DHS Has Limited Capabilities 

to Counter Illicit Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems 

June 25, 2020 

OIG-20-43 
June 25, 2020
	
 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

DHS Has Limited Capabilities to 

Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

June 25, 2020 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems (UAS), commonly 

referred to as ‘drones,’ 

present an emerging threat 

to the Nation as their 

popularity grows. 

Terrorists, criminal 

organizations, and lone 

actors have used UAS for 

malicious purposes. The 

Department of Homeland 

Security is tasked with 

protecting and securing 

the homeland from these 

evolving threats. We 

conducted this audit to 

determine to what extent 

DHS counters illicit use of 

UAS while protecting the 

homeland. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made four 

recommendations to 

improve the Department’s 

management and 

implementation of counterunmanned aircraft 

systems (C-UAS) activities. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

 (202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

DHS’ capability to counter illicit UAS activity remains 

limited. On November 8, 2018, the former DHS 

Secretary issued an internal memorandum calling for a 

uniform approach to DHS’ expansion of its C-UAS 

capability under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act. 

The Secretary assigned the Office of Strategy, Policy, 

and Plans (Office of Policy) as the Department’s lead 

over components with authorized C-UAS missions 

(United States Secret Service, United States Coast 

Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Federal 

Protective Service). The Secretary instructed these 

components to not take any actions toward C-UAS 

expansion until the Office of Policy completed a uniform 

approach for doing so. 

However, the Office of Policy did not execute a uniform 

approach as directed because it did not request the 

funding needed to obtain subject matter experts to fulfill 

all of the Secretary’s requirements for the uniform 

approach, including developing a realistic work plan 

and issuing complete department-wide C-UAS guidance. 

According to DHS officials, funding for C-UAS 

expansion unsuccessfully competed with other mission 

priorities for budget resources. Consequently, DHS will 

remain vulnerable to increased security risks and 

emerging threats from unmanned aircraft until it 

expands its capability to counter illicit UAS activity. 

Agency Response 

DHS concurred with all four recommendations and 

initiated corrective actions to address the findings. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly referred to as ‘drones,’ present 

an emerging threat to the Nation as their popularity grows. The FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 defines a UAS as an unmanned aircraft 

and its associated elements. These elements include the pilot in command and 

the aircraft that operate in the national airspace system. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) projects the recreational UAS fleet to grow from 1.2 

million units in 2018 to 1.4 million in 2023, an average annual growth rate of 

2.2 percent. Additionally, the commercial UAS fleet is forecasted to nearly 

triple from 277,386 in 2018 to 835,211 in 2023, an average annual growth rate 

of 24.7 percent. Further with more than 900,000 UAS owners registered as of 

December 31, 2018, the FAA estimated there were about 1.25 million model 

drones in circulation. As described, the legitimate use of UAS is on the rise. 

The increased availability of drones on the open market continues to amplify 

security risks and emerging threats for the foreseeable future. Table 1 provides 

a brief identification and explanation of UAS-related threats facing the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

Table 1: DHS’ UAS-Related Threats and Definitions 

UAS Threat Definition/Explanation 

Weaponized or 

Smuggling Payloads 

UAS are capable of transporting contraband, chemical, 

or other explosive/weaponized payloads. 

Prohibited Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance 

UAS are capable of silently monitoring a large area 

from the sky for nefarious purposes. 

Intellectual Property 

Theft 

UAS are capable of performing cybercrimes involving 

theft of sensitive information. 

Intentional Disruption or 

Harassment 

UAS are capable of disrupting and invading the privacy 

of individuals. 

Source: DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 

In a September 5, 2018 press release, “Rethinking Homeland Security in an 

Age of Disruption”, the DHS Secretary remarked, “Terrorists are using drones 

on the battlefield to surveil and to 

destroy. Drug smugglers are using them 

to monitor border patrol officers so they 

can slip into America undetected. And 

criminals are using them to spy on 

sensitive facilities. Drones can also be 

used to disrupt communications and or to 

steal data on nearby Wi-Fi.” In January 

2015, a drone crashed onto the lawn of 

the White House illustrating a drone’s 

ability to evade detection and create 

challenges for secure facilities. Figure 1 

 Figure 1: Drone that Crashed onto the 

 White House Lawn

 Source: Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

 obtained from internet 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

shows the drone recovered from the White House lawn by the United States 

Secret Service (Secret Service). Further, in August 2017, drug smugglers used 

a drone to smuggle 13 pounds of methamphetamine across the Southwest 

Border of the United States. Figure 2 shows the drone and methamphetamine 

recovered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 

Figure 2: A Drone Smuggling Methamphetamine across the Southwest Border 

Source: OIG obtained from internet 

These are just two examples of the illicit UAS activity DHS faces as it seeks to 

expand its Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capability.1 

DHS Authorities 

On October 5, 2018, the President signed into law the Preventing Emerging 

Threats Act of 2018 (the Act), the first statutory grant of authority for DHS to 

explicitly counter UAS threats. Prior to passage of the Act, only the Secret 

Service and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) had express 

authority to counter illicit UAS activity. These components’ capabilities were 

limited because C-UAS authority was either restricted to each component’s 

specific mission or under the auspices of another department. 

