21-1316

In re New York City Policing

In the

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AUGUST TERM 2021

No. 21-1316

IN RE NEW YORK CITY POLICING

DURING SUMMER 2020 DEMONSTRATIONS

JARRETT PAYNE, ANDIE MALI, CAMILA GINI, VIDAL GUZMAN,

CHARLIE MONLOUIS-ANDERLE, JAIME FRIED, MICAELA MARTINEZ,

JULIAN PHILIPS, NICHOLAS MULDER, COLLEEN MCCORMACKMAITLAND, VIVIAN MATTHEW KING-YARDE, CHARLES HENRY 

WOOD, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY 

SITUATED, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY LETITIA JAMES,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ADAMA SOW,

DAVID JAKEVIC, ALEXANDRA DE MUCHA PINO, OSCAR RIOS,

BARBARA ROSS, MATTHEW BREDDER, SABRINA ZURKUHLEN, MARIA 

SALAZAR, DARA PLUCHINO, SAVITRI DURKEE, ON BEHALF OF 

THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, SAMIRA SIERRA,

AMALI SIERRA, RICARDO NIGAGLIONI, ALEX GUTIERREZ,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

CAMERON YATES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, MAYOR ERIC 

ADAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BILL DE BLASIO, IN HIS 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, POLICE COMMISSIONER KEECHANT L.

SEWELL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, DERMOT SHEA, IN HIS 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT KENNETH E. COREY,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, TERENCE MONAHAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL 

CAPACITY, SERGEANT GYPSY PICHARDO, SERGEANT KEITH CHENG,
2

OFFICER MATTHEW TARANGELO, OFFICER MATTHEW L. PERRY,

LIEUTENANT THOMAS R. HARDELL, OFFICER DAMIAN RIVERA,

OFFICER JACQUELINE VARGAS, LIEUTENANT MICHAEL BUTLER,

OFFICER AARON HUSBANDS, OFFICER JOSEPH DECK, OFFICER 

THOMAS E. MANNING,

Defendants-Appellees,

OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-32, OFFICERS JANE DOES 1-2, OFFICERS JOHN 

DOES 1-26, OFFICER JANE DOE 1, OFFICER DOE ESPOSITO, SERGEANT 

DOE CARABALLO, OFFICER ISMAEL HERNANDEZ CARPIO (NO. 19759),

JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10, DETECTIVE EDWARD CARRASCO (NO. 1567),

OFFICER TALHA AHMAD (NO. 21358), OFFICER KEVIN AGRO (NO.

8054), OFFICERS JOHN/JANE DOES 1-40, UMID KARIMOV, IN HIS 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, ALFREDO JEFF, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,

DEBORA MATIAS, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, ANDRE JEANPIERRE,

IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, KENNETH C. LEHR, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL 

CAPACITY, FAUSTO PICHARDO,

Defendants,

POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC.,

Proposed Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.*

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York

ARGUED: OCTOBER 5, 2021

DECIDED: MARCH 4, 2022

Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, and JACOBS and MENASHI,

Circuit Judges.

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
3

Proposed Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant Police Benevolent 

Association of the City of New York, Inc. (“PBA”) appeals the order 

of the district court denying its motion to intervene in the 

consolidated cases captioned In re New York City Policing During 

Summer 2020 Demonstrations. The PBA asserts interests in the 

litigation that it argues the parties to the actions cannot adequately 

represent, and for that reason the PBA claims it is entitled to intervene 

as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). We 

reverse the district court’s denial of intervention with respect to the 

actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. We affirm the district 

court’s denial of intervention with respect to those actions that seek 

neither declaratory nor injunctive relief. 

PHILIP J. LEVITZ, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. 

Underwood, Solicitor General, and Anisha S. Dasgupta, 

Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, 

Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, 

NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee People of the State of New York.

MACKENZIE FILLOW (Richard Dearing and Devin Slack, 

on the brief), for Georgia M. Pestana, Corporation Counsel 

of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Municipal 

Defendants-Appellees.

