U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

59–118

" ! SENATE 105TH CONGRESS

2d Session

TREATY DOC.

1998

105–39

INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST

CORRUPTION

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (‘‘THE CONVENTION’’), ADOPTED AND OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT THE

SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) AT CARACAS, VENEZUELA, ON MARCH 29,

1996. THE CONVENTION WAS SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES

ON JUNE 27, 1996, AT THE TWENTY-SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION

OF THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN PANAMA CITY,

PANAMA

APRIL 1, 1998.—Convention was read the first time and, together with

the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 1, 1998.

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to

ratification, I transmit herewith the Inter-American Convention

Against Corruption (‘‘the Convention’’), adopted and opened for signature at the Specialized Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) at Caracas, Venezuela, on March 29, 1996. The

Convention was signed by the United States on June 27, 1996, at

the twenty-seventh regular session of the OAS General Assembly

meeting in Panama City, Panama. In addition, for the information

of the Senate, I transmit the report of the Department of State

with respect to the Convention.

The Convention was the first multilateral Convention of its kind

in the world to be adopted. The provisions of the Convention are

explained in the accompanying report of the Department of State.

The report also sets forth proposed understandings that would be

deposited by the United States with its instrument of ratification.

The Convention will not require implementing legislation for the

United States.

The Convention should be an effective tool to assist in the hemispheric effort to combat corruption, and could also enhance the law

enforcement efforts of the States Parties in other areas, given the

links that often exist between corruption and organized criminal

activity such as drug trafficking. The Convention provides for a

broad range of cooperation, including extradition, mutual legal assistance, and measures regarding property, in relation to the acts

of corruption described in the Convention.

The Convention also imposes on the States Parties an obligation

to criminalize acts of corruption if they have not already done so.

Especially noteworthy is the obligation to criminalize the bribery of

foreign government officials. This provision was included in the

Convention at the behest of the United States negotiating delegation. In recent years, the United States Government has sought in

a number of multilateral fora to persuade other governments to

adopt legislation akin to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

This Convention represents a significant breakthrough on that

front and should lend impetus to similar measures in other multilateral groups.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Convention, and that it give its advice and consent to

ratification, subject to the understandings described in the accompanying report of the Department of State.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

(V)

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, March 24, 1998.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view

to its transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (‘‘the Convention’’), adopted and opened for signature at the Specialized Conference on Corruption of the Organization of American States

(OAS) in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 29, 1996. The Convention

was signed by the United States on June 27, 1996, at the twentyseventh regular session of the General Assembly of the OAS meeting in Panama City, Panama. I recommend that the Convention be

transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

To date, twenty-three states have signed the Convention. Eight

states (Paraguay, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa

Rica, and Argentina) have deposited their instruments of ratification. The Convention entered into force on March 6, 1997.

The Convention is the first instrument of its kind in the world

to be adopted. It establishes a treaty-based regime of obligations

among the OAS member states to combat corruption, including various forms of cooperation analogous to those that exist pursuant to

a number of multilateral law enforcement treaties to which the

United States is a party. The Convention will enhance the United

States’ ability to cooperate with, and receive assistance from, other

countries in the hemisphere in connection with efforts to prevent,

investigate, and prosecute acts of corruption. The Convention will

not require implementing legislation for the United States. As further discussed below, the existing bodies of laws and regulations in

the United States will be adequate to satisfy the Convention’s provisions regarding requirements for legislation, and the other provisions contained in the Convention are self-executing and will not

require additional implementing legislation.

The Convention consists of a preamble and twenty-eight articles.

Article 1 (‘‘Definitions’’) defines the following terms: ‘‘public function,’’ ‘‘public official,’’ ‘‘government official,’’ ‘‘public servant’’ and

‘‘property.’’ With respect to the definitions of the first four of the

terms listed above, it was agreed by the negotiators that the term

‘‘at any level of its hierarchy’’, which is contained in such definitions, was intended to clarify the ‘‘vertical’’ scope of application of

the Convention; i.e., that the Convention would cover officials ranging from those at the very top of the government bureaucracy, such

as Cabinet-level officials, to those at the lowest levels, such as
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clerks. The phrase was included at the behest of certain delegations who expressed concern that some of the corruption laws that

exist in their countries do not reach officials at the very top levels

of government, or, alternatively, those at the lowest levels.

