IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ANDREW C. NIELSEN, JONATHAN 

C. NIELSEN and MICHAEL J. 

REYNOLDS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EBTH Inc., a Delaware Corporation,

Defendant.

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C.A. No. 2019-0164-MTZ

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: June 26, 2019

Date Decided: September 30, 2019 

D. McKinley Measley, Lauren Neal Bennett, and Barnaby Grzaslewicz, MORRIS 

NICHOLS ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Joseph C. 

Weinstein and Sean L. McGrane, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP, 

Cleveland, Ohio, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Andrew C. Nielsen, Jonathan C. Nielsen, 

and Michael J. Reynolds.

Jonathan M. Stemerman, ELLIOTT GREENLEAF P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; 

Frances Floriano Goins, ULMER & BERNE, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio; and John M. 

Hands, ULMER & BERNE, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorneys for Defendant 

EBTH, Inc., a Delaware Corporation. 

ZURN, Vice Chancellor.
2

This case presents the common issue of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 

advancement of fees and expenses incurred in a separate action. Advancement 

cases often follow a familiar series of steps: 1) a corporation grants its officers or 

directors advancement rights; 2) those directors or officers are hauled into court for 

acts relating to their role with the corporation; 3) those individuals then seek to 

exercise the rights the corporation granted them; and 4) the corporation resists,

arguing that entitlement is improper because the case is exceptional and requires

the Court to deviate from well-settled principles of law. But all advancement cases

present unique facts because the underlying actions take various forms. Despite 

the many nuances, few cases present facts that fall short of Delaware’s standard

favoring advancement.

This case follows the common pattern. The plaintiffs are former officers or 

directors of the defendant company. The company granted mandatory 

advancement rights to the plaintiffs in its certificate of incorporation, as well as in 

separate indemnification agreements. While serving in their corporate roles, the 

plaintiffs sold their stock in the company in a private transaction. The company 

was not a party to the transaction, but entered into an agreement with the buyer that 

allowed the buyer to obtain the company’s confidential and proprietary financial

information in considering the transaction. That agreement explicitly authorized

the buyer to seek information from the plaintiffs and one additional person who the 
3

plaintiffs controlled. Thereafter, the plaintiffs allegedly provided the buyer with 

false, misleading, or otherwise incomplete information about the company’s 

financial status, and did so on the company’s behalf. This information was 

material to the buyer’s decision to complete the transaction. After the closing, the 

buyer discovered the plaintiffs’ misconduct and sued the plaintiffs and the 

company, alleging that the plaintiffs used their status as company insiders to 

fraudulently induce the buyer to purchase stock for the plaintiffs’ benefit. 

The plaintiffs asked for advancement, and the company refused, resulting in 

this action. On the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the company 

contends that the plaintiffs are not entitled to advancement because they are not 

parties to the underlying action by reason of the fact that they served as officers or 

directors of the company. The company argues that this case is unique, and 

distinguishable from cases involving claims by a company against its own officers 

or directors, because the plaintiffs sold the stock in their individual capacities and

because the company was not a party to the transaction and owed no duty to the 

buyer. 

I disagree and grant the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The 

plaintiffs are entitled to advancement because, according to the pleadings in the 

underlying action, they are parties to that action by reason of the fact that they 

served as directors or officers of the company. 
4

I. BACKGROUND

This advancement action for expenses and fees-on-fees arises from claims 

against plaintiffs Andrew Nielsen (“A. Nielsen”), Jonathan (“J. Nielsen”), and 

Michael Reynolds (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in an action pending in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Light EBTH LLC v. EBTH 

Inc. et al., 1:19-cv-00011-TSB, (the “Ohio Action”). Defendant EBTH Inc. 

(“EBTH,” or the “Company”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Cincinnati, Ohio. Plaintiffs are former officers of EBTH and former 

members of EBTH’s board of directors (the “Board”). At all times relevant to the 

Ohio Action and this proceeding, Plaintiffs served as EBTH officers or Board 

members. 

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to advancement for the Ohio Action 

under the Company’s charter and its indemnification agreements with Plaintiffs. 

On Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (the “Motion”), the facts are drawn 

from the evidentiary record developed by the parties, including the undisputed 

allegations of the Verified Complaint for Advancement (the “Advancement 

Complaint”), the pleadings in the Ohio Action, and other documentary exhibits that 

are not factually disputed. 
5

A. Plaintiffs Were Officers, Directors, Employees, And Agents Of 

EBTH Covered By Advancement Provisions In The EBTH

Charter And Indemnification Agreements.

From May 2012 through early 2018, A. Nielsen served as the Company’s 

President and Chief Executive Officer, and as a member of the Board. J. Nielsen 

served as the Company’s Chief Revenue Officer from May 2012 through March 

2017, as the Company’s Chief Business Officer from March 2017 through May 

2018, and as a member of the Board during those times. Reynolds served as the 

Company’s Chief Financial Officer from May 2012 through October 2016, as 

Chief Operating Officer from October 2016 through March 2018, and as a member 

of the Board from May 2012 through late 2016. 

By serving in these roles, Plaintiffs benefitted from advancement provisions 

in the Company’s Third Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the 

“Charter”) and their Indemnification Agreements with EBTH. The Charter 

provides for mandatory indemnification and advancement as follows:

The Corporation shall indemnify and hold harmless, to the fullest 

extent permitted by applicable law as it presently exists or may 

hereafter be amended, any person (an “Indemnified Person”) who was 

or is made or is threatened to be made a party or is otherwise involved 

in any action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, 

administrative or investigative (a “Proceeding”), by reason of the fact 

that such person . . . is or was a director or officer of the Corporation 

. . . .

1

 

 

1 Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1 [hereinafter “Compl.”] Ex. A, Art. Tenth, § 1.
6

The Corporation shall advance (i.e., pay in advance) the expenses 

. . . incurred by a person in defending any Proceeding in advance of its 

final disposition, provided, however, that, to the extent required by 

law, such payment of expenses in advance of the final disposition of 

the Proceeding shall be made only upon receipt of an unsecured 

undertaking by the Indemnified Person to repay all amounts advanced 

if it should be ultimately determined that the Indemnified Person is 

not entitled to be indemnified under this Article Tenth or otherwise.2 

The Charter also contains a “fees-on-fees” provision, providing that in connection 

with an action to enforce a right to advancement, “if successful in whole or in part, 

[Plaintiffs] shall be entitled to be paid the expense of prosecuting such claim.”3 

Under the Charter’s terms, the Company bears the burden of proving the individual 

is not entitled to the indemnification or advancement.4

On November 19, 2014, EBTH entered into an Indemnification Agreement 

with each Plaintiff.5 Each Indemnification Agreement contains the following 

advancement provision:

 

2

Id. Ex. A, Art. Tenth, § 2. 

3

Id. Ex. A, Art. Tenth, § 3. 

4

Id. (“In any such action, the Corporation shall have the burden of proving that the 

Indemnified Person is not entitled to the requested indemnification or advancement of 

expenses under applicable law.”). 

