Filed 12/29/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DZIUBLA et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

IGNATIUS A. PIAZZA II et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 D076183

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-00057391-

 CU-DF-NC)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Timothy M. Casserly, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and 

remanded.

Greer & Associates, Curtis Keith Greer and C. Tyler Greer for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Call & Jensen, William Paul Cole and Nilab Rahyar Tolton for 

Defendants and Respondents. 

This appeal concerns a soured business relationship that devolved into 

a fight that was nothing if not personal. Plaintiffs and appellants Robert 

Dziubla and Linda Stanwood claim that defendant Ignatius Piazza II, owner 

of a Nevada firearms training facility, harassed and threatened them by 

publishing defamatory statements along with their personal identifying 

information and sending associates to invade their home. Piazza retorts that 
2

plaintiffs conned him out of thousands of dollars and are now attempting to 

steal his property and chill his constitutional rights.

Cutting a path between these two extremes, the trial court 

appropriately distinguished protected from unprotected activities in 

evaluating Piazza’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP 

statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)—which it granted in part and denied in 

part. With one important clarification as to the scope of protected activity, 

we reach the same conclusion. 

That clarification involves so-called “doxing” allegations in the 

complaint—plaintiffs’ claim that Piazza published private personal

identifying information about them to thousands of gun enthusiasts as a 

thinly-veiled threat about what could happen if they continued to litigate the 

business dispute.1 Although it was included in an otherwise-protected 

litigation “alert” that discussed the pending lawsuit, the doxing information 

was entirely extraneous to the court proceedings that were the ostensible 

subject of the communication. We thus reject Piazza’s assertion that 

plaintiffs cannot meet the “minimal merit” standard on the anti-SLAPP 

motion because the doxing allegations would necessarily be barred by the 

litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). Under wellsettled authority, the privilege does not extend to statements that bear no 

1 “Doxing” is a relatively recent internet-based form of harassment that 

involves posting a target’s private personal information online so it can be 

used by other parties—perhaps the poster’s supporters or internet “trolls”—to 

attack the targeted individual. Despite fear that this serious intimidation 

tactic can even lead to physical assaults, countervailing concerns about 

freedom of speech have made appropriate government regulation difficult. 

(See generally MacAllister, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking A Remedy for the 

Malicious Publication of Personal Information (2017) 85 Fordham L.Rev. 

2451.)
3

reasonable relationship to any judicial proceedings on which the privilege is 

assertedly based. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 

for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Nevada Suit

Defendant Piazza owns Front Sight, a firearms training and selfdefense business in Pahrump, Nevada. According to Piazza, Front Sight has 

taught tens of thousands of individual students and built up a membership of 

over 200,000 people. Members receive e-mail communications to keep them 

informed on Front Sight developments and, of course, business promotions. 

In 2012, Piazza was pursuing a loan for an ambitious expansion project 

that would transform Front Sight into a resort destination—complete with 

timeshare condominiums and a full-service conference center. After he failed 

to secure a traditional bank loan, Piazza explored higher risk options and 

ultimately agreed to work with plaintiff Dziubla, who represented that his 

team could raise $75 million from foreign investors if Front Sight paid 

upfront installments to cover expenses. By 2015, the amount Dziubla 

thought he could raise had decreased to $25 million. One year later, he 

loaned Piazza about $6 million to get the project started.

Piazza’s loan came from the Las Vegas Development Fund (LVDF),

which is run by Dziubla and his wife Stanwood. The loan agreement was 

subject to certain conditions that Dziubla and Stanwood allege Piazza 

breached in multiple ways. LVDF filed a notice of default in September 2018 

and Piazza then sued in Nevada to prevent foreclosure on the Front Sight 

property (among other relief). That litigation is ongoing and provides the 

context for the dispute in this case.
4

2. The California Litigation

Shortly after LVDF recorded a notice of default on Piazza’s Nevada 

property, Dziubla and Stanwood began receiving disturbing visits at their 

California residence from two men, Danielo Quidang and Patrick 

Schneemann, who claimed to be private investigators. According to 

plaintiffs, the men spied on their home, snuck onto their property to take 

pictures and videos, and yelled threats when plaintiffs confronted them. 

Dziubla and Stanwood obtained restraining orders against the men. 

