REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1958

September Term, 2014

______________________________________

BALDEO TANEJA

V.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Woodward,

Graeff,

Sharer, J. Frederick

 (Retired, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Sharer, J.

______________________________________

Filed: November 30, 2016
Preeta Gabba was shot three times at close range, resulting in her death, while 

walking in Germantown, Montgomery County, at about 7:45 on the morning of October 

12, 2013. Her former husband, Baldeo Taneja, and his wife, Raminder Kaur, were charged 

in Gabba’s murder. They were tried together and convicted by a jury of first-degree 

premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder, and use of 

a handgun in the commission of a felony.1

In his appeal, Taneja raises a single issue:

Whether the trial court violated Taneja’s due process right to 

present a defense by excluding several defense witnesses who 

were present in the court and ready to testify concerning the 

defense’s theory of the crime[.] 

Finding no abuse of discretion in the court’s rulings, we shall affirm the judgments 

of the circuit court. 

I. FACTS

The State’s theory of prosecution was that Taneja and Kaur conspired to kill Gabba, 

and that it was Kaur who fired the fatal shots. The State’s case was largely circumstantial 

and centered on motive and opportunity. The State produced evidence that the gun used 

to kill Gabba was found in the rear seat of Taneja and Kaur’s car 30 hours after the murder, 

and that Taneja had purchased the gun five weeks earlier. The defense argued lack of 

criminal agency and, more particularly, that others had motive to kill Gabba. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the following was 

adduced at Taneja’s trial. 

 

1 Following a post-trial motions hearing, Kaur was granted a new trial.
2

Gabba and Taneja were married in India in 2002, and continued to live there for 

several years. In 2006, Taneja moved to the United States; Gabba followed in 2009. They 

lived in the Germantown area, but not together. Two years later, Gabba and Taneja 

divorced, and soon afterward Taneja married Kaur and moved to Nashville, Tennessee. 

Gabba remained in the Germantown area and moved to a condominium on Crystal Rock 

Drive. 

On the morning of Gabba’s murder, she was en route to her job, walking from her 

home to the bus stop, as she had done regularly for the preceding three years. Three 

eyewitnesses testified to the events at the murder scene. 

Elena Komarova was driving her teenage son to his school in the 19700 block of 

Crystal Rock Drive, a residential area, when they heard several gunshots. Komarova 

slowed her car and saw two women ahead of her. One of the women, later identified as 

Gabba, started crossing the street in the middle of the block, while the other woman was 

close behind her. As Gabba fell into the street in front of Komarova’s car, the second 

woman ran away. Komarova and her son described the woman who ran away, in part, as 

wearing a bright orange scarf. They initially described both women as African-American, 

although, at trial, both were less positive about their race. Neither saw anyone else in the 

immediate area at the time. 

A man living in an apartment about 100 yards from where the shooting occurred 

testified that he heard gunshots and looked out his window. He saw a woman, later 

identified as Gabba, lying on the ground, and ten feet away another woman, who exhibited 

a slight limp, was running away. The witness described the woman who was running away 
3

as in her late 40's or early 50's with “brownish” skin color and wearing a bright head scarf. 

Like the Komarovas, he initially told the police that the woman was African-American, 

but, at trial, was less positive of her race. 

Suspicion quickly fell on Taneja and Kaur. Several hours after the murder, around 

3:30 p.m., Montgomery County Police Department homicide detectives called Taneja’s 

cell phone, but it went directly to voice mail, as did several additional calls. Warrants were 

obtained for Taneja and Kaur, who were arrested in Tennessee around 2:00 p.m. the day 

following the murder, as they were driving away from their home. One of the detectives 

observed that Kaur walked with a limp. 

The police searched the car and recovered a backpack containing a wig, black hair 

dye, a black hoodie, and a plastic bag. In the plastic bag was a .357 Ruger LCR revolver, 

which later testing and examination determined to be the murder weapon. The plastic bag 

also contained a holster for the .357 Ruger, and a 100 Ruger revolver. Inside Kaur’s purse 

the police found a note in her handwriting that read: “You calm down. We are now in 

Tennessee near my home.” A global positioning system device (GPS) was recovered from 

the front console of the car. Inside Taneja’s wallet was a piece of paper on which Kaur 

had written Gabba’s address. 

A search of Taneja’s residence recovered documents with a note on top in Kaur’s 

handwriting that read, “Dragon story and other court documents.” The police also 

recovered a composition notebook with different handwriting that read, in part, “No brass, 

no evidence.” 
4

A medical examiner testified that Gabba had been shot three times in the upper chest 

and abdomen. The bullets had entered from the left side and traveled toward the right; two 

of the bullets entered the front part of her body, one entered from the back. Although two 

of the wounds were “rapidly fatal,” the medical examiner testified that Gabba could have 

possibly walked several steps before falling. 

Two firearm and tool mark identification experts testified that the three bullet 

specimens recovered from Gabba’s body were all fired from the .357 Ruger LCR revolver 

that was recovered from Taneja’s car. Taneja’s DNA was found on both guns seized from 

his car. 

