at 6-7% interest. The letter also asked for a variety of
specific classified information, proposed two new accommodation
addresses and a new signal site, and asked defendant HANSSEN to
propose new dead drop sites.

~The February 1988 Dead Drop Exchange

30. On or about Wednesday, February 3, 1988, defendant
HANSSEN mailed an envelope to the KGB addressed to one of the new
Soviet accommodation addresses, designated “A”, in the Eastern
District of Virginia. The envelope bore the return address of
‘Jim Baker” in “Langley”, and was postmarked in Washington, D.C.
The envelope contained a note which read simply:-TM“OK’.

31. On or about the following Monday, February 8, 1988,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “PARK/PRIME” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site in the Eastern
‘District of Virginia, which they thereafter also referred to as
“PRIME” .

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a letter, a computer diskette, and
classified documents. The letter read, in part, as follows:

To my friends:

Acknowledging $20,000 and deposit.

Enclosed are two additional sites designated secondary
and tertiary.

As an alternate to drop activity for messages such as

‘the above, I suggest that I mail you the message
encrypted on.a computer diskette. I will provide you

20


ee eee

asked for information on a wide variety of classified technical,

.operational, and recruitment matters. The KGB also asked what

the Soviets could use of the certain highly classified and
sensitive program information he had previously disclosed.

The May 1990 Dead Drop Exchanges and Mailing

67. On or about Thursday, May 3, 1990, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated signal
site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged time and
location.

68. On or about the following Monday, May 7, 1990,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “DORIS” dead drop site in the Eastern District of
Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (“D-19”) which
contained classified information, and approximately 232 pages of
material which included classified documents. Defendant HANSSEN
gave the KGB permission to use certain highly classified and
sensitive program information he had previously disclosed.
Defendant HANSSEN also advised the KGB that because of a

promotion he would be traveling for one year, and he discussed

_communications plans and a method of renewing contact.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a

package from the KGB containing $35,000 cash and a KGB computer

41


VA” and was postmarked in Northern. Virginia. A letter in the
envelope reported that: “The disk is clean. I tried all methods
- completely demagnetized.”

The October 1989 Mailing and Dead Drop Exchange

60. On or about Monday, October 16, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
mailed an envelope to the KGB, addressed to ‘an accommodation
address in the Eastern District of Virginia, and containing a
computer diskette ("D-16”). The envelope bore a return address
of “G. Robertson, 1101 Kingston Ct., Houston, TX” and was
postmarked in Northern Virginia.

61. On or about Monday, October 23, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the “ELLIS”
(Foxstone Park) dead drop site in the Eastern District of
Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (a duplicate
of “D-16”). ‘The diskette contained classified information about
technical and recruitment matters, and particularly disclosed the
fact that the United States had the capability to read certain
Soviet communications, which fact was classified TOP SECRET/SCI,
related to the national defense, and directly concerned
communications intelligence. Defendant HANSSEN also requested
the KGB to load the “ELLIS” dead drop site at any time, and

advised that he would check the signal site periodically about

37


|

ecoeonmsaipes

The April 1991 Dead Drop Exchange

76. On or about Wednesday, April 10, 1991, defendant
HANSSEN placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated
signal site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged
time and location.

77.. On or about the following Monday, ‘April 15, 1991,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “DORIS” dead drop site in the Eastern District of
Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (“D-22”) in
which he confirmed receipt of cash and provided classified FBI
information about a specific recruitment operation about. which
the KGB had previously asked.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $10,000 cash and a KGB computer
diskette. A letter on the diskette read as follows:

Dear Friend:

Time is flying. As a poet said: “What’s our life,

- If full of care
You have no- time
To stop and stare?”

You’ve managed to slow down the speed of Your running

life to send us a message. And we appreciate it.

We hope You’re O’K and Your family is fine too, We are

sure You’re doing great.at Your job. As before, we’ll

keep staying alert to respond to any call from You
whenever You need it. .

46


the conversation was recorded as'follows ([{UI] = unintelligible):

HANSSEN: Tomorrow morning?

KGB: Uh, yeah, and the car is still available for you
and as we have agreed last time, I prepared all
the papers and I left them on the same table. You
didn't find them because I put them in another
corner of the table.

HANSSEN: I see.

KGB: You shouldn’t worry, everything is okay. The
papers are with me now.

HANSSEN: Good.

KGB: I believe under these circumstances, mmmm, it’s
not necessary to make any changes concerning the
place and the time. Our company is reliable, and
we are ready to give you a substantial discount
which will be enclosed in the papers. Now, about
the date of our meeting. I suggest that our
meeting will be, will take place without delay on
February thirteenth, one three, one p.m. Okay?
February thirteenth.

HANSSEN: [UI] February second?

KGB: Thirteenth. One three.

HANSSEN: One three.

KGB: Yes. Thirteenth. One p-m.

HANSSEN: Let me see if I can do that. Hold on.

KGB: -Okay. Yeah.

[pause]

HANSSEN: [Whispering] [UI]

KGB: Hello? Okay.
[pause]
HANSSEN: [Whispering] Six... . Six...

14


occasion of resumption of contact with you. We firmly
guarantee you for a necessary financial help. Note,
please, that, since our last contact a sum set aside for
you has risen and presents now about 800.000 dollars.
This time you will find in a package 50.000 dollars.
Now it is up to you to give a secure explanation of it.

As to communication plan, we may have need of some
time to work out a secure and reliable one. This why
we suggest to carry on the 13° of November at the same
drop which you have proposed in your letter to.V.K. We
shall be ready to retrieve your package from DD since
20:00 to 21:00 hours on the 12” of November after we
would read you [sic] signal (a vertical mark of white
adhesive tape of 6 - 8 cm length) on the post closest
to Wolftrap Creek of the “Foxstone Park” sign. We
shall fill our package in and make up our signal (a
horizontal mark of white adhesive tape).

After you will clear the drop don’t forget to
remove our tape that will mean for us - exchange is
over.

We propose a new place where you can put a signal
for us when in need of an urgent DD operation.
LOCATION: the closest to Whithaven [sic] Parkway wooden
electricity utility pole at the south-west corner of T-
shaped intersection of Foxhall Road and Whitehaven
Parkway (map of Washington, DC, page 9, grid Bll). At
any working day put a white thumb tack (1 cm in
diameter, colored sets are sold at CVS) into the
Northern side of the pole at the height of about 1.2
yards. The tack must be seen from a car going down
Foxhall Road. This will mean for us that we shall
retrieve your package from the DD Foxstone Park at the
evening of the nex [sic] week’s Tuesday (when it’s
getting dark).

In case of a threatening situation of any kind put
a yellow tack at the same place. This will mean that
we shall refrain from any communication with you until
further notice from your side (the white tack).

We also propose for your consideration a new DD

site “Lewis”. DD LOCATION: Wooden podium in the
amphitheatre of Long-branch Nature Center (map of
N.Virginia, page 16, grid G8). The package should be

put under the FAR-LEFT corner of the podium (when

56


WARNING NOTICE

This document should be disseminated only to
persons having both the requisite clearances

and a need to have access to its contents for
performance of their duties. No further distri-
bution or reproduction is authorized without

the approval of the Associate Deputy Director
for Operations for Counterintelligence, CIA.

and

National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions

(b) A current volume of the DCI Congressional Budget

Justification that detailed the programs and resource needs
of the FBI’s Foreign Counterintelligence Program. The
document was classified SECRET with the caveats NOFORN
NOCONTRACT ORCON, and the warning: “Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions.”

On the diskette, defendant HANSSEN expressed embarrassment over

the pages missing from his earlier package, and advised that he

had been promoted to a position of increased salary and authority
that had moved him temporarily out of direct responsibility for
Soviet matters. He. noted that a new mission for his new group

had not yet been defined, and he quoted a particular remark by

i

a

General Patton about the Japanese. Defendant Hanssen also
provided information about various classified technical and
operational matters, and in particular reported the, fact that the
United States Intelligence Community was obtaining especially

sensitive material derived from the communications of a specific

54



FAPSI may move with the rapidity of the Chinese army,
they can be quite effective, in juggernaut fashion,
that is to say thorough... .

New topics:

If you are wise, you will reign [sic] in the GRU. They
are causing no end of grief. But for the large number
of double-agents they run, there. would be almost no
ability to cite activity warranting current foreign
counterintelligence outlays. Of course the Gusev
affair didn’t help you any. If I’d had better
communications I could have prevented that. I was
aware of the fact that microphones had been detected at
the State Department. (Such matters are why I need
rapid communications. It can save you much grief.)
Many things are closely held, but that closeness fails
when the need for action comes. Then the compartments
grow of necessity. I had knowledge weeks before of the
existence of devices, but not the country placing them.
. I only found out the gruesome details too late to
warn you through available means including the colored
stick-pin call. (Which by the way I doubted would work
because of your ominous silence.) Very frustrating.
This is one reason I say ‘you waste me’ in the note.

The U.S. can be errantly likened to a powerfully built
but retarded child, potentially dangerous, but young,
immature and easily manipulated. But don’t be fooled
by that appearance. It is also one which can turn
ingenius [sic] very quickly, like an idiot savant, once
convinced of a goal. The [ ] Japanese (to quote
General Patten [sic] once again) learned this to their
dismay. ... . .

I will not be able to clear TOM on the first back-up
date so don’t be surprised if we default to that and
you find this then. Just place yours again the
following week, same protocol.

I greatly appreciate the highly professional inclusion
of old references to things known to you in messages
resulting form the mail interaction to assure me that
the channel remains unpirated. This is not lost on me.

On Swiss money laudering [sic], you and I both know it
is possible but not simple. And we do both know that

60


Zurich because now it is impossible to hide its
origin...

94. On or about October 4, 2000, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops.

95. On or about November 13, 2000, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops.

96. On or about November 17, 2000, defendant HANSSEN
created or last modified the following letter to the KGB/SVR,
which he stored on the above-described Versa Card:

Dear Friends:

Bear with me. It was I who sent the message trying. to
use TOM to communicate material to you. On reflection,
I can understand why you did not respond. I see that I
failed to furnish you sufficient information for you to
recognize that the message you left for me in ELLIS did
not go astray. You do this often (communicate such
assurances through the mention of items like the old
date offset we used), and believe me, it is not lost on
me as a sign of professionalism. I say bear with me on
this because you must realize I do not have a staff
with whom to knock around all the. potential
difficulties. (For me breaks in communications are
most difficult and stressful.) Recent changes in U.S.
law now attach the death penalty to my help to you as
you know, so I do take some risk. On the other hand, I
know far better than most what minefields are laid and
the risks. Generally speaking you overestimate the
FBI’s capacity to interdict you, but on the other hand,
cocksure officers, (those with real guts and not as
much knowledge as they think) can, as we say, step in
an occasional cowpie. (Message to the translator: Got
a good word. for cowpie in Russian?? Clue, don’t
blindly walk behind cows.).

