UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

CENTRAL NIGERIA

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH

AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES
Views of a window inside the National Church of Nigeria (L) 

and the front of the Abuja National Mosque (R), on USCIRF 

visits to Nigeria in 2018.
CENTRAL NIGERIA

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH

AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES

FEBRUARY 2019

By Ferdaouis Bagga, 

Policy Analyst

COMMISSIONERS

Tenzin Dorjee

Chair

Kristina Arriaga, Vice Chair

Gayle Manchin, Vice Chair

Gary L. Bauer

Anurima Bhargava

Andy Khawaja

Nadine Maenza

Johnnie Moore

Tony Perkins

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

WHO WE ARE

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal 

government commission created by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) that monitors the 

universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. 

USCIRF uses international standards to monitor violations of religious freedom or belief abroad and makes 

policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary 

of State, and Congress. USCIRF Commissioners are 

appointed by the President and Congressional leaders 

of both political parties. The Commission’s work is supported by a professional, nonpartisan staff of regional 

subject matter experts. USCIRF is separate from the 

State Department, although the Department’s Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom is a 

non-voting, ex officio Commissioner.

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Inherent in religious freedom is the right to believe or 

not believe as one’s conscience leads, and live out one’s 

beliefs openly, peacefully, and without fear. Freedom of 

religion or belief is an expansive right that includes the 

freedoms of thought, conscience, expression, association, and assembly. While religious freedom is America’s first freedom, it also is a core human right international law and treaty recognize; a necessary component 

of U.S. foreign policy and America’s commitment to 

defending democracy and freedom globally; and a vital 

element of national security, critical to ensuring a more 

peaceful, prosperous, and stable world.

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

Dwight Bashir, Director of Research and Policy

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of International Law and Policy

Thomas Kraemer, Director of Operations and Finance

Isaac Six, Director of Congressional Affairs and Communications

Tina L. Mufford, Deputy Director of Research and Policy

Ferdaouis Bagga, Policy Analyst

Jason Morton, Policy Analyst

Dominic Nardi, Policy Analyst

Scott Weiner, Policy Analyst

Kurt Werthmuller, Policy Analyst

Keely Bakken, Researcher

Alex Iverson, Researcher

Patrick Greenwalt, Researcher

Zach Udin, Research Assistant

Kirsten Lavery, International Legal Specialist

Javier Peña, Communications Specialist

Henry Young, Management and Program Analyst
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Conflict in the Middle Belt Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Addressing Hateful and Dangerous Speech. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Countering or Spreading Divisions: Media and Mass Messages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Messages from Elites and Status Influencers in Public Fora. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Polarizing Narratives that Fuel and Reflect Religious Tensions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.S. Policy and Support for NGO Initiatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Conclusion and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Table of Contents

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 1

I

n Nigeria, a range of state and societal violations 

have adversely impacted religious freedom conditions in the country. As a result, since 2009, USCIRF 

has recommended the U.S. Department of State 

designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” 

or CPC. Some of the most egregious are the denials of 

the right to life, liberty, and the security of people on 

the basis of religion or belief. Divides between religious 

communities and the spread of dangerous speech 

that incites further violence often prompt or escalate 

these violations. The Nigerian government has yet to 

find sustainable solutions to perennial conflict and 

religious polarization. In addition, the terrorist group 

Boko Haram has waged war in Nigeria for 10 years to 

eliminate religious freedom and impose an absolute 

religious authority in the northeast. State security 

forces, too, have arrested, detained, and killed individuals over differences of religion or belief. Moreover, 

the longstanding problem of sectarian conflict around 

ethno-religious divides, resources, and property and 

citizenship rights between citizens in the Middle Belt 

region of the country escalated in 2018. 

Dangerous speech and polarizing narratives 

around religion have fueled violence, discrimination, 

and segregation between Muslims and Christians for 

decades, particularly, in central Nigeria. Some religious and political leaders have warned that national 

and state elections in February and March 2019 could 

be a flashpoint for further violence along ethnic and 

religious lines, in part due to polarization and disinformation, voter suppression and intimidation, and other 

threats to a peaceful process. 

