Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

The Coast Guard's Boat Crew 
 

Communications System Is Unreliable 
 

OIG-10-85 May 2010 
Office ofInspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

MAY 1 3 2010 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

FROM: 

The Honorable Admiral Thad W. Allen 

Commandant 

~~-/~~~~'v~ -Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT: Final Letter Report: The Coast Guard's Boat Crew 

Communications System Is Unreliable 

This report addresses the effectiveness of the Coast Guard's boat crew communications 

system to support maritime operations. We conducted this work as part of our audit to 

determine whether the current Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) program and 

structure is the best approach for the Coast Guard to accomplish its maritime law 

enforcement and homeland security missions. We incorporated formal comments from 

the Chief, Office of Budget and Programs in the report. 

Your office concurred with the one recommendation in the report and has taken action to 

resolve that recommendation. Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please 

provide our office with additional information about the activities underway or planned 

by the Coast Guard to address our recommendation, including responsible parties, key 

milestones, and other supporting information. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, as amended, we are 

providing copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight 

and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. The report 

will be posted on our website 

Should you have any questions, please call me, or your staff may contact Anne L. 

Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100. 
Background 

Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) units rely upon small boats 

with mounted automatic weapons to conduct their maritime law enforcement and 

homeland security operations. On March 25, 2007, a crew from MSST Anchorage was 

conducting an escort of a Washington State Ferry in Puget Sound, Washington. During a 

high-speed maneuver to starboard, the boat gunner was ejected from the bow of a 

Response Boat-Small and struck by the boat’s propellers, suffering fatal injuries. 

According to the Coast Guard review, the lack of an effective crew communications 

system to support verbal exchange between the coxswain and boat gunner aboard 

contributed to this accident.1 

One of the Office of Boat Forces’ corrective actions to address this issue was deployment 

of the boat crew communications system (BCCS). The Coast Guard now requires boat 

gunners to use the BCCS to communicate with coxswains when manning mounted 

automatic weapons. By late spring 2007, the standardized BCCS was being deployed 

across all Response Boat-Small vessels, including those used by the MSST units. This 

report addresses the effectiveness of the Coast Guard’s BCCS to support MSST 

operations. 

Results of Audit 

The BCCS does not effectively support MSST small boat communications. Interim 

solutions to technical problems that cause the communication headsets to abruptly lose 

power have not been adequate and it could take up to 10 years for new and improved 

replacement equipment to be provided. Until this issue is addressed, MSST operational 

readiness and the safety of crew members and the boating public may be at risk. 

Unreliable Boat Crew Communications to Meet Mission Needs 

The BCCS is unreliable as a communications system to support the MSST in 

accomplishing its maritime law enforcement and homeland security missions. As 

illustrated in the following photo, the physical locations of the coxswain and gunner 

make it vitally important that they be able to communicate consistently and reliably when 

to begin or cease firing during mission operations. 

1 Chief of Staff’s final decision letter on the Maritime Safety and Security Team Anchorage (91111) class 

“A” mishap; ejection from CG 25501 in Seattle, Washington on 25 March 2007, issued April 27, 2007, 

pages 1 and 13. 

1
 
A boat crew from Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team 91111 demonstrates the 

high-speed maneuverability of a 25-foot small boat at the Port of Anchorage. 

Source: Coast Guard 

There is a systemic problem with BCCS reliability across all five MSST field units that 

we visited. MSST personnel explained that unexpected equipment failures create 

potential miscommunication and potentially dangerous conditions if noncompliant 

vessels and crews have to be aggressively intercepted. The communications headsets 

have become so unreliable that boat crews resort to other methods of communication, 

such as hand signals, the loud hailer (a mounted loud speaker), and the coxswain yelling 

out the sliding door to the gunner. These workarounds each have limitations, including 

crew members not seeing the hand signals, mistaking one hand signal for another, or not 

hearing verbal commands. In addition, yelling and using the loud hailer could allow a 

hostile vessel to hear the coxswain or gunner’s commands and evade intercept. Increased 

ambient noise and decreased visibility during inclement weather can further diminish the 

effectiveness of these workarounds. 

We observed some of the difficulties described by MSST personnel when they were 

attempting to communicate commands to fire weapons. We made these observations 

during exercises conducted in a controlled environment with good weather. For example, 

in Los Angeles/Long Beach, we observed that the coxswain was unable to get the 

attention of the gunner using the BCCS headsets. He resorted to shouting out of the side 

window to command the gunner to fire on a threat vessel. However, the gunner never 

heard the command to fire. 