64


doubt of our commitment to Your friendship and

cooperation which are too important to us to loose

[sic] - :

please note: our next contact is due at HELEN.

Enclosed in the package please find $12,000 and

attached as always are some information requests which

we'd ask Your kind attention to.

Thank You and good luck.

Sincerely,

Your friends.

Using the established "6" coefficient, the reference to "2.13"
actually refers to August 19. In the diskette, the KGB provided
new communications plans and asked for specific information about
a variety of classified technical, operational, and analytical
matters. The KGB also asked for the current 1991 issue of a
particular document reporting on Soviet knowledge of United
States satellite reconnaissance systems, commenting that: “It’s
fun to read about the life in the Universe to understand better
what’s going on on our own planet.” Asking about some pages that
appeared to be missing from defendant HANSSEN’s July package, the
KGB noted: “Sometimes it happens, we understand. Life is
becoming too fast.”
The December 1991 Mailing and Dead Drop Exchange

83. On or about Thursday, December 12, 1991, defendant

_ HANSSEN mailed an envelope to the KGB/SVR at accommodation

address “A” in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of

52


»a” in the Eastern District of Virginia, bearing a return address
of “Jim Baker” in “Alexandria” and postmarked in Northern
Virginia. The envelope contained a note reading: “use 40-TRACK
MODE, this letter is not a signal” -- referring to a technical
process for re-formatting a computer diskette in order to conceal
data by putting the data onto specific tracks on the diskette,
and the need to use the correct codes to decrypt such a diskette
else it appear to be blank.

The April 1988 Mailing; HANSSEN Asks For Diamonds

38. On or about Tuesday, April 5, 1988, defendant HANSSEN
mailed a package to the KGB, addressed to accommodation address
*A” in the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a diskette
("D-5"). The package bore a return address of “Jim Baker” in
‘Pairfax” and was postmarked in Northern Virginia. The diskette
contained classified information, including what the KGB
characterizéd.as “everything” about a particular KGB officer,
additional information about the KGB defector Victor Sheymov, and
information about two specific FBI Soviet recruitments. The
diskette also contained an explanation about why the KGB had been
unable to read previous diskettes, and proposed two new
operational sites. In this letter, defendant HANSSEN advised
that he would use the word “Chicago” in the return address on
envelopes he mailed to the KGB to signal that a dead drop

operation should occur on the following Monday. Defendant

24


diskette. The diskette contained a letter reading, in part, as

follows:
Dear Friend:

. We attach some information requests which
we ask Your kind assistance for. We are very cautious
about using Your info and materials so that none of our
actions in no way causes [sic] no harm to Your
security. With this on our mind we are asking that
sensitive materials and information (especially hot and
demanding some actions) be accompanied by some sort of
Your comments or some guidance on how we may or may not
use it with regard to Your security.

We wish You good luck and enclose $35,000.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Your friends.

The KGB diskette also contained communications plans, and
identified -a new dead drop site, codenamed “FLO”, located under a
footbridge in Lewinsville Park near the intersection of Warner

Avenue and Westbury Road in McLean, Virginia, in the Eastern

District of Virginia, and a nearby signal site. The diskette

also contained specific requests for information, including
operational leads and materials on recruitments of Soviets.

69. On or about Thursday, May 17, 1990, defendant HANSSEN
mailed a letter and a computer diskette to the KGB, addressed to
accommodation address “A” .in the Eastern District of Virginia.

70. On or about the following Monday, May 21, 1990,
defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the “ELLIS” dead drop site in
the Eastern District of Virginia a package from the KGB

containing two KGB diskettes. One contained a letter that

42


manner, to anyone who is not authorized to receive it, without
prior written authorization from an appropriate official of the
United States Government.” He also acknowledged that he had been
advised that such unauthorized disclosure could constitute
violations of criminal laws including Title 18, United States
Code, Section 794.

Defendant HANSSEN signed further iterations of this SCI
Nondisclosure agreement, in connection with a variety of SCI
programs, on or about October 1, 1981; March 1, 1982; September
8, 1983; April 10, 1985; and May 31, 1991.

6. Defendant HANSSEN knew that the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosty, known as the KGB, was the intelligence service of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and that in or
about December 1991 the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossi, known as
the SVR, assumed the foreign intelligence functions of the former
KGB for the principal successor state of the USSR, the Russian
Federation.

7. a. Defendant HANSSEN knew that an operational feature
of the KGB/SVR was the “dead drop”, that is, a prearranged hidden
location used for the clandestine exchange of packages, messages,
and payments, which avoids the necessity of an intelligence

‘officer and an agent being present at the’ same time.
b. Defendant HANSSEN knew that an operational feature

of the KGB/SVR was the “signal: site”, that is, a prearranged


compartmented United States Government program to ensure the
continuity of government in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack,
which related to the national defense and directly concerned
means of defense or retaliation against large scale nuclear
attack and other elements of defense strategy. The diskette
contained classified information from the Bloch-Gikman file and
about several FBI recruitment attempts, and approval of a new
dead drop site the KGB had proposed, codenamed “DORIS”, located
under a footbridge in Canterbury Park in Springfield, Virginia,
in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the “CHARLIE” dead
drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia a package from the
KGB containing $30,000 cash and a letter promising to compensate
him for the returned diamonds and rejecting his suggestions for
an account in Switzerland. In the letter, the KGB also discussed
communications plans and proposed a new dead drop site, codenamed
“BLLIS”, under a footbridge over Wolftrap Creek near Creek
Crossing Road at Foxstone Park, near Vienna, Virginia, in the
Eastern District of Virginia, with a signal site on the “Foxstone
Park” sign.

The September 1989 Dead Drop Operation; The KGB’s First Diskette

57. On or about Friday, September 22, 1989, defendant

HANSSEN placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated

operation at a pre-arranged


with the cipher system and key. The disks and system

will function on an IBM. or IBM compatible system such

as the IBM or Toshiba laptop. (3 % inch format) These

are available locally very cheaply and have adequate

radiation characteristics. This would be a faster and

more secure channel.
In the letter, defendant HANSSEN reported that, “[c]oncerning
your request for information about Victor Ivanovich Sheymov,”
defendant HANSSEN had “arranged time to review his file fora
project in the future” and “a full report will follow as soon as
possible.” Meanwhile, defendant HANSSEN provided details of
Sheymov’s defection and present whereabouts. The information
about Sheymov related to the national defense and was..classified
SECRET. He also disclosed the identity by KGB codename and
recent specific assignment of a KGB agent who was currently
operating as an illegal in a particular United States city and
_who had been recruited by the FBI to serve as a double agent,
which information related to the national defense and was
classified SECRET. He also disclosed a particular limitation on
the National Security Agency’s ability to read certain Soviet
communications, which information related to the national
defense, was classified TOP SECRET/SCI, and directly concerned
communications intelligence.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a

package from the KGB containing $25,000 cash and a letter. The

letter conveyed the thanks of the KGB Chairman, Vladimir

21


(d) A SECRET CIA Counterintelligence Staff Study
entitled “The Soviet Counterintelligence Offensive: KGB
Recruitment Operations Against CIA,” dated March 1988 and
bearing the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON. This document
contained the following preface:

Warning Notice Intelligence Sources

or Methods Involved

(WNINTEL)

National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions

and also expressly defined “NOFORN” as “Not Releasable to
Foreign Nationals.”

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $25,000 cash and a letter. In
the letter, the KGB asked for information’ about surveillance
systems, the agent network in New York City, illegal
intelligence, and several specific FBI recruitment operations.
The KGB also proposed two new dead drop and related signal sites.
One, named “BOB”, was under a footbridge in Idylwood Park,
between Vienna and Falls Church, in the Eastern District of
Virginia. The-other, named “CHARLIE”, was under a footbridge in
Eakin Community Park, south of Vienna, in the Eastern District of
Virginia. For these dead drop sites, the KGB instructed defendant
HANSSEN to load the dead drops by 9:00 pm on the designated day;
the KGB would clear it by 10:00 pm and load it with a package

which defendant Hanssen was to clear after 10:00 pm.

27


unable to find text on the diskette.

36. On or about the following Monday, March 28, 1988,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an’ exchange operation
at the “PARK/PRIME” (Not toway Park) dead drop site in the Eastern
District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the déad drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (which the KGB
referred to as “D-4") and classified documents, including a
version of a TOP SECRET document entitled “The FBI’s Double Agent
Program” which contained a detailed evaluation of FBI double
agent operations, including joint operations with other United
States intelligence agencies, conducted worldwide over a ten-year
period, and which related to the national defense.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $25,000 cash and a letter. In
the letter, the KGB explained why the KGB had not been able to
check the “PARK/PRIME” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site on March
21. In the letter, the KGB advised it was unable to read the
diskettes defendant HANSSEN had sent. The KGB also asked for
information about codes and cryptograms, intelligence support for
the Strategic Defense Initiative, submarines, and other
classified matters.

37. On or about Thursday, March 31, 1988, defendant HANSSEN

mailed an envelope to the KGB addressed to accommodation address

23


eS

i

i
q
a
4
a

4

time and location.

58. On or about the following Monday, September. 25, 1989,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “DORIS” dead drop site in the Eastern District of
Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop. site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (“D-15”) which
contained classified information. The package also contained
approximately 80 pages of material, including part of a document
concerning a United States technical operation against a specific
foreign target, which information was classified TOP SECRET,
related to the national defense, and directly concerned
communications intelligence. The materials also included details
of a United States program of technical penetration of a
particular Soviet establishment, which information was classified
TOP SECRET/SCT, related to the national defense, and directly
concerned communications intelligence.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $30,000 cash, a letter, and, for
the first time from the KGB, a computer diskette.

59. On or about Thursday, September 28, 1989, defendant
HANSSEN mailed an envelope to the KGB addressed to accommodation
address “A” in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope

bore a return address of “G. Robertson, 1408 Ingeborg Ct., McLean

36


MY FRIENDS:

THANK YOU FOR THE $10,000.

I AM NOT A YOUNG MAN, AND THE COMMITMENTS ON MY
TIME PREVENT USING DISTANT DROPS SUCH AS YOU SUGGEST.
I KNOW IN THIS I AM MOVING YOU OUT OF YOUR SET MODES OF
DOING BUSINESS, BUT MY EXPERIENCE TELLS ME THE [sic] WE
CAN BE ACTUALLY MORE SECURE IN EASIER MODES.

