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GLOBAL MARITIME PIRACY:

FUELING TERRORISM, HARMING TRADE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 15, 2011

Serial No. 112–41

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................................ 6

Mr. William F. Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Counternarcotics and 

Global Threats, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................... 16

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement ................................................... 3

The Honorable Andrew J. Shapiro: Prepared statement ..................................... 10

Mr. William F. Wechsler: Prepared statement ..................................................... 19

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 38

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 39

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 41

The Honorable Edward R. Royce: Material submitted for the record ................. 42

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GLOBAL MARITIME PIRACY: FUELING 

TERRORISM, HARMING TRADE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This subcommittee hearing will come to order. Today’s subcommittee hearing is entitled ‘‘Global Maritime Piracy: 

Fueling Terrorism, Harming Trade.’’

And this hearing of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade is going to look at a problem that is not 

a new problem on this planet. The Romans branded pirates outlaws of humanity, and they punished them severely, as did the 

British and certainly us. In our country’s early history, we forcefully, we very decisively confronted pirate attacks off the Barbary 

Coast. 

But today, we face a very different situation. Today, maritime piracy is booming without any credible deterrence, without the type 

of deterrence you saw at one point in time from the British Navy 

or from the U.S. fleet. As we speak, there are 27 vessels and 449 

hostages being held by Somali pirates. We have some slides up on 

the monitor there, if you would like to take a look, that tell a tale. 

From 2007 to 2010, hijackings and pirate attacks increased sevenfold. Employing mother ships, pirates now operate in a space of 

2.5 million square nautical miles, over double the territory from 

just 2 years ago. 

In January, a U.N. official declared, ‘‘Pirates are becoming the 

masters of the Indian Ocean.’’ And the number and abuse of hostages has increased dramatically. 

More attacks and more hostages, of course, equal greater ransom payments. The average ransom payment was $300,000 a few years 

ago. Today the average is $4 million to $5 million. For Somali pirates, crime does pay. 

We should be concerned that these payments may fund alShabaab, al-Qaeda’s East Africa arm. We cannot be passive. As 

Leon Panetta testified last week, al-Shabaab’s threat ‘‘to the U.S. 

homeland is significant and on the rise.’’

The United States has begun targeting pirate ring leaders. In 

April, FBI agents entered Somalia. We apprehended an individual 

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who oversaw ransom negotiations for four American hostages who 

were killed. This was a first. One pirate leader is out the game. 

That is good. 

Unfortunately, there are many, many more to go. 

Pirate ‘‘investors,’’ as they call themselves, investors, who back 

attacks, span the globe. There are pirate investors in Europe, in 

the Middle East, and in Australia. Piracy has become a vast criminal enterprise. We must track down these criminals. The GAO has 

given the administration poor marks on tracking pirate financing. 

That has to change. 

Many navies are working to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden, but 

as Secretary Clinton recently remarked, we are not getting enough 

out of it. 

Too many of our partners are there to log sea time instead of 

stopping pirates. That is my quote, not hers, that second part of 

that, just for the record. 

The pendulum between the Romans and our 21st century treatment of pirates, frankly, has swung too far in the direction of favoring the pirates. Extreme notions of human rights and the rights of 

the accused mean today that of the 10 pirates we catch, 9 are then 

released. 

I prefer the justice our SEALs dispensed against three pirates 2 

years ago. That is a credible deterrence. When navies are used to 

forcefully take out piracy, that is a credible deterrence. 

The U.N. is pushing for specialized piracy courts. The Obama administration, once opposed, is now actively considering this proposal. I have a hard time justifying an international justice system 

for pirates. But we will hear the administration’s case. 

Lastly, it should be stressed that industry itself can do much to 

prevent piracy. Shippers are often blase ́ about ransom payments, 

and it is the vessels that do not employ best management practices 

that are the ones that are hijacked. 

And I want everybody to think about this: Not a single ship employing armed guards has been successfully pirated. Not one. As 

we will hear, we are throwing a lot at this problem, even putting 

American lives at risk. Industry has to play its part in this. 

I will now turn to the ranking member for a 5-minute opening 

statement, and then we will go to other members and then our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening these 

hearings. 

I know we are going the hear excellent testimony from the representative of the Department of Defense. I know that not only 

from his reputation but from his Aunt Winnie. 

I want to thank you for calling these hearings, thank our witness 

for being here. I have been an advocate of burden sharing for quite 

some time. I think that we undercut our burden sharing efforts by 

deliberately understating the cost of our international operations, 

whether they be aid or especially military operations. 

In an effort to understate the cost to the American people, we 

understate the cost to the world. We use the marginal cost system 

of accounting for determining the cost of these operations, and any 

perusing of a cost accounting book would say that that is the worst 

possible system to use for calculating cost. Full cost accounting 

ought to be used, and on that basis, we are doing far more to aid 

those actions urged on us by the U.N. than we currently claim 

credit for. 

It is not cheap to maintain a military capable of responding to 

piracies, tsunamis and other disasters around the world. 

I think Secretary Gates’ comments that our European allies have 

not only hollowed out their militaries but are now contemplating 

even greater cuts comes to mind. 

