alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1369 

CA 14-00461 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THIRTY ONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

JEFFREY COHEN, INDIVIDUALLY, DEFENDANT, 

THE GILL HOUSE AND CHARTER HOUSE INN, LLC, 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (JANET D. CALLAHAN OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

MCMAHON, KUBLICK & SMITH, P.C., SYRACUSE (JAN S. KUBLICK OF COUNSEL),

FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Jefferson County (Hugh

A. Gilbert, J.), entered June 4, 2013. The order denied the motion of

defendant The Gill House and Charter House Inn, LLC, for, inter alia,

a declaration that a purchase and sale contract was null and void and

granted the cross motion of plaintiff for summary judgment seeking

specific performance. 

Now, upon reading and filing the stipulation of discontinuance

signed by the attorneys for the parties on December 4 and 5, 2014,

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed 

without costs upon stipulation.

Entered: January 2, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1080 

To amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to require the use of nontoxic 

products in the case of hydraulic fracturing that occurs during oil or 

natural gas production activities. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 19, 2005 

Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. 

LIEBERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

A BILL

To amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to require the use 

of nontoxic products in the case of hydraulic fracturing 

that occurs during oil or natural gas production activities.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hydraulic Fracturing 

5 Safety Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING. 

7 Section 1421(d)(1) of the Safe Drinking Water Act 

8 (42 U.S.C. 300h(d)(1)) is amended— 
2

•S 1080 IS

1 (1) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘The 

2 term ‘underground injection’ includes hydraulic frac3 turing, which means the process of creating a frac4 ture in a reservoir rock, through the injection of 

5 fluids and propping agents, for the purpose of res6 ervoir stimulation relating to oil and gas production 

7 activities.’’; and 

8 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(3) HYDRAULIC FRACTURING.— 

10 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of hydrau11 lic fracturing that occurs during the exploration 

12 for, or the production of, oil or natural gas, a 

13 producer of oil or natural gas shall not use die14 sel fuel or any other material that the Adminis15 trator has listed as a priority pollutant under 

16 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 

17 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.). 

18 ‘‘(B) REGULATIONS.—The Administrator 

19 shall promulgate such regulations as are nec20 essary— 

21 ‘‘(i) to regulate hydraulic fracturing in 

22 accordance with this subsection; and 

23 ‘‘(ii) to ensure that State programs 

24 under section 1422 or 1425 regulate hy-
3

•S 1080 IS

1 draulic fracturing in accordance with this 

2 subsection.’’.

Æ
Editorial Note on Part 17
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 17 appear at 68 FR 24879, May 9, 2003, and at 88 FR 45065, July 14, 2023.

§ 17.25 Exchange of witness lists, witness statements, and exhibits. ( a ) At least 30 days before the hearing, or by such other time as is specified by the presiding officer, the parties shall exchange witness lists, copies of prior written statements of proposed witnesses, and copies of proposed hearing exhibits, including written testimony.
( b ) ( 1 ) If a party objects to the proposed admission of evidence not exchanged in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, the presiding officer will exclude such evidence if he or she determines that the failure to comply with paragraph (a) of this section should result in its exclusion.
( 2 ) Unless the presiding officer finds that extraordinary circumstances justified the failure to make a timely exchange of witness lists under paragraph (a) of this section, he or she must exclude from the party's hearing evidence the testimony of any witness whose name does not appear on the witness list.
( 3 ) If the presiding officer finds that extraordinary circumstances existed, the presiding officer must then determine whether the admission of the testimony of any witness whose name does not appear on the witness lists exchanged under paragraph (a) of this section would cause substantial prejudice to the objecting party. If the presiding officer finds that there is not substantial prejudice, the evidence may be admitted. If the presiding officer finds that there is substantial prejudice, the presiding officer may exclude the evidence, or at his or her discretion, may postpone the hearing for such time as is necessary for the objecting party to prepare and respond to the evidence.
( c ) Unless a party objects within 5 days prior to the hearing, documents exchanged in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section will be deemed to be authentic for the purpose of admissibility at the hearing.
### Ground-water resources of southern New Castle County, Delaware

By: Donald Robert RimaO. J. CoskeryP.W. Anderson

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/wsp1756

#### Links

-                                                                                                                             Document:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  **Report**                                                                                                     (pdf)                                                                                                                                     
- Plates:                               - **Plate 1**                            (pdf)
  - **Plate 2**                            (pdf) 
- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
Amendment to Shareholder Rights Agreement