Secret Service 

According to Secret Service officials, the Secret Service started its C-UAS 

development in 2012 prior to passage of the Act, to support requirements of its 

protective mission pursuant to 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) 3056, Powers, 

1 We define C-UAS capability as being able to perform all five authorized actions (detection, 

identification, monitoring, tracking, and mitigation), and limited C-UAS capability as being able 

to perform at least one, but not all, authorized actions. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Authorities, and Duties of United States Secret Service and pursuant to 

Executive Order 12333. 

Coast Guard 

In June 2017, the Deputy Commandant for Operations directed the Coast 

Guard to pursue C-UAS authorized actions under Department of Defense 

(DOD) authority to support its maritime escort mission. Therefore, the Coast 

Guard’s C-UAS capability was restricted to operating during DOD maritime 

escort missions. In this capacity, the Coast Guard operates under Title 10 

U.S.C. Section 130i - Protection of Certain Facilities and Assets from Unmanned 

Aircraft, whereby certain DOD assets require Coast Guard escorts when 

operating in and out of their homeports. 

CBP and Federal Protective Service 

Passage of the Act expanded DHS legacy component authorities by granting 

CBP and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) authority to obtain and operate 

C-UAS mitigation capabilities. For example, CBP did not have the express 

authority to mitigate a UAS threat before the passage of the Act. However, it 

was able to passively detect UAS activities using its existing border surveillance 

capabilities. Further, FPS had neither the authority nor the capability to 

mitigate a UAS threat before passage of the Act empowered it to do so. At the 

time of our audit, FPS was not actively pursuing a C-UAS capability. 

Table 2 identifies DHS component authorities to counter illicit UAS prior to and 

following the passage of the Act. 

Table 2: DHS C-UAS Authorities Prior to and Following the Act 

Secret 

Service 

Coast Guard CBP FPS 

Prior to Act Yes Yes No No 

Post Act Yes Yes Yes Yes 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of authorities before and after the Act 

In general, the Act permits authorized DHS component personnel to: 

 detect, identify, monitor, and track UAS without prior consent; 

 warn the operator of a UAS, including by electromagnetic means; 

 disrupt control, seize control, or confiscate a UAS without prior 

consent; and 

 use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy a UAS. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

C-UAS Capability 

Authorized component personnel may operate C-UAS capabilities to eliminate 

credible threats2 posed by a UAS. These capabilities include systems or 

devices capable of performing five authorized actions to secure and protect 

covered facilities or assets:3 detect, identify, monitor, track, and mitigate. 

C-UAS capabilities may require a layered approach that integrates the following 

actions necessary to mitigate a potential threat. 

 Detect – Discovering a UAS by visual or electronic means. 

 Identify – Distinguishing UAS threats from lawful activity. 

 Monitor – Continuous observation of a UAS to determine intent. 

 Track – Observation of a UAS to determine its path. 

 Mitigate – Acting to deter, prevent, or minimize the consequences of 

safety and security threats posed by certain UAS. DHS may use both 

nonkinetic force, such as electronic means, and reasonable physical 

force to mitigate UAS threats. 

We conducted this audit to determine to what extent DHS counters illicit use of 

UAS while protecting the homeland. 

Results of Audit 

DHS’ C-UAS Capabilities Remain Limited 

The Department’s capability to counter illicit UAS activity remains limited. 

DHS’ components with authorized C-UAS missions (Secret Service, Coast 

Guard, CBP, and FPS) could not expand their C-UAS capabilities as permitted 

by the Act because the Office of Policy did not execute a uniform approach by 

which to do so, as the Secretary had directed. Specifically, the Office of Policy 

did not request the funding required to obtain subject matter experts to fulfill 

all of the Secretary’s requirements of the uniform approach, including 

developing a realistic work plan and issuing complete department-wide C-UAS 

guidance. According to DHS officials, funding for C-UAS expansion 

unsuccessfully competed with other Department mission priorities for budget 

resources. Consequently, DHS will remain vulnerable to increased security 

risks and emerging threats from unmanned aircraft until it expands its 

capability to counter illicit UAS activity. 