When we look at global piracy, we do see some 60 nations involved, including some that are not our traditional allies. But there 

are discouraging signs, as the chairman points out. Some 90 percent of the pirates are part of the catch-and-release program. This 

is absurd. We ought to be willing to extradite these pirates to 

whichever nation in the world will treat them with the most justice. And there is universal jurisdiction. If our European friends 

are unwilling to impose penalties, that does not mean they have to 

release the pirates. 

Piracy, of course, as I mentioned, has universal jurisdiction. 

We also ought to look at how the shipowners are behaving. 

Should we be requiring armed guards? Should we be prohibiting 

ransom? Or should we let them view ransom and detention as just 

a cost of business? 

This understates the cost of piracy. The cost of piracy is not just 

the ransom. It is not just the delay. This money is going to some 

of the worst people in the world who are either killing more people 

on the high seas or killing more people in Somalia. 

Paying ransom and refusing to invest in safety is not a business 

decision. And it is not a decision we should allow businesses to 

make on a strictly profit-and-loss basis. 

I have so much more to say, but in so many other occasions, my 

opening statements have stretched the limit of the definition of 5 

minutes, and I am going to yield back for this one time this year. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank the ranking member for yielding. 

I will make two other brief points just for the edification of the 

committee members. The Kenyan Government estimates that 30 

percent of ransom payments are funneled to al-Shabaab. And 

Shabaab commanders have spoken of a sea Jihad and have opened 

a marine office, a marine office to coordinate with pirates. 

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We will go now to Judge Poe of Texas for 2 minutes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The pirates are back. These aren’t swashbuckling, eye-patch 

wearing pirates. These are modern-day pirates that have automatic 

weapons, elaborate intelligence systems, sophisticated money laundering network in connections to their brothers in crime, Islamic 

terrorists. 

One of my constituents from Texas, Bill Rouse, is an avid sailor 

of the high seas, but he is just one example of the way these pirate 

thugs have taken away his freedom. He, like many other small 

boat owners that cross the ocean, have to get a barge to put their 

ship on or their boat on to go through pirate-filled areas. 

The pirates are in it for the money. About 40 percent of the 

world’s oil is shipped through the Indian Ocean, where the Somali 

pirates have had a field day. Collectively governments spend $1 billion a year policing the pirates while the cost of piracy to the global 

economy is anywhere from $7 billion to $12 billion. 

The industry is growing. New reports from confirmed Somali pirates reach all the way to the west coast of India, spanning the 

breadth of the Indian Ocean. I have here a poster of some of the 

recent—excuse me, Mr. Duncan—the pirate attacks in the Indian 

Ocean. From Somalia to India is 2,240 miles. That is a long way. 

And all of these show pirate attacks. The red are 19 months prior 

to October, but the blue, the most of them, are just from October 

to February of this year. They are increasing, and they are, with 

reckless abandon, moving closer and closer to India. 

Right now, I understand there are approximately 200 small boat 

owners in Malaysia waiting to go west but can’t get there because 

they are afraid of the pirates. There are a couple hundred more in 

the Pacific Ocean waiting to go west, but they cannot, because they 

are afraid of the pirates. 

Last year Somalian pirates hijacked 53 ships and a total of 1,100 

hostages were held for ransom. This is increasing every day, and 

they act with disregard to anyone, especially to nations that should 

be patrolling the high seas. 

We can take control of this situation if we have the moral will 

to do so. We can lower the benefits by pirates by stopping them 

from receiving money. We can raise the cost just like Jefferson did 

to the pirates off the shores of Tripoli in 1801. The Constitution actually gives authority to the United States Government to do something about piracy, Article I, Section 8, to define and punish pirates, piracy, and felonies committed on the high seas. It is time 

the United States takes some action and put these outlaws on the 

high seas out of business and send them to Davy Jones’ locker. I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Poe. 

We will go to Mr. Higgins of New York for 3 minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, this is a big problem in that piracy has grown to a 

multi-million dollar criminal enterprise and pirates attack or seize 

ships. Ransoms now average between $4 million and $5 million. 

And some 2,000 pirates operate from Somalia’s shores. 

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Larger pirate syndicates are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and professional. They seize cargo ships and oil tankers because of their huge ransom values. 

Piracy thrives in Somalia for two reasons: Somalia is one of the 

world’s most failed states; and Somalia is a desperately poor state, 

and there is huge money in pirating. 

My concern also is where this money ends up. And so I look forward to the testimony of our expert witnesses and drilling deeper 

into this problem and hopefully coming up with some answers. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

This is a real issue. I just came back where I talked with the Pacific Command. A conversation we had was about piracy, growing 

threat of piracy around the world. We had the opportunity to talk 

with some folks in the Philippines about the issue and about the 

Malacca Strait and how the pirates are starting to come further 

and further east, as Judge Poe said, off the coast of India and even 

closer to Indonesia. So I certainly appreciate the hearing today. 

I came to learn. I am a freshman Member of Congress. That is 

part of the reason I went and talked with those folks about these 

issues. And I look forward to hearing your testimony today. And I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. We are joined by representatives of the 

State and Defense Departments today. 

