U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

34–738 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

S. HRG. 115–459 

THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MONTENEGRO AND 

MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN EUROPE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 13, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 13, 2017 

Page 

THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MONTENEGRO AND MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE

IN EUROPE ............................................................................................................. 1 

Kaludjerovic, His Excellency Nebojsa, Ambassador of Montenegro to the 

United States ........................................................................................................ 1 

Bugajski, Janusz, Senior Fellow, Center for European Policy Analysis ............. 10 

Samp, Lisa Sawyer, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 15 

Wilson, Damon, Executive Vice President, The Atlantic Council ........................ 23 

(III)

(1) 

THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MONTENEGRO AND 

MALIGN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN EUROPE 

THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, 

Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Strange, Reed, Nelson, 

Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, 

Heinrich, Warren, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the attempted coup in Montenegro and malign 

Russian influence in Europe. 

Before we continue with the usual proceedings of the hearing, I 

am pleased to welcome to the committee Montenegro’s Ambassador 

to the United States who will present an official statement to the 

committee on behalf of the Government of Montenegro. Mr. Ambassador, we are honored to have you here with us this morning. 

Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY NEBOJSA KALUDJEROVIC, 

AMBASSADOR OF MONTENEGRO TO THE UNITED STATES 

Ambassador KALUDJEROVIC. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee. I wish to thank you for the opportunity to 

address you today on behalf of my government, and I extend especially our appreciation for the committee’s hearing on this important topic. Your interest and dedication to the issue of security in 

Europe, the Western Balkans, and Montenegro in this case, amid 

the ongoing challenges we are all facing is a considerable contribution in itself to the valued support of the United States to our region towards its future as a full part of the Euro-Atlantic community. 

We are talking today about one serious destabilizing scenario orchestrated from the outside that fortunately never materialized in 

Montenegro on the eve of the parliamentary elections that took 

place in October last year. The plot in question, which virtually 

amounted to a coup d’etat, now subject of a trial in front of courts 

2 

in Montenegro, consisted of planned terrorist attacks to overthrow 

the legitimately elected government and to illegally detain or even 

assassinate the Prime Minister. In the worst case scenario, if the 

plans had succeeded, there would have been chaos and serious violence and extremely dangerous instability with intention to undermine the constitutional order and institutions of Montenegro. This 

would also have been a derailment of the progress of Montenegro 

and the entire region towards NATO and EU integration, which 

was a presumed motive for carrying out the entire plot. 

At this moment, the public trial is ongoing, following months of 

investigation. The Special Chief Prosecutor in charge of the case 

has publicly stated that the evidence in this case is ‘‘undisputable 

and ironclad.’’ 

Indictments that include two Russian nationals—evidence points 

to that, that they were members of military intelligence services— 

as well as two leading politicians and MPs [Members of Parliment] 

from the opposition party, Democratic Front, for conspiracy to form 

a criminal organization and attempt at terrorist attacks, as well as 

the acts against the constitutional order and public safety. Nine 

people so far have admitted their guilt via the plea bargain mechanism. Their confessions were included in the indictment. The witnesses identified one of the Russian nationals, former Deputy Military Attache of Russian Federation in Poland, who was declared 

persona non grata in that country for acts of espionage, as the organizer of the plot. 

The involvement of Russian nationals is undisputed and Montenegrin authorities are waiting for the feedback from the Russian 

authorities, which acknowledged the requests, regarding the questions on the involvement of these nationals and their role in the 

events. By the way, so far, Russian authorities have informed us 

that one of the other suspects, who is not a Russian national but 

is currently at large in Russia, is being subjected to pre-extradition 

background checks following a request for the extradition by the 

Ministry of Justice of Montenegro. This suspect, by the way, is also 

banned from traveling outside the territory of Russia. 

Had the plot in October succeeded, the instability would have 

been created not only within Montenegro’s boundaries, but would, 

for sure, have had a spillover effect in a region that is still not on 

a fully irreversible path to stability. Gratefully, the opposite the 

happened. First of all, Montenegrin citizens, once again like at 

every election since restoring our independence in 2006, have elected pro-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and pro-European Government. 

As we all know, Montenegro joined NATO on June 5th this year, 

and another spillover effect happened but a positive one. The example of another Western Balkans, or Southeast European, country 

joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions is immeasurable. It will create a long-term positive effect, offer motivation and encouragement 

to other aspirants from the region for EU [European Union] and 

NATO membership, that the prospective of membership in these 

organizations is alive based on merits, standards and values. No 

better example could have been given to our region. 

Aside from the outcome of this particular matter, Russia’s view 

on NATO enlargement and the accession of its 29th member is not 

3 

a secret, nor is their support to the opposition parties and actors 

in Montenegro that are against NATO membership. Leading to the 

elections in October, there was a well-organized and financed public campaign to that effect. But these influences Montenegro experienced before, during, and after elections is not an isolated fact but 

a pattern based on notions that the facts on the ground could be 

changed. Membership of Montenegro to NATO is often perceived by 

some high level Russian officials as a temporary setback through 

the false narrative that NATO does not have support in Montenegro, et cetera. Therefore, we expect a continuation of pressure 

both aimed at Montenegro and at the region, especially those countries that have not yet become members of NATO or the European 

Union. 

I wish to point out that Montenegro has been able to succeed in 

achieving its goals in becoming a member of NATO and a 

frontrunner in EU accession by working very hard over the past 

decade with friends and partners like the United States. This is an 

alliance based on values, and that is why it succeeds. The reforms, 

helped bilaterally by the United States, part of achieving NATO 

and EU standards, made our society better and firmly on a right 

path. 

After all, it was thanks to those reforms aimed at strengthening 

the capacities and independence of institutions to uphold the rule 

of law that helped those very institutions to tackle such a challenge 

we are talking about today that would put to test much more established democracies than ours. 

Where we did not have capacities ourselves, considering that the 

attempts were multifaceted, involving propaganda and 

cyberattacks, we were able to ask our partners in NATO or bilaterally like the U.S. for assistance. As an ally, we will work together 

with the Alliance on the capacities to address new challenges like 

these. 

We had and do have a right to determine our alliances and our 

future, which we have always been clear about, as our decisions 

are based on our strategic visions and goals not against anybody 

or anything. Montenegro does not pose any sort of threat to Russia 

and wants to be engaged in conversation, in dialogue, and not in 

confrontation. 

Montenegro in NATO can only mean peace and stability, and expansion of the area of welfare, regional cooperation, and good 

neighborly relations. 

Distinguished members of the committee, what should be done? 

The United States role in Europe is extremely valuable and necessary. The commitment to the vision of Europe whole, free, and 

at peace is as relevant today as it was before. The United States 

and its European partners should continue to reaffirm at every opportunity the value of transatlantic bond, NATO, and article 5 commitment, as President Trump reinforced that valuable message in 

Poland a few days ago. As to the Western Balkans, it is crucial to 

keep countering trends that seems to encourage the countries or 

actors in the region to find alternatives to the Euro-Atlantic integration and full embracement of values and standards that they 

bring. 

4 

We are thankful and grateful for the U.S. support to our NATO 

membership, as well as the increasing focus on the 

Western Balkans issues. The support by the U.S. Congress—and 

the Senate has been a particular champion—is very welcome and 

needed, as well as from the U.S. Administration. 

The upcoming visit to Montenegro by Vice President Pence is a 

strong message that the United States is focused on Europe and an 

opportunity to show continuous support to the stability and security of the Western Balkans region by supporting a clear perspective of membership both in NATO and EU as the best way to 

achieve those goals. 

On our side, Montenegro will continue to spread the area of stability in the region and beyond and fulfill its responsibilities as a 

new ally. We are ready to do our part. 

I thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kaludjerovic follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. NEBOJSA KALUDJEROVIC

Mr. Chairman—Senator McCain, Ranking member Reed, distinguished members 

of the Committee, 

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to address you today on behalf of my Government and I extend especially our appreciation for the Committee’s hearing on 

this important topic. Your interest and dedication to the issue of security in Europe, 

the Western Balkans and Montenegro in this case, amid the ongoing challenges we 

are all facing, is a considerable contribution in itself to the valued support of the 

United States to our region towards its future as a full part of the Euro Atlantic 

community. 

We are talking today about one serious, destabilizing scenario orchestrated from 

the outside that fortunately never materialized in Montenegro on the eve of the Parliamentary Elections that took place in October last year. The plot in question, 

which virtually amounted to coup d’ etat, now subject of a trial in front of courts 

in Montenegro, consisted of planned terrorist attacks to overthrow a legitimately 

elected Government and to illegally detain or even assassinate its Prime Minister. 

In the worst case scenario, if the plans had succeeded there would have been chaos, 

serious violence and extremely dangerous instability with intention to undermine 

the constitutional order and institutions of Montenegro. That would also have been 

a derailment of the progress of Montenegro and the entire region towards NATO 

and EU integration, which was a presumed motive for carrying out the entire plot. 

At this moment, the public trial is ongoing, following months of investigation. The 

Special Chief Prosecutor, in charge of the case, has publicly stated that the evidence 

in this case is (I quote) ‘undisputable’ and ‘iron clad’. 

Indictments that include two Russian nationals (evidence points to that, that they 

were members of GRU–Military Intelligence Services) as well as two leading politicians and MPs from the opposition party Democratic Front, for conspiracy to form 

a criminal organization and attempt at terrorist attacks, as well as the acts against 

the Constitutional order and public safety. Nine people so far have admitted their 

guilt via the plea—bargain mechanism. Their confessions were included in the indictment. The witnesses identified one of the Russian nationals, former Deputy Military Attach ́ e of Russian Federation in Poland who was declared persona non grata 

in that country for acts of espionage, as the organizer of the plot. 

The involvement of Russian nationals is undisputed and Montenegrin authorities 

are waiting for the feedback from the Russian authorities, which acknowledged the 

requests, regarding the questions on the involvement of these nationals and their 

role in the events. (So far, Russian authorities have informed us that one of the 

other suspects, who is not a Russian national but is currently at large in Russia, 

is currently being subjected to pre-extradition background checks following a request for extradition by the Ministry of Justice of Montenegro. This suspect is also 

banned from traveling outside the territory of Russia). 

Had the plot in October succeeded, the instability would have been created not 

only within Montenegro’s boundaries but would, for sure, have had a spillover effect, 

in a region that is still not on a fully irreversible path to stability. Gratefully, the 

opposite happened. First of all, Montenegrin citizens, once again like at every elecVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
5 

tion since restoring the statehood in 2006, have elected pro-NATO and pro-European 

Government. 

Montenegro joined NATO on June 5th, and another spillover effect happened, but 

a positive one. The example of another Western Balkans, or SEE country, joining 

the Euro Atlantic institutions is immeasurable. It will create a long-term positive 

effect, offer motivation and encouragement to other aspirants from the Region for 

EU and NATO membership, that the perspective of membership in these organizations is alive, based on merits, standards and values. No better example could have 

been given to our region. 

Aside from the outcome of this particular matter, Russia’s view on NATO enlargement and the accession of its 29th member is not a secret, nor is their support to 

the opposition parties and actors in Montenegro that are against NATO membership. Leading to the elections in October, there was a well-organized and financed 

public campaign to that effect. But these influences Montenegro experienced before, 

during and after elections is not an isolated fact but a pattern based on notions that 

the facts on the ground could be changed. Membership of Montenegro to NATO is 

often perceived by some high level Russian officials as a temporary setback, through 

the false narrative that NATO does not have support in Montenegro etc. Therefore, 

we expect a continuation of pressure both aimed at Montenegro and at the Region, 

especially those countries that have not yet become members of NATO and/or EU. 

I wish to point out that Montenegro has been able to succeed in achieving its 

goals in becoming a member of NATO and a frontrunner in EU accession by working 

hard over the past decade with friends and partners like the United States. That 

is an alliance based on values, and that is why it succeeds. The reforms, helped bilaterally by the United States, part of achieving NATO and EU standards, made 

our society better and firmly on a right path. 

After all, it was thanks to those reforms aimed at strengthening the capacities 

and independence of institutions to uphold the rule of law that helped those very 

institutions to tackle such a challenge we are talking about today that would put 

to test much more established democracies than ours. 

Where we did not have capacities ourselves, considering that the attempts were 

multifaceted, involving propaganda and cyber-attacks, we were able to ask our partners in NATO or bilaterally like U.S. for assistance. As an ally, we will work together within the Alliance on the capacities to address new challenges like these. 

We had and do have a right to determine our alliances and our future, which we 

have always been clear about, as our decisions are based on our strategic visions 

and goals not against anybody or anything. Montenegro does not pose any sort of 

threat to Russia and wants to be engaged in conversation, in dialogue, and not in 

confrontation. 

Montenegro in NATO can only mean peace and stability, and expansion of the 

area of welfare, of regional cooperation, and good, neighborly relations. 

Distinguished members of the Committee, 

What should be done? The United States role in Europe is extremely valuable and 

necessary. The commitment to the vision of Europe whole, free and at peace is as 

relevant today as it was before. The United States and its European partners, 

should continue to reaffirm at every opportunity the value of Trans-Atlantic bond, 

NATO and article 5 commitment, as President Trump reinforced that valuable message in Poland few days ago. As to the Western Balkans, it is crucial to keep countering trends that seems to encourage the countries or actors in the region to find 

alternatives to the Euro Atlantic integration and full embracement of values and 

standards that they bring. 

We are thankful and grateful for the U.S. support to our NATO membership as 

well as the increasing focus on the Western Balkans issues. The support by the U.S. 

Congress, and the Senate has been a particular champion, is very welcome and 

needed, as well as from the U.S. Administration. 

The upcoming visit to Montenegro by Vice President Pence is a strong message 

that the United States is focused on Europe, and an opportunity to show continuous 

support to the stability and security of the Western Balkans region, by supporting 

a clear perspective of membership both in NATO and EU as the best way to achieve 

those goals. 

On our side, Montenegro will continue to spread the area of stability in the Region and beyond and fulfill its responsibilities as a new Ally. We are ready to do 

our part. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Ambassador, for that statement. 

6 

Before you depart to preside over the festivities of Montenegro’s 

statehood day, let me just say I have had the great fortune to travel to Montenegro a number of times over the years. I know the citizens of your country to be a proud and independent people, and 

that is the spirit you celebrate on July 13th, the day your country 

earned independence in 1878, the day Montenegrins defiantly rose 

up against fascist occupiers in 1941. 

On this July 13th, Montenegro remains determined as ever to 

choose its own future. Montenegro has chosen the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. Montenegro has joined the defense of the free 

world as the 29th member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Someday, Montenegro hopes to join the European Union. The 

pursuit of this Euro-Atlantic future has not been without difficulty. 

But Montenegro has persevered and, in doing so, has sent a powerful message to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin and every other 

tyrant that they cannot and will not control the destiny of free people, not in Montenegro, not in Southeastern Europe, not anywhere 

else in the world. For that, I hope all Americans will look to our 

newest ally, Montenegro, with the same sense of gratitude, admiration, and solidarity that I express to you now. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being with us this morning. 

The committee is grateful to be joined by a distinguished panel 

of expert witnesses: Janusz Bugajski, Senior Fellow at the Center 

for European Policy Analysis; Lisa Sawyer Samp, Senior Fellow at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Damon 

Wilson, Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council. 

As the Ambassador clearly indicated, what happened in Montenegro is perhaps the most disturbing evidence to date of how far 

Vladimir Putin is willing to go to undermine the West, bully other 

nations, and achieve his neo-imperial ambitions. 

Russia’s goals in Montenegro were clear: to stop the country from 

joining NATO, to reverse its progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration, and to end Montenegro’s support for sanctions against 

Russia imposed after its invasion of Ukraine. 

The indictments in this case against the coup plotters in Montenegro read like a spy novel. On October 16th, 2016, Montenegro’s 

election day, the coup plotters planned to storm the parliament, 

capture and/or kill the Prime Minister, and install a new government. With the coup underway, armed men would ambush and kill 

members of Montenegro’s Special Anti-Terrorist Unit to prevent 

them from interfering with the coup. To justify the coup, other plotters disguised as police would fire into a crowd of peaceful demonstrators to create the illusion of excessive force by the pro-NATO 

government. 

Two Russian GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] agents, allegedly in league with Montenegrin politicians and Serbian nationalists, organized the coup plot. One of the GRU officers has been 

identified as the same man who under a different name served as 

a military attache in Poland until he was declared persona non 

grata and thrown out of the country for espionage. Perhaps he was 

more careful during the Montenegro plot, but not by much. In one 

case, he sent money to one of his co-conspirators from a Western 

Union on the same street as GRU headquarters in Moscow. 

7 

But that brazenness should not fool anyone. The plot was well 

along its way to succeeding. If it had not been for one conspirator 

who got cold feet and informed the Montenegrin authorities, it very 

well might have. 

I believe it is critical that all Americans understand what happened in Montenegro and its implications for our security because, 

as I said, it shows how far Vladimir Putin is willing to go to advance his dangerous view of the world, not just in Montenegro, not 

just in Europe, but here in the United States as well. 

Russia is embarked on a campaign to weaken the United States, 

to destabilize Europe, to break the NATO alliance, to undermine 

confidence in Western values, and to erode any and all resistance 

to Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions. He is using the full 

range of capabilities available to him. 

Of course, Putin has rapidly modernized his military and grown 

increasingly willing to use force to achieve his objectives, as we 

have seen in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. 

But even more important to the spread of malign Russian influence has been the sophisticated employment of asymmetric, non-kinetic, capabilities. Indeed, Russia’s Chief of General Staff has emphasized—‘‘The role of non-military means in achieving political 

and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.’’ 

This is the key insight that underpins Russia’s doctrine of, ‘‘new 

generation warfare.’’ It is a strategy of influence, not of brute force. 

Carefully tailored to local circumstances, it seeks to undermine our 

societies and our institutions from within through cyberattacks; 

psychological operations and information warfare; propaganda, 

both overt and covert; coercive economic pressure, especially using 

energy exports; targeted use of corruption to buy influence; financing political parties, think tanks, and other organizations; and 

more. 

