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STOLEN PASSPORTS:

A TERRORIST’S FIRST CLASS TICKET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 23, 2004

Serial No. 108–117

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

KIRSTI GARLOCK, Counsel 

LIBERTY DUNN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Clark Kent Ervin, Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 5

Frank Moss, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau of 

Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................... 8

James M. Sullivan, Director, U.S. National Central Bureau, Interpol Criminal 

Police Organization, U.S. Department of Justice .............................................. 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Clark Kent Ervin: Prepared statement ....................................... 6

Frank Moss: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 10

James M. Sullivan: Prepared statement ................................................................ 15

APPENDIX 

Responses from the Honorable Clark Kent Ervin to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable the Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ............................. 35

Responses from Frank Moss to questions submitted for the record by the 

Honorable the Honorable Joseph R. Pitts .......................................................... 36

Letter addressed to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde from the U.S. Department 

of Justice in response to follow up questions posed to James M. Sullivan ..... 38

(1)

STOLEN PASSPORTS: A TERRORIST’S FIRST 

CLASS TICKET 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m. In Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

I want to thank our witnesses for agreeing to be on our panel 

today. I know protocol is very important, but everybody has a full 

plate today, and we appreciate your cooperation. 

In today’s world, when countries are tightening up their border 

controls due to terrorism concerns, what could be more valuable 

than a first class ticket to travel anywhere in the world? A stolen 

passport may be worth more than its weight in gold. 

As we will hear today, travel document fraud represents a growing concern of law enforcement around the world. Certainly, here 

in the U.S., it is viewed as a serious threat to national security. 

Last month, the State Department announced a new program 

that would contribute to the security of our Nation. The U.S. will 

now participate in Interpol’s stolen document database, which is 

available to border authorities worldwide. Not only will this sharing of vital information curb the movements of organized criminals 

and terrorists, but it will significantly reduce identity theft problems, as well. We laud the efforts of Interpol in taking the initiative by assembling a very useful tool to be used by the international community. I believe it will substantially contribute to the 

level of security that all nations desire to achieve. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today 

in order to gauge the level of a problem which exists both in the 

U.S. and on a worldwide basis, and to assess our efforts in curbing 

the theft of travel documents. 

I am now pleased to yield to my friend and colleague, Ranking 

Member Mr. Lantos, for any opening remarks he may choose to 

make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In today’s world when countries are tightening up their border controls due to terrorism concerns, what could be more valuable than a first-class ticket to travel unVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:20 Aug 09, 2004 Jkt 094508 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\062304\94508.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
2

fettered anywhere in the world? A stolen passport may be worth more than its 

weight in gold. 

As we will hear today, travel document fraud represents a growing concern to law 

enforcement authorities around the world. Certainly, here in the United States, it 

may be viewed as a serious threat to national security. 

Last month, the U.S. State Department announced a new program that would 

contribute to the security of our nation. The United States will now participate in 

Interpol’s stolen document database, which is available to border authorities worldwide. Not only will this sharing of vital information curb the movement of organized 

criminals and terrorists, but it will significantly reduce identity theft problems, as 

well. We laud the efforts of Interpol in taking the initiative by assembling a very 

useful tool to be used by the international community. I believe it will substantially 

contribute to the level of security that all nations desire to achieve. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today in order to gauge 

the level of a problem which exists both here in the United States and on a worldwide basis, and to assess our efforts in curbing the theft of travel documents. 

I will now yield to my friend and colleague, Ranking Democratic Member Tom 

Lantos, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me commend you on convening this very important 

hearing. It is crucial that Congress call attention to the growing 

problem of stolen passports as it represents a serious national security threat. How serious? We really do not know, because there is 

no precise way to track passports that are stolen abroad even as 

they are used to cross our own borders. 

Tens of thousands of these documents are stolen each year in 

visa waiver countries, those countries whose passport holders are 

not required to obtain visas for visits of less than 90 days to the 

United States. So whoever gets his hands on these passports by 

any means has a free and easy entry into this country; and although Interpol has recently launched a database of stolen passport numbers, there evidently is a crippling lack of coordination between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Interpol on 

this point. 

I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, that the United States government is not doing enough to ensure worldwide passport security, 

particularly with respect to countries that qualify for the Visa 

Waiver Program. For example, in France, over the last year, more 

than 14,000 French passports were stolen by the truckload in three 

separate instances. One of them showed up in the hands of an Algerian who reportedly was stopped at JFK Airport only because the 

name of his traveling companion was on a law enforcement watch 

list. 

Some 25,000 Canadian passports have also disappeared. Intelligence officials have reported that 80,000 blank passports have 

been stolen from 36 countries in recent years, among them Italy, 

Germany and Sweden. The numbers stolen in other countries could 

well be staggering. We understand that as many as 627,000 blank 

passports are lost or stolen in other countries, with as many as 

75,000 in countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program. 

It is no stretch of the imagination to suggest that this could be 

an attractive means for terrorists to enter into the United States. 

Trade in stolen travel documents is also a potentially lucrative way 

for terrorist groups to finance their operations. 

Mr. Chairman, I am not encouraged that our own government’s 

efforts to meet this threat are adequate. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General reported this past April that the 

3

Department does not have in place a process to check information 

on lost and stolen passports and other travel information that it receives from other countries against U.S. entry and exit statistics. 

Therefore, Homeland Security does not know the scope of the problem. We to not know the number of such documents that may still 

be in circulation, and it is unclear whether those we know of are 

even recorded in U.S. databases used to alert Border and Customs 

officials. 

I am very pleased that the United States has recently decided to 

join Interpol’s stolen travel documents database and to make available to Interpol the information about U.S. lost and stolen passports. My chief concern is that this cooperation is still too limited 

to be of much use. U.S. border control officers will not have immediate, real-time desktop access to Interpol’s database. An incoming 

traveler’s passport is referred for secondary investigation which includes an Interpol check only if a border control inspector at the 

point of entry has reason to suspect that traveler of wrongdoing. 

For the Interpol database to be useful to us or any other country 

targeted by terrorists for infiltration, border control officials must 

have the capability to determine immediately whether a passport 

presented to them is in the database. Relying on all our officers to 

have some innate sense that something is amiss after they have 

seen and processed hundreds of people every day is clearly not 

enough. I hope our witnesses today will concentrate their remarks 

on this issue. What is required to get real-time access to this information? Does Interpol itself need to increase its capacity? Do the 

state members of Interpol need to provide more resources to accomplish this? 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses; and I thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

The Chair will entertain brief opening statements. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just arrived from the Financial Services Committee where 

when we say visa we mean a completely different document, that 

is to say, a credit card. 

I would say the private sector has done a much better job in creating a document that is difficult to forge and easier to track when 

it has been forged or stolen then has the State Department. We as 

a society are serious that nobody is going to be able to get a TV 

set for free, and that is why we have so many security devices built 

into a credit card. By comparison, our travel documents are wanting. We need, of course, tamper-proof, we need forge-proof, we need 

to make sure that when a passport is created it has a nonchangeable, electronically readable number on it. Once it is reported stolen, or whether it is before or after it is used to create an individual passport for an identified person, that it is on a numeric list. 

I would point out that we as a Congress took some heat by telling our visa waiver partners they had to have biometric passports, 

and it is my understanding that Japan and Britain took us seriously and actually could have met the deadline. Our State Department apparently was less skilled, or took us less seriously, and 

could not. That is why Congress gave an extension for 1 year or 

4

2 years, creating the kind of security at our border that is created 

at every McDonald’s when you go to buy a hamburger with a credit 

card. 

Our Subcommittee on Terrorism and Proliferation had hearings 

on the biometric program that were, I believe, similar in legislative 

import to these hearings. So we will be told again why it cannot 

be done, why it cannot be done now and why the terrorists should 

get another 6 months or another year or another 2 years to exploit 

inadequate border control program. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I am very interested to get into 

the witnesses, so I will forego any opening comment. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I have no opening statement. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. I will pass. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Pitts. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. No opening. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Clark Kent Ervin is the Inspector General of the United States 

Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his current post, Mr. 

Ervin served as the Inspector General of the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. He also 

held various positions in the Texas State government, such as Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Attorney General. 

Mr. Ervin graduated with honors from Harvard College in 1980 

with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Government. He then continued 

his studies at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, earning a 

Master’s Degree in 1982 before returning to Harvard Law School 

for his Doctor of Laws degree in 1985. 

Mr. Frank E. Moss is the Deputy Secretary for Passport Services 

of the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State, 

where he is responsible for managing the production of passports 

for over 7 million American customers each year. From 1998 to 

2003, Mr. Moss served as the Executive Director of the Bureau of 

Consular Affairs for the Department of State. 

He graduated with honors from Georgetown University in 1974, 

holds a Master’s in Public Administration from the Maxwell School 

of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Mr. Moss 

is also a Distinguished Graduate and has a Master’s Degree in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed 

Services at the National Defense University. 

Mr. James M. Sullivan is the Director of the International Criminal Police Organization Interpol–U.S. National Central Bureau, as 

well as a career senior executive with the U.S. Marshals Service. 

Before his current assignment, Mr. Sullivan was the U.S. National 

Central Bureau Deputy Director. 

He attended Northeastern University for Business Management 

and Bunker Hill College for Fire Science and Technology. 

We are honored to have all of you appear before the Committee 

today.

5

Mr. Ervin, if you would provide us with a 5-minute summary of 

your statement. Your full statement will be made a part of the 

record. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARK KENT ERVIN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Members 

of the Committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear 

before you today to discuss the findings of my office’s recent review 

of the security implications of the Visa Waiver Program and the 

threat that stolen passports pose to that program and, more broadly, to national security. 

As you know, the Visa Waiver Program began as a pilot in 1986 

and is now a permanent program that enables citizens from 27 

countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business 

purposes for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. 

From the beginning, the program involved a balancing of security 

risks and benefits to commerce, tourism, foreign relations and the 

workload of the Department of State. Virtually all of those familiar 

with the Visa Waiver Program told us that the lost and stolen 

passport problem is the greatest security vulnerability associated 

with it. Our country is vulnerable because gaps in our treatment 

of lost or stolen passports remain. 

To be specific, DHS does not have a formalized process to check 

lost and stolen passport information against entry and exit information to determine the scope of fraudulent visa waiver passports 

or to determine when a traveler overstays and does not leave the 

country as required. 

Also, there are problems with how the United States obtains lost 

and stolen passport information and a need for more regularized 

collection of such information. 

There are significant variations in security practices and internal 

control that foreign countries apply to their passport manufacturing and issuing processes which should be taken into account 

when DHS conducts the country reviews that assess a country’s 

continued eligibility to participate in the Visa Waiver Program. 

Even when lost and stolen passport data is properly reported to 

the United States and entered into our lookout systems, some passports reported as stolen may still be used to enter the United 

States. 

In cases where inspectors identify stolen visa waiver country 

passports, the fraudulent documents frequently are returned to the 

travelers so they may use them to return to their country of origin. 

Finally, a lack of training hampers inspectors’ efforts to detect 

passport fraud. 

Our report contained 14 recommendations for corrective action; 

and subsequent to the issuance of our report, the applicable DHS 

directorate, Border and Transportation Security, has responded 

and agreed to take corrective action in response to each recommendation. 

