C

hina’s current military reforms are unprecedented in their 

ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational 

changes. Virtually every part of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and 

responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or 

has undergone a major internal reorganization.

Drawing on papers presented at two conferences co-organized 

by the U.S. National Defense University, RAND, and Taiwan’s Council 

of Advanced Policy Studies, this edited volume brings together some of 

the world’s best experts on the Chinese military to analyze the various 

dimensions of the reforms in detail and assess their implications for the 

PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations, for the Chinese Communist 

Party’s control of the army, and for civil-military integration.

The contributors review the drivers and strategic context underpinning the reform effort, explore the various dimensions of PLA 

efforts to build a force capable of conducting joint operations, consider the implications for the PLA services, and examine Xi Jinping’s 

role in driving the reforms through and using them to strengthen 

control over the military. The chapters chronicle successes and 

outstanding problems in the reform effort, and consider what the net 

effect will be as the PLA strives to become a “world- class” military 

by mid-century, if not much sooner.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

ASSESSING CHINESE MILITARY REFORMS

Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, 

Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

2019
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense 

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; 

distribution unlimited.

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of 

reprints or reviews.

Published in the United States by National Defense University Press

260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64)

Suite 2500

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record of this publication may be found at the Library of Congress.

Book design by Jamie Harvey, U.S. Government Printing Office
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Richard H. Yang, 

founder and former Chairman of the Chinese Council of 

Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS).

Dr. Yang was a scholar with strong conviction and strategic vision 

who believed the world should pay close attention to the People’s Republic 

of China’s military modernization and efforts to rebuild China into a 

great power. He acted on this conviction by encouraging academics and 

experts to apply scientific methodology to study the modernization of the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its impact on the regional security 

environment. Beginning in 1987, Richard organized the international 

conference on PLA affairs on an annual basis and used the conference 

proceedings as the basis for books that have stimulated debates and 

become important sources of knowledge. Many young scholars and 

experts have benefited from the international efforts that grew out of 

Richard’s inspiration and hard work.

This volume and the continuing international PLA conference series 

are efforts to build on the foundation that Richard created.

vii

Introduction

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part I: Drivers and Strategic Context

1 Breaking the Paradigm: Drivers Behind the 

PLA’s Current Period of Reform

David M. Finkelstein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

2 Choosing the “Least Bad Option”: Organizational Interests 

and Change in the PLA Ground Forces

John Chen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

3 The Impacts of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy

Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4 The Flag Lags but Follows: The PLA and China’s Great 

Leap Outward

Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Part II: Building a Joint Force

5 Toward a More Joint, Combat Ready PLA?

Mark R. Cozad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

6 Coming to a (New) Theater Near You: 

Command, Control, and Forces

Edmund J. Burke and Arthur Chan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

7 Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA: 

The Long March Toward Joint Logistics

LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

8 A Modern Major General: Building Joint Commanders in the PLA

Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

CONTENTS
viii

Part III: Overhauling Services

9 PLA Force Reductions: Impact on the Services

Daniel Gearin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

10 The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms: The PLA Army

Dennis J. Blasko. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

11 Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

David C. Logan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

12 China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era

John Costello and Joe McReynolds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437

Part IV: Centralizing Authority

13 Large and In Charge: Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519

14 The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China’s Military to His Vision

Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin Godby. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557

Part V: Integrating with Society

15 Keeping Up with the Jundui: Reforming the Chinese Defense 

Acquisition, Technology, and Industrial System 

Tai Ming Cheung. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .585

16 Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

Brian Lafferty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627

17 System Overload? The 2015 PLA Force Reduction, 

Military-Locality Relations, and the Potential 

for Social Instability

Ma Chengkun and John Chen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 661

18 Conclusion: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711

About the Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
ix

Other than the introduction and conclusion, all the chapters in 

this book were originally presented as part of the PLA conference 

series co-sponsored by Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy 

Studies (CAPS), National Defense University (NDU), and the RAND Corporation. The editors thank the authors for their patience and hard work in 

revising and updating their papers for publication.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the presenters, discussants, and 

participants at the CAPS-RAND-NDU 2016 PLA Conference in Arlington, 

Virginia, at the RAND Washington Office: Ken Allen, Dennis Blasko, Ed 

Burke, Arthur Chan, Michael Chase, Richard Chen, Tai Ming Cheung, 

Roger Cliff, Cortez Cooper, Jeff Engstrom, David Finkelstein, Scott Harold, 

Tim Heath, Lonnie Henley, Alexander Huang, Jeffrey Lewis, Nan Li, Lin 

Ying-yu, LeighAnn Luce, Ma Chengkun, Oriana Mastro, Frank Miller, Erin 

Richter, Mark Stokes, and Dennis Wilder. They also thank Megan Bishop 

at RAND, Yi-su Yang and Polly Shen from CAPS, and Don Mosser at NDU 

for logistical and administrative support. MAJ Jason Halub and Patrick 

Shaw of the Joint Staff played an important role in obtaining permission 

for NDU to co-sponsor the conference.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

x

The editors gratefully acknowledge the presenters, discussants, and 

participants at the CAPS-CSS-NDU-RAND 2017 PLA Conference in 

Taipei, Taiwan, at the Far Eastern Plaza Hotel: Ken Allen, John Chen, 

Richard Chen, Chia-Shen Chen, Cortez Cooper, Mark Cozad, Arthur Ding, 

Andrew Erickson, Kim Fassler, Dan Gearin, Scott Harold, Alexander C. 

Huang, Yen-Chi Hsu, Taeho Kim, Brian Lafferty, Ying-Yu Lin, Wei-The 

Li, Chengkun Ma, Ian Burns McCaslin, Joel McFadden, Joe McReynolds, Frank Miller, Brendan Mulvaney, Nathan Beauchamp Mustafaga, 

Weichong Ong, Jagannath Panda, Angela Poh, Phillip Saunders, Andrew 

Scobell, Ming-Shih Shen, Hsiang-Huang Shu, Michael Swaine, Stanley 

Weeks, Joel Wuthnow, Shinji Yamaguchi, Andrew N.D. Yang, Meng-Zhang 

Yang, Stanley Yang, Tiehlin Yen, and Tsung-Chu Yu. They also thank 

Betsy Kammer and Megan Bishop at RAND, Yi-su Yang and Polly Shen 

from CAPS, and Catherine Reese and Lucianna Perez-Pikelny at NDU for 

logistical and administrative support.

In addition to the conference participants, others provided assistance 

in the preparation of the book manuscript. The editors thank NDU contract 

researchers Alex Jeffers and Ian Burns McCaslin for their hard work in 

reformatting chapters, tracking down details of missing notes and ensuring 

consistent formatting, and helping with the translation of terms to and from 

Chinese in the text and the notes. MAJ Ryan Neely provided assistance in 

resolving copyediting queries on several chapters. The editors thank William Eliason and Ms. Joey Seich at NDU Press and Cameron Morse and 

Daniel Chykirda at the OSD Security Review office for their assistance in 

clearing the chapters for publication. NDU Press executive editor Jeffrey 

Smotherman copyedited the book and oversaw the production process.

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow thank Dennis J. Blasko, David 

M. Finkelstein, Frank G. Hoffman, Frank Miller, Andrew Scobell, and 

David Stilwell for comments and suggestions on the introduction and 

conclusion. They also thank Ian Burns McCaslin for translation and 

research assistance for chapter 9, and Ken Allen for providing several 

useful sources. John Costello and Joe McReynolds thank Joel Wuthnow, 
xi

Acknowledgments

Alex Crowther, and Frank Miller for their peer reviews of chapter 13, 

and Jim Chen, MAJ Ryan Neely, and Maj. Adam Greer for proofreading 

the chapter. 

Thanks to the following experts for their help in proofreading the 

final manuscript: Susan Carroll, John Chen, Adam Greer, Nicolas Gruenwald, MAJ Jason Halub, Corey Howell, Rob Miltersen, Paul Nantulya, 

MAJ Ryan Neeley, Lt. Col. Martin C. Poon, Edward Haofeng Tang, Jennifer Thurman, Lt. Col. Terry Vance, and Emily Walz.

And final thanks to Susan Carroll, who indexed the book.

1

CHAIRMAN XI 

REMAKES THE PLA

Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders

I

ntegral to Xi Jinping’s vision of restoring China to greatness—what he 

defines as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” [zhonghua 

minzu weida fuxing, 中华民族伟大复兴]—is building a more modern, 

capable, and disciplined military. China’s economic development, territorial 

integrity, and even the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

itself cannot be guaranteed without an army that can fight and prevail in 

modern warfare. Articulating the need for a stronger military, Xi and his 

colleagues have reflected on periods of Chinese weakness, such as the era 

of imperial decline in the late 19th century and the Japanese occupation in 

the 1930s and 1940s. In Xi’s words, a “nation’s backwardness in military 

affairs has a profound influence on a nation’s security. I often peruse the 

annals of modern Chinese history and feel heartbroken at the tragic scenes 

of us being beaten because of our ineptitude.”1 Such humiliations, in his 

view, should never be repeated.

Xi’s ambition to reshape and modernize the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) has been apparent from his early days as CCP general secretary and 

Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman. At the third plenum of the 

18th Party Congress, held in October 2013, Xi and other Party elites declared 

INTRODUCTION
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

2

their intention to overhaul the military’s command structure, update its 

training and logistics systems, adjust the size and composition of the services, unveil new rules and regulations governing military personnel, and 

strengthen civil-military cooperation in technological development and other 

areas.2

 In early 2014, Xi assumed leadership of a leading group on military 

reform, symbolizing his central role in the process. At the group’s first meeting, Xi declared that “national defense and military reform are an important 

part and an important symbol of China’s overall reform,” noting that the 

overriding goal was to produce a military that can “fight and win battles.”3

Following an interval of study and assessment, Xi announced a series 

of major organizational changes in late 2015 and early 2016.4 Some of the 

key reforms included a reorganization of the bureaucratic structure under 

the CMC, creation of a system of five joint theater commands (TCs), and 

establishment of two new quasi-services that will support joint operations: the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and Joint Logistics Support Force 

(JLSF). This initial tranche of reforms was followed by a series of additional 

changes, such as the execution of a 300,000-person force reduction, elimination of a number of group armies and conversion of army (and some air 

force) divisions to brigades, and an overhaul of the PLA’s professional military education system (more specifics on the reforms are provided later).

These changes help support the longer term vision for military transformation articulated by Xi at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017:

■	 by 2020, the PLA should basically achieve mechanization and make 

strides in applying information technology and developing strategic 

capabilities

■	 by 2035, national defense modernization should be basically completed

■	 by mid-century, the people’s armed forces (including the PLA, People’s 

Armed Police, and militia) should become “world-class forces” [shijie 

yiliu jun, 世界一流军].5

The Xi-era reforms represent the latest stage in a decades-long process 

of organizational realignment and modernization. According to Chinese 
Introduction

3

sources, the PLA underwent 10 major restructurings between 1949 and 2013, 

most of which attempted to reduce end strength, professionalize the officer 

and noncommissioned officer corps, and adapt military force structure to 

meet new operational challenges.6 Many of the focus areas of the current 

(11th) round of reforms, such as strengthening the PLA’s ability to conduct 

joint operations and rebalancing the military’s composition from the ground 

forces to the naval, air, and missile forces, were conceived in the 1980s and 

1990s.7 This agenda followed changes to Chinese military strategy to focus 

less on preparing for a general war with the Soviet Union or the United 

States—which had driven China’s defense planning during the Cold War—

and more on a smaller scale conflict around China’s borders.8 Key events 

signaling the need for reform included the 1990–1991 Gulf War, which 

showcased the U.S. military’s advantages in doctrine and technology, and 

the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which exposed the PLA’s inability to deter 

Taiwan independence forces or counter U.S. intervention on Taipei’s behalf.9

However, fundamental reforms eluded Xi’s two predecessors, Jiang 

Zemin and Hu Jintao. The PLA’s service composition remained heavily 

skewed toward the ground force, for instance, and the outmoded command 

structure was not geared toward rapid crisis response or joint operations. 

The problem likely resulted from a combination of Jiang and Hu’s weak 

political influence over the military, bureaucratic inertia, and opposition 

from corrupt senior officers who profited, quite literally, from a continuation of the status quo. What is unique about Xi’s reforms is not the agenda 

itself, but his ability to overcome bureaucratic resistance.10 He has done this 

through his own personal charisma as well as savvy political tactics, such as 

leveraging anti-corruption investigations over opponents and handpicking 

loyalists for key positions. The result has been a more extensive organizational transformation than what Jiang and Hu were able to achieve, and 

perhaps the most important set of reforms in the PLA’s 90-year history.

The implications of the Xi-era reforms for China’s neighbors and 

potential adversaries are significant. A better trained, organized, and 

equipped PLA will be in a stronger position to accomplish its three primary 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

4

functions: winning modern wars, especially what the U.S. Department of 

Defense terms short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts; deterring 

both larger and smaller competitors; and protecting Chinese interests 

within and beyond Asia.11 Rival territorial claimants, such as Vietnam, the 

Philippines, Japan, and India, will face a more confident and capable adversary in the South and East China seas and across the Sino-Indian border. 

Taiwan will have to contend with a PLA that can more credibly plan and 

execute joint operations, such as amphibious landings, blockades, and joint 

firepower strikes.12 U.S. forces operating throughout the Indo-Pacific region 

will need to anticipate a PLA that can respond more quickly to regional 

crises and conduct counter-intervention operations more effectively.

Foreign analysts have only begun to explore the contents, drivers, 

and possible implications of Xi’s campaign to restructure the PLA.13 Many 

issues remain shrouded in uncertainty and warrant further examination. 

These include:

■	 what impacts the reforms are having on PLA operations, training, and 

logistics

■	 the prospects for the ground forces as the reforms’ nominal biggest 

loser, as well as the other services

■	 challenges the PLA is facing in cultivating operational commanders

■	 the structure, roles, and missions of the SSF and JLSF

■	 how the downsizing is being carried out, and what impact it might have 

on social stability

■	 the implications of reform for Party control over, and Xi’s influence 

within, the PLA

■	 whether and how the reforms will improve coordination between the 

PLA and the civilian science and technology sector

■	 what the implications might be for the defense acquisition process.

This volume explores these and other dimensions of China’s military 

reforms as they were planned and implemented between 2013 and 2018. The 

chapters are based on papers presented at the 2016 and 2017 PLA conferences 
Introduction

5

co-organized by the U.S. National Defense University, RAND, and Taiwan’s 

Council of Advanced Policy Studies, updated to account for more recent 

developments.14 The goal is to assess the motivations of Xi and his associates, 

chronicle key successes and outstanding problems, and consider what the 

net effect of the reforms will be as the PLA strives to become a “world-class” 

military by mid-century, if not much sooner. This introduction provides an 

overview of the major elements and goals of the reforms and summarizes the 

17 substantive chapters. A brief conclusion at the end of the book assesses 

the progress of the reforms to date and sketches the way ahead.

Major Elements

On New Year’s Day 2016, the CMC issued a blueprint for reform that 

explained how the PLA would develop into a “modern military with Chinese characteristics that can win information-age wars” by 2020.15 The 

initial phase of the reforms involved “above the neck” [bozi yishang, 脖子以

上] changes to the PLA’s three major organizational pillars—the services, 

CMC, and theaters—and was introduced by Xi in a series of announcements 

in the winter of 2015–2016. The new PLA structure is depicted in figure 1. 

First, on December 31, 2015, Xi announced three service-related changes:

■	 The Second Artillery Force, responsible for the country’s land-based 

nuclear and conventional missiles, was renamed the Rocket Force and 

upgraded to full-service [junzhong, 军种] status, equal to the army, 

navy, and air force.16 As David Logan argues in this volume, this was 

mainly a symbolic change, though some anticipated that it could imply 

greater resources and expanded missions for the Rocket Force.

■	 The Strategic Support Force was created with the status of an independent branch [budui, 部队], though with a bureaucratic grade 

equivalent to a service.17 This new organization consolidated a variety 

of functions related to the information domain, including space and 

cyber operations, electronic warfare, and even some psychological 

warfare capabilities.18 (Another new force, the Joint Logistics Support 

Force, was established in September 2016 to provide strategic and 

operational logistics support to the new joint theater commands.)19
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

6

■	 Headquarters for the PLA ground forces, which had previously been 

commanded and administered by the general departments, were 

established at the national and theater levels. This reduced the army’s 

importance by placing it on the same bureaucratic level as the navy, air 

force, and Rocket Force.

Second, on January 11, 2016, Xi announced that the four general 

departments—the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political 

Department, General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament 

Department (GAD)—had been disbanded.20 Built on the Soviet model, 

these departments had developed into sprawling, semi-independent fiefdoms with limited external oversight. This autonomy meant that corruption 

had festered during the Jiang and Hu eras, especially in areas such as the 

promotions and logistics systems.21 The general departments were replaced 

by 15 smaller functional CMC departments, commissions, and offices that 

would report directly to the CMC (via the CMC General Office, which was 

ranked first among these organizations).22 These are depicted in figure 2, 

and described in detail in the appendix to this chapter.

Figure 1. New PLA Structure

Ministry of 

National Defense

Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Members)

General Oce

Joint Sta Dept.

Political Work Dept.

Logistics Support Dept.

Equipment Development Dept.

Training Management Dept.

Nat’l Def. Mobilization Dept.

Discipline Inspection Commission

CCP Politburo State Council

Strategic Support

Force

PLA Navy

Headquarters

PLA Air Force

Headquarters

PLA Rocket Force

Headquarters

Theater 

Commands Eastern

Southern

Western

Northern

Central

Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces

PLA Army

Headquarters

CMC Subsidiary Organs

Political & Legal A. Commission

Science & Tech. Commission

Strategic Planning Oce

Reform & Organization Oce

Int. Military Cooperation Oce

Audit Bureau

Organ Aairs Gen. Management

 Bureau Support to

Theater Commands

Nuclear forces still

report directly to CMC;

conventional forces

unclear

Service Headquarters:

Administrative but not

Operational Control

Joint Logistics

Support Force
Introduction

7

The CMC reshuffle impacted the former general departments in different ways. Most affected was the GSD, whose diverse portfolio was distributed 

among new and existing organizations. Core operations and intelligence 

analysis functions were transferred to a smaller CMC Joint Staff Department 

(JSD), while signals intelligence and electronic warfare went to the SSF and 

army aviation was sent to the new army headquarters. The GSD’s training, 

strategic planning, and mobilization departments were all removed from 

the successor JSD and placed under direct CMC control, indicting both their 

significance and the need for more top-level oversight over these functions. 

The other general departments were less affected, though as discussed later, 

several changes were made to the former GPD to encourage greater Party 

control and discipline in the PLA. In addition, the GAD’s Science and Technology Commission was placed under direct CMC oversight, signaling Xi’s 

intent to improve management of military innovation.

Third, the previous system of seven military regions was replaced by five 

joint theater commands. The military regions were largely administrative 

constructs that had no operational control over air, naval, and missile forces 

in peacetime. By contrast, theater commanders would be able to draw on 

conventional forces within their respective areas of responsibility to plan and 

execute operations (theater-based nuclear forces remained under the tight 

control of the CMC). Each of the theaters has a specific set of missions that 

Figure 2. New CMC Organization

Logistics Support

Department

Political Work

Department

General Oce Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairman, Members)

Joint Sta

Department

Equipment

Development Dept.

Training

Management Dept.

National Defense

Mobilization Dept.

Discipline Inspection

Commission

Political and Legal

Aairs Commission

Science and Technology

Commission

Reform and

Organization Oce

Strategic Planning

Oce

International Military

Cooperation Oce Audit Bureau Organ Aairs General

Management Bureau

Departments( 部 )

Commissions ( 委员会 )

Oces( 办公室/署/局 )
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

8

it is primarily responsible for: the Eastern Theater is responsible for Taiwan 

and the East China Sea, the Southern Theater handles the South China Sea 

and land borders with Southeast Asian states, the Western Theater covers 

the land borders with India and Central Asian states (as well as the restive 

regions of Xinjiang and Tibet), the Northern Theater would deal with a 

Korea contingency, and the Central Theater focuses on the defense of Beijing and can provide support to other theaters as needed. A map of the new 

theater boundaries appears in figure 3.

In planning and executing these major organizational changes, the 

PLA clearly drew inspiration from the U.S. military. Assigning service 

chiefs a force building function and investing operational authority in 

joint theater commands paralleled similar changes made in the U.S. system 

after World War II and solidified in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The 

similarities, however, should not be overstated. For instance, the PLA’s new 

regional command structure was geographically confined to China and its 

immediate environs, unlike the globe-spanning U.S. combatant command 

system. The PLA also retained a number of Leninist features that have no 

Figure 3. TC Boundaries
Introduction

9

parallel in the U.S. or other militaries in democratic countries, such as political commissars and Party committees. Indeed the reforms, as discussed 

below, strengthened those features in important ways. 

Following a CMC work conference on military reform in December 

2016, the PLA embarked on a second phase of reforms. Several notable 

changes were carried out in 2017 and 2018 that affected the PLA’s size, 

composition, and personnel. First was a reduction of the PLA by 300,000 

personnel, a goal that Xi had announced at a military parade in September 

2015.23 The focus was on reducing the ground forces, which had constituted nearly 70 percent of PLA personnel on the eve of reform. Following 

the reduction, Chinese sources claim that the army’s share declined to less 

than 50 percent.24 If true, this would represent a major step toward the 

longstanding goal of rebalancing the force toward the other services. The 

reduction also targeted noncombat personnel, such as headquarters staff, 

allowing more resources to be devoted to combat troops and equipment 

that would give the PLA a “stronger battle capability.”25 Overall, more than 

30 percent of commissioned officers were reportedly cut.26 Some personnel 

transitioned to jobs in local governments, state-owned enterprises, or the 

private sector, while others became PLA civilians.27 The reduction was 

declared “basically complete” in March 2018 (though interviewees note that 

the downsizing might not be fully complete until 2020).28

Second were a series of below-the-neck [bozi yixia, 脖子以下] force 

structure changes. In April 2017, Xi announced that 84 “corps-level units” 

had been established or adjusted, forming what he called an “indestructible 

combat force.”29 Few details were provided, though the announcement signaled that the reforms were beginning to address organizational problems 

at lowers levels of the PLA.30 Some of the changes included:

■	 The army continued its transformation from a group armydivision-regiment structure to a standardized group army-brigadebattalion structure, which had begun in the early 2000s. The lineup of 

group armies was cut from 18 to 13, 15 former army divisions were converted into two brigades apiece, and combat brigades were transformed 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

10

into combined arms brigades. Revisions were also made at the level of 

combined arms battalions, which the ground forces had earlier announced 

as the “basic combat unit” [jiben zuozhan danwei, 基本作战单位] capable 

of independent maneuver.31 There has also been an increase in the number 

of more rapidly deployable army units, such as army aviation and special 

operations forces.32

■	 The navy has expanded its marine corps, which stood at around 12,000 

personnel prior to the reforms. With the conversion of one army motorized infantry brigade and up to three coastal defense units to marine 

brigades, the marine corps may have tripled in strength to roughly 36,000 

personnel distributed among the North, East, and South Sea fleets.33

■	 The air force continued its attempts to move from a division-regiment 

structure to a base-brigade structure for fighters and ground attack 

aircraft units under the theater command air forces. (Bombers, as well 

as transport and specialized aircraft, remain organized in divisions.)34

■	 In December 2017, the People’s Armed Police, previously under the 

dual command of the State Council and CMC, was placed solely under 

CMC leadership. Its internal organization was also significantly revised; 

changes included losing its responsibilities for protecting China’s gold, 

forestry, and hydropower resources and gaining oversight of the coast 

guard, which previously reported to the State Oceanic Administration.35

Third were changes designed to improve the competence and quality 

of PLA personnel. Bonuses and other incentives were adopted to increase 

the share of college graduates among active-duty officers, while the reserve 

officer program was altered to accept only college graduates.36 To retain 

qualified officers, the PLA reportedly offered a modest pay increase drawn 

from defense budgets that continued to grow by more than 8 percent a 

year.37 The professional military educational system was restructured, with 

77 institutes reduced to 43 (many were merged into the National Defense 

University (NDU) and National University of Defense Technology).38 Curricular changes were adopted to focus on practical skills in areas such as 

computer science, information technology, and aerospace studies.39 NDU 

created a new training course in joint operations for mid-level officers and 
Introduction

11

inaugurated a specialized joint operations track for its senior commanders’ 

course.40 Reforms to the grade and rank system were also initiated, though 

the results of this effort had not been announced as of mid-2018.41

Another step in the reforms came at the 19th Party Congress, when Xi 

announced an overhaul of the CMC membership. The congress provided 

Xi an opportunity to hand pick leaders that he could trust to implement 

the remainder of his agenda and remove those either too old, unreliable, or 

corrupt to serve, all of whom had been selected by his predecessors. (Two 

former CMC members, Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang, were targeted by 

anti-corruption investigators; Zhang later committed suicide.)42 As detailed 

in the chapter in this volume by Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin 

Godby, the new CMC was also reduced in size from 11 to 7 members, 

which notably did not include the service chiefs or heads of the successor 

organizations to the GLD or GAD. This suggested Xi’s desire to rein in 

those organizations. Added was the secretary of the Discipline Inspection 

Commission, which is responsible for anti-corruption investigations in the 

PLA. Figure 4 lists the old and new CMC members.

Table. Old and New CMCs

18th Central Committee CMC (2012–2017) 19th Central Committee CMC (2017–2022)

Xi Jinping Chairman Xi Jinping Chairman 

Fan Changlong Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang Vice Chairman 

Xu Qiliang Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia Vice Chairman 

Chang Wanquan Defense Minister Wei Fenghe Defense Minister

Fang Fenghui GSD Director Li Zuocheng Joint Staff 

Department Director

Zhang Yang GPD Director Miao Hua Political Work Department Director 

Zhao Keshi GLD Director Zhang Shengmin Discipline Inspection 

Commission Secretary

Zhang Youxia GAD Director 

Wu Shengli Navy Commander

Ma Xiaotian Air Force Commander

Wei Fenghe Second Artillery 

Commander

Key: GAD: General Armament Department; GLD: General Logistics Department; GPD: General Political 

Department; GSD: General Staff Department.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

12

What the Reforms Sought to Achieve 

While broadly focused on building a military that can, in Xi’s words, “fight 

and win battles,” reformers also pursued three more specific objectives. First 

was strengthening the PLA’s ability to plan and conduct joint operations. This 

was not a new goal: by the late 1990s, Chinese military strategists understood 

that success on the modern battlefield would require the PLA to better integrate the activities and capabilities of units from the different services and 

do so with the support of advanced command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and logistics 

systems. Part of this judgment resulted from observations of the changing 

character of war, especially lessons derived from U.S. operations during the 

Gulf War and in the Balkans, while part resulted from the specific requirements of preparing for conflict with Taiwan (including denying U.S. forces the 

ability to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, as they had done during the 1995–1996 

crisis).43 As Mark Cozad explains in his chapter, PLA doctrine and training 

exercises increasingly focused on joint operations in the 1990s and 2000s.

Previous reforms had failed to address several persistent weaknesses. 

The most significant challenge was an organizational culture that prioritized the interests of the ground forces over the other services. As noted, 

the army represented a large majority of all PLA personnel, while ground 

forces officers occupied most key command and staff billets. This was out of 

sync with the growing importance of developing capabilities and expertise 

in the maritime, air, and space domains. A related problem was the lack of 

a joint command structure. In peacetime, air and naval forces were under 

the operational control of their respective service headquarters, while the 

military regions took charge of army units. Prosecuting a joint campaign 

would have required temporary “war zones” [战区] to be established, a process that, while useful to signal strategic intent and non-kinetic escalation, 

would have slowed the PLA’s ability to respond to an emerging crisis and 

denied it the element of surprise in a campaign against Taiwan. Yet another 

shortcoming was the failure of the military’s training and education systems to produce qualified joint commanders.44
Introduction

13

The impetus for further reform was not only a result of these limitations 

but also changes in China’s security environment. In his chapter in this 

volume, David Finkelstein notes that Chinese security assessments became 

increasingly dire under Xi, with a particular emphasis on challenges posed 

by the United States (especially the Barack Obama administration’s pivot to 

Asia, which many in China interpreted as strategic encirclement), Japan and 

other regional territorial rivals, and separatist forces on Taiwan. Xi and his 

colleagues also closely followed the global revolution in military affairs, in 

which other major powers were making strides in new technologies. All this 

meant that the PLA would have to be prepared to win what Chinese military 

strategy termed informationized local wars [xinxihua jubu zhanzheng, 信息化

局部战争], the cornerstone of which is an ability to conduct joint operations.45

Reforms undertaken between 2015 and 2018 advanced this agenda in 

several ways. In brief, these included:

■	 rebalancing service composition to put more weight on naval, air, and 

missile forces

■	 creating the SSF and JLSF, which provided critical operational support 

to joint commanders

■	 removing the service chiefs from operational chain of command, while 

granting theater commanders operational oversight over all conventional forces within their respective regions

■	 establishing an independent training department under the CMC to 

formulate and enforce joint training standards

■	 revising professional military educational curricula to put more 

emphasis on joint operations

■	 increasing specialized forces, such as amphibious and helicopter units, 

that would be essential to a joint campaign.

These adjustments coincided with personnel changes that placed more 

navy and air force officers in key positions, including as commanders of 

two of the five theaters.46

Second was a desire to revitalize Party control and discipline within 

the PLA. The PLA has always been a “Party-army,” which must follow the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

14

CCP’s instructions and defend its interests. Nevertheless, Xi and his colleagues worried that Party control may have been atrophying to dangerous 

levels. One problem was the possibility that some in the military could 

prioritize the interests of the people, or the nation as a whole, over the Party. 

This was an issue during the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, in which some 

local PLA units refused to obey the Party’s orders to use force against the 

student protesters.47 Along these lines, Xi revived concerns that some—

usually unnamed—officers were lobbying for the PLA to be transformed 

from the armed wing of the CCP into a “national army” [jundui guojiahua, 军队国家化], which if true could represent a serious threat to Party 

survival.48 Moreover, the example of the 1991 Soviet military coup (which 

Chinese analyses suggested was partially the result of the Soviet Communist Party’s loosening grip over the military) is never far out of mind.49

Another problem is PLA officers placing their own personal interests 

ahead of the Party’s. Xi recognized that corruption in the officer corps—a 

problem that had been festering on a large scale since the 1980s—could 

blemish the Party’s image among the public, impede readiness and morale, 

and limit the willingness of senior officers to tolerate major reforms. Combating this challenge was thus a major theme of his leadership. At a 2014 

speech in Gutian, site of the 1929 Party Congress that established the principle of Party control over the PLA, Xi commented on problems in cadres’ 

“ideology, politics, and work style,” castigating the “lax” supervision of 

PLA personnel and pointing to Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, CMC vice 

chairmen under Hu who were targeted in Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns, 

as cautionary examples.50 He instead urged the PLA to develop officers both 

loyal to the Party and capable of “leading soldiers to fight and win battles.”51

Central to restoring Party control was elevating Xi’s own status and 

authority within the PLA. This is critical to arresting the trend of too much 

power being delegated to corrupt military elites and helped ensure that his 

vision for military transformation was being implemented. (It was also part of 

Xi’s broader consolidation of power within the Party-state as a whole.) Thus, 

Xi emphasized what the 1982 PRC Constitution termed the “CMC Chairman 
Introduction

15

Responsibility System” [zhongyang junwei zerenzhi, 中央军委责任制], which 

stated that ultimate authority over military affairs rested with that individual 

(who usually serves concurrently as Party general-secretary). Other steps he 

took to assert control over the PLA included attending military events at a 

greater rate than Hu, personally leading reform efforts, weighing in on senior 

officer promotions, and publishing military treatises that became “required 

reading” for soldiers.52

Xi also oversaw a series of structural and personnel changes designed 

to combat graft and ensure political orthodoxy among the officer corps. 

One part was adjusting the PLA’s supervisory mechanisms. Prior to the 

reforms, supervision was centralized in the general departments, which, as 

noted, were notoriously corrupt. Xi changed this situation by disbanding 

the general departments, elevating the Discipline Inspection Commission 

to independent status, and placing its secretary on the CMC—and likewise 

placing the audit bureau and military court system under direct CMC 

oversight. The Political Work Department continued to oversee personnel files, political indoctrination, and the political commissar and Party 

committee systems. This meant that the PLA now had several independent, but mutually reinforcing channels to monitor and fight ideological 

laxity and corruption. This adjustment was complemented by continuing 

anti-corruption investigations and a rotation of senior officers intended, 

in part, to break up patronage networks.53

Third was the need for improvements in the area of “civil-military integration” (CMI) [junmin ronghe, 军民融合]. The term refers primarily to the 

process whereby the military could leverage breakthroughs in the civilian 

science and technology sector, though it also encompasses other types of 

cooperation between the military and civilian realms. Examples include 

expanding reliance on civilian contractors in the military supply chain, 

which is cheaper and more efficient than relying on traditional suppliers, 

and the incorporation of military specifications into the design of civilian 

transport ships, which could be appropriated during wartime (especially 

during an amphibious invasion of Taiwan). As Brian Lafferty discusses in 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

16

this volume, strengthening CMI has been part of the PLA’s reform agenda 

since the 1990s, but its implementation was hindered by ineffectual toplevel management, bureaucratic stovepiping, and other obstacles.

Xi attempted to make progress in the CMI arena through various 

changes. One was upgrading the PLA’s Science and Technology Commission, previously housed within the GAD, to direct CMC supervision. This 

commission is responsible for the military’s coordination with outside 

civilian experts in critical technological areas. Another was reforms to 

the military research system. For instance, several technical institutes 

were merged into the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, helping to more 

closely integrate technical advances with innovations in China’s military 

doctrine.54 To improve management and supervision of the process, the 

government created a new Central Commission for Integrated Military 

and Civilian Development in January 2017, with Xi as chairman.55 In sum, 

these motives—operational, political, and technological—were not new, but 

taken together shaped an agenda that Xi and his fellow reformers acted on 

to create a “world-class” force by mid-century.

Outline of the Book 

The following chapters explore the reforms from a variety of angles and 

are divided into five thematic sections. Part I analyzes the strategic and 

bureaucratic context in which the reforms are occurring. In chapter 2, 

David Finkelstein considers how domestic politics, operational requirements, and changing external security assessments provided the impetus 

for reform and shaped its contents. He also asks who (other than Xi) played 

a critical role in the process. Chapter 3, by Andrew Scobell and Nathan 

Beauchamp-Mustafaga, discusses how the reforms are occurring alongside 

the creation of a more “global” PLA that is being tasked with protecting 

China’s overseas interests. On the bureaucratic front, chapter 4 by John 

Chen explains why the ground forces—which had the most to lose from 

restructuring—reluctantly opted to endorse the changes. In chapter 5, Ian 

Burns McCaslin and Andrew Erickson examine the impact of reform on 
Introduction

17

the navy’s modernization plans and document the emerging rivalries as 

the services position themselves to be the critical part of the joint force.

Part II considers several features of the PLA’s attempts to forge a stronger joint operations capability. Chapter 6, written by Mark Cozad, traces the 

PLA’s progress in the areas of joint training, doctrine, and personnel education since the 1990s, showing why previous reforms failed and how more 

recent changes aim to rectify the situation. In chapter 7, Edmund Burke 

and Arthur Chan explain the role of the new joint theater commands and 

identify several challenges to the effectiveness of the new system, including resistance by the services (which have continued to lead some types of 

operations).56 Chapter 8, by LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter, examines the 

trajectory and key features of the PLA’s logistics reforms, one component 

of which is creating a “precision” system that provides “comprehensive, 

timely, and accurate logistics support to PLA joint operations.” In chapter 

9, Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders assess the challenges facing the 

PLA in cultivating highly qualified joint commanders, and how Xi and his 

colleagues are seeking improvements in this arena.

Part III digs deeper into how the reforms are affecting the PLA’s services. Chapter 10, by Daniel Gearin, places the recent downsizing in the 

context of previous force reductions and assesses the implications for the 

ground forces. In chapter 11, Dennis J. Blasko discusses the army’s new 

structure, recent training and deployments, and changes to its logistics, 

doctrine, and educational systems, concluding that despite new equipment, the army’s modernization process has been slower and perhaps less 

effective than the more technical services. Even as it remains the largest 

single service, Blakso concludes that the army is the “biggest loser” in 

the current reforms. Chapter 12, by David Logan, addresses the status of 

the Rocket Force, which he asserts is “arguably the biggest winner in the 

reforms” because it retained control over nuclear forces, increased its status, 

and strengthened its ability to compete for resources. In chapter 13, John 

Costello and Joe McReynolds provide a comprehensive overview of the SSF, 

detailing this new force’s background, structure, and missions. The authors 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

18

also raise important questions about whether the rise of the SSF was more 

about organizational innovation or the desire by top leaders to centralize 

control over China’s strategic resources.

Part IV assesses the implications of the reforms for defense acquisition and the relationship between the PLA and civilian sector writ large. 

Tai Ming Cheung, in chapter 14, shows how the reforms complement the 

defense industry’s transformation “from a follower to an original innovation leader” and outlines continuing weaknesses in that sector. In chapter 

15, Brian Lafferty explores the CMI dimensions of the reforms. He concludes that despite important structural changes, the historical “track 

record suggests that even positive returns will involve a longer and more 

difficult process than the Party currently acknowledges.” Chapter 16, by 

Ma Chengkun and John Chen, explores the impact of the downsizing on 

military-locality relations and documents the range of policies and tactics 

the government has used to try to compensate the reforms’ losers and mitigate discontent among demobilized soldiers.

Part V turns to the political elite dimensions of the reforms, focusing on 

Xi’s role and status as CMC chairman. Chapter 17, by Phillip C. Saunders and 

Joel Wuthnow, examines the political and ideological challenges Xi sought 

to rectify through the reforms as well as his political strategy for bringing 

the process to a successful outcome. Chapter 18, by Joel McFadden, Kim 

Fassler, and Justin Godby, looks at the new CMC lineup that was announced 

at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. They conclude that “there is little 

doubt that Xi and his generals emerged in a stronger position to steer the PLA 

toward fulfilling its part in the ‘great rejuvenation’ of the Chinese nation.”

Taken together, the chapters suggest that the PLA has been able to 

make major strides, within a short period of time, toward completing the 

unfinished business of organizational transformation left over from the 

Jiang and Hu eras. This is both a testament to Xi’s ability to push structural 

changes through a bureaucracy that has historically resisted them and an 

indication that the PLA is on track to field a more professional and capable 

joint force by 2020. However, the chapters also reveal persistent weaknesses, 
Introduction

19

such as encouraging operational flexibility in a system that prizes top-down 

political control; cultivating proficient joint commanders in the absence of 

real combat experience (China has not fought a war since 1979); reducing 

interservice rivalry and the influence of the ground forces, which remains 

by far the largest service and continues to hold most senior command 

billets; and forging stronger connections between the PLA and civilian 

technological innovators. Resolving these deeper problems will require 

that Xi and his successor—whenever one is named—remain focused on 

the agenda even after 2020 and be prepared to counter resistance if and 

when it resurfaces.

Notes

1 Li Xuanliang and Wang Jingguo, “Focus the Building of Elite Forces on 

Winning in War” [聚焦打赢砺雄师], Xinhua, September 21, 2017, available at 

<www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/21/c_1121704641.htm>.

2 “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues” 

[中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua, November 15, 2013, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm>.

3 “Xi Leads China’s Military Reform, Stresses Strong Army,” Xinhua, March 

15, 2014, available at <http://english.cntv.cn/20140315/102892.shtml>

4 For a summary, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China 

Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 6–22.

5 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th CPC National Congress,” 

Xinhua, November 3, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>.

6 “Previous PLA Reorganizations Since the Founding of the Republic” [建国

以来解放军历次体制编制调整改革], Caixin Online [财新网], November 27, 2015, 

available at <http://china.caixin.com/2015-11-27/100878949.html>.

7 For a discussion of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms during the Jiang 

era, see Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2002).

8 See, for example, Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China’s Changes in Military Strategy,” International Security 42, no. 3 (Winter 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

20

2017/2018), 37–83; and David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy,” 

in Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2007), 99–145.

9 Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Chinese Lessons 

from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 153–200.

10 See Arthur S. Ding, “The PLA and Taiwan Policy under Xi Jinping: One 

Joint Actor Without Its Own Agenda,” Issues & Studies 53, no. 2 (June 2017), 1–24; 

and the chapter by Saunders and Wuthnow in this volume.

11 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China, 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 2016), i; “China’s Military Strategy (Full Text),” Xinhua, May 27, 

2015, available at <http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm>.

12 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “What Do China’s Military Reforms 

Mean for Taiwan?” NBR Commentary, May 19, 2016, available at <http://nbr.org/

research/activity.aspx?id=692>.

13 See, for example, Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the 

Age of Xi Jinping; David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and 

Reform of the PLA (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016); David M. Finkelstein, Get Ready 

for the Second Phase of Chinese Military Reform (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017); and 

the special section on Chinese military reform in Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th

Quarter, 2016).

14 The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense Center for Strategic Studies was 

also a co-sponsor of the 2017 conference.

15 “China Releases Guidelines on Military Reform,” Xinhua, January 1, 2016, 

available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/01/c_134970353.htm>.

16 “Xi Inaugurates PLA Rocket Force as Military Reform Deepens,” Xinhua, 

January 1, 2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/01/c_134970564.

htm>. Previously, the Second Artillery was a branch of the ground forces.

17 Like the service headquarters, the Strategic Support Force headquarters is 

a theater command commander [正战区级] grade organization.

18 See chapter by John Costello and Joe McReynolds in this volume.

19 “China Establishes Joint Logistic Support Force,” China Military Online, 

September 13, 2016, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2016-09/13/
Introduction

21

content_4730336.htm>. See also chapter by LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter in 

this volume.

20 “China Reshuffles Military Headquarters,” Xinhua, January 11, 2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/11/c_134998692.htm>.

21 As Tai Ming Cheung notes in this volume, the PLA has been less transparent about corruption in the weapons research and development system since those 

programs are mostly classified.

22 For a discussion, see Joel Wuthnow, “The CMC General Office: Recentralizing Power in the PLA,” China Brief 17, no. 7 (May 2017), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/cmc-general-office-recentralizing-power-pla/>.

23 “China to Cut Troops by 300,000: Xi,” Xinhua, September 3, 2015, available 

at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/03/c_134583730.htm>.

24 However, it is unclear if this figure accounts for army officers serving in 

“joint” positions within the Central Military Commission departments and theaters. See “Facts and Figures on China’s Military Reform,” Xinhua, December 19, 

2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/19/c_136837189.htm>.

25 “PLA Non-Battle Personnel Downsized as Part of Military Reform: Report,” 

Global Times (Beijing), March 5, 2018, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2018-03/05/content_7959328.htm>.

26 “Facts and Figures on China’s Military Reform.”

27 Authors’ interviews with PLA officers, 2017–2018.

28 “Premier Li: China Has Reduced Army Size by 300,000,” ChinaMil.com, 

March 5, 2018, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-03/05/content_7959842.htm>; authors’ interviews, 2017–2018.

29 “China Reshuffles 84 Corps-Level Military Units,” Xinhua, April 18, 2017, 

available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/18/c_136218258.htm>.

30 Chinese media did reveal that the newly realigned group armies were 

included in the 84 corps. See “PLA Reveals New Designation for First Time,” China 

Daily (Beijing), April 25, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-

04/25/content_29076824.htm>. A Hong Kong newspaper published a purported list 

of the 84 units, which included major commands in all the services and Strategic 

Support Force. See “What Are the 84 Corps-Grade Units?” [84个军级单位是什么?], 

Ming Pao [明报], April 20, 2017, available at <www.mingpaocanada.com/tor/htm/

News/20170420/tcab1_r.htm>.

31 For an overview, see Dennis J. Blasko, “What Is Known and Unknown 

about Changes to the PLA’s Ground Combat Units,” China Brief 17, no. 7 (May 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

22

2017), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/known-unknown-changesplas-ground-combat-units/>.

32 See the chapter by Blasko in this volume, as well as Dennis J. Blasko, “Recent 

Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force,” China Brief 17, no. 8 (June 

2017), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/recent-developments-chinese-armys-helicopter-force/>.

33 Thanks to Dennis Blasko for these observations. 

34 Lawrence Trevethan, “Brigadization” of the PLA Air Force (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2018).

35 Kristin Huang, “China Brings People’s Armed Police under Control of 

Top Military Chiefs,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), December 27, 2017, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2125880/

china-brings-peoples-armed-police-under-control-top>; Lyle Morris, “China 

Welcomes Its Newest Armed Force: The Coast Guard,” War on the Rocks, April 4, 

2018, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/china-welcomes-its-newest-armed-force-the-coast-guard/>. In addition, changes were made to the People’s 

Armed Police (PAP) internal security [neiwei, 内卫] forces, with 14 mobile divisions 

disbanded and replaced by a mix of mobile zongdui and zhidui distributed among 

provincial PAP commands. Thanks to Dennis J. Blasko for this observation.

36 “College Students Account for Large Majority of New Military Recruits,” 

ChinaMil.com, September 10, 2017, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2017-09/10/content_7750599.htm>; “China Changes Student Enrollment 

Policies for Army,” Xinhua, May 26, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2017-05/26/c_136317920.htm>.

37 Minnie Chan, “China Raises Pay, Pensions for Trimmed Down Military, 

Announces Plans for Veterans’ Ministry,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

March 13, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2137008/china-raises-pay-pensions-trimmed-down-military>.

38 “X i Ca l ls for World-Class Mi litar y Research, Educationa l 

Institutions,” Xinhua, July 7, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-

07/19/c_136456748.htm>.

39 “PLA Schools to Expand Recruitment, Help China Win Information 

War,” Global Times (Beijing), June 12, 2017, available at <http://en.people.cn/

n3/2017/0612/c90000-9227234.html>.

40 Luo Jimnu, “Building a World-Class Joint Operations University” [建设

世界一流综合性联合指挥大学], Enlightenment Daily [光明日报], October 19, 
Introduction

23

2017, available at <http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2017-10/19/nw.D110000gmrb_20171019_1-13.htm>; Huang Panyue, “PLA Aims to Cultivate Commanding 

Talents for Joint Operations,” ChinaMil.com, September 7, 2017, available at <http://

english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-09/07/content_7747234.htm>.

41 Kenneth W. Allen, “China Announces Reform of Military Ranks,” China 

Brief 17, no. 2 (January 2017), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

china-announces-reform-military-ranks/>.

42 “PLA Backs Investigation of Senior Military Official,” Xinhua, January 10, 

2018, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/10/c_136885601.htm>.

43 Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,” Journal 

of Strategic Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (February 2017), 169–195.

44 See the chapter by Wuthnow and Saunders in this volume.

45 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informationized 

Local Wars,’” China Brief 15, no. 13 (July 2015), available at <https://jamestown.org/

program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars/>.

46 Those were Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai, who was named Southern Theater 

commander, and General Yi Xiaoguang, who was named Central Theater commander.

47 See Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New 

York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

48 For a discussion, see Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil-Military 

Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” Armed Forces & Society 31, no. 2 (January 2005), 

227–244; a forthcoming volume by Chen Yali (Princeton University Press); and 

chapter by Saunders and Wuthnow in this volume.

49 William Wan, “In China, Soviet Union’s Failure Drives Decisions on Reform,” Washington Post, March 23, 2013, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-china-soviet-unions-failure-drivesdecisions-on-reform/2013/03/23/9c090012-92ef-11e2-ba5b-550c7abf6384_story.

html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b9e61cff20ac>.

50 James C. Mulvenon, “Hotel Gutian: We Haven’t Had That Spirit Here Since 

1929,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 (Winter 2015), available at <www.hoover.

org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46jm.pdf>

51 “Xi Stresses CPC’s Absolute Leadership Over Army,” Xinhua, November 2, 

2014, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/02/content_18843109.htm>.

52 See chapter by Saunders and Wuthnow in this volume.

53 Ibid.

54 Authors’ interviews with PLA Academy of Military Science personnel, 2017.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

24

55 “Xi to Head Central Commission for Integrated Military, Civilian 

Development,” Xinhua, January 22, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2017-01/22/c_136004750.htm>.

56 For instance, the PLA Navy headquarters continues to lead anti-piracy task 

forces (authors’ interviews, 2017), while David C. Logan’s chapter in this volume 

clarifies that the Rocket Force retained control over land-based nuclear weapons.
25

APPENDIX

Central Military Commission Reforms

This appendix analyzes the organizational logic behind the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) shift from a system centered on a small 

Central Military Commission (CMC) staff and the four general 

departments to a much larger post-reform CMC staff that incorporates 

many of the functions of the former general departments. It also describes 

the functions of the 15 new CMC departments, commissions, and offices 

that were announced on January 11, 2016.1

From the General Departments to an Expanded CMC 

The pre-reform CMC had 11 members, including a civilian chairman, 

2 military vice chairmen, minister of defense, heads of the four general 

departments, and commanders of the navy, air force, and Second Artillery. 

The four general departments—the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and 

(from 1998) General Armament Department (GAD)—were led by army 

officers and collectively served as the ground force headquarters, among 

other functions. The CMC members supervised the general departments, 

services, and seven military regions and were supported by a relatively 

INTRODUCTION
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

26

small staff of about 1,000 people in the CMC General Office.2 In this setup, 

the heads of the general departments and services represented their organizations in CMC debates and were responsible for implementing CMC 

decisions within their organizations. The CMC chairman (who served 

concurrently as the Chinese Community Party general-secretary and state 

president) nominally had the final word on decisions, though during the 

Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, considerable decisionmaking authority 

and autonomy were delegated to the uniformed vice chairmen.

The post-reform CMC has only seven members, with the GLD, GAD, 

and service commanders losing their seats, and the director of the CMC 

Discipline Inspection Commission gaining a seat on the CMC proper (see 

table 1). (See the chapter by McFadden, Fassler, and Godby in this volume 

for an analysis of the post-reform CMC leadership.)

Table 1. Pre- and Post-Reform Central Military Commission (CMC) Membership

Position Pre-Reform CMC 

Status

Post-Reform 

Position

Post-Reform 

CMC Status

CMC Chairman CMC Chairman CMC Chairman CMC Chairman

CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice Chairman

CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice Chairman

Minister of Defense CMC Member Minister of Defense CMC Member

GSD Director CMC Member CMC Joint Staff 

Department Director

CMC Member

GPD Director CMC Member CMC Political Work 

Department Director

CMC Member

GLD Director CMC Member CMC Logistics Department Director—

GAD Director CMC Member CMC Equipment 

Development Department Director

—

Navy Commander CMC Member Navy Commander —

Air Force Commander CMC Member Air Force Commander —

Second Artillery 

Commander

CMC Member Rocket Force Commander—

Discipline Inspection 

Commission Director

— CMC Discipline 

Inspection Commission Secretary

CMC Member

Key: GAD: General Armament Department; GLD: General Logistics Department; GPD: General Political 

Department; GSD: General Staff Department.
Introduction Appendix

27

The four general departments were abolished, and the post-reform CMC 

staff grew into a much larger organization that now includes 15 departments, 

commissions, and offices. The parts of the general departments that focused 

on managing the ground forces moved into the new army headquarters, while 

those involved in executing space, cyber, signals intelligence, electronic warfare, 

and psychological warfare operations mostly moved to the Strategic Support 

Force. The remaining parts of the general departments were either converted 

into successor CMC departments (the CMC Joint Staff Department, CMC 

Political Work Department, CMC Logistics Support Department, and CMC 

Equipment Development Department) or elevated to the status of independent 

CMC departments, commissions, or offices (see table 2).

Table 2. CMC Departments, Commissions, and Offices

Name Predecessor Initial Director Current Director

General Office [办公厅] General Office GEN Qin Shengxiang 

[秦生祥]

MG Zhong Shaojun 

[钟绍军]

Joint Staff Department 

[联合参谋部]

General Staff 

Department (GSD)

GEN Fang Fenghui 

[房峰辉]

GEN Li Zuocheng 

[李作成]

Political Work Department

 [政治工作部]

General Political 

Department (GPD)

GEN Zhang Yang 

[张阳]

ADM Miao Hua 

[苗华]

Logistics Support 

Department 

[后勤保障部]

General Logistics 

Department (GLD)

GEN Zhao Keshi 

[赵克石]

GEN Song Puxuan 

[宋普选]

Equipment Development 

Department [装备发展部]

General Armaments 

Department (GAD)

GEN Zhang Youxia 

[张又侠]

LTG Li Shangfu 

[李尚福]

Training and Administration 

Department [训练管理部]

GSD Military Training 

Department

LTG Zheng He [郑和] LTG Li Huohui 

[黎火辉]

National Defense Mobilization Department [国防

动员部]

GSD Mobilization 

Department 

MG Sheng Bin [盛斌] LTG Sheng Bin 

[盛斌]

Discipline Inspection 

Commission [纪律检查

委员会]

GPD Discipline 

Inspection 

Commission

GEN Du Jincai 

[杜金才]

GEN Zhang 

Shengmin [张升民]

Political and Legal Affairs 

Commission [政法委员会]

GPD Military 

Procuratorate

LTG Li Xiaofeng

[李晓峰]

LTG Song Dan 

[宋丹]

Science and Technology 

Commission 

[科学技术委员会]

GAD Science and 

Technology 

Commission

LTG Liu Guozhi 

[刘国治]

LTG Liu Guozhi 

[刘国治]

Strategic 

Planning Office 

[战略规划办公室]

GSD Strategic

 Planning 

Department

MG Wang Huiqing 

[王辉青]

MG Wang Huiqing 

[王辉青]
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

28

Table 2. CMC Departments, Commissions, and Offices

Name Predecessor Initial Director Current Director

Reform and 

Organization Office 

[改革和编制办公室]

GSD Military Affairs 

Department

MG Wang Chengzhi 

[王成志]

MG Zhang Yu 

[张宇] 

Office of International 

Military Cooperation 

[国际军事合作办公室]

MND/CMC Foreign 

Affairs Office

RADM Guan Youfei 

[关友飞]

MG Hu Changming 

[胡昌明]

Audit Bureau [审计署] GLD Audit Bureau MG Guo Chunfu 

[郭春富]

MG Guo Chunfu 

[郭春富]

Organ Affairs General 

Management Bureau [机关

事务管理总部]

GSD Management 

Support Department

MG Liu Zhiming 

[刘志明]

MG Liu Zhiming 

[刘志明]

Key: GAD: General Armament Department; GLD: General Logistics Department; GPD: General Political 

Department; GSD: General Staff Department.

This shift from a PLA centered on the general department system to 

one managed by the CMC and CMC staff reflects the three broad drivers 

of PLA reforms described in the introduction:

■	 strengthening the PLA’s ability to plan and conduct joint operations 

in order to fight and win informationized wars

■	 revitalizing party control and discipline within the PLA

■	 improving “civil-military integration” so that the PLA can tap civilian resources and leverage breakthroughs in the civilian science and 

technology sector.

Strengthening the PLA’s Ability to Plan and Conduct Joint Operations 

One way the reorganization strengthened the PLA’s ability to conduct joint 

operations is by reducing CMC responsibilities to allow greater focus on 

jointness and managing operations. Freed from the need to serve as army 

headquarters and operate technical intelligence collection and space operations, the expanded CMC staff can concentrate on building a joint force 

and supervising joint operations. The removal of service commanders from 

CMC membership weakens the services relative to the CMC, although 

ground force dominance and the service-centric organizational culture 

within the PLA remain obstacles to building a joint force. Key functions 

such as joint training (including military education), national defense 
Introduction Appendix

29

mobilization, and strategic planning were elevated from second-level 

departments within the GSD to the status of independent departments 

and offices within the CMC staff, allowing the CMC chairman and vice 

chairmen direct oversight over these functions and improving their ability 

to push forward a joint agenda without obstruction from a GSD or Joint 

Staff Department director concerned about ground force equities. Some 

new CMC organs, such as the reform and organization office, were created 

to help implement leadership priorities.

Revitalizing Party Control and Discipline within the PLA 

Bringing the general departments and most of their functions inside the CMC 

strengthens the ability of the CMC chairman and vice chairmen to monitor 

those personnel and activities. The CMC General Office is the key CMC staff 

organization responsible for ensuring compliance with CMC directives and 

gathering information on what the larger CMC bureaucracy is doing. That 

office’s critical role is reinforced by the fact that Zhong Shaojun, a longtime 

civilian aide [秘书] to Xi Jinping, was installed as a key General Office official 

to serve as Xi’s trusted eyes and ears within the military.3

 Zhong followed Xi 

to Beijing, was appointed deputy director with a military rank of senior colonel, and was subsequently promoted to major general before being named as 

General Office director in 2018.4 The reorganization also seeks to strengthen 

the effectiveness of monitoring and control mechanisms by giving the Discipline Inspection Commission, Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and 

Audit Bureau independent status and the ability to report directly to CMC 

leaders without interference from their superiors.

Elevation of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission director to 

CMC member status increases the authority of that organization within the 

PLA (and likely the effectiveness of its subsidiary discipline inspection commissions throughout major parts of the PLA). According to interviews, the 

discipline inspection system now functions as a parallel chain of information 

that reaches directly up to Xi and provides an independent assessment of the 

performance of commanders, political commissars, and party committees.5
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

30

This arrangement should reduce opportunities for commanders and political commissars to engage in corrupt practices and provide an independent 

source of information for Xi to use when making promotion decisions.

Improving Civil-Military Integration 

The reorganization also strengthens parts of the PLA that collaborate with 

civilian counterparts in the state and party apparatus. The Science and 

Technology Commission, previously under the GAD, is now an independent CMC organ.6

 The commission will promote civil-military cooperation 

in defense research and development and strengthen high-level guidance 

for the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) system. The 

National Defense Mobilization Department, which manages the military 

districts and garrisons that interface with the party and civilian government organs that run China’s provinces and cities, is now an independent 

department that reports directly to top CMC leaders. The CMC’s Office of 

International Military Cooperation helps ensure that military diplomacy 

is coordinated with China’s broader foreign policy objectives.

Assessing Effectiveness of CMC Reforms 

While the shift from the general department system to an expanded CMC 

staff system has a clear organizational logic that corresponds to the goals 

that PLA reforms are intended to advance, this does not necessarily mean 

that the organizational reforms will achieve their intended results. The 

reforms should increase effectiveness and improve monitoring by creating 

a clearer division of responsibilities and improving the flow of information 

from the agents (CMC staff organs) to the principal (CMC chairman and 

vice chairmen). Our assessment is that the PLA has adopted a CMC organizational structure that can support development of a more effective joint 

force, but that result is by no means guaranteed.

Challenges include the fact that the expanded CMC staff is a larger, more 

complex organization to run than its smaller predecessor, which delegated 

more responsibilities to the general departments. As in other aspects of current 
Introduction Appendix

31

Chinese government reforms, this reflects an impulse to centralize power and 

Xi’s reluctance to delegate responsibilities to others. The “CMC Chairman 

Responsibility System” calls for Xi to make all the important military decisions. Given that the scarcest resource in government is high-level attention, 

how much time can Xi actually devote to these responsibilities?7

 Does he trust 

the CMC vice chairmen enough to delegate some decisions to them?

This challenge is aggravated by the fact that the PLA’s organizational 

culture does not encourage independent decisionmaking and taking 

responsibility, which suggests that greater centralization may slow down 

decisionmaking. According to one PLA source, many of the senior officers Xi has appointed are relatively inexperienced and reluctant to make 

decisions. Instead, they pass the buck to their superiors.8 Xi’s promulgation 

of his own thought on military matters—now required study within the 

PLA—may also make senior officers more reluctant to challenge suboptimal decisions from the top. The result may be slower decisionmaking and 

difficulty in correcting mistakes.

Finally, most key CMC and CMC staff positions are held by army officers, and all of them are staffed by officers whose careers have been spent in 

a military dominated by the ground forces and with rigid promotion and 

assignment systems. Will their decisions reflect their personal experiences 

in a PLA with limited jointness or the leadership’s goal of building a military 

capable of conducting integrated joint operations? Can the PLA move from 

a service-centric mentality to a joint mentality? Even if the structure of the 

reorganized CMC supports efforts to build an effective joint military force, 

the individuals in key leadership positions may frustrate that objective. 

Building a joint force with capable joint commanders and staff officers may 

ultimately require generational change.

Overview of CMC Departments, Commissions, and Offices 

The rest of this appendix describes the composition of the post-reform 

CMC and functions of the new CMC departments, commissions, and 

offices that were announced on January 11, 2016. These departments, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

32

commissions, and offices are presented in the protocol order provided by 

authoritative People’s Republic of China media accounts.9

CMC Departments [bu, 部/ting, 厅] 

General Office [bangongting, 办公厅] 

The CMC retained a General Office whose key responsibilities include 

managing information flows between CMC members and subsidiary departments, providing advice, and conducting policy research.10 Under Xi, a key 

mission of the General Office has been implementing the CMC Chairman 

Responsibility System, which refers to the principle that all important decisions ultimately rest with Xi.11 Authoritative Chinese sources list the General 

Office ahead of all other CMC departments, including those led by former 

general department directors (that is, Joint Staff, Political Work, Logistics 

Support, and Equipment Development), underscoring its importance in 

ensuring that CMC orders are being implemented across the PLA. The office’s 

director from 2012 through 2017 was Lieutenant General Qin Shengxiang, 

who previously served as director of the General Political Department Organization Department.12 In late 2017, Qin departed to serve as the PLA Navy’s 

political commissar but a successor was not immediately announced. Major 

General Zhong Shaojun, one of Xi’s longtime civilian aides, was promoted 

from his position as deputy director to CMC General Office director in 2018.13

Joint Staff Department [lianhe canmou bu, 联合参谋部] 

The Joint Staff Department is responsible for command and control (C2), 

“combat command support” [zuozhan zhihui baozhang, 作战指挥保障], 

campaign planning, formulating military strategy, organizing joint training, 

performing combat capability assessments, and working to ensure combat 

readiness [zhanbei jianshe, 战备建设].14 Thus, the department performs many 

of the functions of the former General Staff Department Operations Department [zongcan zuozhan bu, 总参作战部].15 The Joint Staff Department also 

likely absorbed some of the GSD’s role in intelligence collection and analysis 

(former 2PLA) and, as documented in the chapter in this volume by Costello 
Introduction Appendix

33

and McReynolds, plays a role in cyber and electronic warfare management 

through its Network-Electronic Bureau (former 4PLA). Other former GSD 

functions were transferred to the Strategic Support Force and service headquarters. The organization plays a significant role in the evolving joint C2 

structure by serving as the institutional link between the CMC and five joint 

theater commands, though the nature of that role remains unclear.16 Its initial 

director was former Chief of the General Staff General Fang Fenghui. In 

August 2017, Fang, who had become embroiled in an anti-corruption investigation, was replaced by former PLA ground force commander Li Zuocheng. 

Li serves concurrently as a CMC member.

Political Work Department [zhengzhi gongzuo bu, 政治工作部] 

The Political Work Department performs the duties of the previous GPD, 

including overseeing political education, “human resources management,” 

and party organizations within the military, in addition to managing the PLA’s 

internal and external propaganda arms. Some have speculated that the Political Work Department might have assumed the former GSD Military Affairs 

Department’s role in enlisted personnel management.17 This department is 

instrumental in strengthening the party’s “absolute leadership” over the military, which has been a consistent theme of the reforms.18 However, unlike the 

former GPD, the Political Work Department does not oversee party discipline 

inspection or the military prosecutorial system; those functions migrated to 

independent Discipline Inspection and Political and Legal Affairs commissions 

under the CMC. It was initially led by former GPD Director General Zhang 

Yang. Zhang, who like Fang Fenghui was caught up in an anti-corruption 

investigation, was replaced in September 2017 by Admiral Miao Hua, former 

PLA Navy political commissar. Miao serves concurrently as a CMC member.

Logistics Support Department [houqin baozhang bu, 后勤保障部] 

The Logistics Support Department is responsible for overseeing logistics 

support, setting standards, performing inspections, and carrying out other 

duties previously entrusted to the General Logistics Department.19 As Luce 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

34

and Richter note in their chapter in this volume, the Logistics Support 

Department also plays a role in “facilities management, contracting, budget 

management and funds disbursement, international military engagement, 

and overall administration of PLA hospitals and medical programs.” A key 

focus of the department is managing the logistics system, though combat 

support appears to be carried out by the Joint Logistics Support Force and 

its subordinate units.20 Its first director was former GLD Director General 

Zhao Keshi, who retired in October 2017, and was replaced by former 

Northern Theater commander General Song Puxuan.

Equipment Development Department [zhuangbei fazhan bu, 装备发展部] 

Like its predecessor, the General Armaments Department, the Equipment 

Development Department performs RDT&E functions and oversees procurement management and information systems building [xinxi xitong 

jianshe, 信息系统建设]. However, the GAD’s Science and Technology 

Commission did not migrate to this department and was instead placed 

directly under the CMC (see below). In addition, the GAD’s role in overseeing equipment development for the ground forces was sent to the new 

army headquarters. According to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), 

the PLA aims for a division of labor in RDT&E between the new CMC 

department, services, and theaters, but how this will work in practice is 

unclear.21 The initial director was former GAD Director General Zhang 

Youxia. Following Zhang’s elevation to CMC vice chairman in October 

2017, the department was directed by Lieutenant General Li Shangfu, a 

previous deputy commander of the Strategic Support Force.

Training and Administration Department [xunlian guanli bu, 训练管理部] 

The Training and Administration Department is responsible for overseeing training and professional military education, and likely coordinates 

with the Joint Staff Department, theater commands, and services to 

develop joint training requirements and assess training programs. 

It replaced the former GSD Military Training Department [zongcan 
Introduction Appendix

35

junxun bu, 总参军训部], which had been stood up in 2011.22 Establishing 

a training department under direct CMC supervision underscores the 

importance of strengthening “realistic” joint training across the PLA.23

The first director was Lieutenant General Zheng He, who went on to serve 

as president of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences and later the PLA 

National Defense University. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Li 

Huohui, who was previously commander of the 31st Group Army, one of 

the PLA’s elite units.

National Defense Mobilization Department [guofang dongyuan bu, 国防动员部] 

The National Defense Mobilization Department oversees the reserve forces 

and the provincial military districts [sheng junqu, 省军区] and below, other 

than the Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts and the Beijing Garrison 

(which were placed under the army headquarters in part due to their higher 

bureaucratic grade).24 This department succeeds the former GSD Mobilization Department [canmou dongyuan bu, 总参动员部]. Elevating mobilization 

to a separate CMC department highlights the importance of civil-military 

integration, given the office’s oversight over reserve force and mobilization 

planning.25 The first director was Lieutenant General Sheng Bin, who was 

previously deputy commander of the Shenyang Military Region.

CMC Commissions [weiyuanhui, 委员会] 

Discipline Inspection Commission [jilu jiancha weiyuanhui, 纪律检查委员会]

The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is responsible for enforcing 

party discipline within the PLA, including conducting investigations of 

suspected corrupt personnel. Its mission parallels that of the civilian 

Central Discipline Inspection Commission, which has played a prominent role in China’s anti-corruption campaign since late 2012. Although 

Chinese sources describe this as a new organization,26 the CMC has had 

a discipline inspection commission since November 1980.27 However, the 

work of that commission was reportedly carried out by the GPD. Its inaugural secretary was General Du Jincai, a previous GPD deputy director. In 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

36

March 2017, Du was replaced by General Zhang Shengmin, who had been 

political commissar of the CMC Logistics Support Department. Zhang 

was appointed a CMC member at the 19th Party Congress.

Political and Legal Affairs Commission [zhengfa weiyuanhui, 政法委员会] 

This organization establishes regulations and legal norms to improve the 

administration of the PLA—what the Chinese armed forces call “regularization” [zhengguihua, 正规化].28 It also helps to “prevent, investigate, and 

deal with” criminal activities in the military.29 Centralizing the military’s 

legal system reduces the potential for interference with the enforcement of 

laws and regulations at lower levels. Previously, the military court system and 

Military Procuratorate (which conducted police investigations) were under 

the GPD. The organization parallels the civilian Central Political and Legal 

Affairs Commission, formerly under Zhou Yongkang, which supervises the 

legal and police systems. The first secretary of the CMC Politics and Law 

Commission was Lieutenant General Li Xiaofeng, who previously served 

as the PLA’s chief procurator. In March 2017, he was replaced by Lieutenant 

General Song Dan, previously the commission’s deputy secretary.

Science and Technology Commission [kexue jishu weiyuanhui, 科学技术委员会] 

As part of the CMC reshuffling, the PLA’s Science and Technology Commission was transferred from the GAD to direct CMC oversight.30 It 

continues to be responsible for advising PLA leadership on weapons development and serving as a nexus for collaboration between the armed forces 

and defense industry.31 Moving the commission to the CMC highlights the 

importance of civil-military integration to the PLA, a theme of the larger 

reforms. The commission’s director remained Lieutenant General Liu 

Guozhi, who was appointed to his position in 2014.32

CMC Offices [bangongshi, 办公室/shu, 署/zongju, 总局] 

Strategic Planning Office [zhanlüe guihua bangongshi, 战略规划办公室] 

The Strategic Planning Office is responsible for centralizing authority over 
Introduction Appendix

37

“military strategic planning.”33 It replaced the GSD Strategic Planning 

Department, which was established in 2011 and carried out functions 

such as long-term strategic analysis, resource allocation analysis, and 

organizational reform analysis.34 The new department continues to perform some of these roles, including managing military budgets and project 

evaluation and accountability systems.35 Organizational reform issues, 

however, appear more likely to be addressed within the CMC Reform and 

Organization Office (see below). Major General Wang Huiqing remained 

as the office’s director after its transfer from the GSD.

Reform and Organization Office [gaige he bianzhi bangongshi, 改革和编制办公室]

The Reform and Organization Office is responsible for coordinating military reforms and managing the PLA’s organizational structure.36 The 

organization likely coordinates closely with the CMC’s military reform 

leading small group [zhongyang junwei zhenhua guofang he jundui gaige 

liangdao xiaozu, 中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组], which was 

established in 2014 to provide guidance for the entire reform process under 

Xi’s leadership.37 It appears to replace some functions of the former GSD 

Military Affairs Department [zongcan junwu bu, 总参军务部] and may 

also have acquired some responsibilities from the former GSD Strategic 

Planning Department related to organizational reform.38 The office’s first 

director was Major General Wang Chengzhi, who formerly led the GPD’s 

Direct Work Department [zong zheng zhishu gongzuo bu, 总政直属工作

部]. In 2017, he was replaced by Major General Zhang Yu, who previously 

served as the office’s deputy director.

Office of International Military Cooperation [guoji junshi hezuo bangongshi, 国际

军事合作办公室] 

The CMC Office of International Military Cooperation is responsible for 

managing foreign military exchanges and cooperation and supervising 

foreign affairs work throughout the PLA.39 It replaced the previous MND 

Foreign Affairs Office [guofang bu waishi bangongshi, 国防部外事办公
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

38

室], which had doubled as the CMC General Office Foreign Affairs Office 

(FAO). However, the MND Information Affairs Bureau [guofang bu xinwen 

shiwu ju, 国防部新闻事务局], part of the former FAO that conducts news 

briefings, remained within the MND. Clarifying the office’s status within 

the CMC underscores the importance of military diplomacy, which has 

been an emphasis of Xi.40 The first director of the office was Rear Admiral 

Guan Youfei, who previously headed the MND Foreign Affairs Office.41 In 

May 2017, Guan was replaced by Major General Hu Changming, who had 

previously served as the office’s deputy director.

Audit Bureau [shenji shu, 审计署] 

The Audit Bureau is responsible for inspecting PLA finances and supervising the military’s audit system.42 This office was previously located within 

the GLD but moved to the CMC in November 2014.43 Like the Discipline 

Inspection Commission, the Audit Bureau sends inspection teams to 

units throughout the PLA to ensure compliance with rules and root out 

corruption.44 Major General Guo Chunfu was appointed to lead the office 

in December 2015.45

Organ Affairs General Management Bureau [jiguan shiwu guanli zongbu, 机关事

务管理总部] 

This is a new organization responsible for providing administrative support 

to CMC departments and subsidiary organs.46 The office was apparently the 

result of a merger between the former GSD Management Support Department [canmou guanli baozhang bu, 总参管理保障部], which served a logistics 

function (for example, facilities management), and similar offices from the 

other general departments.47 The new bureau appears to continue to play a 

role in provisioning supplies as well as in managing military wages.48 One 

role of the office is “cutting support units and personnel,” which suggests 

that it has played a role in implementing the PLA’s planned 300,000-person 

force reduction.49 The bureau’s first director was Major General Liu Zhiming, 

former head of the Shenyang Military Region Joint Logistics Department.
Introduction Appendix

39

Notes

1 “China Reshuffles Military Headquarters,” Xinhua, January 11, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/11/c_134998692.htm>; “MND 

Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,” China Military Online, January 

12, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm>. This appendix is adapted from 

Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of 

Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 10 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 61–65.

2 Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military 

Commission in the Twenty-First Century,” in PLA Influence on China’s National 

Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 2015), 90–92.

3 Edward Wong, “The ‘Gatekeeper’ in Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle,” New 

York Times, September 30, 2015, available at <https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.

com/2015/09/30/the-gatekeeper-in-xi-jinpings-inner-circle/>.

4 “Zhong Shaojun Takes Up the Post of CMC General Office Director” [钟

绍军出任军委办公厅主任], Sina News [新浪网], September 18, 2018, available at 

<http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2018-09-18/doc-ifxeuwwr5766185.shtml>.

5 Authors’ interviews, December 2017.

6 For details on the pre-reform General Armament Department, see Kevin Pollpeter and Amy Chang, “General Armament Department,” in The PLA as Organization 

v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: DGI, Inc., 2015), 228–231.

7 This rule is also known as the Saunders Theorem.

8 Authors’ interviews, December 2017.

9 “China Reshuffles Military Headquarters”; “MND Holds Press Conference 

on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

10 Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle,” 90–92.

11 Tian Yixiang, “Faithfully Implement the Duties and Responsibilities of 

the CMC General Office” [忠实履行军委办公厅职责使命], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

April 28, 2016, available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20170523011041/http://

www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-04/28/content_4651306.htm>.

12 “Which Generals Will Be on the CMC after the Reform?” [哪些将军这次

会后调进中央军委?], China Youth Online [中国青年网], January 12, 2016, available 

at <http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20160112/21122496.html>. For 

biographical details on Lieutenant General Qin, see “CMC General Office Director 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

40

Qin Shengxiang Promoted to Lieutenant General” [中央军委办公厅主任秦生祥

晋升中将], Caixin Wang [财新王], July 21, 2015, available at <http://china.caixin.

com/2015-07-21/100830965.html>.

13 “Zhong Shaojun Takes Up the Post of CMC General Office Director.”

14 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

15 The Operations Department was sometimes known as the 1st Department 

[总参一部], a second-level (corps leader grade) department within General Services 

Department. See Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army General Staff Department: Evolving Organizations and Missions,” in The 

PLA as Organization v2.0, 142–145.

16 Alice Miller, “The Central Military Commission,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, 97.

17 Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The PLA’s 

New Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown, Or Speculation (Part 

1),” China Brief 16, no. 3 (February 4, 2016), available at <www.jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45069&no_cache=1#.VxfOffnR_RY>.

18 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

19 Ibid.

20 See chapter in this volume by Luce and Richter.

21 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

22 Stokes and Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff 

Department,” 154–157.

23 See “Reform Efforts Should Be Focused on the ‘Strategic Hubs’” [改革要

向“战略枢纽”聚焦用力], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 22, 2014, available at <http://

theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0422/c40531-24927666.html>.

24 Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure.”

25 This theme was highlighted in a Chinese report about the initial activities of 

the department. See “Demystifying the Newly Established CMC National Defense 

Mobilization Department” [揭秘新成立的中央军委国防动员部], China Youth 

Daily [中国青年报], January 29, 2016, available at <http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2016-

01/29/nw.D110000zgqnb_20160129_1-06.htm>.

26 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

27 Roy Kamphausen, “The General Political Department,” in The PLA as 

Organization v2.0, 173.

28 For a discussion, see Thomas A. Bickford, “Regularization and the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army,” Asian Survey 40, no. 3 (May–June 2000), 456–474.
Introduction Appendix

41

29 Strengthening the “socialist rule of law” [社会主义法制] is a theme of the 

broader national reforms, highlighted in particular at the 4th Plenum of the 18th

Central Committee held in October 2014. See “Highlights of Communique of 4th

Plenary Session of CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, October 23, 2014, available 

at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/23/c_133737957.htm>.

30 Kevin Pollpeter and Amy Chang, “General Armament Department,” in 

The PLA as Organization v2.0, 223–224.

31 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

32 “Which Generals Will Be on the CMC After the Reform?”

33 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

34 Stokes and Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff 

Department,” 153–154.

35 Li Guang, “Promote the Innovative Development of Military Strategic 

Planning” [推进军队战略规划工作创新发展], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 28, 

2016, available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20180110124955/http://www.mod.

gov.cn/topnews/2016-04/28/content_4651317.htm>.

36 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

37 See “Xi Leads China’s Military Reform, Stresses Strong Army,” 

Xinhua, March 15, 2014, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/15/c_133188618.htm>.

38 The GSD Military Affairs Department was also responsible for welfare and benefits and served as the personnel center for enlisted servicemen. 

It is unclear if the new CMC office will assume these duties. See Stokes and 

Easton, 159–160.

39 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

40 “Xi Jinping: Further Innovate a New Situation in Military Diplomacy” [习

近平:进一步开创军事外交新局面], Xinhua, January 29, 2015, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-01/29/c_1114183775.htm>.

41 “Which Generals Will Be on the CMC After the Reform?”

42 This organization has also been translated as “Audit Office.” However, 

“Audit Bureau” may be a better translation of shu [署] and distinguish it from 

bangongshi [办公室] (“office”).

43 “China Military Reaches Key Decision to Strengthen Auditing,” Xinhua, 

November 4, 2014, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2014-11/06/

content_4550175.htm>.

44 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

42

45 “Guo Chunfu Becomes Director of PLA Audit Office, in a New Role Twice 

In a Year” [郭春富任解放军审计署审计长 年内两度履新], Caixin Online [财新网], 

December 30, 2015, available at <http://china.caixin.com/2015-12-30/100894397.html>.

46 Jiguan [机关] may also be translated as “office” or “organization.”

47 Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure.”

48 Li Tongzhu, “Focus On Building a New-Type Service Support System” [

着力构建新型服务保障体系], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 25, 2016, available 

at <https://web.archive.org/web/20170802163930/http://www.mod.gov.cn:80/

topnews/2016-01/25/content_4638461.htm>.

49 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”
PART I

DRIVERS AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT

45

BREAKING THE PARADIGM

Drivers Behind the PLA’s Current Period of Reform

David M. Finkelstein

I

n late 2015, Xi Jinping launched the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) into a period of much anticipated reform that will continue 

for many years. In 2016 alone, the PLA made significant changes to a 

legacy organizational structure that had its roots in the 1950s, when Soviet 

advisors helped to shape the People’s Republic of China (PRC) defense 

establishment. Swept away were the four general departments—traditional 

bastions of authority over operations and training, Party work and personnel 

affairs, logistics, and equipment development.2 In their stead emerged an 

expanded and more powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) that 

includes a newly formed Joint Staff Department, among other subordinate 

departments and organs.3

Also disestablished were the PLA’s seven geographic military regions: 

ground force–dominated entities that harkened back to the immediate 

“post-liberation” period after 1949, when they were created to consolidate 

Communist rule after a long civil war and to defend the borders and coast 

of the newly established PRC against potential external attack.4

 These have 

been replaced by five joint theater commands that will focus on planning 

and conducting operations outward along various “strategic directions.”5

CHAPTER 1

Closely embrace the building of a military that listens to the 

Party’s commands, which can fight and win, with a superior work style.

—Third Plenum “Decision,” November 2013
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

46

These organizational changes have been accompanied by major adjustments in roles, authorities, and responsibilities. With the disestablishment 

of the four general departments, the CMC now has direct control over 

the five joint theater commands and services, the latter now serving as 

force providers responsible for training, equipping, and modernizing their 

respective organizations.6

 Moreover, peacetime and wartime command 

and control relationships have been streamlined and authorities clarified, 

at least in theory.7 This is just the beginning of Beijing’s ambitious military reform agenda.8

 On December 2–3, 2016, President Xi convened and 

chaired the CMC Work Conference on Armed Forces Scale, Structure, and 

Force Composition Reform. This conclave launched the second tranche of 

major organizational reforms focused mostly on force reductions, a rebalancing among the services, a reorganization of major ground force units, 

and institutional reforms such as a reorganization of the expansive system 

of military academies.9

Beyond changes to the PLA’s line-and-block chart, the heart and soul of 

this enterprise will be myriad institutional and systemic changes that were 

announced as part of the military reform agenda in the Central Committee’s “Decision” at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 

2013, that were discussed at the November 2015 CMC Work Conference 

on Military Structural Reform, and that were included in the authoritative 

Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening Reform of National 

Defense and the Armed Forces, which was issued on January 1, 2016.10 These 

institutional, systemic, and procedural reforms—some 46 identified in the 

Third Plenum Decision—cover major areas such as:

■ national military strategy

■ command and control relationships

■ the balance of forces among the services

■ service structure and size

■ force deployments within China

■ the ratio of combat to noncombat organizations
Breaking the Paradigm

47

■ the balance between officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted 

personnel

■ the officer personnel management system (promotions and assignments)

■ professional military education

■ budget and finance

■ oversight and compliance.

Although the PLA’s timetable for enacting change in all of these areas is 

unknown, the year 2020 has been set as the target date for completion.11

Needless to say, this is a bold undertaking. In some areas, such as organizational changes, the decisions to date have already gone far beyond previous 

periods of reform, and more developments are expected. For example, as initial 

versions of this chapter were being drafted, the PLA announced the establishment of the Joint Logistics Support Force under the CMC.12 As for institutional 

reforms, that enterprise has just begun, but it will be marching over well-trampled fields. The PLA will seek to push through change in systemic problem 

areas that have long bedeviled China’s armed forces. Overall, the range of 

issues on the reform agenda suggests the PLA is seeking to make significant 

adjustments to organizational, institutional, and operational attributes that 

have defined it for decades. They are looking to break out of old paradigms.

What is driving this current period of military reform? To what ends? 

Why now? This chapter argues that this period of reenergized military 

reform is being impelled by three drivers that are all interacting at a moment 

in time: domestic political factors, operational factors, and assessments of 

China’s national security situation. When this process is complete, Beijing 

hopes to have a military that is more tightly tied to the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) and more operationally capable of winning joint, high-tech 

wars fought primarily in the maritime and aerospace domains.

The remainder of this chapter looks at each of these three drivers of 

reform in greater depth. The analysis is based almost exclusively on PLA 

and other Chinese materials that have been placed in the public domain, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

48

mostly in the Chinese media. Indeed, PLA leadership and a wide range of 

officers have not been shy about discussing what they intend to achieve and 

why they need to achieve it through speeches, journal articles, and PLA 

media. While the details may be slow in coming (if at all in some cases), the 

general contours of what is transpiring are in the public domain.

The Political Dimensions of Military Reform 

Four key and interrelated political drivers are behind this reform enterprise. 

First and foremost is a need to tighten the CCP-PLA linkage in an era of 

perceived internal and external challenges to the Chinese Party-state. Second is pulling the PLA into the larger national reform agenda that Xi and 

the CCP have set for the PRC. Third is strengthening Xi’s personal power. 

Fourth is the need to preemptively roll over any potential resistance within 

the PLA to the military reform enterprise. Each is examined in turn.

Reaffirming Party Control of the PLA 

Since this period of reform was announced at the Third Plenum in 2013, a 

significant dimension of the accompanying internal propaganda campaign 

directed at the PLA has focused on reinforcing fundamental political principles: that the PLA is a Party-army and the armed wing of the CCP. In short, 

the PLA needs to remain a force that “listens to the commands of the Party.” 

“Adhere to the correct political direction” was the first of the six “Basic Principles” for the reform outlined in the authoritative CMC “Opinion” issued 

on January 1, 2016:

Adhere to the correct political direction. It is necessary to consolidate and perfect the basic principles and system of the Party’s 

absolute leadership over the military, maintain the nature and 

purposes of the people’s military, carry forward our military’s 

glorious traditions and excellent work style, comprehensively 

implement the Central Military Commission chairmanship 

responsibility system, and ensure that the supreme leadership 
Breaking the Paradigm

49

right and command right of the military are concentrated in 

the [Communist Party of China] Central Committee and in the 

Central Military Commission.13

It is easy to dismiss these reaffirmations of Party control of the PLA as 

standard CCP rhetoric [tifa, 提法], for there is nothing new at all in these 

exhortations. However, the amount of hand-wringing over this issue is 

worth noting. At a time when the CCP is facing a challenging domestic 

agenda, Party leadership appears determined that there be no slippage 

whatsoever in CCP-PLA connectivity.14 A strong CCP-PLA connection is 

considered especially critical at this point in time under “the new situation” 

[xin xingshi, 新形势] when the Party perceives that it is facing mounting 

internal and external security challenges, some of which are viewed as 

interconnected—an assessment that is captured in the CCP’s shorthand 

phrase “the two big situations” [liangge da ju, 两个大局].

There continue to be concerns that “anti-Party forces” from within 

and without China pose a real threat to the CCP-led regime. Xi Jinping 

has spoken of the need to “achieve political security as our fundamental 

task.”15 There is no dearth of public commentary about perceived threats 

to the political system. One authoritative example comes from the publicly 

released 2015 defense white paper that transmitted China’s national military 

strategy. The document declared that “China faces a formidable task to 

maintain political security” and that “anti-China forces have never given 

up their attempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’ in this country.”16 Besides 

persistent concerns about color revolutions, the example of the fall of the 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union stands as a stark reminder of what 

can happen when a Party-army loses its political direction. Party leaders 

no doubt also keep in the backs of their minds the momentary confusion 

in the ranks of the PLA at one point in 1989 when some units refused to 

obey orders to enforce martial law. In the face of these political threats and 

challenges, a PLA not loyal to the CCP could pose an existential threat to 

the regime, and so requires constant vigilance.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

50

Second, and directly related to the above, over the past few years senior 

CCP and PLA leaders have felt a need to vociferously attack the notion of 

the “nationalization” or “de-politicization” of the PLA. In 2011, for example, 

the former director of the General Political Department, General Li Jinai, 

wrote a widely disseminated editorial in PLA Daily that lambasted the idea of 

depoliticizing the PLA as an attempt by “domestic and foreign hostile forces” 

to overthrow the CCP, a common theme.17 (In August 2016, an uncorroborated news report alleged General Li was arrested in retirement as part of the 

anticorruption campaign in the PLA.18) In August 2013, in a long article on 

military reform in Seeking Truth [Qiushi, 求是], the CCP’s flagship journal, 

then–CMC Vice Chairman General Fan Changlong warned that the PLA 

must “resolutely refute and reject the erroneous political viewpoints of ‘disassociating the military from the Party, depoliticizing the armed forces’ and 

‘putting the armed forces under the state.’”19 And, of course, Xi’s speech at 

the All Army Political Work Conference held in Gutian in November 2014, 

1 year after the Third Plenum and 1 year before the CMC Opinion on military reform, was a top-down exercise in “re-redding” the PLA.20 Addressing 

concerns about “erroneous views” on depoliticizing the PLA in conjunction 

with the current period of reform is likely a combination of a periodic need 

to exorcise this ultimate demon that CCP and PLA officials have conjured 

up in their worst nightmares, a need to counter the arguments of some 

Western scholars who argue from time to time that the PLA cannot become 

a professional force until it is a national force, and possibly a response to a real 

discourse on this issue that may have been taking place in some quarters of 

the PLA, but into which outside observers have little visibility.21

Third, there are intriguing hints, though based on thin gruel, that over 

the years the absolute power and authority of the CMC (and hence, the 

Central Committee) over the PLA had somehow been diluted and that the 

reorganization would correct this. One article in PLA Daily spoke of “overly 

concentrated power” in the four general departments resulting in them 

taking on some of the prerogatives of the CMC, and that the four general 

departments “in reality form[ed] an independent level of leadership” serving 
Breaking the Paradigm

51

as “a substitute for several functions of the CMC”—not an acceptable situation.22 As for the military regions, the same author used a historical-literary 

allusion from the Western Zhou Dynasty (11th BCE) to assert that as a result 

of the new organizational changes to the PLA, the “large military regions 

will also no longer have feudal powers over their domains.”23

Pulling the PLA “Inside the Tent” 

Another political dimension of the current military reform enterprise is 

bringing the military establishment inside the CCP’s “tent” and chipping 

away at what one might refer to as the PLA’s tradition of bureaucratic exceptionalism. What is meant by this term? To be clear, it is not meant to imply 

that the PLA is a rogue or independent actor within the Chinese Party-state 

system or to question its institutional loyalty to the CCP. It does mean that 

the PLA has been left mostly to its own devices to manage itself, regulate 

itself, and set its own institutional priorities with little or no oversight or 

accountability from outside the PLA. This extreme institutional autonomy 

has resulted in two significant problems for the PLA: rampant corruption 

throughout the officer corps (including at its highest levels) and a lack of 

political will to take on the deeply vested bureaucratic, institutional, and 

personal interests that have stood in the way of implementing reforms 

necessary to enhance the PLA’s capabilities as a warfighting organization. 

The anticorruption campaign sweeping through the PLA and the 

mind-boggling number of senior officers who have been arrested speaks 

volumes to Xi Jinping’s determination that the PLA not elude the larger 

ongoing anticorruption campaign within the greater CCP. Through this 

campaign he is underscoring that the PLA, and especially its top leaders, 

is subject to the same type of Party discipline as civilian CCP members. 

A PLA Daily commentator article in October 2016 strongly suggested the 

anticorruption campaign in the PLA is far from over and will continue for 

some time to come.24

As for the need to move forward on much needed military reforms, 

the PLA has been given its marching orders directly from the CCP to make 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

52

tough decisions and show progress despite the number of “rice bowls” that 

will be upended. Military reform and modernization have been made a 

part of Xi’s and the CCP’s larger national reform agenda—military reform 

is not just the PLA’s business at this point.

The importance of military modernization to the larger CCP agenda 

has been clear since the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and was reaffirmed at 

the Third Plenum in 2013. We recall that the 18th Party Congress work report 

called for “accelerating” defense reform and made its accomplishment “a strategic task of China’s modernization drive,” directing the PLA to “make major 

progress.”25 The Central Committee’s “Decision on Major Issues Concerning 

Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” coming out of the Third Plenum 

placed military reform in the context of a larger national reform agenda that 

included the economic system, government functions, the fiscal and tax systems, urban-rural issues, the “socialist democratic political system,” the legal 

system, accountability of officials, social services, and environmental issues.

Announcing the key components of the current military reform effort 

at a Central Committee plenum, and not at an expanded meeting of the 

CMC as in the past, has been described by some PLA officers as unprecedented. Moreover, as one PLA analyst has written, this was the “first 

time China’s national defense and military reforms have been integrated 

into overall national reforms and been considered an important part of 

executing a national strategy.”26 Finally, as students of Chinese affairs are 

well aware, an important component of the CCP’s “China Dream” [zhongguo meng, 中国梦] is the “Strong Army Dream” [qiangjun meng, 强军梦]. 

Having been handed its own “Goldwater-Nichols moment” by the Party, 

the PLA must now produce results no matter how dislocating or painful it 

may be for various stakeholders.

Strengthening Xi’s Power 

Finally, another result of the political muscle movements associated with 

this current PLA reform and modernization enterprise has been strengthening Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA, and hence his control over the Party 
Breaking the Paradigm

53

itself. Xi is chairman of the “CMC Leading Small Group for Deepening 

National Defense and Military Reform” [zhongyang junwei shenhua guofang 

he jundui gaige lingdao xiaozu, 中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组], 

an organ that was established after the Third Plenum to oversee the development and implementation of military reform and modernization plans. 

The implication is that Xi is personally involved in this process to make 

sure it happens. In the past, the four general departments were responsible 

for carrying out the stated military reform objectives of the CMC. This 

usually resulted in foot-dragging or less than bold initiatives. This time, 

overseeing and enforcing change has been taken over by the CMC chairman himself (Xi), who has taken the four general departments out of the 

process, disbanding them and absorbing many of their former functions 

and responsibilities into the CMC. Second, the PLA and Party literature 

explaining the new organizational and command and control arrangements are awash with explanations of the need to strengthen the “chairman 

responsibility system” [junwei zhuxi fuze zhi, 军委主席负责制]—that is, 

placing more authority in the hands of the CMC chairman, namely Xi. 

As one article put it, the new arrangements “will be more advantageous to 

strengthening the concentrated unified leadership of the CMC, and better 

implementing the chairman responsibility system . . . to safeguard the firm 

grasp of the highest leadership and command authority over the nation’s 

armed forces of Chairman Xi and the CMC.”27 Third, the anticorruption 

campaign and the netting of such high-level generals as former CMC Vice 

Chairmen General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong make clear to 

everyone in uniform how powerful Xi is. Indeed, Xi is getting tough with 

the PLA just as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping did. The symbolism of 

Xi convening the November 2014 All Army Political Work Conference in 

Gutian, the site of one of Mao’s early triumphs over the Red Army (1929), 

could not have been lost on those who attended (and the rest of the officer 

corps not in attendance, thanks to a barrage of articles in PLA Daily). Xi’s 

alleged criticisms of the PLA are reminiscent of Deng, especially Deng’s 

famous 1975 speech, “The Task of Consolidating Our Army,” in which he 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

54

famously criticized the PLA for “bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance, 

and inertia.”28 Finally, because of the reorganization, Xi is the first CMC 

chairman to take on the title commander-in-chief of the Joint Operations 

Command Center.29

At this point, there should be no question in the PLA (or the CCP) 

about who is in charge of the armed forces. Nothing says “I’m in charge” like 

arresting active-duty and retired generals, chairing the group overseeing 

the reform enterprise, having your expositions on national defense and 

army-building published and studied, taking on new titles, and disestablishing organizations that have provided the bases for personal power and 

institutional authority for decades. To oppose or stand in the way of military 

reform is to oppose the will of the Central Committee and Xi Jinping. Such 

a large degree of political power behind the military reforms is considered 

a necessary prerequisite for a successful reform program simply because 

of the challenges of bureaucratic inertia and resistance to change based 

on vested interests. The PLA has been attempting many of these reforms 

for decades, but unsuccessfully due at times to resistance from within the 

armed forces. CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang, an important 

political voice of the reform, has hammered home the need to get with the 

program as directed by the CCP. Typical of his exhortations: “It is necessary 

to break through the restrictions of traditional thoughts, break through 

the obstruction of vested interests, and muster up the courage of blazing a 

trail when facing a mountain.”30 And a steep mountain it is that the PLA 

is trying to climb, for the guts of this enterprise is aimed at enhancing the 

PLA’s capability to conduct a type of warfare it has never fought before.

Operational Imperatives 

The most significant driver of this reform enterprise is the need to improve 

the operational capabilities of the PLA as a joint warfighting force—one 

that can prevail in information-intensive joint operations in the maritime-aerospace domains, and other high-tech battle spaces. In addition to 

strengthening the CCP-PLA linkage, the PLA must come out the other end 
Breaking the Paradigm

55

of this period of reform more capable of prosecuting joint warfare, an objective it has been pursuing for over two decades. In addition to prevailing in 

a joint, high-tech fight, the PLA is being told to better position itself to deal 

with an expanding list of nontraditional security threats faced by Beijing and 

to be able to secure Chinese national interests, many of which are increasingly abroad. All of these missions require enhanced operational capabilities.

The demand signal from the CCP for such a military is captured in 

the opening paragraph of the section on defense and military affairs in the 

work report of the 18th Party Congress:

Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces that 

are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet 

the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic 

task of China’s modernization drive. China is faced with interwoven problems affecting its survival and development security as 

well as traditional and nontraditional security threats. To address 

these problems and threats, we must make major progress in 

modernizing national defense and the armed forces.31

At bottom, the PLA is being told that it must become a force that can “fight 

and win.” It is Xi himself who is demanding that the PLA enhance its actual 

operational capabilities and focus its energies on warfighting.

Xi is quoted ad infinitum in articles in the PLA media and professional 

military journals emphasizing that all facets of the military reform program 

must be focused on the Party’s “strong army objective” [qiangjun mubiao,

强军目标] and that the most important criterion for moving forward with a 

reform initiative is whether it will unleash combat power and meet the “warfighting standard” [zhandouli biaozhun, 战斗力标准]. The following passage 

from The Selected Important Expositions of Xi Jinping on National Defense 

and Army Building (cited by a PLA author) makes the point indelibly clear:

The military must develop the ability to fight and win wars. We 

must strengthen the ability of officers and men to fight wars, to 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

56

lead troops in battle, and train soldiers in a warfighting way of 

thinking. We must firmly establish warfighting capability as the 

fundamental and sole standard. We must build according to the 

requirements of warfighting; grasp preparations; and ensure that 

the army will respond to the call, fight, and win.32

Xi reportedly underscored this point at the first meeting of the CMC’s 

Leading Small Group on Military Reform (March 15, 2014) when he stated that:

it is necessary to firmly grasp the focal point of being able to 

fight and win. Persistently take preparations for military struggle 

[PMS] as the lead, persistently adhere to the orientation of problem 

solving, focus reforms on settling crucial and difficult issues in 

preparations for military struggle and overcoming the weak links 

in combat power building.33

There are two phrases in the statement that merit comment. The first phrase 

of note is “preparations for military struggle” [junshi douzheng zhunbei, 军

事斗争准备], which some also translate as “military combat preparations.” 

This PLA term speaks to the need to be able to equip, train, and especially 

employ a military force to engage in a specific type of conflict. It is a capabilities-based perspective.34 To a large extent, many if not all of the facets of 

this current period of military reform are centered on the need to be able to 

fight a specific type of conflict. What type of conflict is the PLA being told 

to prepare for? The answer was provided by Beijing in the publicly released 

2015 defense white paper. The paper told readers that China’s current military strategy (“Military Strategic Guideline of Active Defense Under the 

New Situation”35) requires the PLA to prepare to fight “informationized 

local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS.”36

There is no dearth of PLA writing or analyses to help us understand what 

type of conflict the Chinese armed forces are being told to prepare for. Briefly, 

first and foremost, it means a joint fight that integrates all of PLA services and 

key capabilities. It means a high-tech and information-dominant conflict. 
Breaking the Paradigm

57

It is anticipated by the PLA that operations will primarily be fought in the 

maritime-aerospace domains, with actions also taking place in cyberspace, 

outer space, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. The ability to fight and 

win this type of fight is what the PLA reform enterprise must accomplish.

The second phrase of note in Xi’s statement is overcoming the weak 

links in combat power building. This is important to highlight because the 

PLA currently assesses that it is not yet where it needs to be when it comes 

to fighting and winning the kind of joint conflict it currently identifies as 

the “focal point” for its “preparations for military struggle.”

Those who are steeped in Chinese military literature and who regularly 

read the comments and articles of commanders, political commissars, and 

Chinese military analysts appreciate that there is no greater critic of the PLA 

than the PLA itself. PLA expert Dennis Blasko has written and commented 

extensively on this point.37 The PLA (and Xi Jinping) have multiple self-critical phrases that capture the PLA’s various self-assessed shortcomings. One 

of the most common is the “two incompatibles” [liangge buxiang shiying, 

两个不相适应], which assesses that the PLA’s level of modernization is not 

yet at the point of being able to win information-based local wars, nor can 

the PLA fulfill all of its new “historic missions in the new phase of the new 

century.”38 Another common phrase is “the two big gaps” [liangge chaju 

hen da, 两个差距很大], which states that there is still a large gap between 

the capabilities of the PLA and the overall demands of national security 

and between the PLA’s state of modernization compared with the world’s 

most advanced militaries.39

What seem to be the problems? Where are the “weak links” Xi Jinping 

spoke of that must be addressed during this urgent period of military reform? 

Even a cursory answer to these questions is far beyond the scope of this 

chapter. However, to oversimplify, they reside in two big bins: technologies 

(weapons and systems) and institutions (organization, people, and processes).

On the technologies side, the PLA is not satisfied that it has the weapons and systems it needs to sustain and prevail in modern warfare. For 

example, there are still problems with China’s defense industrial system, 
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with indigenous innovation, and in manufacturing key components of 

some weapons systems or platforms. Aircraft engines are one persistent 

example where there is still difficulty in the defense industrial sector. The 

current reforms aim to address the perennial problems in China’s defense 

industrial sector again (as they have been attempting to do for almost three 

decades). The emphasis in the current period of reform on enhanced “civil-military integration” [junmin ronghe, 军民融合] as part of the solution 

is not a new concept; it goes back decades (see the respective chapters by 

Cheung and Lafferty in this volume).

Moreover, the PLA speaks of itself as unevenly modernized across 

a force of some 2 million personnel (after the 300,000-troop cut that Xi 

Jinping announced in September 2015 has been implemented). The PLA 

still describes itself as only partly mechanized and partly “informationized”—not only in equipment but also in operational mindsets. The PLA 

views itself as a force operating in two military epochs simultaneously: 

the previous age of mechanization and the current information era, with 

some forces only partially residing in either. In the year 2013, when this 

period of reform was launched, the PLA was not where it planned to be in 

making these transitions, even in achieving full mechanization, as called 

for in its own 30-year military modernization plan known as the “three 

step development strategy” [san buzou fazhan zhanlüe, 三步走发展战略], 

promulgated in 1997.40

These problems notwithstanding, there has been great progress on 

the weapons and systems fronts over the years that the current reform 

enterprise aims to build on and accelerate. China’s defense industries have 

demonstrated that they can indigenously produce (or reverse engineer and 

reproduce) impressive weapons, systems, components, and technologies 

that today give the PLA more reach, more punch, and more situational 

awareness than at any time in the past. The Chinese have demonstrated the 

capacity to field systems credible enough to elicit concerns and reactions 

from among the foreign defense establishments in China’s neighborhood 

and beyond, to include the United States. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 
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annual reports to Congress on Chinese military power, and other types of 

publications, are replete with examples of impressive systems being fielded 

by the PLA (and the high rate by which they are being produced): various 

types of missiles, surface vessels, submarines, aircraft, tanks, long-range 

artillery, satellites and antisatellite systems, radars, cyber capabilities, and 

a nuclear force that is being modernized. The list goes on.41 And there are 

certainly pockets of excellence in defense innovation, so positive strides are 

being made in some sectors in China.

The more vexing issues for the PLA seem to reside on the institutional 

front. There appear to be deep-seated concerns, and a full appreciation, 

that the capacity to produce first-rate weapons and systems does not 

automatically translate into operational capability. The latter is the result 

of real operational know-how (experience), coupled with the necessary 

command and control assets, and organizational structures that allow 

commanders to employ, integrate, and manage forces on the modern 

battlefield. In short, the PLA is concerned about the practical but increasingly complex matters associated with operational art, to borrow a term 

from the U.S. military. The PLA is painfully aware that it has not been 

tested in battle for many years, and there are questions in its own mind 

about how it might fare in real-world operations. As a commentator article in PLA Daily put it, “it should be noted that our military forces have 

not fought any major battle for over 30 years, and have not undergone 

the tempering of actual operations under informationized conditions.”42

Some of the comments attributed to Xi Jinping about the capabilities of 

the PLA’s operational commanders are both blunt and surprising. For 

example, PLA press articles often refer to Xi pointing out that many PLA 

commanders suffer from the “five cannots” [wuge buhui, 五个不会]. These 

commanders cannot:

■ analyze a situation

■ understand higher echelon intent

■ make a decision on a course of action
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■ deploy forces

■ handle unexpected situations.43

Beyond technological shortfalls and the lack of recent real-world operational experience, the literature surrounding this current period of reform 

strongly suggests that the CCP and PLA leadership believe the real inhibitors 

to generating operational capability and combat power are systemic. There 

is an acute acknowledgment that the PLA’s legacy organizational structures, 

processes and procedures, and even its institutional culture and the level of 

operational acumen of its personnel (especially commanders) are such that 

they are inhibiting the generation of combat power. This is borne out by a 

careful read of the military section of the Central Committee’s Decision 

from the Third Plenum. Almost all of the areas identified as needing reform 

or change are organizational, institutional, procedural, or administrative in 

nature. The CMC’s authoritative Opinion on Reform (2016) speaks of the 

necessity of “resolving systematic obstacles, structural contradictions, and 

policy problems that constrain national defense and military development.”44

Writing in People’s Daily over a year before the Opinion was published,CMC 

Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang used almost the same language, calling for the 

pressing need to “break through the restrictions” to accruing combat power 

and operational capability caused by “institutional obstacles,” “structural 

contradictions,” and “policy-related problems.”45

The persistence of institutional and systemic problems inhibiting warfighting capability must be a source of great frustration, for the PLA has been 

working at resolving a host of these issues for decades. This is not the first 

time in recent memory that the PLA has attempted to surge its reform efforts. 

Students of Chinese military affairs will recall the late 1990s and early 2000s, 

when the PLA introduced myriad systemic changes to doctrine, organization, 

personnel management, training, logistics, professional military education, 

and “civil-military integration” in the realm of defense industries.46 Among 

some analysts of the PLA, this author included, 1999 was referred to as “the 

year of regulations” in recognition of the amount of systemic change the 
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PLA was attempting to undergo by enacting new administrative regulations 

and guidelines as well as new operational doctrine. All of these areas (and 

others) are being looked at again during this current reform period. One can 

only surmise that the fixes of the past did not solve the problems they were 

intended to mitigate, were not actually put into place or enforced, or did not 

keep up with the rapidly changing nature of global military affairs. One must 

also surmise that the political will to enable bold but necessary changes was 

not present until recently (see the chapter by Wuthnow and Saunders in this 

volume for an overview of the changes being discussed).

In terms of “bold but necessary changes,” the recent disestablishment 

of the former seven “military regions” [junqu, 军区] and creation of the 

five “theater commands” [zhanqu, 战区] stands out as a prime example of 

what the PLA is attempting to achieve by way of improving its ability to 

conduct joint operations.

After working assiduously since the early-1990s to develop the capacity 

to conduct joint operations, a major stumbling block was apparently command and control arrangements. The wholesale disestablishment in February 

2016 of the legacy military region system makes clear that the PLA assessed it 

was unable to effectively superimpose the requirements of joint warfighting 

onto the military region system, especially with respect to command and control arrangements. This is not surprising. The military regions were conceived 

in the late 1940s based on internal geographic and political considerations: 

internal political defense of the new CCP regime and the defense of the 

new Party-state’s borders and coastlines from attack or invasion. Moreover, 

throughout their existence, the military regions were ground force–centric 

entities, with other services and forces stationed in the military regions 

commanded or managed by their respective service headquarters, elements 

within the four general departments, or the military region headquarters. No 

arrangement could be less conducive to joint warfare.

The five newly created joint theater commands are conceptually different from the old military regions in various significant ways. (See the 

chapter by Burke and Chan in this volume.) The most important difference 
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is that they are joint entities focused on projecting military power externally 

against designated contingencies—“strategic directions” [zhanlüe fangxiang, 战略方向], in the parlance of the PLA. Along with new command 

and control relationships and authorities, the PLA hopes that this organizational change will do the following:

■ Simplify command and control relationships by having the theater 

commands report directly to the CMC.

■ Establish unity of command by giving the five joint theater commanders operational control over all forces assigned to their theaters.

■ Achieve unity of effort by assigning specific strategic directions—

that is, contingencies—to each theater command for planning and 

warfighting purposes.

■ Focus warfighters on warfighting by making theater commanders 

responsible for war planning and joint training and relegating the 

services to the role of force providers.

■ Quickly transition from peacetime training to wartime operations 

by creating standing joint theater staffs versus the previous ad hoc 

command and control arrangements.

This is but one example that underscores the operational factors behind 

the current reform period.

Before leaving this section of the chapter, it is important to state that the 

preceding discussion of the PLA’s self-assessment of its own operational or 

institutional shortcomings, and those pointed out, should not be misconstrued for an argument that the Chinese armed forces are not an increasingly 

capable, increasingly advanced, and potentially formidable force.

National Security Assessments: The Third Driver of Reform 

The third major driver of this period of reform is a set of assessments that 

the CCP and PLA have made about China’s current security challenges, as 

well as concerns about the accelerating nature of the global revolution in 

military affairs. Both are justifying and adding a sense of urgency to the 

military reform enterprise.
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The increasingly “stern,” “complex,” and “uncertain” security environment the Chinese state and CCP itself are said to be facing is being touted 

by Xi Jinping and senior PLA leadership as another critical reason why the 

military must “accelerate” reform and modernization while the “strategic 

window of opportunity” remains open. Then–CMC Vice Chairman General Fan Changlong urged PLA personnel to think of the current reform 

period as “a race against time,” further stating, the “complexity and sternness of our country’s security situation require that substantial development 

be made in national defense and army building.”47 A 2014 article in PLA 

Daily declared, “to successfully accomplish our mission in the relay race of 

history, our Party cadres in the military, no matter at what positions, should 

have a stronger sense of trouble and crisis and a stronger sense of mission, 

and dare to take on duties and commitments in work.”48

The CCP still officially adheres to the ideologically important judgment 

that “peace and development” [heping yu fazhan, 和平与发展] remains the 

“keynote of the times” [shidai zhuti, 时代主题]. This judgment was made 

by Deng Xiaoping back in 1985 and revalidated in 1999 during an extended 

public and internal debate triggered by the errant North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade. At its most basic 

level, this judgment holds that a world war that could involve China is not 

imminent and that China has the opportunity to develop in a fundamentally peaceful environment. That said, this larger judgment provides a good 

deal of analytic space for challenges to China’s national security interests. 

These include the possibility of local wars, regional conflicts, nontraditional 

security threats, and other breeches of the peace that could involve China 

or directly and adversely affect Beijing’s key national interests. Changes in 

assessments in this space can result in adjustments to foreign policy, military policy, and domestic security policies. Consequently, it is important to 

stay abreast of how the Chinese security community assesses its proximate 

security situation at any given time.49

Since the military reform enterprise was launched at the Third Plenum, various assessments of China’s security situation placed in the public 
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domain strongly suggest that Beijing sees challenges to Chinese national 

security on the rise both externally and internally (the “two big situations,” 

in CCP speak). This is discernable in publicly released PRC government 

documents such as the defense white papers of 2012 and 2015. These concerns are especially driven home in much starker language in PLA-authored 

articles in military and Party journals as well as in editorials and commentaries in the PLA’s media complex—venues meant for internal consumption.

Beyond the need to fight a joint, high-tech, information-intensive war 

off China’s littorals, what other threats and challenges are being discussed? 

What are some of the other perceived challenges to Chinese national security that are currently being transmitted down through the PLA and are 

associated with the need for military reform and modernization? Below is 

a brief sampling, not comprehensive by any means.50

The Rising Challenges of “Hegemonism, Power Politics, 

and Neo-Interventionism”

Both the April 2013 and May 2015 editions of the PRC defense white paper 

called out concerns about “hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism.” In 2013 then–CMC Vice Chairman Fan Changlong wrote that 

“Hegemonism, power politics, neo-interventionism are on the rise.”51 In 2014, 

the dean of the Nanjing Army Command Academy parroted this assessment 

in an article in China Military Science, stating that “Hegemonism, great 

power politics, and ‘new interventionism’ have all risen to some extent.”52

External Pressures Aimed at Preventing China’s Rise 

There is also an assessment often found in the PLA and Party literature 

that “outside powers” are working to undermine China’s ascension to great 

power status and retard China’s rise. A February 2014 commentator article 

in PLA Daily declared that “some Western countries are not willing to see 

socialist China’s development and strengthening, and try by all means to 

carry out strategic containment and encirclement against China.”53 This 

assessment was made in the context of urging the PLA to study Xi Jinping’s 
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newly published Expositions on national defense and army building in 2014. 

A PLA Daily editorial on August 1, 2014, commemorating the founding 

of the PLA stated that “external hostile forces do not want to see China 

growing strong, and try by various means to contain and restrict China’s 

development.”54 A variation on this argument is that as China continues to 

grow and gather strength, there will be pushback from outside powers—

especially the United States. In May 2014, Major General Gao Guanghui 

(at the time commander of the 16th Group Army) made these arguments:

As the country’s comprehensive national strength has rapidly 

increased, so too the structure of its national interests produced 

great influence. The friction between containment and anti-containment continues to play out. This is especially true of the [U.S.] 

Asia-Pacific “Rebalance” strategy, which strengthens containment 

of China and brings about great change to the political, economic, 

and strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region.55

In an eye-catching passage from the 2013 edition of Science of Military 

Strategy (published by the PLA Academy of Military Science), the authors 

provided this admittedly low-probability but high-impact scenario when 

it comes to thinking about the possible conflicts China could find itself in:

At this crucial stage in our country’s peaceful development, our 

country cannot rule out the possibility of hegemonic countries 

inciting war with the goal of delaying or interrupting our country’s 

rise. The factors leading to war may be a crisis getting out of control and gradually escalating, or a premeditated plot that arises 

suddenly. The probability of this kind of conflict breaking out is 

low, but its degree of danger is high.56 (Emphasis added). 

The “Three Main Dangers” 

According to some Chinese public domain articles, Xi Jinping himself has 

articulated the need for the Party and PLA to remain vigilant in defending 
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66

against the “three main dangers.” In a long 2015 interview with Huanqiu 

Wang, Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of the General Staff whose 

PLA portfolio included military intelligence and foreign affairs, asserted 

that “President Xi has made a general survey of today’s changing world and 

has clearly presented strategic determinations such as ‘three major trends,’ 

‘three unprecedented situations,’ and ‘three main dangers.’” In the interview, Admiral Sun states, “looking at the matter from the point of view of 

the threats facing national security, the main dangers are the nation being 

invaded, being subverted, and being split; the danger of the overall state of 

reform, development, and stability being damaged; and the danger of an 

interruption in the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”57 This formulation has appeared in other PLA-authored articles. For 

example, in a May 2014 article in China Military Science, Major General 

Wang Pei and Major General Zhang Zhihui, both of the Nanjing Army 

Command Academy, wrote the following under the heading “The Security 

Situation Has Grown Severely Complicated, Presenting New Demands for 

the Military’s Warfighting Capabilities”:

We face a severely complex national security situation. We must 

ensure that the country is not invaded, subverted, or split up; 

ensure that the general situation of reform and development is 

not broken; and ensure that the process of building socialism with 

Chinese characteristics is not interrupted.58

In yet another variation on this theme, the deputy political commissar of 

the PLA National Defense University argued in a January 2014 article that 

the PLA must enhance its ability to fight and win informationized local 

wars “so as to guarantee that our nation will not be turned into a target of 

aggression, subversion, and division.”59

The near verbatim verbiage of these and other statements strongly 

suggests that this language is contained in official internal study materials 

associated with the military reform enterprise, perhaps in Xi’s Expositions

(published in February 2014) on national defense or some other speeches 
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not in the public domain. One notes the three dangers cover the physical 

security of China, China’s development, and political security—issues in 

line with Xi’s concept of “holistic security” [quanmian anquan guan, 全面

安全观] as articulated in his April 2014 speech at the first meeting of the 

National Security Commission.60

Political Subversion and Threats to Sovereignty 

Related to the three main dangers are concerns about political subversion—specifically, the undermining of CCP rule. This is not a new worry, 

but it has been a prominent theme associated with the internal propaganda 

campaign associated with the current military reform program. As mentioned, China’s military strategy, as transmitted in the 2015 defense white 

paper, called out “anti-China forces” that are alleged to be “attempting to 

instigate a ‘color revolution’” in China.61 In his aforementioned interview 

with Huanqiu Wang, Admiral Sun Jianguo likened the “occupy” movement 

in Hong Kong to a color revolution and then went on to explain the concern 

in more detail:

Instigating “color revolutions” is a customary trick of certain 

Western nations to fly the flag of “democratization” and subvert 

the regimes of other nations. With China’s constant development, 

their aim to infiltrate and harm China has become all the clearer, 

their activities are all the more rampant, and they are stepping up 

the implementation of an online “cultural Cold War” and “political genetic engineering.” Struggles in the area of ideology are acute 

and complex—iron-forged souls vs. the souls of termites, solid 

roots vs. the roots of destruction. The contest is growing more 

intense and is becoming a major danger facing China’s political 

security and regime security.62

Related to the concern about the subversion of China’s political and 

ideological unity are concerns about “separatist forces” determined to 

undermine China’s geographic unity. PLA articles continue to emphasize 
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challenges posed by separatist cliques and forces operating within and outside of China to separate Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang from the mainland. 

The challenges in Xinjiang in particular are associated with the incantation 

of the “three evil forces” [san gu shili, 三股势力]: terrorism, separatism and 

extremism. As stated by Major General Wang Pei:

the “three evil forces” are interlinked within and outside of 

Chinese territory. They have intensified separatist movements, 

repeatedly produced incidents, and posed serious threats to 

the political security and social stability of the country. This 

demonstrates that China’s security problems are becoming more 

integrated, complex, variable, and unprecedentedly strong.63

Beyond the various forms of threats and challenges to China’s geographic, political, and “developmental” security, the evolving “global 

revolution in military affairs” is touted as another reason why the PLA 

must make significant progress in modernization and reform. Specifically, 

the Chinese argue that the global revolution in military affairs continues 

to forge ahead, China must keep up, China is not necessarily keeping up in 

all domains, and various other nations are making progress that, in some 

cases, is troubling. From a 2014 PLA Daily commentator article:

The accelerating development of the world’s new revolution 

in military affairs also poses a stern challenge to our national 

defense and armed forces building. With the rapid development 

of new and high technologies with information technology as 

the core, military technologies and the pattern of war are also 

undergoing revolutionary changes. The major countries in the 

world are all stepping up their military transformations in an 

attempt to seize the commanding heights in the future military 

competition. At present, there remains a substantial gap between 

the modernization level of our military and the world’s advanced 

military level.64
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Then–CMC Vice Chairman Fan Changlong used much the same 

language in his own 2013 Qiushi article, writing that the “world’s new 

revolution in military affairs is still accelerating. All major countries are 

stepping up military transformation. This poses a stern challenge to our military.”65 Fan’s then-colleague, CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang, has also beat 

this drum, stating that “deepening national defense and military reform is 

an urgent need in adapting to the accelerating development of the world’s 

new revolution in military affairs and the profound evolution of the warfighting patterns and operational forms.”66 In particular, the United States, 

Russia, and Japan are commonly cited in PLA articles as nations whose 

progress in military modernization bears China’s attention, for they are 

often touted as being on the leading edge of the global revolution in military 

affairs. For instance, one PLA author argues in China Military Science that:

Currently the new worldwide revolution in military affairs has 

developed quickly. Competition [among] countries in the speed 

of advancement and development of quality is increasingly fierce. 

The American military relies on the continuous development 

of science and technology, draws support from enriched combat practices, and continues the revolution in military affairs. It 

openly emphasizes “we must ensure that the U.S. military is a few 

steps ahead of any potential opponent.” Russia has announced 

that it must speed up the process of its military “stepping into the 

21st-century electronic world,” so that [it] can return to a place as 

one of the world’s most influential powers. . . . Japan is accelerating the pace of its military reforms and attempting to build an 

offensive force that can operate regionally and globally. India is 

committed to promoting “a military capable of exerting influence 

both regionally and globally.” Faced with these severe challenges 

and pressing situations, we must view matters soberly.67

What usually follows these narratives of progress among the world’s 

top militaries is the “sober” assessment of China’s lack of progress and the 
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invoking of the various self-critical phrases mentioned earlier, such as the 

“two incompatibles” or laments about the lack of progress in reaching “full 

mechanization” and “informationization” as called for in the PLA’s “three 

step strategy” for modernization of the force. “The foundations of army 

building are weak. We are still engaged in the complex development stage 

of mechanization, semi-mechanization, and informationization,” wrote 

Major General Gao Guanghui.68 Moreover, a PLA Daily commentator 

article stated:

The major countries in the world are all stepping up their military 

transformations in an attempt to seize the commanding heights 

in the future military competition. At present, there remains a 

substantial gap between the modernization level of our military 

and the world’s advanced military level; the modernization level 

of our military is still not in keeping with the requirement of 

winning local wars under informationized conditions.69

For his part, Fan Changlong argues that the PLA is getting closer to its 

modernization objectives, but is not there yet:

We are now so close to the strong army dream like never before, 

and are more confident in and more capable of fulfilling the goal 

[of] strengthening the military. However, we should be soberly 

aware that, at present, our military is situated at the stage of having 

not yet accomplished mechanization and also accelerating the 

development of informationization, there remains a substantial 

gap between our military’s modernization level and the world’s 

advanced military level, and our current condition remains out of 

keeping with the requirement of national security.70

And so it goes. As one reads through PLA and Party materials, it 

is clear that the sense of urgency in moving forward with the military 

reform enterprise is being driven by assessments that China’s threat environment is becoming more acute, that the state of PLA modernization is 
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inadequate, that the global revolution in military affairs is accelerating, 

but that there is still a window of opportunity for China to make substantial progress if the PLA can just push through some bold reforms. How 

much of this threat assessment does the Party and PLA truly believe, 

and to what extent are these fears and concerns being hyped to justify 

some tough decisions? The answer is probably a mix of both. What really 

matters is that this is what the PLA is telling itself, this is what the officers 

and troops are imbibing, this is the narrative being carried in important 

Party media outlets—and one strongly suspects also being expounded on 

in internal Party-PLA documents.

Who Are the Architects of Reform? 

To this point, this chapter has focused on the reasons for the reform enterprise. An equally important question is who is behind these reforms. Who 

devised these changes? As far as any single individual or specific group of 

officers goes, the answer to this question is unclear, at least to this author. 

Nevertheless, some brief speculation is in order.

Certainly, Xi Jinping’s fingerprints are indelibly stamped on this military reform enterprise, and it will undoubtedly be part of his legacy. Like 

other aspects of the Chinese Party-state, Xi is attempting to move the 

PLA into the post-Dengist era. His Expositions on national defense and 

“army building” serve as a political primer to justify the reforms, and his 

chairmanship of the CMC Leading Small Group for Deepening National 

Defense and Military Reform places him in the center of all major decisions on military reform. Overall, it would not be unreasonable to posit 

that Xi is the most engaged CMC chairman since Deng Xiaoping, and 

there should be no question that Xi’s role in this reform process has been 

vital. Specifically, Xi has served as the enabling and catalyzing agent who 

has provided the political muscle necessary to force the PLA to overcome 

its own bureaucratic inertia and force it to move forward with significant 

organizational and institutional reform. Nevertheless, Xi is not the architect 

of these reforms, deft Marxist theoretician though he may be.
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The reforms we have seen to date, and those yet to be announced, could 

only have come from the military professionals within the PLA itself. However, one is hard-pressed to point to any single general officer or group of 

officers publicly identified as being highly influential in the current reform 

effort as in the past. In the 1980s, for example, General Li Jijun was closely 

associated with the creation of the group armies [jituan jun, 集团军] and 

combined arms doctrine for the ground forces. Also in the 1980s, General/

Admiral Liu Huaqing was associated with the modernization of the PLA 

Navy. In the late 1990s, General Chen Bingde was sometimes associated 

with the new iteration of operational doctrine that was issued circa 1999 

(specifically, the “new generation operations regulations” [xin yidai zuozhan 

tiaoling, 新一代作战条令]). Today, the PLA professionals who devised the 

current reform program remain largely anonymous.

Without question, this current reform enterprise is the result of a 

protracted institutional effort across the PLA. It is undoubtedly based on 

many years of study, experimentation, and planning. Lessons learned from 

the practices of militaries abroad were clearly studied by the cohort of military analysts and scholars who comprise the PLA’s foreign military studies 

community. We should assume the PLA military intelligence community 

supported that effort. PLA journal articles strongly suggest that military 

reforms and operational practices of the armed forces of Russia and the 

United States in particular were carefully followed and studied. More than 

likely, PLA delegations traveling abroad and PLA officers studying at foreign institutions of professional military education would have had ideas to 

offer. So too would officers participating in combined exercises with other 

nations’ militaries be in a position to understand best practices from abroad.

More than anything else, perhaps, the results of nearly two decades of 

joint exercises and experimentation were probably critical in formulating 

fixes to the PLA’s more intractable operational problems, especially those 

associated with joint command and control arrangements. The exercises 

involve not only forces in the field but also observers and analysts from 

Beijing and other centers of operations research throughout the PLA. 
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One can imagine organizations such as the Academy of Military Science, 

National Defense University, PLA Navy Research Institute, various service-level command academies across China, and other organizations that 

comprise the PLA’s large military research complex all working on the key 

problems, both through their focused research efforts and as observers in 

field settings.

Staff officers in the former four general departments must have played 

a role in thinking through the operational and administrative challenges of 

the reorganization effort, likewise for officers in headquarters of the former 

military regions. One does wonder with hindsight whether the establishment of the PLA’s Strategic Planning Department [zhanlüe guihua bu, 战

略规划部] in November 2011 was a harbinger of serious preparation for the 

reorganization of late 2015 and the accompanying reforms.

Moreover, professionals from across the PLA were invited to write 

papers and do their own research, a sort of “mass line” [qunzhong luxian, 

群众路线] approach to gathering good ideas for change and practical fixes 

to vexing problems. Some officers associated with the reforms have asserted 

that the PLA has indeed taken a bottom-up as well as top-down approach 

to seeking solutions to its problems. This becomes quite apparent when 

reading the titles of articles in the table of contents in China Military Science

over time, especially between 2013 (post–Third Plenum) and continuing 

over the following 3 years, especially under the journal’s section heading 

of “National Defense and Armed Forces Building.” Many of these articles 

identify shortcomings in various practices and offer solutions. And, of 

course, as is the proclivity of the PLA, one imagines interminable conferences, meetings, symposia, workshops, and seminars at which ideas were 

floated, rejected, adjusted, refined, and then sent up the chain of command 

as recommendations.

Undoubtedly, the CMC Leading Small Group for Deepening National 

Defense and Military Reform, as well as the new CMC Reform and Organization Office [junwei gaige he bianzhi bangongshi, 军委改革和编制办公室], 

have played a critical role in gathering data, taking in recommendations, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

74

and sending decision papers up to Xi and the top leadership of the Leading 

Small Group—whose full membership remains unpublicized, although 

General Fan Changlong and General Xu Qilaing were both reported to be 

vice chairmen.

This is the best we can do using public domain data: speculate about 

how this process may have taken place, without knowing who the creative 

military professionals are who devised the blueprints of the most ambitious 

reform and reorganization enterprise in the history of the PLA. Hopefully, 

that institutional history will be written one day and available.

Conclusion 

This chapter has focused on the drivers behind the current military reform 

enterprise—the reasons why the PLA is being told this is necessary and 

why modernization must be accelerated. Three major drivers have been 

identified: political factors, operational factors, and national security assessments. There are undoubtedly other ways that the catalysts for the current 

reform effort could have been parsed, presented, or analyzed. These three 

were chosen because they represent how the PLA is explaining the need for 

significant systemic change to itself.

For many outside observers, certainly for countries in the Asia-Pacific 

region and for the United States, the operational imperatives for Chinese 

military reform will undoubtedly be the most important. A PLA that is 

better organized, equipped, and trained to conduct joint operations along 

various strategic directions—especially in the maritime-aerospace domains 

beyond the Chinese littoral—will have a wide range of strategic and operational implications. And truly, reorganizing and reforming to become a 

military that “can fight and win” is at the heart of this endeavor.

Yet the Chinese would surely say that the political drivers are equally 

important. The survival and protection of the CCP as the ruling political 

Party of China is Beijing’s number one national security priority: “political 

security,” to borrow a phrase from the PLA and Party literature. One is 

struck by the degree to which Party and PLA leaders see the CCP itself as 
Breaking the Paradigm

75

the real target of internal and external threats. Consequently, a PLA that 

is tightly tied to the CCP and that will defend the regime from political 

threats both from within China and from abroad is deemed absolutely 

essential. This is likely why the paramilitary People’s Armed Police was 

brought under the sole control of the Central Military Commission in 

January 2018, whereas previously it was under the dual command of the 

CMC and State Council.

The sober assessments of China’s national security situation (even as 

the Chinese judge that they are still in “a period of strategic opportunity”) 

are clearly being used to justify why military reform must be accelerated 

and why extraordinary measures are necessary. So too with the judgment 

that the global revolution in military affairs is moving quickly and that 

the PLA cannot miss this opportunity. Indeed, one gets the sense that they 

believe that if they do not fix their biggest problems now, they will only 

find themselves further behind than they believe they are now compared 

to other modern militaries.

The need to maintain the momentum in military modernization and 

reform was reiterated as a political task by the CCP in the work report of 

the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. The year 2020 was set as the time 

by which the PLA must achieve full “mechanization” and significant progress toward “informationization.” The report deemed the year 2035 as the 

point at which the PLA will “basically realize modernization of national 

defense and military.” By mid-century, the CCP aim is to have “a world-class 

military” [shijie yiliu jun, 世界一流军]. These are ambitious objectives.71

What the PLA actually initiated with the issuing of the Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening Reform of National Defense and 

the Armed Forces on January 1, 2016, is a generational undertaking. Being 

joint is not merely changing the line and block charts; it is a capability born 

of a deep set of professional and operational experiences, a product of the 

professional military education system, adjustments based on training 

experiments and real-world operations, and sustained by institutional 

incentives that reward joint service.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

76

How this will unfold for the PLA will depend on many factors, not least 

of which is the quality, training, and capabilities of personnel in the force, 

especially its commanders. From a professional and institutional perspective, some of the more interesting reforms coming down the road will be 

those that address the PLA’s perpetual problems with attracting, training, 

managing, and retaining the personnel it needs to fight the high-tech wars 

it is convinced it must be able to fight (see the chapter by Wuthnow and 

Saunders in this volume). As Jiang Zemin is alleged to have once stated 

about the PLA, “Everything will be empty talk without qualified personnel 

and knowledge.” Yet for all of its problems, the PLA continues to demonstrate that it is a “learning organization.” For those of us who study this 

fascinating military organization, the next few years will hold our attention.

Notes 

1 The formal name of the “Decision” of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central 

Committee is “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 

China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,” 

November 12, 2013, available at <www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_

session/201401/16/content_31212602.htm>.

2 The four general departments were the General Staff Department [zong 

canmo bu, 总参谋部], General Political Department [zong zhengzhi bu, 总政治部], 

General Logistics Department [zong houqin bu, 总后勤部], and General Equipment 

Department [zong zhuangbei bu, 总装备部].

3 The Central Military Committee (CMC) is a Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) organization, an organ of the Central Committee. Its formal name is Military 

Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [zhongguo 

gongchandang zhongyang junshi weiyuanhui, 中国共产党中央军事委员会]. It is 

usually chaired by the General Secretary of the CCP.

4 The number of military regions and their borders have changed over the 

years (in 1985, there were 11). Until their recent disestablishment, they were the 

most important and powerful sub-national organizations in the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) structure.

5 In the PLA doctrinal lexicon the term “strategic direction” [zhanlüe fangxiang, 战略方向] is used to identify either a general direction from the mainland 
Breaking the Paradigm

77

from which China perceives a military threat that requires preparations or a specific contingency. For example, since at least 1993, the PLA has identified Taiwan 

as its “main strategic direction” [zhuyao zhanlüe fangxiang, 主要战略方向]. For 

more on strategic directions, see David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the Military Strategic Guidelines,” in Right-Sizing 

the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. 

Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2007), 69–140.

6 The PLA’s four services are the PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and 

PLA Rocket Force.

7 Other key organizational changes included the elevation of the former Second Artillery (hitherto a branch of the ground forces) to an independent service 

[junzhong, 军种], the establishment of a separate headquarters for the ground forces 

(the PLA Army), the creation of the Strategic Support Force, and a Joint Logistics 

Support Force. Other new organizations may be announced as time rolls on.

8 For analyses of the first tranche of changes that took place in the first half 

of 2016, see David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and 

Reform of the PLA (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016); and Dennis J. Blasko, “Integrating 

the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands,” Journal of Strategic 

Studies 39, nos. 5–6 (August 3, 2016), 685–708.

9 See David M. Finkelstein, Get Ready for the Second Phase of Chinese Military 

Reform (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017).

10 For reportage on the November 2015 conference, see Cao Zhi, Li Xuanliang, 

and Wang Shibin [曹智, 李宣良, 王士彬], “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi 

Jinping Stresses: Comprehensively Implement Reform and Military Strengthening 

Strategy, Resolutely Take the Path to a Strong Military with Chinese Characteristics” [在中央军委改革工作会议上强调习近平: 全面实施改革强军战略 坚定不移

走中国特色强军之路], Xinhua, November 26, 2015, available at <http://cpc.people.

com.cn/n/2015/1127/c64094-27861889.html>. The CMC “Opinion” was published 

by Xinhua on January 1, 2016, under the title “Central Military Commission’s 

‘Opinions on Deepening Reforms of National Defense and Armed Forces’” [中

央军委“关于深化国防和军队改革的意见”系统阐述为什么改、改什么、怎么改], 

available at <www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_128588726.htm>.

11 Wang Jingguo, Sun Yanxin, and Huang Yifang [王经国, 孙彦新, 黄益方], 

“Defense Ministry Spokesman Gives Detailed Explanation on Relevant Issues of 

Deepening National Defense and Army Reforms” [国防部新闻发言人详解深化
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

78

国防和军队改革有关问题], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/01/c_1117646764.htm>.

12 “Make Vigorous Efforts to Build a Strong Modern Logistics Support Force” 

[努力建设一支强大的现代化联勤保障部队], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 14, 

2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/14/content_156621.htm>.

13 “Central Military Commission’s ‘Opinions on Deepening Reforms of 

National Defense and Armed Forces.’”

14 The CCP’s challenging domestic agenda is laid out in the same Decision from 

the Third Plenum (2013) that also included the requirement for military reform.

15 “A Holistic View of National Security,” speech by Xi Jinping to the first 

meeting of the National Security Commission, April 15, 2014, in Xi Jinping: The 

Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2014), 220.

16 See China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: People’s Republic of China Ministry 

of National Defense, May 26, 2015), available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-05/26/content_4586748.htm>.

17 “No Nationalization of Military in China: Senior PLA Officer,” Embassy 

of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, June 20, 2011, 

available at <www.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t832372.htm>.

18 Minnie Chan and Choi Chi-yuk, “Two More of China’s Former Top Commanders Taken Away for Corruption Investigation: Military Sources,” South China 

Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 5, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/

china/policies-politics/article/1999535/two-more-chinas-former-top-commanderstaken-away>.

19 Fan Changlong [范长龙], “Strive to Build the People’s Army That Obeys 

the Party’s Orders, Is Able to Fight Victorious Battles, Keeps a Good Style—Study 

and Implement Chairman Xi’s Important Thinking on the Party’s Strong Army 

Goal Under the New Situation” [为建设一支听党指挥能打胜仗作风优良的人民

军队而奋斗 : 学习贯彻习主席关于党在新形势下的强军目标重要思想], Qiushi

[求是], no. 15 (August 2013).

20 For an overview of the Gutian Conference of 2014, see James C. Mulvenon, 

“Hotel Gutian: We Haven’t Had That Spirit Here Since 1929,” China Leadership 

Monitor, no. 46 (Winter 2015), available at <www.hoover.org/research/hotel-gutian-we-havent-had-spirit-here-1929>.

21 See Peter Mattis, “Is China Scared of a Coup?” The Diplomat, July 

4, 2012, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2012/07/is-china-scare-of-acoup/>; and Liz Carter, “Whom Should the Chinese Army Serve—the Party or 
Breaking the Paradigm

79

the State?” The Atlantic, October 25, 2012, available at <www.theatlantic.com/

international/archive/2012/10/whom-should-the-chinese-army-serve-the-partyor-the-state/264104/>.

22 Wu Ming [吴铭], “Remolding Our Military’s Leadership and Command 

Structure Is a Necessary Choice for a Strong and Revitalized Military” [重塑我

军领导指挥体制是强军兴军的必然选择], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 30, 

2015, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-11/30/content_130735.htm>.

23 On the military regions, Wu Ming stated that the “large military regions 

will also no longer have feudal powers over their domain” [大军区也不再是权力

很大的“一方诸侯”]. The term yifang zhuhou, 一方诸侯 is said to originate from 

the Western Zhou, and is a reference to the king’s siblings and other relatives, 

the nobles, and other key personages. These individuals had high autonomy 

over their lands, including military rights, not unlike a small nation, but they 

also had to report to the king and pay taxes and support military expenses on a 

regular basis. Today, the term is used to describe someone with great influence 

or power over a certain area. The author is indebted to James Bellacqua of CNA 

and Alice Miller of the Hoover Institution for their help in understanding this 

obscure reference.

24 “Continuously Enhance Consciousness and Firmness to Thoroughly Purge 

the Pernicious Influence of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou” [不断增强全面彻底肃

清郭伯雄徐才厚流毒影响的自觉性和坚定性], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 16, 

2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-10/11/content_158578.htm>.

25 “Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress,” October 15, 2007, available at 

<www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>; “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report 

at 18th Party Congress,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United 

States of America, November 27, 2012, available at <www.china-embassy.org/eng/

zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm>.

26 Conference paper by a PLA author, 2014. See also Xiong Zhengyan, “Admiral Sun Jianguo: China Is in Danger of Being Invaded; Using Struggle to Seek a 

Win-Win for China and the United States” [孙建国上将: 中国有被侵略危险用斗争

谋中美共赢], Huanqiu Wang, March 2, 2015, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/

observation/2015-03/5793682.html>. In this interview, Admiral Sun stated, “For 

the first time, national defense and armed forces reform has been incorporated into 

the national reform layout, upgrading it to the will of the Party and national action.”

27 Wu, “Remolding Our Military’s Leadership and Command Structure Is 

a Necessary Choice for a Strong and Revitalized Military”; James C. Mulvenon, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

80

“The Yuan Stops Here: Xi Jinping and the ‘Chairman Responsibility System,’” 

China Leadership Monitor, vol. 47 (Summer 2015), available at <www.hoover.org/

publications/china-leadership-monitor>.

28 Deng Xiaoping, “The Task of Consolidating Our Army,” speech at an 

enlarged meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the 

Communist Party of China, July 14, 1975, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 

1975–1982 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984), 27.

29 “China’s Xi Jinping Takes Commander in Chief Military Title,” BBC News, 

April 21, 2016, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-36101140>. 

30 Xu Qiliang [许其亮], “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National Defense 

and the Armed Forces” [许其亮:坚定不移推进国防和军队改革], People’s Daily

[人民日报], November 21, 2013, available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1121/

c64094-23610085.html>.

31 “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress.”

32 This citation from p. 92 of The Selected Important Expositions of Xi Jinping on 

National Defense and Army Building comes from an article written by Major General 

Hu Yang, at the time Jilin Military District Political Commissar. See “Key Issues on 

Implementing Standards for Warfighting Capability in Peacetime,” China Military 

Science [中国军事科学], May 2014. The Selected Important Expositions of Xi Jinping 

on National Defense and Army Building is not in the public domain. According to 

PLA Daily (February 21, 2014), it was published in February 2014, but its distribution 

was restricted to PLA officers at and above the regimental level. See “‘The Selected 

Important Expositions of Xi Jinping on National Defense and Army Building’ Issued 

by the Army General Political Department, Calling for Members of the Armed Forces 

to Conscientiously Organize Their Studies” [“习近平关于国防和军队建设重要论述

选编”印发全军总政治部下发通知要求全军和武警部队认真组织学习], available at 

<www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2014-02/21/content_4491893.htm>.

33 “Xi Jinping Presides Over the First Meeting of the CMC Deepening Defense 

and Armed Forces Reform Leading Small Group, Emphasizes Applying the Military Strengthening Objective to Direct Reforms, Push Forward Reforms Around 

Military Strengthening Objective, Provide Strong Institutional Support for Building and Consolidating National Defense and a Powerful Armed Forces” [习近平

主持召开中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组第一次全体会议强调坚持以强

军目标引领改革围绕强军目标推进改革为建设巩固国防和强大军队提供有力制

度支撑], Xinhua, March 15, 2014, available at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-

03-15/150629715381.shtml>.
Breaking the Paradigm

81

34 As opposed to a contingency-based perspective that speaks to planning 

for specific campaigns against a specific enemy. For a detailed explanation of this 

term, see Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy.”

35 Liu Hang [刘航], ed.,“The Military Strategic Guideline of Active Defense Under 

the New Situation” [新形势下积极防御军事战略方针], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 

12, 2015, available at <www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-08/12/content_6625850_4.htm>.

36 China’s Military Strategy.

37 See, for example, Dennis J. Blasko, “The ‘Two Incompatibles’ and 

PLA Self-Assessments of Military Capability,” China Brief 13, no. 10 (May 

9, 2013), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/the-two-incompatibles-and-pla-self-assessments-of-military-capability/>.

38 The PLA’s “new historic missions” refer to the expanding set of traditional 

and nontraditional security missions the PLA must address as China’s role as a 

global economic and political power grows. For more on the missions, see Daniel 

M. Hartnett, “The ‘New Historic Missions’: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military 

Legacy,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy 

Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2014).

39 See Dennis J. Blasko, “The New PLA Joint Headquarters and Internal 

Assessments of PLA Capabilities,” China Brief 16, no. 10 (June 21, 2016), available 

at <https://jamestown.org/program/the-new-pla-joint-headquarters-and-internalassessments-of-pla-capabilities/>.

40 According to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Web site “National 

Defense Policy”: “China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing 

its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state’s overall plan 

to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the 

second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach 

the strategic goal of building ‘informationized’ armed forces and being capable of 

winning ‘informationized’ wars by the mid-21st century.” Available at <www.china.

org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm>. See also “Defense Policy,” People’s 

Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, available at <www.eng.mod.gov.

cn/Database/defensePolicy/index.htm>.

41 For the most recent report, see Annual Report to Congress: Military and 

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), available at <www.defense.gov/

Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

82

42 Xi Jinping, “Start the New March in the Course of Military Strengthening and 

Development; Deeply Study and Implement Chairman Xi’s Important Expositions 

on National Defense and Armed Forces Building” [深入学习贯彻习主席关于国防和

军队建设的重要论述], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 17, 2014, available at <http://

cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0217/c83083-24376791.html>.

43 Many thanks to colleague Dennis J. Blasko and Alan Burns for multiple 

references for this phrase.

44 “Central Military Commission’s ‘Opinions on Deepening Reforms of 

National Defense and Armed Forces.’”

45 Xu, “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces.”

46 For an overview of key systemic reforms during these years, see David M. 

Finkelstein et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: 

Overview and Challenges (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2002). See also David M. Finkelstein and James C. Mulvenon, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: 

Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

(Washington, DC: Beaver Press, December 2005).

47 Fan, “Strive to Build the People’s Army.”

48 Xi, “Start the New March.”

49 For the significance of the determination that “peace and development” 

remains the “keynote of the times,” see David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its 

National Security: The “Great Peace and Development Debate” of 1999 (Alexandria, 

VA: CNA, December 2000).

50 Not all of these perceived challenges may be new ones. Even if not new, they 

are being articulated as part of the ideological campaign supporting the military 

reform effort.

51 Fan, “Strive to Build the People’s Army.” Emphasis added.

52 Wang Pei and Zhang Zhihui, “Adhere to the Sole and Fundamental Standard of Warfighting Capability—A Thorough Study of Xi Jinping’s Important 

Expositions on the Standard of Warfighting Capability,” China Military Science

[中国军事科学], May 2014, 22–31.

53 Xi, “Start the New March.”

54 “Faithfully Perform the Missions and Tasks Assigned by the Party and 

the People—Warmly Celebrate the 87th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA” 

[忠实履行党和人民赋予的使命任务 ——热烈庆祝中国人民解放军建军87周

年], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 1, 2014, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2014-08/01/content_83384.htm>.
Breaking the Paradigm

83

55 Gao Guanghui [高光辉], “Consideration on Adhering to the Standard of 

Warfighting Capability in the New Situation” [新型式下坚持战斗力标准的思考], 

China Military Science [中国军事科学], May 2014, 32–41.

56 The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 

2013), 99. Emphasis added.

57 Xiong, “Admiral Sun Jianguo.”

58 Wang and Zhang, “Adhere.” Also see the editorial “Faithfully Perform 

the Missions and Tasks Assigned by the Party and the People,” which used nearly 

identical language, stating that military reform is necessary to ensure that China 

“will not fall into a target of aggression, subversion, division; the overall interests 

of reform, development, and stability will not be harmed; [and] the development 

process of socialism with Chinese characteristics will not be interrupted.”

59 Major General Wu Jieming, “Adhere to the Party’s Mass Line, Strive to 

Achieve the Goal of Military Strengthening,” Qiushi [求是], January 16, 2014.

60 “Xi Jinping Chairs First Meeting of CPC Central Committee’s National 

Security Commission” [习近平主持召开中央国家安全委员会第—次会议] Xinhua, 

April 15, 2014.

61 China’s Military Strategy.

62 Xiong, “Admiral Sun Jianguo.” These comments help to explain the mindset behind recent PRC laws governing foreign nongovernmental organizations 

operating in China.

63 Wang and Zhang, “Adhere.” For more on China’s terrorism concerns, see 

Murray Scot Tanner and James Bellacqua, China’s Response to Terrorism (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016).

64 Xi, “Start the New March.”

65 Fan, “Strive to Build the People’s Army.” Emphasis added.

66 Xu, “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces.”

67 Gao, “Consideration on Adhering to the Standard of Warfighting Capability in the New Situation.” Emphasis added.

68 Ibid.

69 Xi, “Start the New March.”

70 Fan, “Strive to Build the People’s Army.”

71 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with 

Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/

special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>.

85

CHOOSING THE 

“LEAST BAD OPTION”

Organizational Interests and Change 

in the PLA Ground Forces

John Chen

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is currently undergoing a series 

of organizational reforms unprecedented in its 90-year history. 

Beginning in September 2015, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi 

Jinping announced a force reduction of 300,000 PLA personnel, kicking off 

a rapid-fire sequence of organizational and structural reforms. The PLA has 

undergone significant revisions to multiple levels of its command structure, 

constituent branches and services, and force structure that broadly conform 

to a dictum that the CMC will handle general management, newly formed 

theater commands (TCs) will focus on operations, and the services will handle force building [junwei guanzong, zhanqu zhuzhan, junzhong zhujian, 军

委管总, 战区主战, 军种主建].1

 These are major changes, and their complete 

impact may not be fully understood and appreciated for some time to come. 

Changes in China’s external security challenges, altered perceptions 

of the character of warfare, and new political directives all likely played 

critical roles in driving these latest adaptations in the PLA ground forces. 

These drivers, however, appear better suited for explaining the gradual, 

spasmodic pace of PLA Army reform that has taken place over the past 25 

CHAPTER 2
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

86

years rather than the sweeping changes enacted over the past 2 1⁄2 years. If 

these three main drivers offer only partial explanations, what explains the 

dramatic and unprecedented changes in the ground forces announced in 

the latest organizational reforms?

This chapter argues that the army’s organizational and bureaucratic 

interests are a valuable lens for interpreting the 2015 reforms and that 

these same considerations may have contributed to the recent disruptive 

changes aimed at fielding a PLA ground force that serves as a true ground 

component of a joint force. To the extent that organizational interests prove 

to be important steering factors of the future army, they may push the PLA 

ground forces toward a more offensive-oriented role for a PLA ground force 

that has previously been tasked to defend and deter.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. The first section summarizes 

several possible drivers for change within the PLA ground forces since the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, briefly outlining a variety of motivations and 

the expected “new type of army” [xinxing lujun, 新型陆军] that would result 

from each. The second section examines past and present changes in the 

army, arguing that while each driver has some explanatory value, the existing explanations for adaptation are incomplete. The third section identifies 

organizational incentives and behavior as a valuable lens for explaining the 

drawn-out nature of army reforms. The final section describes the implications of army organizational behavior as a possible explanation for the 

latest tranche of PLA reforms.

Drivers for Changes 

Many of the existing explanations for the 2015 reforms fall into three broad 

categories: changes in China’s external security environment, changes in 

Chinese views on the character of warfare, and response to new political imperatives. While these categories of drivers are typically offered in 

explanation of change in the PLA writ large, they are equally applicable to 

changes in the ground forces.2
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Changes in External Security Outlook 

Changes in China’s external security outlook could have motivated significant changes to the PLA ground forces. A broader reorientation of security 

threats along China’s land borders, or a change in enemy war plans along 

those borders, could have led to major changes in the ground forces. Any 

change in threat perception from China’s surrounding waters would also 

have had an impact on the ground forces. If changes in China’s overall 

external security outlook are the main determinant for changes in the 

PLA Army, new doctrinal thinking, force structures, and training patterns 

should emerge following any new assessment of China’s land security situation. Conversely, relative continuity in China’s security situation should 

trigger no major changes in the ground forces.

The most consequential change in China’s external security outlook 

in the last three decades was the disappearance of the Soviet Union as 

a major land threat. Shortly after the December 1991 dissolution of the 

Soviet Union, top Chinese leaders assessed that a major land invasion of 

the Chinese homeland from the north no longer posed an existential threat. 

This relative confidence in the security of China’s land borders is reflected 

in the 1993 Military Strategic Guideline for the New Period [xinshiqi junshi 

zhanlüe fangzhen, 新时期军事战略方针], which called for the PLA to shift 

its attention away from defending the Chinese mainland from large scale 

invasion to preparing to fight local wars under high-technology conditions 

along China’s periphery.3

 The 1993 guideline held that the most likely 

sites of local wars were on China’s land borders, along with near seas and 

associated airspaces.4

The dissolution of a major land threat on China’s northern border has 

been accompanied by an intensified emphasis on offshore threats. Military 

scholars argued that future wars would increasingly threaten targets along 

China’s coastline and involve maritime and air operations,5 and the 2004 

defense white paper called for increased prioritization of naval, air, and 

missile forces in accordance with this new threat perception.6 The most 

recent defense white paper, published in 2015, reiterated the need to shift 
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emphasis away from land and toward the sea, arguing that China “must 

break the traditional thinking that land outweighs sea” [bixu tupo zhonglu 

qinghai de chuantong siwei, 必须突破重陆轻海的传统思维].7 This language 

was a prominent part of the development of the latest iteration of China’s 

military strategy.8

 The overall intent was clear: the PLA as a whole would 

focus less of its resources and attention on land threats.

These altered views on China’s external security outlook had a clear 

impact on reshaping the PLA ground forces. The dramatic decrease of the 

land threat to China led to a reduction in the PLA Army’s end strength, 

while the increasing priority placed on sea threats nudged the army toward 

becoming the ground component of a joint force. The introduction of 

the 1993 military strategic guideline was followed by a force reduction 

of 500,000 personnel in 1997 that reduced the ground forces by some 19 

percent, while only trimming the navy by 11.6 percent and the air force by 

11 percent;9 further reductions in 2005 and 2015 also disproportionately 

impacted the ground forces.10 The losses in end strength have been accompanied by increasing emphasis on maritime threats and joint training in 

the years following the 1993 military strategic guideline, with the army 

increasing the size of its amphibious forces after the 1997 troop reduction by 

transforming the first army division to an amphibious mechanized infantry 

division in 2000 and adding other amphibious units to the order of battle 

in the former Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions (MRs).11 The army 

began discussing and implementing its interpretation of “integrated joint 

operations” [yitihua lianhe zuozhan, 一体化联合作战], which inevitably 

broached an increasing maritime orientation when it was established as 

the main form of operations beginning in 2004.12

Changing Views on the Character of Warfare 

A second explanation for changes in the PLA ground forces could be that 

broader changes in views on new technology and the character of warfare 

drove military reforms within the PLA and its ground forces. The rise of 

new warfighting technologies and their implications for force structure 
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and employment may be driving adaptations in the ground forces, and 

new technology may drive new tactics and ways of conducting warfare. 

Increased emphasis on technological developments, changes in force structure, and rapid integration of new technologies into the force following 

new assessments of the character and conduct of warfare would indicate 

that the PLA ground forces are adapting to changes in the way warfare is 

carried out. Relative continuity within the ground forces during perceived 

periods of fundamental change in the character of war, especially in doctrinal thinking, would suggest that any army changes are responding to a 

different determinant.

PLA strategy documents have envisioned at least three notable shifts 

in the character of warfare over the past 25 years, namely “local war under 

high-technology conditions” [gaojishu tiaojian xia de jubu zhanzheng,高技术

条件下的局部战争], “local war under informationized conditions” [xinxihua 

tiaojian xia de jubu zhanzheng, 信息化条件下的局部战争], and “informationized local war” [xinxihua jubu zhanzheng, 信息化局部战争]. Two of 

these fundamental changes in how the PLA views the character of warfare 

were strongly influenced by recent conflicts: local war under high-technology 

conditions was informed by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and local war under 

informationized conditions was informed by the 1999 Kosovo War and the 

2003 Iraq War.13 Scholars have argued that the third, informationized local 

war, was not influenced by any particular past conflict.14

The lessons derived by PLA academicians from these conflicts place 

a premium on mobility, range, command of information, and increased 

operability in multiple domains, including land, sea, air, space, and the 

electromagnetic spectrum. High-technology warfare is “focused on superior weapons technology; battlefield integration between air, land, and sea; 

high-speed, all-weather operations; new modes of long-range warfare, especially missile, electronic, and air warfare; and a premium on [command, 

control, communications, and intelligence] dominance.”15 War under 

informationized conditions is characterized as an intermediate step toward 

informationized war, using “information systems and a defined degree of 
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informationized weapons to carry out war.”16 Informationized warfare 

“relies upon networked information systems and informationized weapons, 

fighting on air, land, sea, space, and in the electromagnetic spectrum.”17

These lessons have not been lost on the PLA ground forces, which 

have translated them into ground forces more capable of meeting the 

requirements of high-technology and informationized warfare, especially 

by emphasizing increased mobility and more multifunctional [duoneng 

hua, 多能化] units. Army transformation theorists argued that future 

PLA ground forces would need diverse capabilities to enable army units to 

fight under different conditions of informationization.18 Accordingly, PLA 

ground forces began to stress mobility and more organic cross-domain 

capabilities like aviation and electronic countermeasures units. Army 

training has placed special emphasis on transregional mobility and operations in complex electromagnetic environments since at least 2008.19 The 

ground forces have been adding aviation units and building them in size 

and capability since the first formation of an army aviation brigade in 

2009.20 These changes in force structure and training strongly suggest that 

the PLA ground forces have been gradually adapting to a shift in the character of warfare that has called for better mobility and multifunctionality.

Response to New Political Directives 

The PLA’s role as a Leninist military organization subject to CCP command means that military reforms could alternatively be the direct result 

of military obedience to new political directives emanating from the Party. 

Political directives that could have spurred doctrinal and organizational 

change in the ground forces could include anything from the articulation 

of new missions for the ground forces to exhortations to embrace joint 

warfare. Timely changes in PLA ground forces in direct response to CCP 

orders would suggest that obedience to Party directive is the main driver of 

reform in the ground forces. On the other hand, delays in implementation 

or repeated CCP orders would suggest that changes in the ground forces 

are not necessarily responses to Party commands.
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Hu Jintao’s 2004 articulation of a set of New Historic Missions [xin 

de lishi shiming, 新的历史使命] for the PLA is one obvious example of a 

new political directive shaping PLA ground forces. Hu’s speech called for 

the PLA to protect CCP rule, guarantee strategic opportunity for national 

development, provide strategic support for defending national interests, and 

protect world peace and security,21 and thereupon laid the groundwork for 

increasing prioritization of military operations other than war (MOOTW). 

The MOOTW concept made its first appearance in the 2008 defense white 

paper, signifying its elevation in status to that of a critical military task.22

The PLA ground forces have made adaptations in accordance with 

these New Historic Missions, with many of the changes falling in line with 

the new political directive. Doctrinally, the PLA ground forces began to 

embrace their newly articulated MOOTW role in a series of research works 

detailing the army’s role in a variety of MOOTW operations, including 

counterterrorism, protection of social stability, peacekeeping, and disaster 

relief.23 Force structure concepts like “modularity” [mokuai hua, 模块化] 

were originally intended to create more independent, deployable army units 

capable of quickly adapting to a wide variety of missions in combat,24 but 

quickly proved applicable for units training for different types of MOOTW 

operations and yielded obvious utility for units rotating into and out of 

peacekeeping operations abroad.25 At home, PLA ground force units routinely practiced rapid-reaction maneuvers to the point where the official 

distinction between designated “rapid-reaction units” and “regular units” 

has been mostly dissolved.26 Abroad, army soldiers make up the majority 

of China’s peacekeeping forces,27 and some have gained combat experience 

during their time overseas.28

Taken separately, these three drivers for army reform would have 

resulted in three distinct types of ground forces, each with different projected opponents, force compositions, geographic orientation, and types of 

operations. The characteristics of these different types of ground forces are 

summarized briefly in table 1.
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Table 1. Drivers of PLA Army Changes and Resultant Types of PLA Ground 

Forces

Changes in External 

Threat Environment

Changes in Nature of 

Warfare

New Political 

Directives

Change Land threat perception 

greatly reduced; 

maritime threat 

perception increases

Shifting from large land 

conflict to long-range, 

noncontact warfare

Focus on New Historic 

Missions and military 

operations other 

than war

Role Ground component of 

joint force

Defend and deter; 

survive and thrive in 

noncontact warfare

Guarantee Party 

rule; secure China’s 

overseas interests

Required Force 

Size and 

Structure

Reduced size, 

increased amphibious 

capabilities

Multifunctional, mobile Modularity, mobile

Training Joint training with 

other services; 

amphibious training

Cross-domain training; 

joint training with 

other services

Rapid deployment, 

experience overseas

In reality, however, all three of these drivers have stimulated adaptations 

in the PLA ground forces in the past and continue to manifest themselves 

in the 2015 reforms. The PLA ground forces appear to have responded to 

changes in China’s external threat environment, changes in views on the 

character of warfare, and new political directives by implementing many 

of the changes in table 1 to varying degrees over the past 25 years. Many of 

these changes are still under way as a direct result of the 2015 reforms: the 

army continues its seaward orientation,29 revisions to force structure have 

stressed multifunctionality in army units by creating combined arms brigades 

[hecheng lü, 合成旅] from divisions,30 and the army continues to play a large 

(and increased) role in peacekeeping operations overseas.31

Yet an explanation that attributes the 2015 changes in the army solely 

to some combination of the three drivers identified here would be incomplete. None of the specific factors described were especially pressing or 

unique to the period immediately preceding the 2015 reforms. The explanatory gaps associated with each of these drivers are covered in more detail 

in the following section.
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Gaps in Explaining the 2015 Reforms 

Despite the fundamental nature of the existing explanations for reform, 

none of these three main drivers is sufficient explanation for the 2015 

reforms. Many of the critical indicators of change in the PLA ground forces 

were present long before the 2015 reforms came about. Changes in doctrinal 

thinking, force structure adjustments, and new training regimens all suggest that the three main drivers for changes in the ground forces have been 

motivating a number of different adjustments in the army for some time.

Changes in Threat Environment? 

Changes in China’s external threat environment are unlikely to have been 

the primary determinants of the 2015 changes to the PLA ground forces. 

Current analysis indicates that the 2015 reforms were designed to enhance 

the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations,32 which would strongly suggest that PLA leaders envisioned a change in China’s external security 

environment or in the character of warfare dramatic enough to warrant a 

major reorganization of the PLA ground forces—and yet no such tectonic 

shifts are obvious in the period immediately preceding the 2015 reforms. 

In fact, many of the factors driving the 2015 reforms have been unvarying 

components of army transformation for years.

The 2015 force reductions that might be correlated to a shifting threat 

assessment are not unique to the latest tranche of reforms. While these latest 

troop reductions undoubtedly help reorient the army away from land and 

toward the sea, they are better understood as part of a long-running effort 

dating back to the 1990s to create a much smaller [xiaoxing hua, 小型化] 

army. The 1999 Science of Military Strategy noted that combat forces were 

trending toward smaller and lighter formations, and the 2001 Science of 

Military Strategy called for the PLA to reduce the size of the armed forces 

as much as possible without compromising victory.33 By early 2008, army 

researchers had called for overall force reductions and specifically cited 

army reductions as a key component of ground force transformation.34

Force reductions to implement this new type of ground force have taken 
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place intermittently since the 1993 military strategic guideline, with reductions announced in 1997, 2005, and 2015.35

Although the latest reforms purport to push the army toward a maritime orientation, they have not yet added amphibious capabilities to the 

army commensurate with a substantial reorientation toward a maritime 

threat. Some army capabilities, like special operations, aviation, and electronic warfare units, are useful for offshore maritime operations, but PLA 

and army leaders have been calling for more of these units since at least 

2011, as noted in the 2013 Academy of Military Science (AMS) edition of 

the Science of Military Strategy, which called for reductions in “traditional” 

army units in favor of expansions in special operations, electronic countermeasures, network attack and defense, tactical guided-missile, and army 

aviation units.36 These types of units have been growing in size and number 

since at least 2009.37 If anything, rumors about the conversion of army units 

in Northern China to navy-controlled marine brigades seem to suggest that 

other services with more relevant maritime capabilities will benefit at the 

expense of the army.38

Most importantly, the highest-level strategic articulations of army 

missions have remained consistent since the early 2000s, coalescing around 

regional threats including Taiwan, Korean Peninsula, and various forms of 

territorial disputes along China’s borders. These missions are expressed in 

the 2004 and 2015 defense white papers, which represent close approximations of revised military strategic guidelines, but are also reflected in more 

granular PLA texts from the years dating back to at least 2004 and preceding 

years.39 For instance, army academic research confirms the service’s previously anticipated roles in addressing regional threats: a 2011 AMS volume 

identified several regional threats that China was likely to face, including potential land conflict hotspots like the Korean Peninsula to the east, 

Afghanistan and Central Asia to the west, and Kashmir to the south. Tibetan 

independence and Xinjiang independence were also specifically identified 

as security challenges within Chinese land borders.40 For their part, army 

researchers regularly stressed “anti-Taiwan separatist” operational training41
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and emphasized preparations for potential border conflict with India.42 The 

2015 white paper repeats almost all of these regional land security threats, 

with an added emphasis on threats to the security of Chinese overseas energy 

resources, overseas personnel and assets, and strategic sea lines of communication.43 In short, past doctrinal thinking on the army’s main missions 

roughly matched the thinking immediately prior to the 2015 reforms, albeit 

with an additional emphasis on maritime threats in recent years.

Changes in the external security outlook certainly affected army 

modernization, but the nature and scope of those changes may have been 

insufficient to force large-scale, organizationally disruptive reforms. The 

reduction of the Soviet military threat permitted change but did not compel 

the PLA to adapt quickly to confront a major new threat. The rise of the 

threat of Taiwan independence in the mid-1990s created the need for army 

capabilities to deter Taiwan via the threat of punishment, a relatively modest 

goal. Building the capability to successfully invade Taiwan in the face of 

U.S. military intervention was a much more ambitious goal, but one that 

lacked urgency given the acceptability of the status quo, so long as Taiwan 

did not move toward de jure independence.

Changes in the Character of Warfare? 

A fundamental shift in views regarding the character of warfare is similarly unlikely to have been the primary driver of the 2015 reforms. Many 

of the indicators of such a shift predate Xi Jinping’s rule and have been in 

play for many years before the 2015 reforms, suggesting that other factors 

combined to push the 2015 reforms through. Although evidence suggests 

that PLA theorists believe informationized warfare [xinxihua zhanzheng, 

信息化战争] to be a departure from warfare under informationized conditions [xinxihua tiaojian xia zhanzheng, 信息化条件下战争], the changes 

in the army instituted by the latest reforms have been undergoing trial and 

experimentation for a decade or more, suggesting that a new conception of 

the character of warfare among army leaders may not be a primary reason 

for the 2015 reforms.
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The PLA ground forces have been pushing toward the multifunctionality [duonenghua, 多能化] associated with changes in the character 

of warfare since long before 2015, suggesting that it was not a substantial 

change in the way Chinese leaders perceived warfare that directly precipitated the 2015 reforms. The effort to build a “multifunctional” army has 

been justified by a perception that the PLA’s ground forces must adapt to 

a variety of different missions since the early 1990s. For instance, the 1999 

Science of Military Strategy argued that “local wars” were by nature “diverse 

situations,” and called for the PLA to better prepare for missions on land, at 

sea, and in air.44 A 2011 AMS work called for the development of multifunctional forces to fulfill the needs of a “mission-oriented” combat structure.45

This attitude had filtered down to operational army units by mid-2013, 

when a deputy commander of the former Shenyang MR emphasized the 

importance of being able to complete a wide variety of missions.46 These 

same views were expressed in various authoritative PLA writings leading 

up to the 2015 reforms47 and have been implemented in the restructuring 

of group armies to accommodate combined arms brigades.48 This implementation, however, is the culmination of years of efforts that predate the 

2015 reforms, suggesting that it was not a fundamental change in PLA views 

of the character of warfare that drove the increased multifunctionality in 

the latest reforms.