2 Credible threat is the reasonable likelihood a UAS, if unabated, would disrupt DHS 

operations.
 3 Covered facilities and assets are (i) located in the United States, (ii) directly related to certain 

DHS missions, and (iii) identified as high-risk and potential targets for unlawful UAS activity. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS Did Not Expand Its C-UAS Capabilities 

On November 8, 2018, the former DHS Secretary issued an internal 

memorandum, Preparing for Implementation of the Preventing Emerging Threats 

Act of 2018, outlining a uniform approach to expanding DHS’ C-UAS capability. 

The Secretary assigned DHS’ Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (Office of 

Policy) as the lead over Department components authorized to conduct C-UAS 

operations. Further, the Secretary instructed the components to not take any 

C-UAS implementation actions under the Act until Office of Policy had 

completed the uniform approach. 

However, the Office of Policy did not proceed with executing the desired 

uniform approach, preventing components from expanding their capabilities as 

permitted by the Act. The Secret Service continued operating a C-UAS 

capability for its protective mission and the Coast Guard did not expand its 

capability beyond its DOD maritime escort mission. Additionally, CBP and FPS 

did not obtain C-UAS capabilities. Table 3 identifies DHS’ capability to counter 

illicit UAS prior to and following passage of the Act and issuance of the former 

Secretary’s memo. 

Table 3: DHS C-UAS Capability Prior to and Following the Act 

Secret 

Service 

Coast Guard CBP FPS 

Pre Act / 

Memo 

Yes – 

Protective 

Mission 

Yes – DOD Maritime 

Escort Mission No No 

Post Act / 

Memo 

Yes – 

Protective 

Mission 

Yes – DOD Maritime 

Escort Mission No No

 Source: DHS OIG analysis of C-UAS capability before and after the passage of the Act 

Office of Policy Remained Unfunded 

The Office of Policy did not execute a uniform approach to expand DHS’ C-UAS 

capability because it did not request funding as directed by the Secretary. The 

Secretary’s memo directed the Office of Policy to work with the Office of the 

Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) to prepare a request for reprogramming4 of prior 

year funds. However, according to Office of Policy officials, they did not believe 

the OCFO would approve a reprogramming request for C-UAS implementation 

efforts because of numerous competing budgetary priorities. Therefore, the 

Office of Policy did not submit a formal reprogramming request to the OCFO as 

directed in the Secretary’s memorandum and did not obtain the funding it 

4 Reprogramming is the moving of funds within an appropriation or from one budget activity to 

another. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

needed to support C-UAS expansion. 

Lack of Subject Matter Experts 

In its response to the FY 2020 DHS Appropriations Bill Technical Assistance 

Request, the Office of Policy identified a need for specific subject matter experts 

to guide its C-UAS expansion across six lines of effort: 

1. policy development; 

2. interagency coordination / driving implementation; 

3. requirements, research, development, and testing and evaluation; 

4. operations coordination; 

5. external training, education and engagement; and 

6. program management. 

However, inadequate funding prevented the Office of Policy from obtaining the 

subject matter experts it needed to fulfill all of the Secretary’s requirements for 

DHS’ C-UAS expansion, including developing a work plan and issuing 

department-wide C-UAS guidance. As such, the Office of Policy relied on 

detailees who did not possess the technical expertise needed to facilitate DHS' 

C-UAS implementation. According to Office of Policy officials, their office did 

not possess the full complement of skills needed to drive progress and ensure 

department-wide coordination of C-UAS activities. 

Unrealistic Work Plan 

The Secretary’s memorandum directed the Office of Policy to develop a C-UAS 

work plan describing implementation actions and including milestones to aid 

DHS’ C-UAS efforts. The work plan the Office of Policy developed enabled DHS 

to complete some, but not all, required C-UAS expansion tasks, and not always 

on time. The plan was also unrealistic, resulting in DHS missing target dates 

for completing several tasks outlined in the Secretary’s memorandum. For 

example, DHS issued C-UAS guidance in September 2019, significantly later 

than the target date of April 2019. Additionally, guidance for resource 

allocation plans for FY 2019 funding, the incident reporting process, and 

covered facility prioritization remain incomplete. DHS officials from three 

offices confirmed the work plan was outdated and no longer relevant. Table 4 

shows selected implementation actions with estimated and actual completion 

dates. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Table 4: Selected Work Plan Target Dates versus Actual Completion Dates 

Task Name Target Date Actual Date 

Establish Executive Steering 

Committee and Working Groups November 2018 November 2018 

Provide Guidance for Resource 

Allocation Plans for FY19 Funding December 2018 Incomplete 

Develop Incident Reporting Process January 2019 Incomplete 

Covered Facility or Asset Identification 

and Prioritization Process December 2018 Incomplete 

Departmental Guidance* April 2019 September 2019 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of Office of Policy C-UAS work plan 

* Although Department policy guidance was issued, we determined it was incomplete, as we 

identify later in the report. 

