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*********************************************** 
IN RE TEAGAN K.-O.*

(SC 20245)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.**

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion

to dismiss the petition filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner of

Children and Families, to adjudicate T, the child of the respondent

parents, neglected. T was born in Florida, and, after the Florida Department of Children and Families took emergency custody of T and contacted the Connecticut Department of Children and Families to report

that the respondent mother had given birth to T, the petitioner filed the

neglect petition at issue. Shortly thereafter, the Florida Department of

Children and Families filed in a Florida court a motion to transfer

jurisdiction to the Connecticut court on the basis of the family’s history

with service providers and child protective services in Connecticut. A

Florida magistrate issued a report and a recommendation to grant the

motion. The magistrate concluded that Connecticut was a more convenient forum, in part because the petitioner wanted to add T to a pending

dependency case in Connecticut filed in connection with a petition for

termination of the respondents’ parental rights with respect to T’s older

sibling. The Florida court ratified and adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to transfer jurisdiction to the Connecticut court. Subsequently, the father filed a motion to dismiss the pending neglect petition

filed in Connecticut on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The trial court denied that motion, and the father appealed, claiming,

inter alia, that, regardless of whether a petition to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with respect to another child of the respondents

was pending in Connecticut when they relocated to Florida, a Connecticut court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over T’s neglect

petition because any neglect of her would not occur in Connecticut.

The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the determination by a Florida

court that Connecticut would be a more appropriate forum provided a

proper basis for the Connecticut trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction

under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA), which has been adopted by both Connecticut and Florida.

Held:

1. The trial court’s denial of the father’s motion to dismiss the neglect

petition was immediately appealable because, although that decision

was an interlocutory ruling, it constituted an appealable final judgment

under the second prong of the test for determining the appealability of

interlocutory orders set forth in State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27), as there

was a colorable claim that delaying a determination with respect to the

issue of jurisdiction would cause irreparable harm to the parent-child

relationship and the best interest of the child; the Connecticut court’s

exercise of jurisdiction necessarily would have some adverse impact

on the nature and extent of visitation and, in turn, the father’s ability

to bond with T, and, if an appeal after an adverse decision on the merits

resulted in a determination that the Connecticut court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition, the issue of neglect undoubtedly would have been relitigated in Florida, and such a delayed resolution

of that issue would have impacted T’s interests in permanency and stability.

2. The trial court improperly denied the father’s motion to dismiss the neglect

petition because the failure to satisfy the statute (§ 46b-121 (a) (1))

imposing a territorial limitation on jurisdiction over proceedings concerning allegedly neglected children prevented a Connecticut court from

exercising jurisdiction over the petition, irrespective of whether the

conditions for exercising jurisdiction under the UCCJEA were satisfied,

as there were no allegations from which this court reasonably could

infer that T likely would be neglected in this state: courts from other

states that have considered whether a territorial limitation dictated by

statute or common law must be satisfied even though the matter was
a child custody proceeding subject to the UCCJEA or its predecessor

have all indicated that the respective state’s territorial limitation must

be satisfied; moreover, the purpose of the UCCJEA, which is to determine which state having jurisdiction will be permitted to exercise it

when two or more states have concurrent jurisdiction, indicates that

the UCCJEA does not permit the exercise of jurisdiction when the

jurisdictional requirements of a statute specific to the matter at hand

are not met, and, because the UCCJEA does not confer subject matter

jurisdiction but, instead, determines whether a court may exercise jurisdiction or must defer to another state’s jurisdiction, it provided no

impediment to statutes, such as § 46b-121, that determine the scope of

jurisdiction; furthermore, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, giving effect

to the territorial limitation set forth in § 46b-121 will not impede the

operation of the UCCJEA by creating a possible scenario under which

Florida lacks home state or significant connection jurisdiction, and

Connecticut has significant connection jurisdiction under the UCCJEA

but is prevented from exercising its jurisdiction because of the territorial

limitation applicable to neglect proceedings, as Connecticut would not

have significant connection jurisdiction if the territorial limitations under

§ 46b-121 were not met, and, even if Connecticut would have significant

connection jurisdiction under the facts of the present case, Florida would

be permitted to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA’s temporary

emergency jurisdiction provision.

(Three justices concurring in part and dissenting

in part in one opinion)

Argued March 27, 2019—officially released June 24, 2020***

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child neglected,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

New London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, where the

court, Hon. Michael A. Mack, judge trial referee, denied

the respondent father’s motion to dismiss, and the respondent father appealed. Reversed; decision directed.

Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, with

whom was Don M. Hodgdon, for the appellant (respondent father).

Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, with whom,

on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, Clare

Kindall, solicitor general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. This case requires us to consider

whether a Connecticut trial court has subject matter

jurisdiction over a petition to adjudicate a newborn

child neglected on the basis of ‘‘predictive neglect’’1

when the parents relocated to another state shortly

before the child’s birth, purportedly with no intention

of returning, and that state determined that Connecticut

would be a more convenient forum to adjudicate this

matter. The respondent father appeals from the trial

court’s decision denying his motion to dismiss the petition filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, to adjudicate the respondents’ child,

Teagan K.-O., neglected. The father contends that, irrespective of the fact that a petition to terminate the

respondents’ parental rights with respect to another

child of theirs was pending in Connecticut when they

relocated to Florida, a Connecticut trial court cannot

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Teagan’s

neglect petition because any neglect of her would never

occur in this state. The commissioner contends that

the determination by a Florida court that this state

would be a more appropriate forum provided a proper

basis for the Connecticut trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which has been

adopted by both states.2 See General Statutes §§ 46b115 through 46b-115gg; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.501 et seq.

(West 2012). We agree with the father’s jurisdictional

argument. The trial court, therefore, improperly denied

his motion to dismiss the neglect petition.

The record reveals the following facts that are undisputed for the purposes of the present appeal.3 The

respondents, both raised in Connecticut, have a lengthy

history of involvement with the Connecticut Department of Children and Families. Each had been placed

in the department’s custody as a teenager due to various

mental health issues. The respondents’ involvement

with the department continued after they had children.

The respondent mother’s first child, A, born in Connecticut in 2012, was conceived with someone other

than the respondent father. In 2013, the department

became involved with A due to concerns about the

mother’s mental health, her parenting ability, and

domestic violence, as well as concerns about possible

physical abuse of A. A was adjudicated neglected, and,

thereafter, sole custody was awarded to A’s father.

The respondents subsequently had three children

together; the first two children were born in Connecticut. Their first child, G, was removed from the respondents’ custody within one month of his birth in 2015, in

light of the mother’s history and an incident of domestic

violence in G’s presence. Subsequently, G was adjudicated neglected and placed in the commissioner’s cus-
tody. The respondents’ second child, J, was removed

from the respondents’ custody immediately after his

birth in 2016, on the ground that the respondents had

not addressed mental health and parenting issues. In

March, 2017, J was adjudicated neglected and committed to the commissioner’s custody. At that same time,

the respondents’ parental rights with respect to G

were terminated.

In April, 2018, the commissioner filed a petition seeking to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to J. The mother was then near full-term in her

pregnancy with Teagan. The respondents paid a relative

to drive them to Gainesville, Florida, where they signed

a one year lease for an apartment.

In May, 2018, Teagan was born in a Gainesville hospital. The hospital contacted the Florida Department of

Children and Families after information came to light

that the respondents’ other children had been removed

from their care. Two days after Teagan’s birth, when

she was ready to be discharged from the hospital, the

Florida department took emergency custody of her.4

The Florida department contacted the Connecticut

department to report that the mother had given birth.

One day after the Florida department took emergency

custody of Teagan, the commissioner filed a motion in

the Connecticut Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at

Waterford (trial court) seeking temporary custody of

Teagan and a petition seeking to adjudicate Teagan

neglected on the ground that she would be subject to

conditions injurious to her well-being if she remained

in the respondents’ care or that she was denied proper

care and attention.5 The motion for temporary custody

was denied on the ground that the child was not in Connecticut.

Shortly thereafter, the Florida department filed in the

Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida,

Juvenile Division (Florida court), a ‘‘motion to transfer

jurisdiction’’ to the Connecticut trial court on the basis

of the family’s history with service providers and child

protective services in this state. The respondents

opposed the motion. A Florida general magistrate held

a contested hearing on the motion, at which the respondents were represented by separate counsel. Following

the hearing, the magistrate issued a report and a recommendation to grant the motion.

The recommendation rested on the following factual

findings. An open dependency case in Connecticut was

then pending on a petition for termination of the respondents’ parental rights with respect to Teagan’s sibling,

J. The commissioner wanted to add Teagan to the open

dependency case. The respondents had admitted to the

Florida department that they traveled to Florida before

Teagan’s birth to avoid further involvement with the

Connecticut department. Witnesses and persons with
knowledge of the issues pertaining to Teagan’s possible

neglect and to the possible termination of the respondents’ parental rights as to J reside in Connecticut.

The respondents previously had been involved with the

Connecticut department as children, and their parental

rights with respect to another child had been terminated. Teagan’s guardian ad litem and the Connecticut

department both supported the transfer of jurisdiction.

The Florida court had verified with the Connecticut trial

court, Driscoll, J., that the Connecticut court wanted

to, and would, accept jurisdiction.6

The magistrate acknowledged that the respondents

opposed the transfer of jurisdiction and that, in support

of their opposition, they had presented a copy of their

Florida lease and represented that the father was

employed in Gainesville.7 The magistrate also acknowledged that the respondents had offered to consent to

Teagan’s dependency if the Florida court retained jurisdiction, to eliminate the need for witnesses and to allow

the court to rely solely on documentation from the

Connecticut department to establish a reunification

plan. The magistrate noted, however, that the Florida

department and Teagan’s guardian ad litem represented

that they had no intention of offering or supporting

reunification should the Florida court retain jurisdiction

and, instead, would seek to terminate the respondents’

parental rights with respect to Teagan on the basis of

the respondents’ prior history.

The magistrate’s report concluded: ‘‘Connecticut is

a more convenient forum state, and the court finds that

it is in the best interests of the child . . . and will

promote the efficient administration of justice to transfer jurisdiction to Connecticut.’’ The following day, after

the parties waived the period for filing exceptions to

the magistrate’s report, the Florida court ratified and

adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to transfer

jurisdiction to the Connecticut court.