An emphasis on increased mobility emblematic of a shift in the character of warfare has likewise been a consistent feature of army training 

for more than a decade before the 2015 reforms. Doctrinally, the army 

has stressed increased mobility and flexibility since before 2000: the 2000 

defense white paper noted that the army was moving toward smaller, 

modularized, and multifunctional forces as the army “reoriented from 

theater defense to trans-theater mobility.”49 The army began to implement 

some of these concepts by adding aviation units in 2009, while exercises 

beginning in 2006 emphasized transregional mobility and operations in 

complex electromagnetic environments.50 The 2015 reforms may have accelerated implementation of these concepts, but the reforms are implementing 
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changes suggested in response to a shift in PLA views of warfare that was 

elucidated many years before.

Army views on the character of warfare have evolved in the past 25 

years, but there is no evidence that a major change in the Army’s view of 

warfare occurred immediately prior to the 2015 reforms to prompt major 

organizational changes. Many of the changes implemented in the reforms 

were experimented with and agreed on long before they were actually executed, suggesting that other factors were at play in determining the timing 

of the reforms.

New Political Directives? 

Some analysts argue that a new political directive from Xi Jinping may have 

driven the 2015 reforms, but the issuance of a new political directive alone 

is unlikely to have prompted such swift and sweeping change in the ground 

forces. Past political directives have not always been fully heeded or executed 

in a timely fashion. While a new political dictum was issued in March 2013 

calling for the military to obey CCP command, fight and win wars, and 

develop an excellent work style (that is, not be corrupt) [ting dang zhihui, 

neng da sheng zhang, zuofeng youliang, 听党指挥, 能大胜仗, 作风优良],51

this broad formulation did not imply a specific organizational structure or 

translate directly into distinctive guidance for PLA reforms. The outlines of 

the military reforms were unveiled in the third plenum decision document 

approved by the CCP Central Committee in November 2013,52 but it took 

an additional 2 years of work within the PLA to flesh out the details, some 

of which are still being refined as the reforms are implemented. The new 

military strategic guideline that eventually resulted (which was announced 

in the 2015 white paper on China’s military strategy) was a minor adjustment 

rather than a major change. (See the chapter by Wuthnow and Saunders in 

this volume for discussion of Xi’s role in the reforms).

While the 2015 reforms were undoubtedly accompanied by a new 

political urgency, the actual military content of the latest political directive appears to be based on longstanding past appeals by PLA reformers, 
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including the emphasis on improving the PLA’s ability to plan and execute 

joint operations.53 (See the chapter by Finkelstein in this volume.) Immediately after the reforms were announced at the end of 2015, newly anointed 

commander of the army Li Zuocheng called for the service to dispense with 

the “Big Army Mentality” [da lujun siwei, 大陆军思维], avoid the belief that 

“land warfare is outdated and the army is useless” [luzhan guoshi, lujun 

wuyong, 陆战过时,陆军无用], and construct a “new type of army,”54 ostensibly marking a new political directive to the army endorsed by Xi Jinping 

himself.55 These expressions, however, are not new. A 2009 AMS volume 

on army command in joint operations listed “countering the influence of 

the Big Army” [kefu da lujun de yingxiang, 克服大陆军的影响] as the first 

among many steps to establish better coordination among the services,56

and a 2011 volume noted that the PLA should abandon Big Army tradition 

in order to better embrace integrated joint operations.57

Even if the most recent political directive had significant new content, 

the PLA’s track record of executing political orders in a timely manner is 

mixed. Hu Jintao’s New Historic Missions were announced in 2004, but the 

PLA ground forces did not appear to fully embrace the study of MOOTW 

operations until an extensive series of instructional materials were published in 2008.58 The details of Xi Jinping’s new type of army are likely being 

interpreted in a similarly delayed approach: the flurry of recently published 

articles by army officers “studying” Xi’s new type of army suggests that the 

ground forces are still translating this latest political directive in ways that 

may yield additional changes further in the future.59 Hu Jintao reportedly 

contemplated organizational reforms to establish joint command structures 

in 2008–2009, but was unable to push the reforms through against opposition by the ground forces.

These examples indicate a distinctive new political directive was not 

the primary driver of recent army reforms. Hu’s inability to carry out 

reforms may have been thanks to a lack of political capital or the resistance 

of corrupt senior army officers, such as CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong 

or Xu Caihou. The familiar content of the latest political instructions to 
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the PLA suggests that that Xi Jinping’s personal involvement in the reforms 

and use of a multifaceted political strategy to see them through likely 

affected the timing and implementation of the reforms, but the content of 

the reforms was largely derived from ideas about joint operations that had 

been advocated by PLA reformers for years.

The main body of available PLA literature suggests that army theorists 

arrived at a clear answer for their service’s modernization by the end of the 

first decade of the 21st century at the latest: the future army was to be a smaller, 

modular, multifunctional force shaped to conduct informationized joint 

operations with a primary focus on threats emanating from the sea. Many 

of these concepts were well-worn and not unique to the immediate period 

leading up to the 2015 reforms. Even the new political directive to abandon 

the Big Army Mentality was based on previously articulated exhortations.

The existing explanations for the 2015 reforms fail to account for the 

timing and implementation of the most recent changes to the army. What 

explains the time lag between development of army reform concepts and 

the actual implementation after the 2015 reforms, and what could explain 

the timing of the actual implementation of these concepts within the army 

at scale once the 2015 reforms began?

Army Changes from an Organizational Perspective 

The inadequacies of several existing explanations for the timing and implementation of the 2015 reforms leave at least one major question unanswered. 

If many of the changes that comprise the 2015 reforms are not substantively 

new ideas, what explains the long lag time between the genesis of these 

ideas and their actual implementation in 2015, and what may have caused 

the changes to actually happen? Though direct evidence of organizational 

motivation to reform is hard to find, examining the changes from the organizational perspective of the army yields several compelling insights and 

possible explanations for the long delay and the timing of the 2015 reforms.

The rough typology of PLA ground force organizational interests that 

follows is based on past studies of organizational behavior that chart the 
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typical organizational interests of a bureaucracy, as well as evidence of army 

concern about these broad categories of organizational interests. It is neither 

exhaustive nor necessarily fully borne out by direct evidence that may be 

difficult to obtain; instead, the sections below provide a useful framework 

for evaluating army changes from an organizational perspective.

Uniqueness and Identity 

Like any other military organization, the PLA ground forces appear to 

place a premium on a unique service identity driven by unique service 

capabilities and a monopoly of expertise. Early scholars of bureaucracies identified monopoly of expertise as a formidable and indispensable 

source of bureaucratic power.60 Monopoly of expertise and a bureaucracy’s 

“technical superiority over any other form of organization” ensure that a 

bureaucracy is the only unit capable of executing a task and virtually forces 

society to rely on that organization to execute policy.61

PLA Army scholars view the service’s unique capability to seize and 

hold territory as the defining hallmark of its identity, even as the advent 

of integrated joint operations carves out even greater roles for the other 

services. Army theoreticians have argued that even though naval, air, and 

missile capabilities have replaced many of the army’s traditional strengths, 

the army continues to have a special role even in the context of joint warfare, namely to seize, hold, and control strategically important territories.62

Autonomy 

The army’s unique capabilities and identity are inextricably linked to 

autonomy, which is a critical organizational interest for the service. This 

emphasis on autonomy is particularly pronounced when related to control 

of the budget, as the expenditure of funds determines the essence and 

priority of an organization’s activities. Organizations frequently seek total 

operational control over the personnel and resources required to carry 

out a mission.63 Autonomy is valued by bureaucracies “at least as much as 

resources” and signals that the agency “has a supportive constituency base 
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and a coherent set of tasks that can provide the basis for a strong and widely 

shared sense of mission.”64

One proxy for the army’s relative autonomy is its relationship with the 

other PLA services, which is theoretically moving away from single-service 

thinking and toward more interservice cooperation as a result of increased 

emphasis on joint warfare. Army researchers openly acknowledge that 

the service’s relative freedom to act on its own singular objectives is fast 

waning as the rest of the PLA adopts joint warfare as the primary mode of 

operations and the other services gain in prominence.65 On top of that, PLA 

theorists have noted that army commanders must increasingly understand 

and consider the requirements, strengths, weaknesses, and specialties of 

other services, especially in the era of joint operations.66 This rhetoric suggests a steadily decreasing amount of autonomy for army commanders and 

units, especially when engaged in joint operations or exercises.

Budget 

A third army organizational interest is budget. An organization’s budget 

may be the most important of the metrics of bureaucratic power, as money 

enables a bureaucracy to hire personnel, buy equipment, gain prestige, 

and otherwise increase an organization’s capabilities and strengthen its 

ability to get what it wants.67 Scholars have compared bureaucracies to 

firms, articulating a vision of bureaucracies as budget maximizers (instead 

of profit maximizers). The problems of making changes and managing 

a bureaucracy are at least partially alleviated by an increase in the total 

budget, and organizations will frequently maximize their budget relative 

to the production output expected of them by the sponsor of the organization’s budget.68 In brief, money is important to the extent that it enables 

production and eases management, and organizations (and their leaders) 

will pursue higher budgets as rational actors.

Available army writings almost never explicitly reveal budget-maximizing behavior, but the importance of the army’s budgetary disposition 

is not lost on PLA researchers. Past researchers have called for increased 
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overall defense expenditures to enable more investment on army weapons,69

while more recent articles have argued that overall army expenditure is 

excessive in comparison to the spending of other services.70 These contrasting viewpoints illustrate that service budgets have long been a point of 

debate within the PLA, in spite of an overall lack of budgetary transparency.

Presence in Command Billets 

A final organizational interest is the number of influential positions held 

by army personnel. Scholars have argued that in order for a bureaucracy to 

provide governance, its officials must “occupy the most important positions 

in policy making, and further, they must be in sufficient numbers to be 

able to make their decisions effective.”71 Quantity of positions held has a 

quality all its own, in that sheer preponderance of positions held may itself 

increase bureaucratic power.72 Staffers, ad hoc players, and lower level officials are also critical, wielding substantial influence over action channels 

and agenda-setting.73

PLA Army theorists understand the importance of having qualified 

personnel occupying key billets in a given command structure. Army 

researchers have recognized the importance of developing relevant army 

talent to occupy billets that might require army expertise,74 and past analysis has identified the lack of qualified army technical personnel in key 

billets as a major bottleneck for the advancement of transformation.75 One 

prominent researcher proposed the establishment of an army command 

organ, among other specifically army-controlled organizations like military academies, research units, and logistics support units, to remedy this 

problem as far back as 2009.76

Becoming a Joint Force Component: Choosing the 

“Least Bad Option”

While organizational and bureaucratic interests (some would say pathologies) may have held up the reforms until 2015, these same interests could 

also have enabled the reforms by helping the army to evaluate its future 
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force choices. Interpreting the army’s menu of options for its future force 

through the lens of the service’s organizational interests yields an interesting perspective: of the three variants of a new type of army, becoming the 

ground component of a joint force may have been the least objectionable 

option for the army as an organization. The contours of these three different 

models for a future ground forces are summarized briefly in table 2 and 

described in more detail in the sections that follow.

Table 2. Future PLA Ground Force Roles

“Defend and Deter” Constabulary Force Ground Component 

of Joint Force

Missions Deterrence Military operations 

other than war

Taiwan

Unique 

Capabilities

Defend homeland Defend Chinese 

Communist Party at 

home 

Seize and hold 

territory

Relationship with 

PLA Partners

Reliant on naval, 

rocket, and air forces 

for protection 

and strike

Reliant on naval and 

air forces for overseas 

transportation

Reliant on naval and 

air forces for transportation and support; 

naval, rocket, and air 

forces for strike

Budgetary 

Implications

Limited budget; 

investment in equipment for defensive 

and deterrence 

operations

Smallest budget; 

limited investment 

for personnel and 

minimum necessary 

equipment

Comparatively 

reduced budget; 

investment in heavy 

power-projection

Command 

Implications

Stay at home; limited 

role in command of 

high-end combat 

operations

Stay loyal; little to 

no role in command 

of high-end combat 

operations

Reduced but continued role in command 

of complex combat 

operations

Defend and Deter 

The PLA ground force is currently shaped as a force designed to defend and 

deter, largely thanks to China’s longstanding strategic posture and periodic 

modifications in the way PLA leaders perceived the character of warfare. 

The PLA and its ground forces place a heavy emphasis on deterrence and 

defense of China; offense is typically referenced in the context of “active 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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defense,” in which China would task its armed forces to attack only when 

threatened.77 Force modernization resulting from changes in perceptions 

about warfare under high-technology conditions to informationized conditions laid the groundwork for a force that is increasingly mechanized 

and informationized, with growing but limited-range power projection 

capabilities in its special operations and aviation components.78 Taken 

together, these components represent the army’s status quo, forming the 

basis for an army shaped primarily to defend the Chinese homeland and 

deter any violations of Chinese territory.

A ground force shaped for defense and deterrence confers specific 

bureaucratic advantages, capitalizing on the army’s unique capability 

among the PLA’s services to hold territory in defense of China’s landmass. 

While the navy and air force each have ground force components, and the 

Rocket Force is based on land, the army alone has sufficient numbers and 

heavy weapons to assure China’s territorial integrity on land.

At the same time, however, an army shaped for defense and deterrence 

is saddled with distinct bureaucratic disadvantages. While the army could 

benefit from interior lines for transportation and logistical support, it would 

be heavily reliant upon the PLA’s naval and air forces and Rocket Force for 

protection and strike, even while operating inside friendly territory. PLA 

academics acknowledge this reliance, commenting that army operations 

are “near impossible without reliable air cover”79 and that the army should 

make maximum use of long-range firepower strikes from the other services 

to achieve its goals.80

This reliance generates some significant potential budgetary and command limitations for the PLA Army. Comparatively greater portions of the 

defense budget would go to the navy, Rocket Force, and air force to buy highend equipment needed for their operations. Meanwhile, with limited power 

projection capabilities and missions, army commanders would gradually be 

given commands limited to homeland defense and would only participate 

in high-end joint combat operations to the extent that they are needed to 

coordinate with other services tasked with protecting the ground forces.
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The PLA ground forces have already run up against many of these 

limitations. The army does not command strategic air defense assets, 

which belong to the air force, and the long-range strike weapons used to 

keep China’s enemies far afield are under the command of the Rocket Force 

and air and naval forces, which are perceived to be naturally better suited 

to use long-range firepower.81 These trends have contributed to an army 

with limited power projection capabilities designed primarily to secure 

Chinese territorial integrity.

A Constabulary Force 

Hu Jintao’s New Historic Missions offered the army a glimpse at a future 

bureaucratic disposition far worse than the one army leaders were accustomed to during the runup to the 2015 reforms. A PLA ground force that fully 

embraced Hu’s New Historic Missions would have focused more of its time and 

resources on MOOTW missions like antiterrorism, peacekeeping, and internal 

security, at the expense of training and equipping for complex combat operations against peer adversaries. The result would have been an army that more 

closely resembled an enhanced constabulary force with limited expeditionary 

capabilities instead of one designed to defeat the militaries of peer competitors.

While the call to participate in MOOTW missions under the aegis 

of Hu’s New Historic Missions offered bureaucratic opportunities for the 

army, the unique and most politically important of these was not one that 

the PLA ground forces especially savored. Party leaders have continued 

to champion the army as the final line of defense for ensuring continued 

CCP rule,82 but internal security was a mission that army leaders did not 

especially want. Some officers have candidly expressed their distaste for this 

particular duty.83 Indeed, the existence of the People’s Armed Police helps 

distance the PLA from this internal security mission.84

A constabulary army could have expected a greatly reduced share 

of the budget and significantly lessened command responsibility for the 

types of complex combat operations that armies typically embrace. Its 

unique role as the defender of the CCP would not have required extensive 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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modernization that could justify budgetary largesse, and modernization 

funds would likely be funneled to selected units tasked with overseas 

peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and other MOOTW operations, eschewing 

the advanced capabilities needed to fight peer adversaries in favor of lighter 

rapid reaction forces. The increased emphasis on MOOTW would divert 

training time and resources away from more intensive combat operations, 

which would ultimately diminish the number of army officers holding 

prestigious command billets charged with executing complex combat 

operations against peer adversaries offshore from China.

It is no surprise that the PLA ground forces have not fully embraced 

the constabulary model that MOOTW missions would have foisted upon 

the service. Some evidence suggests that army theorists increasingly 

conceive of MOOTW operations within the context of larger, more complex operations rather than a set of separate, dedicated missions.85 This 

is preliminary evidence that army theorists appear inclined to include 

MOOTW missions as lesser included tasks, even though MOOTW 

operations remain enshrined as one of the “three basic ways to use military power” cited in the 2013 Science of Military Strategy86 and offer 

unique opportunities for the army to gain experience in combat support 

skills.87 Given the significant bureaucratic disadvantages, army leaders 

are unlikely to endorse or adopt anything resembling the constabulary 

model if they can help it.

Ground Component of a Joint Force 

Given the options described here, becoming the ground component of a 

joint force appears to be the best option from the perspective of the army’s 

bureaucratic interests. While a full embrace of joint warfare would reduce 

the service’s budget allocation, control over command billets, and leave the 

army reliant on other services for transportation and support, it nonetheless 

presents the strongest case for continued force modernization, making it the 

best option for the ground forces from the standpoint of organizational and 

bureaucratic interests.
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Fully transforming into the ground component of a joint force would 

result in a bureaucratic retreat on multiple fronts, damaging the army’s 

organizational interests and priming the way for significantly reduced 

influence. The army would lose some of its monopoly of expertise as other 

services begin to absorb or compete for army roles, such as amphibious 

operations. Accordingly, the army’s share of budgetary appropriation 

relative to other PLA services would fall as the navy, air force, and Rocket 

Force funnel money toward costlier systems and training needed for complex joint operations. Army dominance of command billets would end as 

officers from other services increased their proficiency in joint operations 

and begin to rise through the ranks, demanding greater control commensurate with the rising importance of the other services.

Many of these bureaucratic retreats have already come to fruition 

during the recent reforms, though the army lost at least some of these 

bureaucratic battles more than a decade ago. Recent changes have captured 

the most attention. For instance, key chief of staff and theater commander 

billets in the newly formed theater commands are increasingly being filled 

by officers from other PLA services.88 If true, rumors that an army brigade 

would be converted to a marine corps unit would have dealt a further blow 

to the army’s weakening monopoly of expertise on amphibious operations.89

Still, it is clear that the army likely lost some important bureaucratic clashes 

years before—the prioritization of informationization over mechanization 

and the announcement that the navy, air force, and Second Artillery would 

have modernization priority in the 2004 defense white paper hinted at 

major bureaucratic defeats for the army.90

In context, however, becoming the ground component of a joint force 

entails comparably fewer bureaucratic concessions than the other two 

options. Should the army ultimately be tasked with a future invasion of 

Taiwan, for instance, it would reap the budgetary benefits of continued 

modernization directed at defeating a technologically advanced Taiwan 

military and the U.S. military might that the PLA expects to confront in 

such a scenario. The aggregate number of officers occupying command 
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billets responsible for joint operations would fall, but the army would still 

retain a legitimate claim to a substantial number of critical command 

positions given its continued role in a joint PLA. An army that is an equal 

participant in joint operations could ameliorate its reliance on other PLA 

services for protection and transportation by contributing niche capabilities 

to joint operations with other PLA services.

Given the comparatively lesser bureaucratic losses to the army, it is 

not entirely surprising that the undeniably painful transition toward a 

joint force is fully under way. This transition, evinced by numerous blows 

to the army’s bureaucratic standing, will likely continue to be shaped by 

not only the army’s organizational interests but also broader strategic and 

political directives described in previous sections of this chapter. In the end, 

however, organizational interests may have helped push army leaders and 

experts toward making the best of a worsening bureaucratic environment.

Explaining Incremental Change: Organizational Backsliding with 

Chinese Characteristics, or Risk Aversion? 

If the transition to a ground component of a joint force was ultimately in the 

army’s best organizational interest, what explains the lag time between the 

introduction of reform concepts in the 2000s and actual implementation 

in 2015?

The first and most simple explanation for the delay is that the army 

simply saw no strategic imperative for dramatic changes to its fighting force 

after the 1993 military strategic guideline, which marked a new era in how 

the PLA and the ground forces should have perceived land security challenges—a shift toward fighting local wars under high-technology and later 

under informationized conditions called for a smaller, more versatile, and 

mobile ground force. According to this explanation, the army’s changes, or 

lack thereof, were a response to the new strategic directives laid down by the 

1993 guideline, and subsequent modifications were appropriate responses 

to comparatively minor adjustments in China’s national military strategy. 

The army continues to implement the directives handed down to them by 
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

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higher authorities and does so with sufficient speed and effectiveness.91

The consistency in the army’s perceptions of land security challenges 

is a function of the enduring nature of China’s remaining land security 

challenges, which is an especially plausible explanation given that China 

has mostly settled its territorial disputes, save for a select few outstanding 

trouble spots.92

But the evidence suggests that this “strategic” explanation is incomplete. If the PLA and its ground forces were as responsive to higher level 

strategic directives as the CCP and the military would have observers 

believe, one might expect quicker and more pronounced changes in doctrine or force structure than those described in the previous sections of this 

chapter. One prominent example of this explanatory gap is the apparent 

multiple attempts to adopt the smaller ground force structure that is consistently upheld and reiterated seemingly ad infinitum as a key pillar of army 

modernization. Since the introduction of the 1993 guidelines, the PLA has 

undergone several troop reductions: 500,000 personnel in 1997, 200,000 

more in 2005, and an additional 300,000 announced in 2015.93 The latest 

reductions were reportedly completed in March 2018,94 nearly a full 25 years 

after the strategic need for a smaller ground force was first articulated in 

1993 and 20 years since the first personnel reduction under the “military 

strategic guideline in the new period” was undertaken. Are these reductions 

deliberate and precise responses to changes in China’s land security threats 

and views on the character of warfare, or have they been conducted in a 

delayed and piecemeal fashion because the PLA (and especially its ground 

forces) was unwilling or unable to reduce the size of the force? How much 

of the delay can be attributed to the consensus-driven nature of the PLA’s 

organizational culture, and how much is due to opposition or resistance? 

Given the relative consistency in China’s views on land security threats 

since 1993, the timing of the iterative, piecemeal force reductions cannot 

be readily explained by adjustments in perceptions of land security threats.

A second explanation involves PLA (and especially ground force) 

resistance to implementing its conclusion that smaller, modular, and 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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multifunctional forces were necessary because these changes went against 

parochial organizational interests within the ground forces. Seasoned 

PLA experts point out that the PLA does not always respond rapidly to 

decisions it does not like. There is ample scholarship supporting the idea 

that the PLA and its ground forces may be less than fully willing to follow 

through on CCP directives,95 and history is replete with concrete instances 

of serious friction between the Party and army. One recent example is the 

November 2015 announcement of a 3-year phase out of PLA commercial 

businesses, which came nearly two decades after the famous 1997 divestiture of PLA businesses ordered by Jiang Zemin, which was apparently not 

as effective or complete as civilian leaders had hoped.96 Through this lens, 

one might attribute the slow and small-scale changes in army priorities to 

organizational backsliding and unwillingness to break “iron rice bowls” 

within the service. The army’s professional role as land warfare experts 

gives the service excellent bona fides upon which to execute this particular form of doctrinal disobedience, as with any other service. The long 

series of experimental exercises in the former Jinan MR may have been an 

expression of this resistance, serving as an excuse to put off implementation of needed reforms rather than a genuine effort to change the army.97

Was the army’s laggard pace of change actually a result of a deliberate 

campaign of military slow walking?

A third possible explanation for the army’s relative failure to adapt 

to a new type of force centers on a potential organizational inability to 

do so, or at least do so in a radical way. Military organizations, like their 

nonmilitary counterparts, are typically deeply resistant to change, except 

under conditions of competition or doctrinal innovation from a foreign 

opponent.98 A review of scholarly literature on organizational behavior 

suggests that organizations rarely adopt radical change, preferring instead 

to engage in incremental innovation characterized by the adoption of policy 

options that bear a strong resemblance to choices adopted in the past.99 On 

its face, the main body of PLA and army literature regarding land security 

threats appears to conform to these patterns of behavior—views on regional 
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

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challenges and the future shape of the force have remained nearly identical, 

while changes to emphasize amphibious operations use many of the same 

intellectual language and constructs employed before the latest revision to 

China’s military strategic guideline.100 This suggests that the ground forces 

may have previously been organizationally unable to innovate, hindered by 

a particular brand of organizational pathology that emphasizes hierarchy 

and consensus-driven processes.101

Evidence to assess the relative weight of these explanations is difficult 

to come by, but some details from the PLA reforms give hints that all three 

of these explanations may be valid to varying degrees. Some of the latest 

reforms appear to be directed at remedying selected residual outcomes 

that could have resulted from the above three explanations, especially 

any deliberate slow-rolling or inability to foster doctrinal innovation. 

For instance, the reduction of army influence at the highest levels of 

administrative and operational command, exemplified by the reassignment of several former General Staff Department functions to competing 

organizations102 and the formation of joint operations command centers 

[lianhe zuozhan zhihui zhongxin, 联合作战指挥中心] at the new theater 

commands,103 would likely reduce any army-led efforts to obstruct or 

hinder the development of a “joint” PLA. The heavier presence of air force 

and navy officers at the theater commands is likely to force their army 

counterparts to interact more with other doctrinal schools of thought.104

The bevy of first-time military delegates to the latest Party congress may 

also hint at a broader displacement of army personnel who were professionally disinclined toward change.105

While it remains difficult to determine precisely which of the above 

explanations best describes the army’s pace and scope of change, the 

relative validities of these explanations nonetheless have much larger 

implications for the army, the PLA writ large, and the state of Partymilitary relations in China.

If the army failed to adjust in the past based on limited adjustments 

in strategy or views on the character of warfare, the latest changes in the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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ground forces suggest that a dramatic reorientation in the army’s future 

force is coming to fruition. Many of the changes that army theorists have 

discussed at length over the past 20-odd years are finally being realized, 

shortly after the issuance of a new military strategic guideline strongly 

emphasizing maritime threats. Reforms from the “neck down” [bozi yixia 

gaige, 脖子以下改革] have resulted in significant reductions and changes 

to army units, including the elimination of five group army headquarters 

and the redistribution and reassignment of many of their subordinate 

units, personnel, and equipment. The remaining group armies command 

combined arms brigades instead of divisions, and have been redesignated, 

reduced in size, and completely reorganized.106 If the army is responsive 

to the latest military strategic guideline, it will continue to work toward 

developing smaller, modularized, and multifunctional forces, primarily 

for use in joint maritime operations.

If the ground forces were backsliding, some elements of the reforms 

may be better interpreted as deliberately disruptive measures. The process 

of “discarding Big Army Mentality” may have motivated the removal of 

individual leaders and precipitated the abolition of certain institutions and 

departments, and any further perceived Big Army Mentality may result 

in further disruption within the PLA ground forces. A concerted move 

against the army would bode ill for the Party-army relationship, and analysts should expect to see much more stringent efforts at political control of 

the army in particular. Ground force personnel associated with corruption 

may be drummed out of the force en masse, and the remaining forces and 

their commanders will likely experience a sharp uptick in political work 

emphasizing political and personal loyalty to Xi Jinping. For career army 

personnel, it will likely pay to be “Red.”

If the ground forces are simply risk averse and organizationally incapable of articulating a radically different view of land security challenges, 

the process of discarding Big Army Mentality is likely to be gentler and 

more gradual, although just as jarring in the end. Party and military 

leaders may increase the army officers’ exposure to other components 
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

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of the PLA, namely the air force, navy, and Rocket Force, in an attempt 

to diversify army doctrinal and operational thinking. Older officers will 

be ushered out of their posts in order to be replaced by a new generation 

that is more inclined to value joint operations with other services. One 

obvious price of becoming more accepting of change in the army, however, is that the service’s bureaucratic status and influence are likely to 

continue to decrease as a result of any “radical” changes in views on land 

security challenges.

These three paths are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and some of 

the recently announced changes from the reforms could be indicators of all 

three explanations of army theoretical and actual change. One major issue 

going forward is that absent better data, much of the evidence gleaned from 

the reforms can be interpreted as supporting evidence for multiple theories 

explaining the army’s views on land security challenges. For instance, army 

leadership reductions and reassignments resulting from the group army 

reorganization could be part of the service’s response to a new strategy, 

serve as a punishment to some backsliding officers, or remove organizational and bureaucratic obstacles to needed change. On balance, such a 

leadership change probably achieves all three of those objectives, which 

makes it difficult to determine which explanation is most valid.

As it stands, the key findings of this chapter suggest that while changes 

in China’s external security challenges, altered perceptions of the character 

of warfare, and new political directives all likely played critical roles in driving these latest adaptations in the PLA ground forces, these explanations 

for reform neglect the army’s organizational interests as a potential driver 

and enabler of reform. While an organizational explanation may still be 

unable to account for exactly what happened to push the 2015 reforms to 

fruition, the existing body of literature on bureaucratic behavior in general 

and on the ground forces suggests that army organizational interests almost 

certainly influenced the scale and timing of reforms.

To the extent that army organizational interests prove to be important 

determinants of the future service, they may push the PLA ground forces 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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toward a more offensive-oriented role for a PLA ground force that has previously been tasked to defend and deter. This is not to say that the PLA or the 

highest CCP leadership will opt to use the ground forces in an offensive manner, 

but rather to imply that a more joint PLA ground force would have a greater 

organizational preference for offensive actions within the context of the PLA’s 

broader posture of active defense. This may be especially true in a Taiwan 

scenario in which the ground forces may be called upon to invade the island.

Ultimately, the ongoing transformation of the army into the ground 

component of a joint force is still not good for the service’s bureaucratic 

standing. An altered strategic paradigm will likely precipitate a continued 

decline in army bureaucratic power and influence. Organizational opposition or simple organizational pathology is likely to trigger similar outcomes, 

albeit with varying degrees of disruption. Given these possible explanations 

and outcomes, the other PLA services and branches will likely continue to 

gain at the expense of the ground forces as the PLA continues to implement 

the next slate of reforms. Nonetheless, the army’s embrace of joint warfare 

will likely continue to be its “least bad” organizational choice, especially 

in light of its other options.

Notes

1 Zhang Jiaoying [张骄瀛], ed., “CMC Opinions on Deepening National 

Defense and Military Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], 

Xinhua [新华社], January 1, 2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_128588503.htm>.

2 For a similar but distinct categorization of the factors that spur changes 

in military strategy, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: 

Explaining China’s Changes in Military Strategy,” International Security 42, no. 3 

(Winter 2017/2018), 40–44.

The author is indebted to Dennis J. Blasko, Morgan Clemens, and 

Phillip C. Saunders for their generous help in reviewing previous 

versions of this chapter. Any errors are the author’s alone.
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

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3 For an extensive description of the formulation, content, and significance of 

the 1993 military strategic guideline, see David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National 

Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” in Right 

Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. 

Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2007), 69–140.

4 Wang Xiangfu [王祥富] et al., eds., Study Guide on Jiang Zemin National 

Defense and Military Construction Thought [江泽民国防和军队建设思想学习读

本] (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press [中共党史出版社], 2002), 75.

5 Shan Xiufa [单秀法], ed., Research on Jiang Zemin National Defense and Military Construction Thought [江泽民国防和军队建设思想研究] (Beijing: Academy 

of Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2004), cited in Finkelstein, “China’s 

National Military Strategy,” 106.

6 China’s National Defense in 2004 [2004 年中国的国防] (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, December 2004), available 

at <www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249947.htm>.

7 China’s Military Strategy [中国的军事战略] (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015), available at <www.mod.

gov.cn/auth/2015-05/26/content_4586723.htm>.

8 Language calling for the military to rid itself of the “big army” [大陆军] 

mentality appeared in several papers published by China Military Science in a 

two-part 2014 study of Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the military. For examples of this 

language, see Gao Guanghui [高光辉], “Considerations on Adhering to the Standard of Warfighting Capability in the New Situation” [新形势下坚持战斗力标准

的思考], China Military Science [中国军事科学], vol. 3 (2014), 34; and Wang Pei 

and Zhang Zhihui [王培, 张志辉], “Adhere to the Sole and Fundamental Standard 

of Warfighting Capability—A Thorough Study of Xi Jinping’s Important Expositions on the Standard of Warfighting Capability” [坚持战斗力这个唯一的根本的

标准—深入学习领会习近平关于战斗力标准的重要论述], China Military Science

[中国军事科学], vol. 3 (2014), 29.

9 China’s National Defense in 1998 [1998 年中国的国防] (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, September 1998), available 

at <http://60.people.com.cn/GB/166974/9988169.html>.

10 Li Tao [李涛], “Ten Historical Troop Reductions of the People’s Liberation 

Army” [人民解放军历史上的10次大裁军], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 18, 

2015, available at <www.81.cn/20151126jg/2015-11/18/content_6885147.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

116

11 See Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 96; and Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Amphibious Capabilities: Structured 

for Deterrence,” China Brief 10, no. 17 (August 19, 2010), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/pla-amphibious-capabilities-structured-for-deterrence/>.

12 Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity,” 79.

13 Ibid., 80.

14 Ibid., 81.

15 Chang Qiaozhang and Cui Shuxia [常巧章, 崔叔霞], “High-Technology 

Warfare” [高技术战争], in China Military Encyclopedia [中国军事百科全书], Military Science I [军事学术1], ed. Song Shilun and Xiao Ke [宋时轮, 萧克] (Beijing: 

Academy of Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 1997), 126–127.

16 All-Military Military Terminology Management Committee [全军军事术

语管理委员会], People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology [中国人民解放军

军语] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2011), 48.

17 Ibid.

18 Zhan Yu [战玉], ed., Research on Army Transformation under Informationized Conditions [信息化条件下陆军转型研究] (Beijing: Academy of Military 

Science Press, 2009), 270–271.

19 For a detailed analysis of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces’ 

transregional exercises involving other services, see Dennis J. Blasko, “Clarity of 

Intentions: People’s Liberation Army Transregional Exercises to Defend China’s 

Borders,” in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, ed. Roy 

Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2012), 171–212; and his chapter in this volume. See also Kevin McCauley, 

PLA System of System Operations: Enabling Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, 2017), 67.

20 Dennis J. Blasko, “Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter 

Force,” China Brief 17, no. 8 (June 9, 2017), available at <https://jamestown.org/

program/recent-developments-chinese-armys-helicopter-force/>.

21 Hu Jintao, “Recognize Historical Missions of Our Military in the New 

Period of the New Century” [认清新世纪新阶段我军历史使命], speech to session of 

the Central Military Commission, Beijing, December 24, 2004, available at <http://

gfjy.jxnews.com.cn/system/2010/04/16/011353408.shtml>.

22 Morgan Clemens, “PLA Thinking on Military Operations other Than 

War,” in China’s Evolving Military Strategy, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, DC: 

The Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 338.
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

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23 In 2008, the Academy of Military Science published a series of books for 

military distribution only through the Nanjing Army Command College [南京陆

军指挥学院] on military operations other than war. The series included volumes 

on the army’s role in counterterrorism, protection of social stability, peacekeeping 

operations, and disaster relief, among others. See Zhang Jian [张健], ed., Military 

Operations other Than War Research Series [非战争军事行动系列研究] (Beijing: 

Academy of Military Science Press, 2008).

24 See Zhan Yu [战玉], “Strategic Considerations on Army Transformation” [

对陆军转型的战略思考], China Military Science [中国军事科学], vol. 2 (2008), 97; 

and Zhan, Research on Army Transformation, 271–272.

25 For a discussion of how PLA academicians conceived of peacekeeping 

rotations, see Li Chunyuan [李春元], ed., Army Peacekeeping Operations Research

[陆军维和行动研究] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2008), 100–106.

26 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 84.

27 Yin Shijie [尹世杰], ed., “Army Begins Organizing Peacekeeping Unit Awaiting 

Orders” [陆军启动组建6类19支维和待命部队], Xinhua Online [新华网], November 

18, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/2017-11/18/c_1121976423.htm>.

28 Zhuang Pinghui, “Two Chinese UN Peacekeepers Killed, Two Seriously 

Injured in Attack in South Sudan,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

July 12, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1988348/two-chinese-un-peacekeepers-killed-two-seriously>.

29 China’s Military Strategy.

30 Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Army Group Army Reorganization: An Initial 

Analysis,” October 2017, available at <www.ashtreeanalytics.com/wp-content/

uploads/2017/10/PLA-Army-Group-Army-Reorganization-An-Initial-Analysis.pdf>.

31 Sarah Zhang, “China Completes Registration of 8,000-Strong UN Peacekeeping Force, Defense Ministry Says,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

September 29, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2113436/china-completes-registration-8000-strong-un>.

32 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reform, INSS Strategic Forum 294 (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, April 2016), 1–9.

33 Researchers at PLA’s National Defense University began work on the 1999 

version of the Science of Military Strategy in 1992, and Academy of Military Science researchers from the Strategy Research Department began work on the 2001 

edition of the Science of Military Strategy in 1996. For information on the drafting 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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processes for both of these volumes, see Wang Wenrong [王文荣], ed., Science of 

Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学

出版社], 1999), 1; and Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi [彭光谦, 姚有志], eds., 

Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 

2001), 509–510. For relevant text on force reduction, see Wang, Science of Military 

Strategy, 273–274, 383; and Peng and Yao, Science of Military Strategy, 203.

34 Zhan, “Strategic Considerations on Army Transformation,” 97–98. Similar 

calls for army force reductions were echoed in a 2009 book edited by the same 

author. For one example of many, see Zhan, Research on Army Transformation 

under Informationized Conditions, 31–33.

35 Li, “Ten Historical Troop Reductions of the People’s Liberation Army.”

36 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

Academy of Military Science Press, 2013), 201. 

37 Blasko, “Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force.”

38 For rumors of a transfer of a 26th Group Army brigade to the PLA Navy 

Marine Corps, see “Two Generals Strike a Pose: Chinese Marine Corps About to 

Expand?” [这两位少将亮相, 中国海军陆战队要扩编成军?], May 29, 2017, available 

at <www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_05_29_410685.shtml>.

39 For a seminal treatment of the importance of the military strategic guideline in understanding China’s national military strategy, see Finkelstein, “China’s 

National Military Strategy,” 69–140. For a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the existence of the military strategic guideline as a single document, 

see Timothy R. Heath, “An Overview of China’s National Military Strategy,” in 

China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 4–6. See also China’s National Defense in 2004

and China’s Military Strategy.

40 Wang Fa’an [王法安], ed., Strong Military Strategy Amidst China’s Peaceful 

Development [中国和平发展中的强军战略] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science 

Press, 2011), 58, 78.

41 For an example, see Zhan, Research on Army Transformation under Informationized Conditions, 291.

42 PLA academics have written extensively about India’s military strategy and 

the threat India poses to China. For a candid 2005 assessment of the Indian border 

threat, see Geng Weidong and Zhou Zhenfeng [耿卫东, 周振锋], eds., Joint Border 

Operations at the Group Army Level [集团军级边境联合作战] (Beijing, Academy 

of Military Science Press, 2005), 1–18.

43 China’s Military Strategy.
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

119

44 Wang, Science of Military Strategy, 282–283.

45 Wang, Strong Military Strategy Amidst China’s Peaceful Development, 177.

46 Wang Xixin [王西欣], “Understanding of and Consideration on Improving 

Warfighting Capabilities of the PLA Infantry Forces” [对提高陆军部队实战能

力的认识与思考], China Military Science [中国军事科学], vol. 4 (2013), 103–107.

47 See Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2015), 330, 332; Shi 

Zhongwu [石忠武], “Considerations on Promoting the Transformation of the PLA 

Army” [推进陆军转型建设的几点思考], China Military Science [中国军事科学], 

vol. 6 (2016), 106–107; Wang Jishan [王吉山], “A Study of Real Combat Training 

of the PLA Army” [陆军实战化训练研究], China Military Science [中国军事科

学], vol. 5 (2015), 127–128; Zhang Dongjiang, Xu Zhen, and Lü Tao [张东江, 许

震, 吕涛], “Guidance of Xi Jinping’s Important Thought on ‘Building a Human 

Community of Shared Destiny’ for China’s Military Strategy” [习近平“构建人类

命运共同体”重要思想对中国军事战略的指导意义], China Military Science [中国

军事科学], vol. 2 (2017), 9.

48 Blasko, “PLA Army Group Army Reorganization.”

49 China’s National Defense in 2000 [2000年中国的国防] (Beijing: State 

Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, October 16, 2000), 

available at <www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307949/307949.htm>.

50 Blasko, “Clarity of Intentions,” 171–212. See also McCauley, 67.

51 Xi Jinping, “Build a People’s Military That Obeys Party Command, Can 

Fight and Win Wars, and Has an Excellent Work Style” [建设一支听党指挥,能大

胜仗,作风优良的人民军队], News of the Chinese Communist Party [中国共产党新

闻网], March 11, 2013, available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0720/

c397563-27332090.html>.

52 “CPC Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues” 

[中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua, November 15, 2013, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm>. 

53 See Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the 90th Anniversary of the 

Founding of the People’s Liberation Army,” Qiushi Journal 9, no. 4 (October–December 2017), available at <http://english.qstheory.cn/2017-11/28/c_1122006806.htm>.

54 Shao Beizhen and Ren Lihong [邵贝真, 任丽虹], eds., “Army Commander 

Li Zuocheng: Build a Strong Modernized New Type of Army” [陆军司令员李作成:

建设强大的现代化新型陆军], People’s Daily [人民日报], January 31, 2016, available 

at <http://sn.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0131/c358036-27662181.html>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

120

55 Jiang Pingping and Cheng Hongyi [姜萍萍, 程宏毅], eds., “Work Hard to 

Build a Strong, Modernized New Type of Army—Deep Study Implementation of 

Chairman Xi’s Important Thoughts Regarding Army Building” [努力建设一支强

大的现代化新型陆军—深入学习贯彻习近平主席关于陆军建设重要论述], Qiushi 

[求是], February 26, 2016, available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0216/

c40531-28128055.html>.

56 Li Chunyuan and Li Zhangrui [李春元, 李章瑞], eds., Army Command in 

Joint Operations [联合作战中的陆军指挥] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science 

Press, 2009), 20.

57 Wang, ed., 75.

58 See Zhang, ed.

59 For instance, see Guo Tong [郭统], “Adhere to Guiding Army Transformation 

by Xi Jinping’s Thought on Military Strategy” [坚持以习近平军事战略思想指导陆

军转型建设], China Military Science [中国军事科学], vol. 3 (2017), 32–39; and Chen 

Genhua and Fu Minghua [沈根华, 付明华], “Consolidate the Political Guarantee for 

Army Transformation—A Strategic Consideration of Strengthening Army’s Ideological and Political Construction” [强化陆军转型建设的政治保证—加强陆军思想政

治建设的战略思考], China Military Science [中国军事科学], vol. 3 (2017), 40–48.

60 See Max Weber, “Essay on Bureaucracy,” in Bureaucratic Power in National 

Policy Making, 4th ed., ed. Francis E. Rourke (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 

1986), 69; and David Beetham, Bureaucracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 

Press, 1987), 60, 75.

61 Weber, 67–73.

62 See Zhan, ed., 144; and Li and Li, eds., 27.

63 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and 

Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 51.

64 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why 

They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 195.

65 Li and Li, eds., 21.

66 Ibid., 25–29.

67 William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Public Economics (Brookfield, VT: 

Edward Elgar, 1994), 38.

68 Ibid., 36–42.

69 Yan Jia and Shi Jianfeng [严佳, 施剑峰], “An Analysis of the Weaponry 

Funds Distributed to the Army in the Future” [我军陆军武器装备经费投入预期], 

Military Economics Research [军事经济研究], vol. 9 (2002), 35–36.
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

121

70 An Wenchao, Hao Lu, and Jiang Nan [安文超, 郝路, 姜楠], “Problems 

and Solutions in National Defense Budget Allocation Efficiency” [国防预算

配置效率的困境与出路], Military Economics Research [军事经济研究], vol. 11 

(2011), 18–20.

71 B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative 

Public Administration (New York: Routledge, 2010), 204.

72 Ibid., 205.

73 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the 

Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999), 296.

74 Zhan, ed., 276.

75 Ibid., 221.

76 Ibid., 247–248.

77 Dennis J. Blasko, “China’s Evolving Approach to Strategic Deterrence,” in 

China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 315–334.

78 Blasko, “PLA Army Group Army Reorganization.”

79 Li and Li, eds., 27.

80 Zhan, ed., 144.

81 Ibid., 142.

82 Murray Scot Tanner, “How China Manages Internal Security Challenges 

and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than 

Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 40.

83 General Xu Qinxian, commander of the 38th Group Army, refused to lead 

his forces into Tiananmen Square to clear out student protestors in 1989. Other 

officials have registered their disapproval: former Defense Minister General Chi 

Haotian asserted that the actions at Tiananmen Square “would not happen again.” 

See Verna Yu, “No Regrets for Defiant Tiananmen General,” South China Morning 

Post (Hong Kong), February 25, 2011, available at <www.scmp.com/article/738185/

no-regrets-defiant-tiananmen-general>; and Dennis J. Blasko and John F. Corbett, 

Jr., “No More Tiananmens: The People’s Armed Police and Stability in China, 1997,” 

China Strategic Review 3, no. 1 (1998), 88–89.

84 Roy Kamphausen, “China’s Land Forces: New Priorities and Capabilities,” 

in Strategic Asia 2012–2013: China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and 

Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 32.

85 In the past, PLA Army writings have allocated dedicated and extensive 

coverage to a range of stand-alone military operations other than war (MOOTW) 
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missions; one recent volume, however, makes reference to counterterrorism and 

social stability operations in the context of joint border campaign operations, not as 

part of a broader MOOTW construct. See Zhang, ed., for an example of the former; 

and Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Ying [曹正荣, 孙龙海, 杨颖], eds., 

Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战] (Beijing: National Defense 

University Press [国防大学出版社], 2014), 246–247, for an example of the latter.

86 Shou, ed., 6. See also Blasko, “China’s Evolving Approach,” 317–318.

87 Zhang Tao, ed., “Monthly Press Conference of the Ministry of National 

Defense on September 28,” Ministry of National Defense, September 28, 2017, 

available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/focus/2017-09/28/content_4793398.htm>.

88 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age 

of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 10 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 18–19; and Chi-yuk Choi, “Admiral Named to 

Head PLA’s New Southern Theater Command,” South China Morning Post (Hong 

Kong), January 19, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/

article/2063649/admiral-named-head-plas-southern-theatre-command>.

89 “Two Generals Strike a Pose.”

90 The 2002 defense white paper claimed that the PLA would pursue both 

mechanization and informationization, but the 2004 white paper announced that 

the PLA would transition from mechanization to informationization, cementing 

a shift in priorities that would ultimately benefit other services over the army. 

See China’s National Defense in 2002 [中国的军事战略] (Beijing: State Council 

Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, December 2002), available 

at <eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2002.htm>; and China’s National 

Defense in 2004.

91 This is almost certainly the narrative that the Chinese Communist Party 

wants both the PLA and the outside world to believe. Defense white papers produced 

for public consumption constantly reiterate that the army will “continue to” carry 

out modernization according to strategic directives from on high. Any alternative narratives would seriously undermine the governing principle of Party-army 

relations, namely that the “Party Controls the Gun” (党指挥枪). See note 34 for an 

example of the careful and differential use of English and Chinese to convey separate 

messages to Chinese and foreign audiences.

92 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 2008), 300–319.

93 Li.
Choosing the “Least Bad Option”

123

94 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on March 29,” China 

Military Online, March 30, 2018, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2018-03/30/content_7987841.htm>.

95 Volumes have been written on the topic of tensions in China’s civil-military 

relationship. Among other works, see Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: 

Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1982); Michael Kiselycynyk and Phillip C. Saunders, Civil-Military Relations in 

China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics, China Strategic Perspectives 2 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2010); James C. Mulvenon, “China: Conditional 

Compliance” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

96 For an analysis of the November 2015 announcement, see James C. Mulvenon, “PLA Divestiture 2.0: We Mean It This Time,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 

50 (2016). For a study of the 1998 divestiture, see James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex 1978–1998 (Armonk, 

NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), which follows up on the problem that apparently never ends.

97 Blasko, “Clarity of Intentions,” 171–212.

98 Much of the literature on organizational behavior can be found in the eponymously named classic on organizations by March and Simon. See James G. March 

and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958). For 

discussions of change within militaries based upon these academic studies of organizational behavior, see Kimberly Marten-Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization 

Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991 (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1993); and Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, 

and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

99 The main threads of this argument are laid out in a study of American 

government organizations in Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling 

Through,’” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (Spring 1959), 79–88. The framework was extended to an analysis of 1970s Soviet policymaking in Valerie Bunce 

and John M. Echols III, “Power and Policy in Communist Systems: The Problem of 

‘Incrementalism,’” The Journal of Politics 40, no. 4 (August 1978), 911–932.

100 Multiple army theoreticians, for example, have repeatedly urged caution 

about the scale and the shape of ground force drawdowns throughout the entire 

period of study covered in this chapter.

101 One fitting and obvious example of the PLA’s emphasis on consensus comes 

from examining the authorship of PLA books. The most authoritative works within 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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the ecosystem of PLA academic literature are typically recognized as ones authored 

by large committee(s) or attributed to entire organizations. Nearly all major PLA 

academic works are edited or vetted by a research or supervisory committee.

102 For a detailed examination of which sub-departments and functions were 

redistributed to which organizations, see Wuthnow and Saunders, 10–13.

103 Chen Jian [陈剑], ed., “Beginning a New Trend Amidst Fluttering Red 

Flags—Post-Establishment Observations of the Theater Commands” [开局新风

起猎猎战旗红—东南西北中五战区成立伊始见闻], Xinhua [新华社], February 3, 

2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/02/c_1117973365.htm>.

104 Wuthnow and Saunders, 18–19.

105 Cheng Li, “Forecasting China’s Largest-Ever Turnover of Military Elite 

at the 19th Party Congress,” Brookings, September 18, 2017, available at <www.

brookings.edu/opinions/forecasting-chinas-largest-ever-turnover-of-militaryelite-at-the-19th-party-congress/>.

106 For a detailed analysis of these “neck-down” reforms to the PLA ground 

forces, see Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Army Group Army Reorganization.”
125

THE IMPACT OF 

XI-ERA REFORMS ON THE 

CHINESE NAVY

By Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson

This chapter examines how China has come to declare itself a maritime country and how the reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Xi Jinping affect the navy’s ability to protect and 

advance China’s maritime interests and its own organizational interests. It 

examines the context within which China’s maritime evolution is occurring, 

explores three vectors of naval modernization, and considers the difference 

that PLA reforms might make for each. Xi, general-secretary of the Chinese 

Communist Party, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), 

and commander in chief of the armed forces, has stated that his “China 

Dream” includes a “strong military dream” and has tasked the PLA to be 

able to fight and win informationized wars. In pursuit of this goal, Xi has 

implemented ambitious reforms intended to force collaboration between the 

services and improve their ability to conduct joint operations. The PLA Navy 

(PLAN) stands to benefit from a reduction in traditional ground force dominance, but the reforms may also shift the trajectory of naval modernization 

efforts in directions less supportive of an independent navy.

This chapter is organized in five sections. The first frames China’s 

maritime development by examining its strategic drivers. The second 

CHAPTER 3
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

126

outlines the navy’s three vectors of modernization: hardware and “software” developments aimed at creating a blue-water navy capable of power 

projection; creation of a maritime component that can work effectively 

with other services as part of a joint PLA; and further development of 

an “interagency” maritime force wherein the navy works with the coast 

guard, maritime militia, and other parts of the Chinese government to 

advance China’s maritime sovereignty claims. Sections two, three, and 

four lay out each of these vectors and examine the impact of the reforms 

on it. The last section offers broad findings concerning the reform of 

China’s sea forces and related implications, with particular focus on the 

tensions among the three modernization vectors.

Strategic Drivers of China’s Maritime Development 

“Reform and Opening Up,” “Going Out,” and “New Historic Missions”

Since Deng Xiaoping ushered in the policy of “Reform and Opening Up” 

in late 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become increasingly 

integrated into the global economy. China took full advantage of opportunities provided by globalization, with foreign companies investing in China 

to tap cheap labor and Chinese state and private companies gradually developing the expertise and technology to produce for export markets. Rapid 

economic growth increased Chinese demand for imported components, oil 

and natural gas, and food and tied the employment of millions of Chinese 

workers to exports. China’s integration with the global economy received 

a further boost when Hu Jintao urged Chinese companies to “go out” into 

the world by investing abroad to acquire natural resources and technology 

and to compete for foreign construction contracts.1

The growing importance of sea-borne trade and increased PRC investment and citizen presence overseas, some in unstable places, prompted 

Beijing to take measures to secure its new interests. In 2004, Hu Jintao gave 

the PLA “New Historic Missions,” including defending China’s expanding 

international interests.2

 Under this aegis, the PLA Navy has conducted 

counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008 and 
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

127

participated in evacuations of PRC citizens during unrest in Libya and 

Yemen. Social media and press coverage have produced growing calls for 

the Chinese government to better protect PRC citizens abroad.3 China’s 

overseas presence has continued to deepen with Xi Jinping’s Belt and 

Road Initiative, an ambitious plan to fund infrastructure construction 

to increase China’s connectivity with Eurasia and the rest of the world. 

The initiative now even includes an additional maritime component, a 

proposed “Polar Silk Road” through the Arctic Ocean.4

Navy Primed to Take Advantage of China’s New Orientation 

Of all the services, the navy was best positioned to exploit the increasing 

importance of the outside world. The navy has long worked to articulate the 

importance of Chinese maritime interests and to advocate for a more capable 

navy to protect these interests.5 PLAN leaders like Vice Admiral Chen Mingshan have argued since the early 1990s that the navy is “a direct defender of 

its [China’s] economy, especially its maritime economy and foreign trade.”6

Chinese analysts have insisted that the navy needs capabilities “to protect 

[China’s] long and increasingly vital maritime energy supply lines.”7 PLAN 

publications such as Modern Navy8 have emphasized topics such as “maritime resources” more frequently than mainstream civilian publications and 

general defense publications.9 The Chinese maritime lobby has grown to 

include officials in maritime provinces, state-owned and private firms reliant 

on overseas trade, companies that build equipment and technology used to 

seize and build on claimed areas, and military and civilian organizations 

charged with seizing, building, and administering claimed areas.10

The navy not only leveraged the growing importance of the sea for 

China’s economy but also stressed the growing importance of China’s 

maritime and sovereignty claims. China’s three highest profile sovereignty 

disputes (Taiwan, South China Sea, and East China Sea) all involve islands 

or other physical features surrounded by vast bodies of water. The navy and 

marines have occupied physical features in the Paracels and the Spratlys 

for decades. As maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

128

and East China Sea intensified after 2012, the navy took center stage in 

defending China’s interests. Efforts by the Chinese naval and maritime 

lobby to emphasize the growing importance of Chinese maritime interests 

helped attract resources for naval modernization and culminated in the 18th

Party Congress work report in November 2012 that set the task of “building 

China into a sea power nation.”11

Calls for greater efforts to protect Chinese maritime interests were 

supported by rapid economic growth following China’s reform and opening up that enabled the PLA to receive double-digit budget increases for 

decades. Higher budgets benefited all PLA services, but the navy received 

an increasing share of the defense budget beginning in 2004, allowing it 

to create and expand a fleet of modern warships and aircraft. Improved 

underwater, surface, and aerial platforms have allowed the navy to operate 

farther from the PRC more frequently and for longer periods of time. Given 

exposure from port calls, international military exercises, and its increasing 

presence in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Indian Ocean, the 

navy has in many ways become the face of the PLA to the world.

Chinese Naval Modernization 

China’s naval modernization can be analyzed in terms of three vectors of 

modernization. The first involves hardware and “software” developments 

aimed at creating a blue-water navy capable of power projection. The second is creation of a potent maritime component that can work effectively 

with other services to achieve operational synergies as part of a joint PLA 

capable of fighting and winning wars against advanced militaries. The third 

is further development of an “interagency” maritime force where the navy 

works with the coast guard, maritime militia (which the U.S. Department of 

Defense refers to as the People’s Armed Force’s Maritime Militia), and other 

parts of the Chinese government to advance China’s maritime sovereignty 

claims. Each vector is driven by certain factors, is supported by certain 

actors, emphasizes different missions, and is optimized for use in different 

areas. As resources are finite, any increase in resources for one particular 
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

129

vector potentially reduces those available for the others, thereby affecting 

the composition of the navy and its capacity to perform other missions.12

The table illustrates key aspects of each vector.

Table. Three Modernization Vectors for the PLA Navy

Blue-Water Navy Joint Operations 

Force for the Maritime Domain

“Interagency” Maritime Force

Type/Mode 

of Operation

Combined-arms naval 

operations

Joint operations Sovereignty claim 

advancement operations

Maritime 

Challenges

SLOC protection, farseas defense, power 

projection, military 

diplomacy

War vs. high-tech 

adversary, Taiwan, 

ECS, long-range piece 

of joint campaign

Maritime territorial 

disputes, regional naval 

clashes

Missions ASuW, ASW, strike, 

amphibious operations, 

nuclear deterrence

ASuW, ASW, strike, 

transportation, 

amphibious operations, 

nuclear deterrence

Presence, deterrence, 

C2, escalation control

Partners Navy branches Other services CCG, PAFMM, MoFA, 

SOEs

What Do 

Partners 

Provide? 

Nothing ASBMs, long-range 

strike, manpower for 

land ops., air control, 

air defense, airlift, 

cyberspace capabilities, counter-space

White hulls, fishing 

vessels, deniability, 

messaging, numbers 

(swarming), asymmetric approach

Key: SLOC: sea lines of communication; ASuW: anti-surface warfare; ASW: anti-submarine warfare; 

ECS: East China Sea; ASBM: anti-ship ballistic missile; C2: command and control; CCG: China coast 

guard; PAFMM: People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia; MoFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; SOE: 

state-owned enterprise.

First Vector: Blue-Water Navy 

Possession of a blue-water navy has been the “blue dream” of every great power 

since technology made such fleets possible.13 A blue-water fleet is commonly 

seen as the epitome of naval development, with the ability to operate far from 

the homeland and perform combined arms naval operations. In the Chinese 

context, such a fleet would allow the navy to operate independently to address 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

130

the maritime challenges of protecting sea lines of communication, far-seas 

defense, power projection, and military diplomacy in distant seas. It would 

also require the navy to perform the missions of antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, strike, amphibious operations, and nuclear deterrence.

The navy has been working for decades to create its own blue-water 

fleet. This involves two main elements: hardware modernization (military 

equipment) and software modernization (education, training, doctrine, 

and so forth). This vector of modernization supports PLAN interests by 

providing a rationale for moving beyond its original role as a support force 

for the army toward an independent operational capability.

Building the Fleet 

The navy had been undergoing modernization for decades prior to Xi’s 

reforms. Early Soviet (1950–1960), later American (1980s), and post–Cold 

War Russian (1991–present) assistance for Chinese naval modernization have 

been largely supplanted by efforts to replace foreign equipment and technology with indigenously developed or improved Chinese versions. Soviet 

support created an initial foundation for the navy, both in terms of hardware 

and personnel training.14 However, the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1960 

and the Western technology blockade forced China to rely on indigenous 

efforts to reverse-engineer foreign technology and to make incremental 

improvements on Soviet designs. Rapprochement with the United States 

eventually allowed China access to some Western arms and military technology, but this window largely closed after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, 

when the United States and Europe imposed bans on arms sales to China.

Improved relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and its 

eventual breakup gave the Chinese military and defense industry access 

to advanced weapons such as the Kilo-class submarine, Su-27 fighter 

(assembled in China, then reverse-engineered and produced as the J-11), 

Sovremmeny-class destroyers (and their advanced antiship cruise missiles), and S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. The combination of broad 

improvements in China’s technology base, direct access to advanced Russian 
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weapons, assistance from weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union, 

and industrial espionage helped the Chinese defense industry assimilate 

advanced technologies into more advanced weapons systems.

Rapid economic growth spurred on by Deng’s reform and opening up 

initiative provided both technology and resources that allowed the PLA 

to import greater numbers of more advanced equipment and weapons 

and procure the increasingly advanced weapons produced by the Chinese 

defense industry. The PLA’s limited ability to respond to the deployment 

of two U.S. carriers during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 

accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the 

Kosovo War persuaded Chinese leadership to increase funding for military 

modernization. Preparing for a potential invasion or blockade of Taiwan in 

the face of U.S. intervention became the chief scenario for PLA planning 

and force modernization, with the maritime aspects of the Taiwan scenario 

supporting PLAN efforts to procure a range of advanced weapons systems.

China’s naval modernization includes the development and deployment 

of advanced surface ships, submarines, aircraft and aircraft carriers, and 

amphibious vessels that will improve the PLAN ability to conduct a range 

of missions. China’s shipyards are now launching new ships at a brisk pace, 

but have also shifted to focus on “quality over quantity.”15 The old surface 

fleet, based on largely antiquated 1950s Soviet technology with some indigenous improvements, is being replaced with new advanced vessels, such as 

the Type 054/054A frigate, Type 052C/D destroyer, and cruiser-sized Type 

055 destroyer. These vessels feature advanced weapons and modern design 

features such as vertical launch systems capable of launching different types 

of antiship, antiaircraft, and land-attack missiles, phased-array radars, and 

improved air and cruise missile defenses.16 The navy had no corvettes prior 

to 2014, but had 37 Type 056/056A ships as of November 2017.17

The notoriously noisy PLAN submarines have been gradually reducing 

their noise footprint.18 The submarine force consists primarily of diesel-powered attack submarines, most of which are capable of launching advanced 

antiship cruise missiles. The navy has also added 10 nuclear submarines 
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to the force since 2002, including 6 longer range nuclear-powered attack 

submarines, and 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). 

The submarine force may grow to between 69 and 78 submarines by 2020.19

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (Type 001), began sea trials in 

August 2011 and was declared combat ready in November 2016. The Liaoning

carries J-15 fighters that launch off its ski jump–style flight deck. The navy 

is currently developing two more advanced aircraft carriers, with the Type 

001A carrier beginning sea trials in May 2018.20 The planned inclusion of an 

integrated propulsion system on the Type 002 aircraft carrier, which would 

support an electromagnetic aircraft launch system, could allow more rapid 

aircraft launches.21 Xinhua hailed the launch of China’s first carrier as a symbolic step forward: “building a strong navy that is commensurate with China’s 

rising status is a necessary step and an inevitable choice for the country to 

safeguard its increasingly globalized national interests.”22

Due to their value and vulnerability to attack, aircraft carriers typically operate as part of a carrier group with multiple vessels protecting and 

supporting them.23 The navy has made clear its intent to establish carrier 

groups by rushing production of the Type 055 destroyer. The Type 055 

destroyers will join the growing array of vessels and weapon systems that 

will provide Chinese carriers protection against air and cruise missile attack 

and allow them to operate more safely outside the range of land-based aircraft. The navy has also been producing a new type of large replenishment 

ship, the Type 901, which is similar in size to those used by the U.S. Navy.24

The production of such support vessels is particularly important given 

the continuing poor ratio of support vessels to frontline ships of the navy, 

especially when compared with the U.S. Navy.25

The navy has also been deploying new ships to improve its limited 

amphibious capabilities. These include semi-submersible amphibious landing vessels, the Type 726A air-cushioned landing craft, and the Type 071 

landing platform dock. The new ships, coupled with the PLA Navy Marine 

Corps expansion to add additional marine brigades, should significantly 

improve PLAN amphibious warfare capabilities.26
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Creating a “New Type” of Sailor for the New Navy: Recruiting, 

Educating, and Training 

Naval modernization also requires talented personnel capable of executing 

independent and joint operations far from the country’s shores. The service 

and its branches have reformed their efforts to recruit higher caliber personnel to fill their ranks, especially with graduates from civilian universities.27

From 1999 onward, the navy planned to recruit 600 officers from civilian 

higher education institutions each year.28 Naval aviation began recruiting its 

own personnel in 1988, an important step toward achieving independence 

from the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), which enabled it to educate and train 

individuals for aeronautical operations in the maritime domain from the 

beginning of their careers.29

The navy has also reformed the education and training of recruits. 

Since 1987, the navy has utilized the training ship Zheng He, a “classroom 

at sea,” to help train its cadets.30 This ship has been an “especially prolific 

traveler,” even embarking on the first circumnavigation of the world by a 

Chinese navy training ship in mid-2012.31 This has allowed the navy to give 

thousands of cadets hands-on experience in a variety of maritime environments around the world.32 The navy has also recently added a “tall ship,” the 

Polang, as well as the advanced naval training ships, Qi Jiguang and Yupeng. 

These ships and the push for naval personnel to undergo “tempering” on a 

vessel allowed the navy to provide onboard experience for 92 percent of the 

3,000 “new soldiers” trained by the South Sea Fleet from 2011 to 2012.33 To 

give its aviators at-sea experience, the navy launched the air training ship 

Shichang in 1996.34 The PLAN aviation training base at Huangdicun has 

added land-based facilities and equipment, such as ski jumps on runways, 

to allow pilots to practice carrier takeoffs and landings more safely, and 

added catapult launch systems to support training for the Type 002 carrier.35

Similarly, the navy created Vessel Training Centers in the 1980s for 

each of its fleets to provide more detailed and vessel-specific training, facilitating the introduction of new classes of ships. The centers can assemble 

military personnel, industry representatives, and other experts to help 
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create an “Outline for Military Training and Evaluation” specific to each 

class of vessel to accelerate training for the first crews.36 This was seen with 

the Bengbu, the first Jiangdao-class (Type 056) corvette to be introduced 

to the East Sea Fleet.37

An increased operational tempo contributes to training of the force. 

China Daily stated that “each year every combat vessel and submarine will 

spend nearly eight months at sea, carrying out patrols, drills, and training. 

Every day, dozens of aircraft, more than 100 ships and submarines, and 

thousands of navy personnel are in operation.”38 Since December 2008, 

PLAN activity has included continuous deployment of an escort task force 

in the Gulf of Aden to conduct escort and counterpiracy operations. This 

high operations tempo is paralleled by more port calls and increased participation in international military exercises. The navy only conducted 11 port 

calls from 2003 to 2008, but conducted 40 in 2015 alone. The navy has also 

led the way in international military exercises. From 2003 to 2016, the navy 

conducted almost half of all international military exercises that involved 

the PLA, more than any other service. The navy has also begun to participate 

in multilateral exercises such as the U.S. Rim of the Pacific exercise series.39

A growing number of these exercises, especially those with Russia, 

include combat or combat-support elements. The navy “completed its first 

overseas joint beach landing drill” as part of the Joint Sea–2015 exercise in 

Russia.40 Sino-Russian naval exercises are being held in new locations, such 

as in the Baltic Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and Sea of Okhotsk, expanding the 

operational horizons of the navy. Some Sino-Russian naval exercises have 

expanded to include combined arms operations with the participation of 

multiple branches.41 Spurred on by their increasing experience and confidence, some navy officers have even begun using run-ins with foreign forces 

as training opportunities, and they have been recognized and rewarded for 

their actions.42

All these exercises and training have begun to pay off as the traditionally strict control by senior officers is starting to relax, giving operational 

commanders more flexibility. Submarine units have been applauded in 
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recent military media reports for undertaking significant operations without additional senior officers onboard, whose presence often reduced 

the captain of a submarine to a “duty officer.”43 Naval aviation began 

introducing greater “pilot autonomy” back in 2013, marking a shift from 

“nanny-style” control of pilots by superior officers.44

Years after the army first established special operations forces (SOF) 

units in the 1980s, the navy finally established its own SOF regiment in 

the South Sea Fleet.45 This regiment has been able to gain operational 

experience from the navy’s antipiracy patrols, which have included a SOF 

contingent with every flotilla.46 PLA SOF operators have also benefited 

from the establishment of the Special Operations Academy in Guangzhou 

and have sought to gain experience from foreign units by participating in 

international SOF competitions.47 The navy’s SOF regiment is augmented 

by smaller units established in at least two marine corps brigades.48

The PLA marines corps functions as the naval infantry branch of the 

navy but has recently established a separate headquarters and is expanding 

its number of operational brigades as part of PLA reforms. The marines 

were relatively late in joining the rest of the PLA in exercising abroad but 

performed their first overseas exercise in Thailand in 2010.49 The marines 

also appear to now have their own helicopters, which had previously been 

provided by naval aviation.50 The Marine Corps College now boasts more 

than 20 professional programs, an educated faculty, and simulation training 

systems.51 Faculty are being encouraged to participate in exercises to rectify 

their lack of combat and operational experience.52

Other branches such as naval aviation are making similar efforts to 

improve education and training to produce officers and seaman capable of 

operating modern weapons. To leverage carriers, the Naval Aviation Academy 

and Naval Aeronautical Engineering Institute have been combined to form 

the Naval Aviation University/Naval Aeronautical University, which will 

train China’s carrier-based fighter pilots.53 The new university has recruited 

450 pilot cadets, which will eventually translate into a significant boost in 

naval aviation personnel to support the deployment of more carriers.54 Naval 
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aviation has also changed the way it trains pilots to emphasize extended 

daytime and nighttime operations and increasing flights over water and at 

low altitudes.55 To improve the quality and realism of training, naval aviation 

held its first actual combat confrontation exercise between different aircraft 

models in 2011.56

Impact of Reforms on the Blue-Water Navy Vector of Modernization 

The reforms have three main effects on the blue-water navy vector of modernization: altering the role of the services, assigning operational control 

to the theater commands, and improving PLA education, training, and 

personnel systems. First, the services are now responsible for force-building 

rather than operations. This should reduce the operational role of navy 

headquarters. However, the navy appears to be utilizing several methods 

to keep a not-insignificant role in operations. PLAN headquarters appears 

to have retained operational responsibility for counterpiracy deployments 

to the Gulf of Aden. The headquarters role in force-building and setting 

naval training requirements allows the navy to use training exercises to 

maintain an operational role, since virtually anything can be promoted as 

having “training” value. The navy refers to this as moving from “separation 

of training and operations” [xunzhan fenli, 训战分离] to “embedding training in operations” [yizhan zaixun, 以战载训].57 The navy headquarters also 

appears to be using tri-fleet exercises, which do not fall under the responsibility of any particular theater command, as another way to hold onto some 

operational responsibilities.58 An unintended consequence of attempting 

to relegate service headquarters to training and force-building is that it 

frees time and resources for the headquarters to advocate for the interests 

of its individual service.59 Such lobbying is more important as the Chinese 

economy slows, which has already led to slowdowns in military budget 

growth. For the navy, this could lead to clashes with the other services and 

with the new theater commands, which have their own distinct interests. 

Some platforms, like land-based aircraft, are highly relevant for the Eastern 

Theater Command in planning for the invasion of Taiwan, while blue-water 
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systems such as aircraft carriers are less relevant. It remains unclear how 

such discrepancies in interests will be resolved.

The second major impact, placing the theater commands in charge 

of operations, reduces the navy’s autonomy in conducting operations. It 

also complicates operations to protect China’s maritime sovereignty claims 

by adding another bureaucratic actor into the mix, especially if a nonnavy officer is in charge of the theater. However, the navy has used theater 

command geographic constraints to lead some operations. The Indian 

Ocean, for example, falls outside of the geographic jurisdiction of the theater 

commands, giving the navy headquarters a strong case for continued leadership in counterpiracy operations, even if these have joint elements.60 Port 

calls and exercises with foreign militaries also fall outside the geographic 

responsibilities of the theater commands, giving navy headquarters another 

opportunity. However, while navy headquarters can task its components to 

meet certain requirements through training, the theater commands nominally control naval forces within their jurisdiction and may have different 

priorities. This situation is complicated by the fact that the service chiefs are 

no longer on the CMC but are now theater-leader grade, putting them on 

equal footing with the heads of the theater commands.61 Neither side has the 

authority to force the other to follow orders. It is unclear whether one of the 

CMC vice chairmen, or perhaps even Xi himself, will arbitrate such disputes.

While the Joint Staff Department Overseas Operations Office coordinates army peacekeeping operations, the navy appears to control its 

far-seas operations.62 This might be partly due to the unique nature of 

navies and the history of “independent command at sea” that they cherish.63 Despite the increasing number of military diplomacy activities and 

exercises involving naval forces, the theater commands do not appear to 

have been able to curtail these activities to increase focus on joint training 

and theater-specific missions.64

The third major impact of the reforms on this vector of modernization involves personnel issues. Some of the most important aspects of 

the reforms and anticorruption campaign have to do with career paths 
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and the health of the military force as a whole. As of April 2018, PLA 

personnel have received two pay increases since Xi announced the 300,000-

troop cut in September 2015.65 How any military deals with its veterans 

is of immense importance for recruiting and for the morale of existing 

active-duty personnel. The PLA has historically been parsimonious toward 

honoring commitments to its veterans.66 To address these shortcomings, Xi 

announced that the government would “set up an agency that will manage 

veterans and protect their legal rights and interests,”67 and a new Ministry 

of Veterans Affairs was established to care for the PLA’s 57 million retired 

personnel.68 Ensuring fair treatment of veterans will help “make a career 

in the military one that is revered and respected by all.”69 As subsequent 

large-scale veterans protests have demonstrated, this is still one area where 

the armed forces and civilian government are struggling.70

The anticorruption crackdown within the PLA may also make a military career more attractive and respected. While the campaign has often 

selectively removed individuals who were seen as potentially disloyal to the 

Party or to Xi himself, many of those individuals were nonetheless spectacularly corrupt.71 The anticorruption campaign has helped officers who 

resented the negative effects corruption has had on the PLA, those unable 

to afford the bribes necessary to advance within a corrupt system, and 

junior officers who can advance more quickly to fulfill positions vacated by 

corrupt officers.72 This should allow professional military criteria to become 

more important for career advancement, especially for the officer corps.

Second Vector: Naval Component of a Joint Force 

The PLA is a “latecomer” to joint operations.73 Its first and only real joint 

operation was the attack and conquest of the Yijiangshan Islands in 1955.74

An effective joint force, in the Chinese context, can respond to the maritime 

challenges of war against a high-tech adversary, an attempted conquest of 

Taiwan or the Senkakus, and the long-range aspect of joint campaigns in 

the near seas. Officers have acknowledged that the PLA must become more 

joint, which is seen as a fundamental part of modern warfare.75 For this to 
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happen, the concept of winning as a joint force must replace the old concept 

of a “single service victory” [danyi junzhong zhisheng, 单一军种制胜].76 The 

push for jointness has undercut the army’s traditional dominance of the PLA 

to the benefit of the other services. While the navy looks to be a big winner 

under the reforms, interservice rivalry and competition for resources and 

missions remain powerful obstacles to jointness and may have some negative 

impact on navy interests. Moreover, jointness implies that naval operations 

will be conducted via joint command and control structures, potentially 

undercutting the navy’s efforts to develop more autonomy and the ability 

to conduct its own combined arms operations in the far seas.

Joint Education and Training 

The PLA’s conceptualization of jointness involves achieving victory by fusing the “operational strengths” of the separate services together to achieve 

collectively what no service could accomplish alone.77 Jointness received a 

much-needed boost following the ground force–dominated PLA’s inability 

to respond effectively to the U.S. Navy’s sending two aircraft carrier battle 

groups toward Taiwan in March 1996. The role of airpower in the Kosovo 

War and sea power in the Falklands War impressed upon the PLA the strategic importance of other services.78 However, despite frequent mention of 

jointness in articles and internal publications, the reality of jointness still 

lags far behind the rhetoric.

The PLA has tried to rectify the imbalance among the services by 

adding the commanders of other services to the CMC (2004–2017) and 

by increasing students and faculty from services other than the army at 

PLA National Defense University and the Academy of Military Science. 

The presence of these officers was intended to facilitate joint thinking by 

ensuring that non-army perspectives are included in the classroom and in 

important debates.

PLA texts acknowledge that China’s armed forces still have a long way 

to go to achieve true jointness.79 Even with increased focus on educating joint 

commanders and theater command staff, joint experience remains a widely 
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acknowledged weakness of the PLA as a whole.80 Officers complain that the 

lack of joint command experience could reduce its joint commanders to 

mere “armchair strategists” [zhishang tanbing, 纸上谈兵].81 The 2015 book 

Theater Joint Operations Command [zhanqu lianhe zuozhan zhihui, 战区联

合作战指挥] suggested that the PLA should engage more in exchanges and 

exercises with foreign militaries to compensate for this lack of experience.82

However, despite increasing PLA participation in international military 

exercises, only a few of these (a mere 7 percent from 2003–2016) involve 

two or more PLA services.83 The navy has been most active in international 

exercises, but these are usually combined arms exercises with multiple navy 

branches rather than joint exercises with multiple PLA services.

Joint training between the various services continues to be limited, but 

some progress is being made.84 The navy (including surface vessels, marines, 

and naval aviation) and air force participated together in a Sino-Russian 

international exercise, Joint Sea–2015 (II), for the first time in 2015.85 However, in the words of one expert, “true joint interoperability remains largely a 

work in progress for the PLA.”86 The navy and air force are doing some joint 

training, most notably in name-brand exercises, such as Sharp Sword–2015.87

In some of the highest profile joint exercises between naval aviation and 

air force, including Golden Helmet–2015, the two were actually competing 

against one another as opposing forces rather than working together.88

Training between the navy and army is also limited, though this 

appears to be changing as well. One example involves army aviation and 

naval aviation providing air support for marines during amphibious training exercises.89 Another involves joint amphibious exercises with army 

amphibious and ground force units, which would provide the bulk of the 

troops for large-scale amphibious landings, such as an invasion of Taiwan.90

In reviewing PLA joint exercises, press reports highlight “cases in 

which PLA commanders were not well-versed in the wide range of capabilities at their disposal, failed to coordinate and share information among 

the units under their command, and demonstrated their weak command 

and organization skills.”91 The lack of qualified joint commanders and staff 
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officers continues to plague China’s armed forces.92 Without significant 

progress, the PLA’s lack of jointness will result in “deconflicted operations,” 

where the services operate in proximity to, but not with, each other.93

Reduced Army Dominance 

Recognition of the increasing value of the maritime domain and the push 

for jointness have benefited navy modernization efforts. One of the earliest 

indicators of a shift in attention and resources away from the army was the 

2003 force reduction, when it took a disproportionate share of the cuts.94

(Blasko’s chapter in this volume argues that the army is the biggest loser in 

the current PLA personnel reductions, as the PLA places more emphasis 

on the other services.)

Decreasing army dominance can also be seen in the PLA’s changing 

strategic outlook. When the 2002 defense white paper stated that the “primary missions” of each service were to be performed “independently or 

jointly,” it simultaneously encouraged the services not only to work together 

jointly, but also to be able to operate on their own.95 Non-army services 

received a further boost with the 2004 defense white paper, which explicitly 

stated the PLA would “enhance the development of its operational strength 

with priority given to the navy, air force, and Second Artillery Force.”96

Acknowledgment of the important role non-army services would play in an 

invasion of Taiwan also gave the navy a new toehold in operational planning.

While the navy’s focus has gradually shifted outward from coastal to 

offshore defense, establishment of an “active defense” strategy for the PLA 

saw the military leadership formally inaugurate a shift in focus from China 

and its immediately periphery, which favored the army, toward “open seas 

protection,” which favors the navy.97 These changes were illustrated in 

the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy that argued, “the main 

threat of war has already shifted from traditional inland direction to the 

ocean direction.” In addition, the “strong enemy,” a common PLA euphemism for the United States, “will rely on its comprehensive distant combat 

superiority from the ocean direction.” Under such circumstances, it will 
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be “increasingly difficult to protect the homeland from the homeland and 

the near seas from near seas, it might even become untenable.” Therefore, 

defensive operations should be pushed farther away from Chinese territory.98 Efforts to “push forward the strategic frontier” to gain additional 

strategic space boosted the navy because the geography of the region 

means that additional strategic space is maritime space. As maritime concerns—such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and sea-borne trade—have 

grown over the years, the navy appears to have been increasingly successful 

at capitalizing on them to bolster itself as a service.

The push for jointness has opened new opportunities for the navy to 

make itself relevant for additional missions. The service has moved beyond 

its initial coastal defense and sealift missions into missions ranging from 

interdiction to amphibious operations to nuclear deterrence.

Increased Competition for Maritime Missions 

The increased priority of maritime missions not only favors the navy, but 

has also encouraged other services to encroach on PLAN turf by highlighting the relevance of their own current and future capabilities to the 

maritime domain. The navy has responded by further developing its own 

ability to perform “diversified tasks” to reduce the need for help from the 

other services.99 These trends highlight the tension between the navy’s 

desire to be able to conduct independent operations (especially in blue water 

far from China’s coast) and the potential for other services to contribute 

useful capabilities in a joint operational context.

As growth in PLA budgets has slowed, the air force, army, and even 

Rocket Force are attempting to carve out new maritime responsibilities 

(and associated budget claims). The air force has made the clearest effort to 

ensure that it is not left out of the new emphasis on the maritime domain. 

In the past few years, it has taken significant steps to emphasize operations 

over water, the traditional domain of the navy and naval aviation.100 This 

has been marked by a number of firsts, including flights over the Western 

Pacific through new air corridors,101 PLAAF H-6K bombers practicing 
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attacks on Guam,102 and deploying some of the air force’s most advanced 

aircraft, such as the Su-35, to the South China Sea. The air force has also 

expanded the role of its vessel troops to support maritime combat operations.103 A professor from the Air Force Command Academy stated that 

South China Sea deployments showed PLAAF “resolution to implement 

missions in the new era and firmly maintain national sovereignty and 

security and maritime interests.”104

The air force has overhauled training for its pilots to emphasize operations over water, including those farther from shore.105 These included the 

creation of new textbooks, including A Practical Handbook on Maritime 

Live-Fire Training with Trainer Aircraft and Safety Checklist for Maritime 

Live-Fire Training.

106 Classroom work has been augmented by “regular high 

seas training” that began in 2015.107 The air force has held seminars attended 

by senior officers to review its progress in overwater training.108 These 

efforts put the air force in direct competition with the navy for maritime 

missions and resources.

The air force has followed the PLAN lead in using the need to protect 

China’s economic interests as an argument to support its strategic relevance. 

Then–PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian gave a speech in 2014 emphasizing 

the importance of airpower for the maritime domain. According to Ma, 

“[W]inning the initiative in the air is important in effectively responding 

to all kinds of security threats at sea. . . . [We must] fully recognize the new 

circumstances in the defense of maritime rights; [it] gives the air force new 

meaning to accelerate the transition from territorial air defense toward 

attack and defense. . . . [We must] transform the ‘center of gravity’ of sea 

operations toward the employment of airpower.”109

The air force is acquiring two types of aircraft that will expand its 

maritime capabilities. The first is the Y-20 long-range transport, which 

can carry paratroopers and their equipment to the remote physical features 

controlled by China in the South China Sea.110 Paratroopers have conducted 

simulated airdrops over “unfamiliar island targets” in exercises.111 The second is the acquisition of additional and updated tankers, such as the IL-78/
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MIDAS, to augment its small and aging fleet of tankers.112 Expansion of the 

PLAAF tanker fleet, including the rumored development of a tanker variant of the Y-20, would increase the range of PLAAF fighters, surveillance 

aircraft, and bombers, improving their ability to operate far over the ocean 

from land bases in China.113

By contrast, the army has found it harder to carve out a maritime role. 

Although Taiwan has been the main driver of PLA modernization for 

decades, the army only had one amphibious tank brigade in 1997.114 The 

army’s amphibious force has grown since then, but these units only spend 

3 to 4 months a year on amphibious operations, with the rest of their time 

spent on nonamphibious training.115 In 2010, only one army ship group was 

exclusively focused on amphibious support.116 However, it has been trying 

to make itself more relevant for maritime missions. Army amphibious units 

have traditionally focused on the conquest of Taiwan, where the need for 

large numbers of ground troops would guarantee it a prominent role. PLAN 

marines have primary responsibility for amphibious operations involving 

smaller physical features, such as the land features that dot the South China 

Sea. However, the army has recently suggested that it could too have a role 

in capturing and holding smaller islands.117

Even the Rocket Force, the “hermit” of the PLA, is pushing into the 

maritime domain. Its control of the PLA’s land-based antiship ballistic 

missiles (ASBM) represents another attempt by a land-based service to “use 

the land to control the sea” [yi luzhihai, 以陆制海].118 Literature from the 

Second Artillery Force (now the Rocket Force) has been overwhelmingly 

positive on the development and future utility of ASBMs, while PLAN analysts have been more pessimistic about the weapon’s value.119 The DF-21D 

ASBM, dubbed the “carrier-killer,” is an obvious attempt to credibly hold 

U.S. carriers at risk. It is joined by the Rocket Force’s DF-26, which also 

has an ASBM variant and has the range to target U.S. facilities on Guam.120

The Rocket Force can also use its arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles to hit maritime-relevant land targets, such as ports. The 2006 edition of 

The Science of Campaigns discussed how conventional cruise missiles can 
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be used to “implement sea blockades” and “capture localized campaign sea 

superiority.”121 Other tactics, such as a “missile fire blockade” [daodan huoli 

fengsuo, 导弹火力封锁], can disrupt facilities important for naval forces, 

such as ports and relevant airfields.122 While these efforts could be done 

jointly in coordination with the navy and air force, the Rocket Force could 

also conduct such campaigns independently, inserting itself into operations 

for “sea blockades” and “sea dominance.”123

This competition for roles and missions goes both ways. The navy 

now has submarines that can compete with Rocket Force conventional and 

nuclear assets. The navy has four SSBNs armed with nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles and attack submarines that can carry land-attack cruise 

missiles.124 Such assets allow the navy to duplicate some Rocket Force capabilities, potentially with greater survivability than land-based Rocket Force 

assets. The navy also has numerous surface vessels and aircraft armed with 

antiship cruise missiles, which give it a strong tool to beat back Rocket Force 

efforts to intrude too far onto navy turf.125 These systems, and the Rocket 

Force’s desire to maintain primacy in nuclear deterrence and long-range 

conventional strike missions, are likely to limit the Rocket Force’s ability 

to carve out too much space in the maritime domain.126 Despite the clear 

interest of other services in competing for maritime missions and associated 

resources, spending too much time on these missions may compromise 

their combat effectiveness in their primary missions.127

The final advantage the navy has over the other services in the maritime domain is presence. It is the only service that can operate assets on or 

over the high seas for long periods of time. It also has advantages in its ability to use overseas bases and commercial port facilities to provide logistics 

support for its peacetime operations. PLAN ability to launch and recover 

helicopters and planes from frigates and carriers allows it to maintain an 

air presence much longer than the air-refuelable land-based aircraft that 

the air force operates.128 The navy can loiter under the waves, on the waves, 

and in the sky—something no other service can do.
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Impact of Reforms on Joint Force Vector of Modernization 

The reduction of army dominance presents new opportunities for the 

navy to promote its own interests, advocate for increased focus on Chinese 

maritime interests, and argue for new military capabilities to protect those 

interests. However, the intent to eliminate the operational role of the service 

headquarters and to conduct operations via joint command and control 

structures also implies a reduction in PLAN autonomy and increased 

competition for maritime roles and missions from other services.

The shifting of operational responsibilities away from the military 

regions and service headquarters to joint theater commands is perhaps 

the most significant operational change instituted by the reforms. The 

establishment of new joint command structures ends the PLA’s reliance 

on army-dominated military regions and ad hoc wartime joint command 

structures. This shift, combined with placing some non-army officers 

in charge of theater commands (Navy Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai in the 

Southern Theater Command and PLAAF General Yi Xiaoguang in the 

Central Theater Command) and presence of non-army staff in all the theater commands, constitutes an important step toward a more joint force.

The role of theater commands in leading military operations within 

their geographic purview presents both a challenge and opportunity for 

the navy. If the head of a theater command is a naval officer, as in the 

Southern Theater Command, then the navy can theoretically run non-navy 

operations there and decide how to integrate relevant capabilities of other 

services into naval operations.129 Even if another service is in charge of a 

theater command, each of the theater commands with a fleet (Northern, 

Eastern, and Southern) has a navy officer as a deputy commander in change 

of theater command naval forces. Much will depend on how much centralized control the theater commander exerts over the theater ground, naval, 

and air components and how much authority the commander is willing to 

delegate to his component commanders. The fact that army officers have 

little experience in commanding naval operations, and the fact that the 

navy can perform many of its near-seas missions using its own assets to 
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conduct combined arms operations, suggests that navy component commanders are likely to retain a great deal of autonomy in most circumstances. 

Most PLA operations in the South China Sea, for example, are kept below 

the threshold where another country would respond with force. However, 

PLA planning for a Taiwan contingency, which would involve both coastal 

operations to support an amphibious landing and blue-water operations to 

delay U.S. intervention, would require the Eastern Theater Commander 

(currently an army officer) to make difficult choices about priorities.

Third Vector: “Interagency” Operations 

China has a long history of drawing on military and militia vessels, as well 

as civilian ships and fishing boats, to compensate for its limited naval capabilities. However, in recent decades, the PLA has increasingly cooperated 

with other parts of the Chinese government and civilian actors to respond 

to maritime and territorial sovereignty disputes and possible regional 

naval clashes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The heightened 

importance of the maritime domain and maritime sovereignty disputes, 

as well as the proven utility of other components of China’s armed forces 

such as the coast guard and maritime militia in pressing Beijing’s claims, 

have helped drive this vector of modernization. However, the other two 

vectors of modernization have also allowed the navy to build capabilities 

that strengthen its ability to conduct “interagency” operations. 

These operations involve the navy working with the maritime militia and coast guard, as well as utilizing a network of bases and outposts 

throughout the South China Sea.130 Civilian agencies are involved in some 

aspects: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state-run media, for instance, 

play an important role in shaping and propagating the narrative of the day.

Navy Leading from Behind 

China’s approach to the South China Sea involves seeking to use a range of 

military, paramilitary, legal, and administrative tactics to expand Chinese 

control of disputed features and waters, while minimizing the chances 
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of military conflict breaking out. The PRC has adopted three lines of 

“defense” in this effort, with the maritime militia as the first, maritime law 

enforcement agencies as the second, and the PLA (especially the navy) as 

the third.131 While the navy is deliberately kept away from the frontline to 

minimize escalation risks, it played a significant role in crafting the strategy 

and continues to directly and indirectly support the other actors.132

China’s maritime militia has always been an integral component of 

China’s maritime forces, and in recent years, its importance and interactions with the navy have increased significantly.133 The maritime militia 

has benefited from a generous building program that has seen its branches 

acquire new, large steel-hulled vessels.134 Trends seen in the PLA at large, 

such as a shift toward greater professionalism and phasing out less advanced 

units, are also evident in the maritime militia.135 Leading personnel in the 

maritime militia are being militarized, professionalized, and incentivized; 

the organization can now call on elite units for more specialized and challenging tasks. Some maritime militia branches have become so well trained 

and are so useful that they have even been referred to as a “veritable ‘light 

cavalry.’”136 Some maritime militia detachments have developed specialized 

combat support and technical skills to better aid the navy in operations.137

While the maritime militia organization has a limited ability to engage in 

high-end warfare, it is optimized for sovereignty advancement operations 

that stay below the threshold of military conflict.138

The navy also has been closely tied to the coast guard since the latter was formed by merging several different maritime law enforcement 

agencies. Its role in protecting disputed Chinese maritime and sovereignty 

claims and projecting Chinese domestic law into disputed waters have led 

many to call it “China’s second navy.”139 The PLA influenced its creation, 

and the navy plays a significant role in planning, coordinating, and conducting coast guard operations.140 Like the maritime militia, coast guard 

vessels have been significantly upgraded in recent years. Some are actually 

former PLAN vessels with some weapons systems removed.141 Some larger 

coast guard vessels even have 76mm main guns, among other armaments.142
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The maritime militia and coast guard have carried out several successful interagency operations against foreign countries in cooperation with 

the navy. Two examples are the Impeccable incident in March 2009 and 

HYSY-981 oil rig incident in May–July 2014.

Impeccable Incident, March 8–9, 2009. The Impeccable incident 

involved the USNS Impeccable, an ocean surveillance ship that was shadowed and harassed by Chinese vessels that maneuvered in ways that 

threatened its safety. The Chinese ships and aircraft involved included 

a PLAN frigate, Fisheries Law Enforcement patrol vessel, State Oceanic 

Administration patrol vessel, two trawlers (one of which was from the 

Sanya maritime militia), and at least one Y-12 aircraft.143 The Chinese action 

involved multiple military and civilian government organizations and maritime militia vessels, necessitating a certain level of coordination. Chinese 

vessels came dangerously close to the Impeccable, dropped objects directly 

in its path, tried to snag its acoustics equipment, and even obstructed it 

after it announced it was trying to leave the area.144 At one point a Chinese 

Y-12 buzzed the Impeccable 11 times.145 The Chinese operation was reportedly led by then-head of the Fisheries Law Enforcement’s South China Sea 

Bureau, Wu Zheng.146 Given the variety of Chinese assets and their close 

proximity to each other and to the Impeccable, a high degree of communication and control was necessary to coordinate actions and avoid collisions.

HYSY-981 Oil Rig Incident, May 2–July 15, 2014. The HYSY-981 oil 

rig incident is China’s largest and most sophisticated “Three-Sea-Force” 

operation to date.147 Throughout the operation, China maintained between 

110 and 115 vessels around the oil rig in an approximately 10 nautical mile 

cordon. These included four navy vessels, 35 to 40 coast guard ships, 30 

transport and tugs, and more than 40 maritime militia vessels.148 While 

the cordon radiated about 10 nautical miles out from the rig, the Chinese 

side utilized maritime militia and “fishing vessels” to harass, and in some 

cases attack and sink, Vietnamese fishing vessels operating miles beyond 

the cordon.149 During the incident, China was able to maintain around 

twice as many vessels as Vietnam did in the area.150 Operating a cordon 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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of so many vessels from so many different organizations over such a long 

period, while sending out skirmishing parties to attack Vietnamese vessels 

miles from the cordon, required careful coordination across multiple military and civilian organizations. This included cooperation with the China 

National Offshore Oil Corporation, a state-owned enterprise that owned 

and operated the HYSY-981 drilling platform.

The maritime militia was given mobilization orders for the operation 

by the Guangzhou Military Region. In the case of the participating Sansha 

City maritime militia, a sea command post was set up and a command 

and coordination group was sent to the coast guard’s “forward command 

post at sea.”151

China appears to plan to conduct more operations like these in the 

future. While the navy is the main military service involved in maritime 

sovereignty defense operations, at least one training event featured limited 

involvement by other services. A 2014 joint escort defense and joint oil rig 

defense exercise in the Gulf of Tonkin involved a maritime police unit under 

the navy’s South Sea Fleet, personnel and vessels from fisheries, maritime 

police, and maritime militia, as well as aircraft from naval aviation and the 

air force. Just as in the HYSY-981 oil rig incident, a maritime command post 

was set up to help coordinate the effort. The exercise took the “defensive” 

actions utilized in the HYSY-981 oil rig a step further when fighter aircraft 

and surface vessels armed with missiles “destroyed” enemy vessels during 

the escort part of the mission. To defend the rig, the Chinese forces practiced blocking the passage of a “suspicious fishing boat” and shooting the 

water to prevent frogmen from getting close to the rig. The exercise ended 

with the arrest of “militants” and a journalist on the boat.152 Although this 

example involved limited participation of the air force, the navy continues 

to regularly perform such drills without the participation of another service.

Artificial “Islands,” More Than Just the “Big Three.” While China’s 

“Big Three” artificial islands in the South China Sea (Fiery Cross, Mischief, 

and Subi Reefs) have dominated the coverage of China’s artificial island–

building activities in the region, they are part of a larger network of Chinese 
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bases and outposts scattered across the South China Sea.153 While PLAAF 

aircraft might be able to operate from runways on the artificial islands, 

the navy regularly operates from both larger and smaller land features in 

cooperation with the coast guard, maritime militia, and other Chinese 

government organizations.

The 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy argued that China 

relies on islands and reefs to help create a “large-area maritime defense 

system” [da quyu haishang fangwei tixi, 大区域海上防卫体系] for power 

projection.154 In addition to the large artificial islands that have harbors 

and airstrips, the smaller, but still vital, islands and reefs have facilities 

called “coastal defense militia outposts” [haifang minbing shaosuo, 海防民

兵哨所], which are staffed by maritime militia and People’s Armed Forces 

Department personnel, to monitor the maritime domain.155 This type of 

force can help maintain a constant forward presence and play peacetime 

(and potentially wartime) operations roles that would be much more visible 

and sensitive if performed by military units.

Reform Impact on the Interagency Vector of Modernization 

The PLA reforms have facilitated some aspects of interagency maritime 

operations but have also created new organizational roles and responsibilities that may complicate existing understandings and procedures. The 

reforms placed the coast guard under the authority of the People’s Armed 

Police, which was itself subordinated to report solely to the CMC.156 This 

gives the CMC the ability to issue orders to both the PLA and coast guard, 

facilitating interagency planning and operations. Certain elite and specialized branches of the maritime militia have also drawn much closer to the 

navy and coast guard in terms of funding, equipment, training, personnel, 

and coordination in recent years.157 Such closer relations should help reduce 

the coordination burden in interagency maritime operations.

That said, the PRC appears to lack a permanent mechanism to coordinate operations of the maritime militia and coast guard with services 

other than the navy. Previous coordination mechanisms appear to have 
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been run through PLAN headquarters and the three fleets, with no or 

limited involvement of the military regions. The establishment of new 

joint theater commands will require adjustments in these command and 

coordination mechanisms, which may be challenging since the theater 

commands have no natural channels to coordinate with national-level 

ministries and state-owned enterprises. The challenge is further increased 

because some maritime militia units are designed primarily for use in 

peacetime sovereignty advancement operations, while others are designed 

to provide support during combat operations. Given the high number of 

maritime militia branches and specialized units within those branches and 

the local nature of these branches, the lack of a mechanism to coordinate 

with non-PLAN services will limit the ability of these forces to contribute 

to joint operations with other services. For the time being, the navy will 

likely have to coordinate directly with the maritime militias and coast guard 

and then coordinate joint operations with the other services on behalf of 

China’s maritime forces.

Conclusion 

Like any large organization, the PLA is made up of different bureaucratic 

actors, each with its own interests. As with any military, there is disagreement among the services, and even between different branches of the same 

service, as to how the force should develop. The three vectors of modernization employed in this chapter are a useful device for highlighting these 

divergent interests and thinking about how they may affect decisions about 

PLA modernization in general, and navy modernization in particular.

We argue that there will be continued tension between the PLAN 

desire to create a blue-water navy optimized for independent operations in 

the far seas and the desire of the CMC and theater commands for a naval 

component that is optimized for joint operations and executing theater contingency plans. Theater commanders are likely to advocate for naval forces 

that suit the specific missions and geography of their region and use their 

operational control to focus the naval components in their theaters on those 
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

153

particular priorities. This tension will likely manifest itself in arguments 

over how PLAN headquarters and the theater commands want naval units 

to spend their time and potentially even what platforms are assigned to what 

theaters. However, because the interagency navy vector of modernization 

involves support for a high national priority (defending and advancing China’s maritime sovereignty claims) and does not involve expensive weapons 

development requirements, this mission set is not likely to be a major focus 

of tensions between the headquarters and theater commands.

There will also be tension among the services over what level of jointness they are comfortable with, since true jointness will require each service 

to give up some of its autonomy and limit its ability to maximize its organizational interests. The pursuit of joint synergies will inevitably involve 

creating new dependencies on other services to provide critical capabilities 

for joint operations. The logic of a blue-water navy whose different branches 

provide all the capabilities needed for far seas operations has inherent 

contradictions with the interdependence and cross-service coordination 

that are the essence of jointness. There may even be resentment between 

the navy and interagency maritime forces because resources going to the 

coast guard and maritime militia will not provide much support for the 

PLAN’s own “blue dream.” The navy’s efforts to seeks an even greater role 

in the training, education, personnel, and operations of the coast guard 

and maritime militia may also remove the gossamer-thin façade that these 

forces are mainly concerned with maritime safety and fishing.

In the short-term, it is hard to tell how the various bureaucratic actors 

in the navy, PLA as a whole, interagency maritime force, and civilian government will respond to the impacts of the reforms. The navy has made 

progress in all three vectors of modernization in recent years, as is evident in 

its improving capability to execute independent operations far from China’s 

coastline, in the PLA’s improving capability to execute joint operations, and 

in the interagency maritime force’s capabilities to outclass the paramilitary 

or military forces of any other South China Sea claimant and to continue 

advancing China’s maritime claims.
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The longer term impact is even harder to predict. For the navy, the 

biggest factor will be how well it can sell itself as a service capable of contributing to the various missions each modernization vector is designed 

to serve. If the navy cannot convince Chinese and PLA leaders of the 

importance of a blue-water fleet, its efforts to develop blue-water capabilities will be hampered. If the navy does not play nice in pursuing jointness 

while holding off efforts of the other services to play greater roles in the 

maritime domain, it may find its roles and missions reduced along with 

its share of the budget. The navy could even lose out on resources if the 

interagency maritime force is too successful, with more resources going to 

the paramilitary and militia forces that are the frontline and public-facing 

elements of the maritime sovereignty defense strategy. On the whole, the 

reforms have provided new resources and new opportunities for the navy, 

but there are challenges on the horizon. How the navy meets them will 

decide its future as a service.

Notes 

1 Nargiza Salidjanova, Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign 

Direct Investment (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Security and Economic Review 

Commission, March 30, 2011).

2 Daniel M. Hartnett, The PLA’s Domestic and Foreign Activities and Orientation (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

March 4, 2009), available at <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.4.09Hartnett.pdf>.

3 Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchatel, China’s Strong Arm: Protecting 

Citizens and Assets Abroad (New York: Routledge, 2015), 37–41.

4 See “China Focus: China Publishes Arctic Policy, Eyeing Vision of ‘Polar 

Silk Road,’” Xinhua Online, January 26, 2018, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2018-01/26/c_136927327.htm>.

5 See Christopher D. Yung, “The PLA Navy Lobby and Its Influence over 

China’s Maritime Sovereignty Policies,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2015), 286–292.

6 Gordon Jacobs, “Chinese Naval Developments Post–Gulf War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 5, no. 2 (February 1993), 82.
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

155

7 See Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Chinese 

Naval Analysts Consider the Energy Question,” in China’s Energy Strategy: The 

Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, ed. Gabriel B. Collins et al. (Annapolis, MD: 

China Maritime Studies Institute and the Naval Institute Press, 2008), 299.

8 While some experts translate xiandai haijun [现代海军] as Modern Navy or 

Contemporary Navy, the authors use the official English translation of Navy Today.

9 M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, “Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s 

Evolving Interests and Potential Influence,” in The Chinese Navy: Expanding 

Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, 2011), 55–56.

10 For more on some of the civilian supporters and potential members of 

the maritime lobby, see Ian Burns McCaslin, Role of the PLA in China’s Foreign 

Policy and Behavior Abroad (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2016), 

138–145.

11 See Wu Xiaoyan, China’s “Sea Power Nation” Strategy (Stockholm: Institute 

for Security and Development Policy, 2014).

12 The extent to which this is a problem in practice depends on how fungible 

particular assets are across the three vectors of modernization.

13 For more on the attempts of non-Chinese powers in the modern era to 

build such fleets, see Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., 

China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 121–233.

14 From July 1949 to July 1960, the “Chinese Navy alone employed 3,390 

Soviet advisers and experts.” Soviet advisers and experts were critical because many 

Chinese officers knew little about the forces they were charged with commanding 

or the equipment they were supposed to use. See Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, 

After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2011), 118–121.

15 A 2013 estimate by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence indicated that 

the PLA Navy could have between 313 and 342 warships (including submarines) 

by 2020. See Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and Kimberly Hsu, China’s Naval 

Modernization and Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, August 26, 2013), 6–7. For more on 

the quality-over-quantity shift in navy vessels, see The People’s Liberation Army 

Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Office of 

Naval Intelligence, August 2009), 16–20.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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16 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “The Type 054/054A Frigate Series: 

China’s Most Produced and Deployed Large Modern Surface Combatant,” China 

SignPost, August 2, 2015, available at <www.chinasignpost.com/2015/08/02/

the-type- 054054a-frigate-series-chinas-most-produced-and-deployed-largemodern-surface- combatant/>. 

17 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy 

Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153 (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, May 21, 2018), 3.

18 The People’s Liberation Army Navy, 22–23.

19 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, May 15, 2017), 24.

20 For a comparison of the China’s first and second aircraft carrier, see “What 

Do We Know (So Far) about China’s Second Aircraft Carrier?” China Power, available at <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-aircraft-carrier-type-001a/>.

21 Minnie Chan, “Breakthrough to Power Most Advanced Jet Launch System on China’s Second Home-Grown Aircraft Carrier,” South China Morning 

Post (Hong Kong), November 1, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/

diplomacy-defence/article/2117947/breakthrough-power-most-advanced-jetlaunch-system?utm_source=t.co&utm_medium=referral>.

22 Chris Buckley, “China Launches First Aircraft Carrier on Maiden 

Sea Trial,” Reuters, August 9, 2011, available at <www.reuters.com/article/

us-china-military-carrier/china-launches-first-aircraft-carrier-on-maiden-seatrial-idUSTRE77900D20110810>.

23 A senior Chinese official stated in the mid-2000s that until recently carriers 

had “not been the best use of national resources” because the country lacked the platforms necessary for an “escort fleet.” See Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, 

“China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, 

ed. Andrew S. Erickson et al. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 230.

24 Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher P. Carlson, “Sustained Support: The 

PLAN Evolves Its Expeditionary Logistics Strategy,” Jane’s Navy International, 

March 9, 2016.

25 The U.S. Navy enjoys a ratio of 1:5 of replenishment ships to frontline 

ships, while, as of December 2016, the PLA Navy only had a ratio of 1:15. See 

“PLAN First Type 901 Replenishment Oiler Started Sea Trails of Shenzhen, China,” 

Navy Recognition, December 23, 2016, available at <www.navyrecognition.com/
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

157

index.php/news/defence-news/2016/december-2016-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4720-plan-first-type901-replenishment-oiler-started-sea-trials-off-shenzhen-china.html>.

26 “868 Semi-Submersible Vessel Enters Service in the South Sea Fleet Can 

Carry European Bison Which Will Impact Island Attack” [868号半潜船入役南

海舰队可载欧洲野牛冲击岛礁], ifeng.com [凤凰网], July 13, 2015, available at 

<http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150713/44156468_0.shtml#p=1>; Henri Kenhmann, 

“China Launches Mass Production of the New LCAC Type 726A” [La Chine lance 

la production en série de son nouveau LCAC Type 726A], East Pendulum, February 

5, 2017, available at <www.eastpendulum.com/la-chine-lance-la-production-enserie-de-son-nouveau-lcac-type-726a>; Andrew Tate, “China Launches Fifth LPD 

for PLAN,” Jane’s 360, June 16, 2017, available at <www.janes.com/article/71491/

china-launches-fifth-lpd-for-plan>.

27 This effort was aided by earlier PLA-wide reforms that sought to encourage 

civilians to work for the PLA. See Thomas J. Bickford, “Trends in Education and 

Training, 1924–2007: From Whampoa to Nanjing Polytechnic,” in The “People” 

in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, ed. Roy 

Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2008), 36–37.

28 Roy D. Kamphausen, “ROTC with Chinese Characteristics: Training 

the PLA in Civilian Universities,” China Brief 7, no. 6 (April 13, 2007), available 

at <https://jamestown.org/program/rotc-with-chinese-characteristics-training-the-pla-in-civilian-universities-3/>. In an effort to further diversify those it 

recruits, the marines even began partnering with wushu schools, such as the Tagou 

Wushu School in Henan, to hold recruitment events at wushu competitions. See 

Li Faxin, The PLA Marines (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2013), 78–80.

29 Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Air Force, Naval Aviation, and Army Aviation 

Aviator Recruitment, Education, and Training (Washington, DC: Jamestown 

Foundation, 2015), 38.

30 This move was in part done to address the complaint that cadets’ education 

focused too much on theory and not enough on gaining practical skills and experience. 

See Kenneth W. Allen and Morgan Clemens, The Recruitment, Education, and Training 

of PLA Navy Personnel (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, August 2014), 7.

31 Kenneth W. Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military 

Diplomacy, 2003–2016, China Strategic Perspectives 11 (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, July 2017), 35; Zhang Xiaomin, “Naval Training Ship Going Round the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

158

Globe,” China Daily (Beijing), April 17, 2012, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.

com.cn/china/2012-04/17/content_15063312.htm>.

32 Between April 1987 and August 1993, the Zheng He trained more than 6,000 

navy cadets. See Srikanth Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power (New Delhi: Knowledge 

World, January 2001), 146.

33 Allen and Clemens, The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy 

Personnel, 32.

34 “82 Shichang National Defense Mobilization Ship” [82 世昌号国防

动员船], haijun360.com [海军360], available at <www.haijun360.com/news/

QTFZCZ/2011/716/11716153820777C426CG301J1KC379.html>.

35 Vinayak Bhat, “Satellite Images Reveal China’s State-of-Art Naval Air 

Base,” The Print, October 17, 2017, available at <https://theprint.in/2017/10/17/

satellite-images-reveal-china-naval-airbase/>.

36 Dale C. Rielage, “Chinese Navy Trains and Takes Risks,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 142, no. 5 (May 2016), available at <www.usni.org/magazines/

proceedings/2016-05/chinese-navy-trains-and-takes-risks>.

37 Yan Jiangzhou, Fu Qiang, and Ren Wei [闫江洲, 付强, 任伟], “‘First 

Ship’ Brilliantly Draws Sword” [“首舰” 精彩亮剑], People’s Navy [人民海军], 

June 9, 2014, 4.

38 Zhao Lei, “Navy Training Exercises Deemed Success,” China Daily (Beijing), April 24, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/24/

content_29050321.htm>.

39 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 23. Notably, however, 

the United States disinvited the PLA Navy from Rim of the Pacific exercise 2018.

40 Yang Jie, “Navy Completes Joint Beach Drill,” China Daily (Beijing), 

August 26, 2015, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2015-08/26/

content_21711187.htm>.

41 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 24–26.

42 See Zhao Lei, “PLA Submarines Defy Death in the Depths,” China Daily

(Beijing), December 18, 2014, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-

12/18/content_19111841.htm>.

43 Rielage, “Chinese Navy Trains and Takes Risks.”

44 Kenneth W. Allen and Lyle J. Morris, PLA Naval Aviation Training and 

Operations: Missions, Organizational Structure and Training (2013–2015) (Maxwell 

Air Force Base, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2017), 7.

45 Fan Jianghuai, Cao Haihua, and Shao Longfei [范江怀, 曹海华, 邵龙飞], 
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159

“These Self-Styled Special Forces—South Sea Fleet Units’ Special Mission, Training, 

and Knowledge” [这些自讨苦吃的特种兵——南海舰队某特种团训练见闻], China 

Military Online [中国军网], January 23, 2013, available at <www.81.cn/tzjy/2013-

01/23/content_5500379.htm>.

46 Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Special Operations Forces: Organizations, Missions, and 

Training,” China Brief 15, no. 9 (May 1, 2015), 8. For the activities of naval special operations forces detachments on the antipiracy missions, see Li, The PLA Marines, 66–76.

47 See Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “Chinese Special Forces Take 1st, 2nd, and 

4th at ‘Olympics’ for Elite Warriors,” Popular Science, May 19, 2014, available at 

<www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/chinese-special-forces-take-1st2nd-and-4th-place-%E2%80%9Colympics%E2%80%9D-elite>; “Chinese Airborne 

Troops Win Glory in International Special Forces Competition,” China Military 

Online, July 10, 2015, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

china-military-news/2015-07/10/content_6581621.htm>.

48 Dennis J. Blasko, “SOF a Priority in China,” The Cipher Brief, March 15, 

2017, available at <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/sof-a-priority-in-china>.

49 China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State 

Council, 2010), available at <http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/

content_281474986284525.htm>; Takeshi Yuzawa, “ASEAN in the Era of JapanChina Tensions: Diplomatic Opportunities or Strategic Dilemmas?” in International 

Security in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Alan Chong (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 

161. The marines were involved in joint exercises with foreign militaries prior to 

2010, such as Peace Mission 2005 with Russia. See Li, The PLA Marines, 176–177.

50 Li, The PLA Marines, 122. In at least one Chinese-language book that 

was part of a series that had the “strong support and guidance” of the Ministry of National Defense, the helicopters used by the marines were referred to as 

being part of a “海军陆战队直升机分队.” See Li Faxin [李发新], The PLA Marines

[中国人民解放军海军陆成队] (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press [五洲传播

出版社], 2013), 107.

51 “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps College Brief Introduction” [中国人民解放军海军陆战学院简介], KaoYan.com [考研帮], April 22, 2014, 

available at <http://yz.kaoyan.com/hjbzzhxy/jianjie/>. 

52 See Li Tang, Zhou Yuan, and Liu Chuan [李唐, 周园, 刘川], “Military 

Teachers, to Teach Warfighting First Must Train on the Frontline” [军校教员, 教

打仗先到一线练打仗], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 26, 2015, available at <www.81.

cn/jmywyl/2015-04/26/content_6460539.htm>. 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

160

53 Both names have been used by official state media outlets. The new university will be located in Yantai, Shandong, with a campus and training base in 

Qingdao, as well as training bases in Huludao, Liaoning, in Changzhi, Shanxi, 

and in Qinhuangdao, Hebei. See Wang Lei, “China’s Only University to Train 

Carrier-Based Fighter Pilots Makes Debut,” CGTN.com, May 29, 2017, available at 

<https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d517a4e3241444e/share_p.html>.

54 Deng Xiaoci, “PLA Navy to Streamline Pilot Training as More Aircraft 

Carriers Expected,” Global Times (Beijing), January 7, 2018, available at <www.

globaltimes.cn/content/1083697.shtml>.

55 Zhang Dabin and Gao Yi [张大宾, 高毅], “Night Training Bids Goodbye 

to Calm Winds and Waves—To Aim for Accurate Real Combat Night Training 

Environment, a South Sea Fleet Aviation Bombing Regiment Concentrates on 

Refining Night Combat Capability” [夜训告别 “风平浪带”—喵准实战构设夜训环

境, 潜心锤炼夜战本领. 南海舰队航空兵某轰炸机团], People’s Navy [人民海军], 

May 18, 2015, 3;Allen and Morris, PLA Naval Aviation Training and Operations, 8.

56 Allen and Morris, PLA Naval Aviation Training and Operations, 16. This 

training is important; the international militaries that naval aviation is most likely 

to come into conflict with—namely those of the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and 

South Korea—do not fly the same aircraft as it does.

57 Dai Zongfeng, Wan Minwu, and Wu Dengfeng [代宗锋, 宛敏武, 吴登峰], 

“A Report on How PLA’s First AIP Submarine Unit Improves Its Ability to Win Battle” [全军首支AIP潜艇部队提升打胜仗能力纪实], Xinhua [新华], June 25, 2018.

58 Authors’ discussions with Chinese naval officers in 2017. The navy 

performed its first tri-fleet exercise in 2010. See Christian Le Miere, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges (New York: Routledge, 2014), 135.

59 Even in the U.S. military, years after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Services still engaged in “Service parochialism” 

to the point where “it is the single most important factor in force planning.” See William A. Owens, “Making the Joint Journey,” Joint Force Quarterly 34 (Spring 2003), 76.

60 During a far-sea training exercise, a flotilla from the navy’s South Sea Fleet 

performed “over 20 training items including joint area air defense, joint maritime 

rights protection, sea and air combined assaults, close counterattacks and in-depth 

land strike and so on.” Despite being described as joint actions, they only involved 

naval forces. See Huang Panyue, ed., “PLA Fleet Returns to Homeport from FarSea Training,” China Military Online, February 26, 2018, available at <http://eng.

chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-02/26/content_7952635.htm>.
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

161

61 The PLA service commanders were Central Military Commission (CMC) 

members from 2004 to 2017.

62 For more on the CMC’s level of control and involvement in overseas naval 

actions via the Joint Staff Department Overseas Operations Office, see Huang 

Jiafu [黄家福], “Take Command of and Provide Support for Overseas Military 

Actions” [海外军事行动的指揮与保障], Naval and Merchant Ships [舰船知识] 

(September 2017), 75–76.

63 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and 

Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 18.

64 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 18.

65 Minnie Chan, “China Raises Pay, Pensions for Trimmed Down Military, 

Announces Plans for Veterans’ Ministry,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

March 13, 2018, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2137008/china-raises-pay-pensions-trimmed-down-military>.

66 Neil J. Diamant, Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families, and the 

Politics of Patriotism in China, 1949–2007 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 

Publishers, Inc., 2010), 6–7.

67 Luisetta Mudie, trans. and ed., “Chinese Military Veterans Skeptical over 

President’s Promise to ‘Protect Their Rights,’” Radio Free Asia, October 23, 2017, 

available <www.rfa.org/english/news/china/veterans-10232017114254.html>.

68 Chan, “China Raises Pay.”

69 Mudie, “Chinese Military Veterans Skeptical.” This claim has been undercut by continuing mistreatment and abuse of veterans by officials and police. 

See Yang Fan and Luisette Mudie, trans. and ed., “Chinese Military Veterans 

Detained, Beaten in Beijing after Pension Petition,” Radio Free Asia, December 5, 

2017, available at <www.rfa.org/english/news/china/chinese-military-veterans-detained-beaten-in-beijing-after-pension-petition-12052017110040.html>.

70 Wong Siu-san et al., trans. and ed., “Chinese Military Veterans Converge on Zhenjiang as Protests Swell,” Radio Free Asia, June 22, 2018, available at 

<www.rfa.org/english/news/china/chinese-military-veterans-converge-on-zhenjiang-06222018111306.html>.

71 “Former Top China Military Officer Hoarded Cash, Jade in Basement: 

Phoenix,” Reuters, November 20, 2014, available at <www.reuters.com/article/

us-china-politics-corruption/former-top-china-military-officer-hoarded-cashjade-in-basement-phoenix-idUSKCN0J412Q20141120>.

72 See Peng Wang, “Military Corruption in China: The Role of Guanxi in the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

162

Buying and Selling of Military Positions,” China Quarterly, no. 228 (December 

2016), 970–991.

73 Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,” Journal 

of Strategic Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (2017), 174.

74 Jeffrey Engstrom and Michael Chase, “Enhancing China’s Status as a Great 

Power,” The Cipher Brief, August 1, 2017, available at <www.thecipherbrief.com/

enhancing-chinas-status-great-power-1091>; also see Kevin McCauley, “PLA 

Yijiangshan Joint Amphibious Operation: Past Is Prologue,” China Brief 16, no. 4 

(September 13, 2016), 12–16.

75 Li Dianren [李殿仁] et al., “Foreword” [前言], Study on the Development of 

Joint Commanding Officers [联合作战指挥人才培养] (Beijing: National Defense 

University Press [国防大学出版社], 2008), 1.

76 Liu Wei [刘伟], ed., “Theater Joint Operations Command” [战区联合作战

指挥], (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2016), 293.

77 Mark R. Cozad, PLA Joint Training and Implications for Future Expeditionary Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 2016), 2, available at <www.

rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT451.html>.

78 June Teufel Dreyer, “People’s Liberation Army Lessons from Foreign Conflicts: The Air War in Kosovo,” in Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars, ed. 

Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, November 2011), 33–73; Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the 

Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/

Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict,” in Chinese Lessons 

from Other People’s Wars, 75–114.

79 Li et al., Study on the Development of Joint Commanding Officers, 2.

80 Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Joint Headquarters and Internal Assessments 

of PLA Capabilities,” China Brief 16, no.10 (June 21, 2016), 8–9.

81 Liu, “Theater Joint Operations Command,” 311.

82 Ibid., 312.

83 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 32–33.

84 One expert stated that the PLA Air Force’s “most glaring” training weakness is the limited training that it conducts with other services. See Lee Fuell, 

“Broad Trends in Chinese Air Force and Missile Modernization,” Testimony Before 

the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission, January 30, 2014, 9. 

More “robust” operations between the air force and navy only began “recently.” 

See Mark R. Cozad and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, The People’s Liberation 
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

163

Army Air Force Operations over Water: Maintaining Relevance in China’s Changing 

Security Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 49.

85 Zhang Zhongkai and Wu Dengfeng [张钟凯, 吴登峰], “Military Experts 

Explain the Sino-Russian ‘Joint Sea-2015 (II)’ Exercise Highlights” [军事专家详解

中俄 “海上联合-2015(II)” 演习亮点], Xinhua Online [新华网], August 24, 2015, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-08/24/c_1116357242.htm>; 

Yang Jie, “Navy Completes Joint Beach Drill,” China Daily (Beijing), August 26, 2015, 

available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2015-08/26/content_21711187.htm>.

86 Fuell, “Broad Trends in Chinese Air Force and Missile Modernization,” 10.

87 Qiu Yue and Yan Jiaqi [邱越, 闫嘉琪], “Expert: Joint Navy and Air Force 

Exercise to Control the Contest of Air Supremacy Helps to Exert the Navy’s Strike 

Capability” [专家: 海空军联演助力制空权争夺发挥海军打击能力], People’s Daily 

Online [人民网], November 4, 2015, available at <http://military.people.com.

cn/n/2015/1104/c1011-27774164.html>.

88 See Liu Wenping and Zhao Haitao, “Flying Against a ‘Golden Helmet,’” 

China Armed Forces 32, no. 2 (2015), 82–83. In exercises involving naval aviation 

and the air force, the two are mostly used as training opponents rather than 

operating on the same side as they would in a real conflict. See Zhang Heng [

张恒], “Confrontation Between Different Models ‘Back-to-Back’ in Progress: 

Naval Aviation and Air Force Joint Training Deepening” [异型机对抗 “背靠背” 

进行], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 21, 2015, available at <http://kj.81.cn/

content/2015-09/21/content_6690270.htm>.

89 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s Marine Corps Is Getting Bigger and 

Stronger,” Popular Science, March 29, 2017, available at <www.popsci.com/chinas-marine-corps-expansion-reorganization>. It is unclear how the marines having 

their own aviation assets will impact the level and frequency of joint training with 

army aviation units.

90 Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American 

Strategy in Asia (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017), 173–175.

91 Cozad, PLA Joint Training, 11.

92 Zhao Lei, “PLA Restructuring Changes Focus at Military Schools,” China 

Daily (Beijing), April 28, 2016, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-

04/28/content_24911350.htm>.

93 Fuell, “Broad Trends in Chinese Air Force and Missile Modernization,” 10–11.

94 “China to Cut Troops by 300,000: Xi,” Xinhua, September 3, 2015, available 

at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/03/c_134583730.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

164

95 China’s National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, December 2002), available at <www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm>.

96 China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing: Information Office of the 

State Council, December 2004), available at <http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/

defense2004/defense2004.html>.

97 “White Paper Outlines China’s ‘Active Defense’ Strategy,” Xinhua, May 

26, 2015, available at <http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0526/c90786-8898060.html>.

98 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], December 2013), 106.

99 Li Youtao [黎友陶], “Diversified Activities Will Help to Calmly Chase Navy 

Blue Dream” [行动多样化: 逐梦深蓝更加从容], Navy Today [当代海军], no. 273 

(June 2016), 18–19.

100 Cozad and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, The People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

Operations over Water.

101 “PLA Air Force Conducts First Training in West Pacific,” China Military 

Online, March 30, 2015, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2015-03/30/content_6420538.htm>.

102 Tara Copp, “China Has Practiced Bombing Runs Targeting Guam, U.S. 

Says,” Defense News, October 31, 2017, available at <www.defensenews.com/flashpoints/2017/10/31/china-has-practiced-bombing-runs-against-guam-us-says/>.

103 These include armed combat vessels for wartime maritime search and 

rescue missions. See Li Jiayao, ed., “Vessel Troops of the PLA Air Force,” China 

Military Online, January 19, 2018, available at <http://english.pladaily.com.cn/

view/2018-01/19/content_7914789.htm>.

104 Huang Panyue, ed., “Su-35, J-20 Fighter Jets Help Maintain China’s Airspace Safety,” China Military Online, February 12, 2018, available at <http://english.

pladaily.com.cn/view/2018-02/12/content_7942685.htm>.

105 According to air force spokesperson Senior Colonel Shen Jinke, “in the 

two years since the Chinese air force launched distant sea training, interference 

from various obstacles had been dealt with, engaged in reconnaissance and early 

warning, maritime patrolling, maritime assault, and mid-air refueling training, 

which improved distant sea mobility and tested distant sea combat capability.” See 

Zhang Yuqing and Zhang Mimi [张玉清, 张汨汨], “China’s Air Force Strengthens 

Distant Sea Training to Improve Strategic Capability” [中国空军加强远海训练提

升战略能力], Xinhua Online [新华网], December 15, 2016, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/2016-12/15/c_1120123755.htm>. 
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

165

106 Li Kaiqiang and Zhang Hongwei [李开强, 张宏伟], “Air Force Organized 

First Live Fire Training at Sea for Flight School” [空军首次组织飞行院校海上实

弹打靶], PLA Daily [解放军报], May 20, 2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/

academy/2015-05/20/content_4585772.htm>.

107 Liangyu, ed., “Chinese Air Force Patrol South China Sea,” Xinhua Online, November 23, 2017, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2017-11/23/c_136774671.htm>. The Air Force Aviation University 

performed its first live-fire training at sea in 2015. See Li Kaiqiang and Zhang 

Hongwei [李开强, 张宏伟], “Air Force Organized First Live Fire Training at 

Sea for Flight School” [空军首次组织飞行院校海上实弹打靶], PLA Daily [解

放军报], May 20, 2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/academy/2015-05/20/

content_4585772.htm>.

108 Cozad and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, The People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

Operations over Water, 19.

109 Ma Xiaotian [马晓天], “Strive to Improve the Ability of the Air Force 

to Fight and Win” [努力提高空军部队能打仗打胜仗能力], PLA Daily [解放军

报], April 2, 2014, available at <www.81.cn/2014-content_18620/2014-04/02/

content_6153511.htm>.

110 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “The World’s Largest Military Plane in Production Is China’s Y-20,” Popular Science, June 20, 2016, available at <www.popsci.

com/worlds-largest-military-plane-in-production-is-chinas-y-20>.

111 Yi Wenbo and Jiang Long [尹闻博, 蒋龙], “Achieving Airdrop Capability 

Through All-Domain Direct Reach Operations: Air Force Airborne’s Air Transport 

Brigade Carries Out Simulated Airdrop Over Unfamiliar Island Targets” [全域直

达练就能降: 空降兵某航运旅对陌生海岛目标实施模拟空降训练小记] Air Force 

Daily [空军报], June 7, 2017, 1.

112 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “Finally, a Modern Chinese Aerial Tanker,” 

Popular Science, April 2, 2014, available at <www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/finally-modern-chinese-aerial-tanker>.

113 “‘Chubby Girl’s’ Sister to Boost China’s Military Capability,” Asia Times

(Hong Kong), December 14, 2017, available at <www.atimes.com/article/chubby-girls-sister-boost-chinas-military-capability/>.

114 For more on the conquest of Taiwan being the prime driver of the PLA 

for decades, see Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, 16–19; and Dennis J. Blasko, 

“PLA Amphibious Capabilities: Structured for Deterrence,” China Brief 10, no. 17 

(August 19, 2010), 5.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

166

115 Blasko, “PLA Amphibious Capabilities,” 6.

116 Ibid., 7.

117 Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Ying, eds., Informationized Army 

Operations [信息化陆军作战] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大

学出版社], 2014), 12–14.

118 Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development: 

Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: Jamestown 

Foundation, May 2013), 6–7.

119 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the 

Sea: Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College 

Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), 73.

120 Chen Heying, “New Missiles for Defensive Purposes Only,” Global Times

(Beijing), September 4, 2015, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/940518.shtml>.

121 The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University 

[国防大学出版社], 2006), 629–630. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns

similarly indicated the Second Artillery force, now the Rocket Force, would work 

with the navy to “execute focused naval blockades” and “achieve command of the 

seas.” The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学] (Beijing: PLA 

Press [中国人民解放军出版社], 2004), 140, 317–318.

122 The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University 

[国防大学出版社], 2006), 634–635.

123 Erickson and Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea,” 60; The Science of 

Campaigns, 623, 629.

124 For more on China’s nuclear-armed submarines, see Eric Heginbotham 

et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United 

States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 107–110.

125 For analysis on navy antiship cruise missiles, see Dennis M. Gormley, 

Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014), 15–23.

126 Anthony H. Cordesman, The PLA Rocket Force: Evolving Beyond the Second Artillery Corps and Nuclear Dimension (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, 2016), 5–6.

127 This happened to the Imperial Japanese Navy aviation force when it took the 

lead aviation role in a land war in China. See Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of 

Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 126.

128 The air force has historically had limited mid-air refueling capabilities. See 
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

167

Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and 

the Evolving Balance of Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 33.

129 In early 2017, Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai was appointed to lead the Southern 

Theater Command. See Nan Li, “The Southern Theater Command and China’s 

Maritime Strategy,” China Brief 17, no. 8 (June 9, 2017), 8. This appointment was 

important not only for what it signaled about the military’s view and orientation 

toward this region but also because he was the “first . . . non-army officer ever to 

command a military region or theater command.” See Dennis J. Blasko, “A ‘First’ 

for the People’s Liberation Army: A Navy Admiral Becomes a Joint, Regional, 

Commander,” China Brief 17, no. 5 (March 31, 2017), 7.

130 The more formal name for the maritime militia was proposed in Conor M. 

Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces 

Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA,” China Maritime Report, no. 1 (March 2017), 1.

131 Wang Xiaobin, “Sansha City Promotes Military-Police-Community Joint 

Defense Mechanism to Construct a Three-Line Maritime Protection Structure” [

三沙市推动军警民联防机制 构建三线海上维权格局], China News Service [中

国新闻网], November 20, 2014, available at <www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/11- 

21/6803776.shtml>.

132 For more on the involvement and influence by the PLA, and specifically 

the navy, see McCaslin, Role of the PLA in China’s Foreign Policy and Behavior 

Abroad, 114–121, 132.

133 For more on the PLA’s control of the maritime militia, see Kennedy and 

Erickson, “China’s Third Sea Force,” 2–10. Some maritime militia units, such as 

Tanmen’s, have been involved with Chinese naval activity in the South China 

Sea for decades. See “Spratlys Reef Construction Project” [南沙礁盘建设工程], 

360doc.com [个人图书馆], June 10, 2014, available at <www.360doc.com/content/14/0610/11/15447134_385347297.shtml>.

134 Yi Xiucheng [易修呈], “Tanmen Militia: Riding Dark Blue Waves of a New 

Journey” [潭门民兵: 踏浪深蓝新征程], China National Defense Daily [中国国防

报], December 24, 2015, available at <http://news.mod.gov.cn/militia/2015-12/24/

content_4634045.htm>.

135 In the PLA writ large, there has been a long-term reduction in overall 

numbers of maritime militia units, with some less advanced units (in equipment 

and capabilities) being phased out, even as units of unprecedented sophistication 

are introduced. See “On the Construction of the Militia Since the Reform and 

Opening-Up” [在创新发展中前行——改革开放以来民兵建设综述], Ministry 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

168

of National Defense [国防部网站], December 15, 2011, available at <www.gov.cn/

gzdt/2011-12/15/content_2020745.htm>.

136 Gao Chen [高辰], ed., “South China Sea Sanya Militia Handles Incursions 

by Foreign Fishing Boats (from) Mischief Reef” [南海三沙民兵处置侵入领海外籍

渔船部署美济礁], China News Service [中国新闻网], January 1, 2016, available at 

<www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/01-27/7735164.shtml>.

137 Wu Weiman [吴维满], “China’s New Type of Service Militia Detachments 

Stage Battlefield to Adapt to Combat Requirements” [中国新型军兵种民兵分队

上演兵场 适应作战需要], PLA Daily [解放军报], December 27, 2010, available at 

<http://mil.sohu.com/20101227/n278525284.shtml>. These navy militia detachments include ones specialized in oil-replenishment security and mobile ship repair.

138 Official Chinese media have referred to there being three lines of defense 

to protect China’s disputed maritime and sovereignty claims. They state that the 

maritime militia is the first line, with maritime law enforcement being the second, 

and navy being the third. See Wang Xiaobin [王晓斌], “Sansha Promotes Military, 

Police, and Militia Joint Defense Mechanism, Constructs a Three Line Maritime 

Rights Protection Structure” [三沙市推动军警民联防机制 构建三线海上维权格

局], China News Service [中国新闻网], November 20, 2014, available at <www.

chinanews.com/gn/2014/11-21/6803776.shtml>. Even though such a defensive line 

system reduces the frontline role of the navy, interviews conducted by Christopher 

D. Yung indicate that the PLA “supports the idea that civilian law enforcement vessels should be on the ‘frontline’ while the military is ‘in the rear.’” See Christopher 

D. Yung, “The PLA Navy Lobby and Its Influence over China’s Maritime Sovereignty Policies,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, 292.

139 The coast guard is composed of four previously separate maritime law 

enforcement agencies: China Marine Surveillance (CMS), China Fisheries Law 

Enforcement, Border Defense Coast Guard, and Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police. 

The CMS fleet is by far the most militant and outward-looking element of the coast 

guard, so much so that authoritative Chinese publications openly refer to the CMS 

fleet as the country’s “second navy.” See Ryan D. Martinson, “China’s Second Navy,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 4 (April 2015), available at <www.usni.org/

magazines/proceedings/2015-04-0/chinas-second-navy>.

140 Yung, “The PLA Navy Lobby,” 292.

141 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Is China’s Coast Guard about to Field a Modified 

PLA Warship?” The Diplomat, June 3, 2016, available at <http://thediplomat.

com/2016/06/is-chinas-coast-guard-about-to-field-a-modified-pla- warship/>.
Xi-Era Reforms and the Chinese Navy

169

142 Andrew S. Erickson, “Numbers Matter: China’s Three ‘Navies’ Each Have 

the World’s Most Ships,” The National Interest, February 26, 2018, available at 

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/numbers-matter-chinas-three-navies-eachhave-the-worlds-most-24653>.

143 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia (Washington, DC: Center for 

International Maritime Security, 2015), available at <http://cimsec.org/chinas-daring-vanguard-introducing-sanya-citys-maritime-militia/19753>.

144 “Pentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ship,” CNN, March 9, 2009, 

available at <www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/09/us.navy.china/index.html>.

145 “Raw Data: Pentagon Statement on Chinese Incident with U.S. Navy,” 

Fox News, March 9, 2009, available at <www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/09/

raw-data-pentagon-statement-chinese-incident-navy.html>.

146 Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China 

Coast Guard,” paper prepared for China as a “Maritime Power” conference, CNA, 

Arlington, VA, July 28–29, 2015, 20.

147 “Three-Sea Force” is a reference to the three maritime forces being employed 

by China: navy, maritime law enforcement agencies, and maritime militia.

148 Erickson, “Numbers Matter.”

149 One report, as well as video evidence, indicate that Qiongdongfang 11209 

from Dongfang City intentionally rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel 7 

miles outside of the cordon. See “The Latest on the Situation in the South China Sea: 

Vietnamese Media Says a Chinese Fishing Boat Crashed into and Sank a Vietnamese 

Fishing Boat Near (the) Haiyang (Shiyou) 981 (Oil Rig)” [南海局势最新消息: 越媒

称中国渔船在海洋981附近撞沉越南渔船], Guancha [观察], May 27, 2014, available 

at <www.guancha.cn/Neighbors/2015_03_25_313539.shtml>. At least 10 vessels and 

200 militia members from the Tanmen maritime militia were involved in the Chinese 

operation. See “Qionghai Wang Shumao: National Model Worker, the New Era of 

‘Dinghai Shenzhen’” [琼海王书茂: 全国劳动模范, 新时期的“定海神针”], Qionghai 

Shichuang [琼海视窗], May 8, 2015, available at <www.qionghais.com/html/2015/

jiaoyu/18391.html>. Sanya City’s maritime militia supplied 29 trawlers for the Chinese 

operation. See Erickson and Kennedy, “China’s Daring Vanguard.”

150 “Japanese Media: Vietnamese Tried to Obstruct China’s Completion of 

Oil Drilling Preparations in the Paracels of the South China Sea” [日媒: 克服越

南船只阻挠 中国在南海西沙群岛海域完成钻探石油准备], Guancha [观察], May 

12, 2014, available at <www.guancha.cn/Neighbors/2014_05_12_228824.shtml>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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151 Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia (Washington, 

DC: Center for International Maritime Security, 2016), available at <http://cimsec.

org/riding-new-wave-professionalization-militarization-sansha-citys-maritime-militia/27689>.

152 Zhang Yigen and He Peng [张毅根, 何鹏], “Protection of Drilling Platforms: Military Police and Civilians Surround and Annihilate in South China Sea 

Drill” [保护钻井平台: 军警民南海演练围歼], China National Defense Daily—Military Affairs Special Edition [中国国防报—军事特刊], August 23, 2014, available at 

<www.81.cn/jmywyl/2014-08/23/content_6107899.htm>.

153 “Updated: China’s Big Three Near Completion,” Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, June 29, 2017, available at <https://amti.csis.org/chinasbig-three-near-completion/>.

154 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 214.

155 Gao “South China Sea Sanya Militia Handles Incursions.”

156 Liu Zhen, “China’s Military Police Given Control of Coast Guard as Beijing 

Boosts Maritime Security,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 21, 

2018, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2138257/

chinas-military-police-given-control-coastguard-beijing>.

157 Liu Weihua, Xu Qiang, and Zhang Ning [刘卫华, 徐强, 张宁], “Service 

Building, How Do Militia Specialized Detachments Correspond?” [军种主建, 民

兵专业分队如何对接?] China National Defense Daily [中国国防报], January 27, 

2016, available at <www.81.cn/mb/2016-01/27/content_7071697.htm>.
171

THE FLAG LAGS BUT FOLLOWS

The PLA and China’s Great Leap Outward

By Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

Does trade follow the flag, or does the flag follow trade? In China’s 

“reform and opening” policy, the sequence appears to be first 

trade, then investment in resources and infrastructure—now 

codified under the so-called One Belt, One Road (OBOR) or Belt and Road 

Initiative (BRI)—followed by efforts to protect the physical manifestations 

of extended engagement with the outside world. While “trade follows the 

flag” may have been “a reasonable maxim for 19th-century imperialism,” it 

does not appear to be a viable course of action for a 21th-century great power 

in a globalized world economy.1

Since the late 1970s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been 

engaged in a sustained economic outreach to the world beyond its borders, 

initially focused mostly on its immediate neighborhood, but eventually 

extending far beyond the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast to the most ambitious economic development policy initiative of the first three decades of the 

PRC, the Great Leap Forward, China’s most ambitious economic development policy initiative since then constitutes a Great Leap Outward.2

 While 

the former effort was autarkic and internally focused, the latter effort is global 

in scope and projected externally. Moreover, while the earlier effort was a 

CHAPTER 4
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catastrophic failure and abandoned 3 years after its launch, the more recent 

effort has been a stunning success sustained for four decades and counting.

This chapter first examines possible options available to protect what 

have been labeled China’s overseas interests—a category of national interests that has become much more meaningful because of the successes of 

Beijing’s ongoing Great Leap Outward. Second, it analyzes People’s Liberation Army (PLA) thinking about the security dimensions of OBOR and the 

role of the armed forces.3

 Third, this chapter considers three case studies 

to explore what securing China’s overseas interests involves in concrete 

terms. Finally, it summarizes the findings and their implications. Before 

proceeding, we briefly discuss Chinese national interests and summarize 

the phases of China’s Great Leap Outward.

Much attention has focused on China’s core interests but far less on 

China’s overseas interests. The former category of national interests has 

understandably drawn considerable focus because when China designates 

interests as core, this means they are considered worth fighting and dying 

for—such as the PRC’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan. But Beijing’s overseas interests have grown in importance and are now routinely identified 

as important interests to be protected. For example, they are mentioned in 

China’s defense white papers and elsewhere. Overseas interests include—

but are not limited to—PRC citizens living, working, and traveling abroad, 

as well as PRC property and investments located abroad. President Jiang 

Zemin announced the “going out” strategy in 2002, and his successor 

Hu Jintao gave the PLA four “new historic missions” in 2004, including 

protecting China’s expanding interests. The Chinese military’s strategic 

guidelines were revised that same year (the first revision since 1994) to 

include “threats to overseas interests” as a primary threat for the first time.4

The volume and strategic significance of this category of national interests 

have expanded considerably since Xi Jinping officially launched OBOR in 

two major speeches in 2013.

The PRC’s prolonged Great Leap Outward has moved through three discernible phrases. It began as a quest to sell Chinese exports to the developed 
The Flag Lags but Follows

173

world, which stimulated demand for commodities and raw materials from 

the developing world. Gradually, China’s initial heavy focus on exports to 

the developed world broadened to include greater attention to the developing 

world. This second phase saw China starting to invest and build infrastructure in the countries of the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa, and Latin 

America in support of trade and investment in these regions. A third phase 

emerged as Beijing started to recognize that since many parts of the developing world are unstable and vulnerable to a range of threats, it was necessary 

to figure out how to protect PRC citizens, investments, and Chinese-built 

infrastructure around the globe.

Options for Protecting China’s Overseas Interests 

The PRC’s expanding overseas interests have prompted a lively discourse 

about how best to protect them. At least five ways have been identified. 

China could:

■	 continue to free ride on the coattails of other countries

■	 rethink its aversion to alliances

■	 reassess its policy of not posting military forces in bases abroad

■	 enhance the nascent power projection capabilities of the PLA

■	 outsource the protection of its overseas interests to host countries or 

private contractors.

Free Riding 

To date, Beijing’s primary means of protecting overseas interests have been 

to rely on the kindness of acquaintances. Certainly, this is not China’s 

preferred option, but given the severe limitations of the PLA and other 

instruments of national power in past decades, Beijing has had little alternative but to look to other great powers, especially the United States, for 

help. Indeed, China has been free riding on the U.S. Navy since the 1980s 

and more recently on the U.S. Army in places like Afghanistan.5

 The U.S. 

Navy has been actively patrolling the sea lanes of the world’s oceans and in 
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the process protecting not only U.S. commercial vessels but also the flagged 

vessels of other countries, including China. But China would prefer not to 

depend on the altruism of the United States; indeed, Beijing is suspicious 

of U.S. intentions and worries that if bilateral relations sour and conflict 

looms, then Washington would restrict or block access to PRC commercial 

vessels. The so-called Malacca Dilemma is about both China’s heavy reliance on one narrow shipping channel and Beijing’s perceived vulnerability 

to blockade by the U.S. Navy. Consequently, there is an active and ongoing 

discourse about possible alternatives to protecting China’s citizens and 

assets, whether on the high seas or land.

Rethinking Alliances 

After decades of insisting that China does not “do alliances,” in recent 

years, Chinese scholars and analysts have been debating the pros and 

cons of having allies. Moreover, although the PRC has strongly criticized 

the U.S. alliance system in Asia and Chinese elites have generally avoided 

advocating for China adopting similar formal security arrangements, 

Beijing has developed closer security cooperation with other countries.6

Indeed, if an alliance is defined as “a formal or informal relationship of 

security cooperation between two or more sovereign states,” then China 

may already have allies.7

North Korea stands out as a sui generis case of a Chinese “ally.” Formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North 

Korea is China’s only official treaty ally as of 2017. The official alliance 

was established by the 1961 Treaty of Mutual Friendship signed between 

Beijing and Pyongyang. However, the security and military-to-military 

components of the bilateral relationship have long been essentially nonexistent, and more recently political ties have soured.8

 In short, 21st-century 

military ties between the PRC and DPRK look nothing like a functioning 

alliance (ironically, China acted like a real ally prior to the penning of the 

treaty—in the 1950s when Chinese forces fought side by side with the DPRK 

Korean People’s Army during the Korean War). In fact, in 2017 China has 
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a far more robust bilateral security relationship with Pakistan and a more 

vibrant multilateral security relationship with the member countries of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, including Russia (see below).

One of the leading proponents of more formalized security relationships for the PRC is Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University. Professor Yan 

has argued that “China should consider having military bases in countries 

it considers allies,” but acknowledges that this may be in the distant future 

because the “Chinese government [unfortunately] insists on a nonaligned 

principle. . . . The major obstacle to China abandoning its nonaligned 

principle is years of propaganda criticizing alliances as part of a Cold War 

mentality.”9

 Discounting the argument that China’s lack of alliances is 

due to a weak military, Yan framed his support for alliances as befitting 

a great power: “China has become the world’s second-largest power, and 

the nonaligned principle no longer serves its interests.” However, Yan does 

not think that China’s OBOR project will lead to a fundamental transformation of partners into official treaty allies: “I don’t think China’s One 

Belt, One Road initiative for economic development across Eurasia can 

fundamentally change the nature of the relations.” He believes that China’s embracing of alliances would not drive another Cold War but rather 

improve U.S.-China relations because the “more allies China makes, the 

more balanced and stable the relationship will be. The more China shies 

away from alliances, the greater the chance that Washington will contain 

China, therefore resulting in an unstable relationship.” Clearly, some in 

China are rethinking alliances.

But if China were to select a 21st-century military ally, the most likely 

candidate would be Pakistan or Russia; both countries have proven records 

of extended strategic cooperation with China. Chinese leaders are deeply 

distrustful of outsiders and other states and trust takes time to develop.

Pakistan is one of the few countries that has been able to sustain good 

relations with China across multiple decades.10 From Beijing’s perspective, 

Islamabad has shown itself to be a trusted partner both during the Cold 

War and after. From Pakistan’s perspective, China has proved itself to be an 
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“all-weather” friend. Moreover, neither country has any good alternatives 

for trustworthy strategic partners in the tumultuous neighborhoods of 

South and Central Asia. Thus, while Beijing has never fought side by side 

with Islamabad or directly come to Pakistan’s aid in any of its serial conflicts with India, China has provided considerable conventional military 

assistance, critical support for Islamabad’s nuclear program, and the PLA 

has sustained interactions with Pakistan’s armed forces over many decades.

Russia is another logical potential ally for China, but this alliance 

option comes with heavy baggage for each country. Both Beijing and Moscow are undoubtedly wary of entering another alliance because of the fate 

of their 20th-century effort. The newly established PRC looked to its socialist elder brother—the Soviet Union—for military support and economic 

aid. Months after formally establishing a new communist party-state in 

China, Mao Zedong traveled to Moscow to meet with Joseph Stalin and 

sign the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. But a decade later, the alliance fractured because of ideological 

differences, political tensions, and personality conflicts between two headstrong leaders.11 These fundamental tensions persist today. Indeed, as one 

Chinese analyst opined, China and Russia will not cement a 21st-century 

alliance unless driven to do so by the United States.12 A scholar at the 

China Academy of Social Sciences wrote in 2016 that he could find “no 

evidence supporting the possibility or necessity of a China-Russia military 

alliance.”13 The expert highlighted the absence of any contributing factors, 

including lack of a clear direct military threat (from the United States), 

major differences between Chinese and Russia national interests, and 

fundamental skepticism that even a formal treaty would guarantee that 

one country would come to the aid of the other in the event of an attack 

by a third country.

Moreover, nothing in official PRC rhetoric suggests that Beijing might 

pursue a military alliance in the near future. President Xi’s May 2014 speech 

to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in 

Asia made clear that China opposes the U.S. alliance system in Asia.14
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Referring to U.S. alliances, the Chinese leader stated, “One cannot live in 

the 21st century with the outdated thinking from the age of Cold War and 

zero-sum game. . . . [T]o beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at 

a third party is not conducive to maintaining common security.” Instead, he 

advocated that security cooperation must be “universal . . . equal . . . [and] 

inclusive” and that China needs “to innovate [its] security concept, establish a new regional security cooperation architecture, and jointly build a 

road for security of Asia that is shared by and win-win to all.” Reflecting a 

regional security order that excluded the United States, Xi concluded that 

“it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of 

Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” Speaking in September 2017, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson clarified China’s interest in partnerships over 

alliances: “We advocate that regional countries should make joint efforts 

to engage in dialogue instead of confrontation, forge partnerships instead 

of alliances, and build an Asia-Pacific partnership featuring mutual trust, 

inclusiveness, and mutually beneficial cooperation.”15 Such strident rhetorical positioning leaves little room for China to enter into a formal alliance.

Yet at least some of China’s relationships with other states are starting 

to resemble alliances, and just because China does not call something an 

alliance does not mean that it may not be or become one. But for Chinese 

leaders and analysts, the term alliance has negative connotations because it 

is seen as denoting a security relationship between two states that targets a 

third state. Indeed, China tends to be both critical and wary of U.S. alliances 

in the Asia-Pacific because they are perceived to be directed against China.16

Overseas Basing 

One manifestation of an alliance can be the military bases of one country on 

the territory of another. In this chapter, we treat overseas bases as an analytically distinct option separate from an alliance (but, of course, they may go 

together). Beijing’s new base in Djibouti is a case in point—despite China’s 

military installation, there is no expanded military cooperation between the 

two countries. Indeed, Djibouti plays host to the military bases of multiple 
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178

foreign states, including the United States, France, Italy, and Japan, but none 

of these countries could be characterized as an ally of Djibouti.

China’s approach to overseas bases has undergone the clearest and 

most dramatic shift in terms of how China thinks about protecting its 

overseas interests. China has long adhered to its policy of non-interference 

in the internal affairs of others, which would ostensibly preclude military 

bases in foreign countries. Yet China’s deployment in the Gulf of Aden 

since 2008 has triggered discussion among the Chinese public and elites 

of the need for bases to support forward-deployed forces, and in 2017, the 

Chinese government finally announced it would establish a military base 

in Djibouti (discussed below).

China’s growing economic interests and the increased presence of PRC 

citizens abroad have largely driven public expectations for the Chinese 

government to protect these interests and related support for overseas bases 

to accomplish this mission. According to an in-depth report on Chinese 

overseas basing requirements, “polling data suggest the Chinese public has 

a positive attitude toward overseas bases.”17 Indeed, the majority of respondents to polls as early as 2009 supported the construction of an overseas 

base, and bases were the most popular responses to a separate survey that 

same year asking how best to improve the PLA Navy (PLAN).18

Linked closely with public interest in overseas basing was elite advocacy for the Chinese government to establish such bases. A wide range of 

Chinese scholars and military commentators began discussing and recommending this course of action, especially after 2008. However, in January 

2010, PLAN media commentator Zhang Zhaozhong instead stated that the 

odds were low that China would build an overseas base.19 Academics also 

joined in the debate, with professor Shen Dingli in January 2010 explaining 

the four responsibilities such a base would accomplish: protecting “people 

and fortunes overseas . . . [and] trading,” as well as preventing “overseas 

intervention which harms the unity of the country; and the defense against 

foreign invasion.”20 Discussions have waxed and waned in the years since, 

but general enthusiasm has persisted.
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Chinese military officials have occasionally tactically supported the 

idea of overseas bases, or at least logistics facilities, to support operations 

far from Chinese shores. The PLA has studied U.S. operations in World 

War II and British operations in the early 1980s for the Falkland Islands to 

understand the requirements of distant sea logistics, suggesting at least an 

interest in such strategies.21 After reports suggested China may be interested 

in establishing a base in the Seychelles in 2011, the Ministry of National 

Defense stated, “Based on our demand in the escort mission, China will 

consider stopping over at ports of Seychelles or other countries for supply.”22

With Djibouti establishing precedent for Chinese overseas bases, this 

raises the question of whether more will be built, and where they might be. 

Pakistan is a likely future choice. Civilian strategist Yan Xuetong advocates 

that China should consider military bases in countries that it considers 

allies and notes that “China now has only one real ally, Pakistan.” Nevertheless, he argued in February 2016 that it is “too early to say where China 

would build military bases.”23 Pakistan’s close security cooperation with 

China generates intense speculation that it may play host to a Chinese base 

in the future. It has been suggested in 2014—before serious rumors began 

about the Djibouti base—that “Pakistan’s status as a trusted strategic partner whose interests are closely aligned with China’s make the country the 

most likely location for an overseas Chinese military base.”24 Following 

the official announcement for Djibouti, the 2016 Department of Defense 

annual report to Congress suggested that Pakistan may host a future Chinese base.25 Nevertheless, the exact location of the proposed base is unclear. 

While Gwadar is mentioned most often, other sites, including Karachi and 

Jiwani, have been discussed.26

Extended Power Projection 

Another way to provide greater security for China’s overseas interests 

is to enhance and expand PLA power projection capabilities to be able 

to respond quickly to specific threats. Of course, this could be done in 

conjunction with other options, not merely as a standalone option. An 
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important element of expanding power projection would be developing 

expeditionary capabilities, which would likely emphasize maritime and 

aviation components.27

China’s military modernization over the last 20 years has begun to 

lay the foundation for a blue water navy, but China does not yet have the 

capability to project power beyond East Asia. The PLAN has deployed 

its submarines outside Asia with more frequency in recent years and has 

recently deployed new longer range nuclear submarines, but its submarine 

force remains insufficient to protect the sea lines of communications along 

the OBOR route. China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers represents a much 

more visible “flag” for deployment abroad, but so far Beijing has kept the 

Liaoning in Asia, and it will likely take years if not decades for Beijing to 

develop carrier strike groups capable of conducting U.S.-style offensive 

operations around the world. Lastly, reporting suggests the PLAN will 

expand its marine corps to 100,000 servicemembers (partly by transferring PLA amphibious brigades).28 This suggests following the U.S. model 

in order to have the option of deploying a land-based presence to combat 

terrorism or local instability along the OBOR. Further investment in submarines and more distant deployments of future aircraft carriers may 

suggest some Chinese interest in actively replacing the U.S. Navy’s longstanding role as the ensurer of freedom of navigation, but China does not 

appear to have made this decision yet.

While China’s Navy has led the way in developing power projection 

capabilities, the PLA Air Force is now beginning to demonstrate its power 

projection capabilities within the region. China’s indigenously produced 

Y-20 provides a more capable strategic airlift capacity that may enable 

Beijing to deploy troops—such as its future marine force—quickly in a 

crisis along OBOR. The September 2016 announcement of the future H-20 

next-generation strategic bomber will also extend the air force’s reach further from the Chinese homeland, but this would likely have to be paired 

with an expansion of overseas military basing to support high-intensity 

operations abroad. One potential solution to this basing requirement would 
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181

be to make its bomber refuelable, which is reportedly under development.29

Other future aerial power projection capabilities that may enable Beijing to 

avoid overseas basing would be to pursue unmanned combat aerial vehicles, 

such as the Lijian.

30 The air force’s development of long-range capabilities 

may alleviate the direct requirement for bases abroad if Chinese aircraft can 

target hotspots along OBOR with aerial refueling, but the U.S. model clearly 

shows force projection on a global scale works best with bases abroad.

China has begun to use these more capable military assets in contingencies abroad. The PLA has participated in the United Nations–mandated 

Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission since 2008, already establishing a limited 

Chinese presence along the OBOR route years ahead of time. This was 

followed by noncombat evacuation operations (NEOs) from Libya in 2011 

using PLA Air Force cargo planes and Yemen in 2015 using PLAN ships (for 

details see below).31 Greater Chinese investment and workers in countries 

along the OBOR route mean that it is likely the PLA will remain in the 

business of conducting NEOs.

While China has a growing suite of military hardware that can power 

project abroad to secure its interests, China’s ability to use these platforms 

has so far been constrained by a lack of dedicated facilities. One study suggested six potential logistics models that China could adopt for its overseas 

operations: “the pit stop model, lean colonial model, dual use logistics 

facility, string of pearls model, warehouse model, and model USA.”32 After 

discounting the lean colonial, warehouse, and U.S. models because they 

violate China’s non-interference policy and too closely mirror often criticized “hegemonic power,” the study suggests the dual use logistics facility 

and string of pearls models. However, “China appears to be planning for 

a relatively modest set of missions to support its overseas interests,” and 

the study rejects the possibility that China is pursuing the ability to conduct major combat operations abroad via a string of pearls strategy. Such 

operations would require hospitals; ordnance resupply; petroleum, oil, and 

lubricant stocks; and likely “bases to provide air cover for naval forces and 

to defend bases and logistics facilities from attack.” These are not evident 
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at any China-related facilities abroad.33 Looking to the future, the study 

concludes that “the most efficient means of supporting more robust [PLA] 

out of area military operations would be a limited network of facilities that 

distribute functional responsibility geographically” and that such bases 

would be dual-use and “probably would be characterized by a light footprint with 100 to 500 military personnel conducting supply and logistics 

functions.” Indeed, the Djibouti base is intended to solve many of these 

challenges and is discussed in the following case study section. Finally, the 

PLA acknowledges its overseas operations are constrained by many factors, 

including legal ones.34

Outsourcing 

Another option is to rely on the host country and/or private contractors to 

handle security arrangements for China’s burgeoning overseas interests. 

The former is what happened in Pakistan. After the 2007 Red Mosque incident in which PRC citizens were murdered and others were taken hostage, 

Islamabad, under pressure from Beijing, reportedly established a security 

force exclusively charged with protecting Chinese citizens in Pakistan.35

In other countries, PRC state-owned enterprises have relied on their own 

security guards or hired private security contractors—the Chinese equivalent of Blackwater—composed of retired PLA personnel.36

But no matter which one of these options—or combination of options—

Beijing decides to pursue to provide security for China’s expanding overseas 

interests, it seems inevitable that the PLA will be expected to play a greater 

role. The potential set of PLA missions for specific PRC overseas interests 

is outlined in the table.
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183

Table. Overseas Interests and Potential PLA Missions

Expanded Chinese Interest Potential Corresponding PLA Missions

Protection of Chinese 

citizens living abroad

Noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 

training and building partner capacity, special operations 

ashore, riverine operations, military criminal investigation 

functions, military diplomacy

Protection of Chinese 

property/assets

Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, training and building partner capacity, 

special operations ashore, military criminal investigation, 

physical security/force protection, riverine operations, military 

diplomacy, presence operations

Protection of Chinese 

shipping against pirates 

and other nontraditional 

threats

Counterpiracy, escort shipping, maritime intercept operations; 

training and building partner capacity; sector patrolling; special 

operations ashore; visit, board, search, and seizure; replenishment at sea; seaborne logistics; military diplomacy

Protection of sea lines of 

communication against 

adversary states

Antisubmarine warfare, antiair warfare, antisurface warfare, 

carrier operations, escort shipping, maritime intercept operations, air operations off ships, helicopter operations, vertical 

replenishment, replenishment at sea, seaborne logistics 

operations, military diplomacy, mine countermeasures

Source: Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing 

Requirements in the 21st Century, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, China Strategic Perspectives 7 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014), 9.

PLA Thinking about OBOR 

OBOR’s focus on economics and diplomacy has generated limited attention 

on the security dimension, and the PLA’s voice on this issue has tended to be 

rather muted. Nevertheless, there is a discernable discourse on the subject.

Discourse 

Previous research on PLA views of OBOR have been sporadic and mainly 

focused on military commentators in high-profile but mainstream publications, which are less authoritative than official PLA ones.37 Earlier work 

by these authors found that most PLA discussions of OBOR focused on the 

benefits accruing to China from economic cooperation, especially against 

the backdrop of U.S.-China competition for influence in Asia, but did not 
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184

focus on PLA responsibilities to protect these trade routes or overseas assets. 

A survey of PLA writings on the topic through 2015 by Andrea Ghiselli 

argued that while all “support the idea that the PLA should protect Chinese 

interests along the One Belt and One Road, they disagree about whether 

the PLA is capable of doing so” and that this debate within the PLA about 

its role in the initiative outside Asia was likely more representative of PLA 

opinion rather than pure propaganda work.38

Some PLA experts placed greater emphasis on military involvement 

in the Silk Road Economic Belt or Maritime Silk Road—usually based on 

their service affiliation, with the navy favoring the Maritime Silk Road 

and the Army and Air Force favoring the Silk Road Economic Belt. Retired 

PLA Army analyst Major General Zhu Chenghu cautioned that while 

overseas bases were necessary, negative global opinion and domestic elections in host nations challenge the feasibility of the idea, and retired PLA 

Air Force Major General Qiao Liang suggested a solution to this problem 

through focusing on air force power projection in times of crisis instead 

of permanent naval deployments. Lyle Goldstein analyzes two articles by 

PLA authors and finds, “while it still seems quite far-fetched to argue that 

military strategy is a major impulse for the [Maritime Silk Road], there is a 

clear strain of threat perception,” possibly as opportunistic bandwagoning 

to justify a larger PLA role in Chinese foreign policy.39 Most PLA writings 

cited focus on nontraditional threats and do not envision fighting a conventional adversary, mirroring Western academic consensus about likely 

PLA operations abroad.40

Limited PLA Analysis of OBOR 

A broad review of PLA sources suggests the Chinese military has yet to 

engage in a substantive debate over its roles and missions for OBOR. Indeed, 

as Goldstein stated, “such writings are rather rare. . . . Chinese military publications have been much more reticent to comment, preferring to stay with 

safe and relatively straightforward strategic issues, such as the maritime 

disputes.”41 This is likely the reason most Western analysis of PLA views of 
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185

the initiative has focused on PLA “talking heads,” since they are the only 

ones providing even superficial analysis from the military. This lack of 

discussion could be due to a lack of senior-level consensus on the PLA’s role, 

sensitivity to imbuing a military angle to President Xi’s premier economic 

and diplomatic initiative, or because the military deems discussion about 

operations abroad as classified.42

A review of all Chinese military region newspapers, service newspapers, and military academic journals revealed few references to OBOR. 

OBOR has never been referenced in China Military Science, the PLA’s 

most authoritative journal, or in many of the operational and equipment 

journals that typically feature debates over the future of PLA capabilities 

and missions. These include Ordnance Knowledge [兵器知识], Winged 

Missiles [飞航导弹], and Missiles and Space Vehicles [导弹与航天运载技

术]. The authors could find only two references to OBOR in the PLA Air 

Force’s Kongjun Bao, one in the PLA Navy’s Renmin Haijun, and none in 

the PLA Rocket Force’s Huojian Bao.

43

There is some evidence that PLA entities studied OBOR in the summer 

of 2015. That June, PLA Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian and other 

senior leaders held a conference with the Academy of Military Science titled 

the National Aerospace Security and Development Forum.44 According 

to Kongjun Bao, “the forum was aimed at implementing Chairman Xi’s 

important instruction, serving the national strategy of ‘One Belt, One 

Road,’ strengthening the research of the informationized warfare winning 

mechanism, [and] providing theory support for winning local wars under 

informationized conditions.” While this may seem like empty rhetoric, 

the forum focused on the PLA Air Force’s responsibilities in the maritime 

domain, which is the most likely area for the service’s foreign operations 

along OBOR. It concluded “that the nation ‘will thrive if being oriented to 

the sea, and will decline if giving up the sea.’ . . . The maritime direction has 

become an important strategic direction concerning the nation’s economic 

lifeline and the expansion of its development interests, and [it] holds a more 

prominent status in the safeguarding of the national sovereignty, security, 
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and development interests.” In explaining the PLA Air Force’s role, the 

forum argued that “aerospace has become closely tied to the seas to an 

unprecedented extent” and that “no battlefield will be isolated.”

PLA Pays Lip Service to OBOR 

The PLA does, however, appear to pay lip service to the concept, likely as a 

way to demonstrate political loyalty to President Xi by supporting his key 

initiative and perhaps lobby for additional funding and resources. PLA 

Daily references to OBOR jumped dramatically during May 2017, when the 

first OBOR Forum was held in Beijing. This rhetorical support is common 

in the PLA’s military diplomacy, where OBOR is a common item discussed 

with foreign interlocutors.

PLA Uses OBOR Opportunity to Reduce Threat Perceptions Abroad 

The PLA commonly uses OBOR, and especially the historical Silk Road, 

as evidence that China’s current global outreach and presence is simply a 

continuation of China’s longstanding involvement in global affairs and 

that this involvement has always been peaceful. On the PLA Navy’s 60th

anniversary in 2009, Commander Wu Shengli stated: 45

Figure. PLA Daily References to One Belt and One Road Initiative, 2014–2017

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

January 2014

April 2014

July 2014

October 2014

January 2015

April 2015

July 2015

October 2015

January 2016

April 2016

July 2016

October 2016

January 2017

April 2017

July 2017

October 2017

Source: China National Knowledge Infrastructure (data through November 2017).
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The maritime silk road starting from China’s coastal areas 

became a friendship bond for spreading China’s advanced civilization to the other parts of the world. More than 600 years ago, 

Zheng He, the famous Chinese navigator of the Ming Dynasty, 

led the then world’s strongest fleets to sail the western seas seven 

times, reaching as far as the Red Sea and the eastern coast of 

Africa, and visiting more than 30 countries and regions. They 

did not sign any unequal treaties, did not claim any territory, and 

did not bring back even one slave. They wiped out pirates for the 

countries along their course, broad[ly] disseminated benevolence 

to friendly nations, brought China’s tea, silk, cloth, chinaware, 

and Oriental civilization to the countries they visited, brought 

back other people’s trust and friendship toward the Chinese 

nation, and created a world-level example of peaceful and friendly 

maritime exchanges.