However, the negotiators expressly discussed and understood

that the phrase ‘‘at any level of its hierarchy’’ was not intended in

this Convention to define the scope of application of the Convention

with respect to constituent units of federal states, nor was the Convention as a whole intended to impose obligations with respect to

the conduct of state or local officials. To emphasize this point, upon

conclusion of the negotiations at the final session of the specialized

conference in Caracas, the head of the U.S. negotiating team read

the following statement into the record:

The U.S. would like to reaffirm for the record the statement made earlier by the President of the Working Group

for the article on definitions that the conclusions of the

Working Group reflect the fact that countries with federal

systems of government may not be able to bind their states

and municipalities to the obligations under the Convention.

This statement was seconded at the conference by the delegation

from Canada and from other States with federal systems. To confirm our understanding on this point, I recommend that the following understanding to Article I be included in the United States instrument of ratification:

The Government of the United States of America understands that the phrase ‘‘at any level of its hierarchy’’ in the

first and second subparagraphs of Article 1 refers, in the

case of the United States, to all levels of the hierarchy of

the federal government of the United States, and that the

Convention does not impose obligations with respect to the

conduct of officials other than federal officials.

Article II (‘‘Purposes’’) describes the purposes of the Convention,

which are to promote and strengthen the development by each of

the States Parties of the necessary mechanisms to prevent, detect,

punish, and eradicate corruption; and to promote, facilitate, and

regulate cooperation among the States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions against corruption in the performance of public functions and acts of corruption specifically related

to such performance.

Article III (‘‘Preventive Measures’’) sets forth a list of measures

that the States Parties ‘‘agree to consider the applicability of ’’ within their own institutional systems, for the purpose of advancing the

goals specified in Article II. These include measures to ‘‘create,

maintain, and strengthen,’’ inter alia, the following: standards of

conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper fulfillment of public

functions and mechanisms to enforce such standards; instruction to

government personnel to ensure proper understanding of their responsibilities and ethical rules; systems for registering the income,

assets and liabilities of government officials; open, equitable, and

efficient systems of government hiring and procurement of goods

and services; government revenue collection and control systems
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that deter corruption; laws that deny favorable tax treatment for

expenditures made in violation of anti-corruption laws; systems for

protecting public servants and citizens who, in good faith, report

acts of corruption; oversight bodies to implement modern anti-corruption mechanisms; and deterrents to the bribery of domestic and

foreign government officials, such as requirements for publicly held

companies and other types of associations to maintain books and

records that accurately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and to have sufficient internal accounting controls.

Article IV (‘‘Scope’’) states that the Convention is applicable provided that the alleged act of corruption has been committed, or has

effects, in a State Party.

Article V (‘‘Jurisdiction’’) enunciates obligations imposed on the

States Parties to establish their jurisdiction over offenses covered

under the Convention. Specifically, this Article obligates each State

Party to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with

this Convention when the offense in question is committed in its

territory. The Article also obligates each State Party to establish

jurisdiction over covered offenses by individuals who are in its territory but whom it declines to extradite on the grounds of the nationality of the alleged criminal. In addition, the Article enables,

but does not require, each State Party to establish jurisdiction over

offenses covered by the Convention when such offenses are committed by its nationals or persons who habitually reside in its territory. Finally, the Article makes clear that this Convention does not

preclude the application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction

established by a State Party under its domestic law.

Article VI (‘‘Acts of Corruption’’) is one of the key provisions of

the treaty, as it specifies the acts of corruption to which the Convention applies. In summary terms, such acts are: the solicitation

or acceptance by, or the offering or granting to, government officials of bribes or benefits in exchange for any act or omission in

the performance of his public functions; any act or omission by a

government official in the discharge of his duties for the purpose

of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party; the

fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of the

acts contemplated in this Article; and participation in the commission of, attempt to commit, or any association or conspiracy to commit, any such acts. The Article also renders the Convention applicable with respect to any other act of corruption as agreed to between or among two or more States Parties.

Article VII (‘‘Domestic Law’’) requires that the States Parties, to

the extent they have not yet done so, adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offenses under their

domestic law the acts of corruption described in Article VI, as well

as to facilitate cooperation among themselves pursuant to the Convention.