ROBERT S. SMITH, Law Offices of Robert S. Smith (Richard 

H. Dolan and Thomas A. Kissane, Schlam Stone & Dolan 

LLP, on the brief), New York, NY, for Proposed IntervenorDefendant-Appellant Police Benevolent Association of the 

City of New York, Inc.

Joshua S. Moskovitz, Law Office of Joshua Moskovitz, 

P.C., New York, NY, for the Sierra, Wood, and Yates 

Plaintiffs-Appellees.
4

MENASHI, Circuit Judge:

Proposed Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant Police Benevolent 

Association of the City of New York, Inc. (“PBA”) appeals the denial 

of its motion to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a) in six civil actions consolidated under the caption In

re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations. Both 

New York State and private plaintiffs brought the actions, which 

name as defendants the City of New York and its leadership (“City”), 

the New York City Police Department and its leadership (“NYPD”), 

and NYPD officers in their individual and official capacities. The 

claims relate to police actions and practices in response to 

demonstrations that occurred in the summer of 2020. We hold that the 

district court erred in holding that the PBA did not have a cognizable 

interest in the personal safety of its member officers at the merits

stages of the actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and that 

such interests were adequately represented. We therefore reverse the 

judgment of the district court as to those cases and remand with 

instructions to grant the PBA’s motion to intervene.

BACKGROUND

I

In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations

includes six civil actions. In each, the plaintiffs allege that the NYPD 

acted unlawfully at demonstrations occurring in the summer of 2020. 

A

Three actions were brought by individual plaintiffs on behalf 

of themselves or putative classes against the City, the NYPD, and 

NYPD officers. The plaintiffs in these actions allege violations of the 

federal and New York State constitutions, New York civil rights law, 
5

and common-law torts. The actions seek injunctive or declaratory 

relief as well as damages.1 Another action, People of the State of New 

York v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-322, was brought by the New York 

State Attorney General against the City and the NYPD, alleging 

violations of the federal and New York State constitutions as well as 

other violations of New York law, and seeks declaratory and 

injunctive relief. The final two actions were brought by individuals on 

behalf of themselves or putative classes against the City, the NYPD, 

and NYPD officers, alleging violations of the federal and New York 

State constitutions and common-law torts. These actions seek only 

damages.2

The complaints in each of the cases allege that the NYPD used

excessive force, engaged in unreasonable searches and seizures, and 

violated First Amendment rights of the press and peaceful assembly.

The Sow plaintiffs, for example, refer to “militarized tactics,” 

including “massive amounts” of NYPD officers “in riot gear 

including riot helmets and militarized” vehicles intended to “alarm[]” 

1 These actions are Payne v. de Blasio, No. 20-CV-8924; Sow v. City of New 

York, No. 21-CV-533; and Sierra v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-10291. The 

Sierra action seeks a declaratory judgment as well as damages. The Sierra 

plaintiffs argue that their request for declaratory relief is “limited” to “a 

request for ‘a declaration that past conduct was unlawful.’” Sierra, Wood, 

and Yates Appellees’ Br. 3 (quoting In re New York City Policing During 

Summer 2020 Demonstrations, No. 20-CV-8924, 2021 WL 2894764, at *5 

(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2021)). Because such a declaration would declare unlawful 

“the City’s policies, practices, and/or customs,” App’x 337, Sierra is 

properly considered alongside those actions that seek injunctive relief.

2 These actions are Yates v. New York City, No. 21-CV-1904, and Wood v. City 

of New York, No. 20-CV-10541. Two additional cases, Rolon v. City of New 

York, No. 21-CV-2548, and Hernandez v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-7406, 

were filed after the PBA’s intervention motion and are therefore not at issue 

in this appeal.
6

and “deter[]” protesters. App’x 270. Likewise, the Attorney General 

alleges in the People case that many NYPD officers who responded to 

protests “appeared in full riot gear, including external Kevlar vests, 

helmets, and forearm plates,” before “unlawfully arrest[ing] over 300 

individuals” in a campaign of “excessive force” that culminated in 

“mass detentions and arrests.” App’x 127-28. 