Mini–Case Studies in Protecting China’s Overseas Interests 

This section examines three examples of PRC efforts to protect overseas 

interests. These cases have been selected to illustrate the full range of 

measures Beijing is employing. The first examines the establishment of 

China’s first military base beyond its borders; the second examines the first 

overseas evacuation of civilians wholly planned and executed by the PLA; 

and the third examines host-nation efforts to provide enhanced protection 

for PRC citizens.

Establishing a Base in Djibouti (2017). There have long been rumors 

about the possibility of China establishing an overseas base, and this speculation has only increased as the PLA has become more involved in United 

Nations peacekeeping operations (since the 1990s) and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (since December 2008). The matter was sensitive 

in China, and PRC officials routinely denied that Beijing was considering 

establishing any base overseas. Thus, when questioned in 2011 as to whether 

the PRC was going to open a base in the Seychelles, a Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs spokesman emphatically denied it, stating, “China has never set up 

military bases in other countries.”46 Moreover, Beijing repeatedly denied 

that China was going to locate an installation in Djibouti. Even after the 

Djibouti president publicly announced in May 2016 that the two countries 

were discussing the prospect, the PRC Ministry of National Defense continued to deny the reports.47

Nevertheless, Chinese civilian and military analysts had for years 

openly discussed the possibility and logic of such an unprecedented move. 

According to Senior Colonel Dai Xu, the criteria for locating “overseas 

bases,” included not only “the needs of escorting [commercial vessels] and 

peacekeeping . . . [but] also . . . the long-term protection of [China’s] overseas interests.”48 Djibouti was a logical choice for several reasons. First, it 

is almost certainly the least controversial location. As noted above, other 

states already have military installations there, and Beijing knew it would 

be hard for critics inside or outside of China to accuse the PRC of creating 

a new alliance, or strengthening an existing alliance, and/or threatening 

third countries. If China had established its first overseas military base in 

Pakistan, the move would have likely provoked tremendous controversy, 

especially from India.49

Second, the location makes great sense considering PLA recent activities in the Middle East and North Africa and China’s growing interests in 

the region. China officially has described the facility as a “logistics facility,” 

which will provide valuable support for ongoing PLAN anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and potentially for Chinese forces involved in 

multiple United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region, including 

South Sudan and Lebanon. Furthermore, Chinese overseas interests in the 

area are significant and only likely to grow since the Middle East constitutes 

the nexus of the overland “belt” and maritime “road” of the PRC OBOR 

initiative. Not only does China have substantial economic investments 

in countries of the region, but there are also approximately 500,000 PRC 

citizens living and working in the Middle East and as many as 1 million 

citizens on the African continent.50
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China’s base in Djibouti positions it to extend military power and 

strategic influence over a critical part of OBOR, and the base appears to 

be designed with room to grow as Chinese interests expand in the coming 

years. Although rumors of China’s troop strength initially went as high 

as 10,000, it appears China began with stationing several hundred troops 

there, including some marines.51 This makes it comparable to most other 

foreign bases, though the United States has 4,000 troops.52 The 90-acre base 

is reportedly capable of supporting a brigade, with a heliport (including a 

400-meter runway), ammunition, as well as petroleum, oil, and lubricant 

storage.53 The base has already conducted several live-fire exercises since 

it opened in August 2017, and according to one analysis, it “will be able to 

accommodate all but the two largest ships in China’s fleet.”54

Evacuating Citizens from Yemen (2015). Beijing is increasingly concerned about the safety of its citizens in hot spots around the world, and 

for more than two decades the PRC has been engaged in efforts to extract 

civilians from harm’s way. Despite modest capabilities, the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs has effectively conducted more than two dozen evacuations 

from countries around the globe. All but two of these operations have been 

purely civilian with no discernible involvement of PLA personnel or assets. 

The first exception was in 2011, when Beijing organized the extraction of 

approximately 36,000 PRC citizens from the chaos of post–Muammar 

Qadhafi Libya, mostly using civilian and commercial vessels with some 

support from one PLA naval vessel in the Mediterranean. Some civilians 

were flown out on chartered commercial airliners, but several hundred were 

evacuated on PLA Air Force transports via Sudan.55

The second and most noteworthy participation by the PLA in an overseas evacuation operation was the 2015 NEO from Yemen. The operation, 

while coordinated with the other PRC bureaucratic actors, notably the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, marked the first time that the PLA took the 

central role in planning and executing an evacuation of Chinese citizens 

from a crisis zone far from home. In response to Saudi Arabia’s decision to 

attack Houthi rebels in Yemen, China evacuated more than 600 Chinese 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

190

citizens and nearly 300 foreign citizens over a week from multiple ports 

in Yemen using three PLAN ships.56 Some of these people were initially 

transported to Djibouti before flying home to China, underscoring the 

strategic location of China’s first overseas military base.57

The operation clearly showed the benefits of China’s military deployments abroad. Most importantly, the evacuation began quickly because the 

PLAN ships involved were drawn from Gulf of Aden patrols, reaching port 

to start evacuations in 3 days.58 By comparison, a naval deployment from the 

Chinese mainland would likely have taken upward of 2 weeks. Second, the 

security situation was likely too dangerous for private companies to transport 

the evacuees, showing the limits of relying primarily on commercial assets 

as in the Libya NEO.59 Third, evacuating foreign citizens allowed China, and 

especially the PLA, to frame Chinese foreign deployments as beneficial to others. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the NEO was a “special action 

by the Chinese government to evacuate foreign nationals,” which embodied 

the notions of ‘putting the people first.’”60 This narrative was also touted at 

home as a reflection of President Xi’s “strong army dream.”61

Outsourcing Security of PRC Citizens in Pakistan (Since 2007). Since 

the 1990s when Chinese citizens have been more active traveling and living 

overseas, they have been subject to crimes and acts of violence. Of course, 

PRC citizens can be victimized by criminals or terrorists in any country, 

but they are more vulnerable in some countries and regions than others. 

Chinese nationals have been killed and/or kidnapped in tumultuous and 

unstable countries in Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. 

While the thousands of Chinese living and working in Pakistan had 

been occasionally victimized by criminals and extremists, until the mid2000s, they had not been targeted by militants to the same extent Westerners 

had. The turning point was the Red Mosque incident in mid-2007 after seven 

Chinese massage parlor workers were kidnapped by Islamic extremists in 

Islamabad.62 The PRC citizens were eventually released unharmed, but the 

episode culminated in the siege and storming of the Red Mosque complex 

in July 2007. Pakistani commandos stormed the fortified mosque defended 
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191

by armed Islamic extremists on July 10, and 20 hours later the complex was 

secured at the cost of more than 100 fatalities. The battle was the most intense 

and sustained combat that Pakistan’s capital city had ever witnessed.63

The June kidnapping of the seven Chinese workers prompted a proactive response by PRC officials starting with PRC ambassador to Pakistan, 

Luo Zhaohui. Luo reached out to numerous Pakistani political figures, 

including the sitting prime minister, former officials, and even the leader of 

the militants holding the Chinese hostages. PRC Minister of Public Security 

Zhou Yongkang also spoke with his Pakistani counterpart, and PLA leaders 

communicated with Pakistani military leaders. In addition, President Hu 

Jintao telephoned Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on the matter.64

Although the Chinese workers were released unharmed, Chinese citizens in Pakistan became targets after the bloody end to the Red Mosque 

incident, as many Islamic radicals blamed China for the crackdown. In 

response, PRC leaders demanded that the Pakistan government do much 

more to protect Chinese citizens. Islamabad established a National Crisis 

Management Cell to coordinate the protection of PRC citizens working 

in Pakistan.65 The cell also formed a joint liaison committee that included 

PRC diplomats. Furthermore, a 24-hour hotline was created linking China’s embassy in Islamabad with Pakistan’s interior ministry and provincial 

authorities across the country. In addition, “thousands” of additional 

security personnel were added to secure Chinese construction projects, 

and Chinese workers were transported in armed convoys.

According to one account, by December 2008, Pakistan mobilized 

nine thousand soldiers and police to guard PRC citizens. Moreover, the 

PRC reportedly contributed almost $300 million worth of new security 

equipment for Pakistani police.66 The increased efforts appear to have 

improved the security of PRC citizens in-country. Beijing was sufficiently 

satisfied. The improved security situation allowed Xi to make a visit to 

Pakistan in April 2015 and to declare that Beijing was committing $46 

billion worth of infrastructure investments to develop an ambitious 

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.67
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

192

Conclusions 

As China’s national interests have expanded further beyond the shores of 

the PRC, Beijing has gradually embraced the idea that China is responsible 

for protecting these interests and that the PLA ought to play a key role in 

safeguarding these interests against both traditional and nontraditional 

security threats.

The PLA constitutes only one set of tools—albeit an important set—in 

the larger PRC toolkit available to protect China’s interests abroad. But no 

matter which of the five security options discussed above Beijing adopts to 

protect its burgeoning overseas interests, the PLA will be expected and will 

be ordered to play a greater role. While China’s armed forces will salute and 

do their best to obey, the PRC’s flag continues to lag in terms of available 

capabilities and resources especially for out-of-area security requirements.

Of the five discrete alternatives identified in this chapter, free riding and 

outsourcing seem destined to continue for the foreseeable future. Both are 

appealing options in the absence of robust enhanced PLA capabilities. Indeed, 

the PLA’s power projection capabilities are likely to grow only incrementally 

and remain extremely limited, especially for out-of-area deployments and 

employments in the near to medium term. Meanwhile, barring a dramatic 

worsening of the strategic environment, China is unlikely to go much beyond 

“rethinking” alliances. The most likely developments in coming years are 

the establishment of at least one or two more military bases overseas, with 

Pakistan being perhaps the most plausible location. With the construction 

of a logistics facility in Djibouti, China has effectively broken the taboo of 

building military installations beyond the borders of the PRC.

Although OBOR is officially a new foreign policy initiative under 

President Xi, the overseas interests at stake for the PLA to protect have 

slowly been growing in these places since the 1990s. The PLA has already 

used some of its newer military capabilities in contingencies along the 

route—mainly evacuating Chinese citizens from warzones, such as Libya 

in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. As greater numbers of more advanced platforms 

come online—including aircraft carriers, submarines, strategic airlift and 
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193

long-distance bombers—an important question is how hard the PLA will 

be pressed to employ these capabilities far from China’s shores.

Notes

1 “Trade No Longer Follows the Flag, Prime Minister,” Financial Times, 

November 13, 2015, available at <www.ft.com/content/cd0d47b8-8a04-11e5-

9f8c-a8d619fa707c>.

2 The phrase Great Leap Outward was coined by one of the authors. See 

Andrew Scobell, “Introduction,” in China’s Great Leap Outward: The Hard and 

Soft Dimensions of a Rising Power, ed. Andrew Scobell and Marylena Mantas (New 

York: Academy of Political Science, 2014), 5–6.

3 For good overviews of One Belt, One Road (OBOR), see Nadege Rolland, 

China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and 

Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, May 2017); and Joel 

Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 12 (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, 2017).

4 Daniel Hartnett, “The ‘New Historic Missions’: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s 

Military Legacy,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, 

ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, April 2014), 31–80; Daniel Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese 

Military: The Historic Missions of the Chinese Armed Forces (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 

2008); David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy,” in The People’s 

Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. 

Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 99–145.

5 Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), 69.

6 Chinese government officials, media, and experts castigate U.S. alliances 

as the cause of much of the tensions in Asia. See, for example, Timothy R. Heath, 

“China and the U.S. Alliance System,” The Diplomat, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/>; and Adam P. Liff, “China 

and the U.S. Alliance System,” China Quarterly, no. 233 (March 2018), 137–165.

7 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 1987), 1, 1n and 12n.

8 Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad, “China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or 

Recharge?” Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring 2014), 51–63.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

194

9 Huang Yufan, “Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive 

Foreign Policy,” New York Times, February 9, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2016/02/10/world/asia/china-foreign-policy-yan-xuetong.html>.

10 On the China-Pakistan relationship, see Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan 

Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). On China’s 

security relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, see Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner, and Michael Beckley, China’s Strategy Toward South and Central 

Asia: An Empty Fortress (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014.)

11 Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet 

Alliance, 1945–1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); Chen 

Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 

Press, 2001).

12 Chen Dingding, “Are China and Russia Moving Toward a Formal Alliance?” The Diplomat, May 30, 2014, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/

are-china-and-russia-moving-toward-a-formal-alliance/>.

13 Zheng Yu, “China and Russia: Alliance or No Alliance?,” China-U.S. Focus,

July 29, 2016, available at <www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-and-russia-alliance-or-no-alliance>.

14 Xi Jinping [习近平], “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in 

Security Cooperation” [积极树立亚洲安全观共创安全合作新局面], speech delivered to the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 

Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai, May 21, 2014, available at <www.fmprc.gov.

cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml>.

15 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press 

Conference on September 14, 2017,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2017, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1493166.shtml>. See also the white paper China’s 

Policies of Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (Beijing: State Council Information 

Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 2017), available at <www.fmprc.

gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml>.

16 Heath, “China and the U.S. Alliance System.”

17 Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: 

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, China Strategic Perspectives 7, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014), 53.

18 Ibid.; Gao Youbin [高友斌], “Netizens Call for Overseas Base, Aircraft 

Carrier Formation to Maintain Distant Sea Rights and Interests” [网民呼吁寻求
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195

海外基地组航母编队维护远洋利益], Global Times [环球时报], October 21, 2009, 

available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2009-10/608793.html>.

19 “Zhang Zhaozhong: Probability That China Builds Overseas Base Not 

Large” [张召忠:中国在海外建军事基地的可能性不大], QQ.com, January 19, 2010, 

available at <http://news.qq.com/a/20100119/002913.htm>.

20 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun,” 8.

21 Ibid., 10; Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s 

Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons 

from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict,” in Chinese Lessons from Other People’s 

Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2011).

22 Li Zhenyu, “China Denies Overseas Military Base Rumors,” People’s Daily 

Online, December 14, 2011, available at <http://en.people.cn/90786/7676578.html>.

23 Yufan, “Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive Foreign Policy.”

24 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun,” 2.

25 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2017), 5.

26 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “A New China Military Base in Pakistan?” 

The Diplomat, February 9, 2018, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/anew-china-military-base-in-pakistan/>.

27 See, for example, Cristina L. Garafola and Timothy R. Heath, The Chinese 

Air Force’s First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2017).

28 Minnie Chan, “As Overseas Ambitions Expand, China Plans 400 Per Cent 

Increase to Marine Corps Numbers, Sources Say,” South China Morning Post (Hong 

Kong), March 13, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078245/overseas-ambitions-expand-china-plans-400pc-increase>.

29 “Expert: If the Airborne Refuelable-6K Is True, Its Range Will Exceed 

10,000 Kilometers” [专家:空中受油型轰-6K若属实 其航程将超1万公里], People’s Daily Online, August 18, 2017, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/

n1/2017/0818/c1011-29479619.html>.

30 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “Meet China’s Sharp Sword, a Stealth Drone 

That Can Likely Carry 2 Tons of Bombs,” Popular Science, January 18, 2017.

31 On People’s Liberation Army (PLA) involvement in these operations, see 

Degang Sun, “China’s Military Relations with the Middle East,” in The Red Star 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

196

and the Crescent: China and the Middle East, ed. James Reardon-Anderson (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 99–100.

32 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun,” 1.

33 Ibid., 11.

34 An Puzhong [安普忠], “Accelerating the Legislation of Overseas Non-War 

Military Operations” [加快海外非战争军事行动立法], PLA Daily, March 10, 2015, 

available at <www.81.cn/2015qglh/2015-03/10/content_6388233.htm>.

35 Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel, China’s Strong Arm, 79–81.

36 Charles Clover, “Chinese Private Security Companies Go Global,” Financial 

Times, February 26, 2017, available at <www.ft.com/content/2a1ce1c8-fa7c-11e6-

9516-2d969e0d3b65>; and Zi Yang, “China’s Private Security Companies: Domestic 

and International Roles,” China Brief 16, no. 15 (October 4, 2016), available at 

<https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-private-security-companies-domestic-international-roles/>.

37 Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Dispatch from Beijing: PLA Writings on 

the New Silk Road,” China Brief 15, no. 4 (February 20, 2015), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/dispatch-from-beijing-pla-writings-on-the-new-silkroad/>; Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Rolling Out the New Silk Road: Railroads 

Undergird Beijing’s Strategy,” China Brief 15, no. 8 (April 16, 2015), available at 

<https://jamestown.org/program/rolling-out-the-new-silk-road-railroads-undergird-beijings-strategy/>; Andrea Ghiselli, “The Belt, the Road and the PLA,” China 

Brief 15, no. 20 (October 19, 2015), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

the-belt-the-road-and-the-pla/>. See also, Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the 

Belt and Road Initiative.

38 PLA commentators are first and foremost propaganda outlets. See Andrew 

Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part 

One),” China Brief 13, no. 15 (July 25, 2013), available at <https://jamestown.org/

program/propaganda-not-policy-explaining-the-plas-hawkish-faction-part-one/>.

39 Lyle Goldstein, “China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Is a Big Deal. So What Is 

the Role for Beijing’s Military?” National Interest, November 20, 2016, available at 

<http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/chinas-one-belt-one-road-big-deal-sowhat-the-role-beijings-18456>.

40 Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel, China’s Strong Arm; and Oriana Skylar Mastro, 

“China’s Military Is about to Go Global,” National Interest, December 18, 2014, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-military-about-go-global-11882>.

41 Goldstein, “China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Is a Big Deal.”
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197

42 Almost all People’s Republic of China (PRC) official speeches and writings stress the economic cooperation aspect of One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and 

downplay/deny any strategic ambitions. See Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the 

Belt and Road Initiative.

43 There was one reference to the historical silk road in Renmin Haijun from 

April 2009 and two from Kongjun Bao in January 2010 and October 2010. For 

articles that mention OBOR specifically, see Gong Benhai and Xu Yi [巩本海, 

许毅], “Third ‘National Aerospace Security and Development Forum’ Is Held 

in Beijing” [第三届 “国家空天安全与发展论坛”在京举行], Kongjun Bao [空军

报], June 24, 2015, 1; Gao Jie [高杰], “Resolutely Maintain the Core, Speed Up 

the Strategic Transformation: Theory Study Central Group of the PLA Air Force 

Party Committee Holds a Concentrated Study Session on ‘Promoting the In-Depth 

Implementation of Safeguarding the Core and Obeying Command, Speeding Up 

the Process of the Air Force’s Strategic Transformation from the New Starting 

Point of Reform and Military Strengthening’” [坚定维护核心加速战略转型: 空军

党委理论学习中心组开展 “推动维护核心, 听从指挥落深落实,在改革强军新起点

上加速推进空军战略转型” 专题集中学习综述], Kongjun Bao [空军报], June 26, 

2017, 1; and Zhao Xin [赵新], “Vigorously Strengthen the ‘Four Counters’ Work to 

Build a Defense Line for Covert Struggle” [大力加强“四反”工作筑牢隐蔽斗争防

线], Renmin Haijun [人民海军], July 3, 2017, 3.

44 Gong and Xu, “Third ‘National Aerospace Security and Development 

Forum’ Is Held in Beijing,” 1.

45 Wu Shengli [吴胜利], “Make Concerted Efforts to Jointly Build Harmonious Ocean” [同心协力共建和谐海洋], Renmin Haijun [人民海军], April 22, 2009, 1.

46 Li Zhenyu, “China Denies Overseas Military Base Rumors,” People’s Daily 

Online, December 14, 2011, available at <http://en.people.cn/90786/7676578.html>.

47 Ben Blanchard, “China Military Declines to Confirm Djibouti Base Plan,” Reuters, June 25, 2015, available at <www.reuters.com/

article/us-china-defence-djibouti/china-military-declines-to-confirm-djibouti-base-plan-idUSKBN0P51CV20150625>; and Kristina Wong, “China’s Military 

Makes Move into Africa,” The Hill, November 24, 2015, available at <https://thehill.

com/policy/defense/261153-chinas-military-makes-move-into-africa>.

48 Retired Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo proposed the idea of a PLA base in Djibouti. See Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun,” 11.

49 Sarah Zheng, “China’s Djibouti Military Base: ‘Logistics Facility,’ or Platform for Geopolitical Ambitions Overseas?” South China Morning Post (Hong 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

198

Kong), October 1, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113300/chinas-djibouti-military-base-logistics-facility-or>.

50 For estimates on the number of PRC citizens in the Middle East and Africa, 

see, respectively, Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: 

The Wary Dragon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 18; and Howard W. French, 

China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in 

Africa (New York: Random House, 2015).

51 “China Formally Opens First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti,” Reuters, 

August 1, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3>.

52 Of the eight countries with facilities there, most are small, and France and 

the United States have the largest troop levels, 2,000 and 4,000, respectively. See 

Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick deGategno, China’s Military Support 

Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas 

Base (Arlington, VA: CNA, July 2017).

53 Mike Yeo, “Satellite Imagery Offers Clues to China’s Intentions in Djibouti,” Defense News, November 8, 2017, available at <www.defensenews.com/

global/mideast-africa/2017/11/08/satellite-imagery-offers-clues-to-chinas-intentions-in-djibouti/>.

54 Kinling Lo, “Chinese Troops Head Back into the Djibouti Desert for LiveFire Drills,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), November 25, 2017, available 

at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2121547/chinesetroops-head-back-djibouti-desert-live-fire>; Downs, Becker, and deGategno, 

China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti.

55 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military 

Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 11, 2011), available 

at <https://jamestown.org/program/implications-of-chinas-military-evacuation-of-citizens-from-libya/>.

56 “Spotlight: China Completes Evacuation from Yemen, Assisting 629 

Nationals, 279 Foreigners,” Xinhua, April 7, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/07/c_134130679.htm>.

57 “Chinese Warship Carrying 83 Evacuees from Yemen Arrives in Djibouti,” 

Xinhua, April 7, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-

04/07/c_134129830.htm>.

58 Guo Yuandan and Yu Wen [郭媛丹, 于文], “Chinese Navy Has Temporarily Paused Patrols in the Gulf of Aden: Expert—May Be to Participate in 
The Flag Lags but Follows

199

Yemen Evacuation” [中国海军暂停亚丁湾护航专家:或赴也门参加撤侨], Global 

Times [环球时报], March 28, 2015, available at <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2015-03/6033036.html>.

59 Zhang Yunbi, “Navy Wins Praise for Evacuating Foreigners,” China Daily

(Beijing), April 7, 2015, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-04/07/

content_20012083.htm>; and Xie Chuanjiao, “Cool under Fire, Captain Leads by 

Example,” China Daily, September 3, 2015, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/

cndy/2015-09/03/content_21782031.htm>.

60 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference 

on April 3, 2015,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2015, available at <www.fmprc.

gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1251976.shtml>.

61 Fan Jianghuai, Zhou Meng, and Zhou Yuan [范江怀, 周猛, 周远], “To 

Raise the Strong Army Dream, the Rule of Law Is the Cornerstone” [托举强军梦,

法治基石坚如磐], PLA Daily (Beijing), October 28, 2016, available at <www.81.

cn/2016gtzghy/2016-10/28/content_7331168.htm>.

62 Small, The China-Pakistan Axis, 111.

63 Ibid., ix–xvi.

64 Ibid., xii–xiv.

65 Ibid., 111–112.

66 Isaac B. Kardon, China and Pakistan: Emerging Strains in the Entente Cordiale (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2011), 14, 16.

67 Nevertheless, PRC security concerns persist, and in February 2016, 

Pakistan promised to create a “special force” of 10,000 troops to protect Chinese 

workers and investments. See Shannon Tiezzi, “Pakistan Will Provide ‘Special 

Force’ to Defend Chinese Investments,” The Diplomat, February 5, 2016, available 

at <https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/pakistan-will-provide-special-force-todefend-chinese-investments>.

PART II

BUILDING A JOINT FORCE

203

TOWARD A MORE JOINT, 

COMBAT-READY PLA?

By Mark R. Cozad

Military reform has been a central element of Xi Jinping’s military program since ascending to the top positions in both the Community Party of China and military in 2012. The need to 

prepare and equip the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to “fight and win 

informationized wars” has been a central, if not the central, theme driving 

these reform and modernization efforts. Accordingly, joint operations factor 

heavily into the PLA’s assessments of the capabilities it needs to improve its 

status as a modern, informationized military. During Xi’s tenure, the PLA 

has placed significant focus on all aspects of improving joint operations, 

including personnel, architecture, organization, training, and concept 

development. These renewed efforts under Xi are building on several years 

of similar programs, all of which sought to build on lessons learned derived 

from observations of recent foreign military developments, particularly 

those involving U.S. operations. These lessons have magnified the importance of joint operations in modern warfare. From this standpoint, Xi’s 

interest in joint operations has not been so much a new start as a top-level 

reinforcement of previous efforts and a recognition that future success will 

rely upon substantive, sustained progress in joint operations capacity.

CHAPTER 5
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This chapter addresses the question of how much progress the PLA 

has made in the joint operations arena during Xi’s tenure. To accomplish 

this, the chapter examines how joint operations have evolved in the PLA 

since 2000 in order to identify where Xi’s policies have diverged from earlier 

practices and where they have maintained continuity. Similarly, this chapter 

provides context on how previous reform efforts relevant to joint operations 

development have fared. While the PLA has outlined new initiatives in 

recent years designed to improve PLA readiness for actual combat, previous efforts in similar areas have met with limited success over the past two 

decades. Lastly, this chapter discusses specific criteria for evaluating PLA 

joint operations progress.

The overall conclusions provided in this chapter do not address two 

key areas: organization and service-related personnel decisions within 

that structure. Clearly, these two areas are essential elements in building a 

military culture that embraces joint operations; however, these structural 

questions become significantly less important if the basic building blocks of 

joint operations have not been developed and put into effect. These building blocks include operational concepts; personnel development, training, 

and education; and field training, experimentation, and exercises. Absent 

developments in these three core areas, organizational reforms, personnel 

changes at senior levels, and information architecture achieve few, if any, 

tangible improvements in capability.

Recent PLA Reforms in Context 

The 1990s were a watershed in PLA history. Military and civilian leaders 

in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) closely observed U.S. operations 

in the Middle East and North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations in 

southeastern Europe and realized how far their forces had fallen behind 

these technologically advanced militaries in several key areas. On further 

study, PLA leaders identified not only major shortfalls in technology and 

weapons systems, but also in conceptual development, organizational 

structure, and personnel. Concerned that China’s forces were unprepared 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

205

for modern combat, PRC analysts studied the successes and failures of 

the Gulf War and Kosovo campaigns, drawing lessons for the PLA about 

“asymmetrical war” and “local wars under high-tech conditions,” focusing particularly on joint operations as a means for efficiently fighting 

in future wars that relied on information technology, networks, and 

advanced weapons controlled by different parts of the military.1

 Their 

research led to a wholesale restructuring of all PLA services that encompassed a new military strategy, new operational concepts, the pursuit of 

advanced technologies, and accelerated purchases of advanced Russian 

weapons and platforms.2 Improved joint operations capability was viewed 

as an imperative.

In particular, the operational surprises and resulting lessons learned 

from U.S. operations in the First Gulf War and Kosovo compelled the 

PLA to confront its weaknesses and step up its modernization efforts. 

U.S. operations demonstrated that modern forces—particularly air 

forces—equipped with precision weapons; advanced command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) capabilities; and aerial refueling offered an unprecedented threat to 

the survivability of the PRC’s most strategically significant infrastructure.3

Many PLA observers thus argued that joint operations—particularly the 

effective integration of offensive air and naval operations—would define 

future conflicts, requiring the PLA to invest in a networked system of systems encompassing precision munitions, automated command and control 

systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).4

These same observers also noted that U.S. and allied forces had easily gained and maintained the initiative in each conflict, deploying with 

impunity around the periphery of the countries under attack and operating 

with little concern for defending their own assets against attack.5 In the 

face of such overwhelming adversary forces, the PLA could no longer rely 

solely on massive numbers of ground forces. Instead, future conflicts would 

depend on having significant maneuverability and destructive capacity. In 

short, many capabilities applicable to future combat resided outside of the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

206

PLA ground forces. The need for developing joint operations concepts and 

capabilities became understood as the critical link for bringing together 

the PLA’s full range of combat capabilities.

Calls within the PLA for new programs to develop commanders and 

improve training highlighted the importance of developing the PLA’s joint 

operations capability. Broad efforts within the PLA to improve the overall 

quality of its personnel focused on a variety of aspects such as recruitment, 

retention, technical training, and military education. With the growing 

demand for technically competent people, PLA efforts required a dedicated program to ensure that its new officers and soldiers were suited for 

modern military operations. The need for commanders versed in modern 

warfare was particularly important. These commanders were envisioned 

as the primary ingredient necessary to “master joint operations under 

modern high-tech conditions.”6

 Moreover, they were expected to possess 

“keen political insight” and a “deep strategic mind” along with mastery of 

“high-tech operational theories and compatible science and technology.”7

Programs to cultivate talented personnel were subsequently focused on 

emphasizing the ability to command joint operations.8 These efforts culminated in efforts throughout the military regions to improve training for 

commanders and mid-level staffs and develop the competency of technical 

personnel needed for future joint operations.9

The PLA has also treated training reform efforts as a means for 

improving joint force readiness. Since 2001, the PLA has issued its third 

Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE). The 2001 version 

was largely focused on improving the framework for how PLA training 

was performed and evaluated. It followed an extended period of study and 

experimentation in the 1990s to ensure that new training methods could 

be implemented effectively across the PLA and that innovations had been 

tested extensively. The 2009 OMTE placed particular emphasis on building 

joint operations capacity. The new guideline treated joint operations as its 

primary theme.10 The most recent iteration of the OMTE has likewise placed 

joint operations as a core element.
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207

These examples demonstrate that the need for joint operations and 

the infrastructure required to support its development was recognized well 

in advance of Xi’s leadership. The programs to develop commanders and 

improve training were widely touted within the PLA as important steps 

toward creating a modern, high-tech—later informationized—military. Likewise, joint operations concept development began in earnest in the early 1990s 

and gained significant momentum during the 10th and 11th Five Year Plans.

PLA Joint Operations Concepts 

In the 1993 revision of the Military Strategic Guidelines in the New Era (still 

in force today with minor adjustments), the PLA’s observations coalesced 

into the core objective of conducting integrated joint operations, a concept 

that predates Xi and has, since its inception, guided the development of new 

systems and operational concepts.11 The PLA textbook Science of Campaigns

defines integrated joint operations as “using integrated methods and information technology, blending an operational system from all services and 

arms and other types of armed strengths with operational units to form an 

integrated whole.”12 The PLA’s evolving framework for integrated joint operations forms the foundation for its current joint operations concept and is a 

driving force behind two key concepts—noncontact warfare and target-centric warfare.13 In order to achieve success in local wars under informationized 

conditions, the PLA recognizes that it must link military information systems 

and networks that will enable PRC military planners to fuse “operational 

strengths” from each of the PLA’s services.14 These integrated joint operations 

in theory rely on a flexible system that permits and enables adjustments and 

coordination over the entire depth of the battlespace and within all domains 

as the situation requires. This flexibility allows for more precise applications 

of military force based on new information as it becomes available and is 

assimilated into the PLA’s command automation system. As one senior PLA 

officer argued in the early conceptual development stages, these types of 

operations are driven by “the guiding ideology of ‘comprehensive supremacy, 

precision strike, and destruction of systems.’”15
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208

Integrated joint operations are linked conceptually with the continuing imperatives to improve the PLA’s level of “informationization” that 

enables “system-of-systems operations.”16 Informationization has been a 

core concept in PLA modernization formally for over a decade.17 In turn, 

informationization is the essence of integrated joint operations, which rely 

on information networks to integrate and systematize operations designed 

to obtain information superiority.18 An informationized architecture forms 

the basis for nearly all facets of integrated joint operations. Integrated joint 

operations thus are considered “the basic form and necessary requirement 

for informationized war,” particularly in terms of ensuring real-time information support, effective precision weapon employment, and a system 

capable of rapidly deploying and configuring the necessary forces for a 

range of environments and contingencies.19 Informationization will permit 

the realization of truly integrated joint operations through the development 

of precision timing for maneuvers, precise position data for fire strikes, and 

precision support for forces across the battlespace.20 Accordingly, efforts 

to develop informationized capabilities serve as a key unifying theme in 

much of the experimentation that supported development of important 

new operational concepts, including noncontact and target-centric warfare.

Another central element in the PLA’s joint operations development 

is found in its emphasis on system-of-systems operations—an area that 

presents commanders and their staffs with significant challenges. This 

concept is based on linking command automation, ISR, precision strike, 

and mobility in ways that permit rapidly and efficiently striking vital 

sites and key nodes in an enemy’s systems.21 Conceptually these “combat 

systems” optimize operational strengths from across the PLA’s services. 

These systems should be optimized to meet specific operational objects 

and ensure that critical weapons and capabilities are used as efficiently as 

possible.22 The Campaign Theory Study Guide, an early PLA textbook that 

addressed system-of-systems, identified the connection between campaigns 

and combat systems in the following manner:
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

209

Paralyzing the enemy’s combat system has become an important 

means of winning a war. . . . Once there are problems in key links 

of the system, the entire weapon system and combat system will 

lose its combat effectiveness, or will even become paralyzed. This 

illustrates that modern campaigns are the confrontation between 

combat systems. Advanced weapons and equipment and good 

strategy and planning both depend upon the integrity and coordination of combat systems. Therefore, in modern campaigns, 

attacking and paralyzing key nodes in the enemy’s combat system 

while ensuring the integrity and coordination of one’s own combat systems has become an important way of winning.23

This important PLA teaching text—although an early version—highlighted two imperatives for success in future wars that remain central to 

PLA thinking on system-of-systems operations and, by extension, integrated 

joint operations. The first imperative is the need to build and protect one’s 

own combat system, while the second involves simultaneously identifying 

and attacking an adversary’s critical weaknesses. These ideas, developed 

and tested as part of the PLA’s military science research efforts, provide the 

underpinnings for many of the PLA’s most recent joint exercises.

Key Joint Operations Concepts 

PLA joint operations capability development efforts have not taken place in 

a functional vacuum; they have been tailored to correspond to major trends 

in global military development over the past two-and-a-half decades. 

The methods of warfare that PLA observers identified during U.S. and 

allied operations since the 1990s have led to the development of new ideas 

within the PLA about how future wars will be fought and the capabilities 

necessary to succeed in this environment. As discussed earlier, these 

observations focus on information and weapon systems that can be integrated efficiently to target an adversary’s war-making capacity. These types 

of operations placed a premium on air and naval power. Likewise, PLA 
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210

observers concluded that future conflicts were much less likely to involve 

ground-heavy, brute-force conflicts of attrition that characterized military 

operations in previous generations. The strategic importance placed on 

gaining superiority in the air, at sea, in space, and in information domains 

presented an imperative to PRC political and military leaders: reorient the 

PLA to become more joint, agile, and efficient or fail to keep pace with the 

demands of the global revolution in military affairs.

One of the most significant developments in modern warfare that 

shaped PLA recognition for the need for a credible joint operations capability 

was the emergence of “noncontact warfare.” According to several senior PLA 

writers who developed the concept, this new form of warfare constituted a 

significant departure from earlier models of warfare in several important 

respects.24 Until the 1990s, they argued, warfare was based on a model 

of attrition that sought the destruction of fielded forces; military success 

was primarily achieved by mass deployments of mechanized forces. U.S. 

operations in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated that warfare no longer 

conformed to this model. The objective of military operations had changed 

from attrition to the destruction of an enemy’s war potential, embodied in 

strategic targets like leadership, energy, industry, communications, and key 

infrastructure.25 Long-range precision strikes on these targets, enabled by 

advanced C4ISR capabilities, would be the cornerstone of modern warfare. 

The noncontact warfare model required PLA commanders to bring together 

each service’s firepower capabilities in unprecedented ways. It was therefore 

necessary for PLA commanders to understand the entire range of kinetic 

and nonkinetic capabilities at their disposal.

The PLA’s latest operational concept is target-centric warfare, which 

has been under development since at least 2011. It appears to be a further 

refinement of the noncontact warfare model primarily oriented toward 

the joint integration of PLA Air Force and PLA ground forces. The general 

concept behind target-centric warfare is that by employing ISR sensors 

and target analysis, PLA commanders can identify—and subsequently 

aim to destroy—the most critical targets in an enemy’s combat system.26
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

211

This operational concept seeks to make efficient use of firepower assets, 

provide timely targeting of the most essential targets on the battlefield, and 

ensure that combat plans are able to adapt in an agile manner that addresses 

rapid changes in a dynamic environment. Recent target-centric warfare 

experimentation has focused on engaging mobile targets and employing 

opposition forces in order to challenge exercise participants.27 Though this 

concept is under development, there has been a limited amount of literature 

available describing its evolution and key elements. Regardless, its existence 

provides an overarching context by which to evaluate key areas of progress 

in the PLA’s development of integrated joint operations.

Training and Experimentation 

The PLA initiated its program to develop joint operations concepts in 2001 

with the Five Year Plan on Headquarters’ Informationization Building, 

2001–2005.

28 This multifaceted effort involved conceptual development 

that brought together a broad body of military science research, technology 

development, new training guidelines, and operational experimentation. 

The plan culminated with two exercises named Sharp Sword 2005, led by 

units in the Chengdu and Nanjing Military Regions (MRs). PLA leaders 

tasked units from the Chengdu MR with exploring new modes of integrated 

joint training, along with air-land integration between the PLA Army and 

Air Force.29 They also tasked units from the Nanjing MR with experimenting on firepower strike coordination, integrated training methods, and 

interservice coordination mechanisms.30 Although this geographically 

dispersed exercise highlighted several shortcomings in the PLA’s capability 

to perform integrated joint operations, it marked a significant foundational 

basis that guided follow-on efforts in the next two Five Year Plans.31

PLA joint operations training entered a “standardized development” 

phase as the 11th Five Year Plan ended in 2010, presumably to experiment 

and test the joint operations concepts and practices that emerged from the 

Sharp Sword exercises. In 2009, the PLA claimed a total of 18 large-scale 

exercises that explored a wide range of joint operations subject matter, 
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212

including civil-military integration, naval and air force power projection, 

“systemic operations,” joint training methods, and war zone–level command and control.32 Three key exercises during 2009 and 2010—Firepower 

2009, Stride 2009, and Mission Action 2010—demonstrated the PLA’s progress in joint operations during the 11th Five Year Plan. More importantly, the 

underlying themes guiding these exercises and evaluations would serve as 

the basis for many components of the major exercises seen in the subsequent 

12th Five Year Plan.

In August 2009, four PLA divisions subordinate to the Shenyang, 

Lanzhou, Jinan, and Guangzhou MRs conducted “the first large-scale, 

intertheater, live-forces, checkout-type exercises since the founding of the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” named Stride 2009.33 Participating 

units deployed to a PLA combined tactical training base located outside of 

their respective MRs. Subjects ranged from practical evaluations of training 

practices and procedures to long-range mobility. PLA training methods 

were further enhanced through the use of dedicated opposition forces and 

the newly deployed Army Unit Exercise and Evaluation System.34 Substantively, exercise participants tested new equipment types, including multiple 

features of the Beidou navigation and positioning system, electronic warfare 

systems, and psychological warfare support vehicles, among many others.35

Stride 2009 also served as a comprehensive test in multiple specialty mobility–related areas, including fuel and material resupply, medical support, war 

compensation, and political work.36

Shortly after Stride 2009 began in October 2009, the PLA General 

Staff Department’s Military Training and Arms Department convened an 

All-Army Symposium named Firepower 2009, which examined precision 

strike under informationized conditions. This 3-day event brought together 

PLA experts and scholars tasked with developing new approaches and 

models for an advanced warfighting concept capable of integrating “precision reconnaissance, precision command, precision firing, and precision 

evaluation.”37 In contrast with the evaluation- and test-focused aspects 

of Stride 2009, Firepower 2009 served almost exclusively as a means for 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

213

experimentation using demonstrations and working groups composed of 

military science researchers and operators. The symposium’s content clearly 

reflected PLA thinking on the intersections between joint operations and 

system-of-systems concepts.

Mission Action 2010 marked the culmination of the 11th Five Year 

Plan’s joint operations training efforts. This exercise involved multiple 

units from across multiple MRs in a test exercise that focused on transregional maneuver and testing of key operational functions, including joint 

campaign command, joint firepower strike, comprehensive protection, 

and precision support.38 Overall, the exercise stretched for 20 days and 

included participants from the Beijing, Chengdu, and Lanzhou MRs, along 

with elements from both the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy. Most notably, 

Mission Action 2010 marked the first time that operational forces crossed 

MR boundaries to participate in an operationally oriented joint exercise.

More recently, since the beginning of the 12th Five Year Plan, joint 

exercises have become even more of a centerpiece in PLA military modernization and experimentation. Primarily, they provide a means by which 

PRC senior leaders can measure PLA progress toward achieving its most 

important modernization objectives. In contrast to the heavy emphasis 

placed on experimentation and concept development in the major joint 

exercises during the 10th and 11th Five Year Plans, more recent joint exercises 

have focused on testing and evaluating a wider range of operational missions 

intended to produce a more flexible, adaptable, and deployable military. At 

the same time, the integrated joint training methods examined in earlier 

exercises—along with recognition among senior leaders that training quality needed to be improved overall—have evolved into a broader effort to 

improve realism and more effectively evaluate unit performance. Although 

many press reports following these events highlight shortcomings that continue to hinder PLA progress in the field of joint operations, they also portray 

significant improvements in realism and complexity, as the units involved 

are placed in much more dynamic scenarios away from their familiar surroundings and with dedicated opposition forces providing more-than-token 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

214

resistance. Based on these improvements, the capabilities developed during 

these joint exercises are essential for meeting the PLA’s objective of being 

able to fight local wars under the conditions of informationization. The 

progression of joint operations exercises spanning the 10th, 11th, and 12th

Five Year Plans demonstrates a sustained focus on the key elements of PLA 

joint operations concepts developed over a decade ago—informationized, 

system-of-systems-based, high-tempo, multidimensional operations that 

integrate all PLA combat strengths.39

Evaluating Progress Under Xi 

The preceding discussion and examples demonstrate that joint operations 

development was under way within the PLA on many levels prior to Xi’s 

coming to power. In no sense was the effort lacking in resources or highlevel interest. In addition, it appeared to make progress in several areas 

despite some acknowledged setbacks by the commanders leading key 

pieces of experimentation. Furthermore, a wide range of literature was 

being made available to PLA professional military education institutions in 

order to educate future commanders in joint operations theory. In sum, the 

range of PLA activities dedicated to building joint operations concepts and 

capabilities increased significantly and methodically attempted to address 

a wide range of critical questions.

The primary issue related to Xi’s impact on joint operations development appears to be greater emphasis and a new organizational structure 

that ensures responsibility for joint training will be overseen by the theater 

commands—the PLA organizations responsible for operational planning 

and warfighting.40 Although many efforts were in place to develop concepts, 

improve personnel and education, and reform training, each of these programs had met with mixed success and were heavily focused on theoretical 

aspects of joint operations. In some cases, personnel and training reforms 

were rolled out in multiple iterations, each time acknowledging many of 

the same longstanding shortfalls in key areas. While in many respects these 

reforms may signal gradual improvements in practice or changes based on 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

215

the state of the-art, in most cases they appear to be redesigned efforts to 

address longstanding problems and shortfalls.

Xi’s imprint on joint operations has nonetheless been significant. His 

guidance to prepare for military struggle has begun taking hold at multiple 

levels as evidenced by a body of new training guidance. Most notably, at the 

beginning of 2014, the Central Military Commission released the Opinions 

on Raising the Level of the Realistic Battle Orientation of Training, and in 

2015, the General Staff Department issued the Opinions on Strengthening 

and Improving Campaign and Tactical Training.

41 While these directives 

build on earlier efforts to improve and reform training, they appear to be 

a corrective to the emphasis under Hu Jintao on nonmilitary operations. 

Similar programs have been designed to educate and train commanders to 

better equip them because the requirements of joint operations have gained 

momentum under Xi’s leadership. In general, Xi’s imprint will most likely 

be felt in three key areas: education, training, and personnel.

In addition, new training regulations clearly outline responsibilities 

for joint training. Most notably, joint training has been identified as the 

key driver for service-specific training requirements. As such, the services 

still maintain their overall responsibility for building general proficiency 

based on service capabilities while the theater commands—overseen by 

the Central Military Commission—are given the authority to ensure that 

combat-related joint training meets PLA specifications and operational 

requirements.42 As explained by the Eastern theater’s commander, the new 

system was designed to have “the theater command taking the lead” to 

ensure “alignment of training with combat operations” and “shaping of systems of systems.”43 Under this system, the theater command generates joint 

training plans based on its missions and operational training requirements, 

delegating key training decisions to the theater commanders responsible 

for combat operations. This approach is a significant departure from the 

highly centralized system overseen by the General Staff Department prior 

to the reorganization.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

216

Personnel 

The PLA has embarked on a program to train and cultivate talented personnel for command positions in joint operational roles. Key elements of 

the program were discussed in Beijing at a July 2016 gathering of some two 

dozen military education and research institutions, theater commands, and 

the armed services that sought to identify measures to improve the cadre of 

qualified commanders.44 The program highlighted several areas by which 

the PLA could accomplish these goals, generally in the development of 

strategic leadership, command capabilities, and management commensurate with the PLA’s future requirements.45 Overall, the effort is dedicated 

to improving the manner in which commanders are selected and trained. 

From a training perspective, this process will rely on intensified training for 

commanders and staffs in eight areas that range from emergency situation 

training to theater joint command organization.46

Another critical component in the effort to improve the quality and 

preparedness of personnel taking joint command and staff positions has 

been developing common standards and training requirements. These 

standards range from educational materials to criteria for evaluating performance and progress of individuals in both educational and field training 

settings.47 In particular, these guidelines are designed to provide a longterm, structured framework for ensuring that PLA personnel are groomed 

at early points in their military career for the positions they will ascend to 

in the future.

Education 

A key element of these personnel reforms involves improved education 

in joint operations. One of the most challenging problems facing the PLA 

education system is determining “what kinds of ideas and models” should 

be used in educating future joint commanders.48 Based on previous military 

science research and experimentation efforts, this realization is illuminating 

in terms of the PLA’s view of its own progress in the field of joint operations. 

In line with the effort to “cultivate talented joint operations commanding 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

217

personnel” the General Staff Department’s Military Training Department 

(prior to its dissolution) alluded to new programs at the National Defense 

University (NDU), National University of Defense Technology, and service and branch command colleges to enhance the content and quality of 

teaching on joint operations topics. Interestingly, the program’s development comes shortly following new editions of key joint operations teaching 

materials used to educate PLA officers.49 The new NDU Joint Operations 

College at Shijiazhuang is likely to play a critical role in educating officers 

for joint positions. It will offer a year-long course for division and “brigadier 

level” officers and train staff below the rank of colonel who will serve in 

joint positions.50

Training 

Progress in training overall has been a notable success for the PLA. Over 

the past 10 years, exercises have grown in scale, complexity, and number 

reflecting the priority the PLA has assigned to developing joint operations 

capability in a number of potential scenarios. These exercises also have 

attempted to incorporate more realistic scenarios and rigorous evaluation 

of performance through all exercise stages. Many of the most significant 

problems highlighted in previous iterations of the OMTE appear to be 

improving across the board. The primary uncertainty, however, is the extent 

to which these innovations reflect true improvements or set piece additions 

that give the appearance of progress. Based on the sources available, it is 

difficult to make a definitive assessment. Regardless, the joint operations 

exercise program and quality of the exercises themselves predates Xi. 

Exercises performed during the 11th Five Year Plan provided an important 

bridge between the PLA’s earlier experimentation and the major exercises 

that have become routine during the 12th Five Year Plan. Based on this 

steady progression, it seems that the PLA’s progress in this area is real but 

not attributable to Xi’s reforms.

Xi’s primary influence is clear in two key areas. The first is in the 

direction given to the PLA to prepare for military struggle, which came 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

218

forward shortly after the 2009 OMTE. Based on the PLA’s recent discussions about this directive, it seems clear that new rigor is being applied to 

exercise content, intensity, and evaluation under Xi.

The second area is closely related to recent efforts to cultivate talented 

personnel and improve education—training joint commanders in realistic 

conditions. Since the PLA reorganization, each of the major theaters has 

highlighted efforts to ensure that joint command is a key topic in their 

specific training programs.51 In addition, several units have attempted 

to address perceived shortcomings in joint command, referred to as the 

“Five Incapables.”52 These examples demonstrate that this critical piece 

of training reform is at the forefront of PLA joint operations training. As 

in previous years, the idea of rigorous training has taken hold across the 

PLA, and units are now attempting to implement these guidelines. The 

degree to which these new directives are being highlighted in PLA media 

suggests that there is added impetus behind ensuring that evaluations and 

commander training are dealt with more substantively than in the past. In 

April 2016, Xi visited the newly established Central Military Commission 

Joint Operations Command Center and emphasized the critical importance 

of developing both operational- and strategic-level command capabilities 

necessary for modern conflicts.53 Additional reports, both before and after 

Xi’s visit, highlighted programs and training initiatives across the PLA and 

within various theater commands designed to implement and test new joint 

command programs and procedures.54

Conclusion 

Overall, it is clear that the PLA has made substantial progress in several 

key areas relating to joint operations capability.55 Exercises have become 

considerably larger and more sophisticated. They now involve units from 

across the PLA, frequently in scenarios that require them to deploy considerable distances from their home bases and familiar training facilities. 

Attempts to improve realism by adding uncertain situations have also been 

noted in several PLA media accounts as enhancing the overall quality of 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

219

joint training. Similarly, joint training increasingly has involved the use 

of new command automation systems to exercise the use of capabilities 

from across the PLA’s services and branches. Participating commanders 

and staffs are being challenged like never before. These developments 

have built on to earlier experimentation and development efforts in clear, 

steady progression from a long-term effort. The progress is real, but it is 

not a result of Xi’s policies.

Xi’s policies likely will have the most significant impact in the areas 

of personnel and education. “New” programs to cultivate better joint commanders are evidence of previous failures and a desire to change the PLA 

culture. Much of the declaratory statements about why these programs 

are important reveal a recognition that earlier reform attempts fell short 

of their intended mark. In addition, the stated need to improve military 

education instruction and content suggests a similar dissatisfaction with 

the materials that are currently available. This second issue is particularly 

striking due to the amount of time and energy devoted to joint operations 

concept development since 2001. The degree to which these two areas are 

considered shortfalls is uncertain, and the extent to which bureaucratic 

branding is at play should temper future assessments. However, the attention devoted to these two areas over the past 3 years strongly suggests that 

PLA leaders, including Xi, perceive a major problem. The reorganization 

of the PLA military education system announced in July 2017 is intended 

to address these shortfalls.

Similarly, the most recent training reforms also suggest dissatisfaction 

with the progress and quality of training across the PLA. Two iterations of 

the OMTE prior to 2010 were touted as solutions to the very problems that 

Xi’s directive to prepare for military struggle was designed to solve. The new 

OMTE, issued in January 2018, reinforced Xi’s core themes and ensured 

that recent organizational reforms are embodied in these new training 

guidelines. In general, directing the PLA to prepare for military struggle 

following nearly two decades of training reform indicates that Xi and other 

leaders were concerned the PLA’s training was not sufficient.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

220

As with any assessment of the PLA that relies on official media, there 

are significant uncertainties due to the quality and veracity of the information. While these latest reforms suggest problems continue beneath the 

surface, visible signs of improved training are readily available. The PLA 

has made progress in joint operations, and its ability to perform many joint 

functions is better today than it was in 2001 when these programs were 

initiated. Regardless, the repeated reintroduction of reform initiatives to 

address longstanding problems strongly suggests that there are significant 

impediments to progress.

Over the past two-and-a-half decades, the PLA has devoted considerable time and resources to becoming a modern, informationized military. 

There is no shortage of PLA analysis of the problems and potential solutions 

required for China’s military to develop the capabilities necessary for bringing it up to the standards of the world’s most modern military, that of the 

United States. Despite some degree of progress, the long lineage of problem 

identification, experimentation, implementation, and reorganization has 

not achieved several of the PLA’s most important objectives, particularly 

in the area of joint operations. In part, this is due to the backward state of 

the PLA when it embarked on its current modernization effort in the early 

1990s. Major changes evolve over time. However, a major reason why many 

of these problems persist is due to the PLA’s organizational culture, which 

has favored the army over other services, fostered a lack of initiative and 

creativity within the officer corps, and discouraged risk-taking. It appears 

that reforms under Xi are focused on changing these aspects of the PLA’s 

culture in ways previous reforms could not.

Absent a crisis that necessitates rapid change to survive, change in 

organizational culture often requires considerable time for personnel 

transitions, bureaucratic acceptance, and acculturation. Xi’s reforms 

attempt to tackle these issues. They provide new professional incentives, 

bureaucratic authorities, and organizational responsibilities that ultimately will guide how current and future military officers will approach 

joint operations and command. At this stage in the current reform effort, 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

221

it is unclear whether these cultural changes will take root and be assimilated successfully. Senior-level interest, although important, is not the 

sole determinant of success, as evidenced by previous efforts to build 

a joint culture within China’s military. Xi’s reforms are an important 

departure from previous efforts and address several of the PLA’s most 

challenging systemic problems. Assessing the prospects of success at 

this early point in the reform effort is difficult, largely due to the number 

of known and unknown variables that might shape the PLA’s actions in 

coming years. However, Xi’s reforms offer an important departure from 

earlier efforts and provide what appears to be a sustainable baseline for 

cultural change—a critical element in making joint operations reforms 

viable over the long term.

Notes 

1 Two key studies include Huang Bin [黄斌], Research into the Kosovo War [

科索沃战争研究] (Beijing: Liberation Army Publishing House, 2000); and Wang 

Yongming, Liu Xiaoli, and Xiao Yunhua [王永明, 刘小力, 肖允化], Research into 

the Iraq War [伊拉克战争研究] (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 

2003). These two studies, along with numerous other military science journal and 

military press publications, highlight intense People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focus 

on foreign military developments, particularly those involving the United States. 

As this chapter discusses, many of these lessons are captured in PLA operational 

concepts developed to respond to specific operational requirements. For an English 

language overview, see Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., 

Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2010).

2 For a discussion of the Military Strategic Guidelines and the central role they 

play in delineating planning and modernization requirements, see David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic 

Guidelines,’” in Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours 

of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), 82–87. See also James C. Mulvenon and 

Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., “A Poverty of Riches: New Challenges and Opportunities 

in PLA Research,” CF-189-NSRD, RAND Conference Proceedings, 2004.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

222

3 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi [彭光谦, 姚有志], eds., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2005), 

321–322; and Ge Dongsheng [葛东升], ed., On National Security Strategy [国家安

全战略论] (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2006), 234.

4 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye [王厚卿,张兴业], eds., Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 

2001), 418–422; Ge, On National Security Strategy, 231–235.

5 Huang, Research into the Kosovo War, 140–144; and Wang, Liu, and Xiao, 

Research into the Iraq War, 199. In addition, see Ge, On National Security Strategy, 

234; and Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], ed., The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: 

National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006), 97.

6 Zhong Shengqin, “Establish New Train of Thought for Training Commanders,” PLA Daily [解放军报], February 9, 1999, 6.

7 Ibid.

8 Li Dianren [李殿仁], “Fundamental Principle of Strengthening the Building of 

Military Academies—Understanding on the Study of Central Military Commission 

Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Important Expositions on Military Academy Education” [

加强军队院校建设的根本指针], PLA Daily [解放军报], May 18, 2000, 6.

9 “Fostering High-Caliber Personnel and Promoting Leaps-and-Bounds 

Development of Chinese Armed Forces—Excerpts from Forum on Implementing 

Strategic Talent Project and Speeding Up Personnel Training” [大力培养高素质

人才 推进我军跨越式发展—全军实施人才战略工程加速人才培养座谈会经验

摘登], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 6, 2003, 2.

10 Liu Fengan and Wu Tianmin [刘逢安, 武天敏], “New-Generation ‘Outline 

of Military Training and Evaluation’ Promulgated” [新一代“军事训练与考核大纲”

颁发], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 25, 2008, 1.

11 Zhang, The Science of Campaigns, 63.

12 Ibid., 80.

13 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] 

(Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013), 125.

14 Ibid.

15 Zhan Yu [战玉], “A Study of the Theory of Integrated Joint Operations” [一体

化联合作战理论探要], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 6 (2007), 11–21.

16 Shou, The Science of Military Strategy, 125.

17 Ge, On National Security Strategy, 62, 280; Hao Yuqing and Cai Renzhao, 

eds., Science of Armed Forces Building (Beijing: National Defense University Press 
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

223

[国防大学出版社], 2007), 280–282; and Zhang, The Science of Campaigns, 85. 

For an English language analysis, see Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s 

Information Warfare and Cyber Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017).

18 Song Youfa and Hong Yaobin [宋有法, 洪耀斌], eds., Integrated Joint Operations Command Headquarters Work [一体化联合作战指挥总部工作] (Beijing: 

Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2005), 1.

19 Zhang, The Science of Campaigns, 80; and Shou, The Science of Military 

Strategy, 127.

20 Shou, The Science of Military Strategy, 127.

21 Ibid., 126. For English language analysis, see Kevin McCauley, PLA System 

of System Operations: Enabling Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, 2017); and Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System 

Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage 

Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), available at <www.rand.org/

pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html>.

22 Ibid.

23 Xue Xinglin [薛兴林], ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide [战役理论学习

指南] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2001), 66. 

Emphasis added.

24 See Liu Yuejun [刘粤军], ed., Non-Contact Warfare [非接触战争] (Beijing: 

Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2004); Pan Youmu [潘友木], The Study 

of Non-Contact Warfare [非接触战争研究] (Beijing: National Defense University 

Press [国防大学出版社], 2003); and Shao Guopei [邵国培], ed., Information Operations in Non-Contact Wars [非接触战争的信息作战] (Beijing: Liberation Army 

Publishing House, 2004).

25 Liu, Non-Contact Warfare, 8–9; and Pan, The Study of Non-Contact Warfare, 50.

26 Liu Shenyang [刘沈扬], “The Theory and Practice of Target-Centric Warfare” [目标中心战的理论与实践], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 5 

(2013), 83–92.

27 Ding Yahan and Li Dezhong [丁雅涵, 李德忠], “In This Battle, Aiming 

at the ‘Vulnerable Spot’ When Firing—Close-Up View of the Military Region’s 

‘Queshan Decisive Victory-2013A’ Exercises with Troops, Part III” [这一丈,瞄准”

七寸”打 - 近观军区”确山决胜-2013A”实兵演习之三], Vanguard News [前卫

报], December 8, 2013, 2; and Chang Xin [常欣], “Use Military Innovation Theory 

to Guide Substantial Leap in Combat Power” [以军事创新理论牵引战斗力实质跃

升], Vanguard News [前卫报], March 31, 2013, 4.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

224

28 “Push Forward Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics, Build Informationized Command Organs—Excerpts of Advanced Typical 

Experiences from the All-Army Conference on Headquarters Building,” PLA Daily 

[解放军报], September 28, 2004, 3.

29 Zhuang Lijun [庄利军] et al., “A Rapidly Expanding Transformation in 

the Training Domain” [训练领域一场方兴未艾的变革], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

February 6, 2006; Cheng Sixun, “Exploration and Practice of Integrated Training 

of Military Region Units: Part One,” Battle Flag News [战旗报], February 9, 2006; 

and Cheng Sixun, “Exploration and Practice of Integrated Training of Military 

Region Units: Part Two,” Battle Flag News [战旗报], February 10, 2006.

30 Zhuang, “A Rapidly Expanding Transformation in the Training Domain”; 

Zhang Wenping and Yan Wenbo, “Advance Phase of Second Artillery’s Integrated 

Training Starts—Establishing Steering Group on Integrated Training, Organizing 

Trial Comprehensive Integration and Integrated Training, Conducting Theoretical 

Study on Integrated Combat and Training, and Exploring Characteristics and Laws 

of Integrated Training,” Rocket Forces News [火箭兵报], July 13, 2004, 1; and Lu Feng 

and Ni Menzhi, “Mobile and Camouflaged Launches Using New Equipment Under 

Complex Weather and Terrain Conditions,” People’s Front [人民前线], July 28, 2004.

31 “An Expedition That Spans History,” Battle Flag News [战旗报], March 9, 

2006; and Wang Jianmin, “Footprints of the Forerunner,” Battle Flag News [战旗

报], February 16, 2006.

32 “Overview of PLA Military Training in 2009,” PLA Daily [解放军报], 

December 30, 2009.

33 Li Yun, Liu Fengan, and Wu Tianmin [黎云, 刘逢安, 武天敏], “Stride 2009: 

A Major Exercise Sticking Close to Actual War” [“跨越―2009”:一场贴近实战的

大练兵], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 11, 2009, 1.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 “All-Army Artillery and Air Defense Forces’ Symposium on Precision 

Attack Exercises Under Informationized Conditions Concludes” [探索信息化条

件下作战训练的新理念新模式新手段 全军炮兵防空兵精确打击演练研讨结束], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], October 15, 2009.

38 Cai Pengcheng and LiYun [蔡鹏程, 黎云],“Mission Action 2010 Trans–Military Region Mobile Exercise Concluded” [“使命行动—2010” 跨区机动演习结束], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], November 4, 2010.
Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

225

39 Shou, The Science of Military Strategy, 93–98.

40 Dai Feng and Cheng Yongliang [代烽, 程永亮], “Joint Training Makes 

Progress along the Course Charted by the Rules—An Account of Efforts Made 

by the Eastern Theater Command to Propel Rules-Based Joint Training” [联合训

练, 在法治轨道运行—东部战区依据法规推动联合训练纪事], PLA Daily [解放军

报], January 2, 2018.

41 Xu Tongxuan [徐同宣], “Where Does Training Go from Here? Viewing Realistic Battle Training During Informationized Transformation from the 

Perspective of Air Force Defense Penetration and Assault Competitive Assessments” [训练向哪里去:从空军突防突击竞赛性考核看信息化转型时期实战化训

练], Kongjun Bao [空军报], July 16, 2015, 3.

42 Dai and Cheng, “Joint Training Makes Progress Along the Course Charted 

by the Rules.”

43 Ibid.

44 Wu Xu and Liu Yiwei [吴旭, 刘一伟], “Eight Measures to Intensify the 

Cultivation for Joint Operational Command Personnel” [八项举措加紧培养联合

作战指挥人才], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 24, 2016.

45 He Sheng [贺胜], “Create a Combined Operational Mode” [打造联合作战

工作模式], PLA Daily [解放军报], May 17, 2016. Also see the chapter by Wuthnow 

and Saunders in this volume.

46 Wu and Liu, “New-Generation ‘Outline of Military Training and Evaluation’ Promulgated.”

47 Liang Pengfei and Li Yuming [梁蓬飞, 李玉明], “Our Armed Forces Completely Launch the Professional Joint Operations Talented Commanding Personnel 

Cultivation Model” [我军全面推开联合作战指挥人才专业化培养模式], PLA Daily 

[解放军报], December 20, 2014.

48 Ibid.

49 Two recent examples include Tan Yadong [谭亚东], ed., Joint Operations 

Course Materials [联合作战教程] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press 

[军事科学出版社], 2013); and Li Yousheng and Wang Yonghua [李友生, 王永华], 

eds., Lectures on the Science of Joint Campaigns [联合战役教程] (Beijing: Military 

Science Press, 2012).

50 Author interviews with PLA officers, December 2017.

51 Dai Feng and Cheng Yongliang [代烽, 程永亮], “Eastern Theater Focuses 

on Main Battle Roles as It Accelerates the Development of New-Type Combat 

Command Talent” [东部战区聚焦主战职能加速推进新型作战指挥人才培养], 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

226

PLA Daily [解放军报], September 1, 2016; Huang Honggui and Meng Bin [黄宏

贵, 孟斌], “Toward Joint, Necessary to Form Links and Also Link in Spiritual” [走

向联合, 既要形联更要神联], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 22, 2016; and Wang Jun 

and Shi Liu [王军, 石榴], “Push Forward ‘Eight Changes’ with Focus on Combat 

Functions” [聚焦主战推进 “八个转变”] PLA Daily [解放军报], March 23, 2016.

52 Hou Guorong and Wang Guangli [侯国荣, 王广利], “Strengthening Leadership Teams in Order to Strengthen Armed Forces; Training Commanders Before 

Troops” [强军先强班子练兵先练指挥], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 27, 2016; 

Wang Tianlin, Ding Rongzhen, and Tian Liang [王天林, 丁荣帧, 田亮], “Understanding Causes of Loss, Admitting Failure, and Trying to Win the Loser’s Game” 

[败得明白输得服气更要败中求胜赢得精彩], Huojianbing Bao [火箭兵报], December 26, 2015; and An Weiping [安卫平], “Thoughts on the Practice of Solving the 

Problem of the ‘Five Incapables’” [破解 ‘五个不会’ 问题的实践思考], Qianjin Bao 

[前进报], April 30, 2015, 4.

53 Hua Xia, ed., “Xi Stresses Joint Battle Command for Military Reform,” 

Xinhua, April 20, 2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-

04/20/c_135297662.htm>.

54 Wu and Liu, “New-Generation ‘Outline of Military Training and Evaluation’ Promulgated.” For a more detailed discussion of these programs and 

initiatives, see Wuthnow and Saunders, “A Modern Major General.”

55 Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,” Journal 

of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (January 2, 2017), 169–195.
227

COMING TO A (NEW) 

THEATER NEAR YOU

Command, Control, and Forces

By Edmund J. Burke and Arthur Chan

I

n late 2015, China enacted a series of sweeping military reforms 

that ostensibly laid the groundwork for a more viable joint force.1

These reforms—long anticipated by Western observers due to the gap 

between the command structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

and its force development goals—give the military an opportunity to align 

its organizations and processes with these objectives. Consolidating the 

former seven military regions (MRs) into five new theater commands (TCs) 

(see figures 1 and 2); abolishing the four general departments; forming the 

Strategic Support Force to consolidate space, cyber, and electronic warfare 

responsibilities; and creating a separate army command are all massive 

steps meant to address many chronic shortcomings that constrained the 

development of the joint force and generation of combat power.

Among many details that are not yet clear and will no doubt require 

years for Western observers (and the PLA) to sort out, perhaps the most 

important is its success or failure in implementing a new approach to commanding and controlling theater forces. As PLA expert Roger Cliff points out, 

there are significant cultural, doctrinal, and technical impediments ahead 

before the PLA arrives at even an interim joint capability at the theater level.2

CHAPTER 6
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

228

Figure 1. MR System Boundaries

Figure 2. Approximate TC Boundaries

Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 2.

Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 2.
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

229

Despite more than a decade of experimentation and sometimes citing a generation gap, critiques in official press continue to highlight the inexperience 

and lack of commitment to “informationization” [xinxi hua, 信息化] on 

the part of PLA officers and leaders.3 Nonetheless, the decision to finally set 

aside the MR structure in favor of a joint TC construct has removed perhaps 

the biggest obstacle in executing integrated joint operations [yitihua lianhe 

zuozhan, 一体化联合作战], which is how the PLA seeks to operate jointly 

under informationized conditions.

This chapter examines in depth one aspect of these new reforms: the shift 

from military regions to theater commands. In so doing, it consults a broad 

range of Chinese and English sources, including authoritative news media, 

publications by Chinese military institutions, and commentary by PLA 

experts. The first section examines the logic behind this shift, particularly 

what Chinese leaders hope to achieve from such a transition. The second 

section looks at the missions and responsibilities of each of the five new TCs. 

It further presents a draft order of battle, sketching out what ground, naval, 

air, and other assets have been assigned to the new theater commands. The 

third section looks at the prospects of success for these reforms.

The Logic Behind the Shift to Theater Commands 

When trying to quantify the importance of the reforms—and the dissolution of the MR system, in particular—it is necessary to revisit a long arc of 

study and publications on military theory and the nature of modern warfare 

by the PLA and its political leaders. This section reviews the background of 

PLA efforts to improve its ability to conduct integrated joint operations. It 

further examines how these efforts are connected with the shift from MRs 

to TCs and what Chinese leaders hope to achieve.

Over the past 20 years, PLA thought leaders have written extensively on 

the criticality of information technology for military innovation, prompted 

by the U.S.-led coalition’s success in the First Gulf War and in particular 

by its perceived ability to effectively command and control joint forces in 

dynamic maneuver warfare. Their exploration of the topic highlighted the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

230

important role of integrating advanced information technology with joint 

forces. This led to the incorporation of a number of related concepts in the 

Chinese military lexicon, including information warfare [xinxi zhanzheng, 

信息战争], digital forces [dianzi budui, 电子部队], and information operations [xinxi zuozhan, 信息作战]. The PLA eventually settled on Information 

System–based System of Systems Operations [jiyu xinxi xitong tixi zuozhan, 

基于信息系统体系作战] as their approach to conflict.4

Many of these themes are illustrated in a 2010 interview with a prominent PLA theorist at the Chinese National Defense University of Science 

and Technology. Citing the U.S. military’s experience not only in the 

Gulf War but also in Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as Joint Vision 2020

materials, the article laid out China’s information system–based system 

of systems operations as “basically identical or similar” to the Western 

concept of network-centric warfare.5 A background section prefacing the 

article laid out what can be interpreted as an official PLA endorsement of 

its new approach: “System operations based on the information system 

have become a basic pattern of joint operations under informationized 

conditions, and information capability has become the primary capability 

in joint operations.” Moreover, after describing the critical importance of 

new command information systems and weapons platforms to the PLA, 

the senior Chinese strategist quoted in the article cited joint air strike operations during Operation Desert Storm as evidence that it was “absolutely 

impossible to use traditional command means and methods to successfully 

direct a complicated informationized joint operation, and it is necessary to 

rely on an integrated command information system.”6

 The PLA’s command 

system itself, then, was a major impediment to achieving longstanding force 

development and capability goals.

Both the command structure changes and the path to joint operations 

writ large have been arduous and nonlinear. As PLA analyst Kevin Pollpeter 

notes, Chinese leaders in the late 1990s began to aim for the creation of an 

informationized force, and one of the ways to achieve this was through 

jointness. In 1999, the PLA issued a gangyao [纲要], or outline, that formally 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

231

instituted joint operations into PLA warfighting. Pollpeter notes that in 

2009, “the General Staff Department (GSD) provided training objectives 

that for the first time fully committed the services to joint operations.”7 Yet 

during this period, the PLA made less progress toward achieving jointness 

than hoped. This was due to a combination of factors, including a focus 

on coordination rather than true jointness, the lack of permanent joint 

structures, and a mindset of single service domination. Individual services 

during this period were able to develop robust vertical command and control systems but failed to take the initiative to do the same across services.8

Chinese leaders have also attempted to change the PLA’s mindset 

regarding joint operations. As Defense Intelligence Agency analysts 

Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley detail, from 2008 onward, these efforts 

centered on three areas: “developing the expertise of academic faculty in 

the military educational institutions; getting PLA commanders and staff 

to think in terms of joint training rather than combined arms training; 

and developing information systems and material solutions to facilitate 

joint command.”9 The PLA also gained knowledge from its interactions 

with other countries in bilateral and multilateral exercises.10 In spite of 

these efforts, however, the PLA continued to have difficulty applying 

joint operational concepts to actual situations and in changing its way of 

thinking about military conflict.

The shift from an MR to TC system may be viewed in this context as 

the continuation of these previous efforts to achieve jointness for the PLA. 

China watchers and analysts for decades have pointed out the limitations of 

China’s MR system, with its built-in impediments to deploying maneuver 

forces across or in the air over invisible lines at MR boundaries and the 

PLA’s reliance on this structure to provision logistics and other combat 

service support in both peacetime and wartime.11 Even veteran PLA officers 

recognized that the MR system was not a functional command and control 

system for modern warfare. PLA campaign literature makes clear that an ad 

hoc joint command and control system would be employed in wartime. This 

ad hoc entity would have been led by an army general attached to the GSD, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

232

but potentially by an MR officer in smaller army-dominated contingencies 

such as a small border crisis with a Southeast Asian neighbor. Maneuver 

and strike forces would be led by GSD officers for large joint operations, but 

potentially could be led by army leader to MR leader grade officers drawn 

from participating military regions.

Over the past decade, as joint training and joint operations increasingly became focal points for the PLA, the MR construct became a greater 

impediment for operational forces in terms of exercising command and 

control and in training realism. If the joint command element would be 

formed from and by the Central Military Commission (CMC) and staffed 

with GSD officers in wartime, how realistic could the operational/maneuver force training have been in the absence of a real command element 

exercising with them? If MR staff officers were not responsible for joint 

training, how could they simulate this command element in a realistic 

manner? How could anyone gain useful joint command experience in 

this structure? The following section explains how the TC system helps 

to rectify these issues.

Chinese Explanations of the TC System 

Chinese researchers framed the need for restructuring as a strategic requirement—even as the framework of the radical reforms was being debated and 

shaped. In September 2015, Senior Colonel Wang Xiaohui of the Strategy 

Research and Teaching Department at China’s National Defense University 

highlighted what he saw as the most pressing strategic preparations [zhanlüe 

zhunbei, 战略准备] the PLA needed to make. While not necessarily authoritative, Wang concisely detailed the shortfalls that would soon be addressed 

with the broad military reforms later that year.12 First, Wang contended that 

China could not exercise unified command over the joint force without first 

establishing what he termed an integrated joint operation command system 

[yitihua lianhe zuozhan zhihui tizhi, 一体化联合作战指挥体制] to command 

and control all PLA forces, to which the theater system would be subordinate. 

He specifically cited the U.S. military experience with combatant commands, 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

233

highlighting that its most prominent features are a simple hierarchy and 

command smoothness and that the campaign and tactical command levels 

from theater to division were reduced from five to three. The envisioned 

Chinese command entity would be responsible for training theater forces in 

peacetime and operational command in wartime. The supporting theater 

departments—manpower and personnel, intelligence, operations, training, 

and support—would then be formed under the theater command.

Second, Wang noted the weakness of combining military administration with operational command, pointing to the U.S. experience separating 

the two. Wang went on at length regarding the challenges the PLA faced 

under its current system:

For example, the command organs are oversized and overstaffed, 

with unreasonable internal structure. Functions of various departments in a command organ are overlapped to a serious extent. Most 

departments are responsible for peacetime training, management, 

and support. As a result, over a long period, there were two major 

shortcomings in our military’s leadership and command system: 

First, the function of commanding forces to fight battles was weak. 

Second, the strategic management capability of directing the whole 

military’s building and development was weak. Such a state of 

affairs is far from meeting the required “flat-shaped” joint operation 

command system in informationized warfare, and also directly 

restricts and affects the conducting of scientific leadership and 

management of national defense and armed forces building.

Third, Wang emphatically highlighted the often-cited imbalance of 

forces due to the historic primacy of the PLA Army and the need to rationalize the mix of combat to noncombat forces:

Furthermore, the most prominent issue related to the quantity and 

scale of the Chinese military forces is the inappropriate proportion of forces in the army, the navy, the air force, and the Second 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

234

Artillery, the inappropriate proportion of combat units to noncombat units, the inappropriate proportion of combat personnel 

to noncombat personnel, and consequently the inappropriate 

proportion of officers to enlisted personnel. . . . In particular, it 

is necessary to energetically reinforce the building of the navy 

and the air force, improve the proportion of various services, 

establish a scientific and reasonable ratio of combat personnel to 

noncombat personnel, and thus enhance the combat power of the 

Chinese armed forces.

The strategic drivers that Wang laid out no doubt reflect the arguments 

that won the day in terms of the reforms. Official statements and commentary by experts within and outside of the PLA cite four primary reasons for 

the shift from MRs to TCs:

■	 streamlining responsibilities

■	 strengthening jointness

■	 increasing readiness

■	 making China’s military policy vis-à-vis external actors more coherent.

This section discusses each of these factors.

Streamlined Responsibilities 

First, under the old system, the MRs fulfilled a wide range of functions, 

which included force-building, management, command, and peacetime 

administration.13 This made the MR a type of composite organization that 

ended up dealing more with routine administration in peacetime than 

actual preparations for wartime operations. As noted, during wartime the 

affected MRs would have been replaced by a command drawn from staff 

in Beijing, not exclusively officers from the particular MR.14 This was the 

case in 1979, when the GSD set up a separate ad hoc organ responsible for 

the overall prosecution of the Sino-Vietnamese War. The MRs adjoining 

Vietnam continued to conduct operations separately and provide support 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

235

for their specific strategic direction.15 In the context of the Cold War, this 

was considered an optimal setup, as China’s political and military leaders 

judged that if a war were to break out, it would likely be an all-out war. Thus, 

it was better to leave the responsibility for preparing operations to the GSD, 

which would create temporary theater command organs as needed.16 The 

shift brought about by the reforms is an attempt to move away from this 

arrangement by stripping the new TCs of many of their non-warfighting 

functions, moving these responsibilities to other leadership organs, and 

making the TCs solely responsible for joint training and operations. Mobilization, for example, now falls to the CMC’s National Defense Mobilization 

Department, 1 of its 15 new functional departments.

At the same time, the reforms clarify the lines of authority flowing from 

various PLA leadership organs. The new system allows the CMC to more 

effectively and directly exercise overall authority over the country’s armed 

forces. Meanwhile, the TCs are responsible for operations, and the services 

are responsible for force-building.17 Under this arrangement, the TCs are able 

to concentrate on performing a more narrowly defined, clearer set of roles, 

theoretically allowing them to do so more effectively and with better results 

than under the responsibilities assigned to the military regions.

Strengthened Jointness 

Second, the TCs’ focus on joint operations and training, in turn, supports another longstanding force development goal: increasing jointness 

among the armed forces. As mentioned, Chinese military experts strongly 

believe that informationized warfare and system of systems warfare will 

predominate in modern conflicts and that only a truly joint force is suited 

for this.18 However, there was a noticeable lack of jointness under the old 

MR system. In particular, regional naval and air forces commanders were 

dual-hatted as deputy MR commanders, but under their dual chain of 

command they also reported to their service chiefs in Beijing in peacetime. This duality impeded a true sense of jointness at the MR echelon. 

In a February 2016 interview, Southern TC Commander Wang Jiaocheng 
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236

explained the rationale for separating administrative management and 

command of regional forces from preparing for joint combat:

In the traditional military region structure, the functions of combat command and construction management were combined, 

construction and use were integrated, and because of that the 

combat command function was weakened, and the joint operations 

structure was not complete enough. Faced with the new challenges 

of the revolution in military affairs, the shortcomings of joint 

command and joint operations were worsened further. The lack 

of smoothness in the joint operations command structure also 

constrained the building of joint training and joint support structures. That contradiction became the most significant structural 

impediment to our armed forces’ ability to fight [win] battles.19

While the precise command and control relationship between conventional missile forces at the brigade echelon and the theaters in which they 

are based is unclear, like other conventional forces they will be available to 

support any of the five theaters through theater joint operations command 

centers if needed. Nuclear forces, on the other hand, are different. One 

Global Times article notes that “According to tradition, nuclear weapons 

are instruments of the utmost importance to the nation. In all countries, 

they are controlled by the highest authority and cannot be assigned to 

the theater commands.”20 Logically, though, if theater commanders and 

their staffs have responsibility for planning for their strategic direction, 

then conventional missile forces will almost certainly be part of planning 

considerations not only in the theaters in which they are based but also in 

supporting other theaters.21 Beijing fielded these operational forces based 

on perceived wartime needs, and those needs have not changed under the 

reforms. These forces would be under the command and control of those 

theater commanders in wartime, but able to support other theaters as 

well. Assigning the theater commander responsibility for an operational 

direction and large-scale training of the joint force for that contingency 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

237

are strong arguments for wartime command and control of conventional 

forces for strike missions in that theater.

Increased Readiness 

Third, a primary aim of the introduction of TCs is to increase the readiness 

of the PLA. Indeed, Xi Jinping has been emphatic about the PLA concentrating on combat readiness.22 Modern PLA military texts stress that limited, 

localized wars are far likelier than the all-out wars (and the concomitant long 

warning times that accompany these conflicts) anticipated during the Cold 

War period. For instance, of the four likeliest future wars that China will 

have to fight that are listed in the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, three are 

essentially localized wars. One is a relatively large-scale, high-intensity conflict with Taiwan. Another is a medium- to small-scale, mid- to low-intensity 

war against bordering countries. The last is a small-scale, low-intensity war 

to counter terrorist activities, maintain stability, and maintain sovereignty.23

Rather than create temporary joint headquarters, Chinese planners argue 

that it makes more sense to have TCs already established for each strategic 

direction so that China will have planned and be prepared for its most likely 

contingencies. Such a system is envisioned to “allow for the rapid shift from 

a peacetime to wartime stance . . . [and] greatly improve the nation’s ability 

to respond to crises and protect national security.”24

The new command mechanisms to promote both jointness and readiness include new standing joint command entities known as Joint Operations 

Command Centers, which exist at two levels. At the national level, there is 

the CMC Joint Operations Command Center, of which Xi is commander in 

chief. Each TC also has its own Joint Operations Command Center.25 How 

these centers will work in practice, or who will serve in specific leadership 

positions beyond the identified theater commanders and deputies, is not 

currently known. For example, will theater joint commanders still exercise 

command and control through operations groups, or will those entities now 

be subsumed at the theater level? What seems certain is that, in the short term, 

these command positions will continue to be dominated by army officers as 
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238

the PLA works through the process of promoting more officers from other 

services into staff and leadership positions at the theater level.

Greater Coherency Externally 

Fourth, a further consequence of establishing theaters with operational 

control of forces within their assigned geographic regions is to provide 

greater coherency to China’s military policy vis-à-vis external actors. As 

the example of the Sino-Vietnamese War demonstrates, the old system had 

more than one MR for each strategic direction. In the event of a conflict, 

the ad hoc “front” approach meant that coordination had to take place 

across MR boundaries, thereby complicating planning, mobilization, and 

communications at precisely the wrong time. As Yang Yujun, spokesman 

for the Ministry of National Defense, stated, the “TC will serve as the sole 

supreme joint operational command organ for its strategic direction.”26

How the new TC system attempts to accomplish this goal is discussed in 

the following section.

Finally, it may also be worth noting the role that outside sources of inspiration have played. Several commentary pieces have compared China’s theater 

commands to Russia’s joint strategic commands (military districts) and U.S. 

unified combatant commands.27 The shift to TCs, in that sense, suggests a 

desire to demonstrate that the PLA aspires to be a peer of the Russian and U.S. 

militaries in terms of how it plans and prepares for conflict. The ultimate goal 

of this, as China’s civilian and military leadership has stressed repeatedly, is 

to make the PLA capable of fighting and winning wars.28

Theater Command Responsibilities 

Each of the new TCs has its own defined set of roles and is responsible 

for a particular strategic direction. In general, each TC has under its 

command ground and air forces, and some capacity to either call for 

fires or have some command authority over conventional missile units 

based in the TC (see table). The three coastal TCs (Northern, Eastern, 

and Southern) also have an assigned naval fleet, while the Central TC 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

239

most likely includes some lower echelon naval elements not subordinate 

to one of China’s three fleets. Of course, various support and nuclear 

missile units are based in each theater, but their chain of command is 

not under question: The consensus among analysts is that they remain 

directly under the command of the CMC and would support any of the 

theaters or directions at CMC discretion.

Table. Order of Battle for Theater Commands

Theater 

Command

Group 

Armies

Fleet Air Assets Rocket Force Base 

(Brigades)/Unit

Eastern 71st, 

72nd, 

73rd

East Sea 

Fleet

10th Bomber Division; 40th, 41st, 

and 42nd fighter brigades; 26th

Special Mission Division; 83rd

Attack Brigade; Fuzhou Base; 

Shanghai Base

61 Base (807, 811, 815, 

817, 819, 820 brigades), 

96180 Unit

Southern 74th, 

75th

South Sea 

Fleet

4th, 5th, 6th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 52nd, 

54th, 96th, 98th, and 99th fighter 

brigades; 8th Bomber Division; 

13th Transport Division; 

20th Special Mission Division; 

Kunming Base; Nanning Base

61 Base (818 brigade), 

96166 Unit; 62 Base 

(802, 808, 821, 825 

brigades), 96212 Unit; 

63 Base (803, 805, 814, 

824, 826 brigades)

Western 76th, 

77th

N/A 16th Fighter Brigade; 36th Bomber 

Division; 4th Transport Division; 

Lanzhou Base; Urumqi Base; 

Xi’an Flying Academy

64 Base (809, 812, 823 

brigades)

Northern 78th, 

79th, 

80th

North 

Sea Fleet

15th, 31st, 32nd attack brigades; 

34th, 35th, 36th, 61st, and 63rd 

fighter brigades; 16th Special Mission Division; Dalian Base; Jinan 

Base; Harbin Flying Academy

65 Base (810, 816, 822 

brigades)

Central 81st, 

82nd, 

83rd

N/A 19th, 55th, 56th,70th, 71st, and 72nd

fighter brigades; 43rd and 44th

fighter/attack brigades; Datong 

Base; Wuhan Base; Shijiazhuang 

Flying Academy

65 Base (806 Brigade); 

66 Base (801, 804, 813, 

827 brigades)

Sources: For ground and naval assets, The Military Balance 2018 (London: International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, 2018); for air assets, The Military Balance 2018, and Lawrence Trevethan, “Brigadization” of the PLA Air Force (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2018); for Rocket 

Force brigades and bases, Directory of PRC Military Personalities (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence 

Agency, 2018), and various Chinese and English media reports.
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Another important facet of the military reforms is the establishment 

of separate service headquarters for PLA Army units within each of the 

five theaters, thereby creating an equivalency between all services in the 

new theater construct. These perform the same function as TC air forces 

and TC navy forces—operational and administrative oversight of operational units, in this case group armies. More than that, the TC service 

headquarters will likely play an important role in ensuring that units meet 

training requirements, in line with the new division of labor within the 

PLA—with the CMC exercising overall control, the theater commands 

responsible for operations, and the services responsible for force-building. 

These would include both service-specific and joint requirements. As one 

commentator noted, Xi Jinping in his report at the 19th Party Congress 

stressed the need to build a modern operational system with Chinese 

characteristics. For the services to “implement and carry out the spirit of 

the commander’s speech, they must not only do a good job of building 

their own weapons/armaments and operations systems, [but] they must 

also improve their consciousness of the overall situation, their joint thinking, and do a good job of resolving the problem of integrating theater 

services command into the theater joint operational command system.”29

Eastern Theater Command 

Headquartered in Nanjing, the Eastern TC area of jurisdiction is exactly 

identical to that of the former Nanjing MR. It has responsibility for 

Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi and initially had 

command of all of the Nanjing MR’s group armies—the 12th, 1st, and 31st.

30

In late April 2017, the PLA ground force underwent another reform that 

saw the number of group armies reduced from 18 to 13 in addition to being 

renumbered from 71 through 83.31 The 12th, 1st, and 31st Group Armies 

were redesignated as the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies, respectively.32

For the maritime dimension, the Eastern TC has responsibility for the East 

China Sea and Taiwan. The East Sea Fleet has been assigned to the Eastern 

TC, with the fleet commander simultaneously serving as deputy theater 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

241

commander and commander of the Eastern TC naval forces, which were 

initally referred to as the East Sea Fleet and then referred to as the Eastern 

TC Navy as of February 2018.33

Because the Eastern TC includes the same provinces as the former Nanjing MR, it should theoretically also have retained its air assets. According to 

the 2018 edition of the Military Balance, the Eastern TC’s air assets currently 

include the 10th Bomber Division, 14th and 32nd Fighter Divisions, 26th Special 

Mission Division, 28th Attack Division, Fuzhou Base, and Shanghai Base.34

(All PLA Air Force fighter divisions and attack divisions have now been converted into brigades. The table shows the new brigade designations for each 

TC.). Finally, the Rocket Force’s 52 Base, now known as the 61 Base and headquartered at Huangshan in Anhui, is based in the Eastern TC as well.35 While 

command and control of PLA Rocket Force nuclear units will remain held at 

the CMC level, 61 Base’s subordinate conventional missile units will no doubt 

feature prominently in Eastern TC planning. Much of China’s conventional 

missile firepower is also based within the Eastern TC, as it was fielded there 

to support Taiwan contingency operations. As mentioned previously, these 

highly maneuverable assets would be allocated to any TC at CMC direction.36

Southern Theater Command 

The Southern TC is headquartered in Guangzhou and was created by 

combining parts of the Guangzhou and Chengdu MRs. From the former, it received the provinces of Hunan, Guangdong (and by extension, 

the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions), Guangxi, 

and Hainan, as well as the 41st and 42nd Group Armies. From the latter, 

it received the provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou and the 14th Group 

Army.37 Following the changes to the group armies in April 2017, the 14th

Group Army was eliminated, while the 41st and 42nd were renumbered as 

the 74th and 75th, respectively.38

The South Sea Fleet has additionally been assigned to the Southern TC, 

serving as its naval force component.39 According to Liang Fang, professor 

at China’s National Defense University, the Southern TC has responsibility 
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242

for the South China Sea.40 Perhaps mirroring the importance of the South 

China Sea in its planning, in early 2017 the Southern TC became the first 

to be led by a PLA Navy officer when Admiral Yuan Yubai was named 

commander, replacing PLA Army General Wang Jiaocheng.41 While this 

may be a primary planning task for the theater, operational units of the 

former Guangzhou MR also had responsibility for Taiwan contingencies 

and participated in high-profile exercises on the Taiwan Strait. The Southern TC may have at least partially inherited this responsibility. It may no 

longer lead planning and preparation for conflict with Taiwan, but it will 

still have to support the Eastern TC. Southern theater commanders will 

therefore have to ensure that it schedules and accomplishes rigorous joint 

training for a variety of contingencies, some of which it may not command. 

Moreover, the theater has added border regions with Laos and Myanmar. 

While the combat tasks and campaigns are the same, planning for border 

conflicts in terms of intelligence preparation, terrain analyses, and logistics 

is presumably more complex when planning for multiple opponents.

In terms of air assets, the 2018 Military Balance notes the Southern 

TC as having the 2nd, 9th, and 18th Fighter Divisions; 8th Bomber Division; 

13th Transport Division; 20th Special Mission Division; Kunming Base; and 

Nanning Base.42

Western Theater Command 

In terms of geographic extent, the Western TC is the largest of the five new 

theaters. It is headquartered in Chengdu and has responsibility for most of 

the provinces under the Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs. From the former, it 

received Sichuan, Tibet, Chongqing, and the 13th Group Army. From the 

latter, it received Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, as well as the 21st

and 47th Group Armies.43 Later on, the 47th Group Army was eliminated, 

while the 21st and 13th Group Armies were respectively renumbered as the 

76th and 77th Group Armies.44 Initial reporting from Global Person argues 

that this TC is in an especially strategically sensitive position because 

it borders multiple countries in Central Asia and India.45 This range of 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

243

border issues suggests that counterterrorism will also be prominent in 

mission planning.

While it lacks subordinate naval forces, from a planning perspective, 

the Western TC staff is responsible for a potential conflict with India, which 

could certainly include a maritime dimension requiring PLA Navy involvement. As a result, naval forces likely would be operationally controlled 

by the Western TC command but overseen by a naval command element 

deployed to the area to command an operations group in a large-scale 

conflict with India. It is unclear if the units subordinate to the Central TC 

are assigned some responsibility for an India contingency, as some Central 

TC ground units no doubt are. With the planning contingencies relative to 

India ranging from a quick border crisis to a full-scale conflict between two 

nuclear powers, the theater planners will have to coordinate closely with 

navy counterparts based in multiple theaters, as well as working through 

service lines of authority to complete their diverse tasks.

For air assets, the 2018 Military Balance notes that the Western TC 

has the 4th Transport Division, 6th and 33rd Fighter Divisions, 36th Bomber 

Division, Lanzhou Base, Urumqi Base, and Xi’an Flying Academy.46

Northern Theater Command 

The Northern TC is headquartered in Shenyang and has jurisdiction over all 

three provinces formerly under the Shenyang MR opposite the Korean Peninsula—Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning. It is further responsible for Inner 

Mongolia, formerly under the Beijing MR.47 It has under its command all 

three group armies from the former Shenyang MR—the 16th, 39th, and 40th—

as well as the 26th Group Army from the former Jinan MR.48 The Northern TC 

further has jurisdiction over Shandong, which was also formerly under the 

Jinan MR. Following the most recent reform to the PLA Ground Force, the 

40th Group Army was eliminated, while the 16th, 39th, and 26th Group Armies, 

respectively, became the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group Armies.49

In terms of other component services under this command, there was 

some initial speculation that the North Sea Fleet would be placed under 
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the Central TC,50 but this was clarified in March 2016 when Rear Admiral 

Yuan Yubai, then-commander of the North Sea Fleet, was appointed to 

the additional positions of deputy commander of the Northern TC and 

commander of the Northern TC naval forces.51 Inclusion in the Northern 

TC makes more sense from a planning perspective, as this theater is responsible for conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which could require heavy navy 

participation in both the air and maritime domains.

According to the 2018 Military Balance, the Northern TC has the 5th

and 11th Attack Divisions, 12th and 21st Fighter Divisions, 16th Special Mission Division, Dalian Base, and Jinan Base.52

Central Theater Command 

Chinese military experts describe the Central TC as being an innovation of 

China’s system: Its unique position allows it to respond to crises on its own 

while also being able to provide support to other theater commands. It subsumed the former Jinan MR, which also served this role for the CMC.53 As 

a result, the Central TC provides the capital region with its own dedicated 

military force, allowing it to respond to crises without having to rely on 

troop transfers from other parts of the country. Defense of the capital is a 

primary role; perhaps reflecting that defense of China’s leadership against 

enemy air attack is a top consideration, the Central TC is now commanded 

by PLA Air Force General Yi Xiaoguang.54 It is headquartered in Beijing 

and was created on the foundations of the Beijing and Jinan MRs. From the 

former, units based in Hebei, Shanxi, Beijing, and Tianjin were presumably 

reassigned, as well as the 27th, 38th, and 65th Group Armies. From the latter, 

it received Henan-based units and the 20th and 54th Group Armies.55 It further has jurisdiction over Shaanxi, formerly under the Lanzhou MR, and 

Hubei, formerly under the Guangzhou MR.56 This setup makes the Central 

TC the most diverse of the new commands in terms of its origins as well 

as the largest in terms of the number of group armies assigned to it. It also 

added the distinction of being the first TC to have a group army relocate: the 

27th Group Army reportedly moved its headquarters from Hebei to Shanxi 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

245

Province by early January 2016 according to PLA press reporting.57 The 

relocation likely accommodated the establishment of the TC army command 

at Shijiazhuang,58 which was formerly the site of the 27th Group Army headquarters. Like their counterparts in the other TCs, the group armies in the 

Central TC also underwent changes in late April 2017. Both the 20th and 27th

Group Armies were eliminated, while the 65th, 38th, and 54th Group Armies, 

respectively, became the 81st, 82nd, and 83rd Group Armies.59

According to Xinhua, the component services of the Central TC 

include not only Ground Force but also navy, air force, and missile units.60

The Hong Kong–based Ming Pao newspaper noted that there are no military ports within the Central TC, but there are a number of technical 

stations and training bases for naval aviation. These include the “naval 

aviation training base located at Qinhuangdao; its associated Shanhaiguan 

airfield; the naval aviation academy at Changzhi, Shanxi; and at Jiyuan, 

Henan, the fighter aircraft branch of the naval aviation academy.”61 In 

early August 2016, it was reported that a Ground Force air defense brigade 

from the Central TC had conducted exercises with naval aviation units 

around the Bohai area.62 In light of this, it appears that naval forces based 

in the Central TC will not include surface vessels but encompass the other 

service branches of the navy based in this geographic area. Until further 

information is available, however, the exact nature of the naval component 

of the Central TC remains a matter of speculation.

The 2018 Military Balance notes that the Central TC has the following air assets: the 7th and 19th Fighter Divisions, 15th Fighter/Attack 

Division, 24th Fighter Division, Datong Base, Wuhan Base, and Shijiazhuang Flying Academy.63

Prospects for Success 

Whether or not these reforms to the PLA succeed will depend greatly on the 

ability of Chinese leaders to overcome a number of continuing challenges 

in the medium to long term. This section identifies several remaining challenges for the new TC system, including training of command personnel, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

246

command and control, and potential service resistance in a still-armydominated military.

Phillip Saunders and Joel Wuthnow of the U.S. National Defense 

University have dubbed the reforms as “Goldwater-Nichols with Chinese 

characteristics,”64 which seems an apt description that promises the same 

opportunities and pitfalls for the PLA. Much of the promise for increased 

jointness will not be realized for years—well past 2020, and probably more 

realistically by about 2030.

In the near term, success will depend on the details of the practical, 

day-to-day relationship between the services and theaters in training units 

for new joint operational capabilities. To be most effective, theater-level 

training departments will need to have a mechanism to provide input into 

(or at least a way to express their requirements to) services responsible for 

force development. Similarly, theater commanders need to have staffs and 

mechanisms in place to express their capability requirements both up a 

command chain to the CMC level and to the military services, which are 

peer organizations at the same grade. This is not to suggest that the PLA 

lacks the personnel to staff these organizations because it clearly does not. 

However, these kinds of relationships are not the norm in the PLA and 

represent a substantial cultural change in that new relationships among 

theater and service staffs may be workable in theory but are untested, which 

will lead to uncertainty and confusion.

In addition, TCs will likely also be advising on and overseeing professional 

military education initiatives for senior officers steeped in their old systems, 

as well as for more junior officers presumably less invested in old processes. 

All of this precedes the complexities of joint training, which requires not only 

designing new training approaches but also becoming more familiar with 

existing service training plans in order to integrate them across service lines 

among like and similar operational elements in ways the PLA has never done.

The changing dynamics of the command and control relationship 

between theater commanders and theater-based operational forces will also 

take some time to sort out. These dynamics are different from those that 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

247

officers have experienced throughout their careers. The forces allocated to 

each theater presumably meet some kind of basic planning factor for that 

theater based on their historic missions and strategic directions under the MR 

system, but the theater no longer has to be concerned with the administration 

of subordinate forces. The separation of administrative responsibilities from 

operational command and warfighting responsibilities may be sensible and 

best for operations, but this division of labor will not be a matter of habit or 

standard procedure for commanders for some time.

The continued dominance of ground commanders at the TC level is 

also problematic. A jaundiced view of the reforms from a non–PLA Army 

viewpoint would be that the names of the organizations have changed, but 

the uniforms are predominantly still green at the TC level. As mentioned, 

the five new army headquarters give the army, navy, and air force counterpart commands at the operational echelon, presumably commanded by 

officers of the same rank. The theater Joint Operations Command Centers’ 

staff is ostensibly the venue through which jointness among these services 

will manifest itself for the time being. The elevation of navy Admiral Yuan 

Yubai to Southern TC commander in January 2017 and the assignment of 

air force General Yi Xiaoguang as Central TC commander in August 2017 

also signal the CMC’s intent to break this ground dominance, especially 

where it makes more operational sense to do so.65

Conclusion 

The decision to do away with the old military regions and replace them 

with theater commands is a major step in a decades-long effort to create 

an informationized joint force. By doing so, Chinese military leaders aim 

to streamline responsibilities, strengthen jointness among the services, 

increase PLA readiness, foster a more coherent external military policy, and, 

ultimately, create a force that is capable of fighting and winning wars. The 

attainment of such a goal may not be so simple as replacing one organizational 

system with another, however. Chinese leaders have undertaken multiple 

initiatives since 1999, when joint operations were officially instituted in PLA 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

248

warfighting, to achieve this goal. These have ranged from developing new 

command and control technologies to altering the curricula at PLA academic 

institutions to exercises with foreign partners. Yet progress to date has been 

slow. Multiple fundamental challenges remain, particularly those related to 

prevailing mindsets within the PLA. Chinese leaders will have to address 

these as well in order for their reforms to be truly effective.

This round of Chinese military reforms is continuing, as the renumbering of group armies and Rocket Force bases attests. Areas for further research 

begin with the most basic, foundational information: orders of battle for 

each TC and service are now uncertain, as are unit designators. Evidence of 

the evolving command relationships between TC commanders and service 

chiefs, both in Beijing and at the TC level, also bears watching; it will probably become available via Chinese official and non-official media outlets. 

The Chinese version of joint forces could well differ from Western concepts, 

so researchers will be best served by gaining insights and evidence not only 

indirectly but also through engagement with Chinese military officials.

As a point of reference, U.S. military efforts to achieve greater jointness 

theoretically began immediately after World War II with the passage of the 

National Security Act of 1947, which eliminated independent Cabinet-level 

departments for each of the Services in favor of a single unified Department 

of Defense. The subsequent Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 strengthened 

the control and authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Services in part 

by authorizing that each department be organized under its own secretary 

who then reported to the Secretary of Defense; it also established “unified or 

specified combatant commands” responsible to the President and Secretary 

of Defense.66 Almost 30 years later came the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which, among other measures, 

“redesigned personnel incentives in order to prioritize ‘jointness’ among the 

Services—a characteristic that the U.S. Department of Defense demonstrably 

lacked prior to the reforms.”67 Even by 2013, as former Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey noted as he advocated for globally integrated 

operations, “efforts to create a fully joint force [were] not yet complete.”68 In 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

249

2016, former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stressed what he saw as the 

need for updates to Goldwater-Nichols that would, among other measures, 

redefine “joint duty assignment” to include operational functions beyond 

“just” planning and command and control.69

Goldwater-Nichols with Chinese characteristics sounds like a much 

lower bar than what the U.S. military has achieved over the years, but 

it certainly hinges on achieving substantial progress on planning and 

command and control if the PLA is to make headway on truly joint capabilities. Chinese leadership has taken decisive steps toward the future with 

its organizational reforms; it is now up to PLA officers at the theater level 

and throughout the services to execute these reforms. It will be a long time 

before we know the outcome.

Notes 

1 For an excellent overview of the reforms, see Michael S. Chase and Jeffrey 

Engstrom, “China’s Military Reforms: An Optimistic Take,” Joint Force Quarterly

83 (4th Quarter 2016), 49–52.

2 Roger Cliff, “Chinese Military Reforms: A Pessimistic Take,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016), 53–56.

3 Dennis J. Blasko, “The New PLA Joint Headquarters and Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities,” China Brief 16, no. 10 (June 21, 2016), available at 

<www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45511&no_cache=1#.

V83n65MrIb0>. See also Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military 

Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

research_reports/RR800/RR893/RAND_RR893.pdf>.

4 For an excellent discussion of how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will 

approach conflict in the future, see Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and 

System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to 

Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), available at <www.rand.

org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html>.

5 Wang Wowen [王握文], “Information Capability: Primary Capability of Joint 

Operations—Interview with Kuang Xinghua, Professor and Doctoral Adviser at the 

National Defense University of Science and Technology” [信息能力:联合作战的第
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

250

一能力——访国防科学技术大学教授、博士生导师匡兴华], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

May 27, 2010, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/gflt/2010-05/27/content_4160027_2.htm>.

6 Ibid.

7 Kevin Pollpeter, “Toward an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” in The PLA at Home 

and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy 

Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2010), 194–195.

8 Ibid., 193–237.

9 Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley, “Aspiring to Jointness: PLA Training, 

Exercises, and Doctrine, 2008–2012,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in 

the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 171–207.

10 See Kenneth W. Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese 

Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 11 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2017), available at <http://

ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1249864/chinese-military-diplomacy-20032016-trends-and-implications/>.

11 For a more in-depth discussion, see Dean Cheng, “The PLA’s Wartime 

Structure” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. 

Allen (Vienna, VA: DGI, 2015), 453–476.

12 Wang Xiaohui [王晓辉], “What Strategic Preparations Should the Chinese 

Armed Forces Make?” [中国军队要做哪些战略准备], Southern Weekend [南方周

末], September 11, 2015.

13 Ma Ho-leung [马浩亮], “Beijing Watch: Five Major Differences Between 

Theater Commands and Military Districts” [北京观察:战区与军区五大不同], 

Ta Kung Pao [大公报], February 2, 2016, available at <http://news.takungpao.com/

mainland/focus/2016-02/3276428.html>.

14 Han Xudong [韩旭东], “The Difference Between Military Regions and Theater 

Commands” [军区与战区的不同], Global People [环球人物], vol. 11 (April 2014), available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/hqrw/html/2014-04/26/content_1422529.htm>.

15 Ibid.

16 Han Xudong [韩旭东], “Decrypting the Military Reforms: ‘Military Regions’ 

Become ‘Theater Commands,’ Getting War Preparations Right” [军改解码: “军区”

改“战区”, 为战争做好准备], Southern Weekend [南方周末], April 27, 2016, available 

at <www.infzm.com/content/116612>.
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

251

17 Yang Yujun [杨宇军], “Transcript for MND Special Press Conference” [国

防部专题新闻发布会文字实录], People’s Republic of China Ministry of National 

Defense [中华人民共和国国防部], February 1, 2016, available at <www.mod.gov.

cn/info/2016-02/01/content_4642553.htm>.

18 Han, “Decrypting the Military Reforms.”

19 Feng Chunmei and Ni Guanghui [冯春梅, 倪光辉], “Interview of Southern 

Theater Commander Wang Jiaocheng: ‘Creating a Joint Operations Command 

Structure Which Is Comprehensively Up-to-the-Mark’” [锻造全面过硬的联合作

战指挥机构], Renmin Ribao [人民日报], February 28, 2016, 6.

20 Guo Yuandan [郭媛丹], “Decrypting the Military Reforms: North Sea Fleet 

Assigned to Northern Theater Command, Missile Force Directly Under CMC” [军

改解读:北海舰队属北部战区火箭军直属军委], Global Times [环球时报], February 

5, 2016, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-02/8510312.html>.

21 Strategic direction [zhanlüe fangxiang, 战略方向] is a military term used by 

the PLA. It is the “operational direction that has a major impact on the overall war 

situation. It points toward strategic targets, possesses a certain depth and breadth, 

and encompasses a multidimensional space that includes both the ground and its 

associated air space, maritime space, and outer space.” There is a single primary 

strategic direction and multiple secondary strategic directions. For more information, see Lu Mingshan [陆明山], “Strategic Direction” [战略方向], Chinese Military 

Encyclopedia: Military Learning II [军事百科全书:军事学术II] (Beijing: Academy 

of Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], July 1997), 715.

22 “Focus Vigorously and Solidly on the Work of Military Training for Combat 

Readiness—Second Commentary on Studying and Implementing the Important 

Speech Given by Chairman Xi Jinping on His Inspection Tour of the Ground Force 

Headquarters of the PLA Southern Theater Command” [抓紧抓实练兵备战工

作—二谈学习贯彻习主席视察南部战区陆军机关时的重要讲话], PLA Daily [解放

军报], April 24, 2017.

23 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

Academy of Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], December 2013), 99.

24 Han, “Decryping the Military Reforms.”

25 Wang Shibin, An Puzhong, and Liang Pengfei [王士彬,安普忠,梁蓬飞], 

“Xi Jinping Inspects CMC Joint Operations Command Center” [习近平视察军

委联合作战指挥中心], People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense 

[中华人民共和国国防部], April 20, 2016, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/leaders/2016-04/20/content_4650183.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

252

26 Yang, “Transcript for MND Special Press Conference.”

27 Jiang Congxiao [蒋骢骁], “Topic: What Theater Commands and Military Districts Do the U.S. and Russia Have?” [谈资:美俄都有哪些战区和军区], 

Xinhua, February 2, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-

02/02/c_128695079.htm>; and Han, “Decrypting the Military Reforms.”

28 Li Xuanliang [李宣良], “PLA Theater Command Establishment Ceremony 

Held in Beijing” [中国人民解放军战区成立大会在北京举行], Xinhua, February 1, 

2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/01/c_1117960554.htm>.

29 Guo Ping [郭平], “Focusing on Advancing the Integration of Theater Services Command into Theater Joint Command” [着力推进战区军种指挥融入战区

联指], Rocket Force News [火箭兵报], November 14, 2017.

30 Xiao Ying and Zheng Xinyi [肖莹, 郑心仪], “New Layout for the Five Theater Commands” [五大战区心布局], Global Person [环球人物], February 1, 2016, 

available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/hqrw/html/2016-03/06/content_1668987.

htm>; and “A Month Since the Five Theater Commands Have Been Established, 

Where Are the 18 Group Armies?” [五大戰區成立1個月 18個集團軍隸屬哪], 

Wen Wei Po [文匯報], February 28, 2016, available at <http://news.wenweipo.

com/2016/02/28/IN1602280050.htm>.

31 “Former 18 Group Armies Used as Basis in Adjustment and Establishment 

of 13 Group Armies” [以原18个集团军为基础,调整组建13个集团军], People’s 

Republic of China Ministry of National Defense [中华人民共和国国防部], April 

27, 2017, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/info/2017-04/27/content_4779505.htm>.

32 Dennis J. Blasko, “What Is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA’s 

Ground Combat Units,” China Brief 17, no. 7 (May 11, 2017), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/known-unknown-changes-plas-ground-combat-units/>.

33 “The Arrangement of the Five Theater Commands: Under Which Theater 

Command’s Protection Does Your Hometown Fall?” [五大战区划设:你的家乡在

哪个战区的保护之下?], Global Times [环球时报], February 11, 2016, available at 

<http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-02/8526693.html>. 

34 “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (February 2018), 257, 

available at <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416982>.

35 Kenneth W. Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Implementing PLA 

Second Artillery Doctrinal Reform,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: 

Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, ed. 

James C. Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2005), 176. The 

new 60 series designations for Rocket Force bases are found in the 2017 Report to 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

253

Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 219–220.

36 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation 

for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 108–109.

37 Xiao and Zheng, “New Layout for the Five Theater Commands”; and “A 

Month Since the Five Theater Commands Have Been Established, Where Are the 

18 Group Armies?”

38 Blasko, “What Is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA’s Ground 

Combat Units.”

39 Shen Fan [沈凡], “59-Year-Old Du Benyin Reassigned as Southern Theater 

Command Naval Forces Deputy Political Commissar” [59岁杜本印改任南部战

区海军副政委], Caixin [财新], March 5, 2016, available at <http://china.caixin.

com/2016-03-05/100916536.html>.

40 Guo Yuandan, Ren Zhong, and Lan Yage [郭媛丹, 任重, 蓝雅歌], “Focused 

on the Potential Strategic Threats of Surrounding Areas, the Reason for Establishing the Five Theater Commands Is Very Clear” [针对周边潜在战略威胁五代战区

成立的目标很清晰], Global Times [环球时报], February 2, 2016, available at <http://

world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-02/8488105.html>.

41 Choi Chi-yuk, “Admiral Named to Head PLA’s New Southern Theatre 

Command,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 19, 2017, available 

at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2063649/admiral-namedhead-plas-southern-theatre-command>.

42 “Chapter Six: Asia,” 258.

43 “A Month Since the Five Theater Commands Have Been Established, 

Where Are the 18 Group Armies?”

44 Blasko, “What Is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA’s Ground 

Combat Units.”

45 Xiao and Zheng, “New Layout for the Five Theater Commands.”

46 “Chapter Six: Asia,” 257.

47 Xiao and Zheng, “New Layout for the Five Theater Commands.”

48 “A Month Since the Five Theater Commands Have Been Established, 

Where Are the 18 Group Armies?”

49 Blasko, “What Is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA’s Ground 

Combat Units.”

50 Minnie Chan and Liu Zhen, “China’s North Sea Fleet Put Under Central 

Command to Help Safeguard the Capital: Sources,” South China Morning Post (Hong 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

254

Kong), February 2, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1908768/chinas-north-sea-fleet-put-under-central-command-jinan>.

51 Jiang Ziwen [蒋子文], “North Sea Fleet Commander Yuan Yubai Becomes Deputy Commander of Northern Theater Command and TC Naval Forces Commander” 

[北海舰队司令员袁誉柏任北部战区副司令员兼战区海军司令员], The Paper [滂

湃], March 20, 2016, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1446278>.

52 “Chapter Six: Asia,” 256.

53 Han, “Decrypting the Military Reforms.”

54 Teddy Ng, “China’s Air Force Gets a Lift with Pilot’s Promotion to Top 

Military Job,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 14, 2018, available 

at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2133405/chinas-airforce-gets-lift-pilots-promotion-top>.

55 Xiao and Zheng, “New Layout for the Five Theater Commands”; and “A 

Month Since the Five Theater Commands Have Been Established, Where Are the 

18 Group Armies?”

56 “Central Theater Command Areas of Jurisdiction Revealed: Area of Jurisdiction Includes 7 Provinces/Municipalities, Including Shaanxi and Hubei” [中部

战区辖区曝光辖区包括陕西湖北等7个省市], Global Times [环球时报], March 27, 

2016, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2016-03/8777452.html>.

57 Guo Kai, “27th Group Army Becomes First Army in PLA to Relocate HQ,” 

China Daily (Beijing), February 25, 2016, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2016-02/25/content_23643856.htm>.

58 “Military Theater Commands’ Army HQs Identified: Source,” Global Times

(Beijing), February 4, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/967289.shtml>.

59 Blasko, “What Is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA’s Ground 

Combat Units.”

60 Li Wenji [李文姬], “Five Theater Commands, Four Have Already Clearly 

Established Naval Forces” [五大战区 4个明确已经建立海军], Xinhua, April 4, 

2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-04/04/c_128861501.htm>.

61 “Although It Has No Military Ports, Official Media Confirms Central 

Theater Command Has Naval Forces” [雖無軍港 官媒證中部戰區有海軍], Ming 

Pao [明報], April 2, 2016, available at <http://news.mingpao.com/pns/dailynews/

web_tc/article/20160403/s00013/1459619554477>.

62 Zhou Fei [邹菲], “A Certain Ground Force Air Defense Brigade and Naval 

Units from the Central Theater Command Jointly Create a Realistic Training 

Environment” [中部战区陆军某防空旅与海军部队共同构建逼真联训环境], 
Coming to a (New) Theater Near You

255

People’s Daily [人民日报], August 1, 2016, available at <http://military.people.

com.cn/n1/2016/0801/c1011-28600205.html>. 

63 “Chapter Six: Asia,” 256.

64 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms, Strategic Forum No. 294 (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, April 2016), 3.

65 Choi, “Admiral Named to Head PLA’s New Southern Theatre Command.”

66 Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-599, 85th

Cong., 2nd sess., August 6, 1958.

67 Kathleen J. McInnis, Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues 

for Congress, R44474 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2, 

2016), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44474.pdf>.

68 Martin E. Dempsey, “The Future of Joint Operations: Real Cooperation for 

Real Threats,” Foreign Affairs, June 20, 2013, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/united-states/2013-06-20/future-joint-operations>.

69 Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter Proposes Updates to Goldwater-Nichols Act,” DOD 

News, April 5, 2016, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/713930/

carter-proposes-updates-to-goldwater-nichols-act>.

257

HANDLING LOGISTICS 

IN A REFORMED PLA

The Long March Toward Joint Logistics

By LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter

This chapter introducesPeople’s Liberation Army (PLA) logistics 

modernization as an outgrowth of demands to ready the PLA for 

joint operations and high-tech warfare while satisfying domestic economic and political objectives for civil-military fusion. To forecast 

future reforms and their impact, we examine the three interrelated logistics requirements that Chinese sources have identified as requisite for the 

implementation of a joint logistics system: centralized command, advanced 

information systems, and civil-military fusion [junmin ronghe, 军民融合], 

also known as civil-military integration. We highlight constraints on PLA 

logistics transformation, including ingrained corruption and weak oversight mechanisms for the military and political elite, which will continue to 

degrade logistics efficiency and overall combat readiness.

The research underlying this chapter relies on a range of Chinese 

language sources. Published speeches, interviews, and editorials provided Chinese Community Party (CCP) and PLA leadership judgments 

regarding future requirements for military logistics. Official Chinese 

news media provided official statements relating to organizational reform. 

Finally, civilian and military academic and industry publications provided 

CHAPTER 7
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

258

additional insights into the strategy and logic behind reform objectives, 

specific examples and assessments of operational capabilities, and suggestions for future developments. This chapter also benefits from and builds 

on prior expert assessments by Susan Puska and Dennis Blasko, as well as 

James Mulvenon’s research on corruption within the PLA.1

The PLA’s long-term goal of logistics reform is a precision logistics 

system that enables comprehensive, timely, and accurate logistics support to 

PLA joint operations. Implementing a joint logistics system is the primary 

means of achieving this goal. The PLA defines joint logistics as a system 

that “unifies the organization of the services to implement basic logistics 

work; avoids duplicate staffing, organizations, and facilities; and rationally 

distributes workforce, material, and financial resources to support joint 

operations and joint activities.”2 Alternatively and more colloquially, the 

system provides logistics support at the right time, at the right place, in 

the required amount.3 This reform does not mean to eliminate specialized 

logistics support from the services, but rather seeks to consolidate general 

logistic support and achieve efficiencies wherever possible. According to 

PLA authors, an ideal joint logistics support system:

■	 provides precision logistics support for high-tempo, dynamic joint 

combat operations

■	 achieves strategic unity of effort by implementing an integrated joint 

logistics command system that is itself fully integrated with a strategic 

joint operations command system

■	 leverages the full potential of China’s comprehensive national power 

through civil-military fusion to maximize combat power, ensure peacetime efficiencies, and maintain a constant state of combat readiness.4

Inspired by the U.S. Joint Vision 2020, the PLA has directed logistics 

modernization and civil-military fusion initiatives over the last two decades 

toward the development of a joint logistics system.5

 While many procedural, organizational, infrastructure, and equipment changes have been 

implemented, some changes necessary to unify and centralize logistics 
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

259

command remain incomplete. Consolidating and centralizing logistics 

command require more than just organizational reforms; it also requires 

the integration of logistics information systems to provide logisticians 

with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, 

and identity of units, personnel, equipment, material, and supplies.6

 For 

the PLA, this requirement also extends to civilian resources and demands 

standardized catalogs of available resources and associated attributes, 

regulations for military procurement, joint equipment development, and 

knowledge transfer. All of these objectives are enabled through integrated 

information systems.7

At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, the 

CCP formally announced a series of significant military reforms intended 

to ensure that the PLA can fight and win high-tech modern wars. These 

reforms, to be implemented by 2020, alter the PLA’s logistics command, 

infrastructure, and civil support systems to better support and sustain 

combat operations. In March 2016, the PLA renamed the General Logistics 

Department (GLD) as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Logistics 

Support Department (LSD), but delayed the execution of additional reform 

measures pending the September 13, 2016, establishment of the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) [junwei lianhe houqin baozhang budui, 军委联

合后勤保障部队].8

 The reason for this delay is unclear, but the broader 

restructuring of the PLA headquarters and military regions (MRs) to CMC 

and joint theater commands (TCs) may have been a necessary precursor.

With the establishment of the JLSF, PLA leaders separated logistics management responsibilities (resource management and regulatory 

activities) from combat service support (sustainment activities). Logistics 

management is now to be carried out by the CMC LSD, and combat service support is to be carried out by the JLSF. This move parallels wider 

PLA reform efforts to separate warfighting from force management. This 

change reduces the responsibilities of LSD offices, purportedly enabling 

the LSD to concentrate on resource management, training, infrastructure 

construction, and procedural oversight. (This reduction in responsibilities 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

260

may explain why the current director of the CMC LSD, Song Puxuan, no 

longer has an ex officio seat on the Central Military Commission.) A more 

focused LSD will theoretically result in a greater standardization of logistics 

management and support procedures across the force, more efficient use of 

financial and materiel resources, streamlining of bureaucratic processes, 

and an overall decrease in corrupt practices by logistics professionals. 

Meanwhile, the JLSF is free to focus on planning and executing integrated 

joint logistics support for strategic and campaign operations.

These structural reforms create opportunities for greater centralization 

of command and control that allow the PLA to more effectively capitalize 

on two decades of information technology (IT), transportation, and facility 

improvements; maturing combat service support doctrine and training; 

and civil-military fusion that collectively improve PLA capabilities to 

manage and execute precision logistics support.

A New Logistics System for a New PLA 

The CCP and PLA vision for future combat capabilities requires a modernized, centralized, efficient logistics system, but in many ways, the PLA 

military logistics support system has persisted as a relic from the Chinese 

civil war. Logistics organizations resisted numerous previous efforts to 

reform the system to more effectively support joint logistics. This section 

first reviews early attempts at and thinking on joint logistic reform. It then 

examines advances in three areas that appear necessary to meet national 

defense and economic logistics expectations: unification and centralization 

of command, IT integration (or informationization), and civil-military 

fusion. It then examines corruption within PLA logistics organizations as 

an obstacle to logistics reform.

Early Attempts at Reform 

Joint logistics was first raised by Zhou Enlai in a 1952 report to the Joint 

Military Affairs Commission. Over the next four decades, the PLA unsuccessfully experimented with various methods of implementing joint 
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

261

logistics. PLA analysts attribute these failures to external events that made 

structural reform of the PLA’s logistics system impossible. These include 

the Cultural Revolution, the death of Lin Biao in 1971, and PLA force 

reductions in the 1980s.9

In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin, as CMC chairman, directed the PLA to 

research and draft a series of military reforms. Drivers for the reforms 

included PLA logistics failures in the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war, observations 

of U.S. military operations in the Balkans and Persian Gulf, the PLA’s inferior military capabilities revealed in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and 

a general lack of combat readiness. In December 1998, the CMC enacted 

a series of military reforms intended to transform the PLA into a modern 

and professional joint operations force. These were subsequently outlined 

in the January 24, 1999, PLA Joint Combat Program. Nested in the program 

was a 10-year PLA logistics support system reform plan that emphasized 

implementation of a joint logistics system, socialization of support functions, modernization of logistics equipment, and improvements to logistics 

training and resource management.10

As a result of these reforms, the PLA logistics system now appears to 

be capable of effectively supporting large-scale military campaigns along 

internal lines of communication and has a nascent capability to sustain 

external force projection operations.11 However, in 2014, the PLA identified 

several areas that required additional emphasis in order to advance PLA 

joint warfighting capabilities. These included unifying logistic units from 

all services under one command center and establishing mutual support 

relationships among and between joint and service units. The PLA needed 

additional improvements to logistics information systems in order to obtain 

the data necessary to command joint operations. The PLA also needed to 

diversify force projection capabilities to support operations both at home 

and abroad. This diversification required enhancing intermodal transport 

capabilities and developing new air and maritime transport platforms that 

leveraged the potential of the civilian sector. Most importantly, the PLA 

needed to reduce corruption within the logistics system to guarantee that 
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the limited resources of the military are used to meet the actual needs of 

armed forces building and combat readiness.12

Unified and Centralized Logistics Command 

Centralization of PLA logistics under one unified system has been an 

objective of PLA leaders since the 1950s. In 1952, the separate supply 

systems for the army, navy, and air force were unified under the leadership of the General Rear Area Services Department (later named the 

GLD).13 On at least five separate occasions between 1965 and 1985, the 

PLA experimented with more comprehensive implementations of joint 

logistics command, but these were never fully executed.14 This was likely 

due to a lack of joint culture in the broader PLA, but an internal power 

struggle may also have played a role.15 The PLA’s 1998 joint operations 

reforms under Jiang Zemin were a necessary precursor to real joint logistics command integration.16

By 2002, Joint Logistics Departments (JLDs) were established under 

each MR. The JLDs unified most transportation, medical, and material support; infrastructure construction; equipment procurement; and financial 

management functions under one headquarters. This allowed the PLA to 

eliminate many redundant structures previously maintained by the navy, 

air force, and Second Artillery Force; these services retained control of 

their specialized facilities and units.17 By 2005, eight division-level logistics 

organizations, 94 rear depots, 47 hospitals, and nearly 2,000 other support 

organizations were eliminated, and a professional civilian cadre system was 

instituted to further reduce active-duty military manpower requirements. 

The cuts enabled the PLA to reduce its size by at least 135,000 troops.18

In July 2004, the GLD initiated a joint logistics pilot test in the Jinan 

MR, combining MR joint logistics and service logistics organization under 

the newly named Jinan War Zone JLD.19 The War Zone JLD brought 

together logistics officers from the MR JLD, and MR army, navy, air force, 

and Second Artillery commands to jointly plan and direct logistics support 

for all PLA units operating in the MR. After the conclusion of the pilot in 
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263

July 2006, GLD evaluations concluded that a fully integrated joint logistics 

system improves the speed and efficiency of logistics support by centrally 

managing logistics command and control at the theater/war zone level, consolidating logistics facilities and organizations, and reducing the amount 

of combat service support capabilities required to support joint operations 

by creating joint task-organized logistics support formations.20

However, the test identified some barriers that prevented implementation of the integrated joint logistics support system across the PLA. While 

the new system enabled centrally managed logistics planning and direction 

at the theater/war zone level, IT deficiencies undermined the JLD’s ability to 

maintain visibility over logistics assets. The JLD was unable to direct the distribution of materials and service in time to support operational demands.21

Established logistics standards, regulations, policies, and procedures did not 

adequately support the effective execution of joint logistics operations. A 

period of comprehensive research and development was necessary to make 

adjustments that fully integrated the requirements of the navy, air force, and 

Second Artillery. Also, CMC leaders concluded that PLA-wide structural 

reforms would be required to effectively centralize logistics command. Presumably, this included the transition from MRs to TCs.

In December 2007, the CMC promulgated “An Outline on Comprehensively Building Modern Logistics,” which directed logistics modernization 

tasks required to fully transition the joint logistics system by 2020.22 From 

2007 onward, the Jinan MR continued to operate an integrated joint logistics system at the MR level. This provided unified direction for service and 

general logistics support activities in order to identify what command, communications, procedural, and operational changes would be necessary for 

PLA-wide implementation.23 The MR would also continue to experiment 

with organizing joint logistics support for deployed combat formations. 

This involved task-organizing joint and service logistics units and fostering 

mutual support relationships between services.24

Between 2009 and 2015, with the exception of Jinan, the MRs continued to operate separate logistics systems for shared and service-specific 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

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requirements. However, they also experimented with centralized theater 

logistics command structures to inform planning for future PLA-wide 

structural reforms. MR exercises emphasized the use of integrated logistics 

command systems to direct logistics operations, and ad hoc joint logistics 

commands were integrated into maturing joint operations command 

structures for increasingly sophisticated campaign-level exercises.25 PLA 

informationization, or IT integration, projects used these exercises to refine 

systems to horizontally and vertically link all logistics activities.

Informationized Logistics 

PRC experts on informationization recognize that the ability to aggregate, 

process, and access large quantities of data, in near real-time, is an absolute requirement to conduct precision logistics. Moreover, examination of 

PLA logistics information system research suggests that the foundational 

technological requirements necessary for centralized joint logistics were not 

met as of 2012. This suggests that there were significant technical barriers 

to creating a centralized, joint logistics command organization.26

Despite the high degree of abstraction that this term has consistently 

carried in PLA theoretical discussions, at its core, informationization (xinxihua, 信息化) emphasizes the integration of information technology and 

other science and technology developments. As former Deputy Director of 

the All-Military Informationization Work Office Hou Xigui expounds in 

the 2002 publication Military Informationization Construction Research, 

the “application of information technology to logistics support promises to 

achieve more accurate and more intense logistics support. When information, logistics, and transportation are brought together, it fundamentally 

changes the traditional delivery support mode, achieving more accurate, 

precise, and intense support.”27 This publication also depicts the logistics 

support system as one essential IT component together with combined 

armed forces; each service’s operations platforms; communication systems; 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems as components 

of information technology. According to the author, these collectively form 
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265

an integrated command platform that will provide a breakthrough in the 

capabilities of the battlefield command and control system.28

PLA researchers recognize that the PLA’s desired logistics system 

involves a large number of technical challenges. Two experts on logistics 

informationization and information aggregation at the PLA Logistics 

Command University raised a tentative list of technology requirements:29

■	 unified military logistics standards, required to achieve logistics system interconnectivity and interoperability

■	 military logistics sensing and collection equipment, such as the comprehensive application of radio frequency identification (RFID), GPS, 

and other Internet of Things sensing and identification technology 

that allows for real-time, dynamic visualization and control

■	 construction of a ubiquitous information transmission network, using 

an All-Military Joint Communication Network, Military Comprehensive Information Network, and other network resources to form a 

Military Logistics Information Transmission Backbone Network

■	 a robust information management platform, to enable data storage, 

efficient processing, rapid retrieval, with intelligent processing to 

prevent abuse

■	 development of comprehensive enterprise applications.

This list lays out the technical milestones for the PLA to achieve visualized, precise, intelligent, coordinated logistics support. Over the last decade, 

the PLA has concentrated on making improvements in several areas, including inventory visibility and management; standardization, which would 

enhance networking of logistics information; tracking of materiel and equipment throughout the distribution process; and information management.30

Warehouse and transportation management information systems, RFID 

and GPS, and camera and aerospace surveillance systems have all been 

sporadically integrated and networked to military logistics command centers. 31 Standardized logistics funding and material management platforms 

and a suite of online procurement systems have been launched to integrate 

logistics managers with commercial suppliers for materiel procurement and 
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distribution. 32 PLA logisticians continue to modify sustainment planning 

factors that are used to drive logistics information systems based on exercise 

consumption and the characteristics of newly fielded equipment.33 In 2013, 

the PLA created the All-Military Logistics Information Center in Beijing to 

integrate logistics system standards to provide a framework for the large-scale 

integration of logistics information systems.34

Informationization programs show that the PRC has prioritized a 

development path that will enable military logistics organizations to coordinate and integrate information sources from outside civilian entities 

with military information systems. One recent example is the new Forces 

Medical Cloud, which leverages cloud technology to implement horizontal 

and vertical integration between information systems between military 

medical organizations and related Civilian Information Systems, such as 

between military hospitals and China’s center for disease control. According to a 2014 presentation by Han Wei, one of China’s leading experts on 

military medical information systems, this system design leverages cloud 

computing–based technology, Software as a Service, Infrastructure as a 

Service, and Platform as a Service to create a managed, scalable foundation 

to develop big data information-sharing capabilities.35

The Forces Medical Cloud project appeared to progress rapidly and created network linkages between civilian and military organizations over a wide 

geographic area, a requirement for centralized logistics. Specifically, the design 

specifications show that the information services were available via mobile and 

fixed-line networks, including three presumably military networks, a military 

3G mobile network, local area networks, as well as a medical telework network 

interface, allowing for information-sharing and coordination. The project 

progressed from the research and planning phase in January 2013 through 

intermediate phases to arrive at the application expansion phase in September 

2014. Moreover, the project was expected to reach the final summary phase by 

January 2015. Thus, in 2 years, Han Wei argues that the cloud-based model 

provided significant improvements to the information platform that would 

allow cost-efficient, scalable information systems infrastructure.36
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The Forces Medical Cloud project also highlights systemic weaknesses 

within the PLA’s previous IT development programs, which suffered from 

a lack of leadership and foresight and resulted in the creation of inefficient, 

cumbersome IT systems that could not easily evolve or scale. In its early 

years of development, the Forces Medical Cloud suffered from technical 

impediments to the integration and centralization of data and was not 

reasonably operational until 2015. According to Han Wei, developers faced 

five major situational challenges:

■	 numerous organizations were involved and were widely distributed

■	 numerous systems were involved and were not easy to use

■	 it was difficult to extend and difficult to maintain

■	 there was insufficient funding and insufficient technology

■	 the system was fixed, not mobile.

Furthermore, he described the pre–cloud computing development environment as characterized by stovepipe style applications that required intensive 

investments and that were difficult to manage. Notably, several of the challenges faced by the developers, such as dealing with numerous, cumbersome 

systems, insufficient funding and technology, as well as stovepiped development models, demonstrate larger systemic failures in leadership and program 

management. Other logistics information systems likely suffered from similar 

early development setbacks but have similarly benefited from advances in 

project development strategy and technology capabilities in recent years.

Civilian Military Fusion 

A third focus for PLA joint logistics reform is civil-military fusion, also 

known as civil-military integration (see the chapter by Lafferty in this volume 

for more details). Civil-military fusion aims to leverage the full potential of a 

state’s comprehensive national power to maximize combat capabilities, ensure 

peacetime efficiencies, and guarantee a constant state of combat readiness. 

Within China, it also emphasizes the fusion of economic development and 

military modernization to support the country’s overall economic and social 
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development. China’s goals are not only to leverage national resources in 

order to support military requirements but also to promote economic growth 

through advancements in military capabilities.37 One Chinese National 

Defense University professor highlights the Beidou system as an example 

that was developed for national defense, but when commercialized can yield 

400–500 billion yuan (63–79 billion USD) in returns by 2020.38

As part of logistics reform, civil-military fusion seeks to separate from 

the PLA those operations where civilian resources can be used as part of 

a larger strategy to strengthen the national economic system and reduce 

military operating costs. This involves outsourcing logistical support to the 

civilian sector wherever operationally feasbile. 39 The target of this reform is 

to “incorporate the development of military logistical services into the state 

economic and social development system and embed military production 

in the civilian sector.” 40 Between 2000 and 2007, more than 5,200 administrative, subsistence, medical, and construction services were outsourced 

to the civilian sector. Subsequently, troops deployed in China for exercises 

and contingency operations have received some level of civilian support 

through support-the-front offices or mobilized militia units.41

The PLA is also working to leverage the capabilities of the civilian sector to support a variety of logistics operations. Many of China’s maturing 

logistics information systems utilize commercial technologies already widely 

employed by international civilian and military logistics systems.42 In addition, Chinese regulations and laws issued between 2003 and 2016 facilitated 

the PLA’s ability to use transportation capacity from the civilian sector and 

encouraged civil transportation construction projects, both infrastructure 

and equipment, to take military support requirements into consideration.43

These projects have improved PLA strategic mobility along internal lines of 

communication through improved infrastructure and transport equipment, 

neither of which must be regularly maintained by the military.44 In addition, 

the construction of dual-use air and maritime platforms and infrastructure, 

usually retained in the civil sector, has allowed the PLA to make modest 

improvements in its ability to support external force projection operations.45
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China’s 2015 defense white paper, China’s Military Strategy, also 

emphasizes the importance of civil-military fusion. The document notes 

that through 2020, the PLA will continue to focus on “developing uniform 

military and civilian standards for infrastructure, key technological areas, 

and major industries, exploring methods for training military personnel in 

civilian educational institutions, developing weaponry and equipment by 

national defense industries, and outsourcing logistics support to civilian 

support systems.”46 The paper also calls on the PLA to enhance force projection capabilities and support overseas operations. The PLA will likely 

rely heavily on mobilized or contracted civilian support resources to do so.

Corruption as an Enduring Constraint 

As the PLA’s logistic system has developed in the modern era, fiscal corruption and links to the private sector have distracted from its mission. 

This section addresses increased corruption within logistics as an outgrowth of CCP policies in the 1980s and 1990s, which was compounded as 

logistics organizations operated in an environment that lacked transparency and independent oversight. After characterizing the environment, 

it examines the impact of corruption in undermining logistics system 

reform efforts.

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1980s helped cultivate an 

environment for corruption in the PLA that persisted to the 2010s, as 

they encouraged the PLA to participate in commercial activities while not 

incentivizing proper behavior or providing adequate internal or external 

oversight mechanisms.47 According to late 1990 estimates, there were over 

15,000 PLA-run companies at one point, generating billions of yuan each 

year.48 However, the military’s activities were shrouded and rarely discussed 

publicly, although corruption was considered a serious issue.49 In July 1998, 

Jiang Zemin declared that the PLA would divest itself from all commercial 

activity, a pronouncement reiterated in his plans for PLA modernization.50

As a result, the GLD rapidly shed many of its corporate investments, handing over factories and other commercial businesses to the civilian sector, 
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and dissolved GLD organizations responsible for managing much of the 

PLA’s commercial enterprise and factory system.51

However, while many businesses were formally removed from military 

control, in practice many remained under the control of relatives or close 

associates of active-duty officers.52 CMC directives to outsource allowed 

senior PLA officials to direct contracts for services to these companies, 

enhancing their profits or to individuals with whom they desired to curry 

favor. Graft was rampant.53 According to the Global Times, as of May 2016, 

the PLA remained active in commercial businesses in sectors such as telecommunications, personnel training, logistics, technology, and health care.54

Furthermore, PLA regulations allowed the compensatory transfer of land 

use rights (with GLD approval) and for units to form partnerships with local 

governments and build real estate projects together on PLA-owned land.55

This set of semi-legal and outright illegal involvements of PLA officials 

in commercial ventures hobbled PLA logistics reforms in particular because 

senior GLD leaders responsible for implementing reforms had a great deal 

to lose in the process. GLD officials managed most of the PLA’s land and 

facilities, oversaw its construction and procurement contracts, managed its 

material and much of its equipment, approved budgets, and accounted for 

and disbursed its funding.56 The GLD also managed the PLA audit system 

and was responsible for ensuring the fiscal discipline of senior PLA officials, 

until the CMC transferred the audit system to its direct control in 2014.57

Anti-corruption measures have been in full swing since January 2012 

when then-GLD Deputy Director Liu Yuan declared war on the establishment, promising to fight corruption to the end. President Xi Jinping 

soon championed this fight.58 According to press reports, at least 17 deputy-corps level or higher logistics officials were charged with corruption 

as of September 2016, and many others, including former GLD Director 

Liao Xilong, are rumored to be under investigation.59 However, these are 

just the tip of the iceberg of structural, endemic corruption within the PLA 

and especially within its logistic system. The elevation of the director of 

the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission to CMC member status in 
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October 2017 is an indicator of the continuing extent of the corruption 

problem and of Xi’s determination to try to address it.

Examining the efficacy of future PLA logistics reforms will require 

consideration of the extent to which Xi has successfully curbed corruption. 

Emphasis on civil-military fusion will compound this challenge, as military 

and civilian logisticians must operate in the same ecosystem. One problem 

is that China’s civilian logistics industry appears to also function in an 

opaque environment that makes identifying corruption difficult.60 FTI 

Consulting’s Asia branch has observed some standard practices within the 

logistics industry that create risk and waste resources: bribery of staff, unauthorized subcontracting to third parties, collusion between suppliers in the 

bidding process, and undisclosed conflicts of interest between purchasing 

or management staff. Overall, the industry appears to lack transparency 

and legislative control, especially when examining the supply chain beyond 

first-tier suppliers. Reforms to the PLA logistics system are bound to fail 

if there is not a similar holistic overhaul of business processes within the 

civilian sector. That would be a particularly ambitious goal given China’s 

demand for economic growth.

A “Reformed” PLA Logistics System 

On February 1, 2016, the PLA announced the permanent transition to a 

joint operations command system comprised of five theater commands 

centrally directed by the CMC.61 By creating a unified command structure 

at the strategic level, this decision set the conditions under which an integrated joint logistics system could be established across the PLA.62

The September 13, 2016, inauguration of the JLSF marked the implementation of the PLA’s new logistics system. During its establishment ceremony, 

Xi Jinping identified the JLSF as the CMC’s main force for implementing joint 

logistics support for strategic and campaign operations.63 Identification of the 

JLSF as subordinate to the CMC and not the LSD suggests that, in sync with 

wider PLA organizational reforms, joint logistics support for PLA operations 

will be separated from force management.
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The LSD appears to be continuing previous GLD responsibilities of 

PLA-wide strategic logistics planning, material management and procurement, facilities management, contracting, budget management and funds 

disbursement, international military engagement, and overall administration of PLA hospitals and medical programs.64 To strengthen PLA logistics 

support as a whole, the LSD is pursuing improved mechanisms to draw 

support from China’s commercial enterprises to support PLA logistics operations, develop technologies to enhance logistics planning and execution, 

and improve logistics support equipment.65 In addition, the LSD appears 

to be spearheading initiatives to standardize information technology for 

logistics management across PLA services to improve data integration 

required to support joint logistics execution.66

The JLSF now coordinates the execution of logistics support to theater 

commands, assuming the responsibilities of previous GLD direct subordinate units and MR JLDs. Its responsibilities include managing the storage 

and distribution of material, fuel, ordnance, and directing transportation, 

field medical, and subsistence support to PLA units assigned to theater 

operations.67 Despite its designation as CMC subordinate, it is possible that 

the JLSF remains administratively organized under the LSD, but it is almost 

certainly operationally subordinate to the CMC Joint Staff Department.

The JLSF is a force led by the army leader grade Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base (JLSB), which directs five joint logistics support centers 

(JLSCs), each aligned to a theater command (see figure 1).68 Each of these 

centers is a deputy army leader grade organization. Before the reforms, the 

Wuhan JLSB was responsible for providing strategic material support to 

the entire PLA. The base had some subordinate units that controlled equipment, weapons, fuel, material, and munitions depots spread throughout 

central China. In wartime, it was tasked with providing strategic logistics 

support to war zones/theaters.69 The base will likely continue in this role, 

with an altered command structure.

The JLSF as a whole appears to operate separately from but in general 

support of the theater commands in order to facilitate the movement of 
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273

resources across theater boundaries as required. The JLSCs are subordinate 

to the Wuhan JLSB but provide direct support to TC operations and general 

support to all units garrisoned and/or operating within their designated 

theater command. JLSCs also appear to have some authority in tasking 

military districts (MDs) and service logistics units within their area to 

provide support to units operating nearby, regardless of service affiliation.70

How JLSCs are tasked to support TC elements is unclear, as there is 

no evidence of a logistics department or staff directly subordinate to the 

TC headquarters after reform. Each TC army and air force headquarters 

does have a subordinate logistics department.71 It is possible TC subordinate units or service components request support directly from the JLSC 

without consulting the TC headquarters, indicating the logistics system 

[xitong, 系统] is distinct from the operational system, but this is unlikely 

given the PLA’s overarching drive toward integrated joint operations. More 

likely, there is a yet to be identified logistics coordinating entity within 

the headquarters responsible for prioritizing the logistics requirements of 

subordinate units based on overall operational needs (see figure 2).

JLSCs are new organizations. Rather than just renaming five MR 

JLDs and transitioning their staffs to support the new theater commands, 

the PLA created entirely new commands geographically separate from the 

Figure 1. Organization of the Central Military Commission Joint Logistics 

Support Force

Central Military Commission

Wuhan Joint Logistics

Support Base

Wuxi Joint 

Logistics

Support Center

Guilin Joint 

Logistics

Support Center

Xining Joint 

Logistics

Support Center

Shenyang 

Joint Logistics

Support Center

Zhengzhou 

Joint Logistics

Support Center

Source: Zhang Tao, ed., “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System 

Reform,” China Military Online, September 14, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm>.
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TC headquarters.72 The JLSCs were probably redesignated and elevated to 

deputy army leader grade organizations from five of the PLA’s previous 26 

division leader grade joint logistics support departments (JLSDs), which 

were subordinate to MR JLDs (see table).73

Table. Probable Association of Former Joint Logistics Subdepartments to 

New Joint Logistics Support Force

Previous Designation New Designation Supports

Wuhan Rear Base (MUCD 

62101)

Wuhan Joint JLSB Strategic Support to all 

Theaters

13th JLSD (MUCD 73801) Wuxi JLSC Eastern Theater Command

20th JLSD (MUCD 76140) Guilin JLSC Southern Theater Command

25th JLSD (MUCD 68060) Xining JLSC Western Theater Command

2nd JLSD (MUCD 65133) Shenyang JLSC Northern Theater Command

33rd JLSD (MUCD 72495) Zhengzhou JLSC Central Theater Command

Key: JLSB: joint logistics support base; JLSC: joint logistics support center; JLSD: joint logistics support 

department; MUCD: Military Unit Cover Designator.

The reason for the separation of JLSCs from the TC headquarters 

remains unclear. It is possible that PLA planners, in line with establishing 

Figure 2. JLSF May Act as a Supporting Command Separate from 

Theater Commands

CMC Joint Operations

Command Center 

Wuhan Joint Logistics

Support Center

Joint Logistics

Support Center

Theater

Air Force

Theater 

Navy

Theater 

Army

Theater 

Command

Supported Command Supporting Command

Strategic Support to all Theaters

Supports designated Theater 

but may be directed to support

other Theaters as required

Source: Zhang Tao, ed., “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System 

Reform,” China Military Online, September 14, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

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theater commands that can smoothly transition to support wartime operations without significant changes to staff, wanted to establish standing 

theater rear command posts to manage logistics, equipment, and mobilization support work in war and peace.74 If this is the case, theater mobilization 

for contingencies may be improved since a full-time rear command post 

would standardize command and support relationships among the JLSCs, 

theater logistics forces, militia, reserve, and civilian supporting organizations. However, at present there is no evidence that JLSCs are responsible 

for equipment support or mobilization activities outside of material procurement and transportation.

Some formerly disparate units appear to have been consolidated under 

the JLSCs, most notably the former GLD transportation military representative offices (MROs) and possibly elements of former MD maritime 

transport units. The following organizations have been listed as subordinate 

to JLSCs in various press reports, though the distinction between secondand third-level organizations remains unclear: 75

■	 Political Work Department

■	 Medical Service Support Department

■	 PLA Hospitals

■	 Military Facilities and Construction Division

■	 Procurement Division

■	 Supplies Division

■	 Military Representatives Division

■	 Navigational Affairs MRO

■	 Transportation MRO

■	 Railway MRO

■	 Airport MRO

■	 Subordinate Work Division

■	 Fuel, Supply, and Ordnance Depots

■	 Ship Transport Units

■	 Waterway Technical Support Unit.
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Prior to reform, each MR JLD had between three and five subordinate division leader grade logistics units responsible for providing general 

logistics support to all PLA units operating within their assigned area and 

task organizing detachments to provide direct support to deploying units 

as required (see figure 3). JLSDs also controlled a number of subordinate 

regiment leader grade material, ordnance, and fuel depots; subsistence 

support and transportation units; and hospitals.76 These units were the core 

of the PLA’s joint logistics support system.

While five former JLSDs have been redesignated as JLSCs, there is 

currently little information available on the other JLSDs. It is possible 

that the PLA may separate the remaining JLSD fixed and mobile logistics 

capabilities into separate but interconnected systems in order to increase 

readiness to support power projection operations. JLSDs have been experimenting with various methods of task organizing contingency support 

brigades for two decades and could carve these units out into their own 

direct support echelon under the JLSC, while other echelons manage fixed 

sites and general support capabilities. This may allow a consolidation of 

some fixed storage areas and allow for a reduction of support personnel.77

Figure 3. JLSD Organization Prior to PLA Reform

Military Region

Joint Logistics Department 

Joint Logistics 

Sub-Departments 

Motor Transport Units

Task Organized 

Support Detachments 

Hospitals Material, Fuel,

Ordnance Depot 

Source: Cheng Yunjie and Xu Jinzhang, “PLA Continues Long March of Logistics Reform,” Xinhua, July 

28, 2007, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20081025011030/http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2007-07/28/content_6441943.htm>.
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The JLSCs are likely to maintain separate maritime and motor transport 

units to support the distribution of materials from rear to forward areas 

supplemented by military representatives who coordinate civilian transport support to theater operations as required, under both peacetime and 

wartime conditions (see figure 4).

A flattening of the logistics organizational structure at the theater level 

may enable an overall reduction in the size of the PLA logistics force while 

increasing its operational efficiency by designating full-time forward support units that can concentrate on mission-specific combat logistics support 

tasks, while retaining a robust theater storage and distribution system. By 

subordinating the military representative system under JLSCs, the PLA may 

also be able to more effectively leverage growing civil-transport capabilities, 

creating economies of force. If the supply support system follows a similar 

model as the transport system, the PLA may be able to more effectively procure materials from local commercial suppliers, reducing theater material 

storage requirements.

There is little information available to date on planned changes to navy, 

air force, or Rocket Force logistic organizations. However, some consolidation of these organizations is likely where efficiencies can be found. The 

newly designated PLA Army will likely inherit some facilities in order to 

Figure 4. Possible Organization of JLSCs with Separated Fixed and 

Mobile Groups

Joint Logistics Support Center

Joint Logistics

Support 

Brigades

Motor Transport

and Maritime

Transport Unit

Military

Representatives

Theater 

Hospitals

Material, Fuel,

Ordnance 

Depots

Forward Support Distribution and Transport Fixed Rear Support

Source: Cheng Yunjie and Xu Jinzhang, “PLA Continues Long March of Logistics Reform,” Xinhua, July 

28, 2007, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20081025011030/http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2007-07/28/content_6441943.htm>.
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establish its own organic service logistics system separate from the joint 

system. Media reports suggest that the GLD’s Qinghai-Tibet Military Depot 

has already been transferred to the army.78

It remains unclear exactly what the relationship between JLSCs and 

TC service logistics units will be in the future. PLA officials have indicated 

that service logistics systems will continue to maintain specialized capabilities and manage material specific to each service, while the JLSF will 

manage all general support.79 This is in itself not a break from previous 

practice; however, it is possible under the “reformed” PLA logistics system 

that the JLSF will have greater authority to task service logistics units to 

provide support to other units where and when necessary, procedures 

required for precision logistics. It appears that JLSCs are much more joint 

in composition than their JLD predecessors, indicating staffs are more 

likely to understand service-specific requirements and capabilities and 

be capable of integrating this information into joint logistics planning 

and execution.80

Conclusion and Questions for Further Research 

Through 2020, the PLA will likely complete the reorganization of its logistics command structure, centralizing support for theater operations under 

a joint logistics headquarters that is more capable of leveraging the civilian 

sector for support. However, legacy logistics infrastructure, leadership, 

and culture, especially corruption, continue to exist as barriers to reform. 

The future sustainability of PLA logistics reform efforts will depend on 

how effectively the PLA can professionalize logistics operations to ensure 

reliability within the system and modernize its information technology 

to effectively integrate information systems among military units, and 

between military and civilian logistics entities.

The PLA appears to be increasing the centralized management of logistics IT projects, while continuing to outsource support work to the civilian 

sector. Both efforts appear focused on rectifying problems associated with 

stovepiped, outdated, and cumbersome systems that impede joint logistics 
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

279

and operational planning and execution. The PLA has now introduced 

organizations dedicated to IT standardization and integration to achieve 

PLA-wide interoperability and compatibility. At the same time, the PRC 

is prioritizing dual-use technology and unified civilian and military technology standards that may allow the PLA to more effectively integrate 

disparate information systems currently in use and speed the fielding of 

newer and more technologically advanced platforms. In particular, PRC 

adoption of new data science methodologies, and development of cloud 

computing and Internet of Things technologies, have the potential to significantly advance logistics management for the PLA.81 These technologies 

are necessary for the PLA to capitalize on structural changes designed 

to enhance joint operations and overcome previous organizational and 

informational stovepipes.

One major question that remains unanswered is how the PLA will 

modernize its logistics system to support overseas operations. The structural reforms under way and efforts to integrate civilian information 

systems into PLA decision and planning systems all emphasize improvements to logistics support along internal lines of communication and 

outward along China’s immediate periphery. There appears to be little 

emphasis on developing true strategic force projection capabilities to support PLA overseas operations beyond the production of large Y-20 military 

transport aircraft. In 2014, PLA leaders identified the development of 

force protection and sustainment capabilities as goals for PLA logistics 

modernization, yet to date there has been little discussion about how this 

will be technically and procedurally achieved, or even what organization 

will be responsible for these operations since they are beyond the current 

responsibilities of any theater command.82

On July 11, 2017, the PLA officially established China’s first overseas 

military base in Djibouti, ostensibly under the PLA Navy. The base is 

purportedly intended to enhance support to naval operations in the Gulf 

of Aden, though other joint missions are likely in the future.83 It remains 

unclear how the PLA will permanently sustain operations from this base, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

280

though it will most likely involve regular support from Chinese commercial shipping and logistics enterprises to reduce the demand on military 

lift platforms. Closely watching the development of logistics mechanisms 

associated with the Djibouti base will be critical to understanding how 

and how well the PLA will regularly sustain operational forces along 

external lines of communication. Future academic research on PLA 

logistics should emphasize civil-military coordination mechanisms to 

leverage national resources to support PLA operations overseas as well as 

the development of PLA expeditionary logistics capabilities with particular emphasis on the maturation of reception, staging, onward movement, 

and integration procedures and supporting technological enablers.

Notes

1 Susan Puska, “Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 

2000,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of 

China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 553–624; Dennis J. Blasko, People’s War Lives 

On: Chinese Military Logistics in the War Zone (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004); 

James C. Mulvenon, “To Get Rich Is Unprofessional: Chinese Military Corruption 

in the Jiang Era,” China Leadership Monitor, vol. 6 (Spring 2003); and James C. 

Mulvenon, “So Crooked They Have to Screw Their Pants On—Part 3: The Guo 

Boxiong Edition,” China Leadership Monitor, vol. 48 (Fall 2015).

2 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia [中国军事后勤百科全书] (Beijing: 

Golden Shield Publishing House [金盾出版社], August 2002), vol. I, 43.

3 Liu Wei and Yu Xin [刘炜, 于鑫], Food and Fodder Go First [粮草先行] 

(Hunan: Hunan Science and Technology Press [湖南科学技术出版社], 2005); Zhang 

Zhende [张振德] “‘Precision Logistics’—The Focus of Military Logistics Reform” 

[‘精确后勤’:军事后勤变革的聚焦点], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 23, 2003.

4 Liu Zhigang [刘志刚], “We Should Focus on Three Types of Changes in 

Logistics Reform” [后勤改革要着眼三种转变], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 

9, 2014; Wang Haibo, Gao Zhiwen, and Hua Xiao [汪海波, 高志文,花晓], “The 

Grand Program for Building Modern Logistics—An Interview of Zhou Songhe, 

Chief of Staff of the General Logistics Department’s Headquarters Department 

on Issues Concerning the Logistic Work in the New Year” [谋篇布势:建设现代
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

281

后勤展宏图—总后司令部参谋长周松和就新年度后勤工作有关问题答记者问], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], February 12, 2014; Liao Xilong [廖锡龙], “Comprehensively 

Develop Modern Logistics with Scientific Development Concept as Guide” [以科

学发展观为指导全面建设现代后勤], Qiushi [求是], July 16, 2006; Cheng Ying 

and Xu Jinzhang [程瑛, 徐金章] “Inside Story of PLA Logistics Reforms” [解放军

后动变化内情], Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan [瞭望东方周刊], no. 3 (January 19, 

2006), 33–34, 36–38; Ma Shuming [马书铭], “Issues on the Theory and Practice 

of the PLA’s Joint Logistics” [解放军联合后勤理论和实践的问题], China Military 

Science [中国军事科学], no. 2 (2000), 14–20.

5 Joint Vision 2020—America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 2000).

6 Joint Publication 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (Washington, DC: The Joint 

Staff, June 13, 2000).

7 Liu and Yu, Food and Fodder Go First; Ma Haoliang [马浩亮], “Civil-Military Fusion” [军民深度融合多管齐下支撑强军路], Ta Kung Pao [大公报], 

November 4, 2015, available at <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2015-11-04/ doc-ifxkmrvp5097082.shtml>.

8 Xu Qiliang [许其亮], “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National Defense 

and the Armed Forces” [坚定不移推进国防和军队改革], People’s Daily [人民日

报], November 20, 2013; Cao Zhi, Li Xuanliang, and Wang Shibin [曹智, 李宣良, 

王士彬], “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi Jinping Stresses: Comprehensively 

Implement Reform and Military Strengthening Strategy, Resolutely Take Path 

to Strong Military with Chinese Characteristics” [习近平在中央军委改革工作

会议上强调全面实施改革强军战略坚定不移走中国特色强军之路], Xinhua, 

November 30, 2015; “Inaugural Meeting of Joint Logistics Support Force of 

Central Military Commission Held in Beijing; Xi Jinping Confers Army Flags to 

Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base and Various Joint Logistics Support Centers 

and Delivers Speech” [中央军委联勤保障部队成立大会在京举行习近平向武汉联

勤保障基地和各联勤保障中心授予军旗并致训词], Xinhua, September 13, 2016, 

available at <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0914/c1024-28714073.html>.

9 Zhang Liansong and Liu Jing [张连松, 刘晶], “From Self-Supporting Arms 

and Services to Joint Support for the Three Services: The 50-Year History of Our 

Army’s Joint Logistics Reform” [从军兵种自我保障到三军联合保障-我军联勤改

革50年的历史跨越], History of the People’s Liberation Army [人民军队史], April 

2004, available at <www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/JLSY200404005.pdf>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

282

10 Pei Fang, “Major Operation to Be Performed on Military Logistics System,” 

Kuang Chiao Ching [广角镜], no. 318 (March 16, 1999), 50–52. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines socialization of support functions as replacing military 

support personnel with civilian professionals and contracting out logistics services 

to civilian companies. See Shi Wennian and Wang Haibo [石文年, 汪海波], “The 

History and Theory of the Socialization of Military Logistics” [军人后勤保障社会

化的历史及理论研究], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 2 (2001), 57–61.

11 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

April 26, 2016), available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20

China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf>; Dennis J. Blasko, “Clarity of Intentions: People’s Liberation Army Transregional Exercises to Defend China’s Borders,” 

in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, 

David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 

171–212; Feng Chunmei [冯春梅], “The Shenyang Military Region Explores a New 

Way of Military-Civilian Integration Strengthening Logistic Support by Complementing Each Other and Seeking Win-Win Results” [沈阳军区探索军民融合新

路子—互补共赢强保障], People’s Daily [人民日報], February 11, 2011.

12 Gao and Hua, “The Grand Program for Building Modern Logistics”; Liu 

Zhigang [刘志刚], “We Should Focus on Three Types of Changes in Logistics 

Reform” [后勤改革要着眼三种转变], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 9, 2014.

13 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, vol. I, 43.

14 Zhang and Liu, “From Self-Supporting Arms and Services to Joint Support 

for the Three Services.”

15 Ibid.

16 Puska, “Taming the Hydra”; Pei, “Major Operation to Be Performed on 

Military Logistics System.”

17 Liao Xilong [廖锡龙], “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint 

Logistics Reform” [亲历济南战区大联勤改革], PLA Daily [解放军报], December 16, 

2008, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/8527794.html>.

18 China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: State Council Information 

Office, 2006), available at <www.china.org.cn/english/China/194332.htm on>; 

Liao, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform”; 

Hao Yingquan and Li Xuanlian, “PLA Begins to Implement System of Non-Active 

Service Staff in 2006,” Xinhua, February 15 2006; “Documentary for Military” 

[军事纪事], CCTV-7, June 22, 2009.
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

283

19 Under the old system, a peacetime military region would become a 

“war zone” in a war situation, and the war zone commander would gain operational control over air force and navy units within the war zone. Under the 

new theater command system, the theater commander has operational control 

of army, navy, air force, and perhaps conventional Rocket Force units in both 

peacetime and wartime.

20 Liao, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform.”

21 Wang Fan [王帆], “Benefits Opened Up by Distributed Support” [配送式

保障开辟的效益途径], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 29, 2009.

22 Liao, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform.”

23 Dong Zhaoxin and Zhao Jianwei, “From Separate Logistics System to Joint 

Logistics of Three Services,” PLA Daily, January 17, 2007; Zhao Jianwei [赵建伟], 

“Strategic Concept for China’s Military Logistics,” Guangming Daily [光明日报], 

January 17, 2007.

24 Zhang Lianwu [张练武], ed., “Theme Word: Integrated Joint Logistics” 

[主题词:一体化联勤], Qianwei Bao [前卫报], April 2, 2008.

25 Chen Biao and Wang Yijie, “Logistics Command College Cultivates Commanders of Joint Logistics,” PLA Daily, November 10, 2009; Zhang Shuo [张硕], 

“Riveting Attention on Winning, Striving for Breakthroughs—General Review 

of Shenyang Military Region’s Efforts for Strengthening Combat Capability 

Building” [紧盯打赢求突破—军区加强作战能力建设综述], Qianjin Bao [前进报], 

November 11, 2009; Lin Siping, Ning Jianhong, and Tian Yong [林思平, 宁剑宏, 田

勇], “Play the Thunderous Music of Joint Support—An Eye-Witness Account of a 

Joint Campaign Logistics Support Exercise Conducted by a Guangzhou Military 

Region Emergency Army Service Station” [奏响联合保障最强音—某分部应急兵

站联合战役后勤保障演练见闻], Renmin Qianxian [人民前线], October 11, 2011; 

Zhang Fenghai [张风海] et al., “Crossing Hundreds of Miles to Conduct Major 

Exercise—Overview of ‘Mission Action-2013A’ Cross-Region Mobility Campaign 

Exercise” [干里跨越大演兵—‘使命行动-2013A’跨区机动战役演习综述], Renmin 

Qianxian [人民前线], September 25, 2013, 2–3; Zhan Qi [战旗] et al., “Three Services Come Together to Cast Sharp Swords—Actual Accounts of Explorations on 

Joint Operation Training Innovation by 26th Group Army” [三军联挟制利剑—第

26集团军探索联合作战训练创新纪实], Qianwei Bao [前卫报], November 16, 2014, 

3; Lei Jianghai and Zheng Xiaogang [雷江海, 郑孝刚], “Lanzhou MR Carries Out 

All-Element Training in Campaign Logistics Support” [兰州军区全要素演练战

役后勤保障], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 21, 2015.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

284

26 Guo Shijun, Luo Ting, and Qing Taiping [郭石军, 罗挺, 卿太平], “Application of IoT Technology in Integrated Military Logistics Information System” [物

联网技术在一体化军事物流信息系统中的应用], Logistics Technology [物流技术], 

no. 2 (2012), 209–212, available at <cf.lcchina.org.cn/docbak/5/6/d/163862_50dbea604056d.pdf>.

27 “Communications Troops Achieve Three Great Leaps from ‘One Half’ Radio” 

[通讯兵从“一部半”电台实现三大跨越], Guangming Daily [光明日报], July 11, 2007, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-07/11/content_6358114.htm>; 

Hou Xigui [侯喜贵], “Military Informationization Construction Research” [军队信

息化建设研究], The Basic Characteristics of Military Informationization [军队信息

化的基本特性] (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2002), 63.

28 Hou, “Military Informationization Construction Research.”

29 Guo, Luo, and Qing, “Application of IoT Technology in Integrated Military 

Logistics Information System.”

30 Puska, “Taming the Hydra.”

31 Liu Zhigang [刘志刚], “We Should Focus on Three Types of Changes in 

Logistics Reform” [后勤改革要着眼三种转变], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 

9, 2014; Zhang, “‘Precision Logistics’—The Focus of Military Logistics Reform.”

32 Cheng and Xu, “Inside Story of PLA Logistics Reforms”; Cui Rongli and Fan 

Juwei, “PLA Shapes Up New Concept Model for Integrated Material Procurement 

and Support,” PLA Daily, August 17, 2006.

33 Gao and Hua, “The Grand Program for Building Modern Logistics.”

34 “PLA Logistics Information Center Established,” PLA Daily, July 8, 2013.

35 Han Wei, “Forces Medical Cloud ‘Research and Development’ Integration 

Design and Concept” [部队卫生云 ‘研建用管’一体化设计与思考], Presentation at 

the Next Generation Medical Information Technology Foundation Forum, Beijing, 

August 2014, 24, available at <www.hit180.com/wp-content/uploads/zhuanti/

wuxi/wuxi_012.pdf>.

36 Ibid.

37 Jiang Luming [姜鲁鸣], “Military-Civilian Integration: The Shield of Modern National Defense” [军民融合:现代国防安全之盾], Loose Leaf Anthology [活页

文选], no. 71 (2015), 34, available at <http://dangjian.com/djw2016sy/djw2016wkztl/

wkztl2016xihy/201604/t20160414_3287764.shtml>.

38 Jiang Luming [姜鲁鸣], “Why to Raise Civil-Military Integration to the 

Status of National Strategy” [为何把军民融合上升为国家战略], People’s Daily [人

民日报], May 31, 2015.
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

285

39 Liao, “Comprehensively Develop Modern Logistics with Scientific Development Concept as Guide”; Yuan Jianda, Xu Jinzhang, and Xu Zhuangzhi, “The 

Liberation Army Will Basically Put in Place Modern Logistical Services in 2020—

Exclusive Interview with Liberation Army General Logistics Department Deputy 

Director Li Maifu,” Xinhua, December 24, 2007.

40 Ibid.

41 “Joint Action 2015D,” Hsiang Kang Shang Pao [香港商报], August 11, 2015; 

Liao, “Comprehensively Develop Modern Logistics with Scientific Development 

Concept as Guide”; Zhang Hongwei and Du Qingguo, “The ‘Fusion’ Effect Is Everywhere—Eyewitness Account of the Theater’s Promotion of Joint Logistics Support 

Structure Reform,” Qianwei Bao, August 22, 2010, 3; Huai Qianjian, Nie Jun, and Su 

Fengshou [怀前进, 臬军, 苏丰收], “Providing Strong and Solid Support for Victory 

in Battle—An Overview of the Public Relations Work During the Large-Scale Battle 

Training Exercise across Five Provinces, ‘Mission Action-2013A,’ Conducted by the 

Nanjing Military Region” [为能打胜仗提供坚强有力保障—‘使命行动 -2013A’跨

区机动战役演习群众工作概述], Renmin Qianxian [人民前线], October 18, 2013; 

Wang Wei and Yang Zhen [王伟, 杨振], “Recent Development in the Study of the 

Thought of People’s War Under Informationized Conditions” [信息化条件下人

民战争思想研究的新进展], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 2 (2009).

