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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

July 24, 2018

v No. 337878

Oakland Circuit Court

JENNIFER M. PRUITT, LC No. 1993-124150-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and JANSEN and O’CONNELL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In 1993, then-16-year-old defendant, Jennifer Pruitt, was convicted of first-degree felony 

murder-armed robbery and first-degree felony murder-larceny, MCL 750.316(1)(b), seconddegree murder, MCL 750.317, and armed robbery, MCL 750.529. Pruitt was sentenced to terms 

of life imprisonment for each conviction. This Court affirmed Pruitt’s first-degree felony 

murder-armed robbery conviction but vacated the remaining convictions. People v Pruitt, 

unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 13, 1996 (Docket No. 

170648), pp 1-2. After Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), 

the prosecution initiated resentencing pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a and requested 

a sentence of 40 to 60 years in lieu of life without parole. Pruitt responded by arguing for a 

minimum sentence of 25 years, the lowest permitted by statute, citing her achievements and 

improvement in prison since the offense. The trial court resentenced Pruitt to 30 to 60 years’

imprisonment for the first-degree felony murder-armed robbery conviction. We affirm. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When reviewing a sentence, we review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and 

questions of law de novo. People v Garay, 320 Mich App 29, 43; 903 NW2d 883 (2017), 

overruled in part by People v Skinner, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2018) (Docket Nos. 

152448, 153081, and 153345). We review a “trial court’s ultimate determination regarding the 

sentence imposed . . . for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 43-44. “A trial court abuses its 

discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes” or 

“when it makes an error of law.” People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722-723; 835 NW2d 399 

(2013). 

II. RESENTENCING 
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Pruitt contends that the trial court erred by not applying Miller to her resentencing. We 

disagree. In Miller, 567 US at 465, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory 

sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender was 

unconstitutional. A trial court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; 

before it does so, it should consider certain factors: 

[defendant’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, 

immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; the 

family and home environment that surrounds him [or her]—and from which he 

[or she] cannot usually extricate himself [or herself]—no matter how brutal or 

dysfunctional; the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of 

his [or her] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures

may have affected him [or her]; whether he [or she] might have been charged 

[with] and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with 

youth—for example, his [or her] inability to deal with police officers or 

prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his [or her] incapacity to assist his

[or her] own attorneys; and the possibility of rehabilitation . . . . [Skinner, ___ 

Mich at ___; slip op at 8-9, quoting Miller, 567 US at 477-478 (first and eighth 

alterations in original).]

Following Miller, the Legislature enacted MCL 769.25a to provide the procedural framework for 

resentencing should Miller apply retroactively. The United States Supreme Court subsequently 

held that Miller applied retroactively. Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US ___; 136 S Ct 718; 193 

L Ed 2d 599 (2016). 

The procedural framework set forth in MCL 769.25a(4) does not specify any factors to 

apply during resentencing. People v Wines, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2018)

(Docket No. 336550); slip op at 2. After the trial court resentenced Pruitt, a panel of this Court 

applied Miller to a sentence less than life imprisonment without parole, concluding that the trial 

court “should be guided by a balancing of the Snow objectives and in that context is required to 

take into account the attributes of youth such as those described in Miller.”1 Id. at ___; slip op at 

4. The Snow objectives are “(a) the reformation of the offender, (b) protection of society, (c) the 

disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (d) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.” 

People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972). 

As an initial matter, Pruitt’s contention that the trial court should have made specific 

findings related to the Miller factors is without merit because the prosecution did not seek a 

 1 We believe that Wines was incorrectly decided. The Wines Court acknowledged that Miller’s 

constitutional holding did not apply to a sentence less than life without parole and that a trial 

court is not required to make specific findings as to the Miller factors when sentencing a juvenile 

offender to a sentence less than life without parole. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. We agree with this 

conclusion, and we believe that Miller has no application whatsoever outside of a sentence of life 

imprisonment without parole for a juvenile offender. See Miller, 567 US at 479-480; 

Montgomery, 577 US at ___; 136 S Ct at 732-737; Skinner, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 31-40. 
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sentence of life without parole. Moreover, the trial court’s analysis was consistent with Wines, 

so Wines does not require remand for resentencing. The trial court began by stating the Snow

objectives and stating its obligation to balance these factors, “along with recognizing the age, 

maturity, and life circumstances of the defendant at the time the offense was committed.” In 

addition to considering Pruitt’s circumstances in 1992, the trial court further considered her 

achievements and substantial personal improvement while imprisoned. The trial court found 

Pruitt’s elocution heartfelt and remorseful, while also acknowledging the victim’s family’s grief

and Pruitt’s active role in aiding her codefendant in fatally stabbing the victim. In addition to 

considering Pruitt’s exemplary behavior while in prison, the trial court considered “her family 

background and her circumstances at the time of this offense.” In short, the trial court 

considered all aspects of this offense, ranging from Pruitt’s youth and background at the time of 

the offense to her demonstrated rehabilitation in the 13 years preceding resentencing. It is not 

clear what else the trial court could or should have considered. Although the trial court did not 

list the factors as stated in Miller, the trial court considered the equivalent of the Miller factors. 

Therefore, we decline to remand proceedings for resentencing. 

III. REASONABLE AND DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE 

Pruitt further argues that the minimum 30-year sentence was unreasonable because the 

sentence was disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender. We disagree. 

A sentence that violates the principle of proportionality is unreasonable. People v Steanhouse, 

500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). A sentence must be “proportionate to the 

seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 460 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). A sentence mandated by statute is presumptively proportionate. 

People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 369; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). In order to overcome the 

presumption of proportionality, “a defendant must present unusual circumstances that would 

render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.” People v Lee, 243 Mich App 

163, 187; 622 NW2d 71 (2000). 

First, Pruitt’s sentence was presumptively proportionate. A juvenile offender previously 

sentenced to life without parole who is entitled to resentencing may be sentenced to a maximum 

term of 60 years and a minimum term ranging from 25 to 50 years. MCL 769.25a(4)(c). 

Accordingly, Pruitt’s minimum sentence of 30 years was presumptively proportionate because it 

fell within the statutory range. 

Additionally, Pruitt fails to articulate unusual circumstances that render the sentence 

disproportionate. Pruitt’s primary challenges were that she cooperated with the police at the time 

of the offense and demonstrated strikingly positive rehabilitation while incarcerated. The trial 

court’s selection of a 30-year minimum reflects the trial court’s balancing of the positive factors 

Pruitt identified with her active participation in the offense. When Pruitt’s codefendant lamented 

that she needed money, Pruitt first suggested that the victim had a lot of money. She did not 

respond to her codefendant’s intention to hurt the victim if it became necessary. Pruitt 

accompanied her codefendant to the victim’s home. She later told a neighbor that she stepped on 

the victim’s ankle because he had a knife, which facilitated Pruitt’s codefendant’s ability to stab 

the victim 27 times. Finally, at Pruitt’s insistence, Pruitt and her codefendant returned to the 

victim’s home to wipe off their fingerprints. Accordingly, Pruitt’s role in the offense reasonably 

merited some increase from the statutory floor. Further, the 30-year minimum was closer to the 
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25-year end of the statutory minimum range rather than the 40-year end of that range, reflecting 

the trial court’s consideration of Pruitt’s youth and background as well as her demonstrated 

rehabilitation. In sum, the trial court imposed a proportionate sentence. 

We affirm. 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell