### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 770 -CV
Appellan t, Ross F eather ston // Cross-Appellants, Robert N. We ller, Tom Ke ilm an & Son Auctioneer s, Inc., Bu d Keilm an, and Tom Ke ilm an
v. Appellees, RobertN. Weller , Tom Ke ilm an & Son Auctioneer s, Inc., Bud Ke ilm an and Tom Ke ilm an//Cross-A ppellee Ross F eather ston

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN30335 3 , HO NORAB LE GISELA D. TRIANA-DO Y AL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Ros s F e a the rs ton

a pp e a ls f ro m a jur y ve rd ic t on

se veral c la ims he br ou g ht a g a ins t To m K e il ma

n& So nA u c ti o n e e r s , I n c . ( “ K e il ma n& So n ” ) , B u d

K e il ma n , T o m K e ilman (collec tively , “the Ke ilmans”), and Robe rt N. Weller. F eathe rston purcha sed a historica l pistol at a Ke ilman & Son auc tion. W hen the pistol’s au t h en t i cit y proved le ss cer

tain than adve rtised, he aske d the Keilmans to re turn his m oney . They ref used, and he sued under

theories of

fra ud, neg lige nt misreprese ntation, neg lige nce, and t he Tex as Deceptive Trade Practice s Act (“ DTPA”). See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41-.63 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008). Fe ather ston recove red
un de r o nly his ne g lig e nc e the or y . He a pp e a ls the qu anti ty of

that r e c ov e ry

a s w e ll a s h is f

a ilure to
re c ov e r a ny thi ngun de r t

he DT PA. Th e Ke ilm ans c ro ss- a pp e a l, a rguin g tha

t F e a therston

sh ou ld2

have r ecove red nothingat all bec ause he ag ree d t o b u y t h e p istol “as is.” We will affirm the tria l
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

I n 2003, Ross Featherston, himself a pr ofessional a uctioneer , lear

ned that Ke ilman & S o nw o u l d

b e a u c t i o n i n g a

p i s t o l t h a th a d

p u r p o rt e d l y b e l o n g e d t o W i l l i a m F
. “ B u f

f a l o B ill ” Cody . Keilman & Son publis hed a pre- auction cata log that contained a descr iption of the pistol and a copy of the pistol’s “prove nance ,” i.e., the c ollection of docume nts that purportedly illust rate d the pistol’s authenticity . The fr ont pa g e of the cata log listed “CONDI TI ONS OF SAL E” for the auc tion t h at i n cl u d edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:

• “The auctionee r assumes no r esponsibility for the a uthenticity

or condition of any item sold.”

• “ Al l me rc ha

nd ise wi ll b e so ld ‘as is, wh e re is’ ‘n o w arr anti e s, no g ua ra nte e s’ in acc ordanc e with the conditions of the sa le.”
Th e c a ta log ’s aff

ir mativ e de sc ri pti on

of the pis tol a s “ B uf

fa lo B ill Cod

y ’s Col t” d i ff er edfr o m t h e m o re ac cu ra t e d es cr i p t i o nt h at Ke i l m an & S o nh adu s edi n an ea rl i er ca t al o g. K e i l m an& S o n h a d p r e v i o u s l y a u c t i o n e d t h e s a m e p i s t o l i n 1 9 9 6 a f t e r a dv e rt i s i n g i ta s “ s u

p p o s e d l y” once be longingto C o dy . Robert Weller purc hased the pistol under that descr iption in 1996, but when he consig ned the pistol back to Ke ilman & Son for inclusion in its 2003 auction he omitted the word “ supposedly ” whe n he desc ribed the pistol in his tra nsmitt al letter. Keilman & Son maintained that omission i n its 2003 pre-a uction cata log a

nd internet “ press re lease s”; the latter simply descr ibed the pistol as having been “ prese nted to Buf falo B ill in 1909.”3 Clin t B a e rm ann , a

n a ntiqu e fi re arm s e xpe rt

wh om t he Ke ilm ans re g ula

rl y hir e d to conduct rese arc h on auction items, penne d the 2003 catalog descr iption of the Cody pistol. Besides examining the prove nance that came with the pistol, Bae r ma nn independe ntly

rese arc hed the pistol’s h i s t o ry i nd et erm i n i n g h o w t o d es cr i b e t h e p i s t o l i nt h e c at al o g. On the day of t he auction, Fe ather ston persona lly inspected the pistol and a copy of its pr ov e na

nc e . T o b id o n th e pis tol , Ke ilm an & Son re qu ir e d F e a the rs ton

to s ig n a “ bid a g re e me nt” and obtain a “ bid car d.” The bid ag ree ment wa s i m p ri nted with “TERMS” that included the following : “I , the purc haser ag ree that items are sold AS I S, W HERE I S a nd with a ll F aults. NO WARR ANTY O R GUARANTEE I S EXPRES SE D OR I MPL I ED AND EACH I TEM I S THE SOL E RESP ONSI BI L I TY OF THE P URCHASER FROM THE MOMENT TH E AUCTI ONEER DECL ARES THE I TEM SOL D.” Si milarly , the bi d car d was imprinted with “Te rms of Sale” that included the f

ollowing: “A ll descriptions of items are believed to be corr ect a s descr ibed by owner . No wa rr anti e s o r gua

ra nte e s e xpre sse d o r i mpl ied on anythi ngso ld at th is s a le . E xami ne ite ms befor e bidding .” The bid car d was a lso imprinted with “SOL D AS I S—W HERE I S.”

The pistol was one of several hundred i tems that Keilman & Son auctioned off on the day in question. W hen the pistol came up for bid, the auctioneer, Tommy Carson, a Keilman & Son employ ee, slowe d the auc tion’s rapid pac e for the first time. Tom Keilman aske d Clint Ba erma nn to s pe a k to the a

ud ie nc e a bo ut the pis tol
. B a e rm ann did so and ma de se ve ra l re pr e se ntatio ns of fa c t, i n cl u d i n g:

• N e b r a s k a

s e n a t o r G e o r g e N o r

r i s g a v e t h e p i s t o l t o C o dy a t a “ B u f f a l o B i l l C o dy D ay” event in 1909.A “ buy e r’ s pr e mium” is a sum that g oe s dir e c tly to the c on sig no r wi tho ut t he a uc tio n h ou se 1 subtractinga commission. 4 • Th e e mpe ro r o f Ja pa n w a s p re se nt whe n Co dy re c e ive d th e pis tol
.

• Cody

used the pistol in his “W ild W est Show” fr om 1909 until 1917.

• The pistol was “the rea l deal. [I t was] Buff alo B ill’s gun.”

• The doc umentary

evidenc e linking the pistol t o Cody “g oes on for ever .”
I n fac t, eac h of these r epre sentation s was either false or unverifie d. Auctionee r Carson a dded repr esentations of his own, saying that “we have t h e d o cumentation and a ll the paper work that g oe s w ithit” and “ [g ]uara nte e y ou wo n’ t fin d one wi th m or e do c ume ntatio n to ba c k it up . G oe s a ll the way back. I t’s the rig ht thing , the rea l de al, and the rig ht kind.” Tom and B ud Keilman stood
near by as B aer mann and Car son made these repr esentations a n d d id n o thing to indicate disag ree ment wi th t he m. Biddingon the pistol beg an immediat el y afte r B aer

mann and Car son spoke. Fe ather ston won the pistol for $22,000, which included a $20,000 b i d and a $2,000 buy er’ s pr e mium. F e a the rs ton ob ta ine d a re c e ipt wh e n he pa id fo r the pis tol that des c ri be d it un qu a lif ie dly 1

a s “ B uf fa lo B ill Cod

y ’s Col t” and c on ta ine d the fo llo wi ng langua g e : “Pur c ha se r a g re e s a bo ve ite ms
wer e sold AS I S, W HERE I S a n d wi t h all faults. No WARRANTY or Gua rante e is expressed or imp l i ed an d eac h item is the sole responsibility of the purc haser

from the MOMEN T the AUCTI ONEER DECL ARES THE I TEM SOL D.”