One of the most significant corrective actions responsive to our 

report is the processing of visa waiver travelers through the United 

States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology, comVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:20 Aug 09, 2004 Jkt 094508 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062304\94508.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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monly known as US–VISIT. As implemented in December, 2003, 

US–VISIT excluded visa waiver travelers from its scope. We 

strongly recommended that visa waiver travelers be added to the 

US–VISIT program because of the additional screening, identification, and exit control features it offers. 

On April 21, Secretary Ridge announced that BTS would begin 

to process visa waiver travelers through US–VISIT by September 

30 of this year. 

A second concern noted in our report was the ill-defined process 

by which a country’s stolen and lost passport information is reported and disseminated among other countries. We are therefore 

pleased to learn of the Interpol plan to expand and regularize the 

reporting of lost and stolen passports. This initiative, when fully 

implemented and when all nations participate, should be of great 

benefit by permitting automatic checking at the port of entry to determine whether the traveler is presenting a lost or stolen passport. 

Even with the completion of the corrective actions we have recommended, the Visa Waiver Program will always pose some security risk. During the course of our review, we obtained documents 

that recount instances in which blank, bona fide passports from 

other countries were stolen and, as determined from their serial 

numbers, later used to enter the United States, sometimes on multiple occasions. In some instances, entry was permitted even after 

the stolen passport has been posted in the lookout system. 

On the basis of this information, I have asked my Office of Inspections to begin an examination of stolen passport usage. I cannot comment, of course, on ongoing work, but I can advise you that 

the review has obtained additional documentation that, while still 

subject to further analysis, strongly suggests that stolen passports 

can be used successfully to enter the United States today. I will report to you on the results of that review as soon as I am able. 

With that, thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, and we surely look forward to that 

report. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARK KENT ERVIN, INSPECTOR

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lantos, and Members of the Committee, 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

findings of my office’s recent review of the visa waiver program and the threat that 

stolen passports pose to that program and more broadly, national security. 

In April 2004, my office issued an inspection report, An Evaluation of the Security 

Implications of the Visa Waiver Program. Copies of the report have been provided 

to the Committee and are available to the public on our website. 

The Visa Waiver Program began as a pilot program in 1986 and has evolved into 

a permanent program in which 27 nations participate. The program enables most 

citizens of these countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business purposes for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. 

From the beginning, the program involved a balancing of security risks and benefits to commerce, tourism, foreign relations, and the workload of the Department of 

State (DOS). Until the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established, 

immigration policy and the conduct of the visa waiver program were the responsibility of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice 

(DOJ). 

The visa waiver program has been studied before. The DOJ Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) examined the visa waiver program in 1999 and in a follow-up report 

7

1The Potential for Fraud and INS’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, Report No. I–99–10 (Mar. 1999); Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver Program, Report 

No. I–2002–002 (Dec. 2001). 2 Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, GAO–03–38 (Nov. 22, 

2002). 

in 2002.1 The reports recounted timeliness and accuracy problems when stolen passport data was entered into lookout systems, failures to check lookout systems when 

passports were presented, and disorder in the management of the stolen passport 

program. More recently in November 2002, the General Accounting Office considered whether the visa waiver program should be ended, but did not recommend 

elimination.2 My office undertook to look carefully at security issues in the visa 

waiver program and make recommendations to strengthen its management, focus 

and procedures now that DHS is established and largely responsible for the program. 

Virtually all those familiar with the visa waiver program told us that the lost and 

stolen passport problem is the greatest security problem associated with the visa 

waiver program. Our country is vulnerable because gaps in our treatment of lost 

and stolen passports remain. To be specific:

• DHS does not have a process to check lost and stolen passport information 

against entry and exit information to determine the scope of fraudulent use 

of visa waiver passports, or to determine when a traveler overstays and does 

not leave the country as required.

• There continue to be problems with how the United States obtains lost and 

stolen passport information from visa waiver program participating governments and a need for a more regularized collection of such information. In 

at least one foreign country visited during our fieldwork, we observed substantial uncertainty over how to report thefts of its passports to our country.

• There are significant variations in the security practices and internal controls 

that foreign countries apply to their passport manufacturing and issuing processes. We urged that DHS examine these passport controls when it conducts 

the country reviews that assess a country’s continued eligibility to participate 

in the visa waiver program.

• Even when lost and stolen passport data is properly reported to the U.S. and 

entered into U.S. lookout systems, some passports reported as stolen may still 

be used to enter the United States. We have indications that stolen passports 

have been used to enter the United States, even after September 11, 2001.

• In cases where inspectors identify stolen VWP passports presented by applicants who are denied entry, the fraudulent documents frequently are returned so that the travelers may use them to return to their country of origin.

• We also reported that a lack of training hampers POE inspectors’ efforts to 

detect VWP passport fraud.

Many of the problems we encountered during this review are either the same as 

the earlier reported problems or closely related to them. Our report contained 14 

recommendations for corrective action in response to the vulnerabilities we observed 

in the program. Subsequent to the issuance of our report, the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate has responded to our report and agreed to take 

corrective action in response to each recommendation. 

One of the most significant corrective actions responsive to the concerns stated 

in our report is the processing of visa waiver travelers through US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT). As implemented in December 

2003, US–VISIT excluded visa waiver travelers from its scope. We strongly recommended that visa waiver travelers be added to the US–VISIT program because 

of the additional screening, identification, and exit control features it offers. On 

April 21, 2004, DHS Secretary Ridge announced that BTS would begin to process 

visa waiver travelers through US–VISIT ‘‘. . . by September 30, 2004.’’

A second and equally important concern from our report was the ill-defined process by which information about a country’s stolen and lost passports are reported 

and disseminated among other countries. We are therefore pleased to learn of the 

INTERPOL plan to consolidate and regularize reporting of lost and stolen passports. 

This initiative, when fully implemented and when all nations participate, should be 

of great benefit by permitting automatic checking at the checkpoint or port of entry 

of whether the traveler is presenting a lost or stolen passport. 

Even with the completion of the corrective actions we recommended, the visa 

waiver program will always pose some security risk. The fundamental premise of 

the program is that millions of persons, about whom we know little, can be exemptVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:20 Aug 09, 2004 Jkt 094508 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\062304\94508.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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3The passports of some countries contain two numbers: an inventory control number for the 

blank document and an issuance number added to the finished passport along with the bearer’s 

personal information. In most instances, only the issuance number is queried against lookout 

lists, although it is the inventory control number that would have been entered into our lookout 

system had it been reported stolen by the foreign government. 

ed from DOS’ ever more rigorous visa procedures and permitted to board U.S.-bound 

planes. As we said in our report, ‘‘The visa is more than a mere stamp in a passport. 

It is the end result of a rigorous screening process the bearer must undergo before 

travel.’’ By the end of the visa interview DOS has collected and stored considerable 

information about the traveler and the traveler’s planned journey. DOS has introduced biometric features into its visas, shares data from its visa records with DHS 

port of entry systems, and significantly increased the percentage of applicants subject to a careful interview. In contrast, the visa waiver traveler is interviewed briefly, and the passport examined, again briefly by an inspector who may be unfamiliar 

with even valid passports from the issuing country. 

During the course of our review of the visa waiver program, we obtained documents that recount instances in which blank, bona fide passports from other countries were stolen and, as determined from their serial numbers, later used to enter 

the United States, sometimes on multiple occasions. In some instances, entry was 

permitted even after the stolen passport had been posted in the lookout system.3

On the basis of this information, I asked that my Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Review begin a review into this information. I do not comment 

on ongoing work, but I can advise you that the review has obtained additional documentation that, while still subject to further analysis, strongly suggests that stolen 

passports can be used successfully to enter the United States today. I will report 

to you on the further results of this review as soon as I am able. 

I look forward now to the opportunity to answer your questions.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sullivan. Is it more convenient to go with 

Mr. Moss? 

Mr. MOSS. Let me go, Mr. Chairman, because my testimony feeds 

into Mr. Sullivan’s. 

Chairman HYDE. Very well. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK MOSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the 

Department of State’s efforts to strengthen the security of the U.S. 

passport and similar documents issued by other governments and 

to help prevent the travel of terrorists, organized crime members 

and others who wish to do us harm. 

The State Department and many other governments are taking 

common action to help prevent passport misuse. The first objective 

is to ensure that passports are issued only to persons who are legitimately entitled to them. This is particularly important since 

physical improvements to passports such as photodigitized images 

of the bearer make it increasingly difficult to defeat internal security features. 

To strengthen the adjudication process that determines whether 

someone is eligible for a U.S. passport, for example, the Department of State has recently signed a memorandum of understanding 

with the Social Security Administration. This will give us access to 

SSA data as a key element to help identify fraudulent applicants. 

We are also examining the role of commercial databases to identify 

cases of identity theft or other applications that require additional 

scrutiny. 

9

Another key element is strengthening port of entry, POE, inspection. The international community, based on leadership by the 

United States and strong legislation enacted by the Congress, is 

hard at work introducing biometrics for use in a verification mode 

to help meet this goal. The member states of the International 

Civil Aviation Organization,ICAO, have approved the following 

globally interoperable biometrics specifications: 

The baseline biometric will be facial recognition. Nations have 

the option of adding fingerprints and/or iris scans, but these biometrics may be for national government use and not necessarily 

globally interoperable. 

The data will be written in the passport to an integrated circuit. 

The data will include both the full facial image of the traveler 

as well as certain biographic data. 

We have established international data transmission protocols 

consistent with International Standards Organization arrangements. 

And, finally, we will use digital signature technology to ensure 

the security of the data. 

U.S. plans, I should add, to introduce biometrics into U.S. passports are well advanced. Working in conjunction with the Government Printing Office, we have released to the industry our request 

for proposal to procure integrated circuits and the associated antenna arrays. We expect to award that contract later this year. We 

will be in limited production of biometric U.S. passports by the end 

of December, and we will start producing tourist passports next 

February. 

In March 2005, there will be a multination test involving our colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security and other governments that are producing biometric passports by that date. We 

expect to complete the migration of the United States passport to 

an embedded one with embedded biometrics by the end of 2005. 

Other governments have similar plans. Australia is close to production now. The European Union will begin producing passports 

with embedded biometrics as a new security feature by the end of 

2005, and we expect Japan to have completed its transition by the 

first half of 2006. 

Having a better passport, a strengthened adjudication system, 

and embedded biometrics will help prevent the misuse of passports. 

Another important step is sharing data electronically on lost and 

stolen passports. The State Department deployed our own Consular 

Lost and Stolen Passports—CLASP—database in 2002. This system provides lost and stolen U.S. passport data to all U.S. ports of 

entry within minutes of receiving this information. We have now 

expanded this critical program to the international level, as will be 

described in Mr. Sullivan’s testimony. 

The State Department recognizes that American citizens could be 

detained abroad based on information in the Interpol database. 

While this could be a case of data entry error on our part, a second 

scenario is that a citizen may report a passport as lost or stolen, 

subsequently locate the passport and then use it for travel. The 

State Department has recently issued regulations to establish that 

if a passport is reported as lost or stolen it is no longer valid for 

travel. 

10

We have also established, in cooperation with the U.S. National 

Central Bureau and our consular colleagues here and abroad, 

standard procedures that will be used to help resolve quickly 

whether someone traveling on a passport is the authorized bearer. 

We are confident that sharing U.S. data with Interpol will jumpstart a broad-based international effort to share information on lost 

and stolen passports. To help make that happen, we are also encouraging the sharing of data through bilateral approaches to other 

governments and in international meetings such as the G–8 and at 

ICAO. 

