CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIESHONOLULU, HAWAII DECEMBER 1998

Chinese Negotiating Styles: Japan’s ExperienceAmbassador Kagechika Matano

----

**Introduction**

**M**r.Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, my task now is to share with you some of Japan'sobservations on Chinese negotiating styles. China is, and has always been, a veryimportant neighbor for Japan. For the sake of lasting peace and friendship between Japanand China, settling problems through negotiations is essential. Across a strip of water inthe western Pacific, separating Japan and China, we Japanese have come to gather a fewimpressions about our Chinese neighbor’s negotiating styles.

In discussing this subject, I would like to focuson two features. The first is the emphasis on *principles*. The second is the senseof *pragmatism*. First let me talk about the importance of principles. This wasmanifest in the****negotiations for normalizing relations between Japan and China,which were concluded at the time of Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to China****inSeptember 1972.

Prior to the official talks between the two governments, China putforth its position for the normalization of Japan-China relations at meetings withnon-governmental delegations visiting China from Japan, such as a delegation of anon-government party, Komeito, which visited Beijing in July 1972. China's position aspresented in these meetings essentially boiled down to three principles, including therecognition of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legalGovernment of China. These three principles were commonly called "the threeprinciples for the restoration of relations."

These three principles as presented by China contained elements whichthe Japanese Government could not accept. In the official negotiations for normalizationthe two sides had to overcome serious difficulties, and after intense discussions, Japanand China agreed to the Joint Communique of September 1972. In relation to the JointCommunique, Japanese Government officials made statements to further clarify the Japaneseposition.

The Joint Communique of September 1972 became the basic framework ofrelations between Japan and China since the normalization of relations. As such, the twocountries refer to this document whenever the two sides discuss the fundamentals of theirrelations.

With regard to Taiwan, the two sides agreed to state their positions inparagraph 3 of the Joint Communique of September 1972, which says "The Government ofthe People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of theterritory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands****andrespects this stand of the****Government of the People's Republic of China, and itfirmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam****Proclamation." WhenChina raises questions about Japan's attitudes toward Taiwan, China refers to this JointCommunique. On our part, Japan has always reiterated its commitment to fully comply withthe Joint****Communique. Japan has also expressed its earnest hope for the peacefulsolution of the problems concerning Taiwan by the talks between the parties on both sidesof Taiwan Strait.

Recently the question of Taiwan was raised by China in connection withJapan-U.S. defense cooperation. Based on the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration of April 1996,Japan and the United States conducted a review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. DefenseCooperation adopted in 1978, and new Guidelines were issued in September last year. In thenew Guidelines, there is a section outlining the mode of cooperation between Japan and theUnited States in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japanand which will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The Guidelinesmake clear that the concept of regional contingencies is situational rather thangeographic.

Regarding the new Guidelines, China expressed its concern over Taiwanand made statements that the question of Taiwan is an internal matter for China and Taiwanshould not be included in the scope of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. In response to suchstatements by China, Japan has reiterated the view that regional contingencies aresituationally, not geographically, defined as stated in the Guidelines.

The Japan-China Joint Communique of 1972 includes a paragraph on thefive principles of peaceful coexistence, which China began to promote from the****mid-1950sas China's basic framework for dealing with foreign countries. Chinese negotiatorsfrequently refer to these principles, as for instance the principle of equality and mutualbenefit, in discussing economic****matters with Japan.

Following the normalization in 1972, the principles of anti-hegemonybecame a subject of hot debate in the negotiations for a Japan-China Treaty of Peace andFriendship. This became a difficult question since China insisted on including ananti-hegemony clause in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, whereas the Soviet Union,another important neighbor for Japan, reacted strongly against such a clause. It was in1978 when this question came to be settled. Japan and China agreed to add an articlestating that the Treaty shall not affect the position of either party regarding itsrelations with third countries.

As I have discussed, the matter of principles occupies a central partof negotiations with China.

**Importance of Principles**

**N**ow I wouldlike to offer my analysis of why Chinese negotiators attach so much importance to theprinciples.

First, it shows the intention to put forward the essence of China'sposition in negotiations. By laying down principles, China announces the basics of whatChina expects to accomplish in negotiations.

Second., once a principle is agreed upon through negotiations, itserves as the basis for future relations. China brings up those principles to promote itsstand in ensuing years. For instance, the principle of anti-hegemony was such a case.Equality and mutual benefit have also frequently been emphasized.

