DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General

Office of Audits

AMOC Needs To Improve Written

Guidelines For Providing Assistance To

Other Agencies

OIG-04-20 March 2004

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, has reviewed 

this report and excised information according to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552, as 

amended. The report also has been edited minimally to preserve continuity and comprehension.

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to DHS to 

identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the program, 

operation, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of 

relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available 

to the OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is 

my hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations. I 

express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Richard L. Skinner

Deputy Inspector General

AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 1

Contents

Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 3

Results in Brief ................................................................................................................................4

Background.................................................................................................................................... 5

 

Assistance Provided To DPS Was Consistent With AMOC’s Mission and Policies .................... 9

AMOC Needs To Improve and Enforce Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance .............. 13

AMOC Needs To Establish Performance Measures To Assess Its Effectiveness

and Productivity........................................................................................................................... 18

Appendices

Appendix 1: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.................................................................. 21

Appendix 2: Management Comments ................................................................................. 22

Appendix 3: Recommendations........................................................................................... 25

Appendix 4: Major Contributors To This Report ................................................................ 26

Appendix 5: Report Distribution ......................................................................................... 27

Attachment

Attachment 1: Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape .......................................................... 28

Abbreviations

AMICC Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center

AMO Office of Air and Marine Operations

AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center

Customs United States Customs Service

DAT Digital Audio Tape

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DoD Department of Defense

DPS Department of Public Safety

DSS Detection System Specialist

FAA Federal Aviation Administration
Page 2 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies

Contents

FSO Facility Standardization Officer

FY Fiscal Year

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NCRCC National Capital Region Coordination Center

OIG Office of Inspector General

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PDT Pacific Daylight Time

P.L. Public Law

ROI Report of Investigation

SCDO Supervisory Command Duty Officer

SDSS Senior Detection System Specialist

Secret Service United States Secret Service

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

Treasury Department of the Treasury

U.S. United States

U.S.C. United States Code
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 3

OIG

Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

Introduction 

This report presents the results of the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) 

audit of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Air and Marine 

Operations Center (AMOC). The audit was initiated as a result of congressional 

concerns regarding AMOC’s use of its assets to locate an aircraft believed to 

be transporting Texas state legislators. AMOC, formerly called the Air and 

Marine Interdiction Coordination Center (AMICC), is a national interagency 

law enforcement facility utilizing civil aviation and military sensor networks 

to support law enforcement and national defense operations throughout the 

Western Hemisphere. Staffed by experienced law enforcement professionals and 

military air traffic personnel, AMOC continuously monitors air traffic over the 

United States (U.S.), Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. This allows AMOC 

to identify, track, and support the interdiction and apprehension of violators 

attempting to enter U.S. airspace with illegal drugs or terrorist objectives.

On May 12, 2003, AMOC provided assistance to the Texas Department of Public 

Safety (DPS) in locating an aircraft believed to be transporting Texas state 

legislators from Oklahoma to Texas. The Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) OIG was requested by Congress to conduct an investigation of the events 

that occurred regarding the assistance AMOC provided to the DPS. 1 The OIG 

conducted a criminal investigation focused on the alleged misuse of DHS assets 

in assisting state law enforcement in locating a reported missing aircraft. The 

OIG released its Report of Investigation (ROI) detailing its findings on June 13, 

2003. In the ROI, the OIG concluded that AMOC provided assistance to DPS 

consistent with its guidelines. In the course of the investigation, however, the 

OIG determined that a review of AMOC’s guidelines for rendering assistance to 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies was warranted. 

The overall objective of this audit was to assess the propriety of AMOC’s existing 

guidelines for rendering assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies. We conducted our fieldwork from July 2003 through September 2003. 

Fieldwork was conducted at the Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) in 

1

 Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin recused himself from any participation in this matter due to his prior employment by the State of 

Texas, and the possibility that he might know one or more of the State of Texas employees involved in this matter.
Page 4 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Washington, D.C.; the AMOC facility in Riverside, California; and the National 

Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC) in Herndon, Virginia. A more 

detailed description of our purpose, scope, and methodology is provided as 

Appendix 1.

Results in Brief

AMOC needs to improve its written guidelines for rendering assistance to 

federal, state, and local agencies in law enforcement and emergency humanitarian 

efforts. Guidelines were general in nature and did not include specific procedures 

to verify that requests for assistance were valid and appropriate requests from 

legitimate federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, 

existing procedures for rendering assistance to law enforcement agencies were not 

always followed. In addition, AMOC did not have organizational performance 

measures and individual performance standards to assess AMOC’s effectiveness 

and productivity. 

We also confirmed that assistance rendered to the Texas DPS by AMOC was 

consistent with AMOC’s mission and policy of providing assistance to federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. AMOC’s policy was to presume 

that any request from a law enforcement agency, whether law enforcement 

or humanitarian in nature, was valid and would not be denied if staffing and 

resources were available. AMOC received two requests for assistance from 

DPS on May 12, 2003. At the time the two DPS requests were received, AMOC 

staff believed that the first inquiry was a legitimate request for law enforcement 

assistance and the second was a legitimate request for humanitarian assistance, 

both from a law enforcement agency. However, AMOC officials did not take 

specific measures to verify the nature or legitimacy of the requests because 

AMOC procedures did not require them to do so. Accordingly, AMOC provided 

current and past flight plan information to DPS. At the time the requests were 

made, flight plan information was considered “open source” information, which 

is defined as any information available to the general public, and has no federal 

restrictions on its release.2 

2

 As a result of the May 12, 2003, incident, on July 15, 2003, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amended its written procedures 

to impose restrictions on the release of aircraft tracking (flight plan) information. According to FAA Order 7210.3, Facility Operation 

and Administration Handbook, (Chapter 2-1-5. Release of Information), “No request for Flight Track Data shall be granted unless it is 

first determined that the request is being made in the interest of aviation safety or efficiency, or for an official purpose by a United States 

