DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Federal Protective Service Needs 

To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Office of Audits

OIG-07-05 October 2006
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

October 30, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report assesses the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) contract guard monitoring efforts within 

its National Capital Region (NCR) and compliance with provisions of the Prompt Payment Act 

nationwide. It is based on interviews with employees and officials from the FPS Headquarters, 

NCR, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and contract guard companies, direct 

observations at buildings in the NCR, and reviews of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 

Federal Protective Service Needs to Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

 Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................1 

Background......................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Audit ...............................................................................................................................5 

 Contractor Deployment of Qualified Contract Guards..............................................................5 

Recommendations..............................................................................................................14 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................................... 15 

Payment of Contract Guard Invoices....................................................................................... 16 

Recommendations..............................................................................................................22 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................................... 22 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology......................................................................24 

Appendix B: Management’s Response to the Draft Report...................................................... 27 

Appendix C: Contract Guard Recertification Requirements ....................................................32 

Appendix D: Summary of OIG Review of Expired Certifications........................................... 33 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to this Report ....................................................................... 34 

Appendix F: Report Distribution.............................................................................................. 35 

Abbreviations 

CERTS Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System

 COR Contracting Officer’s Representative 

CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 

DFC Dallas Finance Center 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FFMS Federal Financial Management System 

FPS Federal Protective Service 

GSA General Services Administration 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

NCR National Capital Region

OFM Office of Financial Management 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PRISM Procurement Request Information System Management 

QAS Quality Assurance Specialist 

Federal Protective Service Needs to Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program
Audit OIG Report 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

This report describes the results of our audit of the Federal Protective Service 

(FPS) contract guard program within FPS’ Region 11, the National Capitol 

Region (NCR). Our objectives were to determine whether (1) effective 

controls are in place to ensure qualified contract guards are deployed at 

federal buildings; (2) FPS’ Region 11 effectively monitors contractor 

performance and compliance with contract provisions; and 3) contract guard 

company invoices were paid timely according to the Prompt Payment Act. 

We concluded that FPS’ Region 11 is not consistently deploying qualified and 

certified contract guards. Contract guards were on post without current 

suitability determinations or with expired certifications. Also, security 

contractors were not performing their security services according to the terms 

and conditions of their contracts. These deficiencies occurred because FPS 

personnel were not effectively monitoring the contract guard program. 

In addition, FPS is not paying invoices timely for its contract guard services 

nationwide and is in violation of the Prompt Payment Act. Of the 25,557 

invoices paid from October 1, 2004, to November 21, 2005, only 12 percent 

were paid within 30 days, as required by the Prompt Payment Act. This 

condition occurred, in part, because the FPS transition from the General 

Services Administration’s (GSA) Financial Management System to the 

U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Federal Financial 

Management System was inadequately planned. As a result, FPS paid over 

$1.2 million in interest to guard companies that are contracted by FPS to 

protect federal buildings for late payments made during this time period. 

We are making four recommendations to the Regional Director of the NCR 

(Region 11), and one recommendation to the Director of FPS to strengthen 

controls over its contract guard program. Management concurred with all 

recommendations and, based on actions taken, we have closed three and 

consider two open pending planned corrective action. The Assistant 

Secretary’s comments to our draft report, dated August 8, 2006, were 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve Its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 1 
incorporated into the body of this report, as appropriate, and are included in 

their entirety in Appendix B. 

Background 

FPS was established in 1971 as the uniformed protection force of the General 

Services Administration for government-occupied facilities. As part of its 

overall strategy to ensure the physical safety of government employees and 

visitors, FPS uses contract guards to deter the commission of crime in and 

around federal buildings. The guards are deployed at roving and fixed posts, 

where they often operate security-screening devices such as magnetometers 

and x-ray machines. FPS guards play a crucial and highly visible role in the 

FPS mission, often the first, and sometimes the only, contact visitors have 

with FPS at a facility. 

Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) became responsible for protecting the buildings, grounds, and 

property owned, occupied, or secured by the federal government under GSA’s 

jurisdiction. In addition to GSA facilities, the Act also provides FPS with the 

authority to protect properties held by DHS components that were not under 

GSA jurisdiction. Accordingly, FPS was moved from GSA, Public Building 

Services, to DHS, effective March 1, 2003. Within DHS, FPS is part of the 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Directorate. 

Contract guard services represent the single largest item in the FPS operating 

budget, with an estimated FY 2006 budget of $487 million. As a result of the 

Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the contract guard workforce more than 

doubled and now numbers around 15,000. FPS has become increasingly 

reliant on its contract guard force, having less than 1,000 uniformed FPS 

officers nationwide. 

FPS operations are divided into 11 Regions, of which the NCR is the largest. 

The NCR is further subdivided into three districts (Central, Maryland, and 

Virginia), with each headed by a District Director. In January 2006, a 

Contract Security Program Manager was appointed within the NCR to oversee 

the administration of the contract security guard program and act as the liaison 

between the Contracting Officer, Contract Specialists, contractors, Quality 

Assurance Specialists (QASs), and tenant agencies. 

1

 Public Law 107-296. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 2 
The NCR contract guard program consists of 54 guard service contracts that 

provide approximately 5,700 guards to protect 125 facilities. Under these 

contracts, FPS issues task orders containing detailed terms and conditions 

under which the guard services are to be provided, such as the buildings 

requiring protection, specific post locations, the hours and days of the week 

each post is to be staffed, whether guards are armed, and the number of guards 

at each post. 

Under contract provisions with FPS, guard contractors must ensure that their 

guards are qualified by undergoing background suitability checks, and possess 

the necessary licenses, certificates, and permits. The guards also are required 

to undergo training and pass an FPS-administered written examination.2 In 

addition, guards must comply with performance requirements in the contract 

that address items such as the guard’s appearance, work hours, supervision, 

equipment, and record keeping. 

While the contractor has the primary responsibility for ensuring that all 

contract provisions and requirements are met, FPS is required to actively 

monitor and verify contractor performance. NCR’s 12 QASs are responsible 

for the day-to-day inspection and monitoring of the contractors’ work. The 

role of the QAS is critical to monitoring contract guard performance, as they 

are the primary NCR personnel on-site who can verify compliance with 

contract provisions and requirements. Specifically, QASs are responsible for: 

• Inspecting work to ensure compliance with the contract statement of work 

requirements. 

• Documenting the results of all inspections conducted through written 

inspection reports. 

• Ensuring defects or omissions are corrected. 