At various times during the negotiations, the U.S. delegation described the extensive network of laws already in place in the U.S.

that address the various acts of corruption covered under the Convention. Based on the discussions held at the negotiating sessions,

the U.S. negotiators do not believe that it is the expectation of any

of the other negotiating delegations that the United States would
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be required to enact any laws beyond those that it already has in

place. Indeed, the opinion was voiced that one of the objectives of

the Convention is to have the rest of the nations of the hemisphere

develop a body of laws on corruption comparable to that which exists in the United States.

There is, however, no single federal anti-corruption law in the

United States that uses exactly the terms used in this Convention.

Moreover, the network of United States anti-corruption laws is extensive, but not every federal employee is subject to criminal prosecution for every act that could conceivably fall within the definition of the ‘‘acts of corruption’’ in the Convention. In particular,

there is no general ‘‘attempt’’ statute in U.S. federal criminal law,

although federal statutes make ‘‘attempts’’ criminal in connection

with specific crimes. The practical effect of this, however, is debatable. The ‘‘acts of corruption’’ described in Article VI (1) (a) and (b)

are defined in such a way as effectively to embrace the acts constituting an attempt within the crime since it is the mere solicitation, acceptance, offering or granting of a bribe which is a crime,

without any consummation of an act of bribery or even an agreement to bribe. The literal terms of subparagraph (c), on the other

hand, would embrace a situation in which an individual took some

preparatory action unknown to anyone, with the ‘‘purpose’’ of profiting illicitly at some future point. Under U.S. law, this would not

be criminalized as such, although the conduct in question in a

given case might well be prosecutable in the context of some other

crime. It should also be noted, with respect to subparagraph (e),

that the reference to ‘‘instigator’’ is not intended to require the

United States to create a new crime of association denominated

‘‘instigation,’’ but rather was included in the Convention merely as

an illustrative form of the types of ‘‘participation’’ that the provision intends to cover. Although the U.S. legal system does not recognize the offense of ‘‘instigation’’ as such, it does contemplate

equivalent but differently denominated offenses, such as aiding or

abetting.

Despite the above, the existing network of laws in place in the

United States can reasonably be deemed to satisfy the obligations

imposed under the Convention with respect to the enactment of

legislation. During the negotiations, the U.S. delegation provided

considerable information to other delegations on the nature and

content of U.S. law, and it was the understanding of all delegations

that Article VII would not be understood to require new legislation

in the U.S. substituting the broad wording of Article VI for specific

U.S. laws currently in place.

In light of the foregoing, I recommend that the following understanding to Article VII be included in the United States instrument

of ratification:

Article VII of the Convention sets forth an obligation to

adopt legislative measures to establish as criminal offenses

the acts of corruption described in Article VI(1). There is

an extensive network of laws already in place in the

United States that criminalize a wide range of corrupt

acts. Although United States laws may not in all cases be

defined in terms or elements identical to those used in the

Convention, it is the understanding of the United States,
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with the caveat set forth below, that the kinds of official

corruption which are intended under the Convention to be

criminalized would in fact be criminal offenses under U.S.

law. Accordingly, the United States does not intend to

enact new legislation to implement Article VII of the Convention.

There is no general ‘‘attempt’’ statute in U.S. federal

criminal law. Nevertheless, federal statutes make ‘‘attempts’’ criminal in connection with specific crimes. This is

of particular relevance with respect to Article VI(1)(c),

which by its literal terms would embrace a single preparatory act done with the requisite ‘‘purpose’’ of profiting

illicitly at some future time, even though the course of conduct is neither pursued, nor in any sense consummated.

The United States will not criminalize such conduct per se,

although we would expect significant acts of corruption in

this regard to be generally subject to prosecution in the

context of one or more other crimes.

Article VIII (‘‘Transnational Bribery’’) obligates the States Parties, subject to their Constitutions and the fundamental principles

of their legal system, to prohibit and punish the offering or granting of a bribe, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, residents, and

businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another

State in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in

exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official’s public functions. This Article was included at the behest of

the United States, and was intended to obligate the States Parties

to have in place legislation similar to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act (FCPA).