Government agency or law enforcement organization with respect to an ongoing investigation.”
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 5

We are recommending that the AMO Director: (1) revise AMOC guidelines for 

providing assistance to federal, state, and local agencies in law enforcement and 

emergency humanitarian efforts; (2) provide refresher training for all operations 

floor staff and reiterate the importance of understanding and following existing 

procedures; (3) document the type of assistance provided, e.g., law enforcement 

or humanitarian, so that these statistics can be easily tracked by the new electronic 

contact database developed by AMOC; (4) develop organizational performance 

measures and individual performance standards to evaluate the effectiveness 

and productivity of both AMOC and its personnel; and (5) prepare meaningful 

management reports to show workload statistics that measure overall productivity.

Background

In 1969, Congress established the United States Customs Service (Customs) 

Aviation Program to stem the flow of drug smuggling across U.S. borders via 

light, private aircraft. In 1971, the Customs Air Interdiction Program began 

operations with a small fleet of confiscated aircraft. Spurred by the increasing 

threat of drug smuggling via light, private aircraft, Customs began experimenting 

with radar interdiction operations during the 1970s and early 1980s. Utilizing 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) 

fixed and mobile radar sites, Customs conclusively proved the value of radar 

in stemming the flow of illegal drugs across the U.S. borders, with one critical 

shortcoming: once a smuggling aircraft was detected it quickly escaped by 

passing out of range of conventional radar facilities. 

To address this shortcoming, Customs opened the Command, Control, 

Communications and Intelligence Center located in Riverside, California, in 

August 1988. A similar facility was opened in Richmond Heights, Florida, a few 

months later. Both facilities were consolidated at the Riverside, California facility 

in October 1994 and the new facility was renamed the Domestic Air Interdiction 

Coordination Center. In 1999, the Air and Marine Programs merged and the 

Air and Marine Interdiction Division was created and the name of the Riverside 

facility was changed to the Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center. 

Effective March 1, 2003, Customs was transferred from the Department of the 

Treasury (Treasury) to DHS. As a result, the AMICC was assigned to ICE, one of 

two new Bureaus under the DHS Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 

The AMICC was renamed the Air and Marine Operations Center and the Air and 

Marine Interdiction Division became the Office of Air and Marine Operations. 

AMOC reports to ICE through AMO. 
Page 6 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

AMOC’s mission is to utilize integrated air and marine forces, the latest 

technology, and tactical intelligence to detect, sort, track, and facilitate the 

interdiction of criminal entities throughout the Western Hemisphere. According 

to AMOC, its capabilities for detection, classification, and prosecution of inbound 

low flying aircraft do not exist anywhere else. Because of its extensive capability, 

AMOC is also providing airspace security coverage over Washington, D.C. and 

has provided airspace security for a number of significant events, including the 

2002 Winter Olympics and the 2003 Super Bowl. AMOC also provided airspace 

security for Operation Liberty Shield.3 AMOC has become the focal point for 

protecting the security of the United States through the tactical direction of ICE in 

the war on air and marine smuggling. 

Personnel assigned to AMOC include a Director, Assistant Directors, Operations 

Officers, Training Officer, Supervisory Command Duty Officers (SCDO), Senior 

Detection Systems Specialists (SDSS), Detection Systems Specialists (DSS), 

Telecommunication Specialists, Intelligence Research Specialists, and a small 

support staff. DSSs have a variety of federal and state law enforcement computer 

systems at their fingertips, allowing them to provide detailed information on the 

movement, registration, and criminal histories of aircraft, vessels, vehicles, and 

individuals. 

This complex communication network gives AMOC personnel the ability to 

speak directly with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, ensuring 

a carefully coordinated response whether investigating suspicious activity or 

securing support for ICE interdiction teams in the field. This capability also 

proves useful when the DSS needs to determine if the caller is a legitimate law 

enforcement officer. AMOC does not have caller identification capabilities for 

external incoming calls. However, the DSS can quickly search the databases and 

display the official numbers for verification when necessary.

Since September 11, 2001, AMOC has turned its surveillance and database 

capabilities toward protecting the people of the United States from further 

terrorist assaults while continuing to deter the smuggling of narcotics into the 

United States. Whether identifying and tracking suspects, providing 24-hour 

surveillance on high priority targets, or performing airspace security missions, 

AMOC is a vital link in the Homeland Security network. AMOC’s mission was 

expanded as a result of September 11, 2001, to include the following Homeland 

3

 Operation Liberty Shield was launched in March 2003 to increase security and readiness in the United States. Part of Operation Liberty 

Shield was to control vital airspace and enforce new temporary flight restrictions that were put into place over certain U.S. cities, including 

Washington, D.C. and New York City.
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 7

Security surveillance and law enforcement support requirements: (1) increased 

internal domestic surveillance and law enforcement support, which included 

counter-terrorism and money laundering; (2) increased support to the Office of 

Air and Marine Branches and Units; (3) increased inter-agency coordination with 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives; the United States Secret Service (Secret Service); and other agencies; 

(4) increased interior radar coverage; and (5) the addition of direct intelligence 

support to Homeland Security. 

Legal Authorities 

AMO has various sources for different legal authorities, including numerous laws 

and Presidential Decision Directives (PDD). Certain authorities originated with 

Treasury and the former Customs. Pursuant to 19 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 

1589a, enforcement authority of customs officer, “Subject to the direction of the 

Secretary of the Treasury, an officer of the customs may – (1) carry a firearm; (2) 

execute and serve any order, warrant, subpoena, summons, or other process issued 

under the authority of the United States; (3) make an arrest without a warrant for 

any offense against the United States committed in the officer’s presence or for 

a felony, cognizable under the laws of the United States committed outside the 

officer’s presence if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person 

to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony; and (4) perform any other 

law enforcement duty that the Secretary of the Treasury may designate.” 