The State also presented evidence to support its theory of Taneja’s and Kaur’s 

motive to kill Gabba, including that, in 2009, when Gabba moved to the United States from 

India, Taneja and Gabba were experiencing marital discord. While Gabba lived in a 

condominium in Germantown with one of Taneja’s sons, Taneja and Kaur lived nearby 

and held themselves out as husband and wife. 

In 2010, Gabba and Taneja began divorce proceedings, which became “very 

contentious” even though they had little property and no children together. The State 

introduced evidence that during the divorce proceedings, Taneja asked his son and Kaur to 

spy on Gabba, and that Taneja referred to Gabba as “Dragon Lady,” as did his son and 

Kaur. At one point during the divorce proceedings, Gabba, acceding to Taneja’s demand, 

left the family home. She later returned, pursuant to a court order, to find that Taneja had 

erected walls so she had access only from the entry door to her bedroom. 
5

The State presented evidence that, although the divorce became final in July 2011, 

Taneja failed to honor their divorce agreements, and their interactions continued to be 

acrimonious. Indeed, at the time of Gabba’s murder, Taneja still had not transferred their 

property in India as required by the divorce settlement, despite several requests by Gabba. 

Additional evidence was offered by the State relating to Taneja’s agreement, as part 

of the divorce settlement, to pay alimony in the amount of $2,400 each month for three 

years. Alimony was to terminate upon the death of either party. By February 2013, Taneja 

had fallen three months behind in his alimony obligation, prompting Gabba to send several 

demands for payment, via e-mail. Eventually, her attorney filed a contempt petition against 

Taneja who, in response, filed a counterclaim for $100,000. The contempt hearing was 

scheduled for October 10, 2013, two days before the murder, but several days before the 

hearing, their attorneys negotiated an agreement whereby Taneja agreed to pay the arrears 

within 90 days. 

The State also presented evidence of Taneja’s and Kaur’s opportunity to kill Gabba. 

About five weeks before Gabba’s murder, Taneja attended a day-long gun training 

class in Tennessee. The class included four hours of instruction and four hours of shooting 

range experience that would allow him to obtain a “handgun carry permit.” In his 

testimony, the instructor recalled that, at the first class, Taneja entered the classroom with 

a woman and sat in the last row. When the woman was asked to leave because she had not 

paid to attend the class, Taneja moved to the first row. The instructor particularly 

remembered Taneja because he took “a ton of” notes. Among the instructor’s 

recommendations to the class participants was that they purchase a revolver rather than a 
6

semiautomatic, because the latter requires much more training for accuracy than a revolver. 

He further remembered telling the class that a semiautomatic “spits out” shell casings that 

can later be matched to the gun, but a revolver does not. 

On September 28, 2013, two weeks before the murder, Taneja purchased two 

revolvers from a gun store in Tennessee: a .357 Ruger LCR, which was described as a 

snub- nosed revolver designed with a “concealed hammer” so it would not get hung up on 

clothing, and a 100 Ruger GP. Additionally, Taneja purchased a holster for the .357 and 

ammunition for both guns. Kaur was present in the store when Taneja purchased those 

items. 

Around 7:00 p.m. on October 11, the night before the murder, Taneja and Kaur 

checked into the Red Roof Inn in Germantown, about eight miles from where Gabba was 

shot. From the GPS recovered from Taneja’s car, the police learned that at 9:58 a.m. the 

next morning – October 12 – the GPS device traveled toward the District of Columbia. 

The evidence disclosed that both Taneja and Kaur were involved in Amway 

distribution and sales, Taneja since the early 1990's. On the weekend of October 11-13, 

2013, Amway held a “Free Enterprise” weekend conference at the Washington Hilton, 

involving thousands of Amway members. The event started Friday night at 6:00 p.m. and 

lasted until Sunday at 3:45 p.m. Taneja’s Amway sponsor testified that Taneja was aware 

of the importance of attending the conference. 

At 10:44 a.m. on the morning of the murder, Taneja purchased two tickets for the 

conference. About 30 minutes later, the GPS revealed a stop near the Washington Hilton, 

a distance of about 19 miles from the Red Roof Inn. At 11:37 a.m., Taneja and Kaur 
7

entered the conference, where they were seen by Taneja’s Amway sponsor and his wife 

shortly after they arrived. A short time later the sponsor texted Taneja, inviting him and 

Kaur to join their group for lunch. Taneja texted back that he could not make it because 

Kaur was not feeling well. The sponsor’s wife testified that Kaur had not appeared unwell 

when she had seen her earlier. From the GPS device, the police determined that Taneja 

and Kaur attended the three day event for less than an hour, leaving the D.C. area shortly 

after noon. Their car continued westward, stopping in Farragut, Tennessee around 

midnight. Their travel resumed the following morning around 9:30 and concluded at their 

home about noon. 

After the State rested, Taneja called nine witnesses who testified as to his character 

trait for peacefulness. 