42 Puska, “Taming the Hydra.”

43 “National Defense Transportation Law of the People’s Republic of China,” 

Xinhua, September 3, 2016; and Yao Jianing, ed., “China Passes New Law on 

National Defense Transport,” Xinhua, September 3, 2016, available at <http://

english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/03/content_7241207.htm>; “Regulations 

on National Defense Mobilization of Civil Means of Transportation” [授权发布《:

民用运力国防动员条例》(全文)], Xinhua [新华网], October 9, 2003, available at 

<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-10-09/1654886729s.shtml>.

44 Blasko, “Clarity of Intentions”; “Liao Xilong Urges to Accelerate Military 

Transportation Mobilization Drive,” PLA Daily, June 23, 2010; Gao Xiaowen [高

效文] et al., “Stars Shine Down on the Vast Flat Lands and the Moon Floods the 

Great Rivers—Looking Back on the 2010 Military-Wide Joint Combined Operations Drill” [星垂平野阔月—回眸2010年全军联], Jiefangjun Huabao [解放军画

报], January 6, 2011, 6.

45 Sang Yongliang, Lin Lin, and He Mingxiang [桑永亮, 林琳, 何名享], 

“Engaging in Emergency Support at Sea” [应急保障在海上进行], Jiefangjun Huabao [解放军画报], October 16, 2010, 54–55; Lin Hongmei and Qu Baichun [林红
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

286

梅, 屈百春], “Our Country Holds Emergency Logistical Support Exercise at Sea in 

Jinan Theater to Test Transportation Combat Readiness” [我国交通战备海上应

急保障演练在济南战区举行], Xinhua, July 18, 2010; Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016.

46 China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council Information Office of 

the People’s Republic of China, May 2015), available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/

Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm>; “China’s Military Strategy” [中国的军

事战略], Xinhua, May 26, 2015.

47 James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese 

Military-Business Complex, 1978–1998 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 2000).

48 “PLA Bans Commercial Activities as Anti-Graft Drive Gains Momentum,” 

Global Times, May 5, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/981596.shtml>.

49 Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune.

50 “Hu Jintao Emphasizes Importance of Closing PLA Businesses,” Xinhua, 

July 28, 1998.

51 Cao Haili, “The Chinese Army Has Sailed Out of the Business Sea,” Beijing 

Zhongguo Qingnian [北京中國青年], February 15, 1999, 4–7; Mulvenon, Soldiers of 

Fortune; “PLA Bans Commercial Activities as Anti-Graft Drive Gains Momentum.”

52 James C. Mulvenon, “PLA Divestiture 2.0: We Mean It This Time,” China 

Leadership Monitor, no. 50 (Summer 2016), available at <www.hoover.org/research/

pla-divestiture-20-we-mean-it-time>; State Council Information Office, “China’s 

National Defense in 2002,” December 9, 2002, available at <https://fas.org/nuke/

guide/china/doctrine/natdef2002.html>.

53 Li Xuanliang [李宣良], “All Units of the Armed Forces to Deal with Commercial Bribery” [中国军队开展治理商业贿赂专项工作], Xinhua [新华网], August 

2, 2006, available at <http://jczs.news.sina.com.cn/2006-08-02/1642387932.html>.

54 “PLA Bans Commercial Activities as Anti-Graft Drive Gains Momentum.”

55 Ibid.

56 Puska, “Taming the Hydra.”

57 Yuan Hao and Fan Juwei [袁浩, 范炬炜], “Liao Xilong Speaks at Plenary 

Session of All-Army Leading Group for the Work of Auditing Economic Responsibility of Leading Cadres; Calls for All-Round, In-Depth Implementation of 

the Work of Auditing Economic Responsibility of Leading Cadres in the Whole 

Army” [廖锡龙在全军领导干部经济责任审计工作领导小组全体会议上强调全

面推进军队领导干部经济责任审计工作深入开展], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 21, 

2006, 1; An Puzhong and Zhang Xiaoqi [安普忠, 张晓祺], “According to the Order 
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

287

Signed by Chairman Xi, the PLA Audit Office Is Turned into an Organ Under 

the Central Military Commission; Fan Changlong Attends and Addresses the 

Event for Announcing the Order; Xu Qiliang Reads Out the Order; Zhao Keshi 

Attends the Event” [近平主席签署命令解放军审计署划归中央军委建制范长龙出

席宣布命令大会并讲话许其亮宣读命令赵克石一同出席], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

November 7, 2014; Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Shifts Control of PLA Audit Office to 

Military’s Top Decision-Making Body,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

November 7, 2014, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1633802/

xi-jinping-shifts-control-pla-audit-office-militarys-top-decision-making>.

58 John Garnaut, “Chinese General to Fight Corruption,” Sydney Morning 

Herald, January 19, 2012, available at <www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-generalto-fight-corruption-20120118-1q6n2.html>.

59 Li Hao [李昊] , “Corruption Is Serious in the Former CPC Central Military 

Commission Joint Support Force” [中共军委联勤保障部队成立前身腐败严重], 

Epoch Times [大纪元], September 14, 2016, available at <www.epochtimes.com/

gb/16/9/13/n8296789.htm>; Minnie Chan and Choi Chi-yuk, “Two More of China’s 

Former Top Commanders Taken Away for Corruption Investigation,” South China 

Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 5, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/

china/policies-politics/article/1999535/two-more-chinas-former-top-commanderstaken-away>.

60 Greg Hallahan, “Collusion, Creative Bribery & Subcontracting,” FTI Consulting, October 30, 2014, available at <www.fticonsulting-asia.com/~/media/Files/

us-files/insights/articles/collusion-creative-bribery-subcontracting.pdf>.

61 Jiang Jie, “China Unveils Five New Theater Commands,” Global Times (Beijing), February 1, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/966860.shtml>.

62 Liu and Yu, Food and Fodder Go First.

63 Ibid.

64 Wang Ke [王克], “Military Logistics” [军事后勤], in Chinese Military 

Encyclopedia [中国军事百科全书], Song Shilun and Xiao Ke [宋时轮,萧克], 

eds., vol. IV (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 

1997), 1–8; Guo Jing and Luo Guojin [郭晶, 罗国金], “Fourth Great Wall International Forum on Military Medicine Successfully Held” [第四届长城国际军事

医学论坛在京成功举办], Xinhua, April 2, 2017, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-04/02/c_129523752.htm>; Huang Panyue, “PLA Releases 

Self-Heating Meals Research and Development Project to the Public,” China 

Military Online, March 28, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jwywpd/2017-03/28/
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

288

content_7542387.htm>; “PLA Starts Test and Trial of ‘Dog Tags,’” China Military 

Online, February 21, 2017, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-

02/21/content_7496278.htm>; “China, Israel Vow to Enhance Military Logistics 

Cooperation,” China Military Online, February 21, 2017, available at <http://eng.

chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-02/21/content_7496087.htm>; “PLA Makes Headway in Improving Combat Protective Outfit System,” China Military Online, 

February 13, 2017, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-02/13/

content_7487395.htm>.

65 “PLA Takes Extraordinary Measures to Ensure Rations Supply,” China 

Military Online, March 28, 2017, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2017-03/28/content_7542292.htm>; Zhao Jie and Lu Qingguo [赵杰, 陆

庆国], “Comprehensive Upgrade of Military Oxygen Support System for Plateau Region” [装备多样化供给标准化管理制度化我军高原制供氧保障全面升

级], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 14, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

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66 “Meeting on Application and Demonstration of All-Military Logistics 

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67 Ibid.

68 “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support 

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69 Information accessed at <www.cgw.cn> and “The General Logistics Department, an Expert Mission to Wuhan Rear Base for the Intelligence Services,” May 13, 2012, 

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先洪, 罗贤宁], “GLD Certain Vehicle Depot Takes Measures to Improve Personnel 

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and Weng Huainan [魏小俊, 翁淮南], “General Logistics Department Base Holds 
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

289

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70 Liu Jianwei [刘建伟] et al., “The Joint Logistic Support Force, Please Receive 

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2016; Liu Jianwei and Liu Lei [刘建伟, 刘磊], “The Shenyang Joint Logistic Support 

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中心着眼使命加速保障数据融合], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 16, 2016; Zhao 

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‘Provision Officers’ into Joint Operations System” [西宁联勤保障中心探索联战联

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71 Qiu Xinli and Zhou Yuan [邱新力, 周远], “When Ordinarily Using Electronic Expense Submissions, What’s to Be Done When Met with Emergency 

Assignments During Network Outages?” [平时采用无货币报销, 断网遇有紧急任

务时又该怎么办?], Junbao Jizhe [军报记者], May 23, 2017, available at <http://zb.81.

cn/content/2017-05/23/content_7614223.htm>; “‘Three Capabilities’ Qualification 

Competition Develops Comprehensive Quality” [‘三能’达标考核锤炼综合素质], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], February 13, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-02/13/content_169266.htm>; Zhang Cunguo and Li Jianwen [张存国, 

李建文], “Military-Civilian Dual-Use Airport Support No Longer Has Each Side 

Focus Solely on Its Own Tasks,” [军地机场保障不再‘各扫门前雪’], PLA Daily [解

放军报], October 27, 2016, 2, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-10/27/

content_160029.htm>.

72 “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System Reform,” China Military Online, September 14, 2016, available at <http://eng.

chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm>; “Army Adjustment 

and Establishment Completed in Five Theater Commands,” China Military Online, 

February 4, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

china-military-news/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>.

73 Gao Jie [高洁], “The Wuxi Joint Logistic Support Center: Strengthen the 

Service Mindset, Improve the Service Form” [联勤保障中心:运行满月,新风扑面无

锡联勤保障中心强化服务意识改进保障方式], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 16, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

290

2016; “People’s Liberation Army (Including Armed Police) Designation Code and 

Garrison Situation” [解放军(含武警)番号, 代号及驻防情况], October 25, 2014; 

“Military and Civilians Work Together to Build a Harmonious Society” [军民同

心共建和谐社会], People’s Liberation Army 101st Hospital [中国人民解放军第101

医院], March 9, 2016, available at <www.wx101.com/Item/976.aspx>; “China Life 

Guilin Branch Celebrates the 87th Anniversary of the Founding” [国寿桂林分公

司举行庆祝建党八十七周年纪念活动], Guangxi Insurance Association Network 

[广西保险行业协会], August 28, 2008, available at <www.gxbx.com.cn/bencandy.

php?fid-122-id-10021-page-1.htm>; “Zhengzhou Military and Police Forces Work 

Together to Green the Yellow River Beach” [郑州军警部队二日一起来绿化黄河

滩], Henan Cultural Industry Network, April 5, 2010, available at <www.henanci.

com/Pages/2010/04/05/20100405044918.shtml>.

74 Dang Chongmin [党崇民], ed., Staff Officer Work in Joint Operations [联合

作战参谋工作] (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], August 2006).

75 Lai Yuhong and Wang Xiaowei [赖瑜鸿, 王晓伟], “Army Establishes Rapid 

Commodity Distribution,” China Military Online [中国军网], May 3, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/sydbt/2017-05/03/content_7585404.htm>; Gao Aiguo [高爱

国] et al., “From ‘Health’ to ‘Medical Service’: Far More Than Just Changing the 

Name of an Organization” [从卫生到卫勤: 远不止改个机构名称这么简单], China 

Military Online [中国军网综合], April 28, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-04/28/content_7581050.htm>; Wang Jun [王俊], “Xie Donghui Becomes 

Director of Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base Political Work Department” [谢东

辉已担任武汉联勤保障基地政治工作部主任], The Paper [澎湃], March 22, 2017, 

available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1644897>; Guo Bin and Lin 

Youwei [郭彬, 林幼卫], “Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Center Forges a Contingent 

of Elite Maritime Soldiers” [无锡联勤保障中心锻造一支海上尖兵], Zhongguo 

Guofang Bao [中国国防报], March 21, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2017-03/21/content_172344.htm>; Tang Zhichao and Sun Xingwei [汤智超, 

孙兴维], “Military Representatives Occupy Apartment of Shanghai-Based Vehicle 

Battalion” [无锡联勤保障中心探索公寓住房区域保障模式军代表住上汽车营公

寓房], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 20, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/1/2017-03/20/02/2017032002_pdf.pdf>; Yang Yucheng and Zhou Peng [杨

玉成, 周鹏], “Organizing the Strengthening of Military Supply Station Leaders in 

Fujian and Jiangxi” [组织闽赣两省军供站长加钢淬火], Zhongguo Guofang Bao [中

国国防报], December 1, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2016-12/01/

content_162993.htm>; Lai Yuhong and Huang Yi [赖瑜鸿, 黄翊], “Guilin Joint 
Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA

291

Logistics Support Center and Civil Airline Sign Cooperation Agreement on Air 

Ticketing Service” [桂林联勤保障中心与某航空公司签订合作协议助推惠军服

务升级], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 7, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2017-03/07/content_171096.htm>; Gao Jie, Sun Yan, and Liu Jian [高洁, 孙

燕, 刘健], “PLA No. 85 Hospital of Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Center Provides 

Services for Island-Stationed Troops” [解放军无锡联勤保障中心第八五医院团

队为海岛官兵服务], China News Service, February 8, 2017, available at <www.

chinanews.com/mil/2017/02-08/8143867.shtml>.

76 Yu Zhiming [於志明], “Command of Joint Logistics Subdepartments” 

[联勤分部指挥], China Military Logistics Encyclopedia [中国军事后勤百科全书] 

(Beijing: Gold Shield Press [金盾出版社], 2002), vol. 1, 252–253; Fu Quanyou and 

Liang Guanglie [傅全有, 梁光烈], “Joint Logistics Sub-Department” [联勤分部], in 

Chinese Encyclopedia: Military Affairs [中国军事百科全书] (Beijing: Encyclopedia 

of China Publishing House [中国大百科全书出版社], 2005), 509.

77 Lonnie Henley, “PLA Logistics and Doctrine Reforms, 1999–2009,” in People’s Liberation Army after Next, ed. Susan Puska (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2000); Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2012), 52.

78 “Details of Military Reforms Come to Light: Personnel of CMC’s Two 

New Departments Has Been Decided” [军委细节曝光:军委两新部门人事已

定], Chaoji Pingguo Wang [超级苹果网], December 28, 2015; He Yongmin [何勇

民], “How Is the Qinghai-Tibet Highway Military Supplies Depot, Which Has 

Undergone Reforms Five Times, Facing Reorganization” [历经5次调整改革的

青藏兵站部如何面对改革], PLA Daily [解放军报], December 21, 2015, available 

at <web.archive.org/web/20170220014703/http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-12/21/

content_6824329.htm >; Ding Li and Li Wei [丁丽, 李伟], “Military Report” [军

事报道], CCTV-7, June 21, 2016, available at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2K1r80mUw>.

79 Zhang Tao, ed., “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System Reform,” China Military Online, September 14, 2016, available 

at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm>.

80 Zhao Jiaqing [赵佳庆], “Shenyang Joint Logistics Center Organizes 

Severe Cold Weather Training” [沈阳联勤保障中心组织冬季严寒条件下的训

练], China Network [中国网], January 26, 2017, available at <www.china.com.cn/

military/2017-01/26/content_40184471.htm>.

81 Jiang, “Military-Civilian Integration.”
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

292

82 Liu Zhigang [刘志刚], “We Should Focus on Three Types of Changes in Logistics Reform” [后勤改革要着眼三种转变], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 9, 2014.

83 “PLA Djibouti Base Must Be Viewed Objectively,” Global Times (Beijing), July 13, 2017, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1056127.shtml>; 

Huang Jingjing and Guo Yuandan, “China’s Logistic Hub in Djibouti to Stabilize 

Region, Protect Interests,” Global Times (Beijing), March 15, 2016, available at 

<www.globaltimes.cn/content/973900.shtml>; Zhou Bo, “Station Looks Beyond 

Anti-Piracy Mission,” China Daily Online, March 17, 2016, available at <http://usa.

chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-03/18/content_23948894.htm>.
293

A MODERN MAJOR GENERAL

Building Joint Commanders in the PLA

By Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders

Among the key ingredients in fielding a modern joint military 

force is cultivating a cadre of high-caliber commanders and staff 

officers to plan and lead operations. This has been a perennial 

challenge for all modern militaries, as the scope and scale of warfare has 

extended past single battle campaigns of short duration. Since the end of 

World War II, for instance, the U.S. military has considered and reconsidered ways in which officers can be given the requisite training, experience, 

and education to work effectively across Service boundaries and within 

joint organizations such as the combatant commands and Joint Staff. The 

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 

mandated joint professional military education and joint assignments as 

requirements for promotion, yet the creation of a deeply rooted joint culture 

remains elusive—if achievable at all.1

For decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also struggled with producing the officers it needs to perform joint operations. 

Reforms carried out during the 1990s and 2000s attempted to reorient the 

PLA toward a stronger joint operational capability, but weaknesses in the 

human resource domain persisted. Key problems included senior and midCHAPTER 8
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

294

level officers with limited exposure to other services, few opportunities for 

non–ground force officers to get joint assignments, and training that paid 

lip service to joint operations via superficial involvement of other services 

to allow portraying service exercises as “joint.” Yet the need for qualified 

personnel has only increased as the PLA, under Xi Jinping, has been tasked 

with being able to fight and win “informationized local wars,” which are 

inherently joint.2

 Xi and his fellow reformers in the PLA understand the 

problem and have adopted several initiatives designed to alleviate it, but 

the effectiveness of those reforms remains unclear.

This chapter documents how the PLA has tried to cultivate joint commanders before and during the current reform cycle, and comments on 

obstacles limiting the chances for success. It is divided into five sections. 

The first discusses the motivation for human capital reforms under Xi. The 

next reviews reforms instituted during the preceding two administrations. 

This is followed by a discussion of identified weaknesses as well as solutions 

considered in PLA sources prior to the Xi era. The fourth assesses reforms 

undertaken since 2016 to build qualified joint commanders in three areas: 

professional military education (PME), personnel management, and training. The conclusion assesses possible obstacles to current reforms and states 

the implications for the PLA.

Impetus for Reform 

An overarching operational objective of the current PLA reform cycle is to 

create the conditions for better planning and execution of joint operations.3

This focus on joint operations mirrors changes in PLA doctrine over the 

preceding 30 years that required commanders to integrate the unique combat 

capabilities of the individual services (army, navy, air force, and Rocket Force), 

along with combat support units in areas ranging from logistics to spacebased surveillance, in order to conduct complex operational missions. The 

current doctrinal rubric is known as informationized local wars [xinxihua 

jubu zhanzheng, 信息化局部战争], which focuses on executing high-tech, 

integrated joint operations. Key types of campaigns include amphibious 
A Modern Major General

295

assaults, blockades and counter-blockades, joint firepower strikes, and anti–

air raid operations.4 Conducting these types of operations effectively would 

be a key to success in larger campaigns against Taiwan and other regional 

adversaries—and to counter U.S. military intervention in a conflict.

Reforms launched in late 2015 and early 2016 sought to improve China’s joint operations capabilities in several ways. Most prominent was the 

creation of a two-tiered permanent joint command structure, in which the 

Central Military Commission (CMC), aided by a Joint Staff Department 

in Beijing, would oversee operations led by five theater commands (replacing the previous seven military regions), each focused on a specific set of 

regional contingencies. For instance, the Eastern Theater Command (TC) 

would be responsible for operations against Taiwan, while the Northern TC 

would lead operations in the Yellow Sea and on the Korean Peninsula. The 

commanders would have peacetime and wartime control of the ground, 

naval, air, and conventional missile units within their theaters.5

 A related 

goal was rebalancing the services in favor of maritime and aerospace forces, 

which had been greatly outnumbered by the ground forces throughout the 

PLA’s history.6 Joint “enablers” were consolidated in the creation of the Strategic Support Force (responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare) 

and the Joint Logistics Support Force.

Xi and his fellow reformers understood that structural changes would be 

of little value without corresponding human capital reforms, especially in the 

officer corps. The initial reform outline presented at the Third Plenum of the 

18th Party Congress in November 2013 discussed the need to build “new-type 

operational forces” [xinxing zuozhan liliang, 新型作战力量], denoting highly 

qualified personnel with the requisite training and education to succeed in 

modern combat.7 CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang noted that achieving 

this goal would demand changes across the PLA’s human resources system, 

including in the areas of promotions, benefits, and career paths.8

 The formal 

5-year reform agenda unveiled on January 1, 2016, further described the need 

to cultivate “new-type military talent” [xinxing junshi rencai, 新型军事人才], 

requiring improvements in PME, training, and personnel management.9
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

296

Nevertheless, recruiting and retaining higher quality officers (as well 

as noncommissioned officers [NCOs]) would only be a first step. Given its 

operational requirements, the PLA would also need a cadre of officers with 

the specialized knowledge and skills required to understand, plan, and 

carry out joint operations. At a tour of the PLA National Defense University 

(NDU) in March 2016, Xi Jinping stated that the entire PLA must focus on 

“grooming talented personnel in commanding joint military operations, 

a complex and large project involving many factors.”10 Xi reiterated this 

message during a tour of the CMC’s new joint operations command center 

in April 2016, when he called on the PLA to adopt “extraordinary measures” 

to train joint commanders and achieve a “big breakthrough as quickly 

as possible.”11 An accompanying PLA Daily report argued that without 

sufficient progress, “joint operations will be only a slogan, and winning 

battles will be impossible to achieve.”12 These statements indicate that a 

second phase of the current reforms will move beyond changes to PLA 

organizational structure and focus on building the softer skills necessary 

for executing joint operations.13

Earlier Reforms 

Xi’s call for more qualified joint commanders was more an exhortation for 

the PLA to complete unfinished business than a radical innovation. The 

PLA’s overall focus on planning and conducting joint operations did not 

originate with Xi, but rather began in earnest in the 1990s.14 Contributing 

factors included the observation that success on the modern battlefield 

required strong coordination between units from different services, as 

exhibited by the U.S. military during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and the 

deterioration of cross-Strait relations, culminating in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which spurred new thinking on the types of missions the 

PLA must be prepared to conduct to deter Taiwan independence or invade 

and occupy the island if necessary.15 This focus on joint operations led to 

a number of changes in the PME system, personnel management, and the 

training arena.
A Modern Major General

297

PME Reforms 

A series of PME changes were designed to better educate officers in joint 

operational arts. PLA NDU [guofang daxue, 国防大学] was established in 

1985 primarily in order to train senior officers (major generals and rear 

admirals) from all the services, preparing them for command positions.16

Reflecting changes in PLA doctrine, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao called 

for that institution to produce commanders capable of leading joint operations.17 Accordingly, during the 2000s, NDU added content in that subject, 

such as by offering courses in “joint firepower strikes under complex 

electromagnetic conditions.”18 This was complemented by the publication 

of new teaching materials, likely derived at least in part from classified doctrinal sources. For instance, in 2012 and 2013 the PLA Academy of Military 

Science [junshi kexue yuan, 军事科学院]—the PLA’s primary center for 

doctrinal development—released two new teaching volumes designed to 

give students more exposure to joint operations concepts.19

PME reforms also affected lower level service academic institutions 

and military regions. In June 2007, for instance, the former General Staff 

Department spearheaded an effort to promote closer collaboration between 

NDU and the service command academies in the area of joint operations 

instruction.20 Although the details of this program are unclear, the goal 

was likely to introduce joint operational concepts to officers earlier in their 

careers.21 A separate program sponsored by the Shenyang Military Region 

between 2004 and 2009 tried to foster stronger interservice understanding 

and esprit de corps by giving officers the chance to cross-enroll in PME 

institutes outside their home service.22 In addition, the 2010 defense white 

paper noted that the PLA was “laying stress on the training of officers for 

joint operations,” in part by publishing “basic readers” on the subject and 

holding lectures across all branches and services.23

Personnel System Reforms 

Earlier reforms in the personnel system sought to develop human capital on two levels. As a first step, the PLA needed to attract and retain a 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

298

high-quality, educated officer corps from which joint commanders could be 

developed. Post-Mao professionalization of the officer corps began during 

the 1980s, but took new strides in the 1990s with the recruitment of civilian 

college graduates. National defense scholarships were also established at 

civilian colleges in order to attract more highly educated and technically 

proficient personnel, a task complicated by growing opportunities in the 

civilian economy.24 Service academies and command colleges increased 

emphasis on science and technology in their curricula.25 Pay and benefits 

also increased as a way to retain top performers. Salaries doubled for some 

officers between 1999 and 2000, for instance, and perks included subsidized 

housing, new cars, and study opportunities.26

Personnel system changes also tried, in limited ways, to enhance officers’ exposure to different services and provide joint opportunities. Several 

military regions experimented with cross-posting officers to temporary 

assignments in different services during the 2000s. For instance, in 2006 a 

North Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff was temporarily posted as a Nanjing 

Military Region group army deputy commander.27 During the mid-2000s, 

100 officers took part in a Shenyang Military Region program involving 

short-term duty in a different service.28 In addition, a handful of senior 

officers took positions in nominally joint billets, giving them broader (and 

likely career-enhancing) experiences.29 Examples include Ma Xiaotian 

and Wu Shengli’s assignments as deputy chief of the general staff prior to 

assuming command of the air force and navy, respectively, and Ma and 

Song Puxuan’s service as NDU president.30 Joint assignments for lower level 

non–ground force officers, however, were few and far between.

Training Reforms 

Following an overall pattern of increasing complexity and realism in the 

training arena, PLA officers gained more experience in joint training 

during the 2000s and 2010s. Major joint exercises in the early 2000s in the 

Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions focused on Taiwan scenarios, 

while those in the Jinan Military Region focused on problems in command 
A Modern Major General

299

and control, logistics, and other areas.31 Mark Cozad documents the evolution of joint training during the 11th and 12th 5-year plans (2006–2010, 

2011–2015), describing a growing number of joint exercises (for instance, 18 

were held in 2009 alone); a broadening range of subjects, such as war zone–

level command and control, civil-military integration, and air force and 

naval power projection; and, especially during the latter period, increasingly 

realistic conditions, including operations in unfamiliar terrain and “dedicated opposition forces providing more-than-token resistance.”32

The PLA also took steps toward greater standardization and supervision 

of joint training. Perhaps the most important change was the creation of the 

General Staff Department Military Training Department in December 2011. 

Compared to its predecessor organization, the new department was intended 

to focus on not only ground force training but also training across all the 

services. It reportedly included a bureau responsible specifically for joint 

training.33 As part of its oversight of the PME system, the Military Training 

Department also sought to “cultivate talented joint operations commanding personnel” by devising new programs on joint operations at NDU, the 

National University of Defense Technology [guofang keji daxue, 国防科技

大学], and service and branch academies.34 In short, the PLA adopted (or at 

least experimented with) a variety of measures to cultivate joint commanders 

during the tenures of Xi’s two immediate predecessors.

Problems and Proposed Solutions 

Despite these initiatives, weaknesses persisted in the development of joint 

commanders and staff officers. Helping to justify Xi’s focus on improvement 

in this area, a Xinhua report on the newly created Central Theater Command 

headquarters noted that most staff officers were “proficient” in the operations 

of their own services, but joint operations were “rather strange to them. So 

there exists an obvious gap in the capability of taking command of joint 

operations.”35 A senior PLA interlocutor likewise argued in June 2016 that 

deficiencies in talent cultivation meant that it would be “many years” before 

non–ground force officers would be able to exercise command over army 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

300

operations, while army commanders had much to learn about employing 

air and naval assets.36 Some senior PLA officers judged the effort to increase 

jointness by cross-service assignments to be a failure. While a cross-service 

assignment increased the officer’s familiarity with another service, crossposted officers served for too short a time (typically 6 to 9 months) and lacked 

the knowledge to be given substantive command responsibilities.37

PLA sources describe several interrelated factors contributing to this 

situation. First are general weaknesses in leadership and technical skills. Poor 

command skills are reflected in recent slogans such as the “two insufficient 

capabilities” [liangge nengli bugou, 两个能力不够], referring to the inability 

of the PLA to fight, and cadres at all levels to command, modern wars; and 

the “five cannots” [wuge buhui, 五个不会], meaning commanders who cannot judge the situation, understand the intentions of higher echelons, make 

command decisions, deploy forces, and deal with exigent circumstances.38

Lack of technical proficiency is also a commonly cited problem. A human 

resources scholar at the Xi’an Political Academy, for instance, bemoaned the 

fact that while the PLA has acquired “cutting-edge weapons” and equipment, 

it lacks personnel qualified to use many of those systems.39

Second is the lack of “joint” education throughout the PME system. 

One concern is that officers are not receiving adequate joint operations 

content in the NDU course for senior commanders, which is a requisite step 

for high-level command billets.40 Another problem is that, despite earlier 

experiments, service academies below the NDU level lack the experienced 

faculty and curriculum necessary to educate officers in joint operational 

concepts. One PLA command academy commandant lamented that his 

institute was lagging behind in its ability to provide joint education because 

it was still struggling with bringing its students (at the colonel/senior colonel grade) to an acceptable level of proficiency in combined arms (that is, 

intraservice) operations.41 Yet another issue is that command academies 

tend to include students only from a single service, and even then are 

segregated according to branch specialty, reducing the ability of officers to 

interact with colleagues from different services.42
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301

Third are quality assurance and credentialing problems. Generally, 

the PLA continues to face problems such as “weak and out of date courses,” 

instructors that are “out of touch with modern operational requirements,” 

and academic fraud and corruption.43 Certification of officers well beyond 

their actual operational abilities has also been a longstanding problem for 

the PME system.44 Exacerbating this situation is the lack of standardized 

criteria for the selection of joint commanders. One PLA source, for instance, 

contrasts the PLA with the U.S. and other Western militaries, which have 

“strict requirements” under which officers must demonstrate proficiency 

in joint operations (such as through graduation from a joint PME course 

or by serving in a joint assignment) in order to advance.45

Fourth is a continuing paucity of joint operational experience among 

PLA personnel. One hurdle is that few active-duty PLA officers have any 

combat experience; those who do, such as current CMC member Li Zuocheng and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, served in the 1979 border 

war with Vietnam and subsequent skirmishes, which did not involve extensive naval or air force operations.46 A retired PLA flag officer identified 

the lack of combat experience as a significant deficiency and noted that 

efforts to gain experience via assignments to United Nations peacekeeping 

forces and exercises with foreign militaries were of limited effectiveness.47

Although more intensive and realistic operational and joint training likely 

compensates somewhat for limited combat experience, PLA sources continue to suggest constraints on training quality. A report on two 2016 

exercises held in the Northern Theater Command, for example, found that 

jointness was achieved only “in form rather than in spirit . . . on the surface, 

rather than in essence . . . and in might rather than in mind.”48

Fifth is inadequate career incentives for officers to aspire to joint 

assignments in the first place. A useful point of comparison is the U.S. 

military prior to Goldwater-Nichols, in which officers were rewarded for 

excelling within their respective Services and appointment to joint organizations was seen as detrimental to one’s career.49 That problem was only 

rectified when joint assignments (and joint PME) became congressionally 
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mandated requirements for promotion. A 2015 NDU volume suggests that 

a similar problem might be at work in the PLA, noting that most officers 

are not pursuing joint command or staff positions.50 In the PLA Navy, for 

instance, key criteria affecting career prospects included experience at sea, 

overseas experience, education level, participation in party affairs, and personal connections—but not experience in joint positions.51 The incentives 

problem was exacerbated by the lack of opportunities for joint assignments.

Sixth is that the PLA is a relative latecomer in efforts to cultivate 

qualified joint command personnel. One source notes that the PLA did 

not begin focusing on joint operations until after the Gulf War, years 

after the U.S. military began to emphasize joint warfare.52 Another source 

similarly notes that both Russia and the United States began the process 

of training joint commanders in the mid-20th century and argues that 

both countries assessed that it would take 25 years to develop a cadre of 

fully qualified joint commanders. Implicit in this critique is the notion 

that building a joint culture, in which officers look beyond their own 

service’s parochial interests, perspectives, and traditions, can appreciate 

different service viewpoints, and can work effectively across service lines, 

is a generational process. If U.S. experience is a guide, the goal of genuine 

joint consciousness might never be fully attainable. Yet the author concludes that China “does not have 25 years and must adopt extraordinary 

measures” to catch up.53

Given these problems, Chinese analysts have considered various proposals on how to improve human capital for joint operations. One set of 

recommendations centers on strengthening joint operations instruction 

across the PME system. Echoing initiatives sponsored in the mid-2000s, 

one study notes that training for joint commanders cannot be accomplished “all at once,” but needs to be pursued at different stages in an 

officer’s career.54 Pursuing a “multitiered” joint PME system, in which 

instruction would begin as early as the major level, would also bring 

China into conformity with the U.S., British, German, and other advanced 

militaries.55 Other suggestions include curriculum reforms, increasing 
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study abroad opportunities, better integrating PME institutes with joint 

exercises, and creating more online courses to facilitate distance learning.56

Another proposal concerned changes to the personnel management 

system. A 2008 internal-circulation volume published by NDU envisioned 

a “joint specialization” (similar to a U.S. military occupational specialty) in 

which a select group of junior officers would be designated as future joint 

commanders and be provided with relevant experience and education at 

different career point. For instance, between the 15- to 20-year mark in 

their careers, ground force officers would be assigned to joint positions as 

staff officers, then receive intermediate-level combined arms education, 

then take a unit command position within a group army, and then receive 

more advanced joint staff officer instruction. This would culminate with 

appointment as a joint commander at the 35- to 40-year mark. Another 

study argued that promotion criteria for joint commanders needed to be 

clarified and standardized.57

Other suggestions focused on the need for practical experience. The 

2013 Science of Military Strategy broadly argues for deepening joint training and completing a more effective joint training management system.58

A 2016 PLA NDU volume noted that “war is the best crucible for forging 

command talent” but identified several areas in which commanders might 

attain useful experience short of actual conflict, including joint exercises, 

use of computer simulations, combined exercises with advanced foreign 

militaries, and participation in military operations other than war, such as 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, and escort 

duty. Without such real-world expertise, the authors feared that many 

PLA joint commanders would be little more than “armchair strategists” 

[zhishang tanbing, 纸上谈兵].59

Xi-Era Reforms 

PLA human capital reforms after 2015 resulted from three factors: the 

practical imperative to build the requisite talent to plan and lead joint 

operations, the foundation provided by previous attempts to adjust the 
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PLA’s human resources systems to achieve that goal, and assessments of 

why the PLA faced continuing weaknesses in this arena. Even prior to 

the structural changes announced in late 2015 and early 2016, the need to 

adopt corresponding human capital changes was likely weighed by Xi and 

the CMC leading small group on reform, which was established in January 

2014 to lead the process and consider policy adjustments. As CMC Vice 

Chairman Xu Qiliang remarked, the reforms would be a “complex systems 

engineering project,” in which the major elements had to be considered in 

parallel, even if they were announced sequentially.60 By late 2017, the PLA 

had begun to unveil changes to the PME, personnel, and training systems.

PME Reforms 

During his March 2016 visit to the PLA NDU, Xi set the tone for revamping the PME system to better educate aspiring joint commanders, calling 

for new teaching concepts, updated course content, improved teaching 

models, and a stronger faculty.61 That guidance led to several changes. 

First, the NDU senior commanders’ course was restructured so that the 

students, who had previously been grouped together, were divided into joint 

operational command and leadership management tracks. The first group 

focused on joint operations, including through case study analysis and 

briefings on “key issues” facing each of the theater commands. The second 

group, destined for senior-level staff posts (such as in service headquarters 

and CMC departments), placed more emphasis on administrative issues.62

This change was accompanied by an updated syllabus, including six new 

courses in joint operations. According to one PLA NDU professor, 80 to 90 

percent of the course content was new.63

Second, PME institutes directly under the CMC expanded their course 

offerings in joint operations. For instance, PLA NDU created a 10-month 

course to expose lower level officers to joint operations. Launched in the 

2017–2018 academic year, the program was focused on officers at the battalion to deputy regiment leader levels (majors through colonels), and included 

staff officers working in each of the TC headquarters.64 According to PLA 
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media, completion of the program would eventually be a precondition for 

certain theater command billets—a goal that, if implemented, may help to 

resolve problems of standardized credentialing.65 This change coincided 

with the announcement that, as part of a larger realignment of the PME 

system, the PLA NDU would oversee a new joint operations college, which 

apparently succeeded the Shijiazhuang Army Command College (though 

few details on that new organization were immediately available).66 The 

National University of Defense Technology likewise unveiled new courses 

on joint operations intelligence support for TC staff officers.67

Third, lower level service PME institutes placed a new emphasis on 

joint operations. One report noted that the PLA Rocket Force Command 

College had signed a cooperative agreement with five other service command colleges that would allow cross-training of students, broader research 

cooperation, and “sharing of talent resources.”68 That college also introduced new rules stating that more than 60 percent of its Ph.D. students 

would be required to complete dissertations focused on joint operations.69

A PLA service command college commandant also noted that his institute 

had increased focus on joint operations, pointing out a system in which 

student groups would have the opportunity to spend a month at each of 

the other service command colleges.70

Fourth, stronger partnerships were established among PME institutes, 

theater commands, and the services. Although faculty from the PLA NDU 

and other institutes previously had opportunities to lecture and observe 

training in the military regions, PLA media suggested that those relationships had deepened after the reforms. For instance, a report from the 

Western Theater Command noted that in 2016, professors from 10 different 

academies had given lectures or conducted seminars on joint operational 

command, while volumes published by NDU were being used to train 

headquarters staff.71 Another report noted that a single lecture by an NDU 

professor drew more than 1,900 officers from the Southern Theater Command headquarters and service component commands.72 Moreover, PLA 

NDU announced that it would invite commanders and staff officers from 
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the theater commands to give lectures to its students in Beijing, bringing 

insights from the field to the classroom.73

Personnel System Reforms 

Building on previous reforms, changes were also made within the personnel 

system to develop stronger joint commanders. One area involved attempts to 

incentivize high performers. A program in the Eastern Theater Command, 

for instance, matched performance in joint operations study and training 

with incentives including promotions, priority in selecting future billets, and 

other “awards.”74 Likewise, the Southern Theater Command stated that it 

would grant awards, citations, and promotions to officers who had achieved 

satisfactory results on tests measuring aptitude in joint operational command 

skills.75 The impending shift to a system based on ranks, rather than grades, 

may also have the effect of incentivizing joint commanders. According to one 

NDU professor, higher ranks would be reserved for personnel who “directly 

participate in operations,” rather than noncombat positions.76 If the PLA does 

replace the senior colonel rank with a flag-level brigadier general rank, some 

PLA sources have suggested that this rank may be reserved for operational 

commanders and that senior colonels in support roles might be demoted.77

The reforms also expanded opportunities for non–ground force officers to serve in joint positions, especially within the theater commands. 

Key examples include the appointment of a naval officer (Yuan Yubai) and 

an air force officer (Yi Xiaoguang) as commanders of the Southern and 

Central Theater Commands, respectively. Those appointments reflect the 

recognition that naval and air force experience is valuable, and even preferable, in those theaters with heavy maritime and air defense responsibilities. 

Changes also occurred at the theater deputy commander level, in which 

the proportion of non-army officers rose from less than one-third to more 

than one-half post-reform.78 Opportunities for naval, air force, Rocket 

Force, and Strategic Support Force personnel at lower levels are less clear, 

though reports suggest that joint operations command centers are staffed 

with personnel from every service.79
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However, more ambitious changes to the personnel system were still being 

debated in late 2017. PLA interlocutors have described proposals to create a rotational system in which officers are able (and required) to move among theater 

command headquarters, operational units, and CMC departments.80 Some 

evidence that these proposals were making their way into practice was seen in 

2017 with the rotation of 100 Beijing-based officers to western provinces and the 

reshuffling of group army commanders (though part of the rationale for the latter development was likely breaking up patronage networks).81 Establishment of 

a rotational system for officers would represent a significant departure from the 

current system, in which officers spend most of their careers within a single theater. Although it would provide future joint commanders with a broader range 

of experience, rotational assignments would likely be an unwelcome change for 

those officers who benefit from residing in more affluent regions, where their 

families have access to better housing, education, and health care—and who 

choose to remain in the PLA because of those circumstances. These practical 

considerations are a significant obstacle to a more radical transformation of 

the assignment system.

Broader changes to the personnel system could also result in a more 

streamlined and competent officer corps. For instance, changes to the promotion system may encourage greater transparency and competition among 

qualified officers. One early indication was a competition held in the Western 

Theater Command in late 2017, in which 2 officers were selected from a pool 

of 14 applicants to fill open brigade commander positions. The candidates 

were screened through a standard assessment gauging their knowledge and 

command skills.82 A separate, but perhaps related, proposal that has been 

discussed in recent years has been to “civilianize” more of the PLA workforce, 

especially noncombat positions currently filled by officers. This would build 

on previous PLA efforts to contract out some nonessential tasks as part of 

civil-military integration. Discussions with PLA officers indicate that the 

previous civilian cadre [wenzhi ganbu, 文职干部] system is being eliminated 

and that some military positions will become civilian contract positions as 

part of efforts to meet force reduction targets. However, some officers are 
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Sources: Dai Feng and Cheng Yongliang [代烽, 程永亮], “Upgrading Capabilities, Strengthening Skills 

in Joint Operations and Joint Training” [能力升级,练强联战联训过硬本领], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

September 1, 2016, available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/01/content_155319.htm>; 

Li Huamin and Jiang Boxi [李华敏, 姜博西], “Speed Up Training for Joint Operations Command Talent” 

[加快联合指挥人才培训], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 15, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2016-08/15/content_153536.htm>; Yang Danpu and Yang Qinggang [杨丹谱, 杨清刚], “‘Joint 

Forum’ Focuses on Real Combat Capabilities” [‘联合大讲堂’聚焦实战长本事], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

April 16, 2016, available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-04/16/content_141747.htm>; Du 

Shanguo and Shi Liu [杜善国, 石榴], “With This Type of Training, We Will Have Confidence in Future 

Battles” [这样练下去,将来打起仗来心里就有底了], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], April 12, 2017, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-04/12/c_129529922.htm>.

reluctant to move from the active force to civilian positions due to lower 

pensions and reduced benefits.83

Training Reforms 

A final set of reforms aimed to improve the quality of PLA joint training. 

Structurally, the former General Staff Department Military Training Department was replaced with a separate Training and Administration Department 

under direct CMC supervision.84 That department exercises its authority by 

both establishing training standards and conducting inspections of training 

events across the PLA, including “theater command–level joint training,” to 

ensure that standards are being met.85 Inspections completed in early 2017, 

for instance, uncovered violations by 57 units and 99 personnel from all of 

the services and meted out a variety of punishments.86 The department has 

also been involved in setting the content of PME reforms, including reducing 

the number of doctoral students in military academies and redirecting their 

focus to “practical” subjects, such as joint operations.87

Table. Theater Command Training for Joint Commanders and Staff

Theater 

Command (TC)

Example Initiatives/Exercises

Eastern TC Command post exercise involving more than 100 joint operations commanders. 

Southern TC Training class for joint commanders involving lectures from NDU scholars.

Central TC Command post exercise focused on handling an “unidentified air object.”

Northern TC Training courses for headquarters staff involving case study analysis, 

lectures from theater commanders, and external speakers.

Western TC Embedding headquarters staff in field exercises carried out by frontline units.
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Training reforms have also been conducted at the TC level. A key 

focus has been on providing officers with practical training related to joint 

operations. Likely intended in part to demonstrate compliance with directives from Xi and the PLA top brass, each of the theater commands have 

announced relevant on-the-job training programs. Captured in the table, 

these ranged from command post exercises, to lectures, to participation 

in unit-level exercises. A Central TC program, for instance, focused on 

six capabilities junior officers would need to run the theater’s joint operations command center, including drafting documents, marking maps, 

performing calculations, performing data searches, providing support to 

decisionmakers, and using the data link command system.88 A December 

2017 competition of 100 staff officers in the Central TC tested skills ranging 

from relaying orders to assessing adversary threats.89 Based on a similar 

training program, the Eastern Theater Command required personnel to 

pass a “joint duty qualification test” that evaluated officers’ understanding 

of the weapons, equipment, and operational principles of different services.90

Some changes have also started to appear in joint field training. While 

a comparison of pre- and post-reform joint exercises is beyond the scope 

of this chapter, it is worth noting that the shift from military regions to 

theater commands may be instrumental in spurring more intensive joint 

training. Speaking during an air-ground exercise, a Southern TC air force 

officer explained that his service often previously paid only lip service to 

joint training, given weak authorities of the military regions over non-army 

units. Under the new system, theater air forces are more responsive to 

training requirements being set by TC headquarters.91 Theater joint training has also allowed non-army officers to gain experience in commanding 

ground forces. For instance, in October 2016, the East Sea Fleet staged an 

amphibious drill in which the activities of army, naval, and air force units 

were directed by a maritime joint command center.92 The latest iteration of 

the CMC’s authoritative training guidance, promulgated in January 2018, 

also emphasizes joint operations as a focus of training across the PLA.93
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Conclusion and Implications 

The first phase of the reforms announced in late 2015 and early 2016 

involved major changes to the organizational structure of the PLA. These 

included disbanding the four general departments and transferring most of 

their functions into departments within a revised CMC structure; restructuring the seven military regions into five joint theater commands aligned 

against specific regional threats; and removing the operational command 

role of the service headquarters and giving them (including a new PLA 

Army service headquarters) an “organize, train, and equip” mission. These 

shifts were followed by an October 2017 restructuring of the membership 

of the CMC, which eliminated ex officio representation for the service 

chiefs and the heads of the CMC Joint Logistics Department and Joint 

Armaments Department.94 These structural reforms collectively constitute 

a major shift in where power and responsibilities lie within different parts 

of the PLA, which is why they were resisted by vested interests (especially 

the ground forces) for more than a decade. Nevertheless, these “above the 

neck” reforms did not affect the organization of most PLA operational units 

and had only a limited impact on average PLA officers, NCOs, and enlisted 

personnel. For most PLA ground force and air force units, the “below the 

neck” reforms to move to a group army-brigade-battalion structure were 

likely more significant.

However, reforms to address the “software” and human capital problems discussed in this chapter have the potential to be much more disruptive 

for the daily lives of the PLA officer corps. (The reduction of 300,000 personnel—declared to be “basically complete” in March 2018—has also been 

extremely disruptive for the military.) Building a “modern major general” 

capable of commanding integrated joint operations will likely involve significant changes to PLA recruitment and retention policies; to the military 

educational system (at the academy level and throughout the service and 

joint PME system); to the rank/grade, assignment, and promotion systems; 

and to the conduct and evaluation of joint exercises. Put another way, 

these reforms could change who joins the PLA, criteria for promotion and 
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advancement, what a successful career looks like, and what quality of life is 

available for a successful officer and his or her family. They could also have 

a negative impact on the careers of current officers, who were recruited, 

promoted, and assigned using a different set of criteria and incentives.

PLA writings and statements by Xi Jinping and PLA leaders suggest 

that the PLA is aware of a number of deficiencies in its current recruitment, 

educational, personnel management, and training practices that inhibit the 

development of effective joint commanders. Moreover, a wide range of solutions are being discussed, some of which would involve significant reforms 

to longstanding PLA regulations and practices. Some of the reforms, such 

as increasing the joint content of PME courses and increasing interactions 

between the field and schoolhouse, are underway and will be relatively 

easy to implement. Others, such as reforming the grade/rank, assignment, 

and promotion systems, will be much more disruptive to the military as a 

whole and to the career prospects of the current officer corps. The degree 

of difficulty is likely to be even higher because changes in one area affect 

many of the other areas.

Making major changes in a military typically requires making major 

changes in the incentives that ambitious military officers face as they try to 

win promotion and advance to senior leadership positions. But changing 

the incentives and promotion criteria also entails changes in who decides 

which officers will get promoted, and this will undermine existing power 

and patronage networks within the PLA. For example, increasing the joint 

content of PME courses is relatively easy, but making these courses more 

rigorous and having the results of classroom evaluations and performance 

on tests influence promotion decisions take autonomy away from the local 

commanders and political commissars who currently determine promotions. These officers (who have succeeded under the old criteria) are likely 

to argue that proven operational command ability and political reliability 

should outweigh classroom performance.95 The current system where 

officers spend most of their careers within one service and one theater 

up to corps leader grade means that winning the approval of one’s local 
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commanders and political commissars is critical for success. But rotational 

assignments to a different service or outside the theater will loosen these 

bonds; the “new guy” will always be at a disadvantage compared to officers 

who have known and worked for the commander and political commissar 

for a decade or more. The U.S. military seeks to avoid these problems by 

having centralized promotion boards within each Service, which reduces 

(but does not eliminate) the role of patronage in promotions. The PLA could 

potentially adopt such a system, but it would constitute a major change from 

current practice, which is adapted to Chinese culture, Chinese Communist 

Party rule, and the PLA’s own organizational culture and values.

Some of the proposals being discussed suggest focusing resources 

and attention on a subset of junior officers who the PLA believes have the 

potential to be effective joint commanders. (This is already being put into 

practice in a limited way by the NDU distinction between “command” 

and “staff” tracks, although this appears to be based on career fields.) One 

challenge is identifying officers with high potential early enough in their 

careers to steer them into the right mix of joint, educational, and operational assignments to develop well-rounded commanders. The idea of a 

“joint specialization” is envisioned as one vehicle for achieving this goal. 

However, a separate career track also has the potential to be a career ghetto 

if the senior leaders deciding on promotions (currently local commanders 

and political commissars within the officer’s service) value a different set 

of criteria (for example, excellence in command rather than a well-rounded 

set of skills). Moreover, if the promotion system discriminates against 

effective service commanders who are not selected for joint specialization 

early in their careers, it is likely to be regarded as unfair. Some militaries 

have adopted joint staff or general staff systems that constitute a separate 

career track, but these usually involve strategy, planning, or staff functions 

rather than operational command of troops.96 The PLA, like any military, 

will resent and resist a promotion system that does not reward and promote 

its most operationally proficient commanders, even if that proficiency is 

demonstrated primarily in single-service operations.
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This suggests that the success of reforms to the recruitment, education, 

assignment, and promotion systems is interdependent with PLA efforts to 

give operational units more stringent joint training requirements and more 

opportunities to practice and meet those requirements in joint exercises. 

This would create the possibility of a virtuous cycle where company and 

battalion commanders understand how their units fit into joint operations 

(and the benefits of jointness for their ability to carry out their assigned 

missions) and bring that knowledge into PME courses and staff assignments 

in a theater service headquarters or command post. That education and 

experience, in turn, would make them more effective in exercising further 

responsibility at the brigade level and then prepare them for higher level 

joint positions at the theater or CMC level. However, this sort of virtuous 

cycle involves generational change to be fully effective. The PLA leadership 

faces difficult choices in deciding what changes are needed to get from 

here to there and how to keep faith with existing officers and NCOs while 

building the military of the future.

PLA leaders have concluded that cultivating “new-type military talent” is 

necessary to build “new-type operational forces” capable of fighting and winning the informationized wars of the future. This chapter describes some of the 

changes to current PLA recruitment, educational, personnel management, and 

training practices that will likely be necessary. Some aspects of these changes 

are likely to be observable as the PLA decides what to do and promulgates new 

regulations to implement reforms in these areas. However, it will be harder to 

understand precisely how these changes affect the career incentives of PLA 

officers and to assess their cumulative impact. Military-to-military exchanges 

offer a limited but valuable window on the issues the PLA is grappling with, 

but U.S. interlocutors should be careful not to offer the PLA answers to the 

problems it faces. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should expect the 

PLA to engage other advanced militaries, including U.S. allies, in its efforts to 

survey and evaluate the range of potential solutions.97

Building a “modern major general” capable of effectively commanding integrated joint operations is a challenging task that may take the PLA 
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decades to achieve. The PLA assesses that its current efforts fall short of 

the mark and is contemplating significant changes to its recruitment, education, assignment, and promotion systems and training practices. The 

extent to which the PLA is willing and able to change how it does business 

to develop more effective joint commanders—and its ability to “fix the 

plane while flying it”—will be a major determinant in how successful it is 

in realizing the potential combat capability created by PLA investments in 

modernizing its weapons systems and developing joint doctrine.

The authors are grateful to Ian Burns McCaslin for invaluable 

research assistance.

Notes

1 On problems of joint culture, see David T. Fatua, “The Paradox of Joint 

Culture,” Joint Force Quarterly 26 (Autumn 2000), 81–86. Nevertheless, creating 

a common joint culture remains an aspiration. For instance, the U.S. Joint Officer Handbook encourages officers to “foster a joint culture that is not mutually 

exclusive of any one Service culture, but instead advocates all Service cultures and 

leverages the best aspect of each.” Joint Officer Handbook (Washington, DC: The 

Joint Staff, August 2012), 70.

2 For a discussion, see M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: 

‘Winning Informationized Local Wars,’” China Brief 15, no. 13 (July 2, 2015), 

available at <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars/>.

3 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age 

of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications,China Strategic Perspectives 10 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 23–32, available at <inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/

Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf>. 

4 Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,” Journal 

of Strategic Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (2017), 174–179. These campaigns are described at 

length in Dang Chongmin and Zhang Yu [党崇民, 张羽], Science of Joint Campaigns

[联合作战学] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press [中国人民解放军出版社], 

2009); Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National 

Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006), 273–326. For an earlier discussion, see Jianxiang Bi, “Joint Operations: Developing a New Paradigm,” in China’s 
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Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, ed. James C. Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein 

(Arlington, VA: CNA, 2002), 29–78.

5 In practice, this control would be exercised through service component commands and operational command posts in each theater. The precise mechanisms 

that theater commanders use to exercise operational control over conventional 

rocket force units in their theaters remain unclear. See Wuthnow and Saunders, 

Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping, 24–28.

6 Prior to the reforms, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces 

held around 69 percent of all PLA end strength, while the navy, air force, and 

Rocket Force account for around 10 percent, 17 percent, and 4 percent, respectively. 

Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping, 29. As 

of writing, it was unclear whether the size of the navy and air force will increase in 

absolute terms or merely in relation to the ground forces.

7 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 

Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” Xinhua, 

November 12, 2013, available at <www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm>.

8 Xu Qiliang [许其亮], “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National Defense 

and Armed Forces” [坚定不移推进国防和军队改革], People’s Daily [人民日报], 

November 21, 2013, 6.

9 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms” [中

央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua [新华], January 1, 2016, available 

at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

10 Li Xuanling and Wang Yitao [李宣良, 王逸涛], “Xi Jinping: To Achieve 

the China Dream and the Strong Army Dream, Supply Human Talent and 

Knowledge Support” [习近平:为实现中国梦强军梦提供人才和智力支持], 

Xinhua [新华], March 23, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-03/23/c_1118422270.htm>.

11 Wang Wenyue [王文跃], “‘The Most Difficult Battle Preparations’ Cannot 

Be Slowed” [“最艰巨的战争准备”慢不得], PLA Daily [解放军报], May 6, 2016, 

available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/06/content_143686.htm>.

12 Ibid.

13 For an overview of the PLA reform agenda through 2020, see Wuthnow and 

Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping, 49–52.

14 The PLA traces its experience with joint operations to the 1955 battle of 

Yijiangshan, in which air force, ground, and naval units coordinated to land on and 
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occupy Nationalist-held islands off the Chinese coast. However, preparations for 

joint operations were limited during most of the Cold War due to a preoccupation 

with preparing for People’s War, centering on ground force operations.

15 Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations.” For a discussion of Chinese lessons from the Gulf War, see Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from 

the Gulf War,” in Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David 

Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 161–162.

16 Its first president, Zhang Zhen, actively investigated how foreign militaries pursued “joint professional military education” (PME), for instance asking 

detailed questions during visits to the U.S. National Defense University (NDU). 

See Paul H.B. Godwin, “The Cradle of Generals: Strategists, Commanders, and 

the PLA–National Defense University,” in The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, 

Training, and Education in China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, 

and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 322.

17 Jia Yong [贾永] et al., “Record of Jiang Zemin’s Concern for the PLA National 

Defense University Training New-Type Military Talent” [江泽民关心国防大学培养

新型军事人才纪实], Xinhua [新华], December 4, 2002, available at <www.people.

com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20021204/881361.html>; “Record of Hu Jintao’s Attendance at the PLA National Defense University’s 80th Anniversary Celebration” [胡

锦涛主席出席国防大学80周年校庆活动纪实], Xinhua [新华], December 7, 2007, 

available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200712/1207_17_324697.shtml>.

18 Nan Li, “Educating ‘New-Type Military Talent’: The PLA’s Command 

Colleges,” in The “People” in the PLA, 300–301.

19 These volumes were Tan Yadong [谭亚东], ed., Joint Operations Course 

Materials (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press [军事科学院出版社], 2013); 

and Li Yousheng and Wang Youhua [李友生, 王永华], Lectures on the Science of 

Joint Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2012). See the 

chapter by Cozad in this volume. Of note, the PLA NDU also tried to foster greater 

critical thinking among its students through greater use of seminar discussions, case 

studies, and wargaming. How much these techniques were used in the study of joint 

operations, however, is unclear. See Li, “Educating ‘New-Type Military Talent,’” 301.

20 Godwin, “The Cradle of Generals,” 332.

21 Typically, PLA officers only began study of joint operations upon attendance 

at the PLA NDU’s senior command course for major generals and rear admirals.

22 Between 2004 and 2009, 200 officers in the Shenyang Military Region participated in cross-college training, while 100 officers served in a different service. 
A Modern Major General

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See Kevin McCauley, PLA System of System Operations: Enabling Joint Operations

(Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2017), 42.

23 “China’s National Defense in 2010,” Information Office of the State Council, March 31, 2011, available at <www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/

node_7114675.htm>.

24 Thomas J. Bickford, “Searching for a Twenty-First-Century Officer Corps,” 

in Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, ed. David M. 

Finkelstein and Kristen A. Gunness(New York: Routledge, 2007), 176–177. See also 

Kristen A. Gunness, “Educating the Officer Corps: The Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army and Its Interactions with Civilian Academic Institutions,” in Civil-Military 

Relations in Today’s China, 187–201.

25 Author’s visit to Army Command College and Air Force Command College, 2005.

26 Bickford, “Searching for a Twenty-First-Century Officer Corps,” 180.

27 Elizabeth Hague, “PLA Career Progressions and Policies,” in The “People” 

in the PLA, 274.

28 McCauley, PLA System of Systems Operations, 42.

29 However, it is worth noting that the PLA did not have a formal joint assignment system, such as exists in the U.S. military.

30 Kenneth W. Allen, “Assessing the PLA Air Force’s Ten Pillars,” China Brief 

11, no. 3 (February 11, 2011), 5–9, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

assessing-the-pla-air-forces-ten-pillars/>.

31 McCauley, PLA System of Systems Operations, 43. See also Wanda Ayuso 

and Lonnie Henley, “Aspiring to Jointness: PLA Training, Exercises, and Doctrine, 

2008–2012,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy 

Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2014), 171–206.

32 Cozad, “Toward a More Joint, Combat Ready PLA?” 12.

33 Mark Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

General Staff Department: Evolving Organization and Missions,” in The PLA as 

Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: Defense 

Group, Inc., 2015), 156–157.

34 Cozad, “Toward a More Joint, Combat Ready PLA?” 18.

35 Mei Shixiong and Zhao Guotao [梅世雄, 赵国涛], “PLA Central Theater Command Starts Its Work by Energetically Enhancing Joint Operations 

Command Capabilities” [中部战区起步开局大力提升联合作战指挥能力],
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

318

Xinhua [新华], April 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

04/01/c_128857500.htm>. The article also cites the case of Jiang Guo, a staff officer 

at Central Theater Command headquarters, who despite his experience within a 

group army, “feels that he still lacks the capability of using forces of other services 

while being transferred to work in the joint command framework after the founding of the theater command.”

36 Interview, June 2016.

37 Interview, June 2016 and November 2017.

38 See Li Chunli [李春立], “Make Efforts to Break Through the ‘Two Insufficient Capabilities,’” [着力破解 “两个能力不够” 问题], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

December 30, 2014, available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/1230/

c40531-26302150.html>; Yu Qifeng [于启峰], “Start from the Source in Breaking 

Through the ‘Five Cannots’” [破解“五个不会”难题要从源头入手], PLA Daily [解

放军报], October 13, 2015, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-10/13/

content_125880.htm>; Wang, “‘The Most Difficult Battle Preparations’ Cannot Be 

Slowed.” See also Dennis J. Blasko, “Walk, Don’t Run: Chinese Military Reforms 

in 2017,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks.

com/2017/01/walk-dont-run-chinese-military-reforms-in-2017/>.

39 Blasko, “Walk, Don’t Run.”

40 Li Dianren [李殿仁] et al., Study on the Development of Joint Commanding 

Officers [联合作战指挥人才培养] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国

防大学出版社], 2008), 35.

41 Interview with PLA Command Academy commandant, April 2016. For a 

discussion on limited “joint PME” within the PLA Navy, see Kenneth W. Allen and 

Morgan Clemens, The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel

(Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2014), 26.

42 Kenneth W. Allen, “Chinese Air Force Officer Recruitment, Education, 

and Training,” China Brief 11, no. 22 (November 30, 2011), 9–13, available at 

<https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-air-force-officer-recruitment-education-and-training/>. It is worth noting that this situation stands in contrast to the 

U.S. PME system, in which officers are able to attend war colleges outside their 

home Service (for example, naval officers attending the Army War College).

43 McCauley, PLA System of Systems Operations, 42.

44 Bickford, “Searing for a Twenty-First-Century Officer Corps,” 321.

45 Li et al., Study on the Development of Joint Commanding Officers, 38. Based 

on requirements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
A Modern Major General

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Reorganization Act of 1986, credentialing for U.S. joint officers is written into 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code. See 10 U.S. Code § 661—Management Policies for Joint 

Qualified Officers, available at <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/661>.

46 On the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, see Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s 

‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment,” Asian Survey 19, no. 8 (August 

1979), 801–815; Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” The China Quarterly, no. 184, (December 2005), 870–871.

47 Interview with retired PLA flag officer, November 2017.

48 Du Shanguo and Shi Liu [杜善国, 石榴], “With This Type of Training, We 

Will Have Confidence in Future Battles” [这样练下去,将来打起仗来心里就有

底了], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], April 12, 2017, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-04/12/c_129529922.htm>. For a similar diagnosis of joint 

training weaknesses in the former Nanjing Military Region, see Cai Yingting and 

Zheng Weiping [蔡英挺, 郑卫平], “Deeply Absorb Historical Experience from 

the War of Resistance to Make Preparations for Military Struggle More Solid and 

Effective” [深刻汲取抗战胜利历史经验把军事斗争准备抓得更加扎实有效], 

People’s Daily [人民日报], July 3, 2015, available at <http://politics.people.com.

cn/n/2015/0703/c1001-27249242.html>.

49 One U.S. author notes that “in the Navy in the mid-1980s, joint duty was 

considered the ‘kiss of death’; it meant that one’s career was over.” See James R. 

Locher III, “Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval 

War College Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 104.

50 Fang Jiangzhe, View on the Armed Forces Education and Training System 

[军队院校培训体制] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版

社], July 2015), 281.

51 Jeffrey Becker, David Liebenberg, and Peter Mackenxie, Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2013), 107–22. One 

exception was that service as a deputy chief of the general staff became a normal 

avenue for appointment as PLA Navy commander.

52 Li et al., Study on the Development of Joint Commanding Officers, 14. Key 

moments on the U.S. path toward creating a joint force included the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which focused on unified command and control; the 1982 

promulgation of the AirLand Battle doctrine by the U.S. Army; and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which strengthened the authority of the regional combatant commands.

53 Wang, “‘The Most Difficult Battle Preparations’ Cannot Be Slowed.” U.S. 

National War College Professor Cynthia Watson has a more pessimistic assessment 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

320

of the PLA’s chances to bridge this gap, arguing that the “PLA cannot hope to achieve 

in a few short years what has taken the United States decades, and it will need many 

more years of practice and experimentation to absorb the changes and derive the 

benefits of a more Western-style PME.” Bickford, “Trends in Education and Training, 

1924–2007,” in The “People” in the PLA, 41.

54 Li et al., Study on the Development of Joint Commanding Officers, 45.

55 Ibid., 35.

56 McCauley, PLA System of Systems Operations, 41.

57 Liu Wei [刘伟], ed., Theater Joint Operations Command [战区联合

作战指挥] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 

2016), 315.

58 Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press [军事科学院出版社], 2013), 203–204.

59 Liu, Theater Joint Operations Command, 311–315.

60 Xu, “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National Defense and the Armed 

Forces,” 6.

61 Li and Wang, “Xi Jinping: To Achieve the China Dream and the Strong 

Army Dream, Supply Human Talent and Knowledge Support.”

62 Chu Zhenjiang and Luo Jinmu [褚振江, 罗金沐], “Innovating Joint Operations Command Talent, Professionalizing Training Models” [创新联合作战指挥人

才专业化培养模式], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 20, 2016, available at <www.81.

cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-03/20/content_138222.htm>.

63 “PLA National Defense University Trains Fine Commanders for Joint 

Operations,” CCTV-7, March 21, 2016.

64 Huang Panyue, ed., “PLA Aims to Cultivate Commanding Talents for Joint 

Operations,” China Military Online, September 7, 2017, available at <http://eng.

chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-09/07/content_7747234.htm>.

65 Ibid.

66 “PLA NDU Joint Operations College Established, Major General Zhou 

Licun Selected as Political Commissar” [国防大学联合作战学院已组建, 周立存

少将担任学院政委], The Paper [澎湃新闻], August 9, 2017, available at <www.

thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1757313>. 

67 Guo Hongyu and Chen Zhen [果翃宇, 陈震], “Focusing on Tomorrow’s 

Battlefields and Forging Intelligence Crack Troops” [聚焦明日战场砥砺知敌尖

兵], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 3, 2018, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-04/03/content_203092.htm>.
A Modern Major General

321

68 Zhang He and Hu Xiaoqing [张贺, 胡小青], “Command College Seeks to 

Cultivate Teachers’ Joint Operations Instruction Capabilities” [指挥学院着力培养

教员联合作战教学能力], Huojianbing Bao [火箭兵报], June 4, 2016, 2.

69 Ibid.

70 However, it was not entirely clear if this was a new initiative. Interview with 

PLA service command college commandant, June 2016.

71 Yang Xiaobo and Ji Dongsheng [杨晓波, 冀东昇], “Talent Capable of Planning and Studying Operations Swiftly Rising” [谋战研战人才方阵加速崛起], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], November 30, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2016-11/30/content_162918.htm>.

72 Li Huamin and Jiang Boxi [李华敏, 姜博西], “Speed Up Training for 

Joint Operations Command Talent” [加快联合指挥人才培训], PLA Daily [解放

军报], August 15, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-08/15/

content_153536.htm>. See also Mei and Zhao, “PLA Central Theater Command 

Starts Its Work By Energetically Enhancing Joint Operations Command Capabilities”; Dai Feng and Cheng Yongliang [代烽, 程永亮], “Upgrading Capabilities, 

Strengthening Skills in Joint Operations and Joint Training” [能力升级,练强联

战联训过硬本领], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 1, 2016, available at <www.81.

cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/01/content_155319.htm>.

73 Zhang Shibo and Liu Yazhou [张仕波, 刘亚洲], “Strive to Build the 

Highest Military Academy with the World’s Advanced Standards and Chinese 

Characteristics” [努力建设具有世界先进水平和中国特色的最高军事学府], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], April 18, 2016, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/education/2016-04/18/content_4649689_2.htm>.

74 Dai and Cheng, “Upgrading Capabilities, Strengthening Skills in Joint 

Operations and Joint Training.”

75 Li and Jiang, “Speed Up Training for Joint Operations Command Talent.”

76 Lu Xiaolin [卢晓琳], “Military Officer System Reform, Take Off!” [军官制

度改革,走起!], People’s Daily Online [人民网], January 8, 2017, available at <http://

paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-01/08/nw.D110000renmrb_20170108_1-06.

htm>. For a discussion of ranks vs. grades, see Kenneth W. Allen, “China Announces 

Reform of Military Ranks,” China Brief 17, no. 2 (January 30, 2017), 7–13, available 

at <https://jamestown.org/program/china-announces-reform-military-ranks/>.

77 Interviews with PLA sources, December 2016 and November 2017.

78 Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping, 18–19.

79 Ibid., 28.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

322

80 Interviews with PLA interlocutors, 2016–2017.

81 Author interviews, December 2017.

82 “Choosing People through Combat! Western Theater Command 

Fills 2 Brigade Commander Positions through Military Competition of 

14 Officers” [以战选人! 西部战区14名军干比武竞争两个旅长岗位], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], December 11, 2017, available at <http://news.ifeng.

com/a/20171211/54045910_0.shtml>.

83 Interviews, 2016–2017. PLA interviewees indicate that civilian contract positions will not count against the PLA’s post-reduction 2 million 

end-strength.

84 Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping, 31.

85 Ouyang, ed., “CMC Intensifies Supervision Over Military Training,” China 

Military Online, March 21, 2017, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2017-03/21/content_7534230.htm>.

86 Ibid. Punishments included “self-examinations,” publicized criticisms, and 

“discipline punishments.”

87 Zhang Tao, “Chinese Military Academies to Cut Student Enrollment,” 

Xinhua, October 23, 2017, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-

10/23/content_7797090.htm>.

88 Mei and Zhao, “PLA Central Theater Command Starts Its Work by Energetically Enhancing Joint Operations Command Capabilities.”

89 Zhang Kunping [张坤平], “100 Joint Campaign Staff in Martial Competition on the Same Stage” [百名联合战役参谋同台比武竞技], PLA Daily [解放军

报], available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-12/16/content_194521.htm>.

90 Cheng Yongliang [程永亮], “Whether One May Command Joint Operations Requires ‘Certification’” [能不能指挥联合作战, 需要 “考证”了], China 

Youth Daily [中国青年报], February 23, 2017, available at <http://news.sina.com.

cn/o/2017-02-23/doc-ifyavwcv8556596.shtml>.

91 Ouyang Zhimin, Ma Fei, Xiao Chiyu [欧阳治民, 马飞, 肖驰宇], “Joint 

Training Is a ‘Chemical Reaction’” [联合训练是一场“化学反应”], PLA Daily 

[解放军报], February 3, 2017, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/power/2017-02/03/

content_4771337_3.htm>.

92 Liu Zhongtao and Zhou Pengcheng [刘中涛, 周鹏程], “Three Services 

Share Information on the Maritime Battlefield” [海上战场,三军信息互联共

享], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 13, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2016-10/13/content_158800.htm>.
A Modern Major General

323

93 “PLA Publishes New Military Training Outline, Highlights Combat,” 

Xinhua, January 27, 2018, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-

01/27/c_136929690.htm>.

94 See Phillip C. Saunders, “Alternative Models for the Central Military Commission,” China Brief 17, no. 13 (October 20, 2017), available at <https://jamestown.

org/program/alternative-models-central-military-commission/>; Joel Wuthnow 

and Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Military Has a Discipline Problem. Here Is How 

Xi Jinping Is Trying to Fix It,” The National Interest, November 12, 2017, available 

at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-military-has-discipline-problemhere-how-xi-jinping-23163>.

95 Alternatively, if test scores and grades are given greater weight in promotion 

decisions, it would produce incentives for cheating and corruption of the military 

education system.

96 The United States implemented a joint staff structure as part of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, though some have argued for a more comprehensive general 

staff model involving a permanent cadre of professional Joint Staff officers. See, 

for example, Jim Thomas, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

on Defense Reform, Senate Armed Services Committee, November 10, 2015, available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Thomas_11-10-15.pdf>.

97 For an overview of these efforts, see Kenneth W. Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and 

Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 11 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 

2017), available at <ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/

china/ChinaPerspectives-11.pdf>.

PART III

OVERHAULING SERVICES

327

PLA FORCE REDUCTIONS

Impact on the Services

Daniel Gearin

I

n October 2013, during the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, 

President Xi Jinping announced Beijing’s intent to reform the Chinese military, with the decision document adopted at the plenum 

providing a brief overview of the intended reforms.1 These remarks kicked 

off what would become a sweeping reform initiative, the details of which 

were revealed over the next few years and implemented in phases with an 

expected completion date of 2020. This reform program has received a fair 

amount of scholarly attention, which it deserves given the scale and scope 

of change taking place within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).2 A 

subset of the overall reform initiative involves a 300,000-troop reduction, 

announced by Xi in September 2015 at an event honoring the anniversary 

of China’s war with Japan. This reduction, and its impact on the PLA, has 

received much less attention from Western academics.3

The current force reduction initiative, which was “basically completed” by the end of 2017, is the eleventh of its kind in the PLA’s history. 

An examination of past efforts in comparison to the current round of troop 

cuts demonstrates broad commonalities in how the PLA implements the 

force reductions as well as in its stated objectives. The PLA has repeatedly 

CHAPTER 9
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

328

conducted large-scale demobilization in tandem with organizational 

changes, and in almost every case the goals are the same: streamline what 

is perceived as a bloated and inefficient military force, focus reductions 

primarily on noncombat troops, and utilize the force reductions and 

organizational changes to address longstanding cultural problems existing 

within the PLA.4

This chapter briefly examines several past force reduction efforts 

dating back to the 1980s to highlight Beijing’s continued interest in 

creating a military that emphasizes quality over quantity, addressing a 

perceived army-centric bias within the PLA, and reducing the number 

of command and headquarters staff positions to enable more efficient 

command and control and military operations. The current round of 

reductions is no exception, with the bulk of demobilized forces coming from the ground forces and noncombat units. The organizational 

changes taking place in tandem with the force reductions are arguably 

the most serious example to date of Beijing’s intent to overcome the PLA’s 

historical army-centric culture and elevate the relative importance of the 

other military services.

The troop reduction effort and overall military reform should also be 

couched within Beijing’s strategic goals for its military. These goals have 

been relatively consistent over the past several decades and were perhaps 

best encapsulated in remarks by Jiang Zemin in December 1997, as he 

laid out a “three step strategy” [sanbuzou zhanlue, 三步走战略] for modernizing China’s military. This strategy, while vague on details, lays out 

three milestones for the PLA: to lay a solid foundation by 2010, to basically 

accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informationization 

by 2020, and to fully realize an informationized military by the middle of 

the 21st century.5

Xi Jinping’s recent political work report at the 19th Party Congress 

reiterated these broad goals but added an interim milestone and modified 

the third goal. Xi called on the PLA to achieve modernization by 2035 and 

to become a world-class military by the middle of the 21st century.6 While 
PLA Force Reductions

329

these goals are clearly ambitious, outside observers may be struck by the 

relative conservative timelines given the long-period of double-digit growth 

in China’s military budget and the overall pace of military modernization 

over the past two decades. The current force reduction effort falls within 

this larger strategic context, as Beijing believes it is a necessary step to 

achieve these broader military modernization objectives.

Historical Context 

The reductions announced in September 2015 were the latest in a series of 

personnel adjustments that have occurred within the PLA over the past 

several decades. The current force reduction is, again, the eleventh iteration 

in the PLA’s history and the fourth since 1985, with the PLA having shed 

1 million troops in 1985; 500,000 in 1997; and 200,000 in 2003. While the 

context and specific drivers for these changes differed in each case, the 

stated objectives that senior PLA leadership hoped to achieve are notably 

consistent. In general terms, force reductions were aimed at streamlining a 

military force that was viewed as bloated and inefficient. Furthermore, the 

PLA implemented organizational changes in tandem with each iteration 

of force reductions, in an effort to enhance the PLA’s overall operational 

capabilities and tackle lingering cultural issues that were viewed as obstacles 

to further modernization.

China initiated its eighth round of military force reductions in 1985, 

which is a useful starting point for analysis due to the size of the reduction 

and because it was largely in response to changes in China’s threat perceptions and domestic situation. The change in threat perception is perhaps 

captured best in the change made to China’s military strategic guidelines 

at the time. The operating guidance for the military changed from “active 

defense, lure the enemy in deep,” to simply “active defense.” While a seemingly cosmetic change, this shift in jargon embodied a significant change 

in worldview.7

 The removal of the phrase “lure the enemy in deep” reflected 

not only China’s embrace of economic modernization but also its growing 

recognition of the doctrinal shortcomings of “People’s War.” Reform and 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

330

opening up placed economic development as the top priority for China. 

A military strategy of allowing the enemy to seize massive amounts of 

territory, particularly China’s most economically valuable territory, fundamentally undermined this new development strategy.8

Directly related to the elevation of economic development as China’s 

primary national objective was the recognition that the makeup of the 

military at the time was too large, too expensive, and wasted manpower 

that could be better utilized in China’s private sector in order to fuel economic growth. Decreasing the size of the armed forces would also alleviate 

economic pressure on the government, allowing it to allocate additional 

resources to foster private industry and the commercial sector.

An unintended consequence of these changes was the creation of what 

became known as “PLA, Incorporated.” As PLA budgets were slashed and 

as China’s economy began to liberalize, the military and defense industry 

became increasingly involved in the commercial sector in an attempt to 

compensate for the lost income. This change had widespread and lasting 

negative influences on the PLA that Beijing is still attempting to address. 

Corruption within China’s military grew to pervasive levels and large 

sections of the PLA shifted their focus away from honing operational 

capabilities toward economic initiatives. One purpose of the current 

anti-corruption campaign in China is specifically to address the challenges 

brought about by this cultural change.9

The 1985 reforms also reduced the number of military regions (MRs) 

from 11 to 7, disestablished 11 group armies, disbanded over 4,000 division 

and regimental entities, and reduced army units above the corps level by 

31.10 In addition to the desire to streamline China’s military force, reductions and changes made during this time were aimed at emphasizing the 

importance of combined arms within the group armies. Group armies 

gained additional subordinate units that provided combined arms capabilities, including antiaircraft artillery, artillery, amphibious tanks, signal 

regiments, and engineering units. Training and exercises at the time also 

shifted to reflect this focus, taking on a more combined arms character.11
PLA Force Reductions

331

The reductions were carried out gradually over a couple years, with 

almost half of the goal of demobilizing 1 million soldiers achieved by 

December 1986 and the reduction basically completed by April 1987.12

Overall this represented a 25 percent cut to the overall size of China’s military, with the bulk of troops coming from China’s ground forces.

A common target for force reductions across each iteration of reform 

included cuts to headquarters and staff personnel at all echelons of the 

PLA, decreasing the ratio of army personnel relative to the other services, 

adjustments to the ratio between officers and enlisted, and eliminating 

noncombat personnel. The 1985 iteration halved the number of personnel 

within the PLA’s general departments, and the navy, air force, and Second 

Artillery all experienced growth in terms of both personnel and budget.13

The 1997 iteration of force reductions was intended to shed an additional 500,000 troops from the PLA. These reductions deactivated an 

additional three group armies and over a dozen infantry divisions, with 

many of these personnel transferred to the People’s Armed Police.14 Additionally, the 500,000 troops demobilized included over 200,000 officers, 

building on a theme established during the 1985 reductions of addressing a 

perceived imbalance between the number of officers and enlisted personnel 

within the PLA.15

The 1997 iteration also included significant organizational changes to 

the PLA to address problems inadvertently created by the previous force 

reduction initiative. Specifically, it was at this time that Beijing began a 

serious effort to divest the PLA from its involvement in private industry. 

By 1997, the PLA was believed to be involved in over 15,000 enterprises, 

totaling over $10 billion annually.16 While some of this revenue was used 

to maintain and improve military installations and equipment, most of it 

is thought to have been siphoned off to line the pockets of individual officers, creating a culture of graft and corruption that Beijing is attempting to 

deal with to this day. To address this problem, Beijing provided sustained 

increases to the PLA’s annual budget and made organizational changes 

meant to manage and rein in the military’s reach into private industry.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

332

In 2003, the PLA initiated its tenth troop reduction, demobilizing 

an additional 200,000 personnel over a 2-year period and disbanding an 

additional three group armies.17 Consistent with the previous reduction 

initiatives, the 2003 iteration focused primarily on noncombat units within 

the ground force, and emphasized the removal of “lower quality” units 

in an effort to bolster the overall operational capability of the PLA. Once 

again, Beijing implemented organizational changes around the same time 

as the force reduction that appeared to be specifically aimed at addressing 

the army-centric culture within the PLA. Notably, it was in 2004 that the 

navy, air force, and Second Artillery commanders were added to the Central 

Military Commission (CMC), a symbolic step toward greater joint representation on China’s highest military body.

Unlike the 1997 iteration, none of the demobilized ground troops 

was transferred to the People’s Armed Police, thus representing a more 

genuine reduction to China’s security forces. This round of reductions 

again centered on streamlining higher echelon units, which was partly 

accomplished by the disbandment of the headquarters and associated 

staff of three group armies. Furthermore, several divisions and brigades 

under these group armies were dissolved, while others were transferred 

to the reserve force.18 A similar method of implementation is taking place 

currently within the PLA.

Current Iteration 

Although Beijing’s public commentary on the purpose of force reductions 

cites the effort as evidence of China’s peaceful intentions and benefit to 

regional security, the actual objectives are likely strikingly similar to the 

historical examples detailed above. China’s Ministry of National Defense 

acknowledged that the troop cuts were primarily designed to optimize 

the PLA’s scale and structure in order to make it a more capable and efficient fighting force, and the primary target for demobilization once again 

involved troops with outdated equipment, headquarters staff, and noncombat personnel.19
PLA Force Reductions

333

Changes to the Top 

Official figures on the number of personnel working within the highest 

echelons of China’s military are difficult to come by. However, the reforms 

made a number of changes to the Central Military Commission and its 

subordinate entities. Although Beijing was probably able to trim some 

excess personnel from the CMC as a result of reform, outside observations 

of the organizational changes to these entities suggest that personnel were 

mainly shifted from one organization to another, rather than removed from 

the military entirely.

The Joint Staff Department, formerly known as the General Staff 

Department (GSD), probably experienced a large amount of change as 

a result of reform, shedding a number of second-level departments with 

responsibilities that fall outside the purview of operations or that fit better in some of the newly created organizations. Specifically, the GSD 

previously had responsibility for ground force operations that did not 

fall under the MR structure, to include army aviation and special forces. 

These departments were almost certainly transferred to the newly created 

army headquarters.

Similarly, the GSD’s well-known third and fourth departments (the 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau and Electronic Countermeasures 

Bureau) were absorbed by the newly created Strategic Support Force (SSF), 

which is responsible for all information operations in the post-reform PLA 

structure. These include space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic operations, 

in addition to the “three warfares” (psychological, media, and legal).20 The 

actual reduction of personnel resulting from this change is probably negligible. Instead, the SSF is likely to see organizational growth in the coming 

years rather than a reduction. Placing all entities within the PLA that have 

a responsibility for information operations—which had previously been 

dispersed across several entities—under a unified command is likely to 

improve China’s capabilities in this new warfare domain.

Other changes to the CMC involved the creation of new organizations, 

which may suggest a force increase rather than a decrease, but these entities 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

334

all existed previously in some form within the PLA. In most cases, these 

organizations were subordinate entities to the previous CMC departments 

and were merely given new names and subordination. For instance, the 

Science and Technology Commission appears to be primarily comprised of 

former General Armaments Department organizations, and the Discipline 

Inspection Commission is made up of entities previously under the General 

Political Department.

The changes to the CMC are important and worthy of discussion, but 

the direct impact of the 300,000-force reduction on China’s top military 

organization appears to be minimal. The changes instead appear to align 

with Xi Jinping’s model for building a “strong army,” with his emphasis 

on having a military that listens to the Communist Party’s command, is 

capable of fighting and winning wars, and strictly maintains discipline. The 

fact that the leaders of the CMC Political Work Department, CMC Joint 

Staff Department, and CMC Discipline Inspection Commission are the 

only CMC department heads to have positions as CMC members reflects 

these priorities.

Military Regions to Combat Theaters 

Below the level of the CMC, at the theater echelon, is where the PLA was 

probably most able to achieve some significant personnel reductions. Similar to earlier force reduction and reform efforts, the latest round of reform 

included the removal of some military regions. The Jinan MR was broken 

up and distributed to the newly created Northern Theater and Central 

Theater, while the Lanzhou MR was disestablished and its subordinate units 

absorbed within the Western Theater. Similar to the 2003 force reduction, 

the elimination of MR headquarters staff and their associated MR air force 

headquarters staff provided an opportunity for actual personnel reductions. 

However, it remains unclear how much of the overall staff was removed 

from the military vice transferred to other entities.

The theater command (TC) structure that resulted from reform has 

interesting operational implications. Chinese state media have noted that 
PLA Force Reductions

335

the newly created theater commands align to China’s “strategic directions” 

[zhanlüe fangxiang, 战略方向]. While rarely enumerated in public forums, 

we can infer the general focus areas from the five TCs that were created, 

which include Taiwan and Japan, the South China Sea and South East Asia, 

India, the Korean Peninsula, and the defense of Beijing.21

The consolidation of the former Chengdu MR and Lanzhou MR into 

a single theater command aligned operational planning for a contingency 

with India under a unified staff. However, the retention of both the Xinjiang 

Military District and the Xizang (Tibet) Military District indicates that 

some degree of bifurcation remains below the theater level.22 These two military districts each border an area of territorial dispute with India in Aksai 

Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, which perhaps necessitates their continued 

existence as military districts. The tensions between China and India in the 

Doklam region in the summer of 2017 provided Beijing an opportunity to 

test and assess the new command organization and its ability to deal with 

a crisis.23 While it is difficult to determine the operational impact of the 

consolidation of command and control from media reporting, the change 

appears to be a step in the right direction for the PLA, at least conceptually.

Similarly, the Jinan MR and its subordinate entities were broken up and 

distributed between the Northern and Central theaters. Historically, Jinan 

MR has served as the PLA’s strategic reserve, and would deploy its subordinate forces to other military regions to support any emerging military 

contingency. The newly created Central Theater absorbed the former Jinan 

MR 54th Group Army and probably carries forth the mission of strategic 

support to the surrounding military regions in the event of a conflict.

Elimination of Group Armies 

As part of the force reduction, the PLA reorganized 84 corps-level entities. 

In April 2017, Beijing officially confirmed what had been rumored for 

several months—that five group armies within China’s ground forces had 

been disbanded.24 The 13 remaining group armies all received new unit 

designators (from 71st to 83rd) that aligned with the new theater structure 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

336

and served as a symbolic break from the tradition and history of the PLA 

ground forces. The full extent of these changes is not yet clear. Similar to 

past instances of eliminating group armies, it appears that the headquarters 

offices have been disbanded but that many of the subordinate units have 

either been transferred to other remaining group armies or remain in a 

state of transition.

Of the five group armies that were eliminated, one came from each of 

the former seven military regions except for Guangzhou and Nanjing MRs, 

possibly representing the continuing operational importance of preparing 

for military conflict with Taiwan (a contingency for which the Guangzhou 

and Nanjing MRs had primary responsibility). While the elimination of 

five group armies represents a reduction in the number of combat troops, 

the total impact remains unclear. The group armies selected for elimination were arguably among the less capable and in possession of more 

outdated equipment.

Force Structure Adjustments 

The PLA appears to have utilized this round of force reductions to implement force structure adjustments that have been under way for several 

years. For the ground force, this includes the wider trend of converting 

existing divisions and regiments into brigades. The brigade structure is 

meant to facilitate greater mobility and modular capabilities, a theme 

highlighted within the PLA for several years now (see the chapter by Blasko 

in this volume). Since at least 2009, the PLA has stressed the need for the 

ground force to be capable of rapid deployments, which it has practiced in 

a series of exercises including Stride [kuayue, 跨越] and Mission Action 

[shiming xingdong, 使命行动].25 The purpose of these exercises is to develop 

the ability of ground units to rapidly deploy anywhere on China’s periphery 

to respond to emerging contingencies; the shift to a brigade structure that 

is accompanying the force reduction is also meant to facilitate this change.

In addition to the continued transition to a brigade structure, the 

ground force is increasing its aviation and special forces units across the 
PLA Force Reductions

337

army. Of the remaining 13 group armies, there is increasing evidence that 

the ultimate goal is to have at least one army aviation brigade and one 

special forces brigade under every group army. This is another example 

of a trend that has been under way for several years, but Beijing appears 

to be utilizing reform and force reductions to force through changes that 

may have otherwise taken longer to implement. Both army aviation and 

special forces are viewed as key elements to the army’s future concept of 

operations, which the PLA generally refers to as “three-dimensional” or 

“multidimensional” assault [liti tuji, 立体突击].

In contrast to the army, the other services within the PLA are likely 

experiencing a force increase rather than a decrease. This trend also predates the current round of reform and is a component of a longstanding 

effort to reduce the army-centric focus of the PLA to the relative benefit 

of the other services. Official personnel figures for the PLA in the 2012 

white paper break out to 850,000 in the army; 235,000 in the navy; and 

398,000 in the air force. The figure for the Rocket Force is left unstated, 

but most unofficial figures put it at around 130,000 personnel. If accurate, 

that leaves approximately 687,000 troops within the 2.3-million-member 

PLA unaccounted for. That figure probably consists of civilian cadre 

[wenzhi ganbu, 文职干部] and noncombat troops, in addition to other 

unidentified personnel.26

Absent updated official figures, the post-downsizing personnel ratios 

within the PLA breakout are a matter of speculation. That said, the PLA 

Navy and to a lesser extent the PLA Air Force and Rocket Force are poised 

to experience potential growth in personnel end strength. This is evident 

from the PLA’s announced prioritization of the maritime domain, as outlined in Beijing’s 2015 white paper on military strategy. Furthermore, 

the establishment of a new marine corps headquarters and a rumored 

increase from two marine brigades to six hold true may produce a significant increase to the size of the navy.27

If the increase in the number of marine brigades proceeds as predicted, 

one possibility that would both accommodate the force reduction plan and 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

338

allow for more rapid establishment of mission capable units would involve 

the transfer of existing ground force units over to the navy. The units 

currently within the PLA Army with amphibious capabilities would make 

logical sense for such a transfer. However, this would represent a significant 

change to the historical missions of the army and marine corps, particularly 

with respect to combat against Taiwan, which the army sees as one of its 

most important missions. Recent PLA marine exercises featuring a diverse 

set of climates suggest a potentially evolving role of the marine corps to one 

that features more expeditionary missions.28

Other than rumors about additional marine brigades, the PLA reforms 

and force reductions have had a relatively minor impact on the navy compared to the other services. The three fleets that existed prior to the creation 

of the geographically focused theaters still exist and retain their previous 

names, unlike the rebranding and flag ceremonies that have occurred 

elsewhere with the PLA. It is unclear at this stage whether this is an interim 

step with wider changes to be expected in the coming years, or if the PLA is 

generally satisfied with the navy’s modernization pathway and will continue 

with established plans (see the chapter by Burns McCaslin and Erickson 

in this volume).

The PLA Air Force is experiencing a number of substantial changes to 

its force structure, primarily as a result of the reforms rather than through 

force reductions. As with the army, the air force has utilized the force 

reductions and reform initiative to implement longstanding aspirational 

force structure adjustments. In particular, the air force has continued its 

own conversion of division and regimental units into brigades, which began 

several years previously but appeared to have stalled. The air force brigades 

are designed to provide more modular capabilities at the operational level 

through the creation of brigades with subordinate units with dissimilar 

aircraft, compared to the past structure that featured entire divisions containing essentially the same operational capability.

The PLA Rocket Force is the most difficult of the services to get 

direct information on through open sources. However, it appears that 
PLA Force Reductions

339

all six operational missile bases that formerly existed within the Rocket 

Force’s predecessor, the Second Artillery, have been retained, albeit with 

new numerical designations. This is noteworthy due to the mismatch 

between the missile bases and number of theaters, suggesting that the 

Rocket Force has not fully been aligned under the theater structure. This is 

further evident in the apparent absence of any Rocket Force leaders among 

the theater deputy commanders.29 (See the discussion of the relationship 

between the Rocket Force and theater commands in the chapter by Logan 

in this volume.)

Similar to the situation with the navy, the reason for this apparent 

disconnect is unclear, and it may represent an interim phase with plans 

for a broader overhaul of the Rocket Force in the future. However, in the 

meantime, the changes to the Rocket Force have been largely symbolic, 

with the formal elevation of the organization to a service, while it had been 

effectively treated as such for several years previously. Unlike the ground 

force, there is little indication within the Rocket Force of structure changes 

or unit transfers. However, like the army, the Rocket Force has been issued 

a new set of military unit cover designators, possibly reflecting a new set of 

true unit designators as well.

Conclusion 

The broad objectives of China’s military force reduction and overall reform 

effort are consistent with the strategies and goals outlined in numerous 

official pronouncements dating back several decades. Although these 

objectives may not be surprising, this does not diminish their significance. 

Indeed, the consistency by which Beijing approaches its overall military 

modernization effort speaks to the level of importance and determination 

associated with this effort. We can conclude that China is sincere when it 

announces goals such as becoming a world-class military by the middle of 

the 21st century and that Chinese leaders are taking the necessary steps and 

making the required investments to achieve these objectives within their 

self-imposed timeline.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

340

Overall, Chinese military force reductions have focused on streamlining the PLA, enhancing cross-service interoperability, eliminating 

a culture that favors the ground forces, and emphasizing qualitative 

improvement of the force over quantitative measures. The 2-million-person military that will exist after the completion of this round of reforms 

will still be among the largest in the world, indicating that reform and 

force reductions will likely continue beyond the current eleventh iteration. 

Indeed, while many of the changes taking place within the PLA today 

are preparing China to become a more capable and effective regional 

military power, a number of additional changes will likely be required 

as Beijing shifts from seeking to accomplish its regional ambitions to a 

more global orientation.

Notes 

1 “CPC Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms” [中共中

央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua [新华], November 15, 2013, 

available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm>.

2 Christina Garafola, “People’s Liberation Army Reforms and Their Ramifications,” RAND blog, September 23, 2016, available at <www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/

pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html>; David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts 

on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA, CNA China Studies (Arlington, VA: 

CNA, January 15, 2016), available at <www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U012560-Final.pdf>; Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reform 

in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China Strategic 

Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 2017), available at <http://

ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf>; and David M. Finkelstein, Get Ready for the Second Phase of Chinese 

Military Reform, CNA China Studies (Arlington, VA: CNA, January 2017), available 

at <www.cna.org/cna_files/PDF/DOP-2017-U-014677-Final.pdf>.

3 For a discussion on the resettlement process for demobilized People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and its impact on society, see John Chen, “Downsizing 

the PLA, Part 1: Military Discharge and Resettlement Policy, Past and Present,” 

China Brief 16, no. 16 (October 26, 2016); and John Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, 

Part 2: Military Discharge and Resettlement Policy, Past and Present,” China Brief
PLA Force Reductions

341

16, no. 17 (November 11, 2016). Also see the chapter by Ma Chengkun and John 

Chen in this volume.

4 Dong Zhaohui, “China Releases Guideline on Military Reform,” Xinhua, 

January 1, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

china-military-news/2016-01/01/content_6840068.htm>; and “CPC Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reform.”

5 China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: State Council Information Office 

of the People’s Republic of China, January 20, 2009), available at <www.china.org.

cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm>; also see Huang Weimin [黄伟民], 

“A Scientific Guide to Advancing Military Reform with Chinese Characteristics: 

Experience in Studying Jiang Zemin’s Collected Works” [推进中国特色军事变

革的科学指南: 学习《江泽民文选》的体会], August 31, 2006, available at <http://

politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/4762395.html>.

6 “China to Build World-Class Armed Forces by Mid-21st Century,” Xinhua, 

October 18, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/18/content_33403375.htm>.

7 For an analysis of changes and adjustments in China’s military strategic 

guidelines, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining 

China’s Changes in Military Strategy,” International Security 42, no. 3 (Winter 

2017/2018), 37–83.

8 Wang Junwei, “A View of Our Nation’s Military Strategic Guidelines Choices 

and Inspiration Based on the Development of Our National Security Interests,” 

Party Literature, May 20, 2013.

9 Andrew Scobell, Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests of 

Asia’s Socialist Soldiers, East-West Center Occasional Papers No. 3 (Honolulu, HI: 

East-West Center, January 2000); Dean Cheng, “The Business of War: The Impact of 

‘PLA, Inc.’ on Chinese Officers,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010), 94–96.

10 “Army to Serve China’s Modernization,” China Daily (Beijing), December 

26, 1986.

11 “Accelerate Our Military’s Pace Toward Fewer but Better Troops,” PLA 

Daily (Beijing), October 17, 2008.

12 “PLA Progress in Streamlining, Restructuring Continues,” Xinhua, December 25, 1986; “PLA Streamlining, Reintroduction of Ranks,” Xinhua, April 5, 1987.

13 Tu Chenxi [屠晨昕], “An Exclusive Interview with Major General Xu 

Guangyu: Performing Arts Troupes Bear the Brunt of Force Reduction” [本端专

访徐光裕少将:裁军文工团首当其冲], Zhejiang Xinwen [浙江新闻], September 3, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

342

2015; and He Youwen and Sun Weishuai [何友文, 孙伟帅], “Chen Zhou, Research 

Fellow of the Academy of Military Science, Interprets the PLA Downsizing of 

300,000 Personnel” [军事科学院研究员陈舟解读裁军30万], China Military Online 

[中国军网], September 10, 2015.

14 The 1985 reduction resulted in the deactivation of Shenyang Military Region’s 

(MR’s) 68th Group Army (GA), Beijing MR’s 66th and 69th GAs, Lanzhou MR’s 19th 

GA, Jinan MR’s 46th GA, Wuhan MR’s 43rd GA, Nanjing MR’s 60th GA, Fuzhou 

MR’s 29th GA, Guangzhou MR’s 55th GA, Kunming MR’s 11th GA, and Chengdu 

MR’s 50th GA. In 1997, the PLA deactivated Shenyang MR’s 64th GA, Beijing MR’s 

29th GA, and Jinan MR’s 67th GA, providing the PLA with a total of 21 GAs.

15 “Three Rounds of Disarmament after Reform and Opening Up,” Xinhua, 

July 18, 2007.

16 Andrew Tanzer, “The People’s Liberation Army, Inc.,” Forbes, March 

24, 1997, available at <www.forbes.com/forbes/1997/0324/5906044a.html#66f22e0c303f>; see also Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Entrepreneurial Army (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

17 The GAs disbanded in the 2003 force reduction included the 24th GA and 

63rd GA from the Beijing MR and 23rd GA from the Shenyang MR.

18 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation 

for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 75.

19 “Defense Ministry Holds Press Conference on V-Day Parade, Cut of Troops’ 

Number,” China Military Online, September 3, 2015.

20 For a discussion of the Strategic Support Force, see the chapter in this volume by John Costello and Joe McReynolds; see also Benjamin Frohman and Daniel 

Gearin, “China’s Strategic Support Force: Seeking Dominance in the ‘High’ and 

‘New Frontiers’ of National Security,” paper presented at the National Bureau of 

Asian Research, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Pacific Command, and Department 

of the Army conference on the PLA, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 21–23, 2016, 7.

21 Wang Hongguang, “Former Nanjing Military Region Deputy Commander: 

The Korean Peninsula Has Historically ‘Dragged China Down,’” People’s Daily

(Beijing), October 8, 2013.

22 “Tibet Military Region Gamba Barracks: Please Rest Assured about the 

Motherland!” Xinhua, September 17, 2015.

23 Sanjeev Miglani and Ben Blanchard, “India and China Agree to End Border Standoff,” Reuters, August 28, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/

us-india-china/india-and-china-agree-to-end-border-standoff-idUSKCN1B80II>.
PLA Force Reductions

343

24 Wang Shibin [王士彬], “Xi Jinping Receives the Newly Adjusted and Established 84 Corps-Level Officials and Issues Orders” [习近平接见全军新调整组建

84个军级单位主官并发布训令], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 18, 2017, available at 

<http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7567108.htm>.

25 Wu Kelei, “A Certain Brigade of the 80th Group Held ‘STRIDE-2017 

Zhurihe’ Mobilization Meeting” [第 80 集团 军某旅举行 ‘跨越—2017•朱日和’ 出

征誓师动员大会], PLA Daily, August 24, 2017; Cai Pengcheng, “More Than 40,000 

People from the PLA Took Part in ‘Mission Action-2013’ Exercise on the 10th” [解

放军 4 万余人 10 日起参加 ‘使命行动-2013’ 演习], PLA Daily, September 10, 2013.

26 The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, April 16, 2013), available at <http://en.people.

cn/90786/8209362.html>.

27 Minnie Chan, “As Overseas Ambitions Expand, China Plans 400 Percent 

Increase to Marine Corps Numbers, Sources Say,” South China Morning Post (Hong 

Kong), March 13, 2017.

28 Zhang Tao, ed., “Chinese Marines Kicks Off Exercise Jungle-2015,” China 

Military Online, September 16, 2015, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2015-09/17/content_6686394.htm>.

29 “China’s Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands,” 

Xinhua, February 1, 2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-

02/01/c_135065429.htm>.

345

THE BIGGEST LOSER IN 

CHINESE MILITARY REFORMS

The PLA Army

Dennis J. Blasko

S

ince 2004, the army officially has been listed in second place for development behind the other services in China’s People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA). Accordingly, the army’s progress toward its modernization 

objectives has been slower and perhaps less effective than the more technical services. Nonetheless, because of China’s huge landmass and despite 

undergoing a 55 percent decrease in manpower from 1997 to 2018, the army 

remains the largest service in the PLA.

China’s changing international environment and strategic realities 

resulted in the 2015 defense white paper’s announcement that the “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great 

importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”1

 This perhaps was the final blow to 

the army’s traditional status of being first among the services.

To contribute to maritime and joint campaigns beyond China’s borders, as well as protect China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, over the 

past decade the army has concentrated on developing “new-type combat 

forces,” including army aviation, light mechanized, special operations, and 

digitalized (cyber/information/electronic warfare) units. It has restructured 

CHAPTER 10
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

346

its organization by mostly abandoning the former Soviet model and seeks 

to make the combined arms battalion the “basic combat unit” capable of 

independent actions on the battlefield. It has radically refined its training 

program to make exercises more realistic to develop both modern combined arms and joint capabilities that have never been tested in battle. Still, 

its forces routinely come in second in their own red-on-blue exercises.

Though it now looks like a modern army with new uniforms and 

equipment, PLA leadership recognizes major shortcomings in the capabilities of many units and some of its combat leaders and staff officers. With 

maritime threats now dominating Chinese defense planning, the army’s 

new capabilities likely will play a supporting role in future joint maritime 

or aerospace campaigns. As such, for the benefit of all the PLA, second best 

is good enough for the army at this stage of the force’s development.

Introduction 

Between the technological display of the First Gulf War and the series of 

military exercises during the 1995–1996 Taiwan imbroglio, the senior Chinese military leadership—led by Jiang Zemin, Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen, 

Zhang Wannian, and Chi Haotian—outlined the general parameters for 

the continued modernization of the PLA, a process begun in the late 1970s. 

The force was to become smaller but more technologically advanced with a 

greater focus on threats from the sea. With a new maritime emphasis, naturally the PLA Navy and aerospace forces (air force and Second Artillery) 

would be strengthened. Nonetheless, as a continental nation, the PLA Army 

would still be important and continue to be modernized, albeit without the 

same sense of urgency as the other services.

By the late 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party leadership, Chinese 

government, and Central Military Commission (CMC) increased the speed 

and scope of PLA modernization with many years of double-digit annual 

percentage increases to the defense budget, even as the PLA underwent multiple manpower reductions. When President Jiang announced the 500,000 

personnel reduction in 1997, the total size of the PLA was about 3 million, 
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

347

with an estimated 2.2 million in the army, 265,000 in the navy, 470,000 in 

the air force, and 90,000 in the Second Artillery, with an official defense 

budget of less than $10 billion U.S. dollars.2 The army acquired its “biggest 

loser” status when it was cut by 18.6 percent (amounting to over 400,000 

people), while the navy, air force, and Second Artillery suffered only 11.4, 

12.6, and 2.9 percent cuts, respectively.3

The 2004 Chinese defense white paper declared that priority of development went first to “the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and 

[to] strengthen [the PLA’s] comprehensive deterrence and warfighting 

capabilities.”4 The 2013 defense white paper announced that “China is a 

major maritime as well as land country,”5 but more ominously for the army, 

the 2015 white paper stated:

The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the 

seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It 

is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force 

structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime 

rights and interests, protect the security of strategic [sea lines of 

communication] and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support 

for building itself into a maritime power.6

As part of the 300,000-man reduction and the new tranche of reforms 

announced in late 2015, according to its first commander General Li Zuocheng, the army now accounts for less than half of the 2 million active-duty 

force (which implies an army numbering less than a million personnel, 

though no specific figures for any service have yet been announced).7

The army likely will see its size, influence, and status diminish further 

throughout the remainder of the PLA’s three-step modernization strategy, 

scheduled for completion in 2049.8

 At the 19th Party Congress in October 

2017, Xi Jinping modified the three-step strategy, calling on the PLA to 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

348

achieve mechanization by 2020; the modernization of military theory, 

organization, personnel, and equipment by 2035; and to become a worldclass military by the middle of the 21st century.9

The PLA’s greatest overall challenge will be the shift in collective mindset required to actually become a modern military capable of both land and 

maritime operations, not simply modifying its organizational structure. 

Changes of this magnitude are not measured in years, but in decades and 

generations. Yet with 14 land neighbors and the threat of transnational terrorism and extremism, a capable but smaller army is still essential to protect 

the Chinese mainland, deter Taiwan independence, and provide support 

to maritime campaigns or other joint operations beyond China’s borders. 

To accomplish these missions, the army is developing and expanding “new 

types of combat forces” [xinxing zuozhan liliang, 新型作战力量].

This chapter examines the army’s new leadership structure, its evolving 

order of battle, recent training and deployments, new logistics arrangements, 

and changes in doctrine and the education system. Throughout the chapter, 

evaluations of PLA capabilities and shortcomings published by its own military media are highlighted. In general, the senior PLA leadership is skeptical 

of the ability of its operational commanders and units to accomplish successfully the wartime missions they could be assigned and understands that much 

work remains to be done to improve operational readiness.

The Army’s New Headquarters and Leadership 

The overall level of our military power system lags behind the world’s

military powers. In particular, the Army’s modernization is 

relatively backward. Some problems are rather prominent. 

It is necessary that we downsize and optimize its structure,

 innovate its form, and strengthen its functions.10

—PLA Army Commander Li Zuocheng

Under the PLA’s old organization, the four General Departments served as 

the national-level army headquarters and something of a joint staff for all 
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

349

the PLA. The CMC, with its own small staff, exercised command of most 

operational army units through the four General Departments to the military regions (MRs). Within an MR, group armies (GAs) and some military 

districts (MDs)—specifically Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan, and the Beijing Garrison—commanded most operational army units (a few specialized units 

fell under the General Staff Department). MDs also directly commanded 

provincial army reserve units and army border defense units through military subdistrict (MSD)/garrison headquarters. MDs further commanded 

militia units through People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) found 

below MSD/garrison level. MRs directed many logistics units through 

joint logistics subdepartments scattered throughout the country, while the 

Wuhan Rear Base and Qinghai-Tibet Depot were controlled by the General 

Logistics Department.

With the dissolution of the four General Departments, many senior 

army generals saw the scope of their responsibilities and bureaucratic clout 

diminish considerably with the expansion of the CMC bureaucracy to 15 

functional departments, commissions, and offices. For example, General 

Fang Fenghui, the first chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department (prior to 

his removal on suspicion of bribery), oversaw a much smaller organization 

than in his former role as Chief of the General Staff. The leaders of the three 

other General Departments also saw important elements of their organizations transferred to other parts of the CMC or to army headquarters. 

Likewise, the newly created Strategic Support Force, commanded by Gao 

Jin, a former Second Artillery general, assumed responsibility for national-level cyber, electronic warfare, and space operations, which previously 

were overseen by mostly army officers in the General Staff and General 

Armament Departments and contributed further to lessening the army’s 

parochial dominance.

When the four General Departments acted as the army service headquarters, the army, by default, held a higher status than the navy and air 

force. After the creation of the national-level army service headquarters 

[lujun lingdao jigou, 陆军领导机构] in Beijing with a grade of theater leader, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

350

the army now has a status equal to the other three services, including the 

upgraded Rocket Force.11 Unlike his service counterparts at the time, the 

first army commander, General Li Zuocheng, was not made a member of 

the CMC. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, the composition of the 

new CMC was announced, and none of the service commanders was given 

a seat on the CMC. Li was named chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department 

and became a CMC member. General Han Weiguo, previously the Central 

Theater commander, succeeded Li as commander of the PLA Army; Lieutenant General Liu Lei remained as the army political commissar (PC).12

As a service headquarters, the new army headquarters must coordinate 

with the CMC structure for “construction/army building” purposes as well 

as with the five theater leader grade joint theater commands (TCs) for operational functions. Therefore, the army headquarters staff organization must 

be able to interface with both the CMC and TC headquarters structures. 

The army headquarters staff structure, as currently known through official 

media reporting, is listed below (over time greater granularity is expected):

Army Discipline Inspection Commission [陆军纪委]

■	 Discipline and Supervision Bureau [陆军纪委纪律检查局].

Army Staff Department [陆军参谋部]

■	 Operations Bureau [陆军参谋部作战局]

■	 Training Bureau [陆军参谋部训练局]

■	 Arms Bureau [陆军参谋部兵种局]

■	 Army Aviation Corps Bureau [陆军参谋部航空兵局]

■	 Administration Bureau [陆军参谋部部队管理局] 

■	 Border and Coastal Defense Bureau [陆军参谋部边海防局]

■	 Planning and Organization Bureau [陆军参谋部规划与编制局]

13

■	 Subordinate Work Bureau [陆军参谋部直属工作局].

Army Political Work Department [陆军政治工作部]

■	 Organization Bureau [陆军政治工作部组织局]

■	 Propaganda Bureau [陆军政治工作部宣传局]
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

351

■	 Cadre Bureau [陆军政治工作部干部局]

■	 Soldier and Civilian Personnel Bureau [陆军政治工作部兵员和文职

人员局]

■	 Art Troupe [陆军政治工作部文工团].

Army Logistics Department [陆军后勤部]

■	 Procurement and Supply Bureau [陆军后勤部采购供应局]

■	 Transportation and Delivery Bureau [陆军后勤部运输投送局]

■	 Health Bureau [陆军后勤部卫生局]

■	 Finance Bureau [陆军后勤部财务局].

Army Equipment Department [陆军装备部]

■	 Maintenance and Repair Support Bureau [陆军装备部维修保障局]

■	 Aviation Equipment Bureau [陆军装备部航空装备局].

While the Army Staff Department and Political Work Department have 

adopted the names found in the new CMC organization, the Logistics and 

Equipment Departments probably will not change to current CMC nomenclature as the CMC Equipment Development Department does not appear 

to be responsible for overseeing equipment repair and maintenance as the 

General Armament Department was.14

The establishment of the five joint theater commands required the 

formation of a new level of command for the army: the TC army headquarters [zhanqu lujun jiguan, 战区陆军机关], each of which is a theater 

deputy leader grade organization. The new TC army headquarters are the 

same grade as the TC navy headquarters/three fleets and the TC air forces, 

successors to the former MR air forces.

These TC service headquarters are important links in the chain of 

command from operational units up to their service headquarters in Beijing (for construction) and to the regional joint TC headquarters (for joint 

operations). However, instead of streamlining the old command chain from 

MRs to group armies, the TC army headquarters actually adds a new link, 

no matter how necessary, in the operational chain of command. The five TC 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

352

army headquarters, not the joint TC headquarters themselves, have direct 

command responsibility for operational army units located in the TC’s area 

of responsibility. Operational units have a single chain of command going 

only to their TC army headquarters. To facilitate communications up to 

both TC and army headquarters and down to their subordinate units, a 

communications support brigade is directly subordinate to each TC army 

headquarters.15 The primary relationship of operational army units to the 

TC army and not the TC is reflected by the fact that all TC army units wear 

the generic army patch, whereas previously army units assigned to an MR 

wore the shoulder patch of their specific MR.

TC army commanders and PCs also serve as deputy commanders and 

deputy PCs for the theater. As seen in table 1, the headquarters for each TC 

army is located some distance from the TC headquarters (therefore, we can 

assume the PLA has confidence in its videoconferencing capabilities and/or 

the TC and TC army headquarters have assigned liaison officers to each other). 

TC army headquarters have been assigned four main missions, serving as:

■	 a campaign headquarters [zhanyi zhihui bu, 战役指挥部] for combat 

operations

■	 a component of the theater joint command post [zhanqu lianzhi de 

zucheng bufen, 战区联指的组成部分]

■	 a construction headquarters [jianshe zhihui bu, 建设指挥部] for routine leadership and management

■	 an emergency response headquarters [yingji zhihui bu, 应急指挥部] 

for any of the nontraditional security tasks they must conduct.16

Each newly established TC army headquarters was assigned a commander and PC. As is the normal pattern, most commanders served in a 

single MR (their primary MR) until promotion to group army commander 

and potential transfer to another MR/theater. PCs were more likely to have 

served in more than one MR and in different types of units throughout 

their career. As Saunders and Wuthnow note in chapter 13, the commander 

and PC of each TC army headquarters came from different geographic 
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

353

locations and likely did not know each other well. Over the course of the 

following year (into 2017), 5 of the 10 new TC army commanders and PCs 

were transferred out of their assignments. Chinese media did not provide 

explanations for the reassignments. Perhaps these officers knew from the 

beginning that they would be placeholders in their new positions, or perhaps the early reporting of their assignments was wrong. A New York–based 

Web site reported that Northern TC army PC Xu Yuanlin was dismissed for 

disciplinary reasons, but this has not been confirmed.17 Table 1 identifies 

the new leaders and indicates which leaders have been replaced.

Table 1. Theater Command Army Leaders

TC HQ–Location TC Army HQ 

Location

Commander

(Primary MR/

Previous MR/TC)

PC

(Primary MR/

Previous MR/TC)

Eastern TC–

Nanjing

Fuzhou Qin Weijiang [秦卫江]

(Beijing/Nanjing)

Liao Keduo [廖可铎] (Beijing/

Beijing)

Southern TC–

Guangzhou

Nanning Zhang Jian [张践]

1

(Guangzhou/Eastern TC)

Bai Lu [白吕] (Nanjing/

Chengdu)

Western TC–

Chengdu

Lanzhou He Weidong [何卫东]

2

(Nanjing/Nanjing)

Xu Zhongbo [徐忠波] (Jinan/

Jinan)

Northern TC–

Shenyang

Jinan Wang Yinfang [王印芳]

3

 

(Beijing/Central TC)

Shi Xiao [石晓]

4

 (Chengdu/

Lanzhou)

Central TC–Beijing Shijiazhuang Fan Chengcai [范承才]

5

 

(Chengdu/Southern TC)

Zhou Wanzhu [周皖柱]

6

(Nanjing/Nanjing)

Key: HQ: headquarters; MR: military region; PC: political commissar; TC: theater command.

1

 Original commander Liu Xiaowu [刘小午] (Guangzhou/Guangzhou).

2

 Original commander He Qingcheng [何清成] (Lanzhou/Lanzhou).

3

 Original commander Li Qiaoming [李桥铭] (Guangzhou/Guangzhou).

4

 Original political commissar Xu Yuanlin [徐远林] (Jinan/Lanzhou).

5

 Original commander Shi Luze [史鲁泽] (Beijing/Beijing); Second Commander Zhang Xudong [张旭

东] (Shenyang/Northern TC).

6

 Original political commissar Wu Shezhou [吴社洲] (Guangzhou/Jinan).

Of the original commanders, only Li Qiaoming was assigned to a new 

theater; the other commanders all had familiarity with their subordinate 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

354

group army commanders and PCs and extensive operational knowledge 

of the conditions in their areas of responsibility. Conversely, all of the PCs 

were transferred to new theaters from their last assignments. Until evidence 

emerges that they purchased these new posts or otherwise obtained them 

through corruption or connections, it seems likely that these leaders were 

selected for their past performance in operational leadership assignments 

(primarily as unit commanders, deputy commanders, chiefs of staff and 

political commissars, and directors of political departments) throughout 

their careers. None of them served primarily in the local command chain 

from MSD/garrison to MD (though Qin and Shi had served as MD commanders after rising through group army assignments).

As could be expected, several TC army leaders worked with each other 

at various points in their careers.18 Insights into the thinking of several new 

commanders and PCs can be found in interviews they have given recently 

or articles they have written. For example, then-army Commander Li 

Zuocheng and PC Liu Lei wrote in February 2016, “In particular, the modernization condition of the Army remains relatively backward, with the 

issues of the ‘Two Inabilities’ and ‘Two Large Gaps’19 existing prominently. 

This has become a shortcoming that restricts the building of a modern 

military power system with Chinese characteristics.”20

The solutions they proposed were the same as what Li had previously 

outlined (as seen in the epigraph that begins this section of the chapter), 

which, unsurprisingly, are consistent with the current reform agenda. 

The fact that both critiques identify concerns about the PLA’s operational 

leadership capabilities is a criticism made frequently in the official media. 

Liao Keduo, Eastern TC army PC, reiterated many of the same issues in an 

important August 2016 article, noting that the PLA must find its own way 

to reform in order to narrow the gap between it and other militaries. The 

army must solve contradictions and problems that have existed for a long 

time and gradually [zhubu, 逐步, a term used frequently by PLA leaders] 

change from being a “following runner to a side-by-side runner [and] 

eventually to a lead runner.”21
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

355

Perhaps the most important and scathing critique of “some” PLA leaders is known as the “Five Cannots” [wuge buhui, 五个不会], which has been 

prominent in the military literature since early 2015. “Some commanders” 

[bufen zhihuiyuan, 部分指挥员]:

■	 cannot judge the situation

■	 cannot understand the intention of higher authorities

■	 cannot make operational decisions

■	 cannot deploy troops

■	 cannot deal with unexpected situations.22

Changes in organization, training, and education are aimed at solving leadership problems at all levels of the PLA. Part of the solution is to decrease the 

responsibilities of theater commanders and their staffs (by relieving them of 

responsibility for day-to-day administration [construction] requirements) 

and to assist battalion commanders by increasing the size of their staff.

Unlike the former MR structure, the TCs and TC army headquarters 

do not control the local headquarters chain of command from MD to MSD/

garrison to PAFD, which is responsible for conscription/demobilization as 

well as command of PLA reserve and militia units. Command of the military districts and below has been assigned to the CMC’s National Defense 

Mobilization Department, with the significant exception of the Beijing 

Garrison and Tibet and Xinjiang MDs, which fall under the “management” 

of the national-level army headquarters.23 Each of these three organizations 

is responsible for sensitive regions in China, command substantial combat 

forces, and have therefore been given the higher organizational grade of 

theater deputy leader compared to the other MDs that hold army leader

grades. The higher grade means that these three headquarters cannot be 

overseen by the National Defense Mobilization Department, which also 

is a theater deputy leader grade organization. This arrangement probably 

means that operational combat units in Beijing, Tibet, and Xinjiang report 

to the TC army headquarters in the area where they are assigned, who then 

reports to army headquarters in Beijing.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

356

Sheng Bin, director of the CMC National Defense Mobilization 

Department, has stated that MD headquarters serve in five capacities:

■	 headquarters/command department for emergencies and combat 

[yingji yingzhan de zhihui bu, 急应战的指挥部]

■	 military affairs department for the local Party committee [difang 

dangwei de junshi bu, 地方党委的军事部]

■	 construction department for reserve forces [houbei liliang de jianshe 

bu, 后备力量的建设部]

■	 conscription department for the government at the provincial level 

[tong ji zhengfu de bingyi bu, 同级政府的兵役部]

■	 coordination department for military-civilian integration [junmin 

ronghe de xietiao bu, 军民融合的协调部].24

Conspicuously absent from this list of responsibilities is the supervision of border and coastal defense units. It appears that command of 

the PLA’s border and coastal defense units is being shifted to the command of TC army headquarters, with MD headquarters no longer in the 

chain. One report from Heilongjiang states that border defense units are 

being transferred to army command and a separate report indicates that 

coastal defense units in Shantou have been transferred to army command.25

Throughout the country, except in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, 

border defense brigades have been formed from former border defense 

regiments.26 Some new border defense brigades have been reinforced with 

new units and equipment and are responsible for areas extending over 

multiple provinces.27 Consolidating multiple border defense regiments 

into a single brigade will allow for a reduction in the total number of staff 

officers required to support the same number of troops.

Both army headquarters in Beijing and TC army headquarters have a 

Border and Coastal Defense Bureau/Division [bianhaifang ju/chu, 边海防

局/处] within their respective staff departments that oversee the border and 

coastal defense units stationed on China’s borders. Furthermore, a report 

has stated that a Guangdong Reserve Division has been transferred to the 
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

357

army, which would be a change from the previous command arrangement 

where MDs commanded reserve units.28 However, no mobilization staff 

organizations have been identified (to date) in either army headquarters in 

Beijing or TC army headquarters to oversee reserve unit activities.

According to unofficial reporting, provincial MD headquarters have 

been changing their organizational structure to include only commanders, 

PCs, and their deputies, while losing the former political, logistics, and 

armaments staff elements.29 This is noteworthy in that several officers 

named for corruption have come from the MD system, and the reduction in 

Figure. Old and New Group Army Structure

2017 PLA Reformed Group Army Structure

Group Army Headquarters

Six Combined 

Arms Brigades

Artillery Brigade

Air Defense Brigade

Special Operations Brigade

Army Aviation Brigade

Engineer & Chemical

Defense Brigade

Service Support Brigade

Two to Five Infantry

Divisions/Brigades

Group Army Headquarters

One Armored

Division*/Brigade

Artillery Brigade†

Special Operations

Brigade/Regiment‡

Air Defense Brigade

Army Aviation

Brigade/Regiment‡

Reconnaissance

Battalion

Engineer Regiment

Chemical Defense

Regiment/Battalion

Communications

Regiment§

Logistics/Armament

Units

Post-Reform Group Army Structure

May 2017 and after (13 Group Armies)

Pre-Reform Group Army Structure

April 2017 (18 Group Armies)

*The 38th Group Army (GA) had an armored division.

†1st/42 GAs also had a long-range rocket brigade.

‡SOF/Army aviation units in some group armies. 

§A few grop armies were also assigned an electronicountermeasures brigade or regiment.

Note: Prior to reform, only two GAs had similar structure. 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

358

the MD staff therefore may be an attempt to decrease the number of officers 

who may succumb to local temptations. Moreover, army officers are no 

longer the only ones who can command MD headquarters; in April 2017, in 

a first for the PLA, an air force major general was assigned as commander 

of Henan MD.30 It is likely that many officers to be demobilized will come 

from this MD-MSD/garrison-PAFD chain of command.

At this time, this command structure appears to be overly complex and 

the details of how all these headquarters interact have yet to be explained 

fully to the outside world. The PLA has given itself until 2020 to work out 

the kinks in its new command structure.31 Further modifications and 

adjustments are likely.

Army Order of Battle 

Force structure remains irrational; there are too many conventional 

units and not enough new types of combat forces. The proportion of 

various arms is not balanced; officers are out of proportion to enlisted 

personnel. Weapons and equipment are relatively backward.32

—Eastern Theater Army Headquarters Political Commissar 

MG Liao Keduo

The PLA Army was assessed to number about 1.6 million personnel prior 

to the 300,000 force reduction. That figure was more than 25 percent 

smaller than the estimated 2.2 million before the 1997 (500,000-man) and 

2003 (200,000-man) force reductions. If, as alleged, the army now numbers less than half of a total PLA force of 2 million, the service indeed has 

been the biggest loser in personnel strength as a result of current reforms. 

To reach this bookkeeping milestone of dropping 600,000 personnel from 

the army’s rolls, it is likely the personnel who still wear army uniforms 

but are assigned to the CMC staff, TC headquarters, Strategic Support 

Force, and new Joint Logistics Support Force are not counted against army 

end strength to better balance personnel among the various services and 

forces. This appears to be the case, as personnel assigned to each of these 
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

359

new organizations wear their new units’ distinctive chest badges and 

arm patches instead of the generic army badge and patch worn by those 

in operational army units.

The 2013 defense white paper defined “new types of combat forces” 

to include “army aviation troops, light mechanized units, and special 

operations forces [SOF], and . . . digitalized units.” It noted the army 

is “gradually making its units small, modular, and multifunctional in 

organization so as to enhance their capabilities for air-ground integrated 

operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults, and special operations.”33 These trends have been clearly evident in the army’s changing 

order of battle for several years.

The 2013 white paper further revealed that 850,000 (over half) of army 

personnel were assigned to “mobile operational units,” such as the 18 group 

armies and independent divisions and brigades. In early 2017, the number 

of operational maneuver army units assigned to group armies and independent units was estimated to include a total of approximately 21 divisions (20 

infantry and 1 armored), 65 combat brigades (48 infantry and 17 armored), 

12 army aviation units (7 brigades and 5 regiments), and 11 SOF units 

(9 brigades and 2 regiments). Additionally, some divisions and brigades 

were assigned smaller SOF units of battalion level or smaller.34 Maneuver 

units were supported by a variety of artillery, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, and other units. Of the 18 group armies, only 2 had similar 

compositions of infantry and armored units. All others were uniquely 

configured, as were the independent combat units assigned to the Beijing 

Garrison Command, Xinjiang MD, and Tibet MD. The remainder of the 

army—some 700,000 personnel— therefore included nearly everybody in 

the four General Departments; MR, MD, MSD/garrison, and county-level 

PAFD headquarters; border and coastal defense units; and noncombatant 

personnel assigned to logistics/equipment support units and to the army 

portion of the PLA system of academies and universities.

A year after the “below-the-neck” reforms [bozi yixia gaige, 脖子以下

改革] began in April 2017, the number of group armies has been reduced 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

360

to 13, their organization standardized and renumbered (from 71 to 83); 

the number of combat divisions has been cut to 6 (4 in the Xinjiang MD, 1 

in the Central TC, and 1 in the Beijing Garrison), and 15 former divisions 

were transformed to two brigades each; and all combat brigades have been 

transformed into combined arms brigades [hecheng lu, 合成旅], and their 

number increased to about 82 (including three brigades in Tibet MD and 

1 in Hong Kong).

Under the new standardized organization, each group army consists of six combined arms brigades and six supporting brigades, one 

each artillery, air defense, army aviation (or air assault [kongzhong tuji 

lu, 空中突击旅]), SOF, engineer and chemical defense [gongbing fanghua 

lu, 工兵防化旅], and service support brigade [qinwu zhuyuan lu, 勤务

支援旅] (see table 2). Based on Chinese media reports, combined arms 

brigades probably are designated either as heavy (armor or mechanized 

infantry) or light (light mechanized or mountain) and are assessed to 

command four combined arms battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, 

an artillery battalion, an air defense battalion, an engineer and chemical defense battalion, a communications battalion, a combat or service 

support battalion, and a guard and service company. Xinjiang and 

Table 2. Army Transregional Exercises, 2016

Stride-2016 

[跨越-2016] (Zhurihe)

Firepower-2016 

[火力-2016] 

(Qingtongxia)

Firepower-2016 

[火力-2016] 

(Shandan)

Eastern TC Part A: 10th Armored 

Brigade (1st GA)

Part A: Artillery Brigade 

(31st GA)

Part D: Air Defense 

Brigade (1st GA)

Southern TC Part D: 40th Mountain 

Infantry Brigade (14th GA)

Part E: Artillery Brigade 

(41st GA)

Part E: Air Defense 

Brigade (42nd GA)

Western TC Part C: 9th Armored 

Brigade (47th GA)

Part B: Artillery Brigade 

(21st GA)

Part A: Air Defense 

Brigade (47th GA)

Northern TC Part B: 77th Motorized 

Infantry Brigade (26th GA)

Part C: Artillery Brigade 

(39th GA)

Part B: Air Defense 

Brigade (26th GA)

Central TC Part E: 196th Motorized 

Infantry Brigade (65th GA)

Part D: Artillery Brigade 

(54th GA)

Part C: Air Defense 

Brigade (65th GA)

Key: GA: group army; TC: theater command.
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

361

Tibet MDs continue to have a nonstandard structure in which both MD 

headquarters directly command combat units and a variety of support 

units, in many ways similar to a group army structure. In total, these 

various types of support brigades number about 87 (including those 

found in Xinjiang and Tibet). New combined arms battalions [hecheng 

ying, 合成营] are formed based on their primary branch (either tank 

or infantry) with reconnaissance, artillery (firepower), engineer, and 

support companies or platoons.35

Below-the-neck reforms have resulted in a significant increase in the 

number and size of new-type combat forces, such as army aviation and 

SOF units. Currently, each group army and the Xinjiang and Tibet MDs 

are assigned an army aviation brigade, for a total of 15. To form these new 

brigades, aircraft and personnel were transferred from the seven former 

brigades and five regiments and new equipment and people added. It is 

likely that not all army aviation brigades are at full strength, and new 

units will require a year or two to reach operational proficiency. Likewise, the previous 9 SOF brigades and 2 regiments have been expanded 

to a total of 16 SOF brigades by adding additional personnel to existing 

units and transforming other types of personnel and units to become 

SOF. Significantly, Xinjiang MD appears to have added a second SOF 

brigade in 2017 by combining elements of a divisional reconnaissance 

unit and the previously existing SOF brigade to form a new brigade 

stationed in Nanjiang.36

The army appears to have transformed one motorized infantry 

brigade in Shandong and multiple coastal defense units in Fujian and 

Shandong into four new marine brigades. As a result of the creation of 

these four new units, when added to the two previously existing marine 

brigades in the South Sea Fleet, it is likely there are now a total of six 

marine brigades, with two assigned to/located in each TC navy.37

Over time, additional details of changes to the army’s order of battle 

probably will be discovered through continuing analysis of media reports.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

362

Army Equipment and Battalion Staff Developments 

Many military units are still upgrading equipment; the problem 

of new and old equipment “three generations living under one roof”

 is relatively prominent.38

The total number of personnel in operational combat and combat support 

units (for example, infantry, armor, artillery, SOF, army aviation, engineers, electronic/cyber warfare, and chemical defense) is probably about 

half that of the late 1990s. Today’s smaller force is being equipped with 

new uniforms and personal equipment, newer tanks, armored fighting 

vehicles, artillery (both towed and self-propelled), helicopters, unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs), small arms and crew-served weapons, and other 

support equipment and electronics. Due to the size of the force and the 

relatively limited production of new equipment by the Chinese defense 

industries, equipment modernization has been a long, drawn out process. 

However, reflecting the army’s lower priority for modernization, all army 

units do not necessarily receive the best equipment the Chinese defense 

industries can produce.

Specifically, in 2016 China Daily reported that the Type-96B main 

battle tank—not the more advanced and expensive Type-99 series—has 

been selected to be the “backbone of China’s tank force,” replacing most 

older models. This appears to be supported by current inventory numbers 

suggesting that the second best tank has been judged to be sufficient for 

the most likely ground contingencies the PLA may encounter in coming 

decades. The China Daily report also stated the PLA had “more than 7,000 

tanks in active service, including about 2,000 Type-96s and Type-96As, 

as well as about 600 Type-99s and Type-99As, so the majority of the PLA 

armored force is still equipped with tanks made several decades ago.”39

Those 7,000 tanks included five types of main battle tanks (Types 59, 79, 88, 

96, 98/99), each with variants and three types of light tanks (Types 62 and 

63A and ZTD-05). In 2018, the Military Balance counted a total of 6,740+ 

main battle tanks, with 3,390 of the Type 96/98/99 series, just slightly above 
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half the total inventory.40 Type 96–series tanks account for 37 percent of the 

force, with Type 98/99 series at 13 percent.

It is not unusual for up to 10 types and variants of a single category of 

equipment, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting 

vehicles, to be found in the army and other services. The large number of 

variants and types of similar equipment complicates training, maintenance, 

and repair, especially when units go to the field. The Chinese refer to this 

condition as “three generations under one roof” [sandai tongtang, 三代同

堂]. Xi’s goal of achieving modernization of equipment by 2035 probably 

seeks, in part, to minimize this situation by eliminating weapons and equipment produced from the 1960s to 1980s and increasing the proportion of 

newer models throughout the entire PLA.

New weapons and technologies allow army units to move faster over 

more difficult terrain, including bodies of water; shoot farther and faster; 

and integrate their capabilities with those found in the other services more 

than ever before. Army commanders now have a variety of means to attack 

opponents out to 150 kilometers beyond their frontlines, including longrange multiple rocket launchers and artillery, attack helicopters, SOF teams, 

nonlethal electronic warfare and possibly cyber weapons, and supporting 

PLA Air Force aircraft and armed UAVs. They are supported by an ever-expanding array of ground, air, and space reconnaissance and surveillance 

capabilities to locate and identify potential targets. Such new capabilities, 

however, require new types of staff procedures and decisionmaking to select 

the appropriate weapons for various targets. These developments, along 

with massive amounts of data now available from advanced computer and 

communications technologies, have stressed commanders and staff in units 

at all levels, especially at battalion-level headquarters.

One of the most important lessons the army has learned in the past 

decade is that battalion commanders do not have sufficient staff to command and control combined arms operations. Recent reporting indicates 

that units are adding a deputy battalion commander, a battalion master 

sergeant [yingshi guanzhang, 营士官长], chief of staff [yingcan mouzhang, 
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营参谋长], and four staff officers or noncommissioned officers [canmou, 

参谋] (NCOs) to assist the battalion commander and political instructor. Though the exact composition of the battalion staff may not yet be 

finalized, it appears that the following types of staff personnel have been 

determined as necessary:

■	 an operations and reconnaissance officer [zuozhen canmou, 作侦参谋]

■	 artillery/firepower and engineering officer [paogong canmou/huoli 

canmou, 炮工参谋/ 火力参谋]

■	 information and communications officer [xinxi tongxin/tongxin canmou, 信息通信/通信参谋]

■	 support officer [zhanqin canmou, 战勤参谋].41

No discussion has been found, however, concerning how many assistants 

each of these staff officers/NCOs would need in order to conduct 24-hour 

operations for extended periods. Standardizing these changes throughout 

the army will require formal modification to battalion structure and changes 

to the professional education and training system to prepare both officers 

and NCOs for these new responsibilities.

The distribution of staff responsibilities described above was seen in a 

recent report about a command information system [zhihui xinxi xitong, 指挥

信息系统] set up in 2016 in the former 20th Group Army. Previously, existing 

information systems in its various subordinate units, such as infantry, armor, 

artillery, and air defense, were incompatible, and commands had to be issued 

separately to the units. To communicate directly with its subordinate units, 

the headquarters set up a command information system composed of “one 

network, four chains” [yiwang silian, 一网四链]: the command basic network, 

command and control chain, reconnaissance and intelligence chain, firepower 

chain, and logistics and equipment support chain.42 The four staff functional 

responsibilities at battalion level would mesh seamlessly into such a system, 

which would also be found at the intervening division and brigade levels.

Fewer units and personnel mean that it will take fewer new weapons 

and equipment to modernize the force. Nonetheless, the army is still so 
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large (more than twice the size of the active-duty U.S. Army) that all units 

cannot be equipped at the same time. Though the current reforms are 

geared to solve previously identified problems, new shortcomings are 

discovered with nearly each deployment of new equipment and in every 

round of field training.

Recent Training and Other Deployments 

Solving the “Five Cannots” and improving command combat capabilities 

is an urgent task in strengthening training and preparing for war.43

The PLA acknowledges that there is “a large gap between the PLA’s level of 

training and the requirements of actual combat,” which is a major contradiction in its modernization process.44 Increasing the level of realism in all 

PLA training by reducing formalism and cheating has been a perennial goal 

for decades and is frequently enunciated by the most senior PLA leaders.45

As indicated by this typical assessment found in a 2016 PLA Daily staff commentator article, though the force has made some progress, the general level 

of advanced, integrated joint operations capabilities is lacking and more 

must be done to overcome the force’s deficiencies: “Through development 

over the past more than 10 years, substantial progress has been made in our 

military’s system-of-systems building. Yet, the overall system-of-systems 

operational capability remains rather weak. In some aspects, defects and 

weaknesses are still quite obvious.”46

As an institution, the PLA correctly identifies the crux of the training 

problem to be a leadership problem at all levels, especially at battalion level 

and above. They often use the formula “In training soldiers, train officers 

[or generals] first” [lianbing xian lianguan/lianbing xian lianjiang, 练兵

先练官/练兵先练将] to focus on the necessity of training commanders 

and their staffs to command and control both joint and combined arms 

operations.47 That slogan underscores the problems of “some leaders” in the 

previously mentioned formulaic assessments known as the Two Inabilities 

and Five Cannots.
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As Zhang Xudong, former commander of the 39th Group Army, wrote 

in July 2016, the PLA is a latecomer in conducting modern joint operations; 

its theory and practice are not yet mature.48 For the past decade, the PLA 

has been seeking to push command of joint operations down to division 

and brigade levels [bingtuan, 兵团] and to enable modularized [mokuaihua, 

模块化], combined arms battalions [hechengying, 合成营] to become the 

“basic combat unit” [jichu zhanshu danyuan, 基础战术单元] capable of 

independent actions on the battlefield.49 (Comparatively speaking, other 

militaries have multiple decades of combat experience in those levels of 

joint and combined arms operations.)

Conducting operations at battalion level requires major change to the 

way the majority of army officers have been trained since the 1950s when 

the Soviet system of command was adopted. Under the now mostly discarded Soviet system (which is still found in the remaining PLA divisions), 

regiments were the lowest level at which combined arms operations were 

executed, and regimental headquarters did all the planning and staff work 

for battalions. With the “brigadization” of the force, which eliminates the 

regiment from the chain of command down to maneuver battalions, battalions now must be capable of planning operations and conducting them 

on their own. This has caused anxiety for many battalion commanders who 

have not been adequately trained to handle such tasks and has resulted in 

frequent critiques of poor coordination among units from the various arms 

assigned to combined arms battalions. As commander of the 41st Group 

Army in 2015 (before becoming commander of the Northern TC army), 

Li Qiaoming observed that some individual commanders had not studied 

adequately or were stuck in traditional modes of operations and were not 

able to utilize the new types of combat forces assigned to them.50 As a result, 

army large unit exercises (above battalion level) emphasize leadership/

staff training and evaluation as much as small unit (battalion and below) 

maneuver, firepower, and support operations.

A principal tool in breaking the PLA’s traditional mode of operational 

thinking has been the roughly 74 division and brigade transregional exercises 
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[kuaqu yanxi, 跨区演习] conducted from 2006 to 2016. For most of the past 

70 years, army units prepared to conduct operations almost exclusively in the 

regions where they were located. Units concentrated on fighting potential 

regional enemies in familiar terrain and climatic conditions. This approach 

required large standing forces spread throughout the country and minimized 

the need for military sea and air strategic lift. As the PLA reduced its size 

and increased its level of weapons technology, the need to develop units that 

could operate outside the areas in which they were garrisoned and cooperate 

with forces from the other services became apparent. Most transregional 

exercises display some degree of joint interoperability; often headquarters or 

reconnaissance units are transported by air, air force aircraft provide support 

to ground operations, and some sea movements and amphibious operations 

have been included, as well as conventional support from Second Artillery/

Rocket Force units. The majority of transregional exercises were under army 

command, but a few have been led by navy or air force headquarters.

The first major, but unnamed, transregional exercise was held in 

September 2006 when the 190th Mechanized Infantry Brigade/39th GA/

Shenyang MR deployed to the Zhurihe Combined Arms Training Base in the 

Beijing MR. None were held in 2007, but in 2008 Jinan MR held the exercise 

Sharpening Troops 2008, in which the 58th Light Mechanized Brigade/20th

GA traveled to Zhurihe in August, followed by exercise Joint 2008 in September, in which the 138th Motorized Infantry Brigade/26th GA undertook a 

sea movement from Yantai to a landing area near Dalian, Liaoning.51

Beginning in 2009, transregional exercises have become the marquee 

events in the army’s annual training cycle, generating massive amounts of 

domestic media attention. Each exercise has been slightly different, but all 

involve sequential (but not simultaneous) deployments—using road, rail, 

military and/or civilian air, and sometimes sea transport—from home 

base to a distant large training base while undergoing enemy harassment 

or attack. After organizing for combat at the training base, several days of 

live-fire drills and confrontation drills between red force (friendly) and 

blue force (enemy) units ensued. Missions sometimes were changed to test 
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the adaptability of commanders and staff. Observers evaluated all phases 

of the exercise using a 1,000-point scale. Some units underwent computer 

exercises in preparation for these (and other) events.

From 2006 through 2015, roughly 35 infantry and armored divisions and brigades participated in the series of Stride-2009, Mission 

Action–2010, Mission Action–2013, Stride-2014, and Stride-2015 exercises, which were organized by all seven MR headquarters (see appendix 

1 for a chart listing each exercise and the red force unit involved). In 2014, 

for the first time, artillery and air defense brigades were tested in the series 

of 10 Firepower-2014 transregional exercises. The Firepower-2015 series 

sent seven artillery brigades to the Qingtongxia training area and seven 

air defense brigades to the Shandan training area (see appendix 2 for a 

chart listing each Firepower exercise and the red force unit involved). In 

2015, a total of 29 brigades of all types took part in transregional training, 

an all-time high for such training. None of the red forces defeated the blue 

forces in any of the 29 exercises. To date, the only red force identified as 

having won a transregional brigade-level exercise is the 68th Mechanized 

Infantry Brigade/16th GA in Stride-2014 Zhurihe D.52 Similar to the U.S. 

Army experience training at the National Training Center, red force units 

coming in second in most exercises is not unusual.

In 2016, army headquarters in Beijing organized the Stride and Firepower exercise series, which involved one infantry or armored brigade and 

one artillery and air defense brigade from each of the five new theaters’ 

area of responsibility for a total of 15 exercises.53 In 2017, as below-theneck reforms were under way, army headquarters organized four of the 

nine Stride and Firepower exercises.54 No sponsor was designated for the 

other five exercises. The Chinese media only reported on four of these 

exercises, Stride-2017 Zhurihe (combined arms), Firepower-2017 Qingtongxia (artillery), Firepower-2017 Shandan (air defense), and Sharp 

Edge–2017 Queshan (the first for SOF units). The reduction in number 

of transregional exercises probably was related to the disruption caused 

by the creation of new joint and service headquarters, which were focused 
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on organizing and training their own newly assigned personnel to perform their duties. If, as expected, transregional joint exercises continue 

in future years, most probably will be organized and overseen by the 

various TC headquarters, following the guidance that the “CMC is in 

overall control, theaters are responsible for operations, and the services 

are responsible for construction” [junwei guanzong, zhanqu zhuzhan, 

junzhong zhujian, 军委管总, 战区主战, 军种主建].

The 15 transregional exercises held in 2016 specifically were intended 

to address the leadership problem of the Five Cannots.55 These exercises 

were further targeted to improve SOF, electronic countermeasures, army 

aviation, and other new-type combat forces capabilities, while operating 

jointly with air force and Strategic Support Force units.56 The units participating in 2016 transregional exercises are identified in table 2. Units from 

11 of the then 18 group armies participated.

Reviewing the units involved in the totality of transregional exercises, 

it is apparent that units from all MRs and theaters participated in mostly 

equal proportions. Of the over 70 transregional exercises conducted from 

2006 to 2016, only the 58th Light Mechanized Infantry Brigade/20th GA and 

235th Motorized Infantry Brigade/27th GA are known to have participated 

in more than one exercise. This implies that no unit or region is considered 

more important than another and that all units must be prepared to conduct operations outside their home areas.

Another important development is the shift from both divisions and 

brigades participating from 2006 to 2013 to only brigades in 2014 and the 

expansion of the exercises to include artillery and air defense brigades. Perhaps even more significant, however, Mission Action–2013C was commanded 

by the air force in a major step toward jointness in the PLA. This segment of 

the three-part exercise primarily was an aerial exercise with support from 

ground-based missile and naval units.57 Since that time, both navy and air 

force headquarters have commanded a handful of other joint exercises.58

Units not participating in transregional events conduct a variety of 

exercises within their home regions, some of which are joint, such as annual 
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amphibious landing training. Many of these large exercises are named and 

receive Chinese media attention, but not all are publicized. They follow an 

annual training plan previously promulgated by MR headquarters, but in 

the future will probably be a joint effort involving both TC and service headquarters passed down to TC army headquarters for execution. Training plans 

highlight functions to be emphasized over the year, such as night operations 

or air support to ground operations, and also must coordinate and deconflict 

other training and operational events, such as exercises with foreign countries, military competitions, parades, and peacekeeping (PKO) deployments.

Because of the reorganization under way in 2016, some training events 

were slight aberrations from previous practice. Although the army participated in nearly 20 exercises with foreign militaries in 2016, Chinese 

participation was relatively small in scale. A few examples include:

■	 Khan Quest 2016, an international PKO exercise in Mongolia

■	 Exercise Tropic Twilight–2016, in which the PLA sent seven personnel 

to a disaster relief exercise in New Zealand

■	 Exercise Kowari 2016, involving small units from China, the United 

States, and Australia

■	 Panda-Kangaroo 2016, with Chinese and Australia forces

■	 ADMM-Plus, a humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, medical exercise 

in Thailand involving 18 countries with some 450 to 500 PLA personnel

■	 Peace Mission 2016, for which the PLA dispatched 270 personnel to an 

anti-terrorist exercise in Kyrgyzstan.

Perhaps the most important aspect of these exercises was that the Southern TC oversaw the joint deployment to the ADMM-Plus exercise and the 

Western TC was in charge of Peace Mission 2016.59 In 2017, while units were 

being reorganized, the number of army exercises with foreign militaries 

was cut to about six.

In previous years, most army exercises with foreign countries focused 

on anti-terrorist missions—sometimes with a heavy conventional combat 

role as seen in the Peace Mission series—and humanitarian/disaster relief 
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371

operations. Many exercises were relatively small, involving a company-size 

or smaller element, frequently featuring SOF personnel. The number of army 

exercises held annually has generally increased from year to year, from 1 in 

2002 when the first event was held to 10 or more since 2014, depending on 

what exercises are included. Although units from all MRs have participated 

in exercises with foreign militaries, MRs on China’s western and southern 

borders (Lanzhou, Chengdu, and Guangzhou) provided troops most often.

Though the PLA has sent units to international military competitions 

in previous years, in 2016 the level of their participation was unprecedented. 

The 14th GA sent 10 personnel to a jungle patrol competition in Brazil, and 

the 26th GA sent 5 personnel from a SOF brigade to a sniper competition in 

Kazakhstan.60 But the PLA’s largest level of participation was at the International Army Games in Russia from July 30 to August 13, involving 1,066 

personnel from all services, multiple GAs, and 11 provinces. Army units 

competed in 17 events including “armor, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, engineering, chemical defense, special warfare, aviation, airborne 

and other professional operations, as well as repair, field kitchen, health 

service and other support.”61 In total, PLA teams competed in 21 events and 

“won the first place in one contest, the second place in eighteen contests, 

and the third place in two contests.”62 The PLA used its own Type-96Bs 

in the tank competition, while all other participants used Russian-made 

T-72B3s.63 The PLA team finished second, with one tank losing a road wheel 

during the competition.64 This trend of active participation in international 

competitions continued in the 2017 training season.

United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations are another significant 

category of activity that has been exclusively assigned to army units. Like 

other high-profile events, responsibility for providing troops to UN PKO 

deployments has been distributed throughout most of the army, though it 

appears that units from the former Nanjing MR have not been so tasked. 

For example, units from Shenyang MR’s 16th and 39th GAs provided troops 

to the mission to Mali; units from the Beijing MR and the 27th and 38th GAs 

have provided units for the missions in Liberia, Congo, and South Sudan; 
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Lanzhou MR’s 21st GA and Xinjiang MD units have also sent units to the 

Congo; elements from Yunnan and the 13th and 14th GAs have been sent 

to Lebanon; and all GAs from the former Jinan MR have participated in 

deployments to Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur. 

The vast majority of units and personnel deployed to UN PKO mission 

have been engineers and transport and medical specialists. However, in 

January 2012, the PLA sent a “guard unit” from the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division/54th GA/Jinan MR to South Sudan and a “guard detachment” 

from the Shenyang MR to Mali in late 2013.65 The size of these forces ranged 

from about a platoon to company size (170 personnel). In late 2014, the army 

deployed its first infantry battalion to the mission in South Sudan. The 

700-strong force was composed of personnel from a motorized infantry 

brigade in the 26th GA and two companies from a division of the 54th GA.66

While press reports called this an “organic infantry battalion,” it was in fact 

a composite battalion formed from units from two different group armies. 

The second rotation in 2015 apparently was an organic infantry battalion, 

this time from the 20th GA.67 While PLA infantry battalion commanders 

usually are majors, it is notable that colonels (two ranks higher than majors) 

were assigned as commanders of these PKO battalions. This could indicate 

both the PLA’s attitude that these are important missions for which a higher 

ranking commander is appropriate and a lack of confidence that a major is 

ready for such responsibilities.

By assigning PKO missions to many units, the army has allowed the 

responsibility and experience of overseas deployments to be shared by multiple headquarters. This indicates senior leadership trust in the abilities of units 

from various parts of China to perform these highly visible missions and the 

desire for many to learn from overseas deployments. Prior to deployment, 

units undergo specialized preparatory training, which removes them from 

routine responsibilities for an even longer period than the 8 months to a year 

that they are deployed. Depending on circumstances, units from any part of 

the army may also be deployed on domestic disaster relief missions. Though 

emergencies may interrupt routine training, these deployments provide units 
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373

with excellent opportunities for small unit leadership problem-solving and 

real-world helicopter, communications, and logistics support operations, 

often in adverse weather and terrain conditions.

New Logistics Arrangements 

The traditional support model of our army is weak, with specialties not 

unified, backward technologies, and scattered resources making it difficult 

to complete system support tasks based on information systems.

68

After the establishment of the General Armament Department in 1998, 

armament (or equipment) departments were added to headquarters 

organizations throughout the PLA. Among other duties, the Armament 

Department was in charge of equipment repair and maintenance as well as 

ammunition supply. The Logistics Department was responsible for finance, 

supply, fuel, food, uniforms, health care, and housing. However, these 

responsibilities became intertwined at the lower levels of the operational 

chain of command. For example, units in the field need to be resupplied 

with ammunition at the same time they are supplied food, water, and fuel. 

Transportation units need to be able to repair and perform maintenance 

on vehicles anywhere when in the field. As a result, small units from both 

the logistics and equipment systems often would locate themselves in the 

same general vicinity when in the field, sometimes operating together.

In 2012, PLA leadership acknowledged this reality by merging the Logistics and Armament departments at division and brigade levels into a single 

Support Department [baozhang bu, 保障部] and Support Office [baozhang 

chu, 保障处] at the regimental level. During the 2017 reforms, group armies, 

TC army headquarters, and the Xinjiang and Tibet MDs also have formed 

Support departments within their headquarters.69 Moreover, each group 

army has established a service support brigade that is comprised of logistics, 

maintenance, communications, UAV, and electronic warfare units.70

The merger of logistics and armament departments into a single support department is consistent with the division of responsibilities between 
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the CMC Logistic Support Department and Equipment Development 

Department. As suggested by its name, Equipment Development focuses 

primarily on equipment acquisition, research and development, and has 

transferred its repair and maintenance responsibilities to the services as a 

part of their “construction” responsibilities.

A major change to the former logistics structure was announced in 

September 2016 with the creation of the CMC Joint Logistics Support Force 

[zhongyang junwei lianqin baozhang budui, 中央军委联勤保障部队]. The 

“force” is comprised of the Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base [Wuhan

lianqin baozhang jidi, 武汉联勤保障基地] and five joint logistics support 

centers [lianqin baozhang zhongxin, 联勤保障中心] at Wuxi, Guilin, Xining, Shenyang, and Zhengzhou, with one center located in each of the new 

TCs.71 It appears the Joint Logistics Support Force has incorporated many 

of the subordinate elements of the former 20-odd, division leader grade 

joint logistics sub-departments [lianqin fenbu, 联勤分部] into its structure, 

with their supply bases and depots, hospitals, and transportation units 

being resubordinated among the Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base and 

the five joint logistics support centers, while some logistics units are being 

transferred to the services.72 (See the chapter by Luce and Richter in this 

volume for analysis of PLA logistics and the creation of the Joint Logistics 

Support Force.)

The Ministry of National Defense spokesman provided a bit more 

information about the responsibilities of the new logistics force, noting 

that “special-purpose materials and equipment are supported by arms and 

services themselves, [g]eneral-purpose materials and equipment are supported by the joint logistic support force.”73 Such a division of labor existed 

previously among the former joint logistics and armament systems and the 

services. A graphic described the Joint Logistics Support Force’s “focus of 

support” [zhongdian baozhang, 重点保障] as finance, housing, uniforms, 

food, transportation, and hospitals. Therefore, the army and other services 

must retain their own logistics systems to provide the specific functions that 

the new Joint Logistics Support Force does not. Exactly how that will be 
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done has yet to be revealed and is probably the subject of experimentation 

and eventual further modification.

Changes in Doctrine and the Education System 

[Military reform] must address the shortage of officers who have a deep 

knowledge of joint combat operations and advanced equipment, 

[a researcher in the Human Resources Department at the PLA Xi’an 

Political Academy] said. “We have developed and deployed many 

cutting-edge weapons, including some that are the best in the world, but 

there are not enough soldiers to use many of those advanced weapons,” 

he said. “In some cases, soldiers lack knowledge and expertise to 

make the best use of their equipment.”74

The changes in PLA command and control, force structure, and logistics system will necessitate adjustments to its operating procedures and 

methods, what may also be called doctrine. The shift to a more joint, 

maritime-oriented force will also require changes to the way the PLA educates and trains its officers and NCOs. (See the chapter by Wuthnow and 

Saunders in this volume for more details.)

An obvious consequence of the 300,000-man reduction is that the 

number of officers in the PLA will be reduced. One report predicted that 

half of the total cuts would affect officers.75 Accordingly, the number 

of cadets selected to attend the PLA and People’s Armed Police system 

of academies was reduced in 2016 and 2017 from the 2015 intake. See 

appendix 3 for the numbers announced from 2005 to 2017. (The manner 

by which these numbers have been reported has varied over time, sometimes making year-to-year comparisons difficult.) Moreover, in 2017, 

PLA Daily announced that the National Defense Student program, which 

began around the year 2000, will no longer recruit (and pay) high school 

graduates or students already in college; instead, the military will select 

and recruit national defense students from graduates of civilian institutes 

of higher learning.76 This change to the National Defense Student program 
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suggests that perhaps the system was not producing the results previously 

expected and that by selecting graduates, rather than freshmen, the PLA 

can adjust the numbers based on current needs and the students’ functional majors as required.

Just as important, the areas of study for the new students will be 

adjusted to better support the changing force structure. In 2016, the CMC 

Training Administration Department announced:

Compared with last year, 24 percent fewer students will be admitted 

to studies related to the army, including the infantry and artillery, 

while logistic and support departments will see their recruits fall 

by 45 percent. . . . In comparison, students studying in aviation, 

missile, and maritime fields will increase by 14 percent. The number 

of recruits in sectors where there is an urgent need, such as space 

intelligence, radar and drones, will rise by 16 percent.77

These percentages show the army (and logistics forces) coming in second 

once more to the other services and the Strategic Support Force. Similarly, the 

number of PLA graduate students will be reduced in 2017, and their fields of 

study altered to support new requirements, most of which are not in the army:

the number of graduate students will be reduced to 6,000 and that 

of doctoral students to 1,475, a decrease of 16.7 percent and 19.2 

percent year-on-year, respectively. The goals of the enrolment 

plan in 2017 are to reduce the enrolment of students majoring in 

science, engineering, and medicine, and to increase the recruitment of those majoring in military-related fields, especially the 

fields that are closely related to construction of new-type combat 

forces, including strategic early warning, military aerospace, 

air defense and anti-missile, information-based operation, and 

strategic projection.78

As the services are rebalanced in the future, the components of the PLA 

education system will likely continue to be modified to provide appropriate 
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377

numbers of graduates for each service and functional specialty, not only 

for officers but also for NCOs. For example, former academies have been 

merged or consolidated. Additionally, curricula in all PLA academies and 

universities can be expected to change to better prepare officers and NCOs 

for joint and combined arms operations. In particular, courses for staff 

officers and NCOs from battalion level up must focus on the integration of 

all the new types of high-technology weapons and support required to conduct maritime and aerospace operations in addition to campaigns on land. 

Some of this work likely will also be conducted at training bases at various 

points in a soldier’s career after graduation from an academy or university.

In the coming years, both the PLA’s education and training systems will 

have to work in unison to change “Big Army” [dalujun, 大陆军] thinking that 

has dominated the Chinese military for nearly a century. This shift in mindset 

will not occur quickly and not without pain for many still on active duty. 

Compared to the “old soldiers,” this change will be easier for younger, more 

junior personnel and those just entering the service. But it is not assured that 

the international environment and the senior civilian Chinese leadership will 

be accommodating enough to allow the PLA the time it needs to make all the 

refinements it deems necessary to develop a modernized education structure 

to prepare officers and NCOs for advanced system-of-systems operations.

Conclusion 

Improving the army’s combat strength has become a major focus. 

But the modernization level of the Chinese army is inadequate to 

safeguard national security, and it lags far behind advanced global peers. 

The Chinese army is not capable enough of waging modern warfare, and 

officers lack command skills for modern warfare.79

The epigraph is one of the few instances, if not the only example, of the Two 

Large Gaps and Two Inabilities assessments in English carried by the Chinese 

military media (though it did not include those specific names). These and 

other self-assessments of the PLA’s overall and functional capabilities have 
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not made it into any of the series of defense white papers intended primarily 

for foreign consumption. Instead, the countless inward-looking criticisms 

are directed at the PLA itself in its Chinese-language media. They usually are 

found after a description of some type of progress the PLA has achieved. But 

most importantly, they underscore that everyone must work harder before 

the PLA can join the ranks of advanced militaries.

Despite the new uniforms and equipment and glowing reports in the 

Chinese media, despite the parades (there is little doubt that the PLA can 

outperform all foreign competition on the parade ground), despite new 

cyber, space, and missile capabilities, as much as it looks like a modern 

force, the PLA has yet to demonstrate that it can operate with the first tier 

of advanced militaries throughout the world. While true for the PLA as a 

whole, this judgment applies even more to the army.

Based only on the types of organizational reforms in motion and 

the open source reporting of the type and content of exercises the PLA 

conducts, the emphasis on improving leadership and staff abilities and 

conducting joint and combined arms operations is warranted. For the 

army, it seems likely that many individual soldiers, squads, platoons, and 

companies can perform their missions proficiently. (The level of tactical 

proficiency may vary from unit to unit and be higher in some units in 

other services.) But putting these units together to operate as combined 

arms teams at battalion level, acting independently or as part of larger units 

in joint operations, is an acknowledged shortcoming. The PLA’s ultimate 

objective frequently is referred to in the Chinese literature as “turning 

strong fingers [small units/service arms] into a hard fist [combined arms/

joint operations].”80 The below-the-neck reforms that created combined 

arms brigades and battalions may help in achieving this objective, but 

without properly educated and trained battalion commanders and staff, 

it may result in small units from the non-infantry or armored branches 

assigned to combined arms brigades not being as fully prepared to perform 

their specific battlefield functions as they would be if they were part of a 

larger brigade of their own specialty.
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

379

Fixing these problems has been a perpetual training objective and 

requires additional changes in education, unit structure, and doctrine that 

must be formalized and implemented throughout the entire army, not just 

in experimental units. While the PLA has begun to address these issues over 

the past 10 to 15 years, many other militaries have conducted combined 

arms operations at the battalion level and joint operations employing larger 

formations in combat for multiple decades, and even they must continue 

to refine organization, tactics, and procedures based on changing realities.

As the army seeks to address these challenges, it also is attempting to 

demonstrate that it has a role in the PLA’s larger maritime doctrine. Several 

new types of combat forces can contribute to operations conducted beyond 

China’s landmass: helicopter units are now operating over water or from 

ships and may conduct attack and reconnaissance missions at sea; SOF 

units can be delivered to distant targets by a variety of means to conduct 

raids and reconnaissance; long-range multiple rocket launcher units, air 

defense, and electronic warfare units can be integrated into multiservice 

groups to defend China’s exclusive economic zones; and army UAVs can 

be integrated into surveillance operations and perhaps eventually strike 

missions. Such missions, however, will be conducted as part of joint operations and all levels of army headquarters must be equipped and trained 

to function within that joint structure.

The tasks described above mainly involve units up to battalion size; 

getting larger units, especially conventional infantry and armored brigades, 

to distant battlefields will require strategic air and sea lift from the other 

services or civilian assets beyond the army’s span of control. Once again, 

lack of strategic lift is an acknowledged PLA shortfall, but one that is beginning to be addressed by adding Y-20 large transport aircraft and a variety 

of amphibious ships and vessels (for example, Type-071 LPDs and Zubr 

air-cushioned craft) to the PLA, augmented by civilian aircraft and roll-on/

roll-off ships, some of which are now designed to military specifications.

Though senior army leaders have been assigned to the vast majority 

of new joint command and senior staff positions, the stage has been set for 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

380

non-army leaders to move into more of these slots in the future. With Vice 

Admiral Yuan Yubai’s promotion to commander of the Southern TC and 

air force General Yi Xiaoguang’s assignment as Central TC commander, 

the PLA has achieved a milestone in its modernization program and quest 

for jointness. Likewise, in the future, more joint exercises must be organized and led by non-army officers and staffs if the PLA is to acquire the 

joint capabilities necessary to conduct maritime and aerospace campaigns. 

As all this occurs, the army will lose the dominant role it enjoyed in past 

decades. The difficulty in changing the PLA’s institutional mindset from 

an army-led land power to an advanced maritime/aerospace joint force 

capable of operating far beyond China’s shores—and the time required to 

achieve these objectives—should not be underestimated. To accomplish its 

modernization goals, the army will have to accept its position as the PLA’s 

biggest loser, now and far into the future, or else squander the progress 

made since China’s last major conflict with a foreign enemy.
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

381

Appendix 1. Red Units (Inf/Arm Divs/Bdes) in Major Named Transregional 

Exercises, 2006–2015

MR 

(Total 

Exercises 

2006–2015)

2006/2008 Stride2009Mission 

Action2010

Mission 

Action2013

Stride2014

(Zhurihe/

Sanjie)

Stride2015

(Zhurihe)

Stride2015 

(Taonan/

Sanjie/

Queshan)

Shenyang (5) 2006: UI 

exercise, 

190th Mech 

Inf Bde 

(39th GA)

115th Mech 

Inf Div

(39th GA)

68th Mech 

Inf Bde 

(16th GA)

Note: the 

only Red 

Unit judged 

to have 

“won”

119th Mtr Inf 

Bde 

(40th GA); 

UI Arm Bde 

(40th GA)

Beijing (5) 188th Mech 

Inf Bde 

(27th GA)

235th Mech 

Inf Bde 

(27th GA)

80th Mtr Inf 

Bde (27th

GA); 235th

Mtr Inf Bde 

(27th GA); 

UI Arm Bde 

(65th GA)

Lanzhou (5) 61st (“Red 

Army”) Div 

(21st GA)

139th Mech 

Inf Bde (47th

GA)

55th Mtr Inf 

Bde (47th GA)

UI Arm Bde 

(21st GA)

Mtr Inf Bde 

(47th GA)

Jinan (6) Sharpening 

Troops 2008, 

58th Lt Mech 

Bde 

(20th GA);

Joint 2008, 

138th Mtr 

Inf Bde 

(26th GA)

162nd Mtr 

Inf Div 

(54th GA)

58th Lt Mech 

Inf Bde

(20th GA)

UI Mech

Inf Bde

(26th GA)

UI Arm Bde

(54th GA)

Nanjing (5) Part A: 86th

Mtr Inf Div 

(31st GA)

UI Arm Bde 

(12th GA); 

34th Mech 

Inf Bde 

(12th GA)

3rd Mtr Inf 

Bde (1st GA)

179th Mtr Inf 

(12th GA)

Guangzhou 

(5)

121st Mtr Inf 

Div (41st GA)

Part B: 124th

Amph Mech 

Inf Div 

(42nd GA)

122nd Mech 

Inf Bde 

(41st GA)

UI Arm Bde 

(41st GA)

UI Arm Bde 

(42nd GA)

Chengdu (4) 149th Mech 

Inf Div 

(13th GA)

UI Arm Bde 

(14th GA)

42nd Mtr Inf 

Bde 

(14th GA)

52nd Mnt Inf 

Bde 

(Tibet MD)

Total 35 3 4 3 2 8 10 5

Source: Chinese media reports.

