IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2016-CP-00815-COA JULIUS SCOTT TURNER A/K/A JULIUS S. TURNER A/K/A JULIUS TURNER APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/28/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAW RENCE PAUL BOURGEOIS JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JULIUS SCOTT TURNER (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ALICIA MARIE AINSW ORTH NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 05/08/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND GREENLEE, JJ. GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Julius Scott Turner appeals the denial of his m o tion f o r p o s t

- c o nviction collateral relief (PCCR). W e f

ind no error and af

f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On F e b r

u a r y 1 1 , 2 0 1 4, Turner entered a guilty plea to Count I, possession of a controlled substance w ith intent, and C ount II, u nlawf ul possession of a f

i rearm or weapon by a convicted f

elon. He was subsequently s entenced as a habitual o f f e n der under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2014) to twelve y ears f or Count I and
ten y ears f

or Count II, to run concurrently , f o r a total of twelve y ears to serve in the custodyof

the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections. ¶3. On February 1 3, 2015, Turner f iled a m o tion f

or PCCR, which t he trial court denied. Turner now appeals and argues: (1) his guilty p lea was involuntarily entered, (2) he received inef f ective a ssistance of counsel, (3) his sentence as a habitual o f f ender is illegal, and (4) his constitutional rights were violated. S TANDARD OF REVIEW ¶4. W e will not disturb a c ircuit court’s denial of a m otion f o r PCCR unless the f

actual f indings are clearly e rroneous. Kennedy v. State , 1 79 So. 3d 82, 83 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. ANALYSIS I. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea ¶ 5. Turner f

i rst argues his guilty plea was involuntarily entered. Turner claim s he pled guilty due to constant pressure f rom his attorney and f

am ily

. “W hen a PC[ C]R m o vant tries
to get out of an already entere d g u i l t y p l e a , it i s the m ovant, not the State, who bears the burden of provi n g b y a preponderance of evidence that the g uilty plea w as i nvoluntary .” W atkins v. State , 170 So. 3d 582, 585 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). ¶6. “A guilty plea is not binding upon a crim inal def e ndant unless it is entered voluntarily and intelligently .” Holland v. State , 956 So. 2d 322, 327 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). “A plea is deem ed ‘ voluntary and intelli g e n t ’ only w here the def endant is advised concerning the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of the plea.” Id

. “[ T]he def endant

m ust be advised that his guilty plea waives m ultiple constitutional rights.” Hill v. State , 60

2So. 3d 824, 828 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). H owever, “ [ a ] l a w y er’s ‘persuading’ a

def endant to p l ead g uilty by ‘every m eans at his disposal’ does n o t r e n der the plea involuntary if t h a t p e r s u asion does not result f r om f ear, violence, deception, or im proper inducem ents.” Brasington v. State , 760 So. 2d 18, 26 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). ¶7. “[ T]he m ost signif icant i ndicator of the v oluntariness of a def endant' s guilty plea is the thoroughness with w hich the d ef endant was interrogated by the lower c o urt.” W atkins , 170 S o. 3d at 585-86 (¶12) (internal quotation m arks om itted). “The Court c a n place great weight on the sworn testim ony o f a def endant given at a plea hearing leaving t he def endant with a h i gh hurdle i n recanting that testim ony .” Pevey v. State , 9 14 S o. 2d 1287, 1290 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). ¶8. During Turner’s plea hearing, the f ollowing exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Bef

ore y ou should be a petition to enter a plea of guilty

. Is there one? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Have y ou read that petition? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do y ou understand it? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Have y ou discussed it with y o ur lawy er? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Has y our lawy er answered any and all questions y ou had

or have relative to that petition to plead guilty ?

3[ TURNER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I s e v ery thing c ontained in that p etition to p le a d g u i l t y true and correct? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are y ou telling m e y o u wis h t o p l e a d g uilty h ere this

m o rning because y ou are in f act guilty ? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir.

. . . . THE COURT: So y ou m u st be aware o f t h e f

act that when one pleads gui l t y , y ou waive and give u p certain constitutional rights, because those constitutional r ights are c o ntained in paragraph f

ive of y our petition to plead guilty ; is t hat right, sir? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir.