We are also looking at avenues beyond Interpol to exchange limited passport data. We have one bilateral effort under way with 

Australia. There is also early work being done on a multilateral 

initiative called Enhanced International Travel Security, or EITS. 

Both of these initiatives will take our efforts to a level where 

checks will be automatic and in real time. 

A final initiative is an internal one. The Department of State will 

soon make available to DHS electronic images of all U.S. passport 

applications received since 1994. These images will help our border 

inspectors resolve questions about U.S. citizens, about persons returning to the United States and claiming to be U.S. citizens 

should such questions arise. 

The State Department deeply appreciates the Committee’s support for our strategy to improve the security of the U.S. passport 

and those issued by other governments. I look forward to your 

questions. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Moss. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moss follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK MOSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am Frank Moss, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services at the Department of State, and it is a privilege to appear before you this morning regarding 

the efforts of the Department of State to prevent the use of lost or stolen passports 

by terrorists, criminals, and others who wish to do us harm. 

The State Department, and our partners in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, are 

taking a number of common steps to help prevent the misuse of passports. The first 

objective of the United States and governments throughout the world is to ensure 

that passports are issued only to persons who are legitimately entitled to them. This 

is particularly important since physical security improvements to passports—such 

as the use of photodigitized images of bearer—make it increasingly difficult to defeat the internal security features of a passport. 

In the United States, we have a sophisticated passport application and adjudication process to help ensure that the person to whom we issue a passport is both 

a U.S. citizen and the person who the applicant claims to be. We are also actively 

exploring new initiatives in this area. We have recently signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding with the Social Security Administration so that the Department of 

State can use that agency’s data as another element in our effort to identify fraudulent applicants. We are also examining the role of commercial databases to identify 

cases of identity theft or other applications that require additional scrutiny. 

Another key element in improving the security of the international passport process is to strengthen the process used at ports-of-entry (POE) to ensure that the person traveling on a passport is the person to whom the passport was legitimately 

issued by his or her national government. The international community, based on 

leadership by the United States and strong legislation enacted by the Congress, has 

made great strides towards introducing biometrics that will be used in a ‘‘one-toone verification’’ of the passport bearer to help meet this goal. Consistent with specifications established through the International Civil Aviation Organization, the 

United States and many other governments, particularly those that are the source 

11

of large numbers of temporary visitors to the United States, have launched comprehensive efforts to introduce biometrics into passports. The ICAO specifications, 

which were revised and received their final approval last month at a meeting in 

Montreal, call for a ‘‘globally interoperable’’ biometric system based on the following:

• The baseline biometric will be facial recognition. Nations have the option of 

adding to that fingerprints and/or iris scans, but these biometrics may be for 

national government use and thus not ‘‘globally interoperable;’’

• The data will be written to an integrated circuit with a minimum storage capacity of 32 kb;

• The data will include the full facial image of the authorized bearer of the 

passport as well as other biographic data found on the data page of the passport;

• Data transmission standards will be consistent with protocols approved by 

the International Standards Organization; and,

• Digital signature technology will be used to secure data written to the integrated circuit.

As a point of reference, here is the status of U.S. plans to introduce biometrics 

into U.S. passports. Working in conjunction with our partners at the Government 

Printing Office, we currently have a Request for Proposal out to the industry. We 

expect to award a contract for the purchase of integrated circuits and the associated 

antenna array later this summer. We expect to produce our first operational passports this December at the Special Issuance Facility here in Washington. We will 

use government travelers as our test population in order to minimize problems for 

the general public should there be any production problems. We plan to begin producing tourist passports in February 2005 at our passport agency in Los Angeles. 

These books will then be used as part of a multi-nation interoperability test that 

will be undertaken by our colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security 

and their counterparts from other governments such as Australia and New Zealand 

that will by then also produce passports with embedded biometrics. Our current 

plan is to complete the migration to passports with embedded biometrics for all U.S. 

domestic passport production by the end of 2005. 

Other governments that are the source of large numbers of visitors to the U.S. 

are working on a similar schedule. The European Union plans to begin introducing 

biometric passports by the end of 2005. Japan should complete its transition to embedded biometrics in early 2006. Many other governments should meet this objective 

around the same time. 

Having a more secure passport, a strengthened adjudication system and embedded biometrics will help prevent the misuse of passports. Another important step 

in this process is sharing data electronically on lost and stolen passports. This has 

been a long-term goal of the Department of State and a key element in our efforts 

to frustrate the international travel of terrorists, criminals and alien smugglers. We 

developed and deployed our Consular Lost and Stolen Passports (CLASP) database 

in 2002. This initiative provides lost and stolen US passport data to all POEs within 

seconds of receiving the information. We have now expanded this critical program 

to the international level with the transfer in early May through our colleagues at 

the US National Central Bureau of limited data on over 300,000 lost or stolen U.S. 

passports to Interpol. 

I know that there are questions about exactly what we have provided INTERPOL 

and how that data will be used. First, in terms of what has gone to INTERPOL it 

is only the passport number of the over 300,000 U.S. passports that have been reported as lost or stolen since April 2002 when we established our centralized database for this information. In addition, we have provided INTERPOL data to show 

that the lost document is a passport issued by the U.S. government. Second, this 

system as it currently operates, requires that a customs or immigration inspector 

become concerned about a traveler, then check with the U.S INTERPOL National 

Bureau and verify whether the passport has been reported as lost or stolen. Should 

that be the case, there would then be a concerted effort involving INTERPOL and 

the Departments of Justice and State to help determine whether the user of the 

passport is its authorized bearer. 

There are at least two ways that a legitimate passport number could be found in 

the INTERPOL database. The first is nothing more than a data-entry error. No 

matter how hard we attempt to check our data before we turn it over to INTERPOL, 

it is almost inevitable that we will encounter an occasional data entry error. The 

second issue that we can foresee is that some people may report a passport as ‘‘lost 

or stolen,’’ locate the passport , and then try to travel on that passport. The State 

Department has recently issued new regulations to make it clear that once a passVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:20 Aug 09, 2004 Jkt 094508 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\062304\94508.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
12

port is reported as being lost or stolen it is no longer a valid travel document, but 

we are concerned that some people will still attempt to travel on such a passport. 

We have established in cooperation with the NCB and consular personnel in the Department of State standard procedures that we will apply to help resolve quickly 

and accurately whether someone seeking to use a U.S. passport for travel is in fact 

the authorized bearer of that document. 

Our delivery of data on over 300,000 lost or stolen U.S. passports is an important 

step, but it is not the end of this process. We will update the data on a daily basis. 

More importantly, we have initiatives underway with INTERPOL that we hope will 

strengthen further the effectiveness of the INTERPOL database. A prime objective 

is to change the system so that it becomes a ‘‘business to business’’ process so that 

once a passport’s machine readable zone is swiped, that is the two lines of data 

found at the bottom of the data page of a passport, data on lost and stolen passports, regardless of nation of issuance, can be made immediately available to immigration and custom officials of member states worldwide. This should help ensure 

that persons traveling on documents that may be lost or stolen are identified at primary inspection. Ann Barrett the Managing Director of Passport Services has recently traveled to INTERPOL headquarters to launch this effort. We know that it 

will take time for INTERPOL’s systems to evolve to the point that data exchange 

is a totally electronic and near-real time process, but that remains our objective and 

that is shared by INTERPOL’s senior management. 

Another important effort that we have underway is to encourage other governments to join us in sharing data on lost or stolen passports with INTERPOL. We 

believe that the U.S. decision to share its data will help jumpstart a broad-based 

international effort. To help make that happen, we are also encouraging the sharing 

of such data through bilateral approaches to other governments and in international 

fora such as the G–8 and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The 

U.S. has also taken steps to obtain comprehensive information from other countries 

on lost and stolen passports in the interim. As part of the Visa Waiver Program 

Country Review process, we have requested complete information on all lost and 

stolen blank passports from all VWP countries under review for the last 10 years. 

This information will be checked against information currently in the lookout system and added if necessary. We are also going to continue to closely monitor the 

lost and stolen blank passport situation to ensure complete and timely reporting by 

these countries. 

The Department of State is also looking at other avenues beyond INTERPOL to 

facilitate the exchange of limited passport data in a real-time environment. Both of 

these initiatives would involve automated checks from ports of entry back to the 

country of passport issuance. One bilateral effort is underway with Australia and 

there is also early work underway on a multilateral initiative that includes ICAO, 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and other potential groups called Enhanced International Travel Security or EITS. Both of these 

initiatives would take our efforts to ensure that passports borne by international 

travelers are legitimate documents to a new level where checks would be automatic 

and in real-time. Much work is needed to bring these initiatives to closure, but they 

offer alternative means to reaching our goal of preventing travel by international 

terrorists, criminals or other persons of concern on lost of stolen passports. 

A final initiative that we have underway is strictly a U.S. initiative. It involves 

making available to Customs and Border Protection Officers at POEs an electronic 

image of all passport applications received since 1994 to assist in resolving questions about the bona fides of persons claiming to be American citizens. The United 

States is encouraging the development and promotion of the initiatives mentioned 

in a manner that is informed by privacy policy guidance on maximizing individual 

privacy protections and information security. 

The State Department appreciates the encouragement that we have received from 

this Committee and others as we have pursued our strategy to improve the security 

of the U.S. passport and those issued by other governments. We are especially appreciative of your support for our efforts to share internationally data on lost or stolen U.S. passports. I would be pleased to answer your questions about our overall 

strategy to help make U.S. and foreign borders more secure through improvements 

to the entire passport process. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. And now, Mr. Sullivan. 

13

STATEMENT OF JAMES M. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, U.S. NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU, INTERPOL CRIMINAL POLICE 

ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos. 

On behalf of U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol I thank you 

for the opportunity to brief on Interpol’s activities in the area of 

lost and stolen travel documents. 

While significant efforts have been made to better control the 

issuance of passports, these documents continue to be vulnerable to 

illegitimate use. Despite the best security efforts, every nation has 

experienced losses and thefts of its travel documents. Furthermore, 

organized crime figures target certain countries because of the 

value of their documents and the ease of travel that they afford. 

In one case, a subject used a stolen Greek passport to enter Bulgaria and legally sponsored 10 immigrants into the country. In another example, a Serbian suspect used a stolen Croatian passport 

to travel extensively throughout Europe. The subject was ultimately charged with involvement in the murder of the Serbian 

Prime Minister. 

It is difficult for Interpol to determine the extent to which terrorist organizations are involved. All countries are vulnerable. This 

vulnerability can best be addressed if global law enforcement share 

passport and identification document information. Interpol can perform this function. 

Interpol’s Automated Search Facility/Stolen Travel Document 

Database, or ASF/STB, became operational in July 2002. It is a 

screening tool for law enforcement and border protection entities. 

The information it provides thwarts the illegal travel of international terrorists and criminals. The Interpol database presently 

contains approximately 1.6 million records actively reported by 41 

Interpol member countries. 

As you have heard, in May 2004, the Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs announced U.S. participation in the 

Interpol program through the transfer of over 300,000 passport 

records. 

The G–8 has also endorsed the Interpol ASF/STD system; and 

earlier this month the G–8 heads of state formally announced their 

participation in the program through the sharing of national data 

on lost and stolen passports, both issued and blank, by December 

2004. This support recognizes the role of Interpol as the world’s 

only truly global law enforcement network. It further legitimizes 

the program and encourages increased participation by our foreign 

counterparts. 