Individual plaintiffs allege that such tactics were deployed 

unlawfully against them when, for example, a “group of at least 100 

NYPD officers form[ed] a line” and “began to move towards the 

protesters with their helmets on and batons out.” App’x 245. An 

officer then allegedly “pointed his drawn baton at” one plaintiff, 

“lunged at” her, “forcefully knocked the phone” out of her hands, 

“struck” her “across her chest,” and “began beating [her] on the arms 

and upper body,” at which point “[a]dditional NYPD members 

descended” to “beat her with their batons and kick[] her.” App’x 245-

46. The plaintiffs allege that such interactions reflect the NYPD’s 

“long history of violence towards Black and Latinx people,” App’x

158, and “historical brutality against protesters,” App’x 271.

B

Four of the consolidated actions seek broad injunctive and 

declaratory relief. For example, the Attorney General asks that the 

district court 

[e]njoin Defendants ... from implementing, applying, or 

taking any action whatsoever under its unconstitutional 

policies or practices of employing excessive force, false 

arrests, and retaliatory tactics ... in the form of an order 

requiring Defendants to take all affirmative steps, 

including changing policies, conducting training, and 

undergoing monitoring, among others, to ... eliminate 
7

ongoing unlawful policing practices and their effects, 

and ... prevent this unlawful conduct in the future. 

App’x 148. The Attorney General further requests that the district 

court “[i]ssue an order holding unlawful, vacating, and setting aside 

Defendants’ policies or practices of employing excessive force and 

false arrests, suppressing free expression and press reporting, and 

retaliating against” who participated in the Summer 2020 

demonstrations. App’x 148.

Similarly, the Sow plaintiffs request that the district court 

“[i]ssue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant City of New 

York and the NYPD from violently disrupting protests.” App’x 299. 

And the Sierra plaintiffs ask that the district court declare 

unconstitutional “defendants’ conduct and the City’s policies, 

practices, and/or customs of retaliating against peaceful protesters out 

of hostility toward their message, arresting protesters without 

probable cause, using excessive force against the protesters, and 

targeting protesters for law enforcement action because of their 

advocacy for racial justice and equality.” App’x 337.

By contrast, the plaintiffs in Yates and Wood seek neither 

declaratory nor injunctive relief.

II

On March 3, 2021, the Police Benevolent Association of the City 

of New York, Inc. (“PBA”) moved to intervene as of right in the 

consolidated actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). The 

PBA is “the designated collective bargaining agent for the more than

23,000 police officers employed by the NYPD,” and its “core mission” 

is “to advocate for and protect the interests of ... the front-line police 

officers of the NYPD.” App’x 66.9-66.10. The PBA argued that it had 

interests at stake at both the merits and remedy phases of the 
8

litigation and that the parties did not adequately represent those 

interests. 

The PBA identified an interest in maintaining officer safety that 

would be affected if the policies that governed front-line officers’ 

rules of engagement with demonstrators were declared unlawful or 

otherwise altered. According to the PBA, front-line officers who 

responded to the Summer 2020 protests suffered multiple casualties. 

For example, the PBA described a female officer who suffered

fractured vertebrae from being repeatedly kicked in the head at a 

demonstration, even though she was wearing a helmet. App’x 66.24. 

Another officer “was struck in the face with a brick,” which bounced 

off the face shield of his helmet, striking his shoulder. App’x 66.25. 

And in responding to a reported robbery at a retail store during the 

protests, another officer was run over by the getaway vehicle, and he 

“sustained injuries to his back, knee, and hip.” App’x 66.26-66.27. 