There are small differences, however, between the wording of Article VIII and that of the FCPA, and a literal reading of Article

VIII could suggest that the U.S. would need to revise its laws in

some respects to comply with the obligations imposed in the Article. For example, the FCPA specifically excepts from coverage ‘‘facilitating payments,’’ i.e., small gratuities sometimes paid to foreign

government officials to secure or expedite performance of routine

government action. See Title 15, United States Code, Sections

78dd–1(b) and 78dd–2(b). Article VIII, however, contains no such

exception. Also, the FCPA applies only to payments made to obtain

or retain business, while Article VIII requires criminalization of all

payments made ‘‘in connection with any economic or commercial

transaction,’’ an arguably larger universe. Since Article VIII was

included at the behest of the U.S. in order to require other OAS

states to enact laws similar to the FCPA, none of the negotiating

delegations expected that the U.S. itself would enact new legislation to comply with Article VIII.

In order to be clear on the scope of the U.S. commitment under

Article VIII, I recommend that the following understanding be included in the United States instrument of ratification:

With respect to Article VIII, the Government of the

United States of America notes that current United States

law provides criminal sanctions for transnational bribery.

It is the understanding of the Government of the United
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States of America that no additional legislation is needed

for the United States to comply with the obligation imposed in Article VIII.

Article IX (‘‘Illicit Enrichment’’) is structurally analogous to Article VIII, and was included at the insistence of a number of the

Latin American nations. The Article refers to the offense known as

‘‘illicit enrichment,’’ which is defined as a significant increase in the

assets of a government official that such official cannot reasonably

explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance

of his functions. Like Article VIII, compliance with the obligations

imposed under this Article is subject to each State’s Constitution

and fundamental legal principles.

Although there is no offense of ‘‘illicit enrichment’’ as such in

U.S. law, there are a number of laws and regulations in the United

States that penalize the same substantive conduct which this article is intended to reach and which is proscribed by the ‘‘illicit enrichment’’ laws that exist in some nations. However, in an illicit

enrichment statute of the sort contemplated by the statute, the defendant must bear the burden of establishing the legitimate origin

of the assets in question. The Article therefore by its terms calls

for States Parties to make the described conduct criminal without

requiring an affirmative showing by the State of wrongdoing on the

part of the defendant. Since under the U.S. legal system the State

must in all cases affirmatively prove that an individual has engaged in wrongdoing before it can impose criminal sanctions on

such person, compliance with the literal terms of Article IX would

impose on the United States an obligation that would be inconsistent with its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its

legal system.

Accordingly, the explicit exception contained in Article IX, which

renders compliance with the obligation therein subject to each

State’s ‘‘Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal

system,’’ is applicable to the United States.

This interpretation is consistent with that which was voiced by

the U.S. delegation during the negotiations, and which was understood by the other delegations. The negotiators discussed Article IX

in detail, and understood that the Article would not require the

United States to enact new legislation. To emphasize this point, at

the final session of negotiations, the head of the U.S. negotiating

delegation read the following statement for the record:

I stress that we remain perfectly happy to offer assistance and cooperation to those OAS states that have enacted illicit enrichment legislation. However, we do wish to

reiterate . . . that we may be unable to adopt such legislation ourselves for constitutional reasons. In addition, we

may be obliged to take a reservation to this article because

our legislature may not wish to adopt such legislation for

reasons unrelated to constitutional law or ‘‘fundamental

principles,’’ such as the fact that we deal with this issue

fully through other laws already in force.

The other delegations accepted this statement, and no objections or

dissenting views were voiced.
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In order to leave no doubt about the scope of the U.S. commitment under Article IX, I recommend that the following understanding regarding Article IX be included in the United States instrument of ratification:

Article IX obligates the States Parties, subject to the

Constitution and fundamental legal principles of their respective legal systems, to establish as an offense the act of

‘‘illicit enrichment,’’ as defined in the Article. With respect

to this Article, the Government of the United States of

America believes that the establishment of such an offense

would be inconsistent with the United States Constitution

and the fundamental principles of the United States legal

system. The United States therefore understands that Article IX does not require the United States to establish a

new criminal offense of illicit enrichment. However, the

United States intends to provide assistance pursuant to

the Convention in accordance with this Article, to the extent permitted by its domestic law.

Article X (‘‘Notification’’) obligates those States Parties that

adopt legislation regarding transnational bribery or illicit enrichment to notify the OAS Secretary General, who in turn shall notify

the other States Parties. The Article further specifies that, for a

State Party that makes such a notification, the crimes of

transnational bribery and illicit enrichment shall be considered

acts of corruption, for purposes of the Convention, thirty days following the date of notification.