Key: Amph: amphibious; Arm: armored; Bde: brigade; Div: division; GA: group army; Inf: infantry; Lt: 

light; Mech: mechanized; Mtn: mountain; Mtr: motorized; UI: unidentified.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

382

Appendix 2. Units Participating in Artillery and Air Defense Transregional 

Exercises, 2014–2015

Firepower-2014

(Total live exercises: 10)

Firepower-2015 

(Qingtongxia)

(Total live exercises: 7)

Firepower-2015

(Shandan)

(Total live exercises: 7)

*Nanjing Part A: Nanjing Artillery 

Academy and 38th GA Artillery Brigade

*Nanjing Part A: Nanjing Artillery 

Academy and 20th GA Artillery 

Brigade

*Zhengzhou: Air Defense Academy and 

47th GA Air Defense Brigade

*Nanjing Part D: Nanjing Artillery 

Academy and 16th GA Artillery 

Brigade

*Leting: Air Defense Academy and 40th

GA Air Defense Brigade

Korla Part A: 1st GA Long-range Rocket 

Brigade

Qingtongxia Part A: 

20th GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part A:

28th GA Air Defense Brigade

Shandan: Tibet MD Air Defense 

Brigade

Qingtongxia Part B:

13th GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part B:

Xinjiang MD Air Defense 

Brigade

Taonan Part A: 65th GA Artillery Brigade Qingtongxia Part C: 

47th GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part C:

13th GA Air Defense Brigade

Korla Part A: 31st GA Artillery Brigade 

(with long-range rockets)

Qingtongxia Part D:

16th GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part D:

54th GA Air Defense Brigade

Korla Part B: 42nd GA Long-range 

Rocket Brigade

Qingtongxia Part E:

1st GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part E:

41st GA Air Defense Brigade

Taonan Part B: 38th GA Artillery Brigade Qingtongxia Part F:

42nd GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part F:

16th GA Air Defense Brigade

Weibei Part A: 13th GA Air Defense 

Brigade

Qingtongxia Part G:

27th GA Artillery Brigade

Shandan Part G:

31st GA Air Defense Brigade

Xuanhua: 40th GA Artillery Brigade

Weibei Part B: 14th GA Air Defense 

Brigade

Sanjie: 26th GA Artillery Brigade

Source: Chinese media reports.

Key: MD: military district; GA: group army.

* Denotes preparatory computer exercise.
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383

Appendix 3. Annual Intake of Students for PLA and PAP Academies

Year High School 

Students for 

PLA and PAP 

Academies

High School 

Students for 

National Defense 

Students 

(PLA + PAP)

PAP Academies 

and National 

Defense 

Students

NCOs/Conscripts 

into PLA and PAP 

Academies

Total

2017 12,000 4,800 16,800

2016 14,500 4,700 5,900 25,100

2015 15,700 6,000 5,300 27,000

2014 15,000 5,000 3,800 23,800

2013

2012 15,000 8,000 6,000 31,000

2011 20,000 8,000 (Not specified, 

included among 

the 20,000)

28,000

2010 15,000+2,200=17,200 6,000+850=6,850 4,100 28,150

2009 15,000 7,500 7,190 29,690

2008 10,000 10,000 20,000

2007 10,000 11,000 21,000

2006 10,000 10,000 5,000 25,000

2005 20,000 12,000 5,000 37,000

2004 20,000 8,000 28,000

Source: Chinese media reports.

Notes 

1 China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council Information Office of 

the People’s Republic of China, May 2015), available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/

Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm>.

2 The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 179–181. In 2018, China’s officially announced defense 

budget was about 175 billion USD (based on exchange rates). For a useful 

discussion of the growth of the Chinese defense budget, see Richard A. 

Bitzinger, “China’s New Defense Budget: Money and Manpower,” Asia Times

(Hong Kong), March 11, 2018, available at <www.atimes.com/chinas-new-defense-budget-money-manpower/>.

3 China’s National Defense in 2000 (Beijing: State Council Information Office 

of the People’s Republic of China, October 2000), available at <www.china.org.cn/

english/2000/Oct/2791.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

384

4 China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing: State Council Information Office 

of the People’s Republic of China, December 2004), available at <www.china.org.

cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>.

5 The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: State Council 

Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, April 16, 2013), available at 

<www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm>.

6 China’s Military Strategy. Emphasis added.

7 “Xi Reviews Troops in Field for First Time,” Ministry of National 

Defense, July 30, 2017, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-07/30/content_4787294.htm>. The Military Balance 2018 (London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 2018), 250, estimates army personnel strength to be 975,000.

8 Both the 2006 and 2008 Chinese defense white papers described a “threestep development strategy” for defense modernization, which identified “mid-21st

century” as the completion date for this process. The mid-21st century, or 2049, is 

also the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The 

three-step development strategy also provided two interim dates, or milestones: 

2010 “to lay a solid foundation” and 2020 to “basically accomplish mechanization 

and make major progress in informationization.”

9 “China to Build World-Class Armed Forces by Mid-21st Century,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/18/content_33403375.

htm>; and “Xi Jinping: Build the People’s Army into a World-Class Military” [习近平:

把人民军队全面建成世界一流军队], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 18, 2017, available 

at <www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-10/18/content_7791594.htm>.

10 Feng Chunmei and Ni Guanghui [冯春梅, 倪光辉], “First Interview with 

Army Commander Li Zuocheng” [陆军司令员李作成首次接受媒体采访], People’s 

Daily [人民日报], January 31, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-01/31/

content_6882034.htm>.

11 As of September 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) apparently has 

begun to use the term theater leader grade (zhanqu ji, 战区级) to replace the former 

military region (MR) leader grade. See “Military Training Units above the Level of 

the Deputy War-Level Units in the Army Held in Beijing” [全军副战区级以上单位

纪委书记培训班在京举办], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 26, 2016, available at 

<www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/26/content_157464.htm>.

12 “China Names New Commanders for Army, Air Force in Reshuffle,” Reuters, 

August 31, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/chinanames-new-commanders-for-army-air-force-in-reshuffle-idUSKCN1BC3L1>.
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

385

13 PLA Navy headquarters has a Planning and Organization Bureau; therefore, it is logical that the army does also.

14 The names seen above continue to be reported as of March 2018. The 

Equipment Development Department “is mainly responsible for development 

and planning, [research and development], testing and authentication, procurement management, and information system construction for the whole military’s 

equipment.” See “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,” China 

Military Online, January 12, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm>. Note 

there is no mention of repair and maintenance in that statement.

15 The first of these brigades has been identified in the Northern Theater 

Command (TC). See “Soldiers Operate Mobile Satellite Communication System,” 

PLA Daily, May 31, 2017, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-

05/31/content_7623013.htm>.

16 Liu Hongjun [刘洪军], “Strengthening Theater Army’s Innovation and 

Awareness of Warfighting and Construction” [强化战区陆军主战主建的创新

意识], China Military Online [中国军网], May 10, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

jfjbmap/content/2016-05/10/content_144076.htm>.

17 Li Ming [黎明], “Chinese Communist Northern Theater PC Xu Yuanlin 

Removed from Office” [中共北部战区政委徐远林被免职 去向不明], New Tang 

Dynasty [新唐人], July 31, 2016, available at <www.ntdtv.com/xtr/gb/2016/08/01/

a1278801.html>.

18 For example, Li Zuocheng worked with Bai Lu in the Chengdu MR, Liu Lei 

worked with He Qingcheng in the Lanzhou MR, and Liu Xiaowu served with Li 

Qiaoming in the 41st Group Army.

19 The “Two Inabilities” [liangge nengli bugou, 两个能力不够] are 1) our military’s 

ability to fight a modern war is insufficient, and 2) our cadres’, at all levels, abilities to 

command modern war is insufficient. The “Two Large Gaps” [liangge chaju henda, 两个

差距很大] refers to gaps between the level of China’s military modernization and 1) the 

requirements for national security, and 2) the level of the world’s advanced militaries.

20 Li Zuocheng and Liu Lei, “Strive to Build a Strong and Modernized NewType Army—Study Deeply and Implement Chairman Xi Jinping’s Important 

Discourse on Army Building” [陆军司令员政委:建设强大的现代化新型陆军努

力建设一支强大的现代化新型陆军—深入学习贯彻习近平主席关于陆军建设重

要论述], Qiushi [求是], February 15, 2016, available at <http://army.81.cn/content/2016-02/15/content_6909160.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

386

21 Liao Keduo [廖可铎], “Promote Effective Army Transformation and Construction” [推进陆军转型建设落地见效], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 23, 2016, 

available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-08/23/content_154414.htm>.

22 Wang Li and Yu Wei, eds. [王李, 宇薇], “One Extraordinary Assessment” 

[一次不同凡响的考核], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 22, 2015, available at 

<www.81.cn/2015lzjqqh/2015-01/22/content_6318223.htm>. Xi has identified the 

problem as one the PLA must solve.

23 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,” China Military 

Online, January 12, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm>; Wang Jun [王俊], 

“Beijing Garrison Has Been Transferred from the Former Beijing Military Region 

Army” [北京卫戍区已由原北京军区转隶陆军], The Paper [澎湃新闻], August 16, 

2016, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1514876>.

24 Zhang Baoyin [张宝印] et al., “Speed Up the Construction of a New 

National Defense Mobilization System with Chinese Characteristics” [加快构建

具有中国特色的新型国防动员体系], Xinhua, March 9, 2016, available at <www.81.

cn/jwgz/2016-03/09/content_6951104.htm>.

25 “Jixi Jun Division Border Guard Officers and Men Turned to Donate 

Money before the Transfer of Education” [鸡西军分区边防部队官兵转隶交前倾

情捐资助学], Bright Picture [光明图片], available at <http://pic.gmw.cn/channelplay/12052/5300867/0/0.html>; Meng Haizhong and Chen Youguang [孟海中, 陈宥

光], “The Coastal Defense Forces Belonging to the Shantou Garrison Command 

in Guangdong Province Transferred Their Troops to the Army in February this 

Year” [广东省汕头警备区所属海防部队今年2月已转隶移交陆军], China National 

Defense Daily [中国国防报], April 1, 2017, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1653214>.

26 “Northern and Southern TC Armies Forming Border Defense Brigades” 

[南部战区陆军, 北部战区陆军等均已组建边防旅], The Paper [澎湃新闻], May 9, 

2017, available at <www.81junzhuan.com/ss/2017-05-09/11521.html>.

27 “Brigade Party Members Carry Backpacks to Meetings” [旅党委委员背着

背包来开会], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 10, 2018, available at <www.81.cn/

jfjbmap/content/2018-01/10/content_196631.htm>.

28 Jing Runqiang [井润强], “Official Disclosure: Guangdong Reserve Division 

Transferred to the Army” [官方披露:广东某预备役师部队已转隶陆军], China 

National Defense Daily [中国国防报], April 7, 2017, available at <www.thepaper.

cn/newsDetail_forward_1656910>.
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387

29 Ma Hao Liang [馬浩亮], “Four Changes to Provincial Military Districts Leadership Positions Reduced” [省軍區四變化削減領導職務], Ta Kung 

Pao [大公报], April 24, 2017, available at <http://news.takungpao.com.hk/

paper/q/2017/0424/3443954.html>.

30 Wang Jun [王俊],“Air Force Major General Zhou Li Transferred to Henan 

Provincial Military District Commander to Succeed Major General Lu Changjian” 

[空军少将周利调任河南省军区司令员,接替卢长健少], The Paper [澎湃新闻], 

April 12, 2017, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1660971>.

31 The year 2020 is the deadline for the current phase of PLA reforms to 

be completed.

32 Liao Keduo [廖可铎], “Speed Up Building a Powerful Modernized NewType Army” [加快建设强大的现代化新型陆军], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 

29, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-03/29/content_6980905.htm>.

33 The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, September 9, 2013), 

available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/China-Military-Watch/2013-09/09/

content_16953672.htm>.

34 Order-of-battle details in this and following paragraphs are based on the 

author’s analysis of open Chinese sources; the numbers cited are close to, but not 

exactly the same as, the numbers found in the Annual Report to Congress: Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016) and The Military Balance 2017

(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017).

35 The discussion of “below-the-neck” reform is based on and updates 

that found in Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Army Group Army Reorganization: 

An Initial Analysis,” October 2017, available at <www.ashtreeanalytics.com/

wp-content/uploads/2017/10/PLA-Army-Group-Army-Reorganization-An-InitialAnalysis.pdf>.

36 “Who Said There Is Trust Crisis? I Say Never Leave Any Brother” [你说有

信任危机?我说绝不丢下任何一个兄弟], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 6, 2018, 

available at <www.81.cn/lj/2018-02/06/content_7934749.htm>.

37 “Role Model Helps New Recruits Grow and Improve” [身边榜样助力新

兵成长进步], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 30, 2017, available at <www.81.

cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/30/content_189134.htm>. A new marine special 

operations forces (SOF) brigade with a Dragon Commando unit [jiaolong tuji dui, 

蛟龙突击队] may also have been formed recently from existing marine assets. 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

388

See “Decrypt ‘Operation Red Sea’ Prototype” [解密《红海行动》原型], Sina.com, 

February 20, 2018, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2018-02-20/

doc-ifyrswmu3697775.shtml>.

38 “PLA Daily Commentator: Adhere to Training to Prepare for War” [解放

军报评论员文章:坚持练兵备战], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 22, 2015, available at 

<www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-07/22/content_6595259.htm>.

39 Zhang Tao, ed., “Type-96B Seen as Pillar of Nation’s Tank Force,” China 

Daily (Beijing), August 10, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2016-08/10/content_7200566.htm>. The 

numbers cited in this article are roughly consistent with what has been reported 

by The Military Balance 2017 and U.S. Department of Defense 2016 report on the 

Chinese military. The 7,000 figure includes both main battle tanks and light tanks.

40 The Military Balance 2018, 251.

41 Zhang Zhaoxing [张照星], “Transformation of Combined Arms Battalion 

from ‘Accepting Instructions Type’ to ‘Independent Operations Type’” [合成营由“

接受指令型”向“独立作战型”转变], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 9, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/lj/2016-09/09/content_7249484.htm>; and Wang Renfei and 

Zhang Xuhang [王任飞, 张旭航], “Combined Infantry Battalion Has Command 

Post” [合成步兵营有了“中军帐”], PLA Daily [解放军报], May 27, 2015, available at 

<www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-05/27/content_6508696.htm>.

42 Yang Xihe and Kang Ke [杨西河, 康克], “20th Group Army Realizes Precision Command by Breaking Information Barriers Between Arms” [第20集团

军打破兵种信息壁垒实现精确指挥], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 25, 2016, 

available at <http://zb.81.cn/content/2016-09/25/content_7275473.htm>.

43 Ma Sancheng and Sun Libo [马三成, 孙利波], “Western Theater Army 

Units Hold Command Ability Standards Training” [西部战区陆军部队开展指挥

能力达标集训], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 23, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

lj/2016-03/23/content_6972534.htm>.

44 Yin Hang and Liang Pengfei [尹航, 梁蓬飞], “All Army Symposium on 

Realistic Military Training Held in Beijing” [全军实战化军事训练座谈会在京召

开], China Military Online [中国军网], June 25, 2016, available at <http://www.81.

cn/jmywyl/2016-06/25/content_7119351.htm>. 

45 For a recent example of this goal stated in English, see Ouyang, ed., “Symposium Highlights Matching Military Exercises with Real Combat,” Xinhua, June 

26, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-06/26/content_7120044.htm>.
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

389

46 Jian Lin [菅琳], ed., “Lay Greater Stress on System-of-Systems Building” [

更加注重体系建设], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 18, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

theory/2016-07/18/content_7159804.htm>.

47 For two examples in 2016, see “For a Strong Military First Train Generals, 

in Training Soldiers Train Officers First” [强军先强将 练兵先练官], PLA Daily [

解放军报], January 17, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-01/17/

content_135485.htm>; and “With This Type of Locomotive in the Lead, Are the 

Little Partners Living It?” [有这样的“火车头”领跑,小伙伴们还坐的住吗?], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], April 12, 2016.

48 Zhang Xudong [张旭东], “Grasp the ‘Key Links’ of Joint Operations” [抓

住联合作战“关节点”], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 19, 2016, available at <www.81.

cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/19/content_150977.htm>.

49 Jiang Yukun [姜玉坤], “The Battalion to Become the PLA’s Basic Combat 

Unit to Carry Out Independent Tasks” [营将作为解放军基础战术单元独立执行

作战任务], Xinhua, April 25, 2008, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2008-

04-25/0632497096.html>.

50 Liao Qiaoming [李桥铭], “Let New-Type Combat Forces Become PLA’s 

‘Trump Cards’” [让新型作战力量成为手中“王牌”], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 15, 

2016, available at <www.81.cn/jlwh/2015-07/15/content_6594358.htm>.

51 For a description of transregional exercises from 2006 to 2011, see Dennis 

J. Blasko, “Clarity of Intentions: People’s Liberation Army Transregional Exercises 

to Defend China’s Borders,” in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and 

Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 171–212.

52 Liang Pengfei and Li Yuming [梁鹏飞, 李玉明], “Looking Back at 

Zhurihe, Seeing the Hardship” [回望朱日和,忧患之中见担当], PLA Daily [解

放军报], August 21, 2014, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2014-08/21/

content_85240.htm>.

53 Shao Min and Sun Xingwei [邵敏, 孙兴维], “Army Organizes 17 Transregional Exercises from July to September, Seven New Rules to Promote Realistic 

Confrontation” [陆军7至9月组织17场跨区演习 7条新规推动真打实抗], PLA Daily 

[解放军报], August 4, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/sydbt/2016-08/04/content_7189782.htm>.

54 “2017 Army Unit Base Training Begins” [2017年陆军部队基地化训练

拉开战幕], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 24, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/

jmywyl/2017-08/24/content_7730097.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

390

55 Shao and Sun, “Army Organizes 17 Transregional Exercises from July to 

September, Seven New Rules to Promote Realistic Confrontation”; ibid.

56 “Stride-2016 Zhurihe Series of Live Confrontation Exercises Begins” [

跨越-2016•朱日和”实兵对抗系列演习拉开战幕], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 16, 

2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/16/content_150685.htm>.

57 Zhang Li, Wu Aili, and Zhao Lingyu, “Exercise Mission Action-2013C 

Led by China’s Air Force,” International College of Defence Studies, People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, June 5, 2013, available at 

<www.cdsndu.org/html_en/to_articleContent_article.id=8a28e6d84adec8bf014ae15b011900b9.html>.

58 For joint exercises commanded by the navy and air force in 2014 and 

2015, see Dennis J. Blasko, “Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 5–6 (August 1, 

2016), 685–708.

59 Li Mangmang [李芒茫], “ASEAN Joint Exercise Begins, Special Operations Force Participates” [东盟联合演练拉开帷幕 特战队员随队参加], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], September 6, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/tzjy/2016-09/06/

content_7244105.htm>; Wang Ning and Sun Xingwei [王宁,孙兴维], “‘Peace Mission-2016’: Listen to the Soldiers! Blood Is Flowing!” [“和平使命-2016”:众将士听

令!热血出征!], China Military Online [中国军网], September 12, 2016, available 

at <http://photo.81.cn/pla/2016-09/12/content_7253297.htm>.

60 Zhang Tao, ed., “PLA Sends Team for International Jungle Patrol Competition in Brazil,” China Military Online, August 11, 2016, available at <http://english.

chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-08/11/content_7202787.

htm>; and Zhang Tao, ed., “China Tops International Sniper Competition,” China 

Military Online, June 28, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2016-06/28/content_7123197.htm>.

61 Zhang Tao, ed., “Two Events of International Army Games 2016 Held in 

Kazakhstan,” China Military Online, August 3, 2016, available at <http://english.

chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-08/03/content_7199339.htm>.

62 Zhang Tao, ed., “International Army Games 2016 Wraps Up in Russia,” 

China Military Online, August 15, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.

cn/view/2016-08/15/content_7207953.htm>.

63 “Aim, Race, Win! Russia’s Tank Biathlon 2016 in Most Spectacular Photos 

& Videos,” RT.com, August 14, 2016, available at <www.rt.com/news/355908-russia-tank-biathlon-2016/>.
The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms

391

64 “New Chinese Type-96B Tank Just Broke Down at ‘Tank Biathlon’ Competition,” Defence Forum India, August 15, 2016, available at <http://defenceforumindia.

com/forum/threads/new-chinese-type-96-b-tank-just-broke-down-at-tank-biathlon-competition.77216/>.

65 Daniel Hartnett, “China’s First Deployment of Combat Forces to a 

UN Peacekeeping Mission-South Sudan,” U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, March 13, 2012, available at <www.uscc.gov/Research/

chinas-first-deployment-combat-forces-un-peacekeeping-mission%E2%80%-

94south-sudan>; and “China to Send Peacekeeping Forces to Mali,” Xinhua, July 

12, 2013, available at <www.china.org.cn/world/2013-07/13/content_29412205.

htm>. Some sources call the deployment to Mali the “first” deployment of a 

guard force.

66 “Details of China’s First Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion,” China Military Online, December 23, 2014, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2014-12/23/content_6282015.htm>.

67 Yao Jianing, ed., “2nd Batch of Chinese Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion Flies to 

South Sudan,” China Military Online, December 3, 2015, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-12/03/content_6798884.htm>.

68 Dai Feng and Wu Xu [代烽, 吴旭], “Combat and Support Integration, a ‘Road’ 

That Must Be Crossed” [战保一体,一道非迈不可的“坎”], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 

18, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/18/content_150828.htm>.

69 “83rd Group Army Organizes Equipment Backbone Training Mobilization 

Activity” [第83集团军组织召开装备骨干集训开训动员活动], PLA Daily [解放

军报], March 22, 2018, available at <http://zb.81.cn/content/2018-03/22/content_7980750.htm>; “In Order to Get Work Results Examine the Effectiveness of 

Learning and Implementation” [以工作成果检验学习贯彻成效], PLA Daily [解放

军报], December 10, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-12/10/

content_193914.htm>; “Fast Train and Mercedes Fusion in Tianshan North and 

South,” PLA Daily [解放军报], January 19, 2018, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2018-01/19/content_197380.htm>.

70 “More Than 10 Units Combine into a Brigade, Harmoniously” [10多个单

位合编成一个旅,和谐相处有妙招], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 3, 2017, available 

at <www.81.cn/jwgz/2017-06/03/content_7626985.htm>.

71 “China Establishes Joint Logistic Support Force,” China Military Online, 

September 13, 2016, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2016-09/13/

content_4730336.htm>.
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392

72 Liu Jianwei [刘建伟] et al., “From ‘Department’ to ‘Force’: The Reforms 

Our PLA’s Joint Logistics Must Make” [从“部”到“部队”:我军联勤改革要跨越啥], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], April 18, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jmbl/2017-04/18/

content_7566998_2.htm>.

73 Zhang Tao, ed., “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System Reform,” China Military Online, September 14, 2016, available 

at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm>.

74 Zhang Tao, ed., “PLA Restructuring Changes Focus at Military Schools,” 

China Daily, April 28, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2016-04/28/content_7028544.htm>.

75 Zhao Yusha, “‘Solemn’ Retirement Ceremony Called for PLA Officers,” 

Global Times (Beijing), June 14, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/988169.shtml>.

76 Yang Hong [杨红], ed., “From 2017, No More National Defense Students 

Will Be Recruited from Ordinary High School Graduates” [2017年起不再从普通

高中毕业生中定向招收国防生], China Military Online [中国军网], May 26, 2017, 

available at <www.81.cn/zggfs/2017-05/26/content_7619955.htm>.

77 Zhang, ed., “PLA Restructuring Changes Focus at Military Schools.”

78 Yao Jianing, ed., “PLA Adjusts Policies on Graduate Student Enrolment,” 

China Military Online, September 19, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.

com.cn/view/2016-09/19/content_7265709.htm>.

79 Yao Jianing, ed., “Xi Brings Strength, Integrity to Chinese Armed Forces,” 

Xinhua, July 30, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

china-military-news/2016-07/30/content_7182049.htm>.

80 Zhang Jiashua and Hai Yang [张佳帅, 海洋], “System of Systems Operations: Turn ‘Strong Fingers’ into a ‘Hard Fist’” [体系作战:变 ‘指头强’为 ‘拳头

硬’], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 18, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2016-09/18/content_156883.htm>.
393

MAKING SENSE OF 

CHINA’S MISSILE FORCES

David C. Logan

S

ince the start of the country’s nuclear weapons programs, China’s leaders have emphasized the development of missile forces. This interest 

in missiles was initially focused on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear weapons but has since expanded 

to include a large and expanding force of conventionally armed short-, 

medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles for regional 

military operations.1 In the past two decades, the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery)—the military organization responsible for operating China’s nuclear and land-based conventional 

missile forces—has been transformed from a small force operating liquid-fueled nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to a much larger and more modern 

force increasingly equipped with solid-fueled ballistic missiles. The majority 

of these missiles are now conventional rather than nuclear.

Changes in China’s missile forces cannot be understood without referring to the broader context in which they are occurring. Jeffrey Lewis has 

argued that changes in China’s missile forces have usually been a function 

of broad changes in China’s political environment and bureaucratic structures, with ideological and strategic considerations of only secondary and 

CHAPTER 11
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

394

tertiary importance.2 The most recent military reforms have continued 

in this trend by demonstrating the importance of broader political and 

organizational changes in altering the structure and policies of China’s 

missile forces. The reforms also raise the possibility of a more powerful and 

independent Rocket Force, a development that could increase the salience 

of strategic considerations in how China develops, sizes, and postures its 

missile forces. Depending on its institutional preferences, a more powerful 

Rocket Force might change China’s missile forces in important ways, such 

as prioritizing conventional missions over nuclear missions or lobbying for 

nuclear forces to begin adopting the more assertive operational practices 

common to conventional elements.

This chapter attempts to answer some of the questions raised by the 

technological and organizational changes sweeping China’s missile forces. 

First, it reviews the history and evolution of China’s missile forces as guided 

by technological and bureaucratic influences. Second, it describes key features of the organizational structure and operational practices of China’s 

missile forces on the eve of the 2016 reforms. Third, it examines the impact 

of the recent military reforms on the missile forces. Finally, it assesses the 

implications of recent changes for the future of China’s missile forces, 

including its orientation toward either the nuclear or conventional mission 

sets and its relationship with other military units. The chapter employs a 

range of sources, including unclassified and declassified reports from the 

U.S. Government, Chinese state propaganda, displays of missile forces in 

parades and on state television, disclosures on social media, commercial 

satellite imagery, computer models, and open-source Chinese press reports 

on missile force organization, exercises, and capabilities.

Evolution of the Second Artillery Force 

The Second Artillery was created in 1966, just 2 years after China’s first 

successful nuclear test at Lop Nor.3 Though work had begun on missile 

systems a decade earlier, the Second Artillery was assigned responsibility 

for wielding these weapons. At its founding, the Second Artillery was not an 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

395

official military service [junzhong, 军种], but rather an “independent branch 

[bingzhong, 兵种] that is considered equal to the services.”4 For decades, the 

Second Artillery operated a small and relatively unsophisticated force of 

liquid-fueled nuclear-armed missiles. The modern incarnation of China’s 

missile forces, the PLA Rocket Force, operates a larger force of increasingly 

mobile solid-fueled missiles armed with nuclear and conventional warheads.

The following section examines some of the key bureaucratic and 

technological drivers that have influenced the evolution of China’s missile 

forces and the organization charged with operating them.5

Bureaucratic Changes 

The evolution of China’s missile forces has been significantly influenced by 

bureaucratic changes, as different organizations have guided the country’s 

nuclear and missile policies. During the first several decades, China’s decisionmaking about nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was dominated 

by the bureaucracy responsible for defense research and development, the 

National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) [guofang 

kewei, 国防科委] led by Nie Rongzhen from 1958 to 1975 and Zhang Aiping 

from 1975 to 1982. In this early period, the Second Artillery, which was not 

established until 1966, does not seem to have been a powerful or important 

player in shaping China’s nuclear forces.6

NDSTC remained the dominant force, although its influence waned 

in the 1980s with the retirements of Nie and his deputy, Zhang. By the late 

1990s, NDSTC, under the leadership of Nie’s son-in-law, was weak enough 

to be replaced in 1998 with a PLA entity, the General Armaments Department (GAD) [zong zhuangbei bu, 总装备部]. This change was intended 

to make the weapons research and development process more responsive 

to the demands of an increasingly professional PLA and its constituent 

services. However, there are reasons to believe that the GAD remained a 

powerful and somewhat independent bureaucratic entity. Despite the significance of the creation of the GAD, it did not usher in dramatic changes 

in China’s nuclear armed-missile force.7
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396

Technological Changes 

Technological advancements have been one of the key drivers of change in 

China’s missile forces. As part of its ongoing nuclear modernization efforts, 

China has largely replaced its silo-based and roll-out liquid-fueled missiles 

with mobile solid-fueled missiles, has deployed new conventionally armed 

missiles, and has taken steps to improve the ability of its missile forces to 

penetrate adversary ballistic missile defenses.

China’s first generation of ballistic missiles were liquid-fueled—the 

DF-2, DF-3, DF-4, and DF-5. The DF-2, with a range of approximately 

1,000 kilometers, provided a rudimentary regional deterrent capability 

until it was phased out of the force in the 1980s. The regional deterrent 

was bolstered by the intermediate-range DF-3, credited with a range of 

roughly 3,000 kilometers, though this missile is believed to have recently 

been completely removed from the force. The DF-4, with a range of at least 

5,500 kilometers, extended the reach of China’s missile forces to Moscow 

and Guam. The silo-based DF-5, with an estimated range of more than 

12,000 kilometers, formed the backbone of China’s intercontinental force, 

providing the ability to strike the continental United States.

While some of these missiles were in development from the early 

1960s, in March 1965 China established a plan to develop four missiles 

in 8 years [banian sidan, 八年四弹], culminating in an intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM).8

 While some sources describe these four missiles 

in terms of their progressively longer ranges—the ability to strike Japan, 

followed by the Philippines, then Guam, and ultimately the continental 

United States—the real innovation embodied in the banian sidan plan 

was structuring the ICBM program around incremental technical goals. 

In retrospect, the DF-1 represented successful copy production, while the 

DF-2 was an indigenized Soviet missile. The subsequent missiles represented technical advances. The DF-3 was the first effort to cluster engines 

and use storable propellant (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine instead of 

liquid oxygen). The DF-4 was the first effort at staging, using a DF-3 as a 

first stage. Ultimately, the DF-5 integrated all these technical achievements 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

397

into a full-range ICBM, making a number of technical improvements that 

allowed Chinese designers to create the massive missile.9

China completed these developmental goals in order, and largely on 

time. In the case of the DF-5, the successful test in 1971 was followed by 

a long period of disruption during the Cultural Revolution. China would 

conduct a full-range test in 1980 as part of the “three grasps” campaign to 

complete the unfinished business of the 1960s and 1970s—an operational 

ICBM, a submarine-launched ballistic missile, and a communications satellite. 10 An important cautionary note is that the completion of flight testing 

does not signal the end of development. Flight testing appears to continue as 

long as a missile is in service, though after deployment flight tests move from 

research organizations, such as the China Academy of Launch Technology 

[zhongguo yunzai huojian jishu yanjiuyuan, 中国运载火箭技术研究院], to 

the operational tests by either the Second Artillery’s equipment department 

or operational brigades.11 China often continues to make evolutionary 

improvements following the successful production of a missile. For example, 

after initial DF-3 testing and deployment, China conducted a second flight 

test series in the mid-1980s to produce the longer range DF-3A.

The DF-4 and DF-5 both remain in the PLA Rocket Force inventory. 

China undertook a program to improve the DF-5 in the mid-2000s, which 

the U.S. Intelligence Community calls the DF-5A. In September 2015, China 

paraded a missile marked DF-5B that reportedly has multiple warheads. 

China’s nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are, in general, too small to be able 

to carry multiple warheads. The DF-5 was long understood to be a possible 

exception to this rule. It is China’s largest ICBM and is massive, with a throw 

weight of a few thousand tons. The reentry vehicle for China’s smallest nuclear 

warhead, developed for the road-mobile DF-31 ICBM, weighs 500 kilograms. 

U.S. analysts have long noted that China might be able to place three or possibly four such warheads on the DF-5. The appearance of the DF-5B during 

the September 2015 parade suggests that China has done it.12

In January 1985, the State Council and Central Military Commission 

reorganized China’s missile programs to develop a new generation of 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

398

solid-fueled missiles to replace the nuclear-armed liquid fueled missiles of 

the 1965 banian sidan plan. China’s current generation of strategic missiles 

dates to this period: the 1,750-kilometer range DF-21/JL-1 to replace the 

DF-3; the 7,000-kilometer range DF-31/JL-2 to replace the DF-4; and the 

DF-41 ICBM to replace the DF-5. China had begun research on solid-fueled 

ballistic missiles in the 1960s, work that was focused on development of 

a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Work proceeded slowly through 

the 1970s, culminating in a March 1985 meeting where Nie’s deputy and 

successor, Zhang Aiping, apparently ridiculed the notion of a sea-based 

deterrent by arguing that a Chinese submarine armed with the JL-1 would 

have to travel to the Arabian Sea for Moscow to be within range.13 China 

subsequently emphasized the land-based variant, the DF-21.14

In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping extended the timeline for the construction of the second submarine, a decision that amounted to cancelation of the 

program. The Xia-class submarine has never gone on patrol and is usually 

described as not operational and not deployed. It is possible that Chinese leaders might order the submarine armed with nuclear weapons in an extreme 

crisis, but this seems unlikely in the normal course of events. China continued 

development of a land-based variant of the JL-1, successfully testing the DF-21 

in 1985.15 Although China reportedly stood up the first DF-21 operational 

test and evaluation unit in 1985 in Jilin Province, the widespread conversion 

of the DF-3 to DF-21 units did not begin until the late 1990s. Establishment 

of operational test and evaluation units and flight testing occurs well ahead 

of full rate production and initial operational capability.

China first tested the DF-21 in May 1985. It then began a range extension program in August 1985, which eventually produced the DF-21A. 

(Development on the JL-1 appears to have stopped after an aborted program 

in the mid-1980s to develop underwater ignition.16) Testing on the DF-21 

continued through the mid-1990s, with deployments beginning in the 

mid-1990s and continuing as the DF-21A gradually replaced older DF-3A 

missiles.17 The range and deployment locations of the DF-21A suggest that 

it serves a regional deterrent role.18 While research and development of the 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

399

DF-31/JL-2 began in the mid-1980s, flight testing of the DF-31 started in 

August 1999.19 Flight testing was probably completed by the mid-2000s. 

The JL-2 sea-launched variant suffered a series of testing failures until the 

most recent cycle of testing in August 2012, which appears to have been 

successful.20 (China has constructed at least four Jin-class ballistic missile 

submarines and appears to have deployed the JL-2 on them as of 2017.21

Given the limited range of the JL-2, which cannot reach the continental 

United States from its base on Hainan Island, there is speculation that China 

may move on to a longer range version of the missile, usually called the JL-3). 

The original DF-41 program gave way to a range-extended DF-31, called 

the DF-31A, which has been operationally deployed with the Rocket Force.

Only in recent years has China resumed work on the DF-41. It has 

tested the DF-41 six times since 2012, with a noticeable increase in the pace 

of testing since August 2015. There are reports that China is considering 

rail-mobile deployment for the DF-41. China explored rail-mobile basing modes for the DF-4 during the mid-1970s but concluded that basing 

the DF-4 in caves under high mountains was a more feasible approach. 

Rail-mobile deployment would offer some advantages; as missiles become 

larger, road-mobility becomes a challenge, both for the transporter itself 

and for the supporting network of roads and bridges. The DF-41 can 

reportedly accommodate multiple warheads.22 Based on the limited public 

information about the size of China’s nuclear warheads, the DF-41 would 

need to resemble the U.S. Peacekeeper missile in size to accommodate about 

four reentry vehicles.

The Second Artillery was originally established to operate China’s 

nuclear deterrent, but China has also developed and deployed a substantial force of conventionally armed missiles. This began in the mid-1980s, 

and the missiles were intended for export as the defense industry came 

under budgetary pressure. These missiles, initially the DF-15 and DF-25, 

appeared in Pakistan as the Shaheen I and Shaheen II. China has developed 

a large number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), although the 

current Rocket Force inventory appears to comprise variants of the DF-11, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

400

DF-15, and DF-16 missiles.23 (The DF-16 appears to be a heavily modified 

DF-11.) In addition to this series of conventionally armed SRBMs, China 

has deployed conventional variants of the DF-21 and a land-attack cruise 

missile called the CJ-10. China is also developing a new intermediate-range 

ballistic missile, the DF-26. The DF-26 is likely to be a two-stage missile that 

offers longer range and greater throw-weight than the DF-21 and DF-25. 

China also displayed a transporter-erector-launcher with a missile canister 

for the DF-26 in its August 2015 parade to commemorate the end of World 

War II. The narration provided on Chinese television pointedly noted that 

the missile could carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.24

Finally, China is taking steps to improve the ability of its nuclear forces 

to penetrate missile defenses. In January 2014, and again in August, China 

tested a hypersonic glide vehicle. Some open-source information seems 

to suggest that the test was a failure, while other sources argue that it succeeded.25 The U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center has stated that 

the hypersonic glide vehicle under development “is associated with [China’s] 

nuclear deterrent forces.”26 One possible clue is in the name of the system. 

The Chinese designation appears to be “DF-ZF,” which probably stands 

for [dongfeng zairu feixingqi, 东风-再入飞行器] or “DF-Reentry Vehicle.”27

This description of the evolution of China’s ballistic missile force 

indicates that the technology push that marked the first generation of 

Chinese missiles is alive and well. The Chinese defense industry continues 

to produce incremental improvements on fielded systems, including range 

extensions, improvements in accuracy, and the ability to employ different 

types of conventional and nuclear warheads.

The Second Artillery on the Eve of the Reforms 

Thanks to the bureaucratic and technological drivers described thus far, the 

Second Artillery that existed on the eve of the 2015 military reforms differed 

markedly from the Second Artillery at its founding. This section reviews key 

aspects of the force structure and operational features of the Second Artillery 

on the eve of the reforms. We discuss Second Artillery leadership and the 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

401

organization of its missile bases and subordinate missile launch units. These 

features appear largely unchanged following the reforms, with the exception 

of improved integration of conventional Rocket Force missile brigades with 

the new theater commands (TCs). We close with a brief discussion of China’s 

sea-based and aircraft-launched nuclear weapons.

Structure 

The organizational structure of the Second Artillery (now the PLA Rocket 

Force) is more complicated than a simple table showing the number of 

missile launchers or missiles. Far more than a single truck is needed to 

conduct launch operations. A brigade of missile launchers requires support 

vehicles, as well as an infrastructure to maintain the vehicles, missiles, and 

warheads and to support the people who perform these tasks. As a result, it 

is necessary to consider the Rocket Force as an organization.28

The Rocket Force is commanded by a full general, who from 2004 to 

2017 was also a member of the Central Military Commission. The Rocket 

Force political commissar is a theater leader grade officer and chairs the 

Rocket Force Party Committee. The commander serves as vice chairman 

of the Party committee.29 The force is divided into six bases (sometimes 

called armies) numbered 61–66, each led by an army leader grade officer.30

Bases 61–66 oversee subordinate launch brigades and support regiments. 

The Rocket Force also oversees a separate base, Base 67 (formerly Base 22), 

which is responsible for maintaining China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads. 

The Rocket Force leadership also oversees three training bases and an 

engineering base headquartered in Luoyang. The engineering base, which 

was established in 2012, oversees a command in Hanzhong, Shaanxi, that 

is primarily responsible for tunneling; a collocated “engineering technology 

general group” in Luoyang, Henan, responsible for facility installation; and 

a specialized engineering brigade for disaster response that is garrisoned 

north of Beijing.31

Each missile base has between three and five subordinate missile 

brigades, with most bases operating a mix of conventional and nuclear 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

402

brigades. The exception is Base 61 (formerly Base 51), which operates only 

conventional missiles and may have up to eight missile brigades. Within 

this organizational structure, command authority is exerted from the base, 

down through brigades, battalions, companies, and platoons.32 Though 

most of China’s missile bases command both nuclear and conventional brigades, these two forces appear to be subject to somewhat separate command 

and control arrangements. The Rocket Force’s nuclear units are believed to 

report directly to the Central Military Commission, while there is evidence 

that conventional units may now be under the operational command of the 

theater commands.33

Table 1. China’s Ballistic Missile Inventory

U.S. 

Designation

Chinese Propellant Mode Range (km) No. of 

Launchers

CSS-2 Mod 2 DF-3A Liquid Transportable 3,000 ?? (limited 

mobility)

CSS-3 DF-4 Liquid Silo and transportable

5,500+ 10–15

CSS-4 Mod 2 DF-5A Liquid Silo 12,000+ About 20

CSS-5 Mod 1 DF-21 Solid Road-mobile 1,750+ Fewer than 

CSS-5 Mod 2 DF-21A Solid Road-mobile 1,750+ 50

CSS-5 

Conventional

DF-21C Solid Road-mobile 1,750+ Fewer than 

30

CSS-5 Mod 5 DF-21D 1,500+ Unknown

CSS-6 Mod 1 DF-15/

M-9

Solid Road-mobile 600 90–110

CSS-6 Mod 2 DF-15A Solid Road-mobile 850+

CSS-6 Mod 3 DF-15B Solid Road-mobile 750+

CSS-7 Mod 1 DF-11/

M-11

Solid Road-mobile 300 120–140

CSS-7 Mod 2 DF-11A Solid Road-mobile 600

CSS-8 B610 Solid/liquid Road-mobile 150

CSS-9 Mod 1 B611 Solid Road-mobile 150 Dual 

launcher

CSS-9 ModX-2

B611M Solid Road-mobile 260

CSS-10 Mod 1 DF-31 Solid Road-mobile 7,000+ 5–10

CSS-10 Mod 2 DF-31A Solid Road-mobile 11,000+ More than 

15

CSS-11 Mod 1 DF-16 Solid Road-mobile 800+

CSS-14 

Mod-X-1

P12 Solid Road-mobile 150 Dual 

launcher
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

403

Table 1. China’s Ballistic Missile Inventory

U.S. 

Designation

Chinese Propellant Mode Range (km) No. of 

Launchers

CSS-14 

Mod-X-2

BP12A Solid Road-mobile 280

CSS-X-15 M20 Solid Road-mobile 280

CSS-X-16 SY400 Solid Road-mobile 200 8 rocket 

MLRS

DF-26 Solid Road-mobile IRBM Reported to 

be dual-capable.

CSS-X-20 DF-41 Solid Road- or 

rail mobile

ICBM Not yet 

deployed

CSS-NX-3 JL-1 Solid Submarinelaunched

1,700+ Not yet 

deployed

CSS-NX-14 JL-2 Solid Submarinelaunched

7,000+

JL-3 Solid SubmarinelaunchedRumored 

to be under 

development

YJ-63 LACM Air-launched

CJ-10/

DH-10

LACM Groundlaunched

Key: ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile; LACM: land 

attack missile; MLRS: multiple launch missile system.

Notes: Table compiled by Jeffrey Lewis. The author gratefully acknowledges his contributions. Public 

U.S. Government reports suggest that all DF-3A systems may have been phased out of the force.

Each brigade has launch battalions and/or launch companies that 

operate a limited number of launchers. A launch platform in this context 

can be a silo (as in the case of the DF-5), a cave rollout to launch site (such 

as the DF-4), or, for mobile missiles, a transporter-erector-launcher. Table 

1 chronicles China’s ballistic missile inventory. The missiles and launchers 

also require significant communications, intelligence, and maintenance 

support. The structure of brigades differs for fixed-site missiles and mobile 

missiles, as well as for conventional and nuclear missiles. As a result, the 

number of missiles per brigade may vary greatly between conventional missile brigades (up to 36 launchers with as many as 6 missiles per launcher), 

mobile nuclear-armed missile brigades (between 6 and 12 missile launchers 

per brigade), and fixed-site nuclear-armed missiles (6 or fewer silos or cave 

(cont.)
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

404

rollout sites.) This reflects differences in the number of battalions, companies, and launchers assigned to each unit.

When looking at unclassified U.S. Government estimates, it usually 

makes sense to estimate that each nuclear-armed mobile missile brigade has 

approximately eight launchers—although average does not necessarily accurately reflect each unit. For example, the National Air and Space Intelligence 

Center assesses that China has 5 to 10 DF-31 missiles and “more than 15” 

DF-31A missiles.34 Using an average of eight, China probably has one DF-31 

brigade and two DF-31A brigades. Using the structure of bases, brigades, and 

launch units, a rough order of battle for the Rocket Force is presented in table 2.

Table 2. PLA Rocket Force Organization

Base (Previous) Brigade (Previous) MUCD (Previous) Location System

61 (52) HQ 96601 (96151) Huangshan, Anhui

611 (807) 96711 (96161) Chizhou DF-21

612 (811) 96712 (96163) Jingdezhen DF-21A

613 (815) 96713 (96165) Shangrao DF-15B

614 (817) 96714 (96167) Yong’an DF-11A

615 (818) 96715 (96169) Meizhou DF-11A

616 (819) 96716 (96162) Ganzhou DF-15

617 (820) 96717 (96164) Jinhua DF-15

62 (53) HQ 96602 (96201) Kunming, Yunnan

621 (802) 96721 (96211) Yibin DF-21A?

622 (808) 96722 (96213) Yuxi DF-31A

623 (821) 96723 (96215) Liuzhou DH-10A?

624 (825) 96724 (96219) Qingyuan DF-21D

625 (UI) 96725 (96216) Jianshui (UI)

626 (825) 96726 (96319) Qingyuan DF-21C/D? DF-26?

UI (UI) 96727 (UI) Puning (UI)

63 (55) HQ 96603 (96301) Huaihua, Hunan

631 (803) 96731 (96311) Jingzhou DF-5B

632 (805) 96732 (96313) Shaoyang DF-31

633 (814) 96733 (96315) Huitong DF-5A?

634 (UI) 96734 (UI) (UI) (UI)

635 (824) 96735 (96317) Yichun DH-10

636 (826) 96736 (96318) Shaoguan DF-16

637 (UI) 96737 (UI) (UI) (UI)

64 (56) HQ 96604 (96351) Lanzhou

641 (806) 96741 (96111) Hancheng DF-31

642 (809) 96742 (96361) Datong DF-31A

643 (812) 96743 (96363) Tianshui DF-31A

644 (UI) 96744 (UI) Hanzhong (UI)

645? (UI) 96745 (UI) (UI)

646 (823) 96746 (96365) Korle DF-21B? DF-21C?

65 (51) HQ 96605 (96101) Shenyang

651 (810) 96751 (96113) Dalian DF-21
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

405

Table 2. PLA Rocket Force Organization

Base (Previous) Brigade (Previous) MUCD (Previous) Location System

652 (816) 96752 (96115) Tonghua DF-21C? DF-21D?

653 (822) 96753 (96117) Laiwu DF-21C

654 (UI) 96754 (UI) Dalian (UI)

66 (54) HQ 96606 (96251) Luoyang

661 (801) 96761 (96261) Lingbao DF-5B

662 (804) 96762 (96263) Luanchuan DF-4? DF-5A?

663 (813) 96763 (96265) Nanyang DF-31A?

664 (UI) 96764 (UI) Luoyang (UI)

665 (UI) 96765 (UI) (UI) (UI)

666 (827) 96766 (96267) Xinyang DF-26?

Key: HQ: headquarters; MUCD: Military Unit Cover Designator; UI: unidentified.

Source: Mark Stokes, “PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference,” Project 2049 Institute, 

Arlington, VA, April 9, 2018, based on open-source analysis. The author and editors thank Mr. Stokes 

for his generosity in sharing this information with us.

Each Rocket Force missile base and missile brigade have a headquarters, with multiple subordinate launch units. As suggested by the use of 

cave-based rollout sites, the Rocket Force relies extensively on underground 

facilities—and engineering elements responsible for digging them. Launch 

units are based above ground on a day-to-day basis in peacetime. Underground facilities are used for storage, as well as missile-warhead assembly, 

check out, and roll out. Launch units practice deploying to tunnels for 

short periods of time, a practice that allows the Rocket Force to ride out a 

nuclear attack as suggested by the country’s no-first-use policy. A recent 

article described a “multiday survival training” exercise in which a launch 

battalion spent 8 days living in tunnels before conducting an exercise.35

The article highlights the “poor living environment” of the tunnels for even 

short periods of time—particularly the challenge of maintaining nutrition. 

(Cooked meals are prohibited because the heat from a kitchen would reveal 

the tunnel is occupied.36)

In addition to the land-based Rocket Force units, the Chinese navy has 

built at least four Jin-class ballistic missile submarines in the past decade. 

These first submarines are believed to be based in Hainan.37 Each Jin-class 

submarine has 12 launch tubes to carry the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic 

missile. The slow development of the JL-2 delayed operational deployment 

(cont.)
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

406

of the system, but the missile now appears to be deployed on submarines.38

Major operational questions, such as how China would communicate with 

ballistic submarines and whether China would conduct continuous at sea 

deterrence patrols, remain unanswered. It is not clear, for example, whether 

naval units will develop their own nuclear warhead storage and control 

system outside of the Second Artillery Base 22 structure, or whether units 

assigned to navy fleets would receive warheads only in a crisis.39

China probably does not currently maintain aircraft-delivered or 

tactical nuclear weapons. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United States 

did not identify locations at airfield for nuclear weapons storage or units 

responsible for nonmissile warhead handling.40 Some estimates periodically 

list aircraft as possibly having “secondary” nuclear missions or speculate 

that China may have an interest in tactical nuclear weapons.41 There are also 

reports of work on a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber currently under 

development.42 However, despite recent changes to the country’s nuclear 

forces and gradual progress toward a potential nuclear triad, China’s nuclear 

deterrent will continue to be dominated by the Rocket Force.

Operational Features 

The operational practices of the Rocket Force have been shaped largely by 

policy choices of civilian leadership and by the technical characteristics of 

the force. Civilian leadership has traditionally prioritized strict political 

control of its missile forces over operational flexibility. This has meant the 

adoption of a relatively constrained nuclear posture, including operational 

practices that may reduce operational readiness but maximize political 

control. Operational practices have also been influenced by technical considerations. For several decades following the creation of the country’s 

missile forces, China’s ballistic missile force consisted of only a few immature 

liquid-fueled stationary missiles. However, as part of its ongoing modernization program, China’s nuclear-armed missiles have increasingly become 

solid-fueled and road-mobile. These technical changes have entailed potentially significant operational changes as well.
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

407

China’s liquid-fueled ballistic missiles are not kept fueled during 

peacetime. These missiles used transporter-erectors for the DF-3As,43

either elevate-to-launch silos or cave-rollout for the DF-4, and silo-basing for the DF-5. A typical rollout-to-launch exercise, as presented on 

closed-circuit television, demonstrates the operational aspects of launching liquid-fueled ballistic missiles.44 (This launch exercise took place at 

a training center, as suggested by the fact that the building in which the 

warhead is attached is above ground.) Chinese missileers must arm the 

warhead inside its shelter and complete a checkout of the missile. The 

missile is then rolled out to the launchpad, where it is erected. The missile 

is fueled and guidance sets are aligned/programmed. The missile is then 

ready for launch. This process can take a significant amount of time, 

lasting hours. For silo-based ballistic missiles, there is no rollout, but the 

missile must be armed, fueled, and the guidance system must be aligned 

and programmed prior to launch.

Although the DF-3 (CSS-2) had limited mobility, the introduction of 

truly mobile solid-fueled missiles such as the DF-21 required new operational practices for the Rocket Force. Mobile operations can be seen in 

satellite images near Da Qaidam, which previously contained two cave 

rollout-to-launch sites but is now believed to be a training center.45 During 

peacetime, the unit is located in a garrison. In the event of a crisis, the garrison would be a likely target of enemy attack. On strategic warning, the 

unit could deploy to hardened shelters, a holding area, or proceed directly 

to a launch site. There are a number of launch sites along the main road 

stretching from a garrison location. In satellite images, one can clearly see 

the pad unoccupied, then covered with vehicles in netting and tents conducting a launch exercise, then empty again.46

China appears to continue to store nuclear warheads separately from 

ballistic missiles during peacetime. A description of a mobile missile 

launch in the Gobi Desert—likely at the Da Qaidam training area—depicts 

the unit mating the reentry vehicle to the missile on the fifth day of the 

exercise, following maneuvers in the field, then erecting and launching the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

408

missile. However, it would seem more logical for units to mate warheads 

before deployment.47

The Rocket Force has an extensive system for handling warheads, 

centered on Base 67 near Baoji (formerly Base 22).48 Each base has a 

warhead regiment that performs these functions. China initially stored 

nuclear weapons in three vaults west of the original nuclear weapons 

design facility near Haiyan (Koko Nor). Sometime after the late 1960s, 

warhead storage moved to the Second Artillery unit near Baoji. Base 67 

is responsible for storing warheads, transporting them, training units 

in warhead handling, and communications and maintenance of warheads and special vehicles. The size and composition of these units have 

remained roughly the same, even as the number of Rocket Force brigades 

has expanded, suggesting that new Rocket Force brigades are mostly 

armed with conventional warheads.

Until recently, Rocket Force training has suffered from a lack of realism 

and a poor emphasis on conducting joint operations. However, in recent 

years, training has increasingly attempted to emphasize realistic conditions 

by undertaking more confrontation red-blue exercises and improving its 

ability to conduct joint operations.

The Rocket Force has taken steps to emphasize and standardize the 

use of red-blue confrontation exercises.49 In 2016, the newly established 

Rocket Force announced the creation of its Blue Army Teaching and 

Research Section, led by Colonel Diao Guangming.50 Diao has been 

quoted as favoring a move toward more complex scenarios in Rocket 

Force training, stating, “Those whose peacetime training is overly nice 

will suffer greatly when they take the battlefield.”51 The new section may 

help standardize future confrontation exercises, which had reportedly 

suffered in the past as blue teams were assembled ad hoc from various 

different units.52 For example, past Rocket Force red-blue exercises have 

employed “electronic blue teams” confined to a base and presumably 

capable of simulating only some kinds of electronic harassment from 

the enemy.53
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

409

Impact of the 2016 Reforms 

China is in the midst of sweeping military reforms that have affected the 

force structure, organization, and command and control mechanisms of 

the PLA. The reforms have the dual goals of tightening political control and 

improving the military’s ability to conduct joint operations. The reforms 

elevated the Second Artillery to full service status and renamed it the PLA 

Rocket Force. Despite much attention paid to its new name and higher organizational status, the Rocket Force appears to be the service least affected 

by the reforms.54 Here we summarize the major reforms to the PLA and 

assess the impact of those reforms on China’s missile forces.

PLA-Wide Reforms 

The Rocket Force’s creation did not occur in isolation, but in the context of 

reforms that affected the missions and command arrangements for nearly 

all the Chinese military. The scope and significance of PLA reforms have 

been likened to those of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986.55

The PLA replaced its old system of seven military regions (MRs) with 

five new joint theater commands. Under the old system, the air force, 

navy, and Second Artillery maintained peacetime control of their units, 

with command and control of air force and navy assets transferring to the 

war zone commander in the event of actual conflict.56 By contrast, theater 

commanders will use their theater joint operations command center to 

work through the army, navy, and air force component headquarters to 

command all the ground, naval, and air forces assigned to their theaters 

in both peacetime and wartime. The commanders of the ground, naval, 

and air components are dual-hatted as deputy theater commanders. The 

relationship between the services and theater commands appears similar 

to the U.S. arrangement, with the services responsible for organizing, 

training, and equipping units as a “force provider” and the theater commands responsible for operational planning and execution (see the chapter 

by Burke and Chan in this volume).57 The reforms also established a new 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

410

headquarters for the PLA Army, renamed the Second Artillery Force as the 

Rocket Force and elevated its status to that of a full service, and created the 

Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistics Support Force.

While the reforms include dramatic changes in the command and 

control arrangements of the other services, the Rocket Force appears largely 

untouched. Initial reports emphasized continuity in both China’s nuclear 

policies and Rocket Force command and control arrangements, though 

more recent accounts suggest greater progress toward integrating China’s 

missile forces with the joint operations command centers of the newly 

established theater commands.

Apparent Continuity of Nuclear Strategy and Policy 

Media reports and official statements consistently emphasize that the creation 

of the Rocket Force will not entail a change in China’s fundamental nuclear 

strategy, and especially not a change in its no-first-use policy. Reporting on 

the creation of the Rocket Force, a China Daily article stated that China’s 

nuclear policy would remain unchanged: “Reiterating the no-first-use nuclear 

weapons policy and the country’s defensive nuclear strategy, [Ministry of 

National Defense Spokesman] Yang [Yujun] said China always keeps its 

nuclear capability at the minimum level required for safeguarding its national 

security.”58 In describing the Rocket Force, Xi Jinping used language identical 

to that applied to the Second Artillery in the past, describing the new Rocket 

Force as “a fundamental force for our country’s strategic deterrent, a strategic 

pillar for our country’s great power status, and an important cornerstone 

in protecting our national security.”59 The same rhetorical formulation was 

repeated by Xi in his 2012 address to the Second Artillery, suggesting the 

fundamental role of the new Rocket Force will mirror that of its predecessor.60

Command and Control 

Rocket Force command and control structures have not changed to follow 

the new model used by the theater commands to control army, navy, and 

air force units within their areas of responsibility. Mainland commentary 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

411

on the Rocket Force has consistently emphasized the need for strong central 

control. In announcing the creation of the Rocket Force, media reports have 

reiterated the importance of centralized high-level command for strategic 

missile forces.61 An article in Rocket Force News stated that the force is “a 

strategic military service directly controlled and used by the Central Party 

Committee, Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.”62 These 

comments suggest that centralized command continues to extend to not 

only nuclear units but also conventional ones.

Although some theater commanders claimed to control conventional 

missile forces within their theaters,63 initial reports about the relationship 

between the services and theater commands were notable for the paucity 

of references to the Rocket Force. Media reports noted that the new theater 

commands would have dedicated forces from the army, navy, and air force 

but did not mention forces of the newly formed Rocket Force, suggesting 

that its units will remain with their home bases.64 The theater commands 

were reported to have two deputy commanders from “each of the three 

service branches,” not including the Rocket Force.65 One report did note 

that 100 Rocket Force personnel have been assigned to TC headquarters as 

staff officers, suggesting that some mechanisms exist for integrating the 

Rocket Force into theater planning.66

Initial reports on training intended to improve the operational relationship between the Rocket Force and theater commands emphasized 

coordination between the Rocket Force and theater commands, eschewing any language suggesting direct command authority from the theater 

command to Rocket Force units.67 A mock order in a training drill used 

the word coordinate [peihe, 配合] to describe the unit’s activities in relation 

to TC units [zhanqu budui, 战区部队]. A photo essay reporting on Rocket 

Force joint training hosted on the Web site of the newly created Southern 

Theater Command stated that Rocket Force units conducted operations 

“according to newly revised joint operations war plans with the relevant 

units of each of the other services,” again suggesting a role of independent 

support rather than command subordination.68
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

412

One indicator of the Second Artillery’s relative independence vis-à-vis 

the military regions prior to the reforms was the fact that the command 

geography of the Second Artillery did not map directly onto the former 

MR borders. The Second Artillery had six missile bases commanding 

launch brigades and a seventh responsible for nuclear warhead storage and 

handling. Of the six operational bases, four were believed to command 

launch brigades garrisoned in different military regions. For example, 

Base 65 (formerly Base 51), headquartered in Shenyang, oversaw not only 

two nuclear-armed launch brigades garrisoned in the former Shenyang 

MR but also one nuclear-armed launch brigade garrisoned in the former 

Beijing MR and one conventionally armed launch brigade garrisoned in the 

former Jinan MR.69 A similar command geography involving Rocket Force 

bases commanding brigades in multiple theater commands appears to be 

in place after the recent military reforms, though there has been significant 

reshuffling of missile force units between the various missile bases.70

Elevation to Independent Service 

In some respects, the formal elevation of the Rocket Force to the level of a service merely codifies its de facto status. The Second Artillery’s organizational 

clout had steadily grown in the last 15 years. Prior to the creation of the Rocket 

Force, the Second Artillery commander and other senior leaders enjoyed 

ranks and grades equivalent to that of their counterparts in the services. 

The Second Artillery had the same constellation of bureaucratic structures 

as the services, including a Political Department, Logistics Department, 

Armaments Department, and Command Academy. In 2004, Jing Zhiyuan, 

then-commander of the Second Artillery, and his navy and air force counterparts became ex officio members of the Central Military Committee (CMC). 

Wei Fenghe, the first Rocket Force commander, was a CMC member, but his 

successor Lieutenant General Zhou Yaning and the commanders of the other 

services no longer have ex officio seats on the CMC.71

Many reports on the Rocket Force have emphasized the significance of 

its higher status as a service. Previous writings about the Second Artillery’s 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

413

role in joint campaigns noted that while strikes conducted by Second Artillery units would be central to the importance of any operation, the Second 

Artillery as an institution would largely play an auxiliary or supporting 

role to the services.72 However, a professor at the Rocket Force Command 

Academy predicted that the force would be able to “fight independently” 

rather than merely “support[ing] other forces, a definition that is incompatible with the Rocket Force’s capacity and actual role.”73

Rocket Force members have stressed the independence and prestige 

that come with its status. The Rocket Force has reportedly already begun 

implementing the internal bureaucratic adjustments necessary to elevate 

it to the status of a full military service,74 including a rollout of Rocket 

Force uniforms.75 Internal Rocket Force reports highlight the fact that Xi 

personally chose the name of the Rocket Force and bestowed a new flag 

to the force.76 An article published in Rocket Force News reflecting on the 

significance of the force’s elevation to the level of a military service noted 

that the “status of the Rocket Force as a military service is getting more 

important than ever before.”77 The article predicted the Rocket Force would 

see changes in structure, status, and missions. Specifically, the “value and 

capability of the Rocket Force should lie in the strengthening of the credible and reliable nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterstrike capabilities 

referenced by Chairman Xi, along with strengthening the establishment of 

intermediate-range and long-range precision strike forces and enhancing 

counterbalancing abilities.”78

A Rocket Force political instructor, writing about the reforms, stated 

that the elevation to the level of a military service would bring commensurate transformation of the force’s structure and elevation of its mission, 

arguing that the status as a full-fledged service means that the “Rocket 

Force is no longer a paper tiger, placing missiles on launch platforms to 

scare the adversary, but rather is a strategic iron fist ready anytime to launch 

missiles to intimidate the enemy,” perhaps suggesting a greater warfighting 

role for the force.79
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

414

Implications for the Future 

Significant questions remain about the future trajectory of China’s missile 

forces. This section addresses three key questions. First, to what extent will 

Rocket Force units be able to successfully participate in joint operations 

with the military units of other services and those assigned to the theater 

commands? Second, will the Rocket Force emphasize the conventional 

or nuclear aspect of its identity, and what implications will this have for 

its force structure and operational practices? Third, what does the Rocket 

Force’s elevation mean for its relationship with other services and how could 

this influence control of other strategic weapons systems?

Future Joint Operations 

The Rocket Force is part of a broader PLA-wide trend in emphasizing 

joint operations (see the chapter by Cozad in this volume). Training has 

appeared to focus on developing the ability to conduct joint operations, 

something that has long been emphasized but not fully implemented. The 

Rocket Force has created plans with other services, spelling out how it will 

coordinate in joint operations.80 Training has reportedly tried to move away 

from emphasizing theories and concepts of joint operations and to focus 

on the actual experience and challenges of conducting such operations.81

Recently there has been a substantial increase in joint operations training 

undertaken by PLA Rocket Force units, especially exercises directly involving units of other services.

As recently as 2014, though the former Second Artillery had been 

emphasizing the concept of joint operations, “few instances of actual joint 

training were reported.” A review of training exercises conducted throughout the entire year of 2014 noted Second Artillery participation in only one 

exercise, a military-wide exercise identified as “Joint Action–2014.”82 A 

2017 report, however, noted a significant increase in joint exercises, reporting that the Rocket Force “has launched hundreds of missiles in live-fire 

exercises over the past several years to improve its combat readiness. The 

missiles were fired during about 40 exercises within the force itself, as well 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

415

as during more than 30 joint drills between the force and other military 

branches and regional theater commands.”83 A Rocket Force News report on 

training improvements noted that “multi-arm, multi-service joint exercises 

and joint training have become the new normal.”84 The Rocket Force and 

Strategic Support Force have also held discussions on coordinating their 

respective forces in future joint campaigns.85

Despite the recent emphasis on joint operations, the PLA may experience difficulties in integrating Rocket Force units into joint operations. 

There are reports of challenges involving the force, with particular emphasis on the concepts and practices of personnel. As one brigade commander 

described it, “It’s a problem of old wine in a new bottle.”86 A report on efforts 

to better coordinate between the theater commands and services noted that 

while members of the various services had been dispatched to help staff 

the theater commands and their knowledge of their own service was quite 

good, their understanding of joint operations exhibited “noticeable gaps.”87

A significant development is apparent progress in integrating Rocket 

Force command and control structures with those of the theater commands. Initial reports following the establishment of the Rocket Force 

suggested that China’s missile units had not yet been integrated into the 

theater joint command and control structures established as part of the 

reforms. Rocket Force command and control appeared to remain centralized and not delegated to theater commanders, which would hamper 

effectiveness in future joint campaigns. The greater institutional independence of the Rocket Force vis-à-vis both the theater commands and other 

services may have exacerbated this problem. Divided command would 

make it more difficult to coordinate the actions of Rocket Force missile 

brigades and those forces assigned directly to a theater command in a 

fast-moving crisis without clear command authorities and an integrated 

communications network.

However, more recent reports on the relationship between the Rocket 

Force and theater commands have emphasized efforts to improve jointness, 

with some language suggesting conventional Rocket Force missile units may
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

416

be formally under the command of TC joint operations command centers. 

One recent report in Rocket Force News observes, “in the future of combat, 

all war will be joint, and without jointness there will be no victory.”88 The 

same account reports that “this base has joined the joint operations chain 

of command” and that “accelerating [the base’s] integration into the TC 

joint operations command system . . . is a top priority.”89 A 2017 report on 

joint exercises led by the East Sea Fleet, in describing the need to enhance 

coordination in joint operations, mentioned the Rocket Force alongside 

the army and navy, suggesting a similar relationship between each of the 

services and the theater command.90 A report on integrating a missile base 

into a TC joint operations command system noted that “when we cross 

the threshold into the theater command, we are like one family.”91 Several 

accounts from Rocket Force sources mention efforts by the missile forces to 

“integrate” or “build into” TC joint operations command centers and cite 

the presence of Rocket Force officers within TC joint operations command 

centers.92 Articles as recent as early 2018 report that efforts to improve 

integration between Rocket Force command and control systems and 

those of the theater commands are ongoing and “exploratory,” suggesting 

that the efforts are as yet incomplete.93 It is still not entirely clear how and 

to what extent theater commands will directly command missile units. 

For example, a sample of recent reports do not explicitly describe direct 

command by theater commands over missile force units or the attachment 

of missile force units to them. However, it is clear that the Rocket Force is 

emphasizing efforts to enhance coordination with the theater commands 

and other services and is undertaking steps to deepen that coordination.

It is not yet clear how far the PLA will integrate Rocket Force units into 

the joint operations command and control over the theater commands or 

why that integration has proceeded more slowly than the integration of 

units from the other services. There are several possible explanations for 

the slow pace. PLA leadership might have decided that maintaining the 

current Rocket Force organization exploits economies of scale and operational synergies. Some of the missile systems operated by the force include 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

417

both conventional and nuclear variants. Even missiles of different systems 

may share logistics, maintenance, and training requirements. Transferring 

control of conventional units to the theater commands would likely have 

required the creation of parallel and redundant structures. As one expert 

notes, “personnel, logistics, and training requirements for only two SRBM 

brigades proved unwieldy for the army when most SRBM units are assigned 

to the Second Artillery.”94

There may also be operational reasons for maintaining current command and control arrangements for conventional missile units. TC leaders 

probably lack familiarity with missile operations and Rocket Force units. 

CMC leaders, including Xi Jinping, may also want to maintain tight central 

control over China’s conventional and nuclear missile systems given their 

unique ability to strike targets abroad and potentially initiate a conflict 

due to carelessness or poor judgment. The accidental launch in July 2016 

of a Taiwanese antiship missile that killed a fisherman provided a sobering 

reminder that such concerns are not merely academic.95

Alternatively, the PLA may intend to fully integrate conventional Rocket 

Force units into the TC command and control mechanisms, and the relatively slow pace of progress may merely reflect the challenges of integrating 

units that historically have been more separate from the rest of the military.

Future Force Structure and Nuclear Strategy 

A more powerful Rocket Force may also be able to wield greater influence 

in shaping the country’s nuclear strategy and policies. Some experts have 

suggested that as China’s political leadership has become less actively 

focused on nuclear weapons issues, the PLA may enjoy greater autonomy in 

the nuclear realm. However, the Rocket Force’s influence on China’s nuclear 

strategy and policies may depend on the extent to which the Rocket Force 

prioritizes either the conventional or nuclear mission set.

At the moment, the Rocket Force appears to treat conventionally armed 

missiles differently than nuclear-armed ones. The Rocket Force has deployed 

conventionally armed missiles in much greater numbers than nuclear-armed 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

418

missiles. The Rocket Force reportedly already controls more than 1,200 

conventional short-range ballistic missiles,96 compared to an estimated 

roughly 160 nuclear-capable ones, and it is estimated that more than half of 

personnel are assigned to conventional forces.97 In the past decade, officers 

who comprise Rocket Force senior leadership were most likely to have served 

in Base 61 (formerly Base 52), the force’s premier conventional base opposite 

Taiwan, and almost no officers have served in both an ICBM base and Base 

61. Doctrine for conventionally armed missiles also emphasizes preemptive 

use, in contrast with China’s no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons.

However, the Rocket Force’s dual identity presents unique bureaucratic 

choices, and its approach to the conventional and nuclear mission sets 

may evolve along one of at least three lines, depending on both the Rocket 

Force’s own institutional priorities and its relative power vis-à-vis other 

services and civilian leadership. The first is that a more powerful Rocket 

Force could advocate for the adoption of a more aggressive nuclear posture. The Rocket Force’s approach to conventional missiles may represent 

its preferred doctrine and approach, absent the political interference that 

accompanies decisions about nuclear weapons. In this scenario, a more 

powerful Rocket Force would press to make China’s nuclear doctrine and 

forces more closely resemble the country’s conventional missile doctrine 

and forces.98 This could include lobbying for a host of more assertive doctrinal and operational choices, potentially including the peacetime mating of 

warheads, increase in alert status, launch-on-warning posture, or abolition 

of China’s no-first-use policy. Evidence to support this hypothesis includes 

statements from officers in the Rocket Force and former Second Artillery 

advocating the adoption of a higher alert status throughout the force and 

a reconsideration of no-first-use.99

A second possibility is that a more powerful Rocket Force may be 

inclined to disregard the nuclear mission and shift more of its resources and 

attention toward the conventional one. Like many military organizations, 

the Rocket Force may regard nuclear weapons as a distraction from the core 

mission. A review of career patterns within China’s missile forces suggests 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

419

that experience with conventionally armed missile units is more likely 

to lead to a senior leadership position within the Rocket Force. Officers 

who have served in units tasked with primarily conventional missions are 

more likely to ascend to the ranks of senior leadership than officers who 

have served in units tasked with primarily regional or strategic nuclear 

missions.100 There is also evidence of an at least informal hierarchy among 

the various missile bases, with Base 61 (formerly Base 52), the Rocket 

Force’s premier conventional missile base opposite Taiwan, sitting at the 

top. In addition, while China has seen only a modest growth in the size of 

its nuclear arsenal, its conventional forces have expanded dramatically so 

that, today, an estimated 80 percent of all missiles and half of Rocket Force 

personnel are assigned to conventional missions.101 A more powerful Rocket 

Force may advocate for more emphasis and investment in conventional 

forces, with the nuclear deterrent persisting in its current form.

Third, civilian leaders may continue to shape operational practices and 

doctrines (especially in the nuclear domain), regardless of Rocket Force priorities. Despite the extent of military reforms, the impact on the Rocket Force 

has been notable more for continuity than change. The civilian leadership 

may still exert significant control over the policies and practices of China’s 

missiles forces and continue to require a relatively restrained nuclear posture.

It is not entirely clear which of these paths the Rocket Force may take. 

The first two possibilities are not mutually exclusive. China could push 

for an expansion and prioritization of its conventional missile forces at the 

expense of its nuclear forces, while Rocket Force leaders simultaneously 

lobby for a more assertive nuclear posture. The relationship between the 

Rocket Force and civilian leadership is especially opaque, making it difficult 

to determine the extent to which the Rocket Force will be able to determine 

its own institutional priorities and practices. However, there are unconfirmed reports that, with the increasing professionalization of the PLA and 

the turning of civilian attention to other matters, the Rocket Force may be 

gaining increased autonomy.102 If true, this would make it easier for the 

force to adopt more assertive policies and practices.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

420

Future Interservice Politics over Other Strategic Systems 

Elevation to a full-fledged service may give the Rocket Force the institutional prestige and resources necessary to compete effectively with the 

other services for resources and missions. As the PLA rebalances away 

from traditional army dominance and slower economic growth leads to 

slower growth in military spending, interservice rivalry, and competition 

to control emerging missions, will likely become more intense.

Conventional missions and forces may present such a “growth area” 

to the Rocket Force. With growing PLA emphasis on conducting joint conventional operations, the force might seek to expand its conventional forces 

and missions. While China’s relatively restrained nuclear strategy may limit 

the growth potential of the nuclear mission, conventional operations can 

more easily be used to justify an expansion in force size and mission set.

Conversely, the Rocket Force maintains a comparative advantage over 

the other services in the nuclear realm. Chinese leadership views about 

the limited utility of nuclear weapons and guidance to build a “lean and 

effective” nuclear deterrent imply a cap on the size of nuclear forces and 

the missions assigned to them.103 However, the Rocket Force could seek 

to capitalize on its unique nuclear role in a number of ways. First, it could 

push China’s leadership to expand the role of nuclear forces and argue for 

an expanded force structure and mission set in ways that could potentially 

lead to more aggressive changes in overall strategy and policy.104 The Rocket 

Force might also make a play for operational control of China’s emergent 

fleet of Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). A number of Chinese 

and American experts have predicted that China’s future SSBN force could 

fall under the command of the Rocket Force, though few have offered specifics about how such a command arrangement might work.105

The PLA Navy has little to no experience controlling nuclear weapons, 

as China built only one hull of the previous generation Xia-class SSBN, 

which never conducted a single operational patrol.106 To the extent that 

greater operational experience with nuclear weapons increases confidence 

and decreases the likelihood of accidents, mistakes, and misperceptions, 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

421

centralizing nuclear control under the Rocket Force might improve strategic stability by reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. 

Conversely, the Rocket Force has no experience running a naval fleet of 

any kind, let alone the kinds of complex operations required to operate 

and protect an SSBN force. Regardless of future command and control 

structures, Chinese SSBNs would undoubtedly be staffed and operated by 

navy crews and serviced in navy ports.

Finally, the Rocket Force could push to gain operational control of 

conventional strategic assets such as the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile 

or direct-ascent antisatellite capabilities. Both of these weapons are based 

on ballistic missile systems already operated by the Rocket Force, and their 

importance as strategic assets argues for strict centralized control.

China’s sweeping military reforms have ushered in substantial changes 

in the relative status and relationships between different parts of the People’s 

Liberation Army. The Rocket Force has arguably emerged as the biggest 

winner in the reforms. The navy and air force lost operational control of 

their forces to the theater commands, and the army suffered a reduction 

in both formal status and administrative power after the dissolution of the 

General Staff Department. The Rocket Force, on the other hand, has maintained direct control of its nuclear units, boosted its formal organizational 

status, and strengthened its ability to compete against the other services 

for resources and missions.

Conclusion 

China’s missile forces are undergoing significant changes, though it is still 

unclear how far those changes will go. Organizational reforms, technological developments, and operational changes all raise questions about 

whether the future of China’s missile forces will resemble the past.

Organizationally, the Rocket Force has increased in prestige and, 

likely, power. For its first few decades of existence, the Second Artillery, 

the Rocket Force’s predecessor, fielded only a few dozen unsophisticated 

missile systems. Today, it is estimated to command over a thousand total 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

422

missile systems. The recent wave of PLA-wide military reforms saw the 

elevation of the Rocket Force to the level of a full-fledged service, increasing 

its institutional status and placing it on par with the other military services.

Technologically, China’s ongoing modernization program has changed 

the technological makeup of its missile forces. In the nuclear domain, China’s missile forces have evolved from a small and relatively unsophisticated 

set of liquid-fueled stationary missiles armed with single warheads into a 

force of increasingly advanced road-mobile solid-fueled missiles, some of 

which can be equipped with multiple warheads. China is also developing 

a sea-based leg for its nuclear deterrent, developing and deploying a new 

generation of SSBNs and accompanying submarine-launched ballistic 

missiles, and there are initial reports of a next-generation strategic nuclear-capable bomber. Just as significant for the Rocket Force, the country’s 

land-based missiles have increasingly shifted from nuclear to conventional 

and, increasingly, advanced dual-capable missile systems.

Finally, the Rocket Force appears to gradually be changing its operational practices. It has placed greater emphasis on training under realistic 

conditions by utilizing red-blue team confrontation exercises. Perhaps 

most significantly, the Rocket Force has increased its integration with 

the theater commands and has increasingly emphasized joint operations 

in its training. These operational changes have, in part, been driven by 

both the organizational and technological changes described herein. The 

creation of the theater commands and the PLA-wide emphasis on joint 

operations have catalyzed the Rocket Force focus on jointness. Similarly, 

the introduction and expansion of conventional units in the Rocket Force 

has made the organization more relevant to the kinds of conventional 

conflicts for which the PLA prepares, especially a possible future conflict 

over Taiwan. These changes raise several important questions about the 

future of the Rocket Force.

First, will the Rocket Force change its fundamental policies and practices, particularly in the nuclear realm? With its recent elevation to the level 

of a full service, the Rocket Force may enjoy greater autonomy in deciding 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

423

its future force composition and operational practices. China has historically 

adopted a comparatively restrained nuclear posture, but this could change.

Second, will Rocket Force units be able to effectively participate in 

joint operations, and what will an increased focus on jointness mean for 

the Rocket Force? As discussed, China’s missile forces have historically 

remained somewhat apart from the rest of the PLA, and the Rocket Force 

has been comparatively slow to integrate with the newly established theater 

commands. Challenges persist in integrating Rocket Force units into joint 

operations, and it remains unclear how long it will take to overcome those 

challenges. The drive to jointness may end up altering the composition and 

identity of the Rocket Force by leading to a stronger prioritization of the 

conventional mission set.

Third, will the introduction and expansion of conventionally armed 

missiles, especially dual-capable systems, increase the escalatory risks of 

entanglement? Several scholars have noted that the deployment of dual-use 

missile systems and the possible collocation of conventional and nuclear 

missiles could create risks of unintentional escalation in a conflict.107

The risks generated by this kind of technological entanglement could be 

mitigated or exacerbated by the operational practices under which those 

missiles are deployed.

Finally, what will the development of other legs of a nuclear triad mean 

for the future of both the Rocket Force and China’s nuclear policies? The 

introduction of sea- and air-launched nuclear forces could push the Rocket 

Force to embrace its conventional identity. The introduction of new nuclear 

platforms could also create new opportunities or pressures for changes in 

China’s nuclear policies. SSBN operational deployments will likely involve 

mated warheads and missiles, which could lead the Rocket Force to advocate peacetime mating of warheads and land-based missiles. Conversely, a 

more diverse and dispersed nuclear force could increase China’s confidence 

in the survivability of its second-strike capability, causing it to forgo more 

assertive changes to its nuclear posture.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

424

Notes 

1 Early Chinese interest in missiles was also driven by a desire to develop 

surface-to-air missiles to shoot down U.S. and Taiwanese reconnaissance aircraft 

that China viewed as compromising its sovereignty.

2 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security 

in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).

3 Bates Gill, James C. Mulvenon, and Mark A. Stokes, “The Chinese Second 

Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in PLA as Organization, ed. James 

C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 517–518.

4 Michael S. Chase, The PLA’s Second Artillery Force as a Customer of China’s 

Defense Industry, Study of Innovation and Technology in China Research Brief 

2013-15 (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, January 2013), 

2, available at <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1tw930nf>.

5 This section draws on arguments developed by Jeffrey Lewis and Raymond 

Wang of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey. The author 

gratefully acknowledges their contributions.

6 This period is described in detail by Benjamin C. Ostrov, Conquering 

Resources: The Growth and Decline of the PLA’s Science and Technology Commission 

for National Defense Science and Technology (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1992).

7 See especially Evan Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 2003); and Harlan W. Jencks, “COSTIND Is Dead, Long 

Live COSTIND! Restructuring China’s Defense Scientific, Technical, and Industrial Sector,” in The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James C. 

Mulvenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 59–77.

8 The fact that the DF-1 was an SS-2 copy accounts for a discrepancy in Chinese and U.S. designations: the DF-2 is the CSS-1, DF-3 is the CSS-2, DF-4 is the 

CSS-3, and DF-5 is the CSS-4. U.S. designations are based on the order in which a 

missile system was identified.

9 The Chinese distinguish ranges slightly differently than Americans. 

Whereas the U.S. Intelligence Community categorizes the DF-4 and DF-5 as 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Chinese sources distinguish between 

the two.

10 Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors, 79.

11 The author is indebted to Mark A. Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute for 

this observation.
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

425

12 Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, eds., The Lure and 

Pitfalls of MRVs from the First to the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Stimson 

Center, May 2016), available at <www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Lure_and_Pitfalls_of_MIRVs.pdf>.

13 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of 

Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 27.

14 China continued with the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 

program, listing it as one of the “three grasps” that represented an effort to conclude 

the unfinished business of China’s first generation of strategic programs: test an 

SLBM, deploy an operational ICBM, and launch a communications satellite. The 

first JL-1 test occurred in October 1982. China’s Xia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) went to sea in 1983, but likely has never conducted an operational 

patrol. See Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 120.

15 Ibid., 188.

16 Ibid.

17 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicated that the DF-21 

had largely replaced the DF-3, which remained deployed by a single brigade by 

2005. See Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic 

of China 2005 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2005), available at <www.globalsecurity.

org/military/library/report/2005/d20050719china.pdf>. Analysis of commercial 

satellite imagery suggests that all DF-3A units have been upgraded. See Hans M. 

Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Missile Upgrade Near Dalian,” Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security blog, May 21, 2014, available at <https://fas.org/

blogs/security/2014/05/dengshaheupgrade/>.

18 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps.”

19 Shirley A. Kan, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, 97-391 F (Washington, 

DC: Congressional Research Service, August 10, 2000), 14–15.

20 On failure, see Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2010), 34, 

available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf>. 

On technical hurdles see Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2011), 34, 

62, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2011_CMPR_Final.

pdf >. On success in 2012, see Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2013), 

31, available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

426

21 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017 (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: National 

Air and Space Intelligence Center [NASIC], 2017), 30, available at <www.nasic.

af.mil/Portals/19/images/Fact%20Sheet%20Images/2017%20Ballistic%20and%20

Cruise%20Missile%20Threat_Final_small.pdf?ver=2017-07-21-083234-343>.

22 Ibid.

23 U.S. Government reports make no mention of the DF-25 having ever 

entered service in China.

24 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017.

25 For a technical analysis of the apparently failed August 2014 test, see James 

Acton, Catherine Dill, and Jeffrey Lewis, “Crashing Glider, Hidden Hotspring: 

Analyzing China’s August 7, 2014, Hypersonic Glider Test,” Arms Control Wonk 

blog, September 3, 2014, available at <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207443/

crashing-glider-hidden-hotspring/>.

26 Donald L. Fuell, quoted in China’s Military Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., January 30, 2014, 36, available at <www.

uscc.gov/sites/default/files/USCC%20Hearing%20Transcript%20-%20January%20

30%202014.pdf>.

27 For more on China’s hypersonic glide program, see Lora Saalman, “China’s 

Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

(SIPRI), August 15, 2017, available at <www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide>; and Lora Saalman, Factoring 

Russia into the U.S.-Chinese Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, No. 2017/1 

(Stockholm: SIPRI, January 2017).

28 For a good overview of the pre-reform Second Artillery Force, see Michael 

S. Chase, Daniel Yoon, and Mark A. Stokes, “The People’s Liberation Army Second 

Artillery Force (PLASAF) as an Organization,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, 

ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: Defense Group, Inc., 2015).

29 The author is indebted to Mark A. Stokes for highlighting the importance 

of grades in assessing where an officer stands in the protocol order.

30 Until recently, China’s missile bases were numbered 51 to 56. Sometime in 

2017, the base designations were changed to number from 61 to 66. The numerical 

order of the previous base designations does not match that of the new designations. For an order of battle using the new base designations, see 2017 Report 

to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic Review Commission (Washington, DC: 

Government Publishing Office, 2017), 219–220. For examples of Chinese sources 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

427

referring to missile bases by the new designations, see “Our City Holds Military 

Coordination Meeting to Specially Study How to Resolve Practical Troop Difficulties and Problems” [我市召开军地协调会专题研究解决部队实际困难和问题], 

Lanzhou Shuangyong Office, August 8, 2017, available at <www.lzsy.gov.cn/web/

jsgl/sydt/486.html?402880ee5ac59a52015ac5d2da73023e,486>; “Yangshan Holds 

Recruit Enlistment Ceremony—125 Recruits Set Off to the Barracks” [阳山举行

新兵入伍仪式—125名新兵奔赴军营], Yangshan County People’s Government, 

September 13, 2017, available at <http://ysq.yangshan.gov.cn/info/4001435813?templateId=40546>; and “In Xianfeng County, 112 Recruits Embark on a Journey” [咸

丰县112名新兵踏上征程], Chengfeng County People’s Government, September 11, 

2017, available at <www.xianfeng.gov.cn/xfyw/94782.jhtml>.

31 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System

(Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 12, 2010).

32 The basic unit of firepower for nuclear-armed forces is the battalion, 

while for conventional units, it appears to be the platoon. See Kenneth W. Allen 

and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal 

Reforms,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, ed. James C. Mulvenon and 

David M. Finklestein (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2005).

33 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: 

China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, 

no. 2 (Fall 2015), 44. The command and control arrangements for the Rocket Force 

remain opaque and difficult to evaluate. For some evidence and discussion, see David C. 

Logan, “PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,” Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 

2016), 58–60. Evidence of more recent integration of Rocket Force and theater command command and control arrangements is discussed in a later section of this chapter.

34 Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: 

NASIC, 2013), available at <www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/

NASIC2013_050813.pdf>.

35 “2nd Artillery Soldiers Hidden in Underground Caverns for 8-Day Exercise 

Eat Leeks and Sweet Peppers” [二炮士兵隐蔽在地下洞库8天生吃韭菜甜椒], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], May 6, 2013, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-05-

06/0420723740.html>.

36 On the challenges of life underground, see Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, 

Half Lives: A Preliminary Assessment of China’s Nuclear Warhead Life Extension 

and Safety Program (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, July 29, 2013).
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

428

37 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2013.

38 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017 (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: 

NASIC, 2017), 30, available at <www.nasic.af.mil/Portals/19/images/Fact%20

Sheet%20Images/2017%20Ballistic%20and%20Cruise%20Missile%20Threat_

Final_small.pdf?ver=2017-07-21-083234-343>; “The People’s Liberation Army 

Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,” Office of Naval Intelligence, 

U.S. Navy, August 2009, available at <www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf>; 

“China’s Navy 2007,” Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy, available at <www.

fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf>; and Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval 

Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for 

Congress, RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 

8, 2012), available at <www.hsdl.org/?view&did=701351>.

39 For more on the country’s emerging SSBN fleet, see David C. Logan, China’s 

Future SSBN Command and Control Structure, INSS Strategic Forum 299 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2016), available at <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/

Article/1013472/chinas-future-ssbn-command-and-control-structure/>.

40 In 1984, the U.S. Intelligence Community was “unable to identify the associated airfield storage sites” for the “small number” of nuclear capable aircraft that 

“probably” had nuclear bombs assigned to them. The Defense Intelligence Agency 

concluded that it was “improbable that China’s air forces have a strategic nuclear 

delivery mission” because “it is unlikely that these obsolescent aircraft could 

successfully penetrate the sophisticated air defense networks of modern military 

powers.” See the declassified “Defense Estimative Brief: Nuclear Weapons Systems 

in China,” April 24, 1984, 3–4, available at <www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=788630>. 

In 1993, the Intelligence Community concluded that the “Chinese air force has 

no units whose primary mission is to deliver China’s small stockpile of nuclear 

bombs.” See “Report to Congress on Status of China, India, and Pakistan Nuclear 

and Ballistic Missile Programs,” U.S. National Security Council, August 4, 2000, 

available at <https://fas.org/irp/threat/930728-wmd.htm>.

41 See, for example, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese 

Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 4 (June 13, 2016), 206.

42 Michael S. Chase, “Nuclear Bomber Could Boost PLAAF Strategic Role, 

Create Credible Triad,” China Brief 17, no. 9 (July 6, 2017), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/nuclear-bomber-boost-plaaf-strategic-role-createcredible-triad/>.
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

429

43 The 2017 NASIC report does not include any reference to the DF-3 system, 

suggesting they may have been completely phased out from China’s missile systems. 

See Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017.

44 “Guo Yafei’s ‘Third Eye’” [郭亚飞的 “第三只眼”], CNTV [中国网

路电视台], May 4, 2011, available at <http://military.cntv.cn/program/

hpnd/20110504/105020.shtml>.

45 Hans M. Kristensen, “Extensive Nuclear Missile Deployment Area Discovered in Central China,” Federation of American Scientists blog, May 15, 2008, 

available at: <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/05/extensive-nuclear-deployment-area-discovered-in-central-china/>.

46 Ibid.

47 Gao Hong [高航], “History: Second Artillery Missile Forces Have Become 

Capable of Strategic Nuclear Counterattack” [历程:二炮成为具有核反击能力的战

略导弹部队], China Military Online [中国军网], July 31, 2005, available at <https://

web.archive.org/web/20071111180904/http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2005-07/31/

content_3282531.htm>.

48 Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System.

49 Wei Zhigang [卫志刚], “Rocket Force Turns Eyes Toward Future War, 

Organizes Red-Blue Opposition Training” [火箭军着眼未来战争组织红蓝对抗

训练理论集训], Rocket Force Daily [火箭兵报], April 29, 2016.

50 “Diao Guangming: Change of Face Is Only to Win in War” [刁光明: “变

脸”只为打胜仗], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 17, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/

jfjbmap/content/2016-04/17/content_141844.htm>.

51 Ibid.

52 “Rocket Force Normalizing the Conduct of Confrontation Exercises to 

Enhance Actual Combat Capabilities” [火箭军常态化开展对抗演练提升实战能

力], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 8, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2016-09/08/content_156037.htm>.

53 “Exposing Our ‘Electronic Blue Forces’ Harassing Forces while Faking Red 

Team Orders” [揭秘我“电子蓝军” 干扰同时假冒红方下命令], PLA Daily [解放军

报], April 19, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-04/19/content_7012144.htm>. 

54 Logan, “PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces.”

55 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? 

Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms,” Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter 

2016), 68–75.

56 Ibid.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

430

57 David M. Finkelstein, Hearing on Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission, January 21, 2016, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., available at 

<www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/USCC%20Testimony%202016_Finkelstein.pdf>.

58 Zhao Lei and Li Xiaokun, “Three New Military Branches Created in Key 

PLA Reform,” China Daily (Beijing), January 2, 2016, available at <www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2016-01/02/content_15366591.html>.

59 The author thanks Joel Wuthnow of National Defense University for this 

observation. See Wang Shibin and An Puzhong [王士彬, 安普忠], “Founding 

Ceremony for Army Leading Organization, Rocket Force and Strategic Support 

Force Held in Beijing” [陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行], 

China Military Online [中国军网], January 1, 2016, available at <http://cd.81.cn/

content/2016-01/01/content_6841020.htm>.

60 Cao Zhi and Zhang Xuanjie [曹智, 张选杰], “Xi Jinping: Building a Strong 

Informationized Strategic Missile Force” [习近平: 建设强大的信息化战略导弹

部队], Xinhua Online [新华网], available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-12/05/c_113922221.htm>.

61 Zheng Wenhao [郑文浩], “China’s Second Artillery Force Renamed to Rocket 

Force, What’s the Mystery Behind Not Adding the Word Strategic?” [中国二炮部队改

名火箭军不加战略二字有何玄机], Sina News [新浪军事], January 1, 2016, available 

at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-01-01/doc-ifxneept3524560.shtml>.

62 Huang Jinxin [黄金新], “My Views on the Rocket Force as a Strategic 

Military Service” [战略军种火箭军之我见] Rocket Force News [火箭兵报], January 

13, 2016.

63 “Transcript of Eastern Theater Commander Liu Yuejun’s Interview” [东部战

区司令员刘粤军访谈录], China Military Online [中国军网], March 3, 2016, available 

at <http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/zhuanti/content/2016-03/04/content_6940918.htm>.

64 Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, “The PLA’s New 

Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown, and Speculation (Part 

1),” China Brief 16, no. 3 (February 4, 2016), available at <https://jamestown.org/

program/the-plas-new-organizational-structure-what-is-known-unknown-andspeculation-part-1/>.

65 Choi Chi-yuk, “The Rising Star in China’s Military Tipped as Future Air 

Force Leader,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 17, 2016, available 

at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1976523/rising-starchinas-military-tipped-future-air-force>. This would be consistent with the 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

431

relationship between the Second Artillery and former military regions. Unlike 

the services, Second Artillery officers did not serve as deputy commanders within 

the military region, illustrating the unique “vertical command” structure of the 

Second Artillery. See Roger Cliff, Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: 

Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2014), 23.

66 Zhang Hui, “PLA Rocket Force Names 100 Officers to Commands,” 

Global Times (Beijing), April 12, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/978291.shtml>.

67 Yan Jiaqi, ed. [闫嘉琪], “Rocket Force Base Explores Standardization of 

Joint Operational Processes” [火箭军某基地着力探索联合作战流程规范化], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], April 1, 2016, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/

n1/2016/0401/c1011-28243986.html>.

68 Feng and Duan, “Theater Command Rocket Forces Enter Joint Training 

Like a Fish Taking to Water.”

69 Information on Second Artillery base and brigade locations and Military 

Unit Cover Designators is from Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture

(New York: Routledge, 2014), 116–121; and Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring 

Assured Retaliation,” 7–50.

70 Based on analysis of Rocket Force base and brigade locations and reported 

theater command boundaries, bases 61, 62, 63, and 64 appear to control units 

garrisoned in different theater commands.

71 Zhou was promoted to succeed Wei Fenghe as Rocket Force commander 

in September 2017. See Mimi Lau, “China’s Missile Forces Get a New Tech-Focused Commander,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 16, 2017, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2111497/

chinas-missile-forces-get-new-tech-focused-commander>. For more on changes 

to the Central Military Commission, see Liu Zhen, “Xi Jinping Shakes Up China’s 

Military Leadership,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 26, 2017, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2116856/

what-changes-top-mean-chinas-military>.

72 John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,” Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5 (2012), 54.

73 Zhang Zhouxiang, “Rocket Force to Protect National Interests,” China 

Daily (Beijing), January 5, 2016, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-01/05/content_22933648.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

432

74 Du Linbo and Cai Ruijin [杜林波,蔡瑞金], “How Does the Rocket Force 

Build from the Basic Level Under the New Services-Equip System” [火箭军在军

种主建新体制下如何抓建基层], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 26, 2016, available at 

<www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-04/26/content_7023132.htm>.

75 See remarks in Zhang Tao, ed., “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on June 30,” China Military Online, June 30, 2016, available at <http://english.

pladaily.com.cn/news-channels/2016-06/30/content_7127994.htm>.

76 “Deeply Implement Chairman Xi and the Central Military Commission’s 

Decision, Work Hard to Construct a Powerful and Modern Rocket Force on a New 

Starting Point” [深入贯彻习主席和中央军委决策部署在新的起点上努力建设强大

的现代化火箭军], Rocket Force News [火箭军报], March 2, 2016.

77 Huang, “My Views on the Rocket Force as a Strategic Military Service.”

78 Ibid.

79 Li Xuan [李璇], “From ‘Force’ to ‘Service,’ Rocket Force Must Shoulder 

Historic Heavy Responsibility” [由“兵” 变 “军”,火箭军更要扛起历史重任], Science 

and Technology Daily [科技日报], February 23, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

depb/2016-02/23/content_6923516.htm>.

80 Feng and Duan, “Theater Command Rocket Forces Enter Joint Training 

Like a Fish Taking to Water.”

81 Ibid.

82 Kenneth W. Allen and Jana Allen, Building a Strong Informationized Strategic Missile Force: An Overview of the Second Artillery Force with a Focus on 

Training in 2014 (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2015), available 

at <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Building-Strategic-Missile-Force_Final.pdf>.

83 Zhao Lei, “Rocket Force More Versatile,” China Daily (Beijing), June 

21, 2017, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-06/21/content_29830330.htm>.

84 Wang Tianlin [王天林] et al., “Revolutionary Innovation, Aiming for the 

Bull’s-Eye of the Battlefield” [改革创新,瞄准战场靶心], Rocket Force News [火箭

兵报], March 16, 2016.

85 “Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force Discuss Joint Warfighting” [火

箭军同战略支援部队讨论联合作战现场热烈], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 3, 

2016, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2016-02/8496915.html>.

86 Feng Jinyuan and Yang Yonggang [冯金源, 杨永刚], “Certain Rocket Force 

Missile Brigade Organizes ‘Blue Army’ Supervision to Specially ‘Nitpick’” [火箭
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

433

军某导弹旅组织“蓝军”督导专门“找茬”], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 13, 2016, 

available at <www.81.cn/depb/2016-06/13/content_7097562.htm>.

87 “Central Theater Command Starts Its Campaign to Enhance Joint Operational Command Capabilities” [中部战区起步开局大力提升联合作战指挥能力], 

Xinhua, April 1, 2016, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0401/

c1011-28244657.html>.

88 “A Certain Base for the First Time Undertakes Cluster Command ‘Winning 

Iron Fist’” [某基地首次集群指挥锤炼 “制胜铁拳”], Rocket Force News [火箭军报], 

November 25, 2017, 1.

89 Ibid.

90 “Combat Readiness, Sword Pointed at New Heights” [备战, 剑指新高地], 

People’s Navy [人民海军], October 21, 2017, 4.

91 “Concentrate on Sharpening the Sword, the More the Strategic Iron Fist 

Is Used, the Harder It Becomes” [潜心砺剑, 战略铁拳越练越硬], PLA Daily [解

放军报], February 6, 2018, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/06/

content_198862.htm>.

92 “A Certain Base’s Joint Training Wins ‘Iron Fist’” [某基地联战联训淬炼制

胜 “铁拳”], Rocket Force News [火箭军报], November 11, 2017, 1; “Command Academy Focuses Intently on Requirements of Winning, Reforms Military Education 

to Reflect Actual Combat” [指挥学院紧盯打赢需要大抓实战化教学改革], Rocket 

Force News [火箭军报], July 8, 2017, 1a; and Guo Yuandan [郭媛丹], “How China’s 

Theater Commands Conduct Operations: By Truly Joining Systems and Fusing 

Command and Control Entities” [中国战区如何打仗: 中国战区如何打仗:体系深

度联合、指挥一体融合, 指挥一体融合] Huanqiu Wang [环球网], October 8, 2017.

93 “Concentrate on Sharpening the Sword.”

94 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation 

for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006), 96.

95 Austin Ramzy, “Taiwan Navy Accidentally Fires Antiship Missile, 

Killing Fisherman,” New York Times, July 1, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2016/07/02/world/asia/taiwan-china-missile.html?_r=0>. 

96 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2016), 25.

97 Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016”; Jeffrey Lewis, 

“China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs,” in The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs, 105.

98 Eric Heginbotham et al., “Domestic Factors Could Accelerate the Evolution 

of China’s Nuclear Posture,” RAND Corporation Research Brief, 3, available at 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

434

<www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9956.html>. For a more thorough analysis 

of ongoing and future changes to China’s nuclear forces, see Eric Heginbotham 

et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United 

States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), chapters 9, 10, available at <www.rand.

org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html>.

99 See, for example, Gregory Kulacki, “China’s Military Calls for Putting Its 

Nuclear Forces on Alert,” Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2016, available 

at <www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/02/China-Hair-Trigger-fullreport.pdf>.

100 David C. Logan, “Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force: What They Tell 

Us,” Asian Security, January 25, 2018.

101 For estimates on delivery systems, see Annual Report to Congress: Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, 25; and 

Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016.” For estimates on personnel 

distribution, see Lewis, “China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs,” 105.

102 Author communication with Chinese nuclear expert, 2017.

103 On China’s nuclear strategy and views of nuclear weapons, see M. Taylor 

Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35, 

no. 2 (Fall 2010); and Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation.”

104 Lewis, “China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs,” 105.

105 Liu Kun, ed. [刘昆], “Expert: Why Is the Second Artillery Being Elevated 

to the Rocket Force, the Fourth Military Service?” [专家:二炮为何要升格为第四

大军种火箭军?], Qianjiang Evening News [钱江晚报], January 9, 2016, available at 

<http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-01/8346721.html>; Kelsey Davenport, 

“China Elevates Nuclear Rocket Force,” Arms Control Association, March 3, 2016, 

available at <www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_03/News/China-Elevates-Nuclear-Rocket-Force>.

106 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower; and Hans M. Kristensen, 

“China SSBN Fleet Getting Ready—But for What?” Federation of American 

Scientists, April 25, 2014, available at <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/04/

chinassbnfleet/>.

107 See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear 

Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and U.S.-China Security Relations,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (August 2012), 447–487; Cunningham and 

Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” 7–50; and Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China 
Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces

435

Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional 

War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017), 50–92.

437

CHINA’S STRATEGIC 

SUPPORT FORCE

A Force for a New Era

By John Costello and Joe McReynolds

I

n late 2015, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) initiated a series of 

ongoing reforms that have brought dramatic changes to its structure, 

model of warfighting, and organizational culture. Undoubtedly, among 

the most important changes has been the creation of a unified Strategic 

Support Force (SSF) [zhanlüe zhiyuan budui, 战略支援部队]. This force 

combines assorted space, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities 

from across the PLA services and its former general departments.

The few statements that Xi Jinping has made about the role of the 

Strategic Support Force have been almost comically circumspect, affirming 

that it is both a “strategic” force and a “supporting” one. Even 2 years after 

its founding, some aspects of the SSF’s organizational structure remain 

opaque to outside observers. However, despite this lack of transparency, a 

coherent picture has gradually emerged of how various SSF components fit 

together and the strategic roles and missions that they are intended to fulfill.

Although the Strategic Support Force is often described as having 

been designed to streamline the organization of China’s information 

warfare forces and thereby improve their efficiency, such incremental 

advantages are not the primary reason that the SSF was created. Rather, 

CHAPTER 12
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

438

the SSF’s structure is first and foremost intended to create synergies 

between disparate information warfare capabilities in order to execute 

specific types of strategic missions that Chinese leaders believe will 

be decisive in future major wars. The PLA views cyber, electronic, and 

psychological warfare as interconnected subcomponents of information 

warfare writ large. Understanding the primary strategic roles of the SSF 

is essential to understanding how China will practice information operations in a war or crisis.

This chapter begins by examining the evolution of China’s approach to 

the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains over the last three decades. 

It then provides an analysis of military organizational reforms launched 

in 2015, contextualizing the SSF’s creation against the backdrop of broader 

changes to PLA structure, command organization, and changing concepts 

of operations before focusing on the organizational dynamics of the SSF 

itself. The chapter then explores each of the SSF’s operational components, 

those responsible for its space, cyber, EW, and psychological operations 

mission areas. After giving a brief overview of how peacetime-wartime 

command relationships have shifted in the reforms, the chapter then details 

the new joint force structure of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 

and evaluates how the responsibilities for intelligence and technical reconnaissance, network and EW, and information support missions have shifted 

force-wide given the preeminence of the SSF in these missions and the 

new CMC and regional theater command structure. Finally, the chapter 

outlines the key operational responsibilities of the SSF in the context of 

the two primary roles it plays: strategic information support and strategic 

information operations. The chapter then defines China’s conceptualization 

of information warfare as applied to the SSF and notes key points where 

this concept aligns with and diverges from a U.S. approach.

A key observation underpinning the research for this chapter is the 

insight that the PLA, at least in the initial stages of its reforms, has pursued 

what we call a “bricks, not clay” approach to reorganization. Instead of 

building whole organizations from scratch, the PLA effected structural 
Strategic Support Force

439

changes by renaming, resubordinating, or moving whole, existing organizations and their component parts and then redefining their command 

relationships within the PLA. While the names, descriptors, designators, 

and, in some cases, the commanders of these organizations have changed, 

the addresses, key personnel, phone numbers, and other unique designators have remained consistent throughout the reforms. Through analysis 

of hundreds of public bid and tender documents, contracts, articles, and 

research papers, the authors have been able to identify numerous instances 

where these designators remained the same, while the organizations to 

which they were tied underwent changes of name or affiliation. From 

clusters of these instances, it can be inferred which existing organizations 

have been renamed or shifted in the reorganization, and from that one 

can determine both the new structure of the SSF and changes in the PLA’s 

larger command context.

Identifying the Military Unit Cover Designators (MUCDs) that have 

been assigned to the SSF, a block of numbers between 32001 and 32099, 

was particularly useful in this analysis. These designators are commonly 

used as a cover mechanism for open-source references to PLA units. Since 

organizations and units operating within this block are now subordinate 

to the SSF, one can apply the above methodology to systematically identify 

SSF units and their command relationships.1

This structural analysis informs analysis of the roles and missions of 

the SSF itself. Based on the assumption that the operational responsibilities 

of most units and organizations that were shifted to the SSF have not been 

fundamentally changed by the reforms, one can draw upon the existing 

body of Chinese military and PLA literature to gain insight into prior 

organizations that are now components of the SSF. With an understanding 

of the structure and mission of the SSF, one can then determine its broader 

roles and responsibilities within the PLA by evaluating this mission set 

against public comments, strategic literature, an understanding of the intent 

and impetus for reforms, as well as the broader command and organizational context under which the SFF was being formed.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

440

The SSF in Historical Context 

China’s approach to the interrelated space, cyber, and electromagnetic 

domains—the main functional and warfighting areas for the Strategic 

Support Force—has undergone considerable evolution over the past three 

decades. In the 1990s, China identified and absorbed lessons from the 1991 

Persian Gulf War, which in its view demonstrated that “the new revolution 

in military affairs had moved from theoretical exploration into the phase of 

implementation . . . drawing back the curtain on informationized warfare.”2

The lessons China took from the Gulf War fundamentally changed the way 

that its military planners viewed the future of warfare as well as an understanding of its own vulnerabilities, prompting a decades-long upheaval in 

Chinese thinking on the strategic role of information in warfare.3

China drew two primary lessons from the Gulf War. First, the war 

proved that the widespread integration of information technology in warfare could confer overwhelming military superiority. As a result, a country’s 

progress in “informationizing” [xinxi hua, 信息化] itself, both in a military 

context and on a broader societal level, is central to its national security.4 To 

this end, the PLA recognized that it would need to study and adopt operational concepts that are informed by the U.S. concept now referred to as 

“network-centric warfare.”5 The operational use of space-based command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) attracted particular notice, with PLA writers frequently 

referencing it as a barometer of how informationized warfare had become.6

Second, the PLA quickly assessed that U.S. use of these technologies created 

fundamental dependencies that could be exploited in wartime. This line of 

thinking paved the way for China’s unique information warfare strategy, 

which seeks to “overcome the superior with the inferior” through the application of asymmetric information countermeasures against critical nodes in 

space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic domains.7 After working through 

a number of doctrinal iterations, by the end of the 1990s the PLA had successfully developed the foundational concepts that have guided China’s strategy 

for and development of its information warfare forces ever since.
Strategic Support Force

441

Chinese strategists spent the 2000s focused primarily on applying 

these concepts and lessons, both through force-wide concepts such as integrated network and electronic warfare (INEW) [wangdian yiti zhan, 网电

一体战] and at the operational level. By the end of the decade, the PLA had 

successfully fielded a regional constellation of Beidou navigation satellites, 

space-based surveillance platforms, and dual-use communications and 

relay satellites. Taken together, they formed the foundation of a nascent 

Chinese C4ISR system to enable regional surveillance, reconnaissance, 

and precision strikes.8 At the same time, China was rapidly developing 

its ability to launch offensive information operations. By 2009, PLA EW 

forces had fielded a basic capability to deny or disrupt U.S. space-based 

C4ISR and navigation.9 China’s military cyber forces attracted global 

attention from the mid-2000s onward due to a series of high-profile cyber 

intrusions that demonstrated both growing sophistication and the rapid 

progress that Chinese forces had made in the span of a few short years. 

China also demonstrated a counterspace capability with the development 

of a direct-ascent antisatellite system, which destroyed an obsolete satellite 

in a January 2007 test.10

The advancement of the technical capabilities of Chinese space, cyber, 

and EW forces stood in stark contrast with the PLA’s stagnant operational 

structure, which remained virtually unchanged throughout the 2000s. In 

the years immediately leading up to the PLA’s 2015 reorganization, there 

was a growing realization in scholarly circles that the PLA’s structure 

and organization, not its technological capabilities, had emerged as the 

foremost roadblock facing modernization efforts.11 The key organizations 

responsible for space, cyber, and EW missions were distributed across 

different parts of the PLA and remained stovepiped in their respective 

organizations, even as the PLA’s strategic literature increasingly called for 

greater integration of these forces as an operational necessity.12 It is therefore unsurprising that the PLA saw the current period of major reforms 

as an opportunity to finally realign its sprawling space, cyber, and EW 

capabilities into a unified force.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

442

The Strategic Support Force’s creation comes at an inflection point for 

the PLA. China has accelerated the ongoing shift of its military posture from 

land-based territorial defense to extended power projection, not only in the 

East and South China seas but also beyond them.13 As part of this transition, 

China’s leaders have expressed a growing desire to protect their country’s 

interests further afield in the “strategic frontiers” of space, cyberspace, and 

the far seas.14 On this point, the relatively authoritative 2013 edition of the 

Science of Military Strategy observed that “preparations and prepositioning 

in fighting for new strategic spaces is both an important brace-support for 

a country’s use of these international public spaces, and also an important 

action in contesting new military strategic commanding heights.”15 China’s 

2015 Military Strategy White Paper similarly describes the three as “critical 

domains” and echoes their importance to China’s national interests.16 The 

SSF’s design is a logical fit for improving China’s access to the space and 

cyber domains in peacetime and contesting them in wartime. The SSF’s 

“remote operations” in the far seas and beyond are aimed at achieving strategic national objectives through counterintervention and power projection.17

Even before the SSF’s creation, the idea of forming an organization 

like it to meet the demands of future warfare had been germinating within 

the PLA’s strategic theory community for years. As early as 2007, China’s 

strategic literature called for an independent space force to unify myriad 

elements of Chinese organizations responsible for space operations.18 Similarly, after the formation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 

2009, there were numerous calls for China to establish its own equivalent, 

with PLA scholars noting the inherent advantages of a unified command.19

In 2012, the influential PLA information warfare specialist Ye Zheng suggested a conceptual and organizational integration of information warfare 

disciplines into an integrated network-electronic-psychological warfare 

force that partially resembles the SSF’s cyber force.20

However, the closest conceptual forerunner for the Strategic Support 

Force comes from U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The PLA’s 

decision to incorporate both space and cyber forces into a single service-like 
Strategic Support Force

443

entity does not appear to have any clear bellwether in Chinese strategic 

literature. Due to USSTRATCOM’s broad responsibilities for space, cyber, 

strategic EW, and strategic information support, it was chosen as a model for 

the SSF.21 Following USSTRATCOM’s example, the SSF is tasked with space 

and cyber missions, while also providing the theater commands with ISR 

support for joint operations.

The SSF and PLA Reform Efforts 

The Strategic Support Force was created as part of a broader reorganization 

that dissolved the PLA’s four former general departments, incorporating 

the bulk of their functions into 15 joint force “functional organs” within 

an expanded Central Military Commission. The General Staff Department (GSD) became the new CMC Joint Staff Department, the General 

Political Department (GPD) became the CMC Political Work Department, 

the General Armament Department (GAD) became the CMC Equipment 

Development Department, and the General Logistics Department became 

the CMC Logistics Support Department.22 These are not exact analogues 

to their predecessors; some capabilities, tasking, and component parts have 

been transferred elsewhere within the PLA, particularly in the case of the SSF.

At the outset of the reorganization, the SSF was formed out of these 

departments’ operational units responsible for space, cyber, and EW. This 

move was aimed in part to alleviate the organizational silos and other roadblocks that previously impeded the effective employment of these elements 

as a cohesive, coordinated strategic force under the general department 

system. The SSF’s space mission is formed primarily from units under the 

former GAD and select elements of the GSD responsible for space-based 

C4ISR. The SSF’s information warfare mission comes largely from the 

former Third and Fourth departments of the GSD, which had respectively held the responsibilities for technical reconnaissance and offensive 

cyber operations. The elements of the GPD responsible for psychological 

operations were also incorporated into the SSF, in keeping with the PLA’s 

aforementioned conceptualization of cyber, electronic, and psychological 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

444

warfare as interconnected subcomponents of information warfare. The 

psychological domain constitutes a core element of the PLA’s concept of 

the “Three Warfares” [sanzhong zhanfa, 三种战法], a unique Chinese 

warfighting model that calls for the coordinated use of psychological operations, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare to gain an advantage over 

an adversary, and thus the SSF is expected to participate in Three Warfares 

missions. Figure 1 shows the pre-reform locations of the major components 

that make up the SSF. Figure 2 shows the post-reform structure of the SSF, 

including headquarters elements such as the Staff Department and Political 

Joint Sta

Department

Operations

Bureau

Political

Work

Department

Intelligence

Bureau

Info and

Comms

Bureau

Info

Support

Base

ECM

Brigades

Tech

Recon

Bureaus

Satellite

Position

Main

Station

Satellite

Main

Station

Equipment

Development

Department

TT&C Centers

Launch Bases

Test Bases

GAD Bases

Operational Units Move to the Strategic Support Force

311 Base

PsyOps

NetworkElectronic

Bureau

General

Political

Department

First

Dept.

Operations

Fourth

Dept.

ECM & CNA

Information

Dept.

Comms

General

Armament

Department

Survey,

Map, and

Navigation

Bureau

Space

Recon

Bureau

Third

Dept.

Tech Recon

Second

Dept.

Intelligence

General

Sta

Department

Administrative Functions Move to the Joint Sta Department

Battleeld

Environ

Support

Bureau

Figure 1. Pre-Reform Locations of Major SSF Components

Key: ECM: electronic countermeasures; GAD: General Armament Department; PsyOps: psychological 

operations; TT&C: telemetry, tracking, and control; GPD: General Political Department.
Strategic Support Force

445

Work Department (organized as first-level departments), the Space Systems 

Department (responsible for space operations), and the Network Systems 

Department (responsible for information operations).

When PLA leadership plotted out a multiyear course for reforms 

through 2020, they opted for a two-stage approach. The first stage largely 

consists of “above the neck” [bozi yishang, 脖子以上] organizational reforms 

that lay out the overall design of China’s armed forces going forward, with 

“below the neck” [bozi yixia, 脖子以下] reforms coming later to reshape 

PLA institutions and operations on a more granular level. In keeping with 

this plan, the PLA has so far largely taken a “bricks, not clay” approach to 

the creation of the Strategic Support Force. That is, existing institutions 

have been taken in their entirety and placed within the SSF’s new organizational superstructure to serve as a core around which other, smaller 

elements can later be arrayed. This dynamic is visible in the SSF’s space and 

cyber warfare forces, the central components of which are formed from the 

Strategic Support Force

Overlapping Missions

Basic Structure

Logistics

Department

Political

Work

Department

Equipment

Department

Space

Systems

Department

Sta

Department

Network

Systems

Department

Network

Systems

Department

Space

Systems

Department

Space

Launch

Space

TT&C

Space

C4ISR

Cyber

Ops

Electronic

Warfare

PsyOps

(?)

Counter

Space

Strategic

Intel

Mission

Divisions

Strategic

Support

Force

Figure 2. Overall Structure of the SSF

Key: PsyOps: psychological operations; TT&C: telemetry, tracking, and control.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

446

GAD’s space cadre and the former GSD Third Department, respectively. 

These in turn act as pillars for their respective missions, with lower grade 

units from the GSD and services being transferred underneath them.

Prior to the PLA’s reorganization, space, cyber, and EW units were 

organized according to their mission type—disciplines of reconnaissance, 

attack, or defense—rather than their warfighting domain.23 This is most 

evident when looking at the PLA’s cyber mission. Previously, espionage 

and technical reconnaissance in the cyber domain were handled by the 

GSD Third Department, while the targeting and attack missions were 

handled by the GSD Fourth Department. Separately, the former GSD 

Informatization Department [xinxihua bu, 信息化部] handled key elements of information systems defense.24 The approach used for the SSF is 

intended to enable more effective full-spectrum warfighting by treating 

space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum as primary warfighting domains in their own right, rather than as supporting elements 

of other domains.25 In recent PLA strategic writings such as the 2015 

National Defense University version of the Science of Military Strategy, 

this approach is termed “integrated reconnaissance, attack, and defense” 

[zhen gongfang yiti hua, 侦攻防一体化].26

PLA strategic writings reflect a recognition that employing a 

domain-centric force for information warfare enables levels of unified 

planning, force construction, and operations that would have been infeasible under the previous structure. This runs counter to the movement of 

the PLA’s conventional armed services toward force construction and away 

from operations, which have been tasked to the theater commands. The 

difference is due to the unique requirements of the information domain, 

where the vulnerabilities and exploits necessary to create “cyber weapons” 

are discovered, refined, and deployed in a rapid, continuous loop throughout both peacetime and wartime.

Another important principle that appears to have influenced the 

design of the SSF is the enduring Maoist imperative of peacetime-wartime integration [pingzhan jiehe, 平战结合, or pingzhan yiti, 平战一体].27
Strategic Support Force

447

Under its pre-reform organizational structure, the PLA would have been 

required to transition to a wartime posture just prior to the outbreak of 

war (or immediately following it, if China were taken by surprise). For 

strategic-level information operations, this operational requirement 

would have demanded unprecedented coordination between GSD, 

GAD, GPD, and military region units across multiple echelons. The creation of the SSF and the theater commands has simplified this process 

dramatically by organizing both China’s conventional and information 

warfare units into permanent operational groupings that are designed 

to transition seamlessly into wartime command structures, though 

how smoothly that transition will be carried out in practice remains 

an open question.

Overview of the SSF as an Organization 

To predict the role that the Strategic Support Force will play in wartime, it is 

first necessary to understand the particulars of the organization itself, as the 

SSF’s structure will have a major impact on how its forces can be effectively 

employed during a conflict. Established on December 31, 2015, the Strategic 

Support Force is a theater command leader grade [zheng zhanqu ji, 正战区

级] independent military force under the direct command of the Central 

Military Commission.28 General Gao Jin [高津], who previously served with 

the former Second Artillery Force [di er paobing budui, 第二炮兵部队] and 

then as president of the Academy of Military Science (AMS), was named 

as the first SSF commander.29 General Liu Fulian [刘福连]

30 served as the 

SSF’s first political commissar until March 2017, when he was replaced by 

General Zheng Weiping [郑卫平].31 General Gao’s previous role as AMS 

president highlights the central role that AMS and its internal debates 

play in China’s formulation of its military strategic thought—including, it 

appears, China’s plans for the SSF. This prominence is without parallel in 

the military academic institutions of western countries.32 See table 1 for a 

list of SSF leadership.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

448

Table 1. Strategic Support Force Leadership, Grades, and Former Positions

Name Position Grade Rank Former Position

Gao Jin

[高津]

Commander Military Theater 

Leader grade

General Commandant,

Academy of Military 

Science

Former Second 

Artillery Officer

Zheng 

Weiping

[郑卫平]

Political 

Commissar

Military Theater 

Leader grade

General Commandant, 

Academy of Military 

Science

Former Second 

Artillery Officer

Lu Jiancheng

[吕建成]

Deputy Political 

Commissar and 

Director, 

Discipline Inspection 

Commission

Military Theater 

Leader grade

General Political Commissar, 

Eastern Military 

Theater Command

Feng Jianhua

[冯建华]

Director, Political 

Work Department

Deputy Military 

Theater

Leader grade

Lieutenant 

General

Deputy Political 

Commissar, Jinan 

Military Region

Li Shangfu

[李尚福]*

Deputy Commander 

and Chief of Staff

Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

Major 

General

Director,

GPD Cadre Department

Sun Bo

[孙波]

Deputy Chief of Staff Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

General* Director, 

GAD Xichang Satellite 

Launch Center

Zhang 

Minghua

[张明华]

Deputy Chief of Staff Corps 

Leader grade

Major 

General

Director, GSD 

Management 

Support Department

Rao Kaixun

[饶开勋]

Deputy Commander Corps 

Leader grade

Major 

General

Director, GSD 

Operations Department

Shang Hong

[尚宏]

Deputy Commander 

and Commander, 

Space Systems 

Department

Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

Lieutenant 

General

Chief of Staff, General 

Armament Department

Kang Chunyuan 

[康春元]

Political Commissar, 

Space Systems 

Department

Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

Lieutenant 

General

Deputy Political 

Commissar, Lanzhou 

Military Region

Hao Weizhong

[郝卫中]

Deputy Commander, 

Space Systems 

Department

Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

Lieutenant 

General

Director, Taiyuan 

Launch Center

Fei Jiabing

[费加兵]

Chief of Staff, Space 

Systems Department

Corps 

Leader grade

Major 

General

Director, Maritime 

Tracking and Control 

Department

Zheng Junjie

[郑俊杰]

Deputy Commander 

and Commander, 

Network Systems 

Department

Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

Lieutenant 

Major 

General

Director, GSD Third 

Department

Director, PLA 

Information 

Engineering University
Strategic Support Force

449

Table 1. Strategic Support Force Leadership, Grades, and Former Positions

Name Position Grade Rank Former Position

Chai Shaoliang

[柴绍良]

Political Commissar, 

Network Systems 

Department

Deputy Military 

Theater 

Leader grade

Lieutenant 

General

Deputy Political 

Commissar, General 

Armament Department

* Li Shangfu is now director of the CMC Equipment Development Department. His replacement as 

SSF chief of staff has not been identified.

Key: AMS: Academy of Military Sciences; GAD: General Armament Department; GPD: General 

Political Department; GSD: General Staff Department; MR: military region; NSD: Network Systems 

Department; SSD: Space Systems Department; TC: theater command.

Administratively, the SSF operates similarly to the former PLA Second 

Artillery Force, which was also a force [budui, 部队33] that functioned like 

a service and consolidated strategic capabilities under the direct command 

of the CMC.34 Of its first-level departments, the SSF has a standard four-department administrative structure that includes the SSF Staff Department 

[canmou bu, 参谋部], Equipment Department [zhuangbei bu, 装备部], 

Political Work Department [zhengzhi gongzuo bu, 政治工作部], and a 

Logistics Department [houqin bu, 后勤部].35 Alongside these departments, 

the force also maintains headquarters for its space and information warfare 

forces in the Space Systems Department (SSD) [hangtian xitong bu, 航天

系统部] and Network Systems Department (NSD) [wangluo xitong bu, 网

络系统部], respectively.36

The SSF’s operational responsibilities and chain of command were 

initially uncertain but have become clearer over time. As part of the PLA 

reforms, the Central Military Commission restructured the principal 

responsibilities of the military’s main components under a new paradigm 

encapsulated by the official phrase “CMC leads, theaters fight, and services 

build” [junwei guanzong, zhanqu zhuzhan, junzhong zhujian, 军委管总, 战

区主战, 军种主建], envisioning a division of labor that would see the new 

theaters focus on operations, the services on force construction, and the 

CMC on supervising and managing both. This approach resulted in a new 

dual-command structure with an administrative chain from the Central 

Military Commission to the services and an operational chain from the 

CMC to the five joint force theater commands. In theory, this would imply 

(cont.)
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

450

that subordinate SSF elements would be under the operational command 

of the five theater commands. In practice, however, much like the PLA 

Rocket Force [jiefangjun huojian jun, 解放军火箭军], which serves as the 

cornerstone of China’s nuclear deterrent, the SSF’s capabilities have been 

deemed sufficiently strategic that it reports directly to the Central Military 

Commission for operations.37 The theater commands are confirmed to have 

subordinate command organizations for ground force, navy, and air force 

elements within their regions, but none have been found for the Strategic 

Support Force.

SSF Structure and Components 

Organizationally, the Strategic Support Force’s operational forces are 

split into two co-equal, semi-independent branches: the Space Systems 

Department, which heads up a force responsible for space operations, and 

the Network Systems Department, which heads up a force responsible 

for information operations. Though the force structure of these departments is largely opaque, as the reforms have progressed details have slowly 

emerged regarding a growing number of personnel transfers, unit consolidations, Military Unit Cover Designator conversions, and in some cases 

the establishment of entirely new units with no identifiable predecessor. 

This transitional state complicates any attempt to give a full accounting 

of structure and command relationships, but some basic inferences can 

nevertheless be drawn.

First, the SSF appears to have a bifurcated structure, whereby the SSD 

and NSD act as largely independent, administrative headquarters for their 

respective forces and the Staff Department serves as an operational headquarters. This arrangement would help explain the apparent administrative 

oddity of the SSD and NSD having the same grade as the Staff Department, 

an organization they would normally report to. Such a command structure 

may better enable the SSD and NSD to independently develop their own 

officer corps, tailor training to force needs, and prioritize their own capabilities development while allowing the Central Military Commission to 
Strategic Support Force

451

integrate their operations in situations where their missions overlap, such 

as in certain strategic intelligence and counterspace missions.

Second, SSF units have been assigned MUCDs, the numerical codes 

that the PLA has long used to conceal a unit’s true identity in public sources. 

The SSF’s MUCDs fall between 32001 and 32099.38 Analysis of these designators largely confirms that, as expected, a number of SSF units are 

beginning to migrate from their old designations to new MUCDs that fall 

within the SSF’s assigned block. However, a select few appear to be newly 

created or do not align to known units. MUCDs are a useful tool for determining which stage of reorganization the SSF’s forces are undergoing, as 

a new designator is generally a fair indication that their structure, grade, 

and command relationships have been reviewed, approved, and are likely 

to remain static throughout the course of the remaining reforms. On the 

other hand, a unit still using its pre-reform MUCD invites speculation that a 

new designation awaits after some administrative change or reorganization.

Finally, many SSF forces appear to be organized as “bases,” a form of 

corps leader grade unit that is distinct to the PLA. The space force in particular had already largely been organized as bases prior to the creation of 

the SSF. Of the former GAD “test bases” [shiyan jidi, 实验基地], numbered 

20 to 33, the five responsible for space operations have been confirmed to 

have been transferred to the Strategic Support Force, whereas the remaining 

bases were transferred to the Equipment Development Department and 

services.39 These bases appear to have retained their previous numerical 

designations even under the new system. However, a newly designated 

unit called the “Strategic Support Force 35th Base” [zhanlüe zhiyuan budui 

35 jidi, 战略支援部队35基地] now appears to be responsible for some of 

the space force’s space-based survey, mapping, and navigation missions, 

including the management of military Beidou satellites.40 The creation 

or designation of a new SSF base beyond the aforementioned five that are 

known to exist, with numbering that extends past what was previously 

the highest numbered PLA base (the 33rd), raises the possibility that there 

may be more space-related numerical bases in the offing. Additional bases 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

452

might also be responsible for supporting the space information support and 

survey, mapping, and navigation missions.

The SSF has also inherited the 311 Base [311 jidi, 311基地], also known 

as China’s “Three Warfares Base,” from the General Political Department, 

though its position within the SSF’s organizational structure is unclear. The 

311 Base is the PLA’s sole organization that is publicly known to focus on 

psychological warfare. Notably, one public record refers to the existence of 

a “Strategic Support Force Eastern Base” [zhanlüe zhiyuan budui dongbu 

jidi, 战略支援部队东部基地].41 This invites comparisons to a similar structure used by the newly created Joint Logistics Support Force [lianhe houqin 

baozhang budui, 联合后勤保障部队], which has subordinate bases that align 

with the five theater commands.42 These bases could fall directly under the 

SSF’s staff department and serve both space and cyber force personnel or, 

alternatively, could be a series of bases that fall under the Network Systems 

Department. The former possibility would help further the SSF mission of 

supporting the theater commands and may explain the absence of identifiable 

SSF elements under them—SSF regional bases are still in the process of being 

created. The latter possibility would answer the question of exactly how the 

NSD intends to organize the loose and geographically dispersed confederation of cyber, EW, and psychological warfare forces it has inherited. 

A Force in Transition 

With reforms scheduled to run from 2015 until 2020, the SSF remains very 

much a force in transition. Its transitional state complicates efforts to fully 

understand how it will be permanently organized. There are several peculiarities in the current SSF structure that may either end up as permanent 

features of its organization (and thus consequential for understanding the 

SSF’s operational concepts), mere transient idiosyncrasies that have been 

left over from larger structural reforms, or bureaucratic compromises that 

have yet to be ironed out.

Many of these anomalies relate to the SSF’s grade [jibie, 级别] structure (see figure 3). The PLA’s grade system is separated into 15 grades that 
Strategic Support Force

453

correspond to 10 ranks, defining both an organization’s and an officer’s 

place in the PLA hierarchy. Ranks are occasionally used for ease of coordination with foreign militaries, since most other militaries consider ranks 

to be paramount, but are often not referenced in the PLA’s daily practice.

Traditionally in the PLA, an organization’s grade, not its commander’s rank, has been the determining factor for its authority, shaping which 

Bases

Former 3PLA

Military Theater

Leader Grade

Deputy Military

Theater Grade

Corps

Leader Grade

Deputy Corps

Leader Grade

Division

Leader Grade

Deputy Division

Leader Grade

Strategic

Support Force

Sta

Department

Gao Jin

Commander

Zheng Weiping

PC

Li Shangfu*

Deputy Commander

Chief of Sta

Shang Hong

Deputy Cdr

CDR, SSD

Zheng Junjie

Deputy Cdr

CDR, NSD

Space Systems

Dept.

Sta

PWD

Logistics

Equipment

XSCC

BACC

1st Bureau

2nd Bureau

12th Bureau

...

Possible

ECM Bureau

Network

Systems Dept.

Possible

Department

Structure

Former 4PLA

ECM Brigade

ECM Brigade

Figure 3. SSF Grade Structure

* Li Shangfu is now director of the CMC Equipment Development Department. His replacement as 

SSF chief of staff has not been identified.

Key: BACC: Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center; CDR: commander; ECM: electronic 

countermeasure; NSD: Network Systems Department; PC: political commissar; PWD: Political Work 

Department; SSD: Space Systems Department; XSCC: Xian Satellite Monitor and Control Center.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

454

organizations it may answer to, coordinate with, or command. The grade 

system also defines the potential career paths for officers, providing 

sequential rungs upon which billets are based.43 For many officers in the 

PLA, organizational mergers or streamlining reforms ultimately mean a 

reduction in billets, which means increased competition over fewer pathways for promotion.44 For organizations, these changes mean a redefinition 

of command and coordination authorities, altering relationships within 

the PLA’s command ecosystem. When reorganizing the PLA, planners 

must be conscious of both officer career paths and organizational responsibilities, balancing the need for structural change against bureaucratic 

and operational pressures.

Since the SSF is a massive merger between elements of the former 

GAD and elements of the GSD, these considerations have almost certainly 

played an important role in decisions about its structure. For instance, one 

would ordinarily expect that the SSF’s Space Systems Department would 

mirror its Network Systems Department counterpart and have bureaus 

[ju, 局] under its headquarters. This would align with the PLA’s overall 

organizational paradigm wherein “departments contain bureaus, which 

in turn contain offices” [bu-ju-chu,部-局-处]. Instead the SSD has another 

layer of departments [bu, 部] where bureaus might be.45 This nonstandard 

structure could either be temporary until the departments can be converted 

into bureaus, or it could be an indicator that the NSD will defy convention 

and maintain second-level departments instead of bureaus. Additionally, 

both the heads of the SSD and NSD are dual-hatted as deputy commanders 

of the SSF, giving them a “deputy theater command leader” [fu zhanqu 

ji, 副战区级] grade. The merger and demotion of former GAD elements 

appears to have created a bureaucratic bottleneck in promotions for much 

of the space mission’s leadership, as many of the senior leaders there, such 

as the heads of the space launch bases, had already attained “corps leader” 

or deputy theater command leader grade. This may help explain the prevalence of former GAD officers in the SSF’s leadership, as it was necessary 

to provide them with billets that accorded with their established grades.
Strategic Support Force

455

The most consequential and enduring mystery in this regard is that the 

SSD and NSD appear to be the same grade as the SSF Staff Department, limiting 

the latter’s ability to command and direct their operations. This arrangement 

may be the result of bureaucratic necessity. Since many of the former GAD 

launch bases were corps leader grade organizations, the Space Systems Department would need to be at least a deputy theater command leader grade to 

command them, requiring a grade increase that made it the equal of the Staff 

Department. Alternatively, it may indicate that SSF structure is in a transitional 

state, with further changes to come that will move the headquarters as well as 

the space and cyber forces into a more permanent organizational framework.

The SSD and China’s Space Forces 

As noted, the Strategic Support Force’s space mission falls under the Space 

Systems Department, a deputy theater command leader grade organization 

that has been described as the headquarters of China’s military space forces 

[junshi hangtian budui, 军事航天部队], also known informally as its “space 

force” [tian jun, 天军].46 The initial leadership of this department consists 

of Major General Shang Hong [尚宏], who has led it since its inception, 

Political Commissar Kang Chunyuan [康春元], Deputy Commander Hao 

Weizhong [郝卫中], and Chief of Staff Fei Jiabing [费加兵].47 With the 

exception of Kang, who formerly served as the Lanzhou Military Region 

deputy political commissar, all are from the former GAD and veterans of 

China’s military space programs.48

This reorganization of China’s myriad space capabilities into a coherent, unified space force is a response to organizational challenges that arose 

from space forces being dispersed throughout the military. Previously, the 

PLA was tasked with executing space missions using assets spread across 

the GAD and GSD.49 The SSD has now subsumed nearly every aspect of 

PLA space operations that were formerly controlled by the GAD and GSD, 

including space launch and support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; 

space information support; space attack; and space defense (see table 2). The 

office overseeing China’s manned space missions has stayed with the CMC 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

456

Equipment Development Department, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the 

appearance of militarizing China’s manned space mission.50

Table 2. SSF Space Corps Units

Space Launch and Support

Name Assessed Grade Function and Description

Jiuquan Satellite Launch 

Center

[中国酒泉卫星发射中心]

20th Testing and 

Training Base

[第20试验训练基地]

Corps Leader grade Oldest and largest launch site and the 

only one that conducts human spaceflight launches.

Taiyuan Satellite 

Launch Center

[中国太原卫星发射中心]

25th Testing and Training 

Base

[第25试验训练基地]

Corps Leader grade The center launches satellites into 

sun-synchronous and low-earth orbits.

Xichang Satellite 

Launch Center

[中国西昌卫星发射中心]

27th Testing and 

Training Base

[第27试验训练基地]

Corps Leader grade The center launches satellites into geosynchronous orbit. Maintains mobile 

tracking stations that supply data to 

other facilities.

Wenchang Aerospace 

Launch Site

[文昌航天发射场]

Corps Leader grade Completed in 2014. The center was 

built to use the new heavy-lift Long 

March 5 and to launch heavier payloads 

into orbit.

Table 2. SSF Space Corps Units

Telemetry, Tracking, and Control (TT&C)

Name Assessed Grade Function and Description

Beijing Aerospace Flight 

Control Center

[北京航天飞行控制中心]

Corps Leader grade Responsible for command and control 

of China’s manned spaceflight program.

Xi’an Satellite Control 

Center

[中国西安卫星测控中心]

26th Testing and Training 

Base [第26试验训练

基地]

Corps Leader grade Core hub for China’s telemetry, tracking, and control network. Maintains a 

nation-wide retinue of fixed and mobile 

TT&C stations.
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457

Table 2. SSF Space Corps Units

Telemetry, Tracking, and Control (TT&C)

Name Assessed Grade Function and Description

China Satellite Maritime 

Tracking and Control 

Department

[中国卫星海上测控部]

23rd Test and Training 

Base [第23试验训练

基地]

Corps Leader grade Provides maritime TT&C for China’s 

space launches and intercontinental 

ballistic missile tests. Maintains a small 

fleet of Yuanwang (远望) tracking ships.

Table 2. SSF Space Corps Units

Space-based C4ISR

Name Assessed Grade Function and Description

Aerospace 

Reconnaissance Bureau 

[航天侦察局]

Deputy Corps 

Leader grade

Responsible for space-based 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Satellite Communications 

Main Station 

[卫星通信总站]

Deputy Corps 

Leader grade

Responsible for space-based communications and data relay.

Satellite Positioning Main 

Station [卫星定位总站]

Deputy Corps 

Leader grade

Responsible for military use of the 

Beidou navigation system.

Although the bulk of the SSD’s operational units and administrative 

functions are drawn from the former GAD’s space cadre, some operational 

units and missions are also drawn from the former GSD. The components 

brought over from the GSD are primarily related to space-based C4ISR 

assets, which in the PLA are categorized as “space-based information support” [tian ji xinxi zhiyuan, 天基信息支援].51 For example, although the 

military intelligence–focused former GSD Second Department [zongcan er 

bu, 总参二部, or zongcan qingbao bu, 总参情报部] remains in existence as 

the new Joint Intelligence Bureau [lian can qingbao ju, 联参情报局] under 

the CMC Joint Staff Department, its former Aerospace Reconnaissance 

Bureau [hangtian zhencha ju, 航天侦察局], responsible for space-based 

remote sensing and the Yaogan [遥感] series of optical and electronic 

intelligence satellites, has been separated and transferred over to the SSD.52

The former GSD Satellite Main Station, which is responsible for satellite 

uplink, downlink, and managing space-based communication satellites, 

(cont.)
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

458

has also been transferred to the SSD, even as its parent organization, the 

former GSD Informatization Department’s Information Support Base 

[xinxi baozhang jidi, 信息保障基地], has been reorganized under the CMC 

Joint Staff Department as the Information and Communications Bureau 

(JSD-ICB) [lian can xinxi tongxin ju, 联参信息通信局] Information Support Base.53 Finally, the GSD Satellite Positioning Main Station [weixing 

dingwei zongzhan, 卫星定位总站], responsible for managing the PLA’s 

use of China’s Beidou navigation satellite constellation, has moved over to 

the SSD as well.54 Its parent unit, the operations-focused former GSD First 

Department’s Survey, Mapping, and Navigation Bureau [cehui daohang ju, 

测绘导航局], has become the Joint Staff Department Battlefield Environment Support Bureau [zhanchang huanjing baozhang ju,战场环境保障局].

It is currently unclear what responsibilities, if any, the SSF’s space force 

has for antisatellite research, development, testing, and operations, nor is it 

known whether the SSF has a role in the related discipline of ballistic missile 

defense (BMD). Both missions could presumably fall under the categories 

of space attack and defense, respectively, which would place them under 

the SSF’s remit. Alternatively, these missions may be assigned to the PLA 

Rocket Force, which already has a role in missile operations, or the PLA 

Air Force (PLAAF), which has already demonstrated a limited capability in 

both antisatellite missiles and BMD. In August 2017, the DN-3 antisatellite 

missile was launched from the SSF’s Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, which 

may indicate that the SSF has responsibility for testing or fielding these 

systems.55 The current locations of many of China’s offensive space capabilities, including its more experimental co-orbital attack capabilities such 

as the Shiyan-7 [实验-7, or SY-7] “robotic arm” satellite, remain unknown.56

The creation of the SSD nevertheless appears to have resolved at least 

some of the previous bureaucratic power struggles over space missions 

between the former GAD, PLAAF, and Second Artillery Force. Although 

the GAD had long held preeminence in space launch, support, and telemetry, tracking, and control, the capabilities necessary for contesting “space 

dominance” (zhikong quan, 制空权) by holding adversary assets at risk 
Strategic Support Force

459

of denial or disruption were split among the three organizations.57 From 

the mid-2000s onward, PLAAF leadership forcefully argued that its core 

responsibility for air defense operations should be extended into space, 

proposing the strategic operational concept of “integrated air and space 

operations” [kongtian yiti zuozhan, 空天一体作战] as a way toward this 

coupling.58 The former PLA Second Artillery Force also promoted itself at 

various points as the best equipped to carry out the military’s space mission 

set. Its arsenal of short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles, as well 

as its inherent status as a strategic service, gave it a strong hand in arguing 

that its existing capabilities “could be adapted for a space intercept role by 

reprogramming missile guidance and fusing.”59 At least for the moment, 

the creation of an independent force with responsibility for PLA space 

missions provides a definitive conclusion to this long-running three-way 

dispute, perhaps reflecting a bureaucratic compromise.

There is also a broader question as to whether the SSF’s primacy in space 

and space-based C4ISR will preclude other services from independently 

developing, operating, or maintaining their own space infrastructure for 

operations. The PLA’s services have been known to defend aggressively 

against one another’s efforts to challenge their primacy in their respective 

primary domains of operation.60 It remains to be seen if the PLA’s reorganization and the CMC’s new functional joint model will relieve pressure on 

these service rivalries, or if they will intensify as a result of new competition 

over funding and development of “new-type” capabilities. It is possible 

that the SSF’s space mission may represent a bureaucratic “solution” to the 

previous fight for space primacy between the PLAAF and Rocket Force.

The NSD and China’s Cyber Forces 

The Strategic Support Force’s cyber mission has been given to the Network 

Systems Department, a deputy theater command leader grade organization 

that acts as the headquarters for the SSF’s cyber operations force, sometimes 

referred to as a “cyber force” [wang jun, 网军] or “cyberspace operations force” 

[wangluo kong jian zuozhan budui, 网络空间作战部队].61 Despite its name, the 
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NSD and its subordinate forces are responsible for information warfare more 

broadly, with a mission set that includes cyber warfare, EW, and potentially 

psychological warfare. Lieutenant General Zheng Junjie was named the NSD’s 

first commander and Lieutenant General Chai Shaoliang as its political commissar.62 Zheng was the director of the former GSD Third Department (3PLA) 

[zongcan san bu, 总参三部] and commandant of PLA Information Engineering University.63 Chai previously served as deputy political commissar of the 

GAD and, before that, of the former Chengdu Military Region [成都军区].64

The NSD appears to represent a renaming, reorganization, and 

grade promotion of the 3PLA. Much as the institutions of the former 

GSD provided the partial foundation for the creation of the Space Systems Department, they also form the organizational core of the NSD. The 

Network Systems Department maintains the former 3PLA headquarters, 

location, and internal bureau-centric structure. In at least one instance, the 

NSD has been referred to as the “SSF Third Department” [zhanlüe zhiyuan 

budui di san bu, 战略支援部队第三部], mirroring its former appellation.65

The bulk of China’s strategic cyber espionage forces were previously 

contained within the technical reconnaissance-focused GSD Third Department, which has been moved en masse into the NSD (see table 3). 

Table 3. Former Third Department Units Now Likely under the SSF

Name of Unit Notes

Operational or Administrative Organs

3PLA Headquarters Now the Network Systems Department (NSD)

First Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Second Bureau (Shanghai) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Third Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Fourth Bureau (QIngdao) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Fifth Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Sixth Bureau (Wuhan) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Seventh Bureau (Beijing) Transferred to NSD

Eighth Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Ninth Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Tenth Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD

Eleventh Bureau (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD
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461

Table 3. Former Third Department Units Now Likely under the SSF

Name of Unit Notes

Twelfth Bureau (Shanghai) Assessed to be transferred to NSD or Space Systems Department or 

Space Systems Department

Beijing North Computing 

Center (Beijing)

Transferred to NSD

Research Institutes

56th Research Institute Transferred to NSD

57th Research Institute Transferred to NSD

58th Research Institute Transferred to NSD

Academic Institutions

Foreign Language Institute Now PLA IEU Luoyang Campus 

Information Engineering 

University (IEU)

Transferred to NSD

The Third Department’s cyber missions were largely handled by its 12 technical reconnaissance bureaus [jishu zhengcha ju, 技术侦察局], which were 

responsible for both cyber espionage and signals intelligence more broadly.66

While only three of the former bureaus can be fully confirmed to have moved 

into the NSD, this most likely reflects incomplete public data rather than an 

incomplete transition. The former GSD’s 56th, 57th, and 58th Research Institutes, which previously provided research, development, and weaponization 

support to the technical reconnaissance mission, have also moved to the 

NSD.67 Former military academic institutions, such as the PLA Information 

Engineering University [xinxi gongcheng daxue, 信息工程大学] and Luoyang 

Foreign Language Institute [luoyang waiyu xueyuan, 洛阳外语学院], have 

also moved over and in some cases have been consolidated.68

The centralization of China’s strategic cyber forces is a key feature of 

the Network Systems Department. The NSD appears designed to address 

the operational coordination challenges that previously arose from the 

structure of the former GSD. Traditionally, computer network attack was 

handled by the GSD Fourth Department (4PLA), while the PLA counter-network defense mission has been handled by the GSD Informatization 

Department. It now appears that the former 4PLA’s computer network 

attack forces have been transferred to the SSF to integrate with the cyber 

(cont.)
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462

espionage elements of the former Third Department (see table 4).69 However, it is noteworthy that the NSD does not appear to have integrated the 

PLA’s counter-network defense mission, which remains with the Joint 

Staff Department’s Information Support Base under its Network Security 

Defense Center [wangluo anquan fangyu zhongxin, 网络安全防御中心].70

The SSF and EW 

Compared with the space and cyber missions, China’s strategic electronic 

warfare mission has historically been far less divided and compartmentalized, having been concentrated almost entirely within the former GSD 

Fourth Department. The former 4PLA, which was also responsible for radar 

and computer network attack, has now been split by the reorganization 

along administrative and operational lines, with various elements either 

abolished, reorganized, or transferred to the Joint Staff Department and 

Strategic Support Force. At the top level, the former 4PLA headquarters has 

been moved to the Joint Staff Department, where it has been reconstituted 

as the new joint force Network-Electronic Bureau (JSD-NEB) [wangluo 

dianzi ju, wang dian ju, 网络电子局, 网电局].71 In its new form, it likely 

oversees management of the cyber and EW missions across the entire 

Chinese military, including the SSF, theater commands, and services. The 

4PLA’s military academy, the PLA Electrical Engineering Institute [dianzi 

gongcheng xueyuan, 电子工程学院], has been subsumed by the National 

University of Defense Technology (NUDT) [guofang keji daxue, 国防科技

大学] to become the NUDT Electronic Countermeasure Institute [dianzi 

duikang xueyuan, 电子对抗学院].72 Meanwhile, 4PLA’s GSD 54th Research 

Institute, responsible for research and development of operational electronic 

and network countermeasures, has moved over to the Strategic Support 

Force, likely under the Network Systems Department.73

At a lower, operational level, at least some of the 4PLA’s EW units have 

been reassigned to the SSF, with Chinese media reports mentioning unidentified “electronic countermeasure brigades” under the new force and public 

documents revealing former 4PLA units now operating under an SSF MUCD 
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463

designation.74 Prior to the reforms, the 4PLA maintained a number of electronic countermeasure brigades, detachments, and stations nationwide, 

none of which has been visibly accounted for in the PLA’s new structure.75

Nevertheless, the reassignment of the GSD 54th Research Institute is a vital 

clue that EW now falls under the aegis of the NSD, and the former 4PLA’s 

monopoly on strategic electronic warfare makes it a near certainty that some 

or all of these units have been assigned to the SSF (see table 4).

Table 4. Former Fourth Department Units Now Likely under SSF

Name of Unit Notes

Operational and Administrative Units

4PLA Headquarters Transferred to JSD as a new 'Network-Electronic 

Bureau'

Electronic Countermeasure Brigade 

(ECM) (Langfang)

Assessed to be transferred to Network Systems 

Department (NSD)

Langfang ECM Brigade Detachment 

(Yingtan)

Assessed to be transferred to NSD

ECM (Beidaihe) Transferred to the NSD

Beidaihe ECM Brigade Detachment 

(Nicheng)

Transferred to the NSD

Electronic Countermeasure Center Potentially merged with Joint Network-Electronic 

Countermeasure dadui

Satellite Main Station (Beijing) Assessed to be transferred to NSD or Space Systems 

Department

Regional Satellite Station (Hainan) Assessed to be transferred to NSD or Space Systems 

Department

Research Institutes

54th Research Institute Transferred to the NSD

Academic Institutions

Electrical Engineering Institute Now the National University of Defense Technology 

Electronic Countermeasures Institute

Integrating the cyber warfare and EW elements of the former 3PLA 

and 4PLA is a crucial step toward fully realizing a long-held PLA theory 

of how best to fight information warfare known as integrated network and 

electronic warfare, which envisions the close coordination of cyber and 

electronic warfare forces in both capabilities development and operational 

use. According to this school of thought, the integration of information 
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technology on the battlefield has created a combined “network and electromagnetic space” [wangdian kongjian, 网电空间] such that cyber and 

EW forces “cannot be mutually exclusive, with each [force] fighting [its] 

own battles.”76 On a more concrete level, integrated network and electronic 

warfare was conceived by former 4PLA head Dai Qingmin in the early 

2000s and represented 4PLA’s side of a bureaucratic turf war between 

3PLA and 4PLA as to the proper division of missions between the two 

organizations.77

With the adoption of INEW as mainstream PLA thinking, 4PLA 

took on both the GSD’s offensive cyber and electronic countermeasures 

missions in a partial realization of the concept, but its broader implementation remained largely incomplete.78 Responsibilities for the cyber 

and electromagnetic domains remained divided at the strategic level, 

with the Fourth Department responsible for both network and electronic 

countermeasures (offense) and the Third Department responsible for 

cyber espionage and traditional radio-frequency signals intelligence 

(reconnaissance and espionage). The Strategic Support Force’s merging of 

the two departments’ operational responsibilities could bring the concept 

full circle, creating a unified force for warfighting in the network and 

electromagnetic space.

The status of this integration is unclear. For now, at least, the integration appears to be notional and largely the result of renaming and 

functionally realigning rather than at a deeper level of combining of personnel, systems, and culture. That said, the reforms are still incomplete 

and the next stage is intended to focus on below-the-neck reforms and 

integration, under which this would presumably fall. Still, it is unclear 

how foreign observers would measure or understand the progress in these 

actions, as they produce fewer appearances than larger scale changes. In any 

case, if successful in achieving deeper integration, this force will be fully 

empowered to conduct both espionage and offense operations, a recognition 

of the ways in which the two disciplines often reinforce and depend on one 

another on the modern battlefield.
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465

The JSD-NEB now seems to be pushing the INEW concept force-wide 

as the main successor of the 4PLA, likely overseeing force development 

and warfighting efforts in the Strategic Support Force, other services, and 

theater commands. Initially, it seemed plausible that the former 4PLA 

might move to the SSF to form something along the lines of a hypothetical 

“Electronic Systems Department” that would stand alongside the SSD and 

NSD.79 The fact that 4PLA headquarters has instead been integrated in the 

Joint Staff Department as the Network-Electronic Bureau makes it more 

likely that strategic electronic warfare units have been merged with the NSD 

to better align with the combined network and electronic countermeasures 

concept that the JSD-NEB is establishing throughout the entire PLA.80 The 

“network-electronic” grouping has also been spotted in other post-reform 

PLA organizations, such as the national joint force Network-Electronic 

Countermeasures dadui [大队] and a Theater Command Network-Electronic Countermeasure dui [队].

81 It is not clear if the NSD has inherited 

any management institutions from the former 4PLA, or if it will create new 

bureaus specifically for the purpose of leading the new operational EW 

units under its command.

The SSF and the Three Warfares 

The Strategic Support Force also appears to have incorporated elements 

of the military’s psychological and political warfare missions, a result of a 

subtle yet consequential reorganization of China’s political warfare forces. 

Before the reforms, the former General Political Department had primary 

responsibility for carrying out military political warfare. This mission was 

encapsulated in a concept developed in the early 2000s known as the Three 

Warfares, a unique Chinese political warfare model that calls for the coordinated use of psychological warfare [xinli zhan, 心理战], public opinion 

warfare [yulun zhan, 舆论战], and legal warfare [falü zhan, 法律战] to 

establish “discursive power” [huayu quan,话语权] over an adversary—that 

is, the power to control perceptions and shape narratives that advance Chinese interests and undermine those of an opponent.82 The former General 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

466

Political Department separated responsibilities for these missions at strategic and operational levels, with the former Liaison Department [lianluo 

bu, 联络部] responsible for the broader mission of political warfare and 

the 311 Base responsible for more operational aspects of political warfare 

and psychological operations against Taiwan.83 While the 311 Base was 

under the command of the General Political Department in peacetime, in 

a conflict scenario, the base, a deputy corps leader grade organization, and 

its six subordinate regiments, would form the core of China’s psychological 

warfare forces in information operations campaigns.84

The reforms shook up this arrangement, incorporating the General 

Political Department into the Central Military Commission as the new 

CMC Political Work Department and reassigning the 311 Base to the 

Strategic Support Force.85 Although the base is unaccounted for in known 

portions of the SSF’s structure, it could potentially fall under the SSF’s 

Political Work Department or, perhaps more likely, the Network Systems 

Department. The latter possibility would see the NSD in command of the 

full spectrum of information operations—not only cyber but also electronic 

and psychological warfare. The move itself appears to remove organizational impediments to coordination across the information operations 

disciplines, integrating them in peacetime to ease their transition into a 

wartime structure. PLA scholars have stressed the importance of both psychological and political operations in shaping the strategic situation ahead 

of conflict.86 Integrating the 311 Base’s operational forces with the SSF’s 

space, cyber, and electronic missions empowers psychological operations 

forces with cross-domain intelligence and helps maximize the impact of 

information operations on an adversary’s psychology.

What is unclear is what responsibilities the CMC Political Work 

Department will have for political warfare and, therefore, psychological 

operations. The former Liaison Department, which previously served as 

the PLA’s political warfare command center, is unaccounted for in the 

PLA’s structure; it has most likely remained with the CMC Political Work 

Department in some form. The PLA’s inherent status as a Party army (not 
Strategic Support Force

467

a national one) imposes on its psychological operations forces an additional 

imperative to ensure ideological loyalty and push Party ideals as part of its 

operational strategy. It is possible that the 311 Base’s move signals a “decoupling” of sorts between political and psychological warfare, which have 

traditionally sat uncomfortably at the intersection of the General Political 

Department’s political command and the GSD’s operational command.87

Both the PLA’s revised 2010 Political Work Guidelines and the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy indicate the need for psychological 

operations to more closely align with traditional, nonpolitical, military 

information warfare forces, and the reorganization may be a direct reflection of this imperative.88

Joint Command and the SSF 

The reforms have also substantially altered the command context for 

many of the missions now under the Strategic Support Force, redefining 

longstanding organizational relationships and creating new responsibilities 

across the PLA command bureaucracy. The CMC’s new Joint Staff Department may have responsibility for relaying CMC operational decisions to the 

SSF.89 Understanding how each of the different components of this organization interface with the SSF is crucial to understanding PLA command 

and control during a wartime or crisis scenario.

The JSD was based on the former GSD, which had effectively been triple-hatted in the past—serving as a notional joint command headquarters, 

ground force headquarters, and as administrative headquarters for strategic 

missions and units. The reforms split these responsibilities apart, forming 

a new ground force headquarters, establishing the Strategic Support Force 

from pre-existing space, cyber, and EW forces, and elevating both the GSD 

and many, but not all, of its subordinate organs to the Central Military Commission as the Joint Staff Department. JSD bureaus oversee various aspects of 

military command, including operations, intelligence, cyber and electronic 

warfare, communications, and battlefield environment support. However, 

the precise manner in which the JSD commands the SSF remains unclear.
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468

Operational Command in Peacetime and Wartime 

In peacetime, the SSF appears to fall under the command of either the 

CMC’s Joint Staff Department Operations Bureau [liancan zuozhan ju, 

联参作战局] or its Joint Operations Command Center [liancan zuozhan 

zhihui zhongxin, 联参作战指挥中心], which are both responsible for central command and control of both the services and theater commands. 

Official media state that the center acts as a “strategic command” over 

services and theater commands.90 In the previous Joint Staff Department 

Operations Bureau incarnation as the GSD First Department, it had a set of 

subordinate bureaus responsible for different types of operations, including 

both service bureaus, such as the Air Force Operations Bureau [kongjun 

zuozhan ju, 空军作战局] and Navy Operations Bureau [haijun zuozhan ju, 

海军作战局], as well as functional bureaus such as the Special Operations 

Bureau [tezhong zuozhan ju, 特种作战局] and Information Operations 

Bureau [xinxi zuozhan ju, 信息作战局].91 Some of these subordinate bureaus 

appear to have survived and been reorganized as offices [chu, 处], though 

only two have been definitively confirmed to exist: the overseas operations 

office [haiwai hangdong chu, 海外行动处]

92 and air traffic control office 

[kongguan chu, 空管处].93

Since responsibilities for operations have shifted from the services 

to theater commands, it is not clear whether the former service-centric 

operations bureaus will ultimately survive or be replaced by geographic 

bureaus that directly align with theater commands. In any case, there is 

no clear subordinate office that would appear to be tasked with directing 

SSF operations. Given the SSF’s mission, the chief candidate would be along 

the lines of a hypothetical “information operations office,” a successor 

organization to the information operations bureau under the Operations 

Department before the reforms. However, an office that has clear authority 

over the SSF has yet to be identified.

Prior to the recent reforms, the PLA’s plans for a wartime campaign 

entailed shifting into “operations groups” [zuozhan jiqun, 作战集群], temporary entities at the strategic, theater, and tactical levels that would act 
Strategic Support Force

469

as joint force commands and direct operations for a particular domain, 

region, or type of wartime activity.94 If this basic structure persists, the 

SSF will likely constitute the core component of an information operations group (IOG) [xinxi zuozhan jiqun, 信息作战集群], a joint force 

wartime construct dedicated to waging information warfare.95 In his 

authoritative 2013 work Lectures on the Science of Information Operations, 

Major General Ye Zheng stated that in wartime the PLA would stand 

up an IOG commanding all aspects of information warfare activity.96

Its missions would be organized as a series of subordinate elements, 

referred to as “groups” [qun, 群], for mission sets including cyber warfare, 

EW, psychological warfare, air defense electronic countermeasures, and 

information support.97 As operations groups are further differentiated at 

the strategic, theater, and tactical levels of warfighting, it is plausible that 

any IOGs would be similarly tiered with national-level, campaign, and/

or theater-level iterations.98

The IOG structure used by the PLA prior to the recent reforms is in 

many ways the predecessor to the new joint command structure in that it 

similarly established joint command mechanisms overseeing individual 

service components at the national and theater levels. The creation of the 

theater commands may have obviated the need to shift the PLA into a 

wartime structure for regional campaigns, but the need may still be present 

at the national level. The Joint Operations Command Center likely facilitates command and control for national strategic missions, but it remains 

unclear how the organization arranges operational groupings across the 

services for these purposes. As of now, no joint force construct has been 

identified under the Joint Operations Command Center that would serve as 

a standing IOG. Instead, the Strategic Support Force appears to serve both 

operational and administrative roles. This would mean that the SSF is not 

a direct analogue to a wartime IOG, but rather a force that is optimized for 

seamless transitioning to a more operational footing. However, an IOG may 

still be necessary to integrate information operations capabilities from the 

various services at the national level.
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470

Intelligence and Technical Reconnaissance 

The reforms also substantially reorganized the intelligence responsibilities of 

the former GSD, creating a new Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau 

out of the former GSD Second Department as well as separating out and 

centralizing the strategic-level technical collection organizations under the 

Strategic Support Force (see figure 4).99 At the national level, this change 

institutionalizes the PLA’s long-standing distinction between “intelligence” 

[qingbao, 情报], which encompasses all-source analysis supporting command 

decisionmaking, and “technical reconnaissance” [jishu zhencha, 技术侦察], 

which refers to technical intelligence collection directly supporting military 

operations.100 The structure appears to maintain the prior arrangement of 

intelligence flow, whereby “all military intelligence flowed upward through 

the GSD.”101 The new Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau serves the 

GSD’s former role, incorporating intelligence from the theater commands, 

each which in turn has its own bureaus responsible for operational and 

tactical intelligence analysis.102 Theoretically, the establishment of a separate 

Theater Command

Northern TC

Joint Sta Department

Strategic Support Force

Network

Systems

Department

Cyber,

Electronic,

PsyOps Intel

Support

to

TCs

Service

TRBs

SSF

Western

Technical

Recon.

Base

Service

TRBs

Service

TRBs

Service

TRBs

Service

TRBs

Central TC Eastern TC Southern TC Western TC

1st Bureau

2nd Bureau

12th Bureau

TRBs

1st Bureau

2nd Bureau

12th Bureau

TRBs

55th RI

Aerospace

Recon.

Bureau

SSF

Southern

Technical

Recon.

Base

SSF

Eastern

Technical

Recon.

Base

SSF

Central

Technical

Recon.

Base

SSF

Northern

Technical

Recon.

Base

Operations

Bureau

Military

Operations

Intelligence

Bureau

Military

Intelligence

Operations

Intelligence Support General Sta Department

Third

Department

Technical

Reconnaissance

Second

Department

Intelligence

Pre-reform Post-reform

55th RI

Aerospace

Recon.

Bureau

Space Systems

Department

Launch, TT&C,

Recon. Survey

and

Mapping

...

...

Figure 4. PLA’s Military Intelligence System in Transition (Notional)

Key: PsyOps: psychological operations; RI: reconnaissance and intelligence; TC: theater command; 

TRB: technical reconnaissance bureau; TT&C: telemetry, tracking, and control.
Strategic Support Force

471

ground force headquarters and the incorporation of the Intelligence Bureau 

into the joint staff gives it more latitude to move away from its army-dominated past and direct intelligence resources to critical missions based on 

operational needs.103 However, it remains unclear what exact responsibilities 

the bureau will have beyond the traditional focus on all-source analysis and 

human intelligence and whether, in light of its elevated role, it will take on 

more bureaucratic responsibilities for managing intelligence demands and 

balancing collections requirements among different competing interests 

within the PLA.

Network and Electronic Warfare 

The Joint Staff Department’s Network-Electronic Bureau creates a new 

force-wide structure for the management of the cyber and electronic warfare missions in the Strategic Support Force, theater commands, and other 

services. The creation of the JSD-NEB suggests that the PLA is maintaining a dual-echelon structure for cyber and EW, with the SSF’s cyber 

force assuming responsibilities for strategic national-level operations that 

previously rested with former GSD units, while the services and theater 

commands continue to be responsible for cyber and EW operations at the 

operational and tactical levels (see figure 5). The precise responsibilities 

of the JSD-NEB are unclear, but likely include oversight and integration 

functions such as the issuance of operational guidance, deconfliction of 

areas of responsibility, and establishment of rules of engagement. In one 

of the few public mentions of the organization tied to a specific sphere of 

interest, JSD-NEB Chief Major General Wang Xiaoming [王晓明] and Deputy Bureau Chief Senior Colonel Lin Shishan [林世山] held a symposium 

with international law experts at the Wuhan School of Law, discussing 

international law in cyberspace and “Tallinn 2.0,” a study on applicability of 

international law to cyber operations performed by the NATO Cooperative 

Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.104

The reforms have also established a national Joint Network-Electronic 

Countermeasure dadui.105 This organization appears to have corresponding 
472

CMC Joint Sta Department

Strategic Support

Force

Network

Systems

Department

Cyber,

Electronic

PsyOps

1st Bureau

2nd Bureau

12th

TRBs

 Bureau

1st Bureau

2nd Bureau

12th

TRBs

 Bureau

Operations

Bureau

Military

Operations

NetworkElectronic

Bureau

Cyber & EW

Policy

Command

General Sta Department

Third

Department

Computer

Network

Exploitation

Fourth

Department

Computer

Network

Attack & EW

57th RI58th RI

AirDef ECM

Brigade

Beidaihe

ECM

Brigade

Langfang

ECM Sat

Station

Beijing

54th RI 56th RI

....

....

