UNITED STATES COU RT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ SILAS WILSON, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. KEITH C. REID, indivi dually and official capacity, Tulsa Police Officer; CHUCK JORDAN, individually and official capacity, Chief of Police Tulsa Police Department; G. T. BYNUM, individually and official capac ity, Mayor of City of Tulsa; SALLY HOWE SMITH, individually and offi cial capacity, (former) Court Clerk Tulsa County; DON NEWBERRY, individually and official capacity, Court Clerk Tulsa County; FNU LNU, individually and official capacity, Unknown Deputy C ourt Clerks; STANLEY GLANTZ; GERALD M. BENDER; G. CHRIS BENGE; TULSA COUNTY; CITY OF TULSA; OKLAHOMA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendants - Appellees. No. 19-5017 (D.C. Nos. 1:18-CV-374 JED-JFJ and 4:18-CV- 00374-JED-JFJ) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* Oral argument would no t materially help us t o decide this appea l. We have thus decided the appeal based on the appellate briefs and the record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgme nt does not constitut e binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 8, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 8, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 ________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , McKAY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal involves a state pris oner’s claims und er 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages, an injunction, and a declaratory judgment. In his pro se complaint, Mr. Silas Wilson, Jr . alleges that he was illegally detained prior to trial because of an affidavit containing a forged signature. Mr. Wilson also alleges that

 city and county officials faile d to investigate the alleged forgery and interfered with h is right to petition for an investigation and

 county officials refused to pr ovide him with public records relating to his arrest. According to Mr. Wils on, these actions vio lated his rights unde r the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection and due-process clauses

. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, conc luding that Mr. Wilson had not alleg ed constitution al violations. 1 We affirm.

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive valu e if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. A pp. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32 .1(A).

1 The district court r elied not only on th e absence of a consti tutional violation but also on Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck , the Supreme Court held t hat courts must dism iss § 1983 suits brough t by state prisoners when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would nece ssarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. As Mr. Wilson points out, the Supreme Court has stated that an illegal detention do es not void a subsequent conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh ,3 I. We conduct de novo review of t he district court’s dismissal. When a district court dismisses a complaint for failure to sta te a valid claim, our review is de novo. 2 Childs v. Miller , 713 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013). Und er de novo review, we liberally construe a pro se complaint. Kay v. Bemis , 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007). For a pro se complaint, the district court can dismiss with prejudice for failure to state a claim if

 the alleged facts ar e obviously insufficient to allow the plaintiff to prevail and

 any further opport unity to amend w ould be futile.
Id. at 1217. II. The district court properly dismissed Mr. Wilson’s claims stemming from his allegedly illegal detention. In his appeal brief, Mr. Wilson a rgues that the district court misinterpreted his complaint as alleging that

 he was arrested pursuant to a warrant and

 the allegedly forg ed affidavit suppor ted the warrant.

420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975 ). But we need not decide whether Heck would bar Mr. Wilson’s claims.

2 We deny Mr. Wilson’s motion to supplement the record. In this motion, Mr. Wilson lists factua l allegations allegedly misstate d or misrepresented by the district c ourt. But the proposed suppleme ntation would not affect our decision.4 According to Mr. Wilson, the dist rict court’s misinterpretation of his factual allegations re sulted in the erroneous dismissal of his illegaldetention claim. The district court app arently did misunderst and Mr. Wilson’s fa ctual allegations. In the comp laint, Mr. Wilson a lleges that he was a rrested “without a warrant .” Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 18 at 5; see also id. at 13 (referring to his “warrantless arrest”). Mr. Wilson also alleges that the affidavit served as the basis for his alle gedly illegal det ention. In Mr. Wilson’s view, the detention was illegal because a signat ure on the affi davit had been forged. As we understand Mr. Wilson’s factual allegations, the affidavi t caused his de tention before the legal process had begun. A clai m for unlawful detention prior to the institution of legal process is a Fourth Amendment false-imprisonment claim. See Mondragon v. Thompson , 519 F.3d 1078, 1083 (1 0th Cir. 2008) (“The period of time between a n unlawful arrest and the institution of leg al process forms on constituti onal claim, arising under the Fourth Amendmen t.”). So the district court in terpreted Mr. Wilson’s complaint as potentially raisin g a false-imprisonm ent claim under the Fourth Amen dment. But in his ap peal brief, Mr. Wilson states in several places tha t the district court mis construed hi s allegat ions by treating his complaint as poten tially raising such a claim. The se parts of Mr. Wilson’s appeal brief appear to disavow a Fou rth Amendment claim.5 Elsewhere, however, Mr. Wilson c ontends that his factual alleg ations do state a Fourth Amendment clai m. Given this c ontention, we co nsider the possibility that Mr. Wilson may be intending to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. We conclude that if he is inten ding to assert a Fourth Amendme ntclaim, it would have been untimely. A Fourth Amendment falseimprisonment claim accrues when a n existing legal process cause d the imprisonment. Mondragon , 519 F.3d at 1083. Legal process is instituted, for example, when a person is a rraigned or bound over for trial