The next month, Piazza published a manifesto characterizing Dziubla 

as an enemy to Front Sight. This “Emergency Action Alert” (Alert) was 

posted on Front Sight’s website and e-mailed to its 200,000 members. In the 

Alert, Piazza described Dziubla as a “Lying, Two-Faced, Gun-Grabbing 

Hillary Clinton Supporting, Con Man” who was “attempting to STEAL Front 

Sight” through the Nevada suit. The Alert used forceful—even violent—

rhetoric and appealed for monetary contributions to Piazza’s “litigation war 

chest.” Of particular significance in this case, Piazza also doxed Dziubla and 

Stanwood in the Alert by publishing their home address, pictures of their 

house, and photos of Dziubla including a close-up image of his face. These 

pictures were taken by Quidang and Schneemann, who were allegedly hired 

by Piazza. 

After learning about the Alert, plaintiffs filed this California lawsuit 

against Piazza, Quidang and Schneemann alleging a dozen causes of action 

that fall roughly into two categories: (1) trespass and privacy claims 

concerning Quidang and Schneemann’s activities on their property; and 

(2) defamation and harassment claims concerning Piazza’s publication of the 

Alert.
5

Piazza challenged the defamation and harassment allegations under 

California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) 

statute, arguing that the Alert was protected speech. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 425.16.)2 The trial court agreed, shifting the burden to plaintiffs to show 

minimal merit so that they could proceed on these claims. As to this second 

step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court largely agreed with plaintiffs but 

for their inability to overcome Piazza’s primary defense: that the Alert was 

protected by the litigation privilege. As a result, the court granted most of 

Piazza’s special motion to strike, effectively barring all of plaintiffs’ claims 

that were based on the Alert (including the doxing allegations). 

DISCUSSION

In its broad outline, we largely endorse the reasoning of the trial court: 

Piazza’s Alert, which provides the basis for virtually all of plaintiffs’ 

challenged claims,3 is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because it was 

published in furtherance of Piazza’s right to petition. (§ 425.16, subds. (a), 

(b)(1), and (e).) We likewise agree with the trial court that as to most of those 

claims, plaintiffs could demonstrate minimal merit but for their failure to 

overcome Piazza’s litigation privilege defense. However, the privilege does 

not apply indiscriminately to everything included in the Alert just because 

that document broadly relates to litigation. As we explain in more detail, the 

doxing allegations should be treated separately from the rest of the 

challenged statements in the Alert. Publishing plaintiffs’ personal 

information was in no way rationally related to litigation, and the disclosure 

of that information is not protected by the corresponding privilege.

2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 

unless otherwise specified.

3 See post, footnote 4.
6

Although we diverge from the trial court on this particular point, our 

decision has a limited effect. Only two causes of action that were previously 

stricken are revived in part by our analysis. The real effect of our decision is 

simply to clarify that it does not run afoul of the litigation privilege for 

plaintiffs to rely on the harm caused by Piazza’s doxing activities as they 

attempt to prove the surviving causes of action.

1. Basic Anti-SLAPP Principles

The anti-SLAPP statute enables defendants to quickly terminate 

meritless actions against them that are based on their constitutionally 

protected rights to speak freely and petition for redress of grievances. 

(§ 425.16.) It allows litigants to file a special motion to strike “at an early 

stage,” in which the trial court uses a “summary-judgment-like procedure” to 

evaluate the claims.4 (Zhang v. Jenevein (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 585, 592.) In 

considering a special motion to strike, courts employ a two-step process. 

(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 

1057, 1061.) In the first step, defendants must show that the claims they 

challenge are based on conduct “aris[ing] from” an act that furthers their 

speech or petition rights. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) This includes, among other 

4 As the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize in Baral v. Schnitt 

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 (Baral), the terms “cause of action” and “claim” can have 

different meanings depending on the context in which they are used, and 

both were employed by the Legislature in drafting section 425.16. (Baral,

supra, at pp. 381‒382.) With respect to the latter term, we follow Baral’s 

lead in using “claim” to refer to a set of facts allegedly giving rise to relief 

that constitutes a “proper subject of a special motion to strike.” (Id. at p. 382; 

see also id. at p. 395 [anti-SLAPP motion is directed to “alleged acts giving 

rise to a claim for relief”].) We use “cause of action” to mean the separate 

counts as pleaded by the plaintiffs. A single cause of action can incorporate 

more than one claim; at the same time, a single claim can sometimes form 

the basis for more than one cause of action. 
7

things, any “writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or 

review by a . . . judicial body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) 

