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                         [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                         ____________________


No. 97-1727

                          DAVID JAMES WYATT,

                         Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                  v.

                        CITY OF BOSTON, ET AL.,

                        Defendants, Appellees.

                         ____________________


             APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

               [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]

                         ____________________

                                Before

                        Torruella, Chief Judge,
                   Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

                         ____________________

    David James Wyatt on brief pro se.
    Malcolm S. Medley, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, on
brief for appellees.
    


                         ____________________
                           March 26, 1998

                         ____________________





           Per Curiam.      This is an appeal from a jury verdict
    in favor of defendant, the City of Boston.  Plaintiff David
    James Wyatt was terminated from his teaching position in the
    Boston public schools and then filed a complaint under � 704(a)
    of Title VII in the Massachusetts district court.  Plaintiff
    essentially claimed that the City had retaliated against him
    for filing charges with the Massachusetts Commission Against
    Discrimination concerning sexual harassment.  See 42 U.S.C. �
    2000e-3(a).  Plaintiff raises essentially two arguments on
    appeal and we reject both of them.
             1.  Plaintiff's first argument is that because the
    City could not show that it had terminated him for a valid
    reason under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
    between the City and the teachers, the City could not rebut the
    presumption that it had acted unlawfully.  For this
    proposition, plaintiff relies on King v. Illinois Bell Tel.
    Co., 476 F.Supp. 495 (N.D.Ill. 1978).  Even assuming arguendo
    that this court would follow King in the same factual setting,
    King would not apply here, however, because it addresses a
    different stage of the Title VII analysis from the one involved
    in this case.
             Specifically, the district court in King was
    concerned with whether the plaintiff could make a prima facie
    case of retaliation -- i.e., whether he could show that he had
    engaged in activity protected by Title VII.  Because the
    conduct in which the plaintiff had engaged violated the
    collective bargaining agreement, the district court held that
    it was not protected.  Id. at 501.  Here, in contrast,
    plaintiff already has made a prima facie case and thus there is
    no question concerning whether the activities in which he had
    engaged were protected.  Rather, plaintiff is focussing on the
    second step in the Title VII analysis -- whether the City has
    shown legitimate reasons for its actions.  King simply does not
    speak to the relevance of a collective bargaining agreement in
    answering this question.
             Plaintiff cites no other cases in support of his
    position that unless an employer can show a dismissal
    accomplished within the terms of a collective bargaining
    agreement, the employer has not articulated a non-
    discriminatory reason for its actions.  This is not surprising
    because plaintiff's position does not hold water. 
    Specifically, plaintiff misunderstands what constitutes
    "unlawful" action under Title VII.
             Courts refer to unlawful action at the second step of
    Title VII analysis.  When a plaintiff has made out a prima
    facie case, an inference is raised that the employer
    "unlawfully discriminated against the employee."  See St.
    Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).  Hence
    the requirement that the employer articulate a "legitimate,
    nondiscriminatory reason" for its action.  See id. at 507
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis
    added).
             As applied to this case, then, once plaintiff made a
    prima facie case, the presumption arose that the City had
    retaliated against him for his complaints of sexual harassment. 
    The burden shifted to the City to articulate, not that its
    reasons for dismissing plaintiff were within the CBA, but
    rather that the reasons were non-retaliatory, whether or notthey were "CBA-valid."  That the City met this burden is plain
    from the evidence submitted at trial.  The burden of showing
    discrimination rests always on the plaintiff and he has not met
    his burden.
             2.     Plaintiff argues that a judgment entered in a
    case he initiated in Suffolk Superior Court was conclusive,
    under the doctrine of res judicata, as to the City's liability
    under Title VII.  However, the City states, and plaintiff does
    not dispute, that the default judgment has since been removed. 
    Thus, res judicata does not apply.
             For the foregoing reasons, all of the district
    court's rulings were correct and we therefore affirm the
    judgment of that court.  Plaintiff's motion for summary
    disposition is denied as moot, as is his motion for the trial
    transcript to be produced at government expense.
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