United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2287

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Victor Bernard Jones

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

____________

 Submitted: April 14, 2016

 Filed: June 16, 2016 

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Victor Jones appeals the district court’s denial of a sentence reduction under

1

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We affirm.

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

1

the Northern District of Iowa.
I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, Jones pled guilty to distributing heroin within 1,000 feet of an

elementary school after a prior felony drug conviction, a violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 851, and 860. In exchange for Jones’s guilty plea, the

government dismissed two additional drug charges and agreed not to seek a

mandatory life sentence. The plea agreement, which expressly did not bind the

district court, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), provided that if Jones was not found

to be a career offender, Jones and the government agreed “an upward departure

[under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) § 4A1.3] to an

offense level of 31 and a Criminal History Category VI, with a sentencing range of

188 to 235 months[,] [wa]s appropriate” to account for Jones’s “substantial underrepresent[ed] . . . criminal history.” 

The district court accepted Jones’s plea, found he was not a career offender,

granted the government’s unopposed motion for an upward departure, and sentenced

Jones to 235 months imprisonment followed by six years ofsupervised release. Jones

appealed his sentence and we affirmed. See United States v. Jones, 639 F.3d 484,

488 (8th Cir. 2011).

Effective November 1, 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission

reduced by two levels the base offense levels in the drug quantity table at U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(c), which was used to calculate Jones’s advisory Guidelines range. See

U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 782. Amendment 782 empowered the district court

to reduce Jones’s prison term pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10(a), (d). 

On March 5, 2015, the district court, on its own motion, had the United States

Probation Office prepare a memorandum regarding Jones’s “eligibility for a sentence

reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” The government conceded Jones was

eligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782, but argued a reduction was

-2-
unwarranted because of the nature of Jones’s offense and his “lengthy and violent

criminal history.”

After holding a sentence-reduction hearing, the district court concluded

Amendment 782 did not justify a reduction in Jones’s sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. The district court explained “the reduction in

the offense level for drug quantity . . . [did]n’t really apply here because the sentence

[wa]s not driven by the total offense level based on drug quantity, but, rather, by a

variety of other issues, including criminal history, [and] the seriousness of the

underlying criminal conduct.”

II. DISCUSSION

Jones appeals the denial of a sentence reduction, arguing “[t]he district court

erred in finding that Mr. Jones’ plea agreement was a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreement that preclude[d] a sentencing reduction.” As Jones sees it, “although the

District Court may not have used the phrase ‘binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreement,’ that was clearly the underlying assumption of the District Court’s

analysis.” Jones alternatively argues that if the district court did recognize the plea

agreement was not binding, its decision to deny a reduction was an abuse of

discretion.

Upon careful review, we find no basis to reverse. See United States v. Long,

757 F.3d 762, 763 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting we review de novo the legal conclusion

that a defendant is eligible for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) reduction and review for

abuse of discretion the decision to grant or deny a reduction). As the government

points out, the district court opened the sentence-reduction hearing by explaining it

set the hearing and appointed counsel for Jones “after making a preliminary finding

that the defendant [wa]s eligible for a reduction”—a point the government conceded. 

The district court then clarified “[t]he issue before the Court . . . [wa]s whether the

Court should exercise its discretion to reduce [Jones’s] sentence in whole or in part

-3-
after considering the applicable factors under 18 United States Code Section

3553(a).” 

Inmaking that determination, the district court explained it “reviewed the court

file in its entirety” and would consider all it knew about Jones and his case in

analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The district court then recalculated the

advisory Guidelines range that would apply—absent the upward departure to which

the parties had agreed—after a two-level reduction in Jones’s base offense level under

Amendment 782. After hearing fromthe parties, the district court decided it was “not

going to make any adjustment in Mr. Jones’s sentence,” finding “the appropriate

sentence [wa]s still 235 months.” 

In a post-hearing written order, the district court further explained, 

After thoroughly reviewing the defendant’s file, the provisions and

commentary of USSG §1B1.10, the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or

community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of

imprisonment and the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, the court

declined to exercise its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and

USSG §1B1.10. 

On thisrecord, we are satisfied the district court understood the plea agreement

was not binding and Jones was eligible for a discretionary sentence reduction under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). And we conclude the district court did not abuse its

discretion in deciding the particular circumstances of Jones’s case did not warrant a

reduction. 

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

-4-