A number of religious leaders, non-governmental 

organizations, and government actors have proposed 

a range of solutions and made attempts to repair 

deeply entrenched religious divisions, such as making 

statements condemning hate speech or participating 

in interfaith fora, with varied success. The United 

States has also supported efforts to improve peace and 

security for Nigerian citizens to freely manifest their 

religion or belief. Towards that end, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommends 

that the United States increase its efforts to creatively 

and more effectively decrease religious discord, 

dangerous speech, and violence in the Middle Belt. 

The U.S. government should utilize the tools available 

under the International Religious Freedom Act, and 

enter into a binding agreement with the Nigerian 

government on commitments to improve religious 

freedom. Commitments could include enhancing 

programs to counter hate speech and incitement to 

violence based on religious identity; supporting the 

training of police and military officers on human 

rights standards and religious tolerance; and developing tailored conflict prevention mechanisms at the 

local, state, and federal levels.

Executive Summary

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 3

Conflict in the Middle Belt—a variously defined 

region extending across multiple administrative geopolitical zones, including North-Central Nigeria—arises from a web of issues and includes 

violent clashes between farmers and herders. These 

clashes also resemble farmer-herder conflict in other 

parts of Nigeria and West Africa, and are a product 

of an intense competition for resources and livelihoods. The scale and sites of clashes are related to 

high population growth, expansion of farms, and 

environmental degradation in northern states. Intercommunal conflict is also interlinked with policies 

on “indigeneity” and citizenship. Although originally 

intended as a protective measure, such policies have 

marginalized certain ethnic and religious groups who 

may not be recognized as indigenous to their state 

of residence. In addition, the proliferation of small 

arms has empowered more criminal gangs, bandits, 

Conflict in the Middle Belt Region

and cattle rustlers to wreak havoc indiscriminately 

across Nigeria. Finally, violence in this region can also 

be a product of deep societal mistrust and historical 

grievances between some religious and ethnic groups. 

Among the many diverse language and ethnic groups 

residing in the Middle Belt are the Adara, Bachama, 

Bassa, Berom, Fulani, Irigwe, and Tiv. Often these ethnic groups are further defined according to a predominant ethno-religious affiliation, such as “Christian 

Bachama” or “Muslim Fulani.” 

Although Boko Haram terrorist violence continues 

to make the northeast one of the most dangerous regions 

in Nigeria, reports indicate that in 2018 conflict in the 

Middle Belt has had an even greater death toll and more 

human suffering. This is especially true in states to the 

east of the capital territory of Abuja, including Plateau, 

Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba, and Adamawa states, which 

saw the most sectarian violence in 2018 (Figure 1). 

Benue

Plateau

Taraba

Adamawa

Nasarawa

Kaduna

Kogi

Cross River

Zamfara

Delta

Ebonyi

Katsina

01/18 02/18 03/18 04/18 05/18 06/18 07/18 08/18 09/18 10/18 11/18

TOTAL DEATHS

0

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE BY STATE/YEAR

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

0

100 200

Figure 1: Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker; states in descending order according to total number of 

deaths in 2018.
4 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Moreover, some media reports and security and 

violent incident trackers showed more violent incidents 

and fatalities due to intercommunal conflict, surpassing the damage due to Boko Haram attacks in 2018. 

According to data analysis by the Council on Foreign 

Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker, 2018 has seen 

almost the same numbers of deaths from sectarian conflict as 2014, and almost double the number of deaths in 

the Middle Belt region compared to 2017 (Figure 2). 

An Amnesty International report released in 

December 2018 also indicates over 2,000 people were 

killed in violent clashes between members of farmer 

and herder communities, mostly in Middle Belt states. 

In Nigeria, religion has been and continues to be a 

powerful and exponential escalation factor in conflict. 

An incident or crime involving a few people of different 

religious, ethnic, or occupational identities can escalate 

if one community seeks collective revenge against the 

other group. In the past few years, conflicts based on 

ethnic and religious identity have killed thousands of 

people and displaced tens of thousands. After a spike 

in violence in Benue state in January 2018, thousands 

mourned at the mass burial of the 73 victims. In an 

attack in April thought to be perpetrated by herders, 19 

people were killed in a Catholic church during a mass 

in Benue state. In June, in Plateau state, ethnic Berom 

militias reportedly mounted roadblocks and stopped 

and killed passersby identified as Fulani or Muslim, but 

also sometimes targeted Christian enemies. In June, 

attacks on multiple villages in Plateau state, reportedly 

by Fulani militia, killed more than 200 people; Human 

Rights Watch called this tragedy “a clear indication 

that the decades-long conflict has reached new levels of 

brutality.” Finally, in October, clashes between Adara 

Christian and Hausa Muslim youth militia resulted in 

more than 50 people killed.

At the same time, other multi-religious areas 

in the Middle Belt have not seen such interreligious 

violence. Research has shown that unique factors, 

such as the existence of power-sharing institutions, 

contribute to peace in some of these areas. The northern states of Kaduna and Zamfara, on the other hand, 

have seen a similar level and type of rural violence 

continue in 2018, but not framed along religious 

lines. Meanwhile, land disputes with high numbers 

of fatalities, the displacement of thousands of people, 

and destruction of property occurred in southern 

states such as Cross River. Indeed, the scope of the 

conflict is unique to these geographic, demographic, 

and historical contexts, and does not assume the 

polarized religious dimensions of some areas in the 

Middle Belt. 

In addition to addressing the major security and 

governance challenges, particularly in rural parts of 

Nigeria, non-military solutions are essential to grappling with the complex issues of ethnic and religious-based division and violence. Thus far, however, 

political and religious leaders have been unable to 

adequately promote peaceful solutions as interreligious 

relations continue to deteriorate.

Figure 2: Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker; with 2,037 total deaths from sectarian conflict recorded 

in 2018.

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE BY YEAR TOTAL DEATHS

YEAR

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

2000

1500

1000

500

0
OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 5

Hate speech in Nigeria is used against many 

identity groups, including those based on 

ethnicity, political opinion, religion, and combinations thereof, and has historically been amplified 

around elections. For Nigerians, a variety of speech or 

insults could be considered “hate speech” – for example, an insult to one’s family by someone of a different 

religion or ethnicity, or an assertion that one religion 

is dominant (or has a higher share of the population) 

in an area than another could be called hate speech. 

In April 2018 the PeaceTech Lab published a lexicon of 

hate speech terms, outlining more than a dozen offensive and inflammatory words and phrases and their 

meanings in Nigeria. Although there is no universal 

definition for hate speech, the United Nations explains

that hate speech is usually “any kind of communication 

in speech, writing or behavior that denigrates a person 

or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words 

based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, or 

other identity factor. While all incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence is hate speech, not all hate 

speech constitutes incitement.” To focus on the potential result of violence, experts have defined a specific 

subcategory of hate speech: “dangerous speech” is “any 

form of expression that can increase the risk that its 

audience will condone or participate in violence against 

members of another group.” 

Nigeria acceded to the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1993, which 

requires in Article 20 that “Any advocacy of national, 

racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 

to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” However, to avoid unduly restricting 

fundamental rights that the ICCPR protects, including 

freedom of expression, this provision is interpreted 

narrowly, to mandate prohibition only of speech inciting imminent violence (see UN Human Rights Council 

Resolution 16/18 (2011)). Other types of hate speech 

should be countered through non-criminal measures, 

including dialogue, education, and counter-speech. 

Nigerian government and civil society actors 

have taken a range of approaches to counter hate and 

dangerous speech. Non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) have conducted community discussions, radio 

programs, and other activities across the country. 

Political leaders and lawmakers continue to take strong 

public stances against hate speech, often condemning it 

or calling on fellow leaders to restrain from engaging in 

it. Debate about criminalizing hate speech is ongoing, 

and several bills to do so are still being considered, but 

there is as of yet no federal law. Many Nigerians worry 

that hate speech laws can be vague and inhibit freedom 

of expression, but the public has expressed both resistance to and support for recently proposed bills related 

to inflammatory speech. 