I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING TYPE OF EXCHANGE. A CAR
WILL BE PARKED ON WYOMING NEAR 24° IN D.C. NW (NEAR
MIL. OFC.) ITS [sic] RIGHT F. DOOR WILL BE UNLOCKED.
MY PACKAGE WILL BE UNDER THE SEAT. LICENSE OF CAR WILL
BE U.S. STATE DEPT. DIPLOMATIC PLATE CEM 015. TIMING
MONDAY 4/18 1AM-3AM. YOU SWITCH YOUR PACKAGE FOR MINE.
FURNISH ME TWO (MAIN & RESERVE) ADDRESSES. I WILL MAIL
YOU A NOTE AT THE ADDRESS INDICATING A SIMILAR EXCHANGE
ANY FOLLOWING MONDAY. IT WILL SAY NOTHING BUT BE
SIGNED RAMON. FIND A COMFORTABLE VIENNA VA. SIGNAL
SITE TO CALL ME TO AN EXCHANGE ANY FOLLOWING MONDAY.

GOOD LUCK IN YOUR WORK.

[IF YOU CANNOT DO THIS I WILL CLEAR THIS ONCE AN
ON YOUR SCHEDULED DATE (RATHER THAN THE OTHER) ]

RAMON

26. Defendant HANSSEN possessed a prototype United States
Department of State diplomatic license plate bearing the number

CEM 015, which the FBI later recovered from his residence.

The November 1987 Operations

27. On or about. Saturday, November 7, 1987, defendant
HANSSEN mailed a letter to the KGB addressed to the “NANCY”
accommodation address, which was the residence of the Soviet
Embassy official Malakhov in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a return address of wg. Baker” in “Chicago”.

In the letter, defendant HANSSEN advised the KGB that Saturday
for “AN” was not suitable, and he postponed the operation for two

days, until Monday, November 16, 1987. He also advised that he

18


i

operation at set day.

1. We thank You for information, wnich [sic] is
of a great interest for us and highly evaluated in our
service.

We hope that during future exchanges we shall
receive Your materials, which will deal.with a [sic]
work of IC, the FBI and CIA in the first place, against
our representatives and officers. We do mean its
human, electronic and technical penetrations in our
residencies here and in other countries. We are very
interested in getting of the objective information on
the work of a special group which serches [sic] “mole”
in CIA and FBI. We need this information especially to
take necessary additional steps to ensure Your personal
security....

2. Before stating a communication plan that we
propose for a next future, we would like to precise
[sic] a following problem. Do You have any possibility
to meet our collegues [sic] or to undertake the
exchange ops in other countries? If yes, what are
these countries? Until we receive Your answer at this
[sic] questions and set up a new communication plan, we
propose to use for the exchange ops DD according to the
following schedule:

= DD “LEWIS” on 27 of may 2001 (with a coefficient
it will mean on 21 of november 2000). We draw Your
attention on the fact that we used a former coefficient
- 6 (sender adds, addressee subtracts). A time will be
shown at real sense. We will be ready to withdraw Your
package beginning by 8 PM on 27 may 2001 after we shall
read Your signal. After that we put DD our package for
You. Remove Your signal and place our signal by 9 PM
of the same day. After that You will withdraw our
package and remove our signal. That will mean an
exchange operation is over. We shall check signal site
(i.e., its absence) the next day (28 of May) till 9 PM.
If by this time a signal had not been removed we shall
withdraw our package and shall put it in for You
repeatedly dates with DD “ELLIS” -- in each seven days
after 28 May till 19 of June 2001 (i.e., 13 of December
2000).

= We propose to carry out our next operation on 16
of october 2001 (i.e., 10 of April) at the DD “LINDA”

62



he wrote: “Let us use the same site again. Same timing. Same
signals.” He proposed that the next dead drop occur on
“September 9" which, according to the “6" coefficient he had
established with the KGB in his first letter, actually meant that
the dead drop operation would take place on March 3, 1986. He
also wrote:

As far as the funds are concerned, I have little
need or utility for more than the $100,000. It merely
provides a difficulty since I can not spend it, store
it or invest it easily without triping [sic] “drug
money” warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as
security to my children and some good will so that when
the time comes you will accept by [sic] senior services
as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would appreciate an
escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.) .

Referring to Yuzhin, Motorin, Martynov, whom he had identified in
his first letter as United States intelligence recruitments
defendant HANSSEN wrote:

I can not provide documentary substantiating
evidence without arousing suspicion at this time.
Never-the-less, it is from my own knowledge as a member
of the community effort to capitalize on the
information from which I speak. I have seen video
tapes of debriefings and physically saw the last,
though we were not introduced. The names were provided
to me as part of my duties as one of the few who needed
to know. You have some avenues of inquiry.

Substantial funds were provided in excess of what could
have been skimmed from their agents. The active one

has always (in the past) used a concealment device -- a
bag with bank notes sewn in the base during home
leaves.

The information about the concealment device pertained to
Martynov, related to the national defense, and was classified

SECRET; its transmittal to the KGB resulted in his identification

10


The May 1989 Dead Drop Exchange

53. On or about Wednesday, May 17, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designatea signal
site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged time and
location.

54. On or about the following Monday, May 22, .1989,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “BOB” dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing approximately 80 pages of material
including classified documents, a computer diskette (*D-13”), and
two of the three diamonds that he had previously received from
the KGB and that he was returning for cash.. In a message on the
diskette, defendant HANSSEN suggestéd that an account in
Switzerland be used for the receipt of payments from the KGB.

The diskette contained classified information about a variety of
technical and operational matters. On the diskette, defendant
HANSSEN reported the existence, and details of, an ongoing FBI
espionage investigation of United States Department of State
officer Felix Bloch, which information was classified SECRET and
related to the national defense; this disclosure by defendant
HANSSEN led the Soviet Union to warn Bloch of the investigation
and thereby prevented the FBI from concluding its investigation.

The diskette also disclosed the fact that the United States was

33


same place. Perhaps the correlation of forces and
circumstances then will have improved.

your friend,

Ramon Garcia

107. On February 18, 2001, defendant HANSSEN went to
Foxstone Park in the Eastern District of Virginia, where he
placed a piece of white adhesive tape on a pole, and then placed
the plastic-wrapped package containing the computer diskette and
the seven classified internal FBI documents under a footbridge in
a manner which concealed the package from view.

108. The package which defendant HANSSEN placed in the
Foxstone Park dead drop site on February 18, 2001, he intended to
transmit to the KGB/SVR.

HANSSEN’ S INTENT

109. In passing classified documents and’ information
relating to the national defense to the KGB/SVR, defendant
HANSSEN acted with the intent and reason to believe that they
were to be used to the injury of the United States and to the

advantage of a foreign government, specifically the Union of

69



After consulting with my attorneys and pursuant to the plea
agreement entered into this day between me, Robert Philip
Hanssen, and the United States, I hereby stipulate that the above
Statement of Facts is true and accurate, and that had the matter
proceeded to trial, the United States would have proved the same
beyond a reasonable doubt; however, as to certain matters
described in these Statement of Facts which do not constitute the
proof in support of elements of the offenses to which I am
pleading guilty, I do not have personal knowledge and, therefore,
cannot attest to their truthfulness or accuracy. As to such
matters, I do stipulate that had the matter proceeded to trial,
the United States would have proved such matters beyond a
reasonable doubt.

AGeak- QE pe —

Rébert Philip Hanssen
Defendant

We are ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN’s attorneys. We have carefully
reviewed the above Statement of Facts with him. To our

knowledge, his decision to stipulate to these facts is an

inf, oluntary one.

John F. Hundley
Sydney J. Hoffmann
Counsel for the Defendant

71



The December 1988 Dead Drop Exchange

46. On or about Monday, December 26, 1988, defendant
HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation ac the
“CHARLIE” dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

, Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette ("D-10”) and
approximately 356 pages of material containing classified
information. The diskette contained additional classified
information, including the fact that the. United States was
targeting a particular category of Soviet communications, which
information was classified TOP SECRET/SCI, related to the
national defense, and directly concerned communications
intelligence.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $10,000 cash, a diamond valued at
$17,748, and a message in which the KGB asked for additional
specific information about a wide variety of classified technical
and recruitment matters.

The January 1989 Emergency Dead Drop Operation

47. On or about Tuesday, January 31, 1989, defendant

HANSSEN placed at the “BOB” dead drop site in the Eastern

District of Virginia a package for the KG containing a

classified cable, a computer, diskette ) containing

comments on the cable and information ° ther classified matters


SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS. I WARN THAT MR. BORIS YUZHIN
(LINE PR, SF), MR. SERGEY MOTORIN, (LINE PR, WASH.) AND
MR. VALERIY MARTYNOV (LINE X, WASH.) HAVE BEEN
RECRUITED BY OUR “SPECIAL SERVICES.”
The information about Yuzhin, Motorin, and Martynov was
information related to the national defense and classified
I SECRET. The information about Motorin and Martynov resulted in
their identification by the USSR as agents of the United States
H and consequently in their deaths. In the letter, defendant
HANSSEN proceeded to describe the existence of an FBI technical
penetration of a particular Soviet establishment, as well as the
specific location of the penetration device, and the methods and
technology utilized, which information was related to the
national defense and classified TOP SECRET, and directly
concerned communications intelligence. In addition, “TO FURTHER
SUPPORT MY BONA FIDES”, the letter provided specific closely-held
items of United States Intelligence Community information
regarding three then-recent Soviet defectors. The letter also
i contained the following operational instructions:
DETAILS REGARDING PAYMENT AND FUTURE CONTACT WILL
BE SENT TO YOU PERSONALLY. . . . MY IDENTITY AND
ACTUAL POSITION IN THE COMMUNITY MUST BE LEFT UNSTATED
TO ENSURE MY SECURITY. I AM OPEN TO COMMO SUGGESTIONS
BUT WANT NO SPECIALIZED TRADECRAFT. I WILL ADD 6, (YOU
SUBTRACT 6) FROM STATED MONTHS, DAYS AND TIMES IN BOTH
DIRECTIONS OF OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS .
9. On or about October 15, 1985, defendant HANSSEN mailed a

package to the KGB addressed to the residence of the Soviet

Embassy official Degtyar in the Eastern District of Virginia,

| 7



fixed location, usually in a public place, on which an agent or
an intelligence officer could place a predetermined mark in order
to alert the other to operational activity.

c. Defendant HANSSEN knew that an operational feature
of the KGB/SVR was the “accommodation address”, that is, a “safe”
address, not overtly associated with intelligence activity, used
by an agent to communicate with the intelligence service for
which he is. working.

