alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL

- TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 18a0496n.06
No. 18

- 1151
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
CHARLES MASON , Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: SILER and KETHLEDGE , Circuit Judge s ; and OLIVER, District Judge. * KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Charles Mason pled guilty to nine felony counts related to
an extensive credit

- card fraud and identity

- theft scheme. In a written plea agreement, Mason and the government stipulated that the G uideline s range for these offenses w as 145

- 175 months’ imprisonment. Mason also agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence, so long as the sentence imposed did not exceed 175 months. At his sentencing hearing, Mason nevertheless made numerous objections to the parties’ agreed

- upon G uidelines calculation . The district court
overruled those objections, but imposed a 126

- month sentence

— below the agreed

- upon range
. Mason now appeals that sentence, again challenging the G uidelines calculation in his plea agreement.

* The Honorable Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.No. 18

- 1151 , United States v. Mason

- 2

-

What Mason omits to say, anywhere in his opening (and only) brief on appeal, is that he waived his right to appeal his sentence. An unsuspecting reader

— such as a judge of this court

— could thus take the time to read all of Mason’s brief, and to consider at least preliminarily the arguments raised there, without realizing that Mason quite likely has waived all of them.
And indeed he has. A defendant may waive his right to appeal a conviction or sentence.
See United States v. Toth , 668 F.3d 374, 377 (6 th Cir. 2012). We will enforce a waive r that was knowing and voluntary. Id

. Here , Mason agreed not to appeal his sentence if it did not exceed
175 months , which obviously it did not. And Mason offers no reason to doubt that his waiver was knowing and voluntary

. Indeed , when the government raised the issue of waiver on appeal, Mason neglected to respond or even to file a reply brief. In a civil case , this conduct would be grounds
for sanctions. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.
We e nforce Mason’s waiver and dismiss t his appea l.
#### § 1316.13 Frequency of administrative inspections.

Except where circumstances otherwise dictate, it is the intent of the Administration to inspect all manufacturers of controlled substances listed in Schedules I and II and distributors of controlled substances listed in Schedule I once each year. Distributors of controlled substances listed in Schedules II through V and manufacturers of controlled substances listed in Schedules III through V shall be inspected as circumstances may require, based in part on the registrant's history of compliance with the requirements of this chapter and maintenance of effective controls and procedures to guard against the diversion of controlled substances.

[62 FR 13969, Mar. 24, 1997]
Exhibit32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the QuarterlyReport of Hutton Investors Futures Fund L.P. II (the"Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the periodending September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the "Report"),I, Daniel R. McAuliffe, Jr., Chief Financial Officer and Director ofCitigroup Managed Futures LLC, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Partnership.

/s/Daniel R. McAuliffe,Jr.

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Daniel R. McAuliffe,Jr.Citigroup Managed Futures LLC Chief Financial Officer andDirector

November 12,2004

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1275

CYNTHIA B. WOODS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

S.C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; MONA SECHREST; 

MARSHA BROWN; KIM BACKMAN; DR. PETE LIGGETT; CHRISTIAN L. 

SOURA,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

HOLLIE HOADWONIC,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (3:18-cv-00834-MGL)

Submitted: June 18, 2020 Decided: June 22, 2020

Before FLOYD, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Cynthia B. Woods, Appellant Pro Se. Fred Adam Williams, GIGNILLIAT, SAVITZ & 

BETTIS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Cynthia B. Woods appeals the district court’s order accepting the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Woods’ several employmentrelated claims. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s 

brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because the informal brief does not challenge the bases for 

the district court’s dispositive holdings, Woods has forfeited appellate review of the court’s 

disposition. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal 

brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues 

preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED
§ 1.623 What reports and notifications must a recognized accreditation body submit to FDA? ( a ) *Reporting results of assessments of accredited third-party certification body performance.* A recognized accreditation body must submit to FDA electronically, in English, a report of the results of any assessment conducted under § 1.621, no later than 45 days after completing such assessment. The report must include an up-to-date list of any audit agents used by the accredited third-party certification body to conduct food safety audits under this subpart.
( b ) *Reporting results of recognized accreditation body self-assessments.* A recognized accreditation body must submit to FDA electronically, in English: ( 1 ) A report of the results of an annual self-assessment required under § 1.622, no later than 45 days after completing such self-assessment; and
( 2 ) For a recognized accreditation body subject to § 1.664(g)(1), a report of such self-assessment to FDA within 60 days of the third-party certification body's withdrawal. A recognized accreditation body may use a report prepared for conformance to ISO/IEC 17011:2004, supplemented as necessary, in meeting the requirements this section.
( c ) *Immediate notification to FDA.* A recognized accreditation body must notify FDA electronically, in English, immediately upon: ( 1 ) Granting (including expanding the scope of) accreditation to a third-party certification body under this subpart, and include: ( i ) The name, address, telephone number, and email address of the accredited third-party certification body;
( ii ) The name of one or more officers of the accredited third-party certification body;
( iii ) A list of the accredited third-party certification body's audit agents; and
( iv ) The scope of accreditation, the date on which it was granted, and its expiration date.
( 2 ) Withdrawing, suspending, or reducing the scope of an accreditation under this subpart, and include: ( i ) The basis for such action; and
( ii ) Any additional changes to accreditation information previously submitted to FDA under paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
( 3 ) Determining that a third-party certification body it accredited failed to comply with § 1.653 in issuing a food or facility certification under this subpart, and include: ( i ) The basis for such determination; and
( ii ) Any changes to accreditation information previously submitted to FDA under paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
( d ) *Other notification to FDA.* A recognized accreditation body must notify FDA electronically, in English, within 30 days after: ( 1 ) Denying accreditation (in whole or in part) under this subpart and include: ( i ) The name, address, telephone number, and email address of the third-party certification body;
( ii ) The name of one or more officers of the third-party certification body;
( iii ) The scope of accreditation requested; and
( iv ) The scope and basis for such denial.
( 2 ) Making any significant change that would affect the manner in which it complies with the applicable requirements of this subpart and include: ( i ) A description of the change; and
( ii ) An explanation for the purpose of the change.
#### In re WALLACE.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

December 24, 1914.)

In the matter of Ernest H. Wallace.

No opinion. Referred to Hon. Henry A. Gilder-sleeve, official referee. Settle order on notice.
#### William H. Fetzer et al. *v.*Miscoe Spring Water Company et al.

Inglis, C. J., Baldwin, O’Sullivan, Wynne and Daly, Js.

Argued May 6

decided June 16, 1954

*George Miske,*for the appellants (plaintiffs).

*DeLancey S. Pelgrift,*with whom, on the brief, was *Robert E. Cohn,*for the appellees (defendants).

Wynne, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court sustaining a plea in abatement and dismissing an action brought by the plaintiffs.

The record discloses the following situation: By an action returnable in October, 1950, the present plaintiffs sued for damages for personal injuries *365arising out of an accident in September, 1950. They are father and minor child. The action was on the trial list in the Superior Court for Hartford County. It had not been reached for assignment when, in April, 1953, at the annual call of the docket, it was stricken because of the plaintiffs’ failure to file a request for a continuance. In October, 1953, a motion to restore to the docket was denied and the present action was brought, based on the same cause. The defendants pleaded in abatement to the new action on two grounds. They alleged that the bringing of the new action was an attempt to restore the action which had been dismissed and that the cause of action stated in the complaint did not accrue within one year next before the commencement of the action. The trial court correctly concluded that the allegation that the cause of action did not accrue within one year prior to the institution of the suit was not ground for abatement, pointing out that such an issue could be raised only by demurrer or answer. *Jakiela*v. *Ellison,*114 Conn. 731, 732, 159 A. 657. The plea was sustained solely on the other ground.