In February 2018, Senator Aliyu Abdullahi, who 

represents Niger state, introduced a bill to criminalize 

hate speech and incitement to violence on the basis of 

ethnicity and religion. News reports noted that Abdullahi’s drive to sponsor the bill was the “cases of religious 

and ethnic violence experienced in the past years.” However, Nigerians widely criticized the bill because it would 

demand death by hanging for any person guilty of hate 

speech resulting in the death of another person. Also, the 

bill was seen as intending to target certain political parties and prohibit speech critical of the government. Other 

civil society and political actors have similarly called for 

a national hate speech law, increasingly so in the lead up 

to the 2019 presidential election. Since 2017, prominent 

religious leaders and civil society leaders have worked 

together to promote a separate religious tolerance and 

hate speech bill that they view as important to deter 

Addressing Hateful and Dangerous Speech
6 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

further violence ahead of elections. In 2016, Kaduna state 

Governor El Rufai put forward a bill in that state to revise 

a 1984 law to add sections aimed at stemming religious 

extremism and hate speech. The bill would charge 

committees from the leading Muslim and Christian 

organizations—the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) and the 

Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)—with reviewing 

and granting permits for religious preaching as well as 

other regulation. The bill has not passed, however, due 

to opposition from Christian and Muslim leaders. This 

law is similar to other state-level laws that also regulate 

religious activities and which have been problematic for 

respect of freedom of religion or belief.

At the same time, other laws have been used without naming hate speech directly but with the intention 

or effect of thwarting it. For example, the Cybercrime 

Act of 2015 outlines penalties for certain forms of hate 

speech and prohibits the distribution of “material 

which denies or approves or justifies acts constituting 

genocide or crimes against humanity.” This act criminalizes any person who with intent threatens or insults 

publicly “through a computer system or network (i) 

persons for the reason that they belong to a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, national or ethnic 

origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of 

these factors; or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these characteristics . . .” 

In a Twitter thread in August 2017, Vice President 

Yemi Osinbajo declared that hate speech would be considered “a specie” of terrorism (Figure 3) and tied it to 

acts prohibited under the Terrorism Prevention Act. He 

drew a link between hate speech and both intimidation 

and violence, and called on leaders not to remain silent 

in the face of such speech.

Figure 3: Tweets by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo in 

August 2017
OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 7

I

n addition to legislative efforts, civil society actors 

have taken up numerous projects aiming to counter 

hateful and dangerous speech, often in partnership with local religious leaders. Radio programs have 

been one successful means of addressing hate speech 

with mass reach, discussing interreligious issues, and 

encouraging civic engagement and nonviolent solutions to local problems. In July, during a radio program 

broadcast across 12 states, guest speakers and callers 

discussed the drivers and impacts of ethnic and religious conflict and the roles citizens can play to end violence. In another radio program in October, civil society 

guest speakers, including religious leaders, discussed 

politicians’ promotion of hatred in the political space 

and religious teachings against hate and prejudice. 

Citizens who called in expressed concerns that some 

religious institutions and leaders also engage inappropriately in politics and elections.

Just as it can advance positive conversations, 

mass media can also reinforce divisions in Nigeria. 

Dangerous and polarizing speech can spread more 

widely and cause more harm through digital media, 

and social media platforms are increasingly accessible. According to We Are Social and Hootsuite, with 

a population of over 193 million people in Nigeria, 

there are 94.8 million internet users (49%), 19 million 

active social media users (10%), 105 million mobile 

users (54%), and 17 million active mobile social users 

(9%). WhatsApp and Facebook are by far the most used 

platforms. Where social media is not as accessible, or 

among older members of the population, radio and TV 

continue to reach all 36 states. According to perceptions polls conducted by Orange Door Research and 

the Nexus Fund in Plateau state in 2018, respondents 

believed that a majority of hate speech is spread by 

social media, followed by family and friends, radio, 

and other means. WhatsApp, in particular, is often 

used to spread hate and polarizing messages.

Many Facebook posts and WhatsApp messages, 

which are widely shared and liked, decry the actions of 

religious and ethnic groups. Users promote claims that 

another group is playing the victim, lying, or violently 

attacking innocent people “on their side,” and accuse 

the “other side” of protecting perpetrators of attacks. 

Such social media posts have the power to perpetuate 

stereotypes and the belief that different ethno-religious 

groups will be perpetual enemies, and use language 

that dehumanizes other ethnic and religious groups. 

Despite efforts to combat inciteful messages on platforms like Facebook and Twitter, such efforts are more 

difficult to implement on WhatsApp where messages 

are private and encrypted.

