NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. RICHARD MAX TAFOYA,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 20

- 50240
D.C. No. 3:19

- cr - 05163

- LAB

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted August 3, 2021 Pasadena, California Before: PAEZ, CALLAHAN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. Richard Tafoya appeals a supervised

- release condition prohibiting him from entering Mexico for five years. He also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his eighty

- month sentence for importing methamphetamine into the United States. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Because Tafoya failed to object to the supervised

- release condition at

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

AUG 18 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

sentencing, we review the matter for plain error. See United States v. Wolf Child , 699 F.3d 1082, 1089, 1094

– 95 (9th Cir. 2012). And contrary to Tafoya’s contention, the district court did not plainly err in failing to support, with record evidence, the travel restriction

. Courts must comply with this “enhanced procedural requirement [] ” when a superv ised

- release condition implicates a particularly significant liberty interest. Id. at 1090 (quoting United States v.
Weber , 451 F.3d 552, 568 (9th Cir. 2006)). Our case law , however, has not established that the right to travel abroad constitutes such an interest for sentencing
purposes. Our case law also fails to support Tafoya’s argument that his relationship with his girlfriend in Mexico “is a relationship that implicates a particularly significant liberty interest in intimate association

. ” See id. a t 1095. It would not, therefore, have been clear or obvious to the court that this case constituted one of the “rare” ones requiring “additional procedures and

. . . special findings.” United States v. Rudd , 662 F.3d 1257, 1263 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Nor is the travel restriction plainly overbroad for not allow ing Tafoya to enter Mexico with his probation officer’s permission. While such exceptions can “help [] to mitigate the severity o f [a] limitation,” United States v. Watson , 582 F.3d
974 , 984 (9th Cir. 2009 ), Tafoya points to no case holding that blanket restrictions
on travel are impermissible

. G iven Tafoya’s smuggling history, criminal3

connections in Mexico, and lack of famil y tie s to that country, the court could have reasonably concluded that a n absolute prohibition was justified. 1 Cf. United States
v. LaCoste , 821 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) (“There are of course situations in which a defendant’s ties to [a particular area] may not be a positive influence, and in such cases a condition of supervised release barring the defendant’s return may well be justified.”)

. Finally, we affirm Tafoya’s custodial sentence. The district court carefully
considered the s tatutory sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) , and explained why it was imposing a sentence twenty months below the guidelines
recommendation

. T he court noted Tafoya’s age and health, on the one hand, and his extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence , on the other. Tafoya disagree s with the court’s reasoning , but he fails to establish that his sentence was “shockingly high . . . or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law

. ” Un i t e d States
v. Ressam , 679 F.3d 1069 , 1088 (9th Cir. 2012 ) (en banc) (citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.

1 Whereas the court’s oral pronouncement prohibited Tafoya from entering Mexico, its written order allowed him to do so with his probation officer’s permission

. The oral pronouncement controls, see United States v. Hernandez , 795 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 2015), but Tafoya may requ est clarification from the court as to which condition was intended.