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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA , Appellee

v.

LEWIS MARTIN MARTIN ,

Appellant :
:
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:
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: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 20 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 1, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 36

- CR

- 000 5151

- 2016

BEFORE: BOWES , J., MCLAUGHLIN , J. and STRASSBURGER , J. *

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 17, 2018

Lewis Martin Martin (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on December 1, 2017, following his jury convictions for indecent

exposure and corruption of minors. Upon review, we affirm.

The relevant fa cts and procedural history have been summarized by

the trial court.

On September 23, 2016, a criminal complaint was filed charging [Appellant] with indecent exposure and corruption of minors. The basis for the charges was an allegation that [Appellant]

ex pose d his penis to the victim, L.M.[, born April 2006] , in June 2015 in East Cocalico Township, Lancaster County. A preliminary hearing was held on October 5, 2016, at which time the charges

were waived over to the Court of Common Pleas.

On July 19, 2017 , the Commonwealth filed a petition to admit testimony under the “tender years hearsay exception,” 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 5985.1. The victim, L.M., was interviewed by Christina Vernerick, a forensic interviewer at the Lancaster County Children’ s Alliance. 2 This interview was videotaped. During this interview, L.M. disclosed that [Appellant] exposed hisJ

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penis to him. A “tender years” hearing was scheduled for the time of tria l

. 3

__________ 2 Lancaster County Children’s Alliance is a child advocacy center where i nvestigations of child abuse are conducted through forensic interviews of children who have been referred either by the Children & Youth Agency or a law enforcement agency. The aim is to minimize the number of interviews a child must endure surrounding al legations of child abuse.

3 The “tender years” hearing never took place as the Commonwealth chose not to have the minor victim testify at trial, nor to introduce the victim’s interview with Children’s Alliance.

On July 20, 2017, the Commonwealth gave n otice of its intent to introduce evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to Pa. R.E. 404(b)([3] ). The older brothers and sisters of L.M. disclosed that when they were around the same age as the victim, [Appellant] expo sed his penis to them as well. 4 These act ions resulted in [Appellant] being charged at Docket No. [CP

- 36

- CR

000] 0432

- 2010 with indecent exposure and corruption of minors. [Appellant] pleaded guilty to the charges in January 2011, and was sentenced to time

- served to 23 months’ incarce ration, foll owed by three years’ probation. [Appellant] was subsequently charged with a probation violation and sentenced on December 30, 2011, to time

– served to 23 months’ incarceration, with a consecutive one

- year probation term. [Appellant] was ultimately release d from probation on October 10, 2014. [One of t] he incident [s] with L.M. occurred approximately two weeks after [Appellant] was released from probation for exposing himself to L.M.’ s older siblings. [ 1 ] The Commonwealth intended to introduce evidence of A ppellant’ s prior bad acts against his other nieces and nephews to show the common scheme and plan, opportunity, knowledge, and absence of mistake. See Pa. R.E. 404(b)(2).

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1 The record indicates that Appellant was initially also charged with exposing himself to L.M. in October 2014, but the criminal information was amended to limit the charge to only the June 2015 incident. N.T., 8/30/2017, at 11

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- __________ 4 Specifically, J.M. [born September 2001] disclosed that when she was aro und the ages of six to nine, [Appellant] exposed his penis to her multiple times in the barn and shed, and would touch his penis. R.M. [born May 1999] disclosed that when she was nine years old and younger, [Appellant] would expose his penis to her in the barn a nd would touch his penis. C.M. [born December 1996] disclosed that when she was between the ages of six and eight, [Appellant] would expose his penis to her in the barn

a nd would touch his penis. M.M. [born September 1992] disclosed that when he was ten years old and younger, [Appellant] exposed his penis to him on multiple occasions.

This case went to trial on August 30, 2017. Immediately prior to trial, [the trial court] heard argument on the prior bad act s request by the Commonwealth. [T he trial court] ruled at that time that M.M., the minor victim’ s older brother, would be permitted to testify to the fact that Appellant repeatedly exposed himself to his nephew, M.M., when he was just a child. This evidence would be admissible to show an absence of mistake and intent. [The trial court] further ruled that should the defense argue that Appellant did not know that his actions would affront or alarm or tend to corrupt the minor victim, then the door would be open to the Commonwealth’s introduction o f Appellant’ s prior convictions for indecent exposure and corruption of minors. Defense counsel objected to the admission of such prior bad acts testimony.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of M.M., Detective Keith Neff of the East Cocal ico Township Police Department, and portions of the audio[

