United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 17, 2014

Decided April 18, 2014

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 13-3224

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARY ANN BOHLEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the Central District 

of Illinois.

No. 13-30005-001

Sue E. Myerscough,

Judge.

O R D E R

For four years Mary Bohlen embezzled money from bank accounts she

controlled. She was treasurer of the Illinois Correctional Employees Memorial

Association fund, which assists families of Department of Corrections employees killed

or permanently injured in the line of duty. Bohlen recruited new members and solicited

donations while skimming more than $50,000 for herself. And in her regular

employment as assistant deputy director and supervisor of accounting at DOC, Bohlen

stole around $27,000 from several DOC funds. She pleaded guilty to two counts of mail

fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and two counts of theft from an organization that receives

federal funds, id. § 666(a)(1)(A). After calculating a guidelines imprisonment range of 21

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 13-3224 Page 2

to 27 months, the district court sentenced Bohlen to 21 months and ordered her to pay

restitution.

Bohlen filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal

is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

Bohlen has not accepted our invitation to respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b).

Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the

issues that a case of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the

brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel has

discussed. See United States v. Bey, No. 13-1163, 2014 WL 1389090, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 10,

2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel begins by noting that Bohlen has no interest in challenging her guilty

pleas. Thus counsel appropriately omits discussion about the adequacy of the plea

colloquy and the voluntariness of the pleas. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348,

349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first considers whether Bohlen could argue that the district court clearly

erred by assigning an 8-level upward adjustment based on a calculated loss of $77,889,

see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E), and concludes that it would be frivolous for her to do so.

We agree. Bohlen objected to that calculation, arguing that the increase should be

limited to 6 levels because she used the money stolen from the DOC accounts to

“repay” about $27,000 of the funds taken from the memorial account before the

embezzlements were discovered. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D) & cmt. n.3(E)(i). Though she did

not contest the total loss amount, she argued that $27,000 should have been credited

against it. See id. § 2B1.1(b) cmt. n.3(E)(i). But courts need not deduct from the loss

amount money that the defendant spent facilitating a continuing fraud. See United States

v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 497 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 607 (7th

Cir. 2005); United States v. Mucciante, 21 F.3d 1228, 1238 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that

defendant was not entitled to credit since repayment was “meretricious effort” to

perpetuate scheme). Bohlen repaid the $27,000 with money she had stolen from the

inmate accounts in order to conceal her embezzlement from the memorial account and

enable her to keep stealing, which she did for three more years. The presentence report

noted as much and Bohlen did not object, and the district court adopted this factual

finding. The judge’s total calculation, then, was not “outside the realm of permissible

computations.” See United States v. Radziszewski, 474 F.3d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 2007)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).
No. 13-3224 Page 3

Counsel next considers whether Bohlen could argue that the district court abused

its discretion by imposing a special condition of supervised release that prohibited her

from frequenting places where gambling occurs. District courts have authority to

impose special conditions not explicitly mandated by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), but

those conditions must reasonably relate to the nature and circumstances of the case, and

they must not infringe the defendant’s liberty more than reasonably necessary to deter,

and protect the public from, future crimes. See id. §§ 3553(a), 3583(c), (d); U.S.S.G.

§ 5D1.3(b); United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370–71 (7th Cir. 2008).

Preventing a defendant with a gambling problem from gambling or frequenting

places where gambling occurs is a permissible condition of supervised release, Silvious,

512 F.3d at 371, and on this record we agree with counsel’s conclusion that a challenge

to the gambling restriction on Bohlen would be frivolous. Bohlen admitted that she had

gambled with the embezzled funds and liked frequenting casinos. See United States v.

Brown, 136 F.3d 1176, 1186 (7th Cir. 1998). The court thus imposed the condition to

ensure that her income would go toward restitution and not gambling. And although

Bohlen argued that the restriction would limit her ability to find a waitressing job, the

district judge explained that many restaurants do not allow gambling.

Counsel finally evaluates whether Bohlen could argue that her concurrent prison

sentences are unreasonably long and rightly concludes that this potential claim would

be frivolous. Her lack of criminal history placed her in Category I, which, combined

with her total offense level of 16, yielded an imprisonment range of 21 to 27 months.

Her 21-month sentence is presumed reasonable, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,

347 (2007); United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2013), and nothing about

this case warrants an exception to that presumption. Before imposing the sentence the

judge considered Bohlen’s mental-health issues and her need to care for her mother. On

the other hand, the judge considered that Bohlen was stealing money that was intended

for families of DOC employees killed in the line of duty and that she may never be able

to fully repay the amount that she stole. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the

appeal.