• Identifying areas of nonperformance by the contractor to the NCR 

Contracting Officer and Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) that 

may result in deductions from contract payment or other contractual 

remedies being taken. 

• Conferring with representatives of the contractor regarding problems 

encountered in the performance of the work, and generally assisting the 

COR in carrying out the duties. 

2

 For a complete listing of guard requirements, see Appendix C. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 3 
Previous GSA OIG reports

3 have noted numerous deficiencies with both

guard qualifications as well as FPS management of guard contracts:

• Guards on post without valid background suit a ability determinations;

• Guards lacking training to perform their duties;

• Armed guards on post without valid firearm qualifications;

• Guards without weapons stationed at armed posts;

• Inconsistent oversight of guard operations and contracts; and

• Inadequate post orders. t

During the course of our review, FPS personnel pointed out that numerous

contract guard companies have complained that they were not being paid for

services rendered in a timely manner by FPS. FPS personnel advised us that

FPS failure to pay c t ontractor invoi t ces on ti c me, according to the provisions of

the Prompt Pay m ment Act e , is costing the governm e ent in excess of a m s illion

dollars in interest, and placing contractors, the services they provide to protect

federal buildings, and employees at risk. Accordingly, w k e expanded the scope

of our audit to address this issue on a nationwide basis, as it was clear that this

was a problem throughout FPS, not P just in the NCR.

3

 “Audit of the Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guard Program,” Report Number A995175/P/2/R00010, March 28, 

2000; and, “Follow-Up Review of the Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guard Program,” Report Number 

A020092/P/2/R02016, August 29, 2002. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 4 
Results of Audit 

Contractor Deployment of Qualified Contract Guards 

The security of federal employees, facilities, and visitors may be at risk 

because NCR contractors are not consistently deploying qualified and 

certified contract guards. Contract guards had expired suitability 

determinations (background checks) as well as other expired certifications. 

Also, contract guards were not performing their security services according to 

contract provisions. These deficiencies occurred because the NCR is not 

consistently and actively monitoring contract guard contracts. NCR does not 

have sufficient QAS and Contract Section resources to supervise QAS 

activities, and does not have the systems to track inspection reports and 

contract deduction status. 

To test whether guard contractors were deploying qualified and certified 

contract guards, we reviewed 93 contract guard files and visited 18 FPSprotected facilities in the NCR. We reviewed files to determine whether 

guards had current suitability determinations and certifications needed to 

perform their duties. For the 18 buildings we visited, we obtained and 

reviewed post orders, requested certification cards, and interviewed guards on 

post to verify that they met current contract provisions related to guard 

deployments and qualifications. 

Expired Suitability Determinations 

FPS policy mandates that prospective contract employees, including guards, 

undergo limited criminal history background checks to ascertain whether any 

serious criminal offenses or incidents exist in order to determine potential risk 

or threat to the safety and security of personnel and equipment. Failure to 

obtain a favorable suitability determination disqualifies prospective guards 

from employment under a contract with FPS. To receive a suitability 

determination, applicants must undergo several computerized background 

checks, including those administered by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services, the National Crime Information Center, and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. 

Contractors are responsible for renewing guard suitability determinations prior 

to their expiration.4

 Guards that continue to work under the contract after 

4

 All contract guards must be re-certified for background suitability every two years. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 5 
their suitability determination has expired must be removed from the contract 

until a new suitability determination is made. Contract guard companies are 

required to submit recertification applications to NCR at least 30 days prior to 

an expiring suitability determination. The FPS Contract Guard Employment 

Requirements Tracking System (CERTS) is used by QASs to determine 

whether suitability determinations are current or expired. 

Some contract guards continued working at FPS-protected facilities after their 

suitability determinations had expired. 

• A review of CERTS data for 93 contract guards identified four guards 

(4%) that were on post with expired suitability determinations. The 

number of days that the suitability determinations had expired ranged from 

26 to 87 days. 

• In addition, a review of 25 contract suitability files identified four guards 

(16%) who worked during 2005 with expired suitability determinations for 

as long as 201 days before being recertified. 

• Inspection reports submitted by QASs in November and December 2005 

identified 18 guards on post with expired suitability determinations. In 

every case, the guards continued working at their posts. In one instance, a 

guard was still on post as of January 2006, although NCR adjudicated the 

guard unfavorable in May 2005 due to a felony assault conviction. NCR 

had notified the guard company on May 4, 2005, that they needed to take 

the necessary steps to remove the guard from the contract. However, the 

guard continued to work until we brought this issue to NCR 

management’s attention. The guard was then removed from her post. In 

another instance, a guard continued to work, although his suitability 

determination had been expired for six months. 

Also, contractors did not submit recertification applications to FPS 30 days 

prior to suitability certifications expiring. Of 58 guards whose suitability 

certifications were expiring within 10 days, only 11 (19%) were in the process 

of having their suitability reevaluated by FPS. Allowing guards to work after 

their suitability determinations have expired enhances the risk of retaining 

guards with serious criminal offenses that would otherwise disqualify them 

from employment. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 6 
Expired Certifications 

In addition to suitability determinations, contract guards are required to have 

as many as 21 other certifications to perform their duties. Examples of other 

certifications include firearms qualification, drug screening, and first aid 

certifications. (See Appendix C for a complete listing of certification 

requirements.) The number of certifications each guard is required to have is 

dependent on their position (supervisory vs. non-supervisory) and building 

post orders (armed vs. unarmed post). According to the contract statement of 

work, contractors are responsible for obtaining initial and recurring 

certifications for all contract guards. Contractors forward completed 

certification documents to the NCR Suitability and Certification Unit where 

personnel security specialists enter certification information into the CERTS 

database. 

Our review of CERTS data for 93 contract guards disclosed that 28 guards 

(30%) working for 10 contractors had at least one expired certification.5 

• Twelve guards had expired expandable baton certifications. 

• Eight guards had expired domestic violence certifications.6 

• Five guards had expired background investigations.7 

• Five guards had expired refresher training. 

• Three guards had expired Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) 

training. 

• Two guards had expired medical certifications. 

Compliance with recertification requirements ensures that the guards retain 

their knowledge base in required areas and enhances the security and safety of 

employees and visitors at federal facilities. 