The PBA also criticized the leadership of the City and the 

NYPD for failing to provide guidance to police officers in advance of 

protests occurring on May 29, 2020, and for adopting a posture of 

“business as usual.” App’x 66.23. The PBA argued that “NYPD 

management was taking a purely reactive and defensive approach, 

and had failed to account for the escalating violence witnessed 

around the country on previous nights and in New York City the 

night prior,” and as a result “a significant number of police officers 

assigned to protest details ... were not equipped with disorder control 

helmets,” a “standard” piece of protective equipment. App’x 66.23.

The PBA suggested that the approach of management caused officer 

injuries, including one officer who was “hit in the back of the head 

with a metal trash can” after he was “instructed by supervisors to 

leave his helmet in the vehicle.” App’x 66.25. The PBA reported that 
9

“nearly 400 police officers ... were injured during the protests.” App’x

66.24.

In its motion papers, the PBA connected its interest in officer 

safety to its role in negotiating collective-bargaining agreements with 

the City. As the collective-bargaining agent for the officers, the PBA 

has the right to bargain over “questions concerning the practical 

impact that” even non-negotiable management “decisions ... have on 

terms and conditions of employment, including ... questions of ... 

employee safety.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-307(b). However, the 

PBA maintains that its interest in officer safety is “not limited to 

‘collective-bargaining rights’” but independently serves as a 

cognizable interest entitling it to intervene as of right. Appellant’s Br. 

12.

The PBA argued that both the merits and remedies phases of 

the litigation implicated its interest in officer safety because the 

“sweeping demands for declaratory and injunctive relief in the 

complaints” could “encompass restrictions on NYPD officers’ ability 

to use defensive and non-lethal equipment ... to protect themselves” 

in future protests. App’x 66.18. Because any conclusions of the district 

court on the merits would affect the scope of a resulting settlement 

agreement between the parties and would constrain the policy 

options available for new rules of engagement, the PBA said its 

intervention at the merits stage is necessary. 

III

The district court denied the PBA’s motion to intervene in the 

consolidated actions on April 28, 2021. The district court 

characterized the PBA’s interest as “an interest in [its] collectivebargaining rights, and how any future injunctions or 

settlements/consent decrees might impact working conditions or 
10

officer safety.” In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 

Demonstrations, 537 F. Supp. 3d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). The district 

court concluded that because “[a]t this early stage of the litigation, the 

primary question ... is whether certain NYPD policies are, in fact, 

unconstitutional—an issue that has nothing to do with the unions’ 

collective-bargaining rights”—the PBA had no “protectable interest” 

that would justify its intervention. Id. at 515. The PBA “might have an 

interest” only “if the parties were to propose a settlement that would 

result in changes to NYPD tactics/personnel procedures, or if the 

[district c]ourt, at the remedy stage after liability was found, was 

considering the imposition of injunctive relief that would have the 

same effect” because “such relief might have a practical impact on the 

unions’ collective-bargaining interests.” Id. at 512. 

The merits stage of the litigation, according to the district court, 

did not implicate a cognizable interest of the PBA in officer safety 

because at the merits stage “the focus is on whether ... certain NYPD 

tactics during protests are unconstitutional,” id., and “[t]he unions 

have not demonstrated why they have a protectable interest in 

preserving any allegedly unconstitutional policies that the NYPD 

might be employing,” id. at 515. The district court denied the PBA’s 

motion to intervene “without prejudice to renewal if changed 

circumstances give rise to a legitimate impact on the unions’ collective 

bargaining rights,” id. at 516, in particular “if the City agrees to any 

proposed settlement or consent decree that impacts the unions’ 

collective-bargaining rights, or if the [district c]ourt proposes to order 

injunctive relief that does so,” id. at 520.

On appeal, the PBA argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying the motion to intervene. The PBA contends that 

it is entitled to intervene on the basis not only of its interest in 
11

collective bargaining but also of its related but independent interest 

in protecting the personal safety of its member officers.3

DISCUSSION

“On timely motion, the [district] court must permit anyone to 

intervene who ... claims an interest relating to the property or 

transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that 

disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 

movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 

adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). To prevail on 

a motion for intervention as of right, a movant must “(1) timely file 

an application, (2) show an interest in the action, (3) demonstrate that 

the interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action, and 

(4) show that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to 

the action.” “R” Best Produce, Inc. v. Shulman-Rabin Mktg. Corp., 467 

F.3d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2006). 

