United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

STEPHEN THALER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF 

COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES 

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED 

STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2021-2347

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:20-cv-00903-LMBTCB, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.

______________________ 

Decided: August 5, 2022

______________________ 

RYAN BENJAMIN ABBOTT, Brown, Neri, Smith & Khan, 

LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

 DENNIS BARGHAAN, JR., Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States 

Department of Justice, Alexandria, VA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by JESSICA D. ABER; 

FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, PETER JOHN SAWERT,

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2 THALER v. VIDAL

MEREDITH HOPE SCHOENFELD, Office of the Solicitor, 

United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, 

VA. 

 MITCHELL APPER, Jerusalem, Israel, amicus curiae, pro 

se. 

 ______________________ 

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, TARANTO and STARK, Circuit 

Judges.

STARK, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the question of who, or what, can be

an inventor. Specifically, we are asked to decide if an artificial intelligence (AI) software system can be listed as the

inventor on a patent application. At first, it might seem 

that resolving this issue would involve an abstract inquiry 

into the nature of invention or the rights, if any, of AI systems. In fact, however, we do not need to ponder these metaphysical matters. Instead, our task begins – and ends – 

with consideration of the applicable definition in the relevant statute. 

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 

undertook the same analysis and concluded that the Patent 

Act defines “inventor” as limited to natural persons; that 

is, human beings. Accordingly, the PTO denied Stephen 

Thaler’s patent applications, which failed to list any human as an inventor. Thaler challenged that conclusion in 

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 

which agreed with the PTO and granted it summary judgment. We, too, conclude that the Patent Act requires an 

“inventor” to be a natural person and, therefore, affirm.

I 

Thaler represents that he develops and runs AI systems that generate patentable inventions. One such system is his “Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of 

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THALER v. VIDAL 3

Unified Science,” which Thaler calls “DABUS.” Thaler has 

described DABUS as “a collection of source code or programming and a software program.” Supp. App. at 781.

In July 2019, Thaler sought patent protection for two 

of DABUS’ putative inventions by filing two patent applications with the PTO: U.S. Application Nos. 16/524,350 

(teaching a “Neural Flame”) and 16/524,532 (teaching a 

“Fractal Container”).1 He listed DABUS as the sole inventor on both applications. Thaler maintains that he did not 

contribute to the conception of these inventions and that 

any person having skill in the art could have taken 

DABUS’ output and reduced the ideas in the applications 

to practice.2 

In lieu of an inventor’s last name, Thaler wrote on the 

applications that “the invention [was] generated by artificial intelligence.” App. at 28, 69. He also attached several 

documents relevant to inventorship. First, to satisfy 35 

U.S.C. § 115’s requirement that inventors submit a sworn 

oath or declaration when applying for a patent, Thaler 

1 The administrative records for both applications 

are materially identical.

2 While inventorship involves underlying questions 

of fact, see Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. 

Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 

S. Ct. 2691 (2021), for purposes of this litigation the PTO 

has not challenged Thaler’s representations, see D. Ct. Dkt. 

No. 25, at 11. Accordingly, our analysis must be consistent 

with the undisputed facts in the administrative record, 

drawing inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See 

Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United States, 989 F.3d 

1326, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (discussing when it is appropriate to supplement administrative record and noting “[t]he 

focal point for judicial review should be the administrative 

record already in existence”) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 

U.S. 138, 142 (1973)). 

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submitted a statement on DABUS’ behalf. Second, Thaler

provided a supplemental “Statement on Inventorship” explaining that DABUS was “a particular type of connectionist artificial intelligence” called a “Creativity Machine.” 

App. at 198-203, 483-88. Third, Thaler filed a document 

purporting to assign himself all of DABUS’ rights as an inventor. 

The PTO concluded both applications lacked a valid inventor and were, hence, incomplete. Accordingly, it sent 

Thaler a “Notice to File Missing Parts of Nonprovisional 

Application” for each application and requested that Thaler identify valid inventors. In response, Thaler petitioned 

the PTO director to vacate the Notices based on his Statements of Inventorship. The PTO denied Thaler’s petitions 

on the ground that “a machine does not qualify as an inventor.” App. at 269-71, 548-50. Thaler sought reconsideration, which the PTO denied, explaining again that 

inventors on a patent application must be natural persons. 

Thaler then pursued judicial review of the PTO’s final 

decisions on his petitions, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-704, 706.3 The parties 

agreed to have the District Court adjudicate the challenge 

based on the administrative record made before the PTO 

and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, the Court granted the PTO’s motion 

for summary judgment and denied Thaler’s request to reinstate his applications. The District Court concluded that 

an “inventor” under the Patent Act must be an “individual” 

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. See also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal 

wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 

statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 

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THALER v. VIDAL 5

and the plain meaning of “individual” as used in the statute 

is a natural person.