Of the 1.6 million records, approximately 60 percent are passports predominantly lost or stolen from the bearer, while 40 percent are national identification documents. 

Through Interpol’s I–24/7 telecommunication system, law enforcement officials in the 181 Interpol member countries can query 

the database to obtain information about the country of issuance, 

the date of theft or loss, and other related information as provided 

by the reporting country. 

I would like to stress that Interpol does not—and I repeat not—

store any personal information relating to the legitimate bearer of 

the passport. This ensures the sharing of information without vioVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:20 Aug 09, 2004 Jkt 094508 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062304\94508.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

lating the privacy of U.S. citizens. Moreover, Interpol’s I–24/7 communications system provides excellent protection for the data 

through its secure, encrypted, internet-based browser technology. 

This system also allows placement of restrictions on who can access 

the system. Accordingly, we have taken action that prevents restricted countries such as Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria from 

accessing U.S. information. 

USNCB–Interpol Washington coordinates U.S. participation in 

the program and will be responsible for the regular transfer and 

updating of U.S. data to the base. The USNCB will automatically 

be notified each time a law enforcement authority searches the 

database and receives a hit. We will immediately go about the 

standard procedure of hit confirmation and follow up with our foreign counterparts to coordinate the appropriate law enforcement 

response. 

As pointed out by Mr. Moss, the manner in which the system 

currently operates is quite passive. An immigration or border official must suspect the authenticity of a traveler’s documentation 

and in each case query the Interpol system. Obviously, requiring 

border officials to perform this extra query is not the most effective 

means of checking the enormous volume of travelers who cross our 

borders. This is why Interpol recognizes the need to establish a systematic and routine mechanism for widespread use of the database 

at border points. 

The ultimate objective is a business-to-business arrangement, 

commonly referred to as B2B, whereby national data can be 

queried through Interpol channels automatically with the swipe of 

every passport at every port of entry through use of the passport’s 

machine readable zone. This mechanism is the only way to ensure 

the ultimate success of this program on a global scale. One advantage for the United States would be that the data will reside locally 

and we will be in a better position to control and monitor access 

to our information. 

The B2B concept is an ambitious but necessary achievable goal, 

provided that the proper resources are dedicated to the program. 

In early June, U.S. and European Union officials met in Lyon on 

this matter. At that time, Interpol committed itself to implementing a B2B proof of concept among a small group of countries 

within the next 3 months. This endeavor is not without cost for the 

Interpol General Secretariat and illustrates the importance that 

Secretary General Ronald Noble has placed on this program. 

To date, no Interpol country is routinely querying the database 

at its ports of entry. The United States has conducted limited queries of the Interpol database. This is due to lack of awareness 

about the system by U.S. law enforcement. In order to rectify the 

situation, USNCB recently alerted Federal, State and local law enforcement to the existence of this Interpol tool. 

The broadcast communication informed U.S. law enforcement of 

the procedures in place for querying foreign and domestic passport 

numbers and the assistance provided through the United States 

National Central Bureau and the Department of State. We are also 

working closely with the Department of Homeland Security National Targeting Center to provide it with direct query access in the 

short term. This will enable the National Targeting Center to 

15

query advanced passenger information against Interpol’s database. 

Ultimately, however, the B2B approach is the only way we will 

achieve broad, systematic use of the system at U.S. ports of entry. 

This will require significant technical collaboration between the 

United States National Central Bureau and the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

This program is in its infancy. It is the first step toward a systemic global law enforcement approach to thwart the illegal use of 

travel documents. Its success will depend on the ability of each 

Interpol member country to respond to queries on a 24-hour basis 

and the establishment of globally accepted best practices or standard operating procedures for the handling of hit information. With 

the support of countries like the United States, Interpol can be a 

leader in this effort. 

I would like to thank you for your time and interest in what we 

believe is a very important Interpol tool. I will be happy to address 

any questions you may have. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES M. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, U.S. NATIONAL CENTRAL

BUREAU, INTERPOL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

On behalf of the U.S. National Central Bureau, INTERPOL, a component of the 

Department of Justice, I thank you for the opportunity to brief on Interpol’s activities in the area of lost and stolen travel documents. 

The events of September 2001 prompted a serious review, at an international 

level, of controls on the issuance, handling and delivery of official travel documents. 

While significant efforts have been made to centralize and better control passport 

issuance procedures, such documents continue to be vulnerable to illegitimate use 

by the world’s criminal element. Despite best security efforts, nearly every nation 

has experienced losses and thefts of its travel documents. Furthermore, organized 

crime figures target certain countries because of the value of their documents and 

the ease of travel that they afford. In one case, a subject used a stolen Greek passport to enter Bulgaria and legally sponsored 10 immigrants into the country. In another example, a Serbian subject used a stolen Croatian passport to travel extensively throughout Europe. The subject was ultimately charged with involvement in 

the murder of the Serbian Prime Minister. 

At a national level, the airline hijackings of September 11th spurred a reevaluation of the penalties surrounding the use of passports and other false documents for 

illegal entry into the United States. In response to these security concerns, the Department of Justice and the Department of State approached the United States Sentencing Commission in its last amendment cycle, requesting penalty increases for 

defendants who fraudulently use or obtain United States passports or other false 

documents. The Commission took the first step by voting to promulgate amendments addressing some of these offenses, increasing penalties by approximately 50 

percent for defendants who fraudulently obtain or use a United States passport, and 

approving upward departures for defendants who fraudulently obtain or use a passport with the intent to engage in terrorist activity. Furthermore, the Commission 

has expressed a commitment to complete its revision of the issue in the upcoming 

amendment cycle. 

While there are countless examples of the use of illegally obtained passports, it 

is difficult for INTERPOL to determine the extent of terrorist organizations involvement, direct or indirect. Suffice to say, a fraudulently obtained passport provides 

criminals and terrorists alike with the opportunity to travel virtually unidentified, 

and we must assume that they will make every attempt to exploit that opportunity. 

Unfortunately, all countries are vulnerable to this risk and we simply cannot afford 

not to share information on stolen or lost travel documents with our foreign law enforcement counterparts. INTERPOL can perform this mission. 

INTERPOL’s Automated Search Facility/Stolen Travel Document Database (ASF–

STD) became operational in July 2002, after four years of development. The ASF/

STD is a screening tool for law enforcement and border protection entities. It serves 

16

1 As of 10 June 2004, the following countries were participants in the ASF/STD program: Armenia, Australia, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, 

Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, France, FYROM, Gabon, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, 

Kirgizia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Niger, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, 

Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovenia, South Africa, Syria, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, 

Zimbabwe. 

to provide information about lost or stolen documents to the international law enforcement community, thereby thwarting the illicit travel of international terrorists 

and criminals. 

Specifically, the ASF/STD contains the identification numbers of lost or stolen national identity and travel documents, such as stolen passports and visas, and na- tional administrative documents, such as vehicle registrations. Through 

INTERPOL’s ‘I–24/7’ telecommunications system, law enforcement officials in the 

181–INTERPOL member countries, can query the database and obtain information 

about invalidated documents, their country of issuance, date of theft or loss, and 

other related information as provided by the reporting country. 

The INTERPOL database presently contains approximately 1.6 million records, 

reported by forty-one different participating member countries 1. These include three 

G8 nations, several of the U.S. visa waiver countries, and countries in all four of 

INTERPOL’s geographical regions: Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. I have 

provided, for the record, the mandatory and optional data fields contained in the 

system. Countries such as Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom have committed 

themselves to supplying data by the end of this year. Of the 1.6 million records, approximately 60% are passports, predominately lost or stolen from bearer, while 40% 

are national identification documents. 

The INTERPOL program is in its infancy and its global success will depend largely on the leadership of countries like the United States. As you have heard, in May 

2004, the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, announced U.S. participation in the INTERPOL program through the transfer of over 300,000 records of 

U.S. lost and stolen passports to the database. This announcement was the result 

of months of inter-agency coordination among the U.S. government and law enforcement entities responsible for passport issuance and border protection. This act was 

the first step in preventing lost and stolen U.S. passports from criminal use. 

The G8 has also endorsed the INTERPOL ASF/STD system, and earlier this 

month, the G8 Heads of State formally announced their participation in the program through the sharing of national data on lost and stolen passports (issued and 

blank), by December 2004. This support recognizes the role of INTERPOL as the 

world’s only truly global law enforcement network. It will further legitimize the program and encourage increased participation by foreign counterparts. 

USNCBBINTERPOL Washington coordinates U.S. participation in this program 

and will be responsible for ensuring the regular transfer and updating of U.S. lost/

stolen passport data to the INTERPOL database. The USNCB also serves as the 

primary point of contact for all ‘‘hits’’ to U.S. passport data and coordination with 

foreign law enforcement counterparts through INTERPOL’s communications network. ‘‘Hits’’ on U.S. lost/stolen data will be handled in consultation with the appropriate U.S. authorities to confirm the bona fides of the individual presenting the 

document, identify any criminal antecedents, and coordinate subsequent law enforcement action, as necessary. 

I would like to stress that INTERPOL does not store any personal information 

relating to the legitimate bearer of the passport. This enables the sharing of lost/

stolen information, without violating the privacy of a U.S. citizen, who may be the 

victim of a theft or simply lost a passport that subsequently fell into the hands of 

a criminal. Moreover, INTERPOL’s I–24/7 communications system provides excellent protection for the data: it is a secure, virtual private network utilizing 

encrypted servers (3–DES) and internet-based browser technology. The system also 

provides the capability of placing restrictions on who can access information. Thus, 

in accordance with U.S. policy, we have taken action that prevents restricted countries (i.e., Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria) from accessing U.S. lost and stolen 

passport data. 

How will we know who is checking our data? Each time a foreign law enforcement 

authority searches the database and receives a ‘‘hit’’ on a known lost or stolen U.S. 

passport, USNCB will be automatically notified. Immediately, we will go about the 

standard procedure of ‘‘hit’’ confirmation and follow-up with foreign counterparts to 

coordinate the appropriate law enforcement response. Thanks to our close collaboration with the Department of State, and in particular, Mr. Moss’ office, we are generally able to respond to such inquiries in a matter of minutes. USNCB–INTERPOL 

Washington will also continue to coordinate its efforts with components of the DHS 

17

to ensure that INTERPOL information can be accessed by various customs and border protection entities in a timely and secure manner. 

To date, no INTERPOL country is routinely querying this database at its ports 

of entry. Nevertheless, queries of the database more than doubled in the first quarter of 2004. We therefore anticipate that foreign and domestic counterparts who 

wish to access this data will increasingly solicit the USNCB. 

As pointed out by Mr. Moss’ testimony, the manner in which this system currently 

operates is quite passive. An immigration or border official must suspect the authenticity of a traveler’s documentation and in each case query the INTERPOL system. Obviously, requiring border officials to perform this extra query is not the most 

effective means of checking the enormous volume of travelers crossing our borders 

on a daily basis. This is why INTERPOL recognizes the need to establish a systematic and routine mechanism for widespread use of the database at border points. 