If defendants can make this initial showing, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiffs in the second step to demonstrate a prima facie case that would 

enable them to prevail on the challenged claims. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

pp. 384–385.) Plaintiffs only need to show “minimal merit” to defeat the 

special motion to strike. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94.) At 

this stage, “[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual 

claims . . . [but rather] accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates 

the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as 

a matter of law.” (Baral, supra, at pp. 384–385.) Appellate courts 

independently review orders granting or denying a special motion to strike. 

(Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055 (Rusheen).)

2. Step One: Plaintiffs’ Claims Arise Out of Protected Activity

In this section, we independently evaluate the nature of the Alert. We 

conclude that the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis is satisfied because 

the Alert (1) forms the basis for plaintiffs’ claims, (2) relates to the Nevada 

litigation, and (3) does not fall within the exceptions that plaintiffs highlight. 

The first two points are not truly contested by plaintiffs, but we examine 

them in the course of our independent review.

a. The Alert forms the basis for plaintiffs’ claims.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Piazza’s anti-SLAPP motion 

sought to strike only seven of plaintiffs’ twelve causes of action, targeting the 

allegations dependent on the Alert and mostly avoiding those based on 

Quidang and Schneemann’s activities at plaintiffs’ house. The challenged 

causes of action included: (1) Criminal Threats, alleging that the “incendiary 

language” in the Alert and the “very nature of the distribution list” amounts 
8

to a criminal threat against Dziubla; (2) Defamation, stating that the Alert 

falsely characterized Dziubla as a con man and a liar; (3) Privacy (False 

Light), claiming the Alert portrayed Dziubla in an offensive manner;

(9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, alleging defendants owed a 

duty to plaintiffs that they breached by harassing, intimidating and defaming 

them; (10) Injunction, asking the court to order the Alert taken down from 

Front Sight’s website; (11) Civil Conspiracy, claiming defendants conspired to 

harass plaintiffs; and (12) Violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 

(Civ. Code, 51.7), alleging plaintiffs were targeted by Piazza based on their 

political affiliations. Our review of the complaint leads us to the same 

conclusion as the trial court; with one exception,5 each challenged cause of 

action cites harms based at least in part on the Alert. (See Baral, supra,

1 Cal.5th 376, 396 [allegations arising in part from protected activity satisfy 

the first step in evaluating a special motion to strike].) We turn now to the 

more central question of the prong one analysis: whether the Alert 

constitutes protected activity.

b. The Alert is protected because it relates to litigation.

The Alert itself is an erratic ten-page document. It starts as a progress 

report, transitions to an exposé, and ends as a fundraising solicitation. 

Piazza opens by explaining the status of the renovation project and how it 

will benefit Front Sight members. Dziubla is quickly introduced as a liar and 

a con man, and then Piazza “divulge[s] the details of his identity, where he 

lives, what he does, and how he hoodwinked us into falling for his scam.” 

5 The eleventh cause of action included the only set of challenged 

allegations that were untied to the Alert; it focused on defendants meeting

together to conspire to harm plaintiffs. The trial court properly denied the 

motion to strike these allegations.
9

This is the section that includes Dziubla’s residential address, photos of his 

home and a close-up picture of his face. According to Piazza, this information 

was included as evidence of Dziubla’s con; he apparently claimed to be broke 

and asked Front Sight for more money, but all the while he owned a “million 

dollar home and [a] Lexus and brand new Mercedes Benz.” 

After this section, the focus of the document turns to funding the 

Nevada litigation. Piazza asks for monetary contributions and offers to 

reward members with “surplus credits, memberships, and certificates” that 

will be converted, in vague terms, to ownership interests in Front Sight when 

the renovations are complete. Piazza states these funds will be used for three 

purposes, to (1) “[d]estroy Dziubla by rapidly and aggressively prosecuting 

our lawsuit against him,” (2) increase Front Sight marketing to grow the 

business, and (3) “increase the pace of construction” to quickly complete the 

resort. 

