PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 15-2222

____________

IN RE: RAYMOND ROSS,

Appellant

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2:15-cv-00197)

District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert

______________

Argued October 25, 2016

______________

Before: VANASKIE, KRAUSE, and NYGAARD, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 8, 2017)

Raymond Ross

P.O. Box 285

Fort Washington, PA 19034

Pro Se
2

Charles J. Hartwell, Esq.

Dethlefs Pykosh and Murphy Law

2132 Market Street

Camp Hill, PA 17011

Counsel for Appellee AmeriChoice Federal Credit 

Union

William H. Burgess, Esq. [ARGUED]

Kirkland & Ellis

655 15th Street, N.W.

Suite 1200

Washington, D.C. 20005

Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of

Appellant Raymond Ross

___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

___________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

Raymond Ross appeals from a broad filing injunction

issued against him by the Bankruptcy Court after he and his 

wife used the bankruptcy process to stave off the sheriff’s sale 

of their home. Ross argues that, as a matter of law, a

bankruptcy court may never issue a filing injunction against a 

Chapter 13 debtor who requests voluntary dismissal under 11 
3

U.S.C. § 1307(b) because doing so would undermine the 

debtor’s statutory rights. We disagree, and hold that a 

bankruptcy court does indeed have the authority to issue a 

filing injunction even in the context of approving a debtor’s 

§ 1307(b) voluntary dismissal because nothing in the

Bankruptcy Code’s express terms says otherwise. 

However, we also find that the Bankruptcy Court’s 

filing injunction against Ross cannot survive this appeal due to 

this case’s particular circumstances. The Bankruptcy Court

provided no reasoning for the broad nature of its filing 

injunction, which went well beyond what had been requested 

and what the Bankruptcy Court found appropriate in the case 

of Ross’s similarly-situated wife. Accordingly, we will vacate 

the injunction and remand this matter for further proceedings.

I.

Appellant Raymond Ross and his wife Sandra have 

lived in their home in Ambler, Pennsylvania, since 1993. In

2003, the Rosses took on a mortgage from Appellee 

AmeriChoice Federal Credit Union. The Rosses fell behind on 

their payments, and in 2012 AmeriChoice filed a foreclosure 

action in Pennsylvania state court. The state court entered

default judgment against the Rosses, and AmeriChoice 

scheduled a sheriff’s sale to be held on October 30, 2013. Ross 

v. AmeriChoice Fed. Credit Union, 530 B.R. 277, 280 (Bankr. 

E.D. Pa. 2015). 
4

The day before the sheriff’s sale, Raymond1—acting 

alone, without Sandra—filed the first of the Rosses’ three

relevant Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. Raymond’s first 

petition triggered Chapter 13’s automatic stay and put a halt to

the sheriff’s sale, but was dismissed about six months later 

after Raymond failed to make required payments. 

AmeriChoice rescheduled the sheriff’s sale for August 27, 

2014. 

On the day of the rescheduled sale, Raymond filed a 

second Chapter 13 petition—the one that led to this appeal—

stalling the sale for a second time. The Bankruptcy Court 

quickly granted AmeriChoice relief from the automatic stay, 

and the sheriff’s sale was rescheduled yet again, this time for 

October 29, 2014. On that day, however, Sandra filed her own 

Chapter 13 petition, delaying the sale of the Rosses’ property 

a third time. In re Sandra Dixon-Ross, No. 15-CV-581, 2016 

WL 1056776, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2016). Sandra’s case 

was assigned to the same Bankruptcy Judge overseeing

Raymond’s case, and a week later the court dismissed Sandra’s 

petition for failure to obtain required pre-petition credit 

counseling. Id. 

In Raymond’s second case, AmeriChoice filed a motion 

under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) to either convert Raymond’s case to 

Chapter 7 or dismiss it altogether due to what AmeriChoice

saw as Raymond’s bad faith use of the bankruptcy process. 

The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on the motion. 

About two weeks prior to the hearing, Raymond filed a motion 

to postpone the hearing due to a scheduling conflict and his

 

1

 For sake of clarity, we will refer to Appellant 

Raymond Ross hereinafter by his first name only, and his wife 

by her first name, Sandra.
5

anticipated absence from the state. The Bankruptcy Court 

denied the motion to postpone a week later. Raymond then 

requested, the day before his hearing, that his case be dismissed 

pursuant to § 1307(b).