The authorities in 19 U.S.C. § 1589a were transferred to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, along with all other functions, personnel, assets, and 

liabilities of Customs, pursuant to section 403(1) of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002, Public Law (P.L.) 107-296, dated November 25, 2002. Subsequently, 

the Secretary delegated the authorities under 19 U.S.C. § 1589a to the Assistant 

Secretary of ICE. The Secretary also delegated to the Director of AMO the 

authority and responsibility to supervise and direct ICE activities with respect to 

air and marine interdiction, and to provide direction and supervision to the AMO 

branch chiefs and other managers as appropriate.

Treasury’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 appropriations bill, P.L. 107-67, dated 

November 12, 2001, specifically provided appropriations in the amount of 

$177,860,000 for AMO including “...the provision of support to Customs and 

other Federal, State, and local agencies in the enforcement or administration of 

laws enforced by the Customs Service; and, at the discretion of the Commissioner 

of Customs, the provision of assistance to Federal, State, and local agencies in 
Page 8 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

other law enforcement and emergency humanitarian efforts...” Congress passed 

another law with identical language for FY 2003, P.L. 108-7, which provided 

$181,829,000 for AMO. These laws afford AMO very broad authority and 

enormous latitude as long as activities fall within the broad categories of law 

enforcement or emergency humanitarian efforts.

AMO’s legal authority to conduct airspace security evolved from Customs’ 

support to the Secret Service in national security events pursuant to PDD 62, 

Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans 

Overseas. PDD 62 requires that AMO and the Secret Service establish airspace 

security over restricted airspace at designated National Special Security Events. 

Other laws that provide legal authority for AMO include: PDD 14, CounterNarcotics “Andean Strategy”; PDD 39, Counterterrorism Policy; PDD 63, 

Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure; National Security Directive 18, 

International Counternarcotics Strategy; the National Defense Authorization 

Act of 1995; the National Drug Control Strategy of 2000; and the Western 

Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.

Assistance Provided To DPS Was Consistent With AMOC’s Mission and 

Policies

AMOC’s assistance to DPS was consistent with its mission and policies for 

providing assistance to federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies based 

on staff’s belief that the request was legitimate. AMOC’s policy was to presume 

that any request from a law enforcement agency, whether law enforcement 

or humanitarian in nature, was valid and would not be denied if staffing and 

resources were available. On May 12, 2003, AMOC provided assistance to 

the Texas DPS by (1) reviewing past flight information on 14 aircraft that may 

have flown out of Austin, Texas, on May 10 or May 11, 2003 and (2) locating an 

aircraft believed to be transporting state representatives from Ardmore, Oklahoma 

to Georgetown, Texas. At the time the DPS requests were originally received, 

AMOC operations floor staff believed that the first inquiry was a legitimate 

request for law enforcement assistance and the second was a legitimate request for 

humanitarian assistance, both from a law enforcement agency. However, AMOC 

officials did not take specific measures to verify the nature or legitimacy of the 

request or the requestor. Accordingly, current and past flight plan information 

was provided to DPS. AMOC did not disclose any proprietary law enforcement 

information to DPS nor did DPS request any.
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 9

According to AMOC’s Training and Operations Manual, dated February 2002, 

the mission of the Customs Aviation Program is “To provide assistance to all 

other elements of Customs requiring aviation support. Air Support also will be 

provided to assist other federal, state, and local agencies as assets permit.” 

AMOC procedures require that any request for assistance be logged into the 

operations floor automated Air Watch Log. Procedures also require any unusual 

requests or incidents be documented and the supervisor on the operations floor 

be notified. However, AMOC procedures did not require the SDSS or the DSS 

to determine the nature and legitimacy of a request for assistance from a law 

enforcement agency. As a result, AMOC staff did not routinely question law 

enforcement officers requesting open source information nor did they routinely 

question whether the caller was a law enforcement officer. AMOC staff presumed 

all calls for assistance from law enforcement officials were legitimate and 

considered it their job to assist in whatever way they could. 

Requesting assistance under the guise of a missing aircraft in a partisan political 

endeavor and requesting past flight information on 14 aircraft represent the 

potential for abuse of public trust and improper use of federal resources. 

According to AMOC staff, had they known the true purpose of the DPS request, 

they would not have assisted DPS. The lack of clear, specific guidelines for 

providing assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies may 

increase the risk that abuse and misuse of federal resources may potentially occur 

in the future.

We attempted to determine how many calls for assistance AMOC receives on 

a daily basis. AMOC considers requests for assistance to include reports of 

low flying aircraft and requests for and receipt of intelligence information. We 

sampled AMOC’s operations floor Air Watch Logs, Intelligence Section Watch 

Logs, and Case Management Air Reports for March and July 2003. AMOC 

operations floor and the Intelligence Section logged 14,580 entries in March 

and July 2003. The records were compiled after AMOC filtered the data 

removing administrative and other non-contact records. After AMOC filtered out 

administrative type calls, the data showed that 2,573 entry contacts were logged in 

those two months. The composite of these entries showed that AMOC logged an 

average of 42 contacts for assistance a day.

Using the operations floor Air Watch Log, AMOC determined the number 

of requests for humanitarian assistance it received over a given period. 

AMOC’s database showed that AMOC received and logged in 314 requests for 
Page 10 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

humanitarian assistance from January 1999 through August 2003. Based on 

this data, AMOC received an average of six requests a month for humanitarian 

assistance.