Despite its vacillating nature, reading the Alert as a whole makes it 

clear that Piazza wrote and distributed the document in furtherance of his 

right to petition the Nevada courts for relief. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The 

anti-SLAPP statute specifies that such an act includes “any . . . writing made 

in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial 

body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e), italics added.) We easily conclude the Alert was 

written and distributed in connection with the Nevada litigation. It returns 

again and again to the lawsuit, and even the most forceful language is 

contextualized to the court battle. Front Sight members can support Piazza 

and “destroy” Dziubla “by rapidly and aggressively prosecuting our lawsuit 

against him.” The Alert even provides the Nevada court pleadings and 

encourages readers to review them. Its primary purpose seems to be 

explaining the litigation to Front Sight’s members and asking for their 
10

financial help. (See Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 821–

822 (Wilcox) [“statements made in the context of exhorting [others] to 

contribute to the cost of pursing . . . litigation” provides a “strong showing 

those statements are rationally connected to the litigation itself”].) Piazza is 

thus correct that allegations based on the principal content of the Alert fall 

under the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute.

c. None of the exceptions cited by plaintiffs apply.

Plaintiffs do not contest the general point that the anti-SLAPP statute 

protects litigation-related documents, but they argue the Alert falls outside of 

the statute’s purview because it is both illegal and constitutes commercial 

speech. In plaintiffs’ view, these defects nullify any constitutional protection 

the Alert might otherwise enjoy. Although plaintiffs have correctly identified 

two exceptions to the anti-SLAPP statute’s reach, they have not 

demonstrated that either applies here.

As to illegal conduct, it is true that a special motion to strike cannot be 

used by a defendant whose allegedly protected activity was illegal. (Flatley v. 

Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320 (Flatley).) Plaintiffs argue this was the 

case, offering three separate theories of how the Alert was illegal. They 

contend it was (1) a “terroristic criminal threat” under Penal Code section 

422, (2) harassment under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, and (3) a 

fraudulent sale of securities. But in the context of the case law, illegal means 

criminal and not merely a violation of some statute. (Mendoza v. ADP 

Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654

(Mendoza).) Furthermore, it is not sufficient that the plaintiffs can 

reasonably argue or offer some evidence that defendant’s conduct was 

unlawful. Rather, at this early stage of the proceedings, the illegality 

exception applies only if the defendant’s activity is “illegal as a matter of 
11

law,” meaning either the defendant concedes the point or the evidence 

“conclusively establishes” as much. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.) 

Neither occurred here. Piazza has never conceded that publishing the Alert 

constituted criminal conduct.6 And the evidence is far from conclusive that 

the Alert was illegal under any of plaintiffs’ theories.

Regarding the criminal threats theory of illegality, the statute plaintiffs 

highlight requires (1) a willful threat to commit a crime that would result in 

death or great bodily injury to another, (2) with the specific intent that it be 

taken as a threat by the victim, (3) which is so “unequivocal, unconditional, 

immediate, and specific” that it (4) causes the victim to be in sustained fear, 

and (5) that such fear is reasonable. (Pen. Code, § 422; People v. Toledo

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228.) Plaintiffs select certain clauses from the Alert 

that they believe evidence a threat; we quote them in full to provide context:

“I am going to need your help to not only stop [Dziubla] in 

his tracks, but also give him what he truly deserves for 

what he has done to us, while we come together as a group, 

200,000 strong, to complete the resort in record time!” 

[¶] . . . [¶]

“I’ll bet it makes your blood boil as much as mine to think 

this traitor used the money we paid him that was supposed 

to support the Front Sight project and instead used it to 

support the gun-grabbing schemes of Hillary Clinton. This 

turncoat needs to be punished, to the full extent the law 

6 Plaintiffs make much of the fact that Piazza was arraigned on a 

misdemeanor count for electronic harassment, to which he pleaded not guilty. 

The prosecutor did not pursue charges when Piazza agreed to remove the 

Alert from the Front Sight website. There was never any admission of guilt. 