No one disputes that the PBA timely filed its motion. This 

appeal turns on whether the PBA sufficiently identified a protectable 

interest at stake in the litigation. “For an interest to be cognizable by 

Rule 24(a)(2), it must be ‘direct, substantial, and legally protectable.’” 

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 602 F.3d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Wash. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 

F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990)). The district court concluded, and the 

appellees contend, that the PBA failed to show that it has a cognizable 

interest that the dispositions of the consolidated actions may impair 

and that the parties do not adequately represent. 

3 The PBA also claims to have an interest in protecting the reputations of its 

member officers. Because the interest in officer safety is sufficient to 

establish a right to intervention under Rule 24(a), we need not consider the 

PBA’s interests in officers’ reputations or in collective bargaining.
12

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to intervene as 

of right for abuse of discretion. Id. A district court has abused its 

discretion if it “based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,” 

“made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,” or “rendered 

a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible 

decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We hold that the PBA identified a direct, substantial, and 

legally protectable interest in officer safety that may be impaired by 

the disposition of those actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief 

with respect to NYPD policies. The PBA also showed that its interest 

was not adequately represented by the parties to those actions. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand with instructions to grant the PBA’s motion to intervene in 

those actions. 

I

The PBA asserted an interest in the safety of front-line officers. 

That interest may be impaired in litigation that could result in a 

determination that NYPD policies governing the interaction of 

officers and protesters are unlawful and must be altered. Therefore, 

the PBA has a cognizable interest at stake in those actions seeking 

declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to NYPD policies—that is, 

the Payne, Sow, Sierra, and People actions. The district court erred in 

concluding otherwise.

A

The district court mischaracterized the PBA’s interest as 

“preserving any allegedly unconstitutional policies that the NYPD 

might be employing, such as the use of excessive force or unlawful 

arrests,” and it erred in holding that officer safety would not be 

implicated in litigation over police policies because “officers are not 
13

allowed to violate the constitutional rights of citizens.” 537 

F. Supp. 3d at 515-16. This reasoning begs the question to be decided

in the litigation—whether the challenged policies are in fact 

unlawful—and thereby confuses the merits of the litigation with the 

standard for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). As we have 

emphasized, “except for allegations frivolous on their face, an 

application to intervene cannot be resolved by reference to the 

ultimate merits of the claims which the intervenor wishes to assert 

following intervention.” Oneida Indian Nation of Wisc. v. State of New 

York, 732 F.2d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).

The merits question before the district court is whether certain 

NYPD policies are permissible. The answer to that question may 

require a change in those policies. And changing the policies that 

govern officer conduct may affect officer safety. That means the 

litigation—at the merits phase—may impair the PBA’s interest.

The district court quoted the Ninth Circuit in stating that “it 

goes without saying that the unions ‘and the officers [they] represent 

have no protectable interest in violating other individuals’ 

constitutional rights.’” 537 F. Supp. 3d at 515 (quoting United States v. 

City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398-99 (9th Cir. 2002)). But the Ninth 

Circuit—in that very passage—specifically rejected the view that 

because a police union and its officers do not have an interest in 

violating constitutional rights, the union lacks an interest in the merits 

phase of litigation that will determine whether officers violated 

constitutional rights:

Of course, as the district court noted, the Police League 

and the officers it represents have no protectable interest

in violating other individuals’ constitutional rights. No 

one could seriously argue otherwise. However, the 

Police League claims a protectable interest because the 
14

complaint seeks injunctive relief against its member 

officers and raises factual allegations that its member 

officers committed unconstitutional acts in the line of 

duty. These allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that the 

Police League had a protectable interest in the merits phase of 

the litigation.