Taneja also called several witnesses to support his theory that another person was 

the shooter. Specifically, he called: (1) Ms. Komarova to suggest that the woman who ran 

away did so out of fear of being shot; (2) two witnesses who testified that Taneja’s current 

annual income was $150,000 to $175,000, to suggest that he had no financial motive to 

commit the crime; (3) Taneja’s divorce attorney, who testified that Taneja was not 

displeased with the outcome of the divorce; (4) a gunshot residue expert to suggest that the 

woman near Gabba just before her death was not the shooter; and (5) a witness who testified 

that an indoor shooting range near the defendant’s home in Tennessee was open on Sunday, 

to suggest that Taneja and Kaur were on their way to the shooting range with their guns 

when they were arrested leaving their house. 
8

II. DISCUSSION

Taneja argues that the trial court violated his right to present a defense when it 

excluded three witnesses, whom he had subpoenaed, were in court, and prepared to testify 

– Deepinder Singh, Dan Wright, and Utsav Taneja.2 Singh is Kaur’s son; Wright was 

Gabba’s attorney in a lawsuit against Singh; and Utsav is Taneja’s son.

Taneja argues that the witnesses’ testimony would have suggested that Singh shot 

and killed Gabba. He relies heavily on Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511 (2006), to support his 

argument. The State responds that Kelly is distinguishable and that the trial court’s ruling 

to exclude the witnesses was not reversible error because the proffered testimony was

inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant. 

A. Law

The Supreme Court discussed the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and its applicability to the State through the 

Fourteenth Amendment nearly 50 years ago in Washington v. Texas: 

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel 

their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to 

present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version 

of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may 

decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to 

confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of 

challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own 

witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental 

element of due process of law. 

 

2 To avoid confusion, we shall refer to Utsav Taneja by his first name.
9

388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In Maryland, the right of a criminal defendant to produce witnesses 

on his own behalf is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 

Constitution and by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Redditt v. State, 337 

Md. 621, 634-35 (1995); McCray v. State, 305 Md. 126, 133 (1985). 

Although the right of a defendant in a criminal trial to present witnesses in his 

defense is a critical right, it is not absolute. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407-10 (1988). 

See also McCray, 305 Md. at 133-35. “[T]he accused does not have an unfettered right to 

offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard 

rules of evidence. The Compulsory Process Clause provides him with an effective weapon, 

but it is a weapon that cannot be used irresponsibly.” Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410. The 

proffered evidence must be sufficiently relevant, rather than “cast[ing] a bare suspicion 

upon another.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 323-24 (2006) (quoting State v. 

Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 1941)). In Muhammad v. State, we noted that: 

the right to present a defense, albeit fundamental, is 

nonetheless subject “to two paramount rules of evidence, 

embodied both in case law and in Maryland Rules 5-402 and 

5-403. The first is that evidence that is not relevant to a 

material issue is inadmissible. The second is that, even if 

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” 

177 Md. App. 188, 274 (2007) (quoting Smith v. State, 371 Md. 496, 504 (2002)) (emphasis 

in Muhammad). 

“Relevant evidence” is defined as “having any tendency to make the existence of 

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
10

probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md. Rule 5-401. “Relevance is a 

relational concept. Accordingly, an item of evidence can be relevant only when, through 

proper analysis and reasoning, it is related logically to a matter at issue in the case, i.e., one 

that is properly provable in the case.” Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591 (2000) (emphasis 

added). Relevant evidence is admissible, and “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not 

admissible.” Md. Rule 5-402. Even relevant evidence, however, may be excluded “if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Md. Rule 5-403. 

A trial court is given wide latitude in controlling the admissibility of evidence. Sifrit 

v. State, 383 Md. 116, 128 (2004) (citing Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 (1997)). 

We review the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 128-29 

(citing Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 404-05). “Abuse occurs when a trial judge exercises 

discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when he or she acts beyond the letter or 

reason of the law.” Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175 (2005) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 

375 Md. 284, 295-96 (2003)). “If the trial court’s ruling is reasonable, even if we believe 

it could have gone the other way, we will not disturb the ruling on appeal.” Peterson v. 

State, 196 Md. App. 563, 585 (2010) (citing Fontaine v. State, 134 Md. App. 275, 288 

(2000)). 

In accordance with the law on relevancy and admissibility, it follows that a 

defendant may be excluded from propounding evidence “if it merely cast[s] a bare 

suspicion upon another or raise[s] a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime 
11

by another.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. at 323-24 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Gregory, 16 S.E.2d at 534). For instance, in Worthington v. State, 38 

Md. App. 487 (1978), the defendant’s counsel sought to cross-examine the victim to 

introduce evidence of the victim’s gambling debts, under the theory that the defendant was 

not the only individual who had a motive to assault the victim. Id. at 495-97. The trial 

court sustained the State’s objection because there was no other evidence submitted by the 

defense to support such a theory. Id. at 496-97. We affirmed the trial court’s decision, 

acknowledging that animosity of others toward the victim could raise an inference that 

those others and not the defendant shot the victim, but “that such a connection is, in the 

absence of real evidence pointing toward [defendant’s] theory, totally speculative and 

tenuous.” Id. at 498 (emphasis added). Cf. Marshall v. State, 174 Md. App. 572, 580-81 

(2007) (while defense counsel was able to present evidence that two other suspects with 

possible motive and opportunity were developed by police, trial court did not err in 

excluding documentary evidence supporting theory because both suspects had alibis and 

theory was too speculative and tenuous) and Malik v. State, 152 Md. App. 305, 323-25 

(2003) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of prior murder and assault convictions 

of one of alleged victims to support theory that he and not the defendant was the gunman, 

as any potential relevance was outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice and misleading 

jury). 