Non-compliance with Other Contract Performance Requirements 

Each guard contract includes a post coverage schedule which specifies the 

guard post hours and locations for each building covered by the contract. The 

post coverage schedule, along with the other provisions in the contract, 

5

 For a complete listing of expired certifications, see Appendix D. 6

 Guards with domestic violence backgrounds are not authorized to carry weapons. 7

 According to a NCR Personnel Security Specialist, the NCR requires background investigations in addition to

suitability determinations. The background investigation is limited to regional police checks in the District of Columbia, 

Maryland, and Virginia, and is used to detect recent criminal activity that might not have been available at the time of the 

suitability determination.

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 7 
specify performance requirements for such items as: armed vs. unarmed 

guards; additional security clearances such as “Secret” or “Top Secret;” and 

other requirements relating to guards carrying certain credentials, such as 

those that indicate pistol qualification, and work permit status cards for noncitizen guards. 

To work at an FPS-protected facility, a guard must possess a valid GSA 

Certification Card (GSA Form 3527), which provides evidence that the guard 

has received a favorable adjudication, passed the medical examination, 

completed the required training, and passed the other required examinations. 

In addition to the GSA Form 3527, the guard must possess an A-1 pistol card, 

if armed; expandable baton card; work permit card, if alien; and, a CPR/first 

aid card. 

NCR contractors did not consistently meet contract provisions related to guard 

deployments and qualifications. We visited 18 NCR buildings during January 

and February 2006, and inspected 73 guard posts to ensure that guards 

stationed at armed posts were, in fact, armed; had the appropriate additional 

security clearance when needed; and, were carrying certification cards 

required by the contract or NCR procedures. We noted the following 

violations: 

• 8 of 48 guards stationed at armed posts were not armed as required. 

• 3 of 25 guards stationed at unarmed posts were armed. 

• 3 of 10 contract guards did not have the required clearances to work at 

their assigned posts. Two did not have the required “Top Secret” and 

one did not have the required “Secret” clearance. Further, 2 of the 3 

did not have current suitability determinations.8 

• 9 of 10 non-citizen guards were not carrying their work permit cards. 

• 2 of 48 armed guards were not carrying their pistol qualification cards. 

• 1 of 48 armed guards was carrying an expired pistol qualification card. 

• 1 of 73 guards was not carrying a first aid card. 

• 4 of 73 guards were carrying an expired CPR card. 

• 1 of 73 guards was not carrying their CPR card. 

• 7 of 73 guards were carrying an expired expandable baton card. 

• 3 of 73 guards were not carrying an expandable baton card. 

8 After verifying our finding, NCR management removed the guards from post and assessed deductions to the guard 

companies for violating the contract. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 8 
As a result, guards were not properly protecting federal facilities with the 

required weapons, security clearances, and certifications. 

Need to Enhance Guard Contract Monitoring 

NCR officials did not adequately monitor contract guard compliance with the 

contract provisions. FPS’s monitoring and enforcement role is critical to 

ensuring that contract guard companies, and the guards they deploy at FPSprotected facilities, meet the minimum standards set in the contracts between 

FPS and the companies. If NCR does not actively, accurately, and 

consistently monitor contract guard contracts, the Region, by default, will be 

dependent on the honesty of its contractors to ensure that all contract 

provisions and requirements are met. 

NCR is primarily reliant upon the QAS and Contract Section personnel to 

monitor contract guards that are on post and ensure they were qualified, 

trained, and performed according to their contracts. NCR’s 12 QASs are 

responsible for conducting audits and onsite inspections of contract guard 

activities at FPS-protected facilities. NCR’s eight Contract Section personnel 

are responsible for processing deductions to contractor invoices due to 

noncompliance issues uncovered by the QASs. However, the QASs were not 

consistently submitting their inspection reports to the NCR Contract Section, 

and for those that were submitted, most were not submitted in a timely 

manner. In addition, Contract Specialists were not making deductions to 

contractor invoices when appropriate. Specifically, they did not process 

potential deductions from contractor invoices totaling almost $1.3 million 

when guard companies failed to comply with contract requirements. 

QASs Were Not Providing Adequate Onsite Monitoring of Guard 

Contracts 

NCR has designated 12 QASs to monitor security services contracts to ensure 

the government receives the caliber of services for which it has contracted and 

to ensure compliance by contractors with contract provisions. Each QAS is 

responsible for a set number of FPS-protected facilities in the NCR. 

On a weekly basis, the QASs are required to collect the GSA Form 139s9

 from 

each guard post and conduct audits and inspections to identify instances of 

contractor violation of contract requirements. Audits consist of reviewing the 

9 When contract guards report to work, they are required to sign in and to sign out on GSA Form 139, Record of Time of 

Arrival and Departure Contract Guarding Duty Register. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 9 
GSA Form 139s and other records to validate that contract guards met 

contract requirements for manning their posts. As part of this review, a QAS 

would determine whether a guard worked in excess of the 12-hour work rule, 

or a guard was working with an expired suitability determination or 

certification.10 Inspections consist of onsite physical inspections of contract 

guards that determine, for example, whether an unarmed guard was stationed 

at an armed post, or whether a post was abandoned. QASs are required to 

prepare and submit the inspection report to NCR’s Contract Section by the 5th 

workday following the month in which guard services were provided. Results 

of these audits and inspections, including deficiencies, are summarized on 

GSA Form 2820, Guard Contractor Inspection Report (Inspection Report). 

The Inspection Report is the primary tool used by NCR to monitor compliance 

with guard contract provisions and requirements. 

QASs were not consistently collecting and auditing the GSA Form 139s and 

submitting Inspection Reports to the NCR Contract Section. For one building 

we visited, a contract guard stated that no one had collected the GSA Form 

139s in the five months since he started working at that building. Unless the 

forms are collected, NCR is unable to properly verify and ensure complete 

and satisfactory performance of guard services according to the terms 

specified under the contract. 

Also, Inspection Reports submitted to NCR’s Contract Section were not 

submitted by the 5th workday following the month in which guard services 

were provided, as required. For example, as of December 7, 2005, (the 5th 

workday of the month), the QASs had not submitted Inspection Reports for 

November 2005 to the Contract Section for 41 of the 62 buildings (66%) that 

we selected for review. Of 260 Inspection Reports submitted during 

November and December 2005, 191 (73%) were not submitted timely, and 

were late by as much as 13 months. For example, one QAS reviewed 

contractor performance for the time period December 12-18, 2004; however, 

the Inspection Report was not prepared until August 6, 2005, and was not 

submitted to the contract section until December 2005, a 10-month delay. 

Unless Inspection Reports are prepared and submitted to the Contract Section 

timely, monetary deduction letters for identified deficiencies cannot be 

prepared. Specifically, for the 191 late Inspection Reports, potential 

deductions identified by the QASs totaling $221,989 could not be initiated 

against contractors. 