AirDef ECM

Brigade

Beidaihe

ECM

Brigade

Langfang

ECM Sat

Station

Beijing

54th RI56th RI57th RI58th RI

Army TRBs

Navy TRBs

Air Force

TRBsTRBs

Army ECM

Units

Air Force

ECM Units

Theater

Commands

(Five Regional)

Joint

Network-ECM

Group

NetworkElectronic

Bureau

Army HQ

NetworkElectronic

Bureau

Navy HQ

NetworkElectronic

Bureau

Air Force HQ

Navy ECM

Units

Figure 5. Network-Electronic Units in Transition

Key: CMC: Central Military Commission; ECM: electronic countermeasure; EW: electronic warfare; HQ: headquarters; PsyOps: psychological operations; RI: reconnaissance and 

intelligence; TC: theater command; TRB: technical reconnaissance bureau; TT&C: telemetry, tracking, and control.
Strategic Support Force

473

lower echelon elements in the theater commands, called Network-Electronic 

Countermeasure dui, which are likely made up of regional service branch and 

theater command cyber and EW elements.106 These organizations mirror 

the former force-wide network of electronic countermeasure centers (ECM 

centers) [dianzi duikang zhongxin, 电子对抗中心], which were composed 

of a national center collocated with the former 4PLA and lower echelon 

elements in the former military regions.107 Based on the ECM center’s public 

research, its mission appears to have focused on electronic support measures, 

electronic intelligence, and targeting in the electromagnetic domain.108 The 

similarities suggest the former ground force ECM centers were most likely 

reorganized into joint force Network-Electronic Countermeasure dadui and 

dui, expanding the scope of their mission to include network reconnaissance 

and targeting. These organizations suggest that the SSF does not, as some 

initially thought, have a monopoly of force in cyberspace, but rather continues 

to share the mission with other components in the PLA.

Information and Communications 

The new Joint Staff Department’s Information and Communications 

Bureau, reorganized from the former GSD Informatization Department, 

has inherited responsibilities for force-wide management of information 

systems, communications, and support for high-level warfighting command and control. The ICB includes the PLA’s Information Assurance 

Base [xinxi baozhang jidi, 信息保障基地], which has similarly moved over 

to the JSD.109 However, the Strategic Support Force’s control of critical 

ground-based satellite communication infrastructure and primacy in 

operating space-based data relays may indicate it is a primary organization 

responsible for routing and supporting information flows through outer 

space, which would imply an overlap with what we understand to be the 

JSD-ICB’s responsibilities. It remains unclear if the SSF will inherit regional 

communications ground stations for downlink and uplink or whether those 

will be operated directly by the Central Military Commission, by other services, or by the theater commands. It is worth noting that the Information 
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474

Assurance Base appears to have maintained at least some of its subordinate 

communications regiments through the reforms, raising questions as to 

whether it might contain a joint “information support force” in the same 

vein as the Joint Logistics Support Force.110

The SSF’s Strategic Missions and Roles 

The Strategic Support Force demonstrates China’s evolving understanding of how information serves as a strategic resource in warfare. The PLA 

recognizes that harnessing outer space, the cyber domain, and the electromagnetic spectrum—and denying their use to adversaries—are paramount 

needs if the PLA is to attain superiority in a conflict. These three domains 

are the primary conduits by which a military force collects, processes, transmits, and receives information. If a force is denied use of these domains, the 

informationized system-of-systems infrastructure that underpins modern 

military operations cannot properly function. For the first time in the PLA’s 

history, the creation of the Strategic Support Force largely unifies both 

responsibility for fielding critical systems in these domains and conducting 

operations to dominate each domain’s battlespaces.

These two missions, frequently summarized as “information support” 

and “information warfare,” align in large part with the composition of 

the SSF’s subordinate space and cyber forces. This unity of organizational 

design and mission set is likely to substantially improve the PLA’s ability to 

achieve information superiority in a conflict. The reforms come at a time 

when the military’s mandate from Xi Jinping to modernize and operate 

further from China’s shores has placed growing demands on China’s information support and information warfare forces.

Strategic Information Support 

The first commander of the SSF, General Gao Jin, has emphasized the 

force’s role in information support by stating that the SSF provides vital 

“support for safeguarding and raising up an ‘information umbrella’ [xinxi 

yusan, 信息雨伞] for the military system, which will be integrated with 
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the actions of our land, sea, and air forces and rocket forces throughout an 

entire operation, [and] will be the key force for victory in war.”111 General 

Gao never expands on what he means by an information umbrella, but 

much can be inferred from a straightforward look at the types of information support the Strategic Support Force is uniquely positioned to provide.

The SSF’s space force contains what the 2013 Science of Military Strategy refers to as the “strategic brace support” (zhanlüe zhicheng, 战略支撑) 

of space-based intelligence and communications, both of which are functions that AMS strategists envision as the primary role for space forces in 

the foreseeable future.112 The terms used by authoritative sources, such as 

brace support and information umbrella, all carry connotations of support 

and extension, in this case by advancing the PLA’s ability to conduct and 

sustain operations both within Chinese territory and in areas abroad that 

China understands to be vital to its national interests.

While the SSF’s role in strategic information support largely derives 

from the plethora of intelligence and communications assets under its space 

force, the cyber force also maintains a deep bench of technical collection 

capabilities that are consequential even beyond offense and espionage operations within the cyber domain. SSF information support missions can be 

divided into five primary functions it offers across the military:

■	 centralizing technical intelligence collection and management

■	 providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands

■	 enabling PLA power projection

■	 supporting strategic defense in the space and nuclear domains

■	 enabling joint operations.

Centralizing Technical Intelligence Collection and Management. The 

Strategic Support Force commands a wide array of national-level technical 

collection assets received from the former organizations that now make 

up the bulk of its force. This includes space-based electro-optical imagery 

intelligence, synthetic aperture radar, electronic intelligence platforms from 

across the GSD and GAD, electronic support capabilities from the former 
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Fourth Department, and strategic, long-range ground-based collection 

systems from the former Third Department.113 Before the reorganization, 

management of these systems was siloed, answerable only to their parent 

general department, and differentiated based on source. While the reorganization places the totality of collection assets under the same organization, 

the advantages inherent to centralization depend heavily on how well the 

technical systems, data, and organizational procedures that underpin those 

operations can be integrated. From a purely organizational standpoint, 

control over these sources of intelligence potentially allows the Strategic 

Support Force to gain the comprehensive perspective necessary to identify 

gaps in collection, assess emerging needs, and tailor operations and acquisitions to address shortfalls and new challenges. In short, the sheer breadth of 

what the SSF can see and hear empowers it to play a decisive role in China’s 

comprehensive domain awareness and national defense far beyond that of 

any single organization that has come before.

Providing Strategic Intelligence Support to Theater Commands. 

While the theater command technical reconnaissance bureaus and 

theater-subordinate service elements maintain their own collection 

capabilities, they are largely focused on operational- and tactical-level 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with limited coverage 

beyond their regional areas of responsibility. Collection is further hindered by the logistical and geographical limitations of the collections 

platforms themselves. Limited-range drones, surveillance planes, and 

shore-based radar, though each provides vital necessary reconnaissance, 

do not provide the type of comprehensive domain awareness necessary 

for actionable early warning.114 The Strategic Support Force’s space-based 

surveillance capacity can thus significantly extend the range of the theater 

command commanders’ battlefield awareness, filling critical gaps in their 

intelligence collection.115

The SSF’s primacy in space-based intelligence collection also places it 

in a unique position to develop identifiers on foreign military targets. These 

identifiers, which can be in the form of specific emitter signatures, signal 
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parameters, radar signatures, infrared heat signatures, or even imagery 

profiles, can help detect, identify, track, and target certain operational platforms and weapons systems. The development of these indicators requires 

long-term technical collection on platforms and thus are a direct function 

of opportunities for surveillance wherein space-based technical collection 

systems have a clear advantage over their terrestrial counterparts. The 

ability to conduct space-based intelligence collection on foreign military 

assets thus gives the Strategic Support Force a primary role in developing 

these indicators, feeding them back to intelligence systems and disseminating them to operational and tactical units in the theater commands for 

joint force early warning, air defense, and area surveillance. In addition, the 

SSF may also play a similar role for nonkinetic targeting in the cyber and 

electromagnetic domains, where it is similarly well-positioned to identify 

spectrum allocation for foreign adversary sensors, communications, and 

radar systems for jamming and foreign adversary cyber infrastructure for 

targeting, intrusion, and compromise.

Enabling PLA Power Projection. The SSF enables and sustains the 

PLA’s ability to project power in the East and South China seas and into 

areas beyond the first island chain. The SSF is said to field assets that cover 

the entirety of the “information chain,” including space-based surveillance, satellite relay and communications, and telemetry, tracking, and 

navigation, all of which are necessary to support these types of remote 

operations.116 Long-range precision strike, far seas naval deployments, 

long-range unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance, and strategic air 

operations all rely to varying degrees on infrastructure over which the 

SSF now wields exclusive control. Conventional strike, the most critical component of both the PLA’s nonnuclear deterrence posture and 

its “counterintervention” strategy, is a prime example.117 Despite being 

conducted primarily by the PLA Rocket Force, the PLA’s long-range 

conventional strike mission depends heavily on the SSF to support operations, from initial detection, identification, and targeting, to guidance 

and battlefield damage assessment.
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The Strategic Support Force’s monopoly on space-based information infrastructure similarly places the service in a position to play an 

indispensable role in enabling the PLA Navy to operate in the far seas. 

While providing traditional intelligence support on enemy movement, 

early warning, and maritime surveillance, the SSF will also provide more 

foundational “battlefield environment support” [zhanchang huanjing 

baozhang, 战场环境保障], a term the PLA uses to describe battlespace-relevant survey, mapping, meteorological, oceanographic, and navigation 

information.118 This knowledge-base is a critical factor for command decisionmaking in ship movement and operational planning. Placing China’s 

growing fleet of maritime surveillance satellites, dual-use oceanographic 

and hydrological satellites, and expanding constellation of Beidou navigation satellites under the Strategic Support Force puts it in a primary 

position to provide this type of information. The expansion of the Beidou constellation also diminishes China’s reliance on the U.S.-produced 

global positioning system. The constellation is expected to have global 

coverage by 2020, extending navigation assurance for naval deployments 

worldwide.119

Supporting Strategic Defense in the Space and Nuclear Domains. 

Although the SSF’s responsibilities for antisatellite missile operations, 

ballistic missile defense, and space-based kinetic operations are unclear, 

its monopoly on space surveillance and early warning means it will at 

a minimum play a critical role in supporting these missions. Space surveillance—the ability to detect, identify, and track objects in space—is a 

prerequisite capability for both antisatellite and ballistic missile defense.120

The SSF’s space force has inherited three major telemetry, tracking, and 

control centers in Beijing and Xi’an and a fleet of Yuan Wang–class [远

望] tracking ships. Each center provides varying degrees of space surveillance capabilities as well as telemetry functions for China’s satellites, 

space launches, and long-range missiles. The military is also known to 

maintain four large phased-array radars in Huian, Korla, Longgangzhen, 

and Shuangyashan, possibly under the former GSD Third Department, that 
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are capable of tracking objects in support of either counterspace or BMD 

operations.121 The former 4PLA’s nonkinetic counter-space mission likely 

means it also possessed a ground-based space tracking and surveillance 

apparatus, which it would have used to feed targeting data to its satellite 

jamming platforms.122

Enabling Joint Operations. The SSF’s role in strategic information support directly enables joint operations by providing a connective substrate 

that helps to integrate disparate units and systems from the PLA’s four services. The SSF’s ability to provide the information umbrella of space-based 

C4ISR, intelligence support, and battlefield environment assessments helps 

forge a common intelligence picture among joint forces within each theater 

command, a fundamental requirement for fulfilling the PLA’s mission of 

winning “informationized local wars.”123 According to PLA commentary, 

the SSF ensures the “centralized management, centralized employment, and 

centralized development” of support resources and acts as an “important 

support” for the PLA’s joint operation “system of systems.”124 At the time of 

its establishment, Xi Jinping spoke of the need for the SSF to support system-of-systems integration, technical interoperability, information-sharing, 

and intelligence-fusion among the services.125 The deputy director of the 

SSF’s 54th Research Institute, Lü Yueguang [吕越光], goes further and states 

that “information-dominant system-of-systems integration” challenges 

will become the “fundamental requirement for future joint operations.”126

Strategic Information Operations 

In addition to its strategic information support role, the SSF is the primary 

force for information warfare in the Chinese military, responsible for 

achieving “information dominance” in any conflict. The Science of Military 

Strategy and other authoritative sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyber, and electronic warfare as strategic weapons to achieve 

these ends, arguing that the PLA must “paralyze the enemy’s operational 

system of systems” and “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of 

systems” in the initial stages of a conflict while protecting its own.127 These 
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concepts are not unique to the Chinese military; many modern militaries 

emphasize the importance of information dominance, underscoring it as 

a prerequisite to victory on the battlefield.

The SSF’s importance in strategic information warfare is best understood in the context of challenges posed by an “information warfare 

campaign,” the conceptual wartime front where the SSF’s forces—and 

an information operations group—would be employed. This campaign is 

likely to be a complex, multidimensional set of operations that incorporates kinetic, space, cyber, electronic, and psychological actions through 

all phases of conflict, and with each discipline of information operations 

having specific strengths at difference phases of a crisis or conflict.128

Psychological and electronic warfare, for example, are key in the pre-crisis 

period to raise the political and military risks associated with aggression. 

EW has the potential to be a key signaling mechanism for the PLA, due to 

its ability to bridge the gap between cyber operations, which have a high 

opportunity cost in terms of blown access when used for signaling, and 

kinetic strikes, which mark a transition to open warfare. Electronic warfare is the workhorse in Chinese information operations and is frequently 

portrayed as inherently defensive (in the broadest sense of the term), pulling double duty as both a tool of coercion and information denial. China’s 

evolving concept of “cyber-electromagnetic sovereignty” raises the possibility that the PLA will one day declare the right to deny or degrade satellite 

reconnaissance aimed at its territorial claims and space-based platforms, 

which could indirectly be understood as holding its assets at risk, complicating U.S. efforts to project power in the region.

If China’s strategic objectives cannot be secured without escalating 

into an overt conflict, the twin disciplines of cyber operations and precision kinetic strike will likely be employed in concert by the PLA in any 

first strike, though PLA writings on the nature of informationized warfare 

suggest that such coordination is only possible once conflict is deemed 

inevitable and China has verifiably achieved information dominance. 

Both cyber operations and kinetic strike offer first-mover advantages to 
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an attacker willing to preempt its adversary, although the intended effects 

may not be durable or reliable during the transition from peacetime to 

wartime. However, these capabilities are also prone to denial, counterattack, 

and uncertain effects. In the best case scenario, however, Chinese writings 

emphasize that the employment of cyber and kinetic strikes can create a 

self-reinforcing cycle that paralyzes an adversary at the outset of conflict, 

cementing one’s own information dominance and quickly securing the 

adversary’s compliance.129

The relative prominence of the information warfare disciplines shifts 

once again after the threshold of war is breached and protracted conflict 

ensues, with cyber warfare losing importance compared to electronic warfare and kinetic strike. Electronic warfare will be a key standoff weapon in 

any conflict that China is likely to fight, offering the potential to significantly diminish the intelligence collection and information processing 

capacity of an adversary even as enemy units come within range of the 

growing web of air, submarine, surface, and missile threats that China 

is extending out along its periphery. Once outright conventional warfare 

begins, kinetic strike once again becomes dominant, and psychological 

operations serve as a tool to maintain the populace’s resolve, weaken the 

enemy’s will, and shape diplomatic and political narratives in order to better 

enable the successful conclusion of the conflict on terms favorable to China.

The SSF evolves the PLA’s ability to conduct information operations 

in both peacetime and wartime in a number of ways, namely, integrating 

these disciplines of information warfare into a unified force, integrating 

cyber espionage and offense, unifying information warfare campaign 

planning, and unifying responsibilities for information warfare command 

and control. This unity of command, planning, and force development 

enabled by the SSF potentially realizes the PLA objective to conduct the 

type of complex, coordinated set of operations an information warfare 

campaign would require.

Realizing “Integrated Information Warfare.” The difficult prospect of 

maintaining readiness in an ever-changing information environment is a 
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key challenge that the SSF’s structural changes are intended to surmount, 

integrating across divisions in a way that can play to the unique realities 

of warfighting in the information domain. In this regard, the SSF effects 

a sort of “integrated information warfare,” unifying China’s myriad and 

dispersed forces across three key dimensions. First and most importantly, 

the force merges espionage and offense disciplines across electronic, cyber, 

and space warfare. Secondly, the SSF merges all the types of strategic warfighting operations that take place primarily in information domains 

(as opposed to physical battlespaces) under a single cohesive force. Both 

changes are necessary preconditions to implement the third and most 

important dimension: peacetime-wartime integration. By consciously 

mirroring the wartime IOG construct during peacetime, the PLA is better 

enabled to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlespace, cohesively 

plan cross-domain and cross-discipline information operations campaigns, 

and develop capabilities suited to the evolving realities of conflict.

Integrated Cyber Espionage and Offense. The creation of the Strategic Support Force optimizes China’s preparation for conducting strategic 

information operations by reducing the degree of separation between its 

espionage and offense-focused disciplines, which previously only unified 

in war under an IOG. This prior arrangement ignored that the two disciplines are heavily intertwined, draw on common resources, and, when 

left uncoordinated in a conflict, can even run the risk of interfering with 

each other.

The SSF brings two key advantages in this context. First, integrating 

espionage and offense for strategic information operations allows both 

missions to benefit from shared reconnaissance, which is essential for 

identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses around which their capabilities can be built and offensive effects can be planned. The set of conditions 

on which these capabilities rely do not remain static and are especially 

sensitive to changes in an adversary’s defense posture, readiness, prevailing attitudes, and the broader shift from peacetime to wartime footing. 

Military readiness in such an environment means maintaining a constant 
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operations cycle of “perpetual mobilization,” wherein countermeasures 

and effects are constantly evaluated against a changing security landscape and the adversary’s efforts.130 The SSF’s integration of espionage 

and offense recognizes that reconnaissance and capabilities development 

overlap enough between the two disciplines that both suffer if they are 

kept separated.

Second, grouping espionage and offense together enables commanders to balance conflicting objectives and inherent tradeoffs that 

can occur between the two disciplines. Espionage operations prioritize 

maintaining access to adversary systems and communications for the 

intelligence gains they may provide, whereas offensive operations may 

involve sacrificing those access methods in order to undermine the 

adversary’s systems and limit his operations, even if the cost is losing a 

prime source of information. These tradeoffs become even more pronounced in cyber domain operations, where offense and espionage are 

inherently blurred; cyber accesses are notoriously “dual-use,” meaning 

they are equally useful for intelligence or disruption. Readiness, in these 

cases, demands empowering commanders to continually evaluate both 

options against each other and against overall campaign objectives and 

evolving military need, a difficult proposition if espionage and offense 

authorities are typically separated.

Unified Operations Planning. The SSF’s dual responsibilities for “force 

construction” and information operations empower it with both the perspective and authority to define campaign objectives and operational 

plans for an information warfare campaign and in turn to develop a force 

necessary to carry those out. Owing to the complexities of coordinating 

disparate elements, Chinese military scholars have stressed the importance 

of unified planning and command in order to “form a complete operational 

force and carry out integrated planning and strategy.”131 The influential 

2013 work Lectures on the Science of Information Operations lists three 

primary requirements for unified planning and command in information 

warfare campaigns, each of which has been addressed to varying degrees 
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by either the large structural changes in the PLA’s reforms or the creation 

of the Strategic Support Force:132

■	 Integrated planning within larger joint and combined operations. The 

SSF affords information operations a status typically reserved for more 

traditional domains by providing a cohesive military service capable of 

representing constituent forces in joint force planning and operations. 

Its creation conceptually upgrades the status of information operations 

within the PLA from an auxiliary component of ground forces to a primary front of warfare alongside land, sea, and air. Fulfilling a similar 

role to that which other services play for their corresponding wartime 

operations groups, the SSF likely serves as the primary constituent service of the information operations group, shouldering responsibility for 

carrying out information warfare within the broader PLA framework 

of integrated joint operations.

■	 Coordinated planning across services, echelons, and theaters. The 

SSF’s precise role in coordinating information warfare planning across 

other service elements and theater commands has yet to be publicly 

defined. Aside from the PLA Rocket Force, the SSF appears to stand 

alone among the services in not having any of its elements subordinate 

to the theater commands, either indicating that lower echelon information warfare planning may largely fall to the theater commands 

themselves or that these subordinate elements exist but have not yet 

been discovered. It is similarly unclear which organization holds planning responsibilities for China’s non-PLA armed forces, including 

local militias and the People’s Armed Police. Some military theorists 

indicate the SSF plays both coordinating and supporting roles in this 

context.133 Given its preeminence in information warfare strategy, 

however, the SSF will nevertheless influence lower echelon planning 

at a minimum.

■	 Unified planning across information operations disciplines. The SSF 

fulfills the core requirement of unified planning and command by 

incorporating all information disciplines into a single cohesive force. 

Chinese scholars have long emphasized the inclusion of “hard-kill” 

measures into information warfare planning, epitomized by Ye Zheng’s 

concept of integrated information and firepower warfare [xin huo 
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yiti zhan, 信火一体战], which calls for the coordinated pairing of 

network and electronic warfare with conventional long-range precision strikes.134 The SSF’s concentration of technical reconnaissance 

capabilities provides a unique vantage point from which to identify 

critical nodes in an adversary’s system of systems, prioritize targeting 

for kinetic strikes, and weigh the use of “hard” and “soft” measures 

against each other in campaign planning and operations.

Unified Information Warfare Command and Control. The importance 

of information operations in gaining unseen information and intelligence 

advantages in peacetime imputes upon the Strategic Support Force a unique 

responsibility for achieving “escalation dominance,” a condition wherein 

China maintains the initiative in shaping adversary behavior in a crisis 

scenario that has not yet become a full-on conflict. This requires substantial 

intelligence capabilities as well as the development of a diverse set of measures for countering, influencing, or deterring an adversary, not only before 

the crisis occurs but also as part of a continuous process of evaluation to 

judge both the merits of intentional escalation and the risks of unintended 

escalation. This capability to engage in “calibrated escalation” reflects a 

highly complex mission set that requires the ability to coordinate across 

multiple dimensions of the military bureaucracy in order to produce a set of 

options that can be clearly communicated up the chain of command, where 

they will then be evaluated against other political, economic, and military 

costs. Having a singular service to produce, account for these options, and 

unify command and control is a marked improvement from the dispersed 

and siloed arrangement that existed prior to the PLA’s reforms.

Comparing U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Information Warfare 

While U.S. and Chinese information support and information operations 

concepts generally align, a key point of departure is the manner in which 

these two missions are understood to fit into broader whole-of-nation plans 

to accomplish strategic objectives.135 The PLA, like the U.S. military, views 

information support and information operations as key for anticipating 
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adversary action, setting the terms of conflict in peacetime, and achieving battlefield dominance in wartime. The PLA places a strong emphasis 

on dismantling the adversary’s system of systems, with decapitation and 

paralysis rather than outright destruction being the ultimate objective. This 

approach is tied to the long-standing Chinese focus on winning without 

fighting, an older Maoist-era phrase that translates today to shaping an 

adversary’s decisionmaking through actions below the threshold of outright war, accomplishing strategic objectives without escalating to open 

conflict. In the Chinese view, if this approach fails, the military needs to be 

prepared to rapidly seize the initiative in order to compel an adversary to 

quickly cease hostilities on Chinese terms if the threshold of open conflict 

is reached. Strategic information support is a key enabler, providing both 

the avenues and intelligence necessary for well-timed political and operational decisions and action. China’s preparations for conflict and planning 

for these strategic campaigns are directly tied to its national emphasis on 

preempting and shaping enemy action.

Chinese information operations theory and force structure have 

historically been somewhat inconsistent on this point, recognizing that 

information operations defy the binary dichotomy of peacetime and wartime, while operating a force that was not up to that challenge. The Strategic 

Support Force comes at a time when there appears to be renewed interest 

in moving away from Western models of conflict, in which peace and war 

are distinct stages, and toward a spectrum of omnipresent “struggle,” a 

Maoist-Marxist-Leninist paradigm that sees a broad political front in an 

enduring clash of political systems and ideologies, with military competition and conflict being merely one part of that whole.136

The strategic cultures and objectives of both the United States and 

China have been on opposite ends of the spectrum in many respects for 

decades, yet both sides have increasingly come to largely the same conclusion on the need to transcend the peace-war binary. The Chinese military 

has long recognized that abandoning the peace-versus-war binary better 

reflects the reality of modern operations but have lacked a military force 
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structure that can properly act on that understanding. The United States 

has maintained a force structure that, since 1986, has merged the concept of 

peace and war and organized for readiness, but nevertheless maintained the 

strategic and political distinction between the two. The key differentiator is 

in how both sides view competition and conflict: as either a rising crescendo 

that if left unchecked results in a discrete crisis event, as the United States 

does, or as a long-term struggle between opposing objectives, as China does. 

Somewhat ironically, in the current round of reforms, the PLA is seeking 

to advance a traditional Maoist understanding of struggle and competition 

by adopting a more Western model of military structure—albeit one with 

Chinese characteristics. The Strategic Support Force’s primary roles of 

information support and information warfare, on which military preparation and readiness in large part rests, are key advancements in China’s 

ability to translate both of these paradigms into operational reality.

Although a truly authoritative insider’s view of Chinese information 

warfare has not been made public, the 2013 Lectures on the Science of 

Information Operations by PLA scholar Major General Ye Zheng gives a 

comprehensive examination of the unique properties, advantages, and 

limitations of information operations and their use in warfare. Ye identifies 

four fundamental principles of Chinese thinking on information warfare 

that inform the SSF’s approach to information operations:

■	 Information operations are offense-oriented. Chinese scholars believe 

information dominance is the core of the “three dominances” of information, air, and space that, when achieved, ensure victory. As modern 

warfare requires the practice of system-of-systems operations, disrupting an adversary’s system of systems while preserving one’s own can 

deprive them of strategic initiative and allow Chinese forces to rapidly 

achieve battlefield dominance.

■	 Information operations are offense-dominant. Cyber and intelligence 

operations in particular are fragile, sensitive to changing circumstances, and rely on techniques and access methods that lose much of 

their power once they have been put to use and the element of surprise 
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is lost. Cyber accesses that enable these effects are frequently more 

effective in the initial stages of a conflict.

■	 “Prepositioning” and “massing on the border” manifest differently in 

information warfare. Whereas other domains prioritize geographic 

prepositioning, readiness and advantage in the information domain 

place a priority on timing, blurring the distinction between peacetime 

and wartime. This in turn partially blurs the distinction between 

intelligence operations and military preparations.

■	 Information advantage can be traded for space and time on the battlefield. A key belief in the Chinese understanding of information 

operations is that prepositioned effects and capabilities, achieved 

through either cyber implants in an adversary’s systems or an intelligence advantage enabled by strategic information support, can be 

utilized at strategic times to anticipate, delay, and disable an adversary’s ability to defend himself or project power. This means that an 

information domain advantage can effectively be traded for physical 

space and time in conflict in order to enable the achievement of China’s strategic objectives.

PLA theorists believe that these characteristics of information warfare 

are not unique to any one nation’s armed forces but instead are universal 

operational precepts that need to be recognized and adhered to regardless 

of a nation’s strategic culture. It is therefore unsurprising that China’s 

understanding of information warfare looks remarkably similar to that 

envisioned by the United States.

Where the Chinese view differs is in the strategic context and scenarios 

where they see these options being employed, stemming from a recognition 

of their vulnerabilities, limitations, and strategic objectives vis-à-vis those 

of their potential adversaries. Bureaucratic factors also play an important 

role. The organizational implementation of China’s cyber force, for example, reflects both the similarities and differences between the Chinese and 

U.S. approaches. One of the key differences between USCYBERCOM and 

the SSF’s cyber force lies in their respective scopes of responsibilities. The 

SSF appears to be responsible for all of information warfare, overseeing the 
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employment of a broad spectrum of tools for kinetic, cyberspace, electromagnetic, and psychological domains.

The SSF reflects another point of divergence between China and the 

United States in the degree of organizational emphasis it places on the 

space domain as a core arena of information warfare. The United States 

certainly recognizes the intersection between the information domain and 

outer space; however, in both strategic writings and official publications, 

the PLA has continuously emphasized the link between space and cyber 

networks, viewing them not in isolation but as extensions of one another 

through their common use of the electromagnetic spectrum as a transmission medium. This may be due to the PLA’s understanding that the most 

extreme threat scenarios it faces, such as a full-scale invasion by a foreign 

power, an adversary’s long-range precision strike and force projection would 

both largely be enabled by space-based infrastructure, which would serve as 

both an extension of terrestrial cyber networks and a means of contesting 

dominance in the electromagnetic domain.

At the strategic level of war, China’s plans for the defense of these 

three domains converge to the degree that combining them not only creates natural efficiencies but also verges on being a requirement for an 

effective force. The comparative lack of emphasis on operational cohesion 

among cyber, space, and electronic warfare in the United States can be 

understood as a manifestation of differing strategic priorities and threat 

perceptions. In the wars the United States has fought since the end of the 

Cold War—against armed insurgencies, terrorist groups, and relatively 

low-tech powers—cyber, space, and electronic warfare could be treated as 

separate, complementary disciplines without a demand for convergence at 

the strategic level as would be required when facing a technologically developed near-peer military power with a mature C4ISR system. It is possible 

that the U.S. 2017 National Security Strategy, which shifts focus away from 

combating terrorism to confronting “strategic competitors,” will presage a 

realignment within the Department of Defense toward an organizational 

concept that more closely resembles the Strategic Support Force.137
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Another key point of divergence between the SSF Cyber Force and 

USCYBERCOM is in the inclusion of psychological operations within the 

former’s remit. Chinese Communist Party and PLA thinkers have long 

understood cyber operations to be a primary vehicle for psychological 

manipulation, a point not fully grasped by the U.S. Government, particularly the defense establishment, until the recent discovery and analysis of 

Russian interference in the U.S. Presidential election in 2016. The United 

States tends to view cyber warfare in terms of destruction and denial, 

with a particular focus on the potential for cyber attacks with kinetic 

effects and the destruction and manipulation of data in a conflict. Chinese leaders, on the other hand, view manipulation of information more 

broadly as their chief vulnerability and worry about the societal effects of 

an adversary undermining Chinese domestic information control. This 

view manifests in China’s civilian cybersecurity establishment, which has 

taken on an expansive scope that extends beyond computer networks to 

physical devices, broadcast airwaves, online content, and propaganda. This 

understanding that failure to control information threatens the Chinese 

Communist Party’s political power and stability in a way that it does not 

in democratic countries is a view shared by China’s civilian and military 

establishments. Maintaining information control is thus viewed as a preemptive defense that obviates the need for more forceful measures, such 

as armed domestic actions, to be employed. For the SSF, the inclusion of 

content and a more information-centric approach to cyber operations is 

translated into the expansive remit of the cyber force, which appropriately 

includes psychological operations in alignment with the expansive Chinese 

view of cybersecurity.

Remaining Challenges 

Simply reorganizing command structures and relationships is but one 

step in a lengthy and likely painful process the Strategic Support Force 

must undertake in fully integrating its myriad components into a cohesive 

operational force. Removing silos and integrating forces eliminate potential 
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barriers, but without deeper changes within the space and cyber forces, the 

SSF will be limited in its ability to fully play its information support and 

information warfare roles. Similarly, in some cases there are deeper organizational tensions at play that may limit or impede overall PLA progress in 

the long term, such as centralizing strategic capabilities vice diffusion and 

balancing the cyber mission between civilian and military components. 

How the PLA handles these challenges is vital in realizing its goal to be a 

modern military able to fight and win wars.

Centralization vs. Diffusion of Control and Development of 

Strategic Capabilities 

It is worth noting that the SSF’s dual responsibilities for both “force 

construction” and operations are in direct tension with one of the key 

purposes of the reforms, namely, to transition operational responsibilities 

away from the services to joint force theater commands. This fundamentally defies the “CMC leads, theaters fight, and services build” paradigm 

implemented across the force. Although the Strategic Support Force appears 

to take the U.S. Strategic Command as its conceptual inspiration, the SSF 

diverges markedly in implementation. USSTRATCOM supports U.S. 

combatant commands as a joint force construct rather than as a singular 

service in the model of the Strategic Support Force. As a joint functional 

combatant command, USSTRATCOM coordinates among a number of 

subordinate elements from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force 

to prosecute its primary missions of nuclear operations, space operations, 

information warfare, strategic C4ISR support, and ballistic missile defense.

While the PLA created joint, regional theater commands analogous to 

U.S. combatant commands, the PLA stopped short in creating functional 

combatant commands, instead in the SSF’s case opting to create a singular 

service that also serves a functional role force-wide. A similar approach was 

taken with the PLA Rocket Force, whose functional role of employing China’s nuclear and strategic missiles has been similarly distilled into a singular 

service that appears incongruent with the overall intent of the reforms.
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The most obvious explanation for these inconsistencies may be that 

the current arrangement is transitional, and the PLA intends to eventually 

create joint functional combatant commands—or some analog—in the 

future. However, there may be deeper organizational dynamics at play. In 

both circumstances, responsibilities for nuclear, space, and information 

warfare may have been deemed sufficiently strategic that the CMC elected 

to keep both operational and force construction functions contained 

within a single service, where their use and development could be more 

easily controlled. The lack of equivalent, mature development of these 

capabilities in the other services, coupled with a still-nascent joint force 

construct, may have convinced PLA planners that operational control 

and development of these capabilities were, for now, best kept contained. 

Chinese defense commentators have explained that the decision to construct the SSF as a separate force rather than a joint force construct was 

driven by lessons learned from observing foreign militaries where the 

distribution of strategic support across the different services resulted in 

redundancies in force development and a counterproductive rivalry for 

funding and resources.138

If taken at face value, this approach highlights some of the broader 

challenges the PLA faces in modernization and reform. The centralization 

of new-type force development and cutting-edge missions, such as space, 

cyber, and electronic warfare, seems to run counter to the objective of 

modernizing the PLA force-wide. The consolidation of these capabilities 

under the SSF, either for resource conservancy, desire to control strategic 

capabilities, or desire to more closely guide their development, may act as 

a limiting factor for other services, preventing the development of space, 

cyber, and information capabilities in their own missions. This raises 

further questions about the future of both the space and cyber missions, 

which in the former case may be shared with the PLA Rocket Force and 

PLA Air Force and in the latter case shared with the theater commands 

and other services. Given the above logic, it seems likely that the desire to 

centralize and reduce redundancy, for whatever reason, may translate to a 
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493

monopoly of force, command, and development over these missions on the 

part of the SSF. The creation of functional services like the SSF and PLA 

Rocket Force appears to be a bureaucratic compromise, allowing theater 

commands access to these capabilities without ceding operational control, 

diffusing force development across other services, or risking the adoption of 

an unfamiliar joint force construct like USSTRATCOM by a PLA already 

acclimating to a new organizational model.

Mission and Force Integration 

Force integration at lower organizational and administrative layers also 

remains a distinct challenge for both of the SSF’s two main forces. The Space 

Systems Department is a motley mixture of higher grade bases, launch 

and ground stations, and experimental technology development facilities 

contained within a force structure that has traditionally not been optimized 

for combat operations. To align and coordinate its disparate component 

parts, the SSD will almost certainly need to stand up new administrative 

structures. Since the SSD’s space mission brings together a disparate set of 

mission components from the GSD and GAD, systems integration poses 

an additional challenge. Each of these organizations comes to the SSD with 

its own operations plans, technical data sources, and infrastructure, with 

missions as diverse as communications, navigation, surveillance and reconnaissance, and telemetry, tracking, and control. For the SSD to fulfill the 

SSF’s (and the PLA’s) broader mandate of system-of-systems integration [tixi 

ronghe, 体系融合], it will need not only to integrate these systems together 

but also to seamlessly feed this information into force-wide networks such 

as the Integrated Command Platform [yitihua zhihui pingtai, 一体化指挥平

台] to support both strategic missions and theater command operations.139

The Network System Department faces several challenges of its own. 

First and foremost, it will need to reform the former 3PLA’s administrative 

structure to accommodate an expanded mission set and a newfound focus 

on cyber domain operations, which had previously been dispersed across 

multiple bureaus and treated as a subdiscipline of technical reconnaissance.140
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Further reorganization is likely to center on consolidating myriad cyber espionage elements and integrating them with cyber and EW elements from the 

former 4PLA. However, these missions were deeply embedded in the force 

structure of their respective departments and separating these elements out 

to reconstitute them along either functional or organizational lines will likely 

require deeper reorganization.

Beyond organizational mergers, the Network Systems Department will 

also need to reform its personnel system. The organizational integration of 

all the PLA’s strategic cyber and EW capabilities fulfills the long-held goal 

of INEW in a more comprehensive way than the previous structure, but the 

NSD still faces steep hurdles in integrating the two disciplines on a human 

level. In the past, 3PLA and 4PLA appear to have largely maintained separate personnel systems, including distinct officer corps, noncommissioned 

officer corps, and technical cadre career paths, all of which will need to be 

merged if the NSD is going to fully embrace and realize INEW.The Network 

Systems Department’s management of professional military education and 

billeting will be a critical factor in any such reform. The consolidation of the 

Information Engineering University as the sole military academy for the 

cyber and electronic warfare arms of China’s network-electronic forces is an 

important step forward that may help unify professional military education 

to meet the disparate needs of both forces. At this time, however, assessments 

of how the NSD will manage its personnel are complicated by the existence 

of the Network-Electronic Bureau, whose responsibilities for force-wide 

management of education and training in this sphere are still unclear.

It also remains an open question how the Strategic Support Force 

will manage conflicting or overlapping responsibilities between its space 

and cyber forces. For instance, a number of organizations now under the 

Network Systems Department once had space mission components; these 

presumably moved over with them to the SSF. The technical reconnaissance–focused former GSD 3rd Department’s 12th Bureau [zongcan san 

bu di shi’er ju, 总参三部第十二局] or Unit 61486 [61486 budui, 61486 部

队] has historically been responsible for space-based signals intelligence 
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495

collection and the interception of satellite communications, and may also 

control a number of ground-based space sensing stations.141 The transfer 

of units from the former 4PLA, which maintained at least two satellite 

ground stations and whose operational brigades possess ground-based 

satellite jammers, presents a similar situation.142 If transferred to the NSD, 

a conflict in responsibilities with the Space Systems Department’s space 

mission components might arise and require ironing out, either via further 

below-the-neck reorganization or through redesign of these units’ operational responsibilities.

Challenges in Cyber Operations 

While the reforms that created the SSF can be favorably compared to the 

reforms that occurred in U.S. military structure between 2009 and 2014 

with the creation of USCYBERCOM, there are key differences between each 

side’s baselines for reform. For the United States, a key challenge has been 

separating USCYBERCOM enough from the National Security Agency for 

independent action and planning without losing the reconnaissance capabilities required to inform military targeting. The Chinese face the opposite 

challenge of integration. Of China’s myriad agencies with cyber portfolios, 

the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and PLA are the two primarily responsible for cyber operations, including both espionage and offensive action. 

The Mandiant report in 2014, the Xi-Obama agreement on cyber-enabled 

intellectual property theft in 2015, and the creation of the Strategic Support 

Force each in various ways forced a realignment of responsibilities between 

the two agencies, with the MSS focusing on foreign intelligence, political 

dissent, and economic espionage, and the PLA redoubling its focus on 

military intelligence and warfighting.

This broad division of responsibilities serves a key purpose, primarily 

by deconflicting their mission and targeting efforts without requiring 

in-depth coordination. Both the PLA and MSS have previously resisted 

greater integration in their intelligence efforts, with the PLA in particular 

heavily rebuffing oversight and coordination with civilian authorities.143
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As their political and bureaucratic power is largely secured by controlling 

exclusive intelligence sources, any sharing of information could mean 

a diffusion of power at the expense of their influence. In China’s 2017 

National Intelligence Law, the provisions discussing national governance of 

intelligence activities exempt the military, writing that the Central Military 

Commission, not civilian authorities, are exclusively in control of military 

technical reconnaissance efforts (and thus cyber operations).144 Despite this 

arrangement offering greater clarity in a bureaucratic space with clashing 

interests, the arrangement ultimately deprives both civilian and military 

missions of the resources, insight, and technical skill from each other’s 

reconnaissance and capabilities development efforts.

The PLA’s cyber operational challenges go beyond the civil-military 

divide. Even under the new structure, the PLA faces crucial challenges in 

its ability to credibly field a modern cyber force. For one, it remains unclear 

how the PLA will integrate the SSF’s cyber operations, which appear to be 

overwhelmingly focused on espionage and offense, with the PLA’s cyber 

defense mission. Currently, primary responsibility for PLA network protection remains with the Information Support Base under the Joint Staff 

Department’s Information and Communications Bureau. The decision to 

separate responsibilities for cyber offense and defense between the SSF and 

JSD is reflected in a similar arrangement between USCYBERCOM and the 

Defense Information Systems Agency, which like the JSD-ICB is responsible for both network protection and network operations for high-echelon 

command and control. It is unclear how the SSF will work with the JSD-ICB 

to help secure PLA networks from cyber threat, or how its broader space 

information support mission will integrate with the JSD’s role as a service 

provider to the PLA writ large.

Even less clear is what responsibility, if any, the SSF will have for cyber 

defense of private, civilian, and critical infrastructure networks. In an early 

description of the SSF, retired navy Admiral Yin Zhuo broadly suggested 

that the SSF plays an “important role” in “protecting the country’s financial 

security and the security of people’s daily lives.”145 It is not clear where the 
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497

SSF would have sourced the personnel or capabilities to serve in this role, 

as it was not a known mission area of either the 3PLA or 4PLA, the two 

cyber-focused organizations from which the SSF drew the bulk of its cyber 

forces. Given the lack of preexisting units responsible for a “national cyber 

protection” mission, Yin’s comments, if meant literally, suggest that the 

SSF would need to create this capability from scratch. Even though as of 

this writing there has been no indication that such units have been created, 

they would be clear analogs to USCYBERCOM’s Cyber Protection Teams 

under its Cyber National Mission Force.

It is also not clear how any SSF cyber defense and protection mission 

would conflict or be coordinated with the Ministry of Public Security 

[gongan bu, 公安部] and Cyberspace Administration of China [guojia 

hulianwang xinxi bangongshi, 国家互联网信息办公室], both of which 

are charged with maintaining the security and defense of China’s critical 

information infrastructure.146 Overlapping responsibilities for defense and 

security of critical infrastructure is a common issue in national cybersecurity governance, one equally felt by the United States. The Chinese 

government would likely face challenges in clarifying roles and responsibilities and establishing necessary legal, procedural, and technical means 

of operational coordination and incident response in order for critical 

infrastructure security and protection to be meaningful. This would in 

turn require a level of maturity and foresight in the notoriously fraught 

relationship between civilian and military authorities that is not likely to 

be achieved in the short term.

Finally, although the structural and organizational barriers between 

cyber attack and espionage appear to have been decreased, PLA units 

responsible for operations planning have little experience in anticipating 

and balancing equities between the two missions. Nor does it appear 

that the PLA has developed a doctrine for the use of force in cyberspace 

under which consistent judgments can be made in a crisis. Freed from 

its previous organizational structure, the PLA now faces the very real 

challenge of defining its own ways of war in cyberspace. These peacetime 
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498

decisions will shape the development of the SSF’s cyber force, network 

warfare capabilities, espionage priorities, and operational preparation 

of the battlespace. Unlike in other areas of warfare, when it comes to 

wartime cyber operations the PLA has precious few real-world examples 

upon which it can draw to inform its own doctrinal development. The 

PLA, like many other militaries, will have to answer critical questions 

about peacetime and wartime targeting, escalation in situations where 

the divide between peacetime and wartime is not always clear, battlespace 

prepositioning, and the viability and wisdom of utilizing cyber operations 

to achieve specific strategic military objectives. Although the PLA has 

developed its own theories on the strategic use of cyber operations in a 

conflict, these ideas have not yet been tested against the hard reality of 

operational and organizational implementation. The restructuring of the 

SSF (and the PLA more broadly) will put those ideas to the test, pushing 

Chinese cyber operations into unfamiliar territory.

Conclusion 

The creation of the Strategic Support Force heralds a new era for China’s 

strategic posture. Its very existence is both predicated on and a reinforcement 

of China’s growing military strength, strengthening China’s preparations for 

“local informationized war” and shifting the PLA’s horizons to projecting 

power farther from China’s shores. The SSF demonstrates the evolution 

of Chinese military thought about information as a strategic resource in 

warfare, recognizing both the role it plays in empowering forces and the vulnerabilities that result from reliance on information systems. The inclusion 

of responsibilities for both information support and information dominance 

in the same organization is a wise decision. As China continues to develop 

technologically and operate beyond the first and second island chains, the 

asymmetric advantages it has relied upon as a land-based, technologically 

inferior power will narrow, and it will increasingly have to contend with 

adversaries on more equal terms. From this standpoint, the introduction 

of an organization designed to balance those equities is forward-thinking.
Strategic Support Force

499

Success in the various roles that Chinese scholars—and Xi Jinping 

himself—have envisioned for the SSF will largely depend on the efficacy 

of the unique and unproven model of “strategic support” that the Chinese 

have chosen to pursue. In one sense, centralizing these components into 

a service rather than dispersing them in a joint manner can be seen as 

innovative. On the other hand, the model can be viewed as an attempt by 

the PLA to grapple with its deeper and more systemic issues rather than 

a simple desire to try something new. Since an emphasis on top-down 

control and distrust of bottom-up decisionmaking has been an enduring 

hallmark of the PRC’s strategic culture, this new centralization of information power may be more a function of persistent paranoia and the 

need for control than a desire to explore innovative means of warfighting. 

China certainly has the technical and operational capability to use its 

strategic resources in a punctuated manner for critical operations, but 

its ability to do so at scale in a sustained way will require deeper cultural 

and organizational innovation.

Notes 

1 Sources on specific units are available to qualified researchers upon request.

2 Ye Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science of Information Operations [信息作

战科学教程] (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013), 69.

3 See M. Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining 

China’s Changes in Military Strategy,” International Security 42, no. 3 (Winter 

2017/2018), 37–83.

4 Joe McReynolds and James C. Mulvenon, “The Role of Informatization in 

the People’s Liberation Army under Hu Jintao,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation 

Army in the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2014), 207–256.

5 Clay Wilson, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues 

for Congress, RL32411 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 

15, 2007), available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32411.pdf>.

6 Both the 2013 Academy of Military Science (AMS) edition of Science of 

Military Strategy and Ye Zheng’s Lectures on the Science of Information Operations

(hereafter LSIO) remark on transfer over space-based intelligence, surveillance, and 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

500

reconnaissance (ISR) networks in support of operations in the 1991 Gulf War, 1999 

strikes on Kosovo, and 2003 invasion of Iraq. Analysts observe that the U.S. military’s appetite for information appears to have grown in lockstep with its relative 

technological sophistication. See Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., Science of Military 

Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], December 

2013), 95–96; and Ye, LSIO, 50–51, 69–72.

7 James C. Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other Than 

Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 275.

8 Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR: Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas,” in China’s Near Seas Combat 

Capabilities, ed. Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson (Newport, 

RI: U.S. Naval War College Press, 2014), 88–89.

9 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2011), 37.

10 Leonard David, “China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud 

Circles Earth,” Space.com, February 2, 2007, available at <www.space.com/3415-

china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html>.

11 Dennis J. Blasko, “The ‘Two Incompatibles’ and PLA Self-Assessments 

of Military Capability,” China Brief 13, no. 10 (May 2013), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/the-two-incompatibles-and-pla-self-assessments-of-military-capability/>.

12 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 169.

13 Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New 

Maritime Strategy, China Strategic Perspectives 9 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 

April 2015), 5.

14 For an expansive discussion of this concept, see Zhou Bisong [周碧松], 

Strategic Frontiers [战略边疆] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大

学出版社], 2016); and Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 73.

15 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 73.

16 “China’s Military Strategy” [中国的军事战略], Xinhua [新华], May 26, 

2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2015-05/26/content_4586723.htm>.

17 Zhou Bisong [周碧松], “Strategic Frontiers” [战略边疆]; excerpts available 

online at <http://zlzy.81.cn/tb/2016-08/15/content_7231775.htm>.
Strategic Support Force

501

18 Kevin Pollpeter et al., China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space 

Technologies and Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017), 94–95.

19 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2017), 35.

20 Ye, LSIO, 81.

21 This information is derived from Costello’s conversations with a credible 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) source who has direct knowledge of organizational 

logic behind the military reforms launched in 2015.

22 For a more in-depth discussion of PLA military reforms of the four general 

departments, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms 

in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 2017), 10–11.

23 It should be noted that the PLA does not classify its forces as “cyber” forces, 

but rather as “network” forces, owing to a conception of the “network domain” that 

overlaps but does not perfectly align with the U.S. military’s concept of “cyberspace.” When the term cyber is used in this chapter in descriptions of PLA concepts 

and developments, it should be taken as referencing PLA network warfare units 

that would fall under the U.S. definition.

24 John Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview,” China 

Brief 16, no. 19 (December 21, 2016), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

strategic-support-force-update-overview/>.

25 Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2015), 388.

26 Ibid.

27 John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance 

of Chinese Information Operations,” in China’s Evolving Military Strategy, ed. Joe 

McReynolds (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 180–182.

28 Public descriptions of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) vary considerably as 

to whether the SSF is a branch [兵种], meaning a subcomponent of another service, 

or a military service [军种] in its own right. Until clearer information is available 

on this point, it is best described as a “force” in English. Even if it were in some 

technical sense a branch, its command structure appears to connect directly to 

the Central Military Commission (CMC) without any intermediary from another 

military service. For a more involved discussion on the status of the SSF, see Kevin 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

502

L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, The Creation of the PLA 

Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 21–22.

29 Yue Huairang [岳怀让], “The Strategic Support Force: Gao Jin as Commander, Liu Fulian as Political Commissar, Breastplate Revealed” [战略支援部队: 

高津任司令员, 刘福连任政治委员, 胸牌曝光], The Paper [澎湃], January 1, 2016, 

available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1415847>; Liu Guangbo [刘

光博], “These Five ‘Theater Command Leader grade’ General Officers Were Just 

Promoted to the Rank of General” [这五位正战区级将领刚刚晋升上将], Chang’an 

Street Knowledgeable [长安街知事], July 28, 2017, available at <http://news.sina.

com.cn/c/nd/2017-07-28/doc-ifyinwmp0572361.shtml>.

30 Li Xuanliang, Zhang Xuanjie, and Li Qinghua [李宣良, 张选杰, 李清华], 

“Ceremony Establishing Army Leading Organ, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Strategic Support Force Held in Beijing” [陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大

会在京举行], Xinhua [新华], January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.

com/politics/2016-01/01/c_1117646667.htm>.

31 “Former Eastern Theater Command Political Commissar Major General 

Zheng Weiping Transfers to the Strategic Support Force” [东部战区原政委郑卫平

上将转岗战支部队], United Morning Post [联合早报], October 23, 2017, available 

at <www.unizw.com/mon/dapan/20171023/40725.html>.

32 Although AMS conducts research and offers graduate degrees, its role in 

PLA doctrine formulation makes it more similar to parts of the U.S. Joint Staff 

Joint Force Development Directorate or the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command than to a military academic institution.

33 The term dui [队] is translated a number of ways in Chinese, though usually 

as ‘unit’ or ‘team’ in a military context. It is used frequently in Chinese military 

terminology such as in budui [部队], ‘force’ or ‘corps’. When used in a unit name, 

the term is subject to interpretation based on context and does not give a firm 

indicator of unit grade or echelon on its own. For the purposes of this paper, the 

term is most often used in the description of joint units where the term is indicated, 

most often in the term itself (dui) and in a related term dadui, which connotes a 

high-level unit under which dui’s fall. As there is no clear English equivalent for 

these terms, this paper utilizes the original Chinese while providing additional 

context to avoid confusion.

34 For a more involved discussion on the status of the SSF, see Pollpeter, Chase, 

and Heginbotham, The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force, 21–22.
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503

35 See “2018 Seventh Exhibition on New Technologies and Equipment for 

Military Logistics” [2018第七届军事后勤保障新技术与新装备展览会], Meeting 

Spot [会点], June 21–23, 2018, available at <www.hui.net/news/special/key/1sim4hc9rsgMu>. A senior colonel, Xiao Zhiyu [肖志宇], from the SSF Equipment 

Department, was referenced as a speaker and attendee to the 2017 China Civil and 

Military Dual-Use Technology Conference [2017中国军民两用技术研讨会] held 

in conjunction with an opening ceremony for the newly established Changzhou 

Military-Civilian Fusion Industrial Park [常州军民融合产业园] on May 21, 2017. 

See Wang Jinghui [王晶辉], “To Help With Civil-Military Integration, Casting 

the Country’s Treasure: Changzhou Civil-Military Integration Industrial Park 

Officially Opened, Entering Enterprises Enjoy Comprehensive, One-Stop Service!” 

[助军民融合, 铸国之重器: 常州军民融合产业园正式开园, 入园企业享受全方位, 一

站式服务!], May 24, 2017, available at <http://edp.hit.edu.cn/ba/07/c7876a178695/

page.htm>; Lin Yunshi [林韵诗], “Major General Feng Jianhua Promoted to Director of Strategic Support Force Political Work Department” [冯建华少将升任战略

支援部队政治工作部主任], Caixin [财新], February 29, 2016, available at <http://

china.caixin.com/2016-02-29/100913753.html>; Feng Jianhua [冯建华] is listed 

as a “deputy Theater Command leader grade” and was subsequently promoted to 

lieutenant general in October 2017. See “Breaking News—Strategic Support Force 

Political Work Department Director Feng Jianhua Has Been Promoted to the Rank 

of Lieutenant General” [战略支援部队政治工作部主任冯建华已晋升中将军衔澎

湃新闻], Military Report [军事报道], August 30, 2017, available at <https://xw.qq.

com/cmsid/20171030A0IZEL00>. The SSF Political Work Department deputy 

directors have been listed as Major General Chen Jinrong [陈金荣] and Huang 

Qiusheng [黄秋生]. See Yue Huairang [岳怀让], The Paper [澎湃], February 3, 

2016, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1429068>; and Yue 

Huairang [岳怀让], The Paper [澎湃], August 1, 2017, available at <www.thepaper.

cn/newsDetail_forward_1749068>.

36 “Strategic Support Force Space Systems Department Test Equipment Materials Purchasing Bureau Medical Equipment Advertisement for Public Open Bid 

and Tender” [战略支援部队航天系统部试验装备物资采购局医疗设备公开招标

采购公告], China Government Procurement Bidding Network [中国政府采购招

标网], August 25, 2016, available at <www.chinabidding.org.cn/PurchaseInfoDetails_pid_1558826.html>; “Our Board Convened the Eleventh Meeting of our Fifth 

Board of Directors and the 2017 Military-Industrial Enterprise Salon” [我会召开第

五届第十一次理事会议暨2017军工企业沙龙], Shenzhen Promotion Association 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

504

for Small and Medium Enterprises [深圳市中小企业发展促进会], August 31, 2017, 

available at <www.szsme.com/cn/dtdetail/81/755.html>.

37 Liu Wei [刘伟], ed., Theater Command Joint Operations Command [战区联合

作战指挥] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2016), 340.

38 The block falls between the one used by units assigned to the CMC (31001 

to 31999) and the one used by the PLA ground forces, which starts at 32100.

39 For the pre-reform bases, see Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., 

PLA as Organization 2.0 (Vienna, VA: Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 145–148.

40 The unit appears to operate under the Military Unit Cover Designator 

(MUCD) 32020 and is located in Wuhan. See “Historic, Proud, Responsible: CLP 

Jin Jiang Intends to Join Hands 35th Base to Create a Grand New Era ‘Weather’” 

[有历史、有自豪、有担当——中电锦江拟携手35基地开创新时代宏伟 “气象”], 

Zhongdian Jinjiang [中电锦江], January 15, 2018, available at <www.jec784.com/

news_detail/newsId=134.html>.

41 Xu Nanqi [徐南启], “The Second ‘Jointly Build a Strong Military Dream’ 

Themed Party and the National Defense 2018 New Year’s Party Have Ended” [我

校第二届“同心共筑强军梦”主题晚会暨国防生2018年元旦晚会落幕], Nanjing 

University [南京大学], December 25, 2017, available at <http://news.nju.edu.cn/

show_article_1_48249>.

42 See the chapter by Luce and Richter in this volume.

43 Kenneth Allen, “Assessing the PLA’s Promotion Ladder to CMC Member 

Based on Grades vs. Ranks—Part 1,” China Brief 10, no. 15 (July 22, 2010), available 

at <https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the-plas-promotion-ladder-to-cmcmember-based-on-grades-vs-ranks-part-1/>.

44 Ibid.

45 “Most Recent News on the Military Reforms: The Central Military 

Commission Comprehensively Implement the Three Tiered Structure of ‘Departments-Bureaus-Offices’” [军改最新消息:军委机关总体实行“部—局—处”三级

体制], Guancha [观察], October 5, 2016, available at <www.guancha.cn/militaryaffairs/2016_10_05_376239.shtml>.

46 “The Most Mysterious and Newest Force—The Strategic Support Force” [最

神秘的年轻部队—战略支援部队], China Military Network [中国军网], September 

20, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jwsj/2016-09/20/content_7268473.htm>

47 For Kang Chunyuan, see Wang Jun [王俊], “Officer in a Deputy Military Region Grade Position Kang Chunyuan Has Been Promoted to the Rank 

of Lieutenant General, Formerly Served as Deputy Political Commissar of the 
Strategic Support Force

505

Lanzhou Military Region” [副大军区职军官康春元已晋升中将军衔,曾任原兰

州军区副政委], The Paper [澎湃], August 29, 2016, available at <www.thepaper.

cn/newsDetail_forward_1521187>. For Hao Weizhong, see Lin Yunshi [林韵诗], 

“The Space Systems Department of the Strategic Support Force Appears, Shang 

Hong as Commander” [战略支援部队航天系统部亮相尚宏任司令员], Caixin [财

新], April 25, 2017, available at <http://china.caixin.com/2017-04-25/101082917.

html>. For Fei Jiabing, see “Leaders of the Space Systems Department Come to 

Our Academy to Research and Direct Work” [航天系统部领导来我院调研指导

工作], China Academy of Space Technlogy [中国空间技术学院], March 31, 2017, 

available at <www.cast.cn/item/show.asp?m=1&d=5700>.

48 Lin, “The Space Systems Department of the Strategic Support Force Appears.”

49 For an excellent analysis of the status of these missions prior to the reforms, 

see Mark A. Stokes and Dean Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, April 26, 2012), 4–5.

50 Pollpeter, Chase, and Heginbotham, The Creation of the PLA Strategic 

Support Force, 28.

51 Zhang Zhanyue and Zhu Shuguang [长占月, 祝曙光], “Trends of SpaceBased Information Support Development” [天基信息支援发展趋势], Satellite 

Applications [卫星应用], vol. 9 (September 2016), 67–71.

52 In April 2016, it was confirmed that former Aerospace Reconnaissance 

Bureau Chief Zhou Zhixin [周志鑫] transferred to the SSF to head up a “certain 

bureau” [某局]. This is good indicator that the bureau has moved to the SSF and, 

given its mission, has been reassigned to the Space Systems Department. See Yue 

Huairang [岳怀让], “Chinese Academy of Sciences Academician Zhou Zhixin to 

Become the Bureau Chief of a Certain Bureau in the Strategic Support Force” [中

科院院士周志鑫出任战略支援部队某局局长], The Paper [澎湃], April 9, 2016, 

available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1454253>. Zhou Zhixin is 

now the Commandant of the Space System Department’s newly created Space 

Engineering University. See “Zhou Zhixin Becomes the Commandant of the 

Strategic Support Force’s Space Engineering University” [周志鑫任战略支援部

队航天工程大学校长], Sohu [搜狐], October 8, 2017, available at <www.sohu.

com/a/196776059_495232>. For more on the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau’s 

mission, see Kevin Pollpeter and Amy Chang, “The General Armament Department,” in PLA as Organization 2.0, 145–148.

53 Costello, “The Strategic Support Force.”
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

506

54 “Einstein Probe Successfully Passes Project Comprehensive Demonstration 

Review” [爱因斯坦探针卫星工程顺利通过立项综合论证评审], Chinese Academy 

of Sciences National Astronomical Observatories [中科院国家天文台], July 5, 2017, 

available at <www.bao.ac.cn/xwzx/zhxw/201707/t20170721_4835406.html>.

55 Bill Gertz, “China Carries Out Flight Test of Anti-Satellite Missile,” 

Washington Free Beacon, August 2, 2017, available at <http://freebeacon.com/

national-security/china-carries-flight-test-anti-satellite-missile/>.

56 The SY-7 satellite has a robotic arm that is claimed to be used to grapple 

onto target satellites for inspection and maintenance. Experts contend, however, 

that the satellite’s arm could be used for co-orbital attack intended to destroy or disable an adversary satellite. For a discussion of the satellite’s capabilities, see Robert 

Beckhusen, “China’s Mystery Satellite Could Be a Dangerous New Weapon,” War 

Is Boring, August 22, 2013, available at <https://warisboring.com/china-s-mysterysatellite-could-be-a-dangerous-new-weapon/>.

57 Pollpeter et al., China Dream, Space Dream, 95.

58 Stokes and Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities, 45.

59 Ibid. Up until the late 1990s, for instance, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

was even limited in its ability to fly over water due to the maritime domain being 

considered the responsibility of the PLA Navy Air Force. In fact, it was not until 

the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis that a PLAAF plane was ordered to fly over water for 

the first time.

60 Kenneth Allen and Jana Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to U.S. Reconnaissance Flights,” China Brief 11, no. 16 (September 2, 2011), available at <https://

jamestown.org/program/assessing-chinas-response-to-u-s-reconnaissance-flights/>.

61 “The Strategic Support Force Has Renamed the Former General Staff 

Department’s Third Department as the Cyberspace Operations Force” [战略支援部

队成军原总参三部更名网络空间作战部队], Boxun.com, January 19, 2016, available 

at <www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2016/01/201601192251.shtml>.

62 Pollpeter, Chase, and Heginbotham, The Creation of the PLA Strategic 

Support Force, 19.

63 “General Staff Personnel Changes; Wang Huiqing Becomes Director 

of the Strategic Planning Department; Zheng Junjie Becomes Director of the 

Third Department” [总参人事变动王辉青任战略规划部部长郑俊杰任三部部

长], Jiangwutang [讲武堂], November 1, 2015, available at <https://web.archive.

org/web/20161018223115/http://j.news.163.com/docs/99/2015110114/B7BFICQ405158ED3.html>.
Strategic Support Force

507

64 Wang Jun [王俊], “Chengdu Military Region Political Department Director 

Chai Shaoliang Becomes Military Region Deputy Political Commissar” [成都军区

政治部主任柴绍良改任军区副政委], Ta Kung Online [大公网], December 31, 2013, 

available at <http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/zgzq/2013-12/2143144.html>.

65 See Guo Rui and He Xiaoyuan [郭瑞, 贺筱媛], “Pretreatment Method for 

Intelligent Analysis of Battlefield Situational Data” [面向战场态势数据智能分析的

预处理方法], Electronic Technology and Software Engineering [电子技术与软件工

程], vol. 16 (2017). Guo Rui’s affiliation is listed as the Fifth Bureau of the Strategic 

Support Force’s Third Department [战略支援部队第三部第五局].

66 For a more comprehensive analysis of the former Third Department’s Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus, see Mark A. Stokes, The Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure (Arlington, VA: 

Project 2049 Institute, 2011).

67 For the General Staff Department (GSD) 56th Research Institute, see 

“Network Systems Department 56th Research Institute National Postgraduates 

Enrollment Exam Subject Catalog” [网络系统部第五十六研究所2017考研专业目

录], Exam Training Camp [考研集训营], November 22, 2016, available at <www.

kyjxy.com/yuanxiao/zhuanye/33616.html>. For the GSD 57th Research Institute, see 

“Shengxi Elementary School 2017 Spring Games Grand Opening Ceremonies” [胜

西小学2017春季运动会隆重开幕], Wenji8.com, April 4, 2017, available at <www.

wenji8.com/p/8cbbE3F.html>. For the GSD 58th Research Institute, see “Strategic 

Support Force 58th Research Institute” [战略支援部队第五十八研究所], Researcher 

Recruitment Network [研招网], available at <http://yz.chsi.com.cn/sch/schoolInfo--schId-367828.dhtml>.

68 “School Introduction” [学校简介], People’s Liberation Army Information 

Engineering University Admissions Information Network [解放军信息工程大学

招生信息网], available at <http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/contents/249/508.html>.

69 See, for example, “Announcement on the Publication of the 2017 Chinese 

Academy of Sciences List of Preliminary Candidates Selected for Academician” [

关于公布2017年中国科学院院士增选初步候选人名单的公告], Chinese Academy 

of Sciences Work Office of the Academic Department [中国科学院学部工作局], 

August 1, 2017, available at <www.cas.cn/tz/201708/t20170801_4610395.shtml>.

70 Note that this mission only appears to extend to protecting the PLA’s own 

network, not government or nation-wide networks more generally. See Wang 

Weiming and Guo Biying [王伟明, 郭碧莹], “Stopping Leaks, Military Cyber 

Experts Teach You the Path of Solving ‘Poison’” [防泄密, 军队网络专家教你解“
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

508

毒”之道], China Military Online [中国军网], May 23, 2017, available at <www.81.

cn/jmywyl/2017-05/23/content_7613285.htm>.

71 Both Unit 31003 and the Network-Electronic Bureau have been listed at 

the address No. 226 North Middle Fourth Ring Road, Haidian District, Beijing [

北京市海淀区北四环中路226号], the known address of the former GSD Fourth 

Department. For Unit 31003’s address, see “Huading Decorations Successfully 

Signed Unit 31003” [华鼎装饰成功签约31003部队], Huading Construction [华

鼎建筑], December 16, 2016, available at <www.hdzs.com.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=5&id=92>. For the Network-Electronic Bureau’s 

address, see “XXX Network-Electronic Bureau Service Unit Single Occupant 

Housing Refurbish Project Open Bid Advertisement” [XXX网电局勤务队和单身干

部宿舍整修改造工程施工招标公告], June 23, 2017, available at <www.bidchance.

com/calggnew/2017/06/23/20745058.html>.

72 “Army Artillery Air Defense Academy and National University of Defense 

Technology Electronic Countermeasure Institute Debut in Hefei” [陆军炮兵防空

兵学院,国防科技大学电子对抗学院亮相合肥], The Paper [澎湃], August 1, 2017, 

available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1748674>.

73 “Announcement on the Publication of the 2017 Chinese Academy of Sciences List of Preliminary Candidates Selected for Academician.”

74 Zhang Qiaosu [张樵苏], “This Squad Leader Is a Little ‘Zhou’—The 

Journal of Grade Three Sergeant Zhou Yunxiao of a Certain Strategic Support 

Force Brigade” [这个班长有点“轴”——战略支援部队某旅三级军士长赵云霄

记事], Xinhua [新华], June 4, 2017, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

politics/2017-06/04/c_1121083630.htm>; Zeng Shijing, Huang Qiyuan, and Li 

Wen [曾世京, 黄琪渊, 李雯], “What Are the Highlights for the Military Services 

Symposium?” [为军服务座谈会都有啥看点?], China Military Online [中国军网], 

May 16, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/zghjy/2017-05/16/content_7603928.htm>.

75 These units include an electronic countermeasure brigade at Langfang and 

an air defense electronic countermeasure brigade at Beidaihe, detachments in both 

Shanghai Nicheng and Yingtan, and satellite stations in Beijing and Sanya. See Liu 

Yanqian [刘燕倩], “Visit to Give Condolences, Strong Civilian Military Relations” 

[慰问走访 军民情浓], Shanghai NiCheng Government [中共浦东新区泥城镇委员

会], February 13, 2015, available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20160318214622/

http://www.nichengdj.gov.cn/html/ArticleShow11343.aspx>; Zhu Fenni [朱芬妮], 

“City Investment Corporation: Carry out ‘August 1st’ PLA Day Memorial Activities” 

[城投公司:开展“八一”建军节慰问活动], Shanghai NiCheng Government [中共浦
Strategic Support Force

509

东新区泥城镇委员会], July 28, 2016, available at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.

com/search?q=cache:L1wu4NnF6CIJ:www.nichengdj.gov.cn/html/articleshow14968.

aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>; “On the Issue of Illegal Burning Near Unit 

61906 Troops Stationed in the Area” [关于61906部队驻地附近非法焚烧排放问题], 

Yingtan Municipal Government [鹰潭市人民政府], December 5, 2016, available at 

<www.yingtan.gov.cn/gzcy/zxts_1/hbj_1/201612/t20161205_408367.htm>; Stokes, 

Lin, and Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber 

Reconnaissance Infrastructure, 15.

76 Xiao, The Science of Military Strategy, 268. Ye, LSIO, 44.

77 Costello and Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese 

Information Operations,” 170–171.

78 Dai Qingmin [戴清民], “On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic 

Warfare” [网电一体战], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 1 (February 

2002), 112–117.

79 Costello, “The Strategic Support Force.”

80 It is worth noting that from a purely organizational standpoint, the former GSD 

Fourth Department only managed a relatively small cadre of bureaus, brigades, and 

ground stations, which, compared with the organizational heft of the General Armament Department and GSD Third Department, may not have been enough to warrant 

a separate, third department in the SSF to focus exclusively on electronic warfare.

81 Li Xiaobiao and Xu Kai [李小彪, 徐凯], “Lei Feng Spirit Motivates Us to Go 

Forward” [雷锋精神激励我们前行], db.81.cn, March 28, 2016, available at <http://

db.81.cn/content/2016-03/28/content_6979623.htm>.

82 Costello and Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese 

Information Operations,” 178. For an informative discussion on PLA Three Warfares 

strategic thought, see Elsa Kania, “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three 

Warfares,” China Brief 16, no. 13 (August 22, 2016), available at <https://jamestown.

org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/>.

83 The 311 Base operates under MUCD Unit 61716 (61716部队). For a more 

in-depth discussion of the 311 Base and Liaison Department, see Mark Stokes 

and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: 

Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 

Institute, October 14, 2013), available at <www.project2049.net/documents/

PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf>.

84 On the organizational makeup of the 311 Base, see ibid., 29. On its wartime structure, see Kevin McCauley, “System of Systems Operational Capability: 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

510

Operational Units and Elements,” China Brief 13, no. 6 (March 15, 2013), 13–17; 

and Ye, LSIO, 135.

85 Major General Mei Huabo [梅华波], political commissar of the 311 Base 

before the reforms, was listed in that position as late as August 2016. In December, 

it was reported that Mei Huabo was appointed political commissar for an unnamed 

base under the Strategic Support Force. Other personnel transfers provide further 

indication the base has moved. In 2016, Mou Shan [牟珊] changed his affiliation 

from “China Huayi Broadcasting Company” [中国华艺广播公司], the commercial 

persona of the 311 Base, to a “Certain Department in the Strategic Support Force” 

[战略支援部队某部]. See Huang Xiaowei and Yu Shan [黄晓伟, 牟珊], “Discussion and Analysis of Taiwan Military Recruitment Promotion Advertisment and 

Its Effect” [台军招募文宣广告及其效果评析], Modern Taiwan Studies [现代台湾

研究], no. 1 (2014), available at <www.cqvip.com/QK/97723X/201401/49213060.

html>; Yu Shan [牟珊], “Analysis of NATO Strategic Communication Strategy” 

[北约战略传播策略探析], Military Reporter [军事记者], no. 6, (2016), available at 

<www.cqvip.com/qk/81377x/201606/669378161.html>.

86 For an in-depth discussion of the Three Warfares, see Wu Jieming and Liu 

Zhifu [吴杰明, 刘志富], An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological 

Warfare, Legal Warfare [舆论战心理战法律战概论] (Beijing: National Defense 

University Press [国防大学出版社], 2014).

87 An indicator of the uniqueness of the 311 Base’s position is its MUCD, 

which fell under the GSD MUCD block even as the organization was subordinate 

to the former General Political Department.

88 Costello and Peter, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese 

Information Operations,” 188.

89 The actual grade of the Joint Staff Department may be equal to the Strategic 

Support Force; however, as a component of the Central Military Commission it acts 

under its authority in relaying operational decisions.

90 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2.

91 “The Tenth China Air Show Flight Command Leading Small Group Meeting Was Held in Zhuhai” [第十届中国航展飞行组织指挥领导小组会议在珠海

召开], Civil Aviation Administration of China [中国民用航空局], October 29, 

2014, available at <www.caac.gov.cn/XWZX/MHYW/201410/t20141029_13886.

html>; “The Ministry of Defense Discloses Three Operational Ways Used by 

Our Naval Forces to Combat Piracy” [国防部披露我国军舰打击海盗三种作战方
Strategic Support Force

511

式], Sina.com [新浪], December 23, 2008, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.

cn/2008-12-23/1052536044.html>; Li Yangyang [李杨洋], ed., “Chinese-Pakistan 

‘Friendship-2011’ Joint Anti-terrorism Training Helicopter Dadui Arrives in Pakistan” [中巴“友谊-2011”反恐联合训练直升机大队今日启程赴巴], China Military 

Online [中国军网], November 15, 2011, available at <http://military.people.com.

cn/GB/42967/16251957.html>; “Writing Style of Major General Liu Xingren” [刘

兴仁少将书法作品], Chinese Army Friendship Net [中国军谊网], October 29, 2014, 

available at <www.chinajunyi.org.cn/show.asp?id=1198>.

92 “Transcript of March 2016 Ministry of National Defense Routine Press 

Conference” [2016年3月国防部例行记者会文字实录], People’s Republic of China 

Ministry of National Defense [中华人民共和国国防部], March 31, 2016, available 

at <www.mod.gov.cn/info/2016-03/31/content_4648220.htm>.

93 “Du Qiang Becomes Central Military Commission Operations Bureau Air 

Control Office Office Chief” [杜强任中央军委联合参谋部作战局空管处处长], The 

Paper [澎湃], January 19, 2016, available at <http://news.163.com/air/16/0119/08/

BDM9D03N00014P42.html>.

94 Ye, LSIO, 108.

95 Ibid., 124–131.

96 Ibid., 134.

97 Ibid., 127.

98 Ibid., 134.

99 Peter Mattis and Elsa Kania, “Modernizing Military Intelligence: Playing 

Catchup (Part Two),” China Brief 16, no. 19 (December 21, 2016), 15–27.

100 For a deeper discussion on “intelligence” versus “technical reconnaissance,” see Peter Mattis, “Chinese Military Intelligence at 90: Consistent Evolution,” 

prepared for CAPS-RAND-NDU Conference, October 2015, 4–7.

101 Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis, “Chinese Legislation Points 

to New Intelligence Co-ordinating System,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, 

September 5, 2017, 7.

102 Cheng Yongliang and Zhang Xiqing [程永亮, 张希庆], “Joint Iron Fist 

Quenches Students” [能力重塑, 联合铁拳淬火生], China Military Online [中国军

网], October 14, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/14/content_189717.htm>; Peter Mattis, “China Reorients Strategic Military Intelligence,” 

IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2016, available at <www.janes.com/images/

assets/484/68484/China_reorients_strategic_military_intelligence_edit.pdf>.

103 Mattis, “China Reorients Strategic Military Intelligence.”
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

512

104 “Professor Huang Zhixiong Holds a Seminar on International Law on 

Cyberspace for Relevant Military Departments” [黄志雄教授为军队有关部门讲授

网络空间国际法], Wuhan Universtiy School of Law [武汉大学法学院], November 

2, 2016, available at <http://fxy.whu.edu.cn/archive/detail/102263>.

105 “Beijing Municipal People’s Procuratorate Holds Symposium for Beijing 

Municipal People’s Congress Delegate in Beijing” [北京市人民检察院召开驻京部队

市人大代表座谈会], Suibi8.com, December 2, 2016, available at <https://webcache.

googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ju7u3SqBfI8J:https://www.suibi8.com/

essay/abf77b-11270011.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.

106 Li and Xu, “Lei Feng Spirit Motivates Us to Go Forward.”

107 For the former Nanjing Military Region electronic countermeasure center 

(ECM center), also known as Unit 73677 (73677部队), see Wang Xiaowen [王晓

文] et al., “Image Fusion Method Based on Visual Saliency Map” [基于视觉显著图

的图像融合方法], Journal of Jilin University (Engineering Edition) [吉林大学学报

(工学版)] (2014). For the former Guangzhou Military Region ECM center, see Xie 

Zhiyong [谢志勇], “PLA Representatives of the 18th Party Congress: ‘Big Defense’ 

Covers Seas and Space” [解放军十八大代表:“大国防”职责涵盖海洋太空], Beijing 

News [新京报], November 14, 2012, available at <http://military.china.com.cn/2012-

11/14/content_27104914.htm>.

108 This is based on papers published under the byline of the ECM centers, 

which include such topics as “A New Method of PRF Detecting Based on DTFT” 

[基于DTFT的一种新的PRF检测方法] and “Principles and Realization of Surface 

Wave Driven Plasma Antenna” [表面波激励等离子体天线的原理与实现].

109 “After a Year of Military Reform, Review of ‘New Institution Time’ in the 

Military Newspaper’s Published Articles”[军改一周年 军报刊文回眸“新体制时

间”之变], PLA Daily [解放军报], December 2, 2016, available at <http://military.

people.com.cn/n1/2016/1202/c1011-28919716.html>.

110 Zhang Qiang, Qiao Xuewei, and Zhang Kunping [张强, 乔学伟, 张坤平], 

“Who Let ‘Command Nerve’ Be More Sensitive” [谁让“指挥神经”更灵敏?], Science 

and Technology Daily [科技日报社], July 31, 2017, available at <http://digitalpaper.

stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2017-07/31/content_374917.htm>.

111 Ni Guanghui [倪光辉], “Secrets of Our First Strategic Support Force” [揭

秘我军首支战略支援部队], People’s Daily [人民日报], January 24, 2016, available 

at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0124/c1011-28079245.html>.

112 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi [澎光谦, 姚有志], eds., The Science of 

Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: AMS Press, 2001), 179.
Strategic Support Force

513

113 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2015), 14.

114 “Prepared Statement of Mark A. Stokes, Executive Director Project 2049 

Institute, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” 

Hearing on Chinese Intelligence Services and Espionage Operations (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 9, 2016), 

available at <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Mark%20Stokes_Written%20Testimony060916.pdf>.

115 Liu Wei [刘伟], ed., Theater Command Joint Operations Command [战区联

合作战指挥] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2016); 

Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 81.

116 Li Dan [李丹], “What Kind of Force Is the Strategic Support Force 

Inspected by Xi Jinping?” [习近平视察的战略支援部队是一支怎样的力量?], 

CCTV [央视网], August 30, 2016, available at <http://news.cctv.com/2016/08/30/

ARTI2Xi1zgynCfj6TYsecOcb160830.shtml>.

117 For a detailed discussion of Chinese thinking on counter-intervention, see 

M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-Intervention,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015), 171–187.

118 A good indicator of this change of terminology is the transformation 

of the former GSD Survey, Mapping, and Navigation Bureau into the Joint Staff 

Department Battlefield Environment Support Bureau.

119 “China to Launch 30 Beidou Navigation Satellites in Next 5 Years,” 

Xinhua, May 19, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-

05/19/c_135372622.htm>.

120 Stokes and Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities, 23.

121 Richard D. Fisher and Sean O’Connor, “Space Invaders—China’s Space 

Warfare Capabilities,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review available at <www.janes360.

com/images/assets/557/40557/Space_invaders.pdf>.

122 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2015, 38.

123 Pollpeter, China Dream, Space Dream, 15.

124 Li Xuanliang and Li Guoli [李宣良, 李国利], “Xi Jinping: Strive to Establish 

a Powerful, Modern Strategic Support Force” [习近平: 努力建设一支强大的现代

化战略支援部队], Xinhua [新华], August 29, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-08/29/c_1119474761.htm>; Li Dan [李丹], “What Kind 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

514

of Force is the Strategic Support Force Inspected by Xi Jinping?” [习近平视察的

战略支援部队是一支怎样的力量?], CCTV [央视网], August 30, 2016, available at 

<http://news.cctv.com/2016/08/30/ARTI2Xi1zgynCfj6TYsecOcb160830.shtml>.

125 Li Xuanliang, Zhang Xuanjie, and Li Qinghua [李宣良, 张选杰, 李清华], 

“Army Leading Organs, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force Established” 

[陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立], Xinhua [新华], January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/01/c_1117646667.htm>.

126 Zou Weirong [邹维荣], “New-Quality Weapons Decide Victory on the 

Future Battlefield” [新质利器决胜未来战场], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 11, 

2016, available at <http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/zhuanti/content/2016-03/11/content_6954336.htm>.

127 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 129.

128 Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: 

National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006); Ye, LSIO, 145–150.

129 Ye, LSIO, chapter 2.

130 Ye Zheng [叶征], “Ye Zheng: The ‘Seven Weapons’ in the Strategic Game of 

Cyberspace” [叶征: 网络空间战略博弈的七种武器], China Youth Daily [中国青年

报], August 8, 2014, available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0808/c40531-

25427203.html>; Costello and Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of 

Chinese Information Operations,” 161–163.

131 Ye, LSIO, 146–147.

132 Ibid.

133 Wang Jinsong, Wang Nanxing, and Ha Junxian [王劲松, 王南星, 哈军

贤], “Research on Cyberspace Operations Command” [网络空间作战指挥研

究], Journey of the Academy of Armored Force Engineering [装甲兵工程学院学报] 

(October 2016).

134 For a more involved discussion of this concept, see Joe McReynolds, 

“China’s Military Strategy for Network Warfare,” in China’s Evolving Military 

Strategy, 215–216.

135 Part of the difficulty in understanding this is in usage of Chinese terms. 

The United States generally differentiates between the terms information operations

and information warfare, with the former being operations conducted in peace 

and the latter in war. The Chinese do make this distinction; however, they more 

generally use the term information operations [信息作战] interchangeably with 

information warfare [信息战争] and information countermeasures [信息对抗], 

with few consistent differences.
Strategic Support Force

515

136 Xiao, The Science of Military Strategy.

137 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 

DC: The White House, 2017), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/

uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

138 Tong Lei [童磊], “Strategic Support Force: Striding Toward the Future’s 

New Type of People’s Army” [战略支援部队: 迈向未来的新型人民军队], September 29, 2016, available at <www.qstheory.cn/laigao/2016-09/29/c_1119646359.htm>.

139 Marcelyn L. Thompson, “PLA Observations of U.S. Contingency Planning: 

What Has It Learned?” in The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in 

China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015), 44–46; Elsa 

Kania, “PLA Strategic Support Force: The ‘Information Umbrella’ for China’s Military,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2017, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/

pla-strategic-support-force-the-information-umbrella-for-chinas-military/>.

140 “Prepared Statement of Mark A. Stokes.”

141 Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure, 7. While it is highly likely that the 

12th Bureau has moved to the SSF, it has not yet been confirmed whether it has been 

placed under the Space Systems Department or Network Systems Department.

142 Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals 

Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure, 15.

143 Hoffman and Mattis, “Chinese Legislation Points to New Intelligence 

Co-ordinating System.”

144 “National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft),” China 

Copyright and Media, May 16, 2017, available at <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.

wordpress.com/2017/05/16/national-intelligence-law-of-the-peoples-republic-ofchina-draft/>.

145 “Experts: The Strategic Support Force Will Be the Key to Success Throughout the Entire Combat Operations Process” [专家:战略支援部队将贯穿作战全过

程是致胜关键], People’s Daily [人民日报], January 5, 2016, available at <http://

military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0105/c1011-28011251.html>.

146 Lu Xiaomeng, “Scoping Critical Information Infrastructure in China,” 

The Diplomat, May 22, 2018, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/scoping-critical-information-infrastructure-in-china/>.

PART IV

CENTRALIZING AUTHORITY

519

LARGE AND IN CHARGE

Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping

By Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow

Chinese military modernization has made impressive strides 

in the past decade.1 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 

achieved progress in key technological areas, ranging from precision-guided missiles to advanced surface ships and fighter aircraft; PLA 

personnel are more highly trained and skilled, capable of carrying out 

increasingly complex operations near to and farther away from China’s 

shores; and Chinese military doctrine has been updated to emphasize 

modern, joint maneuver warfare on a high-tech battlefield.2 This progress 

has been undergirded by significant increases in Chinese defense spending 

every year since 1990.3 Taken together, these changes better enable the PLA 

to fight what the U.S. Department of Defense describes as “short-duration, 

high-intensity regional conflicts.”4

As the title of a 2015 RAND report suggests, however, PLA modernization has been “incomplete.”5

 Among the major weaknesses outlined 

in that report is the PLA’s antiquated organizational structure, which had 

experienced few major changes since the 1950s. Key problems include the 

lack of a permanent joint command and control (C2) structure, inadequate central supervision—which bred corruption, lowered morale, and 

CHAPTER 13
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

520

inhibited the development of a professional force—and institutional 

barriers in the defense research and development (R&D) process.6 Prior 

military reforms made only limited and incremental adjustments to the 

PLA’s structure; more comprehensive reform efforts stalled in the face of 

bureaucratic resistance.

Since the early 1990s, PLA reformers had argued for comprehensive 

changes to the military’s structure. There were two basic reasons. First 

was the trend of modern warfare toward joint operations, most notably in 

the maritime and aerospace domains. This required the PLA to rebalance 

from the army to the navy and air force, and to institute a joint C2 structure 

that could integrate the capabilities of all the services as well as command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The need to conduct effective joint operations in multiple 

domains only increased as China’s national economic and political interests 

expanded outward to the maritime periphery and, later, to a global scale.7

Second, the general departments and military regions had amassed too 

much power and were too poorly supervised, leading to growing financial 

waste and corruption throughout the force. This, in turn, raised serious 

concerns about PLA combat readiness and proficiency.8

To address these problems, the PLA embarked on a series of institutional reforms during the Central Military Commission (CMC) 

chairmanships of Jiang Zemin (1989–2004) and Hu Jintao (2004–2012). 

Important changes included reducing the PLA’s size by 500,000 in 1997 

and 200,000 in 2003; establishing a professional noncommissioned corps 

(NCO) in 1998; increasing resources to the navy, air force, and Second 

Artillery Force in 2004; and restructuring the research, development, and 

acquisition process in 1998.9 However, more fundamental changes to the 

PLA’s C2 and administrative structure eluded reformers. Resistance to 

change was likely strongest among the potential losers of reform, including 

the ground forces and general departments. Moreover, the relative weakness 

of Jiang and Hu within the military made bureaucratic opposition much 

harder to overcome.10
Large and In Charge

521

Conversely, Xi Jinping has been willing to invest significant amounts 

of time and political capital in pushing forward an ambitious PLA reform 

agenda. Prior to the initiation of the reforms, Xi’s signature military initiative was the directive that the PLA must focus on “fighting and winning 

an informationized war.”11 Xi appears to place a high personal priority on 

sovereignty and territorial disputes; a more effective military would be an 

important tool in strengthening China’s ability to resolve these disputes 

on favorable terms.

Revelations about widespread corruption within the PLA and the 

limited authority that former CMC Chairman Hu wielded over senior 

PLA officers also raised important questions about Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) control over the military.12 The corollary to Mao Zedong’s 

dictum that “political power grows from the barrel of a gun” is that “the 

Party must always control the gun.” The extent of corruption within the 

PLA—and the fact that neither political ideology nor existing supervisory mechanisms could control it—was evidence that Party control 

over the PLA had eroded, perhaps to dangerous levels. More broadly, Xi 

appears to believe that emphasizing ideological conformity and obedience to Party central leadership are necessary conditions for continued 

CCP rule.

A final point involves the extent to which Xi seeks to overturn the 

norms of CCP collective leadership that Deng Xiaoping painstakingly 

constructed.13 Given Xi’s apparent desire to build his personal power at 

the expense of collective leadership norms, the military is an area where 

he (as the sole member of the Politburo Standing Committee with direct 

responsibility for military issues) has important advantages over potential political rivals. If Xi’s efforts to reassert CCP control over the PLA 

also build his personal authority over the military and create a senior 

officer corps that is personally loyal to him, this would be an important 

political asset.

This chapter is organized in four parts. The first section examines 

problems in civil-military relations in China from a historical, theoretical, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

522

and empirical perspective. It focuses on identifying the problems that PLA 

reforms are intended to solve: ineffective information-sharing between 

military and civilian authorities, corruption and cronyism, and a perceived 

waning of ideological commitment to Party ideals and values within the 

PLA. The second section examines how specific organizational and political 

aspects of the reforms are intended to address these problems. Given that 

the reforms will adversely affect the organizational and personal interests 

of some parts of the PLA and some PLA senior leaders, reformers anticipated resistance. The third section examines some of the political tools and 

tactics that Xi has used to push reforms through. The conclusion assesses 

whether this political strategy is likely to succeed in building a PLA that is 

more capable of executing joint operations to “fight and win wars” and in 

reasserting CCP control—and perhaps Xi’s personal authority—over the 

Chinese military.

Problems in Chinese Civil-Military Relations 

A key dilemma for civil-military relations is how to build an army strong 

enough to fight and win the nation’s wars that does not pose a threat to a 

civilian regime or social order.14 In mature democracies, the problem is 

often alleviated by military professionalism and broad acceptance of the 

principle of civilian control, aided by institutions such as legislative oversight, the rule of law, and a free press.15 In these circumstances, militaries 

can serve as a professional warfighting force but are constrained in the 

extent to which they can (or desire to) interfere in domestic politics. In 

transitional democracies and some civilian-led authoritarian states, the 

problem is more acute because of weak social norms and weak institutions 

limiting military encroachment into internal affairs. Indeed, in many cases 

the military played a pivotal role not only in the founding of the regime but 

also in post-revolutionary governance.16 Getting the military out of politics 

in such cases is no easy feat.

Chinese reformers have learned firsthand how difficult it can be to 

extricate the military from political affairs. During the Mao era, the PLA 
Large and In Charge

523

played a key role in elite politics as well as in domestic governance. Uniformed officers held high Party posts and on occasion became so powerful 

(and had ideas so divergent from Mao’s) that they had to be purged, as in 

the cases of Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao. The military also played a role in 

social and economic affairs at the grassroots level, most notably during 

the Cultural Revolution.17 During this period, shared belief in Marxism-Leninism by civilian and military elites helped CCP leaders exercise 

what Samuel Huntington called “subjective control” over the PLA.18

Common ideology and objectives were reinforced by “objective control” 

measures such as the political commissar system and the CMC, which 

gave the top CCP civilian leader formal authority over military decisions. 

Following Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping and his co-reformers sought to 

reduce the military’s role in political affairs, including encouraging the 

PLA to focus on its professional military responsibilities. However, this 

required an uneasy bargain in which the PLA was granted significant 

autonomy over its own affairs and given compensation for limited defense 

budgets in the 1980s by being granted permission to engage in a range of 

commercial activities.19 Reduced oversight and encouragement to participate in China’s booming civilian economy proved to be a potent recipe 

for wide-scale corruption.

Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, had to wrestle with 

the consequences of this bargain. Both Jiang and Hu sought to make the 

PLA into a more competent warfighting force, as well as to revise China’s 

national security architecture to cope with a more diverse set of security challenges, but neither was able to fully implement their plans. For 

instance, Jiang’s 1998 decision to remove the PLA from business ventures 

was only partially successful, as many of these enterprises were simply 

transferred to close relatives of senior officers.20 The creation of a National 

Security Council (NSC)-like entity, which Jiang and Hu both supported in 

order to produce more effective responses to regional crises, was stunted 

in part due to the PLA’s unwillingness to share information with civilian officials or coordinate with civilian ministries.21 The problem was 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

524

exacerbated by Jiang and Hu’s lack of knowledge of military affairs and 

limited influence within the military; neither had served in the PLA nor 

had significant ties to it.

Thus, Xi Jinping inherited a military that was making incremental 

progress toward jointness and where Party control over the PLA had eroded 

significantly in some areas. Xi recognized that the lack of effective civilian 

(and especially Party) oversight limited the military’s ability to become a 

truly professional force focused on fighting and winning wars. At worst, the 

military might not follow the Party’s orders in the event of a national crisis. 

This was especially worrisome given the perception that China was facing 

increasing national security challenges both at home and abroad, such as separatism, maritime disputes, and strategic challenges from the United States.22

Xi wrestled with several distinct but interrelated civil-military challenges. These included the military’s reluctance to share information and 

intelligence with civilian authorities, corruption and cronyism, and a 

perceived waning of ideological commitment to Party ideals and values 

within the PLA. These challenges are discussed in turn.

Information-Sharing 

As part of the Deng Xiaoping–era bargain that reduced the PLA’s political 

role, the military was granted extensive autonomy to manage its own affairs. 

From the “principal-agent” perspective, this autonomy created a number of 

information asymmetries between the Party (the “principal”) and PLA (as 

its “agent”).23 Civilian Party elites had limited insight and control over the 

PLA’s internal finances, R&D activities, and perhaps even some operational 

decisions. The fact that a significant share of PLA revenue was coming from 

“off-budget” commercial activities before the 1998 divestiture reduced the 

effectiveness of budgets as an instrument of civilian control. The PLA also 

kept tight control over military intelligence and information about Chinese 

military capabilities and operations as a bureaucratic advantage, and it 

was often reluctant to share this information with either senior leaders or 

civilian ministries (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which occupied 
Large and In Charge

525

a lower bureaucratic grade). At the heart of the problem was an extremely 

thin institutional nexus between the civilian Party elite and PLA—only the 

CMC Chairman himself bridged this divide.24

Limited information-sharing contributed to a number of secondary 

civil-military problems. The first was prolific corruption and financial mismanagement within the PLA (discussed below). Second was the inability of 

senior leaders to anticipate and manage key decisions and announcements 

from the PLA. Two prominent examples were the negative international 

response to the January 2007 test of an antisatellite weapon, which appeared 

to catch Hu and other civilian officials off guard, and the January 2011 

test of a J-20 stealth fighter, which led to a diplomatic kerfuffle as it coincided with the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Beijing. 

Although there are several possible explanations for these incidents, the 

most convincing is simply that Hu and his advisors were not kept abreast 

of the specific operational details and timing of the tests.25 This does not 

mean that the PLA had gone rogue, but, as PLA expert Andrew Scobell 

argues, does suggest that it was able to act roguishly—or in a way that 

caused embarrassment to top Party officials.26

A third problem was China’s limited ability to coordinate effective 

civil-military responses to domestic and foreign crises. One of the key 

drivers for proposals to institute a Chinese NSC was the perception of 

weak and ineffective whole-of-government responses to incidents such as 

the May 1999 accidental North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing of 

the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the April 2001 collision of U.S. and 

Chinese military aircraft in the South China Sea.27 Part of the problem, as 

already noted, was the PLA’s bureaucratic disincentive to share military 

information and cooperate with civilian ministries. To be sure, the military 

was represented on the National Security Leading Small Group, which was 

intended to facilitate stronger coordination, but this was only an ad hoc 

arrangement with little institutional support and no ability to compel the 

PLA to share information or respond to requests from civilian agencies.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

526

Corruption and Cronyism 

Another legacy of Deng’s bargain with the PLA was ineffective external (as 

well as internal) supervision of the military, often resulting in corruption 

and mismanagement. The most well-known examples of graft within the 

PLA are those that came to light following the anti-corruption campaign 

initiated by Xi and his colleagues at the end of 2012 (which was not limited 

to the PLA but covered the entire Party apparatus and state organizations 

as well). Those cases involve investigation and purges from the Party of 

high-ranking cadres such as former CMC vice chairmen Xu Caihou and 

Guo Boxiong, and former General Logistics Department deputy director 

Gu Junshan, who was suspected of selling military ranks. However, corruption was found at many levels of the PLA, and in many areas. More 

quotidian examples of malfeasance include the unlawful privatizing of 

military housing, disobeying traffic regulations, travelling extravagantly, 

and abusing retirement benefits.28 PLA-run businesses, such as military 

hospitals, were also frequent targets of corruption allegations.29

System-wide corruption had several major negative consequences for 

civil-military relations. First was that Party leaders may not have been able 

to rely on the PLA as an effective warfighting instrument. No military, 

of course, is optimized for combat when some (if not many) of its senior 

officers earned their positions through bribes rather than professional 

qualifications. Second was the military’s resistance to reform. As early as 

1998, then PLA Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou warned that substantial reforms to the PLA’s size and structure would be difficult because 

they would “inevitably involve the immediate interests of numerous units 

and individual officers.”30 It is likely that graft-prone parts of the PLA, 

such as the political work and logistics systems, were particularly averse to 

restructuring. Third were the negative effects that corruption likely had on 

morale among those personnel who were genuinely interested in serving 

the Party’s, rather than their own, interests.

A key factor contributing to corruption in the PLA was the lack of 

effective self-policing. At a theoretical level, authoritarian regimes often 
Large and In Charge

527

try to overcome principal-agent problems and concomitant information 

asymmetry through two means: creating quasi-independent supervisory 

mechanisms, such as secret police, and by instituting rules and norms 

intended to shape behavior toward that preferred by the regime.31 The 

PLA attempted both techniques, but with limited results. First, beginning 

in its formative period in the 1920s, the PLA developed an “interlocking 

and reinforcing” system of political commissars, Party committees, and 

discipline inspection commissions. These helped to ensure Party control 

by, respectively, ensuring that Party decisions were followed at each level, 

managing appointments, and investigating violations of rules governing 

Party members in the PLA.32 Because these “objective” mechanisms to 

control the military were all implemented by PLA officers, their effectiveness depended on political commissars acting as loyal members of the 

Party (that is, having the correct “subjective” political values and interests) 

rather than pursuing their individual or PLA institutional interests. Instead 

of objective and subjective control mechanisms being mutually reinforcing, failure of the subjective mechanisms eroded the effectiveness of the 

objective mechanisms. The widespread incidence of corruption in the PLA 

demonstrated that these control mechanisms were not effective and that in 

some cases, such as graft in the promotion system, the supposed monitors 

were complicit in the problem.33

A second effort to strengthen objective control mechanisms, beginning in the 1980s, involved efforts to regularize [zhenggui hua, 正规化] 

the PLA by instituting laws and regulations governing military activities. 

This was part of a larger transformation of governance in China from a 

system based on fiat [renzhi, 人制] to one based on laws [fazhi, 法制] that 

was designed to prevent abuses of power and promote better management 

of Party and state affairs. Hence, the Party restored military ranks (which 

had been eliminated during the Cultural Revolution) in the late 1980s, and 

issued regulations on issues such as recruitment, promotions, retirement, 

procurement, and auditing.34 Figure 1 depicts the increase in laws and 

regulations from 1998 to 2012. However, cultivating a rule of law within 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

528

the PLA was bedeviled by various obstacles. As Chinese law expert Susan 

Finder notes, those problems include the lack of professionalization of 

military courts and prosecutors, gaps in military legislation, isolation of 

the military judicial system from its civilian counterpart, and perhaps most 

seriously, commanders who think that “their word is law.”35

Ideological Laxity 

The most nebulous, but also perhaps the most nefarious, problem in China’s 

civil-military relations involved concerns about the Party’s waning ideological appeal within the PLA. In Huntingtonian terms, this suggested a decline 

in the Party’s subjective control of the army. Speaking at the November 

2014 Gutian political work conference—held at the site of a 1929 gathering 

that cemented the PLA’s status as subordinate to the Party—Xi stated that 

the most fundamental political problems were ideological, including those 

related to “ideals and beliefs,” “Party spirit,” and “revolutionary spirit.”36

A PLA Daily commentary published shortly thereafter stated that the root 

of the ideological malaise was the clash of competing value systems, in 

which the ideas of PLA members are becoming “more independent, more 

selective, more changeable, and more diversified.”37 Although not explicit, 

this certainly refers to concerns about foreign, and especially Western, 

Figure 1. Increase of PLA Laws and Regulations, 1998–2012

250

200

150

100

50

0

Military Laws Military Regulations Military Administrative Rules

Jan 98

Jan 99

Jan 00

Jan 01

Jan 02

Jan 03

Jan 04

Jan 05

Jan 06

Jan 07

Jan 08

Jan 09

Jan 10

Jan 11

Jan 11

70

40 40 47

94 97 98

160 171

215 224 228

12 13 15 15 17 18

Source: Adapted from Shinji Yamaguchi, “Xi Jinping’s Military Reform and Party-Military Relations 

in China,” paper presented at the Japanese Association of International Relations, October 14, 2016.
Large and In Charge

529

ideological influence both in the PLA and in the larger society (from which 

the military draws its personnel).

Of greatest concern for Party leaders were signs of a renewed discourse 

of nationalization [guojia hua, 国家化] and depoliticization [fei zhengzhi 

hua, 非政治化] in the PLA. A 2014 essay in the Party’s flagship journal 

Qiushi explained that the idea of rebranding the PLA as a national (and not 

a Party) army has blurred the understanding of “some officers and men” in 

the PLA about the principle of the Party’s “absolute leadership” over the military. The author stated that “some” have also “blindly admired” Western 

models of civil-military relations, in which armies serve national goals, and 

not those of individual political parties. If those ideas gained prominence, 

the PLA would “lose its soul” and thus its ability to defend the Party.38

These arguments are not new, but rather rooted in the Party’s anxieties 

about the impact of Western influence—an inevitable consequence of China’s economic opening—on the Party’s grip on power. The case of the Soviet 

Union, in which a similar opening contributed to the end of one-party 

rule, is never far out of mind. Regarding the PLA, concerns peaked during 

the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, when some PLA units refused to obey orders 

to disperse the student protesters. This was blamed on unnamed Western 

conspirators as well as on ousted Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, 

whose alleged support for “nationalization” of the army was believed to 

have weakened Party control.39 The crisis led to an increased emphasis on 

political work in the PLA, including a major emphasis on the Party’s “absolute leadership” of the military. In the ensuing years, the same themes were 

stressed at regular intervals. In 2007, for instance, CMC Vice Chairman 

Cao Gangchuan argued that “some hostile forces” had made it their goal 

to “separate the military from the Party leadership,” while in 2011 CMC 

member Li Jinai blamed “domestic and foreign hostile forces” for spreading 

similar ideas.40 Xi’s comments at the Gutian conference and elsewhere are 

fully consistent with this pattern.

Whether the problem of ideological laxity has become more serious 

since Xi took office is difficult to assess. Senior PLA officers continue 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

530

to ritualistically proclaim their loyalty to Xi and the Party in speeches 

and meetings. It is not clear who, if anyone, in the PLA actually supports 

delinking the PLA from the Party.41 Nevertheless, there are two reasons to 

think that Xi’s exhortations are more than a simple reminder. First is the 

declining relevance of Marxism as a guiding concept within the Party-state 

(witness, for instance, senior PLA officers who spend as much time purchasing luxury goods as they do attending meetings on their visits to the 

United States). Second is the increasing role of nationalism as a growing 

ideological force within China. CCP leaders have tried to compensate for 

the declining relevance of Marxist ideology by positioning the Party as the 

only vehicle for fulfilling nationalist goals such as building China into a 

powerful and respected state and resolving outstanding territorial disputes, 

including the status of Taiwan. However, this approach means that support 

for the Party based on nationalism is conditional on its performance in 

achieving nationalist goals. It is not hard to imagine deep resentment within 

the PLA toward leaders viewed as unduly soft toward China’s perceived 

enemies and perhaps even talk about ineffectual Party leaders as national 

traitors [maiguozei, 卖国贼]. That does not mean that a nationalist coup is 

likely as in the Soviet Union in 1991, but it does mean that the Party has to 

continually reassert its influence in the army.

Structural and Procedural Changes 

An initial sign of Xi’s intent to strengthen Party control over the PLA came 

at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013. At the 

plenum, the Party decided in general terms to upgrade management of the 

PLA, noting the need for more effective leadership, bureaucratic processes 

(such as those related to the PLA’s personnel, budgetary, and procurement 

systems), and laws and regulations. In addition, the plenum sought to 

better integrate the military into the broader national security system by 

creating a national security council (NSC).42 These changes were designed 

to increase objective control in the PLA by reducing the problems of limited information-sharing and corruption. At the same time, there was an 
Large and In Charge

531

added emphasis on political work in the PLA, as evidenced by Xi’s speech 

at the Gutian conference. This sought to strengthen subjective control, 

especially by reiterating Party loyalty within the army. Party control was 

also strengthened by changes to the personnel assignment system featuring more frequent rotation of senior officers. This section discusses these 

changes.

Improving Information Flows 

Two sets of structural changes were designed to increase the Party’s ability to understand and control PLA activities. First was disbanding the 4 

general departments and replacing them with a new system of 15 offices, 

departments, and commissions reporting directly to the CMC. This is 

depicted in figure 2. This change was intended to reduce the influence of 

the general departments, which had become powerful enough to limit the 

CMC’s ability to exercise “unified command” over the military.43 Specific 

functions previously ensconced within the general departments, such as 

training, mobilization, and strategic planning, were placed under direct 

CMC control. Moreover, as discussed below, supervisory organs including 

the Audit Office, Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and Discipline 

Inspection Commission also became direct CMC reports. This meant that 

information on PLA affairs that once would have gone through the general 

departments (and thus was subject to manipulation) would now be able to 

Figure 2. 

Logistics Support

Department

Political Work

Department

General Oce Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairman, Members)

Joint Sta

Department

Equipment

Development Dept.

Training

Management Dept.

National Defense

Mobilization Dept.

Discipline Inspection

Commission

Political and Legal

Aairs Commission

Science and Technology

Commission

Reform and

Organization Oce

Strategic Planning

Oce

International Military

Cooperation Oce Audit Bureau Organ Aairs General

Management Bureau

Departments( 部 )

Commissions ( 委员会 )

Oces( 办公室/署/局 )
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

532

reach CMC members directly.

A second change was the establishment of the NSC. Although the 

Third Plenum was vague about the nature of this organization, the Politburo soon clarified that it is a Party organ under the Central Committee 

and that it would be led by Xi. The two vice chairmen are the second- and 

third-ranking Party members (currently Li Keqiang and Li Zhanshu). 

Although perhaps focused more on internal than external challenges, 

the NSC is designed to improve information-sharing and coordination 

between the PLA and civilian agencies, which if successful could increase 

the chances for effective crisis response. The organization will do this by 

maintaining a permanent structure, unlike the ad hoc National Security 

Leading Small Group, and by including PLA representation at a senior level 

and as staff liaisons.44 Anecdotally, the NSC has already begun to improve 

information flows by forwarding situation reports from the PLA’s East 

China Sea joint operations command center to senior Party officials.45

However, these changes are at best only a partial solution to the information asymmetries inherent in Party-army relations. One problem is 

that the PLA still retains control of military intelligence and information 

about military capabilities and operations, and it can decide what information to share with civilian Party elites. Another problem is that the 

institutional nexus between Party and PLA remains thin, located mainly 

in Xi’s hands. The reforms did not increase the involvement of civilians 

in military affairs (though it might be expected that Xi’s successor, when 

named, could become a CMC vice chairman).46 A third challenge is that 

significant power over diverse issues remains in the hands of the general 

departments’ successor organizations, namely the CMC Joint Staff, Political Work, Logistics Support, and Equipment Development departments. 

Those departments have considerable bureaucratic clout and opportunities 

to shape the decisionmaking agenda.

Reducing Corruption 

The PLA also enacted a series of structural reforms to reduce corruption 
Large and In Charge

533

and promote more effective internal governance. A first change came in 

October 2014, when the PLA Audit Office was returned to the CMC from 

the General Logistics Department, where it had resided since 1992. The 

office’s director explained that the transfer was meant to enhance “independence, authority, and effectiveness” of auditors within the military, allowing 

for greater supervision of “high-level leading organs and cadres.”47 A PLA 

Daily report noted that, between 2013 and 2015, the office had audited 4,024 

cadres at or above the Regiment Leader level, resulting in 21 dismissals, 

hundreds of demotions and other penalties, and recovery of 12.1 billion 

RMB (approximately $1.9 billion in 2018 U.S. dollars) in losses due to waste 

and mismanagement.48

Further changes were made as part of a CMC reorganization announced 

in January 2016. The Discipline Inspection Commission, which had been 

part of the General Political Department (GPD) since 1990, was returned 

to the CMC. The PLA also announced that teams of discipline inspectors 

had been created and would be conducting investigations of Party members 

across the PLA, just as the Central Discipline Inspection Commission has 

conducted investigations of Party members in the civilian bureaucracy and in 

state-owned enterprises as part of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. CMC Vice 

Chairman Xu Qiliang encouraged the inspectors to “take advantage of their 

new standing” within the PLA to verify “officers’ political loyalty, power, and 

responsibility.”49 In addition, hotlines were established so that military members could anonymously report Party violations to the Discipline Inspection 

Commission.50 On January 15, 2018, the PLA formally issued a new CMC 

Inspection Work Regulation governing the discipline inspection process and 

specifying the responsibilities of the CMC Inspection Work Leading Small 

Group, its subsidiary inspection groups, and similar bodies established in the 

services and the People’s Armed Police.51 Another organizational change was 

the transfer of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, responsible for 

military courts and prosecutors, from the GPD to the CMC.

These reforms were potentially useful because they extricated supervisory functions from the corruption-prone general departments and gave 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

534

investigators, judges, and auditors greater bureaucratic independence from 

those they were supposed to be supervising. Status as part of the CMC also 

gave these units more authority and allowed CMC leaders (including Xi) 

to exercise tighter control. This was not so much an innovation as a return 

to the earlier system of “interlocking” directorates in which the Party 

maintained several distinct channels of control.52 In this respect, the Audit 

Office, Discipline Inspection Commission, and Political and Legal Affairs 

Commission will reinforce the political commissar and Party committee 

systems (which reside in the Political Work Department, successor to 

the GPD). Taken together, this could result in a greater ability to identify, 

investigate, prevent, and punish corruption at higher levels of the PLA, 

especially in the former general departments. However, a key limitation is 

the continued lack of significant external checks on PLA activities (such as 

a free press or independent legislative oversight). To the extent that there is 

corruption within the auditing, discipline inspection, and military judicial 

systems themselves, structural changes will have little impact.

A related area of change was the announcement of new regulations 

designed to strengthen the rule of law within the PLA and encourage a 

stronger professional ethos among servicemembers. One important development was new restrictions on the PLA’s ability to engage in commercial 

activities, such as accepting civilian patients in PLA hospitals, leasing 

warehouses, and contracting out military construction units.53 This helped 

to close loopholes that allowed the PLA to stay in business despite the 1998 

divestiture. In addition, rules were promulgated to prevent garish displays 

of power by PLA officers, such as use of military license plates to avoid 

traffic laws, use of luxury cars, opulent banquets, and excessive foreign 

travel.54 Still other regulations targeted the personnel system by mandating 

dismissal of officers on the basis of incompetence and clarifying retirement 

ages.55 This was meant to pave the way for a younger, more capable and 

professional officer corps. Nevertheless, concerns remained about the efficacy of such laws. CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang noted that “We need to 

correct the phenomenon of having law but not enforcing it, not enforcing 
Large and In Charge

535

the law strictly, and not pursuing those who break the law.”56

Improving Ideological Commitment 

A third area of efforts to increase Party control is in the ideological 

arena. A key feature of the PLA’s political work in recent years has been a 

renewed emphasis on the principle that the “Party commands the gun.” 

As early as the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, the CMC reiterated that the PLA must “unswervingly uphold the absolute leadership 

of the Party over the army,” guarantee “absolute loyalty and reliability,” 

and support the new generation of Party officials under Xi.57 Xi himself 

stressed the same themes at the November 2014 Gutian political work 

conference and elsewhere.58 At the same time, the CMC highlighted the 

need for “reliable” Party cadres in the army, defined in one document as 

those who have “resolute” political views, carry out military and political 

orders “without hesitation,” and are able to resist “incorrect ideological 

trends.”59 Senior PLA officers were also required to biaotai, or publicly 

pledge their dedication to the Party and its leadership.60

There is nothing inherently unique about the recent emphasis on Party 

loyalty in the PLA. The fact that this theme reappeared after the 18th Party 

Congress does not imply specific concerns about disloyalty to the Party or 

to Xi personally within the army (although it is impossible to rule out such 

concerns). Rather, it is consistent with a pattern established in the immediate post-Tiananmen era of periodic political campaigns deemed necessary 

to ensure that Party control does not waver—or what David Finkelstein 

calls the “re-redding” of the PLA.61 Indeed, a CMC instruction on political 

work released in January 2015 reaffirmed the need to “forge the soul” of the 

army to follow Party commands, requiring continued ideological education 

at all levels, but “especially in the upper echelons.”62 Hence, even as officer 

training and promotion criteria increasingly stress operational capabilities, 

the need for Party education and bona fides will remain central to the PLA’s 

personnel system. Indeed, one PLA officer suggested in a 2017 conversation 

that political loyalty has become the most important factor in promotions.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

536

A secondary emphasis of PLA political work has been on reinvigorating 

support for Marxist principles. Overall, the CMC requires that the army be 

educated with the “important theories of communism and socialism with 

Chinese characteristics,” in addition to the specific principles exhorted by 

Xi.63 This has led to an emphasis on socialist norms such as austerity, intraParty democracy, service to the people, criticism and self-criticism, and 

upright actions.64 The goal is to instill values that counteract more self-interested impulses that give rise to materialism and ultimately to corruption 

and lack of discipline. However, as already noted, the appeal of Marxism in 

Chinese society has waned considerably since the 1980s. This is no less true 

in the PLA, as illustrated in the extreme in cases of self-aggrandizement 

such as those of Xu Caihou and Gu Junshan. PLA members might thus 

vocalize support for Marxism, but it is unclear that those values are being 

re-internalized to any significant degree.

Personnel Assignment Changes 

A fourth aspect of efforts to tighten Party control over the PLA involves 

rotating senior officers to reduce the risk of collusion between commanders 

and political commissars and to break up existing patronage networks that 

might facilitate corruption. Rotation is a traditional means of preventing 

senior officers from developing their own local political networks that 

might challenge civilian control. In the case of the PLA reforms, the assignment pattern of commanders and political commissars varied at different 

levels of the ground forces. At the theater command (TC) level, four of the 

five inaugural commanders were previously assigned to other military 

regions, while all five of the political commissars were local. At the (newly 

established) TC army level, four of the five commanders were local, while 

all of the political commissars rotated from other military regions. At the 

group army level, almost all of the commanders of the group armies were 

transferred from other military regions, while most of the political commissars were from the local area.65

This pattern of personnel assignments balanced the benefits of famil-
Large and In Charge

537

iarity with the operating area and subordinate officers with the enhanced 

political control provided by transferring officers to new locations and 

breaking up existing patronage networks. These rotations meant that 

in most cases the commander and political commissar did not have an 

existing personal relationship and were therefore less likely to trust each 

other and engage in corrupt behavior. They also meant that if a theater 

commander contemplated ordering subordinate ground units to engage 

in unauthorized activity, the operational chain of command included a 

TC army commander and group army commanders that he did not know 

well. Taken as a whole, this pattern of senior officer assignments enhanced 

Party control and the supervision provided by the political commissar system, but likely at some cost to operational effectiveness because the theater 

commander, political commissar, and subordinate commanders were all 

unfamiliar with each other.

Xi’s Political Strategy for Implementing Reforms 

PLA reformers have advocated structural reforms since the early 1990s, 

but previous reform efforts (including some backed by Jiang Zemin and 

Hu Jintao) were stymied by bureaucratic opposition within the PLA. How 

has Xi Jinping succeeded where his predecessors failed? Xi has employed 

a number of tools and tactics to pursue the reform goals of building a 

PLA that can fight and win informationized wars by improving its joint 

operations capability and strengthening CCP control over the PLA. This 

section describes the elements of Xi’s political strategy and the political 

tools available to pursue his military reform agenda.

Embed Military Reforms in a Broader Reform Agenda 

Key elements of the military reforms were unveiled in the Third Plenum 

decision document approved by the Central Committee in November 

2013.66 The plenum not only identified key areas of military reform, but 

also sent a powerful message that fundamental organizational changes to 

the PLA were an important part of China’s overall national reforms and 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

538

were widely supported by the top CCP leadership. By embedding the PLA 

reforms in a broader reform agenda, and elevating the decision mechanism 

to the Central Committee level (where the power of PLA senior leaders was 

diffused), Xi made it harder for potential opponents to resist the reforms. 

As one PLA officer noted, incorporating military reforms into the national 

reform agenda elevated military reform “to the will of the Party and act 

of state.”67 The plenum decision document outlined key aspects of the 

reforms, sometimes in vague terms that indicated the desired direction of 

change without providing specific details. This is an effective device for 

building consensus on the reform agenda while deferring divisive internal 

debates (for example, over which services would gain or lose personnel in 

the PLA restructuring).

Emphasize Xi’s Personal Involvement 

Xi has used his personal involvement in the reform process to demonstrate 

his commitment to making the reforms succeed. Widely considered the 

most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, Xi has invested his time 

and attention to military matters in ways that his predecessors Jiang Zemin 

and Hu Jintao did not.68 For example, in his first 3 years as CMC chairman 

(November 2012–December 2015), Xi made 53 publicized appearances at 

military events. During the equivalent period of time from 2004–2007, Hu 

made only 36 appearances.69 One nonauthoritative Chinese media report 

claims that Xi spends a half-day every week at his CMC office, in contrast 

to Hu, who rarely used his office.70 Moreover, as Nan Li argues, Xi’s more 

assertive leadership style has allowed him to exert greater influence within 

the PLA than either Jiang or Hu.71 Xi has also highlighted the “CMC chairmanship responsibility system,” which emphasizes that he bears ultimate 

responsibility over all military matters.

Xi has used his positions as chairman of the CMC and chairman of the 

CMC Leading Small Group on military reform established in January 2014 

to lead efforts to flesh out the details of military restructuring, including 

chairing meetings to study the feasibility of various options.72 More than 20 
Large and In Charge

539

working groups were established under the CMC to research and consider 

various aspects of the reforms, with extensive consultations with military 

and civilian units at various levels and more than 150 revisions of the 

reform plan.73 Xi personally announced the first details on the reforms at 

a military parade in Beijing in September 2015, stating that the PLA’s size 

would be reduced by 300,000 by the end of 2017, bringing total personnel 

down from 2.3 to 2 million.74 In November 2015, he chaired the CMC 

meeting that adopted the detailed reform plan.75

Since the reforms were announced, Xi has been personally involved in 

pushing them forward. One means involved making formal speeches to military audiences to launch key elements of the reforms, including a December 

27, 2015, speech at the PLA newspaper Jiefangjun Bao and a major address 

on the reforms to CMC and senior PLA leaders at a December 31, 2015, 

ceremony to establish the army as a separate service, rename the Second 

Artillery as the Rocket Force and elevate it to full service status, and stand 

up the Strategic Support Force.76 Xi met with the leaders of the new services 

and personally awarded them banners to serve as symbols of their services.77

He made a similar appearance and speech at a January 11, 2016, ceremony 

to establish the reorganized CMC with its new departments, commissions, 

and offices.78 Xi used these appearances and a photo opportunity at the CMC 

joint operations command center to highlight the missions and importance 

of the new services and the reorganized CMC and to reinforce his authority 

as CMC chairman and his personal commitment to the reforms. He also led 

a 2-day conference on military reform in December 2016 that reaffirmed the 

need for a smaller, more agile military.79

Since Xi himself cannot be personally involved at all times and in all 

aspects of the reforms, he has installed trusted agents within the PLA who can 

ensure that his instructions are being followed. One such individual is Lieutenant General Qin Shengxiang, director of the CMC General Office from 

December 2012 until September 2017, who was also dual-hatted as director of 

the new CMC Reform and Organization Office, which has a leading role in 

formulating reform plans and ensuring implementation.80 Another key figure 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

540

is Major General Zhong Shaojun, who has been a senior civilian aide to Xi 

since Xi’s time as Zhejiang Party secretary. When Xi became CMC chairman, 

Zhong was given a military rank of senior colonel and designated as CMC 

General Office deputy director and director of Xi’s personal office within the 

CMC. His close association to Xi and responsibilities in the General Office 

likely gave him significant influence despite his relatively low formal rank 

and grade.81 Major General Zhong was subsequently promoted to replace 

Lieutenant General Qin as director of the CMC General Office.

Protect Senior Officers 

The PLA organizational restructuring is a major transformation that saw 

the end of the general departments, the transition from seven military 

regions to five theater commands, and the establishment or change in 

status of three services. Some senior PLA officers stayed in essentially 

the same jobs under a new organization structure; others changed to new 

positions, sometimes in different geographic areas. One tacit principle is 

clear, however: all senior (MR-grade and above) PLA officers were given 

jobs at their current grades and kept their current ranks. This proved to be a 

transitional arrangement that only lasted through the personnel shifts prior 

to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, which also named a new Central 

Military Commission and removed the service chiefs and directors of the 

CMC Equipment Development and Logistics Support departments from 

their ex officio seats on the CMC. Protecting the personal career interests of 

senior PLA officers (as opposed to forcing officers whose organizations were 

disestablished to retire early) is an important means of defusing opposition 

to the reforms from leaders whose organizations would lose personnel, 

authority, or budget in the reorganization.

Compensate Reform Losers 

Despite its traditional dominance in numbers and the PLA leadership 

ranks, the army has lost status, budget share, and end strength relative to 

the other services in recent years. Since 2004, Chinese defense white papers 
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541

have emphasized the need for increased funding for the navy, air force, and 

Second Artillery. “Optimizing the composition of the services and arms of 

the PLA” has meant reductions in “technologically backward” army units 

and personnel increases for the other services.82 Most of the 300,000 troops 

that will be cut from the PLA will come from army ranks, and the army is 

widely perceived as the likely loser in current PLA organizational reforms.83

Elimination of the general departments and establishment of a new army 

commander and headquarters reduced the army to bureaucratic equality 

with the other services. The army also lost direct control of space and cyber 

units, which were transferred to the new Strategic Support Force.

Nevertheless, the reforms provided compensation that may actually 

have increased the army’s power, at least in the short term.84 The new joint 

C2 structure gives theater commanders both wartime and peacetime 

operational control over all army, navy, air force, and conventional rocket 

force units within their areas of responsibility. This significantly expands 

the authority of theater commanders relative to commanders of the former 

military regions. All five of the initial theater commanders and four of the 

five initial theater political commissars were ground force officers (and the 

other political commissar has spent most of his career in the army). Giving 

all the theater commander positions to army officers provided a degree of 

assurance to the army, although subsequent personnel reshuffles named 

navy Admiral Yuan Yubai as commander of the Southern TC and air force 

General Yi Xiaoguang as commander of the Central TC.85

Another effort to defuse potential opposition involves ensuring 

that those officers and NCOs who will lose their positions as part of the 

300,000-person downsizing of the PLA will receive pensions, civilian jobs, 

and compensation to which they are entitled. Two PLA National Defense 

University researchers published an article in the PLA Daily warning that 

salary and pension issues needed to be addressed properly to ensure that 

military downsizing did not destabilize the military and society.86 The 

PLA has learned important lessons from previous force reductions and has 

codified the benefits that conscripts, NCOs, and officers should receive, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

542

which vary based on status, years of service, and how they separate from 

the PLA.87 Challenges include allocating sufficient resources to pay earned 

benefits, ensuring that local officials fulfill their responsibilities to provide 

benefits to PLA veterans, and pressuring state-owned enterprises and local 

government offices to fulfill their responsibility to provide civilian jobs to 

PLA veterans who are entitled to them.

One aspect of the reforms gives responsibility for veterans affairs to the 

new CMC Organ Affairs General Management Bureau.88 Senior leaders, 

including Xi, have repeatedly stressed the importance of local officials fulfilling their obligations to veterans.89 These measures, and the establishment of a 

new Ministry for Veterans Affairs in March 2018, are efforts to demonstrate 

the Party’s commitment to take better care of downsized soldiers than in the 

past.90 The October 11, 2017, protest by disgruntled PLA veterans in front of 

the Ba Yi building serves as a vivid reminder of the potential for veterans to 

engage in embarrassing and politically sensitive protests.91 (See the chapter by 

Ma and Chen in this volume for more details on the force reduction process.)

Enlist Support from Reform Winners 

Generally speaking, the navy, air force, and rocket force are likely to be the 

organizational winners from PLA reforms. They have already benefited 

from an increased share of the PLA budget since 2004 and are likely to be 

protected from significant force cuts in the 300,000-person downsizing 

and may even increase their size. Although the army dominated the initial 

theater command senior leadership and the senior CMC staff, the emphasis 

on jointness in the reforms created opportunities for the other services to 

increase their policy influence and their share of senior officer positions. 

One early indicator was the number of air force and navy officers in theater deputy commander positions. In the pre-reform system, air force and 

navy officers held only 10 of the 32 MR deputy commander positions, the 

minimum possible given air force and navy responsibility for commanding 

seven MR air forces and three fleets.92 After the reforms, officers from those 

services occupied 16 of 31 deputy commander positions in the five theaters.93
Large and In Charge

543

As noted above, a navy officer subsequently became commander of the 

Southern TC and an air force officer was named as Central TC commander.

Use Threat of Corruption Investigations to Intimidate and 

Punish Opponents 

Investigations into former CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou not only revealed their complicity in corruption on a massive scale 

but also confirmed the widespread practice of PLA officers paying large 

bribes for promotion to senior positions. This suggests that most senior 

PLA officers are vulnerable to corruption investigations that would reveal 

their complicity in the pay-to-play promotion system. However, in the initial phases of the reform, anti-corruption investigations focused primarily 

on the logistics and political systems (which, along with military district 

commands, offer the most opportunities for corruption). Senior PLA operational commanders were largely spared (with the potential exception of 

some officers with close ties to Guo, Xu, and the network run by Bo Xilai 

and Zhou Yongkang). Nevertheless, the threat of investigation is a potent 

tool to intimidate or remove any officers who might obstruct reform efforts 

or show insufficient loyalty to Xi Jinping.94 Once the organizational reforms 

were implemented, Xi demonstrated his willingness to use this tool by 

launching corruption investigations into then CMC Joint Staff director 

Fang Fenghui and then CMC Political Work director Zhang Yang.95

Use Control over Promotions to Reward Allies and Supporters of Reforms

Guo and Xu were evidently able to extract such large bribes for positions 

because Hu Jintao was not actively involved in the promotion and selection process, essentially rubber-stamping decisions made by the CMC 

vice chairmen. Conversely, Xi Jinping appears to be significantly more 

engaged in the promotion and assignment process, and reportedly conducts 

interviews with candidates for senior military positions.96 Xi’s personal 

engagement in the selection process provides opportunities to place supporters of reforms in key positions and to reward officers with whom 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

544

he has close ties or who display personal loyalty to his leadership.97 This 

approach would be consistent with his broader approach to civilian personnel appointments within the Party and government. The reshuffle of 

senior PLA officers in the runup to the 19th Party Congress in 2017 provides 

additional evidence of Xi’s involvement in PLA personnel decisions (see the 

chapter by McFadden, Fassler, and Godby in this volume for an analysis).

Conclusion 

The previous section indicates that Xi has an extensive range of tools to 

influence the PLA and suggests that he employed a reasonably coherent 

and phased political strategy to push the reforms through. How effective 

will he be in pursuing the long-term goals of building a PLA with a stronger 

joint operations capability that can fight and win informationized wars and 

strengthening CCP control over the PLA?

One starting point is to ask whether Xi’s objectives are compatible 

with the interests and goals of senior PLA leaders.98 Despite the potential 

negative impact on some organizational and individual interests, there 

is likely considerable support within the PLA leadership for reforms that 

will improve PLA combat capability. The organizational reforms draw 

upon insights from the PLA’s study of foreign military operations and on 

theoretical study of the nature of modern war.99 Moreover, senior PLA 

leaders were involved in drawing up the details of the military reforms, 

which appear to incorporate some compromises to protect the interests of 

individual leaders, major organizations, and those soldiers who will be let 

go as part of the military restructuring.

Conversely, Xi’s efforts to strengthen Party control will reduce the 

autonomy of the PLA as an institution and potentially have some negative 

effects on both operational effectiveness and on the organizational and 

personal interests of PLA leaders. Will the increased emphasis on political 

work interfere with efforts to build a more operationally effective PLA? 

Every hour spent on political education is 1 hour less spent on training, 

so some tradeoffs are inevitable. Will the emphasis on regularization and 
Large and In Charge

545

stronger supervisory mechanisms lead to paralysis or disruption in major 

parts of the PLA, especially if the anti-corruption campaign continues 

indefinitely as an instrument of Xi’s personal control?

At a more fundamental level, can efforts to use political work to rekindle 

the ideological flame of belief in Marxism-Leninism succeed? Senior PLA 

officers have been willing to say the correct slogans and swear their loyalty to 

the Party and to Xi as the core leader of the Party. But formal compliance is 

not the same as genuine belief, and may not produce better behavior over the 

long term or loyalty to the Party in a political crisis. Moreover, the hypocrisy 

of CCP leaders pursuing an anti-corruption campaign when their own family 

members have amassed fortunes by trading on their political connections will 

likely undermine efforts to produce cleaner governance.100

The CCP’s insistence on reiterating the principle of absolute loyalty 

to the Party suggests that CCP leaders themselves are not fully confident 

about PLA loyalty. If the means of ensuring objective control over the 

PLA require a high degree of subjective control (in the form of ideological 

belief by those officers doing the supervision) to be effective, then Xi’s 

efforts to improve supervisory mechanisms may not succeed.101 Even if 

these measures are effective in the short term, they will require continued 

high-level attention from Xi himself. This could become a problem in 

the future if Xi’s attention gets drawn away to deal with other pressing 

challenges. A permanent anti-corruption campaign, like the permanent 

revolution Mao called for during the Cultural Revolution, is likely to be 

highly disruptive.

The PLA reforms are still a work in progress, and the PLA is engaged 

in figuring out how to make its new joint C2 system work. Knowledgeable 

observers differ in their assessments of whether the reforms are likely to 

make a significant difference in operational effectiveness.102 Observing the 

PLA’s progress in building an effective joint operations capability that can, 

as Xi Jinping says, “fight and win wars,” will be challenging, especially in 

the absence of actual combat, but at least there will be some exercises and 

operations to observe and some tangible indicators of progress.103
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

546

Assessing Xi’s efforts to reassert Party control over the PLA will be 

much more difficult. Senior PLA officers are likely to say the right things; 

any officers who refuse to profess loyalty to the Party and to Xi will not 

last long. But the real test would only come in a major political crisis or if 

the CCP’s efforts to maintain economic growth and to achieve nationalist 

goals falter. Until then, our assessment that the reforms are more likely to 

succeed in improving PLA operational performance than in reasserting 

CCP control over the military must remain a tentative judgment.

Notes 

1 For an overview, see Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf>.

2 See James C. Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution 

in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2005).

3 For an excellent analysis, see Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” China 

Quarterly, no. 216 (December 2013), 805–830. 

4 Annual Report to Congress, i.

5 Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2015).

6 Brian Lafferty, Aaron Shraberg, and Morgan Clemens, China’s Civil-Military 

Integration, SITC Research Brief 2013-10 (San Diego, CA: Study of Innovation and 

Technology in China, January 2013).

7 For a discussion of China’s global interests, see Phillip C. Saunders, China’s 

Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006); 

and David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2013).

8 Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation, 48–49.

9 For an excellent overview, see Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional Changes 

of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Arlington, VA: 

CNA, 2002).

10 See, for instance, Minnie Chan, “Hu Jintao’s Weak Grip on China’s Army 
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547

Inspired Xi Jinping’s Military Shake-Up: Sources,” South China Morning Post (Hong 

Kong), March 11, 2015, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1734663/

hu-jintaos-weak-grip-chinas-army-inspired-president-xi-jinpings-military>.

11 “Xi Stresses Joint Battle Command for Military Reform,” Xinhua, April 21, 

2016, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/21/content_24709910.htm>.

12 See Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? 

Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms, INSS Strategic Forum 294 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, April 2016), available at <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/

Documents/stratforum/SF-294.pdf>.

13 See Alice Miller, “The PLA in the Party Leadership Decisionmaking System,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. 

Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 58–83.

14 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military 

Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 5–7.

15 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of 

Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997), 140–153.

16 Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” Journal of 

Democracy 6, no. 4 (1995), 9–17.

17 Jaehwan Lim, The Emergence and Demise of Military Governance in China: 

From Cultural Revolution to Deng Xiaoping (Nagoya, Japan: Nagoya University 

Press, 2014).

18 On the concept of “subjective” and “objective” control, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). For a review of the literature on civil-military relations in China, see Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, 

Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics, China Strategic Perspectives 2 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2010), available at <http://ndupress.

ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-2.pdf>.

19 For an overview, see James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall 

of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978–1998 (New York: Routledge, 2000).

20 James C. Mulvenon, “PLA Divestiture 2.0: We Mean It This Time,” China 

Leadership Monitor, vol. 50 (Summer 2016).

21 Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell, “Introduction,” in PLA Influence 

on China’s National Security Policymaking, 8.

22 For a summary of the Chinese government’s view of the security environment, see China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

548

of China, 2015).

23 For two recent analyses employing a “principal-agent” framework to 

assess civil-military relations in China, see Jaehwan Lim, “Drawing a Fine Line 

Between Society and Military: A Political Logic of Military Reform in China,” 

paper prepared for the Japan Association of International Relations Conference, 

Tokyo, October 14, 2016; and Shinji Yamaguchi, “Xi Jinping’s Military Reform and 

Party-Military Relations in China,” paper prepared for the Japan Association of 

International Relations Conference, Tokyo, October 14, 2016.

24 It is worth noting that the Central Military Commission (CMC) vice 

chairmen hold ex officio seats on the Politburo and several senior PLA officers are 

represented on the Party Central Committee, though there is little evidence that 

these Party organs have played a significant role in military affairs.

25 On the antisatellite test, see James C. Mulvenon, “Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test,” China Leadership Monitor, vol. 20 (Winter 

2007). On the J-20 test, see Andrew Scobell, “The J-20 Episode and Civil-Military 

Relations in China,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, Washington, DC, March 10, 2011.

26 Andrew Scobell, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?” 

Parameters 39, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 4–22.

27 Joel Wuthnow, “China’s New ‘Black Box’: Origins, Prospects and Obstacles 

for the Chinese Central National Security Commission,” China Quarterly, no. 232 

(December 2017), 886–903.

28 Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation, 48–49.

29 Mulvenon, “PLA Divestiture 2.0.”

30 Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2002), 67–68.

31 Tom Ginsburg, “Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents 

in Authoritarian Regimes” in Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian 

Regimes, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 58–72.

32 David Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work 

System in the People’s Liberation Army,” China Quarterly, no. 127 (September 

1991), 536–550.

33 One claim made in Chinese media was that former CMC Vice Chairman Xu 

Caihou had netted $3.25 million for the sale of a military region command position. 

Cited in Cheng Li, “Promoting ‘Young Guards’: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA 
Large and In Charge

549

Leadership (Part 1: Purges and Reshuffles),” China Leadership Monitor, vol. 48 (Fall 2015).

34 Thomas A. Bickford, “Regularization and the Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army: An Assessment of Change,” Asian Survey 40, no. 3 (June 2000), 456–474.

35 Susan Finder, “Ruling the PLA According to Law: An Oxymoron?” China 

Brief 15, no 21 (November 2, 2015), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

ruling-the-pla-according-to-law-an-oxymoron/>.

36 “All Army Political Work Conference Opens in Gutian, Xi Jinping Delivers 

an Important Speech” [全军政治工作会议在古田召开习近平出席会议并发表重

要讲话], Xinhua, November 1, 2014, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

politics/2014-11/01/c_1113074055.htm>.

37 Zhang Yu and Chang Xuemei [张玉, 常雪梅], eds., “It Is Urgently Required 

to Settle Apparent Problems in Political Work” [政治工作存在的突出问题亟须解

决], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 5, 2014, available at <http://cpc.people.com.

cn/pinglun/n/2014/1105/c78779-25978483.html>.

38 Yu Guang [禹光], “Looking at Casting the Army’s Soul from the Modern Values 

of the Gutian Conference” [从古田会议的当代价值看铸牢军魂], Qiushi [求是], July 

31, 2014, available at <www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-07/31/c_1111827487.htm>. The 

author is director of the PLA Press, part of the former General Political Department.

39 Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in China,” 555–557.

40 “PLA Reiterates Loyalty to CPC Leadership,” Xinhua, July 17, 2007, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/17/content_5438017.htm>; “No 

Nationalization of Military in China,” China Daily, June 20, 2011, available at 

<www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-06/20/content_12739234.htm>.

41 It was also unclear who supported nationalization of the PLA during the Jiang 

and Hu years. See Michael D. Swaine, “Civil-Military Relations and Domestic Power 

and Policies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2, 2005.

42 The full text of the Third Plenum decision (in English) is available at <www.

china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/>.

43 Wu Ming [吴铭], “Remolding Our Military’s Leadership and Command 

Structure Is a Necessary Step in the PLA’s Rejuvenation” [重塑我军领导指挥体制

是强军兴军的必然选择], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 30, 2015, available at 

<http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_6791140.htm>. 

44 Wuthnow, “China’s New ‘Black Box.’”

45 Michael D. Swaine, “The PLA Role in China’s Foreign Policy and Crisis 

Behavior,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, 146.

46 Xi served as CMC vice chairman from 2010 to 2013, as did Hu Jintao from 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

550

1999 to 2005.

47 Wang Xiaoyi [王晓易], ed., “Effectively Use the ‘Sharp Sword’ of Auditing 

to Build a Defense Line of Supervision” [用好审计“利剑” 筑牢监督防线], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], March 7, 2015, available at <http://news.163.com/15/0307/06/

AK363OKJ00014AED.html>.

48 Jiang Pingping and Cheng Hongyi [姜萍萍, 程宏毅], eds., “Push Forward 

the Innovative Development of Army Audit Work from a New Starting Point” [在

新起点上推动军队审计工作创新发展], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 29, 2015, 

available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0129/c83083-26471805-2.html>.

49 Nectar Gan, “PLA’s New Top-Level Anti-Corruption Units Swing into 

Action,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 5, 2016, available at <www.

scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1941520/plas-new-top-level-anticorruption-units-swing-action>.

50 Yao Jianing, ed., “Chinese Military Opens Channels for Reporting Disciplinary Violations,” China Military Online, February 16, 2016, available at <http://

english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/16/content_6912001.htm>.

51 “Central Military Commission Regulations on Roving Inspection Work” 

[中央军委巡视工作条例], PRC Ministry of National Defense, January 17, 2018, 

available at <www.mod.gov.cn/shouye/2018-01/17/content_4802593.htm>.

52 Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in China,” 527–568.

53 Mulvenon, “PLA Divestiture 2.0,” 1.

54 Carlos Tejada, “China’s New Leaders Ban Lavish Military Banquets,” Wall 

Street Journal, December 22, 2012, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241

27887324461604578194641136585674>; William Wan, “China Curbs Use of Coveted 

Military License Plates in Latest Anti-Corruption Move,” Washington Post, April 1, 

2013, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-curbs-militarys-luxury-cars/2013/04/01/264d2eba-9ac0-11e2-9a79-eb5280c81c63_story.html>.

55 Li, “Promoting ‘Young Guards.’”

56 Finder, “Ruling the PLA According to Law”; Susan Finder, “Shoring Up 

the ‘Rule of Law’ in China’s Military,” The Diplomat, February 4, 2015, available at 

<http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/ruling-the-pla-according-to-the-law/>.

57 Wan Peng and Zhao Jing [万鹏, 赵晶], eds., “Matter of Key Importance 

at Present, Most Important Political Task” [当前头等大事 首要政治任务], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], November 20, 2012, available at <http://theory.people.com.

cn/n/2012/1120/c49151-19633004.html>.
Large and In Charge

551

58 See, for example, “Xi Stresses Military Headquarters’ Loyalty to Party,” 

Xinhua, September 22, 2014, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-09/22/c_133663216.htm>; “Xi Brings Strength, Integrity to Chinese 

Armed Forces,” Xinhua, July 30, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.

cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-07/30/content_7182049.htm>.

59 Yu, “Looking at Casting the Army’s Soul from the Modern Values of the 

Gutian Conference.”

60 Zhang Hong, “PLA Generals Take Rare Step of Swearing Loyalty to President Xi Jinping,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), April 3, 2014, available at 

<www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1463386/pla-generals-take-rare-step-swearing-loyalty-president-xi-jinping>.

61 David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform 

of the PLA (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016), 19.

62 “PLA Pledges Allegiance to Party’s ‘Absolute Leadership,’” Xinhua, January 

30, 2015, available at <www.china.org.cn/china/2015-01/30/content_34702143.htm>.

63 Ibid.

64 “Commentary: Improved Party Life Vital to Advanced CPC,” Xinhua, October 31, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-10/31/c_135794711.

htm>; “The CMC General Office Issues a Notice Requiring All PLA and PAP Units 

to Diligently Study, Propagate, and Implement the Spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 

18th Party Congress” [中央军委办公厅发出通知要求全军和武警部队认真学习宣传

贯彻党的十八届六中全会精神], Xinhua, October 30, 2016, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-10/30/c_1119815230.htm>.

65 See Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the 

Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challengers, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 14–21.

66 “CPC Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues” 

[中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua, November 15, 2013, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm>. 

67 Bai Zonglin, “Perspective on China’s Military Reform,” International 

Strategic Studies, no. 2 (2016), 22.

68 Nan Li, “The Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, 

and Xi,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, 120–140.

69 These figures are based on a search for each leader’s name in the military 

issues section of the China Vitae database for the relevant periods.

70 Ji Beiqun [季北群], “To Reshuffle Military Generals as Fast as Mao: Xi 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

552

Jinping’s ‘Foresight’” [军队换将直追毛泽东习近平 “深谋远虑”], Duowei Newsnet 

[多维新闻], January 10, 2015, available at <http://china.dwnews.com/news/2015-

01-10/59629032.html>.

71 Li, “The Top Leaders and the PLA.”

72 “China’s Reform Leading Group Holds First Meeting,” Xinhua, January 22, 2014, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm>.

73 Bai, “Perspective on China’s Military Reform,” 22–23.

74 “China to Cut Troops by 300,000: Xi,” Xinhua, September 3, 2015, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/03/c_134583730.htm>. For an analysis, 

see John Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 1: Military Discharge and Resettlement 

Policy, Past and Present,” China Brief 16, no. 16 (October 26, 2016), 20–26; and John 

Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 2,” China Brief 16, no. 17 (November 11, 2016), 6–11.

75 “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi Jinping Stresses: Comprehensively 

Implement Reform and Military Strengthening Strategy, Resolutely Take Path to 

Strong Military with Chinese Characteristics” [习近平在中央军委改革工作会议上

强调全面实施改革强军战略坚定不移走中国特色强军之路], Xinhua, November 26, 

2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-11/26/c_1117274869.

htm>; and Liu Xiaopeng [刘晓朋], ed., “CMC Opinions on Deepening National 

Defense and Military Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], 

Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

76 “Faithfully Perform the Sacred Missions Assigned by the Party and the People” [忠实履行党和人民赋予的神圣使命], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 2, 2016; 

also see Li Jing, “President Xi Jinping Lays Down the Law to the Chinese Army in 

First ‘Precept’ Speech Since Mao Zedong,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

January 4, 2016. Li stresses the imperative nature of Xi’s precept speech, known as 

a xun ci [“admonishing words”].

77 Li Xuanliang, Zhang Xuanjie, and Li Qinghua, “Meeting on Establishment 

of Army Leading Organ, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force Held in Beijing”; and 

“Xi Jinping Confers Military Banners to Army, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force 

Units of the People’s Liberation Army and Delivers Speech,” Xinhua, January 1, 2016.

78 Li Xuanliang [李宣良], “Xi Jinping Meets with Responsible Comrades at 

Various Departments of the CMC Organ, Emphasizing the Requirements of Stressing Politics, Striving for Winning, Rendering Services, Playing an Exemplary Role, 

Endeavoring to Build the CMC Organ With ‘Four Iron Qualities’” [习近平在接见

军委机关各部门负责同志时强调讲政治谋打赢搞服务作表率努力建设 “四铁”军
Large and In Charge

553

委机关], Xinhua, January 11, 2016.

79 “Xi Calls for Smaller but More Capable Army,” Xinhua, December 3, 2016, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/03/c_135878424.htm>.

80 “CMC General Office Director Qin Shengxiang Will Concurrently Serve as 

Director of the CMC Reform and Organization Office” [军委办公厅主任秦生祥兼

任军委改革和编制办公室主任], The Paper [澎湃新闻], August 28, 2016, available 

at <http://news.qq.com/a/20160828/009988.htm>.

81 Edward Wong, “The ‘Gatekeeper’ in Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle,” New 

York Times, September 30, 2015, available at <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.

com/2015/09/30/the-gatekeeper-in-xi-jinpings-inner-circle/>.

82 “China’s National Defense in 2004,” State Council Information Office of 

the People’s Republic of China.

83 Saunders and Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols?; Kenneth W. Allen, 

Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown, and Speculation (Part 1),” China Brief 16, no. 

3 (February 4, 2016); China Security Report 2016: The Expanding Scope of PLA 

Activities and PLA Strategy (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), 62.

84 Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen, “Is the Chinese Army the Real Winner 

in PLA Reforms?” Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016), available at <http://

ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/969659/is-the-chinese-army-the-realwinner-in-pla-reforms/>.

85 Choi Chi-yuk, “Admiral Named to Head PLA’s New Southern Theatre Command,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 19, 2017, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2063649/

admiral-named-head-plas-southern-theatre-command>; and Teddy Ng, “China’s 

Air Force Gets a Lift with Pilot’s Promotion to Top Military Job,” South China 

Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 14, 2018, available at <www.scmp.com/

news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2133405/chinas-air-force-gets-lift-pilotspromotion-top>.

86 Sun Kejia [孫科佳] and Han Xiao[韓笑], “Stepping Up Preparations to 

Integrate Military Reform into Country’s Strategic Planning” [加強統籌, 把軍隊

改革納入國家戰略規劃], PLA Daily [解放軍報], November 19, 2015. See also Jun 

Mai, “PLA Pay Deal Could ‘Destabilise’ Chinese Society,” South China Morning 

Post (Hong Kong), November 19, 2015.

87 For details, see Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 1.”

88 Liu Zhiming [刘志明], “Follow the Requirements of the ‘Four Railways’ 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

554

to Create First-Class Service Security Agencies” [按照“四铁”要求打造一流服务

保障机构], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 20, 2016, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/

topnews/2016-04/20/content_4650021_4.htm>.

89 Yin Shen and Tong Zongli [尹深, 仝宗莉], “Two Ministries: No StateOwned Company May Refuse to Accept Retired Soldiers” [两部委: 任何国有企业

不得拒绝接收退役士兵], People’s Daily [人民日报], December 28, 2015, available 

at <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1228/c1001-27986615.html>.

90 See Kevin J. O’Brien and Neil J. Diamant, “Contentious Veterans: China’s 

Retired Officers Speak out,” Armed Forces & Society 41, no. 3 (2015), 563–581.

91 For an assessment of the likely effectiveness of these efforts, see Chen, 

“Downsizing the PLA, Part 2.”

92 Directory of PRC Military Personalities March 2014 (Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, 2014).

93 Directory of PRC Military Personalities March 2016 (Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, 2016).

94 See Derek Grossman and Michael S. Chase, “Why Xi Is Purging the Chinese 

Military,” The National Interest, April 15, 2016, available at <http://nationalinterest.

org/feature/why-xi-purging-the-chinese-military-15795?page=show>.

95 Zhang Yang committed suicide in November 2017, and it was announced 

in January 2018 that Fang Fenghui was under investigation for “giving and taking 

bribes.” Chris Buckley, “Chinese General under Investigation, Joining a Line of 

Fallen Commanders,” New York Times, January 9, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2018/01/09/world/asia/china-general-corruption.html>.

96 Author interviews with two PLA officers, 2017. 

97 See Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective 

Leadership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2016).

98 See Isaac B. Kardon and Phillip C. Saunders, “Reconsidering the PLA as an 

Interest Group,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, 33–57.

99 Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese 

Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2011).

100 At the Sixth Plenum in October 2016, the Central Committee apparently 

voted down a proposal for an “assets-disclosure sunshine regulation” that would 

have required Central Committee members, their spouses, and their children to 

disclose their assets. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Xi Jinping Uses New ‘Leadership 

Core’ Status to Boost His Faction,” China Brief 16, no. 17 (November 11, 2016), 5–6.
Large and In Charge

555

101 For a more positive assessment, see Chien-wen Kou, “Xi Jinping in Command: Solving the Principal-Agent Problem in CCP-PLA Relations?” China 

Quarterly, vol. 232 (December 2017), 866–885.

102 Michael S. Chase and Jeff Engstrom, “PLA Reforms: An Optimistic Take,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2015), 49–52; and Roger Cliff, “PLA Reforms: 

A Pessimistic Take,” Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2015), 53–56.

103 “‘Be Ready to Win Wars,’ Xi Orders Reshaped PLA,” Xinhua, August 2, 2017, 

available at <www.china.org.cn/china/2017-08/02/content_41332028.htm>. For one 

list of potential indicators, see Saunders and Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols?

557

THE NEW PLA LEADERSHIP

Xi Molds China’s Military to His Vision

By Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin Godby

I

n October 2017, the 19th Party Congress resulted in dramatic changes 

to the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s highest military 

decisionmaking body. Outsiders looking in can only speculate that the 

deliberations surrounding the selection of these top generals involved a highstakes negotiation involving sensitive and critical questions of competence, 

loyalty, and the future direction of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 

Although we may never know the content of these debates, the outcome 

of those negotiations—the new CMC structure and leadership lineup—is 

a window into the whims of the country’s top leaders on political loyalties, 

Party-military relations, and China’s military modernization.

Overall, the changes to China’s high command reflect leaders giving 

priority to joint operations and emphasis on having capable, well-rounded 

commanders from across the services take charge of a rapidly modernizing 

force. They also reveal a concerted effort by the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP), especially since 2012, to accelerate the careers of a new generation 

of senior military officers who are in lockstep with President Xi Jinping’s 

agenda and who apparently avoided the worst of the endemic corruption 

that reached to the highest echelons of the PLA. Over the next 5 years and 

CHAPTER 14
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

558

beyond, these new leaders will oversee the PLA’s continued expansion into 

a capable, global military that is attempting training and overseas missions 

that are unprecedented in recent Chinese history. They will also be expected 

to meet key goals, including a 2020 deadline for implementing the most 

comprehensive changes to the PLA’s command structure in recent decades.

Background: PLA Priorities and Party-Military Relations under Xi 

To understand the mindset of Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders involved 

in making these selections ahead of the 19th Party Congress, it is worth 

examining the changes that have taken place in the PLA during the past 5 

years. The incoming Party leadership that rose to power at the 18th Party 

Congress in 2012 did not delay in announcing its priorities for the PLA. 

On November 16, 4 days after the congress concluded in Beijing, newly 

appointed CMC Chairman Xi Jinping and his outgoing predecessor, Hu 

Jintao, addressed an enlarged session of the CMC. After thanking Hu for 

his stewardship of the PLA, Xi first reminded military leaders that the 

PLA must “unswervingly adhere to the Party’s absolute leadership over 

the armed forces.” Second, Xi instructed the PLA to “resolutely complete 

various tasks of military struggle,” including safeguarding national security 

and sovereignty and raising combat capabilities. Finally, Xi exhorted the 

PLA to uphold the military’s “glorious tradition and fine style.” Xi included 

in this sentiment a warning to top generals to “take a firm stand against 

corruption,” foreshadowing a sweeping anti-corruption campaign across 

the Party and military.1

Xi and the new leaders’ sense of urgency about reforming the PLA in 

part probably stemmed from issues in civil-military relations during Hu’s 

tenure, many of which were only brought to light after the 18th Party Congress. Headlining these were poor discipline and widespread corruption 

that apparently reached all the way into the top ranks. The rampant problems must have caused deep anxiety among Party leaders not only about 

the PLA’s loyalty, but also about the corrosive effect of shady procurement 

deals and buying positions on military readiness. The extent of corruption 
The New PLA Leadership

559

in the PLA was revealed in dramatic fashion in 2014 and 2015 when the two 

highest ranking generals and top military advisors to Hu were arrested in 

retirement for corruption.2

As a result of these fears, in 2012 Party leaders led by Xi intensified 

efforts around these three priorities: Party control of the armed forces, combat capability, and discipline. First, the Party firmly reasserted its symbolic 

control over the PLA and bolstered propaganda around Xi’s authority as 

commander in chief. On November 1, 2014, Xi convened a critical all-army 

political work conference in Gutian, Fujian Province. This historic location 

was the site of an important 1929 meeting where Mao Zedong cemented 

Party authority over the Red Army and which thus serves as a potent 

political symbol of the Party’s control over the armed forces. Political propaganda before and after the meeting has stressed the principle of the Party 

leading the army, stridently rejected Western-style nationalization of the 

armed forces, and strongly reiterated the concept of the “CMC Chairman 

Responsibility System,” which emphasizes the singular authorities of the 

CMC chairman (Xi) in running the military.3

Similarly, Xi formally was named commander in chief of the CMC 

Joint Operations Command Center, an honorific title signaling the chairman’s place at the top of the operational command chain. From the start as 

head of the CMC, Xi also took an early and active interest in military affairs, 

frequently visiting military units and meeting with officers and soldiers. In 

July 2017, wearing military fatigues and riding in a jeep, he presided over 

a massive military demonstration to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the 

PLA’s founding, during which he again exhorted the PLA to obey the Party’s 

command and transform itself into an elite fighting force.4

Xi’s second exhortation to the military to “resolutely complete various 

tasks of military struggle” has been most vividly illustrated in the intensified training, exercises, missions beyond China’s borders, and reforms 

to the PLA’s command structure intended to equip the PLA to be able 

to defend evolving Chinese interests. In 2004, then-CMC Chairman Hu 

Jintao ordered the PLA to be prepared to perform new missions, including 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

560

defending China’s overseas interests. Xi’s guidance to the PLA, issued early 

and often during his tenure, to be able to “fight and win”5 compounds this 

guidance. It is both a reflection of the PLA’s rapidly developing and externally facing capabilities and the leadership’s need for a force that can defend 

China’s growing domestic and overseas interests from threats. Chinese 

ships and aircraft now operate more frequently and farther from China’s 

immediate borders than at any time in recent history—as China’s growing 

presence in the East and South China Seas illustrates. Meanwhile, China’s 

first overseas logistics hub in Djibouti and the 24th Counterpiracy Task 

Group to the Gulf of Aden, both completed in 2017, underscore China’s 

growing global interests and the PLA’s increasing global presence. Lastly, 

the whole-scale restructuring of the PLA that began in late 2015 finally 

abolished the military’s outdated organizational structure and brought 

the high command in line with longstanding operational goals, such as 

refining joint operations.6

Finally, Xi and the leadership have taken a firm stand against corruption at all levels of the military. These measures have included inspections 

of military units across China, updated guidelines for proper behavior, 

more frequent political indoctrination sessions, and corruption investigations into top military leaders. In December 2012, the CMC announced 10 

regulations to rein in bad behavior in the PLA, including banning alcohol 

at banquets. Since then, the campaign has netted dozens of officers whose 

names and crimes have been publicly announced in the Chinese press. In 

August 2017, corruption rumors emerged around two CMC members, 

Chief of the Joint Staff Fang Fenghui and Political Work Department 

Director Zhang Yang, when their names were not included on a list of representatives to the 19th Party Congress.7

 The list instead contained a surprising 

percentage of first-time delegates from the PLA, by some accounts up to 

90 percent. These developments suggest that leadership does not intend to 

slow down military anti-corruption efforts anytime soon; instead, anti-corruption measures are likely to have an enduring impact on all aspects of 

military life, including promotions.8
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The Central Military Commission 

The new CMC reflects the themes of Xi’s tenure thus far. It was slimmed 

down from 11 to 7 members and retained a civilian chairman (Xi), two 

military vice chairmen, the defense minister, and the directors of the Joint 

Staff and Political Work Departments. The new structure added the secretary of the PLA’s Discipline Inspection Commission, while the leaders of 

the Logistics Support Department, Equipment Development Department, 

navy, air force, and Rocket Force were removed. This structure and the 

backgrounds of the new elites provide some insight into the Party’s considerations for military leadership selection and its goals for the PLA during 

the next 5 years and beyond.

Analyzing the New Leadership 

Much can be said about the structure and membership of China’s new 

CMC, but it is evident that it aligns closely with Xi’s three-pronged agenda 

for the military: “follow the command of the Party, build capability to win 

battles, and maintain a fine work style.”9

 Although many will argue that 

cutting the CMC from 11 to 7 seats and displacing the service chiefs and 

half of the former general departments from the body reflect yet another 

example of Xi’s personal drive to consolidate all authority under himself, 

a stronger case can be made that it enhances efficiency, decisionmaking, 

and clarifies roles in a much more effective way in the wake of ongoing 

structural reforms.

Atop a body of 15 CMC entities is now a smaller leadership core that 

can serve as an advisory body and focus more succinctly on oversight and 

issuing guidance to an overhauled PLA. The CMC leadership reflects 

the priorities that Xi views as most essential and is better positioned to 

ensure the success of the ongoing structural reforms. This is technically 

the smallest CMC since the 1930s, but it looks very similar to the 1982 

body that Deng Xiaoping brought out of the bloated Cultural Revolution 

era and streamlined to the needs of the coming era.10 The CMC leadership 

structure was the last piece of the PLA not touched by reforms, and its new 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

562

membership finally reflects the PLA’s shift into a new command structure. 

Analysts assessed the CMC would either become a larger Politburo-like 

body bringing on all the service chiefs, five theater commanders, and 

heads of new CMC departments, or become smaller and push some of 

its former responsibilities down. With their missions shifting to focus on 

administration, the services were bumped off the CMC, and it is now clear 

that logistics and equipment development are viewed as important yet 

secondary enablers compared to operations, Party affairs, and ensuring 

accountability and loyalty in the force.11

The new high command with Xi sitting unchallenged at its apex is 

well-balanced between an old guard of three CMC veterans and an inbound 

group of three newcomers who have seen their careers fast-tracked during 

Xi’s tenure. For the first time, the top PLA officer did not rise up through 

the ground forces, but has been at the forefront of a modernizing military 

that has taken on an increasingly joint appearance. A decade ago it would 

have been unthinkable for a Rocket Force commander to become China’s 

primary face for external engagement, but Wei Fenghe was named China’s 

defense minister during the National People’s Congress in March 2018. 

Finally, the easily dismissed resonance of the CMC having two “war heroes” 

with rare combat experience and the elevation of the Discipline Inspection 

Commission (led by a Rocket Force star) could not more clearly signal Xi’s 

priorities for a military he wants to be “world class” by 2050.12

The Old Guard: Precursor to a New Era 

Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang (born 1950/CMC member since 2007). The 

PLA Air Force (PLAAF) fighter pilot could have been pressed to retire after 

serving two-full CMC terms. On the cusp of hitting the informal “seven 

up, eight down” retirement norm, Xu is the first officer to serve this length 

on the high command since former Vice Chairman Chi Haotian. Xu is the 

PLAAF golden boy who always was the youngest, fastest rising officer in 

his cohort. Younger than his successor, Ma Xiaotian, he has made a career 

of hitting “firsts” within China’s modernizing force. It was in 2004 when 
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563

the service chiefs were first elevated to the CMC that Xu and former navy 

commander Wu Shengli were the first non–ground force officers named 

as deputy chiefs to the then–General Staff Department. This gave them 

the requisite grade level for promotion to the CMC and clarified their 

designation as the heirs-apparent to lead their services. During the course 

of his five-decade military career, Xu has been in the vanguard of a rapidly 

evolving PLA, reflecting reform and modernization priorities put forward 

by Jiang Zemin, Hu, and now Xi. It is only apropos that this military prodigy who joined the PLA at age 16 and achieved milestones in so many areas 

of joint representation should become the PLA’s top officer today.

According to his official biography, Xu was born March 1950 in Linqu, 

Shandong. He trained at three of the PLAAF’s aviation schools to become 

a pilot in the late 1960s. During the early 1980s, he served in the PLAAF’s 

4th Army Air Corps and was chief of staff (COS) of its Shanghai base. After 

attending the basic course at China’s National Defense University (NDU) 

from 1986 until 1988, Xu was transferred to the 8th Army Air Corps in 

Fuzhou where he ultimately became its commander from 1990 to 1993. 

Xu took his first staff job in 1993 when named as a deputy COS of PLAAF 

headquarters, a corps-level assignment, and then as COS from 1994 to 1999. 

Xu was transferred to the Shenyang Military Region (MR) in 1999, where 

he was dual-hatted as a deputy MR commander and as the PLAAF MR air 

force commander until 2004. In June 2004, he was promoted to become a 

deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) for 3 years before being 

named commander of the PLAAF and CMC member in 2007.13

Xu, like all in the new CMC lineup, received some higher education. 

He consistently pursued educational opportunities throughout his career 

including coursework at the Air Force Command College and four separate 

study stints at China’s NDU.14 Although not a combat veteran, one source 

suggests his air force unit may have mobilized in 1979 in Guangxi in support of the war against Vietnam.15

Although much has been made of (and speculated about) Xu’s ties to Xi 

Jinping, his air force career really started to take off during Jiang’s tenure and, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

564

according to some reports, with the direct help of Deng ally and PLA stalwart, 

Zhang Zhen. Zhang, who was charged by Deng to oversee the establishment 

of NDU in 1985, apparently took a liking to Xu when Xu was in the first class 

of the basic course at the school with other rising cadre like future PLAAF 

Commander Ma Xiaotian and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Zhang 

Qinsheng. It was during Zhang’s tenure as CMC vice chairman (1992–1997) 

that Xu was transferred out of the Nanjing MR to PLAAF headquarters to 

help lead air force operations, first as a deputy COS and then as COS. During 

Hu Jintao’s 8 years atop the military, Xu became the first air force officer 

to join the GSD leadership, after which Hu selected him over more senior 

competitors to helm the PLAAF and to join the CMC.16

Xu probably developed some ties to Xi Jinping in Fuzhou between 1990 

and 1993 when Xi was the Party chief of the city and Xu was COS and later 

commander of the 8th Army Air Corps. At the time, Xi served concurrently 

as the Fuzhou military district’s first Party secretary. It is not clear to what 

extent they remained in touch afterward, and Xi probably would not have 

been well positioned to support Xu until decades later. More likely, Xu’s rise 

came from his stellar reputation as a first-rate fighter pilot, serving for decades 

in units across from Taiwan, who embodied the skills and leadership traits 

that Chinese leaders were looking for in building a modern air force.

He reached the rank of major general by age 41 and was voted as an 

alternate member of the CCP Central Committee at age 44, the same 

year he was named PLAAF headquarters COS. On his watch, the PLAAF 

undertook some it most critical modernization efforts and emerged as a 

force aligned to support China’s evolving national security interests. Viewed 

as a young innovator by several top civilian and military leaders, Xu even 

caused ripples in 2009 for his reported advocacy for the air force to develop 

both defensive and offensive space warfare capabilities and his belief that 

the eventual militarization of space was inevitable.17

Xu, in his role as CMC vice chairman during the past 5 years, has overseen at least two of Xi’s top priorities for the PLA: cleaning up the force and 

implementing the largest structural reorganization since the 1980s. Since 
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565

2012, Xu has headed the CMC Leading Group for Inspection Work, giving 

him responsibility for monitoring discipline inspection, judicial, auditing, 

and supervision.18 Xu also was tasked as the point person for implementing the reform plan as the executive secretary of the CMC Leading Group 

for Military Reform.19 Regardless of any previous ties to Xi, he clearly has 

earned Xi’s trust as his top military aide.

Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (born 1950/CMC member since 2012).

Zhang, the princeling perhaps best known for his family connections to Xi, 

has taken a relatively modest profile since his elevation to the high command 5 years ago. First as the head of the General Armament Department 

and then as head of its post-reform version, the Equipment Development 

Department, Zhang appears to have quietly but successfully pressed ahead 

in meeting objectives for China’s weapons modernization program. The 

rare PLA officer who can tout combat experience, even in the less than 

complex battle environment along the Sino-Vietnamese border, he is arguably the PLA’s most experienced operator after nearly 50 years split between 

command postings in the Chengdu MR in China’s rugged southwest and 

since the mid-2000s in the Beijing and Shenyang MRs.20

Appointed to the CMC in 2012, the low key Zhang has shown little 

to corroborate the claims in some media sources that he is Xi’s “sworn 

brother” and staunchest ally on China’s top military body.21 Notwithstanding the credibility of reports about his enduring family connections 

to Xi, Zhang, like Xu, probably benefited just as much from the support of 

Hu Jintao and military patrons from previous generations, including the 

disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. In 

fact, the launching point for Zhang’s rise was his transfer to be a deputy 

commander in the Beijing MR in 2005, years before Xi had a toehold in 

either the Party or military leadership. It was also during Hu’s tenure that 

Zhang was elected to the Party’s Central Committee in 2007 and that same 

year given the trusted post of commander of the Shenyang MR bordering 

the Korean Peninsula.22 Xi probably would only have been positioned to 

indirectly help Zhang until 2010, when he was named to the CMC as the 
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566

first civilian vice chairman under Hu. Notably, other princelings with 

rumored ties to Xi such as Liu Yuan, Zhang Haiyang, and Liu Yazhou all 

retired when they reached the requisite age.