The commissioner then renewed her request for an

ex parte order for temporary custody of Teagan in the

trial court, which the court, Driscoll, J., granted. Teagan

was brought to Connecticut and placed with the same

foster family caring for her sibling, J.

The father filed a motion to dismiss the pending

neglect petition on the ground of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.8 Appended to the motion were copies of

the respondents’ Florida lease, a pay stub from the

father’s Florida employment, and the father’s Florida

voter registration card, which was issued after the Florida court proceeding. The commissioner opposed the

motion, contending that the Florida court’s inconvenient forum determination established a basis for the

Connecticut trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction

under the UCCJEA. After a contested hearing on the

motion, the trial court, Hon. Michael A. Mack, judge

trial referee, opened the evidence twice—once to take
evidence that the father had appealed from the Florida

court’s decision granting the motion to transfer, and

again to take evidence that the First District Court of

Appeal of Florida had issued a per curiam, summary

affirmance.

The Connecticut trial court denied the father’s motion

to dismiss. The court cited two reasons. First, the trial

court reasoned that a Florida District Court of Appeal

had affirmed that jurisdiction rests with Connecticut

courts, after the respondents had had an opportunity

to present evidence in that forum on the matter and

had failed to present such evidence. Second, the trial

court determined that the respondents could not seek

equitable redress because they did not come to the

court with clean hands, given their admission to the

Florida department that they had traveled to Florida to

avoid involvement with the Connecticut department.9

Ultimately, the trial court concluded that ‘‘it has subject

matter jurisdiction over Teagan’s case following the

dictates of the [UCCJEA] in that a court of Florida has

declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that

Connecticut is the more appropriate forum, [a Florida

District Court of Appeal] has affirmed that, and Connecticut has accepted that conclusion.’’

The father appealed from the trial court’s decision

denying his motion to dismiss to the Appellate Court.

We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-

1. After the father filed his brief with this court, but

before the commissioner filed her appellate brief, the

commissioner filed a petition in the trial court seeking

to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to Teagan.

I

Before we can consider whether the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss, we must determine

whether that decision is immediately appealable. Ordinarily, a denial of a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional

grounds is an interlocutory ruling, not a final judgment;

see, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Fairfield ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 180 Conn. 223, 227–28, 429 A.2d 478

(1980); see also Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301

Conn. 759, 768, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011); which is a statutory

prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction in most instances.

See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 318 Conn. 680, 698 n.6, 122

A.3d 254 (2015). To surmount that obstacle, the trial

court’s decision in the present case must fall within

one of two circumstances in which an interlocutory

order has the attributes of a final judgment so as to

permit immediate appeal, either ‘‘(1) where the order

or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding,

or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights

of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect

them.’’ State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566

(1983). The parties contend that the present circum-
stances satisfy the second prong of Curcio, although

they disagree on the underlying rationale. We agree

with one of the arguments advanced by the father as to

why the trial court’s ruling is immediately appealable.10

‘‘The second prong of the Curcio test focuses on

the nature of the right involved. It requires the parties

seeking to appeal to establish that the trial court’s order

threatens the preservation of a right already secured

to them and that that right will be irretrievably lost

and the [parties] irreparably harmed unless they may

immediately appeal. . . . One must make at least a

colorable claim that some recognized statutory or constitutional right is at risk.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra,

301 Conn. 769.

A constellation of constitutional and statutory rights

serve to protect the integrity of the family unit, the

parent-child relationship, and the best interest of the

child. See General Statutes § 46b-135; In re Jonathan

M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); State v.

Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 162–63, 425 A.2d 939

(1979). ‘‘The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child

does not evaporate simply because they have not been

model parents or have lost temporary custody of their

child to the [s]tate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 513, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).

‘‘[C]ourts and state agencies must keep in mind the

constitutional limitations imposed [on them when they

undertake] any form of coercive intervention in family

affairs . . . [which includes] the right of the family to

remain together without the . . . interference of the

awesome power of the state.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383, 403, 773

A.2d 347 (2001).

There is a ‘‘unique place that family courts hold in

this state’s jurisprudence.11 This court has a long history

of concluding that, within the context of family matters,

orders that would otherwise be considered interlocutory constitute appealable final judgments. . . . Taken

as a whole, these cases demonstrate that, [o]n balance,

we [have been] more persuaded by the rationale for

allowing an immediate appeal of . . . temporary . . .

order[s] [in family matters] than by the traditional reasons of judicial economy that might otherwise have

precluded [their] review.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Khan v. Hillyer, 306 Conn. 205, 213–14, 49 A.3d 996 (2012). We

have reached this result because even temporary disruptions to the parent-child relationship can result in

irreparable harm. When children have been temporarily

removed from their parents’ care, we have determined

that ‘‘an immediate appeal is the only reasonable

method of ensuring that the important rights surrounding the parent-child relationship are adequately
protected . . . and . . . is the only way to ensure the

protection of the best interests of children.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)In re Shamika F., supra, 256 Conn. 385; see also Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 754–55, 620 A.2d 1276 (1993). This

concern may also extend to orders potentially affecting

visitation.12 See Taff v. Bettcher, 243 Conn. 380, 386–87,

703 A.2d 759 (1997) (recognizing that court order imposing one year bar on review of custody and visitation

orders may interfere with parent’s custodial rights in

manner that cannot be redressed later and cause harm

to child, as ‘‘[a] lost opportunity to spend significant

time with one’s child is not recoverable’’).

There is a colorable claim in the present case that

delaying a determination on the question of jurisdiction

would cause irreparable harm to the parent-child relationship and the best interest of the child. The trial

court’s exercise of jurisdiction necessarily would have

some adverse impact on the nature and extent of visitation and, in turn, the father’s ability to bond with his

infant daughter.13 Even if we assume that the Connecticut department would be willing to pay for the father’s

travel, the combination of distance and employment obligations undoubtedly limit in person visitation opportunities. Although the commissioner’s petition for termination of parental rights indicates that the family caring

for Teagan has facilitated remote audiovisual interactions, i.e., FaceTime, between the father and Teagan,

such interactions are a poor substitute for a parent’s

embrace.

In addition to the impact on visitation, a broader

concern is implicated under the particular facts of this

case. This court has recognized the importance of a

child’s interest in permanency and stability. See In re

Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 494–95, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).

A delayed implementation of a permanency plan,

whether aimed at reunification or termination, is of

particular concern under the present circumstances.

Unlike the typical challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, if an appeal after an adverse decision on the merits

results in a determination that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition, the issue

of neglect no doubt would be relitigated in Florida.

The commissioner agrees that the possibility of such

a delayed resolution clearly would be detrimental to

Teagan.14 Under these circumstances, we are persuaded

that the present interlocutory appeal meets the second

prong of Curcio.

II

Having concluded that the father may appeal from

the trial court’s decision denying his motion to dismiss,

we turn to the merits of the appeal. The parties agree

that, despite the fact that the Florida court never

referred to the UCCJEA in its decision ‘‘transferr[ing]’’

jurisdiction to Connecticut, a state cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a neglect petition unless it is authorized to do so under that act. Where the parties’ positions

diverge is on the question of whether there is a jurisdictional requirement specific to neglect proceedings—the

child must have been, or is likely to be, neglected in

this state—that also must be met.15

A

We begin with an overview of the provisions governing jurisdiction over neglect proceedings and then consider the parties’ arguments as to their application.

General Statutes § 46b-1 prescribes family relations

matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

One such matter is ‘‘juvenile matters as provided in

section 46b-121 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-1 (11).

Juvenile matters, as provided in General Statutes § 46b121,16 ‘‘include all proceedings concerning uncared-for,

neglected or abused children within this state . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-121 (a) (1);

see also General Statutes § 46b-121 (a) (2) (defining

juvenile matters in criminal session). Some version of

this limiting language has been in the statute governing

neglect proceedings since 1921. See Public Acts 1921,

c. 336, § 3; see also, e.g., General Statutes (Supp. 1943)

§ 380g; Public Acts 1976, No. 76-436, § 14.

Another family relations matter within the Superior

Court’s jurisdiction is any matter ‘‘affecting or involving

. . . custody proceedings brought under the provisions

of chapter 815p [the UCCJEA] . . . .’’ General Statutes

§ 46b-1 (17). The UCCJEA, adopted by this state in 1999;

see Public Acts 1999, No. 99-185; replaced a largely

similar scheme adopted in 1978, known as the Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). See Public

Acts 1978, No. 78-318; see also Public Acts 1999, No.

99-185, §§ 39, 40 (repealing General Statutes §§ 46b-90

through 46b-114). The UCCJEA broadly defines a ‘‘child

custody proceeding’’ to include proceedings for neglect,

abuse, dependency, and termination of parental rights

in which custody might be an issue. See General Statutes § 46b-115a (4).

The UCCJEA provision relevant to the present case,

General Statutes § 46b-115k, provides in relevant part:

‘‘(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n

[temporary emergency jurisdiction], a court of this state

has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if:

‘‘(1) This state is the home state17 of the child on the

date of the commencement of the child custody proceeding;

‘‘(2) This state was the home state of the child within

six months of the commencement of the child custody

proceeding, the child is absent from the state, and a

parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside

in this state;
‘‘(3) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) or (2) of this subsection,

the child and at least one parent or person acting as a

parent have a significant connection with this state

other than mere physical presence, and there is substantial evidence available in this state concerning the

child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships;

‘‘(4) A court of another state which is the home state

of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the

ground that this state is the more appropriate forum

under a provision substantially similar to section 46b115q [inconvenient forum] or section 46b-115r [unjustifiable conduct],18 the child and at least one parent or

person acting as a parent have a significant connection

with this state other than mere physical presence, and

there is substantial evidence available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships;

‘‘(5) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivisions

(1) to (4), inclusive, of this subsection have declined

jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is

the more appropriate forum to determine custody under

a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q or

section 46b-115r; or

‘‘(6) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) to (5), inclusive, of this

subsection. . . .’’ (Footnotes added.)

For convenience, these jurisdictional bases are

known as home state jurisdiction, significant connection jurisdiction, more appropriate forum jurisdiction,

and default or vacuum jurisdiction. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) prefatory

note, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 461–62 (2019); id., § 201, comments (1) and (2), 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 504–506; see also

P. Hoff, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, ‘‘The Uniform

Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,’’ Juv.