On that foundation, we now turn to the specific facts related to Taneja’s argument 

which, because those facts present great nuances, we relate in some detail. 
12

B. Trial

After Taneja presented several character witnesses, as well as witnesses supporting 

his theory that someone else could have committed the crime, Taneja informed the court 

that he wished to call Kaur’s son, Deepinder Singh, who was subpoenaed and present. 

Defense counsel stated that he intended to suggest that it was Singh who shot Gabba. 

Counsel further proffered that he wanted to question Singh about a replevin lawsuit he filed 

against Gabba in 2010, in which Singh alleged that Gabba lost or destroyed personal items 

he had stored in her home while deployed to Kuwait. The replevin court granted Gabba’s 

motion for summary judgment in March 2011. 

The court questioned whether defense counsel had a good faith basis for believing 

that Singh had committed the murder. Counsel, somewhat obliquely, responded that he 

also wished to call Dan Wright, Gabba’s attorney in the replevin lawsuit, and Utsav Taneja, 

Taneja’s son from his first marriage. Counsel then proffered that Utsav would testify to a 

conversation with Singh after his unsuccessful lawsuit against Gabba in which: 

Deepinder Singh told [Utsav] somebody ought to kill that B. 

Now, we’re ask[ing], we’re saying it in terms of a motion in 

limine. There obviously would be an objection to that, so 

we’re asking Your Honor to rule on that substantively but it 

also has the purpose of answering Your Honor’s question as to 

a good faith basis. 

So now, I needed to get permission to tell you that, all right. 

And now I’ve gotten it. So, that is the extent of my proffer at 

this point. And I think I’ve said, he was in the military. Was 

at Germantown at 2:30. He lives there. He lost the lawsuit. 

He filed it, hired an attorney to pursue it and he lost it. He was 

upset about it, and he made that statement to Utsav. 
13

Defense counsel added that Singh would also testify that he had a familiarity with guns 

and, on the morning of the murder, he had brunch at a restaurant near the Red Roof Inn. 

Counsel then stated: “I don’t even need to be doing what I’m doing right now . . . [because 

of Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511 (2006)] . . . [b]ut [] we’re talking about the assertion of the 

Fifth[.]” He continued: 

All three of these issues are intertwined. [Kelly], is it a good 

faith basis, and can he do it in front of the jury if he’s going to 

do it. And you know this involves as we’ve already said the 

constitutional due process right to put on evidence and the 

Sixth Amendment. 

Defense counsel then conducted a voir dire of Singh, under oath, informing Singh 

that he may call him as a witness and he may ask him questions about: where he was on 

the night before the murder, at the time of the murder, and on the afternoon after the 

murder; the lawsuit he filed against Gabba; a conversation he had with Utsav about how 

he felt about Gabba after the lawsuit; and his familiarity with handguns. Singh stated that 

he was willing to answer those questions, but when asked by Kaur’s attorney whether he 

would answer questions if it implicated him in the murder of Gabba, Singh said he would 

not. 

The discussion of Singh’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right continued. The 

State advised the court that Singh would not be granted immunity from prosecution, but 

that he would not be prosecuted because, in the State’s view, “I think he might have been 

told about the crime afterwards, but I don’t think he did anything criminal here.” Defense 

counsel then requested that Singh be allowed to speak to a lawyer, and reiterated that he 

wanted to call Wright about what he observed in the lawsuit between Singh and Gabba. In 
14

response, the court questioned Singh further, who eventually told the court that he had not 

“done anything.” 

At this point, the court ruled that Singh could not invoke his Fifth Amendment 

privilege because he lacked a good faith basis to believe that he would be prosecuted. The 

court then stated: 

So then given that, the question then becomes whether [defense 

counsel] now can call him as a witness to say, I filed suit 

against her in 2010, which was resolved in 2011. [Defense 

counsel] proffers that he then made this comment in I guess the 

late summer or fall of 2011 saying “the bitch should die.” Was 

he present, had the ability to do it, and so what’s the State’s 

position with that, with respect to that given that he’s here and 

able to respond to those in effect accusations? 

In response, citing the rules of evidence, both the State and Kaur’s attorney objected 

to the defense calling Singh to attempt to implicate him in the murder. They argued that 

Singh’s testimony was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and it would confuse and 

mislead the jury. Defense counsel then made a second proffer that Singh, who held 

Taneja’s power of attorney, sold Taneja’s Germantown home without telling him. The 

court responded that this additional proffer was not relevant and asked counsel whether the 

right to present a defense superseded the rules of evidence; counsel said that it did. The 

court then ruled as follows on whether defense counsel could implicate Singh in the 

murder: 

[T]he whole issue appears to me is one of whether or 

not the evidence that you seek to elicit from this particular 

witness which in turn I think drives the consideration of the 

other witnesses, whether the evidence that you seek to present 

from Mr. Singh is deemed to be relevant evidence. 
15

And the proffered evidence in this case, as I understand 

it, and I think the record clearly reflects that what you seek to 

do is to put before the jury Mr. Singh and establish that he had 

motive. That he had this grudge against Preeta Gabba which 

went back to 2010, 2011 as evidenced by this lawsuit. Perhaps 

to predate that, but as evidenced by the lawsuit of 2010 which 

was resolved in March of 2011. 

