### *The Hon. Byron R. White, Associate Justice, Retired,

Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation. The Hon. Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for 1 

### the District of Nebraska. _____________ No. 95-1217NE

_____________ Dandy Ebmeier, * * Appellant, * * On Appeal from the United v. * States District Court * for the District * of Nebraska. Jill Stump, Dennis S. O'Brien, * and Ann Stillman, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: October 19, 1995 Filed: December 4, 1995

___________ Before R ICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WHITE, Associate Justice, an d * LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.
In this § 1983 case, Dandy Ebmeier claims Jill Stump, Dennis O' Brien, and Ann Stillman, all former employees of the Nebraska Department of Socia l Services ("NDSS"), violated his federal due-proc ess rights by disregarding
a court-approved plan aimed at reuniting Mr. Ebmeier with his two children
. The District Court 1

### The District Court dismissed Mr. Ebmeier's state-law claims 2 

### without prejudice. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the Buffalo County 3 

### Court's decision terminating Mr. Ebmeier's parental rights. In re Interest of S.B.E. and D.E. , 240 Neb. 748, 484 N.W.2d 97 (1992). The NDSS manual provides that "[a]lternatives to 4 

### reunification should be considered only when all reasonable efforts to reunify the family have been exhausted and return home appears unlikely." Nebraska Dep't of Social Services Manual, Title 474, Neb. Admin. Code § 4-007.02(2). -2- grante d summary judgment for the defendants, holding that, given th e circumstances, Ms. Stump, Ms. Stillman, and Mr. O'Brien acted in a n objectively reasonable manner. We affirm. 2

I. In April, 1988, a state court in Buffalo County, Nebraska, foun d that Mr. Ebmeier had neglected and abused his two children. The court therefor e placed the children with NDSS. Two months later, the court approved NDSS' s "therapeutic plan." The plan's long-term goal was reuniting Mr. Ebmeier and th e children. The court noted, however, that "the extent of th e problems disclosed have not and will not, in the near future, allo w reunification of the children into the family ho me although all reasonable efforts to accomplish that goal have been taken or are being planned for the family."
The court's skepticism was, in hindsight, well-founded. Althou gh the reunification plan remained in effect, the defen dants decided to begin the process of terminating Mr. Ebmeier's parental ri ghts. Two years after the court approved the plan, a petition for termination was filed, and th e court terminated Mr. Ebmeier's parental rights in November, 1990. 3

Mr. Ebmeier claims the defendants "disregarded" both the Buffal o County C ourt's order approving the reunification plan and NDSS policy, 4 thereby violating his "constitutionally protected

### -3-

fundamental liberty interest in the care and cus tody of his children." As the District Court put it, Mr. Ebmeier asserts a "clearly established righ t requiring the defendants to adhere strictly to the court order tha t directed them to devise a reunification plan."

II.
The Distr ict Court did not decide whether Mr. Ebmeier had a federal right requiring the defendants to adhere unswervingly to the court-approve d case plan. Rather, the Court held that even if Mr. Ebmeier did enjoy such
a right, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Cour t noted the precarious situations child-welfare workers confront and the fin e lines they must observe, and held that, given all the circumstances, Ms. Still man's, Mr. O'Brien's, and Ms. Stump's actions were objectivel y reasonable. We agree.
In qualif ied-immunity cases, however, "the threshold question . . . is whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutiona l right." Cole v. Bone , 993 F.2d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Siegert
v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991)). We take thi s op portunity to emphasize that violations of state laws, state-agenc y regulations, and, more particularly, state-court orders, do not b y themselves state a cl aim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 guards and vindicate s federal rights alone. Mr. Ebmeier insists that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in t he care and custody of his children, and he surely does. The constitutional rights of parents reflec t our respect for the dignity of families, and these rights constrain th e act ions of even the best-intentioned social workers. But Mr. Ebmeier' s particular claim is that the defendants

### We are not saying that the defendants actually did 5 

### disregard the court-approved plan or NDSS policy. On our reading, the text and tone of the court's order and of the relevant statements of NDSS policy are aspirational, not mandatory. For example, the manual calls on caseworkers to reassess periodically the possibility of attaining the original goals of a case plan. Neb. Dep't of Social Services Manual, Title 474, Neb. Admin. Code § 4-007.02. See also Cole v. Bone , 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993) 6 

### (issue under § 1983 is whether defendant violated federal or constitutional rights, not whether he violated policies of state agency); Edwards v. Baer , 863 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1988) (police department guidelines do not create constitutional rights); Myers v. Morris , 810 F.2d 1437, 1469-70 (8th Cir.) (violation of state law not cognizable under § 1983), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 828 (1987). -4- violat ed his federal constitutional rights by deviating from the court

approved c ase plan and by disregarding NDSS policies. We disagree. The 5 First Circuit put it well:

It is established beyond peradventure that a state actor's failure to observe a duty imposed by state law, standing alone, is not a sufficient foundation on which to erect a section 1983 claim. Althoug h it is true that constitutional significance ma y attach to certain interests created by state law , not e very transgression of state law does doubl e duty as a constitutional violation.
Martinez v . Colon , 54 F.3d 980, 989 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 6

III. For the reasons given above, we affirm the District Court's order.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.