We take judicial notice of the minute order and the stipulation and order 

related to Piazza’s misdemeanor case, which is proper under Evidence Code 

section 452, subdivision (d). Three separate requests for judicial notice from 

both parties compile various other exhibits that we decline to notice. These 

are either improper for judicial notice, unhelpful to our resolution of the case, 

or both.
12

will allow, for what he has done to us and what he has done 

to you.” [¶] . . . [¶]

“Here’s how we turn the tables on Dziubla and shove his 

dirty deeds against you right down his throat [. . . .] [¶] 

Now that we filed our lawsuit, we press our prosecution of 

the litigation like a blitzkrieg and we do not ease our 

blistering legal attack until we have decisively won, forcing 

Dziubla into debtor’s court to expose his assets for our 

collection or forcing him into financial ruin in bankruptcy 

court.” [¶] . . . [¶]

[Beside a check box for financial contributions:] 

“Yes, Dr. Piazza. I want you to destroy the lying, two-faced, 

gun-grabbing Hillary Clinton supporting, con man Robert 

Dziubla by rapidly and aggressively prosecuting our 

lawsuit against him to overwhelming victory.” 

Plaintiffs might have a colorable argument that this language could be 

interpreted as a threat, but that falls short of a necessary conclusion as a 

matter of law. As seems apparent from context, the violent terms are not 

meant to be read literally. Piazza describes destroying Dziubla, but only 

through court action. His “ruin” will be financial, and his “punishment” will 

be “to the full extent the law will allow.” Given the consistent references to 

the lawsuit, we are unable to find anything that would qualify as an 

indisputable threat under Penal Code section 422. (See People v. Maciel

(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 683; quoting People v. Solis (2001) 90 

Cal.App.4th 1002, 1023 [“A violation of [Penal Code] section 422 requires 

. . . the defendant [to] willfully threaten[] to kill or seriously injure another 

person.”]; United States v. Villavicencio-Burruel (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3d 556, 

562 [“[Penal Code] [s]ection 422’s plain text demonstrates that it requires a 

threatened use of violent physical force against another person.”]; Toledo, 

supra, at p. 228‒229 [explaining that the specific, immediate and unequivocal 

language was added to Penal Code section 422 to bring it into constitutional 
13

compliance]; United States v. Kelner (2d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1020, 1027.) 

Although Penal Code section 422’s elements are not applied formulaically, 

“the words actually used must constitute a threat in light of the surrounding 

circumstances.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 636.) Plaintiffs have 

not conclusively established such a threat.

Cognizant of this deficiency, plaintiffs argue that Piazza’s threat can 

only be understood in context, and that his dissemination of the Alert to 

200,000 “gun enthusiasts” raised the specter of violent retaliation against 

Dziubla. In doing so, however, plaintiffs merely describe the inherent risks of 

doxing, and they ignore that a criminal threat requires specific intent. In 

addition to other disputed issues, Piazza’s intent is contested; based on that 

alone, we can conclude that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the Alert 

contained a criminal threat as a matter of law.7

Plaintiffs rely on substantially the same arguments and cases when 

they suggest, in the alternative, that the Alert constitutes harassment under 

section 527.6. This is an odd selection of statutes, as it details the procedure

for a party seeking a civil restraining order against an alleged harasser. But 

even if we construe this argument liberally and look to the criminal statute 

that Piazza was actually charged with violating—misdemeanor electronic 

harassment under Penal Code section 653.2—the evidence again falls short of 

establishing he was necessarily guilty of that crime. As the trial court noted, 

“charges are only charges—not a conviction.” 

7 Plaintiffs press their point by citing two cases to support their position 

that the Alert was a “true threat,” but neither comes close to holding that 

similar conduct amounted to a criminal threat as a matter of law. (See 

Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1246 (Huntingdon Life Sciences); Planned 

Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists

(9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1058, 1062.) 
14

Taking a slightly different tact in their last illegality argument, 

plaintiffs contend the Alert’s offer of Front Sight credits and memberships 

was an unregistered sale of securities that violates both Nevada and federal 

law. This suggestion, again, falls short of demonstrating a criminal act as a 

matter of law. Instead, it raises a host of questions that are as yet 

undetermined—such as whether these were investments or donations and, if 

the former, whether any exemptions apply. Some language suggests a 

donation; Piazza characterized his program as a “reward” to his “loyal and 

supportive member[s] for your faith in Front Sight and your financial support 

in overcoming the obstacles of litigation.” But other language suggests some 

kind of investment structure; “benefits” will grow in accordance with the level 

of participation. Even assuming the program is more than a donation, it is 

unclear how various “credits” would later convert to ownership interests and

when an ownership interest might mature: “When it is time to turn over 

Front Sight Firearms Training Institute to you, I will allow you to trade in 

your surplus credits, memberships, and certificates for your percentage of 

ownership.” Piazza seems to have left this intentionally vague. We agree 

with the trial court that “some of [the Alert’s] language arguably involves the 

sale of securities”—but this is less than definitive as a matter of law. 