Thaler appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295. See Odyssey Logistics & Tech. Corp. v. Iancu, 959 

F.3d 1104, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that Federal 

Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions raising APA claims against PTO regarding patents). 

II

We review grants of summary judgment according to 

the law of the regional circuit, in this case the Fourth Circuit. See Supernus Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 913 F.3d 1351, 

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In the Fourth Circuit, a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 

See id. (citing Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 

305 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2002)). Challenges to PTO petition decisions are governed by the APA and pertinent administrative law standards. Thus, we may set aside the 

judgment resulting from an administrative adjudication 

only if the agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law” or if the agency’s actions are “in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

“Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that we review 

de novo.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 

973 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

A 

The sole issue on appeal is whether an AI software system can be an “inventor” under the Patent Act. In resolving disputes of statutory interpretation, we “begin[] with 

the statutory text, and end[] there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 

183 (2004). Here, there is no ambiguity: the Patent Act 

requires that inventors must be natural persons; that is,

human beings. 

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The Patent Act expressly provides that inventors are 

“individuals.” Since 2011, with the passage of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, the Patent Act has defined an 

“inventor” as “the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (emphasis 

added). The Act similarly defines “joint inventor” and 

“coinventor” as “any 1 of the individuals who invented or 

discovered the subject matter of a joint invention.” § 100(g) 

(emphasis added). In describing the statements required 

of an inventor when applying for a patent, the statute consistently refers to inventors and co-inventors as “individuals.” See § 115.

The Patent Act does not define “individual.” However, 

as the Supreme Court has explained, when used “[a]s a 

noun, ‘individual’ ordinarily means a human being, a person.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454

(2012) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). 

This is in accord with “how we use the word in everyday 

parlance”: “We say ‘the individual went to the store,’ ‘the 

individual left the room,’ and ‘the individual took the car,’ 

each time referring unmistakably to a natural person.” Id. 

Dictionaries confirm that this is the common understanding of the word. See, e.g., Individual, Oxford English Dictionary (2022) (giving first definition of “individual” as “[a] 

single human being”); Individual, Dictionary.com (last visited July 11, 2022), https://www.dictionary.com/browse/individual (giving “a single human being, as distinguished 

from a group” as first definition for “individual”). So, too, 

does the Dictionary Act, which provides that legislative use 

of the words “person” and “whoever” broadly include (“unless the context indicates otherwise”) “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint 

stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). “With the phrase ‘as well as,’ the definition 

marks ‘individual’ as distinct from the list of artificial entities that precedes it,” showing that Congress understands 

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“individual” to indicate natural persons unless otherwise 

noted. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 454.

Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that, when 

used in statutes, the word “individual” refers to human beings unless there is “some indication Congress intended” a 

different reading. Id. at 455 (emphasis omitted).4 Nothing 

in the Patent Act indicates Congress intended to deviate 

from the default meaning. To the contrary, the rest of the 

Patent Act supports the conclusion that “individual” in the 

Act refers to human beings. 

For instance, the Act uses personal pronouns – “himself” and “herself” – to refer to an “individual.” § 115(b)(2). 

It does not also use “itself,” which it would have done if 

Congress intended to permit non-human inventors. The 

Patent Act also requires inventors (unless deceased, incapacitated, or unavailable) to submit an oath or declaration. 

See, e.g., id. (requiring oath or declaration from inventor 

that “such individual believes himself or herself to be the 

original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed 

invention in the application”). While we do not decide 

whether an AI system can form beliefs, nothing in our record shows that one can, as reflected in the fact that Thaler 

submitted the requisite statements himself, purportedly on 

DABUS’ behalf.

Thaler directs us to several provisions of the Patent Act 

as supposed support for his position that “inventor” should 

be broadly read to include AI software, but each fails to 

persuade. First, Thaler points to the use of “whoever” in 

4 While Mohamad interpreted a statute other than 

the Patent Act, the Court’s reasoning is directly applicable 

here. See generally Legal Def. Fund v. Dep’t of Agric., 933 

F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that “individual” refers to human beings and not animals, based in 

part on Mohamad).