Zhang was born in Weinan, Shaanxi Providence, according to his official biography.23 Like Xu, he attended the basic course at the PLA Military 

Academy (the precursor to NDU) and attained a junior college education 

early in his career. Zhang served nearly three decades in command posts 

in the 14th Group Army (GA) near Kunming in the Chengdu MR. After 

taking additional training in combined arms operations at NDU in the 

mid-1990s, Zhang moved to the 13th GA near Chongqing, where from 1994 

to 2005 he served as deputy commander and then commander. Picked 

by leaders in Beijing for greater things, he was sent to the Beijing MR as a 

deputy commander in 2005 before serving a full 5-year term as Shenyang 

MR commander in advance of joining the CMC in 2012.24

We do not know what part Zhang’s family connections may have 

played in advancing his career, but he has longstanding ties to Xi’s family 

and many others associated with the revolution. Zhang’s father, Zhang 

Zongxun, led the PLA General Logistics Department in the 1970s and 

commanded the Northeast Army Corps (or First Field Army) in 1947 when 

Xi’s father was its political commissar. Both Zhang and Xi are Shaanxi 

natives and second-generation revolutionaries with family who were later 

purged in the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, Zhang made a name 

for himself early, when at the age of 26, as a company commander, he led 

his unit into combat during the border war with Vietnam in the late 1970s 

and in later skirmishes in the 1980s.25 His service in three different MRs 

gave him a wide-ranging background in critical security issues such as 

Tibet, China’s sometimes lawless southwest border, capital defense, and 

North Korea. Since 2012, in leading the PLA’s weapons development and 

acquisition programs he has emphasized civil-military integration and 

emerging issues such as space and lunar exploration.26 Relatedly, Chinese 

press claims he attended the first class focused on high-tech training at the 

National University of Defense Technology in 1998.27
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567

Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe (born 1954/CMC Member 

since 2012). As with all officers rising through the secretive Second Artillery 

Force (now the PLA Rocket Force), we have only modest details on Wei 

Fenghe’s background and career.28 The nuclear officer rose to prominence 

in late 2010 when he was named as the first Second Artillery Force officer 

to fill one of several prestigious posts as a deputy chief of the General Staff 

Department. The promotion to the GSD—giving him the requisite grade 

increase needed for promotion to the CMC—all but guaranteed his later 

promotion to commander of his service in 2012.

According to several official and unofficial biographical sources, Wei 

was born in Liaocheng, Shandong Province. He reportedly has served in 

a variety of command posts associated with China’s nuclear forces. For 

example, he may have risen through the 54th Base located near Luoyang, 

serving as COS from 2001 to 2002. Prior to that, he served in an unidentified brigade as COS then as its commander between 1990 and 1994. He 

then led the 53rd base near Kunming until 2004.29 In 2004, he was named 

to the leadership of the Second Artillery headquarters as a deputy COS 

before taking the COS post in 2006. Wei was promoted to the rank of 

major general in 2004, lieutenant general in 2008, and general after joining 

the CMC in 2012.30 During several periods of his career, he took time to 

pursue educational and training opportunities. For example, he attended 

the Second Artillery Command Academy from 1982 to 1984 and NDU in 

2006 and in 1997–1999 for full-time study.31

Like Xu Qiliang and the air force, Wei has served at the forefront 

of the Rocket Force’s growing representation across the PLA, taking on 

responsibilities never previously available to officers from his service. As 

the youngest deputy among the GSD leadership, Wei spent substantial 

time supporting China’s military-to-military relations with other nations. 

From late 2010 until the fall of 2012, he was involved in extensive foreign 

engagement both at home and abroad including supporting CMC Vice 

Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, as well as then-defense minister 

Liang Guanglie. In fall 2011, Wei joined Guo on a trip to Cuba, Colombia, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

568

and Peru and traveled with Xu to Mongolia in May 2012.32 In June 2011, 

Wei joined Liang as a “key member” of the PLA delegation to the Shangri-la 

Dialogue in Singapore.33

It is unclear how well Xi Jinping knew Wei before 2012, though Xi’s 

first promotion as CMC chairman was promoting Wei to general. Under 

Xi, Wei and fellow Rocket Force officers Zhang Shengmin and Gao Jin have 

risen to unprecedented seniority in the PLA hierarchy. Heading two services and holding two of the six seats on the new CMC, the once backwater 

missile men have arrived.

The New Guard: Bridging the Past and Future 

Joint Staff Department Chief Li Zuocheng (born in 1953/CMC member 

since 2017). Perhaps more a late riser than a newcomer, Li was promoted 

to chief of the Joint Staff Department in late August 2017, replacing Fang 

Fenghui. He rose to prominence in 1979 as the company commander who 

successfully led an offensive again Vietnamese forces during a month-long 

battle along the border. Li sustained multiple injuries and was later awarded 

the honorific title of “Combat Hero” by the CMC for his bravery.34 The 

distinction apparently also earned him a seat on the dais as part of the 12th

Party Congress presidium at age 29 in 1982.35

Li made major general in 1997 but saw little movement with his career 

until 2008, when he was transferred out of the Guangzhou MR after four 

decades to become a deputy commander of the Chengdu MR. In 2009, he 

was promoted to lieutenant general, appearing to benefit from the support 

of then-CMC Chairman Hu Jintao and top military leaders, even though 

he did not make the cut for selection to the Central Committee. However, 

Li has seen his career take off during Xi’s tenure.36

Born in Meicheng, Hunan Province, Li received an undergraduate 

degree in Marxist theory and graduate degree from NDU later in his career. 

During the fight that made him famous in 1979, he reportedly captured four 

enemy personnel along with enemy supplies. Li rose through the 41st GA 

in Guangxi in the Guangzhou MR and was named the unit’s commander 
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569

in 1998. From 2002 to 2008, he served as a deputy COS of the Guangzhou 

MR before his transfer to the Chengdu MR.After his combat exploits, he 

developed a reputation as a skilled administrator who successfully oversaw 

several disaster relief efforts, such as responding to massive flooding in 

Guangxi in 1994 and along the Yangtze River in 1998.37

After 5 years as a deputy commander, Li was promoted to Chengdu 

MR commander in July 2013 in the first notable shuffle of senior military 

personnel under Xi. Along with Li, 31st GA veteran Wang Ning was named 

a GSD deputy chief and Song Puxuan was appointed NDU commandant. 

None of these officers were members of the Central Committee, suggesting 

Xi was already seeking to advance the careers of officers outside established 

PLA leadership circles.38 Li’s career also appears to have risen in parallel 

with Eastern Theater Commander Liu Yuejun. Both officers come from 

Guangxi and fought in the Sino-Vietnamese war, then served together in 

the 41st GA.39 

Until his promotion to the high command, Li’s biggest achievement—and a signal that Xi viewed him as having potential for greater 

things—was his appointment as the inaugural commander of the new 

PLA Army headquarters, established after top-level organizational 

reforms were announced in December 2015. This followed his promotion 

to general earlier that summer.40

It is clear that Xi and Chinese leaders value the symbolism of Li’s war 

hero status and his reputation as an experienced veteran who has seen the 

reality of combat. At the same time, Li brings to his new role a plethora of 

more practical experiences from his decades commanding units in China’s 

rural southern and western regions. His tenure in Chengdu from 2008 to 

2015 gave him a leading role in disaster relief campaigns and managing 

ethnic unrest. He almost certainly played a key part in the response to the 

uprisings in Tibet in 2009 and the Sichuan earthquake in 2010.41 According 

to Xinhua and local news reports, Li also helped facilitate the Chengdu 

MR’s involvement in the 2010 Mission Action mobility exercise where 

units crossed through multiple MRs on a deployment that extended 2,000 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

570

kilometers.42 Li has also authored works on civil-military integration, an 

important element in Xi’s military strategy.43

Li probably also would have had some association with former CMC 

member and Political Work Department head Zhang Yang (who committed 

suicide in November 2017 while under investigation for corruption), as they 

both spent decades in the Guangzhou MR. This speaks to the difficulty of 

understanding why some officers have been targeted even as their peers 

have risen.

Political Work Department Director Miao Hua (born 1955/CMC 

member since 2017). A clear Xi favorite among the next generation of 

military leaders, Miao is one of only two members of the new CMC who is 

eligible to serve another term on the military’s top body starting in 2022, 

if retirement norms hold. Miao is the first among an elite group of officers 

who earned their spurs toiling in the 31st GA in the Nanjing MR near Xiamen. Under Xi, with his close association to that area, Miao and others, 

like Wang Ning and new PLA Army Commander Han Weiguo, have seen 

their careers fast-tracked. Miao, born in Fuzhou, is a career political officer 

who spent almost his entire tenure in the Nanjing MR, including stints as 

the political department director of the 31st GA (1999–2005) and political 

commissar (PC) of the 12th GA.44 

In late 2010, Miao was transferred to the Lanzhou MR to serve as the 

director of the political department. The timing notably coincided with 

Xi’s appointment that fall to the CMC. In mid-2012, Miao was promoted to 

a deputy PC of the Lanzhou MR and secretary of its discipline inspection 

commission. In July 2012, he was made the MR’s PC. Considering that the 

Lanzhou MR was long seen as Guo Boxiong’s powerbase, Miao may have 

had a role in supporting the investigation against Guo and removing remnants of his influence in the region. Miao was made major general in 2001 

and then lieutenant general in 2012. He was a member of the larger Central 

Discipline Inspection Commission body overseen by Wang Qishan from 

2012 to 2017. He has a bachelor’s degree in project management from the 

National University of Defense Technology.45
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571

Miao was among the dozens of senior PLA leaders who in April 2014 

published articles in the same paper pledging loyalty to Xi.46 A political 

track officer from the ground forces, Miao was transferred in late 2014 to 

the PLA Navy to serve as its PC.47 The move appears similar to others like 

Wang Ning’s crossover to become the People’s Armed Police (PAP) commander, which may reflect Xi’s placement of trusted outsiders in service 

headquarters to monitor and clean up malfeasance and fix lingering issues 

with graft. Reflecting his candidacy for CMC elevation, Miao was promoted 

to the rank of admiral in mid-2015 alongside others who have benefited 

from Xi’s trust, including Li Zuocheng, Wang Ning, and Song Puxuan.48

Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary Zhang Shengmin (born 

1958/CMC member since 2017). Arguably the most surprising and impactful move in the unveiling of the new CMC and its membership was the 

elevation of the newly appointed head of the PLA’s Discipline Inspection 

Commission, Zhang Shengmin. Zhang is the youngest member of the high 

command and, alongside Miao, he is well-positioned to serve two terms 

through at least 2027. Hailing from Shaanxi Province like Xi and Zhang 

Youxia, his 42 years in the PLA represent the shortest tenure among his 

CMC peers.

As with his Rocket Force counterpart Wei Fenghe, Zhang’s career 

details are shrouded in mystery. According to an unofficial biography 

from Phoenix News and other reports, Zhang got his start in the Lanzhou 

MR before taking a staff officer post in the then–General Political Department’s General Office. Starting in 2004, in just a decade, he served in senior 

political posts at four separate missile bases (Bases 55, 53, 56, and 54) across 

China. During one of those years, Zhang served as the PC of the Rocket 

Force Command College. By late 2014, Zhang was leading the political 

department of the then–Second Artillery Force headquarters.49

Despite his diverse career spanning multiple bases and MRs, in recent 

years no other officer has benefited more from the top-level changes 

necessitated by the reform effort than Zhang. His positioning as a rising 

star probably helped beforehand from major shuffles in a number of top 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

572

positions in the Second Artillery in 2014 and 2015, possibly spurred by 

corruption concerns and moves to remove the lingering influence of Xu 

Caihou and Guo Boxiong.50 The late 2014 shuffle appeared to be focused on 

the navy, Second Artillery, PAP, senior PLA academies, and the Beijing MR. 

The personnel overhaul represented the first time that all senior officers 

at the MR-leader level were born after 1950.51 The changes also included 

a number of transfers and swaps of posts that probably were conducted in 

place with an eye on 2017 and the revamped military leadership structure. 

For example, among those moving alongside Zhang were Gao Jin, Miao 

Hua, and Wang Ning—some of whom were on their second posting within 

a year. This was the first tangible sign that Xi and his top military deputies 

were intent on resetting the promotion lineup in the coming years.52

Zhang has served in several newly created posts since the PLA was 

reorganized in late 2015. In just 2 years, his status has soared as he was first 

named the inaugural PC of the new CMC Training and Administration 

Department in early 2016, then only a few months later in October was 

reassigned to replace Xi ally and anti-corruption champion Liu Yuan as the 

new CMC Logistic Support Department PC.53 The move coincided with 

a number of other top-level changes in the navy and among the political 

officer corps. In March 2017, not even a year later, Zhang was elevated 

again to become the PLA’s top graft-buster as the secretary of the Discipline 

Inspection Commission. This was part of another sweeping personnel 

overhaul that saw dozens of senior officers step down from their posts.54

The elevation of the PLA’s Discipline Inspection Commission to the 

CMC aligns its prestige to that of its parent organization, the Central 

Discipline Inspection Commission, whose leaders serve on the Politburo 

Standing Committee. It also tracks with the bolstering of the PLA’s inspection, judicial, and audits mechanisms since 2012, including giving them the 

authority and imprimatur of Xi and other CMC leaders. Zhang, with his 

CMC seat and sitting atop a department with responsibilities now viewed 

on par with operations and Party matters, should have a freer hand to institutionalize the military’s anti-corruption processes and use his 10 roving 
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573

inspection teams to ensure that PLA officers are following Xi’s exhortation 

to “conduct themselves well.”55 In January 2018, Xinhua announced that 

full-time inspection teams will start supervising Party members at and 

above the corps level, including organizations under the CMC, underscoring a continued emphasis on discipline through Xi’s second term.56

Outlook and Implications 

Xi’s work report at the opening of the 19th Party Congress called for the 

PLA to perfect its new post-reform joint command system in the face of 

“profound changes” in China’s security environment. This may have caused 

leaders to opt for modest continuity in the midst of historic organizational 

change for the military. Despite rumors to the contrary before the congress, 

the leadership stuck with its decade-long practice of maintaining two uniformed vice chairman posts and did not appoint a potential successor to 

Xi as a civilian vice chairman.57 Similar to the civilian transition, the final 

results of the CMC turnover appear to reflect a balanced lineup of relatively 

clean, competent, and loyal officers with diverse career experiences. The age 

67 norm was also upheld on the military side, with older generals such as 

Fan Changlong stepping down and Vice Chairmen Xu Qiliang and Zhang 

Youxia, both 67, selected to serve on the Politburo through 2022.

Retaining a mix of seasoned veterans while injecting new blood into 

the CMC is not unusual, yet it suggests Xi wants to maintain momentum 

on military reforms as he cultivates a diverse generation of talented leaders. 

Xi’s friendship and decades-long familiarity with the two vice chairmen also 

affords him trusted, capable officers he can rely on during a pivotal time for 

China’s rise—a major contrast to the adverse circumstances Hu Jintao faced 

when dealing with Jiang Zemin’s appointees in the Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou era.58 In addition to spending years together in China’s coastal provinces 

and overlapping with Xi on the CMC since 2010, Xu Qiliang was an early, 

vocal proponent of the military’s reform efforts even before serving as Xi’s 

top deputy on the PLA reform leading group. Zhang Youxia in his former 

role embraced calls for improved civil-military integration and technological 
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574

development, two of Xi’s top priorities for the coming years outlined in his 

marathon speech during the congress. Furthermore, the combat experiences 

of Zhang and Li Zuocheng, albeit dated, will prove valuable in setting an 

example if hot spots flare up on China’s periphery during their tenures.

Wei Fenghe, who was named defense minister in March 2018, is no 

stranger to foreign engagement and is well-postured to serve as the face of 

China’s military diplomacy abroad. In addition, Li Zuocheng’s selection 

represents a refreshing change compared to the old-school officers formerly 

responsible for PLA operations. His relative youth and combat experience, 

combined with his recent tenure as the first army service chief, prepare him 

to address readiness issues precipitated by reform implementation. In the 

next few years, he should be able to apply these lessons learned by translating Xi’s guidance to the PLA and prepare to “fight and win.”

Finally, Miao Hua’s transfer from navy headquarters to run political 

affairs and Zhang Shengmin’s elevation to oversee PLA discipline strongly 

imply the anti-corruption campaign has become further institutionalized 

at the highest levels of the military and is likely to become ingrained for 

years to come. The success of Miao and Zhang in their respective posts 

will be vital if Xi hopes to complete a once-in-a-generation cultural shift 

in the PLA.

The new lineup, however, still leaves observers with some important 

questions. For example, it remains to be seen how the absence of service 

chiefs on the CMC will affect operational decisionmaking, particularly 

during a crisis. It is also unclear how and from whom Xi intends to receive 

service-specific advice during CMC gatherings or through which venues 

the service chiefs will advocate for service priorities in acquisitions. However, the new leaders previously occupied top positions in the services, 

which probably made this change more palatable. Relatedly, it is unclear 

how a CMC that appears to be more joint, at least symbolically, will practically improve the military’s ability to conduct joint operations in the 

timeline Beijing has unveiled. In reality, this transition probably will take 

several years, if not decades.
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575

We also do not know what, if any, political concessions or compromises 

were hammered out in the deliberations about the CMC. From a management perspective, the choice to have a smaller CMC membership overseeing 

an expanded CMC organization with 15 disparate organs seems counterintuitive. The leaders probably will have to rely on the CMC General Office 

more than ever if they hope to coordinate across a sprawling bureaucracy, 

arbitrate disputes over missions and resources, and implement troop cuts 

in the coming years. To this end, Xi has named Zhong Shaojun, a civilian 

and trusted advisor who has worked closely with Xi for more than a decade, 

to lead the General Office. In 2012, when Xi became CMC chairman, he 

picked Zhong to lead his personal office and gave him the rank of senior 

colonel.59 Previous Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao also kept 

an eye on the PLA by appointing confidantes to the General Office, but the 

large-scale changes afoot in the military arguably make Zhong’s job more 

complicated than it was for his predecessors.

The removal of Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang unveiled the first investigations during Xi’s tenure into members of the CMC and sends a strong 

message to younger leaders about a new level of scrutiny in promotions and 

new expectations for officers at all echelons. The generals’ downfall affected 

the final outcome, as both were eligible to remain on the CMC.60 In addition, 

the dramatic revelations about Zhang’s suicide and Fang’s investigation 

punctuated an overhaul of military representatives in the Central Committee to include new and younger officers. In fact, according to Cheng Li of the 

Brookings Institution, the congress may have been the “largest-ever turnover 

of military elite in the history of the PRC.”61 This generational change probably affected associates of Zhang, Fang, and the old guard, and signals that 

the anti-corruption campaign in the PLA is far from over.

If Xi’s exhortations to the PLA during the 19th Party Congress are any 

indication, the new military leadership has a challenging agenda to accomplish. With a new leadership team in place, Beijing is well-poised to address 

its goals for modernizing and reforming the PLA to address future security 

challenges. The congress produced one of the smallest leadership lineups in 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

576

the PLA’s history and enshrined the CMC Chairman Responsibility System 

into the Party’s constitution, reflecting the culmination of Xi’s efforts to 

centralize the CMC’s authority—and his own—over the entirety of the 

armed forces. This should make Xi even better poised to push his priorities for the PLA than at the start of his tenure. What remains to be seen is 

what Xi will do with that added authority over an increasingly capable and 

global military. However, there is little doubt Xi and his generals emerged 

in a stronger position to steer the PLA toward fulfilling its part in the “great 

rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation.

Notes 

1 “Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping Attend Enlarged Meeting of Central Military Commission, Deliver Important Speeches” [胡锦涛习近平出席中央军委扩大会议并

发表重要讲话], Xinhua [新华], November 17, 2012, available at <http://politics.

people.com.cn/n/2012/1117/c1024-19611030-1.html>.

2 Lim Yan Liang, “Xi’s Reforms Have Reshaped, Modernized Military,” Straits 

Times (Singapore), October 12, 2017, available at <www.straitstimes.com/asia/

xis-reforms-have-reshaped-modernised-military>.

3 Zhang Hui, “Party Commands the Gun: Xi,” Global Times (Beijing), November 3, 2014, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/889686.shtml>; “The Work 

System Must Be Made Stricter and More Realistic—Discussion Three on Putting 

Great Efforts into Strengthening the Building of the Various Levels of Party Committee Leading Groups” [工作制度要进一步严起来实起来——三谈大力加强各

级党委班子建设], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 28, 2015, available at <www.81.

cn/jmywyl/2015-01/28/content_6325633.htm>.

4 Xiang Bo, ed., “Chinese Military Takes Solid Steps Toward Strong Army over 

5 Years: Xi,” Xinhua, July 31, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-

08/01/c_136490561.htm>.

5 A concept first introduced under Jiang Zemin.

6 Minnie Chan, “China Has the World’s Biggest Military Force, Now Xi Jinping Wants It to Be the Best,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 19, 

2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2115968/

xi-orders-massive-military-shake-meet-threats-worlds>.

7 Zhang committed suicide in November 2017, and it was announced in 

January 2018 that Fang is under investigation for “giving and taking bribes.” Chris 
The New PLA Leadership

577

Buckley, “Chinese General under Investigation, Joining a Line of Fallen Commanders,” New York Times, January 9, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/

world/asia/china-general-corruption.html>.

8 Rowan Callick, “PLA Purged in Roll Call for Party Congress,” The Australian, September 29, 2017, available at <www.theaustralian.com.au/news/

world/pla-purged-in-roll-call-for-chinese-communist-party-congress/news-story/7232f77e3fc39a3fde4f4990ce16963d>.

9 “Xi Calls for Building a Strong Army,” Xinhua, October 26, 2017, available 

at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/26/c_136708142.htm>.

10 David Shambaugh, “The Pinnacle of the Pyramid: The Central Military 

Commission,” in The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference v. 1.0, ed. 

James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2002), 95–121.

11 Phillip C. Saunders, “Alternative Models for the Central Military Commission,” China Brief 17, no. 3 (October 20, 2017), 18–22.

12 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th CPC National Congress,” 

Xinhua, November 3, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>; Liu Zhen, “Xi Jinping Shakes Up China’s 

Military Leadership . . . What Changes at the Top Mean for World’s Biggest Armed 

Forces,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 26, 2017, available at 

<www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2116856/what-changestop-mean-chinas-military>; “Xi Calls for Building a Strong Army.”

13 “Xu Qiliang—Member of the Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, October 25, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2017-10/25/c_136705645.htm>.

14 Ibid.

15 Chin Chien-Li [今千里], “One of the Key People in Chinese Communist 

Combat Operations against Taiwan: Biography of Xu Qiliang” [中共副总参谋长

许其亮中将评传], Frontline [前哨], vol. 172 (June 1, 2005), 71–75.

16 Minnie Chan, “General Xu Qiliang: How a Chinese Air Force Top Gun Shot 

to the Top of the Military,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 25, 

2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2116939/

general-xu-qiliang-how-chinese-air-force-top-gun-shot>.

17 Ibid.; Peter Foster, “Space Arms Race Inevitable Says Chinese Commander,” 

The Telegraph, November 2, 2009, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/worldnews/asia/china/6486030/Space-arms-race-inevitable-says-Chinesecommander.html>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

578

18 “The CMC’s 10 Inspection Groups to Strengthen Oversight Duties,” Ta 

Kung Pao [大公报], July 28, 2017; Tan Xiaolin and Yin Hang [谭晓林, 尹航], “Xu 

Qiliang Addresses PLA Meeting on Army Inspection Organs” [许其亮在军队巡视

机构成立暨巡视干部培训会议上强调], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 19, 2013.

19 “Report: Xi Jinping Presides over the First Meeting of the CMC Leading 

Group for Deepening Defense and Military Reforms” [习近平主持召开中央军委深

化国防和军队改革领导小组第一次全体会议强调], Xinhua [新华], March 18, 2014; 

Cao Zhi and Li Xuanliang [曹智, 李宣良], “Military Affairs Column: At a Meeting 

on the Work to Reform the Size, Structure, and Organization of the Armed Forces 

Held by the Central Military Commission” [中央军委军队规模结构和力量编成

改革工作会议], Xinhua [新华], December 3, 2016.

20 “Zhang Youxia—Member of the Political Bureau of CPC Central 

Committee,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2017-10/25/c_136705654.htm>.

21 Minnie Chan, “General Zhang Youxia: Xi Jinping’s ‘Sworn Brother’ Now 

His Deputy on China’s Top Military Body,” South China Morning Post (Hong 

Kong), October 25, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2116936/general-zhang-youxia-xi-jinpings-sworn-brother-now-his>.

22 “Zhang Youxia.”

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Chan, “General Zhang Youxia.”

26 Ibid.

27 Jia Xiping, Xi Qixin, and Qiu Wenwei, “Generals Learn about High Technology—Sidelines on First All-Army High-Tech Knowledge Training Class for 

High-Ranking Cadres,” Xinhua [新华], June 14, 1998.

28 Based on precedent, Wei almost certainly will replace Chang Wanquan as 

minister of national defense and state councilor at the National People’s Congress’s 

next session in spring 2018.

29 “Wei Fenghe” [魏凤和], Baidu [百度], available at <https://baike.baidu.

com/link?url=CxbqTHamQvrlVYp4hyOLN8iDcR8YFlOdHoFRFMOOV8CaQC4p5-E8oi3adY6FMKN6FHSYBhTGvNyhPqmEniJA0sAgSxffr3sbwssELNVSZj2hjH5NN2cfPCIwgrXtZag7>.

30 “Second Artillery Chief of Staff Wei Fenghe Promoted to PLA Deputy 

Chief of General Staff” [二炮原参谋长魏凤和升任解放军副总参谋长], Sina.com, 

January 15, 2011, available at <http://dailynews.sina.com/gb/chn/chnpolitics/
The New PLA Leadership

579

sinacn/20110115/16192163540.html>; “Wei Fenghe,” China Vitae, available at 

<http://chinavitae.com/biography/weifenghe>.

31 Wei Fenghe biography [魏凤和简历], March 19, 2018, available at <http://

www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/19/c_1122560874.htm>; “Wei 

Fenghe”; Minnie Chan, “‘Reticent’ General Wei Fenghe Could Be China’s New 

Defense Minister, Sources Say,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 24, 2018, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2134555/reticent-general-rockets-ranks-central-military>; Mark Stokes and 

Russel Hsiao, “China’s Second Artillery Leadership,” The Diplomat, October 1, 2011, 

available at <https://thediplomat.com/2011/10/chinas-second-artillery-leadership/>.

32 “Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong 

Leaves Beijing on Official Goodwill Visit to Cuba, Colombia, Peru,” PLA Daily [解

放军报], October 25, 2011; “Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairman 

Xu Caihou Leaves Beijing on Official Goodwill Visit to Mongolia,” PLA Daily [解

放军报], May 10, 2012.

33 “Chinese DM to Attend Shangri-La Dialogue to Boost Regional Security 

Cooperation,” Xinhua, June 3, 2011, available at <www.china-embassy.org/eng/

gdxw/t828180.htm>.

34 Zhao Lei, “PLA Promotes Three Officers to Top Posts,” China Daily (Beijing), September 8, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2017-09/08/

content_31716930.htm>.

35 Chen Baocheng [陈宝成], “Li Zuocheng Promoted to Chengdu Military 

Region Commander” [李作成升任成都军区司令员], Caixin [财新], August 6, 2013, 

available at <http://china.caixin.com/2013-08-06/100565903.html>.

36 “Xi Jinping Molds Military Brass to His Image,” Nikkei Asian Review, 

September 2, 2017, available at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Xi-Jinping-molds-military-brass-to-his-advantage>.

37 Yu Dong, Pan Mengqi, and Zhao Liangmei [于冬, 潘梦琪, 赵良美], “Officers Born in the 1950s Take Over the Leadership of All Military Regions” [大军

区正职 “50后” 接棒], Southern Weekend [南方周末], August 9, 2013, available at 

<http://www.360doc.com/content/13/0809/10/1427567_305791174.shtml>; “Hong 

Kong Report: Li Zuocheng in Charge of Chengdu Military Region” [港报: 李作成

掌成都军区 七大军区高层调整完成] China News Service [中国新闻网], July 10, 

2013, available at <http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/07-10/5023939.shtml>; 

“Li Zuocheng Named Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Chief” 

[李作成任军委联合参谋部参谋长], Southern Metropolis Daily (Shenzhen) [南方都
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

580

市报(深圳)], August 27, 2018, available at <http://news.163.com/17/0827/00/CSQAJVSR000187VE.html>; Chen, “Li Zuocheng Promoted to Chengdu Military Region 

Commander”; “Li Zuocheng,” Phoenix News Media, August 27, 2013, available at 

<http://renwuku.news.ifeng.com/index/detail/231/lizuocheng>; “Li Zuocheng,” 

China Vitae, available at <http://chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Zuocheng/full>.

38 Ma Haoliang [馬浩亮], “Intensive Reshuffle of 20 High-Ranking Military 

Officers” [20位高級將領密集履新], Ta Kung Pao [大公报], August 2, 2013; Choi 

Chi-Yuk, “War Hero Li Zuocheng Appointed to Top PLA Post,” South China 

Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 11, 2013, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/

article/1279850/war-hero-li-zuocheng-appointed-top-pla-post>.

39 Choi, “War Hero Li Zuocheng.”

40 Zhao, “PLA Promotes Three Officers to Top Posts.”

41 Minnie Chan, “Leaner Lineup Unveiled at Top of Military Machine,” South 

China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 25, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/

news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2117004/xi-jinping-rolls-out-leaner-topline-chinas-military>.

42 Liu Yonghua and Zhu Yingtao [刘永华, 朱映涛], “Military Units and Supplementary Units of the Chengdu Military Region Participating in the ‘Mission 

Action 2010’ Conduct Three-Dimensional Long-Distance Delivery” [使命行动

2010 成都军区参演部队及配属分队向演习地域展开远程立体投送], Xinhua [新

华], October 15, 2010; Zao Meihua [遭美华] et al., “Whole Division Successfully 

Completed Forced Crossing of the Yellow River with All Operation Elements” [某

师整建制全要素成功强度黄河], Zhanqi Bao [战旗报], October 20, 2010.

43 Li Zuocheng [李作成], “Several Important Thoughts on Pushing Forward 

the Integration of People’s Air Defense Building and Socioeconomic Development Systems” [推进人民防空建设融入经济社会发展体系的几点思考], National 

Defense Journal [国防杂志], July 2012, 4–7.

44 Ma Haoliang [馬浩亮], “Five Admirals Assume New Offices at the PLA Navy 

Headquarters” [海軍總部五將軍履新], Ta Kung Pao [大公报], December 28, 2014; 

“Miao Hua,” Phoenix News Media, December 25, 2014, available at <https://web.

archive.org/web/20150907010024/http://renwuku.news.ifeng.com/index/detail/972/

miaohua>; “Miao Hua,” China Vitae, available at <www.chinavitae/biography/

miaohua>; “Who Is Miao Hua, China’s Youngest General?” China News Service [中

国新闻社], August 4, 2015, available at <http://news.china.com/jiedu/20150804/>. 

45 “Miao Hua”; “After Reform, the Positions of the Four Members of the 

Central Military Commission Were Adjusted One by One; Miao Hua Succeeded 
The New PLA Leadership

581

Zhang Yang as Director of the Political Work Department” [军改后中央军委四名

委员职务先后调整,苗华接替张阳出任政治工作部主任], Shanghai Observer [上

观新闻], September 7, 2017, available at <www.jfdaily.com/news/detail?id=64325>; 

“Who Is Miao Hua, China’s Youngest General?”

46 “PLA Senior Generals Reaffirm Support for Xi,” PLA Daily [解放军

报], April 18, 2014, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/18/

content_17446318.htm>.

47 “Miao Hua.”

48 “China Promotes 10 Officers to General,” Xinhua, July 31, 2015, available 

at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/31/c_134469023.htm>.

49 “Detailed Personnel Information,” Phoenix Network [凤凰网], March 1, 

2016, available at <http://renwuku.news.ifeng.com/index/detail/1077/zhangshengmin>; “Comrade Zhang Shengmin’s Biography” [张升民同志简历], China Central 

Commission for Discipline Inspection [中国中央纪律检查委员会], November 29, 

2017, available at <www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/ldjg/zsm/201711/t20171129_113916.

html>; Choi Chi-yuk, “China Names New Political Commissar of PLA Logistics Department,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 19, 2016, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2028999/china-names-new-political-commissar-pla-logistic>.

50 “Trusted Followers of Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong Are Removed from Leading Posts in the Capital Region and in the Second Artillery in the Reshuffles on 

an Unprecedented Scale” [京畿二炮将领空前大洗牌徐才厚郭伯雄亲信遭踢走], 

Ming Pao [明报], January 3, 2015; Mao Haoliang [马浩亮], “Six Generals of Second 

Artillery Corps Assume New Posts, Political Work Posts Reshuffled” [而炮六将履

新政工岗位易人], Ta Kung Pao [大公报], January 4, 2015, available at <http://news.

takungpao.com/paper/q/2015/0104/2876888_print.html>.

51 Ge Chong [葛冲], “Overseas Returnee Bai Jianjun Appointed Beijing MR 

Deputy Commander: Major Reshuffle of PLA Generals Involves General Staff 

Organs, Navy, and Academy of Military Science” [“海归” 白建军任北京军区副司

令解放军将领大调整涉总部机关海军军科院等], Wen Wei Po [文汇报], January 

7, 2015, available at <http://paper.wenweipo.com/2015/01/07/CH1501070006.htm>.

52 Ao Lei [敖雷], “Changes Come to Nearly 50 Military Region Deputy Commander Grade Positions” [近50副大軍區崗位易將], Hong Kong Commercial Daily

[香港商报], January 16, 2015, available at <www.hkcd.com/content/2015-01/16/

content_903117.html>; Suburo Tanaka, “Large-Scale Reshuffling of High-Ranking 

PLA Officers, Promotions of Young Officers All Stemming from Rooting Out of 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

582

Corrupt Officers, as Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping Strives 

to Build a ‘Fighting Army,’” Gunji Kenkyu, June 2015, 182–195.

53 Suburo Tanaka, “Establishment of PLAA Headquarters, Transformation 

from Military Regions to Theater Commands, Second Artillery Upgraded to a 

‘Service,’ Formation of ‘Strategic Support Force,’” Gunji Kenkyu, May 2016, 66–77; 

Choi, “China Names New Political Commissar of PLA Logistics Department.”

54 Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Appoints New Man to Tackle PLA Corruption,” 

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 2, 2017, available at <www.scmp.

com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2075243/china-replaces-top-generalcharge-tackling-military>.

55 “Stronger Discipline Inspection System of the PLA” [軍紀委十大紀檢組

加強監督], Ta Kung Pao [大公报], July 29, 2017; Cao Siqi, “Xi Stresses Combat 

Capabilities, Party Building in Military,” Global Times (Beijing), October 18, 2017, 

available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1070900.shtml>.

56 “China’s Armed Forces to Set Up Full-Time Inspection Teams,” Xinhua, January 17, 2018, available at <http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0117/c90000-9316193.html>.

57 Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Clears Decks for Top-Level Changes to China’s 

Military,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 3, 2017, available at 

<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113054/xi-jinpingclears-decks-top-level-changes-chinas>.

58 Chan, “General Zhang Youxia.”

59 Choi Chi-yuk, “Young Guns Including Xi Jinping’s Top Military Aide 

Expected to Move Up the Ranks,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 13, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2110742/young-guns-including-xi-jinpings-top-military-aide>.

60 Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Rolls Out Leaner Top Line-Up for China’s Military Machine,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 26, 2017, available 

at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2117004/xi-jinpingrolls-out-leaner-top-line-chinas-military>.

61 Cheng Li, “Why China’s Military Facelift Ahead of the Party Congress 

Could Be a Sign of Bigger Changes,” Brookings Institution blog, October 10, 

2017, available at <www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/10/

why-chinas-military-facelift-ahead-of-the-party-congress-could-be-a-sign-ofbigger-changes/>.
PART V

INTEGRATING WITH SOCIETY

585

KEEPING UP WITH THE JUNDUI

Reforming the Chinese Defense Acquisition, Technology, 

and Industrial System

By Tai Ming Cheung

Xi Jinping has established strong control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since becoming its commander in chief and the country’s paramount leader in 2012. He has used this authority 

to press ahead with an ambitious and bone-crunching reform agenda to 

make the defense establishment more politically loyal, less corrupt, and 

better able to fight and win future wars.

One area of particular attention for Xi is the defense acquisition, technology, and industrial (DATI) system, which covers the defense technology 

and industrial apparatus and PLA agencies overseeing acquisition matters. 

The central goal of these reforms is to transform the DATI system from a 

predominantly absorptive development model toward a system better able 

to engage in original higher end innovation. Among the key requirements 

necessary for this upgrading are building a more advanced R&D base, 

developing an operating culture that is more risk-tolerant, greater market 

competition, and closer integration between the civilian and military segments of the national economy. This chapter examines the reforms that are 

currently taking place within the Chinese DATI system and what can be 

expected in the near-, medium-, and long-term future.

CHAPTER 15
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

586

The State of the Chinese Defense Industry in the Mid-2010s 

The Chinese defense industry in the mid-2010s is enjoying a golden age 

of record revenues and profits. Driven by leadership concerns of mounting challenges to the country’s external security environment and rapid 

advances in the global technological order, investment into research, development, and acquisition has soared, greater efforts are being made to 

acquire and absorb foreign technologies, and the existing defense innovation system is being remade.

This has resulted in significant improvements in technological, economic, and industrial performance. The country’s 10 major state-owned 

defense corporate groups, which together control the defense industry’s six 

sectors, have enjoyed nearly double-digit annual growth in revenues and 

profits over the past decade. Between 2004 and 2015, total profits of the 

big 10 increased from Rmb 15 billion to Rmb 120 billion (see figure 1). The 

ordnance, space, electronics, and aviation industries were the most profitable sectors, while the shipbuilding industry has struggled because of a 

severe global downturn. While the robust expansion of the defense industry 

is a bright spot amid slowing growth in the rest of the Chinese economy, 

its future prospects depend on continuing defense budget increases that 

now appear to be slowing. The rate of increase for the 2016 defense budget 

was only 7.6 percent, which may mark the end of the double-digit budget 

increases that began in the early 1990s.1

However, the official defense budget represents only one source of 

funding for the defense industry, which has access to funding and resources 

from a diversified array of sources. Funding for defense-related research 

and development, for example, comes primarily from other areas of the 

central government budget, most notably those allocated to the State 

Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 

(SASTIND), which is not included in the official defense budget. Moreover, 

around half of the defense industry’s revenue and profits comes from civilian business, and in some sectors like ordnance and nuclear this could be as 

high as 80 to 90 percent.2

 In addition, since 2013, the defense industry has 
Keeping Up with the Jundui

587

been allowed to seek investment funding from capital markets that provide 

access to large pools of financial resources, including shareholder funds, 

bank loans, and bonds, which will be discussed later in this chapter. These 

different sources will allow the defense industry to mitigate the impact of 

slowing official defense budget increases.

The aviation sector, for example, is simultaneously engaged in the 

development or production of more than half a dozen combat and transport aircraft. The shipbuilding industry has at least four active nuclear 

and conventional submarine programs along with research, development, 

and construction of aircraft carriers, destroyers, and numerous other surface warships. The PLA Navy is estimated to have laid down, launched, or 

Sources: Information obtained from annual reporting of the 10 defense corporations. See also China 

Civil-Military Integration Development Report 2015 [中国军民融合发展报告2015] (Beijing: National 

Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2015), 61.

Figure 1. Financial Performance of the Chinese Defense Industry, 2004–2015
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

588

commissioned more than 60 naval ships and smaller craft in 2014 alone, 

with the same number expected in 2015.3

An important new trend is also becoming apparent in the performance of the shipbuilding industry. Until the mid-2000s, Chinese naval 

shipyards relied heavily on the importation of foreign, primarily Russian, technology transfers for their industrial development. As Chinese 

shipbuilders absorbed these transfers, they have been able to substantially reduce their foreign reliance in the past decade. The U.S. Office 

of Naval Intelligence (ONI) notes that since the beginning of the 2010s, 

the PLA Navy’s “surface production shifted to platforms using wholly 

Chinese designs and that were primarily equipped with Chinese weapons and sensors (though some engineering components and subsystems 

remain imported or license produced in country).”4

 These include the 

Jiangkai-class (Type 054A) frigate series, Luyang-class (Type 052B/C/D) 

destroyer series, and the upcoming new cruiser (Type 055) class, which 

ONI considers to be “comparable in many respects to the most modern 

Western warships.”5

The space and missile industry has also been among the leaders in 

promoting technological self-reliance in the defense industry. Chinese 

authorities were especially keen to signal the industry’s potency in offensive 

missile capabilities at a military parade in September 2015 to celebrate the 

70th anniversary of the end of World War II, with more than half a dozen 

short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on 

display. These included the DF-15B short-range ballistic missile, DF-21D 

and improved DF-26 medium-range antiship ballistic missiles, and DF-5B 

and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The accelerating pace of output of the Chinese defense economy 

is taking place at the same time as it is confronted with deep-seated 

structural problems. The principal constraints and weaknesses that the 

Chinese defense economy faces stem from its historical foundations and 

the uncertain efforts to overcome the corrosive legacy of its difficult past. 

The institutional and normative foundations and workings of the Chinese 
Keeping Up with the Jundui

589

defense industry were copied from the former Soviet Union’s command 

defense economy and continue to exert a powerful influence.

The PLA and defense industrial regulatory authorities are seeking to 

replace this outdated top-down administrative management model with 

a more competitive and indirect regulatory regime, but there are strong 

vested interests that do not want to see any major changes.

High-Level Leadership Support 

High-level and sustained support and guidance from Chinese Communist Party, state, and military leadership elites have been essential 

in the defense industry’s transformation efforts. Leadership backing 

and intervention have been vital in addressing entrenched bureaucratic 

fragmentation, ensuring adequate resource allocations, and tackling 

chronic project management problems. Without high-level leadership 

engagement, much of the recent progress of the defense industry probably 

would not have happened.

Leadership involvement in the defense industry often occurs through 

small groups and special committees. The committed involvement of the 

country’s top leaders is especially critical, and the DATI system has been 

fortunate that Xi Jinping has taken a keen and active interest in defense 

science, technology, and innovation issues. Between November 2012 and 

October 2016, Xi took part in more than 30 publicly reported events related 

to PLA and DATI issues, which is considerably higher than his predecessors 

such as Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin (see figure 2). Activities that signal his 

interest on defense S&T issues include:

■	 Inspection of the Liaoning aircraft carrier and J-15 carrier fighter 

plant in Liaoning Province in September 2013: within his first year as 

Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, Xi made a high-profile visit to tour the Liaoning aircraft carrier in Dalian and look at the 

progress in the development of the J-15 fighter aircraft at Shenyang 

Aircraft Corporation. This was a clear demonstration of Xi’s keen 

interest in China’s naval airpower capabilities.
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■	 Tour of National University of Defense Technology in Changsha, 

Hunan, in November 2013: Xi has emphasized on his military visits 

that the defense science and technology (S&T) establishment’s duty 

is to serve the needs of warfighters. He noted during an inspection at 

the National University of Defense Technology, the military’s leading 

high-tech R&D establishment, that the work of defense scientists and 

engineers should be “closely linked with real combat and army service.”6

 This fits with Xi’s calls to the PLA to strengthen its preparations 

for “military struggle,” which means enhancing combat readiness.

■	 Convening a Politburo study session on military innovation: Xi chaired 

a study session of the full Politburo in August 2014 devoted to the examination of global trends in military innovation. Xi pointed out that a 

global revolution in military S&T affairs is currently taking place “at a 

Figure 2. Publicly Reported Visits to Military and Defense Science and 

Technology–Related Facilities by Xi Jinping, November 2012–October 2016
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speed so fast, in a scope so wide, at a level so deep, and with an impact so 

great that it has been rarely seen since the end of World War II.”7 Xi stated 

this represented both a challenge and opportunity that required China’s 

defense establishment “to vigorously promote military innovation.”

■	 Keynote speech at the All-Army Armament Conference in Beijing in 

December 2014: With the leaderships of the PLA’s armament apparatus and defense industry in attendance, Xi affirmed the “historical 

achievement” in the PLA’s weapons development, and urged accelerating the pace of construction. He emphasized the importance of 

“unifying thinking” and “gathering consensus,” which may have been 

hints of policy differences over the Third Plenum reform issues.

Preparing for the Next Stage of Defense Industrial Advancement 

The Xi administration signaled its intention to carry out a major overhaul of 

the defense industry as part of an ambitious national program of economic 

and military reforms at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 

2013. A flurry of activity since then by defense industrial decisionmakers 

has produced new medium- and long-term defense industrial development 

strategies, plans, and institutional arrangements that collectively represent 

a potentially key turning point in the defense industry’s evolution from an 

innovation follower to becoming an original innovation leader.

The reform planning effort began in earnest in March 2014 when the 

CMC established a leading group on national defense and military reform. 

This group was headed by Xi Jinping and acted as the command headquarters for designing reform plans, coordinating work among different 

departments, and implementing policy.8

 The leading group conducted more 

than 800 forums and seminars involving 690 military units. After almost 

2 years of investigation, a reform plan titled the Proposal on Deepening 

Defense and Military General Reform Plan was approved at the leading 

group’s third meeting in July 2015. The plan was subsequently released 

at the CMC Working Conference on Reform in November 2015, which 

marked the formal start of the implementation of the most far-reaching 

structural reform of the PLA in its history.9
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While the reforms focused on the PLA’s central management, military 

regions, and services, they also had important implications for the armament management system, which plays a highly influential role in defense 

science, technology, and industrial matters. At the end of 2015, the PLA’s 

armament system underwent a far-reaching reorganization:10

■	 The PLA General Armament Department (GAD) was reorganized 

into the CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD) [zhuangbei fazhan bu, 装备发展部] and given responsibility for “centralized 

unified management” [jizhong tongguan, 集中统管] of the military 

armament system.11 One of the now-defunct GAD’s chief roles was to 

oversee the armament development of the ground forces. GAD units 

responsible for this function have been transferred to the newly created 

PLA Army headquarters.

■	 The GAD Science and Technology Committee was elevated to a commission-level rank reporting directly to the CMC and renamed as 

the CMC Science and Technology Committee (CSTC) [kexue jishu 

weiyuanhui, 科学技术委员会].

Although it will take some time before these reforms are fully implemented and can be adequately assessed, some initial speculative thoughts 

can be offered. First, the promotion of the CSTC from the GAD to the CMC 

demonstrates that Chinese military authorities, especially Xi, are serious 

about engaging in higher end science, technology, and integration (STI) 

activities and establishing a high-level coordinating mechanism through 

the CSTC to provide operational leadership and guidance. Lieutenant 

General Liu Guozhi, who was the GAD S&T Committee director, will lead 

the CSTC. He has spent much of his career engaged in high-tech R&D. Liu 

has a doctorate in physics from Tsinghua University, is a member of the 

Chinese Academy of Sciences, and has technical expertise in accelerator 

physics and high-power microwave technology.12

Second, the ability of the EDD to carry out its mandate of providing 

centralized management of the armament system looks to have a greater 

chance of success than the GAD, which was hamstrung by its institutional 
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bias toward the ground forces. The nature of the relationship between the 

EDD and the armament departments belonging to the service arms will be 

critical in determining how much jointness versus compartmentalization 

will be present in PLA armaments development. The authority and influence of the EDD initially benefited from the appointment of GAD Director 

General Zhang Youxia as its head. Zhang reportedly has close ties with Xi 

through princeling-related links and was subsequently promoted to be a 

CMC vice chairman in October 2017.13 The new EDD director is Lieutenant 

General Li Shangfu, who spent much of his career working in the space 

launch system before serving as a deputy director of the GAD and then as 

a deputy director of the Strategic Support Force.14

In parallel, the state defense industrial bureaucracy formulated new 

strategies and plans for a less ambitious but still significant adjustment to 

the defense industry as well as to chart its medium- and long-term transformation. One of these key plans is the 13th Defense Science, Technology, 

and Industry Five Year Plan (13th Defense S&T FYP). This plan was issued 

at the beginning of 2016 and sets out six key tasks through 2020:

■	 facilitating leapfrog development of weapons and military equipment

■	 enhancing innovation capabilities in turnkey areas

■	 improving overall quality and efficiency

■	 optimizing the structure of the defense industry and vigorously promoting civil-military integration (CMI)

■	 accelerating the export of armaments and military equipment supporting national economic and social construction 

■	 supporting national economic and social construction.15 

Compared to its predecessor, the 13th Defense S&T FYP has a stronger 

focus on the development of high-tech weaponry and civil-military integration. It also signals a significant shift in the direction of defense industry 

development from absorption and reinnovation to greater emphasis on 

original innovation. The 13th FYP also shows that China is seeking to build 

on the inroads it has been steadily making in the international arms market. 
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Chinese arms sales have almost doubled over the past 5 years, according to 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.16 China now supplies 

arms to 37 countries, with three-quarters of the exports to customers within 

the Asia-Pacific region, led by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.17

A longstanding Achilles’ heel of the Chinese defense industry being 

addressed by defense planners is a lack of higher end manufacturing capability. In 2015–2016, SASTIND put together the Defense S&T Industry 

Strong Basic Engineering Project 2025 that is aligned closely with the 

national-level Made in China 2025 Advanced Manufacturing Plan aimed at 

lifting the overall level of the country’s industrial equipment manufacturing 

base and curtailing excessive dependence on foreign core technology and 

products. The defense industry features prominently in the Made in China 

2025 plan, especially in the space and aviation sectors.18

In a further signal of Chinese leaders’ efforts to chart a long-term 

course for the country’s defense S&T development, SASTIND announced 

in June 2015 that it was establishing a defense S&T Development Strategy 

Committee to conduct research and provide policy input that would help 

the country’s leadership in its decisionmaking on long-term defense R&D 

over the next 20 to 30 years. The key goals of this committee are to implement the Communist Party leadership’s strategic decisions and plans; focus 

on strategic, comprehensive, and forward-looking studies; and provide 

policy recommendations and consultation on defense S&T development 

and innovation.

This Development Strategy Committee is headed by the SASTIND 

director and its membership features many prominent figures in the 

Chinese national and defense scientific community, including 10 academicians from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy 

of Engineering.19 In addition, there are officials from a range of other 

governmental agencies such as the National Development and Reform 

Commission, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology, 

Ministry of Finance, and PLA armament units. 
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Targeting Breakthroughs in Core Technological Capabilities 

Another trend in the Chinese national and defense S&T system in the Xi 

era is a stronger emphasis on making breakthroughs in core technological 

capabilities, also referred to as turnkey technological capabilities. A key reason behind the focus on promoting breakthrough science and technology is 

Xi Jinping’s belief in the critical role of advanced technology in enhancing 

China’s competitiveness and acquiring international political power. Xi 

has commented that the previous IDAR (introduction, digestion, assimilation, and reinnovation) development strategy pursued by Hu Jintao’s 

administration is no longer as effective today, since it has become much 

more difficult and often impossible for China to purchase core technologies 

from foreign countries. Those technologies can only be developed through 

original innovation.20

Hand in glove with this shift, in 2016 the Chinese leadership formally promulgated an “innovation-driven development” strategy, which 

aims to strengthen the country’s original innovation capacity and enable 

China to move up the innovation ladder.21 Identifying and making 

breakthroughs in turnkey technology areas is a key component of this 

new development strategy.

At the 5th Plenum in November 2015 that discussed the 13th FYP, Xi 

Jinping stressed that there must be more “serious prioritization” of “technological innovation in key sectors and implementation of important 

technological projects that affect the national big picture and long-term 

future”—a point he has made previously in multiple other venues. Xi also 

called for China to pursue an asymmetric strategy to catch up with developed countries, stating that “China should develop its own strengths and 

explore ‘asymmetric’ measures in core technologies that would otherwise 

be unlikely for China to catch up by 2050. More efforts should be put into 

these critical, bottleneck fields.”22

A number of technological fields have been designated as turnkey 

for short-, medium-, and long- term development, and this is reflected 

in the selection of major projects. In his speech at the National Science 
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and Technology Conference in June 2016, Xi confirmed that China has 

decided to speed up implementation of 16 megaprojects, such as highend all-purpose chips, integrated circuit equipment, broadband mobile 

communication, high-grade numerical machinery, nuclear power plants, 

and new drugs.23 Many of these projects were included as high-priority 

developments in the 2006–2020 Medium- and Long-Term Science and 

Technology Development Plan.

Additionally, China is adding a new round of megaprojects that 

“embody national strategic intentions” with a timeframe of achieving 

breakthroughs in the industries by 2030. This new initiative is part of a 

new program called Science, Technology, and Innovation 2030 that was 

announced in the national 13th FYP. Projects selected for this program 

include aero-engine and gas turbines, quantum communication, information network and cyber security, smart manufacturing and robotics, 

deep-space and deep-sea exploration, key materials, neuroscience, and 

health care. To support this initiative, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) requested proposals for its new National Key Research 

and Development Program in early 2016 in fields that are aligned with the 

2030 Program.

Chinese authorities also announced plans in 2015 to establish largescale national laboratories modeled on U.S. and foreign entities such as Los 

Alamos and Lawrence Berkeley national laboratories to support the pursuit 

of breakthroughs in big science endeavors. Xi Jinping has pointed out that 

“national laboratories are important vehicles in which developed countries 

seize the high ground in technological innovation.”24 For China, these 

national laboratories are viewed as critical platforms to accelerate fundamental and applied research that will enable it to reach the global frontier.25

The idea to establish national laboratories dates back to 2000, when 

MOST started an experiment to build seven national laboratories over 

3 years.26 Progress was very slow, however, and only two laboratories in 

Shenyang and Qingdao were established. Despite measured initial progress 

made by those pilot national laboratories in improving China’s innovation 
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capability, their future prospects are unclear because of unstable financial 

support and divided opinions about the contributions of the laboratories 

to basic research.

However, as the new national laboratories initiative is labeled a key 

priority in the 13th FYP and has Xi’s strong endorsement, this situation is 

expected to change. Xi stated that China

urgently needs to establish comprehensive integrated national 

laboratories of greater dimensions and greater cooperation among 

disciplines, driven by national objectives and strategy and aimed 

at international technological frontiers to optimize the distribution and arrangement of talent and material resources and form 

a new structure of coordinated innovation.27

A series of national laboratories will be established in new sectors that create “important strategic innovation power that can take the international 

technological high ground.”

As such, the old development model for pilot national laboratories will 

be abandoned. According to MOST officials, a new development plan is 

being drafted where MOST, the Ministry of Education, Chinese Academy 

of Sciences, and Chinese Academy of Engineering jointly study the national 

laboratory construction plan and the Ministry of Finance and the National 

Development and Reform Commission work on institutional mechanisms.28

Though it is still too early to tell where this initiative will lead, the building of 

national laboratories will “represent major transformation of China’s R&D 

system,” according to Chinese Academy of Sciences president Bai Chunli.29

The new national laboratories will be significantly different from the 

existing pilot laboratories, both in scope of focused areas and development 

model. Instead of targeting single subjects, the new national laboratories 

will be multidisciplinary and will work in both civilian- and defense-related 

fields. It is not yet clear which technological sectors these national laboratories will be focused on, but if they are modeled on the U.S. system, then 

high-tech weapons R&D may be an important consideration. In addition 
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to these national laboratories, SASTIND has called for building defense 

laboratories and defense science, technology, and industry innovation centers to further support China’s national defense S&T innovation system.30

Vigorously Promoting Civil-Military Integration 

CMI has been promoted in China since the early 2000s but with little tangible success because of limited leadership engagement, unclear strategy, 

ineffective implementation, and weak civil-military coordination. Despite 

the weak progress, Chinese civilian and military authorities see CMI as 

essential in the drive for original innovation and defense modernization.

Efforts to promote CMI have focused primarily on reforms of stateowned defense conglomerates and on the implementation of policies, 

platforms, and other mechanisms by which private-sector technology can 

flow smoothly into defense projects.31 Each of the half a dozen sectors that 

make up the Chinese defense industry is controlled by one or two defense 

corporations. Efforts to promote competition in the late 1990s by dividing 

these monopolistic behemoths into competing entities were largely a failure 

because of poor institutional design. Consequently, Chinese authorities 

began to remerge these firms, especially so they could compete with much 

larger foreign firms on the global arms market. This began in the late 2000s 

with the consolidation of the aviation sector, but there was a long hiatus 

before the next merger took place at the beginning of 2018 between the two 

principal firms in the nuclear sector, China National Nuclear Corporation 

and China National Engineering Corporation. The shipbuilding industry 

appears next in line for restructuring as one of its two dominant conglomerates, China State Shipbuilding Corporation, has been adversely affected 

by a sharp downturn in the global civilian shipbuilding market.

The transfer of state-owned defense technology to the private sector 

also receives strong emphasis in the plan and is important to support China’s “innovation-driven development” and the financing of China’s defense 

industry. China’s efforts to increase its high-tech industrialization through 

programs such as the Made in China 2025 plan also feed directly into CMI, 
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and efforts have been made to coordinate these programs to emphasize 

areas that will directly benefit China’s defense industry.

In 2007, Hu Jintao attempted to broaden CMI’s scope and push for 

deeper implementation, although with only limited success. Ultimately, 

Hu’s aim to implement “overall coordination” [tongchou guihua, 统筹规划] 

stalled due to persistent obstacles such as poor coordination among top-level 

decisionmaking bodies, insufficient regulatory structures to allow transfer 

of technology between civilian and military entities, poor intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, especially for defense industry–originated IPR, 

and lack of universal industry and technology standards across civilian and 

military sectors. While Hu’s attempt at top-down leadership support should 

have been enough to catalyze CMI implementation, it proved insufficient 

to mobilize all the needed actors and agencies.

Two modest successes of Hu’s push include broadening the thinking 

on CMI away from its former limited understanding of “combining the 

civilian and military sectors” [junmin jiehe, 军民结合] to an understanding 

more reflective of the deep implementation required through “integration 

of civilian and defense sectors”; and broadening the scope of CMI to include 

all available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry, 

including capital, technology, human capital, facilities, and information.32

The Xi administration has made a renewed push to make CMI a viable 

policy tool. CMI has been relabeled as military-civil fusion (MCF) [junmin 

ronghe, 军民融合] to distinguish the new approach. To address deficiencies 

in the previous CMI strategy that was ad hoc, structurally misaligned, and 

of low policy importance, Xi designated MCF as a national priority in 2015 

and defined it as a development strategy. According to Xi, a central goal of the 

MCF strategy is to build an “integrated national strategic system and strategic 

capabilities.” The development of such a strategic system and capabilities will 

allow China to “implement key science and technology projects and race to 

occupy the strategic high ground for science and technology innovation.”33

Key elements of this national strategic system are detailed in some 

of the MCF implementation plans that have been formulated since the 
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adoption of the MCF strategy. This includes the 13th 5-Year Special Plan 

for Science and Technology MCF Development issued in 2017 by the CSTC 

and MOST. This plan detailed the establishment of an integrated system to 

conduct basic cutting-edge R&D in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, 

advanced electronics, quantum, advanced energy, advanced manufacturing, future networks, and new materials “to capture commanding heights 

of international competition.”34 This plan also noted the pursuit of MCF 

special projects in areas such as remote-sensing, marine-related technology, 

advanced manufacturing, biology, and transportation.

The political significance of MCF gained even more prominence with 

the formation of the “Commission for Integrated Civilian-Military Development” (CICMD) [zhongyang junmin ronghe fazhan weiyuanhui, 中央军

民融合发展委员会] in January 2017. The importance of this organization 

in leading MCF policymaking and implementation was made clear with 

the appointment of Xi as its chair and Premier Li Keqiang as a vice chair. 

At the CICMD’s first meeting in June 2017, Xi stated that there was a “short 

period of strategic opportunity” to implement MCF, pointing out the most 

fruitful areas that included infrastructure, equipment procurement, training, military logistics, and defense mobilization.35 In its September 2017 

meeting, the CICMD issued a series of plans and guidelines tied to the 13th

Five Year Plan on MCF that covered defense industrial development and 

military logistics.36

Supporting High-Tech Defense Industrialization 

The Chinese authorities are currently engaged in a comprehensive effort 

to boost advanced manufacturing capabilities in high-tech industries, of 

which defense and dual-use capabilities are a central priority. Led primarily 

by civilian agencies, this effort aims to support China’s innovation-driven 

development strategy that focuses on broader economic growth. For the 

defense industry, directing China’s overall plans to develop its high-tech 

industries with particular emphasis on CMI-related industries is a key 

factor that will enable it to produce innovation at higher levels.
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Chief among China’s actions to develop its manufacturing base is the 

Made in China 2025 plan issued in May 2015. The plan outlines a three-step 

strategy for China to comprehensively upgrade its industrial economy and 

achieve its goal of becoming a world-leading manufacturer by 2049.37 The 

plan outlines policies to deepen institutional reforms, strengthen financial 

and tax support, complete a talent training system, and also introduces 

five sub-plans intended to facilitate government involvement when market 

mechanisms alone are insufficient.38 The plan also prioritizes 10 industrial 

sectors for policy and funding support:

■	 new-generation information technology

■	 automated machine tools and robotics

■	 space and aviation equipment

■	 maritime equipment and high-tech shipping

■	 modern rail transportation equipment

■	 new energy vehicles and equipment

■	 power generation equipment

■	 agricultural equipment

■	 new materials

■	 bio-pharmaceutical and advanced medical products.

Close coordination took place between civilian and defense agencies in 

drafting the Made in China 2025 plan to emphasize CMI priorities, including space and aviation equipment, high-tech shipping, and new materials. 

SASTIND continues to be closely involved in the implementation of the plan. 

In June 2015, the State Council established a “State Strong Manufacturing 

Power Building Leading Small Group” [guojia zhizao qiangguo jianshe lingdao xiaozu, 国家制造强国建设领导小组] led by Vice Premier Ma Kai and 

administered by Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 

to oversee Made in China 2025. SASTIND Director Xu Dazhe sits as 1 of 

20 representatives on the leading small group, as do many other leaders of 

major agencies with a vested interest in CMI development.39 The body also 

directs the work of other subgroups, such as the “ Manufacturing Power 
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Building Strategy Advisory Group” [zhizao qiangguo jianshe zhanlüe zixun 

weiyuanhui, 制造强国建设战略咨询委员会], which also includes SASTIND 

representatives, and is tasked with issuing a technical “green paper” every 2 

years to act as an update to the 10 original sectors in the Made in China 2025 

plan.40 All indicators are that CMI-related industries will continue to receive 

priority attention in these plans. SASTIND is also preparing a Defense S&T 

Industry 2025 plan that will set additional goals toward development of 

CMI-related industries. Information on this plan has been scarce, but there 

is a large expectation that turbo-fan engines will receive significant focus.41

Outside of Made in China 2025, many additional efforts are being 

made to strengthen China’s high-tech industrialization. One such industry 

receiving attention from many fronts is the integrated circuit (IC) industry, 

which has been the focus of a new State Council plan titled Guidelines 

on Developing and Promoting the National Integrated Circuit Industry,42 a new leading small group named the “Leading Small Group for IC 

Industry Development” [jicheng dianlu chanye fazhan lingdao xiaozu, 集

成电路产业发展领导小组],43 and an approximately $25 billion National 

Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund.44 MIIT’s Special Action 

Implementation Program calls for creating military IC products and the 

promotion of civil-military IC production lines, and the 2016 SAP states 

that a Civil-Military Dual-Use Integrated Circuit Development Special 

Action Plan will be drafted along with a document outlining “high-level 

plans and programs” for the IC industry development in CMI areas.45

These efforts—and continued movements as China deepens CMI implementation—are intended to produce a defense R&D base more capable of 

sourcing prime technology domestically.

Restructuring the Defense Research Institute System 

Although the Chinese defense industry has made significant progress transitioning from centralized planning to a market-oriented modern enterprise 

system, one overlooked area has been the status of research institutes (RIs) 

that belong to or are affiliated with the big 10 defense corporations. While 
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these RIs are a core component of the R&D capabilities of the defense firms, 

they are designated as “government-affiliated institutions” [shiye danwei, 事

业单位], which means they are subject to state ownership restrictions and 

cannot be restructured into listed entities.

Many defense RIs have developed advanced technologies that are 

potentially lucrative and are viewed as cash cows by their parent defense 

corporations. For example, 30 percent of the profits of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation in 2014 reportedly came from its 28 RIs.46

The barriers in listing defense RIs have become a major bottleneck for the 

defense industry’s ongoing efforts to securitize their assets on the capital 

markets. Besides the ownership problem, the corporate restructuring of 

defense RIs has also run into difficulties in other areas. The issues include 

asset management, personnel placement, income distribution, social welfare, taxation, and secrecy considerations.

However, the restructuring of defense RIs is viewed as critical to 

overall efforts to reform the defense industry and to improve innovation 

capacity.47 Consequently, in 2016, Chinese authorities began tackling 

defense RI reform and drafted a number of reform policies. These include 

the Scheme on Classification of Defense Research Institutes, Defense 

Research Institutes Classified Reform Implementation Plan, and Supporting Policies on the Restructuring of Defense Research Institutes under 

Public Institution Reform. In the latter document, SASTIND drafted a 

total of 31 policies on party-building, personnel placement, income distribution, social welfare, and security and secrecy issues.48 In addition, 

defense RIs will be divided into three categories that will determine the 

nature of their ownership structures.49 These proposals were then sent to 

the major defense corporations for comments, and it now appears that the 

long-awaited RI restructuring process may begin.50 Defense corporations 

with the largest number of RIs, such as the two space and missile conglomerates China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and China 

Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, will be allowed to take the 

lead in reform implementation.51
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Chinese authorities hope that a successful restructuring of the 

defense RIs will be a colossal boost for the defense industry. Analysts 

argue that this will significantly promote innovation, optimize resource 

allocations, increase the efficiency in state investment, facilitate civil-military integration, and bring in more investment for defense R&D from 

the capital markets.52

In addition to the reform of the defense RI system, the country’s 

civilian R&D apparatus is being overhauled to make it more capable and 

effective in producing higher end innovation. One major initiative is the 

consolidation of S&T plans operated by numerous state agencies into just 

five plans. This streamlining is intended to address structural problems 

such as duplication, nontransparency, and corruption that have caused 

widespread waste and inefficiency. Key plans that have or will be merged 

include the 863 Plan, the 973 Plan, and the National Science and Technology 

Infrastructure Plan that is managed by MOST. Research plans administered 

by the National Development and Reform Commission and MIIT will also 

be affected. The five new comprehensive S&T plans will be:

■	 National Natural Science Fund

■	 National Major Science and Technology Plan

■	 National Key R&D Project (NKRDP)

■	 Special Fund for Technology Innovation and the R&D Base

■	 Professional Special Plan.53

The NKRDP is by far the largest and most important of these five new 

plans and was officially established in February 2016. It is designed to be as 

wide-ranging and inclusive, supporting research and development in areas 

such as agriculture, health care, energy, environment, industrial competitiveness, innovation, and national security.54 Unlike the legacy programs 

that the NKRDP replaces, which were divided according to their position 

on the R&D spectrum from basic research to engineering development, 

the new plan covers all phases from research to development and production with the goal of improving commercialization rates.55 The other four 
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remaining plans were expected to be launched at the end of 2016, although 

full-scale implementation was not scheduled until 2019.56

Leveraging Capital Markets for Defense Investment 

The defense industry is being opened up to the capital markets, and the big 

10 state-owned defense corporations are seeking to take advantage of the 

lucrative financial opportunities that this may offer for them to better manage and leverage their assets. With enough recent orders to keep production 

lines churning, a pipeline full of new generations of equipment under development, and plenty of high-level leadership support, the defense industry 

is attracting plenty of interest from a growing proliferation of domestic 

investment vehicles that has appeared in the past couple of decades, and 

especially in the past few years.

While defense companies have been allowed to list subsidiaries on 

stock markets in China and Hong Kong since the early 1990s, this was 

limited to their civilian operations. Chinese authorities—led by the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense—began 

to prepare defense firms to tap into the capital markets from the mid to 

late 2000s by establishing a regulatory framework to ensure a secure and 

orderly process (see table for details). Detailed procedures were promulgated 

in 2007 that emphasized three principles: allow nonpublic capital to enter 

the defense industry, encourage the defense industry to make increased 

use of capital markets, and encourage the defense industry to diversify 

investments and ownership.57 An initial round of deals were allowed to 

take place in 2007 in the shipbuilding and aviation sectors.58 Additional 

guidelines followed that encouraged further opening up to capital markets 

by the defense industry.
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Table. State Guidelines Promoting Diversification of Investments and Use of 

Capital Markets by Defense Industry

February 

2007

Guiding Opinions from COSTIND 

Regarding Non-Public Ownership Economic Participation in 

Construction of Defense S&T 

Industry1

COSTIND Encourage and guide non-public capital to enter 

defense S&T industries; encourage non-publicly 

owned enterprises through purchasing shares, 

shareholding, and mergers and acquisitions to participate in developing civil-military dual-use products 

that emphasize nonmilitary uses.

March 

2007

Guiding Opinions Regarding the 

Development of Defense S&T 

Industry for Civilian Industry2

COSTIND Fully utilize capital markets to promote industrial 

development; encourage introduction of capital into 

military and civilian enterprises through acquisitions, 

asset swaps, and joint ventures; encourage 

companies that sell military products approved for 

nonmilitary production to list.

March 

2007

Certain Opinions Regarding 

Deepening Reform of Investment System for Defense S&T 

Industry3

COSTIND Promote diversification of investment and ownership 

in defense S&T enterprises; expand investment 

from the social sphere in defense S&T industry to 

implement management of different classes divided 

into open, restricted, and prohibited classes.

May 2007 Guiding Opinions Regarding 

Promoting Shareholding 

System Reform for Defense S&T 

Industry4

COSTIND Complete shareholding reform for qualified military 

industrial enterprises; diversify investments; 

promote the establishment of modern enterprise 

structures and modern ownership structures by 

military industrial enterprises.

November 

2007

Interim Measures for Implementation of Shareholding Reform 

for Defense Enterprises5

COSTIND Allow domestically listed companies to reacquire 

military industrial enterprises.

October 

2010

Certain Opinions Regarding 

Establishment and Improvement 

of Civil-Military Integration 

of Weapons and Equipment 

Research and Production 

Systems6

COSTIND Promote shareholding reform through asset restructuring, listing, mutual shareholding, mergers and 

acquisitions; actively and steadfastly promote the 

reform of military research institutes and actively 

promote the applied research institutes to restructure along the commercial basis; establish modern 

enterprise systems or convert into large corporate 

R&D centers.

March 

2011

“Guiding Opinions Regarding 

Categorically Promoting Reform 

of Public Institutions”7

COSTIND Promote the reform of public institution, and particularly for scientific institutions, promote the reform of 

production activities.

June 2012 “Implementation Opinions for 

Encouraging and Guiding Private 

Capital in Entering Defense 

Industries”

COSTIND Encourage and guide private capital in entering 

defense industries; allow private companies to 

undertake R&D and production tasks for weapons 

and equipment; guide and support the involvement 

of private capital in restructuring of military enterprises; encourage private capital to undertake R&D 

for technologies fit for both military and civil uses.

August 

2013

Rules for Defense S&T and 

Industry Fixed Assets Investment Program Management

COSTIND Allow defense corporations to undertake largescale share placements using military assets as 

securitization.

April 2014 Guidelines on Promoting 

Civil-Military Integration

COSTIND Make new progress in giving private capital access 

to the defense industry.

January 

2016

Related Issues for Non–State 

Owned Enterprises Applying for 

Military Industrial Fixed Assets 

Investment Programs

COSTIND Outlines methods by which non–state owned actors 

can invest in fixed assets of defense industry.

Key: COSTIND: Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; CMC: Central 

Military Commission; R&D: research and development; S&T: science and technology; SASTIND: State 

Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense.
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Notes

1

 “Guiding Opinions from COSTIND Regarding Non-Public Ownership Economic Participation in Construction of Defense S&T Industry” [关于印发《非公有制经济参与国防科技工业建设 指南》

的通知], Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, People’s Republic of 

China, August 8, 2007, available at <www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-08/07/content_708284.htm>.

2

 “Guiding Opinions Regarding the Development of Defense S&T Industry for Civilian Industry” [《大

力发展国防科技工业民用产业的指导意见》发布], Commission for Science, Technology and 

Industry for National Defense, People’s Republic of China, March 2, 2007, available at <www.gov.cn/

gzdt/200703/02/content_539623.htm>.

3

 “Certain Opinions Regarding Deepening Reform of Investment System for Defense S&T Industry” [《

深化国防科技工业投资体制改革的若干意见》], Commission for Science,Technology and Industry 

for National Defense, People’s Republic of China, March 5, 2007, available at <www.china.com.cn/

policy/txt/200703/05/content_7905219.htm>.

4

 “Guiding Opinions Regarding Promoting Shareholding System Reform for Defense S&T Industry” [

国防科工委 发展改革委 国资委关于推进军工企业股份制改造的指导意见], Commission for 

Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, People’s Republic of China, June 23, 2007, 

available at <www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-06/23/content_658955.htm>.

5

 “Interim Measures for Implementation of Shareholding Reform for Defense Enterprises” [《军工

企业股份制改造实施暂行办法》], Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National 

Defense, People’s Republic of China, November 21, 2007, available at <http://gov.finance.sina.com.

cn/chanquan/2007-11-21/50173.html>.

6

 “Certain Opinions Regarding Establishment and Improvement of Civil-Military Integration of Weapons 

and Equipment Research and Production Systems” [国务院中央军委关于建立和完善军民结合寓军

于民武器装备科研生产体系的若干意见], State Council and Central Military Commission, People’s 

Republic of China, October 24, 2010, available at <www.jxgb.gov.cn/2011-1/20111111433114.htm>.

7

 “Guiding Opinions Regarding Categorically Promoting Reform of Public Institutions” [中共中央国

务院关于分类推进事业单位改革指导意见], State Council, People’s Republic of China, March 23, 

2011, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-04/16/content_2114526.htm>.

The initiative to allow firms to tap the domestic equity markets was 

curtailed by the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and this hiatus continued 

into the early 2010s. As a consequence, many defense companies delayed 

undertaking management, financial, and other reforms, such as becoming 

shareholding entities that would allow them to issue shares to outside investors.

The situation changed in 2013 when SASTIND began to permit firms 

to issue share placements using military assets as securitization.59 This 

opening up of the defense industry to investment from capital markets is 

part of a broader initiative by Chinese authorities to forge closer integration 

between the science and technology system and financial markets. Premier 

Li Keqiang stated in 2014 that:
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it is necessary to increase the efficiency of science and technology 

innovations with institutional innovation . . . and let the market 

decide allocation of innovative resources. We should intensify financial support, guide more enterprises and social capital to increase 

input in research and development. We should pay particular attention to activating stock assets and enhance capital usage efficiency.60

China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) became the first 

defense firm to undertake a private share placement in September 2013 

and raised Rmb 8.5 billion ($1.4 billion) from 10 Chinese parties to acquire 

production facilities to manufacture warships. More than one-third of the 

funds (Rmb 3.275 billion) was earmarked for the acquisition of mediumand large-sized surface warships, conventional submarines, and large 

landing ships, while Rmb 2.66 billion was designated for arms trade–

related undertakings and civil-military industrialization projects, and 

the remaining Rmb 2.54 billion was allocated as working capital.61 CSIC 

explained that the funds would “satisfy the development and manufacture 

of a new generation of weapons and equipment,” adding that “we need 

urgent large-scale technological improvements and need to expand our 

financing channels.”62 Dalian Shipyard is one of the CSIC facilities that are 

slated to receive proceeds from the share placement, and it is reportedly 

China’s first domestically designed aircraft carrier.63

All 10 big defense conglomerates have begun actively issuing public 

and private equity offerings and bond issuances, although to varying 

degrees. Total funds raised in public and private equity offerings between 

2010 and June 2016 totaled nearly Rmb 207.6 billion ($31.14 billion), with 

most of these funds going specifically to military development projects. Funds raised decreased from 2010 to 2012, but have significantly 

increased annually thereafter. Funds raised in 2016 were expected to 

register a significant jump from 2015, as total funds raised in the first 

half of the year had already exceeded total funds raised in 2015 by Rmb 

4.3 billion ($645 million).64
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The shipbuilding and aviation industries raised by far the largest 

amount of funds, significantly dwarfing the other defense industrial sectors. Between 2010 and June 2016, the shipbuilding industry raised Rmb 

63 billon ($9.45 billion) while the aviation sector brought in Rmb 65 billion 

($9.75 billion). The space industry raised Rmb 31.9 billion ($4.79 billion), 

ordnance industry Rmb 27.1 billion ($4.07 billion), electronics industry 

Rmb 17.3 billion ($2.6 billion), and nuclear industry came last with Rmb 

3.4 billion ($510 million). See figure 3.

Bond issues by defense firms were also substantial and totaled Rmb 

211.5 billion ($31.73 billion) between 2010 and June 2016. Shipbuilding came 

first in total bonds raised during this period with Rmb 101.8 billion ($15.27 

billion). Surprisingly, the nuclear industry came second with Rmb 40.8 

billion ($6.12 billion). Space came in third at Rmb 20 billion ($3 billion), 

Figure 3. Chinese Defense Corporate Equity Deals, 2010–June 2016
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followed by aviation at Rmb 19.6 billion ($2.94 billion) and ordnance with 

Rmb 19.4 billion ($2.19 billion). Electronics came last with Rmb 9.9 billion 

($1.49 billion). See figure 4.

Total equity and bond offerings between 2010 and June 2016 reached 

Rmb 419.16 billion ($62.87 billion), which is equivalent to 8.9 percent 

of the official Chinese defense budget total of Rmb 4.7 trillion ($704.39 

billion) for the same period. See figure 5.

Defense corporations will be able to continue to raise large amounts 

from asset securitization deals and bond issues as well as from bank loans 

in the coming years. As of March 2016, the big 10 defense companies had 

80 subsidiaries listed on China’s stock exchanges, which accounted for 

around 25 percent of their total assets.65

Figure 4. Chinese Defense Corporate Debt Issuances, 2010–June 2016
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Analysts estimate that if China follows the United States, which has 

around 70 percent of defense industrial assets listed, this could allow Chinese firms to raise upward of another Rmb 1 trillion of funds. Aviation 

Industry Corporation of China’s Deputy General Manager Wu Xiandong 

stated, “Not all military industrial enterprises are suitable to marketize 

and undergo shareholder reform, but the vast majority are suitable.”66 As 

an example of the magnitude and speed of growth at which the Chinese 

firms may grow, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 

plans to triple its asset securitization rate from its current 15 percent to 45 

percent by the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan.67 Other defense conglomerates 

can be expected to strive toward similar growth.

Weaknesses in the Chinese Defense Industry 

The principal constraints and weaknesses that the Chinese defense industry faces at present stem from its historical foundations and uncertain 

efforts to overcome the corrosive legacy of its difficult past.68 The institutional and normative foundations and workings of the Chinese defense 

Figure 5. Chinese Defense Corporate Equity Deals and Debt Issuances, 

2010–June 2016
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industry were copied from the former Soviet Union’s command economy 

and continue to exert a powerful influence. The PLA and defense industrial regulatory authorities are seeking to replace this outdated top-down 

administrative management model with a more competitive and indirect 

regulatory regime, but there are strong vested interests opposed to any 

major changes.

Monopolies 

One of the biggest hurdles that PLA and civilian defense acquisition 

specialists point out is the defense industry’s monopoly structure. Little 

competition exists to win major weapons systems and defense equipment 

because each of China’s six defense industrial sectors is closed to outside 

competition and is dominated by a select handful of state-owned defense 

corporations. Contracts are typically awarded through single-sourcing 

mechanisms to these corporations. Competitive bidding and tendering only 

takes place for noncombat support equipment, such as logistics supplies.

An effort in 1999 to inject more competition by splitting corporations 

that monopolized their sectors into two separate entities did little to curb 

monopolistic practices because these firms focused on different areas of 

business in their domains and there was little direct rivalry. These powerful 

defense firms have subsequently sought to reverse this effort at demonopolization by finding ways to remerge or collaborate. In 2008, the aviation 

industry made the first and so far only successful challenge by consolidating 

its two post-1999 entities back into a single monopoly structure. There have 

been occasional reports that the space and shipbuilding sectors might also 

seek to reestablish a single holding company arrangement.

Bureaucratic Fragmentation 

A second serious weakness that has seriously handicapped the effectiveness of Chinese defense economy is bureaucratic fragmentation. This is 

a common characteristic of the Chinese organizational system,69 but is 

especially virulent within the large and unwieldy defense sector. A key 
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feature of the Soviet approach to defense industrialization that China 

imported was a highly divided, segmented, and stratified structure and 

process. There was strict separation between the defense and civilian 

sectors as well as between defense contractors and military end-users, 

compartmentalization between the conventional defense and strategic 

weapons sectors as well as among the different conventional defense 

industrial subsectors, and division between R&D entities and production units. Key reasons for this excessive compartmentalization include 

an obsessive desire for secrecy and the powerful influence of the deeply 

ingrained Chinese model of “vertical functional systems” [tiao tiao, 条

条] that encouraged large-scale industries like those in the defense and 

supporting heavy industrial sectors, such as iron, steel, and chemicals, to 

become independent fiefdoms.

This severe structural compartmentalization is a major obstacle 

to the development of innovative and advanced weapons capabilities 

because it requires consensus-based decisionmaking that is carried 

out through extensive negotiations, bargaining, and exchanges. This 

management by committee is cumbersome, risk-adverse, and results in 

a lack of strong ownership that is critical to ensure that projects are able 

to succeed the thicket of bureaucratic red tape and cut-throat competition for funding.

The research, development, and acquisition (RDA) system also suffers 

from compartmentalization along many segments of the RDA process. 

Responsibilities for research and development, testing, procurement, 

production, and maintenance are in the hands of different units, and 

under-institutionalization has meant that linkages among these entities 

tend to be ad hoc in nature with major gaps in oversight, reporting, and 

information-sharing.70 The fragmented nature of the RDA process may 

help to explain why Hu Jintao was apparently caught by surprise by the first 

publicized test flight of the J-20 fighter aircraft that occurred during the 

visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in January 2011.71
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Weak Management Mechanisms 

A third major weakness is that the PLA continues to rely on outdated 

administrative tools to manage projects with defense contractors in the 

absence of the establishment of an effective system. The PLA did implement 

the use of contracts on a trial basis in the late 1980s with the introduction 

of a contract responsibility system.72 These contracts are administrative in 

nature, though, and have little legal rights because of a lack of a developed 

legal framework within the defense industry. Consequently, contracts are 

vague and do not define obligations or critical performance issues, such as 

quality, pricing, or schedules. Contracts for complex weapons projects can 

be as short as 1 to 2 pages, according to analysts.73

Moreover, the PLA acquisition apparatus is woefully backward in 

many other management approaches and tools that it uses compared to 

its counterparts in the United States and other advanced military powers. 

It has yet to adopt total life-cycle management methods, for example, 

and many internal management information systems are on standalone 

networks that prevent effective communications and coordination. One 

analyst stated that this often meant that the only way for project teams to 

exchange information was through paper transactions.74

Outdated Pricing Regime 

A fourth serious weakness is the lack of a transparent pricing system 

for weapons and other military equipment, representing a lack of trust 

between the PLA and defense industry. The existing armament pricing 

framework is based on a cost-plus model that dates back to the planned 

economy, in which contractors are allowed 5 percent profit margins on top 

of actual costs.75 There are a number of drawbacks to this model that hold 

back efficiency and innovation. One is that contractors are incentivized 

to push up costs as this would also drive up profits. Another problem is 

that contractors are not rewarded with finding ways to lower costs such as 

through more streamlined management or more cost-effective designs or 

manufacturing techniques. Contracts rarely have performance incentives, 
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which discourage risk-taking and any willingness to adopt innovative 

approaches. Yet another issue is that contractors are dissuaded from 

making major investments in new technological capabilities or processes 

because of the low 5 percent profit margin that is available.

To address this longstanding problem, the PLA, Ministry of Finance, 

and National Development and Reform Commission held a high-level 

meeting on armament pricing reform in 2009 that concluded the outdated 

pricing system had seriously restricted weapons development and innovation.76 A number of reform proposals were put forward that provide 

incentives to contain costs, switch from accounting procedures that focus 

on ex post pricing to ex ante controls, and expand from a single-pricing methodology to multiple pricing methods. Some of these ideas were 

incorporated in a document issued after the meeting titled “Opinions on 

Further Pushing Forward the Reform of Work Concerning the Prices of 

Military Products.”

At the beginning of 2014, the GAD announced that it would conduct 

and expand on pilot projects on equipment pricing. These reforms include 

the strengthening of the pricing verification of purchased goods, improving 

cost controls, and shifting from singular to plural pricing models, from 

“after-purchase pricing” to “whole-process pricing,” and from “individual-cost pricing” to “social average–cost pricing.”77 These represent modest 

steps in the pricing reform process, but the PLA will continue to face fierce 

opposition from the defense industry on this issue.

Corruption 

A fifth impediment is corruption, which appears to have thrived with the 

defense industry’s uncertain transition from centralized state planning to 

a more competitive and indirect management model.78 PLA leaders have 

highlighted the RDA system as one of a number of high-risk areas in which 

corruption can flourish along with the selection and promotion of officials, 

enrollment of students in PLA-affiliated schools, funds management, and 

construction work.79
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At the PLA’s annual conference on military discipline inspection work 

in January 2014, CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang, who heads 

the PLA’s anti-corruption efforts, pointed out that armament research, 

production, and procurement was one of two areas that required “better 

oversight.”80 The other area that Xu highlighted was construction projects, 

which have been plagued by a number of high-profile corruption scandals 

in recent years including the case of the General Logistics Department 

Deputy Director Lieutenant General Gu Junshan, who amassed a huge 

fortune from lucrative real estate kick-backs.81

The almost complete absence of public reporting on corruption in the 

defense industry and RDA system means that the extent of the problem is 

not known. Military authorities justify this lack of transparency, as many of 

the cases involve classified programs. In the latest anti-corruption crackdown 

that began with Xi Jinping’s ascent to power at the 18th Party Congress in 

November 2012, there have only been a handful of cases of defense industry 

executives being arrested on corruption charges.82 A rare instance of official 

reporting into defense industrial–related corruption was when the Central 

Discipline Inspection Commission sent a team to investigate SASTIND for 

2 months in the spring of 2016. SASTIND was required to set up a “comprehensive rectification program” [fankui zhuanxiang, 反馈专项] covering 

100 measures and the investigation led to 2 officials being subject to “party 

discipline” [dangji zhengji chufen, 党纪政纪处分], 14 officials were “verbally 

admonished” [jiemian tanhua, 诫勉谈话], 3 officials were moved from their 

positions, and 10 officials were given letters of criticism.83

Implications for U.S.-China Military Technological Competition 

Chinese defense industry efforts to successfully transition from an innovation follower to an original innovator able to engage in higher end 

technological development appear likely to succeed because of the confluence of powerful factors discussed in this chapter. What are the implications 

for the intensifying military technological competition with the United 

States from a more capable and innovative Chinese defense industry?
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First, as the Chinese defense industry becomes more self-reliant and 

less dependent on foreign sources, this will allow it greater ability to forge a 

more independent development path. This is an important policy consideration because Chinese analysts have pointed out that a key goal in the U.S. 

Third Offset Strategy is to lure potential adversaries to compete in areas 

that the United States chooses and in which it enjoys a decisive advantage. 

According to one analysis in the PLA Daily, China should avoid this temptation and “persevere in taking our own development road, continue to 

stress and strengthen the domains where we enjoy superiority, and not be 

influenced by the United States.”84

Second, as the pace and intensity of the Chinese defense industry’s 

restructuring efforts quicken, the United States will find it has a narrowing 

window of opportunity to pursue the Third Offset and other related initiatives and restore its strategic superiority before China is able to catch up in 

critical areas. The next 5 to 10 years could be a decisive period in shaping 

the nature of U.S.-China military technological competition. This is a viewpoint that is shared by Chinese decisionmakers, including Xi Jinping, who 

see China engaged in a zero-sum global race for technological leadership 

in both the civilian and defense S&T domains.85

Notes

1 “China Announces 7.6 Percent Defense Budget Rise, Lowest in Six 

Years,” Xinhua, March 5, 2016, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-

03/05/c_135158243.htm>.

2 “China Civil-Military Integration Development Report 2015” [中国军民

融合发展报告2015] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版

社], 2016), 59.

3 The PLA Navy: New Missions and Capabilities for the 21st Century (Suitland, 

MD: U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, April 13, 2015), available at <https://fas.

org/nuke/guide/china/plan-2015.pdf>. See also Tai Ming Cheung, “Innovation in 

China’s Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies 39, nos. 5–6 (2016), 728–761.

4 The PLA Navy, 15.
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5 Ibid., 13.

6 “Xi Stresses Military Talent,” Xinhua, November 6, 2013, available at <www.

china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/06/content_30544430.htm>.

7 “Xi Jinping Addresses CCP Central Committee Political Bureau 17th Collective Study Session, Emphasizes Need to Acurately Grasp New Trend in the 

World’s Military Development, Advance with the Times to Vigorously Promote 

Military Innovation” [习近平在中共中央政治局第十七次集体学习时强调准确把

握世界军事发展新趋势与时俱进大力推进军事创新], Xinhua [新华], August 30, 

2014, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/30/c_1112294869.htm>.

8 “Xi Jinping Chaired the First Meeting of the CMC National Defense and 

Military Small Leading Group” [习近平主持中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导

小组第一次全体会], State Council, People’s Republic of China, March 15, 2014, 

available at <www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-03/15/content_2639427.htm>.

9 “Documentary of the Design Process of Deepening Defense and Military 

Reform by Xi Jinping and the CMC” [习主席和中央军委运筹设计深化国防和军

队改革纪实], Sina News Center [Sina 新闻中心], December 30, 2015, available at 

<http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2015-12-30/doc-ifxncyar6047368.shtml>.

10 “Central Military Commission Issues ‘Opinions Concerning Deepening 

the Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces’” [中央军委印发“关于深

化国防和军队改革的意见”], Xinhua [新华], January 1, 2016, available at <www.

xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646692.htm>.

11 “Ministry of National Defense Holds News Conference on CMC Administrative Reform and Reorganization,” China Military Online, January 11, 2016.

12 “Former GAD S&T Committee Director Liu Guozhi Appointed Director 

of New CMC S&T Committee,” The Paper [澎湃新闻], January 11, 2016.

13 “Former GAD Director Zhang Youxia Becomes New Director of CMC 

Armament Development Department,” The Paper [澎湃新闻], January 14, 2016.

14 Zhao Lei, “PLA Says Chief of Its Arms Wing Replaced,” China Daily (Beijing), September 19, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-09/19/

content_32187194.htm>.

15 “2016 National Defense Science, Technology and Industry Working Conference Was Held in Beijing” [2016 年国防科技工业工作会议在京召开], State 

Council, People’s Republic of China, January 9, 2016, available at <www.gov.cn/

xinwen/2016-01/09/content_5031770.htm>.

16 Laura Zhou, “China Almost Doubles Weapons Exports over Past Five Years, 

with Pakistan Biggest Buyer: Think Tank,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 
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February 22, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/1915140/china-almost-doubles-weapons-exports-over-past-five>.

17 Ibid.

18 Liu Zhongcai [刘重才], “‘Defense 2025’ Is Coming Soon: Aero-Engines 

May Become the Breakthrough” [“军工版2025”呼之欲出航空发动机将成突

破], Xinhua [新华], June 19, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-06/19/c_127931606.htm>.

19 “Defense Science, Technology and Industry Development Strategy Committee Was Established” [国防科技工业发展战略委员会成立], Ministry of 

National Defense, People’s Republic of China, June 6, 2015, available at <http://

news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2015-06/05/content_4588445.htm>. Xu Dazhe was 

the initial head of the committee when he was State Administration for Science, 

Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) director, but he was 

transferred to become governor of Hunan Province in September 2016.

20 Selection of Xi Jinping’s Comments on Science, Technology, and Innovation 

[习近平关于科技创新论述摘编] (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2016), 

42–43. China continues, though, to undertake a comprehensive and sophisticated 

effort to acquire foreign technology and know-how through diverse means. See Tai 

Ming Cheung, “Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base.”

21 “Outline of the National Strategy of Innovation-Driven Development” [

国家创新驱动发展战略纲要], Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, May 

23, 2016, available at <www.china.com.cn/zhibo/zhuanti/ch-xinwen/2016-05/23/

content_38515829.htm>.

22 Selection of Xi Jinping’s Comments on Science, Technology, and Innovation, 41.

23 Cao Kun [曹昆], ed., “Xi Jinping Pointed Out Three Directions for Technological Innovation” [习近平指出科技创新的三大方向], People’s Daily [人民日

报], June 2, 2016, available at <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0602/c1001-

28406379.html>.

24 Selection of Xi Jinping’s Comments on Science, Technology, and Innovation, 

50–51.

25 “The 13th Five-Year Plan” [十三五规划纲要(全文)], Xinhua [新华], March 

18, 2016, available at <http://sh.xinhuanet.com/2016-03/18/c_135200400_2.htm>.

26 “What Dragged National Laboratory: Still under Development after Ten 

Years” [谁拖了国家实验室的后腿:十多年仍难去“筹”], Sohu News [搜狐新闻], 

March 3, 2016, available at <http://news.sohu.com/20160303/n439195452.shtml>. 

These laboratories included Shenyang National Laboratory for Material Sciences, 
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Beijing National Laboratory for Condensed Matter Physics, Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at the Microscale, Tsinghua National Laboratory for 

Information Science and Technology, Wuhan National Laboratory for Optoelectronics, Beijing National Laboratory for Molecular Sciences, and Qingdao National 

Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology.

27 “13th Five-Year Plan.”

28 “We Could Have Comprehensive National Laboratories” [综合性国家实验

室: 这个可以有], Science and Technology Daily [科技日报], March 12, 2016, available 

at <http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2016/3/340373.shtm>.

29 “CAS President: A Number of National Laboratories Will Be Established 

Targeting Major Science and Technology Issues” [中科院长:将建一批国家实验室

解决重大科技问题], Sina News Center [Sina 新闻中心], February 4, 2016, available 

at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-02-04/doc-ifxpfhzk8866244.shtml>.

30 “SASTIND Takes Measures to Accelerate National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Coordinated Innovation” [国防科工局多措并举加快推进国

防科技工业协同创新], State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry 

for National Defense, People’s Republic of China, June 29, 2016, available at <www.

sastind.gov.cn/n112/n117/c6603042/content.html>.

31 There were nine state-owned defense industrial corporations as of 

mid-2018: China National Nuclear Corporation, China State Shipbuilding Corporation, China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, North Industries Group 

Corporation, China South Industries Group Corporation, China Electronics 

Technology Group Corporation, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, and Aviation 

Industry Corporation of China.

32 Daniel Alderman et al., “The Rise of Chinese Civil-Military Integration,” 

in Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation, ed. 

Tai Ming Cheung (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 112.

33 “Xi Calls for Deepened Military-Civilian Integration,” Xinhua, March 12, 2018.

34 13th Five-Year Special Plan for the Development of Military Civil Fusion [十

三五科技军民融合发展专项规划] (Beijing: CMC Science and Technology Commission and Ministry of Science and Technology, September 26, 2017), available 

at <www.aisixiang.com/data/106161.html>.

35 “Xi Jinping Chairs First Plenary Session of the Central Commission for 

Integrated Military and Civilian Development” [习近平主持召开中央军民融合

发展委员会第一次全体会议强调], Xinhua [新华], June 20, 2017.
Keeping Up with the Jundui

621

36 “Xi Jinping Chairs Second Plenum of Central Commission for Integrated 

Military and Civilian Development” [习近平主持召开中央军民融合发展委员会

第二次全体会议强调], Xinhua [新华], September 22, 2017.

37 “Interpret ‘Made in China 2025’: ‘Three-Step’ Strategy to Become a Manufacturing Power” [“中国制造2025”解读之六:制造强国“三步走”战略], Ministry of 

Industry and Information Technology, People’s Republic of China, May 19, 2015, 

available at <www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1146562/n1146655/c3780688/content.html>. 

See also Tai Ming Cheung et al., Planning for Innovation: Understanding China’s Plans 

for Technological, Energy, Industrial, and Defense Development (Washington, DC: 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 2016).

38 “Made in China 2025 Plan Unveiled to Boost Manufacturing,” Xinhua, May 

19, 2015, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/19/c_134252230.htm>.

39 “Office of State Council on Notice on Establishment of State Strong Manufacturing Power Building Leading Small Group” [国务院办公厅关于成立国家制

造强国建设领导小组的通知], State Council, People’s Republic of China, June 24, 

2015, available at <www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-06/24/content_9972.htm>.

40 “State Manufacturing Power Building Leading Small Group Established with 

Ma Kai as Chair” [国家制造强国建设领导小组成立马凯任组长], Observer [观察者], 

June 24, 2015, available at <www.guancha.cn/politics/2015_06_24_324516.shtml>.

41 “SASTIND Statement Confirms for the First Time ‘Defense S&T Industry 2025’” [国防科工局表态首次确认‘国防科技工业 2025’], Shanghai Securities 

News [上海证券报], June 19, 2015, available at <http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20150619/19871906_all.html>.

42 Author interview with semiconductor industry representative, January 14, 2016.

43 “Guidelines on Developing and Promoting the National IC Industry” [国家

集成电路产业发展推进纲要], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 

People’s Republic of China, June 24, 2014, available at <www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/

n1652858/n1652930/n3757021/c3758335/content.html>.

44 A Decade of Unprecedented Growth: China’s Impact on the Semiconductor 

Industry—2014 Update (London: PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015), available 

at <www.pwc.com/gx/en/technology/chinas-impact-on-semiconductor-industry/

assets/china-semicon-2014.pdf>.

45 “SASTIND Issues 2016 SASTIND Civil-Military Integration Special Action 

Plan” [国防科工局发布2016年军民融合专项行动计划], State Council, People’s 

Republic of China, March 17, 2016, available at <www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/

content_5054670.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

622

46 “Defense Research Institute Reform May Be Implemented Soon” [军工科

研院所分类改革文件或近期落地], Xinhua [新华], January 15, 2016, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2016-01/15/c_128631763.htm>.

47 “Defense Research Institutes Reform Need to Deal with Six Issues” [机

构:军工科研院所改制需直面六大问题], Xinhua [新华], July 23, 2014, available at 

<http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140723/12778652_0.shtml>.

48 “Defense Research Institute Reform May Be Implemented Soon.”

49 “Defense Conglomerates Will Start Classification Reform, 87 Enterprises Are Listed” [军工集团将启动分类改革 已有 87 家企业上市], cnstock.

com, September 6, 2015, available at <http://news.cnstock.com/industry/sid_

zxk/201509/3553950.htm>.

50 “Research Institutes Restructuring Starts, Greatest Potential in Electronics 

and Space” [军工行业:院所改制发令枪响,电科航天弹性最大], Tencent Finance, 

May 12, 2016, available at <http://finance.qq.com/a/20160512/026066.htm>.

51 “Reform of Defense Research Institutes Made Breakthroughs, Space Sector 

May Take the Lead” [军工院所分类改革迎突破 航天系望成“领头羊”], Shanghai 

Securities News [上海证券报], February 4, 2016, available at <www.cnstock.

com/v_industry/sid_rdjj/201602/3703256.htm>.

52 “Defense Research Institutes Reform Need to Deal with Six Issues.”

53 “Plan on Deepening Reform of the Central Government S&T Plan (Projects, 

Funds, etc.) Management” [关于深化中央财政科技计划(专项、基金等)管理改革

的方案], State Council, People’s Republic of China, December 3, 2014, available at 

<www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-01/12/content_9383.htm>.

54 “Policy Explanation on Deepening the Management Reform Central 

Funding of S&T Plans (Items and Funds)” [《关于深化中央财政科技计划(专

项、基金等)管理改革的方案》政 策解读], Ministry of Science and Technology, 

People’s Republic of China, January 1, 2015, available at <www.most.cn/kjzc/

zdkjzcjd/201501/t20150106_117286.htm>.

55 Ibid.

56 Ministry of Science and Technology Vice Minister Hou Jianguo stated that 

the set of S&T reforms outlined in Doc. No. 64 would be completed in 3 years. See 

Science and Technology Daily [科技日报], February 17, 2016.

57 Five separate policy documents issued in 2007 established these principles. 

See included State Guidelines table for additional details.

58 For example, in January 2007, China State Shipbuilding Corporation subsidiary Hudong Heavy Machinery issued a private placement of Rmb 12 billion 
Keeping Up with the Jundui

623

($1.5 billion). The funds were used to buy shipyards and invest in new technology. 

See Charlotte So, “Hudong Heavy Eyes 12b Yuan in Placement,” South China 

Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 30, 2007, available at <www.scmp.com/article/580095/hudong-heavy-eyes-12b-yuan-placement>.

59 “SASTIND Issues Notice on Rules for Defense S&T and Industry Fixed 

Assets Investment Program Management” [国防科工局关于印发国防科技工

业固定资产投资项目管理规定的通知], State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, People’s Republic of China, August 

27, 2013, available at <www.opt.ac.cn/jg/glbm/kjyglb/xagjsjgglwj/201309/

W020140328373812704712.pdf>.

60 “Li Keqiang Stresses Innovative Macroeconomic Measures at CAS, CES 

Meeting,” Xinhua, June 10, 2014.

61 “CSIC Releases Plan for 8.48 Billion Set, Creates Precedent for Defense Asset 

Injection” [中国重工 84.8 亿定增预案出炉开创重大军工资产注入先河], Shanghai 

Securities News [上海证券报], September 11, 2013, available at <http://finance.sina.

com.cn/stock/s/20130911/023716724295.shtml>.

62 “China Navy Plots Course to Stock Market,” Financial Times, September 

11, 2013, available at <https://next.ft.com/content/4f27d80a-1abb-11e3-a605-

00144feab7de>.

63 Ibid.

64 Calculations for public and private equity offerings and bonds were 

aggregated from an IGCC database collecting capital market transactions of 

China’s defense companies. Data for these transactions are compiled from 

numerous online sources for each of China’s 10 big defense conglomerates from 

2010 to June 2016. Official announcements were referenced where possible. Data 

primarily reflect only capital market transactions of the parent companies. 

Also, data for Chinese domestic capital transactions are believed to be complete, 

but Hong Kong and overseas transactions may have missing data. Bonds do 

not distinguish between public bonds and interagency bonds, and for private 

placement deals still being finalized, details such as investor and deal size are 

subjected to change.

65 “Military Industrial Asset Securitization Rate Decreases; Industry Calls for Policy Support” [军工资产证券化率偏低业界呼吁政策支持], 

Xinhua [新华], March 25, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

fortune/2016-03/25/c_1118447808.htm>.

66 Ibid.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

624

67 “CMI Is Trending, Do You Know How to Sort Out Core Stocks?” [军民

融合这么火 你知道怎么梳理核心概念股吗?], Securities Times [证券时报], April 

5, 2016, available at <http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/2016-04-05/doc-ifxqxqmf4052133.shtml>.

68 This section is based on the chapter titled “Weaknesses in PLA Defense 

Industries,” in China’s Incomplete Military Transformation, ed. Michael Chase et 

al. (Washington, DC: RAND, October 2014).

69 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 35–42. 

See also Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and 

Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); 

and David Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1987).

70 See Liu Hanrong and Wang Baoshun, eds., National Defense Scientific 

Research Test Project Management [国防科研试验项目管理] (Beijing: National 

Defense Industry Press [国防工业出版社], 2009).

71 John Pomfret, “Chinese Army Tests Jet During Gates Visit,” Washington 

Post, January 12, 2011; and Elizabeth Bumiller and Michael Wines, “Test of Stealth 

Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China,” New York Times, January 12, 2011.

72 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense 

Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 83–85.

73 Author interview with PLA acquisition specialist, Beijing, November 2011.

74 Ibid.

75 Mao Guohui, ed., Introduction to the Military Armament Legal System [军

事装备法律制度概论] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press [国防工业出版

社], 2012), 158–159.

76 Zong Zhaodun and Zhao Bo [宗兆盾, 赵波], “Major Reform Considered 

in Work on the Prices of Our Army’s Armaments” [我军装备价格工作酝酿重大

改革], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 13, 2009.

77 Zhang Xiaoqi [张晓祺], “Armament Work: It Is the Right Time for Reform and 

Innovation” [装备工作:改革创新正当其时], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 13, 2014.

78 Corruption is defined broadly in China as covering the improper behavior 

of state, party, or military officials, but the more common Western definition is 

the abuse of public office for personal gain in violation of rules.

79 “PLA Gets Tough on Duty Crimes,” Xinhua, December 1, 2014, available at 

<www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-12/01/content_19005244.htm>.
Keeping Up with the Jundui

625

80 Zhang Qian and Yao Chun, eds., “CMC Vice Chairman Stresses Effective Anti-Corruption,” Xinhua, January 17, 2014, available at <http://en.people.

cn/90786/8515367.html>.

81 “How a PLA General Built a Web of Corruption to Amass a Fortune,” 

Caixin Wang, January 16, 2014, available at <www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/caixin-media/how-pla-general-built-web-corruption-amass-fortune>.

82 See, for example, “Wu Hao, Deputy General Manager of AVIC Heavy 

Machinery Under Investigation for Corruption,” Xinjing Bao, June 4, 2014.

83 “Second Central Inspection Team Sent to SASTIND Party Committee to 

Inspect the Situation” [中央第二巡视组向国防科工局党组反馈专项巡视情况], 

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Supervision Web site [中央纪委监

察部网站], June 8, 2016, available at <www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/zyxszt/djlxs_zyxs/

fkqk_18jzydjl_zyxs/201606/t20160613_80395.html>.

84 Zhao Yang and Liu Na [赵阳, 刘娜], “The Best Way of Predicting the 

Future Is to Create the Future: An Analysis of the Technical Background of the 

U.S. High-Profile Presentation of the Third ‘Offset Strategy’” [预测未来的最佳

途径是创造未来—美国高调提出第三次“抵消战略”的技术背景分析], PLA Daily 

[解放军报], May 6, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/05/

content_143605.htm>.

85 See Tai Ming Cheung and Thomas Manhken, eds., The Gathering Pacific 

Storm: Emerging U.S.-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and 

Industrial Development (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2018).

627

CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION 

AND PLA REFORMS

By Brian Lafferty

I

n December 2015, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) formally 

launched reforms that have been described as the “most wide-ranging 

and ambitious restructuring since 1949.”1 Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping announced his intention to pursue these 

changes by calling them the “only way to develop a strong military and 

the key to deciding the future of the PLA.”2 The PLA’s new plan set several 

goals for 2020: achieving “breakthrough development” in joint operations 

command system reforms and leadership management system reforms, as 

well as “significant results” in military force reductions, reforms to improve 

defense policies, and civil-military integration (CMI) development.3 CMI’s 

inclusion as a key pillar in a transformative reform agenda confirmed its 

importance to the PLA’s overall modernization, and China’s unwavering 

embrace of it as a national strategic imperative.

CMI began slowly taking root in China as a military modernization 

strategy in the 1990s, and has since become steadily more institutionalized 

within the PLA and China’s national security sector.4

 Chinese reliance on 

CMI in military and economic development has increased significantly 

under Xi Jinping, who has called for CMI to extend into more technology 

CHAPTER 16
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

628

areas, cover more military and economic activities, and generate more tangible achievements.5 He has provided a theoretical justification for change 

by arguing that China’s CMI has entered a new phase, transitioning from 

its initial institutionalization toward a deep integration of the civil and military sectors. To spur a greater focus on CMI’s importance, in March 2015 

Xi announced that it would be raised to a “national strategy” [ba junmin 

ronghe fazhan shangsheng wei guojia zhanlüe, 把军民融合发展上升为国家

战略], and this decision was ratified by the Politburo a year later.6

Chinese commentators have voiced their support for this policy direction by emphasizing the critical importance of CMI, arguing that it is a 

“strategic requirement” [zhanlüe xuqiu, 战略需求] and the only way to build 

a military capable of winning informationized wars.7 As a recent article in 

Qiushi argued, “CMI has become the one and only choice for strengthening 

national comprehensive strength and defense competitiveness. . . . If a state 

does not pursue CMI then it is difficult to preserve technological dominance.”8

 The same article also asserted that CMI development had become 

a new area of fierce competition between states, and any major country that 

did not quickly adopt CMI would inevitably fall behind its rivals.9

While Chinese CMI reforms have received saturation coverage in 

China, they remain underexplored elsewhere, hindering efforts to understand their potential impact on the PLA’s current round of reforms. In 

particular, CMI has emerged as an integral part of Chinese efforts to promote defense science and technology development and bring additional 

resources more efficiently into defense modernization. Its success or failure will in turn have a corresponding influence on a broad range of PLA 

activities, and as such, it is helpful to better understand China’s efforts to 

implement CMI, as well as its problems and prospects.

This chapter provides an overview of four aspects of China’s push for 

civil-military integration. First, it surveys the broad impetus and objectives 

for CMI, highlighting why Chinese leaders consider it so vital to the overall 

PLA reform program. Second, it describes the operationalization of CMI, 

noting where and how China has tried to pursue CMI reforms. Third, it 
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

629

focuses on some of the key problems that have hindered the effectiveness 

of CMI reforms. Finally, the chapter discusses the creation of the Central 

Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development [junmin 

ronghe fazhan weiyuanhui, 军民融合发展委员会], and how it offers a 

credible new path for resolving some of the most entrenched CMI obstacles.

Broad Impetus for Civil-Military Integration 

China’s impetus for pursuing CMI as a core component of its PLA reforms 

is in large part a result of its reckoning with modern technology-driven 

warfare. After the first Gulf War, Chinese military strategists reached a 

consensus on the decisive role played by technology in military conflicts, 

and the reforms that have followed were geared toward creating a PLA that 

was better equipped and better prepared to fight on the battlefield. The 

many U.S. military engagements since 1991 have only reinforced for Chinese strategists that modern warfare has transitioned from the mechanized 

warfare of the industrial age to the informationized warfare of the network 

age.10 This change has dramatically affected Chinese thinking on military 

modernization and the role of civil-military integration in their national 

security strategy. In particular, it has focused Chinese strategic attention 

on the issues of technology development and resource allocation.

Technology Development 

The 2013 edition of the Academy of Military Science’s Science of Military 

Strategy addressed the importance of science and technology (S&T) for 

military development at length: “Science and technology is the key foundation for combat strength,” and “the ferociously fast development of new 

and high technology . . . has profoundly changed the content and mode of 

combat strength.”11 CMI theorist Hou Guangming also analyzed the changing impact of technology on the PLA, noting in a 2014 book on innovation 

in the Chinese defense industries, from the “state’s perspective, the global 

revolution in military affairs continually promotes upgrades in high-tech 

weaponry, and the core of military competition is changing toward science 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

630

and technology.”12 Thus, the race to upgrade defense technology has become 

an overarching strategic imperative, and PLA strategists have stressed 

that China’s weapons development pace will be inadequate if the country 

fails to catch up in technology innovation.13 This imperative has already 

been enshrined in policy documents, as the 18th Party Congress in 2012 

concluded, “[s]cience and technology innovation is a strategic support for 

raising social productivity and comprehensive national strength, and we 

must place it in a core position within our national security posture.”14 Xi 

Jinping amplified this mandate in 2016 when he stated that the “state needs 

the strategic support of science and technology more urgently than any 

other time in the past” and warned that China was in a precarious position 

in terms of its ability to innovate. He stated, the “situation that our country 

is under others’ control in core technologies of key fields has not changed 

fundamentally, and the country’s S&T foundation remains weak.”15 Most 

recently, China included similar sentiments in the 19th Party Congress final 

report, which stated, “We must keep it firm in our minds that technology is 

the core combat capability, encourage innovations in major technologies, 

and conduct innovations independently.”16

China’s efforts to overcome its deficiencies in defense science and technology are hampered by the fact that the resource commitment needed to 

reach and maintain technological parity with other major military powers 

(let alone preeminence) is enormous. Chinese analysts have made numerous 

references to the increasing costs of next-generation weapons platforms, 

citing, for example, that the research and development (R&D) expenditures 

for global first-generation fighters were under Rmb 500,000, while the cost 

to develop fourth-generation fighters was between Rmb 10 and 40 billion.17

The financial requirements for R&D alone, exacerbated by how long the R&D 

cycle now stretches, pose a significant resource challenge. Chinese analysts 

have also drawn attention to the rapidly rising cost of military operations, 

both in terms of finances as well as materiel consumption.18 Compounding 

these issues, the government is also confronting the enormous cost of transforming its economy in an effort to build China into an S&T power.
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

631

Resource Allocation 

Given these demands on its finite resources, China’s official policy statements 

have repeatedly warned that the country’s much-publicized defense budget 

increases would be insufficient to meet the PLA’s development needs.19 The 

head of National Defense University’s China Institute of National Defense 

Finance Studies [zhongguo guofang jinrong yanjiu hui, 中国国防金融研究会] 

highlighted the PLA’s budgetary constraints in a May 2016 speech, stating, 

“[r]ight now . . . we face the reality that there is an intensified contradiction 

between the rigid demand for increases in defense investment and the state’s 

fiscal situation. In relying solely on state finances for defense investment, 

we are already unable to support major advances in the development of our 

defense.”20 This dynamic has arguably worsened over the last 2 years, as 

China’s official defense budget increase was well below media expectations 

in 2016, and rose by an even smaller margin in 2017, thanks in part to slower 

economic growth.21 While China’s official defense budget does not capture all 

of its defense-related spending, it does capture most defense expenditures.22

Moreover, to the extent that China’s economic growth has slowed to a “new 

normal,” declining defense budget increases are most likely not overly disproportionate with trends in its total defense-related spending.23

As a result, there are no expectations that China can achieve its defense 

modernization goals solely by increases in the defense budget. Chinese 

leaders have been clear that the solution to this problem will not be guns-versus-butter budgetary tradeoffs that prioritize short-term military needs at the 

expense of economic imperatives. Their reluctance to raise defense spending 

more dramatically stems in part from the belief that it would harm economic 

growth (and thus the foundation for long-term military strength), as well 

as from the common perception that one of the major causes for the fall of 

the Soviet Union was its ruinous attempts to match U.S. military spending.

CMI Reforms as Strategic Response 

China’s current CMI reforms have evolved directly from concerns about 

resource constraints versus the need to promote defense modernization.24
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

632

Xi Jinping has stated that they are the product of research into how best 

to coordinate building the country’s economy and defense capabilities, 

and indeed, they reflect what has been a slow evolution in policy toward 

broader, deeper civil-military resource-sharing.25 As currently conceived, 

CMI reforms offer a way to ease PLA competition for resources by broadening and strengthening the resource base that China can use for building 

up defense. Phrased another way, they involve the “leveraging of dual-use 

technologies, policies, and organizations for military benefit.”26 Their 

basic prescription is the abandonment of governing norms that closed off 

[fengbi, 封闭] military and defense institutions from the rest of the country, 

and granted them their own dedicated resources, management systems, 

and policy and standards environments. Instead, Chinese CMI seeks to 

dramatically increase cross-fertilization and sharing between military and 

civilian institutions in a growing spectrum of activities like technology 

development, logistics, finance, and training. It seeks to merge civilian and 

military development resources into a combined system that pursues substantially more cost-effective “coordinated development” [xietiao fazhan, 

协调发展] and resource-sharing [ziyuan gongxiang, 资源共享] to satisfy 

the requirements for China’s national security and economic strategies.27 

CMI’s idealized application is a situation in which “military” and “civilian” 

development is organically blended into a single whole, the distribution of 

civil and military resources are optimized, and the overall efficiency of 

resource utilization is improved to the point where “one kind of resource 

investment produces multiple kinds of benefits” [yizhong ziyuan touru 

chansheng duozhong xiaoyi, 一种资源投入产生多种效益].28 

While CMI touches on a wide range of activities, it is primarily concerned with an efficient allocation and use of resources [ziyuan peizhi he 

shiyong, 资源配置和使用].29 Chinese analysts have often taken inspiration 

from the example set by U.S. moves toward CMI, which they feel considerably lightened the U.S. military’s burden on overall spending.30 To that 

end, China seeks to create coordinating institutions and mechanisms 

between military, political, economic, and social organizations that reduce 
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

633

allocative redundancies, achieve multiplier effects, and eliminate working 

at cross-purposes. As one analyst argued:

Under the premise of preserving core national defense building 

abilities [baochi hexin guofang jianshe nengli, 保持核心国防建设

能力], [CMI] should fully bring about the market’s determinative 

utility in resource allocation, and promote dual directional flow of 

resources between the military and local areas in things like technology, industrial arts, equipment, facilities, labor, capital, and 

information.It should make national defense construction even 

more fully utilize the fruits of economic and social development, 

and actively bring into play the important “pull effect” [ladong 

zuoyong, 拉动作用] that defense and military modernization 

have on economic and social development. We want a maximized 

“military benefit” for economic construction, and a maximized 

“economic benefit” for defense construction.31

In this fashion, China’s leaders feel they can create savings and make 

government spending more effective by doing things like minimizing 

redundant development efforts, such as when defense and civilian institutions are separately receiving grants to conduct similar research on the 

same technologies; finding cheaper civilian sources for generic goods and 

services that do not need to use specialized military providers; and ensuring 

consideration for defense needs in economic planning, so that spending and 

investments are mutually beneficial to the military and local economies.

Chinese strategists argue that CMI reforms can achieve the unification 

of the “strong army” and “rich country” ideals [fuguo he qiangjun xiang 

tongyi, 富国和强军相统一], providing a blueprint for overcoming structural 

impediments to military and economic development. Their support for the 

reforms is enhanced by the fact that CMI serves as a compelling strategic 

response to four major characteristics of modern informationized warfare. 

First, Chinese leadership has reached an analytical conclusion that military 

development and economic development are mutually dependent to a greater 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

634

extent than ever before. They believe it is impossible to be a global military 

power without also being a global economic power. This viewpoint took root 

decades ago, when Deng Xiaoping’s military reforms were conditioned by his 

belief that a country’s military strength was dependent on its economic base. 

However, the resource requirements for modern warfare are so extensive 

now that Chinese analysts are especially conscious of how vital an advanced 

economy is to PLA modernization. As Yu Chuanxin, one of the Academy of 

Military Science’s more prolific CMI experts explained, China’s pursuit of 

a strong military requires a leading economic and S&T foundation, which 

is only possible if China’s economy develops further, productivity levels 

increase, and its strength in S&T advances to the global forefront.32 At the 

same time, Yu argues that given the complex and increasing security threats 

facing China from foreign and domestic enemies, its economy and society 

need a strong military that can ensure security, stability, and peace.33 The 

defense sector can also contribute to economic development through multiple 

channels, such as the transfer of defense technologies for civilian use, integrating defense conglomerates into the broader economy, and contracting out for 

goods and services needed by the military. Therefore, national security and 

economic development should be thought of as a “single piece of steel” [yikuai 

zheng gang, 一块整钢] that serves China’s fundamental national interest.34 

The second characteristic of modern warfare that favors a move 

toward CMI reforms is that technology is increasingly dual-use, blurring 

[mohuhua, 模糊化] the lines between military and civilian.35 CMI analysts 

regularly claim that over 80 percent of technologies in the equipment used 

by leading military powers are dual-use, highlighting an imperative to 

more effectively promote civil-military technology sharing in China.36 In 

addition, the narrow but deep specialization needed to develop next-generation technologies has ensured that an ever-increasing number of industries 

are involved in defense technology development and production. Chinese 

researchers have cited statistics claiming that products from more than 

1,000 industrial technology categories were involved in the equipment 

used to conduct combat operations during the first Gulf War, up from 
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the roughly 160 used for World War II.37 These trends have only accelerated. As such, the limitations of relying primarily on military and defense 

industry resources to pursue defense-related S&T have been brought into 

stark relief. The technology demands of modern combat are so great that 

they far exceed [yuan yuan chaochule, 远远超出了] the research and production capacity of military academic, research, and defense industry 

institutions.38 CMI analysts have been critical of how slow China has been 

to adapt to these dual-use trends, citing widespread wasteful duplication 

in R&D efforts—stemming from bifurcated military and civilian research 

streams—as well as serious difficulties in converting R&D discoveries into 

the production of new defense technologies.39 

China’s slow response to dual-use dynamics has clear consequences 

in an era in which the civilian sector has increasingly become a source of 

major technological innovation.40 As one analysis in Qiushi observed, in 

the “20th century, defense science and technology was the locomotive for 

technological revolutions, and the main direction for the spread of new 

technology was from military to civilian sectors. However, disruptive 

technological change in the 21st century now usually starts in the civilian 

sector.”41 As this implies, in an increasing number of technology fields, 

civilian R&D has surpassed the capabilities of military and defense industry 

research institutions.42 Therefore, China has national security interests in 

helping its civilian technology sector develop as quickly as possible, as well 

as in ensuring that the PLA is able to rapidly absorb and apply whatever 

advanced technologies it produces. Given how fast technology is changing, 

an inability to develop or apply advanced S&T capabilities can have progressively dire effects on a country’s security.43 This logic was clearly evident 

in China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan [xin 

yidai rengong zhineng fazhan guihua, 新一代人工智能发展规划], released 

in July 2017, which established a goal of making China the world’s premiere 

global artificial intelligence innovation center by 2030, and also explicitly 

promoted a CMI strategy to ensure that corporate and civilian advances in 

artificial intelligence could be leveraged for national defense.44
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The third characteristic of modern warfare relevant to CMI reforms 

is its unprecedented resource demands, which has created incentives to 

more fully eliminate the distinction between peacetime development and 

preparation for war. “Combining peacetime and wartime preparations” 

[pingzhan jiehe, 平战结合] has long conditioned party leaders’ approach 

to domestic development strategies, but Chinese analysts have begun to 

advocate for a more extreme version due to their assessment that victory in a 

conflict between major powers is no longer determined by simple measures, 

such as numbers of ships and planes or industrial capacity. Instead, winning 

is determined by comprehensive national security systems, encompassing 

the whole of a country’s national security resources. Everything is brought 

to bear in a major conflict, and the state that is able to fuse its disparate 

resources together to exert the most strength is likely to emerge victorious. 

As a result, they argue that China must approach its military reforms from a 

systems engineering perspective, in which multiple disparate elements work 

together toward an overall goal. The factors involved in winning informationized conflicts—the investments to promote S&T development, reforms 

to promote innovation, infrastructure to support rapid deployments, training to ensure that troops can handle the complexities of informationized 

operations, and so forth—must be defined to include a very broad range of 

activities so that areas not normally viewed through the prism of defense are 

included in military reform and development strategies. Moreover, given 

the importance of these factors, they must be addressed continuously, not 

simply when security concerns are more urgent.

In recognition of these conditions, Chinese CMI analysts now describe 

war between states as a contest between entire systems [tixi duikang, 体系对

抗], encompassing (to a much more consequential degree than in previous 

eras) political, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural strength.45 

As such, failing to recognize the interdependence of defense reforms with 

the country’s overall policy environment is untenable: “In the information 

era the lines are increasingly blurred between concepts like security and 

development, economic and military development, civil and military, 
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peacetime and wartime, frontlines and rear areas, and military-use versus 

civilian-use. These concepts are being increasingly fused together.”46

The last characteristic of modern warfare that makes CMI a compelling 

strategic response to military reform requirements is that informationized 

war has increased the value of quality over quantity. China has enshrined 

this as official policy under Xi Jinping, who has stated that streamlining the 

PLA’s “scale, structure, and power composition” is an important part of the 

PLA’s ongoing reforms.47 As he noted in a July 2017 Politburo study session, 

“Quantity should be reduced and quality improved to build capable and 

efficient military forces, which should be science and technology–oriented 

rather than relying on labor intensity.”48 To this end, Xi has continued the 

PLA’s longstanding efforts to shed excess manpower. In January 2016, the 

CMC announced a plan to cut the PLA’s size by 300,000, focused in part on 

noncombat organizations and personnel [fei zhandou jigou he renyuan, 非

战斗机构和人员].49 Chinese commentators have noted that the troop cuts 

are a sign that the PLA will change “from big to strong” [you da dao qiang, 

由大到强], but the consequence of moving toward a leaner, meaner fighting 

force is that the PLA will be increasingly reliant on civilians, reserves, and 

militias to fulfill certain noncombat roles and responsibilities.50 CMI’s focus 

on promoting civil-military resource-sharing and using civilian capabilities 

to support the military is therefore well aligned with the needs arising from 

a smaller PLA.

Operationalizing Civil-Military Integration 

Having established why China wants to pursue a CMI development strategy, this section examines how and in what areas it has tried to apply CMI. 

It is important to recognize that even though China has been promoting 

CMI reforms in earnest for over 10 years, in most areas the reforms are still 

at early stages of development. At the start of this process the basic infrastructure for CMI—organizations to administer, regulations to govern, and 

institutional mechanisms to facilitate—needed to be established either from 

scratch or from rudimentary foundations.51 Defense conversion [jun zhuan 
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min, 军转民] was the only component of CMI reforms that could be considered solidly institutionalized, but this was due to policies that began at the 

start of the post-Mao era.52 China was unprepared to implement the other 

main components of what it wanted to accomplish with CMI—namely, 

promoting the flow of civilian technology, talent, capital, and information 

into the defense sector and encouraging a freer cross-exchange of civil and 

military resources. As a result, initial CMI reforms focused on identifying 

organizations with managing responsibilities for particular activities, 

crafting first-step regulations that removed barriers to civil-military coordination and/or facilitated better cooperation, creating better information 

flows between relevant civil-military actors, and pushing relevant actors to 

engage in CMI reform tasks.53 It was about laying groundwork rather than 

producing immediate results.

The process of breaking down civil-military barriers and establishing 

cross-cutting civil-military resource-sharing has moved slowly precisely 

because it upended entrenched norms and interests. CMI reforms required 

disruptive change, but Chinese leaders’ own unfamiliarity with CMI and 

their uncertainty about its impact helped pushed them toward a cautious 

policy approach. As one 2008 analysis observed, “CMI is a big issue and 

new topic, and our understanding and research is still in its initial stage.”54

Therefore, much of what China’s leadership promoted for CMI prior to Xi 

Jinping’s administration amounted to relatively basic reforms that took 

piecemeal steps to realign institutional behavior, such as changes that 

allowed private companies to begin to contract goods and services to the 

PLA, or the effort to encourage joint research, technology transfer, and 

personnel training agreements between civil and military companies, universities, and research institutions.55 The focus was in reorienting political, 

corporate, and military leaders toward collaborative development processes 

in which they had little to no experience.

China’s effort to create a basic infrastructure for CMI has been complicated by the fact that the operationalization of CMI reforms are unavoidably 

complex, involving interaction between an array of political, military, and 
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corporate organizations in different administrative levels and geographic 

areas, and across multiple areas of responsibility. It is at least “cross disciplinary” [kua lingyu, 跨领域] and “cross-departmental” [kua bumen, 跨

部门],but is more accurately understood as a “system of systems for coordinated military and economic development.”56 Xi Jinping has described it 

in similar terms, stating that “CMI development is a systems engineering 

issue, requiring systemic thinking, systemic methods, and systemic science 

in making relevant policy prescriptions.”57 As such, the activities that are 

potentially affected by CMI reforms, and the institutions involved, are 

vast, and the interaction between all of them conditions how effective the 

reforms will be.

Due in part to this complexity, China focused its initial CMI reform 

efforts in only four high-priority areas: weapons and equipment development, social support for the PLA [jundui shehuihua baozhang, 军队社会

化保障], defense personnel training, and defense mobilization.58 In each 

of these areas, China identified CMI reform goals, authorized or created 

managing organizations to oversee activity, modified or created rules and 

regulations to support activity, and reviewed implementation to identify 

ways to improve outcomes. It also developed multiple channels for information-sharing so that relevant actors could be more aware of CMI resources 

and opportunities.59

In practice, thanks in part to relentless advocacy for CMI reforms 

from political and military leaders, and political expectations for results, a 

broad swath of Chinese actors at both central and local levels has engaged 

in CMI activities. With so much room to improve, and so many actors 

involved, this participation has generated some notable positive outcomes. 

These include steadily broader and more substantive participation in PLA 

contracting work from civilian-owned companies, fueled in part by the PLA 

General Armament Department’s launch of the online All-Army Weapons and Equipment Procurement Information Network [quan jun wuqi 

zhuangbei caigou xinxi wang, 全军武器装备采购信息网] in January 2015. 

The Web site, now operated post-reorganization by the CMC Equipment 
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Development Department, became the PLA’s first authorized clearinghouse 

for defense procurement notices. More than 1,000 projects were put up 

for competitive bid in both 2016 and 2017—in theory, promoting cheaper, 

more efficient supply services—and the PLA hopes to double that number 

by 2020.60 CMI’s positive results also include the PLA’s increased reliance on 

contractors for basic supplies and simple military services such as barracks 

maintenance, heating supply, power supply, and cleaning, which is already 

common in more urban areas and is increasingly getting adopted in lower 

level and more remote areas.61

Positive developments aside, the operationalization of CMI reforms has 

thus far not fully met the government’s aspirations. Anecdotal evidence and 

the complaints of Chinese leaders (see below) suggest that implementing 

CMI reforms has not unleashed pent-up energies for CMI. The government 

has so far been willing to let CMI participants use a certain amount of 

initiative in implementing CMI measures, in the hopes that self-interested 

behavior would help discover best practices, but civil and military leaders 

have not aggressively embraced new opportunities for collaboration and 

resource-sharing. This could be interpreted as a signal that there is opposition to the reforms, but Chinese leaders and strategists have instead blamed 

the slow pace of meaningful compliance on the government’s inability to 

effectively respond to the difficulties involved in implementing the reforms.

Operationalizing CMI Reforms under Xi 

Xi Jinping did not immediately seek to leave his mark on China’s CMI policies 

when he first took office, but in early 2015 he initiated major new theoretical 

guidelines for CMI work that have shaped reforms since. At a meeting with 

PLA representatives in advance of the 2015 National People’s Congress, he 

announced a new phase in CMI reforms, stating, “China’s CMI development has just entered a transitional phase, from initial integration [chubu 

ronghe, 初步融合] to deep integration [shendu ronghe, 深度融合].”62 It was 

at this same meeting that Xi elevated CMI to a national strategy, setting CMI 

reforms on their current path of serving as a core component of the PLA 
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reform program. Both of these ideas reflected Xi’s belief that a CMI development strategy could “break new ground in the PLA’s capability building.”63

In promoting this new phase of CMI development, it is notable that 

Xi—despite the mixed record of success in China’s CMI reforms to this 

point—decided to dramatically expand the scale and scope of implementation. He has called for using CMI in a broader range of activities and raising 

the level and degree of integration wherever it is applied. While retaining 

CMI’s focus on weapons development, social support for the PLA, training, 

and mobilization, Xi has called for expanding CMI processes into new 

areas, specifically citing sea, space, and cyberspace [haiyang, taikong, wangluo kongjian, 海洋、太空、网络空间] as priorities.64 He has also ordered 

China’s academic, corporate, and research institutions to take the initiative 

in discovering, cultivating, and applying cutting-edge technologies that can 

help build up China’s military and national defense capabilities.65

In addition to new technology areas, Xi wants CMI reforms to focus 

more on organizational innovation, specifically in “three systems” [san ge 

tixi, 三个体系]:

■	 a management system that features unified leadership and coordination 

between the PLA and local governments

■	 an operational system in which work is led by the state, driven by 

demand, and unified by market operations

■	 a policy system that features a well-conceived set of policies (which covers all necessary areas), a complete set of policy linkages, and effectively 

encourages desired outcomes.66

Essentially, Xi is calling for CMI processes to begin working the way policymakers have hoped they would.

Indeed, Xi has been critical of the pace of progress made so far in CMI 

reforms, specifically flagging the country’s inability to quickly generate new 

ideas and concepts to guide CMI activity; the government’s inability to keep 

up with the demand for CMI-related policies, legislation, and operating 

mechanisms; and a lack of top-level, unified management systems. Notably, 
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he has also complained that CMI reform work was not being pursued with 

enough intensity [gongzuo zhixing lidu bugou, 工作执行力度不够].67 As 

he has stated, “We can do some things even better and some things even 

faster with respect to using CMI in S&T areas . . . and we will more quickly 

transform our military toward models based on quality and efficiency and 

concentrated science and technology.”68

Problems in Implementing CMI 

Xi Jinping is not the only critic of CMI’s operationalization, as scholars 

and political and military experts have been cataloging its unresolved 

problems for years. The critiques are motivated by the sense—clearly 

shared by Xi—that given how important CMI reforms are for PLA 

modernization, they have advanced far too slowly. For all the legitimate 

progress that has been made, it is still true that China has only succeeded 

in establishing a basic framework for CMI. Moreover, critical reforms 

such as the restructuring of defense industry scientific research institutions into corporations have taken much longer than originally expected, 

and are only now getting started.69

Thanks to the lack of transparency regarding China’s defense spending, it is hard to gauge how effective CMI has been at promoting a more 

efficient use of defense resources. However, it is telling that experts still 

discuss CMI’s ability to usher in a more productive use of resources in 

aspirational rather than empirical terms, and this style of argumentation 

suggests that there is not yet a wealth of relevant data to cite. In terms of 

CMI’s impact on defense science and technology, despite some encouraging 

signs of technological progress in advanced critical technologies like quantum communications, Chinese leaders have stated that China still lacks 

sufficient international core competitiveness in technological innovation.70

This is, of course, a matter of national security concern given how strength 

in science and technology is considered vital to China’s security and its 

ability to develop into a more advanced military power.
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Problems with Execution 

Despite the government’s clear prioritization of CMI reforms, Chinese 

analysts have observed a lingering (and at this point, increasingly problematic) lack of buy-in from actors impacted by the reforms. Some military 

and civilian operations still remain closed off [fengbi yunxing, 封闭运行] 

because administrators are not actively seeking out opportunities to work 

across the civil-military divide. Other officials act as if national defense 

was not an economic concern and vice versa.71 Analysts have also cited a 

widespread persistence of “no action, no initiative, no self-reliance” [deng, 

kao, yao, 等, 靠, 要] behavior among lower level officials, arguing that they 

too often wait for higher level administrators to deal with CMI implementation problems instead of taking them on themselves. In addition, analysts 

accuse some local officials of not treating CMI reforms with a sufficient 

level of importance, noting that they promote local interests at the expense 

of consideration for CMI development, as if CMI were only a priority for 

the national government or the military.72 

These critiques point to issues of misaligned incentives between 

national and local officials, but Chinese officials and analysts have avoided 

describing the problem in those terms. Instead, they have blamed these 

issues on a persistent superficial understanding of CMI, relating to what it 

entails, why it is important, and how it should guide behavior. The annual 

report on CMI development overseen by the Ministry of Industry and 

Information Technology and National Development and Reform Commission has found that some Chinese believe that any contact between civilian 

and military actors is evidence of successful CMI, and therefore limit their 

ambitions to simple activities that promote army-government and army-civilian unity rather than working on more substantive aspects of CMI. Some 

organizations have also overemphasized one component of CMI, as if it was 

simply about civilian support for the PLA or military interaction with civilian political and economic sectors, without understanding that CMI now 

prioritizes mutually beneficial bidirectional interaction.73 This latter problem 

is especially prevalent in the defense industries, where companies with long 
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experience and comfort in developing products for the civilian market focus 

on that aspect of CMI without expending much effort to utilize civilian 

resources in their operations. These assessments of the problems affecting 

CMI implementation are directly reflected in how Chinese leadership has 

responded, with calls for better education and guidance from the top.

The flip side of concerns about apathy is that with so many units participating in reforms—across industrial sectors; across military, political, 

academic, and business activities; and across central and lower level administrative units—CMI operationalization has been overly fragmented. The 

participants in a 2012–2013 year-long consultative investigation into the 

defense industry’s CMI development strategy, sponsored by the Chinese 

Academy of Engineering, found that individual industries and departments 

were pursuing idiosyncratic CMI strategies that had them scattering off in 

different directions.74 China’s military, economic, and political institutions 

at different administrative levels (for example, national, provincial, municipal, and so forth) established organizations to manage CMI work within 

their specific jurisdictions, but there was little regular coordination between 

them, and coordination work was slow, cumbersome, and consultative, not 

collaborative. In general, these institutions were working individually, but 

not collectively, to advance CMI policies. They were not used to the level 

(and extent) of coordination being asked of them, and in the absence of clear 

guidance and authoritative pressure, it has been easier to remain in their 

comfort zone.75 This is problematic for a policy that requires cross-sectoral, 

cross-industry, and cross-administrative cooperation to work optimally. 

Indeed, CMI work—in the words of one recent commentary—has thus far 

only been implemented to a “narrow, shallow, and superficial” degree.76

Problems with Top-Level Coordination 

Chinese analysts have blamed the above problems on ineffective top-level 

design [dingceng sheji, 顶层设计], a suboptimal outcome that stems from 

the inescapable fact that Chinese CMI is a massive management challenge. 

It requires coordination and cooperation among the leading institutions 
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645

in charge of the military, national economy, administrative institutions, 

and industrial sectors, and affects a broad, cross-sector range of activities, 

including science and technology, education, and the economy. Traditionally, this level of coordination has not been ingrained within Chinese 

institutions, and in the absence of strong national guidance with clear 

incentives, Chinese actors have found it much easier to avoid the effort and 

sacrifice required to make dramatic behavioral changes. This resistance 

has made the generic benefits of CMI—integrating economic and military 

development into unified strategic planning and allocating resources more 

efficiently—much more difficult to achieve.77

These problems reflect China’s inability to effectively coordinate the 

more complex aspects of CMI policymaking among CMI’s leading stakeholders. Functional departments under the State Council and CMC have 

had oversight over individual aspects of CMI, like defense industries, 

defense S&T development, civil air defense, national defense transportation, and defense education, but none has had clear lines of authority 

over the others to lead and coordinate action. As a result, although there 

is a consensus among both military and civilian leaders concerning the 

importance and urgency [jinpoxing, 紧迫性] of CMI, there are still significant differences between military and local civilian actors [jun di zhijian 

de renshi piancha bijiao da, 军地之间的认识偏差比较大] regarding the 

concrete steps to accomplish these goals. Areas of contention include determining civil-military functions, division of responsibilities, and operational 

processes.78 China has also failed to settle on ways to routinize stable operational processes for interagency coordination, as well as for other CMI 

management activities such as linking available resources to requirements 

and implementing civil-military resource-sharing.79 

Experts have consistently argued for years that many of the problems 

in CMI implementation are due to the central government’s disjointed 

management of the issue, which affected its ability to educate and guide 

behavior. Until January 2017, when the government launched the new 

Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development 
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646

(discussed below), China had avoided giving any single institution leadership over the CMI portfolio. Most likely, this was due to the fact that CMI 

straddled both military and economic activities but was only designed to 

affect some aspects of military and economic development. Thus, a supra 

agency with managing authority over only a limited range of its subordinates’ activities was not practical or feasible. Instead, China relied for years 

on the Department of CMI Promotion [junmin jiehe tuijin si, 军民结合推

进司]—a subordinate unit in the Ministry of Industry and Information 

Technology—to serve as the government’s highest administrative body 

devoted solely to CMI work.80 In practice, the department only had limited 

value in advancing reforms, as it had no discernible ability to set or enforce 

CMI policy and lacked the authority to play much of a managing role. It was 

ostensibly charged with promoting greater integration between civil-military 

S&T institutions, but since the actual management of these institutions fell 

to a host of other higher ranking agencies (among them the Ministry of 

Science and Technology, Ministry of Commerce, National Development and 

Reform Commission, and State Administration for Science and Technology 

for National Defense), it could do little to affect actual behavior. As a result, 

its activities were restricted to serving as a CMI facilitator, in which it acted 

as an information resource for CMI opportunities and brought various 

stakeholders together to find opportunities to deepen CMI development.81

The problem of diffused national leadership over reforms was exemplified by the 2010 Opinions on Establishing and Improving a “Civil-Military 

Integration” and “Locating Military Potential in Civilian Capabilities” 

Weapons Research and Production System [guanyu jianli he wanshan junmin ronghe yu jun yu min wuqi zhuangbei keyan shengchan tixi de ruogan 

yijian, 关于建立和完善军民融合寓军于民武器装备科研生产体系的若干

意见] issued by the Central Military Commission and State Council. This 

document was the most authoritative guideline for the CMI reform agenda 

through the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), and in that context it is worth 

noting how many institutions were given responsibility for CMI implementation. The Opinions were addressed to the People’s governments in 
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647

each province, autonomous region, and provincial-level city, the ministries 

and directly managed organizations under the State Council, the People’s 

Armed Police, each of the PLA’s services and branches, the four PLA general 

departments, each military region, each military district, the Academy 

of Military Science, the National Defense University, and the National 

University of Defense Technology. They called on “relevant departments” 

in the PLA and State Council to formulate concrete methods and policies 

to address CMI requirements, to focus their planning on developing links 

between units involved in CMI, and to implement CMI policies in close 

coordination with each other, based on their (unspecified) division of 

responsibilities. They also called on local governments and military equipment management departments at each level to actively work in concert 

and implement a full set of measures to ensure the smooth advancement of 

development for the CMI weapons research and production system. As one 

analysis highlighted, this guidance—in a top-level document that shaped 

CMI development in weapons research and production for years—placed 

overall managerial responsibilities in the hands of at least 20 different 

institutions under the CMC and State Council.82 

China sought to mitigate these problems by creating top-level coordination groups, such as the Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Small Group 

for the Development of the (CMI) Weapons Research and Production 

System, which debuted in 2012. Led by the Ministry of Industry and 

Information Technology, the small group featured senior officials from 23 

military and civilian departments.83 It has met every year since its launch, 

and according to reports the meetings typically focus on discussing each 

member’s respective efforts to support the current CMI priorities.84 While 

this information-sharing is presumably helpful, the body is not equipped 

to resolve conflicts or disagreements, given that all members are on the 

same levels of the administrative hierarchy.

A diffused management of CMI was less consequential when China’s 

key tasks were focused on developing a basic institutional framework for 

CMI. However, as CMI has progressed along its development path, the 
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problems of disorganized management of CMI have become more obvious 

and acute. They are not only confined to the issues of coordination and 

superficial implementation, described above. As Chinese analysts have 

argued, inadequate management has also affected the pace of technology 

innovation, created widespread unnecessary duplication in investment and 

policies, failed to sufficiently encourage competition, and ultimately led to 

a huge amount of waste [juda langfei, 巨大浪费].85

Improving Top-Level Design 

Given the difficulty in resolving the management issues described above, 

Chinese CMI experts have promoted the creation of a national-level managing organization with the authority to oversee top-level design of CMI 

reforms.86 These calls have now been answered. China launched a Central 

Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development [junmin ronghe fazhan weiyuanhui, 军民融合发展委员会]. This commission, 

announced on January 22, 2017, is chaired by Xi Jinping, and its original 

members included three other Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) 

members (Li Keqiang, Liu Yunshan, and Zhang Gaoli) as vice chairmen, as 

well as CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Qiliang and Fan Changlong.87 According 

to news reports, the commission was specifically created to provide unified 

leadership of CMI decisionmaking, acting as a top-level coordinating organization overseeing the most significant issues affecting CMI development. 

It reports directly to the Politburo and PBSC, and its importance is reflected 

in the fact that Zhang Gaoli was chosen to lead the commission’s General 

Affairs Office [bangongshi, 办公室].88 As the South China Morning Post

article on his appointment observed, the head of the General Affairs Office 

is more typically a lower grade leader, so it is unusual that a PBSC member 

was chosen to lead the commission’s day-to-day operations.89

In a sign of how important its work is considered, the commission has 

already met three times—in June and September 2017 and in March 2018. 

At the September 2017 meeting, Xi called on members to strengthen toplevel design of CMI development and urged them to insist on making key 
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649

breakthroughs, while focusing both on present and long-term strategies 

for CMI development.90 The members also reviewed accomplishments 

since the first meeting and discussed work items relating to the passage 

of recent CMI guidelines, including the Guidelines for Defense Science 

and Technology Industry Development During the 13th Five-Year Plan 

(2016–2020), Opinions on Promoting Deep Development of Civil-Military 

Integration in the Defense Science and Technology Industries, and Opinions on Implementing Deep Development of Civil-Military Integration in 

Military Logistics During the 13th Five-Year Plan.91 The commission’s third 

meeting called for strengthening the leading role of strategy and ideology, 

for the CMI development strategy to take root in each region and department, and for reforms to achieve effective results in key domains, regions, 

and industries. It also highlighted the need for key reform breakthroughs, 

such as quickly eliminating barriers to defense conversion [jun zhuan min, 

军转民] and civilian participation in the defense industries [min can jun, 

民参军] and hastening key reforms in areas like defense S&T industries, 

PLA equipment acquisition, pricing of military supplies, and unbalanced 

civil-military taxation policies.92

While the launch of the commission is an important step for the management of CMI reforms, none of the management challenges that existed 

before its creation has melted away. It must still deal with a sprawling network of institutions (with a diverse set of functions) that implement CMI 

directives. It also still faces the problem of misaligned incentives between 

national- and local-level actors, as party leadership appears to expect lower 

level compliance with CMI directives without acknowledging that they 

may be at odds with corporate and organizational interests. However, CMI 

operationalization is now led by a higher authority that can issue concrete 

guidance, push authoritatively for greater interagency cooperation, and 

more credibly demand a focus on overarching goals. In addition, the commission allows the government’s CMI management system to move toward 

a more rational division of labor—where top-level management organs 

make policy decisions, interministerial coordinating organs allow leaders 
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from relevant departments to consult with their counterparts, CMI departments lead, and relevant departments carry out centralized management.93

Conclusion 

Xi Jinping’s assessment that China has only just emerged from its initial 

phase of CMI development serves as a useful reminder that CMI is still a 

work in progress, with fundamental questions about how to operationalize 

and manage it still unsettled. In particular, despite full agreement on the 

abstract need for CMI, China’s aspirations for it involve an extremely complex level of system of systems (interministerial, cross-sectoral, center-local, 

and civil-military) cooperation, and substantive buy-in for this degree of 

integration is not yet widespread. As described in this chapter, Chinese 

actors throughout the CMI universe have shown varying levels of commitment to CMI reforms, and while the sustained drumbeat of pressure from 

top-level leadership makes it unlikely that disinterested actors can fully 

resist efforts to deepen CMI, they can surely limit how far CMI behavior 

is institutionalized. As such, China’s prospects for fully integrating CMI 

processes into day-to-day PLA functions remain in doubt, and the track 

record suggests that even positive returns will involve a longer and more 

difficult process than the party currently acknowledges.

However, China is clearly improving its understanding of CMI-related 

policy challenges and has shown a commitment to working through them 

despite their obvious complexity. Even before the creation of the Central 

Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, one of 

China’s leading voices on CMI strategy argued that China had started 

the process of taking on the deep-rooted obstructions that had hampered 

CMI development.94 This effort is reflected in the designation of CMI as 

a national strategy in 2015, and Xi’s engagement on the issue, which has 

created a new urgency to generate substantive CMI returns. According to 

the reform timeline that the CMC described when it announced its PLA 

reform plan in January 2016, CMI reforms would be a focus from 2017 to 

2020. As such, the effort to adjust, optimize, and improve its workings is 
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

651

just getting started, and still has 3 years to go.95 It is too early to assess how 

well it has gone.

The government has set a goal of “breakthrough” development in 

CMI by 2020, and while this is a vaguely defined objective, there is reason 

for Chinese leaders to think it is reachable. An institutional framework 

for CMI operations is already in place, a better management structure 

has been devised, and invested leaders have accrued several years’ worth 

of watching CMI in practice and working through policy solutions to 

emergent problems. As a result, although CMI reforms have thus far not 

delivered on their promise, and still face significant hurdles, there is more 

of a chance for CMI to take hold. If it does, it will mark a turning point in 

the PLA’s reforms, with tangible and significant multiplier effects in areas 

such as defense science and technology, logistics, military education, and 

mobilization. By the same token, it would be equally important if China 

continued to struggle with CMI implementation. A failure to deepen CMI 

reforms would serve as a drag on the PLA’s reform process and impair 

China’s ability to fully meet the challenges—as it currently sees them—of 

modern informationized warfare.

Notes

1 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age 

of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 10 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 1.

2 Cao Zhi, Li Xuanliang, and Wang Shibin, “Xi Jinping: Unswervingly Implement Comprehensive Reforms for the Strong Army Strategy and Take the Path of a 

Strong Army with Chinese Characteristics” [习近平: 全面实施改革强军战略坚定

不移走中国特色强军之路], Xinhua [新华], November 26, 2015, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-11/26/c_1117274869.htm>.

3 Ibid.

4 As Chinese analysts have noted, China has a long tradition of integrating 

military and civilian resources and functions, including the “PLA, Inc.” that thrived 

under Deng Xiaoping. However, the People’s Republic of China had not previously 

used civil-military integration (CMI) as a modernization strategy.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

652

5 Jiang Luming, “The Overall Strategy for National Security and Development” 

[统筹国家安全和发展的总方略], China Defense Daily [中国国防报], June 2, 2016, 3, 

available at <www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2016-06/02/content_146372.htm>.

6 Ibid., 3.

7 Jiang Luming, “Why Civil-Military Integration Has Been Raised to a 

National Strategy” [军民融合发展缘何上升为国家战略], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

February 3, 2017, 7; Wang Weihai, “Uphold Taking the Strong Army Road of 

Civil-Military Integration with Chinese Characteristics” [坚持走中国特色军民

融合强军之路], Qiushi [求是], August 2, 2017, available at <www.qstheory.cn/

wp/2017-08/02/c_1121421061.htm>.

8 Wang Lu, “Achieve a Unification of ‘Rich Country, Strong Army’ in the 

Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People” [在民族伟大复兴进程中实现富国和强

军相统一], Qiushi [求是], April, 26, 2017, available at <www.qstheory.cn/dukan/

qs/2017-04/26/c_1120876410.htm>.

9 Ibid.

10 Jiang Luming, A Selection of Lectures by Jiang Luming [姜鲁鸣讲稿自选集] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2014), 71.

11 Shou Xiaosong, ed., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013), 267–268.

12 Hou Guangming and Li Cunjin, Applied Research in Methods to Promote 

Defense Industry Innovation [军工企业创新方法推广应用研究] (Beijing: Science 

Press [科学出版社], 2014), 1.

13 “Suggestions on Implementing Innovation-Driven Development in Defense 

Areas, and Promoting Civil-Military Integration-Style Development” [关于在国防领

域实施创新驱动发展战略, 推进军民融合式发展的建议], in Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy [军民融合发展战略], ed. Chinese Academy of Engineering 

[中国工程院] (Beijing: Higher Education Press [高等教育出版社 ], 2014), 440.

14 Hou and Li, Applied Research in Methods to Promote Defense Industry 

Innovation, 1.

15 “President Xi Says China Faces Major Science, Technology ‘Bottleneck,’” 

Xinhua, June 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-

06/01/c_135402671.htm>.

16 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous 

Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese 

Characteristics for a New Era,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.

com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf>.
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

653

17 Li Jia, He Siyuan, and Lu Pei, The Civilian Contracting Big Screen Has 

Opened, [We Discuss] Preferred Platform Companies [民参军大幕开启, 优选平台

型公司] (Guiyang, China: Hua Chuang Securities [华怆机械军工], June 24, 2015), 

9. To be clear, in this instance the authors are speaking of worldwide generations 

of fighters, rather than Chinese fighter generations specifically.

18 Yu Chuanxin, Actual Combat Series on National Defense and Armed Forces 

in the New Situation [实战化的军民融合] (Beijing: PLA Publishing House [解放军

出版社], 2015), 005–006.

19 Eric Hagt, “Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense Industry 

Reform,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities 

of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 481–546.

20 “Liu Yasu’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony for the China Institute of 

National Defense Finance Studies” [刘亚苏在中国国防金融研究会成立大会上的

讲话], China National Defense Finance Association [中国国防金融研究会], May 

12, 2016, available at <www.chinaelections.org/article/1974/243072.html>.

21 Hu Zhengyang and Zhen Yi, Looking at the Next 15 Years in Military Power and 

Defense Industries from the Perspective of Defense Budgets [从军费看军力, 军工未来十

五年] (Guangzhou, China: GF Securities [广发军工], March 23, 2016), 4; Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard, “China Confirms 7 Percent Increase in 2017 Defense Budget,” 

Reuters, March 6, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-defence/china-confirms-7-percent-increase-in-2017-defense-budget-idUSKBN16D0FF>.

22 Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: 

Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” China Quarterly, vol. 216 (December 2013), 805–830.

23 In other words, China seems unlikely to be hiding dramatically higher 

increases in other budgetary areas that affect defense modernization, while allowing the rate of increase in its defense budget to fall.

24 Liu Shuoyang, “Grand Strategy to Promote the Defense Economy Development” [推进国防经济发展的宏伟方略], Military Economic Research [军事经济

研究], no. 11 (2015), 14.

25 Luan Dalong, “Promote Mixed Ownership Reform with the Help of 

Defense Industry Asset Securitization” [借助军工资产证券化促进混合所有制

改革], Defense Science and Technology Industry [国防科技工业], no. 9 (2016), 38.

26 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2017), 67.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

654

27 Wang Shunian, “Coordinate Economic and National Defense Construction—Take the Road of Civil-Military Integration-Style Development with Chinese 

Characteristics” [统筹经济建设和国防建设 走中国特色军民融合式发展路子], 

China Reform Daily [中国改革报], December 26, 2012, available at <www.crd.net.

cn/2012-12/26/content_6143909.htm>; Zhang Fengpo, “Civil-Military Integration 

Inserts Soaring Wings for a Strong, High-Tech Military” [军民融合为科技强军插

上腾飞的翅膀], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 21, 2017, available at <www.stdaily.

com/index/toutiao/2017-06/21/content_554673.shtml>.

28 Jiang Ying, “Military Reforms and Deep Civil-Military Integration” [军队

改革与军民深度融合], National Defense [国防], no. 5 (2017), 14; Zhong Tao and Li 

Yaping, “The Role of National Guidance in Deepening Civil-Military Integration” 

[论军民融合深度发展的国家主导作用], China Military Science [中国军事科学], 

no. 5 (2016), 75.

29 Zhu Qinglin et al., The Theory of Military and Civilian Integration [军民融

合论] (Beijing: Haichao Press [海潮出版社], 2014), 4; Jiang Luming, A Selection of 

Lectures by Jiang Luming [姜鲁鸣讲稿自选集] (Beijing: National Defense University 

Press [国防大学出版社], 2014), 1.

30 Li Xin and Wang Maosen, Defense Industry Mid-Year Strategy Report [

军工行业年中策略报告] (Nanchang, China: AVIC Securities, June 30, 2016), 14.

31 Gu Tongfei, Optimizing the Structure of the Civil-Military Integration Equipment Market [军民融合装备市场结构优化] (Beijing: National Defense Industry 

Press [国防工业出版社], 2017), 9.

32 Yu, Actual Combat Series on National Defense and Armed Forces in the 

New Situation, 004.

33 Ibid.

34 Jiang, A Selection of Lectures by Jiang Luming, 72.

35 Yang Shaoxian, “2017 Development Trends in Civil-Military Integration” 

[2017年军民融合的发展趋势], Defense Science and Technology Industry [国防科

技工业], no. 4 (2017), 31.

36 Wang, “Achieve a Unification of ‘Rich Country, Strong Army’ in the Great 

Rejuvenation of the Chinese People.”

37 Jiang, A Selection of Lectures by Jiang Luming, 71.

38 Ibid., 72.

39 Ma Xianzhang, “A Study on the Deep Development of Civil and Military 

Integration” [军民融合深度发展问题研究], Proceedings of the 5th Conference 

on Chinese Command and Control [第五届中国指挥控制大会论文集] (Beijing: 
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

655

Publishing House of Electronics Industry [电子工业出版社], 2017), 9; Daniel 

Alderman et al., “The Rise of Chinese Civil-Military Integration,” in Forging 

China’s Military Might, ed. Tai Ming Cheung (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 2014), 109–135.

40 Wang Weihai, “The New State of Global Civil-Military Integration Development” [世界军民融合发展新态势], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 17, 2017, 7.

41 Wang, “Achieve a Unification of ‘Rich Country, Strong Army’ in the Great 

Rejuvenation of the Chinese People”; He Xinwen and Hou Guangming, “Constructing National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Organizational Systems 

on the Basis of Civil-Military Integration” [基于军民结合的国防科技创新组织系统

的构建], China Soft Sciences Supplement [中国软科学增刊 (上)], no. 1 (2009), 333.

42 Lin Luning, “Some Thoughts on Promoting CMI Development in Our 

Defense S&T Industries” [关于推进我国国防科技工业军民融合发展的若干思考], 

Defense Science and Technology Industry [国防科技工业], no. 8 (2010), 33.

43 Shou, The Science of Military Strategy, 269; Jacques S. Gansler, Defense 

Conversion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 9–13.

44 Elsa Kania, “The Dual-Use Dilemma in China’s New AI Plan: Leveraging Foreign Innovation Resources and Military-Civil Fusion,” Lawfareblog.

com, July 28, 2017, available at <https://lawfareblog.com/dual-use-dilemma-chinas-new-ai-plan-leveraging-foreign-innovation-resources-and-military-civil>.

45 Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and Systems Destruction Warfare: 

How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018); Wang, “Uphold Taking the Strong Army Road of Civil-Military 

Integration with Chinese Characteristics”; Yu Chuanxin and Zhou Jianping, eds., 

Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Integration Development [军民融合式发展 - 理

论与实践] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 2010), 32.

46 Jiang, “Why Civil-Military Integration Has Been Raised to a National 

Strategy,” 7.

47 An Baijie, “Xi: Reform of PLA Calls for ‘All-Out Efforts,’” China Daily

(Beijing), July 26, 2017, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-07/26/

content_30246927.htm>.

48 “China Targets Smaller but Better Structured Armed Forces,” China 

Military Online, July 26, 2017, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-

07/26/content_7690835.htm>.

49 “The Central Military Commission’s Opinion on Deepening Military 

and National Defense Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

656

Xinhua [新华], January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

50 Jiang Luming, “Winning the Tough Battle That Is Military Reform” [打赢军

队改革这场攻坚战], Guangming Daily [光明日报], July 25, 2017, 2, available at <http://

epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2017-07/25/nw.D110000gmrb_20170725_1-02.htm>.

51 The current Chinese term for CMI [junmin ronghe, 军民融合], which 

conveys the kind of thorough integration of civilian and military resources that 

the government now promotes, became canon after it appeared in the 17th Party 

Congress’s final report in 2007.

52 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense 

Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Chen Xianfan, Zhou Ershuang, and Zhu Yueru, Civil-Military Integration: National Strategy, Strong Country 

and Invigorated Military [军民融合: 国家战略, 强国兴军] (Suzhou, China: Soochow 

Securities, Feburary 22, 2016), 25.

53 The best example of these types of reform measures was the “Opinions on 

Establishing and Improving a ‘Civil-Military Integration’ and ‘Locating Military 

Potential in Civilian Capabilities’ Weapons Research and Production System” 

[guanyu jianli he wanshan junmin ronghe yu jin yu min wuqi zhuangbei keyan 

shengchan tixi de ruogan yijian, 关于建立和完善军民融合寓军于民武器装备科

研生产体系的若干意见] that the Central Military Commission and State Council 

released in 2010, which set the CMI reform agenda in defense science and technology through the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015).

54 Zhu et al., The Theory of Military and Civilian Integration, 2.

55 Alderman et al., “The Rise of Chinese Civil-Military Integration.”

56 Di Bian, “Group Together Policy and Strength to Collectively Advance 

Defense Contracting” [群策群力共推民参军], Defense Science and Technology 

Industry [国防科技工业], no. 6 (2014), 14; Gu Tongfei [顾桐菲], Optimizing the 

Structure of the Civil-Military Integration Equipment Market [军民融合装备市场

结构优化] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press [国防工业出版社], 2017), 9–10.

57 “Focus Hard on Key Areas in Civil-Military Integration Development” [向军

民融合发展重点领域聚焦用力], Changjiang Daily [长江日报], September 23, 2017, 8.

58 Zhu et al., The Theory of Military and Civilian Integration, 5.

59 These include a series of annual catalogs of dual-use and defense conversion 

technologies seeking investment support and declassified defense patent catalogs 

published by the Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department’s National Defense Intellectual Property Rights Bureau, which are designed 
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

657

to help lower defense research and development costs for academic institutions, 

research institutes, and civilian contractors.

60 Jiang, “Military Reforms and Deep Civil-Military Integration,” 16; 2018 

Investment Strategies for the Defense Industries [军工行业2018年度投资策略] 

(Beijing: Northeast Securities Co., Ltd., November 10, 2017), 9.

61 Jiang, “Military Reforms and Deep Civil-Military Integration,” 17; Yan 

Guiwang [严贵旺], “Tibet Advances the Building of an Army-Local Civil-Military 

Integration Guarantee System” [西藏军地推进军民融合保障体系建设], China 

Defense Daily [中国国防报], January 12, 2017, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.

com/mil/2017-01/12/c_129442916.htm>; “PLA Invites Civil Logistics Firms to Help 

Distribute Materials,” China Military Online, May 3, 2017, available at <http://eng.

chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-05/03/content_7586584.htm>.

62 Sun Yanhong, Yuan Wei, and Chen Li, “A Study of Xi Jinping’s Strategic 

Thought on Civil-Military Integration” [习近平军民融合发展战略思想研究], 

China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 2 (2017), 12.

63 “China’s Xi Calls for Closer Civil-Military Integration to Boost Army 

Combativeness,” Xinhua, March 12, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.

com/english/2015-03/12/c_134062544.htm>.

64 Gu Tongfei [顾桐菲], Optimizing the Structure of the CMI Equipment 

Market [军民融合装备市场结构优化] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press 

[国防工业出版社], 2017), 10.

65 Sun, Yuan, and Chen, “A Study of Xi Jinping’s Strategic Thought on Civil-Military Integration,” 13.

66 Bi Jingjing and Xiao Dongsong, eds., China Civil-Military Integration 

Development Report 2016 [中国军民融合发展报告2016] (Beijing: National Defense 

University Press [国防大学出版社], 2016), 27–61; Wang, “Achieve a Unification of 

‘Rich Country, Strong Army’ in the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People.”

67 Jiang, “The Overall Strategy for National Security and Development,” 3.

68 Li Xuanliang, Wang Jingguo, and Wang Yushan, “Xi Jinping: Accelerate the 

Setting Up of a Civil-Military Integration Innovation System in Order to Provide a 

Powerful Support for Our Army Building” [习近平: 加快建立军民融合创新体系为

我军建设提供强大科技支撑], Xinhua [新华], March 12, 2017, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017lh/2017-03/12/c_1120613988.htm>.

69 Yu Xiangming, “The First Batch of Military Research Institutes Have Begun 

Restructuring—Accelerating the Implementation of Civil-Military Integration” [首

批家军工科研院所转制启动—军民融合加速实施], Shanghai Securities News [上
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

658

海证券报], July 10, 2017, available at <http://stock.qq.com/a/20170710/003913.htm>; 

Bank of China, “Mechanized Defense Industry 2015 Fall [Investment] Strategy” [

机械军工2015年秋季策略], August 14, 2015, 26.

70 Elsa Kania and Stephen Armitage, “Disruption under the Radar: Chinese 

Advances in Quantum Sensing,” China Brief 17, no. 11 (August 17, 2017), 15–21; 

Elsa Kania and John Costello, “Quantum Leap (Part 1): China’s Advances in Quantum Information Science,” China Brief 16, no. 18 (December 5, 2016), 11–16; Elsa 

Kania and John Costello, “Quantum Leap (Part 2): The Strategic Implications of 

Quantum Technologies,” China Brief 16, no. 19 (December 21, 2016), 21–27; Lian 

Weiliang, “Use Reform and Innovation to Advance Civil-Military Integration 

Development” [以改革创新促进军民融合发展], Qiushi [求是], October 31, 2016, 

available at <www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-10/31/c_1119817228.htm>.

71 Wen Xiaoge, “In-Depth Civil-Military Integration of Science, Technology 

and Industry for National Defense” [论国防科技工业军民融合深度发展], China 

Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 1 (2016), 48.

72 Zhong and Li, “The Role of National Guidance in Deepening Civil-Military 

Integration,” 77.

73 Bi Jingjing and Xiao Dongsong, eds., China Civil-Military Integration Development Report 2015 [中国军民融合发展报告2015] (Beijing: Defense University 

Press [国防大学出版社], 2015), 12–13.

74 “Recommendations for Reforming the Top-Level Management System and 

Mechanisms for Civil-Military Integration Development” [关于改革完善军民融合发

展顶层管理体制机制的建议], in Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy, 439.

75 Zhong and Li, “The Role of National Guidance in Deepening Civil-Military 

Integration,” 75–79.