10 QASs have access to the Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System to determine whether the 

contractor has properly submitted the required information to certify the guard’s qualifications. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 10 
NCR has not provided adequate supervision of QASs in the performance of 

their duties and does not have a sufficient number of QASs to properly 

monitor 125 facilities and 5,700 guards. Prior to September 2005, the 12 

QASs reported to one NCR police officer who said that, although the QASs 

reported to him, he believed that the Contracting Officer dictated their day-today work activities. The officer also said that he did not oversee whether 

QASs were fulfilling their oversight responsibilities over contract guard 

contracts, and that he supervised the QASs for time and attendance purposes 

only. 

In September 2005, the 12 QASs were reassigned to several Area 

Commanders within the three NCR districts. However, this has not 

established responsibility for effective oversight of QAS activities. 

Discussions with two Area Commanders to whom nine QASs currently report 

disclosed they were minimally involved in supervising the QASs’ work as it 

related to their inspection duties. One Area Commander (to whom six QASs 

reported) said that she did not exercise any supervisory control over the work 

the QASs performed related to monitoring contract guards, such as ensuring 

that QASs: collect GSA Form 139s weekly; perform timely audits of the GSA 

Form 139s; submit the Inspection Reports to the Contract Section; and 

conduct physical inspections of posts. Another District Area Commander, 

who supervises three QASs, said that he did not exercise any supervisory 

control over QAS contract guard monitoring activities. 

In addition, the NCR Contract Security Program Manager advised us there 

were an inadequate number of QASs available for the large number of guard 

posts they were required to inspect on a weekly basis, resulting in a backlog of 

inspections. To relieve the backlog, he said he plans to train NCR police 

officers and physical security specialists to assist QASs in performing security 

guard audits and inspections. 

Contract Specialists Are Not Consistently Processing Deductions to 

Contractor Invoices 

In response to areas of contractor non-performance identified in QAS 

Inspection Reports, the NCR Contract Section may propose deductions from 

contractor invoice payments. This remedy is the primary penalty mechanism 

available to FPS to address contract nonperformance or inadequate service by 

the contractor. After receiving information in an Inspection Report detailing 

contract performance violations, the NCR Contract Section prepares a 

proposed contractor deduction letter which informs the contractor of 

violations and the reasons for proposed deductions. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

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According to guard services contract provisions, NCR must notify the 

contractor of the type and dollar amount of the proposed deductions by the 

10th working day following the month in which the guard services were 

performed. The contractor then has 10 working days after receipt of the 

notification to submit a rebuttal to a Contract Specialist stating the specific 

reasons why all or part of the proposed deductions should not be taken. If the 

Contracting Officer determines that any or all of the proposed deduction is 

still warranted, the contractor is notified and the amount of the deduction is 

recorded on GSA Form 3025, Receiving Report, which is then submitted to 

the NCR Budget Office for payment deduction processing. Examples of 

contract violations and deduction rates are listed in Table 1 below. 

TABLE 1: DEDUCTION RATE FOR CONTRACT VIOLATIONS 

Contract Violation

Unarmed guard working on or at armed post 

 Deduction Rate 

100% of hourly rate for each hour worked 

Guard working without valid GSA 

Certification or Suitability clearance 100% of hourly rate for each hour worked 

Failure to provide relief breaks Hourly rate, pro-rated for amount of break 

not provided 

Backfill required by FPS personnel No less than 100% of the hourly rate and no 

more than $50 per hour of FPS provided 

services 

Failure to provide uniforms or equipment Based on actual cost of purchase, lease, or 

rental pro-rated for time period in question 

Failure to provide vehicle or vehicle provided 

is inoperable 

Based on pro-rated share of contractor’s 

actual costs 

The NCR Contract Section is not consistently processing deductions against 

contractors for violations of contract requirements. In our sample of the 

disposition of 45 deduction letters submitted to contractors during the period 

February 2005 to August 2005, the Contract Section had not processed 38 of 

45 proposed deduction letters totaling almost $1.3 million in contractor 

violations:11 

• In 28 instances, deduction letters were sent, but no rebuttal letters were 

received or processed by Contract Specialists, and a final decision was 

never rendered on the proposed deduction. 

11 Examples of violations included: unarmed guards at armed post; unmanned/abandoned posts; guards working in 

excess of 12 hours; and, guards with expired certifications. The remaining seven letters processed by the Contract 

Section proposed deductions totaling $245,000. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

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• In nine instances, deduction letters were sent and rebuttal letters were 

received, but Contract Specialists failed to take action on the rebuttal 

letters, and, therefore, the Contracting Officer did not render a final 

decision. 

• In one instance, the deduction letter was sent, the rebuttal letter was 

received, a Contract Specialist reviewed the rebuttal letter, and a final 

decision against the contractor was rendered; however, FPS did not 

deducted $12,734 from the contractor’s invoice. 

We attribute these lapses to the following conditions: 

• NCR officials stated that the NCR Contract Section is understaffed, 

contributing to the delays in processing the deduction letters and 

responding to the rebuttal letters. The Section was operating with only 

one-third of the Contract Specialists it had in February 2005 (four of 

twelve). 

• The NCR Contract Section does not have effective procedures and 

systems to track Inspection Reports. Inspection Reports are not datestamped by the Contract Section when received, which makes 

timeliness of processing more problematic. In addition, because the 

Contract Section does not maintain an inventory of FPS-protected 

buildings, they have no assurance that they have received all required 

Inspection Reports. Finally, the filing system is poor, consisting of 

stacks of Inspection Reports and GSA Form 139s all over the floor of 

a filing room, as shown in Figure 1. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 13 
Figure 1: File Room for QAS Inspection Reports and GSA Form 139s 

• The NCR Contract Section does not maintain a system to track the 

status of deduction letters. Consequently, the Contract Section 

personnel were unable to identify: 

o Number of proposed deduction letters sent to the contractors; 

o Number of contractor rebuttals submitted in response to the 

proposed deduction letters; 

o Final decision rendered on proposed deductions; and 

o Final deduction amounts taken against unfavorable decisions. 