On all of plaintiffs’ theories, there is a “factual dispute as to the 

legality” of Piazza’s actions in writing and distributing the Alert. As such, 

his special motion to strike cannot be denied on those grounds. (Paul for 

Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1367.)

Apart from framing the Alert as a crime, plaintiffs attempt to wrest 

this communication from the protective reach of the anti-SLAPP statute by 

asserting it falls within the statute’s exception for commercial speech. This 

exception, detailed in section 425.17, subdivision (c), states that section 
15

425.16 “does not apply to any cause of action brought against a person 

primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services”

under specified conditions. It goes on to list the conditions that define the 

exception. (§ 425.17, subd. (c)(1)‒(c)(2).) This added detail has aided courts 

in determining that the legislature intended to exclude “ ‘only a subset of 

commercial speech’—specifically, comparative advertising.” (FilmOn.com 

Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 147; see also All One God 

Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010) 183 

Cal.App.4th 1186, 1217.)

We are doubtful that Piazza’s Alert can be fairly described as primarily

an effort to sell goods or services, but even assuming it was the Alert does not 

contain the comparative advertising that marks the commercial speech 

exception. This requirement is described in subdivision (c)(1), which clarifies 

that the “statement or conduct” the plaintiff’s claims arise from must 

“consist[] of representations of fact about [the defendant’s] or a business 

competitor’s business operations, goods, or services.” (§ 425.17, subd. (c)(1).) 

To fall within the exception then, the harm plaintiffs allege would have to 

derive from Piazza’s representations about his own business or a competitor’s 

business. (See, e.g., Mendoza, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652.) That is 

not the case here, where plaintiffs generally allege harm from defamation, 

harassment, and threats.

3. Step Two: Plaintiffs Failed to Show They Could Prevail on Most of the 

Claims

In this section, we review the litigation privilege as applied to the facts 

of this case and conclude it defeats most—but not all—of plaintiffs’ 

challenged claims. In particular, the doxing statements included in the Alert 

are not privileged.
16

a. The litigation privilege defeats most of plaintiffs’ claims.

In the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, where plaintiffs must 

demonstrate the “minimal merit” of their claims, they must also show they 

can overcome any affirmative defense the defendant has raised. (Dwight R. 

v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 715‒716; Bently Reserve LP v. 

Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 434.) Here, the trial court 

determined that plaintiffs could probably show minimal merit as to most of 

their claims8 except that they could not overcome Piazza’s defense that the 

litigation privilege applies to the Alert. We likewise agree that the litigation 

privilege disposes of most of plaintiffs’ challenged claims in the second part of 

the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The litigation privilege is a statutory protection that has been 

interpreted expansively. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b); Rubin v. Green (1993) 

4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194.) Although it is not a part of section 425.16, the 

privilege is often invoked in anti-SLAPP motions. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. 

LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737.) It “applies to any communication 

(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other 

participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and 

(4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. 

8 The exception to this was plaintiffs’ first cause of action for criminal 

threats, which was pleaded under a criminal statute—Penal Code section 

422—that does not create a private right of action allowing an alleged threat 

victim to sue. This court requested supplemental briefing on various related 

issues, none of which proved central to our resolution of the case. However, 

in the course of that briefing we received a related motion from plaintiffs to 

consider additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909. We 

ordered that the motion be considered in conjunction with the appeal. We 

now deny it, however, finding no reason to depart from established norms 

that section 909 should be used sparingly. (Monsan Homes, Inc. v. 

Pogrebneak (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 826, 830.)
17

Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) Its purpose is to “afford litigants and 

witnesses free access to the courts without fear of being harassed 

subsequently by derivative tort actions, to encourage open channels of 

communication and zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful 

testimony, to give finality to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation.” 

