2023 IL App (4th) 221022-U 

NO. 4-22-1022 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DONNELL ALLEN TAYLOR, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

McLean County 

No. 22CF94 

Honorable 

William A. Yoder, 

Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Steigmann and Lannerd concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) trial counsel did not render 

ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress evidence obtained from a 

search warrant where the warrant application established a sufficient nexus 

between criminal activity and the premises searched and (2) counsel did not 

render ineffective assistance by eliciting testimony of other crimes or bad conduct 

or in allowing the jury to be given a limiting instruction concerning the conduct 

where (a) the acts were presumed to be trial strategy and (b) to the extent they

could not be deemed reasonable strategy, defendant did not show prejudice. 

¶ 2 In February and March 2022, the State charged defendant, Donnell Allen Taylor, 

in part with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 2022)), 

unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) 

(West 2022)), and unlawful delivery of a look-alike substance (720 ILCS 570/404(b) (West 

2022)). In July 2022, a jury found defendant guilty. 

FILED

November 14, 2023 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 3 On appeal, defendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance when 

counsel (1) failed to file a motion to suppress evidence seized from an apartment defendant 

shared with his girlfriend, (2) elicited testimony about irrelevant other crimes or bad conduct, 

and (3) did not object to an instruction limiting the jury to considering the evidence for purposes 

of establishing identity. 

¶ 4 We determine (1) the warrant application established a sufficient nexus between 

criminal activity and the premises searched and (2) counsel’s elicitation of testimony about other 

crimes or bad conduct and decision not to object to a limiting instruction were presumed to be 

trial strategy. To the extent counsel’s conduct could not be deemed reasonable strategy,

defendant did not show prejudice. Accordingly, defendant failed to show ineffective assistance 

of counsel, and we affirm. 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 A. The Search-Warrant Complaint

¶ 7 On January 26, 2022, Detective Ryan Strebing of the Bloomington Police

Department submitted a sworn complaint for a “second surveillance search warrant” of 

Apartment No. 7 at 1708 Springfield Road in Bloomington, Illinois. The items sought included 

controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, currency, electronic devices, documents of residency, 

and other evidence of drug sales. In the complaint, Strebing averred he regularly worked with 

other law enforcement personnel investigating the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. During 

the course of an ongoing investigation, he had been working with a confidential source (the 

source). Strebing included surveillance logs and narrative reports with the complaint. Those 

were labeled as numbered exhibits for “2nd SW.” The record shows an earlier complaint had
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also been filed by Strebing on January 25, 2022, seeking to enter the common areas of 1708 

Springfield Road for purposes of surveillance. 

¶ 8 The complaint and attachments showed on December 28, 2021, the source told 

Strebing about being at the apartment of a person known as Wallace on Orchard Road in 

Bloomington. At that apartment, the source was introduced to a group of individuals involved in 

ongoing illegal drug sales involving purported cocaine in the Bloomington area. Two of the 

individuals identified were defendant and Eric Seymon. The source indicated defendant and 

Seymon were “almost always together” and believed Seymon worked for defendant. Defendant 

and Seymon had previously been seen in a white car and a gray minivan. The group of 

individuals gave the source Seymon’s phone number. Strebing reported there were five 

controlled buy transactions of purported cocaine with defendant and/or Seymon. 

¶ 9 The first controlled buy occurred on January 7, 2022. Before the buy, the source 

had numerous missed calls from an unknown number. The source called the number back, and 

defendant answered the phone and identified the number as his new phone number. Defendant 

asked if the source needed any crack cocaine. Using defendant’s phone number, the source 

arranged the first controlled buy at the source’s apartment on Orchard Road, which resulted in 

the source purchasing 0.3 grams of purported cocaine. At trial, the parties stipulated the 

substance was 0.2 grams of cocaine. Surveillance logs noted defendant arrived in a silver Buick 

minivan. 

¶ 10 After the transaction, which occurred at approximately 17:20, defendant drove to 

Thorton’s gas station and then to the parking lot of the Hillside apartment complex at 1700 

Springfield Road, arriving at 17:45. A short time later, the Buick drove to the 300 block of 
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Erickson Street, where a black female exited the driver’s seat and entered 301 Erickson Street 

alone.