With conflict occurring across rural areas of the 

Middle Belt, media coverage of specific violent incidents 

is often highly limited. Problems with police investigations have left many journalists responsible for documenting conflict details and unable to rely on official 

data. News reports often vary widely as to the estimated 

numbers of individuals affected, and also differ from 

official figures if any are available. Moreover, many 

reports fail to investigate the causes of incidents or cite 

credible security sources. Some news reports promote 

prejudice against a particular group. Both Christians and Muslims have said that the media blatantly 

expresses bias against their religion, and that journalists 

will deliberately not report their story or perspective. 

Outside the immediate communities affected by 

a specific incident, the general public’s understanding 

of violent events is often incomplete. In some cases, 

false news about attacks has incited people to conduct 

revenge attacks in various parts of the country. The 

BBC has published multiple reports about the troubling 

Countering or Spreading Divisions 

Media and Mass Messages
8 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

effects of “fake news” on conflict in Nigeria, including 

in June and November 2018. In their reporting, the BBC 

presented graphic photos which had been spread in 

online Nigerian media and attributed to recent attacks, 

but explained that in fact the photos came from other 

countries and contexts altogether. The BBC reports provide a critical spotlight on the problems of hate speech 

and false information, and what is being done to tackle 

them in Nigeria and through social media platforms. 

In 2017 and 2018 some Nigerian news outlets took 

new initiatives to combat inadequate reporting and to 

improve the credibility of their brands. One internationally-funded program supports Nigerian journalists 

to collaborate on investigating claims spread on social 

media. Channels TV, one of the main stations in Nigeria, integrated hate speech training into its new journalism academy. Other programs also provide training 

and support for media on countering hate speech, with 

a particular focus on election campaigns.

Unfortunately, many of the challenges with media 

remain outside of journalists’ control. Part of the gap in 

information can be attributed to police and government 

officials’ efforts to deny journalists access to information. Furthermore, journalists have been threatened in 

particular for their reporting on conflict, the Nigerian 

military, and human rights abuses. Reporters Without 

Borders warns that journalists work in a “climate of 

permanent violence,” often threatened and subject to 

violence, and that regional governors act with complete 

impunity when they are involved in blocking access 

to information or silencing the media. In August 2018 

a radio station was reportedly partially demolished 

on orders of the Oyo state government because of its 

reporting. NGOs have also reported curtailing of internet freedom and crackdowns on particular bloggers 

and websites, including arrests under the Cybercrimes 

Act of 2015. In January 2019 the Nigerian military raided 

offices of the Daily Trust paper and arrested journalists 

over their reporting on the war with Boko Haram. Yet 

human rights organizations and journalists alike continue to take risks to document and report on violence 

in Nigeria.
OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 9

One perpetual barrier to ending polarization and 

divisions remains the outsized influence of high 

status, or elite, individuals and groups promoting division based on religion. Political and religious 

leaders may intentionally or accidentally promote the 

continuation of conflict. Religious leaders’ voices carry 

a special weight in Nigeria. As one person told USCIRF, 

“religious leaders are given full respect, especially Christians cannot speak above the word of a pastor.” With the 

upcoming elections and announcements of presidential 

candidates, religious leaders are also heavily influential 

in the realm of civic education, including encouraging 

people to register to vote. Although religious actors have 

specifically endorsed candidates in the past, some warn 

against doing so in the upcoming election for fear that it 

will deepen religious tensions.

Prominent Nigerian religious and political leaders in 2018 continued using polarizing rhetoric that 

amplifies fear and suggests the inevitability of further 

violence. In one widely-reported example in March, 

following severe incidents of violence, former defense 

minister General T.Y. Danjuma made a public call 

for Nigerians to defend themselves from killings in 

the Middle Belt—and referred to the attacks as ethnic cleansing. He said “everyone of us must rise up. 

The armed forces are not neutral. They collude with 

the armed bandits that kill people.” In so doing, he 

both justified and promoted more reprisal attacks. 

He also further polarized Christians and Muslims, 

and suggested government complicity in the violence, 

entrenching distrust of government and security actors. 