But even as our awareness and understanding of malign Russian 

influence has grown, the simple reality is that our response has 

been inadequate to the scale and scope of this challenge. We have 

to change course now because Vladimir Putin is on the offensive, 

and he is enjoying success at relatively low cost. 

We must start by responding to aggression Russia has already 

committed. That is why it is so important that the House of Representatives pass the strong Russia sanctions bill that already 

passed the Senate by the vote of 98 to 2. It is long past time that 

Vladimir Putin paid a meaningful price for his attack on American 

democracy. 

We must also develop a coherent and political policy for responding to any future aggression using the full range of U.S. diplomatic, 

intelligence, military, and economic tools. This is especially true in 

cyberspace where the United States still has no policy to deter, defend against, and respond to cyberattacks. 

We must continue to rebuild conventional military deterrence in 

Europe. Building on the progress made through the European Deterrence Initiative, we need to repeal the Budget Control Act and 

make significant and sustained investments to improve the capability, capacity, readiness, and responsiveness of United States 

forces in Europe. We also have to continue helping our allies better 

8 

defend themselves, including by providing Ukraine the defensive 

lethal assistance it needs and deserves. 

We have to keep the door to NATO open for those countries that 

are willing to do what it takes to join the Alliance and live up to 

the responsibilities it entails. Vladimir Putin will not let another 

country go the way of Montenegro without a fight. So we need to 

begin working with NATO aspirants to help them withstand the inevitable onslaught of Russian pressure. 

We also have to begin addressing the vulnerabilities in Western 

societies, governments, and institutions that Russian strategy is 

explicitly designed to exploit. Taking on Putin’s kleptocracy means 

enhancing the powers of our Treasury Department to trace and 

crack down on corrupt and illicit Russian financing that impacts 

the United States financial system. 

Most of all, we have to stop looking at Russia and its threats to 

our security and our democracy through the warped lens of politics. 

We cannot allow Vladimir Putin to divide us from one another, 

weaken our resolve, undermine confidence in ourselves, or erode 

our belief in our own values. We must take our own side in this 

fight, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans. 

Ambassador and members of this panel, I know that was a long 

statement, and I apologize for that. It is very unusual for this committee to have a hearing of this nature. But I believe that it was 

a near thing. If it had not been an informant on the inside, this 

coup attempt could very well have succeeded not only with blood 

shed but with a message throughout the region. So I thought it was 

important to have this hearing. I thought it was important to have 

three distinguished witnesses come before the committee so that 

we have a record not only of what happened, but what we need to 

do. 

With that, Ambassador, you are certainly free to leave, and I 

would like to welcome our witnesses after a statement by Senator 

Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, the panel, and Mr. Ambassador, thank you very 

much. 

The chairman is holding a very important hearing on the events 

in Montenegro and the Russian malign influence threat in Europe. 

Let me add my welcome to the witnesses and thank them for appearing this morning. 

The events in Montenegro are deeply concerning both for their 

impact within that country and their broader implications. While 

a full accounting of what happened must await the results of the 

criminal trial, the case laid out in the Montenegrin indictment already makes clear that these events are a pattern of Russian aggression that has occurred repeatedly across Europe and the 

United States. Again and again, Russia has used a range of coercive tools at its disposal, including political pressure, economic manipulation, collaboration with corrupt local networks, propaganda, 

deception and denials, and increasingly military force to try to intimidate democratic countries and undermine the further integration of NATO, the European Union, and other Western institutions. 

9 

Disturbingly Russia’s plotting with proxies inside Montenegro 

and the failed attempt to overthrow the pro-Western government 

and assassinate the Prime Minister marks a dangerous escalation 

of its malign influence activities. 

Additionally, Russia’s menacing actions in Montenegro have implications for other Balkan nations including Serbia, Bosnia, and 

Kosovo. We should do all we can to ensure that Montenegro’s accession to NATO sends a clear signal to other countries in the region, 

that NATO maintains its open door policy so that other countries 

can aspire to NATO membership without the fear of becoming the 

target of violent Russian aggression. 

The critical question for our witnesses is how the United States 

and its European partners should counter the Russian malign influence threat. 

In January, the unanimous conclusion of our 17 intelligence 

agencies was that President Putin directed an influence campaign 

against the 2016 United States presidential election with the aims 

of undermining the American people’s faith in the election process. 

The intelligence community also warned that the significant escalation of Russian levels of interference in United States and European elections represents a new normal. As long as Moscow believes that their actions in the United States and Europe will be 

consequence-free, Putin and his associates will continue to escalate 

Russia’s hybrid tactics against us and our partners to advance 

their interests. 

We have a duty to confront Russia over its malign activities to 

protect our national security. Unfortunately, despite mounting evidence, the White House fails to recognize the seriousness of the national security threat posed by Russia’s malign influence activities. 

President Trump continues to cast doubt on the unanimous collusion of our intelligence community and has failed to direct that the 

Kremlin be held accountable for its actions to damage our democratic processes. 

Numerous witnesses have testified to Congress, including Attorney General Sessions and Secretary Mattis, that they have received 

no guidance from President Trump on a strategy for countering interference with our elections. 

President Trump’s recent meeting with President Putin at the 

G20 [Group of 20 Summit] was another missed opportunity to deliver a clear message to the Kremlin that its attacks on our democracy are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Instead of confronting the President, President Putin, President Trump appeased 

Mr. Putin accepting at face value his denials that Russia has interfered with the United States elections. This will only encourage 

further reckless Kremlin adventurism toward its neighboring 

states and efforts to claim a great power role in the Middle East 

and elsewhere. 

Now is certainly not the time to ignore Russian interference in 

elections in Montenegro, France, Germany, the United States, or 

elsewhere and simply move forward. 

Fortunately, the United States Senate has stepped up to provide 

leadership on this issue. Recently an overwhelming bipartisan majority in the Senate passed long overdue Russian sanctions. This 

legislation would codify existing sanctions and expand authorities 

10 

for additional ones. It is now incumbent upon the House to pass 

the Russian sanctions bill without delay and send it to the President for signature. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about additional efforts that are needed to craft a whole-of-government strategy to defend against and deter this growing Russian threat. Also, I hope 

you will address how the United States might coordinate with our 

allies and partners, many of whom have decades of experience in 

this fight, to effectively counter the Russian malign influence 

threat while remaining true to the core values and principles that 

the United States upholds. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to the witnesses. 

Mr. Bugajski, could you begin—either you or Ms. Samp or Mr. 

Wilson—describe the events that took place again for the record, 

which is the reason for this hearing and then proceed with your 

statement? 

STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member and the members of the committee. 

In terms of Montenegro, you have heard from the Ambassador 

the details as we know them now. 

It should not come really as a surprise to us that Russia is determined to prevent new countries from entering NATO. They have 

cultivated their relationship with Montenegro for several years in 

terms of investment, in terms of propaganda, in terms of trying to 

corrupt the country, and they have basically failed. So one of the 

last resorts I think for the Russian Government was to try and 

change the government in Montenegro to prevent that country from 

moving into NATO. 

As I say in my statement, this may be a trial run. We should not 

assume that this is the only case that Russia is going to try to unsettle a government in the region. In fact, I am sure they are preparing other scenarios of destabilization and government replacement. 

So with that said, without going into—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I just mention that scenario included 

people in uniform, killing of opposition? I mean, this was a very 

complex plot with months, if not years, in the planning. That is 

what is so compelling about what happened here. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. It reminds me a little bit of what happened in Crimea. Remember, Putin denied that they had planned the Crimean 

operation, the annexation of Crimea. In fact, they had been rehearsing this for quite a while and it has been admitted by Russian 

sources since. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Please go ahead. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Okay. Let me begin by outlining the fundamental 

threats posed by the Kremlin and then place the Balkans in a 

broader strategic context because I think it is worth remembering 

it is not simply the Balkans. It is a wider Europe. 

Moscow is engaged in a global shadow war in which the primary 

goal is to dismantle the West and project Russia as a pole of power 

11 

on an equal global footing with the United States. Europe is one 

of the core battlegrounds of this struggle for dominance, in which 

Moscow does not recognize the independence or integrity of any 

targeted state. There are three main components of Moscow’s antiWestern offensive. 

First, Russia defines itself as a distinct Eurasian pole of power, 

defending itself against Western encroachment, proud of its antiAmericanism and authoritarianism, determined to delegitimize the 

Western democratic model, and intent on playing a vanguard role 

among governments that reject political influence from Washington 

and Brussels. 

Second, a key Kremlin goal is to reverse United States influences 

within the wider Europe. This would help Putin exert leverage over 

the foreign and security policies of key states, and unlike during 

the Cold War, there is no accepted division of Europe into Western 

and Russian spheres. Instead, numerous states are coerced or enticed either to join the Russian zone, to turn neutral, or to oppose 

United States policy. Moscow pressures former Soviet republics to 

relinquish their western aspirations. It promotes conflicts within 

and between the Balkan states. It fosters and exploits disputes 

over occupied territories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, and 

it subverts members of both NATO and the EU. 

Third, while its goals are imperial, Kremlin strategies are flexible. A diverse assortment of weapons are deployed to disarm the 

adversary, whether energy, business, trade, corruption, blackmail, 

cyberspace, espionage, politics, religion, ideology, disinformation, 

proxy conflicts, or outright warfare. 

Moscow views both NATO and the European Union as threats to 

its expansionist ambitions. NATO’s commitment to collective defense obstructs Russia’s revisionism and its divide and conquer policy. European Union standards of legality and transparency challenge Russia’s opaque business model. Western political and 

human rights standards undermine Russia’s autocratic political 

model. Hence, Brexit and other problems within the EU are welcomed by Moscow as they divide the union, encourage bilateral 

deals with Russia, and potentially limit further EU enlargement. 

Moscow benefits from political, ethnic, and social turbulence in 

Europe. Lucrative business deals and campaign donations enable 

the Kremlin to corrupt and influence targeted officials. Democratic 

regression or the upsurge of nationalist populism favors Russia’s 

objectives by weakening state institutions and deepening EU divisions. Putin appeals both to leftist anti-American and ultra-nationalist Euroskeptics to foster turmoil. During election cycles, Moscow 

aims to discredit politicians that do not favor its interests. This can 

involve blackmail, fabricated news reports, and disclosure of stolen 

personal communications. 

Briefly, the Balkan dimension. The Balkans are viewed in Moscow as Europe’s soft underbelly where latent conflicts are inflamed, 

potential new allies courted, and economic opportunities exploited. 

Russia possesses four main channels of influence in the region: energy, corruption, nationalism, and propaganda. We can go into this 

in question time if you like because I want to be as brief as possible. 

12 

Moscow aims to disqualify the West Balkan states from NATO 

and EU membership. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it encourages the 

Serb entity government to keep the country divided. In Kosovo, it 

uses the Serbian minority to uphold the specter of partition and 

blocks Kosovo from entering the United Nations. In Macedonia, it 

manipulates internal turmoil and the country’s obstructed path towards NATO and the EU to gain political influence. 

The coup attempt in Montenegro during national elections in October 2016 was organized by Russian military intelligence 

operatives to prevent the country from attaining NATO membership. The plot was uncovered in time or it could have led to mass 

bloodshed in Podgorica. While the Russians evaded arrest, Montenegrin courts have begun trials of suspected Serb nationalists, including members of the pro-Moscow opposition. Tellingly, the Serbian Government has been helpful to Montenegro in its efforts to 

investigate the plot. Belgrade I think realizes that Serbia could 

face a similar scenario of destabilization if it decides to loosen its 

links with Moscow. 

We must be better prepared for future violent scenarios in the 

region. The Montenegrin putsch attempt could be a trial run and 

a warning to the region. Moscow’s next conspiracy is likely to be 

more sophisticated and broad-based, whether to incite Serbian 

leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Muslim population, engineering ethnic clashes between Macedonians and Albanians inside Macedonia, or provoking Serbian-Montenegrin conflicts. If it 

serves his interests, Putin would not be averse to igniting a regional war to test NATO resolve, distract attention from Russia’s 

interventions elsewhere, and to undermine the process of Western 

integration. 

Very briefly now, in the Balkans, current security challenges are 

not simply military, not even primarily military. They are political, 

ethnic, economic, financial, and informational, particularly where 

local disputes can be ignited through outside subversion. The 

United States and NATO must prevent conflict by identifying 

vulnerabilities, promoting interstate cooperation, bolstering energy 

diversification, including gas supplies from Azerbaijan, combating 

Russian subversion, and furnishing steps towards NATO entry. 

Paradoxically, Moscow’s attack on democratic elections in the 

United States and in Europe awakened a new sense of realism 

about Putin’s Russia, dispelling illusions about our so-called common interests. Washington must grasp the leadership role just as 

it did during the Cold War because Europe remains divided and is 

perceived by Moscow as weak and indecisive. If the United States 

forfeits its role, we could witness regional crisis not only in the Balkans that shatter European stability and damage the NATO alliance. 

My last word is, if you have time, I would like to include my recent co-authored book with Margarita Assenova for the record entitled ‘‘Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks.’’ It provides 

a comprehensive analysis of Moscow’s strategies and ambitions toward Europe and the United States. It was published a few weeks 

ago—a few months ago. I have copies both for the chair and the 

ranking member. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows:] 

13 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY JANUSZ BUGAJSKI

Chairman John McCain, Ranking Member Jack Reed, and members of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today 

about the growing threat from Vladimir Putin’s Russia to European security and 

our trans-Atlantic alliance. 

I will begin by outlining the fundamental threats posed by the Kremlin and then 

place the Balkans in this broader strategic context. Moscow is engaged in a global 

Shadow War in which the primary goal is to dismantle the West and project Russia 

as a pole of power on an equal global footing with the United States. Europe is the 

core battleground of this struggle for dominance, in which Moscow does not recognize the independence or integrity of any targeted state. 

MOSCOW’S OBJECTIVES

Putin’s Russia is engaged in a concerted campaign to restore a Moscow-centered 

bloc, undermine the stability of several regions stretching from the Arctic to the 

Caspian Basin, weaken NATO as a security provider, and devolve the European 

Union. There are three main components of Moscow’s anti-Western offensive. 

1. Russia defines itself as a distinct ‘‘Eurasian pole of power,’’ defending itself 

against Western encroachment, proud of its anti-Americanism and 

authoritarianism, determined to delegitimize the Western democratic model, 

and intent on playing a vanguard role among governments that reject political 

influence from Washington and Brussels. 

2. A key Kremlin goal is to reverse United States influences within the wider Europe. This would help Putin exert leverage over the foreign and security policies of key states. Unlike during the Cold War, there is no accepted division 

of Europe into Western and Russian spheres. Instead, numerous states are coerced or enticed either to join the Russian zone, turn neutral, or oppose United 

States policy. Moscow pressures former Soviet republics to relinquish their 

Western aspirations, promotes conflicts within and between the Balkan states, 

fosters and exploits disputes over occupied territories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

and Moldova, and subverts members of both NATO and the EU. 

3. While its goals are imperial, Kremlin strategies are flexible. A diverse assortment of weapons are deployed to disarm the adversary, whether energy, business, trade, corruption, blackmail, cyberspace, espionage, politics, religion, ideology, disinformation, proxy conflicts, or outright warfare. 

RUSSIA TARGETS EUROPE

Moscow views both NATO and the EU as threats to its expansionist ambitions. 

NATO’s commitment to collective defense obstructs Russia’s revisionism and its ‘‘divide and conquer’’ policy. EU standards of legality and transparency challenge Russia’s opaque business model. Western political and human rights standards undermine Russia’s autocratic political model. Hence ‘‘Brexit’’ and other problems within 

the EU are welcomed by Moscow as they divide the Union, encourage bilateral deals 

with Russia, and limit further enlargement. 

Moscow benefits from political, ethnic, and social turbulence in Europe. Lucrative 

business deals and campaign donations enable the Kremlin to corrupt and influence 

targeted officials. Democratic regression or the upsurge of nationalist populism favors Russia’s objectives by weakening state institutions and deepening EU divisions. 

Putin appeals both to leftist anti-Americans and ultra-nationalist Euroskeptics to 

foster turmoil. During election cycles Moscow aims to discredit politicians that do 

not favor its interests. This can involve blackmail, fabricated news reports, and disclosure of stolen personal communications. 

MOSCOW’S BALKAN DIMENSION

The Balkans are viewed in Moscow as Europe’s ‘‘soft underbelly’’ where latent 

conflicts are enflamed, potential new allies courted, and economic opportunities exploited. Russia possesses four main channels of influence in the region: energy, corruption, nationalism, and propaganda. 

1. Moscow fosters energy dependence by tying Balkan countries into energy 

projects, including gas supplies, pipelines, and refineries. Energy dependence 

can undergird diplomatic and political compliance by exposing countries to 

blackmail and coercion. 

2. Political leaders and businesspeople are corrupted to favor Russia’s interests 

and to either remain neutral or support Moscow’s positions in its foreign policy 

offensives. 

14 

3. Local nationalisms are promoted to stir conflicts between rival nationalist 

projects, undermine support for NATO, the United States, and EU, and 

strengthen Moscow’s role as mediator. This enables the Kremlin to retard the 

region’s progress toward Western institutions. 

4. The Kremlin engages in propaganda offensives through local media, internet, 

and social networks to enhance Russia’s prestige and undermine state institutions. Its messages are designed to appeal to Euroskeptic, anti-American, and 

ultra-conservative elements in which Russia poses as the defender of traditional values. 

Moscow aims to disqualify the West Balkan states from NATO and EU membership. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it encourages the Serb entity government to keep the 

country divided. In Kosova, it uses the Serbian minority to uphold the specter of 

partition and blocks Kosova from entering the UN [United Nations]. In Macedonia, 

it manipulates internal turmoil and the country’s obstructed path toward NATO and 

the EU to gain political influence. 