The ultimate objective is a ‘‘business-to-business’’ arrangement (commonly called 

‘‘B2B’’), whereby national data can be queried through INTERPOL channels automatically with the swipe of every passport at every point of entry, through use of 

the passport’s machine readable zone. This mechanism is the only way to ensure 

the ultimate success of this program on a global scale. One advantage for the United 

States would be that data will reside locally, and we will be in a better position to 

control and monitor access to our information. 

The B2B concept is an ambitious but necessary and achievable goal, provided that 

the proper resources are dedicated to the program. In early June, U.S. and EU officials met in Lyon on this matter. At that time, INTERPOL committed itself to implementing a ‘‘B2B proof of concept’’ among a small group of countries within the 

next three months. This endeavor is not without significant costs for the INTERPOL 

General Secretariat and illustrates the importance that Secretary General Ronald 

Noble has placed on this program. 

To date, the United States has conducted limited queries of the INTERPOL database. This is due, in part, to a lack of awareness about the system on the part of 

U.S. law enforcement. In order to rectify this situation, the USNCB recently alerted 

federal, state and local law enforcement to the existence of this INTERPOL tool. 

The broadcast communication informed U.S. law enforcement of the procedures in 

place for querying foreign and domestic passport numbers, and the assistance provided through the USNCB and the Department of State. We are also working closely with DHS’ National Targeting Center (NTC) to provide it with direct query access 

in the short-term. This will enable NTC to query advanced passenger information 

against INTERPOL databases. Ultimately, however, the B2B approach is the only 

way that we will achieve broad, systematic use of the system at U.S. ports of entry. 

This will require significant technical collaboration between the USNCB and DHS. 

While this program is in its infancy, we feel that it is the first step towards a 

systematic, global law enforcement approach to thwart the illegal use of travel documents. Its success will, of course, depend on the ability of each INTERPOL member 

country to respond to inquiries on a 24-hour basis, and the establishment of globally 

accepted ‘‘best practices’’ (e.g., standard operating procedures) for the handling of 

‘hit’ information. With the support of countries like the United States, INTERPOL 

can be a leader in this effort. 

Thank you for your time and interest in what we believe is a very important 

INTERPOL tool. I would be happy to address any questions you may have.

18


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19

Chairman HYDE. We will now entertain questions; and, first, Mr. 

Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all three of our distinguished witnesses for their 

very illuminating testimony. 

Let me walk you through my understanding of the issue we are 

dealing with. I take it that if a person comes from a country where 

we require a visa, we have some standard of security, because the 

applicant has to appear at a U.S. Embassy or Consular Office and 

demonstrate that he is qualified to obtain a visa. But we have a 

very large number of countries where the visa is not required. Am 

I correct in this? 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANTOS. Now one of these countries happens to be France, 

is that correct? If I am a French citizen or I come from France, I 

do not require a visa, is that correct? 

Mr. ERVIN. That is right, sir. 

Mr. LANTOS. My understanding is there has been an enormous 

theft of blank French passports in recent times, running into the 

thousands. 

Mr. ERVIN. That is our understanding as well. 

Mr. LANTOS. How do we deal with this issue? What is the training of our immigration officers at the points of entry? What do we 

do if you present a stolen French passport, fraudulent French passport? And my understanding is, by the way, that even if our immigration officer discovers that the document is false, it is a fraud, 

he returns it to the individual so he can return to his country of 

origin, rather than having him arrested and having him deported. 

Enlighten me on this, please. 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes, sir. Two issues there. With regard to the training of the port of entry inspectors, it pales in comparison to the 

training that is provided to consular officers overseas before whom 

visa applicants must appear, as you suggested. 

With regard to the training of the inspectors, they have only 1 

day out of 1 week of training, new inspectors, only 1 day of training 

that is devoted to the detection of fraud. Most of the training that 

does occur is conducted at the local level. As we understand it, 

there has been inadequate funding for experienced teams of inspectors to go from place to place locally to give the benefit of their expertise to new or relatively new inspectors. So training needs to be 

beefed up significantly. 

With regard to the issue of the return of a passport that is discovered to be fraudulent, that is indeed the case. We have recommended to the Border and Transportation Security Directorate 

that they review that process. They have agreed to do so. 

There is a provision in ICAO that appears to permit, at least 

under certain circumstances, the travel document to be returned 

annotated with some suggestion that the document is fraudulent. 

Then the traveler could be given some travel papers and then that 

person would be sent back to his or her country of origin, but at 

least there would be some indication that that person attempted to 

enter our country with a fraudulent document. But, as I say, that 

needs to be reviewed. We understand that BTS is reviewing it; and 

it is troubling, as you suggest. 

20

Mr. LANTOS. Do either of the two other gentlemen want to comment on my question? 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Lantos, I would like to provide a little additional 

background information on the French loss of their of passports. 

What happens in a case like that is they have notified the U.S. 

Embassy in Paris. They have immediately notified our own fraud 

prevention people at the Department of State. We immediately 

enter the numbers of the stolen passports into the databases, including the—I believe it is called the Treasury Enforcement Customs Systems, TECS database, which then flows through to DHS 

for use by the inspectors at ports of entry. 

We found out about the most recent French loss within a matter 

of hours after it happened. Clearly, the French losses are a matter 

of concern to us. We are also, I might add, working with all of our 

Visa Waiver Program countries to educate the countries on the importance of giving us information on both lost blanks as well as lost 

personalized passports. We have sent out messages about that as 

recently as a month ago. And, clearly, the process is under way 

right now between State and DHS to review the continued eligibility of countries for the Visa Waiver Program, is looking at this 

program as well. Thank you. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Congressman. 

First of all, France is one of the members of the 41-member countries that provides information to this database; and my understanding is all of those numbers are currently in the Interpol database. 

The process that we have—and it has been ongoing for several 

years—is we have a State Department agent from the Department 

of Diplomatic Security who is assigned at the United States National Central Bureau. When they receive information on stolen 

passports, the document is forwarded to the Stolen Passports 

Group. The Stolen Passports Group consists of six components. 

They are the Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Unit at DHS; 

the Foreign Terrorism Task Force at the FBI; the Forensic Document Lab at ICE; the Intelligence Division at ICE; the National 

Targeting Center, who I spoke about before; and the Visa and 

Fraud Prevention at the Department of State. 

I think this indicates, as Mr. Moss has said, that it is better to 

receive the information from many sources to make sure none of 

the information slips through and that when the information is received that we share it with as many people as possible so that we 

know when the databases are checked we have the best information possible for law enforcement who is looking to find out the validity of these travel documents. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANTOS. May I raise one more question, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman HYDE. Surely. 

Mr. LANTOS. There was a study done by the Center for Immigration Studies. They compiled a list of 48 militant Islamic terrorists 

who have been charged, convicted, pled guilty or admitted to involvement in terrorism in the United States in the last decade; and 

these 48 violent Islamic terrorists entered the United States on the 

following basis: 23 had tourist visas, three had business visas, one 

21

applied for asylum, five had student visas, one had a seat in transit 

visa, one had a forged Swedish passport, one had a forged Canadian passport, and three of them entered without inspection. 

Now this is a horrendous record. How much progress have we 

made? Because this clearly is the Achilles heel of our security system. I mean, we are—and I am not in the least critical—we are 

processing millions of people coming to this country with great 

speed at many points of entry, and the task is a gargantuan one, 

but could this list occur today that I just read to you, Mr. Ervin? 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes, Congressman, it could. 

Mr. LANTOS. Well, that means we are like a sieve. There is really 

no effective way we are keeping these people out. 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, there are problems. There are vulnerabilities. 

That was the subject of our report. As you heard and as we noted, 

efforts are underway on the part of the State Department, on the 

part of the Department of Homeland Security, on the part of 

Interpol and other partners to address all of these issues; and we 

applaud that. But more needs to be done more quickly because, as 

you suggest, these are security vulnerabilities to which strict attention should be paid. 

Mr. LANTOS. If I may conclude with this, which of the countries 

which do not have visa requirements create most of our problems? 

I would like to ask you to name names because diplomatic niceties 

are irrelevant when we talk about potential terrorism. 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Lantos, what I would say, it is not necessarily 

specific countries that create problems. It is often systems within 

those countries 

Mr. LANTOS. Well, in which countries are there systems which 

create problems for us? 

Mr. MOSS. I think, sir, what I would say, it is countries that have 

highly decentralized passport production systems. I am talking 

about countries where passports are made at the equivalent of the 

city hall, for example. Therefore, you have passports, blank books 

being stored in dozens or perhaps hundreds of locations. 

Mr. LANTOS. What countries are these, Mr. Moss? Name the 

countries. 

Mr. MOSS. Well, certainly in the past Belgium has had such a 

system. They have now gone to a new system of centralized production. 

The French have had a similar system of decentralized production, as you have noted in our own information on theft. I will be 

happy to provide you for the record information on whether the 

French are examining their decentralized system in light of the 

record that you reported earlier about thefts of French passports. 

I would like to provide that for the record, however. 

Mr. LANTOS. As far as you know, the French still have a decentralized system of issuing passports. 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, I would like to confirm that with our Embassy in 

Paris and the French authorities and provide that for the record, 

if I may. 

Mr. LANTOS. Are there any other countries which have a decentralized system of issuing passports? 

Mr. MOSS. Many countries, sir, because of new technology—and 

I mention in my testimony, for example, photodigitization—have 

22

actually gone to centralized production systems. Many other countries as well, because of vulnerabilities with passports issued by 

Embassies and consulates abroad, have actually repatriated that 

work back to their home country or maybe two or three locations 

around the world. 

There certainly, sir, is a shared recognition by countries all over 

the world, in the Visa Waiver Program and outside of it, of the 

need to strengthen the entire passport process so that bad books 

are, first of all, not issued inadvertently and that books that are 

stolen or lost can be identified or tracked through systems like 

Interpol. There really is a new thinking on this process and one 

that certainly your legislation has encouraged and I think certainly 

the work of the State Department and our colleagues at DHS encourages on a daily basis in capitals around the world. 

Mr. LANTOS. What criteria does a country have to meet to move 

into the category of not requiring visas? 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, traditionally, sir, the basis for the visa waiver 

country entrance has been a historically low rate of overstay of the 

visa, a historically low rate of the refusal of visa issuance to that 

country. That is the historical basis for it. Because, historically, the 

concern was that visas not be given to those who actually intended 

to be immigrants, as opposed to mere visitors. 

Mr. LANTOS. But the emphasis has now shifted to preventing terrorism. 

Mr. ERVIN. That is right. That is right. 

Mr. LANTOS. So if I am now a country that requires visas, how 

do I graduate to the other category? 

Mr. ERVIN. If you are a country that requires visas? 

Mr. LANTOS. At the moment. 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, I do not know that there is a process in place 

now to graduate, as you put it. I should think just following the 

logic that if over time a country establishes that it has a good 

record with regard to the issues that we are talking about here 

that that would be a basis and perhaps the basis for that. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

How many U.S. passports were reported stolen for the last, say, 

3 years, for the year 2000 to today, blank and issued? 

Mr. MOSS. First of all, Mr. Pitts, in the question of blank U.S. 

passports, the number is essentially zero. We have an credibly sophisticated system to ensure that U.S. passports do not go missing. 

In terms of lost personalized passports, lost or stolen, we have 

approximately 320,000 recorded in our system, going back to 2002; 

and I should add that the number that we are seeing has probably 

increased because of outreach efforts to the public as well as steps 

we have taken abroad that we cannot replace a U.S. passport reported as lost or stolen without making entries into our CLASP 

database. So we have a much better idea of the current lost rate 

than we may have had about numbers 5 years ago. But I do want 

to assure you we have very sophisticated efforts in place to ensure 

that U.S. blank passports do not go missing. 

