that 

our sample did not represent the total universe of all stolen passports. We were very careful to describe 

the stolen passports that we reviewed in our discussion of methodology and scope. However, the stolen 

passports we studied were not a sample. We reviewed the entire universe of reported stolen passports 

from the selected VWP countries during the stated period. Because it was not a sample, statistical 

methodologies would not apply nor would they have been useful. 

Our conclusions are based on our analysis of the stolen VWP passports in our study. We do not attempt 

to extrapolate our conclusions to the entire universe of stolen passports. However, we do not believe 

it would be unreasonable to assume that we would find similar problems if we studied other groups of 

stolen VWP passports.

Recommendation 1: Require primary inspectors to refer aliens to secondary inspections when the 

aliens’ passports are the subjects of lookouts. 

CBP Response: CBP concurs with our recommendation that additional instruction needs to be given 

to inspectors regarding procedures when they encounter persons bearing suspected stolen passports. 

The Inspectors Field Manual (IFM) requires inspectors to refer persons with stolen passport lookout 

hits to secondary inspections. Further, a policy memorandum issued in April 2004 requires supervisory 

review regarding the admissibility of persons who are subjects of lookouts. CBP plans to issue another 

memorandum reemphasizing the requirement to refer all persons with passports that are subjects of 

lookouts to secondary inspections. Further, CBP will explore the possibility of making a secondary 

inspection referral that is the result of stolen passport lookout hit a mandatory field in TECS.

OIG Evaluation: CBP’s plan to issue a new memorandum to reemphasize the requirement to refer all 

persons to secondary inspection using suspected stolen passports is responsive to this recommendation. 

CBP’s intention to make secondary inspection referrals resulting from stolen passport lookout hits 

a mandatory field in TECS should provide CBP managers with a tool to assist them in monitoring 

inspector compliance with this policy. Please provide us with a copy of the memorandum when it is 

issued. Recommendation 1 is resolved – open.
Page 34 A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from 

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Recommendation 2: Require inspectors to record in detail the results of the secondary inspections and 

justifications for subsequent admissions.

CBP Response: CBP agrees that inspectors should have more guidance in providing minimum required 

information when recording the results of secondary inspections. BTS plans to develop procedures to 

ensure that the secondary inspections records are complete.

OIG Evaluation: CBP’s development of new standards to ensure more complete and useful secondary 

inspection records is responsive to this recommendation. Please provide us with a copy of the new 

standards when they are issued. Recommendation 2 is resolved – open.

Recommendation 3: Require supervisory review and approval of an inspector’s decision to admit an 

alien who was the subject of a lookout; and ensure that the review is recorded as part of the secondary 

inspections record. 

CBP Response: CBP concurs with our recommendation. A policy memorandum issued in April 2004 

requires supervisory review regarding the admissibility of persons who are subjects of lookouts. CBP

plans to issue a new memorandum reemphasizing the requirement for supervisory review of admissions 

after referral to secondary inspections and to record this review in the secondary inspections records. 

Further, CBP will explore the possibility of making supervisory review a requirement in TECS.

OIG Evaluation: CBP’s plan to issue a memorandum reemphasizing the requirement for supervisory 

review of admissions after referral to secondary inspections and to record this review in the secondary 

inspections records is responsive to this recommendation. CBP’s intention to make the supervisory 

review a requirement in TECS should provide CBP managers with a tool to help them ensure inspector 

compliance with these procedures. Please provide us with a copy of the new memorandum when it is 

issued. Recommendation 3 is resolved – open.

Recommendation 4: Require inspectors to timely enter name-based lookouts for aliens found 

inadmissible.

CBP Response: CBP agrees that more timely posting of name-based lookouts is required. While the 

IFM requires the posting of lookouts, it does not define “timely.” CBP will issue guidance that will 

require the posting of lookouts concurrent with case processing. CBP will also explore the possibility of 

modifying its computer systems to automatically post lookouts when adverse actions are completed.

OIG Evaluation: CBP’s new procedures to ensure more timely posting of lookouts is responsive to this 

recommendation. In addition, CBP’s plan to make lookout posting an automatic process will ensure that 

Appendix B

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments
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lookouts are always posted timely. Please provide us with a copy of the new procedures when they are 

issued. Recommendation 4 is resolved – open.

Recommendation 5: Require routine reviews of admission records to identify uses of stolen passports.

CBP Response: CBP concurs with our recommendation to develop processes to review admission 

records to identify uses of stolen passports. It plans to develop an automated mechanism to query 

databases to identify uses of stolen passports. In addition, CBP will track “hits” on reported stolen 

passports to assist the inspectors at the POEs in identifying the bearer of the suspected stolen passport.