¶ 11 On January 12, 2022, the source contacted defendant using his cell phone number 

and arranged the second controlled buy. Defendant directed the source to the 1200 block of 

Orchard Road. The record indicates the location was not the source’s apartment. The source 

was met by a black male wearing a black coat, blue jeans, and a medical mask. The source 

believed the person to be Seymon. Strebing averred the transaction resulted in the sale of 0.8 

grams of a substance that tested inconclusive for cocaine.

¶ 12 On January 17, 2022, the source spoke with Seymon using Seymon’s cell phone 

number. The source asked to buy cocaine, and Seymon directed the source to the Hillside 

apartments at 1708 Springfield Road. Seymon later changed the location to 1714 Springfield 

Road, stating it was the first building. The source arrived and stood in front of the common door 

to 1718 Springfield Road. Seymon called the source and said he was on Orchard Road but 

would be at Springfield Road in 5 to 10 minutes. About 15 minutes later, the source called 

Seymon’s phone, and a female answered. The female said Seymon would be there soon. The 

controlled buy occurred between the source and Seymon in a common hallway area of the 

apartment building at 1718 Springfield Road. 

¶ 13 Before the controlled buy, the surveillance unit stationed on Springfield Road 

observed activity by defendant, Seymon, and a female identified as Tikeybeya Sims in the 

parking lot of the apartment building, along with a gray Jeep bearing an Illinois license plate

registered to Sims. The registration for Sims’s Jeep listed the address as Apartment No. 7 at 

1708 Springfield Road in Bloomington. Surveillance logs associated with the third controlled 

buy stated, at 14:03-14:06, defendant and Sims were seen exiting the common door of the 
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apartment building at 1708 Springfield Road and walking to the gray Jeep. They walked back 

and forth between the common door and the Jeep and then entered the building and appeared to 

walk up a staircase from the common hallway. At 14:05, the source exited a vehicle in front of 

1718 Springfield Road and waited just inside the common door at 1718 Springfield Road. At 

14:09, Sims exited the common door at 1708 Springfield Road, walked to the Jeep, and drove 

out of the parking lot. Defendant watched Sims drive away from the common hallway just 

inside the common door. At 14:27, a silver Dodge Durango arrived at 1708 Springfield Road. 

Seymon exited the rear passenger door and walked inside the common door of 1708 Springfield 

Road. The Dodge then left the area. At 14:32, Seymon walked between the buildings at 1716 

and 1718 Springfield Road and entered the common door at 1718 Springfield Road, where he 

met with the source and made the controlled buy of 0.8 grams of purported crack cocaine.

¶ 14 On January 24, 2022, Seymon called the source and offered to sell cocaine. 

Seymon told the source he was at Springfield Road and said he could come to Orchard Road if 

needed. Surveillance logs show Seymon told the source at 13:38 to come to Springfield Road. 

At 14:06, Seymon told the source he would come to Orchard Road. Seymon arrived in the 

Orchard Road area at 14:10. The transaction took place at Wallace’s apartment and resulted in 

the sale of 0.1 grams of crack cocaine. Surveillance logs showed between 14:33 and 15:45, 

Seymon left the area and drove to the apartments at 1708 Springfield Road. He left Springfield 

Road at 15:55. 

¶ 15 In the complaint, Strebing averred that, on January 25, 2022, the source arranged 

to meet Seymon at an address on Orchard Road. Strebing averred earlier surveillance observed 

Seymon exit Apartment No. 7 at 1708 Springfield Road with an unknown female and child and 

leave in a red Chevrolet. Seymon arrived at the location of the controlled buy in the same 
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vehicle. The controlled buy resulted in the purchase of 0.3 grams of purported cocaine. After 

the transaction, Seymon went back to Apartment No. 7 at 1708 Springfield Road. Surveillance 

logs for the controlled buy do not appear in the record directly attached to the complaint. 