5

Id. Exs. B–D. 
7

Advancement of Expenses. Notwithstanding any other provision of 

this Agreement, the Company shall advance all Expenses incurred by 

or on behalf of Indemnitee in connection with any Proceeding by 

reason of Indemnitee’s Corporate Status within thirty (30) days after 

the receipt by the Company of a statement or statements from 

Indemnitee requesting such advance or advances from time to time, 

whether prior to or after final disposition of such Proceeding. Such 

statement or statements shall reasonably evidence the Expenses 

incurred by Indemnitee and shall include or be preceded or 

accompanied by a written undertaking by or on behalf of Indemnitee 

to repay any Expenses advanced if it shall ultimately be determined 

that Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified against such 

Expenses. Any advances and undertakings to repay pursuant to this 

Section 5 shall be unsecured and interest free.6

Section 13 of the Indemnification Agreements defines “Proceeding” as 

any threatened, pending or completed action . . . in which Indemnitee 

was, is or will be involved as a party or otherwise, by reason of his or 

her Corporate Status, by reason of any action taken by him or of any 

inaction on his part while acting in his or her Corporate Status . . . .

7

 

Finally, Section 7 of the Indemnification Agreements entitles Plaintiffs to legal 

fees and costs incurred in prosecuting their advancement rights, “regardless of 

whether Indemnitee ultimately is determined to be entitled to such . . . 

advancement of expenses.”8

 

6

Id. Ex. B § 5, Ex. C § 5, Ex. D § 5. Section 13 of the Indemnification Agreements 

defines “Corporate Status” as “the status of a person who is or was a director, officer, 

employee, agent or fiduciary of the Company or of any other corporation, partnership, 

joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise that such person is or was 

serving at the express written request of the Company.” Id. Ex. B § 13(a), Ex. C § 13(a), 

Ex. D § 13(a). 

7

Id. Ex. B § 13(f), Ex. C § 13(f), Ex. D § 13(f).

8

Id. Ex. B § 7(d), Ex. C § 7(d), Ex. D § 7(d).
8

B. The Ohio Action Alleges Plaintiffs And EBTH Misrepresented Or 

Omitted Material Facts In Connection With A Stock Purchase 

Transaction.

I draw the following background from the allegations in the Ohio Action. 

Five individuals sold EBTH shares to ten different investors in “an overall offering 

by which multiple founders of the Company sold” their shares to multiple buyers,9

referred to as the “Founder’s Stock Offering.”10 The sellers included Plaintiffs, 

who were Company “insiders.”

11 Light EBTH (“Light”) purchased shares in the 

Founder’s Stock Offering and is the plaintiff in the Ohio Action.12 Light has three 

members: two individuals and an entity called SLC, LLC (“SLC”). Light was 

formed at the request of EBTH and Plaintiffs in order to avoid investments in 

EBTH stock by multiple individuals purchasing modest amounts. 

 The transaction was memorialized in a Stock Purchase Agreement (the 

“SPA”), which reflects that Reynolds sold 328,581 of his EBTH shares to Light for 

$801,134.37, and J. Nielsen sold 40,549 of his EBTH shares to Light for 

$98,865.12.13 Although A. Nielsen did not sell any EBTH shares to Light, he sold 

 

9 D.I. 46, Ex. 1 ¶ 52 [hereinafter “FAC”]. 

10 Id. ¶¶ 24, 31, 41. 

11 Id. ¶ 53. 

12 See id. ¶¶ 1, 16, 51–53.

13 Id. Ex. A, Schedule A. 
9

781,845 of his shares to another purchaser in the Founder’s Stock Offering for 

$1,906,266.34.

14

 

EBTH was not a party to the SPA, but helped facilitate the Founder’s Stock 

Offering. EBTH and SLC executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (the “NDA”). 

Through the NDA, EBTH agreed to make its “non-public, confidential or 

proprietary” information available to Light15 and stated that “EBTH, Inc. and its 

advisors and agents” would provide this information for purposes of “a potential 

investment or other transaction with the Company.”16 Light alleges that the 

NDA’s scope included communications relevant to Light’s investment through the 

Founder’s Stock Offering. 

The NDA specifically identified A. Nielsen, J. Nielsen, Reynolds, and Chip 

Nielsen as agents and controlling “Principals” of EBTH, and identified the 

Principals as Light’s sole source of EBTH information.

17

 The Principals acted on 

behalf of the Company and each other in connection with any disclosures or 

communications made under the NDA and any transaction contemplated by the 

NDA.18 A. Nielsen signed the NDA as EBTH’s CEO. 

 

14 Id. 

15 Id. ¶ 26.

16 Id. ¶ 27. 

17 Id. ¶¶ 28–29.

18 Id. ¶¶ 29–31. 
10

Before the transaction closed, Plaintiffs made a series of representations to 

Light and other investors regarding EBTH’s financial vitality. Light attributes 

these representations to the “collective action” of Plaintiffs and EBTH.19 On 

December 1, 2016, A. Nielsen verbally represented that EBTH’s sales revenue was 

expected to rise in 2017.20 On December 3, A. Nielsen, acting on behalf of 

Plaintiffs and EBTH, emailed Light a copy of the executed NDA. 

Also on December 3, A. Nielsen emailed Light an EBTH pitch deck 

containing additional information about the Founder’s Stock Offering, including 

the price per share.21 The pitch deck also included material financial projections 

for 2016 and 2017, which were consistent with A. Nielsen’s verbal representations. 

A. Nielsen sent the pitch deck to Light from his EBTH email address, and J. 

Nielsen was copied on the email. The pitch deck bore the EBTH logo. On 

December 10, A. Nielsen emailed Light on behalf of Plaintiffs and EBTH and 

provided Company financial information for 2015 and 2016 (through October 

2016), as well as the Company’s purported growth model. He signed the email as 

EBTH’s CEO. 

 

19 Id. at 6 (referring to “The December 3, 2016 Representations and Defendants’ 

Collective Action”). 

20 Id. ¶ 22. 

21 Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 23–24. 
11

On December 19, A. Nielsen emailed Light “the most current info”

pertaining to the 2017 projections.22 On December 22, A. Nielsen again emailed 

Light to provide information about the Founder’s Stock Offering. In that email, A. 

Nielsen proposed a valuation of the Company’s common stock that was consistent 

with the 2016 projections previously provided on December 3 and December 10

and again presented it as “the most current info.”

23

 Neither email mentioned any 

changes or revisions to the 2016 budget or projections.24 A. Nielsen sent both 

emails from his EBTH email address, on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Company. 

On January 3, 2017, SLC asked Plaintiffs to send Light updated financials in 

order to assess the proposed stock purchase.25 SLC also raised concerns about the 

“Company’s SG&A expenses, and thereby its resulting loss expectations for 2016 

and 2017, and raised various questions regarding the Company’s required 

transaction size, profitability, and performance.”

26

 In response, A. Nielsen emailed 

Light on January 3 and attached a document that contained certain EBTH financial 

information, including some of the Company’s “actual” financials as of November 

30, 2016, but omitted certain financial statements and material information about 

 

22 Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 

23 Id. ¶ 41.

24 See id. ¶¶ 39–41. 

25 Id. ¶ 43.

26 Id. ¶ 44. 
12

EBTH’s 2016 projections.

27

 A. Nielsen sent the email from his EBTH address and 

on behalf of the other Plaintiffs and EBTH. 

On January 6, in reliance on Plaintiffs’ oral and written statements on 

EBTH’s behalf, Light purchased EBTH shares in the Founders Stock Offering.

28

 

Under the SPA, Plaintiffs represented and warranted that the transaction would not 

violate any state or federal law,

29 and that “[t]o each Seller’s knowledge, since 

October 19, 2016, there has not been a material adverse effect on the business of 

the Company,”

30 “implying that full disclosure of the business’s financial 

projections and results through that point in time had been made.”31 The stock 

purchase closed on January 9.

Thereafter, a series of post-closing communications revealed that EBTH’s 

actual financial state was materially different than Plaintiffs and EBTH represented 

to Light before the closing.32 Light learned 

 

27 Id. ¶ 47. 

28 See id. ¶¶ 50–53. 

29 Id. Ex. 1 § 4(b); see also id. ¶ 54. 

30 Id. Ex. 1 § 4(h); see also id. ¶ 55. 

31 Id. ¶ 55. 

32 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 57–58, 67, 71, 74, 76, 80. 
13

the information provided by [Plaintiffs] as of the consummation of the 

stock transaction did not include the detailed, most up-to-date 

financial information as had been requested, the most current 

projection information for the Company’s 2016 financial 

performance, or accurate information available to [Plaintiffs] as of the 

time of the parties’ interactions that was necessary to make 

[Plaintiffs’] prior disclosures accurate, corrected, complete, and not 

misleading under the circumstances.33

Light concluded that Plaintiffs and EBTH were aware of the information’s 

fraudulent nature and had the “willful intent” to induce Light to purchase EBTH 

shares “through the presentation of an outdated and fabricated growth model to 

which [Plaintiffs] claimed to be privy as insiders of the Company.”34

For example, on January 10, EBTH’s Chief Financial Officer emailed the 

first routine distribution of EBTH’s financial information to Light and other EBTH 

stockholders. The email included “EBTH November 2016 Financials” and was 

addressed to Plaintiffs and blind copied to EBTH investors.35 The email contained 

more complete and detailed financial information than Light had received prior to 

the closing, as well as information that Light had not received prior to the 

closing.

36

 The CFO was not an authorized point of contact under the NDA, so 

 

33 Id. ¶ 48.

34 Id. ¶ 38. 

35 Id. ¶ 58. 

36 Id. ¶¶ 60–66.
14

Light alleges it could not have contacted him or gathered this information prior to 

closing.37

According to Light, the January 10 email demonstrated that (1) EBTH had 

reforecasted its 2016 projected losses in October 2016 and materially increased 

them over the loss numbers that had been provided to Light; (2) EBTH and 

Plaintiffs, as EBTH insiders and management, knew of this October 2016 

reforecast; and (3) Plaintiffs, as EBTH insiders, concealed this information and 

continued to knowingly misrepresent EBTH’s financials.

38 Light alleges that 

Plaintiffs and EBTH utilized accurate EBTH information to manage EBTH and 

value their own stock, but knowingly gave Light inaccurate information that they 

failed to update or correct.

39

 Light concludes Plaintiffs fraudulently induced Light 

to purchase common stock shares of the Company by “repeatedly and materially 

misrepresenting the true (and severely deteriorating) financial condition of the 

Company.”40 

 

37 See id. ¶¶ 57, 68, 97, 129. 

38 Id. ¶ 67. 

39 Id. 

40 Id. ¶¶ 1, 17. 
15

C. Litigation Ensues; Plaintiffs Demand Advancement Of Their 

Legal Expenses From The Ohio Action, And EBTH Refuses To 

Pay.

On September 5, 2018, Light’s counsel sent a letter to Plaintiffs, demanding 

payment of $900,000 in connection with Plaintiffs’ alleged pre-closing statements 

and omissions. On September 28, Plaintiffs’ counsel forwarded Light’s September 

5 letter to the Company. On November 27, Light’s counsel informed Plaintiffs’ 

counsel that “[Light] has authorized this Firm to proceed with the filing of a 

Complaint against your clients [A. Nielsen, J. Nielsen, and Reynolds].”41 On 

December 5, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the Company a demand for indemnification 

and advancement of expenses incurred and to be incurred in connection with 

Light’s demand and threatened lawsuit, any lawsuit Light actually filed, and any 

future judgments, penalties, fines and amounts paid in settlement. 

Light filed the Ohio Action on January 3, 2019, alleging Plaintiffs materially 

misrepresented EBTH’s deteriorating financial condition prior to the SPA’s 

closing. Light’s complaint (the “Original Ohio Complaint”) included claims 

against Plaintiffs for violations of federal and Delaware securities laws, common 

law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, 

and in the alternative, unjust enrichment.42 Light also brought a claim of aiding 

 

41 Compl. ¶ 19 (second alteration in original). 

42 Id. Ex. H. 
16

and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against EBTH, as well as a claim for breach 

of contract against J. Nielsen and Reynolds. 

On January 10, EBTH denied Plaintiffs’ requests for indemnification and 

advancement.43 EBTH asserted that Plaintiffs’ involvement in the Ohio Action 

was not by reason of the fact that they were former directors or officers of the 

Company.

44

 EBTH stated Plaintiffs “were not acting in their status as officers of 

[EBTH] when they sold their shares”

45 and that “[c]learly, [Plaintiffs] were acting 

in their personal capacities in the personal sale of their common stock.”46 

Undeterred, on January 23, Plaintiffs sent Undertakings for Indemnification 

and Advancement of Expenses to EBTH; on February 4, Plaintiffs asked the 

Company to reconsider Plaintiffs’ requests. When EBTH did not respond, 

Plaintiffs contacted the Company on February 4 and asked for a response. On 

February 8, the Company again denied Plaintiffs’ requests, asserting that the 

“Complaint [in the Ohio Action] arises out of a private stock transaction whereby 

Light . . . purchased stock held by, among others, [Plaintiffs]” and that “[i]t is clear 

 

43 Id. Ex. I. 

44 Id. Ex. I at 1–2. 

45 Id. Ex. I at 1.

46 Id. Ex. I at 2.
17

from the face of the Complaint that this dispute has nothing to do with EBTH or 

[Plaintiffs’] former roles at EBTH.”47 

D. Plaintiffs File This Action To Compel The Advancement Of 

Expenses In The Ohio Action And To Seek Fees-on-Fees. 

On February 27, Plaintiffs filed the Advancement Complaint to compel the 

advancement of their fees and expenses incurred defending against the Ohio 

Action. On March 21, EBTH answered the Complaint. On April 11, Plaintiffs 

filed the pending Motion. The parties briefed the Motion, and I held oral argument 

on May 17. At oral argument, EBTH conceded that Plaintiffs were entitled to 

advancement for legal costs and fees accrued in defending the Ohio Action’s 

breach of fiduciary duty count. EBTH still disputes entitlement as to the other 

counts. 

On June 3, Light filed a First Amended Complaint in the Ohio Action (the 

“Ohio FAC”). The Ohio FAC colors the factual and legal allegations set forth in 

the Original Ohio Complaint. It adds a claim for violation of Ohio securities laws; 

makes Plaintiffs the subject of the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty 

claim; and adds A. Nielsen as a defendant to the breach of contract claim. The 

Ohio FAC asserts federal securities violations against Plaintiffs based on their 

control over EBTH. In addition, the Ohio FAC further details Plaintiffs’ and 

EBTH’s roles in the underlying stock purchase transaction, as well as the relief 

 

47 Id. Ex. O at 1. 
18

Light seeks from both Plaintiffs and the Company. Importantly, the Ohio FAC 

makes new allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ acts and omissions in connection with 

the stock purchase transaction, and alleges that, at every step of the transaction,

Plaintiffs acted as agents of each other and EBTH. The parties agreed the Ohio 

FAC affects the disposition of this Motion and therefore completed supplemental 

briefing on June 26.