Nevertheless, many Nigerians recognized the incitement and condemned the speech. Still other prominent 

leaders have also incited division by labeling entire 

ethnic groups as “terrorists.” In October, the Supreme 

Council for Shari’ah in Nigeria shared a press release 

on social media titled “Berom Christians: The Real 

Terrorists,” which claimed that “Since early 2001, the 

Plateau has become the most spectacular theatre of 

mass killings and destruction of properties by the so 

called “‘indigenous Christians.’” The Berom Educational and Cultural Organization, in turn, spoke out 

against the promotion of ethnic hatred. Similarly, many 

public figures have attributed attacks in the Middle Belt 

broadly to “Fulani terrorists.” This language has had 

the effect of collectively demonizing ethnic groups and 

has led to people being targeted or stigmatized based 

on their ethnic and religious affiliation. These terms 

have been frequently echoed by prominent religious 

leaders and the local population alike, and spread by 

the media. Other influential leaders have spoken out 

against the language. For example, former vice president and 2019 presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar 

in March encouraged media to refrain from using such 

language, instead advising “. . . let us identify them by 

their activities and not by their ethnicity.”

Political leaders in Nigeria are increasingly using 

social media to communicate directly with the population (Figure 4). Government officials usually make 

public speeches regarding interreligious issues, hold 

meetings with religious leaders, visit sites of recent 

intercommunal violence, and share statements online 

to reassure the people that attention is being paid. 

After violence in January, federal government officials 

released statements that they were determined to 

resolve the ongoing herder-farmer conflict. For many 

Nigerians, these statements are expected and necessary, but not enough as the violence continues.

Messages from Elites and Status 

Influencers in Public Fora
10 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Figure 4: Tweets by President Muhammadu Buhari and Government Senior Special Assistant to Vice President Osinbajo, 

Laolu Akande in 2018.
OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 11

Throughout 2018, USCIRF learned from a variety 

of Nigerian civil society and government representatives about the many intersecting issues 

polarizing society. Economic and ethno-religious 

tensions were at the heart of many of the narratives 

explaining current conflict and security problems. 

Although Nigeria has long been a highly religious 

country, some religious community members say the 

division along religious lines is now the worst they have 

ever seen, and is severely affecting children and youth. 

Civil society representatives across religious lines 

noted that children as young as five want to know the 

religion of the people around them. While many interlocutors agreed that the Nigerian government needs 

to do much more to provide security for its citizens of 

all faiths, they disagreed on whether the government 

is intentionally neglecting, or even complicit in the 

attacks on civilians. They also disagreed about whether 

cattle grazing bans or other approaches are helpful in 

addressing farmer-herder conflict. 

Narratives around the causes of violence in the 

Middle Belt are some of the most polarizing between 

religious communities. One widely reported narrative is 

that the sectarian conflict is fueled by hired criminals. 

Reports claim that criminals are posing as herders, 

“dressed like Fulani” to deceive the communities they 

attack. Proponents of this narrative suspect that, as 

many wealthy Nigerians own large herds of cattle and 

hire armed guards to defend them, there may be people 

paid by elite actors involved in the attacks. This is 

believable for witnesses who say that the attackers they 

saw were “not our Fulani neighbors” but rather others, 

even foreigners, whom they do not know. Other interlocutors say attacks in the Middle Belt are simply led by 

conflict entrepreneurs.

One of the most striking narratives is that for many 

Christians the violence occurring in this region is part 

Polarizing Narratives that Fuel and 

Reflect Religious Tensions

of a broader plan to “Islamize” Nigeria by expelling 

Christians from the Middle Belt and seizing their land for 

Muslims. This narrative has existed for decades, since the 

reformulations of government in the 1960s, through the 

debates over the extension of Shari’ah implementation 

in the 1970s, the adoption of the federal constitution in 

1999, the continuation of the Shari’ah debate and expansion in 2000, up to the present with the Boko Haram 

insurgency and the rise of the ISIS-West Africa faction. 

In a cyclical fashion, fears of religious domination 

have led to interreligious violence, which has further 

amplified fears and motivated reprisal attacks. In 

the year 2000, more than 2,000 people were killed in 

fighting between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna 

over the Shari’ah debate. The history of conflict related 

to religious dominance in Nigeria strongly informs the 

views of many Nigerians today. Going back even further 

in history, many Nigerians still reference Usman Dan 

Fodio, the Fulani Muslim scholar who led a religious 

war in northern Nigeria from 1804 to 1810 to revive and 

reform Islam in the region, leading to the establishment 

of the Sunni Islamic Sokoto Caliphate. Some Christian leaders suggest that current conflict with Fulani 