C-UAS Guidance Is Incomplete 

The Secretary’s memorandum required the Office of Policy to develop and issue 

C-UAS guidance for DHS prior to any implementation efforts. The Office of 

Policy issued the Secretary’s Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Policy 

Guidance on September 10, 2019, but the guidance was incomplete. Although 

the guidance referred to six annexes specifying processes and procedures DHS 

components authorized to conduct C-UAS operations should follow to ensure 

program uniformity and consistency, the annexes were missing from the 

document. The six annexes were to describe the key processes and procedures 

related to covered facilities, coordination, privacy, external support, reporting, 

and key definitions. As of the final report issuance, DHS officials confirmed the 

Office of Policy had not completed the six annexes. 

Conclusion 

Until DHS funds the C-UAS initiative, and authorized components expand their 

capability to counter illicit UAS activity, the homeland will remain vulnerable to 

increased security risks and emerging threats for the foreseeable future. 

Without subject matter experts, a realistic work plan, and fully developed 

C-UAS guidance, DHS’ ability to coordinate component C-UAS efforts will 

continue to be hindered. Further, without proper coordination across 

components and a uniform approach to expansion, C-UAS capabilities could be 

significantly delayed or altogether ineffective. Specifically: 

	 C-UAS policies may be fragmented and vary from component to 

component, potentially leading to inconsistent applications of C-UAS 

capabilities and authorities. 

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 Components may develop and use different standards to assess and 

propose assets and locations for C-UAS protection. 

 Some components may acquire and deploy less capable systems than 

other components, hindering DHS’ overall ability to counter the UAS 

threat. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, 

and Plans identify its budget requirements and convey those requirements to 

the Office of the Chief Financial Officer for consideration as identified in the 

Secretary of Homeland Security’s memorandum dated November 8, 2018. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, 

and Plans conduct an objective workforce analysis of the C-UAS Program 

Management Office to determine the appropriate staff needed to accomplish the 

office’s mission cost-effectively. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, 

and Plans develop a timeline with achievable goals for C-UAS capability 

implementation across the Department. 

Recommendation 4: We recommend the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, 

and Plans complete the Secretary’s Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Policy 

Guidance, including the annexes specifying processes and procedures the 

Department needs to conduct C-UAS operations and ensure program 

uniformity and consistency. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Office of Policy concurred with our four recommendations and is taking 

steps, or has implemented actions to address them. Although the Office of 

Policy did not concur with our overall report conclusion, we still contend that it 

did not execute a uniform approach to address the Secretary’s 

November 8, 2018 memorandum, Preparing for Implementation of the Preventing 

Emerging Threats Act of 2018. The Office of Policy cites that the approach it 

developed and implemented to include establishment of the C-UAS Program 

Management Office (PMO) facilitated meaningful progress in its efforts to 

address the Secretary’s requirements. We likewise acknowledge the 

establishment of the C-UAS PMO and other initiatives it undertook as 

important steps toward meeting the Secretary’s mandate. However, the C-UAS 

PMO did not fully carry out the steps outlined in the Secretary’s memo, which 

prevented implementation of a uniform approach and deployment of a 

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Department of Homeland Security 

department-wide C-UAS capability. Consequently, the Department’s C-UAS 

capability was not expanded beyond the capabilities that the Secret Service and 

Coast Guard already possessed. 

The Office of Policy also questioned, "The value added in recommending actions 

the audit team was told were already being taken" to correct the deficiencies we 

identified. We recognize that the Office of Policy proactively implemented some 

actions towards resolving our recommendations. However, providing formal 

recommendations in our report holds the audited entity accountable to ensure 

these deficiencies ultimately are fully implemented. Although the Office of 

Policy satisfied one of the four recommendations we made in its entirety, this is 

only one step needed to achieve the Secretary’s uniform department-wide CUAS approach. 