City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398-99 (emphasis added). We agree 

with the Ninth Circuit that there is a crucial difference between an 

interest in unconstitutional practices, on the one hand, and an interest 

in the outcome of litigation seeking a determination that certain 

practices are unconstitutional, on the other. In this case, as in City of 

Los Angeles, the PBA does not have a protectable interest in acting 

unlawfully. But it does have a protectable interest in the continuation 

or alteration of policies that are alleged to be unlawful—and therefore 

it has such an interest in the outcome of the litigation at issue here.

The district court improperly assumed that any decision on the 

merits of the litigation would be limited to prohibiting unlawful 

conduct and therefore the PBA could not show an interest that would 

be impaired by such a decision. But Rule 24(a) assumes that questions 

about the lawfulness of challenged conduct will be subject to 

adversarial testing. If a proposed intervenor has an interest that may 

be impaired by a decision that challenged conduct is unlawful, the 

district court may not deny intervention on the ground that its 

decision on the merits will be legally correct.

In Brennan v. New York City Board of Education, the district court 

had concluded that non-minority employees of the defendant school 

district lacked “a cognizable interest in their employment status and 

seniority rights” that would justify intervention in a discrimination 

case “because these benefits were presumptively obtained as the 

result of discriminatory practices.” 260 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2001). 
15

We explained that “the district court’s ruling put the cart before the 

horse.” Id. In the underlying litigation, it was “precisely the existence 

or non-existence of prior discrimination and its relationship to [the 

employees’] present status that they want to contest by intervening as 

parties.” Id. at 130. It was possible to resolve that merits issue “only 

after” the employees had “an opportunity for discovery and the 

presentation of evidence as a party to the action.” Id.

The district court’s decision in this case similarly put the cart 

before the horse. The PBA seeks to contest the proposition that the 

challenged policies are unlawful and should be changed. The district 

court erred in denying intervention on the ground that this asserted 

interest amounts to a defense of unlawful policies.

B

The district court also erred as a matter of law when it 

concluded that the PBA’s interest in officer safety was derivative of 

its interest in collective bargaining. The collective bargaining law 

recognizes the importance of employee safety by authorizing 

negotiation over “questions concerning the practical impact” of 

management decisions on “employee safety.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code 

§ 12-307(b). But the interest in officer safety is not limited to the PBA’s 

collective-bargaining rights and is independently cognizable. 

We have cautioned against requiring that a proposed 

intervenor identify a narrow interest amounting to a legal 

entitlement. In Brennan, the district court had denied intervention 

because the non-minority employees had “no vested property right 

in a particular position or appointment.” 260 F.3d at 128 (quoting 

United States v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 85 F. Supp. 2d 130, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 

2000)). In reversing the judgment of the district court, we explained 

that “Rule 24(a)(2) requires not a property interest but, rather, ‘an 
16

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of 

the action.’” Id. at 130 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24). Because the action 

could require changes in the personnel policies of the school district, 

which would affect the non-minority employees through the “loss of 

relative seniority,” the intervenors met that standard. Id. Similarly, in 

Bridgeport Guardians, we held that non-party employees had “an 

interest in their employers’ employment practices” that justified 

intervention in a discrimination case that could alter those policies. 

602 F.3d at 474. 

The appellees suggest that our decision in Floyd v. City of New 

York, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014),requires the conclusion that the PBA 

lacks a cognizable interest. We are not persuaded. In Floyd, we

affirmed the denial of motions by police unions to intervene in 

litigation over the NYPD’s “stop and frisk” practices, which yielded 

“an order imposing remedies ... in the form of various ‘reforms’” to 

those policies. Id. at 1055. In that case, however, we noted that “there 

was no evidence in the record showing that the union members’ 

careers had been tarnished, that their safety was in jeopardy, or that 

they had been adversely affected in any tangible way.” Id. at 1061. By 

contrast, the record in this case more clearly shows that changes to 

policies affecting interactions between officers and protesters may 

affect officer safety. The PBA introduced evidence that officers 

suffered injuries during interactions with protesters because of 

policies governing the rules of engagement with protesters and the 

equipment issued to officers. See App’x 66.24-66.27. The plaintiffs in 

the consolidated actions seek to change those policies to be more 

protective of the protesters and correspondingly less focused on the 

safety interest of the front-line officers. The PBA is asserting an 

interest in officer safety that is “the mirror image” of the claims 
17

pressed in the individual actions, Brennan, 260 F.3d at 130, and that 

interest justifies its intervention.