Andrew Shapiro is the Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticalMilitary Affairs. He served on the Obama transition team and, 

prior to that, was Senator Clinton’s senior defense and foreign policy adviser. Mr. Shapiro received a joint law and master’s in international affairs degree from Columbia University. 

William Wechsler is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, where he leads the department’s counternarcotics and threat finance policies and operations around the world. He reports to the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict. Previously, 

Mr. Wechsler served as special adviser to the Secretary of the 

Treasury on the staff of the National Security Council as director 

for transnational threats. 

All of the witnesses’ complete written testimony we have and 

have read, and will be entered in the record. I will remind our witnesses to summarize your statements, keep it to 5 minutes, if you 

can, and then we will go to questions. 

And we will begin with Assistant Secretary Shapiro. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANDREW J. SHAPIRO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify about 

the problem of piracy on the high seas and outline our new approach to combat this scourge. 

As all the members of the committee noted during their opening 

statements, piracy off the coast of Somalia is a crime of growing 

concern. The number of pirate attacks has risen steadily since 

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2007. In 2010, Somali pirates captured over 1,000 sailors aboard 49 

vessels. As of June 14th of this year, 400 seafarers were being held 

as hostages and 18 hijacked ships were being held for ransom. 

The increase in the total number of attacks has tragically come 

with an increase in the level of violence against hostages. This was 

displayed in brutal fashion by the killing of the four American citizens aboard the sailing vessel Quest in February. 

Pirates are also evolving their tactics. Through the use of mother 

ships and GPS technology, pirates have been able to expand their 

geographic range from the southern Red Sea to the eastern Indian 

ocean. Mother ships are hijacked ships used as floating bases, 

which allow pirates to stage attacks hundreds of miles from Somali 

coast. 

A vicious cycle has formed where ever rising ransom payments 

have not just spurred additional pirate activity but have also enabled pirates to increase their operational capabilities and sophistication. 

Piracy has gone from a fairly ad hoc, disorganized criminal endeavor to a highly developed, transnational criminal enterprise. 

In response, the United States has taken the lead in pursuing a 

multilateral and multidimensional approach to combating piracy 

emanating from the Coast of Somalia. Piracy can only be effectively 

addressed through broad, coordinated and comprehensive international efforts. 

In January 2009, the United States helped establish the Contact 

Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia which now includes nearly 70 nations, international organizations and maritime trade associations. 

The Contact Group helps coordinate national and international 

counterpiracy policies and actions. It has galvanized action and 

harmonized counterpiracy policy among participating countries and 

international organizations. There is immense international concern over piracy and an increasing willingness amongst affected 

nations to expand counterpiracy efforts and increase cooperation 

and collaboration with the United States. 

With this multilateral framework in place, we have pursued a 

multidimensional approach that focuses on security, prevention, 

and deterrence. 

Improving security on the seas has been a principal focus of our 

efforts. As pirate tactics have grown more sophisticated and aggressive, the international naval forces performing counterpiracy operations have responded in kind. U.S. Naval Forces have thwarted 

pirate attacks in process, engaged pirate skiffs and mother ships 

and successfully taken back hijacked ships by opposed boardings. 

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) has worked 

with partners to set up a 463-mile long corridor through the Gulf 

of Aden called the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 

or IRTC for short. 

This transit zone has been successful in reducing the number of 

attacks within the corridor, but it has had the unfortunate side effect of pushing pirate activities elsewhere outside of the corridor. 

Given the immense area in which pirates operate, it is often impossible for naval forces to respond in time to stop an attack. There 

is just too much water to patrol. 

8

That is why the United States has also focused on prevention by 

encouraging commercial and private vessels to implement industry 

developed best management practices. These are practical steps 

shipowners and seafarers can take to prevent pirate attacks from 

happening in the first place. 

More flagged states are also allowing armed guards on merchant 

vessels. It is notable, as the chairman mentioned, that no vessel 

with an armed security team embarked has been successfully hijacked. 

It is also U.S. policy to discourage the payment of ransoms and 

to seek to deny pirates the benefits of any ransoms which may be 

paid. 

Lastly, to deter piracy, we have sought to expand prosecution 

and incarceration. When suspected pirates have been captured, the 

United States has consistently advocated that the states directly 

victimized take on the responsibility to not only try these suspects 

but to also incarcerate them if convicted. There are more than 

1,000 pirates in custody in more than 18 countries where national 

prosecutions are taking place. 

Taken in concert, this multilateral or multi dimensional approach seems to have led to a drop in successful pirate attacks. But 

total number of successful attacks in March, April and May of this 

year was eight. This is still unacceptably high, but it is down significantly from the 27 successful attacks for the same 3-month period in 2010. 

This is a small sample size, so we do not know for sure if it signifies a turning of the tide or a brief aberration. But even if these 

figures do point to significant progress, given the lucrative financial 

incentives, pirates will likely attempt to further adapt their approaches. 

Since pirates are already adapting and expanding their efforts, 

we must as well. 

Earlier this year, Secretary Clinton expressed impatience with 

the lack of progress against piracy and urged that more be done 

to address this scourge. 