herders is a continuation of this religious war, and some 

go so far as to say that herders are working on behalf 

of the Nigerian government to complete Dan Fodio’s 

mission and conquer more territory. Corresponding to 

this narrative, some news reports on the Middle Belt 

conflict have used the terms “genocide” and “ethnic 

cleansing.” However, other Christian leaders disagree 

with this framing and discuss the complexity of causes 

of violence in Nigeria. The narrative and fear of Islamization itself contributes to the polarization of society: it 

negatively portrays the spread of Islam as a threat to be 

thwarted, it allows for the generalization that all Muslims are interested or participating in the effort, and it is 

used to attribute conflicts between Muslim actors and 
12 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

non-Muslim actors—or political/economic conditions 

that benefit Muslims over non-Muslims—as related to 

the effort.

Nonetheless, the narrative of Islamization remains 

a real and pervasive fear for many Christians in Nigeria. Interlocutors have shared with USCIRF a range of 

examples to describe the fear, including discrimination 

by government actors against Christians in employment and political leadership, freedoms for Muslims 

to build mosques but heavy restrictions on Christians 

building churches, statistics on the numbers of Muslims 

in government and security agencies in comparison 

to Christians, the growth in Islamic banking, government failure to protect Christians from violence, and 

the increasing death toll in parts of the Middle Belt. 

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the 

National Christian Elders’ Forum have in the past year 

repeatedly expressed that this is an ongoing threat to 

the country and Christians. CAN leadership and others 

have highlighted Nigeria’s participation in international Islamic organizations such as the Organization of 

Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as evidence of the Nigerian 

government’s approval of or complicity in the Islamization of the country. Another example commonly cited 

is the appointment of Muslims to key leadership posts. 

Some interlocutors with whom USCIRF met said that the 

government has not been balanced, and several highlighted that Muslim individuals lead the “entire security 

apparatus”—which promotes the conspiracy theory of 

government complicity in a broader campaign. 

In contrast, as noted previously, others describe 

conflict in the Middle Belt as primarily about 

resources and the increasing threats to Nigerians’ 

livelihoods and traditional occupations of farming or 

herding. USCIRF met with Fulani and Berom community members near Jos, Plateau state, who said fighting 

over land has led youth in particular to resort to violence. Others said the religious element to the conflict 

is secondary. This tracks with research and conflict 

analyses conducted by international and Nigerian 

NGOs in states such as Plateau, Benue, and Nasarawa, 

which have found that competition over resources, 

particularly farmland and water access, is the main 

source of conflict. Civil society members, including 

the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), noted that it is in part because the majority of 

Fulani herders are Muslim that the conflict has taken 

on a religious tone in many areas. In other areas of 

the Middle Belt, however, conflict may occur between 

farming communities, or between herders and farmers of the same religion. MACBAN pointed out the 

government neglect of grazing reserves and the deterioration of pastures and routes in the north as part of 

the reason herders have been increasingly taking their 

cattle to new areas. One prominent imam shared with 

USCIRF his exasperation with the narrative that the 

government is attacking or persecuting Christians, 

and said that in fact the government has failed all of its 

citizens, including Muslims, by not tackling the root 

issues or providing adequate governance and security. 

Both Muslims and Christians have suffered massive 

loss of life in these conflicts, and share a common 

interest in building peace and security in the region. 

As noted earlier, a complex web of motivations for 

violence exists in the Middle Belt and the causes of conflict are often highly localized and rooted in competition over limited resources. Nevertheless, religion is an 

important strand of this web that cannot be dismissed, 

and a lens through which many Nigerians continue to 

view and describe conflict in this region. The narratives 

that communities use have the power to mobilize people around religious identity to conduct reprisal attacks, 

to escalate minor incidents into more deadly ones, and 

to deepen divisions. 
OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 13

U.S. Policy and Support for NGO Initiatives

The United States government has been actively 

supporting the Nigerian government and 

people to improve security and build peace 

and respect among religious groups. U.S. Ambassador 

to Nigeria Stuart Symington and other U.S. Embassy 

officials continue to encourage religious leaders, 

journalists, political leaders, and others to refrain from 

hateful and divisive speech. U.S. Consul General F. John 

Bray made remarks at a religious tolerance conference in Lagos in August 2018, in which he condemned 

the ongoing violence in the Middle Belt. He said that 

the U.S. Mission firmly believes that every life lost 

“whether a farmer or a herder, a Muslim or a Christian, 

a Berom or a Fulani–is a tragedy.” He also emphasized 

the importance of all voices in promoting peace: “Our 

words matter. Each of us has a role to play in tamping 

down tensions between communities of all kinds. It is 

in your hands to ensure that this tragic violence does 

not descend into broader ethnic and religious fighting, 

and a cycle of reprisals.”