 Exhibit 4.1 
 AMENDMENT NO. 1 
 TO 
 SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AGREEMENT 
 On July 26, 2006, the Board of Directors of
Amedisys, Inc. (the “Company”) adopted the following amendments to Section 1.1 of the Company’s Shareholder Rights Agreement, dated as of June 15, 2000 (all changes are underlined): 
 1.1 Certain Definitions. For purposes of this Agreement, the following terms have the meanings indicated: “Acquiring Person” shall mean any Person who
or which, together with all Affiliates and Associates of such Person, is a Beneficial Owner of 15% or more of the outstanding shares of Common Stock on the date of this Agreement; provided, however, that the term “Acquiring Person” shall
not include any Person (i) [. . .], (ii) who is the Beneficial owner of 15% or more of the outstanding shares of Common Stock but who acquired the excess over 14.9% of Beneficial Ownership of shares of Common Stock
inadvertently and without any plan or intention to seek or affect control of the Company, if such Person promptly enters into an irrevocable commitment promptly (and no later than seven business days after written notice by the Company to
such Person that it is the Beneficial Owner of 15% or more of the outstanding shares of Common Stock) to divest, and thereafter promptly divests (without exercising or retaining any power, including voting power, with respect to such shares),
sufficient shares of Common Stock so that such Person ceases to be the Beneficial Owner of 15% or more of the outstanding shares of Common Stock [. . .].
§ 16.42 Presiding officer. ( a ) An FDA employee to whom the Commissioner delegates such authority, or any other agency employee designated by an employee to whom such authority is delegated, or, consistent with 5 CFR 930.209(b) or (c), an administrative law judge to whom such authority is delegated, may serve as the presiding officer and conduct a regulatory hearing under this part.
( b ) In a regulatory hearing required by the act or a regulation, the presiding officer is to be free from bias or prejudice and may not have participated in the investigation or action that is the subject of the hearing or be subordinate to a person, other than the Commissioner, who has participated in such investigation or action.
( c ) ( 1 ) The Commissioner or the delegate under § 16.40 is not precluded by this section from prior participation in the investigation or action that is the subject of the hearing. If there has been prior participation, the Commissioner or the delegate should, if feasible, designate a presiding officer for the hearing who is not a subordinate. Thus, if the Commissioner's authority to make a final decision has been delegated to a center director, the presiding officer may be an official in another center or the office of the Commissioner. The exercise of general supervisory responsibility, or the designation of the presiding officer, does not constitute prior participation in the investigation or action that is the subject of the hearing so as to preclude the Commissioner or delegate from designating a subordinate as the presiding officer.
( 2 ) The party requesting a hearing may make a written request to have the Commissioner or the delegate under § 16.40 be the presiding officer, notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this section. If accepted, as a matter of discretion, by the Commissioner or the delegate, the request is binding upon the party making the request.
( 3 ) A different presiding officer may be substituted for the one originally designated under § 16.22 without notice to the parties.
[44 FR 22367, Apr. 13, 1979, as amended at 54 FR 9037, Mar. 3, 1989; 67 FR 53306, Aug. 15, 2002]
§ 1401.14 Restrictions on charging fees. ( a ) No search fees will be charged for requests by educational institutions (unless the records are sought for a commercial use), noncommercial scientific institutions, or representatives of the news media.
( b ) If ONDCP fails to comply with the FOIA's time limits in which to respond to a request, it may not charge search fees, or, in the instances of requests from requesters described in § 1401.13(b)(2), may not charge duplication fees, except as described in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this section.
( c ) If ONDCP determines that unusual circumstances as defined by the FOIA apply and the agency provided timely written notice to the requester in accordance with the FOIA, a failure to comply with the time limit shall be excused for an additional 10 days.
( d ) If ONDCP determines that unusual circumstances as defined by the FOIA apply, and more than 5,000 pages are necessary to respond to the request, the agency may charge search fees, or, in the case of requesters described in § 1401.13(b)(2) of this section, may charge duplication fees if the following steps are taken. ONDCP must have provided timely written notice of unusual circumstances to the requester in accordance with the FOIA and the agency must have discussed with the requester via written mail, email, or telephone (or made not less than three good-faith attempts to do so) how the requester could effectively limit the scope of the request in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(B)(ii). If this exception is satisfied, ONDCP may charge all applicable fees incurred in the processing of the request.
( e ) If a court has determined that exceptional circumstances exist as defined by the FOIA, a failure to comply with the time limits shall be excused for the length of time provided by the court order.
( f ) No search or review fees will be charged for a quarter-hour period unless more than half of that period is required for search or review.
( g ) When, after first deducting the 100 free pages (or its cost equivalent) and the first two hours of search, a total fee calculated under paragraph (c) of this section is $25.00 or less for any request, no fee will be charged.
#### CARMELLA CIOCCA, PROSECUTOR, v. THE NATIONAL SUGAR REFINING COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY, RESPONDENT.