First Request – DPS Contacts AMOC For Assistance Regarding Flight 

History Information 

After the initial investigation by the OIG was completed, another tape of DPS 

telephone calls for assistance was discovered, of which neither the AMOC 

employees involved in the second call nor the OIG were previously aware. 

Specifically, review of this Digital Audio Tape (DAT) revealed that on 

May 12, 2003, at 1:19 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), a call from the Texas 

DPS was placed to AMOC’s main administrative telephone number. The main 

administrative telephone number is located in the front office and is on continual 

“call forward” to the Communications Section due to a lack of staffing in the front 

office to answer this telephone. A telecommunications specialist received the call, 

identified that it was for the operations floor, and transferred it to the SDSS duty 

desk. The SDSS transferred the call to the DSS working the Gulf Coast desk. 

The first request was for past flight history information on 12 to 14 aircraft 

presumed to have left Austin-Bergstrom International Airport on May 10 or 

May 11, 2003, to determine if 2 or 3 aircraft had the same destination. The DSS 

researched the past flight history information and reported to the DPS caller that 

none of the aircraft queried that left out of Austin-Bergstrom International Airport 

had the same destination. At the time this request was originally received, AMOC 

operations floor staff believed that it was a valid request for law enforcement 

assistance from a legitimate law enforcement agency. 

The DSS did not log this first request in the automated Air Watch Log as required, 

the SDSS did not detect the omission, and neither notified the supervisor on the 

operations floor of the request for assistance. As a result, this first DPS request 

was not discovered until after the initial OIG investigation was completed. (See 

Attachment for copy of redacted transcript of first DPS tape.)

AMOC officials stated that because policies and procedures were not followed 

regarding this request for assistance, the AMOC Incident Review Board 

would review this incident after the OIG review is completed. Following 

every significant seizure or incident, the Incident Review Board convenes, 

under the direction of an operations officer, to review operations floor actions 

as well as all pertinent documentation. The purpose of the Incident Review 
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 11

Board is to carefully assess each incident to determine lessons learned, areas 

for commendation and improvement, and compliance with established AMOC 

operational procedures. The results of the review are published for the benefit of 

the entire AMOC facility.

Second Request – DPS Contacts AMOC For Assistance in Locating a Missing 

Aircraft

On May 12, 2003, at 3:28 p.m. PDT, a second request from Texas DPS to AMOC 

was received directly on the operations floor. The SDSS on duty answered the 

call, and transferred it to the DSS working the Texas desk. The DSS assisted with 

the request for information concerning a missing aircraft, traveling from Ardmore, 

Oklahoma to Georgetown, Texas, with state representatives on board. Using the 

aircraft tail number, the DSS immediately began looking for its flight plan. Unable 

to find a flight plan, the DSS set about trying to locate the aircraft by calling 

the various airports and flight services in the target area. No one could provide 

current information on the location of the aircraft. Therefore, the DSS offered the 

DPS caller the telephone number to request a search and rescue from the FAA. 

The DPS caller initially declined, and then called back to request the FAA number 

needed to initiate a search and rescue. AMOC had no further contact with Texas 

DPS. 

An Air Watch Log entry was made by the DSS handling the second request 

from the Texas DPS. Both the SDSS and the operations floor supervisor were 

aware of the request and the assistance provided. At the time this request was 

originally received, AMOC operations floor staff believed it was a valid request 

for humanitarian assistance from a legitimate law enforcement agency; however, 

AMOC did not verify the source or the substance of the request.

In the earlier call, the DPS asked AMOC for information on 14 aircraft to 

determine if 2 or 3 aircraft had the same destination. Calls on the operations floor 

are recorded on three different DAT recorders. The first call was routed to the 

Gulf Coast desk, which was recorded on a different DAT recorder than the second 

request, which was handled by the DSS working the Texas desk. As a result, 

coupled with the fact that the first request was not logged in the automated Air 

Watch Log as required, the first request went undetected by the AMOC employees 

involved with the second request.
Page 12 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

AMOC Needs To Improve and Enforce Written Guidelines For Providing 

Assistance 

AMOC’s Guidelines For Providing Assistance Were General and Did Not 

Require Verification of the Legitimacy of the Request or Requestor 

AMOC needs to improve written guidelines for rendering assistance to federal, 

state, and local agencies in law enforcement and emergency humanitarian efforts. 

AMOC’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 01, dated October 1, 2001, 

Subject: Personnel Responsibilities and Duties, provides guidance on personnel 

responsibilities and duty requirements. AMOC’s Training and Operations Manual 

details the duties and responsibilities of a DSS. However, these guidelines were 

very general in nature and neither the SOP nor the Training and Operations 

Manual contained specific procedures to verify that requests for assistance 

were valid and appropriate requests from legitimate federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. For example:

• Guidelines did not include procedures to verify the legitimacy of the 

request for assistance.

• Guidelines did not include a clear description of what constituted a 

legitimate request for law enforcement or humanitarian assistance.

• Guidelines did not include a clear definition for what was considered a 

significant or unusual incident.

• Guidelines did not include procedures for call back verifications of the 

requestor when applicable.

AMOC staff did not routinely question law enforcement officers requesting 

assistance for open source information because AMOC procedures did not 

require the SDSS or the DSS to determine the nature and legitimacy of this type 

of request for assistance. AMOC staff presumed all calls for assistance from 

law enforcement officials were legitimate and considered it their job to assist if 

staffing and resources permitted.

Lack of clear guidelines governing the assistance AMOC provides to federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies create the potential that public trust 
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 13

may be abused, federal resources misused, and sensitive information may be 

inappropriately disclosed.

During our July 2003 site visit to AMOC, we recommended that AMOC

improve guidelines for providing law enforcement and humanitarian assistance. 