23

Mr. PITTS. So how many U.S. passports were reported stolen last 

year? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, I could break that down for the record. All I can 

say right now is about 200,000 a year go into our database. I would 

like to check that as to the breakout between lost passports and 

ones that are reported as being stolen, if I may. 

Mr. PITTS. In what databases are these passports found? National? International? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, they start with being in a U.S. database at the 

Department of State called the Consular Lost and Stolen Passports 

database. The information in that database then flows from there 

to DHS databases so information is available at ports of entry; and, 

as we discussed this morning, we are now sharing certain elements 

of that database through Interpol with governments all over the 

world. So it is shared on both the national level as well as internationally. 

Mr. PITTS. How many stolen passports are believed to be in circulation today? Perhaps Mr. Sullivan. And where are most of them 

from? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, our best estimate for 55 countries, 

of the 181 countries of Interpol are in excess of 10 million. So I do 

not think we have a final figure, but they are in the millions of 

missing or stolen passports. 

Mr. PITTS. What region of the world, what countries are most of 

them from? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is a very difficult question to answer. They 

are from all over. Obviously, they are European. A lot are U.S. 

passports, there is 300,000 plus of those. I do not think I could give 

you specifically what countries. It is more based on who has international travel, what countries are doing international travel. I 

would say it is probably more European based than anything else 

because they have a tendency to travel internationally more than 

any other country. 

Mr. PITTS. Under the Visa Waiver Program an individual can 

enter the U.S. for 90 days for tourism or business. A lot can be accomplished in 90 days by terrorists. Why is the number set at 90 

days? Has there been any study done on limiting the amount of 

time that an individual can stay in the United States? 

Mr. ERVIN. None that I am aware of, sir, but I defer to the Department of State on that. 

Mr. MOSS. Congressman, I will check this for the record, but I 

believe, actually, that some of the requirements involving the Visa 

Waiver Program are actually set in law. I will check and see if the 

90 days is a legislative matter or regulatory and get back to you, 

get back to the staff this afternoon if I could. 

Mr. PITTS. Is there any information on how many times an individual can visit the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program and how 

much time must elapse between a visit under the Visa Waiver Program and another visit? Is there any mechanism to track individuals who enter the U.S. on multiple occasions under the Visa Waiver Program? 

Mr. MOSS. Let me take a crack at that, if I can. 

The requirement is that the individual be in the United States 

for no more than 90 days. They must then leave. 

24

There are people who make multiple trips. For example, this 

does facilitate the travel of international businessmen. They may 

not be staying for the 90 days. They may be staying 2 or 3 days, 

but they may travel 20 times during a given year. 

On the second question about tracking the persons as they enter 

the United States, of course, we have our DHS systems, but they 

will then be augmented in September with the introduction of the 

expansion, I should say, of US–VISIT to cover Visa Waiver Program travelers. That will involve the entry of about 13 million additional persons through US–VISIT, and that will give us both better data as well as biometrics, in this case finger scans and photos, 

of those travelers as part of the US–VISIT system. 

I will turn this over now to Mr. Ervin. 

Mr. ERVIN. Let me underscore how important we believe in the 

Office of Inspector General that the application of US–VISIT to 

visa waiver travelers is. Because until that application is made—

and as we understand it that will begin to be done in September—

until that is the case, there really is no way of knowing exactly 

how many people are entering our country through the Visa Waiver Program, no organized way of knowing that, and no way of having an exit system. The US–VISIT is designed to be an entry and 

exit checkout system, as you know. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Why would we want to continue with the Visa Waiver Program when we have to worry about terrorists coming in? If 

I just heard you correctly, you can use the Visa Waiver Program 

and be here virtually the entire year, just go back for a day or 2, 

come back, back for a day or 2 and come back. 

Mr. MOSS. Congresswoman, I think the Visa Waiver Program is 

an important element not just in our border inspection process and 

our consulate work overseas, but it is also important in encouraging business and tourism in the United States. It is also one that 

applies reciprocal benefits to American citizens as they travel 

abroad, and I think it is that totality of issues that led the Congress in the late 1980s and to subsequently reauthorize it since 

then, that the Visa Waiver Program is a legislative initiative. It is 

one that we believe is important to the global economy as well as 

to industries in the United States. We think that the benefits of 

the Visa Waiver Program are very significant. 

Mrs. DAVIS. As long as that industry is not terrorism, I do not 

have a problem with it. Of the 10 million lost or stolen passports 

that you were talking about, are they mostly from countries that 

have the Visa Waiver Program or are they just scattered? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would say they are scattered. I could not identify 

exactly whether they are from the visa waiver countries or not. It 

is a worldwide problem. It is not specific to any one country, including the United States. We have travelers who lose their passports or have them stolen all the time. So I do not think I can give 

you an answer to that question. I am sorry. 

Mr. ERVIN. If I may, Congresswoman, we may be able to shed 

some light on at least an aspect of that issue when we complete 

the review we have under way. As you heard me say, we are in 

the process now, based upon this report, of doing another which 

25

will focus on the number of lost and stolen passports that are used 

to enter our country. So we will have some sense based on that review of the countries from which those passports come. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Let me follow up on a question that Mr. Lantos had. 

It boggled my mind when I heard you confirm that, in fact, if we 

catch someone with a lost or stolen passport in their possession we 

give it back to them. 

Mr. ERVIN. That is the practice. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is that practice going to be changed? 

Mr. ERVIN. I hope so. We recommended that it be changed; and 

BTS, the applicable directorate in the Department, has agreed that 

that needs to be reviewed. 

Mr. LANTOS. Will the gentlewoman yield? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 

Mr. LANTOS. When did you recommend that idiotic procedure be 

changed? 

Mr. ERVIN. Our draft report was issued to the Department on 

March 11. 

Mr. LANTOS. And they have agreed to take it under advisement? 

Mr. ERVIN. Essentially so, that is right; and their comments were 

given to us on the 28th of May, I think it was. 

Mr. LANTOS. And what were the reasons for not changing this 

moronic procedure? 

Mr. ERVIN. At the risk of appearing to speak for them—and I certainly do not want to do that—they take the position that there is 

some ambiguity as to whether they, DHS, has the legal right to do 

anything other than to return the passport to the traveler. 

Mr. LANTOS. So let me get it straight. I am a potential terrorist. 

I buy a stolen French passport. An eagle-eyed inspector detects 

that it is a stolen French passport. He then returns it to me so I 

may return to France on my stolen fraudulent passport so I can 

buy another fraudulent passport and try to enter the United States 

a week later. Is that the current procedure? 

Mr. ERVIN. That is the current procedure. 

Mr. LANTOS. An insane asylum would be embarrassed to have 

such a procedure; and I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you and I perhaps write a letter to the Secretary concerning this. 

Chairman HYDE. I certainly agree with your suggestion and the 

point you are making. 

Mrs. Davis you still have some time. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you for yielding, Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. You are welcome, Mr. Lantos. 

I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This has been a very interesting hearing, and 

I have been looking through some of my notes at some past hearings here. It was just a few weeks ago someone testified in your 

very same seat, Mr. Ervin, that when someone comes in now to 

this country, that we do have a record of when they come in and 

when they leave. I am trying to figure that out. Is that correct? 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, what I was referring is the US–VISIT program. 

The US–VISIT program——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am talking about, right now, anyone who 

comes into this country, do we have also the record of when they 

return to their home country? 

26

Mr. ERVIN. No, we do not. There is at present no exit system. 

There is no——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If I might note for you, Mr. Chairman, that 

we had a hearing here just a few weeks ago in which a witness 

from this Administration said just the opposite of what I am hearing right now. Said that, yes, we have an exit identification program so that we know when people leave the country—and now we 

are being told that that is not true. 

Mr. ERVIN. Right. Just to complete the sentence, the US–VISIT 

program is intended to be both an entry and exit system. It is in 

operation, as you know, at 115 airports and at 14 seaports. There 

is a test program, a pilot program that has an exit feature at one 

airport and at one seaport. But right now in place today there is 

no formal exit system at all of our ports of entry. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If someone has a visa to come here, first of 

all—I will get to the visa waiver countries next. If someone has a 

visa to come here, we have issued this visa, and he or she is on 

the list of people that have that visa, then do we have a system 

that says, okay, this person came in and this person now has returned and we know they are back in their home country? Do we 

have that? 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes. Well, we do not have an exit system. We know 

that that person has entered. There is no formal, regularized exit 

system is what I am saying. There is something called an I–94 

form which one completes, and there is a part of that form that you 

are supposed to return when you depart. Sometimes it is returned. 

Sometimes it is not. Sometimes it is solicited on departure, and 

sometimes it is not. So there is no formal——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So there is no type of situation——

Mr. ERVIN. There is no formal procedure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, just to note, this is exactly opposite from what was testified here just 2 or 3 weeks ago. I will 

find out exactly who that witness was. This is outrageous, because 

this is a very significant point. 

Now in terms of the illegal immigration to this country, most illegal immigrants, are they not, are just people who have come in 

here and just overstayed their visa and just decided to forget how 

long the visa is for and they just stay here, is that correct? 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, I would like to defer to my State Department 

colleagues on that. I do not think it is fair to say illegal immigrants 

are here because of visas, because many of them enter without having visas. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, but most. People talk about people coming here illegally. The fact is that most illegal immigrants, I believe 

from what I have seen, have come here with a visa. 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Rohrabacher, my understanding is that the overwhelming majority of illegal persons in the United States have entered without inspection. That means that they have come across 

our land borders. The figures that range on the number of 

overstays are imprecise, but the high number I have heard is perhaps 40 percent. I have heard more recently numbers that were 

perhaps in the low 20 percent. But, obviously, the difference are 

people—and, in any event, more than a majority are people who 

entered without inspection. 

27

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Where did you get that figure? 

Mr. MOSS. The enter without inspection figure, sir? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, I will have to go back to my office and check, but 

these are figures that——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will have to tell you that I would like you 

to go back and get that, because I would like to know what is accurate on this. From other people, I have heard a far different assessment from that. 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, I will have that to the Committee staff within a 

few hours. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many visas do we issue to mainland 

China every year? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, the number of visas issued in China is in the several hundred thousand a year range. I am sorry, I do not have that 

exact number with me. But, again, I can give you that. It is one 

of our largest visa-issuing operations in the world right now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. You have not noticed a significant difference in the illegal immigration in people from China in our 

country in the last couple of years? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, there is clearly a major problem with illegal migration from China. I do not think that most of that illegal migration though is via the visa route. There are literally organized rings 

charging 40, 50, even $60,000 to smuggle people around the world 

in order to enter people in the United States. I think that is a 

major source of the illegal migration from China. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be looking forward to your documentation as to where that figure comes from in terms of the people that 

have come here illegally, rather than come in legally and overstayed their visas. 

Chairman HYDE. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman HYDE. I have always wondered at the abuses that are 

inherent in the student visa situation, where I have been told we 

have no idea how many people are in the country by way of student 

visa holders who either have not gone to school—the schools do not 

keep records. God forbid somebody should not be able to matriculate and they get the tuition. It is just about as loose an arrangement as possible. So we have several thousand or more students 

who, once they are in, disappear, and I just wonder if that is too 

gloomy an assessment. 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, let me address that at least from the 

State Department side. I will get into a little bit of DHS’s work, 

and then I would like to defer to the Inspector General. 