The coup attempt in Montenegro during national elections in October 2016 was 

reportedly organized by Russian military intelligence operatives to prevent the 

country from attaining NATO membership. The plot was uncovered in time or it 

could have led to mass bloodshed in Podgorica. While the Russians evaded arrest, 

Montenegrin courts have begun trials of suspected Serb nationalist participants, including members of the pro-Moscow opposition. Tellingly, the Serbian Government 

has been helpful in Montenegro’s efforts to investigate the plot. Belgrade realizes 

that Serbia could face a similar scenario of destabilization if it decides to loosen its 

links with Moscow. 

We must better prepare for future violent scenarios. The Montenegrin putsch attempt could be a trial run and a warning to the region. Moscow’s next conspiracy 

is likely to be more sophisticated and broad-based, whether by inciting Serbian leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Muslim population, engineering ethnic clashes between Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, or provoking Serbian-Montenegrin conflicts. If it serves his interests, Putin would not be averse to igniting 

a regional war to test NATO resolve, distract attention from Russia’s interventions, 

and undermine Western integration. 

WESTERN RESPONSES

United States and EU officials have claimed that there is no zero-sum competition 

with Russia over the allegiance of any European country. In reality, the contradiction between a country’s freedom to choose its international alliances, which the 

West espouses, and limitations on state sovereignty, on which Moscow insists, lies 

at the core of the current struggle. While Putin remains at the helm, Western policy 

must be geared toward long-term support for the independence and integrity of 

countries throughout the Wider Europe. 

In the Balkans, current security challenges are not primarily military but political, ethnic, economic, financial, and informational, particularly where local disputes 

can be ignited through outside subversion. The United States and NATO must prevent conflict by identifying vulnerabilities, promoting interstate cooperation, bolstering energy diversification (including gas supplies from Azerbaijan), combating 

Russian subversion, and furnishing steps toward NATO entry. 

Paradoxically, Moscow’s attack on democratic elections in the United States and 

Europe awakened a new sense of realism about Putin’s Russia, dispelling illusions 

about common interests. Washington must grasp the leadership role just as it did 

during the Cold War, because Europe remains divided and is perceived by Moscow 

as weak and indecisive. If the United States forfeits its role we could witness regional crises that shatter European stability and damage the NATO alliance. 

CONCLUSIONS

The United States and NATO need to be armed for the Shadow War with Moscow. 

In addition to deterrence, the most effective form of defense is offense with a focus 

on Russia’s numerous vulnerabilities: economic, political informational, and cyber. 

The Russian Federation faces prolonged internal decay because of its structural, economic, and demographic failures. To deceive its citizens the Kremlin engages in foreign adventures: when it cannot provide bread it offers circuses. The Trump administration can craft an enduring legacy by reversing the Kremlin offensive in Europe 

and rebuilding a more resilient trans-Atlantic alliance. This would raise the stature 

of the United States as the most effective international leader and make America 

stronger and greater. 

Lastly, I would like to include my recent co-authored book with Margarita 

Assenova for the record. Entitled Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks, it 

15 

provides a comprehensive analysis of Moscow’s strategies and ambitions toward Europe and the United States. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection, it will be included in the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[The received publication will be retained in the committees files.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ms. Samp? 

STATEMENT OF LISA SAWYER SAMP, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. SAMP. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

and distinguished members of the committee, good morning. I 

would like to begin by thanking you for holding this hearing and, 

more broadly, for the steps the Senate has taken to assert its oversight role and voice related to issues of Russia and Europe, including your overwhelming bipartisan support for Montenegro’s accession to the NATO alliance and more recently for the Russia sanctions resolution. I do hope as well, sir, that the House will pass it 

quickly and in matching form. 

With that said, I would like to make two brief points regarding 

the topic of today’s hearing. 

First, Russia is becoming increasingly aggressive and ambitious. 

The coup attempt in Montenegro and Russia’s role in it is illustrative, but it is by no means unprecedented. Montenegro was not 

the first—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. When you say ‘‘unprecedented,’’ I think it 

was almost unprecedented in the extent and the complexity and 

the willingness to kill people. 

Ms. SAMP. I mean more in these terms of it is not the first time 

Russia has attempted to undermine the sovereign right of a nation 

to freely choose its political associations—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I got you. 

Ms. SAMP.—which we saw in both Georgia and Ukraine. But I 

agree it was an audacious attack. 

Russia’s tactics, as you know, are broad in nature. They include 

things like disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks. The list goes 

on. A Polish colleague once described these tools to me as ‘‘not the 

enemy at the gates, but the enemy in your pocket.’’ This was a reference to all the ways that Russia can now reach you through your 

cell phone. 

Putin likely does not want a war with the West, but he is finding 

he can get a lot done without one. For this reason, he has no intention of stopping now. He is experimenting along the way, growing 

increasingly comfortable taking risks and getting better. 

Three years ago, if you had asked anyone in Washington about 

the Russia challenge, you likely would have gotten an answer almost exclusively focused on the eastern flank, Ukraine in particular where Putin annexed Crimea and has continued to stoke violence in the country’s east. Since then, thousands have died and 

over a million have been displaced. 

Next Monday, July 17, will be the third anniversary of a day a 

Russian-provided missile brought down a civilian airliner in the 

16 

skies over eastern Ukraine killing all 298 people aboard, including 

one American. 

Two years ago, if you had asked the same question about the 

Russia challenge of either me or one of my colleagues, our answers 

would have expanded to include Syria where Russia has killed 

thousands in indiscriminate bombing runs and extended the civil 

war and distracted from the fight against the Islamic State. 

As of last fall, our answers would now have to reference the brazen assault that took aim at the very heart of United States democracy and another that took aim at Montenegro’s. 

One has to wonder what is Putin up to right now. What is he 

planning that we will be discussing at a hearing like this a year 

from now? 

The steady drumbeat of increasingly aggressive and opportunistic Russian behavior means we can no longer blame surprise or 

ignorance for inadequate and slow responses. The coup attempt in 

Montenegro serves to further reinforce what we should already 

know, that more must urgently be done to better protect ourselves 

and our allies from Russia’s systemic campaign to undermine the 

very foundations of Western society. 

My second and final point gets at what to do about it. We are 

not outmatched, but we are being outplayed. I will pause here and 

ask you to think about why Russia is trying to sow instability and 

undermine the global order. There has been a lot written on it. I, 

like my colleague, also just added a bit more, and we have some 

copies for the chair and the ranking. 

But it boils down to an easy answer. It wants to and it can without major consequences. I discuss in more detail in my written testimony the ‘‘wants to and can’’ part of that equation. But I want 

to pause for a moment and focus on the ‘‘without major consequences’’ part. 

The steps taken by the West since 2014 remain insufficient. We 

are not doing enough to change Russia’s calculus. Putin is still seeing more reward than risk. It is, therefore, time to increase the 

credibility of our threats and promises and decrease our sensitivity 

to Russia’s knee-jerk protest to any and all NATO activity. It is 

time to draw a firmer line and to speak to Putin in the language 

he bests understands: power and resolve. 

How do we do that? Well, there are no silver bullet solutions precisely because Russian aggression has manifested in so many different ways. We need a combination of measures that aim to shore 

up our own vulnerabilities to Russian coercion and apply greater 

pressure to contest it. We need more defense and, importantly, offense across the spectrum of our toolkit. This means shaping a new 

relationship paradigm that puts more onus on Moscow to comply 

with international norms rather than simply imposing consequences for breaching them. 

What do I mean by that? Well, instead of saying we will lift sanctions when Russia decides to comply with the Minsk Agreements, 

say that we will raise them until they do. Instead of kowtowing to 

Russia’s supposed spheres of influence, provide Ukraine the lethal 

assistance it so desperately needs and increase United States support to vulnerable nations in the gray zone. Instead of simply accepting Russia’s unfounded claims of Western provocation, recogVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
17 

nize the vast disparity in the size of our force posture and exercises 

and begin to enhance deterrence. 

Here it is important to step back and recall that the United 

States combat presence in Europe is a full brigade strength below 

what it was in 2012 prior to renewed tensions with Russia and that 

NATO’s largest exercise conducted since the end of the Cold War 

peaked at about 30,000 troops. Meanwhile, Russia’s Zapad exercise 

planned for later this fall may reach up to 100,000. 

Instead of discussing cooperation on an impenetrable cybersecurity unit, we should be doing more to both defend our systems and 

employ offensive cyber techniques to expose and undermine Russia 

in the cyber domain. 

Instead of delegitimizing or demonizing the free press, we should 

be doing more to promote accurate and truthful narratives using 

all the tools at our disposal, including those available covertly. 

Instead of casting doubt on the efficacy of our alliances, we 

should be educating our publics on the importance of the international order and the value of the transatlantic bond. We should 

be strengthening and investing in NATO, not tearing it down. Our 

alliances are our greatest foreign policy advantage, and I think it 

behooves us all to remember that. 

Finally, we should be practicing what we preach. The United 

States cannot be a credible critic of Russian aggression if it does 

not provide a strong alternative example. Continued United States 

leadership of the international order is at stake. 

Now, none of this means we cannot still cooperate with Russia 

where it is in our interest to do so like on arms control or nuclear 

nonproliferation. But we must approach engagement cautiously, selectively, and with firm limits. Changing Russia’s behavior will not 

be quick or easy, but the stakes are simply too high not to try. If 

Russia can be creative and adaptive, then surely we can too. 

In conclusion, Russia may just be looking out for what it considers to be in its national interest, but then we need to do the 

same. That entails pushing back harder to protect ourselves, our 

allies, and the international order. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Samp follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LISA SAWYER SAMP

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today alongside His Excellency 

Nebojsˇa Kaludjerovic, Mr. Janusz Bugajski, and Mr. Damon Wilson regarding the 

attempted coup in Montenegro and malign Russian influence in Europe. 

This testimony is informed by a study conducted in my capacity as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies entitled ‘‘Recalibrating 

United States Strategy toward Russia: A New Time for Choosing,’’ released in 

March 2017. It also draws from my previous experience working European security 

issues on the National Security Council staff and at the Department of Defense. 

Given the deep expertise of my fellow witnesses on Montenegro, I will focus my remarks on the broader Russia challenge, the response of the United States and Europe, and areas in need of Congressional attention. 

RUSSIA’S ACTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

The 2016 coup attempt in Montenegro was not the first, nor likely will it be the 

last, of Russia’s attempts to undermine the sovereign right of a nation to freely 

choose its political associations—a right Russia itself affirmed in the 1975 Helsinki 

Final Act and reaffirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris. It represents a single data 

18 

1 Carol J. Williams, ‘‘Russia claims vast Arctic territory, seeks U.N. recognition,’’ Los Angeles 

Times, August 4, 2015. 2 ‘‘Russia and Iran in talks over $10 billion arms deal: RIA,’’ Reuters, November 14, 2016, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-iran-arms-idUSKBN1390UM 3Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘‘Russia is sending weapons to Taliban, top United States general confirms,’’ Washington Post, April 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/ 

wp/2017/04/24/russia-is-sending-weapons-to-taliban-top-u-s-general-confirms/?utm— 

term=.639d8c8b979f. 4Tess Owen, ‘‘US Spy Chief Warns of Space Wars, North Korean Nukes, and Cyber Threats,’’ 

Vice News, February 9, 2016, https://news.vice.com/article/us-spy-chief-warns-of-space-warsnorth-korean-nukes-and-cyber-armageddon. 

point on an irrefutable trend line of increasingly aggressive and opportunistic Russian behavior. To describe the incident as new or eye-opening would be to dismiss 

all that has come before it. This is not meant to minimize what occurred, but to 

put it in proper perspective. Given the pervasiveness and severity of Moscow’s 

known offenses, we can no longer blame surprise or ignorance for inadequate and 

slow responses. The coup attempt serves to further reinforce what we should already know: more must urgently be done to better protect ourselves and our allies 

from Russia’s systemic campaign to undermine the international system that would 

hold it accountable to the rule of law and deny its desired spheres of influence. 

President Putin has amassed a robust global toolkit comprised of a variety of conventional and unconventional tactics, to include disinformation and propaganda, 

cyber attacks, economic coercion, political subversion and election meddling, deniable forces in the form of ‘‘little green men,’’ nuclear saber-rattling, aggressive air 

and sea maneuvers, and other malign activities. These tactics are designed to circumvent United States and NATO redlines, confuse traditional response options, 

and use the virtues of the West against it. Russia has experimented with the application of these tactics in varying combinations and at mutable levels of intensity— 

leveraging just enough to create chaos and sow instability in an effort to undermine 

the international system. 

What began primarily as a challenge along NATO’s eastern flank has steadily expanded outward, subverting Western interests and influence in all directions. To the 

North, Russia has increased its military presence in the Arctic and laid formal claim 

to 460,000 square miles of Arctic ocean seabed. 1 To the East and South, Putin has 

employed military force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. In Ukraine, he annexed Crimea and continues to sow violence in the country’s east. Thousands of Ukrainians 

have died and over a million have been displaced. We must also not forget the 298 

people, including one American, who were killed when a Russian-provided antiaircraft missile brought down a civilian airliner in the skies over Eastern Ukraine. 

In Syria, Russia’s support for the Assad regime has extended the civil war, distracted from the fight against the Islamic State, and exacerbated human suffering. 

Russia is also a strategic ally of Iran and a key trading partner. Its interest in selling $10 billion worth of arms to Iran—including T–90 tanks, artillery, aircraft, and 

helicopters—would increase Tehran’s military capability at a time when its malign 

activities are already having significantly destabilizing effects across the Middle 

East. 2 In Asia, there is growing evidence that Russia is supplying weapons to the 

Taliban in Afghanistan. 3 It is also expanding its military and energy cooperation 

with China and India; moves that seek to advance its interests while challenging 

the influence of the United States in the region. 

Compounding all of this, Russia’s attempts to confront the United States in the 

cyber and space domains could have dangerous implications for how Americans live 

and fight, according to former U.S. director of national intelligence James Clapper. 4

Its violation of the INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces] treaty and nuclear 

saber-rattling, likewise, raise worrying questions about Russia’s commitment to 

strategic stability and to the norms that have preserved a certain degree of caution 

in public discussions related to nuclear weapons. 

Russia’s malign influence has also crossed an ocean to strike at the heart of 

United States democracy with its interference in the 2016 presidential election. This 

brazen action shows that Putin is only becoming more emboldened with time and 

growing increasingly comfortable taking risks. Efforts to minimize or downplay Russia’s attack against the United States only increases the likelihood that similar and 

more ambitious election interference will occur in the future, including against our 

closest allies in Europe. Efforts to ‘‘move on’’ or ignore the incident do not serve long 

term U.S. interests. 

19 

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S MOTIVATIONS

Why is Russia seeking to undermining the existing international order by sowing 

instability abroad? The answer is simple: It wants to and it can, while reaping more 

rewards than consequences. 

First, it wants to for a variety of reasons that reflect a combination of: (1) Putin’s 

domestic political calculations; (2) a desire to right historical wrongs borne of the 

‘‘humiliation’’ that ensued following the end of the Cold War; (3) longstanding distrust of Western intentions, especially as it relates to NATO enlargement, that engender a zero-sum world view in which American’s gains are seen as Russia’s losses 

and vice versa; and (4) the need to protect a geopolitical sphere of influence that 

is seen as central to Russia’s own security. 

Second, Moscow is now more able to act on these motives than in the past due 

to a mix of growing strengths inside Russia and growing weaknesses inside the 

West. Russia, for its part, has partially recovered from the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. High energy prices in the 2000s helped stabilize the economy, and Putin’s 

consolidation of political power has minimized domestic opposition that might otherwise constrain a confrontational foreign policy. Moscow’s reinvestments in its armed 

forces since 2008 have helped Russia reemerge as a formidable military power. 

Though not a peer competitor to the United States military, the Russian military 

does enjoy local superiority across the span of its western borders in Europe. This, 

combined with the creative employment of niche capabilities and a low bar for the 

use of force, allows Russia to play to its advantages and yield considerable bang for 

its buck—especially since destabilization is a comparatively limited and achievable 

goal. 

For the West’s part, we have failed to adequately invest in the health of our democracies, institutions, and defenses. The end of the Cold War lulled Western societies into complacency and promoted a misguided faith in the sustaining power of 

good intentions absent proper upkeep. Russia has exposed and exploited the cracks 

in our foundation, likely with more success than even it thought possible. 

Russian disinformation campaigns, for example, benefit from domestic political efforts to delegitimize or demonize the free press and intelligence agencies. Russian 

attempts to break Western unity is abetted by populist narratives that cast doubt 

on the efficacy of our alliances and institutions. Russian political and economic coercion is helped along by the ease with which assets can be held in obscurity in developed democracies and by illiberal trends that spurn transparency and oversight 

while rewarding corruption. Russian military threats and posturing are made more 

threatening by Europe’s lack of defense investment and military readiness. Russian 

manipulation and whataboutism is legitimized by Presidential statements that draw 

moral equivalencies between the West and Russia. Instead of educating our 

publics—who have largely forgotten why NATO and the European Union were created—on the importance of the international order and the value of our alliances, 

some in our own societies are eager to turn public unawareness into anger in exchange for short term political gains. Sadly, Russia can only look at this and laugh. 

The final piece of the equation is that Russia’s current incentive structure appears 

to encourage more action rather than less. In other words, it is reaping more rewards than consequences. Consider, for example, that Ukraine and Georgia’s 

progress toward NATO membership appears indefinitely stalled; Russia now controls Crimea; transatlantic cohesion is straining under the growing political divisions; and Assad has been pulled back from the brink. Meanwhile, Putin is more 

popular at home than ever. Sanctions have proven a convenient scapegoat for greater structural problems within Russia’s economy. Russia’s status as an international 

power player has been renewed. Russia’s pattern of provocative behavior will not 

change until the West imposes greater consequences—until Moscow sees more risk 

than reward. 

UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN RESPONSE

Following Russia’s 2014 aggression in Ukraine, the United States and its allies 

imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia and quickly established 

an enhanced and persistent air, land, and sea presence in Eastern Europe to reassure nervous allies. All of these measures have evolved from their initial formulation. 