Raymond did not appear at the hearing on 

AmeriChoice’s motion. AmeriChoice did appear, and 

indicated that its preference would be for the Bankruptcy Court 

to convert Raymond’s case to Chapter 7; dismissal was its 

second choice. If the Bankruptcy Court decided to dismiss, 

AmeriChoice requested that the court also issue one of two 

proposed filing injunctions: a filing injunction “barring future 

filings [of both Raymond and Sandra Ross] for 180 days,” or a 

filing injunction “barring the use of the automatic stay in any 

future filings by either one of them.” (Addendum to Amicus 

Br. at 24 (transcript of hearing).) The Bankruptcy Judge 

expressed due process concerns with the prospect of issuing an 

order that extended to Sandra because the hearing was held 

only in Raymond’s case and Sandra had not been given notice. 

The Judge instead suggested that if AmeriChoice wanted a 

filing injunction entered against Sandra, it should return to 

Sandra’s case and request one there. Neither the Bankruptcy 

Judge nor AmeriChoice mentioned or discussed Raymond’s 

request for dismissal at the hearing. Following the hearing, the 

Bankruptcy Court issued an Order dismissing Raymond’s case

“with prejudice,” and further providing that “the Debtor is not 

permitted to file another bankruptcy case without express 

permission from this Court.” (App. 205.) 

AmeriChoice took the Bankruptcy Judge’s advice and a 

week later filed a motion in Sandra’s case, requesting that a 

filing injunction be entered against her as well. In re Sandra 

Dixon-Ross, 2016 WL 1056776, at *1. AmeriChoice

suggested as relief the same two alternatives it had proposed in 
6

Raymond’s case: a general restriction on all Sandra’s filings 

for 180 days, or an order granting blanket relief from the 

automatic stay for any claims against the Rosses’ Ambler 

property for the indefinite future. Id. It did not request the 

broad restriction that the court had already entered against 

Raymond. The Bankruptcy Judge granted the motion, but this 

time the order extended only to what AmeriChoice requested:

Sandra was “enjoined from filing another bankruptcy for 180 

days of the date of this Order,” and the automatic stay was not 

to “operate against actions to enforce [AmeriChoice’s] 

mortgage foreclosure judgment” on the Rosses’ property. In 

re Sandra Dixon-Ross, No. 14-18608, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 

Jan. 21, 2015). Sandra lost an appeal in the district court, and 

did not further appeal her case. Raymond unsuccessfully 

appealed his second case to the District Court, Ross, 530 B.R. 

at 282, and then filed the present appeal.

In the midst of this litigation, AmeriChoice completed 

the sheriff’s sale, only to have the foreclosure undone when the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Rosses never 

received proper notice in the state action. AmeriChoice Fed. 

Credit Union v. Ross, 135 A.3d 1018, 1023-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2015). The Rosses also filed a federal action against 

AmeriChoice and other defendants, and eventually the parties 

entered into a near-global settlement, where the Rosses 

promised to make payments on their debt and AmeriChoice 

promised to abandon its foreclosure action. See Ross v. 

AmeriChoice Fed. Credit Union, No. 15-2650, ECF No. 28 

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016).
7

The lone unsettled issue is the Bankruptcy Court’s filing 

injunction against Raymond, which remains in place.2

II.

The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 157. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 158(a)(1) to review the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal order. 

And we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Our task is to “stand in the shoes” of the District Court and 

review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision anew. In re Pransky, 

318 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Krystal 

Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d 

Cir. 1998)). “[W]e review a bankruptcy court’s ‘legal 

determinations de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and 

its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof.’” In re Miller, 730 

F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Michael, 699 F.3d 

305, 308 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012)). The issuance of a filing 

injunction is an exercise of discretion. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 

901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 1990).

III.