However, they do appear in the record just before the second search warrant complaint labeled as 

exhibits for “SWR.” The surveillance log shows, on January 25, 2022, at 15:56, investigators 

installed a camera inside 1708 Springfield Road. That camera recorded Seymon leaving 1708 

Springfield Road at 16:26, before the controlled buy, and returning after the controlled buy at 

17:14. The controlled buy at Orchard Road occurred between 16:50 and 16:52. 

¶ 16 Strebing averred investigators remained in the area, maintained constant 

surveillance of 1708 Springfield Road, and observed Seymon leave Apartment No. 7. Strebing 

alleged, given that Seymon entered Apartment No. 7 before the January 25, 2022, controlled buy 

and returned to the apartment immediately following the controlled buy, there was a reasonable 

inference items relating to ongoing illegal drug activity were present in the apartment. He 

further averred, based on his training and experience in drug investigations, he was aware 

controlled substances, drug proceeds, and drug distribution materials and related items can be 

and are typically hidden through so-called “drug houses” in “such residence locations.” He was 

also aware drug transactions are often initiated via cell phones. 

¶ 17 The trial court issued a search warrant, which resulted in the seizure of crack 

cocaine, cash, digital scales, and other related items from Apartment No. 7 at 1708 Springfield 

Road. Although the record shows recorded controlled-buy money was recovered, the record 

indicates the money was from transactions not at issue in the case, and evidence at trial did not 

tie that money to defendant. The apartment was leased to Sims, but bank cards and court 
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paperwork belonging to defendant were found in a bedroom of the apartment. Defendant’s cell 

phone was also found there. 

¶ 18 Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of unlawful delivery of less 

than one gram of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of less than one gram of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver. It was later determined one of the substances at issue 

was actually breadcrumbs. Defendant was then additionally charged with unlawful delivery of a 

look-alike substance. Defense counsel never filed a motion to suppress evidence based on the 

search warrant. 

¶ 19 B. Evidence of Other Bad Conduct and Trial 

¶ 20 Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of 

other crimes for the purpose of proving identity. The State alleged defendant directly conducted 

the January 7, 2022, controlled buy and appeared to be wearing a ski mask in a surveillance 

video, which put identity at issue. The State alleged that, several hours after the controlled buy, 

defendant had contact with police at a mall in Bloomington after store employees believed he 

had used a stolen credit card. Video from police body cameras showed defendant was wearing 

the same “distinctive outfit” as was worn during the controlled buy earlier that day. Thus, the 

State sought to use the evidence for purposes of showing identity. The State also sought to 

introduce evidence of the buy money found at defendant’s apartment.

¶ 21 At a hearing on the motion, the State argued, as to the count pertaining to the 

January 7, 2022, transaction, identity was a critical issue and evidence related to a police 

officer’s observation of defendant at the mall was probative evidence. The State indicated that it 

would be willing to crop photographs stemming from the incident to minimize the prejudicial 

impact. The trial court found photographs from the incident would be admissible, provided they 
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did not show defendant in front of a police car or handcuffed. The court reserved ruling on the 

issue of the buy money, indicating it was concerned about relevance. The State ultimately did 

not rely on the recovered buy money as evidence at trial. 

¶ 22 Also before trial, the trial court inquired whether the parties anticipated presenting 

evidence requiring a limiting instruction. The State told the court it had prepared Illinois Pattern 

Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (approved Oct. 17, 2014) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 

3.14) regarding proof of other offenses or conduct but took no position as to whether it should be 

given to the jurors at the time of the related testimony or during the final instructions. Defense 

counsel requested IPI Criminal No. 3.14 be given only at the close of the case. During its 

opening remarks, the State told the jurors identity was at issue because, during the January 7, 

2022, controlled buy, the seller wore a ski mask. However, he was wearing a “distinctive outfit” 

similar to an outfit police observed defendant wearing later that night at the mall. The State told 

the jurors it was not going to get into any reasons for why the police observed defendant.