A few wee ks a f

te r b u yin g th e p is to l, F e a th e r s to nd e c id e d to s e ll it
. H e c o n ta c te d Gr e g Mart in Auc tio ns of San F ra nc isc o, wh ic h h a d e x peri e nc e a uc tio nin g Cod

y -r e late d it e ms.L a te r i nv e sti g a tio ns re ve a le d that oth e r d oc ume nts in t he pr ov e na

nc e we re lik e ly 2 inauthentic as w ell, possibly even f org ed. 5 F e a the rs ton

se nt t he pis tol and its pr ov e na

nc e to Gr e g Ma

rt in Auc tio ns fo r e va luatio n. Gr e g Mart in Au c tio ns e xami ne d th e m and inf or me d F e a the rs ton

that th e pr ov e na

nc e wa s p ro ble matic : it
c on ta ine d a

tr ans po rt a tio n ma

nif e st that pu rport e d to be fr om a Wel ls F arg o e xpre ss c omp any in 1921, but the company

in question actually

went out of business in 1918. As a re sult, the pistol ’s authenticity

was que stionable, and the pistol was wor th only $2,000. 2 Upon lear ning this, F eathe rston tender ed the pistol to Keilman & Son and aske d for
a re fund. Tom Keilman re fused to g ive him one. Keilman infor med Robert Weller of the situation, but Weller declined to g et involved. Fe ather ston ne ver contac ted Weller direc tly , and Weller ne ver too k it up on him se lf to o ff e r F e a the rs ton

a re fu nd of his a uc tio n p ro c e e ds
. I n Aug ust 2003, Featherston sued the K eilmans, Weller, and Ba er m an n for f raud,
n egl i gen ce , n egl i gen t m i s re p re s en t at i o n , an d v i o l at i o n s o f th e DT P A. T h e s u i tp ro ce ed edt h ro u gh trial, thoug h Fe ather st o n n o n s uited Ba erma nn befor e it went to the jury
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 162. The jury found that no defendant had committed fraud or neg lige nt misreprese ntation, but it found that K e ilm an & Son , B ud

Ke ilm an, and

B a e rm ann

ha d a c te d n e g lig e ntl y

and ha d vio late d the DT PA (albe it unknowingly

and unwittingly

). See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50 (West Supp. 2008). I n addition, the jury found t hat W eller had ratified the other de fenda nts’ actions and state ments. The jur y f o u n d , h o w e v e r , t h a tt h o s e d e f e n d an t s h a d

ana f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e t o t h e i r

D T P A v i o l a t ion s, namely that they had noti fi ed Feather ston in writing of the ir relianc e on wr itten repre sentations6

by third parties. See id. § 1 7. 50 6 ( Wes t 20 02 ). Thus , F e a the rs to n re c ov e re d und e r o nly his
n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r

y. The jury calc ulated Fe ather ston’s damag es at $18,000. I t a ssigne d thirty -four perc ent of the re sponsibili ty

for these damag es to Keilman & Son, thirt y -t hree perc ent to Ba erma nn, and thirty -three perc ent to Fe ather ston himself. Bec ause F eathe rston had nonsuited B aer mann, the cour

t
awa rded F eathe rston only

Keilman & Son’s thirty -four -per cent sha re of his damag es, or $6,120. F e a the rs ton

fi le d a mot i o n a s kin g the c ourt

to d isr e g ard

the jur y fi nd ing s o n h is D TPA claims. He a lso filed a motion to modify the final judg ment to include ac tual damag es, pre judgme nt interest, and a

ttorney ’s fe es ag ainst Welle r, Keilm an & Son, and Bud K eilman. The tria l court denied both motions. The Keilmans filed their own m otion to disreg ard jury finding s, arguing that the “a s is” lang uag e in the parties’ contra ct precluded recove ry . The trial court denied that motion
as we ll. Featherston and the K eilmans both appea led.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewthe denial of

a motion to disreg ard jury finding s as a leg al suffic iency challeng e. Se e Ex c e l Co rp . v . M c Do na ld , 223 S.W .3d 5 06, 508 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) . We will sust ai n such a c halleng e only when no more than a sc intill a of e vidence supported the jury ’s finding
. See M errell Dow Pharms., Inc

