FIFTH DI VISI ON January 25, 2008

No. 1-06-2374 TIL LI E MORRI S and JOE MORR IS, ) ) Plaintiff s-Appell ees, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of v. ) Cook County ) HALSEY ENTERPRI SES COMPANY, LTD., a ) Taiwanese Corporation, ) ) Honorab le Defendant-Appellant ) Jeffrey Lawrence, ) Judge Presi ding. (Hunter Fan Company , an Illinois Corporation, d/b/a ) Ca sa bl an ca Fa n C om pa ny, ) ) Defendant). ) JUSTICE O’MARA F ROSSARD del ivered t he opinion

of the co urt: Pl ai nt if fs Ti ll ie an d J oe Mo rr is fi le d a la ws ui t t o r ec ov er da ma ge s a ll eg ed ly c au se d b y a defect ive ceili ng fan designe d and manu

factur ed by defenda nts Hunter

Fan Compa

ny, an I llinois

co rp or at io n, d/ b/ a C as ab la nc a F an Co mp an y (C as ab la nc a) , a nd Ha ls ey E nt er pr is es Co mp an y, Ltd., a Taiwanese c orporation (Halsey ). In response, Halse

y filed a motion to quash service and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, and Halsey filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3). 210 I ll. 2d R. 306(a)(3). This court initially denied Halsey ’s petition, but the supreme court subsequently entered a supervisory orde

r directing this court to vacate our decision and g rant Halsey

leave to appeal.1-06-2374

2

Morris v. Hunter Fan Co. , 222 Ill. 2d 609 (2007). Having now g ranted Halsey ’s petition and reviewe d its conte

ntions on th e merits, we reve rse the tr ial cour t’s denia l of the mot

ion to quash and dismiss

. BACKGROUND Our factual summary

is based on the record Halsey submitted to this court in support of its petition, as no additional portions of the trial court record were prepar ed after leave to appeal was granted. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 306(h). On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint ag ainst Casablanca and Halsey. I n the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Casablanca and Ha lsey desig ned and manufactured a “Star/Starlet Casablanca” ceiling fan which was then sold to customers in, among o ther pla

ces, Illinois. I

n Septembe

r or Octo ber of 19 97, plaint

iffs purc hased one of thes e ceiling fans and Joe Morris subsequently installed the fan in plaintiffs’ home bathroom. On April 29, 2003, Tillie Morris suffered serious injuries after the fan motor f ell on her without warning, causing her to fa ll to the floor and strike her head and face. On May 5, 2005, H alsey

filed a mo tion to qua sh servic e and dism iss the six co

unts in plaintiffs’ complaint directed toward it on the grounds that the court lac ked personal jurisdiction. In the motion, Halsey

contended that its contacts with Illinois were so lac king that the exercise of persona l jurisdic tion over

it would fa

il to satisf y th e requir

ements of due proc ess. I

n support, Halsey’s motion contende d that it: (1) was a Taiwanese corporation with a princ ipal place of business i n Taiwan , (2) had

never ma nufactu red or so ld ceiling

fans in I llinois, (3 ) at one t

ime manufactured ceiling fans in Taiwa n for Casablanca, but shipped those fans to California and1-06-2374

3

made only 10% of its g

ross profits from the production of those fans, (4) did not ship any ceiling fans to Illinois for Casablanca a nd did not know that Casablanca would market or sell ceiling fans in Illinois, (5) had no control over Casa blanca’s sale or marketing of c eiling fans and had not manufactured any

fans for Casablanca since 1998, (6) has no sa les or other offices, marketing personnel, bank accounts, telephone listings, real e state, or personal property in Illinois, (7) does not pay taxes in I llinois, is not a registered foreign corpora tion in Illinois, and has never before sued or been sued in Illinois, and (8) doe s not maintain an Internet website direc ted toward