The United States sanctions levied against Russia in response to its seizure of 

Crimea and continuing support of violence in Eastern Ukraine were matched by the 

European Union, along with every non-EU member of NATO (with the exception of 

Turkey) and major non-NATO partners Australia, Japan, and South Korea. It is the 

participation of partners and allies that has given the sanctions their bite. The trade 

in goods between the EU and Russia in 2015, for example, totaled $222 billion. This 

20 

5White House, ‘‘Fact Sheet: European Reassurance Initiative and Other United States Efforts 

in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,’’ June 3, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 

the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support-. 6 Ellen Mitchell, ‘‘NATO pledges to up defense spending after Trump pressure,’’ The Hill, June 

28, 2017. http://thehill.com/policy/defense/339832-nato-pledges-to-up-defense-spending-aftertrump-pressure. 

is compared to $22 billion between the United States and Russia. In late December 

2016, President Obama authorized additional United States sanctions in response 

to Russia’s cyber operations aimed at the presidential election. President Trump 

could rescind these sanctions, imposed by Executive Order, at any time. Should the 

United States unilaterally pull its support, the international sanctions regime would 

likely collapse in short order. 

In the security realm, NATO agreed to assurance and deterrence measures at the 

2014 Wales Summit and the 2016 Warsaw Summit that aimed to enhance alliance 

readiness against all threats. These efforts include additional force presence in 

NATO’s east, enhanced training and exercises, prepositioned equipment, and military infrastructure improvements. The most recent commitments have transitioned 

the alliance from reassurance-focused measures to those that seek to establish a 

longer-term credible deterrence in NATO’s east. This includes, among other things, 

expanding the number of troops in each Baltic State from a company-sized force (approximately 150 troops) to a more capable battalion-sized force (approximately 1,000 

multinational troops); updating war plans; reconfiguring prepositioned equipment to 

support war plan requirements (as opposed to training and exercises); standing up 

a rapid reaction force that would be able to quickly surge reinforcements in a crisis; 

establishing eight reception and staging centers along NATO’s eastern flank to receive those reinforcements; updating alliance threat assessments; improving logistics to reduce barriers to the freedom of movement for troops and equipment across 

Europe; and reinvesting in the defense capabilities needed for territorial defense 

(vice expeditionary operations). 

Much of the United States contribution to broader NATO assurance and deterrence efforts—known collectively as the Readiness Action Plan—has been funded by 

the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and conducted under the auspices of the 

Defense Department’s Atlantic Resolve mission. ERI was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 

2015 as a $1 billion appropriation within the Defense Department’s Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget. 5 Former President Obama’s fiscal year 2017 

budget request proposed quadrupling ERI funding to $3.4 billion, up from $789 million in fiscal year 2016, in acknowledgement of the threat Russia poses to United 

States interests in Europe. 

Despite continuing to reside in the one-year OCO budget, ERI is now considered 

a multi-year effort aimed at enhancing the United States presence, capability, and 

readiness in Europe after decades of decline. The most recent defense authorization 

bill would further expand ERI to a total of $4.8 billion, allowing for additional 

prepositioned equipment and infrastructure investments. ERI does not aspire to return the United States to a Cold War-era posture. It does, however, aim to allow 

the United States to better defend its interests and allies and to begin to contend 

with Russia’s military advantages in Eastern Europe by taking steps deemed minimally necessary for credible deterrence. These steps are prudent given the security 

environment and are neither hostile nor provocative toward Russia, regardless of 

Moscow’s reflexive cries to the contrary. 

The sum total of the measures taken by the United States and its European allies 

since 2014 are a good start, but they are not enough to adequately manage the Russia challenge. Notwithstanding rotational increases made possible through ERI, the 

United States Army combat presence in Europe remains a full brigade strength 

below what it was in 2012—prior to renewed tensions with Russia. Defense spending among NATO allies (not including the United States) will collectively increase 

by 4.3 percent in 2017 with a total increase of $46 billion since 2014, though arguably this can and should be happening more quickly in certain cases. 6 The European Union (EU) has held firm on sanctions (recently renewed through January 

2018), though the $11 billion, 745-mile Nord Stream 2 pipeline project remains a 

possibility—in violation of both the spirit of the sanctions and stated EU desires to 

diversify away from Russian gas supplies. Energy cooperation is likewise expanding 

between Russia and the increasingly autocratic governments in Turkey and Hungary. 

Given that Russia’s malign influence continues unabated and with growing ambition, the yardstick for measuring the success of the Western response can no longer 

be the ability to reach and maintain consensus around a NATO table. Rather, it 

21 

must be tied to outcomes; i.e., changing Russia’s behavior. There remains much that 

can be done to press the West’s advantages vis-a`-vis Russia without sparking a conflict or even coming close. It is time to draw a firmer line—to decrease our sensitivity to Russia’s reflexive protests and increase the credibility of our threats and 

promises. As Lenin reminds us about the Russian attitude toward power, ‘‘You 

probe with bayonets. If you find mush, you push. If you find steel you withdraw.’’ 

A steel spine is required in defense of the international system that has served the 

United States and its allies so well over the past 70 years. 

THE WAY FORWARD

I, along with my co-authors, offer a comprehensive strategy for managing the Russia challenge in a CSIS report entitled ‘‘Recalibrating United States Strategy toward 

Russia: A New Time for Choosing.’’ This strategy seeks to strengthen Western institutions, contest Russia’s aggression, and pursue cooperation where advantageous 

and feasible (such as in the areas of arms control and nuclear nonproliferation) 

without degenerating into endless accommodation. 

Without recreating that work here, I wish to highlight a few of the high priority 

recommendations that Congress can advance: 

• Pass the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017. The Senate’s overwhelming bipartisan support (98–2) for the ‘‘Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017’’ in Senate 

Resolution 722 on June 15, 2017, is a necessary and appropriate step that will 

ensure Russia continues to be held accountable for its aggressive and destabilizing actions; further deter it from undertaking similar acts in the future; 

and positively assert Congress’s vital oversight role in matters pertaining to 

United States national security. 

Beyond codifying the current sanctions regime, the Senate resolution seeks to 

dissuade those that would do business with the Russian intelligence and defense sectors, a vital element of the legislation that would both further punish 

Russia for its interference in the 2016 United States elections and inhibit the 

growth and development of its defense capabilities. The legislation also expands 

sanctions related to Russia’s energy sector and further restricts access to debt 

financing; levies new sanctions against Russian actors engaged in corruption 

and human rights abuses, and those supplying weapons to the Assad regime 

or conducting cyberattacks on behalf of the Russian Government; and, importantly, authorizes assistance to allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe to counter malign Russian influence and disinformation. These are needed 

steps that will help provide the United States with leverage in managing the 

Russia challenge. 

The United States Congress—Republicans and Democrats alike—must unite to 

send a clear message to Russia and others that our core democratic practices 

are not a playground for bullies and dictators—that we will punish and oppose 

any violation of our sovereignty and that of our allies and partners. The United 

States House of Representatives should take immediate action to pass a matching resolution. 

• Increase and optimize the United States conventional military presence in Europe. United States forces in Europe today are not adequate to deter Russian 

aggression at a remaining level of risk that should be acceptable to United 

States policymakers or members of Congress. This does not mean that the 

United States should return to the massive Cold War-era military presence it 

once kept in Europe. There are reasonable steps, however, that could be taken 

to enhance the credibility of our deterrence in Europe. To start, The United 

States should forward station an armored brigade combat team and additional 

Army enabling units in Europe; restore a full-strength combat aviation brigade; 

retain at least six Air Force fighter squadrons in Europe with the ability to rapidly flow in more aircraft as necessary; and ensure a robust naval presence in 

and around European waters. There should be at least as many combat forces 

in Europe today as there were in 2012. 

The European Reassurance Initiative—or rather its successor, the European 

Deterrence Initiative—will need to continue to be funded at similar or slightly 

higher levels and should be codified in the Defense Department’s base budget, 

rather than be considered as part of the Overseas Contingency Operations account. This will provide greater stability and predictability to the Defense Department’s Europe planning. The Russia threat is not going away anytime soon 

and the budget should reflect this reality. 

• Support Ukraine and other partners in the so-called gray zone. The United 

States has committed more than $600 million in security assistance to 

22 

Ukraine—the cornerstone of which is train, equip, and advise efforts that help 

build the capacity of Ukraine’s forces, while also advancing institutional reform. 

Ukraine will require additional support—conditioned on its continued progress 

in implementing necessary anticorruption and transparency reforms—across the 

spectrum of its security, economic, and governance needs. 

Congress should continue the authorization of lethal aid to Ukraine as a signal 

of support for necessary policy changes that would increase the costs to Russia 

for any further aggression. Also needed is greater engagement with and support 

to the other vulnerable non-NATO partners in the Caucasus, Balkans, Central 

Asia, and Eastern Europe as a means to check Russia attempts to undermine 

their sovereignty and foment regional instability. Funding for State Department 

resilience efforts in Europe will be key. 

A REINFORCEMENT MODEL FOR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE

NATO’s conventional deterrence strategy in Europe is based upon a reinforcement 

model that depends on: (1) small, yet capable, tripwire forces; (2) rapid-response 

forces that can be mobilized on short notice; and (3) the ability to get follow-on 

forces to the fight quickly. While much of the alliance’s focus has been on ground 

forces, the United States and its allies would also be expected to surge air and naval 

forces to the region in a crisis, both of which add significant capabilities to counter 

Russia. 

• The tripwire forces in the Baltic States and Poland are known as NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), which began deploying in February 2017 and 

recently reached full operational capability. The eFP is comprised of four multinational battalions, or battlegroups, led by the United States (in Poland), the 

UK (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia), and Germany (in Lithuania), with contributions from several other nations augmenting or in some cases rounding out 

the deployments by these framework nations. NATO’s eFP framework essentially replaces the continuous United States deployments of company-sized elements to each of the Baltic States and Poland. The United States troop presence 

that was once thinly spread across the eastern flank is smartly being consolidated in Poland as the United States-led eFP battalion. Outside of the eFP 

framework, the United State has separately deployed to Poland elements of a 

rotational armored brigade, which will have other elements available for exercises and training elsewhere. Additionally, NATO has established eight NATO 

Force Integration Unit (NFIUs) in countries along NATO’s eastern flank—the 

three Baltic States, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary—that 

will be able to act as rapidly expandable reception and staging centers for arriving reinforcements. 

• The rapid response forces are comprised of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint 

Task Force (VJTF), an approximately brigade-sized multinational force led on 

a rotational basis by participating allies; headquarter elements comprising 

NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps; and other immediately available support elements found within the NATO Force Structure. The United States Army forces 

permanently stationed in Europe—the 2nd Calvary Regiment (Stryker brigade) 

based in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173rd Airborne brigade based in Vicenza, 

Italy—would also be able to quickly respond in a crisis, along with the United 

States’ rotational armored brigade, made possible by ERI. Given NATO’s requirement for political consensus before deploying the VJTF, the U.S. Forces 

would likely be the most readily available first responders in certain contingencies. 

• The follow-on forces would be comprised of forces based in the United States 

that could relatively quickly fall in on the war-fighting equipment that has been 

prepositioned in Western Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium). 

These Army Prepositioned Stocks were added under the fiscal year 2017 ERI. 

Follow-on forces could also potentially include the expanded NATO Response 

Force, including its Initial Follow-on Forces Group and its air, maritime, and 

SOF components, along with any allied national forces joining the fight. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson? 

23 

STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Chairman McCain, Ranking 

Member Reed, members of the committee. I want to begin and bed 

this in a little bit of the story of understanding what happened and 

why it matters. 

In June 2014, NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels to consider Montenegro’s accession to NATO. Just 3 months prior, the 

Russian Federation had annexed Crimea. So many argued at the 

time that the NATO’s decision to invite Montenegro into the Alliance was not only merited on its own terms, but would also contribute to a decisive response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Others, however, urged delay, emphasizing de-escalation of the crisis 

unfolding in Ukraine. 

In the end, it was ambivalence among key allies and, frankly, opposition by the United States that led the Alliance to punt the decision, agreeing to reconsider the issue by the end of 2015, which 

would be 18 months later. 

So as NATO ministers failed to reach consensus on Montenegro 

that tumultuous summer, Moscow saw an opening. NATO had 

blinked. With the successful seizure of Crimea and the emergence 

of what the Kremlin believed would become Novorossiya, Russia 

was on offense. The West was stunned, and true to form, Moscow’s 

success emboldened the Kremlin to pursue further success. The 

thinking in Moscow was that the seizure of Ukrainian territory 

would surely block Ukraine’s move towards NATO and the EU. But 

might the Kremlin also be able to stop the integration process in 

Southeast Europe? 

So it is during this period that the plot for Montenegro was 

hatched when Aleksandar Sindjelic, the leader of the paramilitary 

Serbian Wolves, began Serbian fighters to fight in Ukraine, himself 

included. It is there that Russian nationalists introduced him to 

two Russian military intelligence agents, GRU agents, Eduard 

Shirokov and Vladimir Popov. Open source reporting provides a 

compelling case that the GRU and its associates were directly involved in orchestrating the attempted coup. Sindjelic received 

money from these Russian contacts to purchase weapons and supplies used in the Montenegro operation and to recruit participants. 

The details are sensational, and since, Senator McCain, you asked, 

I will add a few more of the details to put that in the record. 

We should remember that this was plan B. Plan A was for the 

Russians to tip the balance of the elections. I have had the opportunity to travel to Montenegro regularly, almost every year for the 

past several years, and in the run-up to this election, it was pretty 

remarkable to see street signs, billboards all across the country 

anti-NATO campaign. So the plan was to defeat the pro-NATO 

forces in this election through using the Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, a telecommunications company, and a 

media empire. This small country of 600,000 was flooded with resources to tip the balance. In fact, the main Serbian opposition 

party was not radical enough, and the Russians sidelined them, 

picked a fringe party called the Democratic Front and, through its 

resources, it went from being irrelevant on the Montenegro political 

24 

scene to now being the leading opposition. Two of its leaders now 

are being tried for the coup attempt. That was plan A. 

Plan B was that on October 16th, 2016, if the pro-NATO forces 

were to succeed at the election, to enter parliament dressed as 

Montenegro security services, open fire on opposition supporters 

that the organizers had cynically gathered and called to convene in 

front of the parliament themselves, kidnap or assassinate the 

Prime Minister, declare the elections invalid, and install the Democratic Front taking power, this followed very rapidly by a series of 

very strange developments. 

On October 24th, after Serbs doubting it, announced that they 

had found complicit information about co-conspirators in Belgrade. 

2 days later, the head of the—Patrushev, the head of the Russian 

National Security Council, arrives in Belgrade, supposedly privately to apologize for a botched operation, but also to provide 

cover for the deportation of two Russians that departed Belgrade, 

some just before and some again on November 11th. December 

12th, Lavrov is there seen pictured with one of the co-conspirators 

in this coup. 

It is a spy novel. It is hard to believe. 

If the coup would have succeeded, it would have dealt an immeasurable blow to the Alliance. It would have brought a halt to 

the process of NATO enlargement as well. 

This incident is part of Russia’s strategy to make the world safe 

for autocracy and kleptocracy. Russia seeks to reverse the Cold 

War order and undermine both NATO and the EU from within 

through malign influence operations. 

In response, the United States and the European Union have enacted tough sanctions. I very much support the congressional effort 

to toughen those sanctions with the bill that is pending. But sanctions should be part of a strategy rather than the strategy. This administration has yet to articulate clearly the nature of the Russian 

challenge, much less the strategy to counter it. Nonetheless, I believe the key elements of a response are in place or within reach. 

To tackle malign Russian influence, I would advocate a five-part 

strategy: promoting prosperity, bolstering our defense capabilities, 

pursuing a concerted engagement strategy exposing Russian actions, and anchoring our actions and our ideals. That is offering 

our vision of what it is we are seeking to achieve rather than simply countering Russian moves. 

Russia is able to advance its malign influence where there is a 

nexus of corruption, organized crime, and under-development. To 

tackle this, the head of an allied intelligence service recently told 

me that prosperity is the best antidote, as it increases the resilience of nations particularly in the Balkans and Southeast and 

Eastern Europe. 

I think this is why President Trump’s endorsement of the Three 

Seas Initiative in Warsaw is important. It is an initiative that 

brings together the 12 EU member states between the Adriatic, the 

Baltic, and the Black Seas with the aim of advancing cross-border 

energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure to 

better integrate their economies, unlock growth potential, and ensure that Russia cannot hold their economies hostage. This is why 

25 

the congressional move to lift restrictions on LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas] exports to Europe is so important as well. 

So I actually believe an American prosperity agenda should advance U.S. investment in the region, putting economic ties on par 

with our security ties. It is entrepreneurship, after all, that provides jobs outside the control of political patronage networks, which 

are subject to Russian manipulation. 

Second, we need to project our military strength as a stabilizing force. The $4.8 billion European Deterrence Initiative request is a 

great contribution, especially on the eastern flank. But just as we 

have positioned forces, modest forces, in the east, we should do so 

in the southeast. This means transforming our forces that are in 

KFOR [Kosovo Forces], modest as they are, at Camp Bondsteel into 

what I would call a permanent presence to project security 

throughout the region and bolstering Black Sea security by approving the pending Patriot sale to Romania and providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine and Georgia. 

Third, the United States needs a sustained diplomatic offensive 

in the region. Our engagement is too episodic and not at a sufficient political level. Vice President Pence will soon visit Tallinn, 

Podgorica, and Tbilisi where he can follow up on the Three Seas 

prosperity agenda and I hope announce more steps to bolster our 

security commitments. But even as we work to ensure 

Montenegro’s NATO membership is a success, we should have a 

diplomatic strategy that pursues a historic rapprochement with 

Serbia that ends Belgrade’s dangerous hedging, which is why 

President [Aleksandar] Vucic’s visit to Washington next week is so 

important. 

The United States should also resume its leadership in resolving 

the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia, paving the way 

for the latter’s membership in NATO. To start, we should welcome 

the Greek Prime Minister to Washington to ensure Athens is a 

partner rather than an obstacle in the region, not tempted by Russian manipulation. 

Fourth, the most effective means to counter Russian malign influence is to expose it. As our electorates become educated on Russian influence operations, they become inoculated to its impact. 

This is why the Atlantic Council just last week in Warsaw convened the first-ever Open Source Summit to train journalists and 

activists on using unclassified techniques to expose and combat 

Russian influence. Through this work, we have been able to document in great detail what unfolded in Montenegro in an unclassified setting. We need to empower this type of work across the Alliance as it makes our democracies more resilient and our electorates 

less susceptible to manipulation. 

But most importantly, I think we need to keep our values as our 

guiding star and restore a credible vision of a Europe whole and 

free. Our message should be clear that as a result of reforms at 

home, all European states can ultimately be part of a secure and 

prosperous transatlantic community. Advancing a Europe whole 

and free should be a central plank of a broader effort to rally the 

West, as President Trump perhaps suggested in his Warsaw 

speech. I prefer the term ‘‘free world’’ to connote our community is 

not one of geography but one of ideas. Senator McCain, you put it, 

26 

defense of the free world is the purpose where we try to rally folks 

around democratic institutions, rule of law, free media. 

As part of this strategy, the United States itself must remain a 

force for integration, not fragmentation in Europe. We cannot be 

ambivalent about this. We should never become an enabler of the 

Kremlin strategy to divide and weaken the European Union. 

Excluding the invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, the coup in 

Montenegro may be among the most brazen of Russia’s influence 

operations. Its significance is that the Russians almost got away 

with it. But it is not unique. There are incidents. In October 2014, 

Russian Cossacks entered Banja Luka poised to intervene if 

Milorad Dodik had lost his election. Arms caches have been found 

in Hungary with ties to GRU agents. Russian fingerprints are on 

spectacular kidnappings in Estonia, instability and violence in 

Macedonia, efforts to stoke separatism in Gagauzia in Moldova, 

and to delegitimize Kosovo as a state, on top of the financing of extreme political parties across the continent. 

The Kremlin has drawn its own lessons from the muted response 

of the free world. I think it is important that we must end the cycle 

of impunity, continuing to raise the costs of not only Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also its interference in our democratic societies, even as we work to eliminate the opportunities for its malign 

influence throughout Europe. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DAMON M. WILSON

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee: 

In June 2014, NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels to consider Montenegro’s 

accession to NATO. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen was working hard 

toward a consensus that Montenegro would be invited to begin accession talks to 

become NATO’s next ally. 

Just three months prior, the Russian Federation had annexed Crimea. Many, including me, argued at the time that a NATO decision to invite Montenegro into the 

Alliance was not only merited on its own terms, but would also contribute to a decisive response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Others urged a delay, emphasizing 

de-escalation of the crisis unfolding in Ukraine. 

In the end, ambivalence among key allies and opposition by the United States led 

the Alliance to punt, forcing an exasperated Secretary General to announce that 

NATO would reconsider the issue by the end of 2015, 18 months later, removing 

this decision from the agenda of NATO leaders who would meet in Wales that September. 

As NATO ministers failed to reach consensus on Montenegro that tumultuous 

summer, Moscow saw an opening. NATO had blinked. With the successful seizure 

of Crimea and the emergence of what the Kremlin believed would become 

Novorossiya, Russia was on offense. The West was stunned. True to form, Moscow’s 

success emboldened the Kremlin. The thinking in Moscow was that its seizure of 

Ukrainian territory would surely block Ukraine’s move toward NATO and the European Union (EU). But might the Kremlin also be able to stop the integration process 

in Southeast Europe? The lack of a NATO decision on Montenegro signaled ambivalence, leaving a vacuum which Moscow was intent to fill. 

It was during this time that Aleksandar Sindjelic, leader of the paramilitary ‘‘Serbian Wolves,’’ began sending Serbian fighters to Ukraine to support Russia’s seizure 

of Crimea and insurgency in the Donbass. While in Ukraine, Sindjelic worked with 

Russian nationalists who introduced him to Eduard Shirokov (he is also known as 

Eduard Shishmakov) and Vladimir Popov. Open source reporting has verified both 

27 

1https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/25/balkan-gambit-part-2-montenegro-zugzwang/ 

as Russian military intelligence, or GRU, agents. 1 Their encounter set in train the 

attempted coup in Montenegro. 

Thanks to what we at the Atlantic Council call #DigitalSherlocks, or our digital 

forensic open source researchers, we know that Shirokov formerly served as deputy 

military attach ́ e at the Russian Embassy in Warsaw, where he was accused of espionage, declared persona non grata, and expelled in June 2014. His registered address 

in Russia is a GRU-owned residence. He was issued a false passport in August 2016, 

two months before traveling to the Balkans. Popov, who had been spotted in 

Moldova with Gagauzian separatists in 2014, joined Shirokov in hosting Sindjelic 

in Moscow in September 2015, where they proposed the plot to derail Montenegro’s 

NATO bid. Sindjelic received money from these Russian contacts to purchase weapons and supplies used in the operation, and to recruit participants. 

These events set in motion the extraordinarily brazen attempted coup in Montenegro last October. Open source reporting provides a compelling case that the GRU 

and its associates were directly involved in orchestrating this attempted coup in an 

effort to install a government friendly to Moscow and derail Montenegro’s NATO accession. If the coup would have succeeded, it would have dealt an immeasurable 

blow to the Alliance and its credibility. It also would have brought to a halt the 

process of NATO enlargement. 

This incident is part of Russia’s strategy to, in effect, make the world safe for autocracy and kleptocracy. As Russia itself has become more of an authoritarian 

kleptocracy, it has sought to reverse the post-Cold War order that has been so successful in advancing freedom, prosperity, and security in Europe. To achieve its objectives, Russia need only disrupt this process. Moscow however escalates its objectives with success, meaning that Russia has seen an opportunity to undermine both 

NATO and the EU from within through its malign influence operations. 

To date, the West has been flat footed. During the Obama administration, the 

United States and the EU enacted tough sanctions. But sanctions should be part 

of a strategy, not the entire strategy. The Trump administration has yet to articulate the nature of the Russian challenge, much less a strategy to counter it. Nonetheless, key elements of a response are in place or within reach. 

I would argue that the best defense is offense. Building on the president’s recent 

address in Warsaw, we should focus on rallying the free world to defend itself and 

the values that underpin our freedom. To tackle malign Russian influence, I advocate a five-part strategy: promoting prosperity, bolstering our deterrent capabilities, 

pursuing a concerted diplomatic engagement strategy, exposing Russian actions, 

and anchoring our actions in our ideals—that is, offering our vision of what it is 

we are seeking to achieve rather than simply countering Russian moves. 

Russia is able to advance its malign influence where there is a nexus of corruption, organized crime, and underdevelopment. To tackle this, the head of an allied 

intelligence service recently told me that the best answer is to promote economic 

growth. Prosperity is the antidote as it increases the resilience of nations, particularly in Europe’s East and Southeast. 

This is why President Trump’s endorsement of the Three Seas Initiative in Warsaw is important. This initiative brings together the 12 EU members between the 

Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas with the aim of advancing cross-border energy, 

transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure to better integrate their 

economies, unlock growth potential, and ensure Russia cannot hold their economies 

hostage. In effect, this Initiative is about completing Europe within these currently 

segmented markets. At the same time, this effort should aim to connect these EU 

members to non-EU members in Southeast Europe and Europe’s East, helping to 

integrate structurally these economies into Europe. 

An American prosperity agenda should advance U.S. investment and financing in 

the region, putting our economic relationship on par with our security relationship 

in many of these nations. Furthermore, a United States policy of advancing one of 

our soft power strengths, entrepreneurship, would also help provide job growth outside the control of political patronage networks which are subject to Russian manipulation. 

Second, we need to project our military strength as a stabilizing force, especially 

in Europe’s East and Southeast. I applaud the request, and urge Congressional approval, of the increase in funding for the European Deterrence Initiative from $3.4 

billion to nearly $4.8 billion. In addition, to counter malign Russian influence in 

Southeast Europe, the United States should transform its presence within KFOR 

into a permanent United States military presence at Camp Bondsteel, aimed at projecting security throughout the region. Congress should also approve the sale of the 

28 

Patriot system to Romania, reinforcing the deterrent effect of the recent agreement 

to sell Patriots to Poland. Furthermore, Congress should return to the idea of providing substantial defensive lethal weaponry and combat training for Ukraine and 

Georgia. 

Third, the United States has an opportunity to build on President Trump’s visit 

to Warsaw with a sustained diplomatic offensive in the region. Our engagement in 

the region is too episodic and not at a sufficient political level. Vice President Pence 

will soon visit Tallinn, Podgorica, and Tbilisi—providing an excellent opportunity to 

offer concrete follow up on the Three Seas prosperity agenda and announcing steps 

to bolster our security commitments. The President should agree to meet with Three 

Seas leaders at their summit in Bucharest next year, and end the isolation of the 

Hungarian Government which has only made its leaders more susceptible to Russian pressure. We must work to ensure Montenegro’s NATO membership is a success and sharpen the message that reforms at home can lead to membership in 

NATO and the EU. We should pursue an historic rapprochement with Serbia that 

ends Belgrade’s dangerous hedging. In this regard, I applaud the Vice President’s 

hosting of Serbian President Vucic on Monday. The United States should also resume its leadership in resolving the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia, 

paving the way for the latter’s membership in NATO as it consolidates domestic reforms. To start, we should welcome Greek Prime Minister Tsipras to Washington 

and work to ensure Athens is a joint partner in the region rather than an obstacle. 

Robust United States engagement deprives Russia’s strategy of the void it seeks to 

fill. 

Fourth, in our open democratic societies, often the most effective means to counter 

Russian malign influence is to expose it. We do not need to counter disinformation 

with propaganda of our own. However, we need our own citizens to expose Russian 

actions and disinformation. As our electorates become educated on Russian influence operations, they become inoculated to its impact. To this end, the Atlantic 

Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab with its partner Bellingcat last week hosted 

in Warsaw the first Open Source (‘‘OS 360′′) summit to train journalists and activists on using unclassified techniques to expose and combat Russian influence. We 

need to empower this type of work across our Alliance as it makes our democracies 

more resilient and our electorates less susceptible to manipulation. 

Most importantly, we need to keep our values as our guiding star and restore a 

credible vision of a Europe whole and free. The lack of a North Star has opened 

a tempting new front for the Kremlin’s efforts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold 

War era. The United States should join with the EU to re-establish a clear, common 

vision for the continent. Our message should be that as a result of reforms at home, 

all European states can ultimately be part of a secure and prosperous transatlantic 

community. Advancing a Europe whole and free should be a central plank of a 

broader effort to rally the West, as President Trump suggested in his Warsaw 

Speech. I prefer the term ‘‘free world’’ to connote our community is not one of geography, but one of ideals—democratic institutions, human rights, rule of law, free 

media, and a vibrant civil society. 

As part of this strategy, the United States must remain a force for integration, 

not fragmentation, in Europe. Russia’s strategy is to undermine the EU. The administration cannot be ambivalent about this. We should never become an enabler of 

the Kremlin strategy to divide and weaken the EU. 

Excluding the invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, the coup in Montenegro may be 

among the most brazen of Russia’s influence operations. Its significance is that the 

Russians almost got away with it. But it is by no means unique. In October 2014, 

Russian Cossacks entered Banja Luka poised to intervene if Milorad Dodik had lost 

his election. Arms caches have been found in Hungary with ties to GRU agents. 

Russian fingerprints are on a spectacular kidnapping in Estonia, instability and violence in Macedonia, efforts to stoke separatism in Moldova and delegitimize Kosovo 

as a state, and financing of extreme political parties across the continent. 

The Kremlin has drawn its own lessons from the muted response of the free 

world. We must end the cycle of impunity, continuing to raise the costs of not only 

Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also its interference in our own societies, even as 

we work to eliminate opportunities for its malign influence throughout Europe. 

The painful lesson of the 20th century is that American ambivalence only increases the likelihood of conflict in Europe and a direct challenge to our national 

interests. Through sustained leadership and engagement, anchored in our own values and vision, we can counter the malign influence of Putin’s Russia. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Wilson, and thank the 

witnesses. 

29 

Let us talk for a minute, Mr. Wilson, about Serbia. There are 

unique ties between Serbia and Russia. Mr. Vucic seems to be almost schizophrenic. He wants good relations with the United 

States. Yet he also understands the Serbian people’s affinity to 

Russia. Yet he also understands the Serbian people’s look is to the 

West, not to the East. As you say, he is coming to town next week. 

That could be a very seminal event. I had a long lunch with him 

in Belgrade. 

How do you think we should treat Mr. Vucic? 

Mr. WILSON. I think this is a strategic opening and we should 

play, play for Serbia, not in a way that—I am not unaware of some 

of the challenges to Serbian democracy internally. But I think we 

need to recognize that Vucic has been hedging between Russia and 

Europe and the West in part because he sees the EU as distant 

and uncertain in its commitment to Serbia’s place in Europe and 

the United States is an inconsistent and somewhat distant partner. 

But we have an opportunity right now. 

I had the opportunity to meet with President Vucic in Belgrade 

at the beginning of this year. This coup in Montenegro is a wakeup 

call not just for us but for those sitting in Belgrade. It was forces 

within his intelligence services, for which he probably was completely unaware, that were complicit in this. Shortly after the exposure of this coup, an arms cache was found in Belgrade on the 

route that is driven from his family’s house. I think this has had 

a psychological impact. 

The Serbs believe that they can hedge and play both sides. Most 

Serbs know the reality is their economy is overwhelmingly anchored in Europe. Their interests are overwhelmingly anchored in 

Europe. I think with clarity from the United States, coordinated 

with Germany and the European Union, that we can help Mr. 

Vucic understand that hedging is actually playing with fire and 

that their ability to maneuver this poses actually risk to Serbia and 

its future over time. 

One of the challenges we have is that unfortunately Serbia allowed the opening of a civilian emergency response base in Nis in 

southern Serbia where the Russians have been breathing down his 

neck to obtain diplomatic immunity for their—it is the Ministry of 

Emergencies. The Ministry of Emergencies has a notorious record 

of being involved in nefarious activities in this region. I think part 

of what our presence can do by transforming our own presence at 

Bondsteel, saying it is a presence for the region, is to help signal 

to Serbia that we will not be a fair-weather friend. This is not a 

partisan issue. We can have a consistent American strategy of engagement, supporting their transformation at home and welcoming 

them in our community. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ms. Samp, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

Ms. SAMP. I am sorry. I thought you were asking a separate 

question. 

I completely endorse what Damon said and I do not have anything of substance to add. 

Chairman MCCAIN. What about the influence of the church, Ms. 

Samp, which is clearly Russia-aligned? 

30 

Ms. SAMP. It is yet another tool. It is yet another way that they 

can—you know, attempts at coercion. It is one they leverage to 

great success with the people. I think it is not something that gives 

them an advantage that cannot be overcome, but it certainly does 

create strong ties, both historical, cultural, and other, with the region. It is yet another tool that the Russians have in the region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Bugajski? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I fully agree with Damon. I would simply add a 

couple of things about Serbia’s position. 

I think Serbia now stands in front of a choice. Does it ally itself 

with a Russia that is increasingly aggressive, assertive, and expansionist in Europe and anti-American? Or does it align itself with 

the European Union, with the Western community, with the international alliance, including NATO, which does not mean NATO 

membership straight away but eventually? 

I would add this also. Vucic has to be careful because Putin could 

possibly pull Serbia into a conflict that he engineers in a neighboring country, whether in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if he pushes for 

separatism. We have already heard about this in terms of Russian 

activities in Republika Srpska, in the Serbian entity in Bosnia. 

Both Croatia and Serbia could be brought into a conflict. Similarly 

in Kosovo. If Russia were to provoke some sort of conflict with the 

minority, Serbia itself could be drawn into the conflict. Similarly in 

Macedonia. 

So what I would say to Vucic is be on the right side of history 

here. Russia does not have your interests at heart. We do. Russia 

does not want you to make an independent choice in terms of your 

international alliances. Russia is willing to drag you into a conflict. 

We want to give you security. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yet the ethnic and historic affinity between 

Russia and Serbia is also very well known. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Can I add to that? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I think that is exaggerated. If you look at history, 

even recent history, which country broke first with Stalin? It was 

Yugoslavia. It was Tito. So it was a relatively non-aligned country. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good point. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. If you look through history, Russia has manipulated both Serbia and Bulgaria in its policies in the Balkans at different times. Of course, it taps into that historical memory and exaggerates it in order to have influence in both countries. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the panel for excellent testimony. 

Ms. Samp, you raised an interesting sort of situation where you 

said a year ago, we would have predicted that or we would not 

have predicted. So let us look ahead. What is their plan, more or 

less—the Russians? What is the vulnerable point that they are trying to exploit right now or points? 

Ms. SAMP. I mean, I wish I knew, sir, where we could expect 

them to go next precisely. I think what we know for sure is that 

they will continue what they are doing. They will continue to try 

to undermine the international order. They want to cut the United 

States down a notch. They want to break Western unity. So we 

31 

cannot call shots they do not like or hold them accountable to the 

rule of law. So what we can say is this kind of destabilizing activity 

will continue. 

I think if you look across the map, there is instability in Central 

Asia. I think the Balkans are a target-rich environment. They already have peacekeepers in Moldova. So I think continued agitation in Ukraine is something that we can expect. It is hard to know 

exactly precisely because they like to experiment, but the one thing 

that we do know for sure is that they will continue to sow instability. So we have to better prepare for it. 

Senator REED. Mr. Wilson, any specific details you would add? 

Ms. SAMP. In terms of better preparing? 

Senator REED. No, no. To Mr. Wilson, are you picking up anything where they are beginning to focus or coalesce on a particular 

target or targets, or is it just instability everywhere, exploit ad hoc 

what you can? 