Beginning last year, there is a very sophisticated system between 

the State Department and DHS called SEVIS, which is intended to 

track students from their visa application through their entry into 

the United States, through change of course, their eventual departure from the United States. And I think the Inspector General 

may have additional information. But I do think we have gone a 

long way toward dealing with the vulnerabilities that you address 

in the student visa program. 

Mr. ERVIN. I can add only, sir, that we intend to and we will 

shortly begin a review of SEVIS to determine how well that system 

28

is working; and during the course of that review we will have some 

sense of the number of students and whether they are accounted 

for, whether the schools are properly accredited, whether they actually attend the schools, whether they actually depart the country 

when the terms of their students visas expire, et cetera. 

Chairman HYDE. That will be most helpful, most useful. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am very happy that you intend to shortly 

begin the review. What we are talking about, these things are long 

overdue. We have experienced in this country a massive flow of illegal immigration into this country. 

And I am certainly looking forward, Mr. Moss, to getting to the 

source saying that these people have actually come in across the 

borders illegally. Because, Mr. Moss, you might, when you are 

checking that, determine for me what the increase is in the number 

of legal visas that have been given to people who live in the mainland of China over the last 10 years. I understand that it is dramatic. 

At the same time—I mean, people talk in California a great deal 

about Mexicans coming into the United States illegally, but I would 

contend that the major course of illegal immigration into our country today is coming from Asia, and people are coming in under 

visas. I would like some information as to what the number of increase in visas issued in that region are. 

Finally, of the 27 visa waiver countries, do we know the number 

of people who have overstayed their visas and stayed here illegally, 

are they more from the visa waiver countries or more from people 

who have visas and overstay them? 

Mr. ERVIN. I would say that we can’t determine that because of 

the various problems that we have described here today, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We can’t determine that because we do not 

have any way of determining whether someone who has come into 

our country illegally has returned to their home country. 

Mr. ERVIN. Right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, this is incredible. Thank you very 

much. This has been very enlightening testimony. I appreciate you 

guys facing a major challenge. And we all have to work together 

on it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, sir. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize for 

having been called away, because I am hoping that the questions 

are not redundant and I will make them brief. 

When we have the new documents available and we have the 

new type of passport available to us, biometrically controlled, I am 

wondering how they will be made available. Will it only be to new 

applicants for passports? 

And then secondly, if someone presently has a stolen passport or 

a fake passport and has used it many times, as has been attested 

to here, and evidently there is no real way of us determining 

whether that particular document is stolen, what would prevent 

them from turning that in, if in fact they are able to exchange an 

old passport for a new one? What would prevent them from turning 

one of those in for a new good one? 

I guess—anyone. 

29

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Tancredo, let me take a crack at those questions 

if I can. First of all, on the question of replacing old passports, we 

will not call U.S. passports. We have roughly 55 million in circulation. We will replace them as new applicants apply. They will receive a passport with embedded biometrics as others come up for 

renewal. They will be replaced with a passport with embedded biometrics. 

Mr. TANCREDO. How do we know, when someone is applying for 

a new one, that the application is coming from someone who does 

not in fact presently have a false document? And that, therefore, 

they would get a brand new good document? You know what I 

mean? We are handing them a great asset if they have got a bad 

one. 

Mr. MOSS. What I would like to talk about is how we would police that in the case of the United States passport system, and I 

think it is a similar system that is used elsewhere. First of all, 

countries have very good records on passports that have been reported as lost or stolen within their national government systems. 

So these records are routinely checked. 

The second step is even a passport renewal is still examined 

closely by adjudicators in the United States or elsewhere looking 

for just that type of information. 

I think that what you are saying is theoretically possible. I think, 

though, it would be very difficult for someone to pull that off, to 

have acquired a stolen passport and get it renewed, largely because 

there should be information on that old passport. 

A third point, in the case of the United States, we have something called our multiple issuance verification system, which we 

track every passport issued to an individual. In order to get that 

passport replaced, in the case of my passport, Frank Moss, it would 

pop up on my systems, for example, that wait a minute, we have 

already issued three passports to Frank Moss in the last 10 years. 

He reported one stolen. He had that replaced. Why is he now coming in, 5 years later asking, for that one to be replaced? Oh, wait 

a minute; this is the number of the one that was stolen. We have 

a problem here. 

These are the types of systems the governments frequently use 

to ensure the effectiveness and the security, the internal security 

of their passport processes. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Was I mistaken in understanding from your 

opening comments—I did not hear subsequent questions, and I 

apologize again—was I mistaken when I thought I heard you say 

that, in fact. people are using stolen documents today, even with 

numbers on it, that are not being caught? That people have come 

in two or three times using fake passports? 

How would we in fact then know? I do not get it. How would we 

know that they are handing us a fake passport? 

Mr. ERVIN. If I could, Mr. Tancredo, it is I who said that. I was 

really talking about foreign passports. I wasn’t talking about American passports. I would not dispute what Mr. Moss is saying about 

American passports and controls that are in place to ensure that 

a new passport, a new American passport with biometrics included, 

is not given to someone who attempts to exchange it for an old 

passport that was fraudulent. 

30

However, that said, there is a big difference between the United 

States and other countries. Not all countries have a regularized 

system whereby, routinely, lost and stolen passport information is 

reported to some central location. We found, for example, with regard to France that there is not such a rigorous system of reporting 

stolen passport information. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Oh, come on. Could that be true? Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very interesting hearing. And I appreciate the panelists participating 

today. Often—I should say occasionally, I have an opportunity to 

read publications that cater to the expatriate community, those 

who want to live the life of an ex pat. And I have read of certain 

countries that will sell you citizenship, will sell you a passport for 

a price. And in many cases, you do not even have to be a resident 

of that particular country. 

And I was wondering, number one, is this true? How many countries do this? And number two, who are they? Mr. Moss? 

Mr. MOSS. Thank you, Mr. Weller. There are—I can provide a 

more complete list for the record. There are a couple of countries 

around the world I can think of that have had programs that have 

granted nationality to someone based on an investment being made 

in that country. These are not countries that are in the Visa Waiver Program, sir. They are countries that, when we at the State Department become aware of it, we come down very hard on this 

issue because we do believe it creates vulnerabilities. 

And I would just like to provide some additional information for 

the record on precisely what countries it is, because some countries 

have done it in the past, that may be what I am thinking of. 

Mr. WELLER. Can you tell us who currently is providing citizenship for a price? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, I would rather provide it for the record just to 

make certain that what I am giving you is timely information, is 

not something that is overtaken by events. 

Mr. WELLER. Do these countries provide someone with a passport 

for a fee even if they do not have citizenship? 

Mr. MOSS. What they have done, sir, the couple of instances that 

I am aware of, they have programs for investors, people promising 

to make significant investments in the countries to create jobs, 

things like this. And in exchange for that, they have been able to 

acquire, on an expedited basis, nationality. 

Let me check and find out exactly what countries have such programs for you. 

Mr. WELLER. I would be interested in seeing the list. 

Officially, what is the policy of the United States Government in 

regard to passports that are issued by countries which either sell 

their citizenship for a price or would sell an official passport for a 

price? 

Mr. MOSS. I think in both cases the answer is the same. We undertake very strong efforts at the highest level our government, 

Ambassador to heads of state, things of this nature, to convince 

that country that they have to stop this, that they are creating 

vulnerabilities here, why they are creating vulnerabilities. And it 

31

is something that we routinely pursue whenever we find information about these programs and we get on it immediately. 

Mr. WELLER. Do you also have figures on how many of these citizenships have been purchased by individuals or the number of 

passports that have been purchased by individuals from these 

countries? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, I don’t have that data with me, but as part of the 

same answer on which countries have had these programs, let me 

see what we actually have at the State Department on the number 

of passports they issued pursuant to these programs okay? 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Sullivan, what is the view of Interpol regarding 

the sale of citizenship for a price, or the sale of official passports 

to someone for a fee who is not a resident or a citizen of that country? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, it is certainly something that the 

organization does not condone. However, Interpol, it is an interesting organization. It is really 181 different entities that are combined in a mutual group that works for the exchange of police information. One of the things that makes the organization worthwhile is to try to stay out of politics and to stick strictly with police 

information and the exchange of that information between countries. But I am sure under no circumstances do we condone the 

selling. 

Mr. WELLER. You would view it as a local politics of a country 

to issue a passport to someone who is not even a resident of a particular nation? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think it depends on the situation. Going back to 

what Mr. Moss has said, if it is a business situation and that is 

deemed appropriate, I would say that may be something that the 

organization would look at. Anytime that something like this is 

brought up, there is a mechanism in place that we as a country, 

the United States, can bring it forward to the organization and we 

can have the organization put pressure on that country to cease 

and desist with that type of action. 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Ervin. 

Mr. ERVIN. I find it troubling, Mr. Weller, and as part of this review that I mentioned we can and will look at that. As a footnote 

as well, laying aside the issue of purchasing citizenship, as you 

know in certain visa waiver countries it is easier to obtain citizenship than others. Not purchases, but for the record I just want to 

lay out naturalization and derivative citizenship. 

There are certain visa waiver countries, as you know, Denmark, 

Sweden, Belgium being among them, have liberal laws whereby if 

you are a third-country national you can come to those countries 

and after 3 years become a citizen of those countries. Also there is 

something known as derivative citizenship. Some countries have 

very liberal systems where in Ireland, if one of your four grandparents were Irish, you can ipso facto obtain Irish citizenship. And 

as we understand it, Italian law is even more liberal in this regard. 

Again, it is not purchasing citizenship but it makes citizenship 

easier, and with regard to visa waiver countries you can see the 

problem with that. 

32

Mr. WELLER. Does your Department give extra attention to passports coming from these countries, not only those who sell the passports, but those who have relatively easy citizenship requirements? 

Mr. ERVIN. I can’t answer that, I don’t know whether the inspectors give particular attention to that. They certainly should. And 

that is one of the things that we will be looking at as we continue 

this series of reviews with regard to this complex set of issues. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel for 

their time. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Nick Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Several issues. What is 

success? What are our objectives? I would suggest that it is extremely important, whether it is the computerization or other hightech methods, to somehow do a better job. 

And let me look at the flip side of the problem. I chair the Research Subcommittee in Science, and now we see universities in 

other countries such as Australia, Europe, Canada and other European countries that are advertising, countries that are saying to 

foreign students, instead of going through all of the harassment of 

getting into a university in the United States, come to our universities. We are hiring the professors from universities in the United 

States to teach in our universities. We can give you the same 

science research-related experience that you could get in the 

United States. 

I mean, that is a long way of saying that there is also a problem 

when you make entry so difficult for students or businessmen that 

in the long run, our economy loses. And that is happening in our 

university system. And I think it is a difficult problem. Even the 

SEVIS program that is designed to keep students out, to make sure 

that they go home after they finish their education, reduces the 

number of highly qualified technical students, that historically 

would have stayed in this country and become some of our best 

academic and business researchers. 

I would like to hear your comments on both sides of the equation. 

Keeping the illegals out is important. Somehow getting an organization and tracking system is also important. I am so impressed. 