Conclusion 

FPS is not adequately monitoring its guard contracts. Guards were working 

with expired suitability determinations, unarmed guards were working at 

armed posts, a guard with felony convictions was employed by one contractor, 

and guards did not always have the required “Secret” and “Top Secret” 

clearances. These lapses in contractor oversight can result in the government 

paying for services it did not receive, loss of monies resulting from contract 

deductions due to nonperformance, and placing FPS-protected facilities, 

employees, and facility visitors at risk. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

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Recommendations 

We recommend that the Regional Director of the National Capital Region: 

Recommendation 1: Ensure that NCR Area Commanders adequately 

monitor QASs’ inspection reports for quality and timeliness, and provide 

training for QASs found to be deficient. 

Recommendation 2: Provide the necessary resources to the Contract 

Section to ensure the timely processing of proposed deduction letters. 

Recommendation 3: Establish effective systems and procedures to track 

the status of Inspection Reports and proposed deduction letters to ensure 

guard company compliance with contract requirements. 

Recommendation 4: Review all inspection reports and proposed 

deductions for the period March 1, 2003 through the present and initiate 

collection actions on all contracts found to be deficient. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 15 
Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Comments to Recommendation #1 

ICE stated that the agency has taken and will take specific steps to improve 

the monitoring of the contract guard program, which are detailed in the 

agency’s response to our draft report. For example, standard operating 

procedures have been developed and implemented that outline a process to 

monitor contract performance and guard company deductions that are 

proposed, assessed, and actually taken. In addition, the agency has selected a 

Contract Guard Program Manager to oversee the regional guard program and 

act as liaison to the Consolidated Contracting Groups, QASs, agencies, and 

guard companies. The agency also plans to increase the number of trained 

personnel involved in monitoring the contract guard program. In addition, a 

process has been developed to assess and report on guard contractor 

performance and use past performance as a factor in the selection process for 

future contractor selection. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #2 

ICE agreed that additional resources are needed to perform all of the 

responsibilities necessary to efficiently run the Contract Section and to ensure 

the timely processing of proposed deduction letters. However, the agency 

stated in its response that due to budgetary constraints that are preventing 

increased staffing, some of the functions have been transferred to other 

sections in order to accomplish their mission. The QASs have been 

reassigned to their respective district commands for more direct monitoring of 

their contract sites, the Physical Security Inspectors have been reassigned to 

the district command for more direct monitoring, the Contract Guard Program 

has been reassigned from the Threat Management Branch to the Mission 

Support Division, and the Background and Suitability Unit has been 

reassigned from the Mission Support Division to the Contract Guard Program. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #3 

ICE accepted this recommendation and stated the following steps have already 

been taken to address this issue: ICE (1) selected a Contract Guard Program 

Manager to oversee the regional program; (2) developed and implemented 

Standard Operating Procedures for the Contract Guard Program; (3) trained 

Inspectors and Police Officers to increase the number of personnel involved in 

the contract guard-monitoring program; (4) developed a process to assess and 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 16 
report on guard contractor performance; and (5) initiated a weekly status 

report outlining all regional activities impacting the guard program. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #4 

ICE stated that its efforts are ongoing. The entire contract guard program has 

been assumed by acquisitions and compliance functions of the Consolidated 

Contract Guard Program under the direction of the supervision of the ICE 

Office of Acquisition Management. The agency further stated that this group 

has assumed responsibility for reviewing all past Inspection Reports and 

deduction letters. 

OIG Comments and Analysis 

We consider Recommendations #1 and #2 resolved and closed. The actions 

planned or taken by ICE to improve FPS’s contract guard monitoring efforts 

should ensure that contractors are consistently deploying qualified and 

certified contract guards at federally protected facilities. We consider 

Recommendation #3 resolved but open until ICE addresses how it intends to 

track the status of Inspection Reports and proposed deduction letters. In 

addition, we consider Recommendation #4 resolved but open until the ICE 

Office of Acquisition Management completes it review of all past Inspection 

Reports and deduction letters and initiates collection actions on all contracts 

found to be deficient. 

Payment of Contract Guard Invoices 

FPS is not paying invoices for its contract guard services nationwide in a 

timely manner, resulting in a violation of the Prompt Payment Act. Of the 

25,557 invoices paid from October 1, 2004, to November 21, 2005, 88 percent 

were not paid within 30 days as required by the Prompt Payment Act.12 Of 

the 25,557 invoices paid from October 1, 2004, to November 21, 2005, 

88 percent were not paid within 30 days as required by the Prompt Payment 

Act. As a result, FPS paid over $1.2 million in interest to guard companies 

that are contracted by FPS to protect federal buildings for late payments made 

during this time period. Failure by FPS to pay contract guard companies in a 

timely manner is not only costing the government millions in interest, but is 

12 The Prompt Payment Act requires federal agencies to pay their bills on a timely basis and pay interest when payments 

are late (generally 30 days after receipt of invoice). According to Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

Part 1315.4(g), interest will accrue on any payment not paid within 30 days after receipt of invoice, if not specified in the 

contract, if discounts are not taken, and if accelerated payment methods are not used. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 17 
also placing contractors and the services they provide to protect federal 

buildings and employees at risk. 

To obtain payment for contract guard services, FPS guard contractors are 

required to submit monthly invoices for contract guard services by the first 

day of the following month to FPS. An NCR Contract Specialist reviews the 

invoice to ensure compliance with the contract, and, if acceptable, prepares a 

receiving report certifying that the services have been received. The invoice 

and receiving report are then forwarded to the NCR Budget Office, which is 

responsible for ensuring adequate funding is available and preparing a 

receiving ticket. The invoice and receiving ticket is then forwarded to 

Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) Dallas Finance Center (DFC), 

which processes all payments for FPS. The DFC will match the invoice and 

the receiving ticket to an obligation. If the invoice amount plus previous 

payments do not exceed the obligated amount, the payment will be processed. 

DFC paid 25,557 invoices amounting to $544 million from October 1, 2004, 

until November 21, 2005 nationwide. As shown in Table 2, only 12 percent 

of these invoices were paid within 30 days. Twenty five percent of the 

invoices were paid later than 90 days from the date of invoice. DFC paid 

$1,246,992 in interest on these late payments. 

Table 2: Paid Invoices for Contract Guards, 10/1/04 –11/21/05 

Payments Total Invoices 

Invoice Date to Payment Date 

≤ 30days 31-60 days 61-90 days >90 days 

Total 25,557 3,141 8,671 7,356 6,389 

Percentage 100% 12% 34% 29% 25% 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 18 
As shown in Table 3, the NCR alone had 263 unpaid invoices for 16 

contractors, totaling $18.5 million, as of September 2005. The performance 

periods for these unpaid invoices date as far back as FY 2003. One contractor 

had 46 unpaid invoices, while another contractor was owed in excess of $3.4 

million. 