Technical Headset Problems Not Easily Resolved 

The problems with the BCCS can be attributed to batteries or components of the headsets 

that frequently fail during mission operations with no indicator or warning that the 

system will turn off. According to MSST personnel, the headset battery life is not 

2
 

adequate for the MSST missions. The life of the batteries varies and quickly diminishes, 

leaving boat crews without a functioning communication system. The Office of Boat 

Forces said the correct type of battery must be installed to ensure the longest life. The 

Office of Boat Forces posted messages via official Coast Guard message traffic to all 

units directing them to install the correct battery. While the message traffic helped to 

communicate how to respond to the failures, our interviews with MSST program and unit 

personnel determined that not all personnel were aware of the posting or knew which 

batteries to use. 

Further, a component in the headset, as originally procured, was not manufactured to 

procurement specifications and fails in cold weather. A warranty replacement program 

was implemented in February 2008 to install components that could operate in cold 

weather conditions. Instructions on the replacement part/recall were posted on the Office 

of Boat Forces website for unit personnel to review. The timeline for warranty parts 

replacement is based on component availability at the radio manufacturer. Currently, 

MSST personnel are either waiting for the replacement part availability or are unaware of 

the replacement part solution. Equipment reliability issues persist at MSST units, 

showing the continuing need for improved technology. The Office of Boat Forces is 

having difficulty finding a manufacturer that can provide marinized equipment that meets 

the technical and budget requirements of the Coast Guard communications platform. 

Until improved, alternative technology can be identified, correct battery installation and 

warranty repairs will continue to be the Coast Guard’s interim solutions to address the 

BCCS headset problems. Officials have stated that no additional research has been done 

in reference to these two issues. MSST personnel have suggested using a hardwired 

headset as an alternative to the BCCS. However, when interviewed regarding this 

suggestion, Office of Boat Forces officials said that the Response Boat-Small may not 

have enough power to run a hardwired system. The cost of approximately $1,800 to 

retrofit each hardwired system could be prohibitive. 

The Office of Boat Forces considers small boat communications a top priority, but a new 

Response Boat-Small with an improved communication system is not estimated to be 

acquired until 2012. It will take an additional eight years, until 2020, to replace the entire 

fleet. 

Risks Posed by Unreliable Communications 

Until this issue with the BCCS is satisfactorily addressed, MSST operational readiness 

and crew safety remain at risk. A Coast Guard official said, 

“It is my opinion that gunner/coxswain communications are going to be the fault 

of something bad to happen down the road. Open, reliable communications from 

the boat coxswain to the person with their finger on the trigger of a high-caliber 

automatic weapon, operating in a congested domestic port is absolutely essential 

to mission success and catastrophe avoidance. Uninterrupted comms will be the 

difference between operational excellence and anything other.” 

3
 

Using the unreliable BCCS also poses a safety risk to the public. For example, if a live 

fire situation were to occur, an MSST would use quick maneuvers to ward off threat 

vessels while firing the machine gun mounted on the bow of the boat. If a coxswain is 

unable to effectively communicate these maneuvers to the gunner, live rounds could 

inadvertently be fired into public areas and bystanders could be struck. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Commandant develop an interim solution to immediately address 

the unreliable boat crew communications system to reduce the risk of crew fatalities 

related to ineffective communication. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendation in our report and agreed that there 

have been reliability issues with the BCCS on the Response Boat – Small. The Coast 

Guard is recalling faulty headsets and has begun a long term research and development 

project to identify a solution to this problem. We consider the recommendation resolved, 

but it will remain open until the Coast Guard provides details and documentation on 

corrective actions taken so that we can determine whether these actions adequately 

address the substance of our finding and recommendation. The Coast Guard also 

provided technical comments and clarifications to the report. We have included a 

verbatim copy of the Coast Guard’s comments in Appendix B, and incorporated changes 

into the report as applicable. 

4
 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

This report addresses the effectiveness of the Coast Guard’s boat 

crew communications system to support maritime operations. We 

conducted this work as part of our ongoing audit to determine 

whether the current MSST program and structure provide the best 

approach for the Coast Guard to accomplish its maritime law 

enforcement and homeland security missions. 

To accomplish this work, we reviewed policies, procedures, and 

issues relating to readiness, such as equipment and training 

programs. We interviewed Coast Guard command and personnel 

at Coast Guard Headquarters-Office of Boat Forces and each of the 

five units we visited: Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; 

Miami, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Boston, Massachusetts; 

and Galveston, Texas. We also toured these facilities and observed 

the communication equipment being used during MSST drills on 

the water. 

We conducted this performance audit between March 2009 and 

November 2009 under the authority of the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We would like to extend our appreciation to the Coast Guard, in 

particular the Office of Boat Forces and MSST personnel, for the 

cooperation and courtesies extended to our staff during this audit. 