Specifically, we recommended that guidelines be strengthened to include 

procedures to verify the identity of the requestor, the organization of the requestor, 

the nature of the request, and the specific purpose for assistance. AMOC officials 

concurred and revised SOP-01 to reflect our recommendations during this site 

visit. 

As a result of our audit, AMOC staff also developed an electronic contact 

database for DSS use on the operations floor to help track all calls for assistance 

and information. An electronic contact card is to be filled out when someone from 

outside ICE calls and requests assistance, information, or assets and when AMOC 

calls an outside agency requesting their assistance or providing information. This 

contact database will allow AMOC to retrieve information easier and faster. 

AMOC’s Written Procedures Were Not Always Followed

AMOC’s written procedures for providing assistance to federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies were not always followed. AMOC staff did 

not always log entries into the Air Watch Log; and AMOC staff did not always 

notify supervisors of significant or unusual requests. In addition, AMOC did not 

always comply with guidance on shift scheduling for the operations floor. Failure 

to comply with written guidelines governing the assistance AMOC provides to 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies creates the potential that public 

trust may be abused, federal resources misused, and sensitive information may be 

inappropriately disclosed.

• AMOC staff did not always log entries into the automated Air Watch Log. 

According to AMOC’s Training and Operations Manual, Chapter 4, MIS 

Documentation, all requests (by whom, for what, and the results) must 

be logged into the automated Air Watch Log. The Air Watch Log is an 

automated daily log in which all pertinent events, as well as information 

surrounding those events, should be logged in a clear and concise manner 

by the DSS. According to AMOC’s SOP-01, Personnel Responsibilities 

and Duties, SDSSs are responsible for ensuring the accuracy and 

completeness of operations floor documentation, i.e., Air Watch Logs and 

Track Logs, during their shift. There was some uncertainty and confusion 
Page 14 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

on the part of the operations floor staff regarding the requirement to log 

entries into the automated Air Watch Log. 

• AMOC staff did not always notify supervisors of significant or unusual 

requests. According to Chapter 4 of the Training and Operations Manual, 

certain situations may occur that need to be documented in more detail 

than what is required or recorded in the daily operations log. This could 

include any unusual request or incident where the supervisor should be 

made aware. In some cases, AMOC staff did not believe the request or 

event was significant or unusual, and therefore, did not notify supervisors. 

Consequently, significant or unusual requests may not receive the proper 

priority or response. 

• Τhe hiring and training of a DSS can be a lengthy process. Locating, 

identifying, and tracking suspect aircraft require a unique set of both 

operational and technical skills. Operations personnel are required to 

develop an intimate knowledge of air smuggling organizations, traffic 

patterns, potential terrorists targets, terrain features, drug trafficking 

routes, and transshipment points. On the average, it takes a minimum 

of six months to complete the hiring process for a new DSS. Once on 

board, it takes between eight to ten months to train and certify a new DSS 

at AMOC. According to AMOC staff, AMOC’s workload has increased 

as a result of the Customs transition into DHS and the increase in law 

enforcement responsibilities for terrorism. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the AMO Director:

1. Revise AMOC guidelines for providing assistance to federal, state, and local 

agencies in law enforcement and emergency humanitarian efforts to include 

procedures to verify the identity of the requestor, the organization of the requestor, 

the nature and type of the request, e.g., law enforcement or humanitarian, and 

the specific purpose for assistance. If existing procedures regarding staffing 

requirements or operational priorities are no longer valid or practical, AMO 

should update them to reflect what is reasonable and necessary.
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 15

Management Comments 

AMO management concurred with our recommendation. The AMOC Training 

Office issued revised written procedures that address our concerns on October 15, 

2003.

OIG Comment 

The actions taken by AMOC meet the intent of our recommendation. 

2. Provide refresher training for all operations floor staff and reiterate the 

importance of understanding and following existing procedures to ensure that 

policies and procedures for providing assistance to law enforcement agencies are 

properly and consistently followed. 

Management Comments 

AMO management concurred with our recommendation. The AMOC basic 

training syllabus has been rewritten and specifically addresses the issues raised 

in the OIG review. The training builds upon the revised procedures addressed in 

Recommendation 1. Operational personnel received refresher training the week 

of October 20, 2003, on the revised procedures and supervisors are enforcing the 

new procedures.

OIG Comment 

The actions taken by AMOC meet the intent of our recommendation. 

3. Document the type of assistance provided, e.g., law enforcement or 

humanitarian, so that these statistics can be easily tracked by the new electronic 

contact database developed by AMOC. 

Management Comments 

AMO management concurred with our recommendation. AMOC has a panel 

of experts that is developing the statistical requirements that should be included 

in AMOC’s tracking database. AMO management estimated that it would take 

approximately 12 months to update its electronic contact database.
Page 16 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

OIG Comment 

The actions taken and planned by AMOC meet the intent of our recommendation. 

AMOC Needs To Establish Performance Measures To Assess Its 

Effectiveness and Productivity 

AMOC did not have organizational measures or individual performance standards 

in place to assess the effectiveness and productivity of the operations floor and 

its personnel. In addition, AMOC was not currently preparing management 

reports that included productivity, evaluation, and standardization summaries on 

operations floor activity. According to the AMOC officials, AMOC did not have 

performance measures because it was difficult to develop meaningful performance 

measures that were fair and equitable given that many factors influencing 

AMOC’s performance were outside AMOC’s control. AMOC ceased preparing 

management reports that included productivity, evaluation, and standardization 

summaries on operations floor activity in February 2003. According to the 

AMOC Director and the SDSS who had previously prepared the reports, AMO 

Headquarters no longer required the reports. Also, the SDSS who previously 

prepared the reports was reassigned to the operations floor and no longer had 

time to prepare the complex and labor-intensive reports. Without meaningful 

performance measures and productivity reports, AMOC cannot effectively (1) 

assess how well AMOC is meeting its mission, strategic goals, and objectives; 

(2) evaluate overall operations floor productivity, individual DSS productivity, 

and compliance with management initiatives; and (3) identify trends on the 

operational floor and areas for improvement. 