- ] recorded statement of Appellant’ s police interview. M.M. testified to the fact that he walked in on Appellant exposing his penis to L.M. He further stated that he immediately told his mother abo ut the incident. M.M. also testified that when he was between the ages of 5 and 10 years old, Appellant exposed himself “ maybe 20 times ” and spoke to M.M. in a sexual manner.J

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- Detective Neff testified that, after signing the Miranda [ 2 ] warnings form, Appe llant agreed to an interview. Portions of Appellant’ s audio[

- ] recorded stat ement were played for the jury. Appellant acknowledged in his police interview that M.M. is a truthful person. Appellant would neither admit nor deny the charged criminal activit y because he said he had no memory or recollection of the alleged events.

The defense pres ented no testimony or evidence. Following deliberations, the jury returned a ver dict of guilty on both charges. Following the verdict, senten cing was deferred pend ing a pre

- sentence investigation.

On December 1, 2017, [Appellant] appeared for sentencing. [The trial court] imposed concurr ent sentences of 9 to 23 months’ incarc eration followed by three years’ probation for the indecent exposure and co rruption of min ors convictions. As Appellant had already been in prison for over nine months awaiting trial, Appellant was made immediately eligible for parole for admission to an inpatient treatment program that would address his psychiatric, psychological or behaviora l issues related to these charges. Restitution in the amount of $1,000.00 was imposed. 5 [Appellant] was ineligible for a Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (RRRI) sentence, and his ineligibility was not waived by the Commonwealth.

__________ 5 [Appellan t] was ordered to reimburse the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue $1 [,] 000.00 for the forensic examination of the minor victim, L.M.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO) , 2/1/2018, at 1

- 5 (citations to the record

omitted)

.

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2 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).J

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Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal , 3 and both Appellant and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant argues that “the trial court erred in allowing M.M.

to testify that [Appellant] had exposed himself to M.M. several year s prior in

violation of Pa.[R.E.] 404(b) w here this testimony was not relevant to a

legitimate purpose and any probative value it may have had was outweighed

by the unfair prejudice to [Appellant].” Appellant’s Brief at 4. We consider

this issue mindful of the following.

The admission or exclusi on of evidence is a matter vested in the trial court’s sound discretion, and we may reverse the court’s ruling only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law or an exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill

- will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. Our scope of review is limited to an examination of the trial court’s s tated reason for its decision.

Commonwealth v. Wattley , 880 A.2d 682, 685 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citations and quotation marks omitted)

. Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a f act more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

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3 Appellant had 30 days from entry of the trial court’s sentencing order on December 1, 2107 to file his notice of appeal , but the last day of his appeal period fell on a Sunday (December 31, 2017) and th e following day was a holiday (January 1, 2018). Thus, Appell ant timely filed his notice of appeal on January 2, 2018

. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday ..., such day shall be omitted from the c omputation.”).J

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Pa.R.E. 401. “Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. In addition, “[t]he court may exclude relevant

e vidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403; see Commonwealth v. Kouma , 53 A.3d 760, 770 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that even when evidence meets the relevance requirements, “such evidence may still be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[]”).

However, [e]vidence will no t be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. [E]xclusion is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based on something other than the legal propos itions relevant to the case.... This Court has stated that it is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand[.]

Kouma , 53 A.3d at 770 (citation omitted); see Pa.R.E. 403, cmt. (defining “unfair prejudice” as “a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially[]”).

Commonwealth v. McCarthy , 180 A.3d 368, 377 (Pa. Super. 2018) (some

citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Dillon , 925 A.2d 131, 141

( Pa. 2007).

Our rules provide further direction when the evidence relates

specifically t o other crimes, wrongs, or acts

. (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses

. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not permissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.J

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- (2) Permitted Uses

. This e vidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving mot ive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity , absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice

.
Pa.R.E. 40 4 (b)(1)

- (2 ). In addition , while evidence of prior bad acts may be relevant and admissible, there is the potential for misunderstanding on the part of the jury when this type of evidence is admitted. This evidence must, therefore, be accompanied by a ca utionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for which that evidence has been admitted.