48

 

II. ANALYSIS

A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings and 

materials submitted to the Court “show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.”49 Advancement proceedings are summary by statute.

50 As such, summary 

judgment is an efficient and appropriate method to expeditiously resolve 

advancement disputes because “the relevant question turns on the application of 

the terms of the corporate instruments setting forth the purported right to 

 

48 On June 10, 2019, the Court entered a Stipulation and Proposed Order that directed the 

parties to submit supplemental briefing about the Ohio FAC. D.I. 43. Also on June 10, 

EBTH conceded advancement as to the fiduciary duty count in the Ohio FAC. 

D.I. 44 ¶ 10. On June 14, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for the Entry of Advancement Order 

for advancement of costs and fees associated with the fiduciary duty count in the Original 

Ohio Complaint and the Ohio FAC. Id. at 1. On June 20, I denied that motion, declining 

to evaluate fees on the fiduciary duty count until all entitlement issues have been resolved 

in this matter. D.I. 52. 

49 Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).

50 See 8 Del. C. § 145(k). 
19

advancement and the pleadings in the proceedings for which advancement is 

sought.”51 

There is no genuine dispute of material fact before the Court.52 I need only 

address the following questions: (1) whether Plaintiffs are parties to the Ohio 

Action by reason of the fact that they served as EBTH officers or directors and are 

therefore entitled to advancement as a matter of law, and (2) whether Plaintiffs are 

entitled to fees-on-fees for bringing this action.53 Each count in the Ohio FAC is 

 

51 Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 2004 WL 243163, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2004) 

(quotation omitted). 

52 In briefing, EBTH contended Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment because 

there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether or not Plaintiffs are parties to the 

Ohio Action by reason of the fact that they served as EBTH officers or directors. 

D.I. 36 at 2–3. The disputed application of the “by reason of the fact” standard to 

undisputed facts does not create a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes 

summary judgment. Whether Plaintiffs are parties to the Ohio Action by reason of the 

fact of their former roles as EBTH officers or directors is a question of law, not fact. 

See, e.g., Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 214 (Del. 2005) (“The Court of 

Chancery properly dismissed [defendant’s] ‘official capacity’ defense as a matter of law 

in its summary judgment decision.”); VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 83, 86 

(Del. 1998) (en banc) (resolving the “narrow legal question” of entitlement by analyzing 

the language of Section 145 and the language of the defendant corporation’s 

indemnification bylaw); Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch.) 

(“Where such a mandatory provision exists, the rights of potential recipients of such 

advancements will be enforced as a contract.”), aff’d, 788 A.2d 111 (Del. 2001) (per 

curiam). 

At oral argument, EBTH conceded that reasonableness of fees is the only fact in 

dispute that would preclude summary judgment. D.I. 40 at 47 [hereinafter “Hearing Tr.”] 

(“[T]here are material facts as to the fees that are alleged.”). That dispute has no bearing 

on this Motion. I only address the narrow entitlement issue at this stage; reasonableness 

of fees will follow, pursuant to the procedures adopted in Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc., 

58 A.3d 991 (Del. Ch. 2012). See D.I. 52. 

53 EBTH also challenges entitlement on the grounds that certain claims in the Ohio 

Action are not properly alleged and/or are not supported by applicable Ohio and federal 
20

based on Plaintiffs’ alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and active concealment 

of material information, and so I address entitlement generally, rather than on a 

count-by-count basis.54 Plaintiffs are entitled to advancement and fees-on-fees, for 

the reasons that follow.

A. Advancement 

As to advancement, the sole issue presented is whether Plaintiffs are parties 

to the Ohio Action by reason of the fact that they served as EBTH officers or 

directors, where the challenged transaction involves their personal sale of stock. 

Advancement “attract[s] capable individuals into corporate service” by 

“provid[ing] corporate officials with immediate interim relief from the personal 

out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses 

 

law. D.I. 53 at 4–5, 7, 18. EBTH’s challenges are misplaced in this advancement case. 

The Ohio Courts, not this Court, will assess the validity or sufficiency of the allegations 

in the Ohio Action. For purposes of Plaintiffs’ entitlement to advancement, I rely on the 

allegations in the underlying pleadings, which I must accept as true. 

54 The Ohio FAC supplements the Original Ohio Complaint and best helps the Court 

“discern the true nature” of the claims in the Ohio Action. Imbert v. LCM Interest Hldg. 

LLC, 2013 WL 1934563, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2013) (citing Brown v. LiveOps, Inc.,

903 A.2d 324, 329 (Del. Ch. 2006)). My holding is supported by the allegations in both 

the Original Ohio Complaint and the Ohio FAC. EBTH argues that the Court should 

bifurcate its analysis, considering entitlement under the Original Ohio Complaint 

separately from entitlement under the Ohio FAC after it became the “operative pleading.” 

D.I. 53 at 19–20. When an amended complaint is filed, the Court has the discretion to 

look to that complaint to “discern the true nature” of the underlying proceedings and to 

rely on it to make a determination as to entitlement. Imbert, 2013 WL 1934563, at *5–6

(relying on pleadings as a whole and noting importance of the amended complaint in that 

action); see also Zaman v. Amedeo Hldgs., Inc., 2008 WL 2168397, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 

23, 2008) (relying on the “various complaints” filed in the underlying action to determine 

if the “by reason of the fact” standard was satisfied). This Court has determined 

entitlement by looking at the pleadings as a whole, and I will do so here. 
21

inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings.”55 “The broader 

salient benefits that the public policy behind [S]ection 145 seeks to accomplish for 

Delaware corporations will only be achieved if the promissory terms of 

advancement contracts are enforced by courts even when corporate officials . . . are 

accused of serious misconduct.”56 Plaintiffs’ entitlement to advancement depends

on the mandatory advancement provisions in EBTH’s Charter and Indemnification 

Agreements, which incorporate the “by reason of the fact” standard from Section 

145 of the DGCL.

57

An advancement claim arises “by reason of the fact” of a person’s corporate 

status “if there is a nexus or causal connection between any of the underlying 

proceedings contemplated by Section 145(e) and one’s official corporate 

capacity.”58 “This language has been interpreted broadly, and includes all actions 

brought against an officer or director for wrongdoing that he committed in his 

official capacity, and for all misconduct that allegedly occurred in the course of 

performing his day-to-day managerial duties.”59 The requisite nexus “exists if 

corporate powers were used or necessary for the commission of the alleged 

 

55 Tafeen, 888 A.2d at 211. 

56 Id. at 218. 

57 Compl. Ex. A, Art. Tenth, §§ 1, 2; id. Ex. B § 5, Ex. C § 5, Ex. D § 5.

58 Tafeen, 888 A.2d at 214. 

59 Imbert, 2013 WL 1934563, at *5 (quotation omitted). 
22

misconduct.”60 The nexus is also established if the underlying claim is 

“inextricably intertwined” with the actions taken in the plaintiffs’ former capacities 

as officers or directors, such that the plaintiffs would necessarily be required to 

defend those actions and possibly disprove allegations that they acted improperly 

in those capacities.61 

1. Light Explicitly Challenges Plaintiffs’ Conduct As Officers 

Or Directors Of EBTH.