The October 1985 Initial Contacts

8. On or about October 1, 1985, defendant HANSSEN mailed an
envelope to the. KGB addressed to the residence of a Soviet
Embassy official named Viktor M. Degtyar in the City of
Alexandria’ in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope
contained an inner envelope marked: “DO NOT OPEN. TAKE THIS
ENVELOPE UNOPENED TO VICTOR I. CHERRASHIN - who at the time was
the KGB’s Line KR (Counterintelligence) Chief at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, D.C. The letter read in part as follows:

DEAR MR. CHERKASHIN:

SOON, I WILL SEND A BOX OF DOCUMENTS TO MR.
DEGTYAR. THEY ARE FROM CERTAIN OF THE MOST SENSITIVE
AND HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED PROJECTS OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL ARE ORIGINALS TO AID IN
VERIFYING THEIR AUTHENTICITY. PLEASE RECOGNIZE FOR OUR
LONG-TERM INTERESTS THAT THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF
PERSONS WITH THIS. ARRAY OF CLEARANCES. AS A COLLECTION
THEY POINT TO ME. I TRUST THAT AN OFFICER OF YOUR
EXPERIENCE WILL HANDLE THEM APPROPRIATELY. I BELIEVE
THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A $100,000 PAYMENT TO
ME.

I MUST WARN OF CERTAIN RISKS TO MY SECURITY OF
WHICH YOU MAY NOT BE AWARE. YOUR SERVICE HAS RECENTLY


had an urgent package for the KGB, and he asked the KGB to place
a signal about receiving the letter.

28. On or about Tuesday, November 17, 1987, defendant
HANSSEN mailed a letter to the KGB. The envelope bore a return
address of “G. Robertson” in “Houston”. The letter, which was
handwritten, read as follows:

Unable to locate AN based on your description at night.

Recognize that I am dressed in business suit and can

not slog around in inch deep mud. I suggest we use

once again original site. I will place my urgent

material there at next AN times. Replace it with your

package. I will select some few sites good for me and

pass them to you. Please give new constant conditions

of recontact as address to write. Will not put

substantive material through it. Only instructions as

usual format.

Ramon

29. On or about the following Monday, November 23, 1987,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “PARK” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site in the Eastern
District of Virginia. Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop
site a package for the KGB containing a number of classified
documents, including a report about a recent FBI/CIA meeting with
a Soviet intelligence officer who was an FBI/CIA recruitment
target, which report related to the national defense and was
classified SECRET. Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead
drop site a package from the KGB containing $20,000 cash and a

letter. In the letter, the KGB conveyed “regards” from the KGB |

Director and advised that $100,000 had been deposited ina bank ~-

19


package.”
11. Defendant HANSSEN and the KGB thereafter referred to
the Nottoway Park dead drop site by the name “PARK”.

The November 1985 KGB Payment and HANSSEN Letter

12. Between on or about Saturday, November 2 and Friday,
November 8, 1985, defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the “PARK”
(Nottoway Park) dead drop-site in the Eastern District of
Virginia a package from the KGB containing $50,000 cash and a
message proposing procedures for future contacts with him.

13. On or about November 8, 1985, defendant HANSSEN mailed
a letter to the KGB addressed to the residence of the Soviet
Embassy official Degtyar in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The letter read in part as follows:

Thank you for the 50,000.
I also appreciate your courage and perseverance in
the face of generically. reported bureaucratic

obstacles. I would not have contacted you if it were

not reported that you were held in esteem within your

organization, an organization I have studied for years.

I did expect some communication plan in your response.

I viewed the postal delivery as a necessary risk and do

not wish to trust again that channel with valuable

material. I did.this only because I had to so you

would take my offer seriously, that there be. no

misunderstanding as to my long-term value, and to

obtain appropriate security for our relationship from

the start. .

In the letter, defendant HANSSEN rejected the contact plans
proposed by the KGB, and suggested a particular communications

scheme based on “a microcomputer ‘bulletin board’” at a

designated location, with “appropriate encryption”. Meanwhile,

9


HANSSEN also asked for diamonds.

The May 1988 Operation

39. On or about May 17, 1988, defendant HANSSEN mailed an
envelope to the KGB, addressed to an accommodation address and
containing a computer diskette ("D-6"). The envelope bore a
return address of “Jim Baker” in “Chicago” and was postmarked in
Northern Virginia. The diskette contained classified information
about a number of matters including a specific recent FBI Soviet
recruitment operation. A note indicated: “PRIME”.

The July 1988 Operations

40. On or about Wednesday, July 13, 1988, defendant HANSSEN
mailed a letter to the KGB addressed to accommodation address “A”
in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return
address “Chicago” and was postmarked in Washington, D.C.

41. On or about the following Monday, July 18, 1988,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “PARK/PRIME” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site in the Eastern
District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing over 530 pages of material,
including the following classified documents which related to the
national defense:

(a) .A TOP SECRET United States intelligence analysis

of the effectiveness of Soviet intelligence collection

25


i

}

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

)
)
v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 01-188-A
)
)

ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN

STATEMENT OF FACTS

If this matter were to proceed to trial, the united States
would prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following:

1. Defendant ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN was a Special Agent of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who entered on duty
with the FBI on January 12, 1976, and served continuously until
February 18, 2001. Throughout most of his FBI career, defendant
HANSSEN worked in the FBI’s Intelligence Division, renamed the
National Security Division. In that capacity, defendant HANSSEN
worked with, and had access to, classified information relating
to the foreign intelligence’ and counterintelligence activities of
the FBI and other United States Intelligence Community agencies,
including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National
Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

2. From in or about January 1981 to in or about September
1985, defendant HANSSEN was assigned to FBI Headquarters in
Washington, D.C. From in or about September 1985 to in or about

August 1987, defendant HANSSEN assigned to the FBI Field Office


Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a

package for the KGB containing a computer diskette ("D-23”) and
approximately 284 pages of material. The diskette read, in part:

~~» returned, grabbed the first thing I could: lay my hands on” and

“I was in a hurry so that you would not worry, because June has
passed, they held me there longer.” He also noted that he had at
least five years until retirement, and remarked: “Maybe I will
hang in there for that long.” Defendant HANSSEN also reported on
a particular FBI-CIA operation. The classified documents he
provided included FBI documents, human intelligence plans, and
documents concerning nuclear and missile weapons proliferation.
Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $12,000 cash and a KGB computer
diskette reading, in part, as follows:
Dear friend:
Acknowledging the disk and materials . . . received
through “DORIS” we also acknowledge again Your superb
sense of humor and Your sharp-as-a-razor mind. We
: highly appreciate both.
Don’t worry. We will not steam out incorrect
conclusions from Your materials. Actually, Your
information grately [sic] assisted us in seeing more
clearly many issues and we are not ashamed to correct
our notions if we have some. So, thank You for Your
help. But if some of our requests seem a bit strange
to You, please try to believe us there were sufficient
reasons to put them and that. what we wanted was to sort
them out with Your help.
In regard to.our “memo” on Your security. Just one

more remark. If our natural wish .to capitalize on Your
information confronts in any way Your security

: 48



If you wish to continue..ocur discussions, please

have someone run an advertisement in the Washington

Times during the week of 1/12/87 or 1/19/87, for sale,

“Dodge Diplomat, 1971, needs engine work, $1000.” Give

a phone number and time-of-day where I can call. I

will call and leave a phone number where a recorded

message can be left for me in one. hour. I will say,

“Hello, my name is Ramon. I am calling about the car

you offered for sale in the Times.” You will respond,

‘I’m sorry, but the man with the car is not here, can I

get your number.” The number will be in Area Code 212.

I will not specify that Area Code on the line.
Defendant HANSSEN signed the letter: “Ramon”. According to the
established “6" coefficient, the week the advertisement was
actually to run was July 6, 1986, or July 13, 1986.

15. From on or about July 14, 1986, to on or about July 18,
1986, the following advertisement appeared in The Washington

Times:

DODGE .- ‘71, DIPLOMAT, NEEDS ENGINE WORK, $1000. Phone
(703) 451-9780 (CALL NEXT Mon., Wed., Fri. 1 p.m.)

16. On or about Monday; July 21, 1986, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call to the telephone number given in the KGB’s
Washington Times advertisement, and gave a phone number to the
KGB officer with whom he spoke.

17. On or about Monday, July 21, 1986, about an hour after
the conversation described in the foregoing paragraph, defendant
HANSSEN received a telephone call at the number he had given to
the KGB, and had.a conversation with a KGB officer who informed
HANSSEN that the Nottoway Park dead drop site was being loaded

for him.

12


by the USSR as an agent of the United States and consequently in
his death. Defendant HANSSEN also wrote about the existence of a
successful United States intelligence collection operation
against a Soviet target, which information was classified TOP
SECRET/SCI.

The Summer 1986 Operations

14. On or about June 30, 1986, defendant HANSSEN mailed a
typed letter to the KGB addressed to the residence of the Soviet
Embassy official Degtyar in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The letter read in part as follows:

I apologize for the delay since our break. in
communications. I wanted to determine if there was any
cause for concern over security. I have only seen one
item which has given me pause. When the FBI was first
given access to Victor Petrovich Gundarev, they asked

if Gundarev knew Viktor Cherkashin. I thought this
unusual. I had seen no. report indicating that Viktor
Cherkashin was handling an important agent, and here-
to-fore he was looked at with the usual lethargy
awarded Line Chiefs. The question came to mind, are
they somehow able to monitor funds, ie., to know that
Viktor Cherkashin received a large amount of money for
an agent? I am unaware of any such ability, but I
might not know that type of source reporting.

In the letter, defendant HANSSEN disclosed the fact that the
United States knew of a particular technical vulnerability in
Soviet satellite transmissions and was actively exploiting the
vulnerability, which information related to the national defense,
wag classified TOP SECRET/SCI, and directly concerned satellites.

He then concluded:

1]



money
vague
level

is not really ‘put away for you’ except in some
accounting sense. Never patronize me at this
. It offends me, but then you are easily

forgiven. But perhaps I shouldn’t tease you. It just
bets me in trouble.

thank

Ramon

93.
on the abo
KGB/SVR:

Dear

you again,

On or about July 31, 2000, defendant HANSSEN maintained

ve-described Versa Card the following letter from the

Ramon:

We are glad to use this possibility to thank You

for Your striving for going on contact with us.

We received Your message. The truth is that we

expended a lot of efforts to decipher it.

well

First of all we would like to emphasize that all
known events wich [sic] had taken. place in this

country and in our homeland had not affected our
resources and we reaffirm our strong intentions to

maint
with

Your

ain and ensure safely our long-term cooperation
You.