And it’s further evidenced by statements that Utsav 

would testify that the witness had made to him subsequent 

thereto in mid-2011 to late-2011 where he said, somebody 

should kill the bitch and at the same time there was some 

discussion about his background and experience, which 

included the fact that he was in the reserves. Has some 

experience with guns. 

And that from this witness, that really is the limits of the 

evidence. I mean, the proffer seems to be that you want to 

create for the jury, then, the possibility that somebody else 

could have done this. Not your client. And so then the issue 

becomes whether or not the evidence proffered is relevant to 

prove that proposition or has a tendency to make that 

proposition more true or more probable. 

After citing the rules on relevancy, materiality, and probative value, the court continued: 

Is there anything from which the jury could logically 

infer from this testimony that he might possibly be the person 

who committed this? And there’s absolutely nothing that you 

proffered that puts him anywhere near that gun or in touch with 

that gun, or conceivably explains how he possibly could have 

come in possession of [that] which is uncontrovertedly the 

murder weapon in this case. 

So, the only other evidence is that he lives in the area 

and that he had brunch some time on the date of the shooting. 

But we know the shooting occurred at approximately 7:00 

something in the morning, close to 8:00 in the morning. 

So, I think the question is one of, it’s addressed before 

we get an issue of the Court’s discretion. I am very mindful 

that this is a murder case. I’m very mindful of the defendant’s 

right to put on a defense. But I don’t believe that that right 
16

supersedes the require[ment that] the evidence be somehow 

relevant. 

And when I look at all of the facts in this case, it’s 

inconceivable to me from the facts that you’ve proffered that 

this witness would testify that any jury could reasonably infer 

from that particular evidence that any fact that would tend to 

make more probative the defense in this case, that your client 

was not directly involved in the shooting or that your client was 

only an accessory after the fact. 

So for all of . . . those reasons, I therefore don’t believe 

that the evidence is relevant evidence, and will preclude you 

from calling him in front of the jury. And for the same reason, 

preclude you from calling the other two witnesses to the extent 

their testimony relates to testimony that his motive to want to 

shoot Preeta. 

Defense counsel reiterated that pursuant to Kelly, he wanted to call Singh, Utsav, 

and Wright, even though he acknowledged that the State would object. The court 

responded that: 

in [Kelly] the defense called zero witnesses, which was one of 

Judge Cathell’s problems, and in [Kelly] I basically anticipated 

the State’s objection. So I asked [the defense counsel], 

anticipating the objection, what the evidence would be and as 

the dissent pointed out, everybody agreed that the evidence 

was inadmissible. But that [sic] Judge Cathell said well, the 

State might have changed their mind or might not have 

objected. 

In this case, the State has told me they object. . . . and 

[Kaur’s attorney] objects as well. . . . So I don’t think [Kelly] 

applies to those facts.

Defense counsel then called Utsav, who testified, inter alia, about his familial relationships 

and Taneja’s character trait for peacefulness. 
17

After Utsav’s testimony, defense counsel made a third proffer that, during a 

conversation between Utsav, Singh, and Taneja, in late 2011 or early 2012, Singh said that 

he was going to a shooting range and that Taneja should also buy a gun to go to a shooting 

range. The court ruled that because defense counsel’s additional proffer was vague as to 

the time period and whether it resulted in Taneja purchasing the murder weapon, “it would 

not affect my evaluation of the issue of relevancy, and the exercising of my discretion I 

still would find it not to be relevant.” Defense counsel asked if he could put those witnesses 

on the stand outside the presence of the jury, although he admitted that he had let Wright 

leave the courthouse. The court responded: 

Okay, well then what that means is then, we’re going to have 

to put Mr. Wright on at some point but we don’t have to put it 

in front of the jury because there’s no agreement on what the 

facts are for purposes of the Court making a decision on the 

feel [sic]. So you can both call him at some point. I don’t 

know exactly when. Maybe when the jury is deliberating we 

can put it on, and then you can flesh out the proffer, okay. 

It is noteworthy that, although the court was agreeable to hearing Wright’s testimony 

outside the presence of the jury, Taneja never mentioned it again, nor did any of the parties. 

Singh and Wright did not testify for the defense. 

Taneja argues on appeal that the trial court’s ruling “gutted” his defense. We are 

not persuaded, and explain.

Taneja proposed to question Singh about: the replevin lawsuit he brought against 

Gabba in 2010, a statement he made about her around that time that “someone should kill 

that b[itch]”; living in the area where Gabba was murdered; being familiar with weapons; 

selling Taneja’s Germantown home after he was given power of attorney following 
18

Taneja’s arrest; and a statement he made to Taneja in late 2011 or early 2012 that Taneja 

should go to a shooting range. 

We agree that such evidence would have been, at best, only tangentially relevant 

and had a high probability of confusing, distracting, and misleading the jury. We are 

mindful that evidentiary questions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and are 

not to be disturbed – even if we were inclined to rule differently – absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. In sum, the evidence Taneja sought to introduce through Singh was 

disconnected and remote. It had no other effect than to raise the barest of suspicion that 

Singh might have killed Gabba. Cf. State v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 484-88 (Me. 2010) 

(defendant not denied his right to present a defense where trial court excluded alternative 

suspect evidence); Commonwealth v. Buckman, 957 N.E.2d 1089, 1096-98 (Mass. 2011) 

(tension between neighbor and victim not sufficient to permit introduction of alternative 

suspect evidence). See also David McCord, But Perry Mason Made it Look so Easy!: The 

Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest that Someone Else 

is Guilty, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 917, 938-47 (1996). 

For the same reasons, we likewise find Wright’s and Utsav’s proffered testimony to 

have been lacking in relevance and more likely to be misleading, confusing, and distracting 

than relevant and probative. 

C. Kelly v. State

Taneja relies heavily on Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511 (2006), to support his 

“alternative suspect” argument. Kelly asked the Court of Appeals to decide:
19

[w]hether the right to present a defense is violated when the 

court, without justification, and as a predicate to permitting an 

available witness to take the stand, requires the defense to 

proffer, in the State’s presence, the content and theory of 

admissibility of the witness’s testimony?

Id. at 517. Under the facts presented, the Court answered the question in the affirmative 

and reversed Kelly’s convictions.3

In Kelly, the State presented evidence that three friends engaged in an angry verbal 

exchange with Francesco Kelly while riding a public bus in Silver Spring, after which the 

three friends left the bus and walked into a nearby 7-Eleven. A short time later, while they 

stood waiting for the next bus, a man appeared with a gun and shot at them. Two of the 

victims, Nicholas Watson and Melissa Wainwright, identified Kelly as the shooter. Id. at 

517-19.

After the State rested, Kelly’s attorney informed the court that she intended to call 

two police officers. One had been subpoenaed and was present, but the other was neither 

subpoenaed nor present. Id. at 519. The State initially objected because the defense had 

not included one of the witnesses on the witness list presented to the jury. In response to 

the court’s query as to what she intended to elicit from the subpoenaed witness, defense 

counsel replied that she wanted to elicit testimony that the police had other information 

about the shooting that they failed to pursue. Id. at 520-21. The court indicated its opinion 

that the testimony would be hearsay, but granted a brief recess to enable defense counsel 

to locate the one witness who was in the courthouse. 

 

3 The convictions had been affirmed by this Court. Kelly v. State, 162 Md. App. 122 

(2005).
20

When the trial was reconvened, defense counsel informed the court that the officer 

was present and ready to testify. The State requested a proffer of the officer’s testimony, 

and the court asked counsel what the officer was going to testify to. Id. at 522. Initially 

defense counsel stated that she did not know what the officer would say, only that she 

wished to elicit two pieces of evidence from the officer: (1) the bus schedule, which would 

impeach the victims’ testimony as to how long they were waiting for the bus; and (2) that 

the bus driver had no recollection of the altercation on the bus. Id. at 522-23. The court 

reiterated its opinion that the proffered evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 524. 

When the State questioned what defense counsel could ask of the witness that would not 

be inadmissible hearsay, defense counsel responded: “I don’t get to ask them that in their 

case, and I think that I can ask it without eliciting hearsay.” Id. at 525. 

Defense counsel next stated that she also wanted to ask the officer about a bus 

surveillance videotape. The court, however, opined that the tape was irrelevant because it 

was inoperable. Id. at 526. When defense counsel again asked if she could elicit the bus 

schedule from the officer to show that the police might have interviewed the wrong bus 

driver, the court denied the request, stating that the officer did not have personal knowledge 

of the schedule. Believing that the officer would not give any admissible testimony, the 

court dismissed the officer and adjourned for the day. Id. at 526-27. 

When the court asked the following day if there were any other unresolved issues, 

defense counsel stated she wished to call a civilian witness. The court asked for a proffer 

of that witness’s testimony, and defense counsel objected to having “to proffer what 

witnesses are going to testify to. I mean, [the State] can make objections just like I have 
21

to.” Id. at 527 (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, defense counsel said that she wanted to 

call the witness to testify as to Watson’s habit of loitering around the bus stop and his 

reputation for violence in the community, to suggest that the shooter had been someone 

other than Kelly. Id. at 528. The State objected, arguing that the testimony was relevant 

only to a collateral issue and, further, that the proposed witness did not have personal 

knowledge. The Court of Appeals resolved that the State objected only because the trial 

court required defense counsel to make its proffer. Id. at 528.