Raymond’s appeal raises two main issues: (1) whether 

the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a bankruptcy court from issuing

a filing injunction against a debtor who requests voluntary 

 

2

 Raymond proceeds pro se in this appeal. Because of 

the important and unsettled nature of the power of a bankruptcy 

court to issue a filing injunction in response to a Chapter 13 

debtor’s motion for voluntary dismissal, we appointed counsel 

to serve as an Amicus Curiae on behalf of Raymond in this 

appeal. We express our gratitude to court-appointed amicus, 

who provided valuable assistance to the Court.
8

dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), and (2) whether this 

case’s particular facts and circumstances indicate that the 

Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in issuing a broad filing 

injunction. We hold that the answer to the first question is no, 

but find the answer to the second is yes. 

A.

Raymond’s first argument is that bankruptcy courts may 

not impose a filing injunction after a debtor has motioned for 

voluntary dismissal pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b). 

Bankruptcy courts possess a general statutory authority to 

“issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 

appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Bankruptcy 

Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). And bankruptcy courts “may also 

possess ‘inherent power . . . to sanction ‘abusive litigation 

practices.’” Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) 

(quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 

375-76 (2007)). But these broad “equitable powers . . . are not 

without limitation.” In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 

190, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). As relevant here, for example, a

bankruptcy court’s general authority does not extend to actions 

that conflict with “specific,” “explicit,” and “express” terms of 

the Bankruptcy Code. Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1195-97. 

In this vein, Raymond argues the Bankruptcy Court’s 

filing injunction is not authorized by its general authority 

because it conflicts with the express terms of § 1307(b). 

Section 1307(b) states that a bankruptcy court “shall” dismiss 

a Chapter 13 case on the “request” of the debtor unless the 

debtor’s case has already been converted from some other 
9

chapter of the code. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b).3 There is a split in 

authority as to just how mandatory this right to dismissal really 

is, and the Third Circuit has yet to weigh in. Some courts hold

that the statute’s command is mandatory and grants a debtor an 

“absolute” right to dismissal—if a debtor requests dismissal, 

then the court must dismiss; no exceptions. See, e.g., In re 

Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999) (reasoning that 

reading a bad faith exception into § 1307(b) would undermine

§ 303’s procedures governing the initiation of an involuntary

Chapter 7 case); In re Procel, 467 B.R. 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 

2012) (applying Barbieri’s rule after holding that Barbieri was 

not overruled or abrogated by Marrama, 549 U.S. at 365); In 

re Williams, 435 B.R. 552, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (same). 

Other courts read the statute to contain an exception that 

permits a bankruptcy court to delay ruling on a bad faith 

debtor’s request for dismissal and instead first address a 

creditor’s competing motion to dismiss the case or convert it to 

Chapter 7. See, e.g., In re Jacobsen, 609 F.3d 647, 649 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that Marrama requires the court to read-in

a bad faith exception); In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 772, 773 

n.12 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). Raymond argues we should side 

with Barbieri, and therefore the Bankruptcy Court erred in 

granting AmeriChoice’s motion over Raymond’s dismissal 

 

3 The precise language of section 1307(b) is as follows: 

On request of the debtor at any time, if the case 

has not been converted under section 706, 1112, 

or 1208 of this title, the court shall dismiss a case 

under this chapter. Any waiver of the right to 

dismiss under this subsection is unenforceable.
10

request because a debtor’s § 1307(b) right to dismissal is 

absolute.

But we need not weigh in on this split in authority today, 

because even if Raymond were correct, and § 1307(b) required 

the Bankruptcy Court to grant Raymond’s request for dismissal 

before considering AmeriChoice’s motion, the Bankruptcy 

Court could have just as easily attached its filing injunction to 

Raymond’s requested dismissal order. Raymond argues that 

such a conclusion cannot be correct because it would 

undermine the purpose of several other Bankruptcy Code

provisions that already address the problem of repeat-filers and 

bad-faith debtors: § 727(a)(8) and § 1328(f), which limit the

availability of two discharges to the same petitioner; 