. . . . THE COURT: Do y o u u n d e r s t a n d by pleading guilty , y ou’re waiving

and f orever giving up e a ch and every one of the rights we just went over? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And is that what y o u wish to do? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did any one use any f orce, threats, c o ercion, intim i dation or place y ou in any ty

pe o f duress to in d u c e y o u into pleading guilty

here today ? [ TURNER]: No, sir.
THE COURT: Did any one exercise any undue inf luence, guarantee y ou a particular sentence, or m a ke any ty pe of prom ise to y ou
4wha t s oever to induce y o u into pleading guilty h ere today ? [ TURNER]: No, sir.

. . . . THE COURT: So t hat y our ex p o s u r e in this case i s one to 40 y ears in

the p enitentiary and/or a f ine of $5,000 up to $1,005,000. Do y ou understand that, sir? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: A n d d o y ou understand that as long as this Court st a y s

withi n those boundaries or p aram eters, it is within its discretion? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: A n d d o y o u f urther understand, M r. Turner, t h a t t h i s Court could s entence y ou to the m axim um p e n alty , which would be 40 y e ars i n the penitentiary and im pose a $1,005,000 f

ine? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And y ou still wish to plead guilty ? [ TURNER]: Yes, sir.
¶9. The record shows Turner was advised of the nature of the charges against him and the
consequences of a guilty plea. Turne r w a s f urther advised that by pleading guilty , he was waiving c ertain constitutional rights. Im portantly , Turner s tated his guilty plea was not the result of any f

orce, threats, coercion, or i ntim idation. Instead, Turner stated he was pleading guilty because he com m itted both crim es. ¶10. W e f

ind Turner’s guilty plea was voluntarily e n tered. Accordingly , t his c l aim is

5without m erit.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶11. Turner next a rgues he received inef f ective assistance of c ounsel. Specif ically , Turner claim s h is counsel f

ailed to conduct an independent investigation into his case, was “hostile
to the f acts of af f i rm ative def

enses,” and f

ailed to m ake certain objections during h is pretrial hearings. ¶12. “[ W ]here a def

endant voluntarily pleads g uilty to an of f ense, he waives all nonjurisdictional rights incident to trial.

. . .” Hill , 6 0 So. 3d a t 827 (¶6). “This waiver includes all claim s of inef

f ective a ssistance of counsel, e xcept insof a r as the alleged inef

f e ctiveness relates to the voluntariness of the g i v i n g o f the g uilty plea.” Id. ( internal quotation m arks

om itted). ¶13. As previously discussed, Turner voluntarily pled guilty to both of f enses. Theref

ore, he waived his right to now claim inef f ective assistance of

counsel. ¶14. Despite the w aiver, w e f ind Turner’s inef

f ective-assistance-of

-cou n s e l c l aim

f ails. To prove inef

f ective assistance of counsel, Turner m ust show: (1) his c ounsel’s perf orm ance

was def icient, and (2) t he d ef

icient perf

o rm a n ce prejudiced his def e nse. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 66 8 , 6 8 7 (1984). There is “a strong presum ption that counsel’s conduct f a lls within t he wide range of reasonable prof essional assistance.” Id. at 689. To

overcom e this p r esum

ption, Turner “m

ust show that there is a reasonable probability that, but f or c o unsel’s unprof

essional errors, the result of the proceeding would have b een dif f erent.” Id . at 694.

6¶15. “The def endant m ust a llege f

acts of inef

f ective a ssistance with specif icity and detail.” Berryhill v. State , 197 So. 3d 938, 941 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotation m arks

om itted). A “petitioner’s bare assertions are insuf f icient.” I d

. ¶16. Turner claim s his counsel f ailed to adequately investigate his case and was “hostile
to the f acts o f a f f i rm ative def

enses.” However, the plea-hearing transcript shows Turner advised the trial court, under oath, that he was satisf ied with the services of his counsel, that his counsel h ad taken the tim e to f am iliarize him self with the f acts and circum stances of his
case, and had explained the elem ents of the charged crim es as well as any possible def enses he m ight h ave to those charges. Additionally , the signed plea petition i ndicates T u rner was “satisf ied with the advice and help [ his] lawy e r ha[ d] given.” ¶17. Turner f

a ils to of f e r a ny evidence of his i nef f ective-as s i s t a n c e - o f

- c o u n s el claim bey ond the unsupported assertions in his brief that a police of f icer li e d a n d f

abricated evidence in order to convict him . However, such bare assertions are insuf f icient. Id. ¶18. Turner f

u r ther c laim s his cou n s e l f a i l e d t o ma k e c e r t a in objections. However, “counsel’s c h oice of whether or not to f ile c ertain m otions