The basis of that ground was that the files of the court made it apparent that the present action was an attempt to circumvent the court in the dismissal of the first action. The bringing of the present action was not an attempted restoration of the former suit. That former suit, without question, had gone to final judgment, although not upon the merits. *Glazer*v. *Rosoff,*120 Conn. 120, 122, 179 A. 407. The present suit was a new action commenced by a new writ. Except for the fact that it alleged the same cause of action, it was separate and distinct from the former suit. The trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the present action. It obtained *366jurisdiction of the defendants by the service upon them of the writ and complaint. The plea obviously was not grounded upon the claim of another action pending. It does not appear to have been based on a claim that the plaintiffs’ cause of action was res adjudicata. See *Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.*v. *Pear*son, 139 Conn. 186, 196, 91 A.2d 778. And even though it had been, the issue of res adjudicata may not be raised by a plea in abatement. The grounds alleged in the plea were not sufficient to warrant the sustaining of it.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to overrule the plea in abatement.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.
§ 145.126 Artificially sweetened canned cherries. ( a ) Artificially sweetened canned cherries is the food which conforms to the definition and standard of identity prescribed for canned cherries by § 145.125(a), except that in lieu of a packing medium specified in § 145.125(a)(3), the packing medium used is water artificially sweetened with saccharin, sodium saccharin, or a combination of both. Such packing medium may be thickened with pectin and may contain any mixture of any edible organic salt or salts and any edible organic acid or acids as a flavor-enhancing agent, in a quantity not more than is reasonably required for that purpose.
( b ) ( 1 ) The specified name of the food is “artificially sweetened ______”, the blank being filled in with the name prescribed by § 145.125(a) for canned cherries having the same optional cherry ingredient.
( 2 ) The artificially sweetened food is subject to the requirements for label statement of ingredients used, as prescribed for canned cherries by § 145.125(a). If the packing medium is thickened with pectin, the label shall bear the statement “thickened with pectin”. When any organic salt or acid or any mixture of two or more of these is added, the label shall bear the common or usual name of each such ingredient.
[42 FR 14414, Mar. 15, 1977, as amended at 58 FR 2879, Jan. 6, 1993]
#### In re Appointment of Constable in Newtown Township

*Raymond E. Larson,*for petitioners.

*Fronefield Crawford,*for Louis L. Lobb.

October 5, 1950.

Sweney, J.,

On August 23, 1950, after hearing, the court (Sweney, J.) appointed Louis L. Lobb as constable of Newtown Township. This is an application by Albert A. Saffren to set aside this appointment on the ground that Saffren is the duly elected constable and is serving in that capacity so that no vacancy existed when the Lobb appointment was made.

At a hearing on this application held September 8, 1950, the following testimony was adduced: Saffren was appointed constable by this court in May 1944 to fill a vacancy; Saffren qualified by taking his oath *521after filing a bond; he functioned as a constable thereafter and, in addition, served as a police officer for the township; he was elected constable of the township in 1949, defeating Lobb for the position by a vote of 616 to 275; he was notified of his election by the Delaware County Election Board; he has been serving since January 1,1950, as an elected constable, but did not file a new bond and did not take a new oath as he was not aware that such action was necessary; that no notice of the application of Lobb for the appointment was given Saffren; and that no notice that the petition of Lobb for constable was given to anyone.

We have, therefore, for decision the question as to whether the court may rescind its order of August 23, 1950, by virtue of which Lobb has filed his bond, which was approved by the court, and has taken his oath. It is our opinion that we can. Counsel for Lobb calls our attention to the unreported case of Appointment of Auditor of Newtown Township in which this court held that we had no authority to revoke an order; but, the present case does not present the same factual situation as the Auditor case. Here there was no vacancy made by resignation; in the Auditor case, the auditor had resigned and had sent his resignation to the secretary of the board of supervisors; the question for decision was could the court appoint an auditor to fill the vacancy without the written resignation before us; we held we could and, having made the appointment, we had no power to set it aside.

Here, however, clearly there was a wrong impression as to the law. Saffren did not realize he had to take a new oath and file a new bond; he continued to serve; but, had he been given notice of the intention of Lobb to file his petition for appointment, he could have rectified his error.
427 A.2d 1204

#### Commonwealth v. Leymeister, Appellant.

Submitted September 13, 1979.