Appendix A contains the Office of Policy’s management comments in their 

entirety. We also received technical comments to the draft report and revised 

the report where appropriate. A summary of the Office of Policy's responses 

and our analysis follow. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 1: Concur. The Office of Policy’s PMO 

manages all C-UAS coordination across the Department and related 

interagency efforts. A fully functional PMO requires approximately $5 million 

annually to support nine full-time equivalent staff and operating funds. The 

Office of Policy submitted this requirement to the OCFO on April 5, 2020, as 

part of the formal Fiscal Years 2022–2026 Resource Allocation Planning 

process. 

OIG Analysis of DHS Comments: The Office of Policy has taken steps to 

satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We obtained and analyzed the 

Resource Allocation Plan Program Decision Option for FYs 2022–2026 and 

determined that the Office of Policy identified and conveyed necessary budget 

requirements to the OCFO. If the Office of Policy receives the full budget as 

requested, it should be able to complete many of the requirements to 

implement a C-UAS capability throughout the Department. We consider this 

recommendation resolved and closed. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 2: Concur. In addition to the 

$5 million budget requirement submitted to DHS’ OCFO on April 5, 2020, the 

Office of Policy will scope and execute a workforce analysis tailored to meet 

requirements for a future state C-UAS PMO. The Office of Policy will identify 

an appropriate funding source and the appropriate resource to perform the 

workforce analysis. The PMO will also collaborate with component partners to 

clearly delineate roles and responsibilities as well as prioritize its functions to 

better identify required subject matter expertise, as appropriate. Estimated 

Completion Date: April 30, 2021. 

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OIG Analysis of DHS Comments: The Office of Policy has taken steps to 

satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We consider this recommendation 

resolved, but it will remain open until the Office of Policy provides 

documentation to support that all planned corrective actions are completed. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 3: Concur. Establishing the DHS 

C-UAS PMO within the Office of Policy’s Office of Counterterrorism and Threat 

Prevention Policy enhances DHS’ implementation and oversight capacity, and 

enables completion of tasks within established deadlines, along with 

improvements in interagency communications. The C-UAS PMO and 

components made significant progress completing activities identified in the 

current work plan. The PMO and components will work with partners to 

refresh the work plan by closing out completed milestones, prioritizing current 

activities, and establishing new milestones based on relevant projects. The 

C-UAS PMO will account for funding and staffing while developing milestones 

and deliverable due dates. Estimated Completion Date: April 30, 2021. 

OIG Analysis of DHS Comments: The Office of Policy has taken steps to 

satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We consider this recommendation 

resolved, but it will remain open until the Office of Policy provides 

documentation to support that all planned corrective actions are completed. 

DHS Comments to Recommendation 4: Concur. As of May 12, 2020, the 

Office of Policy had completed three of the six required annexes, and was 

coordinating the remaining three draft annexes through the Department-wide 

clearance processes, as appropriate. Estimated Completion Date: December 

31, 2020. 

OIG Analysis of DHS Comments: The Office of Policy has taken steps to 

satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We consider this recommendation 

resolved, but it will remain open until the Office of Policy provides 

documentation to support that all planned corrective actions are completed. 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

Our audit objective was to determine to what extent DHS counters illicit use of 

UAS while protecting the homeland. To accomplish our objective, we reviewed 

Federal laws and regulations related to countering unmanned aircraft systems 

and DHS’ internal controls, policies, procedures, and guidance associated with 

UAS. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

We interviewed DHS personnel from the Office of Policy, Office of the General 

Counsel, Coast Guard, CBP, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secret Service, Transportation 

Security Administration, OCFO, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis, and FPS. 

We reviewed Secret Service, CBP, Coast Guard, and FPS policy and guidance 

relevant to C-UAS. We analyzed components’ UAS sighting data. This 

included sightings from Secret Service, Coast Guard, CBP, FPS, and the 

Transportation Security Administration. However, we are not relying on the 

data to support our findings or conclusions. Therefore, we did not perform 

data reliability testing. 

We conducted this performance audit between February 2019 and October 

2019 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Maryann Pereira, Director; 

Anthony Colache, Audit Manager; Mark Lonetto, Auditor-in-Charge; Ryan 

McCarthy, Auditor; Zachary Wilkolaski, Auditor; Tessa Clement, Independent 

Reference Reviewer; James Lazarus, Attorney Advisor; and Thomas Hamlin, 

Communications Analyst. 

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Appendix A 

Office of Policy Comments to the Draft Report 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Appendix B 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Senior Official Performing the Duties of Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, 

Policy, and Plans 

CBP Commissioner 

Coast Guard Commandant 

Secret Service Director 

FPS Director 

TSA Administrator 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-20-43 
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www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

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