Submitted January 18, 1939

Decided February 21, 1939.

Before Justices Case, Donges and Porter.

For the prosecutor, *Arthur F. Mead*and *Cox & Walburg.*

For the respondent, *John J. Breslin, Jr.,*and *McCarter & English.*

Per Curiam.

The writ brings up for review a judgment in the Bergen County Court of Common Pleas reversing a judgment which had been awarded by the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau in favor of the petitioner on a workman’s compensation claim. In awarding judgment, Judge Del Mar filed this opinion:

> “Following an award of the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau in favor of the petitioner-appellee the respondent-appellant appealed to this court. I find from the evidence that Salvatore Cioeca, the petitioner’s deceased husband, died from heat prostration about two and a half hours after being stricken during the course of his employment by the respond*166ent-appellant, at its plant in Edgewater. The sole question at issue is whether the death was caused by an accident arising out of his employment. I find from the evidence that he was overcome by heat while sweeping crumbs of sugar with a broom weighing two and a half pounds. The place where he worked was a large, well ventilated warehouse, built over the Hudson river, the day was hot, but Cioeea was not exposed at any time to the direct rays of the sun. There is no evidence that the place where he worked was hotter than other places in the vicinity. In fact, all the evidence on this point indicates that it was cooler. Neither is there any evidence that his exposure to the heat of the day was greater than that suffered by the public generally, nor that he was exerting himself unduly or unusually, nor that he was doing heavy work or working longer than was usual. He was not exposed to any artificial heat. There is, to sum it up, no evidence that his employment in any way contributed to or caused his prostration by heat or his ensuing death. There being no evidence that in his employment the decedent was subjected to a greater risk than that to which persons in the locality generally were exposed, his dependents are not entitled to compensation. *Kauffeld*v. *Pfund,*77 *N. J. L.*335. This conclusion results in setting aside the award to the appellee, and the award of a judgment in favor of the appellant.”

*We*concur in the findings of fact and of law therein expressed. Other cases, namely, *George*v. Waldron, 111 *N. J. L.*4; *Matthews*v. *Woodbridge,*14 *N. J. Mis. R.*143; *Byrant*v. *Fissell,*84 *N. J. L.*73; *Richter*v. DuPont, 118 *Id.*404, and *Hentz*v. *Janssen Dairy Corp.,*131 *Id.*160, do not serve to change that determination.

The judgment below will be affirmed, with costs.
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7848

TAHRIM SUPREME C. JIHAD, a/k/a Vincent Edward

Little,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES HARVEY, Regional Administrator; LAURIE

F. BESSINGER, Warden; JOYCE BROWN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (CA-96-1971-2-22AJ)

Submitted: August 11, 1998 Decided: September 17, 1998

Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Tahrim Supreme C. Jihad, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Stephen Pauley,

LIDE, MONTGOMERY, POTTS & MEDLOCK, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina;

Andrew Frederick Lindemann, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A.,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) complaint. We

have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. Jihad v. Harvey, No. CA-96-1971-2-22AJ (D.S.C. Dec.

8, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Jasvir SINGH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-76475.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 3, 2005.*

Decided Oct. 19, 2005.

*542Inna Lipkin, Esq., Law Offices of Kuldip Singh Dhariwal, Fremont, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit. Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SKOPIL, BOOCHEVER, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jasvir Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial by an immigration judge (IJ) of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review under the substantial evidence standard and will uphold the decision unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. *See Singh v. Ashcroft,*367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2004). We deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that conditions have changed in India such that Singh no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. *See Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft,*336 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding a denial of asylum based on changed country conditions where the agency rationally construed state department report). The IJ provided a detailed, individualized analysis of Singh’s situation. The IJ and the BIA rationally construed the recent country reports which state that conditions have improved in India for Sikhs and that persecution on account of political opinion has diminished. *See id.*at 1000. Moreover, Singh testified that he was a rank and file member, not a leader, of the Sikh student movement in 1996. Even taking Singh’s factual contention as true that the police may still have a file on him many years after his departure from India in 1997, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that changed country conditions indicate that Singh no longer has a well-founded fear of future persecution. *Id.*

Because Singh failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he has necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Movsisian v. Ashcroft,*395 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th *543Cir.2005). Singh has also failed to meet the standard for CAT relief. *See El Himri v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir.2004); *Kamalthas v. INS,*251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.2001).

Pursuant to *Desta v. Ashcroft,*365 F.3d 741, 745-46 (9th Cir.2004), Singh’s motion for stay of .removal is construed to include a timely request for stay of voluntary departure. This stay will expire upon the issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.