U.S. NGOs such as Search for Common Ground, 

the United States Institute of Peace, Mercy Corps, and 

Nexus Fund, are just a few examples of groups working 

at the community level in the Middle Belt to address 

local farmer-herder conflict and to prevent hate speech 

and further violence. In one local initiative, a women’s 

farmer-herder dialogue led to a woman preventing her 

husband from committing violence against a herder. 

Dialogue at the local level is essential for building relationships between different religious communities as 

well as between citizens and local officials and security 

actors. Nigerian civil society leaders have consistently 

voiced to USCIRF the value of interreligious dialogue 

efforts, and have made important recommendations for 

improving their impact. They recommend programs that 

engage more youth, address trauma, combat and train 

community members on hate speech and its impact, and 

engage religious and traditional leaders, among others. 

The U.S. government has long supported activities 

like this in Nigeria. For example, for more than five 

years, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) has supported the Training of Leaders on 

Religious and National Coexistence (TOLERANCE) 

project, which has contributed to improving interfaith 

relations, advocating for religious freedom, and diminishing discrimination. In 2017, USAID brought together 

more than 150 stakeholders, Muslims and Christians, 

in partnership with several NGOs from the United 

States and Nigeria, to address farmer-herder issues. 

One key recommendation from the conference was 

to provide training for the media, which, as discussed 

earlier, sometimes exacerbate tensions by the nature 

of their reporting. Interlocutors praised the conference 

as productive and inclusive, but recommended more 

follow-up, in particular from the Nigerian government, 

to continue its impact. 

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 15

I

n the lead up to the 2019 presidential election, and 

with the highly politicized nature of the conflict, 

both Nigerians and the international community 

have worried about a further downward spiral into 

violence. The Middle Belt region is widely seen as one 

of the most powerful constituencies to influence presidential elections because of its role as a swing region 

where the more Muslim north and mostly Christian 

south converge, and as a significant and continuous 

site of deadly sectarian conflict. As the U.S. government supports Nigerian preparations for the 2019 elections, including for the post-election period, it should 

work to enhance short- and long-term peacebuilding 

initiatives and combat the escalation of hate speech, 

polarization, and sectarian violence. 

As USCIRF has noted in its Annual Report

recommendations each year, the U.S. government 

should designate Nigeria a CPC, which would provide 

many opportunities and non-punitive measures for 

the U.S. government to more effectively promote 

respect for freedom of religion or belief in Nigeria, 

and to reduce polarization and conflict between 

religious groups. If it designates Nigeria as a CPC, 

the U.S. government should enter into a binding 

agreement with the Nigerian government to set forth 

mutually agreed upon commitments for improving 

religious freedom in Nigeria, and provide technical 

and financial support for the fulfillment of those 

commitments. Key commitments in this agreement 

could include:

• Increasing peacebuilding programming and 

research—in partnership with local and traditional leaders and other parts of civil society—in 

order to counter hate speech and incitement to 

violence based on religious identity, such as:

■ conducting a national survey on the manifestations and effects of dangerous speech in Nigeria;

■ holding action-oriented town halls and 

inter-ethnic/interreligious dialogues to reach 

more communities impacted by violence;

■ developing long-term radio programming to 

educate wider audiences and to build interreligious understanding and collaborative 

peacebuilding;

■ training media actors on identifying and countering hateful and dangerous speech;

■ training of local, state, and federal officials on 

freedom of religion or belief and countering 

hate speech based on religious identity;

• Training police on conducting professional and 

thorough investigations into violent incidents and 

prosecuting perpetrators;

• Enhancing training for military and police officers 

on international human rights standards and religious tolerance; and

• Developing early warning systems and other conflict prevention mechanisms at the local, state, and 

federal levels.

Conclusion and Recommendations


UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, D.C. 20401

www.uscirf.gov

Telephone: (202) 523–3240, Fax: (202) 523–5020

email: media@uscirf.gov