After an intensive review of our strategy following the Quest 

tragedy, Secretary Clinton approved a series of recommendations 

which, taken together, constitute a new strategic approach. This 

approach calls for continuing naval action at sea as well as exploring nonmilitary options to target pirate leaders and organizers 

ashore. 

Our intention is to pursue innovative measures to maximize all 

the tools at our disposal in order to disrupt the activities of the financiers, organizer and logistics suppliers of piracy. We are in the 

process of discussing our ideas for these new lines of action with 

our interagency partners with an eye toward rapid implementation 

of agreed measures. 

The focus on network is essential. As piracy has evolved into an 

organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly clear 

that the arrest and prosecution of pirates captured at sea, who are 

often the low-level operatives involved in piracy, is insufficient on 

its own to meet our longer-term counterpiracy goals. Pirate leaders 

and facilitators receive income both from investors and ransom 

payments and disburse a portion of the proceeds of ransom back to 

9

their investors and to the pirates who actually hijack the ships and 

hold the crews hostage. 

We will focus in the coming months in identifying, apprehending 

the criminal conspirators who provide the leadership and financial 

management of the pirate enterprise with the objective of bringing 

them to trial and interrupting pirate business processes. 

Already the United States has recently indicted and extradited 

two alleged Somali pirate negotiators for the respective leadership 

roles in attacks on U.S. vessels. 

To achieve this, we are working to connect law enforcement communities, intelligence agencies, financial experts and our international partners to promote information sharing and develop actionable information against pirate conspirators. This effort includes tracking pirate sources of financing and supplies, such as 

fuel, outboard motors and weapons. 

Additionally an important element of our recalibrated 

counterpiracy approach involves renewed emphasis on enhancing 

the capacity of the international community and particularly states 

in the region to prosecute and incarcerate suspected pirates. 

The United States supports a comprehensive approach that addresses concerns about incarceration and repatriation by increasing 

prison capacity in Somalia, developing a framework for prisoner 

transfers so convicted pirates serve their sentence back in their 

home country of Somalia, and by working to establish a specialized 

piracy chamber in the national courts of one or more regional 

states. 

Finally, we believe supporting the reestablishment of stability 

and adequate governance in Somalia represents the only sustainable long-term solution to piracy. This will require concentrated 

and coordinated assistance to states in the region, including those 

parts of Somali society with which we can work, to build their capacity to deal with the social, legal, economic and operational challenges to effective law enforcement. 

However, acknowledging the difficult situation ashore does not 

preclude progress at sea. Through the State Department’s new 

strategic approach, significant progress can be made to degrade the 

ability of pirates to conduct attacks and threaten vital shipping 

lanes. 

We should have no illusions. There is no simple solution to modern day piracy off the Horn of Africa. But through the shared commitment of the United States and the international community, 

there is much we can do in the months and years ahead to achieve 

progress against this growing challenge. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shapiro follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Shapiro. 

Mr. Wechsler. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL 

THREATS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Representative Sherman and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I will be brief. And one thing that I will skip in my oral 

statement is a description of the problem because, quite frankly, 

you all have described it extremely well and very accurately. 

The cost of piracy is no more visible, though, than through the 

tragedy aboard the sailing vessel Quest in February. Four Americans—Jean and Scott Adam, Phyllis McKay, and Robert Riggle—

were murdered by pirates. 


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Chairman Royce and Representative Sherman, I understand the 

Adams were from Marina del Rey in your State. This incident is 

a stark reminder of what is at stake in our efforts to fight the piracy. 

One thing that has been mentioned is the question of the connections between the pirates and the revenues that they receive and 

terrorists that operate in the same area. This is an exceedingly important question. 

I think it would be untrue if we were to represent to you that 

we know the answer to this question or that the intelligence on 

this issue is much less than any of us would like. 

However, as we see it now, we believe that the terrorists and the 

pirates are not operationally or organizationally aligned, though 

there is an element of coercion that results in pirate revenues 

going to al-Shabaab. 

Disrupting piracy will remain challenging for several reasons. 

First and foremost, as was just discussed by my colleague from the 

Department of State, the root causes of Somalia piracy lie in Somalia, in the poverty, instability and absence of governance in that 

country. 

Second, Somali pirates operate in an area covering approximately 2.9 million square nautical miles. This is an area approximately the size of the continental United States. It is a vast 

amount of area that simply cannot be covered by naval forces. Indeed, if you took all of the navies of all of the countries in all of 

the world and put them against this area, we still wouldn’t be able 

to cover this amount of nautical space. 

Third, captured suspected pirates often go unprosecuted, as has 

been noted, even when significant criminal evidence exists. Many 

states lack the appropriate domestic laws to prosecute pirates. 

Other states may have the necessary legal frameworks but do not 

have the prosecutorial and judicial capacity to hold pirates accountable. And most troubling, other states just simply lack the political 

will at all to do this job. 

Finally, as the members of this subcommittee know, the Department of Defense has many other urgent priorities around the 

world, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the Horn of Africa, 

many of the resources most in demand for counterpiracy activities, 

such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, are urgently required for counterterrorism purposes. 

These multidimensional challenges illustrate that there is no 

simple solution to piracy. Most importantly, they underscore that 

this problem cannot be solved by military action alone. 