Third, it is useful for securing internal****accord within China.With its huge population, vast geographic expanse and diverse society, the principlesserve to show the rallying points for the Chinese people.

Fourth, it is in keeping with the Chinese rhetorical tradition. Thereis a Chinese expression "Yi mu liao ran," meaning "Just one glance, and itis so clear." We Japanese use the same expression "Ichimoku ryozen,"meaning the same, using the same four Chinese ideographs. Expressing fundamentals in shortphrases is deep in Chinese tradition.

At this stage, let me introduce to you my own experience in negotiatingwith the Chinese Government.

In 1989 when I was Director General of the Immigration Bureau of theMinistry of Justice, there took place one thing which surprised the Japanese nation.

In late May of that year a group of about 107 boat people landed on asmall uninhabited island off the coast of Nagasaki prefecture in Southern Japan. Theyclaimed to have come from Vietnam, and the Japanese government accommodated this group ofpeople in the refugee center. In June two more groups arrived, and suddenly in August thenumber of boats****arriving in the Japanese waters surged, and by the beginning ofSeptember a total of 18 groups numbering more than 2,100 persons arrived.

By this time my Bureau found out that in reality these people came fromChina, not from Vietnam.

Although they disguised themselves to be Vietnamese, they were eitherChinese totally unrelated to Vietnam or those Chinese who were settled****in Chinaafter leaving Vietnam. After these 18 groups, still a few hundred more people arrived insmall boats.

We began our negotiations with the Chinese government for theirrepatriation to China. The Chinese government acknowledged their responsibility forrepatriating the Chinese nationals who were unrelated to Vietnam. However they voiceddoubts about those Chinese who were settled in China after leaving Vietnam, saying thatthose Chinese were refugees from Vietnam who sought asylum in China at the time ofChina-Vietnam conflict.

Here was a case where the matter of principle had the decisivesignificance. Japan consulted the office of the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees, and it was established that the country which offered the first asylum had theresponsibility to look after the refugee. Once this principle was made clear, the Chinesegovernment fully cooperated with us in repatriating these Chinese people from Japan.

I am glad to add that the Chinese official with whom I negotiatedsuccessfully in Tokyo on this matter then, Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, is now the Chinese ForeignMinister.

**Sense of Pragmatism**

**H**avingdiscussed the importance of principles, I should now take up another important aspect ofChinese negotiating style: the sense of pragmatism.

Again let me refer to Japan's negotiations with China for normalizingrelations in 1972. As I reflect upon that page of history, I am struck by the wisdom ofboth Japanese and Chinese negotiators in accomplishing the difficult task of bringing thetwo sides together to the common ground to stand upon. I am impressed by the sense ofpragmatism displayed by the Chinese side in settling those problems that Japan'snegotiators regarded as vitally important.

One example is shown in the first paragraph of the Japan-China JointCommunique of September 1972. Prior to the visit to Beijing by Prime Minister Tanaka, theChinese side sent a message through an intermediary, Mr. Takeiri, Chairman of Komeito atthe time, a non-governmental party, setting forth the Chinese proposal for the jointcommunique. The Chinese proposal included a paragraph stating that *the state of war*betweenJapan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date upon which the jointcommunique is issued. From the standpoint of Japan, this was unacceptable. The Japanesegovernment held that since the Peace Treaty Japan concluded with the Republic of China in1952 legally took effect, it was impossible to agree to another document to terminate thestate of war. 

Through negotiations, the two sides came to agree to: (1) refer in thePreamble of the Communique to the aspiration of the peoples of the two countries for thetermination of the state of war, and (2) state in paragraph one that *the abnormal stateof affairs*that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of Chinais terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.

In this process, the sense of pragmatism to achieve a mutuallyacceptable solution was abundantly displayed.

Another case in point in this regard is the conclusion of a newJapan-China fisheries agreement. In 1975 a fisheries agreement between Japan and China wasconcluded. This 1975 Agreement has been the legal framework for fishing activities by thetwo countries. However, in 1996, both Japan and China joined the regime of the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea and each established its Exclusive Economic Zone.This development made it necessary for Japan and China to make new arrangements for theirfishing activities.