C

The district court distinguished Brennan and Bridgeport 

Guardians on the ground that the motions for intervention were filed

in those cases after “the parties to the lawsuit had agreed on a 

settlement.” 537 F. Supp. 3d at 516. But in neither Brennan nor 

Bridgeport Guardians did we hold that such an agreement was 

necessary to establish a cognizable interest. To the contrary, we 

focused on “the nature of appellants’ interest in the underlying 

action,” in light of the relief being sought, and we cautioned district 

courts against requiring too direct a connection between the interest 

asserted and the relief sought. “[T]he effects of a loss of relative 

seniority rights,” we said, “should not be regarded as too speculative 

and remote to justify intervention save, perhaps, in a case where a 

concrete effect on an employee is impossible.” Brennan, 260 F.3d at 

129, 132 (footnote omitted). Given the relatively straightforward 

connection between the relief sought in this case and the PBA’s 

claimed interest, the PBA’s interest is not too remote.

In Floyd, we faulted the police unions for failing to move to 

intervene before the parties agreed to the remedial order that settled 

the litigation. We said that the “unions knew, or should have known, 

of their alleged interests in these controversial and public cases well 

before they filed their motions” because “the full scope of these cases 

and the potential reform measures were readily apparent from years 

of extensive public filings and intense media scrutiny.” Floyd, 770 F.3d 

at 1054, 1058. We explained that the litigation “should have put the 

unions on notice of the potential political and judicial dangers that 

these cases posed to their interests well before” the remedial order 
18

and, for that reason, we would not “allow[] the unions to revive a 

now-settled dispute by intervening at this late juncture.” Id. at 1054, 

1058.

Our decision in Floyd is incompatible with the conclusion that 

the PBA must await a settlement agreement in order to establish an 

interest justifying intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). As in Floyd, the 

scope of these cases and the potential reform measures are apparent 

from the character of the actions that seek to “hold[] unlawful” and 

“vacat[e] ... policies” that allegedly authorize “excessive force and 

false arrests.” App’x 148. The nature and scope of any injunctive relief 

and accommodations could turn on political calculations with respect 

to which the individual officer defendants would not be influential 

and to which they may not even be privy. Likewise, the nature and 

scope of any injunctive relief would likely be influenced by the 

circumstances shown in discovery and the resolution of issues that 

may predate the remedy phase. We therefore hold that the PBA has 

identified an interest that may be impaired by the disposition of the 

consolidated actions. 

II

We further hold that the PBA has “carried the minimal burden 

required for a showing that representation by the existing parties may 

be inadequate.” LaRouche v. FBI, 677 F.2d 256, 258 (2d Cir. 1982). The 

district court correspondingly erred in concluding that the PBA’s 

interest in officer safety was adequately represented by the City 

defendants. 

Intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) is warranted when there is 

“sufficient doubt about the adequacy of representation.” Trbovich v. 

United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972). This requirement 

“is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest 
19

‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should 

be treated as minimal.” Id. at 538 n.10. We have explained that an 

employer may inadequately represent the interest of its employees

when the employer may have an interest in “bringing such litigation 

to an end by settlements involving the displacement of employees 

who are not parties to the action.” Brennan, 260 F.3d at 133. “The 

employer may, in short, behave like a stakeholder rather than an 

advocate” for those employees. Id. 

We observed in Floyd that it was not evident that the City “ever” 

adequately protected the interests of NYPD officers. 770 F.3d at 1059. 