Table 3: Region 11 Unpaid Invoices as of 9/23/05 

Contractor 

Number of Unpaid 

Invoices Amount Outstanding 

Oldest Performance 

Period 

1 16 $3,442,002 Sept. 2004 

2 13 $2,449,953 Feb. 2005 

3 39 $1,389,813 Sept. 2003 

4 2 $52,409 Aug. 2004 

5 6 $158,529 Mar. 2005 

6 18 $1,037,542 Oct. 2004 

7 46 $2,616,038 May 2004 

8 7 $664,159 Apr. 2004 

9 13 $114,752 Dec. 2003 

10 32 $1,418,530 May 2004 

11 32 $2,211,804 Jan. 2004 

12 1 $4,341 Dec. 2004 

13 4 $449,522 May 2005 

14 11 $205,318 Jun. 2003 

15 10 $1,619,075 Jan. 2004 

16 13 $715,435 Jan. 2005 

TOTAL 263 $18,549,222 

We attribute the cause for the payment delays to: (1) FPS’ transition from the 

GSA Financial Management System to the ICE Federal Financial 

Management System, which was not adequately planned; and, (2) FPS’ 

contract administration practices, which adversely affected invoice payment. 

FPS’ Transition from the GSA Financial Management System to the ICE 

Federal Financial Management System 

The FPS transition to ICE on October 1, 2004, occurred before the system was 

adapted to meet the unique financial and budgeting requirements associated 

with FPS’ business processes. The DHS, Office of the Under Secretary for 

Management, originally directed that the FPS transition from the GSA 

Financial Management System to the ICE Federal Financial Management 

System (FFMS) be completed by October 1, 2003. Following the initial 

review of the unique financial management requirements needed to support 

the FPS offsetting collections program, the transition date was extended to 

October 1, 2004. FPS officials stated that, despite attempts to explain FPS 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 19 
business processes and FFMS needs to the ICE Office of Financial 

Management (OFM), problems with adapting the FFMS to FPS needs 

remained and suggested that the transition to the ICE system be postponed. 

However, DHS required FPS to transition to the system on October 1, 2004, 

despite concerns about the system’s ability to meet FPS needs. ICE financial 

management staff had assured the staff of the Senate Appropriations 

Committee, in a briefing on February 17, 2005, that the FPS transition would 

be completed by March 31, 2005. 

However, problems with contractor payments and the transition to FFMS 

continued. In a May 6, 2005, memorandum to the Assistant Secretary for 

ICE, the Director of FPS outlined what he considered systemic problems and 

issues with the FFMS and noted that problems with contractor payments had, 

in fact, worsened since the transition. An independent auditor contracted by 

us to perform an audit of DHS financial statements13 also concluded that the 

integration of FPS’ accounting processes from GSA to ICE created numerous 

issues with the integrity of FPS transaction data and represented a material 

weakness in ICE’s internal controls. 

FPS Budget and Finance officials in Region 3 and FPS Headquarters officials 

informed us that inadequate training prior to the transition and the difficulty in 

using the FFMS contributed to the invoice payment problems. These officials 

indicated that the system is difficult to navigate and that errors are 

time-consuming to correct. 

Because of the continuing problems, ICE and FPS personnel have been 

working in “Tiger Teams” to perform a reconciliation of the FY 2005 default 

account, assisting with expediting FY 2006 payments and looking at future 

ways to reduce the payment backlog. As of the time of our fieldwork, which 

ended in February 2006, the Teams were still working. 

13 DHS’s Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal year 2005, November 15, 2005, Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

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FPS’ Contract Administration Practices Adversely Affected Invoice 

Payment 

ICE procurement personnel, NCR budget personnel, NCR procurement 

personnel, and FPS contract guard companies identified FPS contract 

administration practices that have contributed to invoice payment delays. 

ICE procurement personnel advised that FPS does not routinely provide 

required, complete, and accurate supporting documentation and data for 

procurement actions in order to process invoice payments timely. We 

analyzed “After-the Fact” ICE reviews of three FPS procurement actions. 

ICE personnel provided examples where FPS contracts for guard services 

failed to include critical items, such as: 

• Contract signed and dated by the contractor; 

• Contract modifications; 

• Correct performance periods; and 

• A contract administration plan to ensure full performance by the 

contractor. 

As a result of these and other deficiencies in its contract administration, FPS 

was not able to enter the obligation data completely and accurately in the 

FFMS. Until the data is properly entered, payments of the invoices are 

delayed. 

An NCR FPS analysis of 118 invoices that were unpaid at the end of FY 2005 

confirmed that FPS was contributing to contractor invoice payment delays. 

According to this analysis, most invoices were unpaid because the obligations 

were missing or under-funded. As shown in Table 4, 83 of 118 invoices had 

no corresponding obligation in the FFMS. 

Table 4: FPS Analyses of Unpaid Invoices 

Reason for Delay Number of Invoices 

No funds available 5 

No Obligation 83 

Problem with Obligation 6 

Correct Obligation 16 

Miscellaneous 8 

TOTAL 118 

Guard contractors said they were unable to bill FPS because paperwork was 

not received timely from FPS contracting officials. Because a number of 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 21 
contracts were set to expire and NCR personnel were unable to get new 

contracts in place, the FPS Contracting Officer requested the guard companies 

to agree to “letter contracts” extending their services for six months. FPS 

personnel informed the contractors that the paperwork finalizing the contracts 

would soon follow. However, the paperwork was still not provided to the 

contractors six months after the services began. As a result, the contractors 

were not paid timely for these services. 

NCR understaffing also contributed to the untimely processing of contract 

guard invoices. According to the FPS Director of Acquisition Management, 

the group responsible for serving the NCR is severely understaffed and the 

personnel on board did not have the warrant level required for administering 

large procurement actions. There were 12 Contract Specialists serving NCR 

at the time FPS transitioned to the ICE FFMS, but at the time of our 

fieldwork, only four remained. As a result, he said the contractors were not 

getting paid; invoices were not getting reviewed, and new contracts were not 

getting awarded. The Director said that he was attempting to hire more 

procurement personnel. 

Payment Problems Forced ICE to Pay Some Invoices Using a Default 

Account 

In addition to complaints from contract guard companies, FPS and ICE 

received numerous inquiries from the DHS Chief Financial Officer, DHS 

Chief Procurement Officer, and the Congress to expedite the payment process. 