¶ 23 At trial, the source identified photos of defendant and Seymon and identified 

defendant in court. The source testified about meeting defendant at a neighbor’s house and 

stated she asked for defendant’s phone number. The source stated the January 7, 2022, 

controlled buy occurred after the source called defendant’s phone number. The source stated 

defendant arrived, and the source captured video of defendant which showed him walking 

around the source’s apartment. The video was admitted into evidence. Although the video is of 

poor quality, between 19:55 and 20:06, the video shows a person wearing a dark hooded jacket 

with a red shirt underneath with a logo on the front of the shirt. When asked if defendant was 

wearing a mask, the source said, “I think so.” The source was unable to recall what else he was 

wearing.
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¶ 24 The State also presented surveillance video evidence from Thorton’s gas station 

taken shortly after the controlled buy showing defendant wearing a dark jacket with a red shirt 

underneath with what appears to be the same logo on the shirt, but with the face mask rolled up 

and worn like a beanie. The surveillance officer also testified defendant was wearing a black 

jacket and red shirt with some kind of image or emblem on it. Strebing testified the source 

arranged the January 7, 2022, controlled buy over a speakerphone, and Strebing recognized

defendant’s voice as the person the source was speaking to. 

¶ 25 Bryan McCall, a Bloomington police officer, testified he encountered defendant at 

the mall on January 7, 2022, in connection with a call for service. As part of that call, he looked 

at defendant’s identification card. McCall identified photographs from his body camera of 

defendant wearing clothing matching the description given by the surveillance officer and which 

showed defendant wearing a dark jacket with a red shirt underneath bearing a logo matching the 

shirt seen in the video taken in the source’s apartment and the images taken at Thorton’s. On 

cross-examination, defense counsel established defendant was searched but ultimately never 

charged with a criminal offense at the mall. Counsel further established defendant did not have 

any drugs and McCall did not find any marked buy money on him. Counsel then asked if 

defendant was searched multiple times. The officer replied defendant was searched once 

because of his parole status and a second time after he was placed in custody.

¶ 26 Because the sufficiency of the evidence to prove defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt is not at issue on appeal, we need not provide an extensive recitation of the 

remainder of the evidence. Overall, the evidence showed Seymon lived on Orchard Road and 

had a reciprocal drug dealing arrangement with defendant. Seymon acted on behalf of defendant 

during the controlled buy involving the delivery of a look-alike substance and identified text 
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messages between himself and defendant about the transaction. Personal items belonging to 

defendant were found in Apartment No. 7 on Springfield Road, and the record indicates he 

stayed there with Sims. Strebing also testified surveillance had seen defendant come out of the 

apartment, and Strebing believed defendant lived there or stayed there.

¶ 27 During the jury instruction conference, the State tendered IPI Criminal No. 3.14. 

The trial court stated it assumed the instruction was related to defendant’s encounter with the 

police at the mall. The State responded it was, and defense counsel stated he had no objection. 

As a result, the jury was instructed as follows: 

“Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in 

conduct other than those charged in the Indictment. This evidence has been 

received on the issues of the defendant’s identification, and may be considered by 

you only for that limited purpose. It is for you to determine whether the 

defendant was involved in that conduct; and, if so, what weight should be given to 

this evidence on the issue of identity.” 

¶ 28 During closing arguments, defense counsel stressed neither buy money nor drugs 

were ever found on defendant after any of the transactions. Later in his argument, counsel 

repeated that, on January 7, 2022, the police at the mall did not find marked buy money on 

defendant and defendant was not arrested. Counsel argued if the police believed a drug deal 

happened on January 7, 2022, someone would have arrested defendant. Counsel then repeated, 

“[I]t happens, they do have [an] encounter with him. He has no drugs on him at the mall. And 

there is no buy money found on him and confirmed at any point in time here anywhere, all day 

long.” Counsel later argued, “It is rare, rarer when in a drug dealing case the defendant is never 
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found with buy money, controlled money on them, on their place, in their car. And [defendant]

was never found with buy money, controlled buy money.” 

¶ 29 The jury found defendant guilty. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years’ 

imprisonment for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver. The court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment 

for unlawful delivery of a look-alike substance. Defendant filed a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, arguing the State failed to prove him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion. 

¶ 30 This appeal followed. 

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 On appeal, defendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance when 

counsel (1) failed to file a motion to suppress evidence seized from the apartment defendant 

shared with his girlfriend, (2) elicited testimony about irrelevant other crimes or bad conduct, 

and (3) did not object to an instruction limiting the jury to considering the evidence for purposes 

of establishing identity. 