. v. Havner , 953 S.W .2d 706, 711 (T e x. 19 97 ). Mo re tha

n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e e xists wh e n r e a so na ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le could differ i n t heir c onclusions. Id . We reviewthe evidenc e in a lig ht that tends to support the jury ’s finding and disreg ard a ll evidence and inf ere nces to the c ontrary

unless doing so w ould be
unrea sonable. See City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).7 We reviewthe denial of

a motion to modif

y a j u dg ment for a

buse of discr etion. See W agner v. Edlund , 2 29 S.W. 3d 87 0, 87 9 (Tex
. App .— Dalla s 2 00 7, pe t. d e nie d) . U nd e r t his standard, w e may

only reve rse if the trial court acted unreasona bly or i n an ar

bitrary manner , without ref ere nce to guiding r

ules or princ iples. See B eaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller , 806 S.W .2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). A trial court does not a buse its discretion if probative e vidence supports its decision. Se e Hi sa w & As so c s. Ge n. Con tra c tor s, In c . v . Co rn e rston e Con c re te Sy s. , 115 S.W .3d 16, 20-21 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2003, pet. denied).

DI SCU SSIO N Featherston ’s Points of Error

On a pp e a l, F e a therston

ra ise s si x poin ts o f e rr or that r e du c e to t

hr e e iss ue s: (1 ) whe the r F e a the rs ton

sh ou ld h a ve re c ov e re d on his DT PA c la ims ; (2 ) wh e the r F e a the rs ton sh ou ld have r ecove red f

rom Weller g iven Weller’s ra tification of the other defe ndants’ ac ts; and (3) whe ther F e a the rs ton

sh ou ld h a ve re c ov e re d pre jud g me nt int e re st on his ne g lig e nc e c la im. We a dd re ss t he se issues in turn.
Fe ath e rst on’ s D TP A Cla im The pa rties do not dispute the j ury ’s findi ng that the Keilmans eng ag ed in a “false, misleading , or dec eptive ac t or prac tice” that could support rec overy under the DTPA. Rather, the pa rt ie s d isput e whe the r t

he Ke ilm ans e sta

bli sh e d a n a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e to F e a the rs ton ’s DT PA claims. Fe ather ston claims that the y did not. Be cause the jury found that they

did, Fea therston ca

n8

on ly pr e va il on thi s iss ue if he sh ow s that the jur y ’s fi nd ing wa s su

pp or te d by no mor e tha

n a sc int ill a of evide nce. See H

avner , 953 S.W .2d at 711. Section 17.506 of the DTPA pr ovides an a ffirma t i v e def ense to DTPA c laims if a de fe nd ant:
pr ov e s t hat befor e c on summatio n o f t he tr ans a c tio n h e g a ve re a so na ble and tim e ly written notice to the plaintiff of t he defenda nt’s relianc e on . . . . written information relating to the pa

rticular g oods or servic e in que stion obtaine d from anothe r sourc e if the inf or matio n w a s f

a lse or ina c c ur a te and

the de fe nd ant d id no t kn owand c ou ld not rea sonably

have know n of the fa lsity or inac cura cy

of the infor

mation.
Te x. B us . & Com . Co de Ann. § 1 7. 50 6( a )( 2) . H e re the jury fo un d th a t th e Ke ilm ans , Tommy Carson, and Clint Ba erma nn g av e Fe ather ston written notice of the ir relianc e on wr itten i n fo rm at i o np ro v i d edb y

o t h er s . Fe at h er s t o n ar gu es t h at t h e ev i d en ce d i d n o ts u p p o rt t h i s fi n d i n g. We disag ree . The Ke ilmans included the C ody pistol’s provena nce in their pre -auc tion catalogand display ed it along side the pistol at the auction. This constitutes m o re t h an a scinti lla of evide nce that the Keilmans g ave Fe ather ston w ritten notice of their relianc e on the prove nance . Fe ather ston seems to ar g ue that 17.506 re quires a f ormalistic rec itation—something a l o n g t h e lines of a written disclaimer

stating, “ we a

re relying on written i nformation from another source .” The statute, howeve r, re quires only