Article XI (‘‘Progressive Development’’) lists a number of acts the

criminalization of which the States Parties ‘‘view as desirable and

undertake to consider’’ so as to foster the development and harmonization of their domestic legislation and the attainment of the purposes of the Convention. Such acts include the improper use by a

government official of classified or confidential information, or of

property belonging to the State or to any firm or institution in

which the State has a proprietary interest; any act or omission by

any person who seeks to obtain a decision from a public authority

to obtain illicitly a benefit or gain for herself or for another person;

and the improper diversion to an independent agency or to an individual by a government official of any property, funds, or securities

belonging to the State, that such official has received by virtue of

his position for purposes of administration, custody, or for other

reasons. The Article further states that, for those States Parties

that have established these offenses, such offenses shall be considered acts of corruption for the purposes of the Convention. Any

State Party that has not established these offenses shall, insofar as

its laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation with respect to

these offenses as provided in the Convention.

Article XII (‘‘Effect on State Property’’) clarifies that it shall not

be a requirement for application of the Convention that the acts of

corruption harm State property.

Article XIII (‘‘Extradition’’) sets forth standard provisions on extradition which are found in other multilateral treaties on law enforcement matters. The Article applies to the offenses established

by the States Parties in accordance with the Convention. It states
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that each of the offenses to which this Article applies shall be

deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition

treaty existing between or among the States Parties. Morever, the

States Parties undertake to include such offenses as extraditable

offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded in the future.

The Article also provides that, if a State Party makes extradition

conditional on the existence of a treaty, it may consider the Convention as a legal basis for extradition to a State with which it

does not have an extradition treaty, with respect to any offense to

which the Article applies. In addition, the Article establishes that

States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offenses to which the Article applies as extraditable offenses between themselves.

Article XIII further provides that extradition shall be subject to

the conditions provided for by the law of the Requested State or by

applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the

Requested State may refuse extradition. If extradition for an offense to which this Article applies is refused solely on the basis of

the nationality of the person sought, the Parties are obligated to

submit the case to their authorities for the purpose of prosecution,

unless otherwise agreed with the Requesting State. Finally, this

Article enables the Requested State, when the circumstances so

warrant and are urgent, to take into custody a person whose extradition is sought or take other appropriate measures to ensure such

person’s presence at extradition proceedings.

Article XIV (‘‘Assistance and Cooperation’’) contains obligations

regarding mutual legal and technical assistance. It stipulates that,

in accordance with their domestic laws and applicable treaties, the

States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance by processing requests from law enforcement authorities of other States Parties, for the purpose of obtaining evidence and taking other necessary action to facilitate legal proceedings and measures regarding the investigation or prosecution of

acts of corruption. The Article further provides that the States Parties provide to each other the widest measures of mutual technical

cooperation on the most effective ways and means of preventing,

detecting, investigating, and punishing acts of corruption. This provision also requires the States Parties to foster exchanges of experiences by way of agreements and meetings between competent bodies and institutions, with special attention to methods and procedures of citizen participation in the fight against corruption.

Article XV (‘‘Measures Regarding Property’’) stipulates that the

States Parties are to provide to each other, in accordance with their

domestic laws and applicable treaties or agreements, the broadest

possible measure of assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of property or proceeds obtained, derived from, or used in, the commission of corruption offenses. The

Article also directs each State Party that enforces its own or another State Party’s forfeiture judgment to dispose of property or

proceeds related to corruption offenses in accordance with its laws.

Finally, the Article contains an asset-sharing clause, which provides that each State Party may, to the extent permissible under

its laws, transfer all or part of forfeited property or proceeds to any
XIII

other State Party that assisted in the underlying investigation or

proceedings.

Article XVI (‘‘Bank Secrecy’’) provides that the Requested State

shall not invoke bank secrecy as a basis for refusal to provide assistance sought under the Convention by the Requesting State. The

Article states that the Requested State shall apply this Article in

accordance with its domestic law, procedural provisions, or international agreements with the Requesting State. The Article also

provides that the Requesting State shall be obligated not to use

any information received that is protected by bank secrecy for any

purpose other than the proceeding for which the information was

requested, unless authorized by the Requested State.