Just. Bull., December, 2001, pp. 2, 5–6, available at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/189181.pdf (last

visited June 24, 2020).

Section 46b-115k of the UCCJEA further provides:

‘‘(b) Subsection (a) of this section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination

by a court of this state.

‘‘(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction

over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient

to make a child custody determination.’’19

The drafters’ comment to subsection (c) explains:

‘‘[N]either minimum contacts nor service within the

[s]tate is required for the court to have jurisdiction to

make a custody determination. . . . The requirements

of this section, plus the notice and hearing provisions
of the [a]ct, are all that is necessary to satisfy due

process.’’20 Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act (1997) § 201, comment (2), supra, 9

U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 506.

B

The father contends that § 46b-121’s ‘‘neglected . . .

within this state’’ limitation on jurisdiction is not satisfied and that it controls the outcome of the present

case, whereas the commissioner contends that jurisdiction exists under the UCCJEA and that the act controls exclusively because more than one state is implicated. We begin our analysis with the effect of § 46b121 rather than the UCCJEA for two reasons. First, the

Florida court’s decision does not clearly reflect that it

in fact relied on the UCCJEA to ‘‘transfer’’ jurisdiction

to our trial court and, if so, on what jurisdictional basis.

That decision is devoid of any express reference to the

UCCJEA by name or statutory provision. It invokes none

of the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional labels commonly relied

on by courts, lacks factual findings necessary to support certain jurisdictional grounds, and omits material

considerations from the UCCJEA’s inconvenient forum

analysis.21 Both of the parties to the Florida proceeding,

of which the Connecticut commissioner was not one,

agree that the court only was exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction and was not exercising jurisdiction

under any one of the grounds prescribed in § 46b-115k.

By contrast, it is undisputed that § 46b-121’s territorial limitation on jurisdiction—‘‘neglected . . . children within this state’’—is not satisfied.22 Although this

phrase has not previously been construed by our courts,

whether it means that neglect has occurred or likely

will occur within this state, that a child neglected elsewhere is currently present in this state, and/or that the

child’s domicile is in this state, none of these conditions

exists.23 We agree with the father that the failure to

satisfy § 46b-121 prevents Connecticut from exercising

jurisdiction over the neglect petition, irrespective of

whether the conditions for exercising jurisdiction under

the UCCJEA would be met.

We begin with the observation that, prior to the enactment of the UCCJEA, there was some question as to

whether its predecessor, the UCCJA, applied to neglect

and dependency proceedings. See Unif. Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) prefatory

note, supra, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 463. The UCCJEA made

clear that it did apply to such proceedings. See id., § 102

(4), 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 475. When our legislature adopted

the broadly applicable UCCJEA, it did not eliminate the

territorial limitation in § 46b-121 specific to neglect proceedings.

Although many states do not impose such a territorial

limitation,24 doing so is not unique to Connecticut or

to neglect proceedings. Such a limitation may be dic-
tated by statute or by common law. See, e.g., La. Code

Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 10 (A) (Cum. Supp. 2020) (‘‘[a] court

which is otherwise competent under the laws of this

state has jurisdiction of the following actions or proceedings only under the following conditions . . . (5)

[a] proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor

if he is domiciled in, or is in, this state’’); Mich. Comp.

Laws Serv. § 712A.2 (b) (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2019)

(neglected juvenile ‘‘found within the county’’); Mo.

Ann. Stat. § 211.031 1. (1) (West 2017) (neglected child

‘‘who may be a resident of or found within the county’’);

Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-103 (1) (a) (2019) (neglected

youth ‘‘who is within the state of Montana for any purpose’’); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C:3 (2014) (‘‘jurisdiction over petitions to terminate the parent-child relationship when the child involved is present in the state

or is in the legal custody or legal guardianship of an

authorized agency located in the state’’); N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 7B-1101 (2019) (‘‘termination of parental rights to any

juvenile who resides in, is found in, or is in the legal

or actual custody of a county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency in the district at

the time of filing of the petition or motion’’); Okla. Stat.

Ann. tit. 10A, § 2-2-102 (A) (1) (West 2018) (jurisdiction

where child ‘‘resides,’’ ‘‘is found,’’ or ‘‘is alleged to be

or is found to be in need of supervision’’); R.I. Gen.

Laws § 14-1-5 (1) (Cum. Supp. 2019) (neglected child

‘‘residing or being within the state’’); W. Va. Code Ann.

§ 49-4-601 (a) (LexisNexis 2015) (‘‘in the county in

which the child resides, or if the petition is being

brought by the department, in the county in which the

custodial respondent or other named party abuser

resides, or in which the abuse or neglect occurred’’);

Arizona Dept. of Economic Security v. Grant ex rel.

Maricopa, 232 Ariz. 576, 581, 307 P.3d 1003 (App. 2013)

(recognizing that jurisdiction exists, not only when

neglect or abuse of child occurred in state, but also

when child subject to abuse or neglect is present in

state); In re Shaw, 449 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. App. 1969)

(‘‘[t]o expand a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to include

children outside the court’s territorial boundaries

would contravene a general principle of jurisprudence’’); In re Juvenile 2002-098, 148 N.H. 743, 746–47,

813 A.2d 1197 (2002) (relying on traditional parens

patriae power of state and broad language of state statute to allow court to exercise jurisdiction over ‘‘any

case involving a child found within the [s]tate who is

alleged to have been abused or neglected, no matter

where the abuse or neglect is alleged to have

occurred’’); In re Westchester County Dept. of Social

Services, 211 App. Div. 2d 235, 236–38, 627 N.Y.S.2d 735

(1995) (although abuse occurred out of country, court

could exercise jurisdiction because child was then in

state).

Several courts have considered whether such a territorial limitation must be satisfied even though the mat-
ter is a child custody proceeding subject to the UCCJEA.

Some of these cases involved the UCCJA, the predecessor to the UCCJEA, but they are equally relevant

because both acts prescribed the same grounds for the

exercise of initial custody jurisdiction, including home

state, significant connection, etc., and deemed the physical presence of the child not to be a prerequisite to

jurisdiction. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act

(1968) § 3, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 106–107 (2019). Although

taking different approaches, all of them indicate that

the territorial limitation must be satisfied.

In several of these cases, the courts determined that

the limitation specific to the matter (e.g., neglect) and

the conditions under the UCCJEA both had to be met

for the court to exercise jurisdiction. See State ex rel.

R.P. v. Rosen, 966 S.W.2d 292, 297–98 (Mo. App. 1998)

(framing issue as whether Missouri has jurisdiction over

abuse and neglect proceeding both under statute vesting juvenile court with jurisdiction in proceedings

‘‘[i]nvolving any child or person seventeen years of age

who may be a resident of or found within the county

and who is alleged to be in need of care and treatment’’

and under UCCJA (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)); In re K.U.-S.G., 208 N.C. App.

128, 131, 702 S.E.2d 103 (2010) (‘‘Our Juvenile Code

grants district courts ‘exclusive original jurisdiction to

hear and determine any petition or motion relating to

termination of parental rights to any juvenile who

resides in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody

of a county department of social services or licensed

child-placing agency in the district at the time of filing

of the petition or motion.’ . . . Nevertheless, the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA also must be

satisfied for the [D]istrict [C]ourt to have authority to

adjudicate termination actions.’’ (Citation omitted.));

In re D.D.J., 177 N.C. App. 441, 443, 628 S.E.2d 808

(2006) (concluding that subject matter jurisdiction was

lacking under termination of parental rights statute

because child neither resided in state, was found in

state, nor was in state’s custody when petition was filed,

and there was no further consideration of UCCJEA);

In re Bean, 132 N.C. App. 363, 366, 511 S.E.2d 683 (1999)

(court must engage in ‘‘a two-part process’’ to determine

whether it has jurisdiction, under requirements of both

UCCJA and those under parental termination statute);

In re Leonard, 77 N.C. App. 439, 440–41, 335 S.E.2d 73

(1985) (holding that, despite fact that North Carolina

court had jurisdiction under UCCJA, state lacked jurisdiction because requirement of termination of parental

rights statute—child resided or was found in district at

time petition was filed—was not met: ‘‘[although] a

determination of jurisdiction over child custody matters

will precede a determination of jurisdiction over parental rights, it does not supplant the parental rights proceedings’’ (emphasis omitted));25 see also Arizona Dept.

of Economic Security v. Grant ex rel. Maricopa, supra,
232 Ariz. 579–81 (first determining that jurisdiction was

proper under UCCJEA and then rejecting argument that

subject matter jurisdiction was improper because

alleged abuse or neglect occurred outside of state, citing

case law from New York and New Hampshire supporting exercise of jurisdiction when neglected or abused

child is found within state, even if abuse and neglect

did not occur in state).

In two other cases, the courts recognized the controlling force of the territorial limitation but limited its

scope of operation. Both cases involved statutes vesting

the state’s court with ‘‘ ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ ’’

over proceedings to terminate parental rights with

respect to a child who resides or is found within the

state. In re G. B., 167 N.H. 99, 102, 105 A.3d 615 (2014);

accord In re H.L.A.D., 184 N.C. App. 381, 385, 646 S.E.2d

425 (2007), aff’d, 362 N.C. 170, 655 S.E.2d 712 (2008). The

courts distinguished ‘‘exclusive, original’’ jurisdiction

subject to the territorial limitation in the termination

statute from ‘‘exclusive, continuing’’ jurisdiction in the

UCCJEA,26 giving each an independent sphere of operation. See In re G. B., supra, 105 (The forum’s original

jurisdiction statute and the UCCJEA’s continuing jurisdiction provision ‘‘independently grant jurisdiction

under the circumstances set forth in each. That jurisdiction under one is not supported on a given set of facts

does not preclude jurisdiction under the other.’’);27 In

re H.L.A.D., supra, 386–87 (noting distinction between

‘‘ ‘exclusive, original jurisdiction’ ’’ of termination statute

and ‘‘ ‘exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’ ’’ of UCCJEA,

and, although former authorizes court to adjudicate

termination of parental rights when circumstances

specified exist, ‘‘[t]his . . . does not preclude the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s exercise of jurisdiction in circumstances

in which the court already has ‘exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction’ pursuant to the UCCJEA’’). The courts

deemed the territorial limitation applicable to initial

custody determinations but not to modifications of such

a determination.