These inquiries combined with the $1.2 million paid interest compelled ICE to 

implement changes. ICE decided to institute a default accounting string code 

to obligate/disburse items for which there were no supporting obligations. 

From October 1, 2004, until November 21, 2005, the DFC paid $121 million 

in contractor invoices from the default account. 

This practice could result in overpayments, duplicative payments, and 

significant reconciliation difficulties for FPS. The FPS Director of Financial 

Management strongly recommended that the default code not be applied to the 

FPS account. He said that that this process will almost certainly place the FPS 

Account in violation of the Antideficiency Act, will further delay contractor 

payments, cause additional delays in the reconciliation process, and create a 

large additional workload that neither ICE or FPS will be able to reconcile 

before the end of the fiscal year. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 22 
Late Payments Causing Financial Hardship for Some Contractors 

Because many FPS contract guard companies are not receiving timely 

payments for their services, they are experiencing considerable financial 

hardship, especially the smaller companies that have limited borrowing 

capacity. In May 2005, the Director of FPS reported that FPS guard 

contractors were resorting to liquidating cash reserves and short-term lines of 

credit in order to meet their payroll obligations. The interest that is paid to 

these companies under the Prompt Payment Act14 may not offset the added 

expense and difficulties associated with meeting payroll obligations. 

We interviewed or visited several contract guard companies. One contractor 

who had contracts with several FPS regions complained that his invoices had 

an average turnaround time of almost 90 days. Further, he said his current 

outstanding balance was $11 million. Untimely payments has caused his 

borrowing needs to increase by $5 million over his existing line of credit and 

he had to pay an additional 2% over the existing borrowing rate. This rate of 

interest was considerably higher than the rate of interest used to calculate the 

amount of interest paid on late payments under the Prompt Payment Act. 

Another contractor said late payments caused him financial hardship, which 

resulted in his reducing hours for administrative staff because of inadequate 

cash flow. The contractor told us that they had to limit full-time 

administrative personnel to part-time work because of their inability to meet 

their payroll. The financial problems became so severe that the contractor 

was unable to pay his taxes and the Internal Revenue Service was in the 

process of issuing a Notice of Levy on the company. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 5: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Protective Service work with the ICE CFO to implement corrective actions to 

adequately address internal control deficiencies and payment timeliness issues 

noted here and in our annual financial audit report issued in November 2005. 

14 5.125 percent in January 2006. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Comments to Recommendation #5 

The Assistant Secretary stated that FPS’ contracting activities has been 

merged into the ICE contracting component under the supervision of the 

Director of the ICE Office of Acquisitions Management. ICE will continue to 

work with FPS to achieve improvements in business process that will address 

these concerns. In addition to the Tiger Team efforts referenced in the report, 

ICE has put into place a Financial Action Plan (FAP) to address findings from 

the 2004 and 2005 financial audits including those that relate to FPS issues. 

The Project Management Office has worked with various offices and 

stakeholders to develop the plan, and is overseeing the implementation of the 

FAP. The FAP includes a project to improve invoice processing. Under the 

direction of the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA), the ICE Office of 

Acquisition Management is taking an active oversight role over FPS 

contracting activities. 

The Assistant Secretary also reported that reconciliation is currently underway 

to properly reclassify the default transactions to the appropriate accounting 

codes. Further, ICE has worked with the Office of Management and Budget 

to apportion additional budget authority in the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 

to allow FPS Regions to fully fund contracts. Other steps to implement 

corrective action include an organizational change in facilitating 

standardization of acquisition policies and procedures in FPS, the 

establishment of a Headquarters Acquisition Management Office that reports 

to the HCA, and all FPS Regional contract staff now report to the 

Consolidated Contract Groups (CCGs). FPS also established four CCGs that 

report to the FPS Director of Acquisition Management. Additionally, FPS is 

currently using the ICE automated procurement system that standardizes the 

procurement process and documentation. Implementation of the electronic 

interface between the Procurement Request Information System Management 

(PRISM) system and the financial system will result in automated 

establishment of obligations upon award. 

OIG Comments and Analysis 

We agree that ICE has been responsive to our recommendation and has taken 

steps to implement corrective actions to adequately address internal control 

deficiencies and payment timeliness issues. We consider this 

recommendation resolved but will remain open until implementation of the 

various steps outlined in the agency’s response are complete. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 24 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of the audit was to determine whether the FPS monitors 

contractor performance and compliance with contract provisions and whether 

effective controls are in place to ensure that qualified and certified contract 

guards are deployed at federal buildings. Also, we determined whether FPS 

contract guard company invoices were paid timely according to provisions the 

Prompt Payment Act. 

The scope of our work for reviewing guard qualifications, performance 

requirements, and FPS’s monitoring of contract guards was conducted at the 

NCR. The scope of our work on the timeliness of contract guard payments 

included all FPS regions. Our scope did not permit evaluating the quality of 

contractor processes for monitoring guard qualifications and ensuring 

compliance with other contract provisions. 

To determine the timeliness of NCR’s contract suitability reviews, we 

examined contract suitability files for 25 contract guards. We reviewed 

information stored in the Contract Suitability System and verified it against 

the information in the contract suitability files for the 25 contract guards. To 

determine whether there were any contract guards whose suitability 

determination had expired, we reviewed Inspection Reports and GSA 

Form 139s submitted by QASs in November and December 2005, and 

identified 19 guards. We examined the CERTS guard files for the 19 guards 

to determine when their suitability had expired and whether it had been 

adjudicated favorably later. We reviewed Inspection Reports for the 19 

guards covering the period that each guard’s suitability was expired and 

documented whether the QAS had identified the deficiency on the relevant 

Inspection Reports. 

To examine contractor qualifications, we obtained and reviewed FPS’s Policy 

Handbook, Contract Guard Information Manual, and guard services contracts 

for NCR. We selected 93 contract guard files for review. We examined the 

guard files and CERTS data for all 93 guards to determine whether suitability 

determinations or other certifications had expired. 

To examine the contractor guards’ performance, we inspected 73 guard posts 

at 18 buildings within the NCR. We judgmentally selected six buildings from 

each of the three NCR districts. The 18 buildings were guarded by 12 of 18 

guard contractors in the NCR. At each building, we determined whether 

guards: 1) were manning the guard posts; 2) were in uniform and were well 

groomed; 3) were performing any prohibited activities such as reading, eating, 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 25 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

sleeping, etc; 4) were armed when required; 5) had required guard 

certifications; 6) had additional security clearance above the FPS suitability 

determination when needed; and 7) were carrying required certification cards, 

such as the FPS Certification card and cards for CPR and First Aid Training. 