The discussion of the matter continued, defense counsel stating that the testimony 

was relevant and the court concluding it was too speculative for a jury to infer that others 

might have wanted to kill Watson, and would have come to the 7-Eleven to shoot him at 

that precise time. Id. at 528-30. The court ultimately ruled that it would not permit defense 

counsel to call the civilian witness. When the court then asked if the defense rested, defense 

counsel stated, “I guess so, since I am not allowed to call any witnesses.” Id. at 530 

(emphasis omitted). 

The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Kelly’s assertions by announcing that it 

would review the trial court’s “decision not to allow the witnesses to testify under the abuse 

of discretion standard applicable to exclusion of evidence in general.” Id. at 532. The 

Court discussed the law on compulsory process, recognizing that while it is a fundamental 

right, it does not confer the right to present inadmissible evidence. Id. at 532-37. 

The Court then reasoned that the trial court’s refusal to place the witnesses on the 

stand was premature, stating: 
22

[T]he petitioner made the required showing to, at the 

very least, permit him to question the witnesses. Petitioner’s 

counsel proffered that Officer Patel would testify to the 

conduct of the investigation questioning the events related by 

the three victims. [The civilian witness] was to impeach 

Watson’s testimony, which would go to his credibility as a 

witness. This testimony presumably could have been favorable 

to the petitioner. Watson was one of two witnesses who could 

identify the petitioner as the shooter. 

Id. at 538. 

The Court noted that the State did not object to two of the three witnesses, and 

believed that the State objected only to the civilian witness testifying when prompted by 

the court’s calling for the proffer. Id. at 528. The Court stated that “the trial judge should 

have allowed the witnesses to testify and rule on the admissibility of their testimony, if 

proper objections were made, during questioning by the defense, not before.” Id. at 539. 

The main concern was that, rather than allowing the State to make or waive its pertinent 

objections in the normal course of examination, “the court sua sponte opted to require the 

petitioner’s counsel to proffer the questions she was going to ask. It then decided that, 

because such questions would only elicit hearsay testimony, the witnesses would not be 

allowed to testify.” Id. at 540. In doing so, in the Court’s view, the trial court 

impermissibly became an advocate for the State: 

When the trial court makes a ruling as to the 

admissibility of evidence on its own without a prior objection 

by any of the parties, the court leaves its role as an arbiter and 

assumes another role as a party to the proceeding, placing into 

question the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
23

Id. at 541. This danger is especially magnified where there is a lopsided requirement of a 

pre-examination proffer as to all of the defendant’s witnesses but not to any of the State’s 

witnesses. Id.

The Court concluded: 

When the court assumes the role of a party by ruling on 

the admissibility of evidence in the absence of appropriate 

objections, the court departs from the adversarial nature of our 

system where the State, not the court, bears the burden of 

objecting to the testimony offered by the opposing party. 

Should the State fail to object, otherwise inadmissible evidence 

sometimes may be admitted to the detriment of its case because 

. . . such a failure to object is considered a waiver. This is not 

to say that the defendant will be allowed to present properly 

objected to testimony that violates the rules of evidence or 

procedure. It merely requires that exclusion take place at the 

appropriate time and in the appropriate manner. The 

responsibility of the trial court to control the proceedings 

before it does not extend to the right to take over a party’s case. 

When that occurs, as it occurred here, the court risks denying 

to a defendant the fair trial guaranteed to him by both the 

United States Constitution and Maryland’s Constitution.

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “[t]he 

conduct of the trial must of necessity rest largely in the control 

and discretion of the presiding judge.” Kelly, 162 Md. App. at 

141. That control, however, must safeguard the defendant’s 

constitutional rights. 

Id. at 542-43 (internal string citations and parentheticals omitted). Because the court 

denied Kelly the right to present a defense by not allowing any of his witnesses to testify, 

he was granted a new trial. Id. at 543.

While Kelly is similar to the case before us, we are ultimately persuaded that it is 

distinguishable. In Kelly, the trial court required defense counsel to proffer the testimony 

of its only witnesses. Here, Taneja’s proffer of the testimony of Singh and the other two 
24

witnesses was generated by a Fifth Amendment concern as to Singh. But for that concern, 

no proffer would have been called for. This is not, as the Court found in Kelly, a situation 

where the trial court abandoned its role as a neutral arbiter and required counsel to proffer 

its defense. Rather, the court focused its analysis on the relevance of the witnesses’ 

proffered testimony, and not its admissibility under other rules of evidence. Throughout 

the discussion of Singh’s potential testimony, the court noted variously:

[T]he whole issue appears to me is one of whether or not the 

evidence that you seek to elicit . . . from Mr. Singh is deemed 

to be relevant evidence. 

* * *

And so then the issue becomes whether or not the evidence 

proffered is relevant to prove that proposition or has a tendency 

to make that proposition more true or more probable. 

* * *

Is there anything from which the jury could logically infer from 

this testimony that he might possibly be the person who 

committed this? 

* * *

I’m very mindful of the defendant’s right to put on a defense. 

But I don’t believe that that right supersedes the require[ment 

that] the evidence be somehow relevant. 