. Wallace v.
Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). At the latest, legal p rocess justifying the imprisonment was in stituted on May 11, 2012 (when Mr. Wilson was arraigned). State of Oklahoma v. Silas Wilson Jr. , No. CF-2012-1979. F rom this date, Mr. Wilson had two years to bring his false-imprisonment claim. 3 But Mr. Wilson began the suit on June 15, 2018—over six year s after his arraignment. Thu s, a Fourth Amendment claim for false-impris onment would have been untimely

.

3 The statute of limitations for such claims brought under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 “is dictated by the personal injury statute of limitatio ns in the state in which the claim arose.” McCarty v. Gilchrist , 646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011). In this case, the cla im arose in Oklahoma, which ha s a two-year limitations period for personal-in jury claims. 12 Okla. Stat. t it. 12, § 95(A)(3); Meade v. Grubbs , 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988).6 We thus conclude that the distri ct court did not err in dismiss ing Mr. Wilson’s claim of illegal detention. III. Mr. Wilson failed to adequate ly brief his remaining appell ate arguments. For the remainder of his appe llate arguments, Mr. Wilson relie s solely on his incorporation of a motion that he filed in the di strict court. In our circuit, however, a party may not incorporate materials tha t had been filed in district court. 4 See 10th Cir. Rule 28.3(B) (2019) (“Incor porating by reference portions of lower court or agency briefs or pleadi ngs is disapproved and does not satisfy t he requirements of Federal Ru les of Appellate Procedure 28(a) and (b).”); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA,
Inc. , 160 F.3d 613, 623–24 ( 10th Cir. 1998) (rej ecting the use of incorporation by reference in a ppellate briefs). Mr. Wilson’s p ro se status does not excuse his failure to comply with this rule. See Wardell v.
Duncan , 470 F.3d 954, 964 (10t h Cir. 2006) (conclud ing that the plain tiff’s pro se status did not exempt him from adherence to the rule aga inst

4 We have explained that “[a]llo wing litigants t o adopt distric t court filings would provide an effectiv e means of circu mventing the p age limitations on briefs set forth i n the appellate rules and unne cessarily complicate the task of an appellate judge.” Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc. , 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10t h Cir. 1998) (i nternal citation omitted ).7 incorporation by reference). Mr. Wilson’s remaining appellate a rguments are thus waived for inadequate briefing. Gaines-Tabb , 160 F.3d at 624.
IV. Amendment would be futile. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Beca use Mr. Wilson was acting pro se, dismissal with prejudice was appr opriate only if amendment would have been futile. Kay v. Bemis , 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Based on Mr. Wilson’s preserv ed appellate arguments, we conclu de that amendment would have been futile. His only preserved argum ent relates to his detention before the institution of legal proces s. This claim is a Fourth Amendment false-impriso nment claim. But even if Mr. Wi lson has not disavowed such a claim, it would have been time-barred. See p. 5, above. Thus, amendment of the compla int would have been futile. Affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge