United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-1582

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Joshua D. Stricklin

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Dolgencorp, LLC (originally sued as Dollar General of Harrisburg, Arkansas 72432)

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro

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 Submitted: January 13, 2014

 Filed: July 1, 2014

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Joshua Stricklin appeals the district court's1

 grant of summary judgment to

Dolgencorp, LLC, which is the parent corporation of his employer, Dollar General

1

The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.
(collectively, "Dollar General"). In November 2009, Stricklin began working as a

sales associate at a Dollar General store in Harrisburg, Arkansas. Store manager

Rebecca Kirby hired Stricklin with knowledge of his hearing impairment and multiple

sclerosis. Stricklin was terminated in December 2010 following a period of disabilityrelated leave. Stricklin sued Dollar General, alleging that it discriminated against him

in violation of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). We affirm.

I. Background

Dollar General stores, including the Harrisburg store, are leanly

staffed—typically by just two or three employees during a given shift. Because of

Dollar General's light staffing model, a sales associate must perform a number of tasks

associated with store operations. The job description for a sales associate—which

Stricklin acknowledges reading and understanding—includes "[f]requent walking and

standing"; "[f]requent bending, stooping, and kneeling to run check-out station, stock

merchandise and unload trucks"; "[f]requent and proper lifting of up to 40 pounds

[and] occasional lifting of up to 55 pounds"; and "[o]ccasional climbing (using step

ladder) up to heights of six feet." (Emphases omitted.) 

About a year after his hiring, Stricklin's disabilities began to affect his work

capacity. On November 4, 2010, Stricklin presented a physician's note to Kirby, which

stated that Stricklin "should be restricted in any areas that would be considered heavy

work, such as lifting, excessive standing or excessive temperatures." On November

8, 2010, Matrix Absence Management, Inc. ("Matrix")—Dollar General's third-party

leave administrator—sent Stricklin a letter requesting a "Certification of Health Care

Provider Form." Stricklin's physician completed the form, stating that Stricklin could

return to work from November 8, 2010, to November 8, 2011, with restrictions of "no

more than 24 hrs/wk with no heavy lifting, climbing, bending, or stooping." On

November 12, 2010, Matrix sent Stricklin a letter stating that he had been approved

for a medical leave of absence from November 6, 2010, to December 17, 2010,

although Stricklin never requested medical leave. Stricklin contacted Kirby on

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November 25, 2010, to inform her that he could return to work that day. According

to Stricklin, Kirby told him that he could not return to work without a physician's note.

Stricklin did not bring a note because, in his view, he did not need one. 

Dollar General contacted Matrix on December 21, 2010, to determine Stricklin's

return-to-work status; Matrix stated that Stricklin could return to work with no

restrictions on November 8, 2011. Thus, Stricklin would not be medically cleared to

work for almost eleven months. On December 22, 2010, Dollar General's leave

administration sent Stricklin a letter informing him that his medical leave had expired

and requesting that he contact leave administration within ten days to discuss his

employment status. Stricklin never contacted leave administration. While the parties

disagree as to precisely when and how Stricklin's employment ended, it is sufficient

for our purposes that it did end.2

The district court identified two claims in Stricklin's complaint. First, Stricklin

alleges that Dollar General violated the ADA by refusing to offer a reasonable

accommodation for his disability. Second, he alleges that Dollar General violated the

ADA by terminating him on the basis of his disability. The district court granted

summary judgment to Dollar General on both claims. With respect to both claims, the

court found that Stricklin could not perform the essential functions of the sales

associate job and therefore was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Stricklin argues that the district court erroneously granted summary

judgment to Dollar General on his ADA claims because "he could perform the

2

Dollar General asserts that Stricklin's employment ended as a "voluntary

resignation" on January 2, 2011, because Stricklin failed to respond to the December

22, 2010 letter. Stricklin asserts that he was effectively fired when he was placed on

medical leave, which he never requested, in November 2010.

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essential functions of his job" and therefore is a qualified individual within the

meaning of the ADA.

This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment.

Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.

2006). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis

of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "For his ADA claim to survive summary

judgment, [Stricklin] must show that he was qualified to perform the essential

functions of his position, with or without reasonable accommodation." Otto v. City of

Victoria, 685 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2012) (failure-to-accommodate claim) (citing

Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc)); see also

Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that a

plaintiff must show that he or "she is a 'qualified individual' under the ADA" to

establish a disability-discrimination claim).

Stricklin has failed to demonstrate that he is a "qualified individual" within the

meaning of the ADA. While he strenuously asserts that "he could perform the

essential functions of his job," Stricklin offers no evidence to substantiate that claim.

Rather, Dollar General was presented with a physician's note barring Stricklin from

"lifting, excessive standing or excessive temperatures." Shortly thereafter, Dollar

General received a second physician's form that barred Stricklin from "heavy lifting,

climbing, bending, or stooping" for one year. "The ADA does not require an employer

to permit an employee to perform a job function that the employee's physician has

forbidden." Otto, 685 F.3d at 758 (quotation and citation omitted). It is undisputed that

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Stricklin's job required the very kind of walking, lifting, climbing, bending, and

stooping that his physician forbade. As a result, Stricklin is not a "qualified

individual" within the meaning of the ADA. This is fatal to both of his ADA claims.

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dollar

General.

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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