## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Kic v. Bianu cci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622

Appellate Court Caption T ERESA KI C, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WI L L IAM BIANUCC I
, Def endant- Appellee

.

District & N o. First District, Second D ivision Docke t No. 1-10-0622

Filed Dec ember 13, 2011

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The denial of plaintiff’s motion to rec onsider the judgme nt dissolving her marria g e to defe ndant was upheld over her contentions that the trial court; inter alia , improperly

denied he r motion for substitut ion of judge , err ed in r eopening discovery afte r the trial beg an, err ed in a llowing defe ndant
to amend his pleading s, improperly allowed him additional t i m e to respond to a reque st to admit, and improperly intervened an d advis ed defe ndant to testify

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 06-D6-305 4 7 ; t h e Hon. Edwa

rd A. Ar ce, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Ba rre tt & Sramek, of Palos Heights (B erna dette Gar rison Ba rre tt, of counsel), f

or appe llant.

Panos & Associates, L L C, of Palos Heights (Diane M. Panos, Nanc y M. Donlon and Jeffre y

L . Paustian, of counse l), for a ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE CUNNI NGHAM delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Quinn and J ustice Har ris concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This appea l arises from a Fe bruar y 9, 2 0 1 0 o rd er en t ered by the circ uit court of Cook County
, which denied plaintiff-a ppellant Tere sa Kic’s (Ter esa) motion to rec onsider the judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e. On appea l, Tere sa argues that: (1) the trial court err ed in deny ing her motion for substitut ion of jud ge; (2) the trial court err ed in reope ning discovery afte r trial beg an an d a ll o w in g th e d e f endant- appellee
, Wil liam Bia nucci (Will iam),
to amend his p l ea d ings; (3) the trial court improperly allowed Wil liam additional time to respond to a request to admit fac ts; (4) the trial cour t erre d by failing to name a residential
pare nt a nd failed to e nter an order of child support, education e x penses and extracurr icular activities for the minor child; (5) the trial court improperly intervene d and advised Wil liam, who was acting pro se , to testify ; (6) the trial court’s ruling allowing Wil li am a y ear to ref inance the marital residenc e was inequitable and improper; (7) the trial court improperly penalized Tere sa for the same financ ial matter more than once; (8) the trial court er red in failing to incorpora

te a list of marital proper

ty subject to distribution in its order ; and (9) the trial court err ed in failing to find a specific date reg arding the brea kdown of the marria g e and its finding of dissipation of marital assets by Tere sa was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidence. I n response, Wil liam argues that: (1) Tere sa has forf eited four of the issues she raises on appea l for failing to includ e them in her motion to rec onsider; (2) Tere sa has forf ei t ed ei g ht of the issues she raises on appea l due to their defic iency under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)( 7) (ef f. J u l y 1
, 2008); and (3) the trial court proper ly denied Tere sa’s motion for substitut ion of judge

. For the following rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the c ircuit court of

Cook County

.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Tere sa and Wil liam w ere marrie d on August 29, 1987, and the marria g e was reg istered in Cook County
, I llinois

. In 1998, the parties acquir ed the marital residenc e located at 11740 Shaker Ct., Orland Park, I L (Shaker Ct. home), throug h tenanc y by the entirety

. The parties

-2-obtained a mortg ag e at the time the residenc e was purcha sed, and afte r it was ref inance d the home was encu m b er ed b y a mortg ag e of approximately $500,000. The home was further encumb ere d by a home equity line of cre dit with a balanc e of approximately $99,632. Be tween 1998 and 1999, the parties acquir ed a commerc ial building located at 525 Bur nham St., Calumet City
, I L (State Fa rm office ), throug h joint tenanc y

. T h e State Fa rm office contains five total renta l units, one of which i s used for Tere sa’s sole proprietor ship as an insurance ag ent for State Fa rm Insuranc e Company

. Tere sa rents the other four units in the building, g ener ating income from the proper ty which amounted to $16,1 0 4 i n 2007. The State Fa rm offic e wa s encumbe red by a mortg ag e of $53,187.67 a s of Octobe r 2008. ¶ 4 On May 13, 2003, Tere sa and Wil liam’s only child, Robert Bia nucci (Robert) was born. In Dec ember 2003, Wil liam wa s co n v i ct ed 1 count of bank fra ud and 12 counts of false statements to a bank. Wi lliam was sentenc ed to 46 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised relea se and order ed to pay restitution in the s um of $3,418,854. The restituti on lien ag ainst Wil liam also attache d to both the Shaker Ct. home and the State Fa rm office

. On J une 29, 2004,Wil liam executed a dur able powe r of attorney to Tere sa which g ave her the authority to control all his financ es. Wil liam was incar cer ated on J une 30, 2004, and rele ased

on Marc h 5, 2007. On J uly 12, 2005, Tere sa formed a limit ed liability company called Big sy Properties L .L .C. (B igsy Properties). In J uly 2005, Big sy Properties borrow e d $ 4 0 0
, 0 0 0 from Tere sa’s mot her, J ane Kic (J ane)

. These funds we re u s ed to purcha se vacant l ots pursuant to a business agree ment betwee n Big sy Properties and R&D Deve lopment. On J anuar y 31, 2006, Wil liam revoke d his power of attorney

. ¶ 5 On May 18, 2006, Tere sa filed a petition for dissoluti on of marria g e. Wil liam, while he

was still incar cer ated, filed an answe r to the petition for dissoluti on of marria g e on J une 26, 2006, acting pro se

. Wil liam also filed a motion for a temporar y stay of all proce eding s until he was no longe r incar cer ated and able to re turn to Chicag o. On the same day
, Tere sa filed

a motion for a defa

ult prove- up. On September 13, 2006, Wil liam was g rante d leave to f ile
an appe ara

nce. ¶ 6 On Dec ember 12, 2006, Tere sa was awa rded temporar

y sole custody of Robert. Will iam

was awa rded visitation and order ed to pay child support in the amoun t o f $ 70 per wee k. Tere sa was allowed possession of the Shaker Ct. home from Sunday through Thursday night. Wil liam was allowed possession of the residenc e from Thursday night throug h Sunday

. Tere sa was also order ed to pay all utilit ies of the home and monthly installments of the home equity line of credit. Wil liam was orde red to pa y the m onthly mortg ag e pay ments and real
estate tax es. On Mar ch 5, 2007, Willi am was r elea sed fr om prison. ¶ 7 On August 7, 2007, counsel for Tere sa filed a motion for leave to w ithdraw as attorne y of rec ord. The motion was g rante d on August 16, 2007. On May 9, 2008, Tere sa, appea ring
pro se , filed a petition for lega l separ ation. On J anuar y 10, 2008, the parties enter ed int o a mediation agree ment that established a joint custody agree ment by which they eac h agree d
to share residential responsibilities in car ing for Robert. On May 1, 2008, J udg e Na omi Schuster (Judge Schuster) set the matter for pretria l on J une 18, 2008. L ater that wee k, J udg e Schuster was rea ss i gned to a differ ent court and J udg e Edwar d Arc e (Judge Arc e) was assig ned to handle the matter. On J une 18, 2008, both parties appea red pro se and prese nted motions befor e J udg e Arce. The m atter was t hen set for trial. The trial date was continued

-3-and at a status hear ing Tere sa prese nted a motion for substitut ion of judge

. On J uly 30, 2008, Wil liam prese nted an emer g ency motion that soug ht pay ment by T er es a for the real estate taxes; contribution to the monthly expenses of the marital residenc e; and to asser t a claim dissipation o f m ar i t al assets by Tere sa. On August 14, 2008, the court g rante d Tere sa’s 1

emer g ency motion for leave to file an additional appea ranc e by counsel. On September 30, 2008, Tere sa’s motion for substitution of judge w as denie d. ¶ 8 The trial commence d on November 18, 2008 in the circ uit court of Cook County . Tere sa appea red with counsel. Wil liam appea red pro se during the entirety of the trial. On J anuar y 26, 2009, Wil liam prese nted (but did not file) a mo t i o n cl aiming marital economic misconduct including but not limit ed to the di ssipation of m arital assets by Tere sa. Teresa filed a motion to strike these additional alleg ations but the trial court allowed discovery on these issues. After the parties exchang ed discovery
, Wil liam was allowed an ex t ensi on

2 beyond 28 day s to respond to Tere sa’s reque st to admit fac ts. During trial on J une 25, 2009,

as Wil liam was prepa

ring to rest his case in chief
, the trial court asked h i m wh ether he planned to testify . The trial c ourt then told Wil liam that without testimony from him there

was nothing to consider with respe ct to Wil liam’s case

. Wil liam then g ave his testimony in

narr ative for

m. ¶ 9 On September 8, 2009, the trial court enter ed the judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e. The extensive order ruled on all of the contested issues including cust o d y , m aintenanc e, distribution of rea l proper ty , distribution of retire ment acc ounts, dissipation, and division of martial proper

ty

. Most notably
, the trial court re s er v ed the issue of child support, g rante d Wil liam sole possession of the Shaker Ct. home with a y ear to ref inance and remove Tere sa’s

name from any attache d obligations, and found that Tere sa had dissipated the marital estate in the s u m o f $ 3 10,964.03. On October 7, 2009, Tere sa filed a motion to rec onsider the 3 court’s ruling of September 8, 2009. Her motion alleg ed: (1) that the reope ning of discovery and allowing Wil liam to a ssert a c laim of ec onomic misconduct in J anuar y 2009 afte r trial beg an was a manifest err or of law; (2) that it was a manifest err or of law to g rant Wil liam an extension of time to answe r Tere sa’s reque st to admit fac ts; (3) that allowing Wil liam a y ear to refina nce the Shaker Ct. home is a manife st error of law; (4) that the trial cour t failed to specify the date of irretr ievable brea kdown of the marria g e for the dissipation claim; and (5) that the findi ng of di ssipation of m arital assets by Tere sa i s ag ain s t the m anife st weight of the evidenc e. Tere sa also soug ht modification of the judgme nt for dissoluti on in the amount that Wil liam was awa

rded reg arding her State Fa rm mutual fund retire ment acc ount. On

T his m oti on is not in the re cor d bec aus e it was never actual ly fi le d in cou rt

. T he tr ia l cou rt 1 rul ed t hat th e motio n was not an emergency and i t wa s ne ver fi le d.

T he tr ia l cou rt did not act ual ly grant or den y Wi ll ia m ’s m oti on in a wri tt en ord er but ins te ad 2 ord er ed t he p ar ti es to exc han ge dis covery on t he i ssu es pre sen te d i n W il li am’s m oti on.

T his sum was bas ed on in d i vi d u a l f i ndi ngs of dis si pat ion in the amounts of $147 ,000
, 3 $86, 458. 16, $55, 000, and $22, 505. 87. T he act ual bal anc e due to Wi ll ia m was $124 ,719 .52 due t o the cou rt ’s fi ndi ng of W il li am’s di ssi pat ion of $61 ,525

.
-4-October 29, 2009, Wil liam filed a response to Tere sa’s motion to rec onsider and for

modification of the judg ment for dissolution. ¶ 10 On Fe bruar

y 9, 2010, the trial court ruled that Tere sa’s motion to rec onsider was g rante d
reg ardingWil liam’s awa

rd fr om the State Fa

rm mutual fund, but that the rema ining issues

wer e denied. Wil liam’s motion for modification was al s o d enied. On Fe bruar y 25, 2010, Tere sa filed a

notice of a

ppeal.

¶ 11 ANALYSI S ¶ 12 As a preliminary matter before we consider Teresa ’s arguments, we m u s t d etermine if this c ourt has jurisdiction. William ar gues that Tere sa forf eited four of the issues raised in 4 her brief beca

use she failed to include them in her motion to rec onsider in the trial court. Wil liam presents a

compellingargument that Tere sa m ay not raise issues for the first time
on appea l. Wi lliam points out that Tere sa ra ised the issues in a leg al memorandum instead of in a motion. He argues that no exception to the forf eiture rule should a

pply to T ere sa. In g ener al, Wil liam’s argument is corr ect as applied to jury case s. Specifica lly
, a party may not

ar gu e o n ap p eal any point that was not specifie d in the party ’s posttrial motion befor e the trial court. I ll. S. Ct. R. 366(b)( 2)(iii) (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994). Ho we v er, in civil bench trials, “[n] either the filing of nor the failure to file a post -j udg ment motion limit s the scope of revie w.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 366(b)( 3)(ii) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Furthermore
, it has been repe atedly held that failure to raise an issue in a posttrial motion does not prec lude a party from raising that issue on appea l in nonjury civil case s. Sh u mak v. Shumak
, 30 I ll. App. 3d 188, 332 N.E.2d 177 (1975); City of Chicago v. Mid-City Laundry Co.
, 8 I ll. App. 3d 88, 289 N.E.2d 233 (1972). There fore
, Tere sa’s failure to include argu m en t s (1), (4), (5), and (8) in her motion to reconsider is not fatal to her a rguments on appea l. ¶ 13 We f

irst consider Tere sa’s argument that the trial court err ed in de ny ing her motion for substitut ion of judg e. A moti on for substi tution of j udg e as of right s hall be gra nted i f i t is
prese nted before trial and before the judge has made a ruling on any substantial issue. 735 I L CS 5/2-1001(a) (2)( ii) (West 2008). The trial court “has no discretion to deny a proper motion for substitut ion of judge .” Rodisch v. Commacho-E sparza , 309 I ll. App. 3d 346, 350, 722 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1999). In addition to the s ubstantial issue rule, there is an exception that allows the denial of a motion for substitut ion of judge

. When the happening s at a pretria l confe renc e allow a party to “test the water s” and g et an idea of the judge ’s opinion on some of the issues of the case , a m o t ion for substitut ion of judge can be proper ly denied. In re Estate of Gay , 353 I ll. App. 3d 341, 343, 818 N.E.2d 860, 863 (2004). The purpose of this exception is to keep parties from “judg e shoppi ng ” when they are able to tell which way a judge is leaning on a case before substantial issues have been de cided. Id . In Gay , the trial judge hosted pretria l confe renc es t hat wer e not memorialized. Id

. The appellate court held that when the trial judge ’s recollections do not contradic t or impeac h the re cord, the judge

can rely on those rec ollections in deter mining the substance of the pretria l confe renc e. Id

. at 344, 818 N.E.2d at 863. The denial of a motion for substitut ion of judge is revie wed de novo.

Spec if ic al ly, is sue s ( 1), (4 ), ( 5), and(8 ). 4

-5-Id . at 343, 818 N.E.2d at 863.

¶ 14 I n t h i s ca s e, the parties are in dispute as t o whether a pretrial confere nce was held an d whether Tere sa wa s able to test the water s befor e pre sentingher motion for substitution of judge

. The question of whether the trial j u d ge ru l ed o n a subst antive matter is not at i ssue here and has no bearing on our analy sis. On May 1, 2008, J udg e Schuster set the matter for pretria l on J une 18, 2008. During the first wee k of May 2008, J udg e Schuster was rea ssigne d
to another court and J udg e Arce was as s i gn ed t o handle the matter. On J une 18, 2008, the parties appea

red pro se and prese nted motions befor e J udg e Arc e. Tere sa prese nted a motion for leg al separ ation and Wil liam prese nted a motion for proper ty settlement. J udg e Arc e set the matter for trial status on August 11, 2008, and for trial on August 18, 2008. The trial date

was c ontinued and J udg e Arc e continued to he ar va rious motions from both parties during the per iod before trial. At a trial status hearing on September 22, 2008, Tere sa presented a motion for substitut ion of judge
, and J udg e Arc e set the motion for hear ing on September 30, 2008. On September 30, 2008, J udg e Arc e denied Tere sa’s motion for substitut ion of judge on the basis that he ha d conducte d a pre trial confe renc e bef ore the motion was prese nted. ¶ 15 At the time of the J une 18, 2008 pretria l, both parties appea red pro se

. The proc eeding s went unmemorialized and Tere sa offe rs no by stander’ s re p o rt or aff idavit descr ibing the substance of the proce eding s. There fore
, we are only able to rely upon J udg e Arc e’s own

rec ollections. In dealing with two pro se parties prese nting motions at a pretria l confe renc e, it is rea sonable to assume that J udg e Arc e discussed matters of substance reg arding the case

. The rec ord sug g ests that from his rec ollection s o f t h e p retria l confe renc e, J udg e Arc e deter mined that Tere sa’s motion for substitut ion of judge was inappropriate at this point in the proce eding s. There is no evidenc e in the rec ord that contra dicted J udg e Arc e’s

rec ollections. Absent any such evidenc e by Tere sa, we ho l d t h at J udg e Arc e’s denial of Tere sa’s motion for substitution of judge w as prope r. ¶ 16 We next examine whether the trial court committed reve rsible err or when the trial court allowed Wil liam to reope n discovery and amend his pleading s afte r the trial beg an. As a rule, the trial court is a

ble to supe rvise “all or any part of any discovery proce dure.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 201(c) (2) (eff

. J uly 1, 2002). I t is well established i n I llinois that the t rial court is aff orded b road discretion in ruling on discovery matters. BlueStar Energy Servic es, Inc. v. Il l i n o is Commerce Comm’n
, 374 I ll. App. 3d 990, 996, 871 N.E.2d 880, 887 (2007). The exercise of the trial court’s discretion will not be overturne d on appea l unless there wa s cl early an abuse of discretion. Id . “An a

buse of discr etion occur s wher e the tria l court ac ts arbitrar ily and fails to employ conscie ntious j u d gm ent and ignor es rec ognized principles of law.” Castro v. Brown’s Chicken & Pasta, Inc.
, 314 I ll. App. 3d 542, 554, 7 3 2 N. E .2d 37, 47 (2000) ( citing Ave ry v. Sabbia , 301 I ll. App. 3d 839, 844, 704 N.E.2d 750, 755 (1998))

. ¶ 17 Tere sa argues t hat t he trial court erre d by allowing Wil l i am to prese nt (but not file) a n

emer g ency motion on J uly 30, 2008. The motion soug ht contribution to rea l estate taxes and monthly expenses of the marital estate by Tere sa, and also asser ted a claim of dissipation of marital assets by Tere sa. The trial court ruled that Wil liam’s motion was not an emer g ency and continued the motion until the time of trial on the issues of contribution to real es t at e taxes and monthly expenses of the marital estate. The trial court did not rule on the issue of di s s i p at i o n o f marital assets. The rec ord shows no evidenc e that the trial court abused its

-6-discretion in allowingWil liam’s motion to be presented. T here are no fac ts to sug g est that

the trial court acte d arbitra rily
, failed to employ conscie ntious judgme nt, or i gn o re d

rec og nized principles of law. Be cause the trial co u rt is aff orded broad discretion in

overse eing discovery matters, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, this court will not overturn the trial court’s rul in g

. T e r e s a h ig h li ghts the fac t that, althoug h continued, Wil liam’s J uly 30, 2008 motion was never filed wit h the clerk of t he court and never ruled on by the trial court. Howeve r, this fac t proves to be detrimental to Tere sa’s argument. In the absenc e of an adver se ruling ag ainst Tere sa, she cannot claim wrong doing or prejudice by the court. The trial court did not rule on Wil liam’s J uly 30, 2008 motion as a separ ate act b u t rather

seems to have considere d the issues raised in the motion in the context of resolving the whole

case

. Ba sed on this analy sis, the actions of the trial court cannot be said to be detrimental to Tere sa. Ac cording ly , Tere sa’s a rgument on this iss ue fa ils. ¶ 18 Tere sa ar gues that the trial court e rre d when it allowed William to present a motion on J anuar y 26, 2009 claiming marital economic misconduct, inc lu ding the dissipation of marital
assets by Tere sa. Tere sa filed a motion to strike Wil liam’s motion, but the trial court denied her motion to strike and reope ned discovery

. Tere sa claims that Wil liam’s supplemental and amende d pleading s wer e in the improper form. Fur ther, Tere sa arg

ues that the rules require that a party claiming dissipation must put the opposing party on notice of the claim if it is not pled. She also argues that Wil liam’s J anuar y 26, 2009 motion contra dicted his answe r to the petition for dissoluti on of marria g e and his emer g ency motion of J uly 30, 2008 reg arding the date of the irre trievable brea

kdown of the ma

rriag e. ¶ 19 T h e t ri al co u rt has broad discretion in whether or not to reope n discovery
, and t h at decision will not be disturbe d absent a n abuse of discretion. Ruane v. Amore
, 287 I ll. App. 3d 465
, 471, 677 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (1997). The rec ord does not reve al any evidenc e that the trial court abused its discretion. F urthermor e, Te resa does not provide c itations to case law or case s whose fac ts are analog ous to this case

. Acc ording ly
, we find no err or by the trial
court. Simpl y p u t , Tere sa’s arguments are unsupported by the rec ord or case law and are unpersua sive. ¶ 20 Tere sa makes additional arguments attacking Wil liam ’s p l ea d i n gs and motions as a whole based on defic iency in form. Howeve r, Tere sa’s arguments are unsup p o rt ed by the

rec ord or case law. S ection 2-616 of t he I llinois Code of Civil P roce dure state s in rele vant part: “At any time befor e final judgme nt amendments may be allowed on just and rea sonable terms, introducing any party who oug ht to have been joined as plaintiff or defe ndant, dismiss ing any party , changing the causeof action or defense or adding new causes of

a ct i o n or defense

s, and in any matter, either ofform or substance, in any p r o ce s s , pleading, bill of

particulars or procee dings, which may enable the plaintif f to sustain the claim for which it was intended to be brought or the defendant to make a defense or assert a cross claim .” (Empha sis added.) 735 I L CS 5/ 2-616(a ) (West 2010). Thus, the trial court, in its discretion, could proper ly allow Wil liam to amend his complaint. Fur thermore
, dissipation may be considere d b y the trial court sua sponte reg ardle ss of the pleading s of either party

. In re Marriage of Sanfratello
, 393 I ll. App. 3d 641, 653, 913

-7-N.E.2d 1077, 1089 (2009); 750 I L CS 5/503(d)(2) (W es t 2 0 10). Tere sa further argues that

Wil liam’s dissipation claim from the J uly 30, 2008 motion and the J anuar y 26, 2009 motion should not be considere d. Howeve r, the trial court has the discretion to consider dissipation by either party reg ardle ss of t he allegations in t h e p leading s. In this case , the court did not rule on the issue of dissipation unti l it entered the dissoluti on order

. There fore
, Tere sa was not prejudice d by

any rulingon the issue. ¶ 21 Simi larly
, Tere sa argues that the trial court c ommitt ed re versible e rror when it a llowed Wil liam m o re t h an 2 8 d ay s to respond to a reque st to admit fac ts. On Marc h 13, 2009, Tere sa’s reque st for admission of fac ts was mailed to Wil liam. After rec eiving no response , Tere sa filed motions to strike Wil liam’s amende d complaint and to deem the reque st to admit fac ts as true and corr ect. In response , Wil liam stated: (1) that he did not rec eive any reque sts prior to April 28, 2009; (2) that if the reque sts wer e sent on Marc h 13, 2009, he would have

rec eived them on Marc h 17, 2009; (3) that there was a vacation hold place d on his mail from Marc h 16, 2009 to March 19, 2009; a nd (4) that he believes Te resa interce pted and picke d up his mail from the post office on Marc h 18, 2009. ¶ 22 The decision whet h e r to a llow an extension for a discovery matter is discretionar y . Tere sa is unable to show that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Wil liam an extension. The I llinois Supreme Court Rules allow the trial court to extend the time to file any pleading either befor e or afte r the expiration of the deadline when g ood cause is shown. I ll. S. Ct. R. 183 (ef f. F eb. 16, 2011). What constitutes “g ood cause ” is a fa ct-de pendent issue a nd falls withing the disc retion of the c ourt. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v . Haas , 226 I ll. 2d 334, 353, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1079 (2007). Supreme Court Rule 183 applies to response s to reque sts to admit fac ts. Id

. at 343, 875 N.E.2d at 1072. In this case , the trial court considere d Wil liam’s explanations for his untimely response and grante d an extension. There is no evidenc e of abuse of discretion by

the trial cour

t. ¶ 23 Tere sa next prese nts a number of arguments that are not framed in the context of a proper leg al theory or supported by any leg al authority whatsoever. W i l l i am argues that this unorthodox prese ntation should bar T er es a’ s claims from being considere d. The I llinois Supreme Court Rules provide that the appellant’ s brief must contain contentions along with citations to the authoriti es and pag es i n the re cord r elied upon. I ll. S. C t. R. 341(h)( 7) (eff. J uly 1, 2008). A failure to cite rele vant authority violates Rule 341 and can cause a party to forf eit consi d er at i on of the issue. Fortech, L.L.C

. v. R.W

. Dunteman Co.
, 366 I ll. App. 3d 804, 818, 852 N.E.2d 451, 463 (2 0 0 6 ). Ar guments that violate Rule 341 do not merit consideration and can be reje cted solely for that rea son. Maun v. Departme nt of Professional Regulation
, 299 I ll. App. 3d 388, 399, 701 N.E.2d 791, 799 (1998). “The appellate court is
not a depository in which the appe l l an t may dump the burden of argument and rese arc h.” Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquis t , 145 I ll. App. 3d 712, 7 1 9
, 495 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (1986). Howeve r, a court may consider improperly raised issues in the interest of finding a jus t result because Rule 341 is not a li mitation on the court’s jurisdiction, but an admonishment to the parties. Brown v. Brown
, 62 I ll. App. 3d 328, 332-33, 379 N.E.2d 634, 637 (1978). Five of Tere sa’s nine arguments are prese nted with abso l u t ely no citations to leg al authority

. The arguments contain rec ord citations that are i n t er m ittent and often inacc urate

. We note that these issues could be forf eited on the basis of noncompliance with

-8-Ru le 3 4 1. Howeve r, notwithstanding the defic iencies, Tere sa’s arg u ments w a r r a nt d is c u s s io n and re solution. ¶ 24 The first of these unsupported contentions is that the tr i al co u rt committed reve rsible

err or when it failed to name a residential pare nt and failed to enter an order on child support, educational expenses and extracurr icular activities for the minor child. The I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr i age Ac t (t h e Act) states that the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgme nt for d issoluti on of marria g e even if it has rese rved the issues of child custody
, support, maintenanc e or distribution of proper ty

. 750 I L CS 5/401(b) (West 2010). This can be acc omplished throug h either the agree ment of the parties or motion by either party and a finding of “appr opriate circ umstances” by the court. Id

. Whil e we rec og nize that the statute g ener ally discourag es judg ments that are bifurcated, i t does provide that when appropriate circ umstances are prese nt the court has discretion to rese rve the issues of child custody
, s u p p o r t, main tenanc e or distribution of proper ty to be deter

mined subsequent to the judgme nt of dissoluti on. See In re Marriage of Co h n , 9 3 I ll. 2d 190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982). I t has been held that appropriate circumstance s include circumstance s “whe re the court does not have in personam jurisdiction over the responde nt, wher e a party is unable to pay ch i l d support or maintenanc e if so order ed, wher e the court has set aside an adequate fund for child support pursuant to section 503(d) of the Act [citation]
, or wher e the children do not reside with either pare nt.” In re Marriage of Cohn
, 93 I ll. 2d 190, 195, 443 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1982). This rule has been interpre ted not jus t t o al l o w t he rese rvation of ancillar y issues in the

enumer ated circ ums t an ces listed above, but also to include circ umstances that are of the

same caliber

. In re Marriage of W ade
, 408 I ll. App. 3d 775, 778, 9 4 6 N. E

. 2 d 485, 488 (2011). The trial court’s decision to enter a bifurcated judgme nt for dissoluti on is revie wed using an abuse of discretion standard. Id

. at 778, 946 N.E.2d at 488. As the finder of fac t, this allows the court broad discretion in deciding whether to g rant bifurcation. Id

. at 7 8 0
, 946 N.E.2d at 490. ¶ 25 Tere sa argues t hat t he trial court commit ted rev er s i b le error when it rese rved the issue of child support. In this case , the only issue that was rese rved was child support and there is considera ble evidenc e in the rec ord and in tr ial court’s order that supports the ruling by the trial court. In deter

mining whether to rese rve the issue of child support, the court considere d

a number of statutory fac tors, including the financ ial resour ces of the child, the split custody
sy stem that was established by the mediation agree ment, and the fac t that both pare nts ear ned considera ble income that could provide for Robert. The court felt that in light of these fac ts, the application of a child support order ag ainst either party was not war rante d. Although the fac ts and circumstance s in this case are not amo n g the enumerated circumstanc es l isted in Cohn and W

ade , they are of the same caliber . Tere sa make s no showing that the trial cour t acte d arbitra

rily or ignor ed established p ri n ci ples of law in rese rving the issue of child support. There fore , we hold that the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion. ¶ 26 T er esa also claims that the trial court err ed by entering an order that was silent on th e issues of desig nati n g a re s i dential pare nt and contributions to educational expenses and
extracurr icular activities for Robert. A close examination of the trial court’s order does not support Tere sa’s contentions. On the issue of desig nating a residential pare nt, the trial court

rec og nized that the parties had agree d to and implemented a stable sy stem wher e Robert lives