By its plain text, the Ohio FAC explicitly and repeatedly challenges 

Plaintiffs’ conduct as EBTH officers and directors. In alleging that Plaintiffs and 

EBTH collectively and fraudulently induced Light to purchase EBTH stock, the 

Ohio FAC emphasizes each Plaintiff’s role within EBTH.

62

 The Ohio FAC states: 

At all relevant times, [Plaintiffs] controlled the Company and acted as 

agents on its behalf and each other as related to [Light’s] purchase of 

stock at issue herein. As alleged below, each of the [Plaintiffs] was a 

central and primary participant in [Plaintiffs’ and EBTH’s] joint 

action to promote the stock sale at issue to [Light], enter into 

agreements between [Light], on the one hand, and all three 

[Plaintiffs], on the other, and to make materially false and/or 

deceptive financial statements and disclosures provided to [Light]

only through the three [Plaintiffs] on behalf of each other and of the 

Company.63

 

60 Hyatt v. Al Jazeera Am. Hldgs. II, LLC, 2016 WL 1301743, at *8 (Del. Ch. 

Mar. 31, 2016) (quotation omitted). 

61 Id. at *9 (alteration omitted) (quoting Rizk v. Tractmanager, Inc., C.A. No. 9073-ML, 

at 21 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014) (MASTER’S FINAL REPORT)); see Davis v. 

EMSI Hldg. Co., 2017 WL 1732386, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2017).

62 See FAC ¶¶ 5–10.

63 Id. ¶ 11. 
23

The Ohio FAC repeatedly alleges Plaintiffs acted on EBTH’s behalf and in 

their roles as EBTH’s agents and managers that directed and controlled the 

Company:

 “Prior to the transaction, on or about December 3, 2016, 

[Plaintiffs], acting on behalf of the Company but in furtherance of 

their collective scheme to defraud, provided a copy of an EBTH 

pitch deck that included . . . material financial projection 

information about the Company.”64

 “[T]hrough their statements, disclosures, and dealings leading up 

to the stock transaction, [Plaintiffs] were speaking and making 

statements on behalf of each other and on behalf of the Company 

and acting in their roles as agents of the Company and 

management principals thereof who directed and controlled

Company policy.”65

 “The December 10, 2016 Email was sent to Mark Sullivan and 

Ellen Schubert by A. Nielsen on behalf of all of [Plaintiffs and 

EBTH], who were referenced as ‘we’ therein . . . .”66

 “[Plaintiffs and EBTH] next provided a December 19, 2016 email 

sent to Mark Sullivan by A. Nielsen from his Company email on 

behalf of all of [Plaintiffs and EBTH], again referenced as ‘we’ 

therein . . . .”67

 “In a December 22, 2016 email to Mark Sullivan, sent from a 

Company email address on behalf of [Plaintiffs and EBTH], A. 

Nielsen again described the proposed transaction as a ‘Founder’s 

Stock Offering’ to sell up to 2,950,000 shares of common stock 

owned at that time by the principals of the Company . . . .”68

 

64 Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added). 

65 Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis added). 

66 Id. ¶ 33 (emphasis added). 

67 Id. ¶ 39 (emphasis added). 

68 Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added).
24

 “In response to this specific inquiry concerning the Company’s 

2016 and 2017 expenses, operations, and profitability, A. Nielsen 

sent a January 3, 2017 email from his Company email address and 

on behalf of [Plaintiffs and EBTH], again referenced as ‘we’ 

therein . . . .”69

 “Moreover, given the extent of [Plaintiffs’] respective roles with 

the Company, and their actions on its behalf exposing it and 

themselves to Section 10(b) liability, [Plaintiffs and EBTH] 

knowingly made the above-stated false statements and/or 

omissions of material fact in conflict with their duties to disclose 

arising from the NDA . . . .”70

 “Moreover, as the issuer of the stock on behalf of whom the 

statements and omissions were made under the NDA, and as the 

controlling persons who participated in both the disclosure process 

and the stock transaction, each of the Company and [Plaintiffs] had 

the opportunity to engage in the deceptive schemes, statements, 

and practices to which [Light] was exposed and by which it was 

deceived and induced into purchasing Company stock.”71

 “Given the extent of [Plaintiffs’] respective roles with the 

Company, and their actions on its behalf, [Plaintiffs and EBTH] 

knowingly made the above-stated material false statements and/or 

omissions of material fact.”72

 “[Plaintiffs], through their independent conduct and their control 

of the Company, combined and agreed between them to engage in 

concerted action and through an improper scheme and practice 

designed to defraud and induce [Light] to sign the Common Stock 

Purchase Agreement and to purchase shares of the Company.”73

 

69 Id. ¶ 45 (emphasis added).

70 Id. ¶ 95 (emphasis added).

71 Id. ¶ 98 (emphasis added).

72 Id. ¶ 109 (emphasis added).

73 Id. ¶ 135 (emphasis added). 
25

 “[Plaintiffs], through their independent conduct and their control 

of the Company, willfully, maliciously, and with reckless 

indifference caused harm to [Light] . . . .”74

 “[Light] brings this claim as a shareholder for [Plaintiffs’] breach 

of their fiduciary duties owed to the Company and resulting from 

their provision of false and inaccurate information on behalf of the 

Company but in the furtherance of their individual sales of 

Company stock . . . .”75

 “By virtue of their positions as members of the Company’s Board, 

and/or officers of the Company, [Plaintiffs] owed fiduciary duties 

as set forth and alleged herein above.”76

Light’s claims are “brought against [each] officer or director for wrongdoing 

that he committed in his official capacity.”

77

 Plaintiffs will be required “to defend 

their actions as officers and directors of the Company”78 and possibly disprove 

allegations that they acted improperly in those capacities in the Ohio Action.

79

 

This is sufficient to satisfy the “by reason of the fact” standard. 

2. Plaintiffs Accessed And Misused Confidential EBTH 

Information By Virtue Of Their Roles With EBTH. 

Plaintiffs are also entitled to advancement because the Ohio FAC alleges 

Plaintiffs accessed and shared (or purposefully withheld) EBTH’s confidential 

financial information by reason of the fact that they served the Company.

 

74 Id. ¶ 137 (emphasis added).

75 Id. ¶ 140 (emphasis added).

76 Id. ¶ 152 (emphasis added). 

77 Imbert, 2013 WL 1934563, at *5 (quotation omitted). 

78 Davis, 2017 WL 1732386, at *10. 

79 Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 22–23. 
26

“[W]here the claims asserted against a defendant in an action are based on the 

misuse of confidential information that the defendant learned in his or her official 

corporate capacity, that action qualifies as being asserted ‘by reason of the fact’ of 

that corporate capacity.”80 Advancement is appropriate if the “[t]he gravamen of 

the underlying complaint is that [the plaintiff] had access to proprietary 

information by reason of the fact that he was a director and officer of [the 

defendant] and that he wrongly used that information for his personal benefit.”81 

The relevant inquiry “is into whether the [wrongful] scheme is alleged to have 

employed the corporate powers (or, for example, confidential inside information 

acquired through the corporate status) conferred upon the officer by virtue of his 

status.”82

The Ohio FAC alleges that Plaintiffs were able to share false, misleading, or 

incomplete EBTH information because they were Company “insiders” with

authority to control EBTH’s financial narrative.