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35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 271. Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 

and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 

therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 

title.” As this very section makes clear, however, patents 

must satisfy the “conditions and requirements of” Title 35 

of the U.S. Code, including its definition of “inventor.” Section 271, in setting out what constitutes infringement, repeatedly uses “whoever” to include corporations and other 

non-human entities. That non-humans may infringe patents does not tell us anything about whether non-humans 

may also be inventors of patents. The question before us 

inevitably leads back to the Patent Act’s definition of “inventor,” which uses the word “individual” – and does not 

use “whoever.”5 Furthermore, as we noted already, the 

Dictionary Act establishes that Congress uses “whoever” as 

a much broader term than “individual.” See 1 U.S.C. § 1.

Second, Thaler contends that AI software programs 

must qualify as inventors because otherwise patentability 

would depend on “the manner in which the invention was 

made,” in contravention of 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 103 is 

not about inventorship. Instead, it provides, in relevant 

part, that inventions may still be nonobvious even if they 

are discovered during “routine” testing or experimentation. 

See Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A.

de C.V., 865 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (explaining 

that second sentence of § 103 was intended to clarify that

“flash of creative genius” is unnecessary for patentability). 

This statutory provision relates to how an invention is 

5 While the PTO also initially relied on the use of 

“whoever” in § 101 of the Patent Act, the PTO has also consistently explained that “individual” is limited to natural 

persons, a position we now uphold. 

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made and does not trump a provision that specifically addresses who may be an inventor.

Third, Thaler emphasizes that the term “inventor” 

must be interpreted with attention to the “context in which 

that language is used[] and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 

(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have undertaken precisely this task. For the reasons explained above, 

the Patent Act, when considered in its entirety, confirms 

that “inventors” must be human beings.

B 

Our holding today that an “inventor” must be a human 

being is supported by our own precedent. See Univ. of Utah 

v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

(“[I]nventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.”) (emphasis added); Beech Aircraft 

Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

(“[O]nly natural persons can be ‘inventors.’”). While these 

opinions addressed different questions – concluding that 

neither corporations nor sovereigns can be inventors – our

reasoning did not depend on the fact that institutions are 

collective entities. The two cases confirm that the plain 

meaning of “inventor” in the Patent Act is limited to natural persons. 

C 

Statutes are often open to multiple reasonable readings. Not so here. This is a case in which the question of 

statutory interpretation begins and ends with the plain 

meaning of the text. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. 

Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“This Court has explained many 

times over many years, when the meaning of the statute’s 

terms is plain, our job is at an end.”). In the Patent Act, 

“individuals” – and, thus, “inventors” – are unambiguously 

natural persons. Accordingly, we have no need to consider 

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additional tools of statutory construction. See Matal v. 

Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017) (“[I]nquiry into the 

meaning of the statute’s text ceases when the statutory 

language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III

We briefly address Thaler’s additional arguments.

Thaler argues that inventions generated by AI should 

be patentable in order to encourage innovation and public 

disclosure. Thaler’s policy arguments are speculative and 

lack a basis in the text of the Patent Act and in the record. 

In any event, the text before us is unambiguous, and we 

may not “elevate vague invocations of statutory purpose 

over the words Congress chose.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 

142 S. Ct. 1783, 1792-93 (2022). Moreover, we are not confronted today with the question of whether inventions

made by human beings with the assistance of AI are eligible for patent protection.

Thaler invokes the canon of constitutional avoidance. 

In Thaler’s view, permitting AI programs to be inventors 

would support the constitutional purpose of patents “[t]o 

promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It follows, Thaler continues, that 

not recognizing AI as an inventor undermines such progress, raising potential constitutional concerns we should 

be careful to avoid. Thaler is incorrect. The constitutional 

provision he cites is a grant of legislative power to Congress; Congress has chosen to act pursuant to that power 

by passing the Patent Act. Thaler does not (and cannot) 

argue that limiting inventorship to human beings is unconstitutional. Therefore, the canon of constitutional avoidance is simply inapplicable. See Veterans4You LLC v. 

United States, 985 F.3d 850, 860-61 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining that this canon may be helpful when there is serious question regarding statute’s constitutionality); see also 

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THALER v. VIDAL 11

Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014) (noting that 

canon of constitutional avoidance “has no application in the 

absence of . . . ambiguity”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thaler also notes that South Africa has granted patents with DABUS as an inventor. This foreign patent office was not interpreting our Patent Act. Its determination 

does not alter our conclusion.

We have considered Thaler’s additional arguments and 

find they do not merit discussion. 

IV

When a statute unambiguously and directly answers 

the question before us, our analysis does not stray beyond 

the plain text. Here, Congress has determined that only a 

natural person can be an inventor, so AI cannot be. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs shall be assessed against Appellant. 

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