Frank R. Cori, Public Defender, for appellant;

Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before PRICE, WIEAND and VAN der VOORT, JJ.*

*

 Judge Donald E. Wieand is sitting by special designation.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
§ 1318.02 Definitions. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, the term *cannabis* means any plant of the genus Cannabis.
( b ) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, the term *medicinal cannabis* means a drug product made from the cannabis plant, or derivatives thereof, that can be legally marketed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
( c ) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, the term *cannabis preparation* means cannabis that was delivered to the Administration and subsequently converted by a registered manufacturer into a mixture (solid or liquid) containing cannabis, cannabis resin, or extracts of cannabis.
( d ) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, the term *cannabis resin* means the separated resin, whether crude or purified, obtained from the cannabis plant.
( e ) As used in this part, the terms *cannabis, medicinal cannabis,* and *cannabis preparation* do not include any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that falls outside the definition of marihuana in section 102(16) of the Controlled Substances Act (the Act) (21 U.S.C. 802(16)).
( f ) The term *Single Convention* means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (18 U.S.T. 1407).
( g ) The term *bona fide supply agreement* means a letter of intent, purchase order or contract between an applicant and a researcher or manufacturer registered under the Act.
( h ) The term *registered researcher or manufacturer* means a person registered under the Act to perform research or manufacture of marihuana in Schedule I.
# EUR-Lex - 31989D0273 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31989D0273

**89/273/EEC: Commission Decision of 30 March 1989 approving the plan relating to the examination for residues of substances other than those having a hormonal action submitted by the Netherlands (Only the Dutch text is authentic) **

*
Official Journal L 108 , 19/04/1989 P. 0028 - 0028 *

COMMISSION DECISION of 30 March 1989 approving the plan relating to the examination for residues of substances other than those having a hormonal action submitted by the Netherlands (Only the Dutch text is authentic) (89/273/EEC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 86/469/EEC of 16 September 1986 concerning examination of animals and fresh meat for the presence of residues (1), and in particular Article 4 thereof,

Whereas, by letter of 6 June 1988, the Netherlands sent the Commission a plan setting out the national measures taken on the examination for residues of the substances referred to in Annex I, Groups A.III and B to Directive 86/469/EEC;

Whereas examination of this plan, as modified, has shown that it conforms to the provisions laid down in Directive 86/469/EEC, and in particular Article 4 (1) thereof;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1 The plan relating to the examination for residues of the substances referred to in Annex I, Groups A.III and B to Directive 86/469/EEC submitted by the Netherlands is hereby approved.

Article 2 The Netherlands shall adopt the necessary laws, regulations and administrative provisions for the implementation of the plan referred to in Article 1.

Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Done at Brussels, 30 March 1989.

For the Commission

Ray MAC SHARRY

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ No L 275, 26. 9. 1986, p. 36.
<PAGE>



                            Certification Pursuant to
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


         Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Medialink Worldwide
Incorporated (the "Company"), hereby certifies to such officer's knowledge, that
the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002
(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 14, 2002                           /s/ Laurence Moskowitz
                                                 ----------------------
                                                 Name:  Laurence Moskowitz
                                                 Title: Chief Executive Officer


         The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.
Office Services Agreement between Registrant and Johnson & Colmar



 Exhibit 10.9 
 TRANS-INDIA ACQUISITION CORPORATION 
 July 28, 2006 
 Johnson and Colmar 
 300 South Wacker Drive 
 Suite 1000 
 Chicago, IL 60606 
 Gentlemen: 
 This letter will confirm our agreement, that commencing on the effective date (“Effective Date”) of the registration
statement of the initial public offering (“IPO”) of the securities of Trans-India Acquisition Corporation (“Company”) and continuing until the earlier of the consummation by the Company of a “business combination” (as
described in the Company’s IPO prospectus) and the Company’s liquidation (the “Termination Date”), Johnson and Colmar shall make available to the Company certain administrative, technology and secretarial services, as well as the
use of certain limited office space in Chicago, as may be required by the Company from time to time, situated at 300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 1000, Chicago, Illinois 60606 (or any successor location). In exchange therefor, the Company shall pay to
Johnson and Colmar the sum of $7,500 per month (the “Fee”) on the Effective Date and continuing monthly thereafter until the Termination Date. 
  

			
	 TRANS-INDIA ACQUISITION CORPORATION

		
	By:	 	 /s/ BOBBA VENKATADRI

		 	 Name: Bobba Venkatadri

		 	 Title:   President and Chief Executive Officer
#### § 1250.21 Inspection.

The Commissioner of Food and Drugs may inspect such conveyance to determine compliance with the requirements of this subpart and § 1240.20 of this chapter.

[40 FR 5624, Feb. 6, 1975, as amended at 48 FR 11432, Mar. 18, 1983]