The only cases we have found that have not deemed

the territorial limits controlling support, rather than

undermine, the father’s claim in the present case. Louisiana appears to be one of the only states with a statute

prescribing a territorial limitation specifically applicable to custody cases. Cf. Feriole v. Feriole, 468 So. 2d

1090, 1091 (Fla. App. 1985) (‘‘For many years it was

the law of [Florida] that a court had no jurisdiction to

initially adjudicate the question of the custody of a

minor child unless that child was physically present

within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time

the [action] seeking an adjudication of his custody was

filed. . . . However, Florida adopted the [UCCJA]

effective October 1, 1977, which superseded prior Florida law in this area.’’ (Citation omitted.)). Article 10

of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides in

relevant part: ‘‘A court which is otherwise competent
under the laws of this state has jurisdiction of the following actions or proceedings only under the following

conditions . . . [a] proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor if he is domiciled in, or is in, this

state. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann.

art. 10 (A) (5) (2014). In Gusman v. Gusman, 598 So.

2d 1256 (La. App. 1992), the court considered an appeal

from the trial court’s decision dismissing a custody

matter filed by the father on the ground that Louisiana

did not have jurisdiction over the matter because Virginia, where the children and the mother presently

resided, was the children’s home state under the

UCCJA. See id., 1257–58. On appeal, the father argued

that Louisiana had jurisdiction under the predecessor

to article 10 (A) (5) of the Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure because it was his domicile and, in turn, his

children’s domicile. Id., 1257. The Louisiana Court of

Appeal rejected that argument, holding ‘‘that when Louisiana adopted the [UCCJA] the [l]egislature intended

that law to supersede all laws in conflict with it, including [the predecessor to article 10 (A) (5)]. [Although]

this does not mean [that article 10 (A) (5)] was facially

repealed, it does mean that it was repealed as to its

applicability when in conflict with the [UCCJA] . . . .’’

Id., 1258. In Banerjee v. Banerjee, 258 So. 3d 699 (La.

App. 2017), the Louisiana Court of Appeal stated, perhaps more clearly, in a case arising under the UCCJEA:

‘‘Louisiana courts have jurisdiction over a minor’s status

in a ‘proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor

if he is domiciled in, or is in, this state.’ La. Code Civ.

[Proc. Ann.] art. 10 (A) (5) [2014]. However, a second

tier of inquiry into the jurisdiction over custody issues

exists under the UCCJEA . . . . Even if a Louisiana

court has subject matter jurisdiction, that jurisdiction

must be declined based on limitations imposed by the

UCCJEA.’’ (Citation omitted.) Banerjee v. Banerjee,

supra, 701–702.

These Louisiana cases stand for the unremarkable

proposition that, even if jurisdiction is authorized

under the territorial limitation, the exercise of jurisdiction may be limited or precluded in a given case by the

UCCJEA. See Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St. 3d 241,

249, 883 N.E.2d 420 (2008) (‘‘the mere fact that the

Ohio court has basic statutory jurisdiction to determine

custody matters in [legal separation] and divorce cases

. . . does not preclude a more specific statute like [a

provision under Ohio’s UCCJA] from patently and

unambiguously divesting the court of such jurisdiction’’

(citations omitted)). Our concern in the present case,

of course, is with the converse—whether, when the

jurisdictional requirements of a statute specific to the

matter at hand are not met, the UCCJEA nonetheless

permits the exercise of jurisdiction.

Not only do the cases previously discussed indicate

that this question must be answered in the negative, but

so too does the purpose of the UCCJEA. A paramount
purpose of the act is to determine which state having

jurisdiction will be permitted to exercise it when two

or more states have concurrent jurisdiction.28 See In re

Marriage of Sareen, 153 Cal. App. 4th 371, 376, 62 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 687 (2007) (‘‘UCCJEA is the exclusive method

of determining subject matter jurisdiction in custody

disputes involving other jurisdictions’’), cert. denied sub

nom. Sareen v. Sareen, 552 U.S. 1259, 128 S. Ct. 1670,

170 L. Ed. 2d 357 (2008); Brown v. Brown, 195 Conn.

98, 107, 486 A.2d 1116 (1985) (UCCJA ‘‘envisages that

where concurrent jurisdiction exists, only one state

should exercise that jurisdiction’’ (emphasis in original)); In re J.R., 33 A.3d 397, 400 (D.C. 2011) (‘‘[the

UCCJEA] establishes the bases for subject matter jurisdiction over custody matters in the District [of Columbia], setting forth rules to govern jurisdiction when

more than one state may be involved, in order to prevent jurisdictional conflicts’’); Ball v. McGowan, 497

S.W.3d 245, 249 (Ky. App. 2016) (‘‘Broadly speaking,

[the UCCJEA’s] purpose is to avoid jurisdictional conflict and competition in custody matters . . . and to

promote uniformity. . . . To effect this purpose, the

UCCJEA provides rules for determining jurisdiction in

custody cases involving multiple states.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.)); Rosen v. Celebrezze, supra, 117 Ohio St. 3d

248 (‘‘the primary purpose of the [UCCJEA is] . . . to

avoid jurisdictional competition’’); In re R.W., 191 Vt.

108, 126–27, 39 A.3d 682 (2011) (‘‘[t]he UCCJA was

created to end the interstate custody jurisdictional tugof-war between states’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Custody of A.C., 165 Wn. 2d 568, 574, 200

P.3d 689 (2009) (‘‘The UCCJEA arose out of a conference of states in an attempt to deal with the problems of

competing jurisdictions [issuing] conflicting interstate

child custody orders, forum shopping, and the drawn

out and complex child custody legal proceedings often

encountered by parties where multiple states are

involved. . . . Most states have adopted the UCCJEA

in order to reduce conflicting orders regarding custody

and placement of children.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)); In re NC, 294 P.3d 866, 872 (Wyo. 2013)

(‘‘[t]he dominant objective of the [UCCJEA] is to eliminate the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction over custody disputes by more than one state’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The UCCJEA’s purpose of preventing the exercise of

concurrent jurisdiction is reflected in that act’s designation of § 46b-115k (a) as ‘‘the exclusive jurisdictional

basis for making a child custody determination by a

court of this state.’’ General Statutes § 46b-115k (b).

This provision recognizes that, even though a state may

have subject matter jurisdiction over the custody matter, it may be required to decline to exercise that jurisdiction if § 46b-115k (a) designates another state as

having priority.
This means, as many courts have recognized, that

the UCCJEA, like its predecessor, does not create jurisdiction but prescribes the circumstances under which

jurisdiction that otherwise is conferred by constitution

or statute can be exercised in a given case. See, e.g.,

In re Marriage of Holder, Docket No. F036747, 2002

WL 443397, *5 (Cal. App. March 20, 2002) (‘‘[d]espite the

existence of fundamental jurisdiction [in the California

Superior Court], the UCCJEA severely limits the exercise of superior court custody jurisdiction where there

are interstate or international aspects to the litigation’’);

McCormick v. Robertson, 15 N.E.3d 968, 974 (Ill. App.

2014) (‘‘whereas the UCCJEA may procedurally limit

the circumstances in which a [C]ircuit [C]ourt may exercise its power to render a custody determination . . .

it may not deprive the [C]ircuit [C]ourt of its constitutionally derived [subject matter] jurisdiction to decide

the matter in the first place’’ (citation omitted)), aff’d,

28 N.E.3d 795 (Ill. 2015); Williams v. Williams, 555

N.E.2d 142, 144–45 (Ind. 1990) (‘‘Resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue involves determining

whether the claim advanced falls within the general

scope of authority conferred upon the court by the

constitution or statute. . . . The authority to hear child

custody cases is not directly granted by the UCCJA.

Rather, [the UCCJA] merely operates to restrict the

existing power of courts to hear custody cases.’’ (Citation omitted.)); In re A.A.-F., 310 Kan. 125, 135, 444

P.3d 938 (2019) (‘‘By statute, Kansas district courts have

general original jurisdiction of all matters, both civil

and criminal, unless otherwise provided by law. . . .

And, more specific to this case, the Revised Kansas

Code for Care of Children generally confers original

jurisdiction on Kansas courts to hold proceedings concerning any child who may be a child in need of care.

. . . But the [l]egislature placed limits on this jurisdiction, making it [s]ubject to the [UCCJEA] . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); State

ex rel. J.W., 975 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. App. 2008) (‘‘[t]he

UCCJA provides jurisdictional limitations that require

a court that otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction

to decline to exercise it’’); Hightower v. Myers, 304

S.W.3d 727, 733 (Mo. 2010) (‘‘This case is a civil case.

Therefore, the trial court had constitutionally vested

subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. . . . The

[C]ircuit [C]ourt’s statutory or [common-law] authority

to grant relief in a particular case differs from the [C]ircuit [C]ourt’s constitutionally granted subject matter

and personal jurisdiction. . . . In this respect, the

UCCJA jurisdiction provisions inform a court whether

it lacks authority to modify custody because of the statutory limitations. . . . [T]he UCCJA provisions at issue

do not remove subject matter jurisdiction from the

court.’’ (Citations omitted.)); DeLima v. Tsevi, 301 Neb.

933, 937, 921 N.W.2d 89 (2018) (‘‘We have previously

said that subject matter jurisdiction over a child custody
proceeding is governed exclusively by the UCCJEA.

. . . Our use of the word ‘exclusively’ in this context

was slightly imprecise, because there are other statutes

outside the UCCJEA that confer jurisdiction to decide

child custody matters. . . . But while other statutes

may confer jurisdiction generally, § 42-351 [of the

Revised Statutes of Nebraska] directs courts to determine whether jurisdiction exists over a specific child

custody proceeding under the UCCJEA.’’ (Citations

omitted.)); Lustig v. Lustig, 560 N.W.2d 239, 242 (S.D.