We perceive Your actions as a manifestation of
confidence in our service and from our part we

assure You that we shall take all necessary measures to
ensure Your personal security as much as possible.

Just because proceeding from our golden rule - to

ensure Your personal security in the first place - we

have

proposed to carry out our next exchange operation

at the place which had been used in last august [sic].

We di
with

d not like to give You any occasion to charge us
an inadequate attention to problems of Your

security. We are happy that, according to the version
You have proposed in Your last letter, our suggestions
about DD, known as “Ellis”, coincided completely.
However a situation around our collegues [sic] at the

end of passed [sic] year made us to refuse this

61


ceisarbemiedteas

aoe

Soviet Embassy employee. who defendant HANSSEN had previously
identified as an FBI recruitment-in-place, and who the KGB
believed was about to defect.

The August-September 1990 Mailing and Dead Drop Exchange

71. On or about Monday, August 20, 1990, defendant HANSSEN
mailed an envelope to the KGB, addressed to ‘accommodation address
»A” in the Eastern District of Virginia and bearing the return
address “J. Baker, Box 1101, Alexandria VA”. In the envelope was
a computer diskette ("“D-20”) containing classified information
and a message instructing the KGB to load the “FLO” dead axop
site on September 3, 1990.

72. On or about Monday, September 3, 1990, defendant
HANSSEN retrieved from a dead drop site in the Eastern District
of Virginia a package from the KGB containing $40,000 cash and a
KGB computer diskette. The diskette contained a letter which
identified more call-out signal sites, made numerous specific
requests for classified information, and noted that some of the
materials defendant HANSSEN had provided about “political issues
of interest . . . were reported to the very top.”

The February 1991 Dead Drop Exchanges

73. On or about Saturday, February 2, 1991, defendant
HANSSEN placed an emergency call-out signal for the KGB.
74. On or about Saturday, February 2, 1991, defendant

HANSSEN placed at the “CHARLIE” dead drop site in the Eastern

44


Community’s consensus as to specific MASINT objectives and
studies leading to needed capabilities, and its contents were
highly specific and technical. It bore the caveats NOFORN and
NOCONTRACT, and contained the following preface:
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

In passing this document to the KGB, defendant HANSSEN requested
that it be returned. The second. package contained a computer
diskette ("“D-12”) and approximately 539 pages of materials
including classified information on a variety of matters.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $18,000 cash, a diamond valued at
$11,700, and a letter. In the letter, the KGB confirmed
“receiving defendant HANSSEN’s December 26 and January 31
packages, discussed a personal meeting, requested new dead drop
sites, and asked how to increase operational security. The KGB
also asked defendant HANSSEN about his security precautions for
the diamonds. ‘The KGB also asked for information about a wide
variety of technical and operational subjects. The KGB thanked
“B” for the information he provided. on January 31, and asked him
“for everything else that’s possible.”

52. Defendant HANSSEN assured the KGB that he would say the

diamonds came from his grandmother.

32


interests we definitely cut down our thirst for profit
and choose Your security. The same goes with any other
aspect of Your case. That’s why we say Your security
goes first.

We are sure You remember our next contact is due at
“FLO” .

As always we attach some information requests, which
are of current interest to us.

We thank You and wish You the very best.

Sincerely,
Your friends.

Enclosed in the package please find $12,000.

The KGB also provided new communications plans, and numerous
specific requests for classified technical, operational, and
recruitment matters. The KGB also asked follow-up questions
about information defendant HANSSEN had previously provided, and
requested information about specific United States Intelligence
Community activity towards the Soviet Union.

The August 1991 Dead Drop Exchange

80. On or about Monday, August 19, 1991, defendant HANSSEN
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the “FLO” dead
drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (“D-24") anda
SECRET document disclosing details of a proposed FBI technical
‘surveillance operation against a Soviet person in the United |

States, which information related to the national defense. On

49


about which the KGB had previously asked, and a note reading:
*Send to the Center right away. This might be useful.” :

48. On or about Tuesday, January 31, 1989, defendant
HANSSEN placed an emergency call-out signal at a pre-designated
signal site, to alert the KGB that he had placed a package at a
pre-arranged dead drop site.

49. After observing the emergency call-out signal on or
about January 31, 1989, the KGB retrieved the package defendant
HANSSEN had placed at the “BOB” dead drop site.

The March 1989 Dead Drop Exchange

50. On or about Thursday, March .16, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated signal
site, to schedule a dead drop exchange at a pre-arranged time and
location,

51. On or about Monday, March 20, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the “CHARLIE”
dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

, Defendant HANSSEN placed two packages for the KGB at
the dead drop site. One package contained a TOP SECRET/SCI
document entitled “DCI Guidance for the National MASINT
Intelligence Program (FY 1991-FY 2000),” which was prepared by

the Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Committee,

dated November 1988, and related to the ional defense. The

MASINT document represented the United States Intelligence

3



- Sakina Scien

SECRET and relating to the national defense, which contained
details of ongoing and proposed FBI counterintelligence
operations against. Russian persons in the United States.

106. On February 18, 2001, defendant HANSSEN wrapped the
seven classified internal FBI documents, and a computer diskette,
in a plastic garbage bag secured with clear ‘tape. The computer
diskette contained an encrypted letter which, when decrypted,

read as follows:
Dear Friends:

I thank you for your assistance these many years. It
seems, however, that my greatest utility to you has
come to an end, and it is time to seclude myself from

active service.

Since communicating last, and one wonders if because of
it, I have been promoted to a higher do-nothing Senior
Executive job outside of regular access to information
within the counterintelligence program. It is as if I
am being isolate. Furthermore, I believe I have
detected repeated bursting radio signal emanations from
my vehicle. I have not found their source, but as you
wisely do, I will leave this alone, for knowledge of
their existence is sufficient. Amusing the games
children play. In this, however, I strongly suspect
you should have concerns for the integrity of your
compartment concerning knowledge of my efforts on your
behalf. Something has aroused the sleeping tiger.
Perhaps you know better than I.

Life is full of its ups and downs.
My hope is that, if you respdnd to this constant-
conditions-of-connection message, you will have

provided some sufficient means of re-contact besides
it. If not, I will be in contact next year, same time

68


which package contained classified documents.

10. On or about October 24, 1985, defendant HANSSEN mailed
an envelope, postmarked in New York City, addressed to the
residence of Soviet Embassy official Degtyar in the Eastern
District of Virginia. The envelope contained the following
message:

DROP LOCATION

Please leave your package for me under the corner

(nearest the street) of the wooden foot bridge located

just west of the entrance to Nottoway Park. (ADC

Northern Virginia Street Map, #14, D3)

PACKAGE PREPARATION

Use a green or brown plastic trash bag to cover a
waterproofed package.

SIGNAL LOCATION

Signal site will be the pictorial “pedestrian-crossing”
signpost just west of. the main Nottoway Park entrance
on Old Courthouse Road. (The sign is the one nearest
the bridge just mentioned.)

SIGNALS

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive
tape meaning I am-ready to receive your package.

Your signal to me: One horizontal mark of white
adhesive tape meaning drop filled.

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive
tape meaning I have received your package.

(Remove old tape before leaving signal.)

The message established a date and time for the signals and

drops, and concluded:~*I will, acknowledge amount with my next

8


Kryuchkov, for the information regarding the valuable source
about whom defendant HANSSEN had reported on November 23, 1987,
and for more information about the source. The KGB also asked
for additional information on other subjects.

32. In or- about February 1988, defendant HANSSEN reviewed
the FBI’s file on Viktor Sheymov.

The March 1988 Operations

33. On or about Tuesday, March 15, 1988, defendant HANSSEN
mailed an envelope to the KGB, addressed to accommodation address
“a” in the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a computer
diskette. The envelope bore a return address of “Jim Baker” in. _
“Chicago” and was postmarked in Washington, D.C.

34. On or about Wednesday, March 16, 1988, defendant
HANSSEN mailéd an envelope to the KGB, addressed to accommodation
address “A” in the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a
note instructing the KGB to: “Use “P’ until you approve the
others.” ‘P’ referred to the “PARK/PRIME” dead drop site. The
envelope bore a return address of “Jim Baker” in’ “Chicago” and
was postmarked in Northern Virginia.

35. On or about Thursday, March 24, 1988, defendant HANSSEN
mailed an envelope to the KGB, addressed to accommodation address
“A” in the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a computer
diskette. The envelope bore a return address of “Jim Baker” in

“Chicago” and was postmarked in Washington, D.C. The KGB was

22


Set the signal at my site any Tuesday evening. I will
read your answer. Please, at’ least say goodbye. It’s
been a long time my dear friends, a long and lonely
time.

Ramon Garcia

91. On or about. March 31, 2000, defendant HANSSEN conducted
searches of the FBI’s ACS System, for the purpose of determining
whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops involving Russia.

92. On or about June 8, 2000, defendant HANSSEN created or
last modified the following letter to the KGB/SVR, which he
stored on the above-described Versa Card:

Dear Friends:

Administrative Issues:

Enclosed, once again, is my rudimentary cipher.
Obviously it is weak in the manner I used it last --
reusing key on multiple messages, but I wanted to give
you a chance if you had lost the algorythm [sic].

Thank you for the note. It brought me great joy to see
the signal at last. As you implied and I have said, we
do need a better form of secure communication --
faster. In this vein, I propose: (without being
attached to it) the following:

One of the commercial products currently available is
the Palm VII organizer. I have a Palm III, which is
actually a fairly capable computer. The VII version
comes with wireless internet capability built in. It
can allow the rapid transmission of encrypted messages
which if used on an infrequent basis, could be quite
effective in preventing confusions if the existence
[sic] of the accounts could be appropriately hidden as
well as the existence, [sic] of the devices themselves.
Such a device might even serve for rapid transmittal of
substantial material in digital form. Your FAPSI could
review what would be needed, its advisability, etc.,
obviously - - particularly safe rules of use. While

59

]


On funds transfers through Switzerland, I agree that
Switzerland itself has no real security, but insulated
by laundering on both the in and out sides, mine
ultimately through say a corporation I control loaning
mortgage money to me for which (re)payments are
made.... It certainly could be done. Cash is hard to
handle here because little business is ever really done
in cash and repeated cash transactions into the banking
system are more dangerous because of the difficulty in
explaining them. That doesn’t mean it isn’t welcome
enough to let that problem devolve on me. (We should
all have such problems, eh?) How do you propose I get
this money put away for me when I retire? (Come on; I
can joke with you about it. I know money is not really
put into an account at MOST Bank, and that you are
speaking figuratively of an accounting notation at best
to be made real at some uncertain future. We do the
same. Want me to lecture in your 101 course in my old
age? My college level Russian has sunk low through
inattention all these years; I would be a novelty
attraction, but I don’t think a practical one except in
extremis.)