83

 Through the NDA, EBTH 

explicitly authorized Plaintiffs to share the Company’s confidential and proprietary 

 

80 Pontone v. Milso Indus. Corp., 100 A.3d 1023, 1052 (Del. Ch. 2014); see also

Holley v. Nipro Diagnostics, Inc., 2014 WL 7336411, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2014).

81 Brown, 903 A.2d at 330. 

82 Perconti v. Thornton Oil Corp., 2002 WL 982419, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2002). 

83 FAC ¶¶ 19, 38, 53, 67, 69–70, 97. 
27

information in relation to the stock purchase transaction with Light, through SLC.84 

The Ohio FAC alleges that, pursuant to the NDA, 

all contacts, requests, and discussions with EBTH Inc. and its advisors 

and agents regarding any potential investment in the Company’s stock 

or other transaction with the Company were to occur only through the 

Principals of the Company (including and limited to specifically to 

Andy Nielsen, Jon Nielsen, Mike Reynolds or Chip Nielsen), who were 

specifically identified as its agents and controlling “Principals” and 

were thereby, without limitation, acting as express and apparent 

agents of the Company and of each other in connection with the 

transactions contemplated by the NDA and their statements and 

representations related thereto.85

A. Nielsen signed the NDA as EBTH’s CEO.86 Under the NDA, EBTH permitted 

Light to communicate about the Company’s finances solely with Plaintiffs and 

Chip Nielsen (who Plaintiffs allegedly controlled). Plaintiffs spoke (or failed to 

speak) to Light in their roles as EBTH “Principals.” 

So empowered, Plaintiffs allegedly provided Light with false information. 

Because they controlled EBTH’s financial records, Plaintiffs were able to prepare 

and provide Light with documents that included false information, omitted material 

information, and misrepresented, among other things, that EBTH had favorable 

 

84 The Ohio FAC alleges Plaintiffs owed Light the duty to speak fully and truthfully 

under several sources: the NDA (id. ¶¶ 95, 98, 115, 125–126, 143); the SPA 

(id. ¶¶ 158, 160); state and federal security laws, because Plaintiffs were controlling 

persons or issuers of stock (id. ¶¶ 93, 95, 107, 109); and fiduciary duties stemming from 

Plaintiffs’ roles as EBTH officers or Board (id. ¶¶ 140–41, 152–54).

85 Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added). 

86 Id. ¶ 30.
28

projections for 2016.87 As insiders, Plaintiffs “deliberately provided only selected 

information” and knew that the information they provided did not reflect EBTH’s 

true financial state.88 

For example, Plaintiffs provided Light with an EBTH pitch deck.89 A. 

Nielsen allegedly sent the pitch deck on behalf of EBTH and the other Plaintiffs. 

He sent it “from his Company email account and bearing the signature block of A. 

Nielsen as Chief Executive Officer of the Company.”90 The email was “copied to 

J. Nielsen at his Company email address, and the EBTH pitch deck itself [was]

marked on every page with the name and logo of the Company.”91 

Plaintiffs subsequently provided Light with additional information that was 

consistent with the pitch deck, but did not reflect the Company’s true financial 

condition.92 In crafting the financial statements they shared with Light, Plaintiffs 

purposefully removed key information from spreadsheets.93 Plaintiffs allegedly 

concealed that the Company completed a reforecast in early October 2016 and 

 

87 See id. ¶¶ 35, 37–38, 47–48, 59–60, 62–67, 69–70. 

88 Id. ¶ 49. 

89 Id. ¶ 20.

90 Id. ¶ 23.

91 Id. 

92 See id. ¶¶ 33, 38, 41, 60.

93 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 37, 46–48, 61–64, 66. 
29

failed to disclose that information in order to remedy previous inconsistent 

statements.94 

In emails, Plaintiffs leveraged their insider status, directing Light to “pay 

most attention” to false, misleading, or incomplete information in documents that

Plaintiffs controlled.95 Plaintiffs represented that the documents and other written 

representations provided the Company’s “most current” information before the 

Founder’s Stock Offering.96 This was not the case.97

All of the foregoing projections, financial assessments, and 

representations were made by insiders, engaged in the management of 

the Company, who had complete[] access to and responsibility for the 

Company’s financial projections and reporting, who were 

knowledgeable regarding the accurate information at the time that 

inaccurate projections were provided to [Light], and who failed to 

provide updated and corrected information to [Light] (including 

through the apparent adulteration of financial documents) during the 

ongoing communications of the parties prior to the closing of the 

stock sale transaction. . . . Thus, the facts show that [Plaintiffs and 

EBTH], as corporate insiders and participants in the stock transaction, 

acted through a knowing and deliberate scheme to induce [Light] to 

purchase Company stock from them in a reckless and highly 

unreasonable manner given their positions as informed insiders who 

were presenting a false narrative and statement of the Company’s 

financial condition and failing to update and correct that deceptive 

depiction.

98

 

94 See id. ¶¶ 35, 38, 47–48, 60, 63–65.

95 See id. ¶¶ 33, 36, 38. 

96 Id. ¶¶ 39–41. 

97 See id. ¶¶ 48, 57–68, 71, 74, 76. 

98 Id. ¶¶ 69–70 (emphasis added). 
30

Light relied on Plaintiffs’ information and trusted its accuracy because they 

were Company insiders.99 Because the NDA limited Light’s sources of 

information to Plaintiffs and one other insider, Light had no way of knowing that 

the information Plaintiffs provided was false.100 

Advancement is appropriate because the “gravamen” of the Ohio FAC is 

that Plaintiffs misused proprietary EBTH information, which they accessed, 

filtered, and distributed by reason of the fact that they were directors or officers of 

the Company.101 Plaintiffs were Principals of EBTH under the NDA “by reason of 

the fact” of their roles at EBTH, and therefore are parties to the Ohio Action by 

reason of that fact as well.102 Plaintiffs will need to defend Light’s claims that, 

while acting on EBTH’s behalf, they provided Light with false or misleading 

information, knew the information was false or misleading, and could have 

corrected any false or misleading statements by virtue of their roles with the 

Company. Light’s allegations that Plaintiffs misused “confidential inside 

 

99 See id. ¶¶ 68–70, 87, 99, 110, 117, 128.

100 See id. ¶¶ 68–71, 98–99, 109–10, 118, 125, 128–29. 

101 See Brown, 903 A.2d at 330; see also Sider v. Hertz Global Hldgs., Inc., C.A. No. 

2019-0237, at 58 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2019) (TRANSCRIPT) (“It is difficult to think of a 

less personal task than preparing a corporation’s financial statements or a task more 

deeply tied to the use of corporate powers.”). 

102 EBTH argues that the NDA did not create a duty to disclose and will not be 

dispositive in the Ohio Action. D.I. 53 at 16–17. As mentioned, that argument on the 

merits must be made in the Ohio Action. See supra note 53. Light alleged that the NDA 

created a duty on behalf of EBTH and Plaintiffs as principals of EBTH. 

See, e.g., FAC ¶ 95. I accept those allegations as true in this action. 
31

information acquired through the corporate status” satisfy the “by reason of the 

fact” standard.103 

3. Plaintiffs Are Entitled To Advancement Even If They Entered 

Into The SPA In Their Personal Capacities.