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 was enacted 

by Congress to promote a new focus on improving program performance and 

to provide greater accountability for results within the federal government. 

GPRA provides a foundation for examining agency missions, performance 

goals and objectives, and results. GPRA requires that federal agencies develop 

and implement an accountability system based on performance measurement, 

including setting goals and objectives, a description of how the goals and 

objectives are to be achieved, and measuring progress toward achieving them. 

A key objective of GPRA is to help Congress, the Office of Management and 

Budget, and other executive agencies develop a clearer understanding of what is 

being achieved in relation to what is being spent. Linking planned performance 
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 17

with budget requests and financial reports is an essential step in building a culture 

of performance management.

From August 2000 to February 2003, the AMOC Director assigned a SDSS 

to act as a full-time Facility Standardization Officer (FSO). One of the FSO’s 

responsibilities was preparing numerous management reports, including 

productivity, evaluation, and standardization summaries. Also, the supervisor on 

the operations floor produces a daily morning summary for AMO Headquarters. 

However, these summaries are not broken down by DSS and they do not 

effectively measure individual productivity. 

Management reports can be a useful tool for developing performance measures 

for AMOC and for evaluating how well AMOC is meeting its strategic goals and 

objectives. Management reports can also be useful for identifying trends on the 

operations floor, productivity, and areas for improvement. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the AMO Director:

4. Develop organizational performance measures and individual performance 

standards to evaluate the effectiveness and productivity of both AMOC and its 

personnel. 

Management Comments 

AMO management concurred with our recommendation. AMOC’s senior staff is 

revising its current performance measures to reflect better the effectiveness and 

productivity of assigned personnel. AMO management estimated that it would 

take approximately 12 months to complete the revisions.

OIG Comment 

The actions taken and planned by AMOC meet the intent of our recommendation. 

5. Prepare meaningful productivity reports to show workload statistics that 

measure overall operations floor and individual DSS productivity. These reports 

should also document the number and type of assistance provided, i.e., whether 

law enforcement or humanitarian. 
Page 18 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Management Comments 

AMO management concurred with our recommendation. AMOC’s senior 

leadership will define appropriate reports needed to measure overall DSS 

productivity and address our concerns. This work is in progress and AMO 

management estimated that it would take approximately 12 months to complete.

OIG Comment 

The actions taken and planned by AMOC meet the intent of our recommendation.
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 19

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

Our overall objective was to assess the propriety of AMOC’s existing guidelines 

for rendering assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

Specific objectives were to:

• Document the authority that established AMOC’s mission;

• Evaluate the appropriateness of AMOC’s written policies and procedures 

governing the assistance it provides to federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies;

• Determine how these policies and procedures have been applied in the 

past; and

• Determine whether the type of assistance AMOC provided to the DPS was 

consistent with its existing policies and procedures and its mission under 

the DHS. 

To accomplish our audit, we conducted fieldwork at AMO Headquarters in 

Washington, D.C.; the AMOC facility in Riverside, California; and the NCRCC 

in Herndon, Virginia. We reviewed applicable governing laws, regulations, 

and legal authorities related to AMOC’s mission. We also reviewed AMOC’s 

policies, SOPs, Training and Operations Manual, Training Plan, AMOC position 

descriptions, MOUs, and other relevant documentation pertaining to providing 

law enforcement and humanitarian assistance. We also reviewed information 

for the months of March and July 2003 to determine the number and nature of 

telephone calls AMOC received. 

To obtain a thorough understanding of AMOC’s mission and policies for 

rendering assistance, we interviewed key AMOC personnel, including its Director, 

Assistant Directors, Operations Officers, Training Officer, numerous SDSSs, 

DSSs, SCDOs, and a Command Duty Officer, as well as staff from AMOC’s 

Intelligence and Communications Sections. We interviewed AMO personnel 

to discuss AMO’s role and relationship with AMOC and funding for AMOC. 

We also interviewed attorneys from ICE and Customs and Border Protection to 

discuss AMOC’s mission and its legal authorities. 

We conducted our audit between July 2003 and September 2003 according 

to generally accepted government auditing standards. A listing of the major 

contributors to this report is included in Appendix 4.

Appendix 1

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
Page 20 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Appendix 2

Management Comments
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 21

Appendix 2

Management Comments
Page 22 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Appendix 2

Management Comments
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 23

We recommend that the AMO Director:

Recommendation 1: Revise AMOC guidelines for providing assistance 

to federal, state, and local agencies in law enforcement and emergency 

humanitarian efforts to include procedures to verify the identity of the requestor, 

the organization of the requestor, the nature and type of the request, e.g., law 

enforcement or humanitarian, and the specific purpose for assistance. If existing 

procedures regarding staffing requirements or operational priorities are no longer 

valid or practical, AMO should update them to reflect what is reasonable and 

necessary.

Recommendation 2: Provide refresher training for all operations floor staff and 

reiterate the importance of understanding and following existing procedures to 

ensure that policies and procedures for providing assistance to law enforcement 

agencies are properly and consistently followed. 

Recommendation 3: Document the type of assistance provided, e.g., law 

enforcement or humanitarian, so that these statistics can be easily tracked by the 

new electronic contact database developed by AMOC. 

Recommendation 4: Develop organizational performance measures and 

individual performance standards to evaluate the effectiveness and productivity of 

both AMOC and its personnel. 

Recommendation 5: Prepare meaningful productivity reports to show workload 

statistics that measure overall operations floor and individual DSS productivity. 