consumer s in Il linois. Atta

ched to the motion wa s an aff idavit att esting t o the truth

of these assertions executed by Ha lsey’s g eneral manager, B enjamin Lee. The trial court allowed the parties to engage in limited discovery on the issue of pe rsonal jurisdict ion. I n its answe

rs to writt en discov ery , Halsey

stated tha

t it produc ed appro ximately 386,000 units of 20 different type s of ceiling fans for Casablanca be tween 1996 and 1998. Of these, approximately 5,228 units were of the Starlet model. Halsey a cknowledged that around 1994, Casa

blanca i nformed it that a si gnific ant incr

ease in production would be require d becau se Casablanca would begin selling ceiling fans through Home Depot. Halsey denied it ever discusse d any

marketin g or dist ribution a spects of

Casablan ca’s ar range ment with H ome Depo t. In May2005, the parties took a number of depositions. John Pearson, Casablanca’s vicepresident of marketing, testified that he had worke d for Casablanca in various capacities for ove r 20 years. I

n 1994, Cas ablanca

acquire d the Home stead Cei ling Fa n Company

and conti nued to sel l t he S tar and St arl et m ode ls th at H om est ead had pre vi ous ly so ld and Hal sey m anu fac tu red . In 19 95 , C as ab la nc a w as in tu rn bo ug ht by t he Hu nt er Fa n C om pa ny.1-06-2374

4

Pearson t estified that Casa blanca s old ceilin

g fans t hrough a nationw

ide network of some 600 t o700 r etail light ing st ores. Casab lanca h as als o sol d fans from t ime t o tim e thro ugh nationwid

e home improvemen

t stores su

ch as Home Depot a

nd Lowe’s. Ha

lsey was a Taiwanese manufacturer whose main business was producing ceiling fans for the United States market. Casablanca’s business relationship with Halsey began in approximately

1990 or 1991 and continued through 1997 or 1998. During the re lationship, Halsey would manufac ture ceiling fans for Casablanca and packa ge them for retail sale. In the beginning , Halsey wa s producing approximately 20,000 to 30,000 units per y ear for Casablan ca. How ever, Pe arson be gan disc ussing a n opportun

ity w ith Halse y to signific antly increase this amount in order to supply ceiling fans nationwide to Home Depot in 1992 or 1993. This opportunity would require produc tion to increase to 250,000 to 300,000 units per ye ar. After ensuring that Halsey could meet this increased demand, Casablanca supplied Home D epot with ceil ing fan s from ap proximatel

y 19 93 to 1995. The Star a nd Starle t models we

re not sol d th ro ug h H om e D ep ot , a nd Pe ar so n c ou ld no t r ec al l e ve r d is cu ss in g t ho se mo de ls wi th Ha ls ey. Pearson testified Halsey

was aware that Home Depot had stores nationwide a nd that Casablan ca also d istribute d its fans t

hrough its nationw

ide chai n of other retaile rs. He a lso testified that in addition to shipping fans to Casablanca in California, Halsey would also ship fans both directly to Home Depot’ s own regional distribution centers and to at least one other Casablanca customer. However, Pearson could not say that Halsey was aware its fans were distribute d to any

specific market, including

Illinois. More over, Pe arson him self was not sure i f either Home Depot or Casablanca’s other c ustomers were located in each of the 50 states.1-06-2374

5

Finally, Pearson te stified that while he frequently met with Halsey re

presentatives in Taiwan, Californ ia, and a t a semian

nual Dall as national show, h e could on ly r ecall “ running into them” once at a national trade show he attended in Chicago. Lee Ching Tan, Ha

lsey’s chair

man, testified that his company wa s an “original equipment manufacturer”

that prod uced ce iling fa

ns for a n umber of differe nt compan

ies. Appr oximately 70% of the fans it produced were exported to the United States, wher e it shipped hundreds of thousands of units each ye ar. Halsey first began producing ce iling fans for Casablanca around 1992. Those fans would be shipped fully assembled and individually pac kaged. Tan knew that Casablanca was a “sizable” manufactur er and distributer of ceiling fans, but denied that he or anyone e lse at Halsey ha