¶ 33 A. Failure to File a Motion to Suppress 

¶ 34 Defendant first contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

move to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant. In particular, relying on 

People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, 129 N.E.3d 1141, defendant argues the complaint for the 

search warrant and its accompanying exhibits failed to establish a sufficient nexus between 

defendant’s criminal activity and Apartment No. 7 at 1708 Springfield Road. 

¶ 35 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the standard set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23, 965 
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N.E.2d 1109, 1115. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant.” People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 

(2010). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to 

satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Clendenin, 

238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18, 939 N.E.2d 310, 319 (2010). 

“In order to establish prejudice resulting from failure to file a motion to suppress, 

a defendant must show a reasonable probability that: (1) the motion would have 

been granted, and (2) the outcome of the trial would have been different had the 

evidence been suppressed. [Citation.] The failure to file a motion to suppress 

does not establish incompetent representation when the motion would have been 

futile.” People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 438, 841 N.E.2d 889, 907 (2005). 

¶ 36 Under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., 

amend. IV), made applicable to state officials through the fourteenth amendment to the United 

States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV): 

“ ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.’ ” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 26 (quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV). 

Similarly, under the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution: 

“ ‘The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or 
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interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No 

warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly 

describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ ” 

Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 27 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6).

¶ 37 With a narrow exception not relevant in this case, our supreme court has held the 

search and seizure provision in article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution is to be interpreted 

in lockstep with the fourth amendment. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 28. “The fourth amendment 

and the Illinois search and seizure clause, then, both set forth two underlying requirements: that 

searches and seizures must be reasonable and that probable cause must support search warrants.” 

Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 28. 

¶ 38 Under both federal and state warrant requirements, a detached judicial officer 

must resolve the question of whether probable cause exists to justify issuing a warrant. Manzo, 

2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29. Whether probable cause exists in a particular case depends on the 

“ ‘totality of the circumstances and facts known to the officers and court when the warrant is 

applied for.’ ” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 400, 447 

N.E.2d 218, 228 (1983)). The “facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge at the 

time the warrant is applied for” must be “ ‘sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to 

believe that the law was violated and evidence of it is on the premises to be searched.’ ” Manzo, 

2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 77, 687 N.E.2d 820, 829 (1997)). 

“It is the probability of criminal activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is the 

standard for determining whether probable cause is present.” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29. 
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¶ 39 “Whether the necessary probability exists is governed by commonsense 

considerations that are factual and practical, rather than by technical rules.” Manzo, 2018 IL 

122761, ¶ 30. 

“ ‘The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense 

decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay 

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place.’ ” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29 (quoting Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 

¶ 40 A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate in 

construing an affidavit. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 31. Instead, the court merely decides 

whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. Manzo, 

2018 IL 122761, ¶ 31. “A sworn complaint supporting a search warrant is presumed valid.” 

Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 32. “Moreover, in determining whether an affidavit demonstrates the 

existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should largely be 

determined by the preference to be accorded to the warrants.” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 31. 

Probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). 

¶ 41 With regard to the search of an individual’s home, “[t]he critical element in a 

reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is 

reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on 

the property to which entry is sought.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). 

There must be a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought. Manzo, 2018 

IL 122761, ¶ 35. 
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¶ 42 In Manzo, our supreme court found probable cause for a search warrant was 

lacking based on the failure of the State to show a nexus between the premises searched and 

evidence of illegal activity. There, the complaint for the search warrant did not target the 

defendant but sought a warrant to search his residence. The complaint focused on three 

undercover cocaine purchases from an individual named Casillas who was the cousin of Leticia 

Hernandez, the defendant’s then girlfriend and future wife. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 4. The 

purchases occurred over a period of 20 days preceding the issuance of the search warrant, and 

two of the purchases occurred “in the vicinity” of the defendant’s residence. Manzo, 2018 IL 