In my last few airline flights, I have been struck by the computerization of e-tickets. ‘‘Sorry, Mr. Smith, your plane is 20 minutes 

late.’’ But what do you see as the future and the danger of systems 

that we are using? Are we going too far? 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Smith, I think that the points you raise are very 

valid ones. They are certainly ones that attract high-level attention. There are clearly working efforts underway between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State and 

the Homeland Security Council at the White House to address 

these issues right now. 

We are trying to balance, as Secretary Powell has said, secure 

borders and at the same time open doors. We are a Nation of immigrants. We value the impact that foreign students have on our educational system and the value of foreign education—foreign students have on our ranks of academic researchers, scientists, what 

have you. We are trying to balance all of those issues. 

There is an important initiative underway, and I think that some 

of the points you made, you will see important news about in the 

33

coming weeks on efforts that are being made to further balance 

these, as you very rightly put it, competing requirements. 

Mr. SMITH. Got to move from that side of the equation back to 

the other side. Consider the 19 terrorists that came into this country, boarded the planes and attacked us on September 11th. Isn’t 

it true that all 19 were granted visas, none came from a visa waiver country? 

Mr. MOSS. That is correct, sir. And as a result of that, we have 

fundamentally changed our visa process. We now require face-toface interviews. We now collect biometrics at the time of visa application. We certainly have a much expanded data sharing process 

among the government agencies to try to prevent such a horrific incident ever happening again. 

Mr. SMITH. And that relates to the flip side where frequent business travelers and multinationals coming into this country now are 

complaining about having to go through a personal interview every 

month. We just finished an interParliamentary with Canada, and 

that is a special problem, being from Michigan, that we are encountering on business travel. What is being done in terms of the frequent traveler type identification to better accommodate that frequent travel? 

Well, I believe that the Department is considering—the Department of Homeland Security is considering expanding the notion of 

trusted traveler programs throughout the entirety of the traveling 

regime. As you know, that system is being—or that notion is being 

piloted by TSA and some thought is given to expanding such system at land borders. There is the SENTRI program, et cetera. So 

you are essentially talking about a trusted traveler program and 

the Department is considering that in this context. 

Mr. SMITH. I have another couple of questions, if I may. A couple 

of years ago we were told that the stolen passport database system 

was closed down on weekends, and therefore for somebody flying 

in from Rome—there was no way to check for them in our system. 

Has that glitch been corrected? 

Mr. ERVIN. Our understanding is that that is not the case, sir. 

Mr. MOSS. I can verify from the State Department it is a 24–7 

operation. It is available around the clock. 

Mr. SMITH. Anyway, gentlemen, thank you. There is no question 

that it is a huge challenge, but I think we have just got to be especially careful that in overprotecting ourselves we do not shoot ourselves in the foot. Half of our research in our university system 

now is done by foreign students. I think it is a heads-up for us to 

do a better job in science and math education, K through 12 and 

in our university system. But it also represents in the long term 

a great loss if we lose the kind of high-tech talent coming in from 

the rest of the world into this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Smith. It has been reported 

that Ramzi Yousef who was responsible for the 1993 World Trade 

Center bombing entered the United States on a stolen blank Iraqi 

passport after first boarding a plane on a fraudulent British passport. Although we did not have the type of relations we would have 

needed with Iraq at the time, would the proposed or envisioned 

34

Interpol database have been able to send necessary information on 

this case to us? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That comment has also been reported to me by 

the prosecutor who handled that case. Actually the current Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, he told 

me that exact fact. And I would state unequivocally that if the 

countries, the 181 member countries do participate in this Interpol 

database, that it could have been prevented and it will be prevented in the future. 

I would like to echo what Congressman Smith said initially. Part 

of my statement, that the way that this system is going to work 

in the United States and throughout the world is to develop the 

technology, the information technology, to take the human element 

out of it, so that when someone comes across the border in the 

United States and their passport is swiped, that that database that 

has the stolen—and maybe in the future, blank as well as stolen—

passports in it, that immediately action can be taken. 

Right now, as we said before, Congressman, it is a passive system. When this is developed, when one country can talk to the 

other country and ping the database, that is when this system will 

be most effective. And I think with all the countries, when they do 

participate, this type of situation as Ramsey Josef, as you said, entering the United States can be prevented. 

Chairman HYDE. I would hope, along with yourself, that all nations would join the database or support the global database. And 

so many of these problems seem to have a commonality with so 

many countries, maybe somebody will sponsor a world summit on 

passport security to iron out the differences between various countries. 

I understand there are some pretty bizarre situations that are 

possible under the present global structure. And this seems to me 

a vulnerability that we have been too late in paying attention to, 

and I think Congress deserves some blame for that. 

But you gentlemen have instructed us and illuminated the challenges that you face and that we face, and we appreciate very 

much the very important work that you do. And we are going to 

consider your statements in full and try to determine what is appropriate legislation to help meet some of these challenges. And we 

will be back talking to you off the record as soon as we can. 

We want to thank you for your time and for your contribution. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 o’clock p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(35)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CLARK KENT ERVIN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY THE HONORABLE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Question: 

I notice that Brunei is a member of the Visa Waiver Program. Given Brunei’s 

neighbors (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines), is there any concern about terrorist 

cells operating in this region using passports—stolen or legitimate—from Brunei to 

enter the U.S.? 

Response: 

In the course of conducting our evaluation of the Visa Waiver Program, we visited 

five of the participating countries: France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Brunei, 

and Singapore. We chose Brunei and Singapore not only due to regional terrorism, 

but also because Brunei is the only VWP nation that is predominantly Muslim, and 

Asian alien smugglers have frequently misused Singapore’s passport. 

We found both countries to have highly centralized passport production with significant systems of internal controls. In Brunei, for example, the ministry responsible for passports and citizenship is also responsible for acting as the central registrar of all birth and death records, and issues all national identity cards. Centralization and reconciliation of birth and death records is an important fraud prevention tool that very few countries have implemented. As an added anti-fraud 

measure, the pages of each new Brunei passport are perforated at the time of issue 

with the bearer’s national ID card number. Taken together, these controls make it 

difficult to imagine any non-citizen obtaining a Brunei passport from the government, or using a stolen one successfully. 

The Government of Brunei is concerned that totally counterfeit documents purporting to be Brunei passports have been detected in Bangkok and elsewhere. The 

real Brunei passport is a highly secure document produced in Germany that contains security features that distinguish it from counterfeits. Our vulnerability to 

counterfeit and altered passports depends on the level of training and experience 

of our Port of Entry inspectors in examining such documents and utilizing their security features. 

Question: 

In the process of adding or removing countries from the Visa Waiver Program, is 

any consideration given to terrorist activity in neighboring countries? 

Response: 

Eligibility for the Visa Waiver Program has always been set in statute, beginning 

with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99–603. Conditions for 

joining or remaining in the VWP have been changed over the years in various immigration related bills, but terrorist activity in neighboring countries is not a statutory 

criterion. 

Question: 

How are the various agencies involved in dealing with visa issues balancing the 

need for security with the need to ensure that deserving international students receive 

visas to travel to the United States to study as well as to learn about democracy? 

One of the most important aspects of US public diplomacy is having international 

students at our colleges and universities. 

36

Response: 

Much additional law enforcement and intelligence data has been shared between 

agencies since September 11, 2001. Department of State officials have testified on 

several occasions about many changes to the visa application process since September 11, 2001. We defer to them to explain those changes more fully, and to describe how student visa decisions are made. 

Question: 

If a deserving student is erroneously denied a visa, where would they go to appeal 

the decision? 

Response: 

Visa applicants whose applications are denied can and do reapply, submitting additional information and hoping for a more favorable outcome. We defer to the Department of State to provide you with additional details, if desired. 

RESPONSES FROM FRANK MOSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. 

PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Question: 

I notice that Brunei is a member of the Visa Waiver Program. Given Brunei’s 

neighbors (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines), is there any concern about terrorist 

cells operating in the region using passports—stolen or legitimate—from Brunei to 

enter the U.S.? 

Response: 

Two countries in Southeast Asia, Brunei and Singapore, are included in the Visa 

Waiver Program (VWP). The continuance of these two countries, as well as 23 other 

countries, in the VWP is currently under review through an interagency process 

headed by the Department of Homeland Security. Each country review includes an 

assessment of terrorism both within the nominee country and outside the country 

both by the country’s nationals and by individuals who have impersonated or might 

impersonate the country’s nationals. The review process also examines the countries’ extent of cooperation in the war on terrorism, information on lost and stolen 

passports, including use by nationals of other countries, the impact that VWP participation of particular countries has on U.S. national security, pertinent historical 

patterns or trends regarding terrorism, criminal groups, narcotics trafficking, alien 

smuggling, trafficking in persons, and fraud. 

Question: 

In the process of adding or removing countries from the Visa Waiver Program, is 

any consideration given to terrorist activity in neighboring countries? 

Response: 

The review process includes a comprehensive analysis of the terrorist threat posed 

by participating countries, including terrorist activity and potential penetration 

from neighboring countries. 

Question: 

How are the various agencies involved in dealing with visa issues balancing the 

need for security with the need to ensure that deserving international students receive 

visas to travel to the United States to study as well as to learn about democracy? 

One of the most important aspects of US public diplomacy is having international 

students at our colleges and universities. 

Response: 

There have been some significant changes to the visa process that have affected 

student visa applicants. Most importantly, all students must now be registered in 

the DHS-run Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) before a 

student or exchange visitor visa can be issued. The Department of State worked 

closely with DHS and U.S. universities to ensure that implementation of SEVIS 

went smoothly and that SEVIS did not become a barrier to timely visa processing. 

We believe that SEVIS has been a major improvement to border security that has 

not had adverse impact on student visa applicants. 

37

In addition, virtually all applicants for student visas must now appear in person 

at a U.S. embassy or consulate for a visa interview. (In the past, some students 

could apply by mail or other means that did not entail an interview.) This change 

in policy is tied to implementation of the biometric visa requirement of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. Most of our overseas 

posts are now issuing visas with biometric indicators that require personal appearance of the applicant in order to record finger scans of index fingers; all posts will 

do so by October of this year. Both the interview and biometric requirements are 

major steps toward more secure borders. To ensure that student visa applications 

are processed in a timely fashion, especially during the summer, when such applications peak, the Department has instructed all embassies and consulates to give priority to student applicants when scheduling visa interviews. 

Applications from some students, especially graduate students in scientific fields, 

often require special clearances that include coordination with other Washington 

agencies. The Department has in recent months significantly shortened the clearance process and is currently involved in interagency working groups that are developing additional measures to speed and simplify the process. 

Question: 

If a deserving student is erroneously denied a visa, where would they go to appeal 

the decision? 

Response: 

Persons whose visa applications are denied have two avenues of recourse. First, 

they may reapply at any time and are encouraged to do so when they have new information to present, especially if the initial application was denied because of missing or incomplete documentation. Their other recourse if they feel their application 

was erroneously denied is to write to the chief of the nonimmigrant visa unit at the 

post where the visa was adjudicated. Supervisory consular officers review the decisions of line officers to ensure conformity with visa law and policies. Supervisory 

officers can, and do, reverse the decisions of line officers if new information is presented indicating an applicant is eligible for a visa. 

38

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN RESPONSE TO

FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS POSED TO JAMES M. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, U.S. NATIONAL

CENTRAL BUREAU, INTERPOL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

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