The SPA governed Plaintiffs’ sale of their personal stock. According to 

EBTH, Plaintiffs’ actions were purely personal and do not establish a nexus to 

conduct taken in their official capacities because the Company was not formally 

involved in the stock purchase transaction, and because Plaintiffs, not EBTH, 

benefitted from the transaction. EBTH alleges that Light is a “complete legal 

stranger” to the Company because EBTH was not a party to the SPA and because 

SLC, not Light, entered into the NDA.

104

 Relying on the belief that the Company 

was far removed from the transaction, EBTH contends that advancement is 

improper because the Ohio Action only implicates Plaintiffs’ personal contractual 

obligations.105 I disagree.

Advancement rights do not attach “when the parties are litigating a specific 

and personal contractual obligation that does not involve the exercise of judgment, 

 

103 Perconti, 2002 WL 982419, at *7. 

104 D.I. 53 at 17; D.I. 36 at 6, 23.

105 D.I. 53 at 11–12; see also D.I. 36 at 14–15. 
32

discretion, or decision-making authority on behalf of the corporation.”106 “When a 

corporation seeks to avoid an officer’s demand for advancement on the ground that 

the claim the officer is defending is not an advanceable claim, in order to prevail, 

the claim at issue must clearly involve a specific and limited contractual obligation 

without any nexus or causal connection to official duties.”107 This is a difficult 

standard, and the Court will favor advancement if “[t]he claims in the underlying 

action are not nearly so limited.”108 

The Delaware Supreme Court has directed an expansive approach when 

assessing the capacity in which a party seeking advancement entered into an 

agreement.109 Advancement will be appropriate where the collective pleadings and 

papers demonstrate that the underlying allegations “are not merely allegations that 

Plaintiffs have breached specific contractual terms personal to them.”110 This may 

be true even where the former officer or director was acting in her personal 

capacity as a seller when making certain representations and warranties, where the 

 

106 Hyatt, 2016 WL 1301743, at *8 (quotation omitted); see also Weaver,

2004 WL 243163, at *3 (“‘[B]y reason of the fact’ is not construed so broadly as to 

encompass every suit brought against an officer and director.”). 

107 Davis, 2017 WL 1732386, at *10 (quotation omitted).

108 Id.

109 VonFeldt, 714 A.2d at 85 (“In keeping with the aversion to undue formalism, we 

decline to engage in the hyper-technical exercise of trying to measure the ‘scope’ of Stifel 

Financial’s request against the various roles VonFeldt filled at SNC. Stifel Financial was 

surely aware that, in today’s corporate world, directors will commonly extend their 

official activities beyond the four walls of the boardroom.”). 

110 Davis, 2017 WL 1732386, at *10. 
33

former director or officer was not formally acting on behalf of the corporation 

when the wrongful act occurred, and where the underlying transaction did not 

involve the corporation.111 The fact that the director or officer’s conduct was 

motivated by greed or personal gain will not preclude advancement.112 

Although EBTH was not a party to the SPA, the Ohio FAC alleges that by 

entering into the NDA with SLC, EBTH anointed Plaintiffs as exclusive sources of 

confidential Company information to support the SPA. As Principals under the 

NDA, Plaintiffs exercised their judgment, discretion, or decision-making authority 

on EBTH’s behalf when they shared confidential Company information with Light. 

The Ohio FAC sufficiently demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ roles as EBTH Principals 

were inextricably intertwined with their roles as sellers pursuant to the SPA. 

The fact that Plaintiffs entered into the SPA as individual sellers and not in 

their formal capacities as officers and directors of the Company is not dispositive. 

Then-Master LeGrow granted advancement where a corporate insider entered into 

 

111 See, e.g., id. (noting plaintiffs were sued for breaching personal representations in a 

stock purchase agreement); Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 21 (noting plaintiff was sued “in 

his capacity as a seller”); Pontone, 100 A.3d at 1050 (noting plaintiff was not affiliated 

with the company as an officer or director at the time the misconduct occurred); Brown, 

903 A.2d at 324 (noting company sued plaintiff and indicating company was not a party 

to transaction where plaintiff “wrongfully misappropriated the corporation’s confidential 

information and used it in forming a competing enterprise”).

112 Tafeen, 888 A.2d at 214 (noting case law “reflects a consistent line of authority 

upholding the contractual and statutory advancement and indemnification rights of 

corporate officials charged with serious misconduct allegedly inspired by personal greed” 

(quotation omitted)). 
34

a transaction as an individual seller and was later sued for breaching 

representations and warranties made in that capacity. In Rizk v. Tractmanager, 

Inc., a former CEO was sued for breach of contract from alleged 

misrepresentations in the underlying Merger Agreement.113 The company argued 

that the CEO was not entitled to advancement because the representations were 

made in his capacity as a seller, not as CEO.114 In particular, the defendant argued 

that the sellers “made a series of representations and warranties in the Merger 

Agreement, placed money and equity in escrow to cover potential indemnification 

liabilities associated with breaches of those representations and warranties, and that 

those escrowed funds are the subject of the breach of contract claim.”115 Master 

LeGrow rejected this argument and granted advancement because the breach of 

contract claim was “inextricably [] intertwined” with actions taken in plaintiff’s 

former capacity as CEO.116 

 

113 Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 20–21. After then-Master LeGrow issued her final report, 

the Rizk defendants filed a Notice of Exceptions to the final report. See Rizk D.I. 52. The 

action was then assigned to a Vice Chancellor for the purpose of hearing the exceptions 

to the final report. See Rizk D.I. 53. Before the Court had the opportunity to address 

those exceptions, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice. See Rizk v. 

Tractmanager, Inc., 2014 WL 5788767 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2014) (granting stipulation of 

dismissal with prejudice). The final report was never adopted by the Court.

114 Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 21. 

115 Id. at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

116 Id. at 21. 
35

I am persuaded by the analysis in Rizk. EBTH’s argument to the contrary 

“would place a narrow reading on the ‘by reason of the fact’ standard, a standard 

this Court consistently interprets broadly and in favor of advancement.”117 While 

Plaintiffs entered into the SPA in their personal capacities, the Company supported 

the transaction, and Plaintiffs allegedly used their Company status to misrepresent 

EBTH’s confidential information for their personal gain. EBTH has failed to show 

that Light’s claims “clearly involve a specific and limited contractual obligation 

without any nexus or causal connection to official duties.”118

Relatedly, EBTH argues that Plaintiffs did not misuse their corporate powers 

because they could have breached their contractual obligations under the SPA even 

if they were never EBTH officers or directors.119 EBTH “cites no authority in 

support of its argument that this inquiry should turn on whether a non-officer 

employee could engage in the wrongdoing alleged in the complaint, and such a 

rule appears inconsistent with the summary nature of advancement proceedings 

and the record typically considered by the Court in resolving these disputes.”120 

 

117 Id. at 17–18 (citing Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., 2008 WL 2262316, 

at *6–7 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008)). 

118 Davis, 2017 WL 1732386, at *10 (quotation omitted).

119 D.I. 36 at 16–18. 

120 Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 17. 
36

In Rizk, then-Master LeGrow rejected this position because it “would place a 

narrow reading on the ‘by reason of the fact’ standard”121 and “would create an 

artificial distinction in which advancement was dependent on whether the conduct 

at issue in the underlying complaint was conduct in which only an officer could 

engage.”122 “This distinction is particularly ill-fitted in this case” because 

according to the FAC, Plaintiffs served as EBTH officers or directors at all times 

relevant to the stock purchase transaction.