Commonwealth v. Weiss , 81 A.3d 767, 798 (Pa. 2013) (internal citation s
and quotation marks omitted); s ee also Commonwealth v . Cousar , 154
A.3d 287, 304 (Pa. 2017) (stating that “where evidence of a defendant’s

prior bad acts is admitted, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that

the evidence is admissible only for a limited purpose”). Jurors are presumed

to follow t he trial court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Hairston , 84

A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014)

. Appellant argues that “[t]he fact that t his happened to M.M. years

prior was not relevant to the instant case and whether or not [Appellant]

had exposed himself to L.M. ” Appellant’s Brief at 12. He further argues that

the evidence was “simply used to impress upon the jury that [Appellant] had

acted in this manner before, so he must have acted this way again ” and

“just because [Appellant] exposed his penis to M.M. years prior does not

mean he intended to show it to L.M. on this occasion.” Id. Finally,J

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Appellant contends that even if the evidence were admissible, it was unfairly

prejudicial. Id. at 13.

Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), t he trial court admitted Appellant’s

prior other acts against M.M

. “ to show intent and lack of mistake or

accident.” TCO, 2/1/2018, at 7

- 8 , citing N.T., 8/30/2017, at 49

- 50

. The

trial court further found that the evidence was admissible as “the crimes are

so related that proof of one tends to prove the others.” 4 Id. at 8 (citation

and quotation marks omitted). Finally, the trial court held that the probative

value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Id. at 9.

With respect to the common plan and lack of mistake or accident

exceptions, which are interrelated, this Court has explained that

[w] hen ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception, the trial court must first examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator. Relevant to such a finding will be the habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to commit crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims typically chosen by the perpetrator. Given this initial determination, the court is bound to engage in a careful balancing test to assure that the common plan evidence is not too remote in time to be probative. If the evidence reveals that the details of each criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact

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4 This language is consistent with the “common plan ” exception, discussed infra

. See Com monwealth v. Tyson , 119 A.3d 353 (Pa. Super. 2015) ( en banc ).J

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- that the incidents are separated by a lapse of time will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence unless the time lapse is excessi ve. Finally, the trial court must assure that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact upon the trier of fact. To do so, the court must balance the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence with such fa ctors as the degree of similarity established between the incidents of criminal conduct, the Commonwealth’ s need to present evidence under the common plan exception, and the ability of the trial court to caution the jury concerning the proper use of such e vidence by them in their deliberations.

Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr. , 926 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Although “remoteness in time is a factor to be considered in determining the probative value of other crimes evidence under the theory of common s cheme, plan or design, the importance of the time period is inversely proportional to the similar ity of the crimes in question.” Commonwealth v. Aikens , 990 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2010) [] (holding evidence of defendant’ s prior sexual assault was adm issible under common scheme exception despite nearly ten

- year gap between periods of abuse, where victims were of similar age and both were daughters of defendant; defendant initiated contact with each victim during overnight visit in his apartment; defend ant began sexual abuse by showing victims pornographic movies; and assa ults occurred in bed at night). See also Commonwealth v. Luktisch , [] 680 A.2d 877 ( [Pa. Super.] 1996) (holding common scheme exception justified admission o f testimony regarding defen dant’ s previous sexual assaults despite six

- year lapse between periods of abuse, where three victims were nearly same age, victims were either daughter or step

daughter of defendant and lived with him when acts occurred; and pattern of molestation

— from imp roper touching to oral sex to sexual intercourse

— was highly similar with respect to two victims).

Evidence of a prior crime may also be admitted to show a defendant’ s actions were not the re sult of a mistake or accident, where the manner and circumstances of two crimes areJ

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remarkably similar. See Commonwealth v. Sherwood , [] 982 A.2d 483 ( [Pa.] 2009) (holding evi dence of defendant’ s prior physical assaults of child was admissible to show absence of mistake or accident in prosecution for inten tional beatin g death of child); Commonwealth v. Boczkowski , [] 846 A.2d 75 ( [Pa.] 2004) (holding evidence of defendant ’ s murder of former wife was admissible to show absence of accident in pros ecution for murder of defendant’ s second wife, where both victims were found dead in bathtub or hot tub in highly similar circumstances).

Tyson , 119 A.3d at 358

– 59 (some internal citations and quotation marks

omitted)

. Here, t here are several victims who were the subject of the

Commonwealth’s notice of intent to introduce eviden ce of Appellant’s prior

acts. The victims are all siblings and Appellant is their uncle.

Commonwealth’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Prior Bad Acts,

7/20 /2017, at ¶ 2 ; N.T., 8/30/2017, at 78

. L.M. is the victim in this case.