Mr. WILSON. I do have specific concerns. I think we have seen 

Russian tactics actually quite savvy in that they know they cannot 

actually compete head on and they cannot compete against tough 

targets. So they go for the vulnerable targets, places where they 

know where our response would be mixed, weak, or the pushback 

would be ambiguous because they do appreciate they would fail in 

a head-on confrontation. 

That raises for me two concerns. One is Belarus. Ms. Samp mentioned the Zapad exercise. This is traditionally the largest exercise 

in the western military district of Russia. In the past, they have 

used it to exercise a nuclear strike on Warsaw, for example. My 

fear right now is given the tenuous relationship between President 

Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus and Mr. Putin, that with a major 

movement of Russian forces on the territory of Belarus as part of 

Zapad, that perhaps they do not leave or that perhaps they do 

something that tightens their grip around Belarus, knowing that 

this is a soft target. This would allow actually Putin to continue 

to rally the nationalist card at home, demonstrate his greatness, 

and probably not encounter the wrath of the West in the way that 

Donbas has turned into a bigger problem for him. 

Second, I do watch very closely on Moldova. There is an agreement right now between the Moldovans and the Ukrainians to finally try to impose border controls on the eastern flank of 

Transnistria, the slice of territory where Russian troops are stationed. It is an agreement that the Ukrainians would allow the 

Moldovan border units to be based on Ukrainian territory since 

they cannot be on Transnistrian territory. This would be an excellent way to control illicit flows across that border, but it also would 

put up a greater barrier to Russia’s potential freedom of maneuver. 

I do not think they would accept that very easily. They were hoping 

to do that this summer, and I think it could be a flashpoint. 

Senator REED. Mr. Bugajski, please. Any comments? I have just 

a minute. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Thank you. I would reiterate what Damon has 

said in terms of flashpoints. 

I would add one more. South Caucasus. Even as we speak, Russia has been moving the border of South Ossetia, which is occupied 

territory, deeper into Georgia. The danger there is—I think the obVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
32 

jective is eventually to threaten and cut off pipelines and transportation systems between the Caspian Basin and Europe because 

there is a thin wedge of Georgia through which major energy, gas 

and oil, resources go through transportation to the coast and then 

out to Turkey to the Balkans and into Europe. Russia is now within a few hundred yards of capabilities of cutting off this pipeline 

in the event of conflict. 

In addition, the conflict over Nagorna-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan—that has to be watched extremely carefully. 

Every so often it flares up. I think the Azeris are coming to a point 

where they are now extremely frustrated with ever getting these 

occupied territories back. There seems to be no progress in any 

agreements. It is a bit like the Minsk process. It is their own 

Minsk process that is frozen. 

So these potential flashpoints either Russia engineers or some 

local conflict mushrooms into a Russian intervention. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wilson, you touched on this very briefly, and I think my 

overemphasizing it, which I have been doing admittedly, is not because I am from an oil and gas State, because it seems so obvious 

to me that what is going right now could have a huge impact on 

Russia and on everything we have been talking about this morning. 

General [Philip M.] Breedlove, when he was talking to this committee just the other day—he said Russia is very apt to use energy 

dependence and energy capabilities as one of the tools, and so more 

available sources I think would help to defuse the tool that they 

use. We are talking about all the dependency that those countries 

that we are so concerned with have on Russia because they have 

the control. Now, to a lesser degree, I guess you could argue that 

Iran also has exports. But in the case of Russia, 68 percent of their 

exports are oil and gas. 

I was very proud of the President the other day when he was in 

Poland and he drove this home. For all those people who think 

maybe he is too cozy with Putin, this statement did not help him 

any. They should defuse some of that notion. He said we are committed to securing your access to energy so Poland and its neighbors are never again held hostage to a single supplier of energy. 

So I would like to hear from each one of you how significant you 

think this is. The ban has lifted. We now no longer have the war 

on fossil fuels. So I think good things are going to happen. What 

do you think? 

Mr. WILSON. Senator, I think it is terrific. I had the opportunity—I was at the President’s speech in Warsaw, and that particular line was received extremely well. Many of our friends in 

this region remember the two dramatic gas cutoffs that sent literal 

shivers through their populations, that the Russians have undoubtedly proved that they will use this as a weapon not just as a tool 

of coercion, which they do on a daily basis. 

The lifting of the LNG export restrictions was significant both for 

psychological impact, as well as for a commercial impact. At the 

end of the day, we do not need to force all of Russian natural reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
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sources out of the market. We need Russia to be restricted so that 

it has to play by the market. I think this is where it is a fairly significant thing. The beginning of an American LNG shipment had 

arrived in Poland just in the past 6 weeks. This is the news of the 

year in Poland. 

The announcement last month of a breakthrough in negotiating 

an LNG terminal on Kirk Island in Croatia that would be linked 

up to Hungary through a small pipeline is the lifeline that Hungary needs itself. So there are two areas where we have real problems, Hungary and Serbia, in large part because the Russians have 

a stranglehold on both energy supplies and energy distribution. 

Senator INHOFE. I think others agree with the significance of 

that. 

I was actually invited to Lithuania by the President when they 

were opening their first LNG terminal, and they had other countries coming in who were just elated with that. 

Mr. Bugajski, when you look at the other aspirants, of course, we 

saw that Montenegro went through all kinds of coercion. I am kind 

of thinking now how the fact that they were able to come out ahead 

on this thing—what affect do you think this has on the other countries, Bosnia and Macedonia, Kosovo and the others, the fact that 

they won, Russia lost? What do you think? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. There are two things I would say. Montenegro, 

the fact that it withstood a Russian attempt at overthrowing the 

government, sends a warning, if you like, to the region that Russia 

may not be averse to attempting a similar scenario in other countries. So in other words, they are going to be better prepared, hopefully with our assistance, to withstand such an assault. 

Secondly, I would say the positive results of Montenegro’s NATO 

membership. In other words, remember, this is a country that only 

recently regained its independence, that many dismissed as being 

unviable, too small. Now this country is becoming successful. It has 

entered our security alliance. It is part of our security system. 

Senator INHOFE. The others are watching. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. The others are watching carefully. There are several countries that would like to join, at least most of Bosnia 

would. Certainly Kosovo would. Macedonia is desperate for NATO 

membership, but it is blocked, unfortunately, by this name dispute 

with Greece. 

I think we have to refocus attention on the region to see—and 

this I think would be the best way to push the Russians back, to 

try and move these countries as quickly as possible and as effectively as possible into the Alliance because they will contribute. 

They are very pro-American. They want to contribute to the Alliance. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. 

My time has expired, but one last question to Ms. Samp. You 

made the comment, ‘‘The Army combat presence in Europe remains 

a full brigade strength below what it was in 2012 prior to the renewed tensions with Russia.’’ I am wondering what some of our allies over there think because the budget that the President came 

out with is about the same as we were criticizing, you and I was 

also prior to this. What kind of effect that might have on our allies 

over there. 

34 

Ms. SAMP. So United States combat force presence in Europe, as 

you know, has decreased quite dramatically since the end of the 

Cold War. This was a recognition of a new threat environment, and 

so it rightfully went down from about 35,000 troops in the mid1980s. We are now at about 62,000 troops. The rotational forces 

that we have added under the European Reassurance Initiative has 

brought us by about 6,000. So for the first time in 25 years, the 

trend line of combat forces in Europe has begun to tick up. 

There was a decision made in 2012 that was quite controversial 

at the time to remove two heavy brigades, two armored brigade 

combat teams from the European continent, which left us with only 

two BCTs [Brigade Combat Team], one infantry airborne and another striker. So we have no heavy armored forces in Europe at the 

moment, save for a rotational force added under ERI. 

At the time the decision was not well received by allies. If U.S. 

troops are the most physical manifestation of the commitment of 

the United States, then the removal of those forces did send a message that the United States is ready to leave Europe and pivot perhaps to Asia. 

With a return of forces to the continent, I think the message 

would be welcomed by allies for one and also be seen by Russia as 

a symbol of commitment to deterrence. I think it would increase 

our leverage in the region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

Earlier this year, Senator Gardner and I introduced a resolution 

reaffirming the United States’ unwavering commitment to NATO. 

As you well know, questions have been raised, notably in the White 

House by the President, about that commitment. The resolution is 

cosponsored by Senators Rubio, McCaskill, Portman, Feinstein, 

Johnson, Kaine, Shaheen, and Booker, a good bipartisan group. 

During these times of extraordinary global uncertainty, even as 

our President is in France as we speak, and increasingly troubling 

Russian aggression, I believe—and many of my colleagues do as 

well—that we need to reassure our NATO allies that the United 

States remains strongly committed to this essential alliance. 

I understand the Ambassador from Montenegro has left and decided, understandably, not to take questions. But I wonder how 

Montenegro’s accession to NATO benefits the Alliance and the 

United States in particular. If you have comments on that topic, I 

would appreciate them, to all of the witnesses. 

Ms. SAMP. Thank you for that question. 

I was firmly in the camp of supporting Montenegro’s accession to 

the Alliance. Not only did I think it added more assets than liabilities in terms of its geography, it plugged an important hole in the 

NATO map along the Adriatic, which a couple years earlier Russia 

had tried to exploit and put ships in a port there. Their military 

forces are small but they do bring niche capabilities. They only 

have about 2,000 forces. They spend about 1.6 percent on defense. 

None of this makes them a super star new ally, but it also does 

not make them the least in any of the categories that NATO ranks 

allies against. That is one. That is kind of the more, I guess, concrete considerations. 

35 

Now there are also symbolic considerations, and these I think 

were even more important in Montenegro’s case because it affirmed 

NATO’s open door which, as we just discussed, are important to 

other aspirants for the Alliance. More importantly, it showed that 

Russia is not going to have veto power over the decisions of NATO. 

So I think for both concrete and symbolic reasons, allowing Montenegro into the Alliance made us all stronger. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. By symbolic, I assume you mean moral 

reasons as well. Here is a people who wants to defend themselves 

against Russian aggression. We do not care whether it is a small 

country. We do not care whether it is a large country. We do not 

care whether it is powerful or not. America believes in defending 

freedom, and NATO is a means to do it in Europe. Our commitment to NATO is based not just on the strength of specific allies 

in numbers of troops or tanks or planes, but on their will to defend 

themselves and their commitment to freedom. 

Ms. SAMP. Exactly. We gave them a list of things that they needed to do to join this club. They did it. They met their commitments, 

and we needed to meet ours and, as I said, reinforce NATO’s open 

door, which is a tenet of the Washington Treaty. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I welcome other comments if you have 

any. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I would add that it also sends a very positive signal to other countries in the region to meet the standards for 

NATO entry. Remember, entering NATO is not just a question of 

asking for it. You have to meet certain standards, civil military 

standards, military organization, and so forth. If Montenegro can 

do it, then other countries can do it. 

Also to Serbia it sends a very positive signal. In other words, 

would you want to be linked with the most modern, sophisticated, 

effective military organization in the world, or with an increasingly 

obsolete Russian military? In other words, I know Serbia has been 

training with NATO, but it has also participated in exercises with 

Russian and Belarussian forces. They have to be weaned away 

from that dependency relationship that Russia is trying to create 

with them, and I think NATO is one of the ways it can be done. 

Mr. WILSON. I just briefly would add, sir, I think the decision to 

welcome Montenegro not only sort of projects confidence in our Alliance, but I think it was in part because of some of our ambivalence 

in the process that the Russians smelled an opening. So I think it 

is the clarity of our views on this that it actually is part of our preventive defense. 

It does do some things that are strategically useful, closing the 

northern littoral of the Mediterranean. This is the last strip of 

land, which does not sound all that significant to us, and yet that 

is why the Russians were focused on the potential of Bar Port, potentially as the one place where their fleet could have port call 

rights. They pressured the government several years ago to give 

them that and the government turned them down. This was significant for the Russians, and we have taken that off the board. 

Senator McCain mentioned the role of the Orthodox Church. A 

country like Montenegro has a deeply sophisticated understanding 

of how the Orthodox Church is used as an instrument of advancing 

Russian geopolitical instruments. That is a pretty useful contribuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
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tion to the Alliance for them to be in that network and to be sharing that type of information. Importantly, I think it is the stabilizing force for the region. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you to our witnesses today. This has been a very, very 

helpful discussion I think not only for the folks here but also those 

that serve on other various important committees here in the 

United States Senate as well. 

As we witness continued Russian influence throughout the Baltics and the Balkans, I am really worried that we are going to see 

another Crimea-like scenario. Specifically, I am concerned about 

Russia’s activities in Serbia and its impact on Iowa’s sister state, 

Kosovo. In fact, just this March, General Scaparrotti echoed these 

very same concerns. 

This is for all of our panelists, please. Can you describe to me 

how Serbia is attempting to undermine Kosovo and what that 

means for the stability of the region overall? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Well, to begin with, thank you for the question. 

To begin with, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state. 

Senator ERNST. Exactly. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Neither do five European Union countries. This is 

where I think we could be more effective in trying to convince those 

five countries that do not recognize Kosovo to go ahead and do so. 

That would complete the picture in European Union. 

Russia blocks Kosovo’s entry into the United Nations and to the 

OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] and 

other international organizations. There has to be pushback on this 

as well. If we are serious about creating and consolidating a democratic state in Kosovo, I think it has to be a member of all international organizations. 

Serbia will not recognize Kosovo anytime soon, but there are 

things that can be done. Quite a few things have been done in recent years to try and normalize relations. But I think ultimately 

Serbia’s entry into the European Union and eventual entry into 

NATO hinges on recognizing Kosovo as an equal, in other words, 

as an independent state. I think, again, we could do more with 

Vucic to try and persuade him, if not recognition, at least to not 

allow Russia to use Serbia to put pressure on Kosovo. 

I will tell you one very interesting thing from the Russian angle. 

We have this idea that the Russian-Serbian relationship is so close. 

Do you know that the Russians have threatened Serbia that if you 

petition to join NATO, we will no longer block Kosovo’s entry into 

the United Nations? In other words, they are using Kosovo as a 

tool against Serbia. We have to think of creative ways in which we 

deny them that tool to influence Serbia. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Thank you for that input. 

Yes, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. I might just add to Mr. Bugajski that we have seen 

Russian efforts and sometimes Russian through Serbia efforts to 

delegitimize Kosovo as a state, to block it as it tries to join 

37 

UNESCO [United States Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization], things like that that have to trappings of state hold. 

We have seen more disturbingly sort of provocations, this extraordinary Orthodox draped train that sent down to the border over the 

summer very much as a provocation. It is true that Belgrade now 

has sort of extinguished democratic choice among the Serbs in 

Kosovo, and they really are under control of Belgrade right now. 

Our task should be to work with the EU to broker this agreement, a more durable agreement, between Serbia and Kosovo to orchestrate our own historic reconciliation with Serbia, recognizing 

that the story of our NATO alliance as former adversaries coming 

together as allies. That is the entire narrative of what this process 

has been. 

I do think that we could do something further. We have about 

maybe 700 forces in KFOR at Camp Bondsteel, and oftentimes 

the—I remember when I served at NATO, it was always the pressure. Every 6 months, the U.S. Defense Secretary would want to 

know how can we draw down these forces, how many more troops 

can come out. I think if we actually just with some clarity said that 

our presence there is an enduring presence to project stability for 

the region, capacity building for the region, that Camp Bondsteel 

remains, it actually would change the mentality of the region not 

just seeing it limited as a stabilizing force in Kosovo, but as an expression of America’s security commitment to the entire region. I 

think this would both, strangely enough, reassure Serbia that 

Kosovo will be under control while also actually providing incentives for Serbia to work with us. 

Senator ERNST. I think our Kosovo friends would greatly appreciate that as well. 

Ms. Samp, as you mentioned, just very briefly in your testimony, 

Russia has been engaged in a lot of nefarious activities in the gray 

zone, including propaganda, economic coercion, and political subversion and various types of interference. In your opinion, what 

should the United States and our NATO allies be doing to discourage the type of activities that we see at the gray zone? 

Ms. SAMP. Thank you for that question. 

The gray zone is one of our hardest challenges. Obviously, it does 

not have the article 5 guarantee that Russia so respects and that 

keeps Russia’s conventional interference in allied territory at bay. 

We saw them push into the gray zone in Georgia, Ukraine, and in 

other ways in countries that we are talking about in the Balkans 

today. 

So what can we do to help shore up their defenses? A lot of this 

is going to be things not by the U.S. Military, but by the U.S. State 

Department. It is going to be things that build their resistance, 

their resilience, increase their media train so that their journalists 

are able to identify and attribute stories instead of just copying and 

pasting from RT [Russia Today] or Sputnik. It is going to be things 

that enhance and share lessons learned on cyber defenses. It is 

going to be doing things that add oversight to their processes to decrease corruption and increase transparency. So I would not say 

there is a huge role for NATO in the gray zone other than to continue to partner with these countries, continue to build their capacity, their capability, involve them in exercises. I do not see a U.S. 

38 

troop presence, for example, in gray zone territory, but I think this 

is going to be a lot of work on the resilience side and through the 

State Department. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. I am going to take the opportunity here to 

sort of follow up on Senator Ernst’s questions with regard to the 

gray zone in particular. Have you had a chance, Ms. Samp, to look 

at any of the authorization language that we recently passed trying 

to get our hands around better tools for working in that kind of an 

environment in Eastern Europe and trying to apply some of the 

lessons learned from other conflicts in the world? 

Ms. SAMP. I was happy to see that the fiscal year 2017 NDAA 

approved the Global Engagement Center. I was less happy to see 

that its funding was cut at the same time its mandate was expanded. But I know that there have been other efforts. 

Senator HEINRICH. I would love to, in follow-up to this, share 

some language that we incorporated—Senator Ernst and I—in the 

Emerging Threats Subcommittee to try and wrap our hands around 

some of these challenges and see what you think of that, really for 

all of you. 