d any specif

ic knowledge of Casablanca’s distribution network or the identity of its cust

omers. The one e xception wa s a speci fic insta nce whe re Casab lanca a sked Hal sey to incre ase its production of ceiling fans for sale at Home D epot, which he understood to be a large na tional retail home improvement store. Tan asserted that Halsey never produced fans for any company located in Illinois, although he had a ttended a national trade show in Chicago seven or e ight times. Halsey did not formally participate in the trade show, and Tan never sa w any fa ns produced by H alsey on display there. While he did see clients at the show, he never conducte d any business there . Tan did recall conducting business meetings with clients in California, Texas, Florida, and New York. Donny Teng , Halsey’s de puty ge neral manager, confirme d that his company produce d ceiling fans for other companies. Teng estimated that 80% to 85% of Halsey ’s production was1-06-2374

6

ultimately distributed in the United States and that the company shipped 700,000 to 800,000 units ther e annua lly. He was a

ware tha t ceiling fans man ufactur ed by Halsey were so ld in reta

il and spec ialized lig

hting stores in the

United Sta

tes, but he

did not know

where they

were a ll located. Additionally, Halsey produced fans sold at Home Depot and L owe’s. He described Home Dep ot as a la

rge ho usehold a ppliance s store, b

ut he did no t know exactly w here Ho me Depot’s s tores we

re loca ted. Ten g described L owe’s a s a big ho usehold it ems store with reta il stores in many states, but he did not know if it had any stores in Illinois. Teng also testified that Halsey began producing fans f

or Casablanca in 1992 or 1993 and stopped in 1998. Over that time, Halsey produced some 10 to 20 different models for Casablanca, including the Star and Starlet models. Each fa n was individually packaged, and Casablan ca orde red 300, 000 units f

rom 1992 to

1996 and a

nother 36 8,000 units

from 1996

to 1998. Teng recalled that at one point Casablanc a did request a significant increase in fan production for Home Depot, but he denied that he was otherwise aware of how Casablanca distribute d its fans f

or sale. Teng ha

d attende d a national trade show in Chic ago ap

proximatel

y seven times, but Halsey did not forma lly participate and he

never saw any

fans manufactured by Halsey on display

there. On July 28, 2006, t

he trial c ourt ente

red a wr itten orde r deny ing Hal sey ’s motion to

quash and dismiss, finding that “the exercise of in personam jurisdict ion over H alsey

is consiste

nt with the Due Pr

ocess cl ause.” H alsey

sought le ave to ap

peal to th is court, and following the supreme court’s supervisory

order, we granted Halse

y’s appea l on April 12, 2007.1-06-2374

7 ANA LYSIS On appea l, Halsey continue s to asser

t that the a ssertion o f personal jurisdi ction ove r it would not comport with due process. We agree. It is the plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate a prima facie basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant such as Halsey

. Commerce Trust Co. v . Air 1st A

viation Cos

. , 366 I ll. App. 3d 135, 140 (2006). A defendant’s uncontradicted e vidence may

overcome a prima facie case and defeat jurisdiction. Kostal v. P inkus Der matopathology

Laboratory

, P.C. , 357 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383 (2005). Where, as here, the trial court decide s the issue of personal jurisdiction without an

evidenti ary

hearing , our rev

iew is de novo . Commerce Trust , 366 Ill. App. 3d at 140. Section 2-209(c) of Code of Civil Procedure contains a “ca tch-all” provision providing that an Illinois court may

“exercise jurisdiction on any othe r basis now or hereafter permitted by the I llinois Cons titution an d the Consti

tution of the United S tates.” 735 I LCS 5/2 -209(c)