J.M., R.M., an d C.M. are victims from Appellant’s prior convictions, in

January 2011, for indecent exposure and corruption of minors. Id. at ¶ 9.

It appears that M.M. was not a subject of Appellant’s prior convictions

. Id.

The Commonwealth sought to admit evidence o f Appellant’s prior other acts

against all of these nieces and nephew, J.M., R.M., C.M., and M.M. Id. at

¶ 12. However, t he trial court limited the evidence admissible to only

Appellant’s prior acts against his nephew, M.M. 5 TCO, 2/1/2018, at 3, citing

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5 The trial court also ruled that if Appellant argued he did not know exposing his penis to L.M. would affront, alarm or tend to corrupt the minor victim, (Footnote Continued Next Page)J

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N.T., 8/30/2017, at 50

- 51. At trial, M.M. testified , inter alia , that when he

was between the ages of five and ten, Appellant exposed his penis to M.M.

on about 20 different occasions when the two of them were alone. N.T.,

8/30/2017, at 83

- 84 , 95

- 96

. M. M. also testified that w hen he was a child,

Appellant talked to him in a sexually suggestive manner. Id. at 97 , 99

.

In deciding that the evidence of Appellant’s prior acts against M.M.

was admissible , the trial court explained that

Appellant suggested th at L.M. misinterpreted his acts as having sexual purpose. 6 The testimony of the other victim, M.M., about Appellant’s indecent exposure was admissible to demonstrate that Appellant’s actual intent in removing his penis from his pants was not to simply ur inate[,] but to show his penis to a 9

- year old child for his own sexual gratification. Moreover, M.M.’s testimony was admissible to show that Appellant’s penis did not just accidentally come out of his pants. Rather, it was a deliberate and intentional a ct in this instance as it had been years previously with M.M. See N.T., [8/30/2017,] at 84.

__________ 6 Defense counsel suggested that Appellant might have exposed his penis to L.M. and his siblings when urinating. He further implied that corn fodder, which might have been stuck to Appellant’s clothing, had the appearance of a penis. N.T., [8/30/2017,] at 94

- 95.

TCO, 2/1/2018, at 8 (some citations and quotation marks omitted)

. We agree with the trial court that evidence of Appellant’s prior acts

ag ainst M.M. was relevant and admissible. Admission of Appellant’s prior

(Footnote Continued)

_______________________ the door would be open for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior convictions relating to J.M., R.M., and C.M. TCO, 2/1/2018, at 3. No evidence of Appellant’s prior c onvictions was introduced at trial.J

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acts of exposing his penis , on multiple occasions, to his nephew, M.M.,
demonstrates Appellant’s awareness that exposing his penis to his nephew,

L.M., was not a mistake or accident. Appellant’s actions had significant

similarities suggesting that Appellant planned intentionally to take advantage

of a familial relationship and exposed his penis while he was alone with a
young nephew in a small out building on the family farm where they lived.

The mann er and circumstances of the incidents are nearly identical as to
time, place, and type of victim : both victims are Appellant’s nephews;

Appellant committed the same acts against M.M. as he did aga inst L.M.

(exposing his penis); he committe d them when M.M. and L.M. were about

the same age (10 years old and younger ); and he committed them in the

same location ( in a building on the family farm )

. See Tyson , supra

. T hus,

t he challenged evidence was relevant to prove that the acts against L.M.

were intentional, rather th an a mistake or accident , and that t he factual

overlap between the two victims reflects a distinct pattern of Appellant

intentionally exposing his penis to young nephews while they were isolated

from other family members

. 6 Id.

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6 We note that, while Appellant has not raised an issue as to remoteness in time, we do not find the evidence of prior acts against M.M. to be too remote in time to negate its probative value. The remarkable similaritie s between the acts against M.M. and L.M. render the time gap less important. See Tyson , 119 A.3d at 359 , quoting Aikens , supra (explaining that, while

“ remoteness in time is a factor to be considered in determining the probative value of other crimes evid ence under the theory of common scheme, plan or (Footnote Continued Next Page)J

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W e now consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that “the

probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.” TCO,

2/1/2018, at 9. Appellant argues that M.M.’s testimony was “highly

prejudicial” because it “clearly tended to su ggest to the jury to make a

decision on an improper basis: being that he must have exposed himself to

L.M. since he had done it before ” and it “suggested to the jury that because

[Appellant] had done it so many times in the past, it was likely he had done

it again.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.