1997) (‘‘Before a court may decide custody, it must

possess jurisdiction. . . . Courts must also adhere to

the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA and the

prohibitions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)); see also Ashburn v. Baker,

256 Ga. 507, 509, 350 S.E.2d 437 (1986) (‘‘Although the

[UCCJA] is the last expression of the legislature, it does

not expressly repeal any particular provisions of the

Civil Practice Act, nor the existing statutory provisions

covering divorce, custody, alimony, and child support

procedures. Finding this to be true, we will consider

the requirements of the [UCCJA] in pari materia with the

other applicable provisions of law pertinent thereto.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)); 2 A. Haralambie,

Handling Child Custody, Abuse and Adoption Cases (3d

Ed. 2009) § 11:4, p. 215 (‘‘Most statutes provide that the

court has jurisdiction if the child resides or is present

or has property in the state. Because guardianship of the

person affects the custody of children, the [UCCJEA]

and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act

. . . apply as limitations on the court’s jurisdiction.’’

(Footnotes omitted.)); W. Hogoboom et al., California

Practice Guide: Family Law (2019) § 5:28.4, p. 5-14

(‘‘[e]ven if it otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction

over the proceeding, a California court may have to

yield to another state’s jurisdiction under the Federal

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act . . . and the

[UCCJEA]’’ (citation omitted; emphasis omitted)); 7 J.

Levin, Nichols Illinois Civil Practice (2015) § 123:168,

p. 286 (‘‘[w]hile the UCCJEA may procedurally limit

circumstances in which a circuit court may exercise its

power to render a custody determination, it does not

deprive a circuit court of its constitutionally derived

jurisdiction to decide the matter in the first place’’);

10 (Pt. 1) A. Scheinkman, West’s McKinney’s Forms:

Matrimonial and Family Law (2011) § 20:55, pp. 191–92

(‘‘[u]nder the [UCCJEA], a New York court which is

otherwise competent to decide [child custody] matters

has jurisdiction to make an initial [child custody] determination only if one of four statutory tests is met’’).

The fact that the UCCJEA resolves competing claims

of jurisdiction and does not itself create jurisdiction

is most clearly manifested in its inconvenient forum

provision, which allows a court having jurisdiction to

decline to exercise jurisdiction in favor of another

state’s court. See General Statutes § 46b-115k (a) (5);
General Statutes § 46b-115p. Inconvenient forum is a

doctrine that historically applies only when the matter

could have been initiated in the more convenient forum

in the first instance. See, e.g., American Dredging Co.

v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447–48, 114 S. Ct. 981, 127 L.

Ed. 2d 285 (1994) (doctrine of forum non conveniens

applies ‘‘when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to

hear [a] case’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 102

S. Ct. 252, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1981); see also Brown v.

Brown, supra, 195 Conn. 108 n.17 (‘‘[e]ven before the

adoption of the UCCJA, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was recognized as applicable to child custody

disputes over which the court otherwise had jurisdiction; see, e.g., Clark v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d

298, 309, 140 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1977) . . . Loonan v.

Marino, 179 N.J. Super. 164, 168, 430 A.2d 975 (1981)’’).

There is no evidence that the UCCJEA intended its

inconvenient forum provision to operate differently.

See Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1182

(R.I. 2008) (inconvenient forum provision in UCCJEA

‘‘mends the fabric of the [common-law doctrine], rather

than weakening it’’); see also Brown v. Brown, supra,

107–108 (The UCCJA ‘‘contemplates that considerations that evolved under the traditional [common-law]

doctrine of forum non conveniens . . . are not supplanted by the inconvenient forum provision of the

UCCJA. . . . The [common-law] principle of forum

non conveniens provides that a court may resistimposition upon its jurisdiction even when it has jurisdiction.’’

(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

To the contrary, the language in the UCCJEA reflects

an intention to conform to the doctrine’s common-law

operation. The UCCJEA says nothing about one state

transferring its subject matter jurisdiction to, or conferring its jurisdiction upon, another state.29 Instead, it

allows a state having jurisdiction to ‘‘decline’’ to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of its inconvenient

forum determination. General Statutes § 46b-115q (a)

and (d). If it so declines, it ‘‘shall stay’’ the proceeding

‘‘upon condition that a child custody proceeding be

promptly commenced in another designated state

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-115q

(c). Jurisdiction cannot be transferred if it is retained

during a stay. A proceeding cannot be commenced in

a state that lacks jurisdiction. Perhaps the most obvious

indication that the more appropriate forum must have

subject matter jurisdiction when that determination is

made is that the UCCJEA designates ‘‘any agreement

of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction’’ as a relevant factor in deciding whether another

state would be a more convenient forum. General Statutes § 46b-115q (b) (5). It is black letter law that courts

do not obtain subject matter jurisdiction by consent or

agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Angersola v. Radio-
logic Associates of Middletown, P.C., 330 Conn. 251,

272, 193 A.3d 520 (2018); Hayes v. Beresford, 184 Conn.

558, 562, 440 A.2d 224 (1981).

In fact, although the commentary to the UCCJEA

specifically characterizes the jurisdiction provisions as

relating to ‘‘subject matter jurisdiction’’; see Unif. Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) § 201,

comment (2), supra, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 506; some courts

and commentators have taken issue with that characterization and instead view them as prescribing conditions

for exercising personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Williams

v. Williams, supra, 555 N.E.2d 145 (referring to UCCJA);

Harris v. Young, 473 N.W.2d 141, 143 (S.D. 1991)

(same); B. Atwood, ‘‘Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Territoriality,’’ 52 Ohio St. L.J. 369, 375 and n.36 (1991)

(citing disagreement among commentators and among

courts); see also 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 60/208 (West

2019) (referring to UCCJEA as prescribing personal

jurisdiction); Friedman v. Eighth Judicial District

Court ex rel. Clark, 127 Nev. 842, 848 n.5, 264 P.3d 1161

(2011) (noting that it would have been more appropriate

for UCCJEA to refer to ‘‘exclusive venue’’ instead of

‘‘subject matter jurisdiction’’ but using latter for consistency (internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting In

re Custody of A.C., supra, 165 Wn. 2d 573 n.3. This view

is lent some support by a statement in the commentary

to the UCCJA, the UCCJEA’s predecessor, explaining

that, under the significant connection ground for jurisdiction, ‘‘[t]here must be maximum rather than minimum contact with the state’’; Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968) § 3, comment, supra, 9 U.L.A. (Pt.

IA) 108; suggesting that the UCCJA’s standards exceed

the due process requirements for personal jurisdiction

prescribed by the United States Supreme Court. See,

e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (prescribing

minimum contacts standard).

Irrespective of whether we characterize the conditions under the UCCJEA as personal jurisdiction or

jurisdictional facts necessary to the exercise of subject

matter jurisdiction, the effect is the same in the present

case. Because the UCCJEA does not confer subject

matter jurisdiction on our courts but instead determines

whether our courts may exercise existing jurisdiction

or must defer to another state’s jurisdiction, it provides

no impediment to statutes, like § 46b-121, that determine the scope of jurisdiction.30

Giving effect to § 46b-121 does not ‘‘ ‘nullify’ ’’ any

provision of the UCCJEA, as the concurring and dissenting justice suggests. See State v. Victor O., 320

Conn. 239, 250, 128 A.3d 940 (2016) (‘‘we must read

statutes to avoid conflict that would result in a nullification of one by the other’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). The UCCJEA’s operation is unimpeded in

almost every case within its purview. Our interpretation
simply precludes that act’s application in a discrete and

rarely arising circumstance that undoubtedly was not

contemplated when the act was drafted. If this result

is not what our legislature intended, it is free to repeal

§ 46b-121 or expressly designate that its territorial limitation is inapplicable when Connecticut otherwise

meets the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA.

Nor can we say that it was irrational for the legislature

to have maintained this requirement. Neglect proceedings are materially different from traditional custody

disputes between parents, in substance and procedure.

A state child protection agency or its commissioner

is the opposing party in a neglect proceeding. That

proceeding typically does not end with a determination

of custody in favor of one party or the other. It often

results in substantial conditions being imposed on the

parents in order to regain custody. It also may establish

the predicate for termination of parental rights. It makes

eminent sense for the child, personally or through her

parent, to have a present connection with the state if

an agency of that state is going to oversee the provision,

and evaluate the success, of the services necessary to

achieve family reunification.31

Nonetheless, the commissioner contends that giving

effect to the territorial limitation will impede the operation of the UCCJEA, which our legislature could not

have intended. She points to the following hypothetical

to illustrate this point: Florida lacks home state or significant connection jurisdiction, but Connecticut has

significant connection jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

The commissioner argues that, if we were to conclude

that the territorial limitation applicable to neglect proceedings prevents Connecticut from exercising jurisdiction, no state would have jurisdiction over the matter.

She points out that the UCCJEA permits a state to

exercise default jurisdiction only when no other state

has jurisdiction under one of the designated grounds.

See General Statutes § 46b-115k (a) (6).

We disagree with the commissioner’s concern for a

couple of reasons. First, if the territorial limitations

under § 46b-121 are not met, Connecticut would not

have significant connection jurisdiction. We have found

no case in which significant connection jurisdiction was

found to exist in a case of predictive neglect in the

absence of evidence that at least one parent maintained

his or her domicile in the state exercising jurisdiction.32

That fact would be a sufficient basis for the child to

be deemed neglected within this state under a theory

of predictive neglect. Second, even if the present facts

were sufficient to support Connecticut’s significant connection jurisdiction, Florida would be permitted to

exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA’s temporary

emergency jurisdiction provision, General Statutes

§ 46b-115n. Under that provision, Florida’s order would

remain in effect until the court of another state having
jurisdiction issues a custody order. See General Statutes

§ 46b-115n (b) and (c). Because Connecticut lacks jurisdiction to do so, Florida would be free to issue orders

that are more permanent.

The allegations in the present case do not satisfy the

jurisdictional predicate of the juvenile matters provision. See General Statutes § 46b-121 (a) (1). There is

no allegation from which we reasonably could infer

that Teagan likely would be neglected within this state.

She is present in this state only because of another

state’s action to remove her from her parents’ state

of residence. Jurisdiction to make an original custody

determination rests with the state of Florida.33

The denial of the father’s motion to dismiss is

reversed and the case is remanded with direction to

grant the motion.

In this opinion D’AURIA, KAHN and ECKER, Js., concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Supreme Court.