We noted that “the interests of employers and their employees 

frequently diverge, especially in the context of municipal 

employment, where an employer’s interests are often not congruent 

with the employee’s and the employer may argue that the employee 

was acting outside the scope of his employment.” Id. Given “[t]his 

inherent conflict,” we said that “it should have been readily apparent 

to the [police] unions that their interests diverged from the City’s long 

before the unions filed for intervention.” Id. And we emphasized that 

the inadequacy-of-representation standard was met before any 

settlement was discussed: “the unions should have known that their 

‘interests might not be adequately represented’ far in advance of any 

indication that the City might settle the dispute.” Id. (quoting Butler, 

Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 2001)).

In this case, the PBA has shown that its interest might not be 

adequately represented by the City. The PBA provided a detailed 

account of how its view of the appropriate response to the Summer 

2020 protests diverged from the views of the City and the NYPD. 

Indeed, the PBA argued that the approach of the City and the NYPD 

resulted in officer injuries. App’x 66.23. In addition, the PBA took 

account of the “widely understood ... views of the incumbent 
20

municipal administration.” Floyd, 770 F.3d at 1058. As the PBA notes, 

after the Attorney General filed the complaint in the People action 

against the City, the Mayor of the City announced that he had met 

with the Attorney General and “couldn’t agree more that there are 

pressing reforms that must—and will—be made this year.” App’x 

66.17-66.18. On this record, the PBA has met its burden to 

demonstrate that the City’s representation may be inadequate. 

We also agree with the PBA that “[t]he defense of individual 

damage actions is not comparable to the defense of a high-profile, 

politically charged litigation seeking ‘reforms.’” Reply Br. 9. 

Accordingly, the individual officers named as defendants in some of 

the actions do not necessarily represent the PBA’s interest. While the 

individual officers might be interested in the impact of NYPD policies 

on officer safety, their interests in the litigation are not “so similar” to 

those of the PBA that “adequacy of representation” is “assured.” 

Brennan, 260 F.3d at 133. Those officers may well be primarily 

concerned with vindicating their own conduct because personal 

liability would predictably affect each individual officer’s career. 

Moreover, if the conduct alleged is found to violate “any rule or 

regulation” of the NYPD, N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-k(3), the City will

have grounds to withhold indemnity. As a result, the individual 

officers have reason to fear financial consequences, and concerns over 

policing policies regarding officer safety are of discounted 

importance. We therefore hold that the district court erred in denying 

the PBA’s motion to intervene in those actions that seek declaratory 

or injunctive relief regarding NYPD policies.4 

4 We do not believe that the PBA has shown a cognizable interest 

inadequately represented in those actions that seek only damages against 
21

III

Because the PBA was entitled to intervention as of right for the 

four litigations that seek declaratory or injunctive relief, we need not 

address the district court’s denial of permissive intervention. As to 

those two litigations that seek neither declaratory nor injunctive 

relief, we review the district court’s denial of permissive intervention 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1) for abuse of discretion. 

Permissive intervention is appropriate when a proposed intervenor 

“has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common 

question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). The district court 

did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the PBA had not

identified such a claim or defense with respect to the damages-only 

actions.

CONCLUSION

The district court abused its discretion in denying the PBA’s 

motion to intervene as of right in the actions seeking declaratory or 

injunctive relief with respect to NYPD policies. The PBA has a 

cognizable interest in officer safety that may be impaired by the 

disposition of those actions and that the parties may inadequately 

represent. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment 

denying intervention under Rule 24(a) as to Payne v. De Blasio, No. 20-

CV-8924; People of the State of New York v. City of New York, No. 21-CV322; Sow v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-533; and Sierra v. City of New 

York, No. 20-CV-10291. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment 

denying intervention under Rules 24(a) and (b) as to those litigations 

within the consolidated actions that seek only damages: Yates v. New 

certain defendants for past conduct and that could not directly require a 

change in NYPD policies. We affirm the district court’s judgment with 

respect to those actions—namely, Yates and Wood.
22

York City, No. 21-CV-1904, and Wood v. City of New York, No. 20-CV10541.