(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063.) These policy considerations are 

paramount, and courts recognize that guarding them by adhering to the 

privilege will “result[] in some real injuries that go uncompensated.” 

(Silberg, supra, at p. 218.) This is “simply part of the price that is paid” for 

free access to the courts. (Pettitt v. Levy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 488 

(Pettitt).) If the privilege applies, it cannot be set aside for any tort claim 

except malicious prosecution. (Rubin, supra, at p. 1194.)

Because the privilege “attaches to any publication that has any 

reasonable relation to [a court] action and is made to achieve the objects of 

the litigation,” we have little trouble concluding that the Alert generally falls 

under its broad scope. (Pettitt, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 489.) As discussed 

above, the Alert informed Front Sight members about the Nevada litigation 

and asked for their help to fund it. As such, it was written and distributed to 

achieve the ends of Piazza’s petition for judicial relief. (See Wilcox, supra,

27 Cal.App.4th 809, 826 [third-party who distributed memorandum to raise 

funds for litigation “would have enjoyed an absolute immunity from suit 

under the litigation privilege” for her efforts if she had been a party]; see also 

Costa v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 673, 678; Izzi v. Rellas (1980) 

104 Cal.App.3d 254, 262‒263; Rosenthal v. Irell & Manella (1982) 135 

Cal.App.3d 121, 126.) However, the fact that the Alert generally falls under 

the litigation privilege does not mean everything within it is automatically 

protected. 
18

b. The doxing allegations are not barred by the litigation privilege.

Even when a document broadly relates to litigation, it may contain 

unrelated parts that do not find shelter in the privilege. When 

communications are “substantially extraneous” to the court proceedings, 

there are “reasonable limits” on the application of the privilege. (Nguyen v. 

Proton Technology Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 140, 142‒143 (Nguyen).)

The allegedly defamatory statements in this case meet the logical 

relation test because they serve the ends of the litigation. Impolite as his 

name-calling may read, Piazza would be hard pressed to tell his version of 

the story and request help from Front Sight members without the freedom to 

describe Dziubla as a liar and a con man. 

Piazza’s doxing disclosures are a different matter. There was simply no 

good reason to include Dziubla’s home address, images of his house and a 

close-up picture of his face in a communication aimed at explaining the status 

of ongoing litigation and soliciting financial support. Piazza argues to the 

contrary, asserting that he “specifically referenced Dziubla’s address and 

photos of his home to argue Dziubla was lying when he represented to Front 

Sight that he was broke.” But the accompanying text, describing Dziubla’s 

wealth based on the approximate worth of his home and possessions, had 

already accomplished this same purpose. Furthermore, the precise address is 

unnecessary and the pictures of the house hardly demonstrate Piazza’s point; 

the home does not appear particularly lavish and the make of the cars, 

depicted in an unlit garage, is indiscernible. All this information really 

provides is an additional tool for a would-be harasser to find the right house. 

Piazza’s failure to offer any justification at all for the close-up image of 

Dziubla’s face underscores our conclusion.
19

We find Nguyen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 140, instructive due to its 

factual similarity. In that case, a company called Proton noticed a movement 

of employees and then customers to its competitor Excelsior and suspected

improper solicitation. Nguyen was one of the employees who left Proton to 

join Excelsior. In a letter that threatened litigation, Proton advised Excelsior 

that Nguyen had been “working for Proton under a work furlough program 

sponsored by the Santa Clara County Probation Department [and] was in 

prison for repeatedly and violently assaulting his wife.” (Id. at pp. 143–144.) 

This turned out to be inaccurate, and Nguyen sued Proton for libel. (Id. at 

p. 145.) The court gave measured consideration to whether the litigation 

privilege protected Proton, but ultimately concluded it did not because 

Nguyen’s conviction history was unrelated to Proton’s contemplated litigation 

with Excelsior. (Id. at p. 152.) “The terms ‘related to’ or ‘connected with’ 

necessarily require more than a remote relationship or common factual 

genesis between two otherwise unconnected subjects. To come within the 

privilege, the fact communicated itself must have some bearing on or 

connection with the subject matter of the litigation.” (Id. at p. 149; quoting 

Younger v. Solomon (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 289, 302.)