** The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

*** June 24, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1

‘‘The doctrine of predictive neglect is grounded in the state’s responsibility to avoid harm to the well-being of a child, not to repair it after a tragedy

has occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph W., 305

Conn. 633, 644, 46 A.3d 59 (2012). To establish predictive neglect, ‘‘the trial

court must find that it is more likely than not that, if the child remained in

the current situation, the child would be ‘denied proper care and attention,

physically, educationally, emotionally or morally’; General Statutes (Rev. to

2011) § 46b-120 (8) (B); or would be ‘permitted to live under conditions,

circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child . . . .’

General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b-120 (8) (C) . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)

In re Joseph W., supra, 646. ‘‘If the parents have indicated that they intend

to care for the child jointly . . . the trial court may treat the parents as a

single unit in determining whether the petitioner has met [his or her] burden

of proving predictive neglect.’’ Id., 647–48.

2 For convenience, in this opinion we cite Connecticut’s version of the

UCCJEA and denote those few provisions in which Florida’s version has

any material difference.

3 The record before this court does not include many of the filings from

the Florida proceedings. The facts on which we rely are those found by the

trial court in either Florida or Connecticut, or those alleged in pleadings

filed by the Florida Department of Children and Families or the Connecticut

commissioner, which have not been challenged by the respondents.

4 According to its brief filed in the First District Court of Appeal for

Florida, the Florida department took this action after learning of the respondents’ past history, that they had left Connecticut to avoid the Connecticut

department’s involvement with Teagan, and that they had offered to pay a

relative to transport them out of Florida when they realized that the Florida

department was going to be involved with Teagan. It is unclear from the

record whether it was the Florida department or the Connecticut department

that first initiated communication with its counterpart. Nor is it clear whether

conduct by the mother prompted an investigation, which, in turn, led the

two agencies to communicate.

5 Because the merits of the pending neglect petition for Teagan are not

an issue before us, we do not recount in detail the commissioner’s allegations. To convey the gravity of the concerns that led to the filing of the

present petition, it suffices to note that, in addition to allegations about

the long-standing mental health issues of the respondents, particularly the
mother, that raised concerns about violence in the home and their parenting

abilities, the commissioner alleged in Teagan’s neglect petition that the

mother had suffered from postpartum depression following the birth of her

two older children, A and G. This condition caused the mother to have

thoughts of harming herself and her child, and she admitted to trying to

smother A and to having thoughts of throwing G in the fireplace. We underscore that our conclusion as to jurisdiction is not intended to call into

question the propriety of the Connecticut department’s efforts to convey

the gravity of these concerns to the Florida department.

6 At the hearing on the motion, the magistrate stated: ‘‘[A]fter I received

the motion [to transfer jurisdiction], I did make contact with Judge Driscoll

of the [Connecticut trial court]. I did not talk to Judge Driscoll directly. We

exchanged messages, and the message I received in return was that his

court would accept and wanted transfer of jurisdiction, and that there are

court dates coming up within the next few weeks in the case in Connecticut,

and this case would be added if transferred. And Children’s Legal Services

conferred with their counterparts in Connecticut, according to the motion,

and they are willing and, in fact, wanting to accept Teagan into their case.’’

7 At the hearing before the magistrate, the father’s counsel represented

that the father had begun full-time employment at a Hampton Inn in Florida

one week before the hearing. The mother’s counsel also represented that the

mother recently had begun counseling sessions and identified the provider.

8 The father also sought dismissal on the ground of a lack of personal

jurisdiction, a claim that the court summarily disposed of as follows: ‘‘[The

father’s] contention that he was not served ‘in Connecticut’ and therefore

[that] the proceedings are invalid misstates the law of Connecticut, the law

of Florida, and the [UCCJEA].’’ The father does not renew his personal

jurisdiction claim on appeal.

9

In her brief to this court, the commissioner concedes that unclean hands

would not have been a proper basis to deny the father’s motion to dismiss

because he was not seeking equitable relief but argues that the court’s

decision did not rest on this basis. We need not reach this issue in light of

our conclusion that dismissal was compelled for other reasons.

10 The father contends that the decision denying his motion to dismiss is

immediately appealable because litigating custody in a distant jurisdiction

will impair his ability to participate in the litigation, to call witnesses in his

defense, to engage in services to facilitate reunification, and to visit with

Teagan. The commissioner contends that no evidence was presented to

support these claims of irreparable harm and that the mere fact that a parent

must litigate a case in another state does not necessarily mean the parent

has been irreparably harmed. The commissioner nonetheless agrees that

the father can immediately appeal because doing so would be the only

way in which he could potentially be afforded the relief he was originally

seeking—avoiding litigation in Connecticut. In light of our agreement with

one of the father’s arguments, we need not consider the other arguments.

11 The same policy concerns that inform our approach to interlocutory

appeals from trial court decisions in family matters are implicated in such

appeals from trial court decisions in juvenile matters. See generally General

Statutes § 46b-1 (defining Superior Court’s jurisdiction over family relations

matters to include juvenile matters).

12 The trial court deferred ruling on the father’s motion for visitation until

the jurisdictional issue was resolved but noted that visitation could be

worked out with the Connecticut department on a voluntary basis in the

interim. The petition to terminate the respondents’ parental rights filed in

January, 2019, after the ruling on the motion to dismiss was issued, states

that, since Teagan was brought to Connecticut, the father has not had a

supervised visit with her ‘‘due to [his] residing in Florida.’’ The petition does

not indicate whether the department ever offered to provide supervised

visitation at its expense. It does indicate that the father had failed to engage

in any contact with the department since September, 2018, approximately

one month before his motion to dismiss was denied.

13 Although nothing in the record before this court indicates whether the

respondents made an argument to the Florida court that transfer would

adversely impact visitation, we do not view that omission to preclude the

father from raising that concern in connection with his final judgment argument in this court. Insofar as the commissioner contends, in connection

with the final judgment issue, that the father presented no evidence regarding

the impact of the trial court’s jurisdiction on visitation, we are hard-pressed

to see how or when he could have presented such evidence.

14 It appears that, under various rules that govern interlocutory appeals
in other jurisdictions, most jurisdictions permit an immediate appeal from

a decision determining that subject matter jurisdiction exists under the

UCCJEA. See In re Marriage of Lamaria, Docket No. B237111, 2013 WL

1402278, *3 (Cal. App. April 8, 2013) (rejecting claim that jurisdictional

determination under UCCJEA is not appealable interlocutory order); Cohen

v. Cohen, 300 Ga. App. 7, 8, 684 S.E.2d 94 (2009) (denial of motion to dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction under UCCJEA was immediately appealable because

decision involves child custody order, which is immediately appealable by

statute); In re Welfare of Child of G.R., Docket No. A17-0995, 2017 WL

5661606, *1 (Minn. App. November 27, 2017) (considering interlocutory

appeal from trial court’s decision denying motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under UCCJEA); South Carolina Dept. of Social

Services v. Johnnie B., Docket No. 2014-UP-080, 2014 WL 2579937, *1 (S.C.

App. February 21, 2014) (concluding that interlocutory appeal challenging

subject matter jurisdiction under UCCJEA should be permitted ‘‘in the interest of justice and judicial economy’’); Sackett v. Roseman, Docket No. M2002-

00587-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 22349077, *2 (Tenn. App. July 2, 2003) (trial

court granted father’s motion for summary judgment, finding that it had

jurisdiction under UCCJEA and granting mother permission to seek interlocutory appeal from that judgment). But see Duffy v. Reeves, 619 A.2d 1094,

1098 n.1 (R.I. 1993) (concluding that permitting interlocutory appeal from

trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction under emergency jurisdiction provision of UCCJA can cause more harm to child than if appeal was delayed

until determination of merits, that court would decline to review these

interlocutory appeals in absence of extraordinary circumstances in future,

and that petition for certiorari should be filed in such cases); see also

Fitzgerald v. Bilodeau, 908 A.2d 1212, 1213 and n.2 (Me. 2006) (denial of

motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens under UCCJEA is not immediately appealable in absence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., narrow

exceptions to final judgment rule, such as judicial economy, collateral order,

and ‘‘ ‘death knell’ ’’ exceptions).

15 The parties agree that the Florida court did not cite any particular

provision of the UCCJEA as a basis for its decision that jurisdiction should

be transferred to Connecticut as the more convenient forum, but their briefs

to this court assume that the Florida court either did exercise, or could

have exercised, jurisdiction under a particular provision of that act. Although

we are inclined to agree, the record provides a basis to question that assumption. The Florida department took the position in its appellate brief that

Florida had only limited, temporary, emergency jurisdiction because of

evidence that the respondents were making plans to leave the state with

Teagan to avoid her being taken into that state’s custody, which deprived

the Florida court of jurisdiction on a more permanent basis under the

UCCJEA. Moreover, although the father claimed in his brief that there was

a bar to Connecticut’s jurisdiction because Teagan would never be neglected

in this state, he did not identify any statute imposing such a requirement.

Given these concerns, after oral argument, we ordered the parties to file

supplemental briefs to address whether any ground for making an initial

custody determination under the UCCJEA supported Connecticut’s exercise

of jurisdiction, and, if so, whether General Statutes § 46b-121, which restricts

the exercise of jurisdiction in neglect proceedings, nonetheless barred the

exercise of jurisdiction.

16 Although § 46b-121 was the subject of amendments in 2018; see Public

Acts 2018, No. 18-31, § 27; those amendments have no bearing on the merits

of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision

of the statute.

17 The UCCJEA defines ‘‘home state’’ as ‘‘the state in which a child lived

with a parent or person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months

immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In

the case of a child less than six months old, the term means the state in

which the child lived from birth with any such parent or person acting as

a parent.’’ General Statutes § 46b-115a (7). ‘‘[C]ases in other states have

concluded [that] time spent in a forum after the filing of a child custody

petition may not be counted [toward] the time necessary for home state

jurisdiction.’’ In re Marriage of Sareen, 153 Cal. App. 4th 371, 379, 62 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 687 (2007), cert. denied sub nom. Sareen v. Sareen, 552 U.S. 1259,

128 S. Ct. 1670, 170 L. Ed. 2d 357 (2008). But see General Statutes § 46b115n (b) (temporary emergency jurisdiction may become basis for final

custody order if, among other things, state has ‘‘become’’ child’s home state).