In this case, evidence that Appellant had previously exposed his penis

under nearly identical circumstances is certainly probative. However, we

must still cons ider whether its admission was unduly prejudicial.

Comm onwealth v. Gordon , 673 A.2d 866, 8 70 (Pa. 1996);

Commonwealth v. Diehl , 140 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“The

admission of evidence becomes problematic only when its prejudicial effect

creates a danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sw eep [it]

beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial.”).

The trial court here explained that (Footnote Continued)

_______________________ design, the importance of the time period is inversely proportional to the similarity of the crimes in question”). In addition, Appellant was incarcerated for several years during the time at issue

. See Tys on , 119 A.3d at 361 (stating that “time spent in prison must be excluded in the calculation of how much time has elapsed since the prior crime”) ; see also Aikens , supra (holding te n
- year lapse was not excessive) ; Luktisch, supra . Moreover, remoteness in t ime is “ only one factor in the common scheme analysis, but not the dispositive factor. ” Tyson , 119 A.3d at 361.J

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Although evidence of the prior indecent exposure on the victim, M.M., may have been prejudicial, it was not unduly so. As noted... , “ ‘ [u]fair prejudice’ means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Pa.R.E. 403 cmt . The indecent exposure evidence, introduced for legitimate purpos es, was not so prejudicial that it likely diverted the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.

Moreover, “[w]hether relevant evidence is unduly prejudicial is a function in part of the degree to which it is necessary to prove the case of the opposing party.” Commonwealth v. Gordon , [] 673 A.2 d 866, 870 ([Pa.] 1996). Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove indecent exposure, which includes knowingly exposing one’s genitals “under circumstances in which [the perpetra tor] knows or should know that this conduct is likely to offend, affront or alarm.” 18 Pa.C.S. [] § 3127(a). See also Commonwealth v. Thiry , 919 A.2d 961, 963 (Pa. Super. 2007). Appellant denied that the exposure occurred, and since the uncorroborated t estimony of the victim in this case might have reasonably led a jury to determine that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Appellant committed the crimes charged, it was fair to conclude that the other [prior acts] evidence was necessary for the pro secution of the case. Without doubt, the [prior acts] evidence was prejudicial to Appellant. That is what it is designed to be. On the facts of this case, however, it was not unduly prejudicial, as it was required for the Commonwealth’s case. Moreover, it is “[t]he function of the trial court ... to balance the alleged prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value and it is not for an appellate court to usurp that function.” Commonwealth v. Parker , 882 A.2d 488, 492 (Pa. Super. 2005), af

f’d on other grounds , [] 919 A.2d 943 ([Pa.] 2007).

TCO, 2/1/2018, at 9

- 11.
We recognize M.M.’s testimony was prejudicial to Appellant. However,

it was not such that it was an error of law or abuse of discretion for the trial

court to believe a jury wo uld be able to look past the particulars of

Appellant’s prior acts and to consider the evidence only for the purpose forJ

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which it was permitted. The evidence w as critical in establishing the

absence of mistake or accident and a common scheme or plan. The degree

of similarity established between the incidents of criminal conduct and the

Commonwealth’s need to present the evidence weigh against any prejudicial

impact. See Tyson, supra

. Moreover, the trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction

regarding M.M.’s testimony and emphasized the limited purpose for which

the evidence was admissible, thereby minimizing any prejudicial effect. See

Weiss , 81 A.3d at 798

. Specifically , the trial court instructed the jury at the

close of evidence that th is evidence was to be used only for the limited

purpose of showing Appellant’s intent and absence of mistake or accident

.
The court further cautioned that it was not be considered for any other

purpose other than what the trial court stated, and it must n ot be regarded

as showing Appellant “is a person of bad moral character or criminal

tendencies for which [the jury] might be inclin ed to infer guilt.” N.T.,

8/30/2017, at 141

. The jury was advised at trial that the challenged

evidence could not be consid ered to establish that Appellant had a

propensity to commit a crime, and as we have noted, “t he jury was free to

accept or reject the evidence and to give it whatever weight it felt it

deserved

. ” Commonwealth v. Kinard , 95 A.3d 279, 287 (Pa. Super.

2014) ; see also Hairston , 84 A.3d at 666 (“J urors are presumed to follow

the trial court’s instructions.”). Accordingly , based on the foregoing, weJ

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conclude that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial here. Thus, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2018