In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-3596

Thomas L. Hickey, III

and Hickey Funeral Home,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Frank O’Bannon, individually and

in his official capacity as Governor of

the State of Indiana, Lawrence Voelker,

individually and in his capacity as a

purported member of the Indiana State Board of

Funeral and Cemetery Service, Jerry Maguire,

individually and in his official capacity as a member

of the Indiana State Board of Funeral and Cemetery

Service, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:00cv0657 AS--Allen Sharp, Judge.

Argued February 14, 2002--Decided April 25, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, Bauer and Evans,

Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffsappellants filed suit against the

defendants-appellees, claiming, among

other things, deprivation of their

constitutional rights in violation of 42

U.S.C. sec. 1983. The district court

dismissed the appellants’ complaint in

its entirety, finding no constitutional

basis to award the relief requested. We

AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

Background

 In September of 1997, a complaint was

filed against the appellants with the

consumer protection division of the

Indiana Attorney General’s Office. That

complaint resulted in disciplinary action

against the appellants, the dispensation

of which serves as the basis for this

lawsuit.

 The filing of the September 1997
consumer complaint against the appellants

prompted the state of Indiana, by way of

its deputy attorney general, to file a

disciplinary complaint/1 with the

Indiana State Board of Funeral and

Cemetery Service (the "Board"). The Board

in turn instituted administrative

proceedings, including three hearings at

which the appellants were present and

fully participated. Throughout the

proceedings, the appellants challenged

the status of certain Board members,

arguing that such members were ineligible

to serve under state statute.

Notwithstanding the appellants’

objections, the Board issued its Final

Order imposing sanctions against the

appellants.

 The appellants subsequently filed a

Verified Petition for Judicial Review of

Agency Action in Indiana state court, and

the Board’s Final Order was ultimately

set aside on state statutory grounds.

After winning in state court, the

appellants initiated this suit, seeking a

remedy for claimed deprivation of

"rights, privileges or immunities secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United

States or the state of Indiana." The

district court dismissed the appellants’

complaint, finding no appropriate basis

under United States Constitution or

section 1983 to award the relief

requested therein. We agree with the

district court that the appellants’

complaint fails to set forth facts that,

if true, establish a constitutional

violation.

Discussion

 We review the district court’s decision

to grant the appellee’s motion to dismiss

de novo.

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint is

proper where it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his or her claim on which

relief may be granted. Szumny v. Amer.

Gen. Fin., Inc., 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). At a

minimum, a complaint must contain facts

sufficient to state a claim as a matter

of law. Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452,

457 (7th Cir. 1998). All well-pleaded

facts are accepted as true and are

construed in favor of the plaintiff.
McLeod v. Arrow Marine Transp., Inc., 258

F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2001). Further,

we are not obliged to accept as true

legal conclusions or usupported

conclusions of fact. Id.

 Here, the appellants failed to plead

facts that, if true, state a

constitutional or section 1983 violation

as a matter of law. Accepting all facts

therein as true, the most liberal reading

of the appellants’ complaint reveals only

that the Board failed to comply with

procedural rules for conducting

administrative hearings as provided by

state statute. That is an insufficient

basis on which to state a federal due

process claim. Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 57 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 1995)

(a violation of a state procedural

statute does not offend the

Constitution); Wallace v. Tilley, 41 F.3d

296, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The denial of

state procedures in and of itself does

not create inadequate process under the

federal constitution."); Osteen v.

Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993)

("[A] violation of state law . . . is not

a denial of due process, even if the

state law confers a procedural right.");

Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman

Estates, et al., 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th

Cir. 1988) ("A violation of state law is

not a denial of due process . . . .")

(citations omitted). Indeed, the

appellants did receive all the due

process to which they were

constitutionally entitled; namely, notice

and the opportunity to be heard. See,

e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary

Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 654-55 (1985)

(notice of and opportunity to be heard at

disciplinary proceeding sufficient to

satisfy demands of federal due process). 

 Moreover, the appellants have already

sought and won relief pursuant to state

statute for the procedural deprivations

of which they complain. Cf. Pro-Eco,

Inc., 57 F.3d at 514 (noting that

plaintiff had already received relief for

the defendant’s violation of a state

procedural statute in the form of

invalidation of the subject ordinance

when ruling that state procedural

violation did not offend the United

States Constitution). As noted by the

district court, the appellants are simply

not entitled to more procedure than this

under federal law. Because the appellants
failed to plead facts sufficient to

support their constitutional claims and

on which relief could be granted, we find

no error in the district court’s grant of

the appellees’ motion to dismiss, and,

therefore, we need not reach the issue of

immunity.

Conclusion 

 The district court’s dismissal of the

appellants’ case is hereby AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTE

/1 The state later filed an amended disciplinary

complaint against the appellants, upon which the

Final Order issued by the Board is predicated.