(West 2004). “ Thus, if the contac ts betwee n a defe ndant and Illinois are s

ufficie nt to satisf

y bo th federal and state due process conc erns, the requirements of I llinois' long-arm statute have been met, and no other inquiry is nec essary.” Kostal , 357 Ill. App. 3d at 387. In a federa

l due process analy sis, personal jurisdiction may be established w here: (1) the nonresident defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state, ( 2) the cause of action arises out of or is related to those contacts, and (3) it is rea sonable to require the nonresident defendant to litigate in the forum state. Burg er Ki ng Corp. v . Rudze

wicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471- 78, 85 L . Ed. 2d 528 , 540-44, 105 S. Ct. 217 4, 2181-8 5 (1985). Thus, we m ust first address whether Halsey had suff icient min

imum conta

cts with I llinois.1-06-2374

8

The United States Supreme Court has long held that the nonresident defenda nt’s “minimum c ontacts”

with the f

orum state

must be suf

ficient e nough that mainte

nance o f a suit there does not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945), quot ing Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343 (1940). A nonresident defendant must have “ ‘fair wa rning’ ” that its activities may subject it to suit in the forum state. Burger Ki ng, 471 U.S. a t 472, 85 L . Ed. 2d at

540-41, 1 05 S. Ct. at 2 182. This “ fair warning” requirement can be satisfied where the defendant purposefully directs its activities at residents of the forum state and the litigation results from alleg ed injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. Burger Ki ng, 471 U.S. at 472, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 540-41, 105 S. Ct. at 2182. In such a situation, “the defe ndant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980). The focus must be on the defendant’s conduct, however. As the Supreme Court has observe d: “The uni lateral activity of those w

ho claim some relat

ionship wit

h a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the f orum State . The app lication o f that rul e will var y with the quality and nature

of the defendant’s activity , but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defe ndant purposefully ava

ils itself of the privilege of conducting activities1-06-2374

9 within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger Ki ng, 471 U.S. at 474-75, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542, 105 S . Ct. at 218 5, quo ting Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1298, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239-40 (1958). The requirement of “purposeful availment”e nsures that a defendant will not be haled into [the forum state] solely as a re sult of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts [citations], or of the ‘unilateral activity

of another party

or a third person’ [citation].’ ” Burger Ki ng, 471 U.S. at 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542, 105 S. Ct. at 2183. Plaintiffs claim specific personal jurisdiction over Halsey under a “stream of commerce” theory. The Supre

me Court addressed the stream of commerce theor y in World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. 2 86, 62 L . Ed. 2d 490 , 100 S. Ct. 55 9. In that cas e, an au

tomobile purchased in New York by New York residents was involved in an accident in Oklahoma a nd a products -liability

action wa s filed against a nu mber of d efenda nts in that s tate. The

Supreme Court ultima

tely found tha

t the state court ha d no personal jurisd

iction ove r the retail deal ership that sold the automobile in New York or a related regional distributor when neither entity ha d any other c onnection to the state. The Court held that the single, unilateral action of the purchaser in bringing the automobile to Oklahoma c ould not establish sufficient minimum contacts necessary

for personal jurisdiction over these two defendants. World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 298, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 502, 100 S. Ct. at 567. Nevertheless, the Court also stated: “[I]f t

he sale o f a produ

ct of a ma nufactu rer or d istributor *** is1-06-2374

10 not simply an isolated occurre nce, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market f or its prod

uct in othe

r States, it is not unr

easonab le to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly de fective mercha ndise has there be en the sou

rce of i njury to its owne

r or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purcha sed by consumers in the f orum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297-98, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 501-02, 100 S. Ct. at 567. The Supreme Court addressed the stream of commerc e theory a gain in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court , 480 U.S. 1 02, 94 L . Ed. 2d 92, 107 S. Ct. 102 6 (1987). In tha t case, a Japanese manufacture wa s aware that its products were being sold in California, but took no other action specifically directed toward that state. The Court unanimously agreed that Californ ia could n ot exercis e personal jurisdi ction ove r the for eign ma nufactu rer in tha t case because it would be unreasonable. Asahi , 480 U.S. at 116, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107, 107 S. Ct. at 1034. However, the Court split on the proper scope of the stream of c ommerce theory and whether sufficient minimum contacts between the manufacturer and California had been established. Four justices found that the “placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.1-06-2374