In this same vein, we conclude that the doxing information included in 

the Alert had no connection with, nor legitimate relation to, the Nevada 

litigation. As a result, it is not protected by the litigation privilege. Contrary 

to Piazza’s contentions, this court is not bound to interpret “logical relation” 

so expansively that we cannot separate the wheat from the chaff. And as the 

Nguyen court observed, enforcing the relevancy requirement does not narrow 

the litigation privilege, but rather prevents its abuse. (Nguyen, supra, 

69 Cal.App.4th 140, 150.)
20

4. Application on Remand

In the preceding sections, we affirmed the principle that litigationrelated communications such as the Alert fall under the protections of the 

anti-SLAPP statute in the first step of the analysis. In the second step, we 

clarified the contours of the litigation privilege and concluded that the doxing 

allegations fall outside of its protections because those disclosures were 

unrelated to the Nevada litigation. This last section functions to bring the 

discussion back to the practicalities of this case and clarify the effect of our 

decision on what remains of plaintiffs’ case.

As we noted previously, the trial court granted Piazza’s special motion 

to strike as to six of the seven causes of action he challenged: Criminal 

Threats, Defamation, Privacy (False Light), Negligent Infliction of Emotional 

Distress, Injunction, and Violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 (Civ. 

Code, § 51.7). Only two of these are revived by our decision because they 

specify the doxing disclosures as a source of injury, which we have 

determined provide a proper basis to proceed.

The first is the civil rights cause of action, which partially survived the 

anti-SLAPP motion. In the words of Baral, this was a “mixed cause of 

action,” in that it included allegations of both protected and unprotected 

activity. (1 Cal.5th at p. 382.) Because it considered the Alert protected by 

the litigation privilege, the trial court struck the allegations based on the 

Alert but declined to strike those based on Piazza’s hiring of Quidang and 

Schneemann. Our decision modifies this result so that the alleged civil rights 

violation evidenced by the doxing can still be developed by plaintiffs.
21

The second affected cause of action is plaintiffs’ request for an 

injunction.9 Here, plaintiffs asked the court to order Piazza to take down the 

Alert from Front Sight’s website, and it was stricken by the trial court under 

the same rationale—that the entire Alert was protected by the litigation 

privilege. In the meantime, Piazza took down the Alert as part of a deal to 

avoid prosecution for a misdemeanor charge. But as plaintiffs point out, the 

deal only requires Piazza’s compliance for six months. Given the personal 

and contentious nature of this dispute, the trial court should have the 

opportunity to consider whether an ongoing injunction to prevent Piazza from 

republishing the doxing information is warranted.

These are the only causes of action before us that are affected by our 

decision. The others either did not rely on the doxing as a source of harm,10

or suffer from some other defect.11 There were additional causes of action 

that Piazza did not challenge in his special motion to strike. Those theories, 

of course, remain for plaintiffs to pursue. And as we read the complaint, the 

9 We pass over the debate whether a claim for injunctive relief is 

properly characterized as a “cause of action” or is rather a “remedy.” (See, 

e.g., Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1787.)

10 This was the case with the Defamation and False Light causes of 

action, which are based only on the alleged false statements about Dziubla in 

the Alert.

11 The cause of action for Criminal Threats and the Negligent Infliction of 

Emotional Distress both fall into this category. As to Criminal Threats, 

plaintiffs essentially lack standing because the Penal Code violation they 

allege creates no right for plaintiffs to sue. The cause of action for Negligent 

Infliction of Emotional Distress is simply unsupported by the facts as pleaded 

because plaintiffs alleged nothing to show there was a special relationship

that created a duty of care. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, supra, 129 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1264; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 

965, 984‒985.)
22

doxing allegations were incorporated by reference into each cause of action. 

We mention this only to clarify that, where it is relevant, plaintiffs can 

invoke the doxing activity as evidence to support any of their remaining 

causes of action.

DISPOSITION

The order granting the special motion to strike is reversed in part as to 

two of plaintiffs’ cause of action ‒ the tenth, seeking an injunction, and the 

twelfth, alleging a civil rights violation ‒ but only as to the claims included in 

these causes of action that allege injury from the publication of their personal 

information, i.e., the doxing allegations. In all other respects, the order is 

affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on 

appeal.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

HALLER, J.