122761, ¶ 5. For one of the purchases, Casillas drove a vehicle registered to Hernandez at the 

address of the defendant’s home. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 6. For another purchase, 

surveillance officers saw Casillas exit the defendant’s residence on foot and walk to meet the 

undercover officer at the nearby grocery store. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 8. Law enforcement 

records showed Casillas was “an associate” of Hernandez but did not further explain the meaning 

of that term. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 9. The complaint for the search warrant alleged, based 

on those facts, the officers had probable cause to believe a search of the defendant’s residence 

would result in the seizure of cocaine, currency, drug records, drug packaging, drug 

paraphernalia, and other evidence related to drug crimes. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 4. The 

appellate court held the warrant was based on probable cause, but our supreme court disagreed. 

Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 36. 

¶ 43 The supreme court in Manzo recognized “the fact that a dealer leaves his home to 

complete a drug sale makes it more likely that he possessed drugs at his home.” Manzo, 2018 IL 

122761, ¶ 52 (citing United States v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. 

Montes-Medina, 570 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359 (1st 
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Cir. 2005); State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199 (Tenn. 2009); Holmes v. State, 796 A.2d 90 (Md. 

2002)). However, the court held the fact Casillas was seen leaving the defendant’s home before 

one of the undercover buys and his use of a vehicle registered to Hernandez at the defendant’s 

residence for another undercover buy failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Casillas’s 

criminal conduct and the defendant’s residence. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶¶ 38-39. The court 

noted, although Casillas used a vehicle registered to Hernandez at the defendant’s residence, 

“There [was] no evidence indicating where Casillas was before arriving at the drug deal in [the] 

vehicle. In particular, there was no evidence that Casillas drove [the] vehicle directly from [the] 

defendant’s home to meet [the undercover officer].” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 40. 

¶ 44 The supreme court also noted the fact Casillas left the defendant’s home to 

complete a drug sale established that Casillas had drugs on his person when he left the 

defendant’s house, but “it [did] not follow that Casillas obtained those drugs from defendant’s 

home as opposed to any other place.” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 48. The court stated, “Without 

more information connecting defendant’s home to the drug sale, it is equally possible to infer 

that Casillas had the drugs on his person when he arrived at defendant’s home.” Manzo, 2018 IL 

122761, ¶ 48. Moreover, the court observed no evidence was presented in the complaint for the 

search warrant that the location to be searched was the defendant’s home, or that Casillas was a 

frequent visitor there. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 39. Notably absent from the complaint were 

allegations Casillas lived in the residence searched, stored narcotics there, or conducted any drug 

transactions inside the residence. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 51. At best, the complaint 

established Casillas was an acquaintance of the occupants of the residence and did not establish a 

nexus to believe evidence of Casillas’s illegal activities would be found there. Manzo, 2018 IL 

122761, ¶ 51. 
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¶ 45 The supreme court further observed although law enforcement records showed 

Casillas was an “associate” of Hernandez, the connection between them was not further 

explained and there was no evidence Hernandez had any involvement in illegal activities. Thus, 

that statement on its own did not create an inference Casillas and Hernandez engaged in drug 

dealing together, let alone that Casillas was storing evidence of drug dealing at the defendant’s 

home. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 39. 

¶ 46 Additionally, the supreme court in Manzo found it significant the affiant officer 

requesting the search warrant did not describe his experience with drug investigations and 

arrests. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 60. Notably, the Manzo court distinguished the case from 

Commonwealth v. Clagon, 465 Mass. 1004, 987 N.E.2d 554 (2013), a case in which the affiant 

officer described his experience in drug investigations and arrests, attesting he was familiar with 

drug distribution tactics, including a delivery service whereby a distributor conceals a supply of 

controlled substances at his residence and conducts sales to individual buyers at other locations. 

Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 54 (citing Clagon, 465 Mass. at 1004-05, 987 N.E.2d at 555-56). The 

affidavit in Clagon also suggested the defendant was an established drug dealer with an ongoing, 

regular trade, which was corroborated by controlled purchases where the defendant produced 

heroin within a short time after receiving a call from a confidential source. Further, the affidavit 

established the defendant’s connection to the premises. The defendant in Clagon twice left the 

premises and went directly to the drug sale and, on a third occasion, was seen returning to the 

premises after the drug sale. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 54 (citing Clagon, 465 Mass. at 1004-

05, 987 N.E.2d at 555-56). Likewise, the Manzo court also distinguished additional cases in 

which the affiant officer averred to his or her expertise. See Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶¶ 55-59 

(discussing cases).
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¶ 47 Here, the facts are distinguishable from those in Manzo. Indeed, the facts are 

closer to those of Clagon, which the Manzo court had specifically distinguished. First, unlike in 

Manzo, defendant here was a direct target of the investigation and his involvement in illegal 

activity and association with Seymon was well documented. Strebing provided evidence 

defendant and Seymon were part of a group selling purported cocaine, defendant and Seymon 

were almost always together, and the source believed Seymon worked for defendant. It was also 

established defendant was involved in drug activity in general, as he personally conducted the 

first controlled buy and arranged the second one. 

¶ 48 Second, while none of the controlled buys occurred inside of Apartment No. 7 at 

1708 Springfield Road, one did occur in a common hallway of a building in the apartment 

complex at a time when defendant was established to be present in the area within minutes of the 

sale. This differs from the circumstance in Manzo, where the sale took place at businesses “in 

the vicinity” of the residence. See generally People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App 4th 200081, 

¶¶ 68-70, 205 N.E.3d 812 (distinguishing Manzo when a drug sale took place in the backyard of 

the target residence). Here, the sale occurred in very near proximity to the residence searched. 

Further, Seymon was dropped off immediately before a transaction and entered 1708 Springfield 

Road before exiting again and meeting the source in the common hallway of another building to 

complete the transaction. When considered in light of other facts in the complaint, there was a 

reasonable inference he went to Apartment No. 7 before that transaction. 

¶ 49 Further, surveillance generally connected multiple sales of cocaine to the Hillside 

apartment complex. After the first controlled sale, defendant was observed returning to the 

apartment complex. The January 17, 2022, transaction occurred in a common hallway in the 

complex. On January 24, 2022, Seymon told the source he was at Springfield Road before he 
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went to Orchard Road for the transaction. He then returned to 1708 Springfield Road after that 

transaction. Then, Seymon’s delivery of cocaine on January 25, 2022, was directly connected to 

Apartment No. 7 at 1708 Springfield Road when he was observed leaving that location before a 

transaction and returning there immediately after. This is far different from the facts of Manzo, 

where there was a lack of evidence of a connection between the defendant and the person 

performing the drug sales and a lack of evidence tying the person making the sales to the 

defendant’s residence both immediately before and after drug sales. 

¶ 50 Finally, unlike in Manzo, where the affiant officer failed to establish expertise in 

investigating drug transactions, Strebing did so. Strebing specifically averred, based on his 

training and experience in drug investigations, he was aware controlled substances, drug 

proceeds, and drug distribution materials and related items can be and are typically hidden 

through so-called “drug houses” in “such residence locations.” He was also aware drug 

transactions are often initiated via cell phones. 

¶ 51 Defendant argues Manzo applies because the State failed to connect Sims, as the 

person named in the apartment lease, to defendant or Seymon. But defendant’s argument ignores 

that in Manzo, the only significant connection between the person selling drugs and the location 

searched was a seemingly innocent relationship with a third person. There was a lack of 

evidence the seller was keeping drugs in the third-person’s home. As previously noted, with 

regard to the search of an individual’s home, “[t]he critical element in a reasonable search is not 

that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe 

that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry 

is sought.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). Here, both Seymon and 

defendant were directly connected to controlled buys associated with the Hillside apartments. It 
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was unnecessary to also connect them to Sims, or for the complaint to allege Sims dated 

defendant or Sims was involved in the drug deals. It was enough the evidence showed Seymon 

and defendant worked together as part of a group selling purported cocaine and 1708 Springfield 

Road was frequented by them in close temporal proximity to multiple drug transactions. 

¶ 52 Apartment No. 7 was also specifically identified as the pertinent residence. 

Defendant contends the surveillance logs connecting the transactions to Apartment No. 7 were 

missing from the exhibits considered by the trial court when it issued the warrant. The record 

indicates those exhibits were perhaps not included with the operative search-warrant complaint. 

