*The Hon. Byron R. White, Associate Justice, Retired,

Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.

 The Hon. Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for 1

the District of Nebraska.

_____________

No. 95-1217NE

_____________

Dandy Ebmeier, *

*

Appellant, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court

* for the District

* of Nebraska.

Jill Stump, Dennis S. O'Brien, *

and Ann Stillman, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: October 19, 1995

 Filed: December 4, 1995

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WHITE, Associate Justice, and

*

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

In this § 1983 case, Dandy Ebmeier claims Jill Stump, Dennis O'Brien,

and Ann Stillman, all former employees of the Nebraska Department of Social

Services ("NDSS"), violated his federal due-process rights by disregarding

a court-approved plan aimed at reuniting Mr. Ebmeier with his two children.

The District Court1
 The District Court dismissed Mr. Ebmeier's state-law claims 2

without prejudice. 

 The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the Buffalo County 3

Court's decision terminating Mr. Ebmeier's parental rights. In

re Interest of S.B.E. and D.E., 240 Neb. 748, 484 N.W.2d 97

(1992).

 The NDSS manual provides that "[a]lternatives to 4

reunification should be considered only when all reasonable

efforts to reunify the family have been exhausted and return home

appears unlikely." 

Nebraska Dep't of Social Services Manual, Title 474, Neb. Admin.

Code § 4-007.02(2).

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granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that, given the

circumstances, Ms. Stump, Ms. Stillman, and Mr. O'Brien acted in an

objectively reasonable manner. We affirm. 2

I.

In April, 1988, a state court in Buffalo County, Nebraska, found that

Mr. Ebmeier had neglected and abused his two children. The court therefore

placed the children with NDSS. Two months later, the court approved NDSS's

"therapeutic plan." The plan's long-term goal was reuniting Mr. Ebmeier

and the children. The court noted, however, that "the extent of the

problems disclosed have not and will not, in the near future, allow

reunification of the children into the family home although all reasonable

efforts to accomplish that goal have been taken or are being planned for

the family." 

The court's skepticism was, in hindsight, well-founded. Although the

reunification plan remained in effect, the defendants decided to begin the

process of terminating Mr. Ebmeier's parental rights. Two years after the

court approved the plan, a petition for termination was filed, and the

court terminated Mr. Ebmeier's parental rights in November, 1990.3

Mr. Ebmeier claims the defendants "disregarded" both the Buffalo

County Court's order approving the reunification plan and NDSS policy,4

thereby violating his "constitutionally protected
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fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his children." As

the District Court put it, Mr. Ebmeier asserts a "clearly established right

requiring the defendants to adhere strictly to the court order that

directed them to devise a reunification plan." 

II.

The District Court did not decide whether Mr. Ebmeier had a federal

right requiring the defendants to adhere unswervingly to the court-approved

case plan. Rather, the Court held that even if Mr. Ebmeier did enjoy such

a right, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court

noted the precarious situations child-welfare workers confront and the fine

lines they must observe, and held that, given all the circumstances, Ms.

Stillman's, Mr. O'Brien's, and Ms. Stump's actions were objectively

reasonable. We agree. 

 

In qualified-immunity cases, however, "the threshold question . . .

is whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional

right." Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Siegert

v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991)). We take this

opportunity to emphasize that violations of state laws, state-agency

regulations, and, more particularly, state-court orders, do not by

themselves state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 guards and

vindicates federal rights alone. Mr. Ebmeier insists that he has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of his

children, and he surely does. The constitutional rights of parents reflect

our respect for the dignity of families, and these rights constrain the

actions of even the best-intentioned social workers. But Mr. Ebmeier's

particular claim is that the defendants
 We are not saying that the defendants actually did 5

disregard the court-approved plan or NDSS policy. On our

reading, the text and tone of the court's order and of the

relevant statements of NDSS policy are aspirational, not

mandatory. For example, the manual calls on caseworkers to

reassess periodically the possibility of attaining the original

goals of a case plan. Neb. Dep't of Social Services Manual,

Title 474, Neb. Admin. Code § 4-007.02. 

 See also Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993) 6

(issue under § 1983 is whether defendant violated federal or

constitutional rights, not whether he violated policies of state

agency); Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1988)

(police department guidelines do not create constitutional

rights); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1469-70 (8th Cir.)

(violation of state law not cognizable under § 1983), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). 

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violated his federal constitutional rights by deviating from the courtapproved case plan and by disregarding NDSS policies. We disagree. The 5

First Circuit put it well: 

It is established beyond peradventure that a state

actor's failure to observe a duty imposed by state

law, standing alone, is not a sufficient foundation

on which to erect a section 1983 claim. Although

it is true that constitutional significance may

attach to certain interests created by state law,

not every transgression of state law does double

duty as a constitutional violation.

Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 989 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).6

 III.

For the reasons given above, we affirm the District Court's order.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.