-9-in the Shaker Ct. home full time (the home in which he has lived since birth). Wil liam lives

in the Shaker Ct. home with Robert from Thursday night throug h Sunday of eac h wee k, and Tere sa lives with Robert in the same home from Sunday throug h Thursday afte rnoon of eac h

wee k. The sy stem was established by a medi ation agree ment betwee n the parties dated J anuary 10, 2008. In its ruling
, the court considere d many fac tors including the statut o ry guidelines that permit joint custody of a child (750 I L CS 5/ 5 0 1 (W est 2010)), and the
guidelines that deter

mine the best interests of the ch i l d (750 I L CS 5/602(a) (West 2010)). Wit hout restatingsignific ant portions of the trial c ourt’s orde r, we note that the court g ave

a leng thy
, in-depth analy sis of rele vant fac tors befor e ultimately deciding not to disrupt the alre ady agree d-upon sy stem that had been established by the parties. The trial court decla red that eac h pare nt would share the residential res ponsibili ties in car ing for Robert. Most notably , the trial cour

t rea soned that both the par ties had adjusted their lifestyles and wor k schedule s and had succe ssfully set t h ei r persona l differ ence s aside for the best interests of their child. Clearly
, the court weighed appropr iat e fa ctors in making its deter mination. Acc ording ly
, there was no abuse of discretion and the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed. ¶ 27 In reg ard to the claims co n ce rn i n g ed u ca t ional, medical, and extracurr icular a ctivity
expenses, the trial court ’s order in fac t addre ssed eac h one of these issues. In its final judgme nt, the trial court’s order states that eac h party will pay equally all medical and dental
expenses for Robert which are not cover ed by insurance ; that Tere sa will provide Robert with medical insurance coverag e and that Wil liam is to reimburse Tere sa for half of the cost of

cover ag e; and the parties are to consult eac h other conce rning all of Robert’s extracurr icular activities. There fore
, Tere sa’s arguments that the trial court failed to rule on these issues are without merit. ¶ 28 Tere sa al s o ar gu es t h at t h e trial court committed reve rsible err or when it failed to incorpora te, in para g raph T of the judgme nt for dissoluti on, a list of marital proper ty that was subject to d i s t ri bution. No rea soning is prese nted nor citations to leg al authority

. An examination of para g raph T along with para g raphs L and M shows that while the trial court did not specific ally itemiz e all the proper ty that was to be distributed, it did awa rd eac h party his or her own persona l clothing, jewelr y , bank acc ounts, automobiles, items of appar el and other persona l proper

ty

. The order also provided a method for the parties to fairly distribute the rema ining proper

ty in the marital residenc e. The defic iency of this argument is such that there is no basis for disturbingthe trial cour t’s rulingon these issues. ¶ 29 Next, we consider Tere sa’s argument that the trial court committed reve rsible err or whe n the trial court advised Wil liam that he should testify

. Gene rally
, the court has wide latitude when conducting a trial. Crump v. Universal Safety Equipment Co.
, 79 I ll. App. 3d 202, 210, 398 N.E.2d 188, 194 (1979). Moreove r, in a nonjury trial, the comments of a trial judge are allowed g reater latitude than in jury trials. City o f C hicago v. W

estphalen
, 93 I ll. App. 3d 1110, 1121, 418 N.E.2d 63, 72 (1981) . “[N]otever y comment or unguarde d expression by

a trial judge will support a claim of prejudice

. A showing of prejudicia l e ffe ct is r equire d.” Id

. ¶ 30 In W

estphalen
, the tr i al j u d ge ad v i s ed the defe ndant in open court to reta in another lawyer. See W

estphalen
, 9 3 I l l

. Ap p

. 3d 1110, 418 N.E.2d 63. This court found that the

-10-comments made we re not pre judicial. See id

. The comments made by the trial court in this

case are even less prejudicia l tha n in W estphalen

. At trial, as Will iam was a bout to rest his

case in chief, the followingexchang e occ urre d:
“THE COU RT: No other witnesses?
MR. BIANUCCI

[W illiam] : No
THE COURT: You’r e not g oing to testify on your own c ase?
MR. BIANUCCI

[W illiam] : Can Ijust make statements?
THE COURT: You’r e g oing to have to. You’r e re prese nting yourself.
MR. BIANUCCI