The new Fisheries Agreement, signed in November last year, provides fora set of measures in order to maintain stable relations between the two countries in thefield of fisheries. The core of the new agreement is to enable the fishing activities ofthe two countries in each other's Exclusive Economic Zone, provided that the coastal stateexercises control over the other party's fishing activities in its Exclusive EconomicZone. At the same time, in the areas where it is difficult to enable such mutualactivities, an area for provisional measures under the joint control of the two countrieswill be established. In addition, in the area south of 27 degrees North Latitude, theexisting system will be maintained.

This new Agreement reflects the willingness of both sides to takepractical measures to maintain stable fisheries relations, when both sides are aware thatit is difficult to agree quickly on a mutually acceptable demarcation of the ExclusiveEconomic Zones of the two countries. Through the negotiations for this new FisheriesAgreement, the sense of pragmatism was well displayed by the Chinese side.

From a Japanese perspective, it seems there is a political backgroundbehind the exercise of pragmatism. Namely, pragmatism is displayed amply when there ispositive political will in the top leadership of China to conclude an accord with Japan.

Now I would like to make some observations on the methodology ofChinese negotiations.

First, the use of intermediaries is key. We have experienced a goodnumber of cases where China sent to Japan its signals through intermediaries. Theseintermediaries were mostly members of the Japanese Parliament or business leaders whovisited China. Those signals were useful for the Japanese government to see the directionin which the wind was blowing.

We saw those signals through intermediaries at a time when negotiationsfor the Treaty of Peace and Friendship were at a standstill in the mid 1970's. Morerecently, when Japan's official assistance programs were interrupted after the Tian'anmensquare incident in 1989, signals were sent from China in the same manner, prompting theJapanese government to continue its economic cooperation.

This practice of using intermediaries is linked with the Chineseattitude of identifying those Japanese who China can regard as capable of working inharmony with China. We note that efforts are made by China to select from their standpointthe right people for the right purpose.

Second, the bureaucratic structure cannot be ignored. China today is ahighly structured society where the Political Bureau of the Communist Party holds theultimate power. Having negotiated with China, we have noted that Chinese delegates have toengage in as much or almost as much debating internally as with the Japanese delegates.Therefore, in order for a point to be accepted by the Chinese side, it is important thatour presentation is formulated in such a way that it would reach the top strata of theChinese decision-making machinery.

Third, the use of Chinese media must be understood. In enunciatingChinese viewpoints, China can mobilize its media. Depending on the situation, we also notedifferent shades of tone in what Chinese media says as compared to official statements.

Fourth, the distance between the central government and localauthorities must be kept in mind. There can be a time lag between the decisions of thecentral government in Beijing and the local authority which has jurisdiction over thesubject matter of negotiation. At the time when I was engaged in negotiations for stoppingthe flow of illegal immigrants from China, it was necessary to speak to the localauthorities of the region where illegal immigrants originated in parallel with speaking tothe Beijing authority.

Fifth, China’s rich historical heritage provides its negotiatorswith a generous amount of versatility in dealing with foreign countries. China is capableof placing itself in a position to show its magnanimity as well as severity. At times itsattitude is quite stern, and then it can become more conciliatory. This is versatility.

Ladies and Gentlemen, What I have stated is my brief analysis ofChinese negotiating style. Japan and China share a long history of relations which extendsover two thousand years. Through so many years of contacts and exchanges, Japan has cometo share many common cultural heritages with China. For instance, poems written by twooutstanding poets of Tang Dynasty era, Li Bai and Du Fu, are today as much appreciated inJapan as in China. At the same time, we Japanese are aware that China is different fromJapan in many ways, and it is important to know the difference.

Is China mysterious? This question was taken up in Dr. Kissinger'sconversation with Premier Chou Enlai. Mysterious or not, it is important to know thereality. By better understanding China, we can make our dialogue with China moremeaningful.

Japan is resolved to secure and develop a lasting relationship of peaceand friendship with China. To this end, peaceful negotiations to settle problems betweenthe two countries are of vital importance.

Based on our experiences, we in Japan are most willing to promotedialogue with China and other like-minded nations to establish a truly peaceful and stableinternational community with China.

Thank you.

----

*Ambassador Matano formerly served asJapan’s ambassador to Sweden, Latvia, and Vietnam. He also served as the DirectorGeneral of the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of Japan and later served asCommissioner of the Fair Trade Commission. These remarks were presented to the conferenceon "Asian Approaches to International Negotiations: Borders and Territories"held 8-10 September 1998. The conference was co-sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Center forSecurity Studies and the Atlantic Council of the United States.*

----