11

Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State ***. But a defendant’s aware ness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of plac ing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi , 48 0 U. S. at 1 12, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 107 S. Ct. at 1032 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Powell and Scalia, JJ.). However, another four justices found that sufficie nt minimum contacts had been established under the stream of commerce theor y. They held that personal jurisdiction over the Japanese manufac turer wa s consiste

nt with due

process as long a s the def

endant is involved i

n “the regular and anticipated f low of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale” and it was “aware that the final product is being ma rketed in the forum State.” Asahi , 480 U.S. at 117, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107, 107 S. Ct. at 1034 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). This was so whether or not the defendant directly conducted any

business in the forum state, or engage d in any additional conduct dire cted toward that state. Asahi , 480 U.S. at 117, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshal, and Blackmun, JJ.). Unsurprisingly, c ourts have found it somewhat difficult to apply the stream of commerce theory in light of the Asahi decision. Indeed, our supre me court has described Asahi as an “extreme ly b alkanize d opinion” and rec ognized t

hat “it is n

ot possible

to deter mine from Asahi whether the broad or the narrow ver sion of the stream of commerce theory is correct.” Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co. , 125 Ill. 2d 144, 156, 159-60 (1988).1-06-2374

12

In Wiles , a Japane se manuf acture r challe nged pe rsonal ju risdiction in an Illinois law suit filed after two of four machines it sold in Japan were shipped by the purchaser to Illinois. The manufacturer had no other contacts with I llinois and there was no evidence it was aware tha t the purchaser intended to ship the two machines to I llinois. Our supreme court acknowledged the split decision in Asahi , but found that it nee d not dete

rmine whi ch theor

y w as corr

ect bec ause neither the broad nor narrow version was sa tisfied. The court found that “[u]nder either interpretation of the stream of commerce theor y, it is clear that purpose ful availment of the forum’s market requires, at a minimum , that the alien de fendant

is ‘ aware that the f

inal prod uct is being marketed in the forum State.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Wiles , 125 Ill. 2d at 160, quoting Asahi , 480 U.S. at 117, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshal, and Blackmun, JJ.). Without any evidence that the for eign manufacturer was a

ware that its products were destined for I llinois, under either theory it “ma de no effort, directly

or indirectly, to serve the

market for its product in Illinois.” Wiles , 125 Ill. 2d at 160. In light of Wiles , we also need not join the debate on the proper scope of the stream of commerce theory

to resolve this appeal. A t a minimum, it must be demonstrated that Halsey was

aware the produ

cts it plac ed in the s tream of commerc e were

being ma rketed i n Illi nois. The re is simply no evidence in the re cord showing such an awarene ss. Certainly Halsey

was aware that hundreds of thousands of its products wer e being distributed and marketed nationally through a network of lighting stores a nd national retail chains such as H ome Depo t and L owe’s. H alsey arrang ed for di

rect de livery

of some of

its products to some of these retailers, and somewhere be tween 70% and 85% of its sales were destined for the1-06-2374

13

United Sta

tes marke t. Howeve

r, Halse y ha d no contr

ol over th e specif

ic distrib ution of its

fans in this country and was not aware where all of its products were mar keted or sold. Specifically , the evidence did not demonstrate that Halsey had any knowle dge that any of Casablanca’s distributors, inclu

ding Home Depot or Low e’s, we re loca ted in I llinois. Pea

rson himse lf admitted he had no knowledge Halsey was ever informed its products were being distributed or sold in Illinois. Without any evidence of such knowledge, we cannot say that Halsey had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under any formulation of the stre am of commerce theory . See Wiles , 125 I ll. 2d at 16 1 (“while it would be r

easonab le to assu

me that [de fendant

] had avai led itself

of the Un

ited State s market, there is n o showing

in the re cord tha

t [defend ant] purpo sefully

directe d its produ

cts into Illinois”). Casablanca acknowledges the Wiles decision, but contends it is distinguishable on the grounds that it involved only a single transaction and a small number of products entering the United States as opposed to the hundreds of thousands of ceiling fans at issue in this case