. . . or m ake certain o bjections f all[ s ] withi n t he am

bit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an inef f e ctive assistance of counsel claim

. ” Jackso n v
. S t a t e , 815 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (¶8) ( Miss. 2002) (internal quotation m ark om itted). ¶19. Overall, Turner has f ailed t o show that his counsel’s perf orm ance was d ef

icient and that the a lleged def

icient perf

orm a nce prejudiced his d ef e n se. Accordingly , his inef fectiveassistance-of

- counsel claim

f ails.

7III. Illegal Sentence

¶20. Turner next argues h i s s entence under M ississippi C ode Annotated section 99-19-81 is illegal. He c laim s the trial c ourt erroneously introduced c ertif i ed copies of his prior f

elony convictions without any accom pany ing testim ony f

rom the c e r t if

y ing of f icial. Turner contends that h is inability to c onf ront the party responsible f or certif y ing t he copies deprived him of his sixth am e ndm ent right to conf rontation. ¶21. The Mississippi Suprem e Court h a s s e t o u t t h e p a r a me t e r s o f t h e r i g h t to conf rontation: The Sixth A m endm ent to the United States C onstitution and Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution guarantee a crim inal def endant the r ight to conf ront and cross- e x a mi n e t he witnesses against him

. T he United States Suprem e Court h as held that the Sixth Am endm ent C onf rontation C lause bars the adm ission of “testim onial statem e n ts” m ade by a witness w h o d oes not appear at trial, unless the witness is u navailable and the def endant h ad a prior opp o r t unity to cross-exam ine him

. Though no exhaustive list def ining test i mo n i al statem ents exists, “a docum e nt created solely f or an ‘ evidentiary purpose’ ranks as testim o nial.” Small v. State , 141 So. 3 d 61, 68 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) ( quoting Grim v. State , 102 So. 3d 1073, 1078 (¶12) (Miss. 2012)). ¶22. “W e have held t hat self -authenticating records of a def endant' s prior convictions are
not t estim onial evidence, and d o not trigger a def e ndant’s constitutional right to conf ront witnesses.” Id

. at 69 (¶24). Indeed, the certif ication of the docum ents “ i n d i c a t e s that the custodian of th e r e c o r d s s w ore that t he docum ents were true a n d correct copies, not that [ Turner] actually com m itted any a ct.” Frazier v. State , 907 So. 2 d 985, 997 (¶42) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly , we f ind this issue is m eritless.

8IV. Constitutional Violations

¶23. Turner last argues his c onstitutional r ights we re violated. He c laim s he was denied the right to conf

r ont the conf

idential inf

orm ant in this case. He also claim s that the evidence obtaine d b y the police and used to c onvict him was f alsif ied and m anuf

a ctured. Turner
asserts that these violations, coupled with his i nef f ective counsel, lef

t him with no choice but to plead guilty . W e disagree. ¶24. “If a def

endant pleads guilty to com m itting the charged o f f ense, h e m ay not thereaf

ter

r a i s e i n d e p endent claim s r elating to the deprivation o f constitutional rights that occur r e d p r i o r
to the entry of the guilty plea.” Rust i n v. State , 138 S o. 3d 270, 273 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation m ark om itte d )

. By pleading guilty to the charged of f enses, Turner’s claim

is procedurally

barred. Id

. ¶25. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we f i nd Turner’s constitutional claim s f ail. Not only are these c l aim s m ade without any supporting evidence, they are all contradictory to Turner’s testim ony in the record. Accordingly , we f i nd this issue is without m erit. CONCLUSION ¶26. W e f

i nd no m e rit t o the issues raised on appeal. Thus, we af f irm the judgm ent of

the Harrison County

Circuit Court. ¶27. AFFIRMED.
L E E , C . J . , I R

V I N G , P . J . , B A R

N E S , C A R L T O N , FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

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