§ 362(b)(4), which diminishes the effect of the automatic stay 

for repeat-filers; and § 109(g), which effectively imposes a 

180-day filing injunction on a certain subset of repeat-filers 

who act in bad faith. But whether or not the Bankruptcy 

Court’s filing-injunction order undermines these sections’

purposes is not the question; all that matters is the “express” 

and “explicit” terms of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, in 

Marrama v. Citizens Bank, the Supreme Court upheld an order 

as falling under the bankruptcy court’s general authority, and 

brushed back an argument that its decision would undermine

the purpose of other Code provisions. See 549 U.S. at 375; see 

also id. at 380 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority did 

not adequately consider the “purpose” of other Code 

provisions). What mattered to the Court was that there was

“[n]othing in the text” of the Code that prohibited the 

bankruptcy court’s order. Id. at 374-75. By comparison, when 

the Supreme Court reversed an order in Law v. Siegel for 

exceeding the bankruptcy court’s general authority, it held that 

the order conflicted with the “explicit mandates” and “express 
11

terms” of 11 U.S.C. § 522, in light of two specific aspects of 

that section. 134 S. Ct. at 1196 (referencing specific textual 

language granting debtors the right to seek exemptions and a 

“meticulous” and “detailed” list of exceptions and limitations). 

Raymond’s case is much more like Marrama than Law v. 

Siegel. Raymond highlights “nothing in the text” of § 1307(b)

that prohibits the entry of a filing injunction alongside a 

§ 1307(b) dismissal order, and the purposes behind the other

cited statutory provisions are irrelevant.

Raymond also argues against this conclusion by 

comparing § 1307(b) to the analogous Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure governing voluntary dismissals by a plaintiff, Rule 

41(a)(1).

4

 Rule 41 states in its text that a notice of voluntary 

 

4 Rule 41(a)(1) provides:

(a) Voluntary Dismissal.

(1) By the Plaintiff.

(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 

23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable 

federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an 

action without a court order by filing:

(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party 

serves either an answer or a motion for summary 

judgment; or

(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties 

who have appeared.
12

dismissal is effective without a court order and the dismissal is

without prejudice if the plaintiff requests dismissal and has not 

previously had “any federal- or state-court action based on or 

including the same claim” voluntarily dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 41(a)(1)(B). Thus, Raymond suggests that had the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure governed the Bankruptcy Court’s 

procedures in Raymond’s case, the Bankruptcy Judge arguably 

would have been prohibited from entering the filing injunction 

because Raymond’s § 1307(b) request for voluntary dismissal

was his first.5 The problem with this Rule 41 analogy, 

however, is once again the text of § 1307(b): whereas Rule 41

 

(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states 

otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But 

if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federalor state-court action based on or including the 

same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an 

adjudication on the merits.

5 Raymond’s first bankruptcy petition was dismissed 

involuntarily in response to a motion to dismiss filed by the 

Trustee; it was not dismissed voluntarily. See In re Raymond 

Ross, No. 13-19412, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014) 

(dismissal order). Prior to dismissal, Raymond and 

AmeriChoice apparently entered into a stipulation in an 

attempt to relieve AmeriChoice from the automatic stay and 

avoid future litigation between the parties. AmeriChoice’s 

Mot. to Convert or Dismiss, Ex. P ¶¶ 10-13, Bankr. E.D. Pa. 

Case No. 14-16866, Docket No. 41. But that stipulation did 

not purport to resolve Raymond’s first Chapter 13 case in its 

entirety, and was not the basis for the Bankruptcy Court’s 

dismissal.
13

requires in specific and express terms that dismissal is 

automatic and without prejudice, § 1307(b) contains no similar 

textual hook. 

The Bankruptcy Court therefore possessed the general 

authority to issue a filing injunction against Raymond.

B.

The Bankruptcy Court’s filing injunction against 

Raymond is still problematic, however, due to the specific 

circumstances of this case. A court may not issue orders that 

are “arbitrary or irrational,” and we may vacate decisions for

an abuse of discretion on that basis. United States v. Bailey, 

840 F.3d 99, 117 (3d Cir. 2016). Furthermore, when reviewing

for abuse of discretion, we grant less deference to court 

decisions that are unaccompanied by reasoning. Id. Although

we may affirm a judgment of a lower court for any reason 

supported by the record, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 

191 (3d Cir. 2011), we are not obligated to search the record 

for reasons to affirm and may vacate or remand if the lower 

court declines to provide reasoning supporting its decision.