However, Strebing averred to the contents of them, including averring Seymon exited Apartment 

No. 7 before a drug transaction and returned there immediately after the transaction. Those 

actions provided a reasonable inference items relating to ongoing illegal drug activity were 

present in the apartment.

¶ 53 Under these circumstances, we find Manzo distinguishable and determine the 

complaint for the search warrant established probable cause. Accordingly, counsel’s 

performance was not deficient, as it would have been futile for counsel to file a motion to 

suppress. 

¶ 54 B. Other Bad-Conduct Evidence 

¶ 55 Defendant next contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

eliciting irrelevant instances of other bad conduct and then failing to object to IPI Criminal No. 

3.14, further drawing attention to the evidence. 

¶ 56 Defendant does not argue allowing McCall’s testimony and the images portraying 

defendant’s clothing was in error. Instead, he notes the State never elicited evidence of any 

misconduct, thus negating any relevance of IPI Criminal No. 3.14. He argues it was his counsel 
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who raised the issue of misconduct and allowed testimony defendant was on parole, searched, 

and placed in custody, which then allowed the instruction to be given, drawing additional 

attention to those facts.

¶ 57 Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or bad conduct is inadmissible 

because it is so persuasive of a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes that it becomes unfairly 

prejudicial. See People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170, 788 N.E.2d 707, 714 (2003). Illinois 

Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) permits character evidence for “purposes, such as 

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident.” However, such evidence “may still be excluded from evidence if its 

prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.” People v. Petrakis, 2019 IL App 

(3d) 160399, ¶ 22, 128 N.E.3d 1053; see Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). 

¶ 58 Counsel’s effectiveness is determined by the totality of his conduct, and, as a 

court of review, we will not inquire into areas involving the exercise of judgment, discretion, 

trial tactics, or strategy. People v. Edwards, 301 Ill. App. 3d 966, 981, 704 N.E.2d 982, 994 

(1998). There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Further, counsel’s decision as to 

what jury instructions to tender is one of several determinations widely recognized as matters of 

trial strategy. People v. Lowry, 354 Ill. App. 3d 760, 766, 821 N.E.2d 649, 557 (2004). 

¶ 59 Here, counsel’s decision to elicit testimony about McCall’s search of defendant 

was presumed to be strategy. The record shows counsel used that testimony to show, despite 

several searches, defendant did not have drugs or buy money on his person after the January 7, 

2022, controlled buy. At that point, it was reasonable for the jury to be given IPI Criminal No.
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3.14 to minimize any prejudice arising from the inference that, because defendant was detained 

and searched, he committed other crimes or bad conduct. 

¶ 60 Further, to the extent counsel should have prevented or objected to McCall’s 

statements about defendant’s parole status and being placed in custody, defendant has not 

demonstrated how he was prejudiced by that testimony. The evidence merely consisted of a 

passing remark. Further, the evidence was also clear defendant was not arrested, and the use of 

IPI Criminal No. 3.14 specifically instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for purposes 

of establishing identity. 

¶ 61 Meanwhile, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Defendant was 

clearly identified as the person who sold the source cocaine on January 7, 2022. Aside from 

evidence showing defendant wearing the same or similar clothing at the controlled buy, the gas 

station, and the mall, the source testified the buy was arranged using defendant’s phone number. 

Then, Strebing testified he recognized defendant’s voice on the call. As to the other transactions, 

Seymon testified about his reciprocal arrangement with defendant, including defendant’s 

involvement with the sale of look-alike drugs. Evidence was also found in Apartment No. 7 at 

1708 Springfield Road supporting defendant’s possession of drugs with intent to deliver. 

Defendant points to various weaknesses in the State’s case to argue otherwise. However, we 

disagree a fleeting reference to defendant’s parole status and being searched, coupled with an 

instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of such evidence to the issue of identity, shows the 

result of the proceedings would have been different in its absence. Accordingly, defendant has 

not shown counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 

170571, ¶ 60, 145 N.E.3d 544. 

¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 63 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 64 Affirmed.