* * *

So for all of . . . those reasons, I therefore don’t believe 

that the evidence is relevant evidence, and will preclude you 

from calling him in front of the jury. 
25

Moreover, as was Kelly, Taneja was not denied the only witnesses available to him; 

Taneja was able to present a defense by vigorous cross-examination of the State’s witnesses 

and by calling several defense witnesses. Further, again unlike Kelly, the State and 

Taneja’s co-defendant, Kaur, objected to the calling of the three witnesses. It is noteworthy 

that Kaur strenuously objected – understandably, given that it was her son whom Taneja 

wanted to implicate in the murder of Gabba. We cannot conclude that both the State and 

Kaur’s attorney would have failed to make a timely objection had the witnesses been called 

to the stand. 

We also find Void v. State, 325 Md. 386 (1992), to be instructive, but nonetheless 

distinguishable. Void was charged with several crimes related to the kidnaping and 

robbery of Officer Steedley, the victim and the State’s essential witness. The State’s case 

rested substantially on Steedley’s credibility. Id. at 387.

Prior to Void’s trial, Steedley had been charged and tried on, but acquitted of, 

perjury charges related to the prosecution of unrelated drug offenses. Void subpoenaed 

three Prince George’s County Police Department officers who had testified against 

Steedley at the perjury trial, wishing to call them to testify as to Steedley’s character for 

truth and veracity. Id. at 388. Special counsel for the police department filed a pre-trial 

motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that: the officers had no knowledge of the arrest 

of Void; that the defense would attempt to elicit the prior perjury charge; and requiring the 

officers to be in court would place a great burden upon the department. The trial court 

agreed and quashed the subpoenas. Id. at 388-89.
26

On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the officers’ testimony 

would not have been admissible. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning: 

We believe that a fair conclusion can be drawn from the 

proceedings at the hearing on the motion that the testimony 

Void sought was directed to the character of Steedley. We are 

not in accord with the State’s notion that Void was merely 

attempting to introduce evidence of prior bad acts by Steedley 

under the guise of character evidence. It may be that defense 

counsel’s argument could have been articulated in more 

specific terms. And perhaps some of the reasons he gave for 

desiring the witnesses’ testimony, and which the judge 

declared he would not permit, may not have been admissible. 

But that did not justify precluding Void’s examination of the 

witnesses. The proper time for the judge to determine the 

admissibility of their testimony was upon their examination. 

Id. at 392. The Court continued: 

Here, however, the trial judge did not have a sufficient 

basis for the exercise of sound discretion. He refused to hear 

from the subpoenaed witnesses. Their affidavits were of no 

help; the averment that the witnesses had no knowledge of the 

facts and circumstances of the investigation, arrest or 

prosecution of Void was of no consequence. Their lack of such 

knowledge was neither relevant nor material to a determination 

of the credibility of Steedley. The bare statement that any 

personal knowledge of the subpoenaed witnesses that might be 

used to discredit any witness came to the subpoenaed witnesses 

in a confidential investigation, did not suffice to justify a 

refusal to permit Void to examine his witnesses. The judge 

could winnow out on hearing their testimony what was 

inadmissible as legitimately protected. We do not perceive 

how he could properly determine, on what was before him, that 

none of their testimony relating to the credibility of Steedley 

was admissible without affording Void an opportunity to 

examine them under oath. 

Id. at 393-94. Reversing, the Court stated: 

The short of it is that the trial judge should have heard 

from the subpoenaed witnesses, either at a pretrial hearing or 
27

at the trial out of the presence of the jury. He could, at that 

time, determine whether the witnesses had admissible 

testimony to offer. He erred in short-circuiting the common 

law and statutory rights of Void by quashing the subpoenas. 

Id. at 394 (internal citation omitted). 

The present case is likewise distinguishable from Void. The court in Void had little 

information before it when it ruled. Here, the exchange between the parties and the court 

about the facts and the law relating to the proposed testimony was expansive, in contrast 

with the essentially sua sponte rulings in both Kelly and Void. In fact, that discussion 

consumed more than 50 pages of trial transcript. Indeed, the Court in Kelly observed that 

the trial court’s rulings were “premature.” Kelly, 392 Md. at 538, 539. In contrast, here 

the court granted considerable breadth to the discussion; defense counsel was permitted to 

proffer in detail what he wanted to ask Singh should he be called and how Singh would 

respond. Taking the witnesses’ testimony outside of the presence of the jury would have 

been appropriate, indeed perhaps preferable, but in light of the circumstances presented 

and our standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion.4 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we can find no reason to conclude that the court’s rulings were arbitrary, 

capricious, or beyond the letter of reason of the law. Thus, we are persuaded that the trial 

 

4 We note that the court specifically stated that it was amenable to taking Wright’s

testimony out of the presence of the jury later during the trial. By not again raising the 

question, Taneja has waived it as to Wright. Cf. Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691 (1993) 

(“As Gilliam did not object to the course of action proposed by the prosecution and taken 

by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to 

complain that the court’s action was wrong.”)
28

court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting Taneja to call Singh, Wright, and Utsav 

to testify as to an “alternative suspect” possibility. We affirm the judgments of the trial 

court. 

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR MONTGOMERY 

COUNTY AFFIRMED.

COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.