6

 

 

6 See United States v. Garza, 593 F.3d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 

2010) (holding that the district court abused its discretion when 

it sua sponte transferred a case to a not very convenient venue 

and did not provide reasoning); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking 

Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(vacating the district court’s award of damages under the 

Lanham Act for lack of reasoning); Stuebben v. Gioiosi (In re 

Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) (remanding to the 

bankruptcy court because it failed to “provide a sufficient basis 
14

Here, three aspects of the filing injunction, none of 

which were explained by the Bankruptcy Court, together 

suggest the Bankruptcy Judge abused his discretion in issuing 

the broad and indefinite filing injunction. First, the filing 

injunction went beyond what AmeriChoice requested. 

AmeriChoice only asked that the Bankruptcy Court either 

restrict Raymond’s filings for 180 days or bar the application 

of the automatic stay to AmeriChoice’s attempts to sell the 

Rosses’ property. The Bankruptcy Court, however, barred 

Raymond from making any bankruptcy filings anywhere for 

the indefinite future—there was no temporal or geographic 

limitation—except when the court grants its express 

permission. 

Second, the filing injunction against Raymond is

several degrees harsher than the filing injunction against 

Sandra, even though the same Bankruptcy Judge oversaw each 

spouse’s case and gave no indication that the two are not 

similarly situated. Similarly, even though it appears that 

Raymond and Sandra are similarly situated, the Bankruptcy 

Court limited its filing injunction in Sandra’s case to what

AmeriChoice requested while in Raymond’s case went beyond 

their request.

Third, 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) is persuasive authority that a

180-day filing restriction may have been sufficient in 

Raymond’s case. As mentioned above, that section imposes

an effective 180-day filing restriction on debtors who have 

either (1) willfully failed “to abide by orders of the court” or 

“to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case,” 

or (2) requested and received dismissal in advance of a court 

 

for reviewing its exercise of discretion” in imposing sanctions 

under Rule 9011).
15

ruling on a creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay. 

11 U.S.C. § 109(g). Thus, the section imposes a 180-day filing 

restriction on a certain subset of bad faith debtors. The section

almost certainly did not apply here because Raymond appeared

before the Bankruptcy Court, apparently followed the court’s

orders, and did not file his motion in response to 

AmeriChoice’s previously-granted motion for relief from the

automatic stay but rather its motion to dismiss or convert 

Raymond’s case. Nonetheless, if 180 days is often sufficient 

for the bad faith debtor contemplated by §109(g), 180 days

may have been sufficient for Raymond too.

These three aspects of the Bankruptcy Court’s filing 

injunction together, left unexplained by any court reasoning,

lead us to the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in 

issuing such a broad filing injunction. If any one of these 

factors had not been present, or if the Bankruptcy Court had 

provided oral or written reasoning describing a legitimate 

rationale for the broad nature of its filing injunction, then 

perhaps we would have arrived at a different result, because 

even broad filing restrictions are common and often justified. 

See, e.g., Olson v. Ramsey Cty., No. 15-3131, 2015 WL 

5778478, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2015) (restricting the 

plaintiff, for the indefinite future, from “filing new cases in this 

District Court unless he is represented by counsel or receives 

prior written authorization from a judicial officer in this 

District Court”); Riches v. Parcells, No. 1:07-cv-1891, 2008 

WL 117887, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008) (restricting the 

Clerk of Court, for the indefinite future, from accepting any of 

the plaintiff’s future civil complaints if the plaintiff has not 

paid the filing fee). Nevertheless, a broad filing injunction is 

an “extreme remed[y]” that “should be narrowly tailored and 

sparingly used.” In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 747 
16

(3d Cir. 1989). Given both the breadth of the injunction in this 

case and the Bankruptcy Court’s failure to articulate why such 

an injunction was warranted by Ross’s conduct, a remand is 

warranted.7 

IV.

We will vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s filing-injunction 

order and remand the case to the Bankruptcy Court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

7 Because we vacate the filing injunction on this basis, 

we need not address Raymond’s final argument in the 

alternative, that the Bankruptcy Court violated his procedural

due process rights.