So good luck. Wish me luck. OK, on all sites detailed
to date, but TOM’s signal is unstable. See you in
‘July’ as you say constant conditions.

yours truly,

Ramon

97. ‘On or about December 21, 2000, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops.

Operational Activity in January 2001

98. In or about January 2001, defendant HANSSEN possessed a

personal PALM III device which contained on it a.record referring

to “ELLIS” and the date February 18 and the time 8:00.

99. On or about January 16, 2001, defendant HANSSEN

66


fe ee aE Rot

several documents. One of the documents was a Director of
Central Intelligence National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
entitled “The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two
Years”, dated November 1989, which was classified SECRET, related
to the national defense, and bore the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT
WNINTEL and the notice: “Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.” The documents also included printed
materials containing details of the TOP SECRET/SCI United States
program of technical penetration of a particular Soviet
establishment, about which defendant HANSSEN had reported to the
KGB in the package he had placed at the “DORIS” dead drop site on
or about September 25, 1989, and which information related to the
national defense and directly concerned communications
intelligence. The diskette also contained a message in which
defendant HANSSEN complimented the KGB’s efficient actions, and
provided current information about: several ongoing FBI
recruitment operations against Soviet intelligence officers;
three new tightly-protected FBI sources within the KGB and other
Soviet entities; and four defectors. He also provided updated
information on the Bloch-Gikman matter.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $38,000 cash as payment for the
October 16-23 period plus compensation for the two returned

diamonds, and two KGB diskettes. The diskettes contained

39


Christmas greetings from the KGB, discussed communications plans,
and asked for specific information about a variety of classified
technical operations.

The March 1990 Dead Drop Exchange

65. On or about Thursday, March 1, 1990, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated signal
site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged time and
location.

66. On or about the following Monday, March 5, 1990,

defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation’
at the “CHARLIE” dead drop site in the Eastern District of

Virginia.

oo

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the’ dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing classified materials and a
.computer diskette ("“D-18”) on which he reported classified
information on a wide variety of topics. In particular,
defendant HANSSEN confirmed that a particular Soviet Embassy
employee in the united States, and a second particular Soviet
person, were recruited intelligence assets of the FBI, which
information was classified SECRET and related to the national
defense.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a

package from the KGB containing $40,000 cash and a computer

diskette on which the KGB discussed communications plans and

40



foreign country, which fact was classified TOP SECRET/SCI,
related to the national defense, and directly concerned
communications intelligence. He also discussed communications
plans, and in particular proposed a new communications system in
which he would set up an office at a location in town not subject
to electronic surveillance, where he and the KGB/SVR could
communicate directly using a computer that would be specially-
equipped with certain advanced technology.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB/SVR containing $12,000 cash and a KGB
computer diskette discussing communications plans and asking for
specific information about various classified matters.

Operational Activity in 1999

85. On or about August 11, 1999, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s collected computerized databases
of classified and unclassified investigative files and indices,
called the Automated Case Support (ACS) System, for the purpose
of determining whether the FBI was aware of operational activity
at Foxstone Park.

86. On or about October 6, 1999, defendant HANSSEN
maintained, on a computer memory storage device known as a Versa
Card, the following letter from the KGB/SVR:

Dear friend: welcome!

It’s good to know you are here. Acknowledging
your letter to V.K. we express our sincere joy on the

55


42. On or about Friday, July 29, 1988, defendant HANSSEN
mailed an envelope to the KGB, addressed to accommodation address
‘A” in the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a diskette
("D-7"). The envelope bore a return address of “Alexandria”.

The diskette contained classified information on technical
surveillance systems, a new recruitment in New York City, illegal
intelligence, and several other specific FBI Soviet recruitment
targets. A message on the diskette also accepted the KGB’s
proposed operational sites “BOB” and “CHARLIE”.

The September 1988 Mailing and Dead Drop ‘Exchange

43. On or about Tuesday, September 20, 1988, defendant
HANSSEN mailed an envelope to the KGB, addressed to accommodation’
address “A” in the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a
note and a computer diskette ("D-8"). The envelope bore a return
address of “Chicago” and was postmarked in Washington, D.C. The
diskette contained classified information about particular Soviet
recruitment targets of the FBI. The note read: “At BOB”.

44. On or about the following Monday, September 26, 1988,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “BOB” dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the “BOB” dead drop site in
the Eastern District, of Virginia a package for the KGB containing
approximately 300 pages of material containing classified

information, including an FBI memo about a particular individual

28


Operational Activity in 2000

89. On or about March 14, 2000, defendant HANSSEN conducted
searches of the FBI’s ACS System, and retrieved documents
containing detailed information about a classified foreign
counterintelligence operation that the FBI had conducted in 1999
against a suspected Soviet penetration of the United States
Intelligence Community.

90. On or about March 14, 2000, defendant HANSSEN created
or last modified a letter to the KGB/SVR, which he maintained on
the above-described Versa Card, and which began as follows:

I have come about as close as I ever want to come to

sacrificing myself to help you, and I get silence. I

hate silence.

Defendant Hanssen then provided detailed information regarding
the classified FBI foreign counterintelligence operation that was
the subject of documents he retrieved from the ACS system on or
about March 14, 2000. The letter continued as follows:

Conclusion: One might propose that I am either insanely

brave or quite insane. I’d answer neither. I'd say,

insanely loyal. Take your pick. There is insanity in

all the answers.

I have, however, come as close to the edge as I can

without being truly insane. My security concerns have

proven reality-based. I’d say, pin your hopes on

‘insanely loyal’ and go for it. Only I can lose.

I decided on this course when I was 14 years old. I'd

read Philby’s book. Now that is insane, eh! My only

hesitations were my security concerns under

uncertainty. I hate uncertainty. So far I have judged
the edge correctly. Give me credit for that.

58


anna

eee

conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops.

100. On or about January 19, 2001, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops.

101. On or about January 22, 2001, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recént dead drops or of
operational activity at Foxstone Park.

102. On or about January 30, 2001, defendant HANSSEN
maintained in the glove compartment of his personal automobile a
roll of white Johnson & Johnson medical adhesive tape and a box

of Crayola colored chalk.

103. On or about January 30, 2001, defendant HANSSEN

maintained in the trunk of his personal automobile a roll of

“ Superior Performance Scotch clear mailing tape and a number of

dark colored Hefty garbage bags.

Operational Activity in February 2001
104. On February 12, 2001, defendant HANSSEN maintained in

the glove compartment of his personal automobile a box containing

thumbtacks of various colors, including yellow and white. |.
105: On February 18, 2001, defendant HANSSEN possessed, in

the trunk of his personal automobile, seven internal FBI

documents, dated from October through December 2000, classified

67



Specifically:

a. Upon entering on duty with the FBI, on January 12,
1976, defendant HANSSEN signed an Employment Agreement in which
he acknowledged that:

I understand that Federal Law such as Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; . .
(Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the
Attorney General . . . prohibit loss, misuse, or
unauthorized disclosure or production of national
security information, other classified information and
other nonclassified information in the files of the
FBI; . . . I understand that unauthorized disclosure of
information in the files of the FBI or information I
may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in
impairment of national security, place human life in
jeopardy, . . . or prevent the FBI from effectively
discharging its responsibilities. . . . I agree that I
will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word
or conduct, or by any other means disclose to any
unauthorized recipient without official written
authorization . . . any information from the
investigatory files of the FBI or any information
relating to matérial contained in the files, or
disclose any information or produce any material
acquired as part of the performance of my official
duties or because of my official status

b. On or about June 23, 1980, defendant HANSSEN signed
a Nondisclosure Agreement for Sensitive Compartmented
Information, in which he acknowledged having received a security
indoctrination -for a specific SCI program, and further
acknowledged, among other things, that he had been advised that
the direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure by him of SCI
information “could cause irreparable injury to the United States,
and be used to advantage by a foreign nation,” and pledged that

*T will never divulge such information, in any form or any ~.


We acknowledge receiving one disk through CHARLIE. One
disk of mystery and intrigue. Thank you.

Not much a business letter this time. Just
formalities. We consider Site-9 cancelled. And we are
sure You remember: our next contact is due at ELLIS.

Frankly, we are looking forward to JUNE. Every new
season brings new expectations.

Enclosed in our today’s package please ‘find $10,000.
Thank You for Your friendship and help. :

We attach some information requests. We hope You’1l be
able to assist us on them. :

Take care and good luck.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB. also asked for information about several specific
classified matters, including United States Intelligence
Community plans to respond to domestic turmoil in the Soviet

Union and new United States communications intelligence efforts.

The July 1991 Dead Drop Exchange

78. On or about Tuesday, July 9, 1991, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated signal
site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged time and
location.

79. On or about the following Monday, July 15, 1991,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “ELLIS” dead drop site in the Eastern District of

Virginia.

47


District of Virginia a package for the KGB containing a computer
diskette (“D-21”). The diskette contained a letter in which
defendant HANSSEN acknowledged receipt of the $40,000, calling it
“too generous” . He also disclosed to the KGB that the FBI’s

chief of counterintelligence in the New York Field Office had

told him that the FBI had recruited a specific number of sources
at a particular Soviet establishment. In particular, defendant =
HANSSEN confirmed that a particular Soviet person in the United
States was a recruited reporting asset of the FBI, and he
confirmed the true identity of a Soviet person in the United
States who was operating as an FBI recruitment-in-place, all of
which information was classified SECRET and related to the
national defense.. Defendant Hanssen also advised that he would

a

be ready for an operation on February 18, 1991.

75. On or about Monday, February 18, 1991, the KGB placed
at the “CHARLIE” dead drop site in the Eastern District of ©
Virginia a package. containing $10,000 cash and a KGB computer
diskette. On the diskette, the KGB established two new dead drop
sites, one of which was codenamed “GRACE” and located under a
footbridge in Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C. The KGB also
asked for specific classified technical and operational

information, and instructed that the next contact would be at the

“DORIS” dead drop site.

4S


Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its successor state, the

Russian Federation.

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH E. MELSON
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

PAO Belomr apa/o1

Randy I. Bellows
i Justin W. Williams
Gordon D. Kromberg
sistant United States Attorneys

(. riminal Division
United States Department of Justice

70


HANSSEN:

KGB:

HANSSEN :

KGB:

HANSSEN :

KGB:

HANSSEN:

KGB:

HANSSEN:

KGB:

[pause]

That should be fine.