Article XVII (‘‘Nature of the Act’’) provides that, for purposes of

Articles XIII–XVI of the Convention, the fact that the property obtained or derived from an act of corruption was intended for political purposes, or that it is alleged that the act of corruption was

committed for political motives or purposes, shall not suffice in and

of itself for the act to qualify as a political offense or as a common

offense related to a political offense.

Article XVIII (‘‘Central Authorities’’) establishes that, for the purposes of international assistance and cooperation provided under

the Convention, each State Party may designate a central authority or may rely upon such central authorities as are provided for

in any relevant treaties or other agreements. The central authorities shall be responsible for making and receiving the requests for

assistance and cooperation under the Convention. Because in the

United States there are numerous agencies that may have authority over a particular corruption matter, the U.S. negotiating team

proposed that the designation of a central authority be rendered

optional. It is expected that the U.S. agency designated as the central authority for our mutual legal assistance treaties (the Department of Justice) shall be the central authority in connection with

requests for mutual legal assistance relating to corruption issues.

Other types of requests will be handled by the appropriate agency

in the U.S. with responsibility for that particular matter or type of

request.

Article XIX (‘‘Temporal Application’’) provides that, subject to the

constitutional principles and domestic laws of each State, and to

the existing treaties between the States Parties, the fact that the

alleged act of corruption was committed before this Convention entered into force shall not preclude procedural cooperation in criminal matters between the States Parties. The Article clarifies that

this provision shall not affect the principle of non-retroactivity in

criminal law, nor shall application of this provision interrupt existing statutes of limitations relating to crimes committed prior to the

date of entry into force of the Convention.

Article XX (‘‘Other Agreements or Practices’’) states that no provision of the Convention shall be construed as preventing the

States Parties from engaging in mutual cooperation within the

framework of other international agreements, bilateral or multilateral, that are currently in force or may be concluded in the future,

or pursuant to any other applicable arrangement or practice.

Article XXI–XXVIII contain the final clauses. Article XXI (‘‘Signature’’) provides that the Convention is open for signature by the
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Member States of the OAS. Article XXII (‘‘Ratification’’) states that

the Convention is subject to ratification and that the instruments

of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the

OAS. Article XXIII (‘‘Accession’’) provides that the Convention shall

remain open for accession by any other State, and that the instruments of accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat

of the OAS.

Article XXIV (‘‘Reservations’’) stipulates that the States Parties

may, at the time of adoption, signature, ratification, or accession,

make reservations to the Convention, provided that each reservation concerns one or more specific provisions and is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

Article XXV (‘‘Entry into Force’’) provides that the Convention

shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. This Article also stipulates that, for each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention

after the deposit of the such State of its instrument of ratification

or accession.

Article XXVI (‘‘Denunciation’’) states that the Convention shall

remain in force indefinitely, but that any of the States Parties may

denounce it. Any instrument of denunciation must be deposited

with the General Secretariat of the OAS. The Convention shall

cease to be in force for the denouncing State one year from the date

of deposit of the instrument of denunciation.

Article XXVII (‘‘Additional Protocols’’) stipulates that any State

Party may submit for the consideration of other States Parties

meeting at a General Assembly of the OAS additional draft protocols to the Convention to contribute to the attainment of the purposes of the Convention. The Article further provides that each

such additional protocol shall establish the terms for its entry into

force and shall apply only to those States that become Parties to

it.

Finally, Article XXVIII (Deposit of Original Instrument’’) states

that the original instrument of the Convention, the English,

French, Spanish, and Portuguese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the OAS,

which shall forward an authenticated copy of its text to the United

Nations Secretariat for registration and publication. This provision

also states that the General Secretariat of the OAS shall be responsible for notifying its Member States and the States that have acceded to the Convention of signatures, of the deposit of instruments

of ratification, accession, or denunciation, and of reservations, if

any.

It is my belief that this Convention would afford substantial benefits to the United States, and would be consistent with existing

United States legislation. The Departments of Justice and Commerce, the Office of Government Ethics, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission join the Department of State in recommending that the Convention be transmitted

to the Senate at an early date for its advice and consent to ratification, subject to the understandings described above.

Respectfully submitted,

STROBE TALBOTT.
(1)
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