“wr itt en notice.” We be lieve that the c opies of the doc uments in the provena nce could have c onstitut ed “written notice.” Cf. id
. § 1.201(b)( 43) (W est 2009) (a ny thing intentionally

reduc ed to tang ible form qualifies as “w ritten”). I n any event, whe ther the pr ovenanc e constituted written notice wa s a question of fa ct for the jury to decide. See O ’Ferral v. Coolidge ,9

228 S.W .2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1950) (notice is f act question unless ordinary minds could not differ a s to proper conclusion t o be drawn from evidence ). B eca use we cannot sa

y it was unrea sonable for the jur y to c on c lude tha

t th e pr ov e na

nc e c on sti tut e d w ri tte n n oti c e , th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y up he ld the jury ’s finding
. See H avner , 953 S.W .2d at 711. Cha ng ing tack, F e a the rs ton c ite s Glassman v. Pe na , No. 08-02-00541- CV, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 10643, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec
. 18, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.), for the proposition that defe ndants ca n only invoke sec tion 17.506 if they we re “m er el y actingas conduits of information provide d to them by others.” Even if Glassman ha d p re c e de nti a l va lue in this Cou rt , i t d o es n ot actually stand for that proposition. The contrac t at issue in Glassman happene d to state that the def endants ther e we re only

actingas conduits, but that fac t was irre levant to the court’s holding
. Se e id . at *13-14.

F e a the rs ton

g oe s o n to c la im, wi tho ut ar g ume nt or c itatio n, that de fe nd ants c an o nly invoke sec tion 17.506 if their dece ptive repr esentations are based “solely” on wr itten information from others. This a

rg ument is w aived beca

use it is unsupported by

argument or citation to rele vant authority
. Se e Swe e d v . Ci ty of E l P as o , 195 S.W .3d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). But e ven if it wer e not, sec tion 17.506 plainly does not include this require ment. We th er ef ore decline to impos e it. See City of Rock wall v. Hughes , 24 6 S.W. 3d 62 1, 62 5- 26 (T e x. 20 08 ) ( c ourt s must ge nera lly

g ive statutes their plain mea ning)
. Finally , Fe ather ston argues that 17.506 shields defe ndants from liability only if the third-par ty written information on which they rely is the “sole” producing cause of the pl aintiff’s ha rm . T he statut e state s:Th e Ke ilm ans bo re the burd e n o f e sta bli sh inge ve ry

e le me nt o f t

he ir a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e 3 under se ction 17.506. See Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy , 996 S.W .2d 873, 879-80 (Te x . 1999). Th is b ur de n d id n ot req ui re the m to e sta bli shthe a

bs e nc e of pr od uc ingc a us e s th a t c ou ld c re a te liability despite that defe nse. Section 17.506(b) makes clea r that the exis tence of a n affirmative de fe ns e un de r t

he se c tio n a

nd the e xiste nc e of

pr od uc ingc a us e s n ot su bjec t to it a

re tw o s e pa

rate qu e sti on s. 10 I n asser ting a defe nse under S u b division (1), (2), or ( 3) of Subsec tion (a) of Section 17.506 above, the defe ndant shall prove the [t hird-par ty ] written information wa s a producingcause of the a lleg ed dama g e [to plainti ff] . A finding of one producingcause does not bar r ecove ry if other co n d uct of the de fenda nt not the subject of a

defe nsive finding under Subdivis ion ( 1), (2), or (3) of Subsection (a) of Section 17.506 above w as a pr oducing cause of dama g es of the pla intiff.
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.506(b) ( emphasis adde d). We interpre t this provisi on to mean that even if

some of a defe ndant’s injurious conduct is subject to the a ffirmative defe nse of section 17.506, the plaintiff can sti ll rec over if the defendant has eng ag ed in other injurious conduc t that is not. Here, the jury