I was glad to hear you talk about the importance of our State Department and public diplomacy efforts in this region. You know, a 

major part of our strategy for Russian malign influence has to be 

proactive not just reactive, and we certainly need a robust public 

diplomacy effort and transparency if we are going to be able to 

combat the kind of propaganda vacuum that they often operate in. 

In some places, there just is not a counterbalancing communications effort to RT or Sputnik. 

Can you talk a little bit about the strength and capability of 

that? What authorities and, frankly, resources do we lack in terms 

of that effort? Go ahead, Ms. Samp. 

Ms. SAMP. So I would say our officials who conduct public diplomacy are very skilled. When I say that we lack capacity in the region, it is not to in any way impugn—— 

Senator HEINRICH. It is not the quality of the individuals. 

Ms. SAMP.—the quality of the people doing the work. That said, 

there is not enough of them. It is not coordinated enough. It does 

not have enough money. Russia spends a billion dollars a year on 

propaganda efforts. I would say we are also not using every tool 

that we have available to us. Why are we not using military information support teams in Eastern Europe? Why are we not using 

that? That is a tool that would allow us to present truthful information to publics that would otherwise be impenetrable to a U.S. 

message. It does this by veiling attribution. This is not against our 

values, but it does allow us to press advantages. Why are we not 

doing that? Why are we not working more with the public sector, 

with social media, with advertising? Again, as I said, I think if 

Russia can be creative, then we need to be too, and this is an area 

where we have not gotten our act together, quite frankly. 

Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Wilson, you listed exposing Russian actions as one of your five—the list of things that we should be doing 

39 

aggressively. Can you talk a little bit more about that and how we 

make that more robust and more assertive and fill that vacuum? 

Mr. WILSON. Certainly. Let me pick up on that last word, the 

‘‘vacuum.’’ I actually think the gray zone, as you call it, is one of 

the most important parts of where this will play out because it is 

where Russia sees its buffer. It is where Russia intentionally sows 

chaos and insecurity. From our interests, if these countries not just 

survive but if they thrive, this is an existential challenge to the 

model of corrupt authoritarianism. Therefore, Mr. Putin sees their 

success as something that actually painfully knocks on his door 

close to home. 

That is why I think part of our strategy, yes, is to expose. 

Ukrainian journalists are actually at the forefront of actually understanding how to manage this now. We can learn from them. 

But I think more importantly the people in the region understand that their future is uncertain, that Brussels and Washington 

are not quite certain what to do about it. I think the best thing we 

could do to fill the vacuum is to actually have clarity that our goal 

ultimately is to eliminate the uncertainty of where these countries 

lie, that they are not going to be in some gray zone between East 

and West. They have an opportunity to gain a rightful place as 

part of the free world, if you will, and thereby a concerted joint 

NATO–United States–EU strategy that is focused on growing their 

economies, strengthening their defense capacities and their militaries, and helping to create Europe on their ground, visa-free travel, independent media, this I think is part of the broader strategy 

if they could see a coordinated effort out of Washington, Brussels, 

Berlin that was committed to operationalizing the fact that they 

have a future option in the free world if they can get it right at 

home. 

Senator HEINRICH. I am out of time, but just a real quick yes or 

no. Is it a problem that we seem to be sending all of our allies 

mixed messages, that we undermine transparency, and we are creating overtures—the President to Vladimir Putin—at the same 

time as we are saying, hey, we are going to be with you, you can 

rely on us? 

Mr. WILSON. I think it is a problem. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I would say there is a lot of confusion in Europe 

what is going on. 

Ms. SAMP. It only helps Putin. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the witnesses? testimony here on a very important 

topic. 

I wanted to go back to the issue Senator Inhofe raised on energy, 

and being from an energy-producing State like he is, I think we are 

just scratching the surface on finally realizing how important this 

instrument of United States power can be to bolster our allies and 

push back on the Russians, to be perfectly honest. 

Mr. Wilson, you and I worked in the Bush administration on an 

important energy project, the southern corridor pipeline, or the B– 

T-C pipeline that a lot of people know it by, Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan, 

that is a dual oil and gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea out into 

the Mediterranean into southern Europe. When we worked on that, 

40 

the Russians certainly were not supportive of that initiative. Were 

they? 

Mr. WILSON. Dramatically opposed. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, and that was U.S. diplomacy and leadership that drove that very important southern corridor strategy. 

We passed, and I was a big supporter recently of the Iran and 

Russia sanctions bill. There are elements of that, though—it is now 

becoming apparent—that could possibly undermine the completion 

of that southern corridor pipeline, particularly on the gas side. Are 

you aware of that at all? 

Mr. WILSON. In the legislation or—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, in the legislation. 

Mr. WILSON. I do not know the details of that. 

Senator SULLIVAN. We can get that to you. I would welcome the 

panel’s opinion. There might be an opportunity to tweak some of 

the legislation on the House side or in the conference to make sure 

that we are not undermining actually one of the big geostrategic 

plays that we undertook against Russia, which was to help those 

countries to develop that southern corridor. Would you be supportive of that if we were somehow inadvertently undermining actually a very good energy strategy that we have been undertaking? 

By the way, the Clinton administration, then the Bush administration, and even the Obama administration were all supporters of 

the southern corridor pipeline. 

Mr. WILSON. I think we have yet to fully maximize our harnessing of America’s energy strength. You cited the example of 

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, which was a huge strategic and commercial 

success. We have not had the win that we need still in finishing 

the southern corridor effort, and it is in part—I think as Senator 

Inhofe mentioned, adding LNG exports into the mix is useful. But 

there are still real challenges in the pipeline structure, particularly 

when it comes to the Western Balkans, Serbia, Hungary in particular. I think this is an area where in the absence of a combined, 

concerted diplomatic effort that is based in the commerciality, it is 

really hard to get these done. At the same time, we have undermined our own interests and efforts because Nordstream 1, 

Nordstream 2 have really helped drain—negatively impacted some 

of the economics that would be required to get this right. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me turn to the issue of allies that I think 

most members of the committee here are focused on. Would you 

agree that one of the most important strategic advantages that we 

have as a country globally, but particularly in Europe, is that the 

United States is an ally-rich nation and our adversaries and potential adversaries like Russia are ally-poor? 

Mr. WILSON. I think this is sometimes something that we do not 

fully as a Nation appreciate, the historically unique asset we have 

in a global network of alliances of countries that will stand with 

us, go into the fight with us, and that this is a huge force multiplying effect for our influence and our power in the world. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Is it not also true that we—do you not believe 

that we should be looking to deepen those alliances and expand 

them particularly when it is very clear that Russia’s—one of their 

top strategic goals, as was pointed out in testimony, is to undermine and split our alliances? 

41 

Mr. WILSON. I think that is right. I mean, nations around the 

world understand that Russia’s strong relationships are often 

based on coercion and intimidation. That is not how we operate. So 

I think the value that these alliances represent for us means that 

we actually have to invest in them—they do not work without our 

leadership—and look for opportunities to actually be able to welcome others into those camps. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me just pose one final question to the entire panel on this issue of allies. You know, a number of us, myself 

included, had some concerns about when President Trump was a 

candidate talking about alliances, he did not seem to understand 

the importance, and a number of us had concerns about maybe the 

Trump administration was not focusing enough on our alliances. 

This is in addition to the Obama administration. Some of you 

might remember the Atlantic piece last year entitled ‘‘The Obama 

Doctrine,’’ and if you read it, it essentially was President Obama 

openly being dismissive of most of the leaders of our key allies. It 

certainly was not an ally-building exercise as well. 

What more can the Trump administration or the Members of 

Congress be doing to enable us to deepen and expand our alliances, 

which clearly would help advance the national security interests of 

the United States? 

Ms. SAMP. Thank you for that question. 

I think it is incredibly important that we strengthen our alliances. Our alliances are our greatest foreign policy advantage. Period. Full stop. It is what other authoritarian states look at and say 

I want that. Can I have that? There is no magnetism. As Damon 

said, Russia’s alliances are built off of coercion. So we need to protect them. The way that we can do that—Damon also mentioned 

U.S. leadership—is incredibly important in NATO. NATO does not 

work without U.S. leadership. Deterrence does not work without 

U.S. leadership, and so attending meetings, holding back maybe 

when you would like to criticize aloud, and keeping things inside 

a room, I think these all are important signals. Right? It is optics 

but it is important when you are talking about alliance because you 

are not just sending messages to friends. You are sending messages 

to adversaries about the U.S. commitment. 

As you know, credible deterrence is built off of two things: capability and intent. Putin has to believe that we not only have the 

power to defend our alliances, but that we have the will and intent 

to defend our alliances. The statements that I have seen so far I 

think undermine that deterrence. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. If I could add, I think this administration has actually quite a strong national security team. The next step, though, 

would be for that national security team to devise a strong national 

security doctrine, which includes the purpose and capabilities of 

the NATO alliance. I think deeds are more important than words 

as well. In other words, this enhanced forward presence that we 

are now building in the Baltic states, in Poland, extremely important, started late, unfortunately, but at least started under Obama. 

It is important that this administration, Trump administration, is 

reinforcing and continuing with that. 

But I think we need to look at other factors. Look at our allies, 

particularly those most vulnerable along the eastern flank and ask 

42 

them what is it that you need. Air defense, missile defense, territorial defense? We can help you in all this. So I think deed, as well 

as word, is essential. 

Mr. WILSON. I would just add I think it is absolutely right to 

keep the pressure on our allies to do more in terms of defense investment, as has been a consistent bipartisan policy and certainly 

from this body. But I also think there is a difference in understanding that our alliances, our relationships are not just transactional with them. These are long-term relationships. In fact, we 

have permanent alliances. Understanding the value of consulting 

them on big decisions and recognizing that a third of the forces, for 

example, in Afghanistan are provided by our allies. They are in the 

fight with us. These are not transactional relationships alone. 

I also think the more that this body can help actually make the 

case to your constituents as well about how alliances are force multipliers for our interests and our values and not just a taxpayer 

burden, I think it is an important message to take to the American 

people as well. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. Very helpful. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, we all on this side of the dais are often prone to bragging 

about our own States, but in this case, I cannot fail to mention that 

a lot of the preparation for Montenegro’s accession to NATO on the 

military and security side came through the partnership with the 

Maine National Guard. We have been working with Montenegro 

since 2006, and I am extremely proud of the work that our men 

and women have done in order to facilitate a very important geopolitical development. So I wanted to preface my remarks with a 

real recognition of the work that was done by those good people 

from Maine. 

I have often thought that if you woke up somebody in 1780 in 

England and said when are you living, very few would have said, 

oh, the industrial revolution, or an Italian in 1500, oh, the renaissance, of course. In other words, we are not really aware of the era 

in which we live. 

But listening to you today has helped me to focus my thinking. 

I think we are in a new era of conflict. We talk about the Cold War. 

We talk about hot war. We are in a warm war with Russia that 

involves everything from cyber to disinformation to political disruption to coup attempts and military invasion in the Ukraine, for example. I think that is a very important insight that we cannot just 

act like this is a continuation of what has gone on for the past 10 

years or 20 years or 50 years. 

The second piece of that recognition—and this goes to your testimony—Mr. Wilson, you had a chilling observation I wrote down. 

The Kremlin has drawn its own lessons from the muted response 

of the free world. We are not treating this with the seriousness 

that it deserves. 

Mr. Bugajski, would you comment on those thoughts? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Absolutely. The Kremlin knows that it cannot confront this directly. So it uses every available, if you like, soft power 

43 

tool to conduct a campaign of subversion to divide and eventually 

dismantle the West. I actually put this in my—— 

Senator KING. This is an active strategy. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Active strategy from the very top around the presidential administration. There is a strategy. We often heard that 

Putin is an opportunist. He uses opportunities to conduct his strategy, but there is a strategy. There is a purpose. There is an ambition. It does not necessarily mean Russia will be successful. In fact, 

many times, as we have seen in Montenegro, it has had the reverse 

effect. 

Senator KING. But they will be if we do not respond. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. We have to respond. We have to respond. We have 

to not only push back, I would say even further we have to go more 

on the offensive vis-a`-vis Russia, not militarily but in the soft 

power tools. Where they use disinformation, we should use counterdisinformation, in other words, to inform the Russian public more 

accurately what the Russian Government is not telling them. 

Senator KING. Well, in 1999, we dismantled USIA [United States 

Information Agency], for example, a terrible geopolitical mistake in 

my opinion. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Absolutely. I think VOA [Voice of America], RFE 

[Radio Free Europe], any other tool of information that we have either at our disposal or that we fund I think we should be helping. 

Throughout the countries that are most vulnerable, we should be 

strengthening their institutions. One of the main institutions is a 

free media. Also the social media. We have not touched on this, but 

the social media—there are initiatives in different parts of central 

eastern Europe, for example, the elves in Lithuania that are fighting the trolls on the Internet to get accurate information across. 

This is something we should be focusing on. We actually could 

learn quite a bit from the Central Europeans that are, let us say, 

the most vulnerable countries on the border of Russia. 

Senator KING. I have always thought it was ironic that we seem 

to be losing the information war, and we are the people that invented Facebook and Hollywood. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Precisely because they have subverted that and 

used it for their purposes. You know, these instruments are neutral. It depends on how they are used. We assume they will be used 

for the right purposes, that people would be smarter and get more 

intelligent. That is not necessarily the case. 

Senator KING. In a few seconds, I want to go to a much more specific question. Mr. Wilson, we have been talking a lot about gas and 

energy as a geopolitical—‘‘weapon’’ is not the right word, but a geopolitical force. The difference is, though—and I wanted to ask you 

in more detail and maybe you can get back to me on the record. 

The differential between the price of pipeline-delivered gas and 

LNG—there is a $3 to $4 premium on LNG, to liquefy, ship, and 

de-liquefy. My question is can the Russians counter the LNG 

threat, if you will, simply by lowering the price of their pipelinedelivered gas, which currently in the U.S.—Henry Hub I think is 

about 3 bucks. So a brief answer if you would on that question. In 

other words, is LNG the weapon we think—I hate to use the word 

‘‘weapon’’—the force that we think it might be because of the price 

differential delivered to the customer? 

44 

Mr. WILSON. Right. It does have an impact. I have just come 

back from Hungary, which is a particular challenge with this. 

What LNG has done in the region, both psychological—American 

LNG is in the game—and commercial—Gazprom has already said 

in Hungary we will sell $1 cheaper than any offer you get in LNG 

through Kirk Island terminal—— 

Senator KING. Which they can do because they do not have to 

pay the shipping. 

Mr. WILSON. But that still has a real concrete effect of introducing market economics into pricing. Frankly, if they are taking 

Russian gas, but they have an option of others, if the Russians are 

forced to play into the market, that is where we win, and that is 

the problem we have right now. 

Senator KING. People are willing to make those pretty substantial capital investments for LNG liquification and de-liquification. 

Mr. WILSON. I would say it is not a simple answer. It took far, 

far too long to build the first LNG terminal to get this Kirk Island 

pipeline going. So it is not clean cut. This is partly why we have 

been focused on these infrastructure connections running northsouth through Central and Eastern Europe because the Soviets 

built everything west-east, and the EU structural fund started to 

do east-west. There are these major gaps in the energy corridors 

running north-south through the eastern flank of our Alliance, and 

that is a problem here. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for your holding this 

hearing. I think this is a very, very important hearing. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. I too agree. This is a profoundly important 

hearing, and I want to thank the chairman and ranking member 

for scheduling it, for taking the time to make sure it was thorough. 

This was a scandalous, outrageous act on the part of Vladimir 

Putin’s Russia. The fact that it largely went under the radar screen 

here in the West is indicative of a lot of things about our foreign 

policy. 

Let me just make an observation or two and then perhaps you 

can comment. 

I happen to be chairman of the Helsinki Commission. That is the 

American participation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We 

just got back from Minsk, Belarus with a delegation of 11 House 

and Senate Members, Republicans and Democrats, and of course, 

we in the Parliamentary Assembly are part of the larger diplomatic 

OSCE organization which only day before yesterday now has a 

complete diplomatic corps of leadership at the four top positions. 

If any of you want to comment about the value of OSCE, feel free 

to do so. 

The military exercise in Belarus was mentioned by one of you. 

I was told by President Lukashenko that this would be about 

15,000 military personnel. One of you, I think, speculated 100,000 

personnel. I was also told in no uncertain terms by President 

Lukashenko that Americans were welcomed as observers, and I 

have not yet gotten that back to the administration, but at least 

from the President, we are welcomed as observers. What is the sigVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
45 

nificance and what do we need to worry about about this military 

exercise in Belarus? 

Then maybe I can start by recognizing Mr. Wilson because, Mr. 

Wilson, you talked about the five-part strategy, one of which was 

exposing Russian actions. I think someone today said let us not 

counter their disinformation with our version of disinformation. I 

do not think we do very well in public diplomacy in the United 

States, and part of that is that we resist propaganda. There is a 

lot to be said for letting the light shine on what is happening, and 

so if any of you could comment about a better way of thinking of 

how our Government can let the light of day shine internationally 

on what is coming out of Putin’s Russia. So I will start with you, 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me connect your last point to your opening with the Helsinki 

Commission. Thank you. Kudos for the Helsinki Commission. It 

plays an extraordinarily important role on many of the key issues. 

There is a connection to the information propaganda issue. Sometimes I think we lose the information war not because we do not 

have enough assets or better public diplomacy offers. It is because 

we have lost the clarity of what our purpose is and to be able to 

have a unity of message coming from leaders across Europe, the 

United States. 

What we have witnessed over the past years is the advance of 

authoritarian kleptocracy on the one hand and radical extremism 

out of ISIS on the other in a way that has come to challenge the 

sense of the free world. We have had a rough patch. We have had 

economic troubles. We have had long wars, and there are reasons 

that our populations have been rambunctious, if you will. But the 

power of the free world is that we can rejuvenate ourselves. We are 

self-correcting. 