Okay. We will confirm you, that the papers are
waiting for you with the same horizontal tape in
the same place as we did it at the first time.
Very good.

You see. After you receive the papers, you will
send the letter confirming it and signing it, as
usual. Okay?

Excellent.

I hope you remember the address. Is... if
everything is okay?

I believe it should be fine and thank you very
much.

Heh-heh. Not at all. Not at all. Nice job. For
both of us. Uh, have a nice evening, sir.

Do svidanya.

Bye-bye.

According to the established “6" coefficient, the operation

discussed in this conversation was actually scheduled to occur on

August 19, 1986, at 7:00 am.

20. On or about August 19, 1986, defendant HANSSEN

retrieved from the “PARK” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site in the

Eastern District of Virginia a package from the KGB containing

$10,000 cash and a letter. In the letter, the KGB proposed two

additional dead drop sites, a new accommodation address codenamed

“NANCY”, and plans to enable defendant HANSSEN to personally

15


facing the podium). Entter [sic] Longbranch Nature
Center at the sign from Carlin Springs Road (near 6TM
Road south) and after parking your car in the lot
follow the sign “To Amphitheatre.” LOCATION OF THE DD
SIGNAL: a wooden electricity utility pole at the
northwest corner of the intersection of 3d Street and
Carlin Springs Road neagr [sic] the Metrobus stop (the
same map, grid F7). The signals are the same as in the
“Foxstone Park” DD. The white adhesive tape should be
placed on the NORTHERN side of the pole, so that it
could be noticed‘fro [sic] a car moving along Carling
Springs Road in the southern direction from Route 50.

Please, let us know during the November operation
of your opinion on the proposed places (the -new signal
and DD “Lewis”).

We are intending to pass you a permanent
communications plan using drop you know as well a new
portion of money. For our part we are very interested
to get from you any information about possible actions
which may threaten us.

Thank you. Good luck to you. Sincerely,

Your friends.

The initials “V.K.” are those of a known SVR Line KR senior
officer in Washington, D.C.

87. On or about November 3, 1999, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops in
Virginia or of operational activity at. Foxstone Park.

88. On or about November 15, 1999, defendant HANSSEN
conducted searches of the FBI’s ACS System for the purpose of
determining whether the FBI was aware of recent dead drops in

Virginia or of operational activity at Foxstone Park.

57


Lonesome

in “Round Tree park” (if this place suits for Your
[sic] we would like to receive Your oppinion [sic]
about that during exchange in may). “A time of
operation from 8 pm to 9 pm, signals and schedule of
alternate dates are the same. In the course of
exchange ops we shall pass to You descriptions of new
DD and SS that You can check them before. You will
find with this letter descriptions of two new DD
“LINDA” and “TOM”. Hope to have Your opinion about
them.

In case of break off in our contacts we propose to
use DD “ELLIS”, that you indicated in your first
message. Your note about a second bridge across the
street from the ‘F’ sign, as back up, is approved. We
propose to use “ELLIS” once a year on 12 August (i-e.,
with coeff. it will be 18 February) at the same time as
it was in August 1999. On that day we can carry out a
full exchange operation -- You will enload your package
and put a signal, we shall withdraw it, load our
package and put our signal. You will remove our
package and put your signal. Alternate dates - in
seven days ‘til next month.

= As it appears from your message, you continue to
use post channel as a means of. communication with us.
You know very well our negative attitude toward this
method. However if you send by post a short note where
date (i.e., with coefficient), time and name of DD for
urgent exchange are mentioned, you could do it by using
address you had used in September (i.e., with coeff.)
putting in a sealed envelope for V.K.

In future it is inexpedient to use a V.K. name as
a sender. It will be better to choose any well known
name in this country as you did it before.

3. We shall continue work up [sic] new variants
of exchanging messages including PC disks. Of course
we shall submit them to your approval in advance. If
you use a PC disk for next time, please give us key
numbers and program you have used.

4. We would like to tell you that an
insignificant number of persons know about you, your
information and our relationship.

5. We assess as very risky to transfer money in.

63


to him and to the professional way you have -handled
this matter.
sincerely,
Ramon
According to the established “6” coefficient, the dates referred
to in this letter were actually September 10, 12, and 16.

23. On or about September 14, 1987, defendant HANSSEN
mailed to the KGB a package containing classified documents,
including documents of the National Security Council.

24. On or about September 15, 1987, defendant HANSSEN
retrieved from the “PARK” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia a package from the KGB containing
$10,000 cash and a message. In the message, the KGB proposed two
additional dead drop sites, one codenamed “AN” located in Ellanor
Cc. Lawrence Park in Western Fairfax County in the Eastern
District of Virginia, and another named “DEN” at a different
location farther. away. The KGB proposed that defendant HANSSEN
load the dead drop at “PARK” or “AN” on September 26, 1987, and
that the KGB respond by loading “DEN”.

25. On or before September 26, 1987, defendant HANSSEN
placed at the “PARK” (Nottoway Park) dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia a package for the KGB containing a
letter and a classified document. The letter, which was

handwritten, began as follows:

17


produced by or for, or under the control of the United states
Government, and (2) falls within any of the categories set forth
in section 1.5 of the Order (including: intelligence sources or
methods; cryptology; military plans; and vulnerabilities or
capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans
relating to the national security), may be classified by an
original classification authority who determines that the
unauthorized disclosure of such information reasonably could be
expected to result in damage to the national security. Where
such damage would be “serious”, the information may be classified
as SECRET. Where such damage would be “exceptionally grave”,. the
information may be classified as TOP SECRET. Access to
classified information at any level may be further restricted
through compartmentation in SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
(SCT) categories. Dissemination of classified information at any
level may also be restricted through caveats such as NOFORN (Not
Releasable to Foreign Nationals) or ORCON (Dissemination and
Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator), and was
formerly likewise restricted through the caveats NOCONTRACT (Not
Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants) and WNINTEL
(Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved) .

5. Defendant HANSSEN held TOP SECRET clearances
continuously from the time he joined the FBI in 1976, and was

indoctrinated for access to a variety of SCI programs.


splines oc

the loading.

62. Between on or about Tuesday, October 31, 1989, and on
or about Friday, November 3,. 1989, defendant HANSSEN retrieved
from the “ELLIS” dead drop site in the Eastern District of
Virginia a package from the KGB containing $55,000 cash and a
computer diskette. The diskette contained a letter. conveying
regards from the KGB Chairman and notifying defendant HANSSEN
that $50,000 had been deposited into his escrow account in
Moscow. The diskette also provided a new accommodation address,
and instructions on how to inform the KGB which materials should
be opened by the KGB in Washington, D.C., and which should go to
the Center. It also made extensive requests for additional
information concerning particular United States intelligence
activities targeting the Soviet Union.

The December 1989 Dead Drop Exchange

63.- On or about Wednesday, December 20, 1989, defendant
HANSSEN placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated
signal site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged
time and location.

64. On or about the following Monday, December 25, 1989,
defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the “BOB” dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a

package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (*D-17”) and

38


efforts against certain United States nuclear weapons
capabilities, bearing the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON,
which analysis directly concerned early warning systems and
other means of defense or retaliation against large scale
attack.

(b) A TOP SECRET/SCI/NOFORN document entitled
“Compendium of Future Intelligence requirements: Volume II”,
dated September 1987, prepared for the Director of Central
Intelligence by the Staff of the Intelligence Producers
Council, containing a comprehensive listing of specific
current intelligence information, including information
about military capabilities and preparedness, sought by the
United States regarding the Soviet Union and other nations.

(c) A TOP SECRET comprehensive historical FBI review
of allegations from recruitments and defectors over a period
of years that the Soviet intelligence services had
penetrated the FBI, which identified Soviet recruitments and
defectors with specificity, and described particular
information they provided. It contained the following
warning:

IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THIS DOCUMENT,
THE UTMOST CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ITS HANDLING. THE
CONTENTS INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SENSITIVE SOURCE
ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF PENETRATION OF THE FBI BY
THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH
WOULD COMPROMISE HIGHLY SENSITIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS AND METHODS. ACCESS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

26


:
:
i

in New York, New York. In or about August 1987, he returned to

Washington, D.C., where he served in a variety of FBI assignments

until February 18, 2001.

3. Upon entering on duty with the FBI on January 12, 1976,
defendant HANSSEN signed an Oath of Office in which he swore
that: “I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties
of the office on which I am. about to enter. . So help me God.”
That same day, he signed the FBI Pledge for Law Enforcement
Officers, in which he pledged, in part, as follows:

Humbly recognizing the responsibilities entrusted to
me, . . . . I accept the obligation in connection with
my assignments to . . . consider the information,
coming into my knowledge by virtue of my position as a
sacred trust, to be used solely for official purposes.
- . In the performance of my duties and assignments,
I shall not engage in unlawful and unethical practices
+ + . . While occupying the status of a law enforcement
officer or at any other time subsequent thereto, I
shall not seek to benefit personally because of my
knowledge of any confidential matter which has come to
my attention. I am aware of the serious
responsibilities of my office and in the performance of

my duties . . . . I shall wage vigorous warfare against
the enemies of my country, of its laws, and of its
principles; . . . I shall always be loyal to my duty,

my organization, and my country.
4. Executive Order 12958 and its predecessor orders

establish that information-in any form that (1) is owned by,


ie diskette, defendant HANSSEN provided information about
luesitied technical and operational matters, including: the fact
that the National Security Agency was reading the communications
of a specific foreign country, and the specific methods used to
do so, which information was classified TOP SECRET/SCI, related
“to the national defense, and directly concerned communications
intelligence; and the fact that the FBI was initiating a “dangle”
operation against the Soviets at a particular named United States
military facility, which information was classified SECRET and
related to the national defense. On this diskette, defendant
HANSSEN also discussed communications plans, and suggested how
the Soviet Union could benefit from a thorough study of the
period of Chicago’s history when the city was governed by Mayor
Richard J. Daley.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $20,000 cash and a message
welcoming him back and advising that the next exchange would be
at the “GRACE” dead drop site.

The October 1991 Dead Drop. Exchange

81. On or about. Tuesday, October 1, 1991, defendant HANSSEN
placed a call-out signal for the KGB at a pre-designated signal
site to schedule a dead drop operation at a pre-arranged time and
location.

82. On or about the following Monday, October 7, 1991,

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targeting a particular category of Soviet communications, which
information was classified TOP SECRET/SCI, related to the

national defense, and directly concerned communications

intelligence.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing a letter and the “MASINT”’
document that defendant HANSSEN had previously provided to the
KGB and had asked the KGB to return to him. In the letter, the
KGB described its two prior failed efforts to return the “MASINT”
document to defendant HANSSEN, and promised to pass money to him

the next time.

The August 1989 Dead Drop Operation

55. On or about Tuesday, August 1, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
placed two simultaneous call-out signals for the KGB at pre-
designated signal sites to schedule a dead drop operation at a
pre-arranged time and location.

56. On or about Monday, August 7, 1989, defendant HANSSEN
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the “CHARLIE”
dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (*“D-14”) and
five rolls of undeveloped film. The film depicted the contents
of a highly-restricted TOP SECRET/SCI analysis, dated May 1987,

of the Soviet intelligence threat to.a specific and named highly-

34.


discussed in detail communications plans and recontact
procedures. It read, in part:

Dear Friend:

Congratulations on Your promotion. We wish You all the
very best in Your life and career.

We appreciate Your sympathy for some difficulties our
people face - Your friendship and understanding are
very important to us. Of course You are right, no
system is perfect and we do understand this.

Speaking about the systems. We don’t see any problem
for the system of our future communications in regard
to this new circumstances of Yours. Though we can’t

but regret that our contacts may be not so regular as
before, like You said.

We believe our current commo plan - though neither
perfect - covers ruther [sic] flexibly Your needs: You
may have a. contact with us anytime You want after
staying away as long as You have to. So, do Your new
job, make Your trips, take Your time. _The commo plan
we have will still be working. We'll keep covering the
active call out signal site no matter how long it’s
needed. And we’ll be in a ready-to-go mode to come
over to the drop next in turn whenever You are ready:
that is when You are back home and decide to

U communicate. All You’1l have to do is to put Your call
out signal, just as now. And You have two addresses to
use to recontact us only if the signal sites for some
reason don’t work or can’t be used. . . . But in any
case be sure: You may have a contact anytime because
the active call out site is always covered according to
the schedule no matter how long you’ve been away. . -

ee

Thank You and good luck.
Sincerely, a

ee

The KGB particularly ndant HANSSEN to “give .us some

good leads to possible "among “interesting people in

the right places.” d for information about a


believed at the time to be a KGB Line KR officer in New York

City, information on technical means of Soviet intelligence

a

transcript of a Counterintelligence Group meeting, and
information on several other classified matters.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from a dead drop site in
the Eastern District of Virginia a package from the KGB
containing a diamond valued at $24,720 and a letter. In the
letter, the KGB advised that $50,000 had been deposited in
defendant HANSSEN’s escrow account. The letter also expressed
gratitude to him from the KGB Chairman (Vladimir A. Kryuchkov) .
The letter also discussed communications procedures, security
measures, a personal meeting, and passports. It also asked him
to provide information about classified technical operations in
the Soviet Union, agent network details, allies’ sources, FBI
programs, past cases, and a certain missile technology.

The November 1988 Mailing

45. On or about November 30, 1988, defendant HANSSEN mailed
an envelope to the KGB, addressed to accommodation address °A” in
the Eastern District of Virginia and containing a computer
diskette ("D-9”). The envelope bore a return address of °G.

Robertson, Baker’s Photo” and was postmarked in Washington, D.c.

The diskette contained information about a number of classified

matters.



18. On or about August 7, 1986, defendant HANSSEN mailed a
letter to the KGB addressed to the residence of the Soviet
Embassy official Degtyar in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The typed letter read as follows:

I found the site empty. Possibly I had the time
wrong. I work from memory. My recollection was for
you to fill before 1:00 a.m. TI believe Viktor Degtyar
was in the church driveway off Rt. 123, but I did not
know how he would react to an approach. My schedule
was tight to make this at all. Because of my work, I
had to synchronize explanations and flights while not
leaving a pattern of absence or travel that could later
be correlated with communication times. This is
difficult dnd expensive.

I will call the number you gave me on 2/24, 2/26
or 2/28 at 1:00 a.m., EDST. Please plan filled
signals. Empty sites bother me. I like to know before
I commit myself as I’m sure you do also. Let’s not use
the original site so early at least until the seasons
change. Some type of call-out signal to you when I
have a package or when I can receive one would be
useful. Also, please be specific about dates, e.g.,
2/24. Scheduling is not simple for me because of
frequent travel and wife. Any ambiguity multiplies the
problems. .

My security concerns may seem excessive. I
believe experience has shown them to be necessary. I
am much safer if you know little about me. Neither of
us are children about these things. Over time, I can
cut your losses rather than become one.

Ramon
P.S. Your “thank you” was deeply appreciated.

According to the established “6” coefficient, the dates 2/24,
2/26, and 2/28 actually referred to August 18, 20, and 22.
19. On or about August 18, 1986, defendant HANSSEN placed a

call to the telephone number given in the KGB’s Washington Times

- advertisement, and spoke to a KGB officer. The latter portion of

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I. have drawn together material for you now over a
lengthy period. It is somewhat variable in import.
Some were selected as being merely instructive rather
than urgently important. I think such instructive
insights often can be quite as valuable or even more
valuable long-term because they are widely applicable
rather than narrow. Others are of definite value
immediately.

My position. has been most frustrating. I knew Mr.
Gusev was in eminent [sic] danger and had no effective
way of communicating in time. JI knew microphones of an
unknown origin were detected even earlier and had no
regular way of communicating even that. This needs to
be rectified if I am to be as effective as I can be.
No one answered my signal at Foxhall.. Perhaps you
occasionally give up on me. Giving up on me is a
mistake. I have proven inveterately loyal and willing
to take grave risks which even could cause my death,
only remaining quiet in times of extreme uncertainty.
So far my ship has successfully navigated the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune.

I ask you to help me survive.

On meeting out of the country, it simply is not
practical for me. I must answer too many questions
from family, friends, and government plus it is a
cardinal sign of a spy. You have made it that way
because of your policy. Policies are constraints,
constraints breed patterns. Patterns are noticed.
Meeting in this country is not really that hard to
manage, but I am loath to do so not because it is risky
but because it involves revealing my identity. That
insulation has been my best protection against betrayal
by someone like me working from whatever motivation, a
Bloch or a Philby. (Bloch was such a shnook. ... I
almost hated protecting him, but then he was your
friend, and there was your illegal I wanted to protect.
If our guy sent to Paris had balls or brains both would
have been dead meat. Fortunately for.you he had
neither. He was your good luck of the draw. He was
the kind who progressed by always checking with those
above and tying them to his mistakes. The French said,
“Should we take them down?” He’ went all wet. ‘He'd
mnever made a decision before, why start then. It was
that close. His kindred spirits promoted him. Things
are the same the world over, eh?)

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defendant HANSSEN and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
a at the “GRACE” dead drop site in the District of Columbia. -

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a

package for the KGB containing a computer diskette (*D-25”) and a

document entitled “The US Double-Agent Program: Management Review

and Policy Recommendations”, dated September 10, 1991, and
classified SECRET. The diskette contained information about

: various classified recruitment operations. Defendant Hanssen

also identified by name a particular “old friend” whom he
suggested the KGB try to recruit; he explained that the man was a
\ military officer who had recently been told he would not be
promoted.

Defendant HANSSEN retrieved from the dead drop site a
package from the KGB containing $12,000 cash and a KGB computer
diskette reading, in part, as follows:

Dear friend:

Thanks for the package of 02.13. [The] materials are
very promising, we intend to work on the scenario so
wisely suggested by You. And the magical history tour
to Chicago was mysteriously well timed.. Have You ever
thought of foretelling the things? After Your
retirement for instance in some sort of Your own
“Cristall [sic] Ball and Intelligence Agency” (CBIA) ?

There are always so many people in this world eager to
get a glimpse of the future.

But now back to where we belong. There have been many
4 important developments in our country lately. ‘So many
that we’d like to reassure You once again. Like we

said: we’ve done all in order that none of those events
ever affects Your security and our ability to maintain
the operation with You. And of course there can be no

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|
a

Virginia. The envelope, which was addressed by hand, bore a
handwritten return address of “J. Baker, Box 1101, Houston, TX”
and was postmarked Washington, D.C. The envelope contained a
handwritten note reading: “— @ BOB on 6/22; T. DEVICE APPROVED
6/16, COMING SOON”. Using the established en coefficient, the
reference to "6/22" actually refers to December 16- In stating
“T. DEVICE APPROVED”, defendant HANSSEN was reporting that
approval had been given for a device the FBI was to implant in
the technical surveillance operation against a Soviet person in
the United States about which defendant HANSSEN had first
reported to the KGB on August 19, 1991, which information was
classified SECRET and related to the national defense.

84. On or about Monday, December 16, 1991, defendant

HANSSEN and the KGB/SVR carried out an exchange operation at the

. “BOB” dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Defendant HANSSEN placed at the dead drop site a
package for the KGB/SVR containing a computer diskette ("“D-26"”)
and several documents relating to the national defense,
including:

(a) A SECRET document, entitled “The KGB’s First Chief
Directorate: Structure, Functions, and Methods”, produced by
the Director of Central Intelligence Counterintelligence
Center and dated November 1990, bearing the caveats NOFORN

NOCONTRACT ORCON. It also bore the following notices:



contact KGB personnel in Vienna, Austria, in the event of an
emergency. The “NANCY” address was the residence of KGB Line PR
officer Boris M. Malakhov in Alexandria, Virginia. The KGB
instructed defendant HANSSEN to mis-spell Malakhov’s name as
“Malkow.”

21. On or about August 19, 1986, deferidant HANSSEN mailed
an envelope to the KGB addressed to the residence of the Soviet
Embassy official Degtyar in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a handwritten address and the return address:
“Ramon Garcia, 125 Main St, Falls Church VA”. Inside the
envelope was a handwritten note: “RECEIVED $10,000. RAMON.”

The September 1987 Operations

22. on or about September 8, 1987, defendant HANSSEN mailed
an envelope to the KGB, bearing a handwritten address to ‘B.N.
MALKOW” at the “NANCY” address in the Eastern District of
‘virginia. Inside the envelope was the following typed letter:

Dear Friends:

No, I have decided. It must be on my original
terms or not at all. I will not meet abroad or here.
I will not maintain lists of sites or modified
equipment. I-will help you when I.can, and in time we
will devetop methods of efficient communication.
Unless a [sic] see an abort signal on our post from you
by 3/16, I will mail my contact a valuable package
timed to arrive on 3/18. . I-will await your signal and
package to be in place before 1:00 pm on 3/22 or
alternately the following three weeks, same day and
time. If my terms are unacceptable then place no
signals and withdraw my contact. Excellent work by him
has ensured this channel is secure for now. My regards

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