18 The decisions of both the Florida court and our trial court imply that

the respondents engaged in unjustifiable conduct by leaving Connecticut
for the purpose of avoiding the Connecticut department’s involvement with

Teagan. It is unclear, however, whether General Statutes § 46b-115r would

apply under the present circumstances. That statute applies when the person

engaging in such misconduct seeks to ‘‘invoke [the court’s] jurisdiction’’;

General Statutes § 46b-115r (a); and the respondents clearly were not trying

to invoke any court’s jurisdiction.

19 The counterpart to this provision in Florida’s UCCJEA is structured

differently from ours but is the same substantively in all material respects.

See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.514 (West 2012).

20 The commentary to the UCCJA, the UCCJEA’s predecessor, more clearly

explained the rationale for this rule: ‘‘There is no requirement for technical

personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory that custody determinations,

as distinguished from support actions . . . are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status.’’ Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968) § 12,

comment, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 372 (2019). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments explains that custody is treated as a matter of status (i.e., a determination of the relationship between parties, like divorce) and that, if status

determinations could be made only with respect to individuals present in

the state, ‘‘it would have been impossible to determine family relationships

in which one party to the relationship was not personally present, for example when a local resident sought a divorce from a spouse who had moved

elsewhere. Conceiving the status as a thing overcame this difficulty. The

status could be attributed a situs where a party to the relationship had

some significant connection, such as residence, and jurisdiction accordingly

exercised on the basis of situs of the status.’’ 1 Restatement (Second),

Judgments § 7, comment (b), p. 81 (1982); see also Perry v. Ponder, 604

S.W.2d 306, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (‘‘if ‘minimum contacts’ were required,

cases would arise in which no court would have personal jurisdiction over

both parents’’).

21 Courts have held that all relevant factors must be considered in strict

compliance with the inconvenient forum provision. See In re McAndrews,

171 N.H. 214, 220, 193 A.3d 834 (2018) (citing cases). There is no indication

that the Florida court considered two manifestly relevant enumerated factors—the distance between Florida and Connecticut and the parties’ relative

financial circumstances. See General Statutes § 46b-115q (b) (3) and (4).

Although the respondents did not make specific arguments on these factors,

the father submitted a pay stub reflecting an hourly wage of less than $10

an hour, which suggests that the respondents’ financial resources pale in

comparison to the resources of a state child protection agency. In addition

to its failure to consider relevant enumerated factors, which are not exclusive, the Florida court’s decision reflects no consideration of legitimate

concerns that the father has raised in this court about the impact of Connecticut’s exercise of jurisdiction on visitation and on the provision of services

to rehabilitate the respondents and reunify the family. Despite the fact that

neither respondent raised those issues in the trial court, their significance

should have been recognized by the court on its own initiative. Review

of the propriety of the Florida court’s inconvenient forum determination,

however, and the effect of the respondents’ failure to timely raise relevant

considerations are matters exclusively within the province of the Florida

courts.

We note that our trial court communicated Connecticut’s willingness to

assume jurisdiction, via a telephone message. Insofar as our trial court

represented that Teagan’s case would be added to the pending case pertaining to her sibling if her case was transferred, we observe that no such

decision could be rendered without first giving the respondents an opportunity to object to the consolidation. See Practice Book § 35a-6A (requiring

court to consider whether consolidation would cause injustice). Had the

courts engaged in a communication on the record, as the UCCJEA demands;

see General Statutes § 46b-115h; the aforementioned issues might have been

explored in a more meaningful way. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.511 (West 2012)

(requiring, in addition to verbatim record of communication, that ‘‘[t]he

court shall allow the parties to participate in the communication,’’ at which

time ‘‘they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments

before a decision on jurisdiction is made’’).

22 ‘‘The term territorial jurisdiction . . . refers to the connection between

the territorial authority of the court and the action that has been brought

before the court. 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments [c. 2], introductory

note, p. 22 [1982].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trichilo v. Trichilo,

190 Conn. 774, 779–80 n.7, 462 A.2d 1048 (1983). It reflects the concept that,

because governments have an authority that generally is defined by reference
to their legal boundaries or territorial limits, the courts constituted by them

have an authority that is correspondingly defined in territorial terms. See

1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 4, comment (a), p. 56; see also General

Statutes § 51-1a (b) (‘‘[t]he territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,

the Appellate Court, and the Superior Court shall be coextensive with the

boundaries of the state’’). ‘‘Hence, outside the territorial limits of a court’s

jurisdiction, the coercive effectiveness of its judgment depends upon the

judgment’s being given recognition by the authorities of another government,

under a principle of comity or by virtue of legal provisions such as the

[f]ull [f]aith and [c]redit [c]lause of the [United States] [c]onstitution.’’ 1

Restatement (Second), supra, c. 2, introductory note, p. 23.

Although the concurring and dissenting justice places significant weight

on the characterization of § 46b-121 as a reflection of territorial jurisdiction,

the distinction between territorial jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction

is not always clear; territorial jurisdiction has been viewed as combining

aspects of subject matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction. See id.,

introductory note, p. 28 (‘‘Whatever term is used [to refer to subject matter

jurisdiction], the concept of authority to decide a particular type of legal

controversy is sometimes difficult or impossible to distinguish from that of

territorial jurisdiction. For example, when reference is made to a court’s

authority to determine a matter of status or to determine interests in property, it can be said that the state’s connection to the status or the property

is a matter of territorial jurisdiction or that it is one of subject matter

jurisdiction.’’); see also, e.g., B.J.P. v. R.W.P., 637 A.2d 74, 80–81 (D.C. 1994)

(Ferren, J., concurring) (‘‘There are two species of jurisdiction over the

subject matter. The first—the one commonly meant when referring to ‘subject matter jurisdiction’—concerns the ‘competence’ of the court to adjudicate a particular kind of controversy; e.g., divorce or child custody. . . .

The second species is called ‘territorial jurisdiction,’ which requires the

court to have a geographical relationship to a particular ‘thing’ or ‘status’

. . . in addition to the competence to adjudicate the type of claim at issue;

e.g., jurisdiction over custody where the child is domiciled. Territorial jurisdiction often combines aspects of classic subject matter jurisdiction (e.g.,

a status such as child custody) with those of in personam jurisdiction (e.g.,

a particular parent’s custody of a particular child).’’ (Citations omitted;

footnote omitted.)); Feriole v. Feriole, 468 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. App. 1985)

(‘‘Whenever a minor child resides in the state, a circuit court has inherent

jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining to custody and [issue] any orders

appropriate to that child’s welfare. . . . For many years it was the law of

this state that a court had no jurisdiction to initially adjudicate the question

of the custody of a minor child unless that child was physically present

within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the [action] seeking

an adjudication of his custody was filed.’’ (Citation omitted.)).

The only material consequence flowing from characterizing a condition

as an expression of territorial jurisdiction, rather than subject matter jurisdiction, is the possibility of the former being subject to waiver. See 1

Restatement (Second), supra, c. 2, introductory note, p. 28. But see State

v. Dudley, 364 S.C. 578, 582, 614 S.E.2d 623 (2005) (‘‘Although territorial

jurisdiction is not a component of subject matter jurisdiction, we hold that

it is a fundamental issue that may be raised by a party or by a court at any

point in the proceeding. . . . The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction

implicates the state’s sovereignty, a question so elemental that we hold it

cannot be waived by conduct or by consent.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote

omitted.)). Waiver is not a concern in the present case, however, because

the father has consistently objected to Connecticut’s exercise of jurisdiction

over the case due to Teagan’s lack of presence in this state.

23 This broad construction is consistent with the historical treatment of

territorial jurisdiction and custody jurisdiction. See 1 Restatement (Second),

Conflict of Laws § 79, p. 237 (1971) (Custody of the Person); 1 Restatement

(Second), Judgments § 4, p. 55 (1982) (Constitutional and Legislative Determinants of Territorial Jurisdiction); 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 7,

p. 79 (1982) (Jurisdiction over Status); see also Castle v. Castle, 247 So. 2d

455, 456 (Fla. App. 1971) (Walden, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]wenty-seven states

. . . are unanimous in holding that even though children may be physically

without the state, power exists in the court to make an award of custody

of children domiciled within the state. See [C. Drechsler, Annot., ‘Jurisdiction

of Court to Award Custody of Child Domiciled in State but Physically Outside

It,’ 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 442, § 5 (1950)].’’); In re Gonzales, 25 Ill. App. 3d 136,

143, 323 N.E.2d 42 (1974) (‘‘The [s]tate’s interest in this particular case in

which the parent is a nonresident is established in that the [s]tate, as [p]arens
patriae, has a responsibility to care for and protect any child within its

borders. . . . Consequently, the legal residence of the child does not technically affect the jurisdiction of the court, so long as the child is physically

present within the [s]tate.’’ (Citation omitted.)).

24 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-306 (a) (1) (2015) (‘‘[t]he circuit court

shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of and shall be the sole court for

the following proceedings governed by this subchapter, including without

limitation . . . (B) Proceedings in which a juvenile is alleged to be dependent or dependent-neglected’’); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-104 (1) (2019) (‘‘the

juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings . . . (b)

Concerning any child who is neglected or dependent, as set forth in section

19-3-102’’).

25 The concurring and dissenting justice discounts this North Carolina

case because the termination statute provided that state’s District Court

with ‘‘exclusive original jurisdiction’’ over the termination matter. (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leonard, supra, 77 N.C.

App. 440. This exclusivity language is commonly used, however, to designate

which of North Carolina’s courts, i.e., District Court or Superior Court, has

jurisdiction, not to designate which state’s court has jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-241 and 7A-272 (2019).

26 Conditions for exercising exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the

UCCJEA are codified in General Statutes §§ 46b-115l and 46b-115m.

27 The commissioner views this New Hampshire case as supporting her

position, reading it as standing for the proposition that the UCCJEA has an

independent sphere of operation, such that it applies when more than one

state has a claim to jurisdiction. We do not think this is a fair reading of

the case. Nowhere is this more evident than the New Hampshire court’s

reliance on the reasoning of the North Carolina court in In re H.L.A.D.,

supra, 184 N.C. App. 381.