[W illiam] : Okay

. THE COURT: But if you don’t prese nt a case as part of your case , then–I mean I still haven’ t hear d from y ou what y ou are say ing y our date of separation was, other than as part of your questioning , but that’s cer tainly not evidence

. MR. BIANUCCI

[W illiam] : Okay . Ido apolog ize.
THE COURT: And I apolog ize for overstepping my bounds a littl e bit, but if I don’t do this then ***.” These are the statements that Tere sa is challeng ing. We do not find that this comment by the
court sug g ests that it was acting as an advoca te for Wil liam. On the contra ry , the trial court was withi n its discretio n in clar ifying the proce dural process during trial. There is nothing
to sug g est that the trial court’s statements prejudice d Tere sa. We note that this was a bench trial. ¶ 31 Tere sa also argues that the trial court committed reve rsible err or when it allowed Wil liam

a y ea r to ref

inance the Shaker Ct. home and to remove Tere sa’s name from any mort gage obligation. Tere sa claims this ruling limit ed her options. In support of this asser tion, Tere sa cites section 503 of t he Act (750 I L CS 5/503 (West 2010)), which set s fo rth the factors t o be conside red in e quitable distribution. ¶ 32 “In case s involving the distribution of martial proper ty , the appellate court will reve rse only upon a finding that the lower court abused its discretion.” In re Marriage of McH enry , 292 I ll. App. 3d 634, 639, 686 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1997). Equitable distribution does not have
to be equal, and when the court rules that one spouse rec eives income-pr oducing assets, “the
court may achie ve an eq u itable distribution by awa rding offse tting pay

ments to the other
spouse or by awa

rding a g reater share of the total ma rital assets to the spouse who does not

rec eive the inc ome-produc ing a ssets.” Id . at 643, 686 N.E.2d at 677. ¶ 33 In this case , the tr i al co u rt re cognized that the parties owned the Shaker Ct. home, encumbe red by a mortg ag e of $500,000, and a home equit y l o an o f $ 9 9,632. They also owned the State Fa

rm office
, encumbe red by a mortg ag e of $53,187.67, in joint tenanc y

. Both qualify as marital proper ty and are also encumbe red by a fede ral lien of $3,418,854 due to Wi lliam’s criminal conviction. The trial court considere d the relative value a nd primary purposes of both pr operties. The court re asoned that the Shaker Ct. prope rty does not ha ve any subst antial equity

. On the other hand, the court found that the State Fa rm office
g ener ated $16,104 in renta l income i n 2 0 0 7 an d was estimated at the time to be worth betwee n $140,000 and $150,000. The court rea soned that the only way t o ef fec tuate an

-11-equitable division of marital proper ty would be to sell the proper ties; howeve r, both parties
reque sted that the court not exercise that option. The parties agree d that Wil liam should be allowed to reta in the Shaker Ct. home as long as h e i s able to ref inance the exis ting mortgages and remove Tere sa’s name. The court awa rded Wil liam the Shaker Ct. home while awa

rding Tere sa the income-pr oducing S t ate Fa rm office

. At the time of the ruling
, Tere sa’s income was more than twice the amount of Will iam’s income. The mere fac t that Wil liam was g iven a year to ref inance the Shaker Ct. home does not s up p o rt an ab u se of dis cr et i o n alleg ation in the di stribution of m arital property

. Absent an abuse of discretion,

we c annot hold that the distribution of marital proper ty was inequitable

. ¶ 34 Teres a fu rt her argues that the trial court committed reve rsible err or by penalizing he r twice for the same matter when it found that she dissipated funds by withdrawing money in the amount of $86,458.16 from the State Fa rm mutual fund acc ount on November 19, 2007. Howeve r, she makes no cog ent argument in support of this contention. Be cause this
argument is clea

rly defic ient pursuant to I llinois Suprem e C o u rt Rule 341, we will not consider this issue on appe al and it is theref ore f orfe ited. ¶ 35 Tere sa’s fina l argument is that the t rial court committed reve rsible er ror whe n it found that she dissipated martial assets and failed to identify the date of the irretrievable brea kdown of the mar

riag e. Aga in, she fails to make a cog ent argument and provide s no leg al support for her theory

. “A decision is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e when the opposite conclusion is cl early evident or wher e it is unrea sonable, arbitra ry , and not based on the evidenc e.” In re Marriage of Berger
, 357 I ll. App. 3d 651, 660, 829 N.E.2d 879, 887 (2005). We must revie w the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the appellee
, and wher e there is

a possibili ty for multipl e infere nces, we must acc ept those infere nces that support the court’s order

. In re Marriage of Divelbiss
, 308 I ll. App. 3d 198, 206-07, 719 N.E.2d 375, 381 (1999). Tere sa’s theory that the trial court’s finding of dissipation was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e is wholly unsupported by

the re cord or

established leg al principles. There fore
, we cannot s ay that the t rial cour t’s findingis ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. ¶ 36 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Cook County is affirme d.

¶ 37 Affir

med.

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