Let me briefly describe the Department of Defense’s role. Our 

primary role is to interrupt and terminate acts of piracy. We also 

play a supporting role in reducing the vulnerability of the maritime 

domain and facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates. 

On average, United States has two to four vessels participating 

in counterpiracy operations as part of Combined Task Force 151 

and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. Combined Task Force 151 is 

a component of combined maritime forces which regularly host 

international coordination meetings to share information and 

deconflict regional counterpiracy efforts. 

18

The Department of Defense also is in support of the Departments 

of State and Treasury in efforts to track the finances and make 

this criminal activity less lucrative. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that you have long and deep history in 

the efforts of the executive branch to combat threat finance and 

many other areas, and this is an area in which we all are committed to doing much more. 

Through our interagency partners, DOD will continue to work 

with regional states to develop their capacity to patrol the seas and 

enhance their prosecutorial and judicial capabilities. While much 

remains to be done, as Assistant Secretary Shapiro has noted, we 

are seeing concrete results already from our efforts. 

Since August 2008, international efforts have led to the destruction or confiscation of more than 100 pirate vessels and numerous 

weapons, including small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. The 

international community has also turned over approximately 1,000 

pirates to various countries for prosecution. 

From the Department of Defense’s perspective, when we have the 

opportunity to act, we do act. But given the trends that you all described, it is, again, clear that military action is not enough. 

As you noted, one of the—I will just close by noting that one of 

the very key elements in our strategy has to have a more effective 

shared responsibility with industry. Effectively countering piracy, 

the single most effective way to deter piracy in the short term is 

to make the vessels harder to attack successfully. There was a time 

a couple of years ago where there was some debate on this question. Best management practices, which range from hardening the 

vessel to maintaining professional civilian armed security teams on 

board, can thwart the majority of pirate attacks without the need 

for military intervention. 

I would underscore, as you did, Mr. Chairman, that no vessel 

that has implemented best management practices and has armed 

private security teams aboard has been successfully pirated. Indeed, just last month, at least six attacks were halted after embarked security teams engaged pirates. 

Thank you very much for inviting me to this hearing. I look forward to your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wechsler follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Wechsler. 

One of the things that hasn’t changed is the vastness of the 

ocean. The reason we established the U.S. Navy, arguably, the reason put forward by Jefferson had to do with pirate attacks off the 

Barbary Coast. And so what has changed over time is our rules of 

engagement. 

And I know this is a debatable point here in the U.S. and in the 

U.K., but Mr. Shapiro, in a speech last year, you said, ‘‘We have 

to apply 21st century standards of evidence, human rights, and 

other legal protections’’ to the piracy problem. We are aware of the 

debates on the engagement between the way the British and the 

U.S. handle this and the way that the Russians, for example, and 

the Indians handle the piracy problem. 

There has not been one pirate who has taken a Russian seaman 

who has lived the tell the tale. And the Indians engage the same 

way. 

The Indian Navy, they take these ships to the bottom of the 

ocean. 

A few weeks ago, I think it was, I read about a German warship 

that engaged two attack skiffs and sunk them but allowed the 

mother ship to return. 

So the rules of engagement are different between different navies. And I think one of the questions we wrestle with, and I know 

reading—I have seen legal commentary put forward, that the U.N. 

Security Council resolutions, which were issued under Charter 7 of 

the U.N. Charter, should serve as sufficient legal justice to kill pirates on the high seas. And you have legal scholars calling for targeting, selective targeting of pirate leaders, just as we do with alQaeda, with terrorist leaders in Yemen or in Pakistan. 

So, why not take this approach, Mr. Shapiro? I mean, we can revisit your commentary on this and sort of reopen this debate. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, thanks for that question. I think the quote 

you were referring to is, I was quoting Secretary Clinton saying 

that we needed 21st century solutions to a 19th century problem. 

And that meant more broadly, we need to use all the tools at our 

disposal. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me quote you exactly, ‘‘We have to apply 21st 

century standards of evidence, human rights, and other legal protections’’ to the piracy problem. That is sort of the debate. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I think a couple of issues, first, from our perspective, our ability to gain international support for addressing piracy 

will require us to treat in a manner consistent with the rule of law. 

Secondly, when you talk about targeting pirates on the high seas, 

it is important to prosecute those we catch. But what is more important is to target the pirate facilitators because there is an almost innumerable number of young pirates who are willing to be 

recruited to go out on the high seas and take their chances, given 

their life in Somalia. 

It is the facilitators and the people who profit from this that we 

need to target, and that is what our approach is going to start to 

do. 

We have already brought back two facilitators back to the United 

States for prosecution. And I think that in order to continue to get 

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the level of international support that we need to make further 

progress, that is the right approach. 

We continue to build cases against them, as we have done 

against other organized crime groups, such as drug cartels, build 

the cases, bring them back for prosecution, and in that way, we can 

disrupt the pirates from being able to get the funding that they 

need to go out to sea. 