28 The UCCJEA, like its predecessor, is aimed at achieving the following

purposes: ‘‘(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of

other [s]tates in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted

in the shifting of children from [s]tate to [s]tate with harmful effects on

their well-being;

‘‘(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other [s]tates to the end that

a custody decree is rendered in that [s]tate which can best decide the case

in the interest of the child;

‘‘(3) Discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing controversies over child custody;

‘‘(4) Deter abductions of children;

‘‘(5) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other [s]tates in this

[s]tate; [and]

‘‘(6) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other [s]tates . . . .’’

Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) § 101, comment, supra, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 474. Conflicting custody orders and the enforcement of orders had been a problem in part because there was some question

as to whether custody orders fell outside the purview of the full faith and

credit clause of the United States constitution. See 1 Restatement (Second),

Conflict of Laws § 79, comment (c) and reporter’s note to comment (c), pp.

238–39, 241–42 (1971). Noncustodial parents had been using the child to

forum shop for a more favorable custody arrangement, as the child’s presence was deemed a basis for a court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bellew v. Larese,

288 Ga. 495, 499, 706 S.E.2d 78 (2011); In re Felty v. Felty, 66 App. Div. 3d

64, 71–72, 882 N.Y.S.2d 504 (2009); see also P. Hoff, supra, p. 2.

29 Nor does the transfer rule that the Florida court cited as authority for

its decision. Rule 8.205 (c) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides: ‘‘If it should appear at any time that an action is pending in another

state, the court may transfer jurisdiction over the action to a more convenient

forum state, may stay the proceedings, or may dismiss the action.’’ (Emphasis

added.) This language plainly reflects that the more convenient forum state

already had jurisdiction over the action prior to the transfer. The record

suggests that the Florida court viewed the case pending in Connecticut

regarding Teagan’s sibling, J, and Teagan’s case to be part of the same

‘‘action,’’ in reliance on a telephone message it had received from the Connecticut trial court that Teagan’s case would be added to J’s case if the

Florida court declined to exercise jurisdiction.

30 A different type of territorial limitation commonly operates in the proceeding at which most initial child custody determinations are made. In a

marriage dissolution action, in which an initial custody determination most

commonly is made; see General Statutes § 46b-115q (d) (allowing court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over initial custody determination incidental

to dissolution action while retaining jurisdiction over dissolution); it has

long been the law in nearly every state, including Connecticut, that the party

filing for dissolution must reside in the state in which the action is filed.

See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 96 Mass. App. 557, 561–62, 136 N.E.3d 408 (2019)

(‘‘Nearly every [s]tate . . . imposes a statutory durational residency requirement to ensure ‘that those who seek a divorce from its courts [are] genuinely

attached to the [s]tate,’ and ‘to insulate [its] divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack.’ Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404–405, 409, 95 S.

Ct. 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975).’’); see also, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-44

(residency requirement).

31 That such a connection is required is consistent with the historical

treatment of custody jurisdiction and the UCCJEA’s disclaimer that neither

the physical presence of, nor personal jurisdiction over, the child or ‘‘a

party’’ is necessary. See General Statutes § 46b-115k (c). For many years

prior to the enactment of the UCCJA, the rule was that ‘‘[a] state has power

to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the custody . . . of the person

of a child . . . (a) who is domiciled in the state [a fact dictated by a parent’s

domicile], or (b) who is present in the state, or (c) who is neither domiciled

nor present in the state, if the controversy is between two or more persons

who are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state.’’ 1 Restatement

(Second), Conflict of Laws § 79, p. 237 (1971). The first ground was based

on the theory that custody is a determination of status; see id., comment

(a), p. 237; which is the theory cited in the commentary to the UCCJA as

the rationale for the disclaimer regarding physical presence and personal

jurisdiction. See footnote 20 of this opinion. Under this status theory, each

state has jurisdiction to ‘‘determine the civil status and capacities of all its

inhabitants,’’ and even if an involved nonresident party could not be served

within the state, the decree would be binding within the state in which it

was rendered. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878),

overruled in part on other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97

S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977); see also In re Termination of Parental

Rights to Thomas J.R., 262 Wis. 2d 217, 236, 663 N.W.2d 734 (2003) (‘‘child

custody proceedings determine the ‘status’ of children . . . [and thereby]

implicate ‘the right and obligation of the state in its parens patriae role to

consider the welfare of the child subject to its jurisdiction and to make a

determination that is in the best interests of the child’ ’’). Thus, the status

theory is predicated on the presence of the child or a parent, but not both

parents. See In re R.W., supra, 191 Vt. 125–29 (applying UCCJEA and citing

status cases from other jurisdictions in support of conclusion that Vermont

had jurisdiction to terminate father’s parental rights, even though father

lacked minimum contacts with Vermont, because court had jurisdiction to

adjudicate custody ‘‘status’’ of his children, who, along with their mother,

were within court’s jurisdiction).

32 See H.T. v. Cleburne County Dept. of Human Resources, 163 So. 3d

1054, 1066–67 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (Alabama had significant connection

jurisdiction over termination petition pertaining to infant born in Georgia,

even though mother had been living in Georgia immediately before child’s

birth, because mother repeatedly used Alabama address as her residence

on official forms and insisted to Department of Human Resources that she

intended to live at that address with infant after leaving hospital); In re

Iliana M., 134 Conn. App. 382, 391–93, 38 A.3d 130 (2012) (Connecticut had

significant connection jurisdiction over neglect petition relating to infant

born in Massachusetts hospital because trial court did not credit parents’

representations that they intended to live in Massachusetts given that they

were longtime residents of Connecticut, they had listed Connecticut as their

residence on hospital forms, and court filings and recent police reports

listed Connecticut as their residence); In re J.S., 131 N.E.3d 1263, 1264–65,

1271 (Ill. App. 2019) (Illinois had significant connection jurisdiction over

neglect petition relating to infant born in Indiana hospital because mother

claimed that she was planning move to Arizona and her hospital record

noted that mother ‘‘has Illinois Medicaid, Illinois food stamps, and Illinois

[Women, Infants and Children benefits]’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Arnold, 532 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Mo. App. 2017) (Missouri had

significant connection jurisdiction over neglect petition pertaining to infant

born in Kansas because parents lived in Missouri during time relevant to

cases pertaining to infant’s siblings, parents’ last known address is in Missouri, and parents declined to provide court with Kansas address despite

claiming that they presently lived in that state); State ex rel. R.P. v. Rosen,

supra, 966 S.W.2d 301 (Missouri had significant connection jurisdiction over
neglect petition relating to infant born in Kansas hospital because parents

had been living in Missouri for considerable period of time prior to child’s

birth, they indicated to social worker at Kansas hospital that they intended

to return to Missouri with baby, and Missouri Medicaid paid for expenses

associated with infant’s birth); State ex rel. W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011,

1012–13 (Utah App.) (California had significant connection jurisdiction over

neglect petition relating to infant born in Utah because parents were longtime

California residents, father stayed behind in California while mother looked

for state with more favorable custody law, and mother took few belongings

and did not establish permanent residence), cert. denied sub nom. In re

W.D., 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989); In re M.S., 205 Vt. 429, 439–41, 176 A.3d 1124

(2017) (Vermont had significant connection jurisdiction over neglect petition

relating to infant born in New Hampshire because parents lived for extended

period in Vermont and occasionally lived in New Hampshire but did not

establish their own residence in New Hampshire); In re D.T., 170 Vt. 148,

150, 153, 743 A.2d 1077 (1999) (Vermont had significant connection jurisdiction over neglect petition relating to infant born in Massachusetts because

child was taken to Vermont when he was two months old and parents

stipulated that they intended to remain in Vermont).

Despite the absence of this factor in the present case, the concurring and

dissenting justice nonetheless concludes that Connecticut has significant

connection jurisdiction. It reads the case law as indicating that ‘‘proof of

the following factors will support a conclusion that an infant has a significant

connection to a forum state as a result of parental conduct: (1) history of

long-term residency in that state by a parent; (2) the ongoing presence of

the child’s siblings in the state, especially if they are in the state’s legal

custody; (3) the presence of other relatives in the state; or (4) a state’s

provision of child welfare or other social services to the family.’’ We disagree

that the case law supports the concurring and dissenting justice’s conclusion.

With regard to the long-term residency of a parent in the state, if such

residency has been relinquished at the time jurisdiction is invoked, the past

residency could establish the parent’s connection to the state, but it would

not establish the connection of a child who has never been and will never

be in the state. The statute unambiguously requires that ‘‘the child and at

least one parent or person acting as a parent have a significant connection

with this state . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-115k (a)

(3) and (4). With regard to the presence of the child’s relatives in the state,

we are unaware of any case in which this factor was cited without evidence

demonstrating that the child voluntarily had maintained, or would be maintaining, a relationship with those relatives. With regard to the state’s provision of services or benefits, the cases cited previously in this footnote

suggest that there was a present entitlement to the services or benefits, or

at least that such services or benefits had been received shortly before the

child’s birth and had not yet been terminated. It is reasonable to presume that

a parent presently entitled to such services or benefits has not relinquished

residency in the state. That is not the case here. Finally, with regard to the

ongoing presence of the child’s siblings in the state, especially if they are

in the state’s legal custody, we are unaware of any case in which this factor

alone was sufficient to establish a significant connection between the child

and the state, especially when there is no evidence that the child has been

or will be present in the state.

33 Our conclusion that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the commissioner’s neglect petition has no effect on the order granting the commissioner

temporary custody of Teagan. The father did not challenge that order, and

Teagan’s presence in this state is sufficient to establish a basis for temporary

emergency custody. Teagan has resided with her sibling’s foster family since

the Connecticut trial court issued the order placing her in the commissioner’s

temporary custody. It is significant to note that our decision is limited to

the question of whether Connecticut had jurisdiction to make a final custody

decision at the time the custody proceeding was commenced. We have no

occasion, in this appeal, to consider whether the UCCJEA would provide

another mechanism by which such a temporary order could become a final

custody determination under the facts of this case; see General Statutes

§ 46b-115n (b) and (c); or whether Teagan could remain in the care of her

sibling’s foster family even if the issue of a final custody determination is

made by a Florida court. See General Statutes § 17a-175 (Interstate Compact

on the Placement of Children); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 409.408 et seq. (West 2018)

(Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children). Should either of those

issues, or any other, arise hereafter, they will be addressed in the first

instance by a Connecticut court.