123

 Accepting EBTH’s argument would 

impermissibly require the Court “to undertake fact-finding outside the limited 

inquiry typically involved in an advancement dispute.”124 

The Ohio FAC asserts Plaintiffs breached the SPA because they were able to 

access and misuse EBTH’s confidential information by virtue of their positions 

with the Company. EBTH’s proposed thought exercise, which asks this Court to 

consider whether Plaintiffs hypothetically could have accessed Company 

information and misused it in breach of the SPA if they had not served in their 

respective roles with EBTH, is not sanctioned by Delaware law and does not 

preclude advancement.

 

121 Id.

122 Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). 

123 Id.

124 Id.
37

4. The Nature of the Underlying Claims Does Not Preclude 

Advancement.

Finally, EBTH argues that advancement is inappropriate because certain 

claims in the Ohio Action—specifically the breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment claims—are not premised on Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duties to the 

Company, as evidenced by the fact that the claims seek rescission as a remedy.125 

The “by reason of the fact” standard can be met even where the cause of action 

does not specify a breach of fiduciary duty, if “the conduct that is alleged to be a 

breach of the SPA is the same conduct through which Plaintiffs are alleged to have 

misused their corporate powers.”126 

Here, the Ohio FAC presents a “quintessential” fiduciary duty claim for 

which EBTH has conceded advancement.127 That claim is premised on the same 

conduct that underlies the other claims in the Ohio FAC. As such, those claims 

“all could be seen as fiduciary allegations” because they involve the charge that 

 

125 See D.I. 53 at 4–8; D.I. 36 at 24–25. 

126 Davis, 2017 WL 1732386, at *9 (distinguishing Cochran v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 2000 

WL 1847676 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 809 A.2d 555 (Del. 

2002)); see also Pontone, 100 A.3d at 1051. 

127 See Hearing Tr. at 5, 31–32, 42; see also Zaman, 2008 WL 2168397, at *17 (“In 

considering whether a corporate official faces an official capacity claim, the key inquiry 

is whether the claim depends on a showing that the official breached duties, 

quintessentially fiduciary duties, he owed to the corporation in that capacity or faces 

liability from a third party due to actions taken in his official capacity.”). 
38

Plaintiffs failed to live up to their duties of loyalty and care to the corporation.128 

For example, Light alleges that Plaintiffs owed fiduciary duties by virtue of their 

positions with the Company, and that Plaintiffs “acted contrary to their fiduciary 

duties to the Company when they provided materially inaccurate and/or incomplete 

financial information to [Light] . . . and exposed the Company to resulting 

liability.”129 The Ohio FAC’s claims are “grounded in [Plaintiffs’] alleged misuse 

of the substantial fiduciary responsibility they were given as key managerial 

agents” generally and under the NDA.130 The Ohio FAC’s allegations, “couched 

as breaches of representations and warranties in the SPA, are not merely 

allegations that Plaintiffs have breached specific contractual terms personal to 

them. Instead, Plaintiffs will be required to defend their actions as officers and 

directors of the Company and their alleged intentional abuse of their corporate 

powers.”131 

B. Fees-on-Fees 

Plaintiffs are entitled to fees-on-fees in prosecuting this action. “Plaintiffs 

who successfully prosecute an advancement suit are generally entitled to an 

appropriate award of fees for the expenses incurred in litigating the suit, unless the 

 

128 Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 2002 WL 1358761, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002); 

see also FAC ¶¶ 141–46.

129 FAC ¶ 144. 

130 Davis, 2017 WL 1732386, at *9 (quotation omitted). 

131 Id. at *10.
39

parties have agreed otherwise.”132 Here, the parties have not agreed otherwise. 

The Charter and Indemnification Agreements grant Plaintiffs broad rights to 

expenses in prosecuting an advancement suit. 

Plaintiffs rely primarily on the Charter for fees-on-fees proportional to their 

success, as the Indemnification Agreements’ unconditional fees-on-fees grant is

too broad.133 Section 7(d) of the Indemnification Agreements entitles Plaintiffs to 

fees-on-fees “regardless of whether Indemnitee ultimately is determined to be 

entitled to such . . . advancement of expenses.”134 In Levy v. HLI Operating 

Company, Inc., Vice Chancellor Lamb invalidated a provision allowing for feeson-fees regardless of whether the plaintiff was successful in bringing the 

advancement action.

135

 The Court held that such provisions are contrary to public 

policy and void as a matter of law.136 Having voided the provision, the Court 

 

132 Thompson v. Orix USA Corp., 2016 WL 3226933, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2016).

133 In their brief, Plaintiffs recognized that provisions such as Section 7(d) of the 

Indemnification Agreements “have been ruled void under Delaware law,” citing Levy v. 

HLI Operating Co., 924 A.2d 210 (Del. Ch. 2007). D.I. 37 at 25 n.14. But at oral 

argument, Plaintiffs argued that Levy left open the possibility of full indemnification for 

partial success, and requested full indemnification under Section 7(d) in view of 

Defendants’ concession of advancement on the fiduciary duty claim. Hearing Tr. at 31–

32. I do not reach that issue because Plaintiffs succeeded, in whole, on their Motion. 

134 Compl. Ex. B § 7(d), Ex. C § 7(d), Ex. D § 7(d).

135 See Levy, 924 A.2d at 225–27. 

136 See id. at 226 (“[S]ection 145 . . . is best read as limiting a corporation’s power to 

indemnify fees on fees to those situations where success is achieved on the underlying 

claim. . . . [A]llowing a contractual provision such as the one in [this case] to stand 

contravenes notions of sound public policy previously noted by this court.”). 
40

explained that the plaintiffs were still entitled to fees in proportion to the extent of 

their success in bringing the action.137

EBTH’s Charter grants Plaintiffs appropriately proportional fees: “if 

successful in whole or in part, [Plaintiffs] shall be entitled to be paid the expense of 

prosecuting such claim.”138 Plaintiffs are entitled to fees-on-fees in an amount 

proportional to their success in this action. Because Plaintiffs succeeded in full on 

their Motion, they are entitled to reimbursement of their legal fees and expenses 

incurred in this litigation. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. The Plaintiffs are entitled to advancement of expenses and fees in the 

Ohio Action and fees-on-fees incurred in bringing this action. The parties shall 

submit a stipulated form of order within ten days of this opinion imposing the 

 

137 Id. at 225–26 (“A contractual agreement for indemnification of fees on fees, then, 

cannot overstep this bright-line legal boundary. A party must succeed (at least to some 

extent) on its underlying indemnification action to have a legally cognizable claim for 

monies expended in forcing its indemnitor to make it whole.”); id. at 227 (“For these 

reasons, the provision found in section 4 of the indemnification agreements which 

purports to require Old Hayes to indemnify the plaintiffs for fees and expenses incurred 

in this action regardless of their success on the merits is invalid. . . . Any fees and 

expenses advanced to Christophe and Witt are subject, in an inverse proportion to the 

level of success they ultimately achieve in this case, to a right of recovery by Old 

Hayes.” (footnotes omitted)). 

138 Compl. Ex. A, Art. Tenth, § 3. 
41

framework detailed by this Court in Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc.,

139 which shall 

govern the submission of further requests for advancement and the prompt 

resolution of any disputes that arise regarding such requests.

 

139 Fitracks, Inc., 58 A.3d at 1001–03.