I think the key to the information war is not the next budget 

cycle, although that is not insignificant. It is can we find the clarity 

of voice across the Atlantic on the purpose of how to actually 

adapt—yes, adapt—revitalize and defend the free world, and that 

this onslaught of authoritarian kleptocracy or radical extremism— 

that is not the future. I think uniformity in that messaging would 

actually go far more effective in helping us to get the propaganda 

wars right because we do not fight propaganda with propaganda. 

We fight it with who we are and what our purpose is, which is why 

the Helsinki Commission values matter. 

Just very briefly on Zapad, the observer offer is significant because, as far as I am aware of, the Russians always turn us down 

for observers at some of these. So that would be significant to take 

President Lukashenko up on his offer. 

The exercise itself is concerning because it is a tool of intimidation of its neighbors. It is a real exercising of massive troop movements to demonstrate the utility and potential for them to use 

their military modernization program. Frankly, I worry about what 

this means for Belarus’ own sovereignty. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join my colleagues in thanking you and Ranking Member 

Reed for holding this hearing. I think it is very important that we 

46 

continue to, as the Senate Armed Services Committee, raise the 

concerns about what is happening in the Balkans and Russia’s intent in going after Western democracies. 

Ms. Samp, I want to go back to something I understand you said 

while I was out at another hearing, and that is that credible deterrence is a combination of capabilities and intent and that we have 

to wary of how we are signaling intent to friends and adversaries. 

It is my understanding that shortly after Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov threatened that we must return the two dachas that 

were seized back in December as the result of Russian interference 

in our elections, that the State Department rescheduled a meeting 

that had been pulled down between Deputy Secretary Shannon and 

Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. One of the reasons that meeting 

had been pulled down in St. Petersburg was because of our seizure 

of the dachas and our, so far, unwillingness to give those back to 

Russia. 

Can you talk about what it suggests that we have now suddenly 

rescheduled this meeting shortly after Russian Foreign Secretary 

Lavrov threatened us around those two dachas? 

Ms. SAMP. Yes, I would be happy to because I can tell you it does 

not send a good signal, a strong signal to Russia that we are going 

to be doing what it takes to push back against their aggression. 

Quite frankly, it only emboldens them to further action. 

The seizure of those two facilities were part of the United States 

response in the wake of Russia’s interference in our elections. This 

was something undertaken by President Obama in 2016, along 

with the imposition of additional sanctions. So overturning those 

decisions I think sends a message that we are going to let Russia 

get away with it, that we want to move on, and that we are not 

going to stand up in any real way or push back. I think that is absolutely the wrong signal to be sending at the worst possible time. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree with that. Can I ask, Mr. 

Wilson, do you share that view? 

Mr. WILSON. I do. I think the Russians have come to have an expectation that through American political transitions, they can gain 

some leverage. Water under the bridge, new team. We have seen 

this, frankly, through the past three transitions. I can think of very 

specific examples where the Russians have leveraged this. They 

will respect our coming to the table in a position of confidence and 

strength, and I think that is what we need to take to the table with 

the Russians. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Bugajski, do you also agree? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I agree, and I would like to put in a broader context. I think the Russians increasingly see us as a soft target, not 

forcefully enough, not resilient enough to Russian pressure not only 

overseas but maybe even here. They are exploiting our own divisions, our political polarization, access to our media, let us say, financial greed and political ambition. This is exactly what they exploit in Western democracies, and it has come here now, and it is 

time to act. It is time to push back. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You all have talked about the various hybrid tools that Russia 

uses, whether it is disinformation, cyber, illicit financing, the various tools that they have been using. In your opinion, which of 

47 

those tools is the most difficult for us to respond to, and can you 

describe any areas where we have been successful? I would throw 

that out to any of you to respond or all of you. 

Ms. SAMP. I want to highlight the propaganda issue not because 

we have not already spoken about it but because I do think it is 

a serious challenge. The lack of objective truth in our society is a 

serious challenge. It makes it easier for Russia to be able to manipulate the narrative. If we are not even speaking with one voice inside the United States Government, how much more difficult does 

it make it for the American people to understand how they should 

be thinking about and looking at Russia. So I think this discontinuity in the message, the lack of objective truth, and Russia’s preying upon that weakness in our society with propaganda, 

disinformation, and influence operations is one of the harder challenges we face. 

I think going back to our strengths, of course, this is nothing 

that we do not have the tools to address. It is whether or not we 

have the will to address it. Our allies, our institutions, we have the 

strongest military in the world. We have the strongest economy in 

the world. We should not be falling victim to these sorts of tactics, 

and I think if we really leverage the advantages that we have and 

harness them in a single direction instead of multiple directions, 

that would help us to be able to manage the Russia challenge. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I am actually out of time, but I could not agree more that 

disinformation is I think the biggest challenge we face. Actually, 

Mr. Wilson, I would argue that the Atlantic Council needs to do its 

open source summit in the United States. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Perdue, please. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Chair. 

I just want to thank the witnesses today for their careers of work 

in this area. This is a really important area right now and we need 

help. 

Mr. Bugajski, you have written about these frozen conflicts in 

Eastern Europe. We have seen Russia ignore territorial sovereignty, occupy land in Moldova, eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia. It has been 9 years since Russian troops invaded Georgia, and 

they have created a frozen conflict. I never heard of that before 

coming to the Senate. But this is outrageous. 

I would like all of you to comment on this question. We have 

seen Russia from Murmansk to—Kaliningrad right now is bristling. It is a bristling military enclave. We have seen them in 

Sebastapol have access to warm waters and now in Latakia and 

Tortus in Syria build permanent installations circling Eastern Europe. I mean, it looks to me like—from a tactical standpoint it is 

pretty obvious what they are doing. 

My questions, though, are very specific about these frozen conflicts. What is NATO doing? What are we doing? What should we 

be doing to make sure that the Georgia conflict does not remain 

frozen and that the Ukraine/Crimea conflict does not become a frozen conflict? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Excellent question. Thank you, Senator. 

48 

I would say this. We need to understand what Russia is up to 

with these so-called frozen conflicts, or unresolved conflicts. The 

idea is to freeze the state within which the conflict is taking place, 

and we see this clearly in the case of Ukraine and Georgia to prevent these countries from moving into NATO; in the Moldovan 

case, to prevent Moldova from moving into the European Union; in 

the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, keeping both Azerbaijan and Armenia dependent on Russia to try and resolve the conflict. We can be 

more active in some of the—particularly I would say in Georgia 

and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the case of Ukraine, I 

would say it is very important for the Ukrainian Government to be 

able to prevent Russia from expanding its territorial hold on 

Ukraine and using the frozen conflict as a tool of pressure to prevent Ukraine from moving into Western institutions. 

Senator PERDUE. I am sorry. Should the United States arm the 

Ukraine with offensive weapons? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Absolutely. I would give them any weapons they 

want. In a way, you could say Ukraine is a test for our resolve in 

stopping Putin. If Putin is successful in Ukraine, can you imagine 

the ambition that will be raised? If he is stopped in Ukraine, that 

will not only stop him from meddling in other countries, but could 

have a blowback inside Russia as well. 

Ms. SAMP. I would just add that I think Putin has already been 

successful in Ukraine. I do not think his intention was ever to take 

Kiev. I think it was to destabilize just enough to make Ukraine an 

unattractive partner for NATO and for the West. How do we support these governments? I support arming them not quite to giving 

them any weapon they would want, but they do need lethal assistance. 

A bigger challenge, though, is making sure the part of the country that has not fallen under Russian control continues to integrate 

with the West, continues on its path of anti-corruption and transparency measures to be the best model of governance it can be so 

that the part of the country that is inside of a frozen conflict sort 

of falls under the weight of its own corruption and problems and 

challenges. Now you have sort of the other half—three-fourths of 

a country that is successful and that creates its own magnetism 

and draw. 

Then finally, the most probably important piece of the equation 

is patience. None of these frozen conflicts are going to be resolved 

in the near future. But having a clear non-recognition policy which 

is tied up in our sanctions I think is important. We had a non-recognition policy with the Baltic states for 50 years, and that was 

very important to their prospects for one day integrating with the 

West. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson? 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Senator. I would just add that the frozen conflicts are a means for the Russians to take out a long-term 

insurance policy that these countries will never be able to join 

NATO or the EU because they have been occupied. This is their objective. They do not need to depend on the word or commitment of 

one political leader that may come or go with an election. It is their 

insurance policy. 

49 

The status quo in these endless negotiations, five plus two for 

Transnistria, the Geneva process in Georgia, Minsk with 

Ukraine—suit the Russian interests and get us trapped in a kabuki 

game. Many of our allies are quite pleased to have a process at 

least ongoing, but I actually do not think they serve our interests. 

So I think we need to change the equation. In part, we told the 

Russians or the Russians read our own doctrines that say if there 

is occupied territory in a country, it cannot join our Alliance. That 

is in NATO study in 1996 as we were beginning our enlargement 

process to incentivize nations, essentially Europe, to resolve their 

borders. It made sense at that time. 

I think we should be a little bit more brazen and change that 

and say Russian occupation will not stand as a permanent block on 

nations joining the EU and NATO even if that means the jurisdiction of the EU or NATO may not apply to those territories. Simply 

the rhetorical switch of that is how you begin to change Russia’s 

calculations. 

I do agree with my colleagues on I think it is important that we 

give them the strength of a porcupine defense and help arm them 

in a way that it makes the costs too high for the Russians to invade. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you all. 

Thank you, Chair. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Peters, please, on behalf of the chairman. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Thank you to each of our panelists today for some excellent testimony, very thought-provoking testimony. 

I serve as the co-chair of the Senate Albanian Issues Caucus 

with my colleague Senator Ernst, who you heard from earlier. I am 

certainly very proud to represent a very dynamic, very active Albanian American community in Michigan, many of which have very 

strong roots to Montenegro. So I am sure they are watching and 

following the discussion here today. But they also have roots in 

Kosovo and in Macedonia as well. I know Senator Ernst brought 

up the issue of Kosovo. So I would like to talk a little bit about 

what we are seeing in Macedonia. 

Mr. Bugajski, you suggested in your opening statement the 

clashes between Albanians and Macedonians may be engineered by 

Moscow as part of its efforts to destabilize the region, as we have 

been discussing today, test NATO resolve, which is a huge issue, 

and distract attention from their other interventions. 

I understand that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have been frustrated with government policy and political polarization and are demanding greater rights for their community in Macedonia. In turn, 

Macedonian politics has been increasingly disruptive, and there is 

a growing nationalist movement as well that threatens to fracture 

the society and perhaps weaken government structures. 

If you could provide some more context to us on the tensions between Albanians and Macedonians, the current level of severity of 

that tension, and expand on possible Russian involvement fostering 

that. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Thank you very much, Senator. 

50 

Macedonia is stuck because of its name dispute with Greece. A 

country that has actually qualified for NATO cannot make any 

progress because of the fact that it cannot resolve that name dispute. That is having an effect on internal politics and inter-ethnic 

relations in Macedonia because, as you know from your constituents, Albanians, being probably some of the most pro-American and 

pro-NATO populations anywhere in Europe, would like to follow Albania in pulling Macedonia into NATO as well. 

The longer that conflict continues, that standoff continues, the 

more that nationalists will exploit them. We saw this during the 

previous administration that nationalism was manipulated in an 

international but also a domestic context. 

Macedonia now has a new chance. It has a new government. It 

is a coalition government with an Albanian partner. I think it is 

very important—and I know Vice President Pence has talked to 

Zaev—for the United States to become more closely involved in resolving this name dispute, or at least getting Macedonia into NATO 

even if that dispute is not finally resolved. That would help to if 

not settle at least to pacify any possibilities for inter-ethnic conflicts within Macedonia. 

Senator PETERS. You mentioned the strong relationship between 

Albania and the United States. Do you want to elaborate on how 

important our relationship with Albania is to securing that region? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Albania is one of the key countries in the region. 

Let us say it is still a developing democracy. It is a NATO member. 

It contributes to security. It is very pro-American. It sends a very 

positive message to other Albanian communities in terms of their 

Western and NATO aspirations. 

The problems, of course, they have internally are problems common to many Balkan states, lack of judicial reform, corruption, 

poor governance in some places. Again, these are areas where we 

have to, let us say, not cut our funding but help them to achieve 

the standards of other European countries, not only in Albania but 

elsewhere. As I said earlier, there is not a more pro-American population—maybe in Kosovo. But we had a strong role in helping to 

create—President Berisha, as you know, in creating the first Albania and several recent presidents in creating—consolidating Kosovo 

as a state, and they remember that and they will always remember 

that. 

The Albanian population, I would say, in the Balkans is one of 

the key factors that we need to keep our eye on and to make sure 

that any kind of program for greater Albania is resisted, but the 

Albanians are integrated and empowered in each of the countries 

that should be part of NATO, including, as we have said, Macedonia and Montenegro, which has already entered. 

Senator PETERS. Well, thank you. 

I am running out of time. So I am not going to have an opportunity to get an answer to this question, but I will submit it to you 

and hopefully we will hear back. 

I just recently returned from a trip to Latvia and Lithuania, 

folks who have been dealing with miscommunication and propaganda from Russian media. In fact, when I was there at the NATO 

STRATCOM [Strategic Command], they showed me a Facebook 

post that the Russians were sending around the country that the 

51 

Americans had apparently bombed a building in Latvia. It had pictures of a burning building, but of course, did not exist, but nevertheless, was being used to create anti-American tensions. 

I know, however, that the Baltic states have also been pretty effective in pushing back against some of that misinformation. I met 

with a group of journalists who are working actively to get folks 

to question what they see and what they hear. 

But I would certainly love to have each of your assessments as 

to lessons learned in the Baltics that may apply to us broadly. We 

are out of time, but would hope that you could respond in written 

form to me. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Peters. 

On behalf of the chairman, Senator Warren. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you all for your work for many decades. 

It looks like I am in final position here. So I just want to start 

by summarizing where I think we are from this. Russia is actively 

working to destabilize countries along its borders and to undermine 

European Union and NATO. They are doing it through indirect tactics like enabling separatist forces and disseminating propaganda 

and fake news, as well as launching cyberattacks against the 

American electoral system and others in Europe. 

Now, all of you have said this requires a strong response, and 

last month, the Senate tried to do something about it by passing 

a bill that both expands sanctions and ensures enforcement of existing sanctions against Russia. I know you touched on this in your 

testimony, but I just want to draw a line under it because I think 

it is so important right now. 

Ms. Samp and Mr. Wilson, would these new Russia sanctions 

passed by the Senate be helpful or harmful in responding to Russian aggression? Ms. Samp? 

Ms. SAMP. Thank you. 

I think they would be extremely helpful. We have to do more to 

change Russia’s risk calculus. We are all saying the same thing 

here, Democrats and Republicans alike. Ultimately, this comes 

down to how serious do we want to be about Russia’s interference 

in our election? If this was a fundamental assault on our democracy, then we need to be pretty serious. The Russia Sanctions Act 

is a monumental piece of legislation that says to Russia, enough. 

You are not going to get away with it anymore. I know that the 

longer we wait to act, the more emboldened Russia is going to feel. 

The Germans have elections coming up. I do not think we want 

them feeling emboldened going into the fall or even into 2018 in 

our own society. 

So I think the House should take immediate action to pass the 

bill as is. I think any efforts to water it down or delay it should 

be considered a dereliction of duty on their part. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you. That is pretty strong, and I appreciate that and agree with it. 

Mr. Wilson, would you like to add anything? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes. I very much agree that it is extraordinarily 

helpful. I am in Europe a lot, and one of the things that is coming 

through is despite sometimes the nature of our partisan debate and 

lack of clarity in messaging, it is coming through loud and clear, 

52 

an extraordinarily strong bipartisan consensus in the United States 

on standing up to Russian revisionism and aggression. That is coming through loud and clear. Essentially the vote for Montenegro, 97 

to 2, was whether the United States would leave a vacuum in the 

Balkans and stand up to Russia. The vote on the sanctions—every 

one we speak to, when we were traveling through Europe, watches 

that in great detail and sees it is very helpful to get done. 

We do need to recognize that Russia is doing this in part because 

Putin is insecure at home. He does want to demonize the West as 

a threat to Russia, and so he will use what we do to play up the 

nationalist card at home, and so we need to combine raising the 

costs with Russia with a real strength of confidence in our own democracies and democratic institutions because that is actually what 

he is afraid of. 

Senator WARREN. I very much appreciate your comments on this, 

and you are right. This was strongly bipartisan. I was one of the 

cosponsors. Many others were, both sides of the aisle. 

The fact that the House is dragging its feet is not only bad for 

us here at home, but as you say, this sends a terrible signal both 

to Europe and to NATO and to Russia, and I think it is time for 

the House just to do this, to pass this bill and for the President 

to sign it into law. 

I am really concerned, after the President’s behavior at the G20, 

that we cannot keep waiting for the President of the United States 

to take leadership on this. I think this is a place where Congress 

has to step up, and we have really got to put it out there and get 

this bill passed and put it on the President’s desk and urge the 

President to sign it. 

Did you want to add here? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I just want to add one thing. We keep talking 

about information and disinformation. I think it is very important 

that we underscore why sanctions are important, and I do not 

think we have done enough of that. I think a lot of times people 

will say—in fact, the Russians are saying, well, the sanctions do 

not really affect us. You should lift them because they are actually 

just spoiling relations. But they are having an impact on the 

oligarchs, the companies that are closely tied to the Kremlin that 

engage in some of these human rights and subversive activities 

abroad. We need to be a little bit clear in getting the information 

out on why sanctions are important and why this bill is now extremely important. 

Senator WARREN. I very embrace your point on this. You know, 

we had hearings on this over in the Banking Committee, and one 

of the points raised there is it does have an economic impact. But 

as you all say, it also has a powerful political impact. 

So I think we speak with one voice on both sides of the aisle. The 

House needs to pass the sanctions bill now, and we need to get it 

over to the President to be signed. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank you for your excellence testimony. We look forward to working with you as we go forVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:35 Mar 20, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\2017 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\34738.TXT WILD
53 

ward on these issues and many more. But, again, thank you very 

much. 

On behalf of the chairman, let me call this hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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