### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03 - 19 - 00571 - CV

Madeleine Connor, Appellant

v. Douglas Hooks and Elizabeth Hooks, Appellee s

FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D - 1 - GN - 19 - 000428, THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Madeline Connor petitions this Court for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order granting summary judgment to Dou glas and Elizabeth Hooks

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (d) (a uthor i zing trial court to permit interlocutory appeal s in certai n circumstances) , (f) (requiring party seeking appeal to petition appellate court for permission) ; Tex. R

. A p p. P. 28.1 (addressing requirements of petition) . For the reasons that follow , we will d eny the petition.

Connor, a n attorney, sued the Hooks in connection with a n allegedly false online review of her services

. Connor asserted a claim for defamation, and t he Hooks moved for
summary judgment on the statut e of limitations

. C on nor then amende d her petition to add a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court gra nted summary2

judgment on the defamation claim and, by separate order , granted Connor permission to appeal fro m that order

.

Section 51.01 4 of the Civil Pr a c tice and Reme dies C ode authorizes a trial court to permit an appeal of an order “ not otherwise appealable ” if “ the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of op in ion ” and if “ an i mmediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. ” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (d). Appellate courts have discretion to accept such an interlocutory appeal if it meets those requi re ments and th e p a r ty seeking to appeal files with the court of appeals “ an application for interlocutory appeal explaining why an appeal is warranted under Subsection (d). ” Id. § 51.014(f); see also Sabre Travel Int ’ l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG , 567 S.W.3 d 725, 731 ( T ex. 20 19) ( confirming that Legislature granted appellate
court s discretion to accept or reject p ermissive appeals).

“ In its statement of permission granting an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014, a trial court must identify the controlling ques ti on of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opi nion and must state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate t ermination of the litigation. ” Gulf Coast Asphalt Co. v. Lloyd , 457 S.W.3d 539, 543

– 44 (T ex. App

. — H ou sto n [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 ( incorporating section 51.014(d))

. P er mission to appeal “ ‘ must be stated in the order to be appealed, ’ not in a subsequent order. ” Devine v. Doh Oil Co. , No

. 03

- 19

- 00639

- CV, 2020 WL 1161102, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Austin Mar. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 168). The d istrict court ’ s grant of permission is not stated in the order to be appealed, and it does n ot identify a controlling question of law or fin d that an immediate ap pea l may materially advance the ultimate t ermination of the litigation

. Because the order appealed from3

fails to comply wi th the stat utory requirements , we deny C o nnor ’ s petition

. Se e T ex. R. Civ. P. 168 ; Scarb orough v. City of Hous t on , No. 01

- 16

- 00302

- C V, 2017 WL 117329, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (de nying p etition because o rder

“ does not identify the controlling question of law or state why an immediate appeal may

m aterially adva nce the u ltimate termination o f t he litigation ” ).

__________________________________________ Edward Smith , Justice Before Justices Good w in, Tria n a, and Smith Filed : August 27, 202 0