Mr. ROYCE. You know, it is an interesting question. I remember 

the debate in the State Senate over the use of lethal force, which 

is what we are talking about here, as well, in California. The question was—and it actually prevailed at the time—the question was, 

could you use lethal force if someone was attacking you, coming 

into your home, robbing your home, invading your home, could you 

use lethal force? And the decision in the State Senate and the Assembly was, yes, you could. 

And clearly, the conclusion that has been reached in Germany, 

India, Russia, is that they are going to use lethal force in engagements with pirates. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, in India, they did use lethal force to free their 

ship, but they also brought back many of their pirates for prosecution in India. 

And I would say, Secretary Clinton has expressed a desire to 

make progress. She has expressed an openness to entertaining 

ideas regarding addressing the pirate problem on shore. 

But at the end of the day, if we are to target these networks, it 

will be important to build cases and develop information, and that 

means you bring in one pirate facilitator, and then he rolls up the 

next one. And then you bring in the next one and work your way 

up the chain to the highest levels. So these require long, complicated cases. But at the end of the day, if we are going to disrupt 

these networks, we are going to have to target the appropriate people, bring them back, get them to turn on their higher ups and continue to make progress in disrupting these organizations. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Sherman. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Shapiro, the State Department has to often 

decide, do they want to be popular with the diplomats from Europe, 

or do they want to serve the interests of the American people? 

These ships, 99.9 percent of them, are foreign ships. They are not 

U.S. ships. They are not U.S. crews. We don’t get the jobs, and 

most of that cargo isn’t headed to the United States. 

And yet these are foreign shipowners, making foreign profits. 

Do we charge any fees for protection for any of these ships? Or 

do we bear the cost at the cost of the U.S. taxpayer? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. We do not charge fees. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And so we will use the marginal cost system to 

say that this is only costing us hundreds of millions, but it is actually costing us billions, a gift to foreign shipowners. 

You say that punishing the rank and file pirates doesn’t matter; 

I think, yes, there are a large number of Somalis who are willing 

to become rank and file pirates, but that is because they don’t get 

punished. If you create a high level of mortality among these rank 

and file pirates, that will be successful. 

But now let’s turn to the real rip off of the U.S. taxpayer, and 

that is these shipowners. They don’t want to told to put armed 

30

guards. That costs them money. They would rather have U.S. taxpayers pay money. They don’t want to be told, only go through in 

convoys. That costs them money. They want our money. 

What are you doing to say, we are going to shift the costs to the 

shipowners, we are going to require armed guards, and we are 

going to require armed convoys? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well I would say for U.S. ships, you know, the 

Coast Guard——

Mr. SHERMAN. None of these are U.S. ships, sir, so why don’t you 

talk about the real ships? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, obviously, we are working through the Contact Group and through our international partners to encourage 

this. 

We, as a matter of policy, have made the decision that for U.S. 

ships, we will permit it. A number of other states actually ban it. 

Some ships have moved their flag states because their governments 

will not allow them. And we are working through diplomatic channels to change that attitude. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So as long as it is in the interests of the shipowners and the Europeans, so that the shipowners don’t have to 

bear the cost of having armed guards and the shipowners don’t 

have to bear the cost of going in convoys, we will be there with U.S. 

taxpayer money to support these shipowners? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, I think we are there with U.S. taxpayer 

money because it is in our own interests. As we saw——

Mr. SHERMAN. It is in our interests to bear the costs that should 

be borne by those foreign shipowners? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, it is in our interests as we saw, you know, 

we had four Americans who were brutally murdered by pirates. We 

have U.S. ships that have had been attacked by pirates. So it is—

there is——

Mr. SHERMAN. And if these ships were all required to go in convoys, those Americans would be alive, and the costs for corporate 

shipowners would be higher. Is that correct? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. In terms of—probably, that, I believe that is an accurate statement. But I am not an expert on what the shipowners 

think their costs are. 

But I would say, certainly we have been disappointed. And Secretary Clinton has testified that she has been disappointed that the 

shipowners have not taken more responsibility, and that is going 

to be a focus of our efforts going forward is to put——

Mr. SHERMAN. I serve on Financial Services, where we get a 

chance to bail out rich corporations with U.S. taxpayer dollars. We 

rarely get the opportunity to discuss that in this room. But these 

are multi-billion dollar private corporations who don’t want to bear 

the costs. They don’t want to bear the inconvenience. They don’t 

want to pay for armed guards. They don’t want the inefficiency of 

having to go in convoys, and they are willing to operate that way 

because they are subsidized by free security offered by the U.S. 

taxpayer. 

I would say it is time for us to condition our protection of these 

ships on them either paying the fee or bearing the cost. And if U.S. 

ships are in the area, we could organize convoys. But bailouts happen, apparently, in the jurisdiction of both of my committees. 

31

Mr. SHAPIRO. I would make two points. 

First, we have seen more and more shipowners adopt the practice of armed security teams. Indeed, that is why we think there 

has been less success over the last 3 months, is that greater adherence to best management practices. 

The problem is that the small number of ships that don’t follow 

best management practices are responsible for the vast majority of 

those that are actually pirated. So the question is, what do you do 

about those? And we need to work with the shipping industry to 

put financial pressure and incentives on those who are not following best management practices and leading to this problem to 

take further action. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that the U.S. Navy is capable 

of detaining those ships that are acting in a way that is hazardous 

to their crews, promoting piracy, putting themselves in a position 

where they are going to need a naval bailout. And for these ships 

not to be willing to have armed guards and/or convoys and for us 

to sit back and say, okay, we will defend you, is bailout foreign policy. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Duncan, I have an amendment on the floor. If 

you will continue to chair and handle the panel here, I will try to 

return after it is taken up. 

I think you are next, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I believe that the presence of U.S. Naval vessels in the region are 

a definite deterrent and meeting with Admiral Papp with the Coast 

Guard recently and learning that the U.S. does have a strong presence there with the Coast Guard is encouraging. 

But I think it was French philosopher Pascal that said a police 

force without force is impotent. 

And I believe that if we don’t have a presence there—I think you 

mentioned earlier that the Germans and the Russians and the Indians even use more force in dealing with the Somali pirates, and 

I would be willing to say their vessels are probably the least pirated. So I would love to see that. 

I want you to, if you will repeat, did you say that you would encourage security forces on U.S. flag vessels? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, the Coast Guard requires either an armed or 

unarmed security team for U.S. flag vessels. We have not taken a 

position on whether to encourage them to be armed or unarmed 

other than to note that armed vessels have not been successfully 

pirated. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. And that is good. 

Mr. Wechsler, you noted that you didn’t see a meaningful connection between the pirates and other violent extremist groups, and 

we are all concerned about money going to the extremists and the 

jihadists that are wanting to continue to wage this war against 

freedom. 

But there been meaningful reports that multi-million dollar ransoms have become a source of funding for Somali based terrorist 

groups al-Shabaab, and they have reportedly taxed Somali pirate 

32

ransoms. The Kenyan Government estimates that 30 percent of 

ransom payments are funneled to al-Shabaab. 

Could you comment on that? And does the Kenyan Government 

have it wrong? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Sure. Let me make sure that I am clear. 

I want to make two points about what I can say in this session, 

and if you want to get together in a closed session, one on one, I 

am happy to give a full intelligence brief on this as well. 

What we don’t believe, what we don’t see yet is operational or organizational alignment between the piracy, the pirates themselves 

and al-Shabaab. They are not the same organization. 

Mr. DUNCAN. No direct connection then? 

Mr. WECHSLER. It is not no direct connection, but they are not 

the same organization; they are not operationally or organizationally aligned. 

What we do believe that we see some evidence of is coercion. So 

these are competing organizations, and al-Shabaab sometimes coerces the pirates into giving some revenues to them. That is, again, 

with all the caveats that I said previously about the limits of our 

intelligence right now, that is what I can say in this open session. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

The chair will recognize the gentleman from New York 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

United States Special Forces killed three Somali pirates in 2009 

and freed captain Richard Phillips. In that there are dozens of 

ships being held off the coast of Somalia and some 300 to 500 merchant sailors, why aren’t other countries taking unilateral action 

against these pirates in the Gulf of Aden? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, each country makes its own decisions about 

how they will address their pirated vessels. 

We have, as was noted earlier, certain countries have become 

more aggressive in addressing their pirated vessels where their 

citizens have been captured and their ships have been captured. 

India was mentioned; South Korea, and others. 

Ultimately, because often these vessels have hostages, each case 

is unique. Each case has its own particular factors which require 

the Navy ship on scene to make a determination as to whether it 

is, the risk is worth taking kinetic action against those ships. So 

there is no hard and fast rule. Each is unique, based on each particular circumstance. 

Mr. WECHSLER. I think I can best describe what we do, and I 

also want to make sure that this point is clear for this committee, 

because it is quite an important point about our rules of engagement. We are constantly assessing and reassessing our rules of engagement. Again, the specific nature of our rules of engagement is 

something that I would be more than happy to discuss in a closed 

or one-on-one session with anyone here. 

But I am very comfortable with the rules of engagement as they 

are now. They are very well balanced. We are constantly assessing 

them. They have been changed as a result of the changing dynamic. That I can say in this session. 

And one thing I would just point out is, as recently as last 

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sage from the Artemis Glory, which reported that it was being attacked by pirates, launched an SH–60B helicopter. Upon its arrival, under the principle of extended unit self defense, which is allowed in order to provide protection to the crew, the helicopter engaged the pirates. All the pirates are believed to have been killed. 

So I do want to make clear that some of the distinctions that 

folks may be referring to between what we do and what some other 

countries do, we have very robust rules of engagement, and when 

appropriate, we can act, and we do act. 

But I do want to go back, again, to what I said in my opening 

statement; the full solution to this problem will not be addressed 

by military means alone. It will be addressed by some of the other 

nonmilitary elements that we have also been discussing here. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Just a final question. Are there concerns along the 

Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa that this problem is expanding 

to areas beyond Somalia? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thus far, we have not seen it. Obviously, the ships 

coming from Somalia are moving further and further out into the 

Indian Ocean. But in terms of pirate havens, typically that takes 

place, as we have seen in Somalia, in a failed state environment. 

So we have not seen this tactic spreading elsewhere in the region. 

However, we are concerned that the number of—that the ships are 

extending their range to cover a broader area of the Indian Ocean. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Somalia is a special case. In some parts of the 

world, it is—and going through history, some of which has been 

mentioned before, piracy, including back in the early 1800s, was, 

in effect, a state-sponsored activity. There was somebody making a 

decision to do this. And in fact, at that point, a huge proportion of 

the U.S. Treasury was going to pay tribute to the pirates in Tripoli 

because it was a state-sponsored activity. 

In other places, where there was a—where it is nonstate activities, it is much more geographically focused, as it has been in the 

Straits of Malacca. Here you have the combination of a vast geographic area and no state, in large case, to organize this, and so 

a sanctuary for the pirates. So this is the combination of both of 

these situations for the worst-case scenario. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from 

North Carolina, Ms. Ellmers, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. ELLMERS. Thank you. Thank you gentlemen for being here 

today. 

Mr. Shapiro, I have a question. We have talked a lot about the 

Somalian pirates, and U.S. officials, yourselves, acknowledge the 

fact that we need to be doing more to alleviate this problem. 

One of the areas, of course, is targeting and following the monetary flow of ransom and the moneys that are being paid. In a recent meeting of the International Contact Group, they did discuss 

mapping and following the money. But the group was put together 

in 2009. This seems like a pretty commonsense approach. 

Why is it taking this long to prioritize that and to take this approach? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I will say, as you mentioned, the Contact Group 

was set up in 2009. And initially, it was starting from scratch, and 

it was focusing on building prosecutorial capacity, working on what 

34

and how to work, how the international community should coordinate on this issue. 

As we learned more, as we learned how the pirates operate, it 

has become apparent that in order to be successful, we will need 

to target the financial flows. 

There has been a learning curve for the international community, no question about it. 

But now we have ascended that learning curve. And we in the 

United States Government, at the State Department, we have 

begun to devote resources into how to crack this. We are going to 

work with our interagency partners, and the Contact Group is talking about setting up a fifth working group on financial flows, so 

that we can work together with the international community which 

will be essential.

Mrs. ELLMERS. Mr. Wechsler, kind of along the same line of 

questioning here. Basically, you have pointed out that the Department of Defense is working with the International Contact Group 

with the aim of pursuing criminals who are funding pirates, demanding ransoms, and laundering the illegal proceeds from ransom 

payments. In your opinion, how can this best be executed? 

Mr. WECHSLER. The Department of Defense has learned a lot, 

has been forced to learn a lot about this question in Iraq and Afghanistan where, we have confronted and are confronting an irregular adversary with independent sources of revenue through criminal means. The best way to go about this and the way that I know 

my colleague from the Department of State would agree is to use 

all the tools available to government in a coordinated campaign effort to go against the financiers on a counter network capacity. 

You have to be able to map the networks. You have to be able 

to identify the right nodes, and then you have to be able to identify 

which tool of the U.S. Government is best suited to go after the 

nodes to have—what kind of effect that you want to have, whether 

it is military activity, whether it is intelligence activity, it is law 

enforcement activity, whether it is sanctioning activity. That is the 

way that we have found in other contexts the ability to have some 

strategic impact. 

Mrs. ELLMERS. Thank you. 

And I yield back my time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I am going to reserve some time for myself to ask another question for Chairman Royce. The Somali piracy is essentially an international criminal enterprise, and the GAO found that the information on private finances collected by various U.S. Government 

agencies is not being systematically analyzed and is unclear if any 

agency is using it to identify and apprehend pirate leaders or financiers. How are you correcting this? 

Because we have had practice with organized crime and terrorism, this is where we can truly have a strategic impact it would 

seem. So the question is, how are you correcting this? And that is 

for either one. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. As I mentioned, the State Department is coordinating interagency efforts to identify the most effective means of 

disrupting the financial flows of piracy and targeting the pirate——

Mr. DUNCAN. Would that be the Contact Group? 

35

Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes. We will work both in our Government, as well 

as with international partners. And through our international partners is with the Contact Group. So we will be working—you know, 

there are a number of agencies throughout the U.S. Government, 

the Department of Treasury, Defense, DEA, FBI, as well as the intelligence community. We will also be working with INTERPOL 

and through our law enforcement contacts. 

So we do acknowledge that we need to do a better job on this—

no question about it—that we need to focus on financial flows and 

that we need to devote the resources that are necessary in the U.S. 

Government to better track financial flows. 

Mr. DUNCAN. When you say we will be working, I understand 

that the Contact Group was established over 2 years ago and with 

the things going on in the world, it would seem like this element 

would be prioritized. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. And indeed, there was a recent meeting, as the 

Congresswoman mentioned, to talk about this issue at the Contact 

Group. And the goal was to set up another working group to focus 

on financial flows. So there is great interest in the international 

community. And I have talked with a number of our international 

partners who are greatly interested in working with us on tracking 

financial flows. 

Mr. DUNCAN. As you can see, I am the last one here. So let me 

take this opportunity to thank the panelists for being here. If any 

of our subcommittee members or committee members have written 

questions, they will be submitted, and we ask you to timely return 

those. And since there is no other committee members here, we will 

stand adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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