We visited and inspected posts at these 18 buildings between January 10, 

2006, and February 2, 2006. 

To evaluate NCR monitoring of qualifications and performance of contract 

guards, we obtained and reviewed the QAS position description, contract 

guard service contracts, and the FPS Policy Handbook. We also reviewed 

GSA Form 2820s, and GSA Form 139s submitted by QASs for 62 buildings. 

We determined whether the QASs were submitting Inspection Reports in a 

timely manner. We did not evaluate the quality of the QASs’ inspections and 

audits. We interviewed contractor support personnel to determine how they 

process Inspection Reports from the QASs. We also assessed the disposition 

of 45 deduction letters submitted to contractors during the period February 

2005 to August 2005 to determine whether the Contract Section was 

processing deductions against contractors for violations of contract 

requirements. 

To analyze the timeliness of contract guard payments, we visited or 

interviewed six contract guard companies that had contracts with NCR or 

other FPS regions. We visited ICE’s DFC in Dallas, Texas, which handles all 

the accounts payables for FPS. We obtained a listing of paid invoices from 

October 1, 2004, through November 21, 2005. We judgmentally selected a 

sample of 26 payment transactions, and obtained payment files and examined 

invoices, FY 2005 payment logs, and file correspondence. We interviewed 

the DFC Director and the Supervisory Accountant for Commercial Payments. 

Other ICE personnel interviewed included the Director, Office of Procurement 

and a Senior Procurement Analyst within the Policy and Oversight Branch. 

We obtained “After-the Fact” reviews conducted by ICE Office of 

Procurement on three Region 11 procurement actions. We also obtained a 

copy of ICE’s procurement review process as documented in 

ICECAP 0503.02.11. Finally, we obtained a listing of congressional requests 

from the Office of Legislative Affairs concerning FPS from October 1, 2004, 

until January 27, 2006. 

We conducted interviews with FPS Headquarters officials, FPS Region 3 

(Philadelphia) representatives, FPS NCR officials, Personnel Security 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 26 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Specialists, Contract Specialists, Area Commanders, QASs, and FPS’s 

Consolidated Contracting Group. In conjunction with this review, we sent a 

questionnaire to NCR Contract Section personnel on the Region’s contract 

monitoring process, concerning the proposed deduction process. 

We reviewed prior reports from FPS, GSA OIG, and Congressional Research 

Service on contract guards and the contract guard program. We reviewed 

contracts, modifications, statements of work, and related documentation for 

the contract guard program. 

We conducted fieldwork between November 2005 and February 2006 under 

the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according 

to generally accepted government auditing standards. The cooperation and 

courtesies extended to our audit team by FPS were appreciated. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 27 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response to the Draft Report 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 28 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response to the Draft Report 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 29 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response to the Draft Report 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 30 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response to the Draft Report 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 31 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response to the Draft Report 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

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Appendix C 

Contract Guard Certification Requirements 

 Certifications Expires after 

1 Background Investigation 2 years 

2 Contractor Provided Basic Training Given once 

3 Contractor Provided Refresher Training 2 years 

4 CPR Training and Certification 1 year 

5 Domestic Violence Certification 1 year 

6 FPS Provided Orientation Training 100 years15 

7 Contractor Certification of Firearms Training 100 years 

8 Firearms Qualification 1 year 

9 Annual Weapons Re-Qualification 1 year 

10 Proof of Education 100 years 

11 First Aid Certification 3 years 

12 Medical Certification (SF 78) 2 years 

13 Mandatory Drug Screening Certification 100 years 

14 

Initial and Final (if applicable) Suitability 

Determination 

2 years 

15 Work Permit (Form I-9) 10 years on average 

16 Written Exam Given once 

17 State Weapons Permit 100 years 

18 Expandable Baton Certification 1 year 

19 Magnetometers/X-Ray Machine Training 100 years 

20 Supervisor Training 100 years 

21 Supervisory Experience 

100 years unless 

specified period stated on 

letter in file 

22 Supervisory Written Exam Given once 

15 One hundred years is used here to represent the guard’s life. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

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Appendix D 

Summary of OIG Review of Expired Certifications 

Certifications 

Number 

Expired 

Expiration Date to 

Review Date 

1 Background Investigation16 5 3 to 740 days 

2 Contractor Provided Basic Training 0 

3 Contractor Provided Refresher Training 5 18 to 919 days 

4 CPR Training and Certification 3 1 to 153 days 

5 Domestic Violence Certification 8 1 to 945 days 

6 FPS Provided Orientation Training 0 

7 Contractor Certification of Firearms Training 0 

8 Firearms Qualification 0 

9 Annual Weapons Re-Qualification 0 

10 Proof of Education 0 

11 First Aid Certification 0 

12 Medical Certification (SF 78) 2 30 to 671 days 

13 Mandatory Drug Screening Certification 0 

14 

Initial and Final (if applicable) Suitability 

Determination17 

4 27 to 88 days 

15 Work Permit (Form I-9) 0 

16 Written Exam 0 

17 State Weapons Permit 0 

18 Expandable Baton Certification 12 3 to 324 days 

19 Magnetometers/X-Ray Machine Training 0 

20 Supervisor Training 0 

21 Supervisory Experience 0 

22 Supervisory Written Exam 0 

Total 39 

16 According to a NCR Personnel Security Specialist, background checks differ from suitability determinations in that 

they are limited to regional (District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia) police checks. 17 Suitability determination involves undergoing several computerized background checks, including those administered 

by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the National Crime Information Center, and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 34 
Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Timothy Crowe, Director, Philadelphia Field Office 

Dennis Deely, Supervisory Auditor, Philadelphia Field Office 

Richard Kotecki, Auditor, Philadelphia Field Office 

Kevin Donahue, Auditor-in-Charge, Philadelphia Field Office 

Robert Ferrara, Auditor, Philadelphia Field Office 

Barry Bruner, Auditor, Philadelphia Field Office 

Katherine McPherson, Auditor, Philadelphia Field Office 

Christine Haynes, Referencer 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Chief, Security Officer 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

DHS OIG Liaison, ICE 

DHS OIG Liaison, CIS 

Office of Management and Budget

 Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

 DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

 Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the 

Contract Guard Program 

Page 36 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the 

OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL 

STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, 

Building 410, Washington, DC 20528, fax the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or email 

DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer 

and caller.