expli citly and rea sonably found that the wr itten information the Keilmans relied on w as a pr oducing cause of F eathe rston’s har m. The jury

did not, however , expli citly find that any producingcause exis ted th at wa s n o t s imilarly subject to the af

firmative de fense of
s ec t i o n1 7
. 5 0 6
. As p l ai n t i ff , Fe at h er s t o nb o re t h e b u rd en o f p ro cu ri n g s u ch a f i n d i n g. Un de r t

he se 3 circ umstances, we cannot sa y the trial cour

t erre d in a

pply ing section 17.506 and denying r ecove ry under the DTPA.

I n sum, Feath er s t o n has not demonstrate d that the jury ’s DTPA finding s were unsupported by

more than a

scintilla of eviden ce . W e t here fore aff irm the trial cour

t’s denial of F e a the rs ton ’s mot ion

to d isr e g ard

the jur y ’s DT PA f

ind ing s.11

Featherston ’s Recov ery f rom Weller Fe ather ston argues that re g ardle ss of whether he re cover ed fr om the Keilmans under the DT PA, he sh ou ld h a ve re c ov e re d f ro m We lle r on bo th his DT PA and ne g lig e nc e c la ims be c a us e Weller ratifie d the other de fenda nts’ harmful a cts. We disag ree . Reg ardingrec ov er y u n d er the DTPA, as just discussed, the jury rea sonably

found that th e Keilm ans a

nd B a e rm ann

ha d a n a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e to F e a the rs ton ’s DT PA c la ims
. Fe ather ston cites no authority indicating th at W el l er s hould never theless be liable f

or the other defe ndants’ DTPA-r elated a cts. I n fac t, suc h a result would conflict with established c ase la w. See De W itt v . H arris Cou nty , 904 S.W .2d 6 5 0 , 6 5 4 (Tex. 1995) (primar y wrong doer’ s aff

irmative de fe ns e sh ie lds se c on da

ry wr on g do e rs fr om d e ri vativ e lia bil ity ); W i l l i s v . D o n n e l ly , 199 S.W .3d 262, 273 (Tex. 2006) (ratification is form of de rivative liability). Ac c or d G re e n v . A me ric an Ge n. In s. Co. , 354 S.W .2d 616, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.—F ort Worth 1962, writ ref’ d n.r.e.) (insurer cannot be derivatively

liable for ha

rm ca used by insured if insure d is acquitted of liability). Reg ardingrec overy

under ne g lige nce, the trial court di d not abuse its discretion in deny ing F e a th e r s to n an y r e c o v e r y f r o m We ll e r . T h e ju

r y e xp r e s s ly f

o u n d th a t We ll e r h a d zero
re sp on sib ili ty

fo r F e a the rs ton ’s d a

m a g e s . T h a

t f i n d i n g w a s r e a s o n a

ble g ive n We lle r’ s atte nu a te d r ole in the dispute. Thus, denying r ecove ry from Weller on the ba sis of that fin d i n g was proper. See T ex . C i v . P ra c. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.013(a ) (West 2008) (a defe ndant “is liable to a c laimant
o n l y fo r t h e p er ce n t age o f t h e d am age s fo u n d b y t h e t ri er o f f ac teq u al t o t h at d ef

en d an t ’s p er ce n t age of re sponsibili ty ”).12

Fe ath e rst on’ s Re c ov e ry

of Pre jud gment Inte re st Finally , Fe ather ston argues that the trial c ourt err ed in not awa rding him prejudg ment interest. We disag ree . The a war d of prejudgme nt interest is discretionar y with the trial court. See W ilmer-Hutchins Inde

p. Sch. Dist. v. Smiley , 97 S.W .3d 702, 7 0 6 (T ex . App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied ). I n case s other than wr ong ful death, personal injury , or prope rty damag e, g ener al principles of equity deter

mine whether prejudg ment interest is war rante d. See J

ohnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc . v. Kenne co Ene rgy, Inc

. , 962 S.W .2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998). Her e, the tria l court did not ab u s e i t s d i s cr et i o n i n d ec i d i n g t h at eq u i t y d i d n o td i ct at e a naw ar d

o f p re j u d gm en ti n t er es t
. T h o u gh the trial cour

t did not enumerate its reasons for ref using to a war d prejudg ment interest, the r ecor d contains ample e vidence on which that dec ision could have been r ationally based. F or example, the Ke ilm ans te sti fi e d w ith ou t op po sit ion that th e y ste a df a stl y be lie ve d th e pis tol a t is su e wa s a c tua lly Cody ’s . I n keepingwith that fac t, the jury found that the Ke ilmans did not deceive F eathe rston knowing ly

or intentionally
. I n such circumstance s, we cannot say that equity

absolutely

compelled
an a wa rd of pr e jud g me nt i nte re st.
The Keilm ans’ Point

of Error Th e Ke ilm ans c onte nd

that F e a the rs ton

a g re e d to purc ha se th e Co dy pis tol “ a s is , wher e is.” The y

further con t en d t h at the trial cour t erre d in not declar ing, a s a matter of law, that Fe at h er s t o n ’s “a s i s ” p u rc h as e p re v en t edh i m fr o m re co v er i n g an y t h i n g. Be cause the Keilmans soug ht to avoid l i abil ity on the basis of “ as is” contr act lang uag e, they

bore the burden of

establishing that such lang uag e occ urre d in a contra ct that bound the par ties. See Compass Bank v. M FP Fin. Servs., I

nc. , 152 S.W .3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—DallasI ndeed, even at the jury char g e conf

ere nce, which occ urre d afte r both sides had pre sented 4 a ll the ir e vid e nc e , c on fu sio n e xiste d a s to wh ic h d oc ume nt o r d oc ume nts c on sti tut e d th e c on tr a c t. One pa rty even sug g ested, without obv i o u s dissent, that the parties may have ha d more than one c on tr a c t. 13 20 05 , pe t. d e nie d) (p art

y a sse rt inga ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e be ars burd e n o f p le a din g and pr ov ingits elements). T he re cord, how ever , re v ea ls no ex press c ontrac t betwee n the par ties. Nor did either party establish the exist ence of such a contract at trial. The Ke ilmans failed to obtain a jury finding on the matter. Ma

ny documents and or al exchang es we re at pl ay h er e, and the Ke ilmans never
e sta bli sh e d e xac tly

wh ic h o f t

he m (i f any

) c on sti tut e d the c on tr a c t be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. As a

re su lt, 4
we c ann ot d e te rm ine that “ a s is ” langua g e c on tr oll e d th e sa le of the pis tol
. F ur the rm or e , w hil e the Ke ilm ans may have dis c la ime d th e pis tol ’s auth e nti c ity in writ t en d o cuments, t hey also allowed a ffirmative repr esentations of authenticity to be made imm e diate ly

be fo re the pis tol ’s sa le
. Un de r su c h c ir c ums tanc e s, it wa s pr op e r f or the tr ia l c ourt

to submit a jury question on whether Fe ather ston purchase d the pistol “as is.” See H yundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez , 995 S.W .2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1999) (court should submit to jury all questions raised by evidenc e). The jury

answe red that Fea

therston did not a g ree to pur chase “as is.” Unless evidenc e conclusively

established that F eathe rston purcha sed the pist ol “as is,” the court could not disreg ard the jury ’s finding
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 301 (court may disreg ard jury finding only if it has no support i nt h e e v i d e n c e )
. A s m e n t i o n e d , b e c a u s e o f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n tr e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e g ar d i n g a u t h e n t i c i t y, the evidenc e did not so establish. The Ke ilmans’ point of err or is overr uled.14 CO NC LU SION The re cord co n t ains substantial evidenc e supporting the jury ’s finding s that Fe ather ston should recove r nothing under the DTPA and nothing from Weller. I n ad d i t i o n , the Keilmans did not d em o n s t ra te that Fe ather ston’s rec overy was ba rre d as a matter of law

by contra ctual “a s is” lang uag e. We there fore aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Jul y

3, 2009