These reports should also document the number and type of assistance provided, 

i.e., whether law enforcement or humanitarian.

Appendix 3

Recommendations
Page 24 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Appendix 4

Major Contributors To This Report

Alexander Best, Jr., Director, Border and Transportation Security Audit Division

Lynn Richardson, Audit Manager

Leigh Johnson-Steele, Auditor

Ronda Richardson, Auditor
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 25

Appendix 5

Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Under Secretary, Border and Transportation Security

DHS OIG Liaison

 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Assistant Secretary

Director, Office of Air and Marine Operations

Director, Air and Marine Operations Center 

ICE OIG Liaison

Office of Management and Budget

Homeland Bureau Chief

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

 Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate

Select Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives
Page 26 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape (Originally Transcribed by AMOC Operations on June 25, 2003, with

Minor Clarifications Made by OIG)

ABBREVIATIONS:

AMICC Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center

AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center

AUS Austin-Bergstrom International Airport

DPS Department of Public Safety

FBO Fixed Base Operator

SAS Santa Fe Airport

LEGEND:

AMOC1: AMOC Senior Detection System Specialist1

AMOC2: AMOC Telecommunications Specialist

AMOC3: AMOC Detection System Specialist

AMOC4: AMOC Senior Detection System Specialist2

AMOC5: AMOC Senior Detection System Specialist3

DPS1: Texas Department of Public Safety

Start of Call 

Call #1 (First Request)

AMOC1: AMICC radar, [AMOC1].

AMOC2: Yeah [AMOC1], here’s a call for ya from Austin Texas.

AMOC1: Okay. Hello this is [AMOC1].

DPS1: [AMOC1], my name is [DPS1] with the Texas Department of Public Safety in Austin 

Texas, how ya doing?

AMOC1: Good.

DPS1: I have twelve tail numbers that left out of an FBO in Austin Texas on Saturday night 

Sunday morning.

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 27

AMOC1: Uh-huh.

DPS1: And what I’m looking for is a...common...uh...I’m sure they all had to fly...file flight plans 

cause they were multi engine big planes.

AMOC1: Uh-huh.

DPS1: I’m looking for a common destination...that that...I don’t know what plane I’m looking 

for...I’m looking for three or four of the planes that went to a specific location.

AMOC1: Okay.

DPS1: Would you...what could I, ...how would I be able to get that information?

AMOC1: Uh...well uh let me hand you off to the uh...uh...to the gulf coast desk and he’ll take 

the tail numbers, he can run them for ya...and uh...it will take a little while and he’ll 

probably have to call you back.

DPS1: All right appreciate it.

AMOC1: Uh...and then we can see if we got anything common to them.

DPS1: Thank you.

AMOC1: Hold on just a minute.

 End of conversation – call transferred

__________________________

Dial tone

AMOC3: Hello.

DPS1: Yes, this is [DPS1] with DPS.

AMOC3: Yeah.

DPS1: Uh...whom I speaking with?

AMOC3: This is [AMOC3].

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
Page 28 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

DPS1: [AMOC3], what I have...is I have twelve...uh about fourteen...uh tail numbers that all 

left from the same FBO...Saturday night and Sunday morning.

AMOC3: Uh-huh.

DPS1: And they all...I’m looking for...where two or three of them went to the

 same destination.

AMOC3: Okay let me have the numbers.

DPS1: You ready?

AMOC3: Yeah...(garbled, sounds like if I thought) they have to file a flight plan...if they didn’t 

there’s no way of telling.

DPS1: I understand that, but I ...these are all multi-engine...pretty big planes.

AMOC3: Okay.

DPS1: So I feel comfortable they did. Now I...I’m not...I don’t know airplane jargon so you’ll 

have to bear with me a little bit.

AMOC3: Okay, all need is the tail numbers.

DPS1: Alright...598 Charles William.

AMOC3: 598 Charlie Whisky.

DPS1: Nine hundred, Queen Sam.

AMOC3: Quebec Sierra...(laugh)...oh that first one was Charlie Whisky right?

DPS1: Yeah, Charlie, yeah.

AMOC3: For some reason I wrote Charlie Sierra.

DPS1: Okay.

AMOC3: Okay, go ahead third one?

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 29

DPS1: Uh...nine hundred...okay the third one was 401...uh...G...J or George, John.

AMOC3: Gulf Juliet.

DPS1: Okay, I ...I...(Garbled)

AMOC3: I’ve...I’ve been with ya. (Laugh)

DPS1: 3541 Queen.

AMOC3: One...Quebec, okay.

DPS1: Uh...ninety-eight, three Quebec Sam.

AMOC3: Three...(Garbled).

DPS1: Sierra, Sierra.

AMOC3: Sierra.

DPS1: 376 Quebec Sierra.

AMOC3: Okay.

DPS1: 288 Charlie Whisky.

AMOC3: Okay.

DPS1: Uh...106 Sierra Tom.

AMOC3: Tango.

DPS1: Tango, I’m...I’m...I’m learning (laughing) 364...Lincoln Quebec.

AMOC3: Lima Quebec.

DPS1: 829...nor...uh...November...uh...Lincoln...er.

AMOC3: Lima.

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
Page 30 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

DPS1: Lima, 306 Quebec Sierra.

AMOC3: Okay.

DPS1: And seven, excuse me, 676 Quebec Sierra.

AMOC3: Okay.

DPS1: 914 Sierra Henry.

AMOC3: Sierra Hotel.

DPS1: And 446 Charlie Whisky.

AMOC3: Charlie Whisky, ya got a callback number?

DPS1: Uh...yes sir, its 512-424...uh...hold on just a second, 512-424-57...uh 68.

AMOC3: Okay, I’ll call...I’ll be calling you back.