OIG Evaluation: CBP’s development of a process to conduct regular reviews of admission records to 

detect possible uses of stolen passports to enter the United States is responsive to this recommendation. 

Please provide us with status reports on the progress made in developing the process. Recommendation 

5 is resolved – open.

Recommendation 6: Disseminate information on the use of stolen passports to ICE for further 

investigation. 

CBP Response: CBP agrees that the process to pass information on the uses of stolen passports to ICE 

for investigation should be formalized. It will add this responsibility to that of the ICE liaison at NTC.

OIG Evaluation: CBP’s intention to add the management of stolen passport information to the duties 

of the ICE liaison at NTC is responsive to this recommendation. Please provide us with a copy of the 

modified ICE liaison duty description when it is issued. Recommendation 6 is resolved – open.

Recommendation 7: Investigate, locate, and remove from the United States, persons who have used 

stolen passports to gain entry to the country and to report the outcomes of its investigations to CBP. 

ICE Response: ICE concurs with our recommendation to ensure that leads are reviewed and prioritized 

for subsequent investigation and removal of the persons that used of stolen passports to enter the United 

States.

OIG Evaluation: ICE’s intention to include leads developed by CBP of those persons suspected of 

having used stolen passports to enter the United States is responsive to this recommendation. We also 

want to ensure that a continuous dialogue exists between CBP analysts at NTC and ICE investigators. 

This dialogue would help ensure that the information provided by CBP to ICE investigators is 

actionable. In addition, we want to ensure that appropriate information gained as a result of the 

Appendix B

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments
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investigation is passed on to CBP inspectors to assist them in their border security enforcement 

responsibilities. Please provide us with a status report on ICE’s utilization of such leads in its 

investigations. Recommendation 7 is resolved – open.

Recommendation 8: Investigate the activities of aliens who used the stolen passports with the Al 

Qaeda links while in the United States and determine their current whereabouts.

ICE Response: ICE agrees with our recommendation and has initiated investigations concerning the 

individuals that used stolen passports from the two countries to enter the United States.

OIG Evaluation: ICE is opening investigations of the persons who used certain passports with terrorist 

links, which is responsive to this recommendation. Please provide us with a general status report on the 

investigations. Recommendation 8 is resolved – open.

Appendix B

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments
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Recommendations

We recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection:

Recommendation 1: Require primary inspectors to refer aliens to secondary 

inspections when the aliens’ passports are the subjects of lookouts. 

Recommendation 2: Require inspectors to record in detail the results of the 

secondary inspections and justifications for subsequent admissions.

Recommendation 3: Require supervisory review and approval of an inspector’s 

decision to admit an alien who was the subject of a lookout; and ensure that the 

review is recorded as part of the secondary inspections record. 

Recommendation 4: Require inspectors to timely enter name-based lookouts for 

aliens found inadmissible.

Recommendation 5: Require routine reviews of admission records to identify 

uses of stolen passports.

Recommendation 6: Disseminate information on the use of stolen passports to 

ICE for further investigation. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement:

Recommendation 7: Investigate, locate, and remove from the United States, 

persons who have used stolen passports to gain entry to the country and to report 

the outcomes of its investigations to CBP. 

Recommendation 8: Investigate the activities of aliens who used the stolen 

passports with the Al Qaeda links while in the United States and determine their 

current whereabouts.

Appendix C

Recommendations
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Appendix D

Major Contributors to this Report

David M. Hiles, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Douglas Ellice, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Kenneth McKune, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Kirsten Murray, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews
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Appendix E

Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

The Honorable Tom Ridge

Secretary

Admiral James Loy

Deputy Secretary

The Honorable Asa Hutchinson

Under Secretary, Border and Transportation Security

The Honorable Robert C. Bonner 

Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection

The Honorable Michael J. Garcia

Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Mr. Duncan Campbell

Chief of Staff

Ms. Susan K. Neely

Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs

Mr. Joe D. Whitley

General Counsel

Mr. Jack L. Johnson, Jr.

Chief Security Officer

Ms. Anna F. Dixon 

DHS OIG Liaison

Ms. M. Evelyn Lim

BTS Audit Liaison

Mr. Eddie Carlisle

ICE Audit Liaison

Ms. Cecelia Neglia

CBP Audit Liaison
Page 40 A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from 

Visa Waiver Countries to Enter the United States

Office of Management and Budget

Mr. David Haun 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Jim Holm

Program Examiner

Office of Management and Budget

Congress

Select Committee on Homeland Security

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Appropriations

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

United States Senate

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

Appendix E

Report Distribution

Additional Information and Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at www.

dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.