5
 

0.,,"""""_ eomm._ 2100 Second Strut, S.W., Stop 1245

u.s. Homeland Security Uniled Sill.. Cout 0uaJd Washington, DC :z(IS9J.{llJ()1

StaffS)'IlIboI:C0-823

United Statu Phone, (202) 372·3533

Fax: (202) 372_2311 Colist Guard

7501

APR 2 9 1010

Reply to Audit Manager,

Attn of: Mark Kulwicki

(202) 372-3533

To: Anne L. Richards

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Subj: RESPONSE TO DHS-OIG DRAFT, ''THE COAST GUARD'S BOAT CREW

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IS UNRELIABLE"

Ref: (a) DHS Inspector General (DHS DIG) Draft Report ofAprill, 2010

I. This letter transmits the Coast Guard's response 10 the Department ofHomeland Security

Inspector General (DHS OIG) draft findings and recommendation in reference (a).

2. Coast Guard concurs with the findings and recommendation.

3. If you have any questions. my point of contact is Mr. Mark Kulwicki at (202) 372-3533.

Alternately, my Chiefof Extemal Coordination, CDR Todd Offutt, can be reached at

(202) 372-3535.

•

Enclosure: (I) USCG Comments

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Letter Report 

6
 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT OF DUs-DIG

ON BOAT CREW COMMUNICATIONS

TITLE: "THE COAST GUARD'S BOAT CREW COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IS

UNRELIABLE"

The Coast Guard concurs with the Office oflnspeetor General's (010) recormnendation in the

draft report, and believes an interim solution has been fielded. The Coast Guard is also exploring

a long term solution. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard appreciates the OIG's efforts in documenting

this need for improvement, and offers conunents under four sections: recommendation and

response, technical comments, supplemental comments, and editorial comments.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSE

OIG Recommendation: Develop an interim solution to immediately address the unreliable boat

crew communications system to reduce the risk of crew fatalities related to ineffective

communications.

USCG Response: Concur. The Coast Ouard developed an interim solution by working with the

manufacturer to resolve the problems, and provided guidance on battery selection and proper

configuration to the field. The Coast Guard agrees there have been reliability issues with the

Boat Crew Conununications System (BCCS) on the Response Boat-Small. The two main

problems are battery life and faulty headsets. Faulty headsets have been recalled and are being

replaced. For the long term, the Coast Guard began a research and development project to

identitY solution for all boat types, including the Response Boat-Small.

TECHNICAL COMMENTS

1. Page 2, first paragraph: "There is a systemic problem with BCCS reliability across all five

MSST field units that we visited." It is not unexpected that auditors observed problems with the

BCCS; at least two ofthe MSSTs had headsets identified as faulty and were subject to the recall

during the time ofthe audit. The report also illustrates that units may not have properly

configured their BCCS, which would directly affect reliability

2. Page 2, first paragraph: The loud hailer on the Response Boat-Small is not portable. It was

delivered as a component ofthe electronics package. The loud hailer has a built in intercom

system that allows two way communication between persormel in the cabin and on the bow.

Until the BCCS was fielded, it was the primary means to communicate between the gunner and

coxswain. The loud hailer is now secondary.

3. Page 2, third paragraph: "According to MSST persormel, the headset battery life is not

adequate for the MSST missions." There have been no reports of headset battery life failures.

Issues with the headsets have generally been attributed to the headsets microphone, not the

battery. The reported issues with the battery life relate to the submersible portable transceiver

(SPT). The Coast Guard published guidance on battery life management ofthe SPT.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Letter Report 

7
 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS

The Coast Guard fielded a new concept (electronic communication between crew members) and

technology (wireless communication) simultaneously to a new user group. Wireless

communications have limitations that must be managed when a fully wired system may not be

pmctical because freedom ofmovement about the decks is a key performance specification.

Paragraph 3 on page 3 contains a statement that the cost to retrofit a hardwired system would be

prohibitive. The Coast Guard is not sure that statement is true, and the current research and

development project will evaluate solutions that could potentially be retrofitted into the Response

Boat Small. If feasible and affordable, the Coast Guard would retrofit the Response Boat-Smalls

conducting mounted automatic weapons activities.

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

After the Mishap ofMarch 25, 2007, the Coast Guard quickly leveraged the 47 foot Motor Life

Boat Crew Communications System contract to improve communications between the gunner

and coxswain. This system may not be the optimal solution on the Response Boat-Small.

However, when properly maintained the current BCCS allows communication between the

gunner and coxswain. A research and development project to identify/quantify crew

communications requirements for all Coast Guard Boat Forces is underway and will address

perfonnance limitations of the currently fielded BCCS.

2

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Letter Report 

8
 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Brooke Bebow, Director 

Paul Streit, Audit Manager 

Michael Staver, Auditor-In-Charge 

Jacque Bear, Program Analyst 

G. Scott Crissey, Program Analyst 

Falon Newman-Duckworth, Program Analyst 

Gwen Priestman, Program Analyst 

Lorinda Couch, Desk Officer 

James Bess, Referencer 

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Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

United States Coast Guard Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.