DPS1: Thank you sir, bye-bye.

AMOC3: Right

 End of Call

---------------------------------------

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 31

Call #2 (First Request)

Dial tone

Ringing

DPS1: This is [DPS1].

AMOC3: Hey this is [AMOC3]. 

DPS1: Yes Sir.

AMOC3: Hey when did these guys take off?

DPS1: Oh, uh.... the first three took off on the 10th and out the 10th (Garbled) after 8 o’clock.

AMOC3: Uh-huh.

DPS1: The rest took off Sunday...probably between 6 am and noon.

AMOC3: Okay, I just needed the date, so I have to go back in to the archives.

DPS1: Okay then...the one was on the...I guess 10th and the other was on the 11th.

AMOC3: Okay, thank you.

DPS1: Bye-bye [AMOC3].

 End of call

______________________

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
Page 32 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Call #3 (First Request)

Dial tone

Ringing

 RECORDING: You’ve reached the office of [DPS1], criminal law enforcement, I’m 

unable to...get to the phone right now, if you’ll leave a name and number I’ll get back 

with you. (Beep)

AMOC3: Hey [DPS1] this is [AMOC3] with Customs, uh...you never...you told me they took off 

out of the same FBO, uh...Oh, I need to find out which FBO it was so I’ll know which 

uh...which airport to look for that uh.... that these guys took off out of, so if you could 

give me a call back, thank you.

 End of call

_________________________

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 33

Call #4 (First Request)

 Unidentified person saying “yeah”

AMOC4: AMICC, [AMOC4].

DPS1: Hey, Hey...ho hold on a second okay...hold on. Uh...[AMOC3]?

AMOC4: Who?

DPS1: [AMOC3]?

AMOC4: [AMOC3] who?

DPS1: I don’t know his last name...uh...he was at the gulf coast desk.

AMOC4: Okay hold on.

Dial tone

AMOC3: Hello.

DPS1: [AMOC3]?

AMOC3: This [DPS1]?

DPS1: Yeah.

AMOC3: Hey uh...what airport what FBO airport...did they take off?

DPS1: Signature aviation out of Austin...uh.

AMOC3: Okay.

DPS1: (garbled) Bergstrom International.

AMOC3: We’ve been trying to figure which airport they took...there’s a lot departures out of 

different places.

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
Page 34 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

DPS1: I...I know and I apologize...as soon as you...you said that I said dad-gumit I forgot 

to (unintelligible). Yeah but it out of Signature Aviation...uh...Austin-Bergstrom 

International.

AMOC3: Okay just out of Austin...AUS.

DPS1: Yeah.

AMOC3: Okay so far we’ve only found one that’s taken off out of there that filed a flight plan, the 

rest of them...the earliest one is 6 May that they took off out of, and the next three are...

none...uh but we’ll get all the ones out of Austin together and then I’ll call you back.

DPS1: Alright...what...what...I tell you what ...you know that...where it starts at 3541.... uh 

Quebec.

AMOC3: Uh-huh.

DPS1: It’s gonna probably...that gonna probably be...the...the ...the Sunday morning.

AMOC3: Yeah, 3541 Quebec there was nothing.

DPS1: Okay.

AMOC3: I’ll run him again in...November 3541...Quebec.

DPS1: And those would’ve been on the 11th.

AMOC3: And deep archives...so he had to...there’s nothing even in deep archives that he ever 

filed a flight plan.

DPS1: Okay. Uh...what about the other ones?

AMOC3: I’ve only got...uh...one...two, three, four, five, six of them done so far...and uh...two of 

them are 6 May, one of them was nothing, uh...two of them was uh...three of them was 

nothing...and the 376 Quebec Sierra uh...was uh... out of the Bahamas.

DPS1: Okay.

AMOC3: And I haven’t got the last of them, and one of them is out of Austin so far...

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 35

DPS1: Okay then.

AMOC3: ...on 12 May though.

DPS1: But...which one...on 12 May?

AMOC3: That was today.

DPS1: Oh...Okay.

AMOC3: That was 914 Sierra Hotel...so that wouldn’t matter; it would be the 10th or the 11th

you’re looking for.

DPS1: Exactly.

AMOC3: Yeah, okay, thank you sir.

DPS1: Yeah, bye-bye.

 End of call

_________________________

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
Page 36 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies 

Call #5 (First Request)

Dial tone

Ringing

DPS1: This is [DPS1].

AMOC3: This is [AMOC3].

DPS1: Yes sir.

AMOC3: Okay, I only had two departures...uh...three departures out of Austin, and only two of 

them on the 11th and.... neither one of them went to the same place, one went to David 

Wayne Hooks and one of them...let’s see where SAS is at.

DPS1: S...that’s SAS.

AMOC3: That’s Santa Fe.

DPS1: One of them went to Santa Fe?

AMOC3:SA...I am checking to see which one that is...(someone in background: “what, what 

number?”) yeah Santa Fe, New Mexico. (Someone in background: “thanks”)

DPS1: Which one went to Santa Fe?

AMOC3: That was 106 Sierra Tango. And he went there on the 11th.

DPS1: I sure do appreciate it.

AMOC3: Not a problem.

DPS1: Thank ya.

AMOC3: Alright, bye.

DPS1: Bye-Bye.

 End of call

_____________________

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies Page 37

Call #6 (First Call of Second Request)

(Transcribed by AMOC Operations on June 26, 2003)

Dial Tone

AMOC5: Operations, [AMOC5]

DPS1: Uh...Texas desk.

AMOC5: Stand by.

-----------------------------------------------------------

OIG ROI, dated June 13, 2003, picked up here.

Attachment

Redacted Transcript of First DPS Tape
Page 38 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies

Additional Information and Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov.

OIG Hotline

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.