. Casablanca contends that this case is more similar to Worldtronics International, I nc. v. Ever Splendor Enterprise Co. , 969 F. Supp. 1136 (N.D. Ill.1997). In tha t case, E ver Splen dor, a Ta iwanese origina l equipme nt manufa

cturer , sold its products to distributors which in turn imported those products to the United States. The manufacturer wa s aware

that its pr

oducts we re being sold nationally

through K mart an

d would occasionally ship products directly to K mart’s wa rehouse for its customers. Worldtronics , 969 F. Supp. at 1138. However, the manufacturer contended that it had no direct connection to the1-06-2374

14

United States or Illinois and that its customers were fre e to distribute its product anywher e in the world at their own discretion. Worldtronics , 969 F. Supp. at 1138. The federal district nevertheless found Ever Splendor subject to I llinois personal jurisdiction under a stream of commerce theory

. Worldtronics , 969 F. Supp. at 1141-42. While Casa

blanca i s corre ct that Worldtronics contains a number of similar

ities to this case, it ignore s the most sa

lient diff erence ; that ther

e was evidence E

ver Splen dor was a ware its products were being distributed in I llinois. The court specifically note d that the products were sold throu

gh an “ established distrib ution cha nnel” an d Ever Spl endor wa s aware of the ulti

mate destination of its products. Worldtronics , 969 F. Supp. at 1138. Moreover, Ever Splendor was obligated by

a contract with one of its customers to indemnify that customer in a separate patent lawsuit then pending in Illinois. Worldtronics , 969 F. Supp. at 1139. Thus, there is nothing about the Worldtronics decision that modif

ies the re quireme

nt that Ha lsey be awar e that its products were being sold or marketed in I llinois. We also find unpersuasive Casablanca’s arg ument that there is jurisdictional significance in the attendance of Halsey employees at na

tional trade shows held in Chicago. Halsey never formally participa

ted in those shows, its products were not on display the re, and its employee s never conducted any

business meetings there. More importantly , there is no connection between Halsey’s a

ttendance at the Chicago trade show a nd plaintiff’s lawsuit and this activity theref ore fails to establish jurisdiction. See Bolger v. Nautica I nternational, Inc. , 369 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951-52 (2 007) (fi

nding no gener al jurisdi ction ar

ising out of trade show atte

ndance ); Bertho ld Types L td. v. European Mikrograf Corp. , 102 F. Supp. 2d 928, 933-34 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding1-06-2374

15

neither general nor specific jurisdiction from trade show attendance). We there fore fin

d that the evidenc e has fa

iled to est ablish Ha lsey has minimum

contact s with Illinois sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. I n light of this finding, we need not further address the remaining ele ments of the federal due process analy sis. Wiles , 125 Ill. 2d at 161. Moreover, while ty

pically I llinois courts must consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdict ion satisf ies both the fede ral and s tate due

process require ments ( Commerce

Trust , 366 Ill. A pp. 3d at 1 41; Kostal , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 387-88 ), here

any further analy sis of the s tate constituti onal req

uiremen ts is unnec essary

as our lon

g-arm statute r equires that both constituti onal guarante es be sat isfied. Se e 735 I

LCS 5/2 -209(c)

(West 2004 ); Presley v. P&S Grain Co. , 289 Ill. App. 3d 453, 461 (1997). CONCLUSIO

N For the f orego ing rea sons, the t

rial cou rt’s den ial of Ha lsey ’s motion to

quash and dismiss is reversed, and this cause is remanded for f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. FITZG ERALD SMITH, P.J., and TULLY, J., concur.