76 Xie Wuzhong, “Five Development Concepts to Guide the Deeper Development of Civil-Military Integration” [以五大发展理念引导推动军民融合深度发

展], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 25, 2016, 6, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/

content/2016-01/25/content_136357.htm>.

77 Zhong and Li, “The Role of National Guidance in Deepening Civil-Military 

Integration,” 75–76.

78 Ma, “A Study on the Deep Development of Civil and Military Integration,” 9–10.

79 Zhong and Li, “The Role of National Guidance in Deepening Civil-Military 

Integration,” 75–76.

80 Task Group for “Research on Chinese Defense Science and Technology Industries’ Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy Project” [“中
Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms

659

国国防科技工业军民融合式发展战略研究”项目课题组], “Research Report on 

Chinese Defense Science and Technology Industries’ Civil-Military Integration 

Development Strategy” [中国国防科技工业军民融合式发展战略研究报告], in 

Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy, 448.

81 Dong Xiaohui, Zeng Li, and Huang Chaofeng, “The Present Condition of 

Military and Civilian Integration Development of National Defense Industry Base 

and the Countermeasure” [国家工业基础军民融合发展现状与对策], Military 

Economics Research [军事经济研究], no. 4 (2012), 19.

82 Ibid.

83 Task Group for “Research on Chinese Defense Science and Technology 

Industries’ Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy” Project, 448.

84 “The Sixth Meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Small Group for 

the Development of ‘Civil-Military Integration’ and ‘Locating Military Potential 

in Civilian Capabilities’ Weapons Research and Production System” [军民结合寓

军于民武器装备科研生产体系建设部际协调小组第六次会议召开], Changzhou 

Jianeng Management Consulting [常州嘉能管理咨询], April 6, 2017, available at 

<www.jmrhw.org/gczx/20170406/1695.html>.

85 “Recommendations for Hastening Civil-Military Integration-Style Development in China’s National Defense Science and Technology Industries” [关于加

快我国国防科技工业军民融合式发展的建议], in Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy [军民融合发展战略], ed. Chinese Academy of Engineering [中国

工程院] (Beijing: Higher Education Press [高等教育出版社], 2014), 437.

86 Yu Chuanxin, “Some Thoughts on the Top-Level Design of Civil-Military 

Integration Development” [军民融合式发展顶层设计的几点思考], in Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy [军民融合发展战略], ed. Chinese Academy 

of Engineering [中国工程院] (Beijing: Higher Education Press [高等教育出版社], 

2014), 94–97.

87 Choi Chi-yuk, “In Unusual Move, Xi Appoints Top Party Leader to 

Lead Daily Affairs of Key Committee,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

June 21, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2099248/xi-jinping-further-consolidates-power-commission>. It is unclear 

what the senior leadership of the commission will look like in the wake of Liu and 

Zhang’s retirement at the 19th Party Congress. News items about the third meeting 

of the commission, held on March 2, 2018, did not describe personnel changes 

but noted that Li Keqiang, Zhang Gaoli, and Wang Huning were in attendance. 

Zhang was presumably in attendance because his term on the Politburo did not 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

660

officially expire until later in March 2018. See “Xi Jinping: Truly Grasp and Work 

to Firmly Implement the Civil-Military Integration Development Strategy, Open 

up a New Aspect of the New Era of Deeper Civil-Military Integration Development” [习近平:真抓实干坚定实施军民融合发展战略 开创新时代军民融合

深度发展新局面], Xinhua, March 2, 2018, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

politics/2018-03/02/c_1122478435.htm>.

88 Li Junhai and Wang Nianchun, Central Commission for Integrated Military 

and Civilian Development Is Created, and This Is Good for the Long-Term Development of the Defense Industries [军民融合发展委员会成立, 利好军工长期发展] 

(Shenzhen, China: Guosen Securities [国信证券], January 23, 2017), 1.

89 Choi, “In Unusual Move, Xi Appoints Top Party Leader to Lead Daily 

Affairs of Key Committee.”

90 “Focus Hard on Key Areas in Civil-Military Integration Development,” 8.

91 Ibid.

92 Xi Jinping: Truly Grasp and Work to Firmly Implement the Civil-Military 

Integration Development Strategy.”

93 You Guangrong and Zhao Linbang, Development of Civil-Military Science 

and Technology Integration—Theory and Practice [军民科技融合发展 — 理论与实

践] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press [国防工业出版社], 2017), 13.

94 Yu Chuanxin, “On the Four Principal Points in the Strategy of Civil-Military Integrated Development” [论军民融合发展战略的四个关节点], China Military 

Science [中国军事科学], no. 6 (2016), 109.

95 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening Military and 

National Defense Reforms.”
661

SYSTEM OVERLOAD? 

The 2015 PLA Force Reduction, Military-Locality 

Relations, and the Potential for Social Instability

By Ma Chengkun and John Chen

On September 3, 2015, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General 

Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman 

Xi Jinping announced a reduction in the overall size of the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from 2.3 million personnel to 2 million, a reduction of about 11 percent of the military’s end strength.1

 The 

announcement was followed by a Work Conference on Central Military 

Commission Reform [zhongyang junwei gaige gongzuo huiyi, 中央军委

改革工作会议] in which Xi initiated his military reform plan.2 A flurry 

of organizational and structural reforms to the PLA soon followed, and 

continues apace today.

The reforms were to be implemented in three main stages. First, top 

leadership and management organs of the PLA were to be reorganized and 

the joint operations command structure reformed before the end of 2015. 

Next, changes in force structure and size, along with reforms to the military 

education system and the People’s Armed Police, were to be implemented 

before the end of 2017. Finally, the above reforms, along with changes to the 

policy system and civil-military integration, were to be adjusted, advanced, 

optimized, and completed from 2017 to 2020.3

CHAPTER 17
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

662

To those ends, the Ministry of National Defense announced that the 

reduction of 300,000 personnel from the PLA would be completed by the 

end of 2017.4 Broadly speaking, Xi’s reform directives explicitly included 

rationalizing the structure and organization of the military force, reducing 

numbers of administrative and noncombat personnel, and adjusting and 

improving the ratio of different services.5

 The troop reduction was widely 

interpreted as a means of implementing these overarching directives. 

Noncombat billets are likely to be targeted for elimination, and PLA interlocutors have suggested that the ratios of navy and air force personnel will 

increase relative to their army counterparts.6

Downsizing 300,000 PLA personnel while simultaneously upending 

and reorganizing the operational and administrative components of the 

military would inevitably bring considerable turmoil and dislocation. Xi’s 

downsizing policy also forced Chinese society to absorb and reintegrate a 

substantial portion of these 300,000 personnel in the span of approximately 

2 years. At a minimum, any failure or inefficiency in accommodating these 

personnel and their families could jeopardize the pace and effectiveness of 

the military reforms; at worst, neglect or poor execution of the downsizing 

could lead to potentially regime-threatening social instability.

The risks of a botched troop reduction were not lost on the Xi regime. 

Xi himself has consistently reiterated the importance of properly reintegrating downsized military personnel back into Chinese society, and he has 

emphasized the work of veteran administration and support at the central 

government level to forestall dissatisfaction from downsized personnel.7

This chapter argues that although force reductions are especially 

fraught for the local governments responsible for accommodating veterans, 

the effort will ultimately be successful due to a number of countervailing 

forces in play during this latest reduction effort. These offsetting forces 

range from the benevolent encouragement of veteran entrepreneurship to 

the more ominous specter of Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, and 

most importantly, the supremacy of party rule over any potential legal, 

economic, and political contradictions. The announcement in March 2018 
System Overload?

663

that the troop reduction was “basically complete” supports this judgement, 

while the establishment of a new Ministry of Veterans Affairs [tuiyi junren 

shiwu bu,退役军人事务部] speaks to the military-locality tensions and 

conflicts of interest that had to be managed and overcome in the process.8

The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first section gives a brief 

historical overview of military-locality relations and documents changes 

in relations that have increasingly pushed the burdens of troop reductions 

and personnel resettlement onto local governments. The second section 

describes key parts of the military-locality administrative system and the 

legal regulations overseeing the 2015–2017 troop reduction. The third 

section explores political, economic, and legal issues that complicate force 

reduction efforts, and describes the intermittent protests by dissatisfied 

veterans that have resulted from past complications. The chapter concludes 

with an examination of several countervailing considerations and various 

factors unique to the Xi era that are likely to offset the difficulties of the 

reduction, albeit at the expense of strains in military-locality relations.

Evolving Military-Locality Relations 

The PLA’s modern-day efforts to reduce its end strength are dependent 

on good relations with the localities that must absorb the burden of troop 

reductions. Military-locality relations in the years before Deng Xiaoping’s 

late 1970s reforms focused primarily on providing moral and material 

support to the PLA and its predecessors. After Deng’s reforms began to take 

hold, however, the realities of China’s emerging market economy began to 

substantially increase pressure on localities charged with handling troop 

reductions. These difficulties have extended to the present day.

Early Military-Locality Relations 

The PLA has a long history of drawing support from the people, dating 

back to the 1927 founding of its predecessor military organization, the 

Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army [zhongguo gongnong hongjun,

中国工农红军]. In the years leading up to 1949, interactions between the 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

664

military and the people, referred to as “military-locality relations” or 

“double support work” [shuangyong gongzuo, 双拥工作] by the Communist Party, initially emphasized preferential treatment for Red Army 

soldiers and their dependents in order to increase recruitment and political and logistical support for the Communist cause, and later expanded 

to demobilization and mobilization efforts.9

The resolution of the First Red Army Representative Assembly [minxi 

di yi ci gongnong bing daibiao dahui xuanyan ji jueyian, 闽西第一次工农兵

代表大会宣言及决议案], held in Fujian in March 1930, provided a monthly 

stipend to Red Army soldiers and called for CCP members to shape the 

societal atmosphere to improve the social position of the Red Army.10 This 

treatment was later extended to Red Army dependents in 1934: the CCP 2nd

National Soviet Assembly adopted the Resolution on Preferential Treatment 

of Red Army Dependents [zhongguo gongchangdang zhongyang weiyuanhui, zhonghua suweiai gongheguo renmin weiyuanhui guanyu youdai 

hongjun jiashu de jueding,中国共产党中央委员会、中华苏维埃共和国人民

委员会关于优待红军家属的决定], emphasizing the necessity of extending 

this resolution into a social movement for the purpose of strengthening the 

combat determination of the Red Army and encouraging more people to 

join the forces.11

The founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 introduced demobilization of military personnel as a major new task for 

military-locality relations. Military victory over the Kuomintang on the 

mainland precipitated a pressing need to reduce the size of the PLA, which 

led to an initial force reduction in March 1950.12 Newly anointed PRC 

officials set up governing and administrative infrastructure according 

to socialist ideology for national development. Early centrally planned 

mechanisms for resettling and reintegrating demobilized soldiers in their 

hometowns provoked relatively little controversy between the military and 

various localities because the interests of central and local governments 

often overlapped—for instance, the PLA needed to shed personnel, and 

local governments needed labor.
System Overload?

665

Mao Zedong’s decision to send PLA troops to the Korean War abruptly 

upended the initial process of demobilization and sent defense mobilization to the top of the priority list of military-locality issues. On December 

2, 1950, the Central Government Interior Affairs Ministry and General 

Political Department of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission 

issued “Instructions for Supporting Policy and Loving the People and Initiating Movement of Supporting Military Personnel and Their Dependents” 

[guanyu xinjiu nianguan kaizhan yongzheng aimin he yongjunyoushu 

yundong de zhishi, 关于新旧年关开展拥政爱民和拥军优属运动的指示], 

formally establishing a mechanism of interaction for local governments 

to mobilize logistics and recruitment support for the army.13 This was the 

first official directive by the Chinese government codifying a mechanism 

for mobilization efforts from the Chinese population.

Defense mobilization, preferential treatment for military personnel 

and their dependents, and resettlement of demobilized military personnel 

remained the core issues of military-locality relations until 1979, along with 

a strong emphasis on maintaining popular support for the military. The 

provision of preferential benefits to soldiers and codification of mobilization 

efforts were supplemented by patriotic parades and ceremonies organized by 

local governments on significant days for the PLA. The main responsibility 

for military-locality interaction fell largely on the people, who were charged 

with showing their respect and support for military personnel.

Popular moral support for the military belied the comparatively 

underdeveloped nature of demobilization mechanisms. After the PRC was 

founded in 1949, the government kept the military permanently mobilized 

as it continually perceived serious hostility from the international community. Under these circumstances, the PLA had little chance to transform 

itself from a revolutionary force organized mainly by rural citizens into a 

regular army with regular conscription and a demobilization mechanism. 

Time in service was not well defined. Personnel could remain in the military until they decided to leave or the military believed they were too old 

to continue service. While mobilization mechanisms relied heavily on 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

666

popular local support, demobilization mechanisms remained comparatively underdeveloped.

Reform and Opening Up, Military Modernization, and Military-Locality 

Relations, 1979–Present 

China’s leaders initially sought to maintain existing military-locality relations even as Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 reform and opening up [gaige kaifang, 

改革开放] shifted the direction of the national zeitgeist from revolution 

to peaceful development. The December 14, 1979, “Notice to Enhance the 

Glorious Tradition of Supporting Military Personnel and Dependents, 

Supporting Policy and Loving the People, and Further Strengthening 

Military-People Unity” [guanyu fayang yongjunyoushu, yongzheng aimin 

de guangrong chuantong, jinyibu jiaqiang junmin tuanjie de tongzhi, 关于

发扬拥军优属, 拥政爱民的光荣传统, 进一步加强军民团结的通知] exemplified this extension of the status quo and confirmed existing mechanisms 

of military-locality interaction.14

In the early 1980s, however, China’s program of defense modernization presented a new major challenge to military-locality relations. Deng 

announced a force reduction plan in June 1985 that would trim 1 million 

military personnel from the PLA as part of a broader defense modernization and cost reduction effort.15 The announcement of the massive troop 

reduction was followed soon by a notice placing the responsibility of resettling demobilized personnel at the top of the priority list for localities. The 

July 27, 1985, “Notice on Respecting the Military and Actively Supporting 

Military Reform and Construction” [guanyu zunzhong, aihu jundui jiji 

zhichi jundui gaige he jianshe de tongzhi, 关于尊重,爱护军队积极支持军

队改革和建设的通知] elevated resettlement [anzhi, 安置] for demobilized 

PLA personnel as the most important task that localities could undertake 

to support the reforms.16

At first, local governments were usually able to resettle demobilized 

PLA personnel into corresponding high- or low-level positions. Local 

governments had more billets available than the central government and 
System Overload?

667

proved able to accommodate demobilized personnel one way or another. 

Officers were offered local government positions roughly equal to their 

former military grade and became civilian officials; enlisted personnel, for 

whom the local government had no resettlement responsibility, were nonetheless often pointed toward lower level grassroots labor units to forestall 

potential unemployment.

As Deng’s economic reforms accelerated, however, China’s transition 

to a market economy made military resettlement much more difficult. 

Market pressures for organizational and financial reform in government 

sectors to reduce personnel spending and improve government efficiency 

made it increasingly difficult to accommodate demobilized PLA personnel. 

Local governments, given wide latitude to implement their own reforms, 

began privatizing state-owned enterprises, reducing redundant billets, 

laying off underperforming employees, or at least slowing the hiring of 

new personnel. The remaining collectively run government enterprises 

were hit especially hard, facing stiff competition from foreign and foreigninvested competitors.

This rush to privatize state-owned enterprises disenfranchised demobilized PLA personnel. Newly privatized enterprises began to shirk their 

responsibilities to resettle and retrain veterans in their drive to compete in 

the marketplace. The 1993 “Notice Concerning Problems of Enterprises 

Canceling Worker Identification Boundaries and Fully Implementing the 

Labor Contract System” [guanyu qiye quxiao gongren shenfen jiexian shixing 

quan yuan laodong hetong zhi ruogan wenti de yijian de tongzhi, 关于企业取

消工人身份界限实行全员劳动合同制若干问题的意见的通知] was one such 

example; the notice allowed enterprises to cancel the national cadre identity of 

former military cadres in order to establish more normal, efficient personnel 

systems within the enterprise.17 It also freed enterprises from the burden of 

subsidies, as well as medical and social insurance for these military cadres, all 

of which had been promised by the government when they left the military.

In an attempt to respond to reports of shirking, the central government 

promulgated a series of legal and organizational measures intended to 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

668

ensure better military-locality relations. A National Double Support Work 

Leading Group [quanguo shuangyong gongzuo lingdao xiaozu,全国双用工

作领导小组] was established in 1991 by the State Council and CMC to coordinate and unify the work of provincial, county, city, and municipal Double 

Support Offices [shuangyong bangongshi, 双用办公室].18 To further clarify 

regulations regarding the treatment of separated officers, the State Council 

and CMC issued the Provisional Measures for Resettling Transferred Officers

[jundui zuanye ganbu anzhi zanxing banfa, 军队转业干部安置暂行办法] 

in 2001. These measures remain in force today as the primary reference 

document governing the treatment of demobilized, retired, or downsized 

PLA personnel; the measures have been supplemented by additional laws 

codifying the treatment of enlisted personnel. The administrative organs 

and the legal regulations guiding the resettlement of PLA personnel are 

covered in detail in the following section.

Administrative and Legal Mechanisms for Force Reduction 

As the 2015 PLA personnel reduction has proceeded, several details about 

troop reduction have surfaced. Half of the downsized personnel are reportedly officers,19 and generally speaking, administrative and command billets 

have been reduced.20 For the most part, these discharged personnel will 

have a number of separation options available according to a collection of 

laws passed and overseen by two main organizations of the State Council. 

This section examines key components of the separation process, giving 

an overview of the legal mechanisms and organizations responsible for 

accommodating discharged PLA personnel.

Resettlement and Separation Options 

Soldiers leaving the PLA have a number of separation options available 

to them according to their grade and time in service.21 Resettlement and 

separation options for conscripts, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and 

officers are governed by a variety of relevant laws discussed in the text and 

figures below.22
System Overload?

669

Conscripts (义务兵). As late as 2007, conscripts appeared to have 

only one main option for separation from the PLA. They could choose 

to simply be released from service [tuiwu, 退伍] after their 2-year service 

commitment with no government obligation to provide job placement, or 

they could decide to extend their term of service and become NCOs, after 

which they would enjoy the separation benefits and options described in 

the next section. Those who chose to leave have traditionally returned home 

and continued their old way of life.23

Conscripts that left after fulfilling their service obligation were 

entitled to certain benefits, including a small resettlement allowance 

and assistance in job-hunting. However, these entitlements had often 

been ignored or doled out unevenly across China, sparking complaints 

and aggravating civil-military tensions.24 Dissatisfaction with inconsistent disbursement of benefits led the central government to codify the 

benefits available for discharged conscripts. The most obvious changes 

are manifested in 2011 revisions to the Military Service Law [zhonghua 

renmin gongheguo bingyifa, 中华人民共和国兵役法] and Enlisted Personnel Resettlement Regulations [tuiyi shibing anzhi tiaoli, 退役士兵安

置条例], which declared conscripts eligible for a one-time independent 

subsidy [zizhu jiuye yicixing tuiyijin, 自主就业一次性退役金], in which 

Figure. Separation Options for PLA Servicemembers

Conscripts 

[义务兵]

Noncommissioned

Officers [士官] Officers [干部]

Demobilize

[退伍]

Civilian 

Transfer

[转业]

Retire

[退休]

Independent Job 

Search [自主就业]

Finish Education

[完成学业]

Full Government

Support [国家供养]

Conscript Option

NCO Option

Officer Option

Shared Option

Conditional Option

Disability Option
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

670

they would look for a job themselves and collect a one-time subsidy 

from the military.25 As of September 2015, demobilized conscripts also 

receive a one-time demobilization subsidy [tuiwu buzhufei, 退伍补助费], 

a one-time healthcare subsidy [tuiwu yiliao buzhufei, 退伍医疗补助费], a 

subsidy consisting of next month’s allowance [lidui xiayue jintie, 离队下

月津贴], prorated living expenses for the month they leave [lidui dangyue 

shengyu tian huoshi fei, 离队当月剩余天伙食费], and living expenses for 

the month after demobilization [lidui xiayue huoshifei, 离队下月伙食费], 

among additional healthcare and retirement subsidies.26

Noncommissioned Officers (士官). NCOs enjoy more separation 

options and benefits than conscripts. As of 2007, enlisted personnel who 

had served up to 6 years beyond their initial 2-year conscription period were 

considered junior NCOs [chuji shiguan, 初级士官] and were eligible only for 

demobilization [tuiwu, 退伍]. NCOs who had served between 8 and 16 years 

beyond their initial 2-year conscription period were referred to as mid-level 

NCOs [zhongji shiguan,中级士官] and were eligible for transfer to civilian 

state positions [zhuanye, 转业] after 10 years of total service. Senior-level 

NCOs [gaoji shiguan, 高级士官], or NCOs who had served at least 14 years 

beyond their conscription period, were eligible to retire [tuixiu, 退休] after 

30 years of total service.27

Major changes to discharge and resettlement policy enacted in 2011 

expanded resettlement options and simplified separation benefits. Revisions 

to the Military Service Law outlined five major separation and resettlement 

options: independent job-searching [zizhu jiuye,自主就业]; government 

job placement [anpai gongzuo, 安排工作], also known as civilian transfer [zhuanye, 转业]; full retirement [tuixiu, 退休]; government support 

[gongyang, 供养]; and completion of education [jixu wancheng xueye, 继

续完成学业].28 The 2011 revision to the Enlisted Personnel Resettlement 

Regulations simplified eligibility rules for separation benefits: NCOs who 

had served less than 12 years would receive essentially the same benefits as 

conscripts, including the same one-time independent job-searching subsidy 

per year of service from the military, along with possible further financial 
System Overload?

671

subsidies from local provincial and municipal governments.29 NCOs who 

had served more than 12 years were eligible for government job placement 

(also known as resettlement),30 while those who had served at least 30 years, 

were disabled in war or public service, were 55 years or older, or had to retire 

for health reasons were eligible for full retirement or government support.31

Officers (干部). Officers have the most options available for separation 

from the PLA and enjoy greater benefits than either enlisted soldiers or 

conscripts.32 Officers are required to apply for separation from the PLA. 

Of those whose applications are accepted, officers who have served for 30 

years are eligible for full retirement. Division leader grade officers with 

less than 30 years of service and officers at the battalion leader grade or 

lower with less than 20 years of service are to be transferred to civilian 

state employment. Battalion and regiment leader grade officers who have 

served between 20 and 30 years are allowed either to accept a transfer to 

a civilian job or to accept a partial pension while they independently seek 

employment in the private sector [zizhu zeye, 自主择业].33

Officers transferred to civilian positions are entitled to the same levels of pay and benefits they would have earned at their duty grade level 

in the PLA,34 and their years in military service count toward retirement 

at their civilian positions.35 Civilian transfers also collect subsidies for 

living expenses [shenghuo buzhufei, 生活补助费] and home settlement 

[anjia buzhufei, 安家补助费].36 Officers who choose to independently seek 

employment accept an 80 percent pension that persists unless they accept a 

job in the government sector.37 They are also eligible for a job-search subsidy 

[zizhu zeye buzhufei, 自主择业补助费] on top of the living expenses and 

home settlement subsidies offered to civilian transfers.38 Officers that retire 

collect full pensions and are eligible for a number of allowances, including 

one-time payments for living expenses and home settlement,39 along with 

housing, healthcare, and other benefits.40

Most officers leaving the PLA must return to the location of their 

original household registration [hukou, 户口]. Some consideration is made 

for the locations of spouses or parents,41 although the policy does not 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

672

elaborate on who makes the decision. Those leaving under the auspices of 

independent job-searching, as well as aviation and naval officers who have 

served 10 or more years, are also allowed a degree of flexibility in resettlement.42 Discharged officers can also be placed in other regions as needed.43

Some officers may simply be transferred to locations as needed rather than 

transferred home, especially to government regions in central and western 

China “eagerly hunting for talented people.”44

Full Government Support (国家供养). A special discharge option is full 

government support [guojia gongyang, 国家供养] for all military personnel 

who are disabled in public service and includes considerable disability compensation payments based on the level and type of disability. Disabilities 

are classified on a scale of severity from Levels 1 to 10 (1 is the most severe) 

and sorted by combat, work, or illness disabilities. Personnel with disability 

ratings from Level 1 to Level 4 are eligible for full government support and 

receive substantial compensation payments in addition to health care and 

housing allowances.45

Key Trends. Changes in the PLA’s separation and resettlement processes since the last major troop reduction in 2003 can be characterized 

in three main ways.

First, conscripts have increasingly enjoyed greater benefits for their 

service, and as the PLA continues to seek more college-educated personnel, 

it will feel compelled to better enforce existing demobilization policy and 

improve the conscript demobilization package by providing more generous benefits. The 2011 revisions to discharge policy afforded much greater 

financial assistance to conscripts by opening up independent job selection 

to a group that was simply demobilized and returned home in the past. 

Some demobilized conscripts ostensibly leave the force with marketable 

job skills and useful certifications such as a driver’s license,46 although their 

employment prospects are in doubt in an economy that increasingly values 

higher skilled workers. The PLA faces no shortage of available conscripts,47

but in recent years it has been forced to relax physical standards to attract 

better educated personnel.48 As it continues to compete with the private 
System Overload?

673

sector for college-educated personnel, the PLA will have little choice but 

to continue increasing expenditures on demobilized conscripts as one way 

to attract desired talent.

Second, the PLA has placed increasing emphasis on higher education 

as a separation pathway, especially for its enlisted and noncommissioned 

personnel. This is evident in the various incremental revisions to NCO 

discharge and resettlement policies. Starting in 2011, NCOs who have 

been discharged for longer than a year, have tested into a full-time higher 

education program, and are participating in independent job-searching are 

also entitled to a yearly tuition subsidy of up to 6,000 RMB (roughly $942 

USD in 2018 )49—a figure that was adjusted upward in 2014 to 8,000 RMB 

($1,257) a year for undergraduate programs and 12,000 RMB ($1,885) a 

year for graduate programs.50 Discharged enlisted personnel who choose 

independent job selection are also entitled to attend local government 

vocational education for up to 2 years at no cost.51

Third, the civilian transfer process for officers has become increasingly 

competitive. Though the burden of resettling transferred officers is the legal 

responsibility of local governments52 and rejecting officers is not allowed,53

there appears to be a priority order for the best positions. Division and 

regiment leader grade officers eligible for civilian transfer must undergo 

an evaluation process [kaohe, 考核] that assigns civilian positions based on 

moral virtue, grade, military rank, time in service, specialty skills, hardship duty, and military commendations. Eligible officers at the battalion 

leader grade or lower would undergo the above evaluation process and an 

additional testing process [kaoshi, 考试] administered by the receiving 

province, consisting of a written test and an in-person interview.54 The 

competitive nature of civilian transfers has generated considerable anxiety 

over transfer prospects.55

Separation and resettlement mechanisms have changed over time 

according to various needs and pressures. The PLA’s desire for collegeeducated personnel precipitated an increase in benefits for demobilized conscripts, while the looming expense and difficulty of finding jobs for NCOs 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

674

led officials to highlight education as an increasingly important pathway 

for discharged troops. The opacity of the officer civilian transfer process 

prompted officials to clarify the process in an attempt to defuse criticism from 

the affected group. In each case, the PLA and the relevant civilian agencies 

have taken deliberate steps to address a need or a potential problem.

Resettlement Organizations 

The task of reintegrating PLA personnel into Chinese civil society falls to 

a pair of State Council small groups [xiaozu, 小组] comprised of various 

agency officials with relevant roles. These national-level small groups 

nominally oversee a larger nationwide ecosystem of corresponding provincial, county, and municipal groups responsible for disbursing a variety of 

benefits to discharged PLA personnel, ranging from placement in civilian 

government-arranged jobs to lump sum pension and buyout payments. 

Although the exact bifurcation of responsibilities remains unclear, generally 

speaking the State Council Military Cadre Transfer and Resettlement Work 

Small Group is responsible for transferring military officers to civilian 

government jobs, while the National Double Support Work Leading Small 

Group handles the resettlement of retiring military personnel and civilian 

cadres [wenzhi ganbu, 文职干部].

Resettlement and Transfer Work. The organization primarily responsible for transferring military personnel to civilian government jobs is 

the State Council Military Cadre Transfer and Resettlement Work Small 

Group [guowuyuan jundui zhuanye ganbu anzhi gongzuo xiaozu, 国务院

军队转业干部安置工作小组]. This group is headed by the director of the 

Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security [renli ziyuan shehui 

baozhang bu, 人力资源社会保障部]

56 and has typically been comprised 

of members from the former General Political Department, Ministry of 

Public Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, and several other government, 

party, and military organizations.57
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675

Table. Separation Options and Major Associated Benefits for 

PLA Servicemembers

Separation 

Mechanism

Eligibility Major Associated Benefits

Demobilize 

[退伍]

Conscripts; NCOs with less 

than 12 years of service

One-time demobilization subsidy (4,500 RMB 

per year of service); one-time independent 

job-searching subsidy (2,000 RMB); one-time 

healthcare subsidy; pro-rated last month’s living 

expenses; following month’s living expenses 

(750 RMB)

Finish 

Education 

[完成学业]

NCOs demobilized more 

than a year ago who have 

tested into a full-time 

higher education program 

and are independently job 

searching

Tuition subsidy: 8,000 RMB per year for undergraduate programs; 12,000 RMB per year for 

graduate programs; up to 2 years of free access 

to local government vocational education

Civilian 

Transfer 

[转业]

NCOs with more than 

12 years of service; division-leader grade officers 

with less than 30 years of 

service; battalion-leader 

grade officers or lower 

with less than 20 years of 

service

Salary equivalent to pay level at time of 

discharge; years in military service count toward 

civilian retirement; living expenses subsidy: none 

for less than 8 years of service; 3 months salary 

for 8 to 9 years of service; additional 1 month 

salary for each year of service beyond 9, up to 16 

years; home settlement subsidy: 4 months salary 

for 14 years of service or less; additional halfmonth salary for each year of service beyond 

15 years

Independent 

Job Search 

[自主择业]

Battalion and regiment 

leader grade officers with 

more than 20 but less than 

30 years of service

Monthly pension payment worth 80 percent 

of monthly salary; job search subsidy: 1 month 

salary for every year of service under 15 years; 

additional 1.5 month salary for each year of service beyond 16 years; same living expenses and 

home settlement subsidies as civilian transfers

Retire 

[退休]

NCOs and officers at the 

age of 55 or with 30 or more 

years of service

Full monthly pension; one-time living expenses 

subsidy: 4 months salary; home settlement 

subsidy: 8 months salary for troops returning to 

rural areas; 6 months salary for troops retuning 

to cities

Full 

Government 

Support 

[国家供养]

Conscripts, NCOs, and 

officers disabled in public 

service

Health care, caretaking, and housing allowances; 

annual compensation payments corresponding 

to disability level and type, ranging from 5,000 to 

52,000 RMB

Key: NCO: noncommissioned officer; RMB: renminbi.
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The General Office of the Transfer and Resettlement Small Group 

[guowuyuan jundui zhuanye ganbu anzhi gongzuo xiaozu bangongshi, 国务

院军队转业干部安置工作小组办公室], also known as the Military Officer 

Transfer Resettlement Department [junguan zhuanye anzhisi,军官转业安

置司], carries out most of the actual work of resettling transferred officers 

to civilian government roles at the national level. Specifically, the General 

Office plans military cadre transfer resettlement, trains and educates on 

policy and resettlement plans, makes adjustments to the resettlement system, and handles Beijing-area transfer resettlements. The organization is 

also partly responsible for resolving problems that arise with transfers to 

industries, and manages independent job-searching services [zizhu zeye, 自

主择业].58 The national level small group oversees the work of local provincial, county, and municipal leading small groups that undertake the same 

transfer resettlement tasks as the General Office.59

Double Support Work System. The administrative system officially 

responsible for coordinating overall military-locality relations is headed 

by the National Double Support Work Leading Small Group (NDSWLSG) 

[quanguo shuangyong gongzuo lingdao xiaozu, 全国双用工作领导小组], 

operating under the authority of the CCP Central Committee, State 

Council, and CMC.60 Led by a vice premier, the NDSWLSG is made up 

of 7 deputy directors and 31 members representing a wide variety of 

government, party, and military organizations, including the political 

work departments of the four former PLA general departments and the 

People’s Armed Police.61

The General Office of the NDSWLSG [quanguo shuangyong gongzuo 

lingdao xiaozu bangongshi, 全国双用工作领导小组办公室] is charged with 

disseminating information to and liaising with provincial, county, and 

municipal Double Support Offices [shuangyongban, 双拥办],62 which are 

typically situated under the authority of local civil affairs departments.63

The General Office has two subordinate groups: the Secretariat [mishuzu, 

秘书组], charged with organizing and coordinating meetings and communication between national and local Double Support Offices, and the Policy 
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Research Group [zhengce yanjiu zu, 政策研究组], responsible for drafting 

reports and publications of the NDSWLSG.64

The NDSWLSG is responsible for resettling certain types of discharged 

military personnel. The director of the Special Care Resettlement Bureau 

[youfu anzhi ju, 优抚安置局] of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) 

[minzhengbu, 民政部] is a member of the NDSWLSG,65 and the bureau 

is responsible for the resettlement of discharged enlisted personnel [tuiyi 

shibing, 退役士兵] demobilized cadre [fuyuan ganbu, 复员干部], retired 

military cadre [jundui li tuixiu ganbu, 军队离退休干部], and retired nonmilitary staff [wu junji tuixiu tuizhi zhigong, 无军籍退休退职职工].66 The 

bureau’s subordinate units include a Comprehensive Office [zonghe chu, 综

合处] and a Policy and Law Office [zhengce fagui chu, 政策法规处]. Both 

are affiliated with the Secretariat and Policy Research Group of the General 

Office of the NDSWLSG, respectively.67

Overall, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the PLA’s CMC Political 

Work Department are the primary loci of responsibility for double support work, with a heavy emphasis on resettlement of military personnel. 

The director and deputy director of the MCA occupied two of the seven 

NDSWLSG deputy director positions in 2013, and the MCA deputy director 

was dual-hatted as the head of the General Office of the NDSWLSG. Two 

of the three deputy directors of the General Office hailed from the CMC 

Political Work Department Mass Work Office [zong zhengzhi bu qunzhong 

gongzuo bangongshi, 总政治部群众工作办公室]; the third was the deputy 

director of the Special Care Resettlement Bureau of the MCA.68

Broader Characteristics. At the national level, the composition of these 

small groups suggests that a variety of agencies have important equities in 

managing resettlement and separation of PLA personnel. Several agencies 

have representatives present as members of both small groups, specifically 

the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, CCP Central Organization Department, political departments of the various former PLA general 

departments, and ministries and administrations for national development and 

reform, finance, education, housing, taxation, and industry and commerce.69
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Many of the participating organizations in both the Double Support 

and Resettlement LSGs have other primary functions, and the rotational 

nature of LSG membership extends to both national- and local-level LSGs. 

The overwhelming majority of members in both groups are deputy directors of their respective “home” organizations, serving on the groups as part 

of a rotational assignment; a few are assistants to directors.70 New rosters 

with different members are announced every 4 to 5 years.

While the responsibilities at the national level seem clear, the lines 

of responsibility are not always so at the local level. Both double support 

work and resettlement work are the responsibilities of local civil affairs 

departments, but it is not clear if double support work includes resettlement, or if double support work and resettlement are considered separate 

tasks under separate units. The NDSWLSG considers resettlement to be 

within its purview, describing resettlement work as a critical part of double 

support work.71 Some provinces include resettlement and transfer work 

under the auspices of double support work.72 Several cities, however, direct 

“double support work” at active military personnel and their dependents, 

and consider double support work to be distinct from resettlement work.73

Problems with Resettlement 

While the codification of preferential treatment and job placement for discharged PLA personnel represented a concerted attempt to formalize a 

discharge and separation process, the effort has suffered from complications. 

A lack of standardization in converting military grades to civilian equivalents 

has led to complaints about resettlement, and restrictive legal measures limit the 

options of local governments. At a macro level, the localities charged with resettling PLA personnel into civilian jobs face political and economic pressures that 

profoundly undercut their ability to complete this task quickly and efficiently.

Complications 

The lack of a standardized conversion between military and civilian grades 

has spawned widespread complaints that personnel resettlement differs 
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across provinces. While the Provisional Measures for Resettling Transferred 

Officers stipulates that military officers should be emplaced into positions 

of equal grade,74 the measures do not specify what the corresponding civilian grades are. According to one PLA officer, the military uses a system 

based on 15 grades and equivalent civilian systems have 11 or 12 grades.75

Although there is discussion about unifying the two systems, as of 2017, the 

conversion from military to civilian grades varied from province to province.76 Problems with resettling regiment and division grade officers are 

particularly acute.77 In the past, many regiment and division grade officers 

would have readily found arranged employment in local government billets 

as dictated by the State Council, typically as county mayors [xianzhang, 县

长], office heads [chuzhang, 处长], administration heads [juzhang, 局长], 

or department heads [tingzhang, 厅长].78 As more regiment and division 

grade officers left the PLA across multiple troop reductions, however, 

local governments struggled to accommodate all of these personnel at the 

dictated civilian grade level. Instead, local governments began backsliding 

on these assignments, sometimes failing to assign discharged personnel to 

civilian positions or assigning them to lesser sinecures as a way to fulfill 

their obligation. Discharged regiment and deputy regiment grade officers 

continue to face this problem: many are currently being forced to accept 

lower grade positions while working their way up the civilian promotion 

ladder to positions to which they should have already been legally entitled.79

Local governments, however, do not have full authority to assign discharged PLA personnel to whichever positions they wish; their autonomy 

is restricted by laws passed to reform China’s civil service. The 2005 Civil 

Servant Law [gongwu yuanfa, 公务员法] states that all non-leadership positions lower than senior section member [zhuren keyuan, 主任科员] must 

be filled using open examination, strict testing, and equal competition to 

select the most qualified candidates.80 Article 25 of the same law states that 

civil service positions will be “filled within the limits of the authorized size” 

and when there are “vacancies of corresponding posts to be filled up.”81

Structurally, this means that local government positions at the township 
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[xiang,乡] level and below are subject to open examination and fair competition practices and cannot be simply assigned to discharged military 

personnel;82 all billets must be filled according to set, existing vacancies, 

severely restricting the ability of local governments to create positions for 

discharged PLA personnel.

Broader efforts to streamline and reform the administrative elements 

of local and national governments, along with corresponding efforts to 

reduce military administrative billets, have also greatly complicated the 

resettlement and accommodation of discharged PLA personnel. Accelerated reform efforts in both the PLA and in local governments have upset 

patronage networks and “iron rice bowls” that previously provided for 

military cadres and government officials.

Breaking Military and Government Iron Rice Bowls 

The recent PLA reorganization has focused on slimming down noncombat and administrative organs, upending the PLA’s iron rice bowl and 

resulting in a surplus of discharged PLA personnel who must be offered 

civilian positions commensurate to their military grade.83 In the past, unit 

commanders often extended the military careers of officers who did not 

win promotion to increasingly competitive command track positions in 

combat units by transferring them to administrative or noncombat billets. 

This process was especially common for division and regiment grade officers and helped commanders avoid embarrassing personnel downsizings 

that would weaken their fiefdoms. These billets are now being reduced en 

masse, resulting in a large number of less-qualified discharged division and 

regiment grade officers who must be accommodated by local governments.

In the past, local governments responded to the ballooning number 

of discharged military personnel by creating civilian billets with little substantial responsibility to accommodate additional troop reductions. Today, 

however, local governments face a mandate to slim down their administrative organs—the same ones that would ordinarily provide civil service 

billets for demobilized or discharged PLA personnel.84 Local governments 
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often have little recourse left but to offer lower grade positions, register 

these veterans and ask them to wait, or hope veterans accept buyouts to 

participate in independent job-searching.

The pressure to slim down both civilian and military administrative 

positions has created significant difficulties in finding appropriate positions 

for field grade officers at the division- and regiment grade levels. The resettlement of these officers is one of the most difficult problems in personnel 

resettlement and has been amplified by the lack of a standardized conversion between military and civilian grades, leading to widespread complaints 

that personnel resettlement differs across provinces.85 Regiment and deputy 

regiment grade officers, among others, have often been forced to accept 

lower grade positions while working their way up the civilian promotion 

ladder to positions they may have already been legally entitled to.86

The Effects of Market Reforms and Economic Adjustment 

China’s shift toward a market economy has also profoundly reduced the 

ability and willingness of localities to accommodate discharged PLA 

personnel. In the past, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were to accommodate discharged personnel into positions in industry and commerce, 

but increasing privatization and market liberalization have incentivized 

these companies to shirk their responsibilities to veterans. Some economic 

reforms, like the 1993 Notice Concerning Problems of Enterprises Canceling Worker Identification Boundaries and Fully Implementing the Labor 

Contract System [guanyu qiye quxiao gongren shenfen jiexian shixing quan 

yuan laodong hetong zhi ruogan wenti de yijian de tongzhi, 关于企业取消

工人身份界限实行全员劳动合同制若干问题的意见的通知] not only were 

meant to create more efficient and competitive personnel systems in stateowned industries,87 but also allowed enterprises to cancel the national cadre 

identity of these former military cadres, freeing the companies from the 

burden of medical and social insurance.

The ultimate result of this privatization for enterprises was organizational reform, large-scale layoffs, and veteran dissatisfaction. Newly 
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unemployed military veterans were told that the enterprise had already 

become a private business, so SOEs had no responsibility for their subsidies 

and medical care promised by the government. Local governments claimed 

they had fulfilled their obligation to veterans by finding them jobs, and 

the military viewed these veterans as civilians and ultimately refused to 

intercede on their behalf.

Economic readjustment and rebalancing are slated to accelerate under 

Xi Jinping, leaving localities with an even more daunting task ahead of 

them. The government is embarking on “structural reforms” to reduce overcapacity in the steel and coal sectors, potentially shedding millions of jobs, 

many in the economically depressed Northeastern rust belt.88 The sweeping 

pace and scope of the anticipated economic reforms have prompted officials 

to promise that China can handle the economic adjustments;89 the government quickly announced that it would earmark some 100 billion RMB 

(roughly $15.7 billion USD in 2018) to offset pending unemployment.90

Nonetheless, local governments will likely be hard pressed to find appropriate jobs for discharged military personnel amid the upheaval caused by 

the latest tranche of economic reforms.

Overall, local governments are under increasing pressure to accommodate PLA personnel leaving the military, but their viable options for doing 

so are dwindling. Problems with resettlement policy and restrictive legal 

measures limit the ability of local governments to handle the most recent 

troop reduction quickly and without incident. When combined with the 

effects of accelerating reform in military, civil, and economic sectors, the 

processes of resettlement and dispensing preferential treatment for PLA 

veterans look set to significantly increase military-locality tensions and 

potentially create problems for the regime.

Protests 

Many of the problems described above have resulted in increasingly visible 

protests by disenfranchised PLA veterans in the last 15 years. In April 2005, 

more than 1,600 discharged military personnel came from 20 provinces 
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to hold a peaceful sit-in demonstration in Tiananmen Square, where they 

protested their unemployment even though they were supposed to receive 

corresponding jobs after they left the military.91 Protests continued as market 

reforms deepened after Hu Jintao’s inauguration. In 2007, more than 1,000 

discharged military members clashed with the police in Heilongjiang, with 

several injured and arrested.92 In Hunan, more than 300 discharged personnel 

protested in front of a provincial government building, prompting the local 

government to use special police forces to suppress the demonstration.93

The Central Military Commission responded to these protests by 

increasing subsidies for these former cadres, but the situation did not 

improve because protestors had already been stripped of their national 

cadre identities by local SOEs. In March 2008, roughly 6,000 discharged 

military cadres signed a petition to show their disapproval of the situation. This petition appealed to the central government to recover their 

cadre identity and associated subsidies, medical, and social insurances.94

Protests continued into 2009, as hundreds of former cadres demonstrated 

and petitioned members of the local Shandong government assembly and 

asked the government to recover their cadre identity and to implement 

the resettlement policy of the central government.95 Although the local 

government suppressed this demonstration, a larger protest occurred only 

6 months later.96

The potential for troop reduction to create social instability is probably 

the single weightiest concern for the party.97 Authorities appear to have 

ample reason for wariness: veterans complain that state-owned companies 

often renege on promised benefits and local officials embezzle funds meant 

for veterans,98 and reports of protests have increased in the last year. As 

many as 4,000 veterans assembled at the offices of the CMC in July 2016 

to call for the full payment of benefits.99 Another protest in October 2016 

brought hundreds of veterans to the CMC headquarters building in Beijing,100 followed by another in early January 2017.101

Troop reduction will inevitably increase tensions between local governments and the central government and the PLA. Official media writings 
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acknowledge these difficulties, noting that local governments will bear the 

heaviest burden of finding jobs for transferred officers and emphasizing the 

importance of alleviating this pressure.102 The requirement that downsized 

personnel return to their home provinces virtually ensures that the troop 

reduction will impact Chinese provinces unevenly, as local governments in 

economically depressed regions of China will be charged with finding jobs 

for discharged personnel who likely joined the military in greater numbers 

to escape poor economic prospects. This could be harder if the PLA decides 

to cut large numbers of higher-ranking officers, who are entitled to scarce 

high-paying jobs.

Troop Reduction in the Xi Jinping Era 

In spite of the organizations and regulations put in place to manage the 

separation of 300,000 military personnel from the PLA, the 2015 troop 

reduction has almost certainly encountered political, economic, and legal 

headwinds. The local governments that would otherwise accept discharged 

PLA personnel as civil servants face a political mandate to slim down their 

administrative ranks that has intensified as Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 

campaign continues apace. Large SOEs, previously major employers of 

discharged PLA personnel, face a similar political zeitgeist compounded on 

two sides by statist pressures for strong economic performance and market 

pressures wrought by privatization and free market competition. To make 

matters worse, the organizations responsible for resettlement are typically 

low on the pecking order, and legal mechanisms ensuring preferential treatment for discharged military personnel conflict with legislation designed to 

reform government civil service. At first glance, the 2015 troop reduction is 

likely to seriously disrupt military-locality relations thanks to these political, economic, and legal obstacles—recent suggestions that the deadline 

for force reductions will be extended until 2020 likely prove as much.103

Nevertheless, the party’s worst fears about a troop reduction gone 

wrong are unlikely to come to pass in the era of Xi. Though the potential 

implications for social instability are serious, a number of considerations 
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are likely to mitigate the problems of the ongoing troop reduction. Expertise 

gained from past troop reductions, general demographic characteristics of 

the downsizing, and the government’s active efforts to strengthen supervision of veterans’ affairs may help attenuate the difficulties of the current 

reduction effort. A number of countervailing forces unique to Xi Jinping’s 

rule may temper objections and force cooperation, including recent initiatives for entrepreneurship, Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, and the 

ultimate supremacy of party rule over the rule of law. On balance, the party 

will likely successfully reduce the size of the PLA without threats to its rule, 

even at the cost of greater tension in military-locality relations.

Countervailing Considerations 

The PLA and Chinese government have extensive experience managing 

troop downsizing, implementing at least 11 large force reductions since 

1949. Past reductions have been much larger and were accomplished in 

part by transferring personnel to the People’s Armed Police.104 Recent 

reduction efforts were similar in size, scale, and method to the current 

downsizing: the 1997 troop reduction cut 500,000 troops in 3 years, and the 

most recent troop reduction in 2003 downsized 200,000 troops in 2 years.105

Though historical experience is no guarantee that Chinese authorities will 

successfully navigate the ongoing downsizing, both the PLA and relevant 

civil authorities have gained substantial insight into the possible problems 

associated with large troop reductions.

The demographics of the latest reduction may be less problematic than 

it initially appears. Though dissatisfied veterans might pose a political 

risk for China’s leaders, they may constitute a relatively small percentage 

of discharged soldiers. Officers transferred to civilian jobs should be mollified by a position with equivalent pay and benefits, while retired officers 

can expect extensive benefits and a full pension. The biggest losers of the 

downsizing will be those officers who choose independent job-searching 

but subsequently have difficulty finding work on their own. Statistics from 

2014, however, indicate that only 22.5 percent of the discharged officers 
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choose independent job-searching,106 amounting to an estimated 11,600 

to 13,000 officers per year during the downsizing. This is no small figure, 

but authorities have already stepped up efforts to help these officers find 

employment by organizing conferences, giving classes, and teaching entrepreneurship skills.107

The transfer of PLA personnel to state-owned enterprises may also 

prove less painful than speculated. Statistics from past years suggest that 

only 1.5 to 2 percent of eligible officers are placed into SOEs,108 roughly 

equivalent to 1,160 officers per year for the current troop reduction. Past 

economic reforms split SOEs into public and commercial categories, with 

several “strategic” industries kept under strict government control that 

will face a strong mandate to find jobs for eligible discharged PLA personnel.109 Though the percentage of enlisted personnel transferred to SOEs 

is unknown, the government has reportedly made accommodation for 

enlisted personnel, announcing that 5 percent of jobs at SOEs would be 

reserved for discharged soldiers.110

While recent protests by PLA veterans have made for splashy headlines, these protestors are likely less of a threat to regime stability than 

reports indicate. Many of the demonstrators in these protests were older 

veterans from past conflicts like the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, for whom 

the primary concern is pension and benefits, not employment and resettlement.111 These protesters are more likely to be placated by appropriate 

disbursement of subsidies and pose a less difficult logistical problem for 

local governments.

At a higher administrative level, the central government and PLA have 

undertaken several steps meant to strengthen supervision of veterans’ affairs 

and eliminate corruption in the system. An October 2015 report indicated the 

PLA is considering establishing an independent body responsible for veterans’ 

affairs.112 The PLA’s recent organizational reforms dismantled the four general departments that previously handled veterans’ affairs for themselves113

and placed the newly formed Organ Affairs General Management Bureau 

[zhongyang junwei jiguan shiwu guanli zongju, 中央军委机关事务管理总
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局] in charge of veterans’ affairs under direct CMC supervision.114 Changes 

in resettlement and separation policy have expanded and codified benefits 

for discharged soldiers, and current policy allows the central government 

to simply assign officers to jobs outside their home province if necessary.115

Pronouncements from the highest levels of China’s leadership warn against 

contravention of demobilization and resettlement policy.116

The Chinese government has also demonstrated a tacit willingness 

to extend deadlines in order to forestall any potential future disruptions 

brought on by the troop reduction. PLA officers have suggested that the 

original deadline for reductions will be extended from the end of 2017 

until 2020, giving more time for the relevant parties to arrange for the 

downsizing and subsequent treatment of discharged personnel.117 While the 

deadline extension is an indicator of the difficulties inherent in trimming 

the PLA’s end strength, it is also undoubtedly intended to relieve pressure 

on both PLA commanders charged with making reductions and the local 

governments tasked with providing benefits to discharged personnel.

Countervailing Factors in the Xi Era 

Although the convergence of political, economic, and legal obstacles depicts 

bleak prospects for a smooth PLA personnel reduction, a variety of countervailing factors suggests that the reduction will nonetheless be successfully 

implemented. For instance, the various party and government organs 

charged with accommodating discharged PLA personnel will encourage less burdensome alternative separation paths for them. Xi Jinping’s 

anti-corruption campaign will punish some military personnel and leave 

them ineligible for preferential treatment, while cowing others into foregoing aggressive efforts to secure their full benefits. Xi’s recent consolidation 

of power at the 19th Party Congress is likely to steer governance away from 

institutionalization and rule of law and further toward party supremacy 

and personalized rule by Xi himself, making it less likely that legal barriers 

and local concerns will truly stand in the way of swiftly executing troop 

reduction and resettlement efforts that have Xi’s backing.
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Alternative Separation Options. Higher education, independent 

job-searching, and entrepreneurship initiatives benefiting discharged 

soldiers are increasingly attractive for the local governments and SOEs 

already hard pressed to accommodate former military personnel. Higher 

education bonuses and reduced pensions for independent job-searchers are 

ultimately much less expensive and easier to arrange than retirement with 

full pensions or transfer to civilian billets.118 Chinese authorities are placing 

a stronger emphasis on these separation options. Military authorities have 

already stepped up efforts to help officers find employment by organizing conferences, giving classes, and teaching entrepreneurship skills;119

provincial human resources offices have added more classes to improve 

entrepreneurship ability for discharged soldiers.120 Provincial civilian and 

military organizations responsible for the troop reduction have begun holding ceremonies for soldiers who leave the PLA to obtain higher education.121

These separation options benefit multiple stakeholders in the discharge 

and resettlement processes and may alleviate the burden on localities 

charged with accommodating discharged soldiers. The military is able to 

jettison the personnel it no longer wants, and discharged PLA personnel 

are able to secure some benefits while pursuing futures in the private sector. Hard-pressed local authorities are absolved of resettlement obligations 

beyond a buyout payment for veterans who chose independent job-searching; they are similarly absolved of further obligations for personnel who 

choose to pursue higher education. Neither of these options are as expensive 

as retirement or civilian transfer, and nominally, neither option explicitly 

excludes PLA personnel that may have been charged with corruption. 

At scale, these alternative separation options could have benefits for the 

central government’s effort to rebalance the economy; each veteran who 

starts a business is one less veteran on the payroll of a local government or 

state-owned enterprise.

The Anti-Corruption Campaign. Should education bonuses and 

entrepreneurship classes fail to satisfy the demands of PLA veterans, Xi’s 

anti-corruption campaign adds a powerful coercive tool to the central 
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government’s toolkit for implementing the troop reduction on Xi’s terms. 

The anti-corruption campaign has accelerated at an extraordinary pace 

since 2013, with 4,024 officers above lieutenant colonel punished since 

2013122 and 4,885 officers punished in 2016 alone.123 At least 13,000 military officers have been punished since the campaign began in 2012.124

According to article 13, section 2, of the Provisional Measures for Resettling Transferred Officers, regiment grade officers and below who have 

committed a crime are not eligible for resettlement benefits; anyone 

convicted of a crime is likewise ineligible for civil service jobs of any 

kind.125 While some of these officers may remain in PLA service and are 

not part of the latest troop reduction, those who leave the PLA will not 

enjoy preferential treatment from the party.

The anti-corruption campaign also has a strong coercive and deterrent effect on military personnel and local government officials who have 

not officially been convicted of corruption. Many of the administrative 

and noncombat military organizations facing personnel reductions were 

hotbeds of corruption given their frequent interaction with commercial 

industry and civilian business. The specter of guilt and criminal charges 

withheld is likely to be compelling enough to force corrupt military personnel to leave the PLA without claiming the veterans’ resettlement and 

benefits owed by the government. Even the hint of prosecution for corruption may have cowed Xi’s political opposition into compliance before the 

19th Party Congress; a similar dynamic will likely hold true for both the 

military personnel leaving the PLA and the local governments and SOEs 

charged with accommodating the discharged personnel. PLA veterans 

may be more willing to accept less than they are due rather than make 

complaints that risk triggering a corruption investigation.

Coercion and silencing effects aside, the national scope of the anti-corruption campaign may also free up civilian billets for discharged PLA 

personnel who do not have the black mark of corruption charges on their 

records. Local government officials and SOE leaders are not immune from 

the anti-corruption campaign; indeed, the campaign has thus far ensnared 
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nearly 100,000 higher officials since it began in 2012, and the “tigers and 

flies” nature of the effort has targeted local officials as well.126 Some of these 

recently vacated positions may be open for discharged PLA personnel.

Xi Ascendant: A More Compliant Governing Apparatus? Xi’s consolidation of power at the top of the CCP will lead to a party that is more 

compliant and more likely to override legal mechanisms of resettlement 

should the need arise. Most agree that China is a country under “ruled by 

law” rather than “rule of law,” despite attempts to portray China as the latter.127 In other words, China’s highest governing authorities, namely Xi and 

the CCP, may be more inclined than ever to adjust, override, contravene, 

or outright ignore existing law if the troop reduction threatens their rule.

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and subsequent coronation as core 

leader of the CCP hint at an increasing unity of command throughout the 

party that controls all aspects of the Chinese state and government. Given 

the party’s longstanding emphasis on its control of the military and the military’s continued allegiance to protecting the party,128 central party leaders 

will not look kindly upon laws or local officials that restrict their ability to 

extend preferential treatment to PLA veterans. Military-locality relations 

will undoubtedly be strained by the troop reduction, but the well-worn 

maxim that the party comes before all else in China is likely even more 

true under Xi’s consolidated rule than in years past. This centralization of 

power and emphasis on party rule will likely override local difficulties in 

accommodating PLA veterans.

Conclusion 

The People’s Liberation Army and relevant civilian agencies were well aware 

of the potential negative impact the force reduction could have on morale 

and social stability and have worked hard to anticipate and ameliorate 

problems from past force reductions. Expanding and increasing benefits 

to demobilized conscripts, providing more exit opportunities to NCOs in 

the form of education stipends, and clarifying the civilian transfer process 

for officers all represent calculated efforts by the Chinese government to 
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soften the negative impact of force reductions on discharged soldiers. The 

government announced in March 2018 that the force reduction was “basically complete,” although some PLA officers have privately suggested that 

the force reduction process could extend beyond the originally announced 

2017 deadline until 2020.129

Nonetheless, the troop reduction significantly strained military-locality relations. Tensions were likely most aggravated in the localities hit 

hardest by the economic downturn that face underfunded mandates to find 

jobs for discharged PLA personnel. Still, the success of the force reduction 

indicates that challenges such as increased costs are serious but solvable: the 

government would likely find the monetary resources needed to make separation and pension payments if serious threats to social stability emerged. 

Furthermore, recent veteran protests appear to be aimed at eliciting central 

government pressure to rectify local injustices and protect veterans’ rights, 

rather than directing dissatisfaction at the CCP and central government.130

If social instability rises to a level that requires suppression, the Chinese 

internal security apparatus has amply demonstrated its ability to stifle any 

substantial disruption of social stability, applying its expertise most recently 

against veteran protesters in 2015.131 The party’s ability to control, co-opt, 

coerce, or otherwise suppress dissent is well documented by past incidents 

and verified by the party’s continued rule.

The biggest challenge in any force reduction lies in finding civilian 

positions for discharged soldiers in poorer parts of China. Failure on this 

front could exacerbate tensions between the PLA and local governments, 

and more importantly, between the PLA and a party obliged to care for 

its military. However, this challenge does not seem to have posed a severe 

threat to party rule since the PLA and Chinese government were well 

positioned to mitigate the difficulties that arose from the force reduction. 

The claim that the force reduction is basically complete suggests that the 

challenges were manageable.

In March 2018, the Chinese government responded to the issues that 

emerged in the force reduction by establishing a new Ministry of Veterans 
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Affairs to “to maintain the legitimate rights and interests of the military 

personnel and their families, strengthen the building of the service and 

support system for veterans, build and optimize a concentrated, integrated, 

and well-defined service and support system for veterans, so as to make the 

military a better respected career in China.”132 The ministry is intended 

partly to serve as an advocate for veterans and to press local governments 

to meet their responsibilities. However, it is unclear whether this new organization will be successful in overcoming the inherent conflicts in interest 

between the military and local governments.

This chapter is based on a conference paper prepared for the 2016 

CAPS-RAND-National Defense University People’s Liberation Army 

Conference and a two-part article published by the Jamestown Foundation’s 

China Brief. See Ma Chengkun, “Xi Jinping’s Military Reform and Military 

Locality Relations,” November 18–19, 2016; John Chen, “Downsizing the 

PLA, Part 1: Military Discharge and Resettlement Policy, Past and Present,” 

China Brief 16, no. 16, October 26, 2016, available at <https://jamestown.

org/program/downsizing-pla-part-1-military-discharge-resettlement-policy-past-present/>; and John Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 2: The 

Potential for Social Instability,” China Brief 16, no. 17, November 11, 2016, 

available at <https://jamestown.org/program/downsizing-pla-part-2-military-discharge-resettlement-policy-past-present/>.

Notes 

1 Shen Mengzhe and Liu Shaohua [申孟哲, 刘少华], “Chinese Military Reduction of 300,000 Personnel Draws Worldwide Praise” [中国裁军30万迎来世界点赞], 

People’s Daily Overseas Edition, September 11, 2015, available at <www.mod.gov.

cn/intl/2015-09/11/content_4619049.htm>.

2 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Political Department, “Resolutely 

Win the Tough Battle of Deepening Reform of National Defense and the Armed 

Forces—Thoroughly Study and Implement Xi Jinping’s Important Expositions on 

Deepening the Reform of National Defense and Armed Forces” [坚决打赢深化国

防和军队改革这场攻坚战一一深入学习贯彻习主席关于深化国防和军队改革重

要论述], China Military Science, no. 6 (2015), 1–6.
System Overload?

693

3 Liu Xiaopeng [刘晓朋], ed., “CMC Opinions on Deepening National 

Defense and Military Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], 

Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

4 Sun Yanxin, Wang Jingguo, and Li Xuanliang [孙彦新, 王经国, 李宣良], 

“Ministry of National Defense Holds News Conference to Explain Military Parade 

and Troop Reduction Questions” [国防部举行新闻发布会详解阅兵和 裁军等问

题], Xinhua, September 3, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-

09/03/c_1116457865.htm>.

5 Liu, “CMC Opinions.”

6 Huang Zijuan [黄子娟], “Major General: Troop Reduction Will Focus on 

‘Joint Warfare’; Navy and Air Force Troop Ratios Could Increase” [少将: 裁军将

围绕”联合作战”的核心; 海空军比例或增加], People’s Daily (Beijing), September 7, 

2015, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0907/c1011-27550619.html>.

7 Wang Jingguo [王经国], “Xi Jinping: Care and Show Concern for Resettling 

Military Cadre—Innovate Resettlement Work System” [习近平: 关心关爱军转干

部创新安置工作机制], Xinhua, June 7, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.

com/politics/2016-06/07/c_1119007068.htm>.

8 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on March 29,” China Military 

Online, March 30, 2018, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-

03/30/content_7987841.htm>.

9 “Double support work” is a contraction of a Chinese phrase that roughly 

means “Locals support the troops and their dependents, troops support governments and love the people” [地方拥军优属, 军队拥政爱民]. See Hao Sijia [郝思嘉], 

ed., “How Much Do You Understand about Double Support Common Knowledge?” 

[这些双拥常识,你了解多少?], Nantong Double Support Network [南通双拥网], 

July 5, 2017, available at <www.81.cn/zjsymfc/2017-07/05/content_6609115.htm>.

10 For one examination of early preferential treatment reserved for Red Army 

troops, see Dong Guangcun [董广存], “Early Era Military Personnel Stipends of 

the People’s Liberation Army” [中国人民解放军建军早期的军人津贴], China 

Files [中国档案], January 26, 2009, available at <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/

GB/8722624.html>.

11 “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chinese Soviet 

Republic People’s Committee Decision Regarding Preferential Treatment for Red 

Army Dependents” [中国共产党中央委员会、中华苏维埃共和国人民委员会关

于优待红军家属的决定], Selected Documents of the Chinese Communist Party 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

694

Central Committee, vol. 10 (1934–1935), available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/

GB/64184/64186/66640/4489969.html>.

12 Li Tao [李涛], “Ten Historical Troop Reductions of the People’s Liberation 

Army” [人民解放军历史上的10次大裁军], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 18, 

2015, available at <www.81.cn/20151126jg/2015-11/18/content_6885147.htm>.

13 For a discussion of this decision in historical context, see Bai Li [白黎], 

“People and Military United as One, Try and See Who Could Resist! Recollections 

of the Development of China’s Double Support Work” [军民团结如一人,试看天下

谁能敌: 忆我国双拥工作的发展], Qiushi Network [求是网], July 30, 2016, available 

at <www.qstheory.cn/wp/2016-07/30/c_1119309252.htm>.

14 “A Brief History of the Development of Double Support Work” [双拥工作发

展简史], China Double Support Magazine [《中国双拥》杂志], available at <http://

syzz.mca.gov.cn/article/syjg/201405/20140500638856.shtml>.

15 Li, “Ten Historical Troop Reductions of the People’s Liberation Army.”

16 “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Council 

Notice on Respecting the Military and Actively Supporting Military Reform and 

Construction” [关于尊重, 爱护军队积极支持军队改革和建设的通知], Selected 

Important Documents of the 12th National Party Congress, available at <http://cpc.

people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66679/4493919.html>. The actual Chinese text is 

jieshou anzhi hao zhuanye ganbu, shi dangqian difang dui jundui gaige he jianshe 

de zuida zhichi, 接收安置好转业干部,是当前地方对军队改革和建设的最大支持.

17 For the text of the notice circulated to Shenzhen, see “Labor Department General Office Transmits to Shenzhen City Notice on Opinions Concerning Problems of 

Enterprises Canceling Worker Identification Boundaries and Fully Implementing the 

Labor Contract System” [劳动部办公厅转发深圳市《关于企业取消干部工人身份界

限实行全员劳动合同制若干问题的意见》的通知], Shenzhen City Labor Bureau, July 

5, 1993, available at <http://law.lawtime.cn/d521214526308.html>.

18 Ministry of Civil Affairs [民政部], “A Brief Description of Double Support 

Work” [双拥工作简介], China Double Support Network [中国双拥网], available at 

<http://sy.mca.gov.cn/article/zzjg/sygk/200707/20070700000959.shtml>. 

19 Fang Yongzhi [房永智], “Media: Demobilization Ceremonies Should Be 

Held for the Nearly Half of the 300,000-Personnel Troop Cut That Will Be Officers” 

[媒体: 裁军30万近半是军官应举行退役仪式], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 

June 13, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-06/13/content_7098812.htm>.

20 Zhang Xiangyi, ed., “PLA Daily Editors’ Department Essay: Military 

Reforms Have Entered the Era of ‘New Organization’” [军报编制部文章: 改革强军
System Overload?

695

进入新体制时间’], PLA Daily [解放军报], April 8, 2016, available at <http://news.

eastday.com/c/20160408/u1a9288279_K26843.html>; and Li Dongxing, Li Liang, 

and Wang Pei [李东星, 李亮, 王沛], “Organizational Reconstruction: How to Lead 

‘Large Armed Forces’ with ‘Small Organizations’” [体制重塑, ‘小机关’ 如何指导 ‘

大部队’],” PLA Daily [解放军报], July 29, 2016, available at <http://military.people.

com.cn/n1/2016/0729/c1011-28594372.html>.

21 Chinese laws do not appear to specify transfer to the People’s Armed Police 

(PAP) as a regularly available option for soldiers leaving the PLA, although some 

past reductions have transferred entire PLA units to the PAP. Considering the 

amount of state media attention surrounding other demobilization methods and 

goals, such wholesale transfers are unlikely to represent a significant portion of the 

ongoing force reduction.

22 For a seminal treatment of Chinese demobilization policies in the open 

literature, see Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization and Resettlement: The 

Challenge of Downsizing the People’s Liberation Army,” in Civil-Military Relations 

in Today’s China, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (Armonk, NY: 

M.E. Sharpe, 2007).

23 Ibid., 260–261.

24 Ibid.

25 “What Is Living Expenses Policy Like for Demobilized Conscripts? A 

Group of Questions and Answers in Reply” [退伍义务兵生活待遇政策怎么样? 

一组问答告诉你], Financial Affairs Section of the Nanjing Military Region Joint 

Logistics Department, People’s Frontline News Weixin [人民前线报微信], August 

8, 2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2015-08/08/content_4613364.htm>.

26 Huang Yanghai [黄杨海], ed., “Demobilized Soldiers, Don’t Miss Out on 

These Benefits If You Want to Start Your Own Business” [退伍了, 如果你想创业, 这

些优惠不要错过], PLA Daily Reporter’s Weixin [军报记者微信], September 7, 2015, 

available at <www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-09/07/content_6669758_4.htm>. 

27 Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization and Resettlement,” 262.

28 “People’s Republic of China Military Service Law” [中华人民共和国兵役

法], National People’s Congress, revised October 29, 2011, available at <www.npc.

gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/zxfl/2011-10/31/content_1678464.htm>.

29 See articles 18 and 19, “Enlisted Personnel Resettlement Regulations” [退役

士兵安置条例], State Council of the People’s Republic of China and Central Military 

Commission of the People’s Republic of China, November 1, 2011, available at <www.

gov.cn/zwgk/2011-10/30/content_1981589.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

696

30 See article 29, “Enlisted Personnel Resettlement Regulations.”

31 Ibid., article 41.

32 The term ganbu, 干部, is actually best translated as cadre, and includes both 

military officers and PLA civilians [wenzhi ganbu, 文职干部]. The more specific 

Chinese term for officer is junguan, 军官, but PLA demobilization regulations 

tend to use ganbu in reference to officers. This chapter uses officers to refer to both 

uniformed military officers and PLA civilians.

33 Provisional Measures for Resettling Transferred Officers [军队转业干部安

置暂行办法] (Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China and Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, January 19, 2001), 

chapter 4, article 22, available at <www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zcfg/flfg/

xzfg/201605/t20160506_239559.html>. See also Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization 

and Resettlement,” 263–266.

34 Provisional Measures, chapter 5, article 34.

35 Ibid., chapter 5, article 37.

36 See table for details, which summarizes information from “Two Hundred 

Questions on Living Expenses Policy for Officers and Men” [官兵生活待遇政策

200问], Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, March 11, 

2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2015-03/11/content_4574146.htm>.

37 “Opinions Regarding Problems Managing the Resettlement of Officers 

Selecting Independent Job-Search” [关于自主择业的军队转业干部安置管理若

干问题的意见], State Council of the People’s Republic of China, August 24, 2001, 

available at <www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61487.htm>.

38 See table for details.

39 “Two Hundred Questions on Living Expenses Policy for Officers and Men” 

[官兵生活待遇政策200问].

40 Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization and Resettlement,” 260.

41 Provisional Measures, chapter 3, article 16.

42 Ibid., chapter 3, article 19.

43 Ibid., chapter 3, article 21.

44 Zhang Tao, ed., “Troop Cuts to Boost PLA Capability and Efficiency,” 

China Military Online, September 9, 2015, available at <http://english.chinamil.

com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-09/09/content_6673474.htm>.

45 “Ministry of Civil Affairs and General Staff Department Explains 2014 

Demobilized Enlisted Personnel Resettlement Policy” [民政部总参谋部解答

2014年度退役士兵安置政], Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
System Overload?

697

China, March 10, 2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2015-03/10/

content_4643949.htm>.

46 Kivlehan-Wise cites anecdotal evidence documenting this trend, which 

likely applies to rural conscripts more than those from the cities. See Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization and Resettlement,” 268.

47 Dennis J. Blasko writes that new recruits are “drawn mostly from a pool 

of over 10 million males that reach conscription age annually,” suggesting that 

conscript supply still outnumbers demand. See Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army 

Today (New York: Routledge, 2012), 59.

48 Zhao Lei and Cang Wei, “PLA Eases Standards for Recruitment,” 

China Daily (Beijing), June 17, 2014, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2014-06/17/content_17592194.htm>.

49 “Opinions Regarding Implementation of Financial Subsidization Policy 

for the Education of Demobilized Enlisted Personnel” [关于实施退役士兵教育

资助政策的意见], Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education, October 25, 

2011, available at <www.mof.gov.cn/preview/jiaokewensi/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201110/t20111031_603544.html>.

50 “Notification Regarding the Adjustment and Perfection of National Educational Debt Subsidization Policy Measures” [关于调整完善国家助学贷款相关政策

措施的通知], Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, People’s Bank of China, 

and China Banking Regulatory Commission of the People’s Republic of China, July 

18, 2014, available at <www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/wg2014/

wg201409/201503/t20150331_1210835.html>.

51 Niu Chenfei [牛晨斐], “Ministry of Civil Affairs General Staff Department Interprets 2014 Enlisted Personnel Demobilization and Resettlement 

Policy” [民政部总参谋部解答2014年度退役士兵安置政策], China Military Online 

[中国军网], November 6, 2014, available at <www.81.cn/sydbt/2014-11/06/content_6216297.htm>.

52 Provisional Measures, chapter 1, article 8.

53 Yuan Jing, “Beijing Officer Resettlement Work Conference Requests That 

No Unit Refuse Transferring Officers” [本市转业干部安置工作会要求任何单位

不得拒收军转干部], Beijing Daily [北京日报], July 15, 2016, available at <www.

beijing.gov.cn/sjbsy/jrbj/t1441308.htm>. See also Liu Jianjun [刘建军], “An Advisor 

Replies to A Young Officer’s Concerns about Civilian Transfer” [年轻军官的转业

烦恼, 谢顾问为你解答], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 5, 2016, available at <www.81.

cn/jwgz/2016-07/05/content_7134792.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

698

54 “Opinions Regarding the Problems and Improvement of Measures for 

Civilian Transfer for Demobilized Officers” [关于改进计划分配军转业干部

安置办法若干问题的意见], Communist Party of China Organization Department et al., Inner Mongolia Ministry of Human Resources and Social Stability, 

January 21, 2012, available at <www.nmg.gov.cn/xxgkpt/rst/xxgkml/201708/

t20170821_635361.html>.

55 Liu, “An Advisor Replies.”

56 Jun Zhuanxuan, “State Council Military Cadre Transfer and Resettlement Work Small Group Meets in Beijing” [国务院军队转业干部安置工作小组

会议在京召开], China Organization and Human Resources Report [中国组织人

事报], May 8, 2017, available at <www.alldem-center.com/html/htmlganbugongzuo201705082446.html>.

57 The last complete roster of the Transfer and Resettlement Small Group 

was released in 2008; the 2013 and 2017 press releases do not mention the actual 

composition of the groups. See “Personnel Adjustment for State Council Military 

Cadre Transfer and Resettlement Work Small Group” [国务院军队转业干部安置

工作小组组成人员调整], State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Liaoning 

Provincial People’s Government Report, 2008, available at <www.ln.gov.cn/zfxx/

lnsrmzfgb/2008/d9q/gwybgtwj/200806/t20080602_219353.html>.

58 “Military Officer Transfer Resettlement Department” [军官转业安置司], 

Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, People’s Republic of China, 

January 31, 2013, available at <www.mohrss.gov.cn/jgzyzzs/ltxgbjzz/201301/

t20130131_78467.html >.

59 For an example, see “Military Cadre Transfer Resettlement Department” 

[军官转业安置处], Fujian Provincial Department of Human Resources and Social 

Security, available at <www.fjrs.gov.cn/zw/jgszyzn/tjgcs/jzb/>.

60 Hao Sijia [郝思嘉], ed., “A Description of the National Double Support 

Work Leading Group” [全国双拥工作领导小组介绍], China Double Support 

Network [中国双拥网], July 31, 2015, available at <www.81.cn/zjsymfc/2015-07/31/

content_6609076.htm>.

61 For a full list of organizations with high-level equities in double support 

work, see the roster of the national leading small group at Cui Xiaosu and Yao Yi 

[崔小粟, 姚奕], eds., “Adjustment of the National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group Roster” [全国双拥工作领导小组组成人员名单调整], News of the 

Chinese Communist Party, November 11, 2013, available at <http://renshi.people.

com.cn/n/2013/1111/c139617-23496497.html>.
System Overload?

699

62 Hao, “A Description of the National Double Support Work Leading Group.”

63 General Office of Hebei Province Double Support Work Leading Small Group, 

“Double Support Work Responsibilities and Work System” [职责和工作制度], Hebei 

Province Department of Civil Affairs, available at <www.hebmz.gov.cn/mzyw/sygz/>

64 Hao, “A Description of the National Double Support Work Leading Group.”

65 Cui and Yao, “Adjustment of the National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group Roster.”

66 “Special Care Resettlement Bureau” [优抚安置局], Ministry of Civil 

Affairs, People’s Republic of China, July 2015, available at <www.mca.gov.cn/

article/jg/jgsj/201507/20150700847756.shtml>.

67 Ibid.

68 Cui and Yao, “Adjustment of the National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group Roster.”

69 See appendix for a comparison of the 2008 rosters for both working groups.

70 Cui and Yao, “Adjustment of the National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group Roster.”

71 “Demonstrate Superiority in Double Support Work, Strongly Support the 

Deepening of National Defense and Military Reform” [全国双拥工作领导小组:发挥

双拥工作优势,大力支持深化国防和军队改革], National Double Support Work Leading Small Group, Ministry of Civil Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 23, 2016, 

available at <www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/mzyw/201605/20160500000635.shtml>. 

72 “Double Support Work Responsibilities and Work System” [职责和工作制

度], General Office of Hebei Province Double Support Work Leading Small Group, 

Department of Civil Affairs, available at <www.hebmz.gov.cn/mzyw/sygz/>.

73 “Guidance on Executing Double Support Work” [双拥工作办事指南], 

Tai’an City Department of Civil Affairs, available at <www.tamz.gov.cn/html/

bszn/syyfaz/shuangyong/69.html>.

74 Provisional Measures.

75 Interview of PLA officer by authors, November 2017.

76 Xu Jingjing, “How to Understand ‘Arranging Corresponding Duty Grades’ 

in Military Transfer and Resettlement” [军转安置中”安排相应职务”咋理解], 

National Defense News [国防报], February 14, 2017, available at <http://military.

people.com.cn/n1/2017/0214/c1011-29078672.html>.

77 Ibid.

78 One document from 1985 detailed civilian grade equivalents for military 

personnel transferring out of the PLA. Division grade leaders [zheng shi zhi, 正师
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

700

职] were to be assigned as local administration or department heads [ju, ting zhang, 

局,厅长], deputy division grade leaders [fu shi zhi, 副师职] to vice administration or 

department heads [fu ju, ting zhang, 副局,厅长], regiment leaders [zheng tuan zhi, 正

团职] to office heads [chu zhang, 处长] or county mayors [xian zhang, 县长], and deputy regiment leaders [fu tuan zhi, 副团职] to vice county mayors [fu xian zhang, 副县

长] or deputy office heads [fu chu zhang, 副处长]. See State Council and Central Military Commission, “Notice on the Problem of Salaries and Treatment of Transferred 

Military Cadre” [军队转业干部工资待遇问题的通知], November 19, 1985, available 

at <www.bjrbj.gov.cn/LDJAPP/search/zxfgdetail.jsp?no=201208211103400341>.

79 Meng Leilei [孟磊磊], “What Did This Transferred Military Cadre Rely 

upon to Become a Deputy County Mayor in Sixteen Months?” [一年零四个月,这

名军转干部靠什么成为副县长?], China Military Online [中国军网], May 10, 2017, 

available at <www.81.cn/jwgz/2017-05/10/content_7596327.htm>.

80 See article 21 of “Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China” [中华人

民共和国公务员法], Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist 

Party, available at <www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-06/21/content_8249.htm>.

81 Ibid., article 25.

82 For a conversion between the number of civil service grades and administrative (county, township, and so forth) grades, see “Regulations on Managing Civil 

Servant Grades and Levels” [公务员职务与级别管理规定], Ministry of Human 

Resources and Social Security, People’s Republic of China, April 9, 2006, available at 

<www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zcfg/flfg/xzfg/201605/t20160506_239550.html>.

83 Zhang, “PLA Daily Editors’ Department Essay”; Li, Li, and Wang, “Organizational Reconstruction.”

84 Many of these downsizing mandates are motivated by concerns about 

mounting local government debt. For a discussion of past downsizing efforts, see 

John P. Burns, “‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 

1990s,” China Quarterly, vol. 175 (September 2003), 775–802. See also Frank Tang, 

“China’s Spiraling Local Government Debt Still Out of Control, Says Outspoken 

Lawmaker,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 9, 2017, available at 

<www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2077367/chinas-spiralling-localgovt-debt-still-out-control-says>.

85 Xu, “How to Understand ‘Arranging Corresponding Duty Grades’ in Military Transfer and Resettlement.”

86 Meng, “What Did This Transferred Military Cadre Rely upon to Become 

a Deputy County Mayor in Sixteen Months?”
System Overload?

701

87 For the text of the notice circulated to Shenzhen, see “Labor Department 

General Office Transmits to Shenzhen City Notice on Opinions Concerning 

Problems of Enterprises Canceling Worker Identification Boundaries and Fully 

Implementing the Labor Contract System” [劳动部办公厅转发深圳市《关于企业

取消干部工人身份界限实行全员劳动合同制若干问题的意见》的通知], Shenzhen 

City Labor Bureau, July 5, 1993, available at <www.govyi.com/zhengcefagui/quanguofagui/200707/52528.shtml>. 

88 Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Mass Layoffs in China’s Coal Country 

Threaten Unrest,” New York Times, December 16, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2015/12/17/world/asia/china-coal-mining-economy.html>.

89 See Tian Shaohui, ed., “China Can Deal with Economic Challenges: Official,” Xinhua, February 3, 2016.

90 Zhao Xiaohui [赵晓辉], “China Initiates Fight Against Production Overcapacity; Government Allocates 100 Billion Yuan for Worker 

Resettlement” [中国打响去产能攻坚战 政府斥资千亿元用于职工安

置], Xinhua, February 25, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

fortune/2016-02/25/c_1118157288.htm>.

91 See Benjamin Lim, “China Veterans Stage 2,000-Strong Protest,” Reuters, 

April 16, 2005; and Edward Cody, “China Grows More Wary Over Rash of Protests,” Washington Post, August 10, 2005, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/09/AR2005080901323.html>.

92 Lu Jianwei, “A Thousand Demobilized Military Personnel Clash Bloodily 

with Hundreds of Special Police in Heilongjiang” [黑龍江千名退伍軍人與數百特

警流血衝突], Central News Agency, September 9, 2007.

93 Zhang Qian [張謙], “China’s Demobilized Military Personnel Hit the 

Streets for Their Rights; Hunan Government Deploys Special Police as a Precaution” [中國退伍軍人上街爭權 湖南派特警戒備], Central News Agency, April 20, 

2007, available at <www.epochtimes.com/b5/7/4/20/n1684680.htm>.

94 “Nearly 6,000 Demobilized Chinese Military Cadres Publicize Petition 

Appealing for Equal Treatment” [中国近6千军转干部发表要求同等待遇请示书], 

Radio Free Asia [自由亞洲電台], March 26, 2008, available at <www.epochtimes.

com/b5/8/3/26/n2059023.htm>.

95 Guo Meilan [郭玫兰], “Large-Scale Demonstration by Demobilized Military Cadres Explodes in Yantai” [煙台爆發軍轉幹部大規模抗議行動], Central 

News Agency, December 16, 2009, available at <www.epochtimes.com/gb/9/12/16/

n2756491.htm>.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

702

96 Guo Meilan [郭玫兰], “Over 400 Demobilized Military Personnel 

Petition the Yantai Government” [400多名退伍軍人到煙台市政府請願], Central News Agency, May 20, 2010, available at <www.secretchina.com/news/

gb/2010/05/20/350544.html>.

97 Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization and Resettlement,” 257.

98 Jeremy Page, “As China’s Economy Slows, Unrest Among Veterans Rises,” 

Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2016, available at <https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/04/26/as-chinas-economy-slows-unrest-among-veterans-rises/>.

99 These protests are, unsurprisingly, not covered by official state media. 

See Qu Ming, ed., “More Than 4,000 Demobilized Soldiers Gather at the Central 

Military Commission Holding Banners to Protect Their Rights” [4000余退役军

人聚中军委拉横幅维权], New Tang News, July 18, 2016, available at <www.ntdtv.

com/xtr/gb/2016/07/19/a1276834.html>.

100 “China Blockades Streets Around Military Building as Hundreds Protest 

in Capital,” Reuters, October 11, 2016, available at <www.reuters.com/article/

us-china-military-protests/china-blockades-streets-around-military-building-ashundreds-protest-in-capital-idUSKCN12B12V>.

101 Chi-yuk Choi, “PLA Veterans Stage Another Protest in Beijing over 

Unpaid Benefits,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 4, 2017, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2059225/pla-veterans-stage-another-protest-beijing-over-unpaid>.

102 Fang Yan, “Demobilization Bugle Call Sounds: The Pressures of Civilian 

Transfer and Resettlement Will Not Be Small” [裁军号角吹响: 转业安置压力不

会小], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], March 3, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

rd/2016-03/03/content_6939115.htm>.

103 Information from PLA officers, November and December 2017.

104 Li Tao [李涛], “The 10 Large Troop Reductions in People’s Liberation Army 

History” [人民解放军历史上10次大裁军], PLA Daily, November 18, 2015, available 

at <http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/1118/c1011-27827138.html>.

105 Ibid.

106 Huang Fuyou, ed., “Media: Where Can Downsized Officers Go?” [媒体: 

被裁的军官们都能去哪儿?], Beijing Daily [北京日报], September 4, 2015, available 

at <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150904/44584202_0.shtml>.

107 Chen Guoquan and Li Youtao [陈国全, 黎友陶], “Navy and Ministry of 

Human Resources Hold Joint Training Class on Independent Job Selection, Job 

Searching, and Entrepreneurship” [海军与人社部联合举办自主择业军转干部就
System Overload?

703

业创业培训班], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 9, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

jwgz/2016-08/09/content_7196968.htm>.

108 Huang, “Media: Where Can Downsized Officers Go?”

109 “Opinions Regarding the Guidance of Delineation and Categorization of 

State-Owned Enterprise Capabilities” [关于国有企业功能界定与分类的指导意见], 

Ministry of Finance, People’s Republic of China, December 30, 2015, available at 

<www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201512/t20151230_1638704.htm>. 

110 Song Yu, ed., “British Media: China Requests State-Owned Enterprises 

Reserve 5% of Jobs for Demobilized Enlisted Soldiers” [英媒: 中国要求国企按招

新5% 比例聘用退役士兵], Reference News, December 30, 2015.

111 See Minnie Chan, “Why Former Chinese Soldiers Are Skeptical about Xi 

Jinping’s Promise of Better Treatment,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

November 5, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117765/why-former-chinese-soldiers-are-sceptical-about >; and Christopher 

Bodeen, “China Veterans’ Protests for Pensions Pose Test for Leaders,” Associated 

Press, October 17, 2016.

112 Zhao Lei, “Veterans to Receive Better Income, Pensions Package,” China 

Daily, October 9, 2015.

113 Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

General Staff Department: Evolving Organizations and Missions,” in The PLA as 

Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: DGI, 

Inc., 2015), 160–161.

114 Liu Zhiming [刘志明], “Adhere to the ‘Four Iron’ Demands to Build a FirstRate Support Organization” [按照 ‘四铁’ 要求打造一流服务保障机构], PLA Daily 

[解放军报], April 20, 2016, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-04/20/

content_4650021.htm>.

115 See Provisional Measures, chapter 3, article 21.

116 See Yin Shen and Tong Zongli [尹深, 仝宗莉], eds., “Two Departments: 

No State-Owned Enterprises Are Allowed to Reject Demobilized Enlisted Personnel” [两部委: 任何国有企业不得拒绝接收退役士兵], People’s Daily [人民网],

December 28, 2015, available at <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1228/

c1001-27986615.html>; and Yuan Jing [袁京], “Beijing Officer Resettlement Work 

Conference Requests That No Unit Refuse Transferring Officers” [本市转业干部

安置工作会要求任何单位不得拒收军转干部], Beijing Daily [北京日报], July 15, 

2016, available at <www.beijing.gov.cn/sjbsy/jrbj/t1441308.htm>.

117 Information from PLA officers, November and December 2017.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

704

118 See table for details.

119 For examples, see Chen and Li, “Navy and Ministry of Human Resources 

Hold Joint Training Class on Independent Job Selection, Job Searching, and Entrepreneurship”; and Leng Xinggao and Li Bingfeng [冷兴高, 李兵峰], “Rocket Force 

Organization Job Search and Entrepreneurship Classes Help Independent Job 

Search and Civilian Transfer Military Cadre Enter the ‘Sea of Commerce’” [火箭

军组织就业创业培训为自主择业军转干部融入“商海”搭桥], Xinhua, August 31, 

2017, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-08/31/c_1121579275.htm>.

120 See Yunnan Provincial Office of Human Resources and Social Security, 

“Notice Regarding Holding Entrepreneurship Training Courses for Independent 

Job-Searching Military Cadre” [关于举办自主择业军转干部创新创业能力提高培

训班的通知], Yunnan Human Resources and Social Security Network, December 

14, 2016, available at <www.ynhrss.gov.cn/NewsView.aspx?NewsID=20437&ClassID=558>.

121 Guangdong Provincial Office of Human Resources and Social Security, 

“Guangdong Province Holds First Ceremony for Transferring Military Cadre 

Entering Higher Education and Special Training Schools” [广东省举办首批军转

干部进高校专项培训开学典礼], September 20, 2017, available at <www.gdhrss.

gov.cn/gzdt/20170920/10520.html>.

122 Zhao Lei, “Scores of PLA Officers Punished,” China Daily (Beijing), 

January 30, 3015, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-01/30/

content_19444889.htm>.

123 Liu Mengjiao, ed., “PLA Daily Vows Strict Discipline for Chinese Army,” 

Xinhua, March 27, 2017, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-

03/27/c_136161188.htm>.

124 Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Clears Decks for Top-Level Changes to China’s 

Military,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 3, 2017, available at 

<www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113054/xi-jinpingclears-decks-top-level-changes-chinas>.

125 For the relevant prohibition in the Provisional Measures, see chap. 2, art. 13, 

sec. 2. For the corresponding prohibitions in civil servant law, see art. 24 of “Civil 

Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China.”

126 “Robber Barons, Beware: A Crackdown on Corruption Has Spread Anxiety 

among China’s Business Elite,” The Economist, October 22, 2015, available at <www.

economist.com/news/china/21676814-crackdown-corruption-has-spread-anxietyamong-chinas-business-elite-robber-barons-beware>.
System Overload?

705

127 Josh Chin, “‘Rule of Law’ or ‘Rule by Law’? In China, a Preposition Makes 

All the Difference,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2014, available at <https://

blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/10/20/rule-of-law-or-rule-by-law-in-china-apreposition-makes-all-the-difference/>.

128 For a discussion of the relationship between the party and PLA, see James 

C. Mulvenon, “China: Conditional Compliance” in Coercion and Governance: The 

Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 2001).

129 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on March 29,” China 

Military Online, March 30, 2018, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2018-03/30/content_7987841.htm>.

130 Qu, “More Than 4,000 Demobilized Soldiers Gather at the Central Military Commission Holding Banners to Protect Their Rights.”

131 More recent reports have indicated that some veteran activists have been 

taken away by security services. See Chan, “Why Former Chinese Soldiers Are 

Skeptical about Xi Jinping’s Promise of Better Treatment.”

132 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on March 29.”
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

706

Appendix

Comparison of National-Level Working Groups Responsible for 

Military-Locality and Demobilization, 2008

Military Cadre Transfer and Resettlement 

Work Small Group

National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group

State 

Council

Director, Ministry of Human 

Resources and Social Security [人

力资源社会保障部部长]*

Vice Premier, State Council 

[国务院副总理]*

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of Human 

Resources and Social Security [人

力资源社会保障部副部长]**

Director, Ministry of Civil Affairs 

[民政部部长]**

State 

Council

PLA Assistant to Director of General 

Political Department 

[总政治部主任助理]**

Deputy Director, CCP General Office 

[中央办公厅副主任]**

CCP

CCP Deputy Director, 

Central Organization Department 

[中央组织部副部长]

Deputy Director, Central Organization Department [中央组织部副

部长]**

CCP

CCP Deputy Director, 

Propaganda Department 

[中央宣传部副部长]

Assistant Secretary General, State 

Council [国务院副秘书长]**

State 

Council

CCP Deputy Director, State Commission 

Office for Public Sector Reform [中

央编办副主任]

Deputy Director, 

Propaganda Department 

[中央宣传部副部长]**

CCP

State 

Council

Assistant Secretary General, 

State Council 

[国务院副秘书长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of Civil 

Affairs [民政部副部长]**

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, 

National Development and 

Reform Commission 

[发展改革委副主任]

Deputy Director, National 

Development and Reform 

Commission [发展改革委副主任]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Education 

[教育部副部长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Education [教育部副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, 

Ministry of Public Security 

[公安部副部长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Science and Technology [科技部

副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of Civil 

Affairs [民政部副部长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Industry and Information Technology [工业和信息化部副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance 

[财政部副部长]

Deputy Director, Ethnic Affairs 

Commission [国家民委副主任]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, 

Ministry of Housing and 

Urban-Rural Development 

[住房城乡建设部副部长]

Director, Political Department, 

Ministry of Public Security 

[公安部政治部主任]

State 

Council
System Overload?

707

Comparison of National-Level Working Groups Responsible for 

Military-Locality and Demobilization, 2008

Military Cadre Transfer and Resettlement 

Work Small Group

National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group

State 

Council

Assistant to Director, 

People’s Bank of China 

[人民银行行长助理]

Deputy Director, Ministry of Justice 

[司法部副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, 

Administration of Taxation 

[税务总局副局长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance 

[财政部副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, 

Administration for 

Industry and Commerce 

[工商总局副局长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of Human 

Resources and Social Security 

[人力资源社会保障部副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Administration of 

Press, Publication, Radio, Film, 

and Television [广电总局副局长]

Member, Party Committee, 

Ministry of Land and Resources 

[国土资源部党组成员]

State 

Council

PLA Political Commissar, General 

Logistics Department [总后勤部

政治委员]

Deputy Director, 

Ministry of Housing and 

Urban-Rural Development 

[住房城乡建设部副部长]

State 

Council

PAP Director, Political Department [武

警部队政治部主任]

Deputy Director, 

Ministry of Transport 

[交通运输部副部长]

State 

Council

PLA Deputy Director, General Political 

Department Cadre Department [总

政治部干部部副部长]

Deputy Director, 

Ministry of Railways 

[铁道部副部长]

State 

Council

State 

Council

Deputy Director-General, Ministry 

of Human Resources and Social 

Security [人力资源社会保障部

副司长]

Deputy Director, Ministry of Water 

Resources [水利部副部长]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Agriculture [农业部副部长]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Commerce [商务部部长助理]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of 

Culture [文化部副部长]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Ministry of Health 

[卫生部副部长]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, State-Owned 

Assets Supervision and 

Administration Commission 

[国资委副主任]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Administration of 

Taxation [税务总局副局长]

State 

Council
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

708

Comparison of National-Level Working Groups Responsible for 

Military-Locality and Demobilization, 2008

Military Cadre Transfer and Resettlement 

Work Small Group

National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group

Deputy Director, Administration for 

Industry and Commerce 

[工商总局副局长]

State 

Council

Deputy Director, Administration of 

Press, Publication, Radio, Film, 

and Television [广电总局副局长]

State 

Council

Director, General Staff 

Department Political Department 

[总参谋部政治部主任]

PLA

Director, General Political 

Department Mass Work Office 

[总政治部群众工作办公室主任]

PLA

Director, General Logistics 

Department Political Department 

[总后勤部政治部主任]

PLA

Director, General Armaments 

Department Political Department 

[总装备部政治部主任]

PLA

Deputy Political Commissar, 

People’s Armed Police 

[武警部队副政治委员]

PAP

Vice Chairman, All-China 

Federation of Trade Unions 

[全国总工会副主席、书记处书记]

NGO

Secretary, Central Secretariat, 

Communist Youth League 

[共青团中央书记处书记]

CCP

Vice Chairman, All-China 

Women’s Federation 

[全国妇联副主席、书记处书记]

NGO

Vice Chairman, All-China Federation 

of Industry and Commerce 

[全国工商联副主席]

CCP

Director, Ministry of Civil Affairs 

Special Care and Resettlement 

Bureau [民政部优抚安置局局长]

State 

Council

Notes: Heads [zu zhang, 组长] of these two groups are denoted with one asterisk; deputy heads 

[fu zu zhang, 副组长] have two asterisks. Positions in red are common to both groups, but few 

of the actual personnel are dual-hatted with positions in both groups. All information is sourced 

from the 2008 rosters, which is the last year both rosters could be found. See State Council of the 

People’s Republic of China, “Personnel Adjustment for State Council Military Cadre Transfer and 

Resettlement Work Small Group” [国务院军队转业干部安置工作小组组成人员调整], Liaoning 
System Overload?

709

Provincial People’s Government Report, available at <www.ln.gov.cn/zfxx/lnsrmzfgb/2008/d9q/

gwybgtwj/200806/t20080602_219353.html>; and Duan Hongjie, ed., “State Council General Office 

and CMC General Office Notice on Adjustment of Personnel in National Double Support Work Leading 

Small Group” [国务院办公厅中央军委办公厅关于调整全国拥军优属拥政爱民工作领导小

组组成人员的通知], Jilin Provincial People’s Government, available at <www.jl.gov.cn/zw/xxgk/

jlgb/2008/200809/200809GBF/200812/t20081228_2275705.html>.

711

CONCLUSION

Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow

China’s military reforms are driven by Xi Jinping’s ambition to 

reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to 

win informationized [xinxihua, 信息化] wars and to ensure that it 

remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is broad political support within the party for Xi’s goal of building a stronger military. The 

outline of the current military reform agenda was endorsed at the third plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, and Xi played a central 

role in working with PLA leaders to develop detailed reorganization plans 

and implement the reform agenda.1

 At the first meeting of the new leading 

group on military reform in early 2014, Xi declared that the overriding goal 

was to produce a military that can “fight and win battles.”2 The 19th Party 

Congress work report in October 2017 advanced the timeline for Chinese 

military modernization, calling for achieving mechanization and making 

strides on informationization and building strategic capabilities by 2020 and 

building “world-class forces” [shijie yiliu jun, 世界一流军] by mid-century.3

The reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale 

and scope of the organizational changes. Virtually every part of the PLA 

now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and responsibilities 

CHAPTER 18
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

712

changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or has undergone a major 

internal reorganization. The relationships between and among the Central 

Military Commission (CMC) departments, offices, and commissions, the 

services, and the theater commands have all changed. The military education system has been reformed to reduce duplication and place greater 

emphasis on jointness, and changes to the military assignment, promotion, 

and grade/rank systems are still to come. The reforms will have important 

implications for the PLA’s responsiveness to political direction and ability 

to achieve the modernization goals that the CCP has set for it.

The chapters in this book explore various dimensions of Xi’s PLA 

reform agenda in detail. This conclusion draws the analytical threads 

together to assess what difference the reforms are likely to make for the 

PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations, for the CCP’s control of the army, 

and for civil-military integration. The analytic judgments draw on some 

of the arguments, evidence, and assessments presented in the individual 

chapters, but those authors do not necessarily share all our conclusions.

Assessing the Reforms 

While the reforms are not complete, the chapters in this book show how 

much has been accomplished in a relatively short period. One important 

judgment is that Xi and fellow PLA reformers have succeeded in forcing 

the military to adopt needed reforms that previous CMC Chairmen Jiang 

Zemin and Hu Jintao were unable to push through and that the PLA could 

not adopt on its own. Xi’s political strategy for pushing his reform agenda 

through bureaucratic opposition appears to have succeeded, with the 

reforms breaking up the four general departments (previously described 

as “independent kingdoms”), reducing the institutional power of the previously dominant ground forces and purging the senior PLA officer corps 

of many potentially disloyal and corrupt elements.4

The structural reorganization of the PLA is basically complete, with 

the responsibilities and constituent parts of the four general departments 

redistributed to CMC departments, commissions, and offices or sent to 
Conclusion

713

the new army headquarters, Strategic Support Force, or the Joint Logistic 

Support Force. The seven military regions have been converted into five 

joint theater commands, which now exercise operational control over the 

ground, naval, air, and conventional Rocket Force units within their areas 

of responsibility. The army has stood up its new headquarters, the Rocket 

Force is now a full-fledged service, and the Strategic Support Force and Joint 

Logistics Support Force are both operational. Ground force group armies 

and air force fighter and fighter-bomber units have been reorganized into 

a standardized “group army/corps-brigade-battalion” structure. The PLA 

claims to have completed its downsizing of 300,000 officers and troops, 

cutting over 1,000 units and 30 percent of commissioned officers by the 

end of 2017.5

 The military education system has been reorganized and 

downsized to achieve efficiencies and increase emphasis on joint operations and technology. Changes have also been made to the People’s Armed 

Police, which handles domestic security as part of China’s armed forces. 

Planned changes to the military assignment, promotion, and grade/rank 

systems—which will have a major impact on the ultimate success of the 

reforms—are yet to be implemented.

Improving Joint Operations Capability 

The reforms revised the division of labor within the PLA, with the CMC 

providing “general management” [junwei guan zong, 军委管总], the theater 

commands focusing on operations [zhanqu zhu zhan, 战区主战], and the 

services managing force-building [junzhong zhu jian, 军种主建].6 The 

resulting theater joint command and control structure, with the theater 

commands exercising control of ground, naval, and air forces through 

service-specific theater component headquarters, rectifies a major problem 

with the pre-reform command and control structure, where the military 

region headquarters did not have peacetime command of naval, air, and 

missile units within its area of responsibility. The new construct should be 

much better suited to joint planning, training, and operations. PLA joint 

exercises at the theater level appear to be focused on developing the ability 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

714

of commanders and their staffs to employ joint forces effectively. There 

have been significant growing pains as the theater commands and their 

components adjust to new command relationships and learn how to work 

together, but the basic joint command structure appears to be workable. 

The disruption caused by the organizational reshuffling and personnel 

downsizing has probably reduced the PLA’s near-term combat readiness, 

but the reforms are likely to produce significant improvements in the PLA’s 

ability to plan and execute larger and more complex joint operations within 

2 to 3 years.

Important questions remain about the relationships between the 

CMC’s Joint Staff Department (JSD) and theater commands and about how 

theater commanders will tap nuclear and nonnuclear strategic capabilities 

that remain under CMC command. The reforms established joint command and control structures at the national level (under the CMC’s JSD, 

which also has nominal control of operations beyond China’s periphery) 

and at the theater level (the theater commands). But the precise division 

of labor and willingness of the CMC to delegate decision authority to the 

theater commander remains unclear. Will the JSD (acting on behalf of the 

CMC) view its role primarily as providing supporting strategic capabilities 

(such as antiship ballistic missiles, intelligence derived from space and cyber 

systems, counterspace and offensive cyber capabilities, and long-range precision strike) to help a theater commander execute his war plan, or will the 

JSD (run by a CMC-member grade officer senior to the theater commanders) attempt to micromanage the theater’s operations? The prevailing PLA 

organizational culture emphasizes caution and deference to authority, not 

taking responsibility for actions not fully vetted with more senior leaders.7

The notion of empowering military officers to exercise initiative to carry 

out the intent of their commanders (known as mission command), which 

is integral to some Western militaries, is not culturally accepted in the PLA 

at present.8

 Integrated communications systems and a common operational 

picture provide both opportunities for timely support and temptations to 

intervene in the decisions of subordinate commanders.
Conclusion

715

A second question is the role of the services in supporting joint operations and building a joint force. In principle the reforms remove the service 

headquarters from operations, but in practice all of them have held onto 

some operational command responsibilities. Army headquarters retains 

responsibility for border and coastal defense; navy headquarters supervises the counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden; air force headquarters 

retains centralized control of bomber, transport, and airborne assets; and 

the Rocket Force has operational control over strategic forces. Moreover, 

all the services are using service-specific training requirements (including 

multi-theater exercises) as a means of asserting a continued operational role. 

The theater command service component commanders report to both the 

theater command headquarters for operations and to their service headquarters for service training and administration. How they will reconcile 

competing (and potentially incompatible) demands remains to be seen.

While the services are responsible for building forces to support joint 

operations, there is ample evidence of interservice rivalry and competition 

for missions and resources. Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew Erickson 

show in their chapter how the higher priority accorded to the maritime 

domain by Xi Jinping has prompted efforts by the air force, Rocket Force, 

and even the army to develop and showcase capabilities relevant to maritime operations.9

 Similar trends are evident in long-range precision strike, 

where the navy, air force, and Rocket Force all have systems that perform 

similar missions. Especially in an environment where military budgets are 

growing more slowly, interservice competition over missions and resources 

may impede operational cooperation. This may also be the case in the 

nuclear domain as the PLA Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missile–

equipped nuclear submarines become operational and if the PLA Air Force 

develops nuclear capabilities. The tension between the services desire to 

maximize their budgets and capabilities and the needs of theater commanders for trained forces that can work jointly to achieve operational synergies 

is real. One question going forward is whether the removal of the service 

commanders from membership on the CMC will allow that organization to 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

716

override parochial service considerations and make procurement decisions 

that maximize PLA joint capabilities.

Achieving the potential synergies of a joint force will ultimately depend 

on the PLA’s ability to successfully recruit, educate, and train operational 

commanders and staff officers who can lead and work effectively in a joint 

environment.10 The PLA recognizes this as a current weakness, and some 

planned military reforms are aimed at fixing these problems. PLA Army 

officers currently spend the bulk of their careers in a single group army, in 

a single theater, with limited opportunities to work with units from other 

locations or services. This system produces officers and commanders who 

may be proficient in their service tasks and assigned responsibilities in 

specific contingencies, but who have a very limited perspective. Building 

effective joint commanders will require changes not only to the military 

education system to teach soldiers about the other services and how to conduct joint operations but also to the military assignment, promotion, and 

grade/rank systems. Without cross-fertilization and broader operational 

experiences, PLA effectiveness could be stunted.

However, these changes are interdependent and would constitute a 

major disruption of longstanding PLA practices. For example, a rotational 

assignment system would allow officers to gain experience with other 

services, localities, and job responsibilities and help them develop into wellrounded commanders capable of leading joint operations. But rotational 

assignments would require developing new military housing and schools 

for dependent children to entice officers to accept assignments in remote 

regions.11 They would also likely require a shift to a centralized promotion 

system that evaluates officers fairly and rewards them for their experience 

and qualifications rather than their relationship with their local commander.12 Such changes to the assignment and promotion systems are being 

contemplated and experimented with, but conversations with PLA officers 

suggest that military leaders remain cautious about implementing reforms 

that will reshape career incentives and affect every member of the PLA.
Conclusion

717

Ensuring CCP Control over the Military 

A second major driver for the reforms was Xi Jinping’s desire to strengthen 

party control over the military, which had eroded during Hu Jintao’s tenure 

as CMC chairman. Rampant corruption within the PLA was one major 

problem, but the potential for the military not to follow orders from the CCP 

(and from Xi himself) was an even bigger issue. Xi asserted his authority 

over the PLA by emphasizing the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” 

[zhongyang junwei zeren zhi, 中央军委责任制], which gives the chairman 

the ultimate authority over military affairs, and by using anti-corruption 

investigations to root out senior officers who might be disloyal, including 

retired CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong (both appointed 

by Jiang Zemin). The example set by these cases—and the vulnerability of 

other corrupt officers to investigation—proved to be a potent weapon in 

defusing potential opposition to military reforms.

Xi has implemented a series of structural and personnel changes 

designed to combat graft and ensure political orthodoxy among the officer 

corps. These include reducing the susceptibility of PLA supervisory mechanisms to the influence of commanding officers by elevating the Discipline 

Inspection Commission to independent status, raising its secretary to CMC 

member status and placing the audit bureau and the military court system 

under direct CMC oversight. It also includes efforts to reemphasize the 

importance of party organs and political work at all levels of the PLA, including the requirement to incorporate Xi’s writings on military issues into the 

military education system. Finally, Xi has used corruption investigations, 

rotations of senior officers, forced retirements, and promotion of younger 

officers to reshape the ranks of the senior PLA officer corps, eliminating or 

sidelining officers deemed to be potentially disloyal and promoting those 

viewed as politically reliable and relatively free from corruption.

These measures have marginalized potential opposition to Xi’s PLA 

reform agenda and have likely been effective at uprooting officers who 

might have been part of patronage networks tied to Xu and Guo. The structural changes to the CMC’s organization should improve the effectiveness of 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

718

monitoring mechanisms, while the appointment of Zhong Shaojun as head 

of the CMC General Office gives Xi’s long-time personal aide the ability 

to monitor communications and activity within the CMC. Xi’s personal 

involvement in the promotions of senior officers and ability to initiate (or 

withhold) investigations are powerful carrots and sticks to help ensure 

an obedient officer corps. However, the continued effectiveness of these 

measures requires Xi to continue to dedicate significant time to military 

personnel issues and is likely to create a climate of toadying and fear that 

may stimulate resentment and inhibit diverse or contrary military advice.

More generally, efforts to use political work to rekindle the ideological 

flame of belief in Marxism-Leninism will be difficult. Senior PLA officers 

are willing to mouth the correct slogans and swear their loyalty to the 

party and to Xi as its core leader. But formal compliance is not the same as 

genuine belief and may not produce better behavior over the long term or 

loyalty to the CCP and to Xi personally in a political crisis. Moreover, the 

hypocrisy of CCP leaders pursuing an aggressive anti-corruption campaign 

when their own family members have amassed fortunes by trading on their 

political connections is likely to breed cynicism and undermine efforts to 

produce a cleaner PLA.

Strengthening Civil-Military Integration 

A third major driver of PLA reforms is the desire to strengthen civil-military cooperation, known as civil-military integration [junmin ronghe, 军

民融合] (CMI) or civil-military fusion. The PLA has long relied on defense 

mobilization to reduce military expenditures by tapping civilian transportation, personnel, and supply resources in a crisis or conflict. However, 

a major focus of CMI is finding ways for the military to leverage breakthroughs in the civilian science and technology (S&T) sector and to ensure 

that military science and technology needs are met. CMI also involves other 

types of military and civilian cooperation, including expanding reliance on 

civilian contractors in the military supply chain and incorporating military 

specifications into the design of civilian transport ships, which could be 
Conclusion

719

mobilized during wartime (especially during an amphibious invasion of 

Taiwan). As Brian Lafferty discusses in this volume, strengthening CMI has 

been part of the PLA’s reform agenda since the 1990s, but its implementation has been hindered by ineffectual top-level management, bureaucratic 

stove-piping, and other obstacles.

The PLA reforms include several initiatives to enhance CMI. One 

involves upgrading the PLA’s Science and Technology Commission, previously subordinate to the General Armaments Department, to a higher 

level CMC organization that reports to Xi Jinping. This commission is 

responsible for the military’s coordination with civilian experts in critical technological areas. Another change involves reforms to the military 

educational and research systems. For instance, several technical research 

institutes were merged into the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, helping to more closely integrate technology advances with innovations in 

China’s military doctrine.13 To improve management and supervision of 

the process, the government declared civil-military integration to be an 

official development strategy in 2015 and created a new Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development in January 2017, 

with Xi as chairman.14

In their chapters in this volume, Brian Lafferty and Tai Ming Cheung 

analyze the prospect for intensified CMI efforts to build on the existing 

foundation and produce important breakthroughs in military technology. 

Cheung sees the adoption of civil-military fusion as an official development 

strategy, the establishment of the new commission, integrated civilian and 

military S&T planning, efforts to develop China’s advance manufacturing 

base as part of the “Made in China 2025” plan, and reforms of defense 

research institutes as creating the conditions for major innovations. He 

concludes with a positive assessment of “prospects for the Chinese defense 

industry to successfully transition from an innovation follower to an original 

innovator that is able to engage in higher end technological development.”15

Lafferty has a more measured assessment, noting that the Chinese government has laid an initial foundation for CMI, improved its understanding 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

720

of challenges in implementing CMI, and shown a commitment to tackling 

them, but that success is not guaranteed.16

Although there are clearly potential civil-military synergies in some 

areas, the large-scale cooperation envisioned by CMI advocates requires 

Chinese companies and government agencies to reduce their organizational 

autonomy by opening up their decision processes to incorporate the views 

and interests of other actors. The contradiction between the CCP’s desire 

to incorporate all civilian and military interests into economic and S&T 

decisionmaking and the reluctance of companies and agencies to cede 

control to others may make it difficult for China to move beyond formal 

compliance (for example, establishing mechanisms to participate in CMI) 

to actual accomplishments. The CCP’s ability to appoint the leaders of 

Chinese state-owned enterprises is a powerful tool, but it has not prevented 

these leaders from pursuing the financial and institutional interests of the 

companies they run and resisting implementation of mandates that would 

interfere with profits.

Signposts for the Future 

How can we gauge the extent to which PLA reforms are succeeding?

In the absence of a regional conflict that would put the PLA’s new joint command structure to the ultimate test, joint training and exercises will provide 

the best window into improvements in PLA joint operations capability. 

Large exercises that involve multiple PLA services working together against 

an adaptive enemy would be the best evidence that new joint command and 

control structures can not only plan joint operations but also execute them 

and respond to changing battlefield conditions. Effective use of Strategic 

Support Force and Joint Logistics Support Force units to support theater 

exercises—and the ability to integrate other strategic capabilities controlled 

by the CMC or the services—would be additional evidence of improvements 

in higher level joint operational capabilities.

Another metric will be the extent to which joint operations and forces 

take priority over their service counterparts. A crude metric for assessing 
Conclusion

721

reductions in ground force dominance is the army’s share of overall personnel, theater command positions, important jobs in the CMC, and slots 

in the joint military education courses that will train future PLA leaders. 

A more sophisticated metric will be observing whether officers with joint 

experience enjoy a promotion advantage over peers who stick to traditional 

service-centric career paths. The U.S. military ultimately required congressional intervention to make joint experience a requirement for promotion 

to general officer; a similar PLA regulation would be an important milestone for jointness. Of course, major changes to the PLA assignment and 

promotion system would be necessary to support such an action. The U.S. 

experience suggests that building an effective joint force can takes decades, 

since it requires a new generation of senior leaders that has experience 

working with other services and that develops a mindset that prioritizes 

joint operations over service interests.17

Another question is whether the CMC eventually develops the ability 

to contain interservice rivalry and discipline service desires for new weapons systems that advance service equities rather than joint objectives. The 

removal of the service chiefs from CMC membership in October 2017 may 

mark an important evolution in jointness within the PLA. The addition of 

the navy, air force, and Second Artillery commanders to the CMC in 2004 

marked what might be called “representational jointness,” with those services gaining a voice in high-level PLA decisions. The removal of the service 

commanders from CMC membership as part of Xi’s reforms could mark 

a transition to “directed jointness,” where the CMC imposes its decisions 

about how to build a joint force on the services. Given the service-centric 

nature of the PLA, the CMC is unlikely to play this role anytime soon, but 

this would be an important development if it occurs.

Assessing the degree to which Xi’s efforts to reassert CCP control over 

the PLA have succeeded will be a much more difficult analytic challenge. 

All senior PLA officers are likely to say the right things in public; any officers who refuse to profess loyalty to the party and Xi will not last long. But 

the real test would only come in a major political crisis or if the CCP’s efforts 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

722

to maintain economic growth and to achieve nationalist goals falter and 

call Xi’s leadership (and the party’s legitimacy) into question. Until then, 

our assessment that the reforms are likely to strengthen CCP control over 

the military in the short term, but will not guarantee military support in a 

crisis, must remain a tentative judgment.

Identifying markers of progress in civil-military integration is also difficult because the priority that CCP leaders place on the program requires 

Chinese companies and agencies to pay lip service to CMI and emphasizes 

procedural improvements rather than substantive outputs. The clearest evidence of success would be a leap forward in innovation in Chinese weapons 

systems that incorporate dual-use technologies and production processes. 

Another indicator would be a major expansion of PLA use of civilian contractors and Chinese defense industries subcontracting important parts 

of weapons system development to civilian companies or state-owned 

enterprises outside the defense sector.

Implications 

If PLA reforms succeed, they will have significant implications for China’s 

neighbors, competitors, and opponents. A better trained, organized, and 

equipped PLA will be in a stronger position to accomplish its primary 

functions: winning modern wars, especially what the U.S. Department of 

Defense terms “short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts”; deterring 

both large and small competitors; performing a variety of military operations other than war (also known as nontraditional security missions); 

and protecting Chinese interests in Asia.18 A more effective joint command 

structure will enable the PLA to more quickly and seamlessly transition 

from peacetime to combat operations, as well as to more capably oversee 

complex peacetime missions that may require participation from multiple 

services, such as large-scale disaster relief or noncombatant evacuations. 

That system will be further improved as the PLA educates and trains commanders and staff to employ joint forces, and as more advanced capabilities 

in the various domains of warfare come online.
Conclusion

723

Rival territorial claimants, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, 

and India, will face a more confident and capable adversary in the South 

and East China seas and across the Sino-Indian border. Reforms to the 

broader Chinese armed forces, including placing the People’s Armed Police 

under firm CMC control, could permit closer coordination between PLA, 

coast guard, and maritime militia forces, thus giving Beijing a strong hand 

in gray zone operations against other claimants. Taiwan will have to contend with a PLA that can more credibly plan and execute joint operations, 

such as amphibious landings, blockades, and joint missile strikes.19 This will 

further strengthen the need for the Taiwan military to develop and implement asymmetric and innovative approaches to respond to the threat posed 

by a more capable PLA. U.S. forces operating throughout the Indo-Pacific 

region will face a PLA that can respond more quickly to regional crises 

and conduct counter-intervention operations more effectively. Moreover, a 

Chinese military and defense industry that can effectively harness civilian 

S&T breakthroughs to create advanced and innovative weapons would 

be an even more formidable strategic competitor over the long term. This 

latter point is important to counter the U.S. defense strategy that seeks 

to regain its technological edge over time to sustain a favorable regional 

balance of power.

A Future Expeditionary PLA? 

One future requirement that the current PLA reforms do not fully address 

is the potential need to command and support a broader range of military operations beyond China’s borders. In the last several decades, PLA 

overseas operations have been limited to participation in United Nations 

peacekeeping operations, counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden (since 

2008), short-term deployments to participate in military exercises and conduct military diplomacy, and a few noncombatant emergency evacuations.

The theater commands are better equipped to respond to a range of 

regional contingencies than was possible under the pre-reform military 

regions. However, their ability to plan and execute operations has geographic 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

724

limits depending on their areas of responsibility and the specific contingencies they are assigned.20 For example, the Southern Theater Command 

already routinely conducts operations that extend into the far reaches of 

the South China Sea, while the other theater commands have more limited 

areas of operations. However, in the event of a Taiwan contingency, the PLA 

Navy may be tasked to operate even farther from Chinese territory into the 

Western Pacific, and it is not clear whether the Eastern Theater Command, 

navy headquarters, or the CMC’s Joint Staff Department would have operational control over forward-deployed naval forces. Command and control 

arrangements are even less clear in the event of a conflict with India that 

involves both ground operations along the Sino-Indian border and naval 

operations in the Indian Ocean, since the Western Theater Command does 

not have a naval component to conduct contingency planning or take charge 

of naval operations in a war.

The PLA is devoting considerable effort to developing power projection capabilities, doctrine, and political justifications that would support 

expeditionary operations well beyond China’s land borders and outside 

the second island chain.21 The new PLA logistics base in Djibouti provides 

the ability to sustain peacetime naval operations in a permissive environment and a nascent capability to support other types of operations that 

may involve a combat role. These operations are justified domestically by 

the need to protect China’s overseas interests and internationally by the 

claim that the Chinese military can provide public goods and contribute 

to international stability.22

PLA operations beyond the theater command areas of responsibility 

are currently handled differently depending on the type of operations. 

For example, navy headquarters appears to retain responsibility for the 

counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, with each escort task force 

composed of ships drawn from a different fleet. Conversely, the Joint Staff 

Department’s Overseas Operations Office is in charge of PLA deployments 

to support United Nations peacekeeping operations. Unlike the U.S. military, which assigns every part of the world to a geographic combatant 
Conclusion

725

command responsible for contingency planning and operations within 

its area of responsibility, the PLA has gaps where potential operations fall 

outside the areas of responsibility of the theater commands. Moreover, it 

does not appear to have established a standing or ad hoc joint task force 

mechanism to command such operations.

To date, most PLA independent overseas operations (such as the 

evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011) have been small, of 

short-duration, and in relatively permissive environments.23 These types 

of operations could be assigned to either the Joint Staff Department or 

one of the service headquarters depending on the nature of the operation. 

However, these mechanisms are likely to prove inadequate if PLA overseas 

operations become larger, require joint forces, last for extended periods 

of time, or occur in nonpermissive environments where deployed forces 

face threats from hostile state or nonstate actors. Conducting multiple 

simultaneous overseas operations would further stress the PLA’s ability 

to command overseas operations. If the PLA begins to regularly conduct 

such operations, new joint command and control mechanisms will likely 

be necessary.

Conclusion 

This volume has traced the drivers of the PLA’s ambitious reform agenda, 

examined how the reforms affect the component parts of the PLA and their 

relationships to each other, and assessed the opportunities and challenges 

that will affect the success of the reform agenda. The reforms that have 

been implemented have already had a major impact on how the PLA is 

organized and how it expects to plan, train, and execute combat operations. 

The reforms that are still to come—which will affect the military recruitment, education, assignment, promotion, and rank/grade systems—are 

likely to play a decisive role in determining whether a reformed PLA can 

realize Xi Jinping’s goal of building a joint force capable of fighting and 

winning informationized wars. As the PLA begins conducting larger and 

more sophisticated joint operations and potentially expands the range and 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

726

scope of its overseas operations, experience is likely to reveal the need for 

additional adjustments to joint command and control mechanisms to fully 

support China’s growing military ambitions.

Notes

1 “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues” 

[中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua, November 15, 2013, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm>.

2 “Xi Leads China’s Military Reform, Stresses Strong Army,” Xinhua, March 

15, 2014, available at <http://english.cntv.cn/20140315/102892.shtml>.

3 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th CPC National Congress,” 

Xinhua, November 3, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/

special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>.

4 See Minnie Chan, “Chinese General’s New Job Suggests Army Revamp 

Finished,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 25, 2016.

5 “Facts and Figures on China’s Military Reform,” Xinhua, December 19, 

2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/19/c_136837189.htm>.

6 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening National Defense and 

Armed Force Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January 

1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

7 Roger Cliff, “Chinese Military Reforms: A Pessimistic Take,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016), 53–56.

8 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command 

in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

9 See Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “The PLA and Maritime 

Security Challenges,” in this volume.

10 See Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “A Modern Major General: 

Building Joint Commanders in the PLA,” in this volume.

11 See Shanshan Mei, People of the PLA (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: China 

Aerospace Studies Institute, 2018).

12 See Peng Wang and Jingyi Wang, “How China Promotes Its Officers: 

Interactions Between Formal and Informal Institutions,” China Quarterly, no. 234 

(June 2018), 399–419.

13 Interviews with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military 

Science personnel, 2017.
Conclusion

727

14 “Xi to Head Central Commission for Integrated Military, Civilian 

Development,” Xinhua, January 22, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2017-01/22/c_136004750.htm>.

15 See Tai Ming Cheung, “Keeping Up with the Jundui: Reforming the Chinese 

Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Industrial System to Engage in Advanced 

Innovation,” in this volume.

16 See Brian Lafferty, “Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms,” in 

this volume.

17 PLA officers have asked U.S. counterparts how the U.S. joint professional 

military education system works to develop a “joint mentality” among the U.S. 

officer corps.

18 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

2016), i; “China’s Military Strategy (Full Text),” Xinhua, May 27, 2015, available at <http://

english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm>.

19 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “What Do China’s Military Reforms 

Mean for Taiwan?” NBR Commentary, May 19, 2016, available at <http://nbr.org/

research/activity.aspx?id=692>.

20 See Andrew Scobell et al., eds., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015).

21 Kristen Gunness and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “A Global People’s Liberation 

Army: Possibilities, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Asia Policy, vol. 22 (July 

2016), 131–155.

22 This theme is prominent in China’s 2012 defense white paper. See The 

Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, April 16, 2013).

23 See Michael S. Chase, “The PLA and Far Seas Contingencies: Chinese Capabilities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” in Scobell et al., The People’s 

Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, 301–319.

729

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga is a Policy Analyst at the RAND 

Corporation, where he focuses on Asian security issues. Prior to joining 

RAND, Beauchamp-Mustafaga was the Editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief. He has also spent time with the International Institute for 

Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Peking 

University (CISS) under Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng, and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). Beauchamp-Mustafaga 

graduated from the dual-degree MSc in International Affairs program 

at the London School of Economics and Peking University, and earned 

a bachelor’s degree in International Affairs and Chinese Language and 

Literature from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George 

Washington University. 

Dennis J. Blasko is an Asian Analyst in the China Security Affairs 

Group at CNA Corporation. He is a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. 

Army. He served as an army attaché in Beijing and in Hong Kong from 

1992 to 1996. Blasko is the author of The Chinese Army Today: Tradition 

and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd edition (Routledge 2012).

Edmund J. Burke is a senior intelligence and defense researcher at the 

RAND Corporation. Mr. Burke has served in and out of government as a 

China specialist since 1988. Immediately prior to joining RAND, he was 

a Senior Executive and the senior China officer at NGA. Mr. Burke was in 

the private sector from 2001-2009; in 2003 he founded a consulting firm, 

which was eventually acquired by a large defense contractor. From 1997-

2001 Mr. Burke was an all source analyst, manager and PDB briefer at CIA. 

He spent his first nine years of government service as a China analyst at the 

CONTRIBUTORS
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

730

National Photographic Interpretation Center. is a senior intelligence and 

defense researcher at the RAND Corporation.

Arthur Chan was previously a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. Prior to joining RAND, he worked at the National Bureau of Asian 

Research, the American Enterprise Institute, the NYU Department of 

Politics and the U.S. Embassy in Paris, France. Arthur holds a Masters in 

European Affairs from Sciences Po Paris and a BA in political science and 

French from New York University. He is a native speaker of Cantonese and 

has professional proficiency in Mandarin and French.

John Chen is a Research Associate at the Special Programs Division of 

SOS International, where he conducts China-related research and analysis 

on foreign policy, national security, and science and technology issues using 

Chinese-language sources. He received an AB from Dartmouth College and 

an MA from Georgetown University.

Tai Ming Cheung is Director of the Institute on Global Conflict and 

Cooperation (IGCC) located at the University of California, San Diego in La 

Jolla. He leads the institute’s Study of Innovation and Technology in China 

project that examines China’s efforts to become a world-class science and 

technology power. Dr. Cheung is also a professor at the School of Global 

Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego, where he teaches courses on Chinese 

foreign and defense policy and Chinese security and technology policy. 

Dr. Cheung is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and 

national security affairs, especially defense economic, industrial and science 

and technological issues. He is the author of Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Cornell University Press, 2009), 

editor of Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing 

Innovation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), and co-editor of The 

Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging US-China Strategic Competition in 

Defense Technological and Industrial Development (Cambria Press, 2018). 

He was based in Northeast Asia (Hong Kong, China, and Japan) from the 

mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic, and strategic developments 

in Greater China and East Asia as a journalist for the Far Eastern Economic 
Contributors

731

Review from 1988-1993 and subsequently as a political and business risk 

consultant for a number of companies, including PricewaterhouseCoopers. 

Dr. Cheung has a PhD in War Studies from King’s College, London.

John Costello is Director of the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 

in the National Protection and Programs Directorate at the Department of 

Homeland Security. He coauthored this chapter before taking his current 

position. Previously, he served as a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow in New 

America’s Cybersecurity Initiative and a Senior Analyst for Cyber and East 

Asia at Flashpoint. He is also a former Congressional Innovation Fellow for 

majority staff in the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform. During his time on the Hill, Costello helped 

investigate the 2015 breach into the Office of Personnel Management and 

helped oversee federal IT management. Previously, Costello was a research 

analyst at Defense Group, Inc., where he concentrated on Chinese cyber 

espionage, information warfare, and intellectual property theft. He is a 

U.S. Navy veteran, former NSA analyst, and is fluent in Mandarin Chinese, 

having graduated with honors from the Defense Language Institute. His 

insights have appeared in Wired, the Wall Street Journal, the New York 

Times, Reuters, and the Jamestown China Brief. Costello’s research focuses 

on Chinese cyber forces, evolving technology and innovation environment, 

and quantum technologies.

Mark R. Cozad is a senior international defense research analyst at 

RAND. Previously, he served in both the military and intelligence community in a variety of areas including intelligence analysis, targeting, 

operational planning, and strategy development. Cozad’s work at RAND 

focuses on strategic warning, intelligence analysis, and security issues in 

Europe and East Asia. In his final assignment in the intelligence community he served as the deputy to the Assistant Deputy Director of National 

Intelligence for the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). Immediately preceding 

his assignment to the ODNI, he was the Defense Intelligence Officer for 

East Asia, the senior intelligence officer on that issue within the Department of Defense.
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

732

Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War 

College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). As a core 

founding member, he helped to establish CMSI and to stand it up officially 

in 2006, and has subsequently played an integral role in its development. 

CMSI has inspired the creation of other research centers, to which he has 

provided advice and support. Since 2008 Erickson has been an Associate 

in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Kim Fassler is a political-military analyst at the U.S. Department of 

Defense where her focus includes U.S.-China relations and East Asia political and security issues. She holds an M.A. in international relations from 

the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies 

(SAIS) and a B.A. in political science and Chinese from Williams College. 

Ms. Fassler also studied at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center on a National 

Security Education Program Boren Fellowship. Originally from Honolulu, 

she worked in journalism, public relations, and energy consulting before 

starting her career with the U.S. Government.

David M. Finkelstein is a Vice President of CNA and Director for 

China and Indo-Pacific Security Studies. A retired U.S. Army Officer, Dr. 

Finkelstein held command and staff positions in various field units and 

China-related positions at the Pentagon. He also served on the faculty at 

West Point, where he taught Chinese and Japanese history and the history 

of warfare in Asia. Finkelstein holds a Ph.D. in Chinese and Japanese history from Princeton University, is a graduate of the United States Military 

Academy, the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, and the Army 

War College. He also studied Mandarin Chinese in Tianjin, China at Nankai University. A long-time student of Chinese security affairs, his edited 

volumes include Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (ME 

Sharpe), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Developments in the Operational Art of the People’s Liberation Army (CNA), Civil-Military Relations 

in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea (ME Sharpe), and China’s Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation (ME Sharpe). 
Contributors

733

His historical monograph, From Abandonment to Salvation: Washington’s 

Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-50 (George Mason University and Naval Institute 

Press), was hailed in Presidential Studies Quarterly as “blazing a new trail” 

and as certain to “take an important place in the literature of U.S.-China 

relations in the mid-20th Century.”

Daniel Gearin is a liaison officer with the Department of Defense, 

currently serving in Taipei, Taiwan. Daniel previously served as an analyst 

with the Department of Defense, focusing on China’s military capabilities. 

Before joining the Department of Defense, Daniel held research positions 

with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the National Defense University, 

and the Brookings Institution. He obtained a B.A. in International Affairs 

from Northeastern University, and an M.A. in International Affairs from 

the George Washington University. Daniel also spent two years living in 

Beijing, China studying Mandarin Chinese.

Justin Godby is a Department of Defense political-military analyst 

specializing in East Asia security issues. He previously served as a liaison 

officer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security 

Affairs and as a researcher for James Madison University’s Institute for 

National Security Analysis. Mr. Godby will graduate in 2018 with a M.S. 

in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University created 

by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Mr. Godby attended 

James Madison University and graduated with a B.S. in Information Analysis and a minor in Asian Studies. 

Brian Lafferty is a Chinese language researcher at the Special Programs Division of SOS International, specializing in research on China’s 

defense science and technology development. He has written a number of 

articles, briefs, and conference papers concerning China’s civil-military 

integration. Dr. Lafferty holds a B.A. from Cornell University and received 

his Ph.D. from Columbia University.

David C. Logan is a Ph.D. Student in Security Studies at Princeton 

University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

734

where his research focuses on U.S.-China security relations and nuclear 

strategy and arms control. His writing has been published by Asian Security, Nonproliferation Review, Foreign Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, and the 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Mr. Logan attended Grinnell College and 

received his MPA in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson 

School at Princeton University. 

LeighAnn Luce is an independent analyst specializing in Chinese 

civil-military integration and science and technology development with 

a particular focus on defense electronics and information technology. She 

has previously worked as a senior engineer at SOS International’s Special 

Programs Division as well as an Associate Deputy Director of Technical 

Analysis at Defense Group Incorporated’s Center for Intelligence Research 

and Analysis. Ms. Luce attended the George Washington University’s Elliott 

School of International Affairs and received a dual B.A. in International 

Relations and Chinese Language and Literature, with concentrations in 

Asian Studies and International Economics.

Ma Chengkun is Professor and Dean of the College of PLA Studies at 

Taiwan’s National Defense University. Professor Ma received his Ph.D. in China’s war behavior study from National Taiwan University and specializes in 

People’s Liberation Army affairs. His articles include “China’s security strategy and military development” and “China’s three warfares against Taiwan.” 

Professor Ma is currently researching China’s military strategic thinking and 

military transformation and participates in international academic exchanges 

about China’s military modernization with various countries.

Joel McFadden is a specialist in East Asian politics and security issues 

with the U.S. Department of Defense. Prior to joining the federal government in 2008, he worked for U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) as 

a senior aide on defense and greater China policy. Mr. McFadden holds a 

master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has also studied Chinese history and language 

at Fudan University in Shanghai. He spent most of his youth living in the 

Asia-Pacific region including Taiwan.
Contributors

735

Joe McReynolds is a Principal Cyber Analyst at SOS International. 

His research interests primarily center on China’s approach to computer 

network warfare and defense science & technology development. Mr. 

McReynolds has previously worked with the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council for International Policy, and is a graduate of 

Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Graduate Security 

Studies programs. He speaks and reads Chinese and Japanese, and has lived 

and studied in Nagoya, Guilin, and Beijing.

Ian Burns McCaslin is a contract researcher at the U.S. National 

Defense University’s Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

and a China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) Associate. Previously, he 

worked as an intern at the Project 2049 Institute. He received his B.A. in 

International Studies with a minor in Mandarin Chinese from Ohio Wesleyan University and his M.A. in International Relations from the National 

University of Singapore (NUS). At NUS his thesis focused on the role of 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China’s foreign policy and behavior 

abroad using the Korean War, 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the South 

China Sea as case studies. He has also studied at National Taiwan University 

and Fudan University.

Erin Richter is a Senior Intelligence Officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency where she has specialized in Chinese military capabilities 

and civil-military interdependencies for the last 14 years. Erin has served 

for the last 20 years in the United States Marine Corps as a logistics officer, 

intelligence officer, and reserve attaché, completing reserve and active duty 

assignments throughout the Indo-Pacific, in the Middle East, Balkans, and 

within the continental United States. She is a graduate of the Marine Corps 

Command and Staff College and Joint Forces Staff College, and holds a 

M.A. in International Affairs from American University and a B.A. in 

Anthropology from the University of Maryland.

Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense 

University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunders previously 
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

736

worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he was 

Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999-2003, and 

served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1989-1994. Dr. Saunders is 

co-author with David Gompert of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American 

Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of five books on Chinese military and security issues. Dr. Saunders 

attended Harvard College and received his MPA and Ph.D. in International 

Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. 

Andrew Scobell is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He was previously an Associate Professor of international affairs at 

the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas 

A&M University. He is the author of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond 

the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and 

co-authored China’s Search for Security (Columbia University Press, 2012). 

In addition to editing or co-editing 12 books, Dr. Scobell has written dozens 

of reports, monographs, journal articles, and book chapters. He holds a 

Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of 

Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University’s Institute for 

National for Strategic Studies. He also serves as an adjunct professor in 

both the Eisenhower School at NDU and the Edmund A. Walsh School 

of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Dr. Wuthnow has worked 

as a China analyst at CNA, a postdoctoral fellow in the China and the 

World Program at Princeton University, and a pre-doctoral fellow at The 

Brookings Institution. He is the author of Chinese Diplomacy and the UN 

Security Council (Routledge). Dr. Wuthnow holds degrees from Princeton 

University (A.B., summa cum laude, in Public and International Affairs), 

Oxford University (M.Phil. in Modern Chinese Studies), and Columbia 

University (Ph.D. in Political Science).
737

13th Defense Science, Technology, and 

Industry Five Year Plan, 

2016, 593–594, 595, 596, 

597, 600

Academy of Military Science (AMS), 

139, 297, 447

Aden, Gulf of, counterpiracy patrols 

in, 126–127, 134, 135, 

136, 178, 181, 187, 188, 

560, 724

Africa, PRC citizens living and working 

in, 188

All-Army Armament Conference, 2014, 

591

All Army Political Work Conference, 

Gut ia n, November 

2014, 50, 53, 59, 528, 

529, 530–531, 535

All-Army Weapons and Equipment 

Procurement Information Network, 639–640

All-Military Logistics Information 

Center, 266

Alliances, Chinese interest in exploring, 174–177, 192

Amphibious forces, 88, 132, 144, 338

Anticorruption efforts

1997 efforts to divest the PLA 

from its involvement in 

private industry, 331

effect on making military careers 

more attractive, 138

effects of PLA logistics reforms, 

269–271, 278

extent of, 51, 53, 526, 533, 560, 

572–573, 574, 575, 616, 

687, 688–690, 717–718

hypocrisy of, 545

and the reduction of military district staffs, 357–358

structural reforms, 532–534

used to intimidate opponents of 

Xi, 543, 687, 689

Antipiracy operations, 178, 181, 187, 188

Air Force. See PLA Air Force (PLAAF)

Arms sales by China, 594

Army. See PLA Army (PLAA)

Army Unit Exercise and Evaluation 

System, 212

Aviation industry, 605, 609–610

Ayuso, Wanda, 231

Bai Chunli, 597

Bangladesh, 594

Beijing, defense of, 355, 356–357

Beijing Garrison, 355, 359–360

INDEX
Index

738

Beijing Military Region, 213, 243, 244, 

371

Belt and Road Initiative, 127, 171, 172, 

175, 180, 183–187, 189

Blasko, Dennis, 57

Campaign Theory Study Guide, The, 

208–209

C a o G a n g c h u a n , G e n . , C M C 

Vice-Chairman, 529

Carter, Ash, 248–249

Central Commission for Integrated 

Military and Civilian 

De velopment , 629, 

645–646, 648–650, 719

Central Discipline Inspection Commission, 35

Central Military Commission (CMC)

ability to focus on building a 

joint force after reform, 

28–29

Audit Bureau, 29, 38, 270, 531–534, 

717

blueprint for PLA reform issued 

New Year’s Day 2016, 5

challenges to the effectiveness of 

reforms, 30–31

composition of, 11, 25–28, 31–38, 

332, 350, 531–532, 557–

558, 561–573, 721

control of strategic missile forces, 

410–411, 417, 419

control over the military, 521, 

535, 537, 557–560, 712, 

717–718, 721–722

and demobilized military personnel, 668, 676, 683

disbanding of the general departments, 531–532

Discipline Inspection Commission, 26, 29–30, 33, 

35–36, 270–271, 334, 

531, 533–534, 562, 571–

573, 616, 717

effects of absence of service 

chiefs on operational 

decisionmaking, 574–

575, 715–716

Equipment Development Department (EDD), 27, 34, 351, 

374, 455–456, 532, 565, 

592–593, 639–640

exclusively in control of cyber 

operations, 496

exercise of control over the Strategic Support Force, 

449–450, 491–492

General Office, 29, 32, 575, 717–718

Inspection Work Leading Small 

Group, 533

Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC), 218, 237, 

468, 469

Joint Staff Department (JSD), 27, 

32–33, 137, 272, 333–

334, 350, 458, 462, 465, 

467, 468, 470–471, 473, 

496, 532, 568–570, 714, 

724–725

Leading Group for Inspection 

Work, 565
Index

739

Leading Small Group for Deepening National Defense 

and Military Reform, 

53, 73–74, 538–539, 565, 

591, 711

Logistics Support Department 

(LSD), 27, 33–34, 259–

260, 373–374, 532

National Defense Mobilization 

Department, 30, 35, 

235, 355

Office of International Military 

Cooperation (OIMC), 

30, 37–38

Organ Affairs General Management Bureau, 38, 542, 

686–687

organizational changes, 333–334, 

348–350, 443, 711–713

People’s Armed Police brought 

under the sole control 

of, 10, 75, 713

Political and Legal Affairs Commission, 29, 33, 36, 531, 

533–534

Political Work Department (PWD), 

27, 33, 334, 466–467, 532, 

534, 570–571, 677

Reform and Organization Office, 

37, 73–74

replacements for the general 

departments to report 

directly to, 6–7, 531

responsibilities, 259, 260, 272

responsibilities of members 

pre-reform, 25–26

Science and Technology Commission, 30, 36, 334, 592

Strategic Planning Office, 36–37

Training and Administration 

Department, 34–35, 

307, 376

Work Conference on Armed 

Forces Scale, Structure, 

and Force Composition 

Reform, 9–11, 46

Work Conference on Military Structural Reform (November 

2015), 46, 591

“CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” 14–15, 31, 32, 53, 

538, 559, 575–576, 717

Central Military Commission Opinion 

on Deepening Reform of 

National Defense and the 

Armed Forces, January 1, 

2016, 46, 48–49, 60, 75

Central Political and Legal Affairs 

Commission, 36

Central Theater Command, 8, 238–239, 

244, 245, 309, 334, 335

Chai Shaoliang, Lt. Gen., 460

Character of warfare

changes in Chinese views on as 

driver of changes in 

the PLA, 86, 88–90, 92, 

95–97

as an enduring clash of political 

systems and ideologies, 

486–488

focus on winning without fighting, 486
Index

740

Information System–based System 

of Systems Operations 

as an approach to conflict, 230, 235

noncontact warfare, 207–210

Chen Bingde, Gen., 72

Chen Mingshan, Vice Adm., 127

Chengdu Military Region, 211, 213, 241, 

242, 335

Cheung, Tai Ming, 719

Chi Haotian, Gen., CMC ViceChairman, 346, 562

China Academy of Launch Technology, 

397

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 

603, 611

China Daily, 134, 362, 410

China Military Science, 66, 69, 73, 185

China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 150

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

191

China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, 603, 608

China’s Military Strategy, 2015, 269

Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

Central Party Committee control 

of strategic missiles, 

410–411, 419

“peace and development” as the 

“keynote of the times,” 63

PLA as the armed wing of the, 

48–51, 529, 559

policies in the 1980s and 1990s that 

increased corruption in 

the PLA logistics system, 269–270

waning ideological appeal to PLA 

members, 528–530, 

536, 545

Chinese Communist Party, 18th Party 

Congress, Third Plenum, 

November 2012

work report calling for “building 

China into a sea power 

nation,” 55, 128

Chinese Communist Party, 18th Party 

Congress, Third Plenum, 

October 2013

changes to the PLA’s logistics system, 259

military reform agenda announced 

in Central Committee 

“Decision,” 46–47, 52, 

537–538, 591

and the need for highly qualified 

people to succeed in 

war, 295, 557–558

Xi’s declaration of intention to 

overhaul the PLA, 1–2, 

327, 530–531, 558, 711

Chinese Communist Party, 19th Party 

C ong ress, Oc tober 

2017, 2, 11, 328–329, 

557–558, 573, 711

Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red 

Army, 663–664

Civil Affairs, Ministry of, 677

Civil-military integration

and the 13th Defense Science, Technology, and Industry 
Index

741

Five Year Plan, 593–594, 

598–599

CMC opinion paper on, 646–647

and defense mobilization, 598–

600, 627–630, 631–632, 

639, 718–719

effect of privatization of stateowned businesses on 

demobilized personnel, 

667–668, 681–682, 683, 

684, 686

efforts to coordinate building the 

country’s economy and 

defense capabilities, 

632–637, 717–718

efforts to improve, 15–16, 30, 

522–530

establishment of a clear authority 

to coordinate action, 

645–651

impact on defense science and technology, 642, 718–719

management challenge posed 

by, 641–642, 644–648, 

719–720

as a national strategic imperative, 627–628, 629–630, 

640–641, 650–651, 719

opaqueness of the civilian logistics 

industry, 267–268, 271

organizational reforms, 641–642, 

648–650

problems operationalizing, 15–16, 

640–650, 712

removal of barriers to civil-military 

coordination, 637–639

resource-sharing, 632–633, 636–

637, 645

role in winning informationized 

conflicts, 636

and the role of dual-use technology, 634–635, 718–719

social support for the PLA, 639, 641

Civil Servant Law, 2005, 679–680

Cliff, Roger, 227

Coast guard, 147, 148–151, 152

Combined arms operations, 330–331, 

366

Command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 440, 

441, 457, 459, 479

Commanders, battalion, 363–364, 365, 

366, 378

C o m m i s s i o n f o r I n t e g r a t e d 

Civilian-Military Development, 600

Commission for Science, Technolog y, a nd I ndu s t r y 

for National Defense 

(COSTIND), 605

Congo, 371–372

Corruption

effects on efficacy of PLA logistics 

reforms, 269–271, 278, 

526

effects on military readiness, 

558–559

effects on PLA morale, 526

extent of in the defense industry, 

615–616
Index

742

extent of within the PLA, 521, 526, 

558–559

as an impediment to PLA modernization, 526

resulting from military and defense 

industry involvement in 

the commercial sector, 

269–270, 330, 331

selling of military ranks, 526, 527, 

543

Cozad, Mark, 12, 299

Cyberspace Administration of China, 

497

Cyber warfare, 438, 440, 441, 442, 443–

444, 445–446, 459–462, 

463–464, 471–473, 475, 

480–481, 482, 488–489, 

490, 495

Da Qaidam, China, 407

Dai Qingmin, Maj. Gen., 464

Dai Xu, Sr. Col., 188

Dalian Base, 244

Darfur, Sudan 372

Datong Base, 245

“Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 

Deepening Reforms,” 

Central Committee, 

Third Plenum, 2013, 

52, 60

Defense acquisition, technology, and 

industrial (DATI) system, 585, 589

Defense industries

bond issuances by, 608, 609–610

efforts to boost high-tech manufacturing capabilities, 

600–602

foundations of copied from Soviet 

Union’s command economy, 611–613

integrated circuit industry, 602

international competitiveness of, 

616–617, 629–630, 631, 

634–637, 642

need for improved civil-military 

integration to achieve 

defense modernization, 

598–602, 627–628

need to utilize more civilian 

resources in their operations, 643–644

opening up to the capital markets, 

605, 607–611

problems with, 57–58, 594, 611–616

problems with research institutes 

affiliated with defense 

corporations, 602–605

profits for the state-owned defense 

companies, 586, 603, 

614–615

progress on the weapons and 

systems front, 58–59, 

588–594

role of monopolies, 612

structural problems, 588–589, 

602–605, 612–613

transfer of state-owned defense 

technology to the private sector, 598–600, 

602–605
Index

743

Defense mobilization

civil-military reform efforts, 639, 

641

local governments’ responsibility 

for, 665–666

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 248

Defense Science and Technology 

Development Strategy 

Committee, 594

Defense S&T Industry Strong Basic Engineering Project 2025, 594

Defense white papers

2002, 141

2004, 107, 141, 347

2010, 297

2012, 337

2013, 347, 359

2015, 345, 347, 442

Dempsey, Martin, Gen., Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

248–249

Deng Xiaoping, 53–54, 63, 71, 398, 561, 

563–564, 634, 663

economic reforms helped cultivate 

an environment for corruption in the PLA, 269

policy of “Reform and Opening 

Up,” 126, 131, 666–667

reduction of the PLA’s political 

role, 521, 523, 524, 526

Diao Guangming, Col., 408

Djibouti

Chinese military base in, 177–178, 

179, 182, 187–189, 192, 

560, 724

logistics support for base in, 279–

280

Du Jincai, Gen., 35–36

East China Sea, 127–128, 240–241

East Sea Fleet, 416

Eastern Theater Command, 8, 238, 

240–241, 306, 309, 724

Economic development

effects on reintegration of demobilized military personnel 

into society, 681–684, 

688, 691

effects on the size of the military, 

330

military logistics system used to 

support, 268–269

as a top priority for China, 329–

330

Electronics industry, 609–610

Electronic warfare, 438, 440, 441, 443, 

459–460, 462–465, 471–

473, 480, 481, 484–485

Enlisted Personnel Resettlement Regulations, 669, 670

Erickson, Andrew, 715

Fan Changlong, Gen., 50, 63, 64, 69, 70, 

74, 573, 648

Fang Fenghui, Gen., 11, 33, 349, 543, 

560, 575

Fassler, Kim, 11

Fei Jiabing, Chief of Staff, 455

Finance, Ministry of, 615

Finder, Susan, 528

Finkelstein, David, 13, 535
Index

744

Fisheries Law Enforcement, 149

“Five Cannots,” 59–60, 218, 300, 355

“Five Incapables” of joint commanders, 

218, 300, 355, 365, 369

Five Year Plan on Headquarters’ Informationization Building

2001–2005, 211

2006–2010, 212, 217

2011–2015, 213, 217

Fleets

East Sea, 240–241

North Sea, 243–244

South Sea, 135, 150, 241–242

Force reductions

1950, 664

1985, 329–331, 666

1997, 88, 109, 329, 346–347, 685

2003, 329, 332, 685

2005, 109

absorption of released military 

person nel by loca l 

economies, 662–663, 

665 – 668, 674, 676, 

678–684, 690–691

announced by Xi Jinping in September 2015, 9, 85, 109, 

327, 539, 661–663, 713

cuts affecting officers, 375, 668

designed to create a much smaller 

army, 93–94, 109

effect on the numbers of noncombat personnel, 331, 332

effect on the ratio between 

officers and enlisted 

personnel, 331

effect on the ratio of army personnel to that of other 

services, 331, 346–347

effects on military-locality relations, 661–691

goals of, 328, 329, 332

potential for resulting social instability, 683–685, 690–691

reasons for the slow and piecemeal implementation 

of, 109–110

Forces Medical Cloud, 266–267

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, 147, 187–

188, 189–190

Fu Quanyou, Gen., Chief of the General 

Staff, 526

Fuzhou Base, 241

Gao Guanghui, Maj. Gen., 65, 70

Gao Jin, Gen., 349, 447, 474–475, 568, 

572

Gates, Robert, 525

General Armament Department (GAD), 

565, 615, 639

disbanded, 6, 7, 26, 27

responsibilities, 373, 395

responsibilities reassigned, 34, 36, 

334, 349, 443, 445–446, 

451, 454, 455, 457, 458–

459, 493, 592

General Logistics Department (GLD)

corruption in the, 269–270

disbanded, 6, 26, 27, 259

responsibilities, 262–263, 349, 373

responsibilities reassigned, 33–34, 

38, 272, 275, 532–533
Index

745

General Office of the Transfer and Resettlement Small Group, 676

General Political Department (GPD), 

6, 7, 27, 33, 35, 36, 334, 

443–444, 452, 465–466, 

467, 533

General Staff Department (GSD), 567

disbanded, 6, 7, 27

information warfare responsibilities reassigned, 443, 

445–446, 454, 455, 

457–458, 460–462, 464, 

467, 468, 470, 471, 473, 

475–476, 478–479, 493, 

494–495

Military Training and Arms 

Department, 212–213

Military Training Department, 

216–217, 299, 308

promotion of joint operations 

instruction, 297

responsibilities reassigned, 32–33, 

34–35, 37, 38, 333, 349

training responsibilities, 215, 231

Ghiselli, Andrea, 184

Global Person, 242–243

Global Times, 236, 270

Godby, Justin, 11

Goldstein, Lyle, 184

Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986, 248–249, 

293, 409

Great Leap Outward, 171–173

Ground Forces. See PLA Army (PLAA)

Group Armies, 335–336, 337, 359–360, 

361, 373, 713

Gu Junshan, Lt. Gen., 526, 616

Guam, 142–143, 144

Guan Youfei, Rear Adm., 38

Guangzhou Military Region, 150, 212, 

241, 242, 244, 298

Guidelines for Defense Science and 

Technology Industry 

Development During 

the 13th Five-Year Plan 

(2016–2020), 649

Guidelines on Developing and Promoting the National 

I nteg r ate d Ci rc u it 

Industry, 602

Guo Boxiong, Gen., CMC ViceChairman, 98, 526, 543, 

567–568, 570, 572, 717

Guo Chunfu, Maj. Gen., 38

Hainan, China, 405–406

Han Wei, 266–267

Han Weiguo, Gen., 350, 570

Hao Weizhong, Lt. Gen., 455, 448

Heilongjiang, China, 683

Henley, Lonnie, 231

Hong Kong, 360

Hou Guangming, 629–630

Hou Xigui, 264–265

Hu Changming, Maj. Gen., 38

Hu Jintao, 191, 215, 297, 525, 599, 613, 

717

2004 New Historic Missions, 91, 

98, 105, 126–127, 172
Index

746

failure to fundamentally reform 

the PLA, 3, 520, 523–

524, 538, 712

rise of corruption during his tenure, 558–559

role as CMC chairman, 26, 521, 

564, 565–566, 573, 595

Hunan, China, 683

Huntington, Samuel, 523, 528

Huojian Bao, 185

HYSY-981 oil rig incident, 2014, 149–

150

Impeccable, USNS, 149

India, 242–243, 335, 723, 724

Indian Ocean, 137, 724

Industry and Information Technology, 

Ministry of, 601–602, 

604, 643–644, 646, 647

Information operations groups, 468–

469

Information system–based system of 

systems operations, 230

Information warfare capabilities

cyber warfare, 438, 440, 441, 442, 

443–444, 445–446, 

459– 462 , 463– 46 4, 

471–473, 475, 480–481, 

482, 488–489, 490, 495

electronic warfare, 438, 440, 441, 443, 

459–460, 462–465, 471–

473, 480, 481, 484–485

intelligence and technical reconnaissance, 470–471

space-based technical collection 

system, 476–477

space operations, 438, 440, 441, 

442, 443, 445–446, 

451–52, 480, 489

Information warfare strategy, 440, 

479–489

Chinese focus on winning without 

fighting, 486

Chinese principles on the nature 

of information operations, 487–488, 489

differences between U.S. and 

Chinese approaches to, 

485–487, 488–490

integrated network and electronic 

warfare (INEW), 441, 

463–464, 465, 494

legal warfare, 465–466

peacetime-wartime integration 

of, 446

psychological warfare, 438, 443–

444, 452, 459–460, 

465–466, 480, 490

public opinion warfare, 465–466

role of civil-military integration 

in, 629

strategic role of, 440, 479–485

Inner Mongolia, China, 356

“Instructions for Supporting Policy and 

Loving the People and 

Initiating Movement 

of Supporting Military 

Personnel and Their 

Dependents,” 665

Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Small 

Group for the Development of the (CMI) 
Index

747

Weapons Research and 

Production System, 647

International Army Games in Russia, 

2016, 371

International military competitions, 

371

Iraq War, 2003, effect on Chinese thinking about the character 

of local war, 89, 204–206

Jiang Zemin, 76, 110, 172, 297, 328, 

346–347, 717

failure to fundamentally reform the 

PLA, 3, 520, 523–524, 712

and logistics system reforms, 261, 

262, 269–270

role as CMC chairman, 26, 563–

564

Jinan Base, 244

Jinan Military Region, 212, 243, 244, 

298–299, 334–335, 372

Jinan War Zone Joint Logistics Department, 262–263

Jing Zhiyuan, Gen., Second Artillery 

Force Cmdr., 412

Joint commanders

changes to the personnel system to 

encourage joint opportunities, 298, 311–313

cultivation of, 299–303, 304, 310–

314, 716

deficiencies of, 300–301

early changes in the preparation 

of, 296–299

efforts to improve the quality of 

recruits, 297–298

inadequate career incentives for 

officers to aspire to joint 

assignments, 301–302

need for personnel who can better 

plan and execute joint 

operations, 294–295

objective of the current PLA 

reforms, 294

professional military education for, 

297, 300, 304–306, 313

theater commanders, 295, 415–

417, 541, 714

Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), 5–6, 

47, 259, 260, 271–275, 

278, 295, 374–375, 720

Joint logistics system

combat service support responsibilities, 259

encouraging civil transportation 

construction projects 

to improve strategic 

mobility, 268–269

endemic nature of PLA corruption, 269–271, 278

impediments to effective centralization, 263, 264, 267

joint logistics support bases, 374

joint logistics support centers, 

272–275, 276–277, 278

need for civil-military fusion, 

266–269

need for integration of logistics 

information systems, 

208, 259, 264–265

outsourcing logistical support to 

the civilian sector, 268
Index

748

past efforts to reform, 260–263

PLA goals of reform, 258, 265, 

267–268, 269

technology requirements, 265–

266

Joint Network-Electronic Countermeasure, dadui, 471, 473

Joint operational capabilities

conceptual development of, 207–

211, 219–220

military region system as an 

obstacle to, 61

as a PLA core objective, 207–209

success of, 214–215, 720–721

Joint Operations Command Centers 

(JOCCs), 237–238, 247

Kang Chunyuan, 455

Kongjun Bao, 185

Korean Peninsula, 243–244

Kosovo War, 89, 131, 205, 525

Kunming Base, 242

Lafferty, Brian, 15–16, 719–720

Lanzhou Base, 243

Lanzhou Military Region, 212, 213, 242, 

244, 334, 335, 371–372

Laos, 242

Leading Small Group for IC Industry 

Development, 602

Leading Small Group on Military 

Reform, 56

Lebanon, 188, 371–372

Lectures on the Science of Information 

Operations, by Maj. Gen. 

Ye Zheng, 469, 483–485, 

487–488

Lewis, Jeffrey, 393

Li, Cheng, 575

Li Huohui, Lt. Gen., 35

Li Jijun, Gen., 72, 529

Li Jinai, Gen., 50

Li Keqiang, 532, 600, 607–608, 648

Li, Nan, 538

Li Qiaoming, Lt. Gen., 353–354, 366

Li Shangfu, Lt. Gen., 34, 593

Li Xiaofeng, Lt. Gen., 36

Li Zhanshu, 532

Li Zuocheng, Gen., 33, 98, 301, 347, 348, 

350, 354, 568–570, 574

Liang Fang, Sr. Col., 241–242

Liao Keduo, Maj. Gen., 353, 354, 358

Liao Xilong, Gen., 270

Liaoning, aircraft carrier, 180, 589

Liberia, 371–372

Libya, 126–127, 181, 189, 190

Lin Shishan, Sr. Col., 471

Liu Fulian, Gen., 447

Liu Guozhi, Lt. Gen., 36, 592

Liu Huaquig, Gen./Adm., 72, 346

Liu Lei, Lt. Gen., 350, 354

Liu Yazhou, Gen., 566

Liu Yuan, Gen., 270, 566

Liu Yunshan, 648

Liu Zhiming, Maj. Gen., 38

Local governments

ability to absorb demobilized 

officers into local government positions, 

666 – 668, 674, 676, 

678–681
Index

749

absorption of demobilized military personnel into local 

economies, 662–663, 

665–668, 680–684, 688

educational support for demobilized military personnel, 

673, 688

effect of transition to a market 

economy on ability to 

accommodate demobilized military personnel, 

667–668, 681–682

Logan, David, 5

Logistics, 5, 27, 33–34, 38, 257–280, 295, 

349, 373–375, 532–533

Lü Yueguang, 479

Luo Zhaohui, 191

Ma Kai, 601

Ma Xiaotian, PLAAF Gen., PLAAF 

Cmdr., 143, 185, 298, 562

Made in China 2025 Advanced Manufacturing Plan, 594, 

598–599, 601–602, 719

Mali, 371–372

Mao Zedong, 521, 522–523, 665

Maritime development

effects of placing the theater commands in charge of 

protection of China’s 

maritime sovereignty 

claims, 136

need to defend China’s expanding 

international interests, 

126–127, 173–193

strategic drivers of, 126–128

Maritime law enforcement agencies, 

role in the South China 

Sea, 148

Maritime militia, role in the South 

China Sea, 147–148, 

149–151, 152

Maritime missions

competition among the service 

for, 142–147

interagency operations, 148–152, 

153, 154

Maritime Silk Road, 184, 186–187

McCaslin, Ian Burns, 715

McFadden, Joel, 11

Medium- and Long-Term Science and 

Technology Development Plan, 2006–2020, 

596

Miao Hua, Adm., 27, 33, 570–571, 572, 

574

Middle East, 188

Military Balance, 2018 edition, 241, 242, 

243, 244, 245, 362–363

Military bases in other countries, 177–

179, 180–181

Military-civil fusion, 599–602, 639, 

640–641, 718

Military districts, 356–358

Military equipment, problems caused 

by “three generations 

under one roof,” 58, 

362, 363, 364–365

Military Informationization Construction Research, 264

Military Officer Transfer Resettlement 

Department, 676
Index

750

Military operations other than war 

(MOOT W), 91, 98, 

105–106, 126–127, 181, 

189, 190

Military reform

architects of, 71–74

national security assessment as 

driver of, 62–71, 75

operational drivers of, 54–62, 74

political directives as drivers 

of, 48–54, 74–75, 86, 

90–92, 97–99

Military regions

Joint Logistics Departments, 

262–264, 272, 273–274, 

276, 278

limitations of, 231–232

replaced by joint theater commands, 7–8, 61

strategic drivers that led to switch 

to theater commands, 

234–238

Military Service Law, 2011 revisions, 

669–670

Military Strategic Guideline for the 

New Period, 1993, 87, 

108–109, 207

Military Unit Cover Designators, 439, 

451, 462–463

Ming Pao, 245

Missile brigades

command and control of, 236–

237, 239, 241, 401, 402, 

406, 409–412, 415–417, 

420–421

for conventional missiles, 401–404

for nuclear missiles, 401, 402–406, 

408

Missiles

banian sidan development plan, 

396–398

CJ-10, 400

conventionally armed ballistic 

missiles, 393, 396

conventionally armed cruise missiles, 393

DF-2, 396

DF-3, 396, 397, 398, 407

DF-4, 396, 397, 403, 407

DF-5, 396–397, 403, 407

DF-5B, 397, 588

DF-11, 399–400

DF-15, 399–400, 588

DF-16, 399–400

DF-21, 398–399, 400, 407, 588

DF-25, 399

DF-26, 400, 588

DF-31, 397, 398–399, 404

DF-31A, 404, 588

DF-41, 398, 399

improvements to following production of, 397

intended for export, 399

intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

393, 396–397

JL-1, 398

JL-2, 398–399, 405–406

launch platforms for, 403–404, 

405

liquid-fueled nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, 393, 395, 

396, 397–938, 406–407
Index

751

nuclear, 236, 239, 241, 395, 396–

400, 401–407, 410–411, 

416–419, 420–421

offensive capabilities of, 588

political control of, 236, 239, 241, 

401, 402, 406, 410–411

regional deterrent role, 396, 398

short-range, 399–400

solid-fueled ballistic missiles, 393, 

397–398, 406–407, 422

submarine-launched, 397, 398–

399, 405–406, 420–421

underground facilities for, 405

with multiple warheads, 397, 399

Missiles and Space Vehices, 185

Musharraf, Pervez, 191

Myanmar, 242, 594

Nanjiang, 361

Nanjing Military Region, 211, 240, 241, 

298

National Aerospace Security and Development Forum, 185

National Aviation University/Naval 

Aeronautical University, 135–136

National Defense, Ministry of (MND), 

179, 188, 332, 374, 567–

568, 662

National Defense Science and Technology Commission, 395

National Defense Student program, 

375–376

National Development and Reform 

Commission, 604, 615, 

643–644

National Double Support Work Leading Small Group, 668, 

674, 676–677, 678

National Integrated Circuit Industry 

Investment Fund, 602

National Intelligence Law, 2011, 496

National Key Research and Development Program, 596, 604

National laboratories for scientific 

research, 596–598

National Science and Technology Infrastructure Plan, 604

National Security Act of 1947, 248

National Security Commission, 530, 

532

National Security Council, Chinese, 

523, 525 

National Security Leading Small 

Group, 525, 532

National University of Defense Technology (NDUT), 305, 

462, 590

Navy. See PLA Navy (PLAN)

New Generation Artificial Intelligence 

Development Plan, 635

Nie Rongzhen, Marshal, 395, 398

Noncombatant evacuation operations 

(NEOs)

Libya, 126–127, 181, 189

Yemen, 126–127, 181, 189–190

Noncontact warfare, 207, 210

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

204

North Korea, 174–175

Northern Theater Command, 238, 242, 

243–244, 301, 334, 335
Index

752

Notice Concerning Problems of 

Enterprises Canceling 

Worker Identification 

Boundaries and Fully 

I mpl e m e nt i n g t h e 

Labor Contract System, 

1993, 681

Nuclear industry, 609

Nuclear weapons

abilit y to penetrate missile 

defenses, 400

aircraft-delivered, 406

organizations in charge of, 395, 

396 – 4 0 0, 4 01– 4 06, 

417–419, 714, 715

policy regarding, 410–411, 417–

419, 420–421, 422–423

political control of, 395, 396–400, 

401, 406–407, 410–411, 

416–419, 420–421, 714

road-mobile, 406–407

on submarines, 180, 397, 398, 399, 

405–406, 420–421, 422, 

715

tactical, 406

underground facilities for, 401, 405

One Belt, One Road (OBOR), 127, 171, 172, 

175, 180, 183–187, 189

“Opinions on Further Pushing Forward the Reform of 

Wo r k C o n c e r n i n g 

the Prices of Military 

Products,” 615

Opinions on Raising the Level of the Realistic Battle Orientation 

of Training, CMC, 2014, 

215

Opinions on Strengthening and Improving C ampaig n and 

Tactical Training, General Staff Department, 

2015, 215

Ordnance industry, 609–610

Ordnance Knowledge, 185

Outline of Military Training and Evaluation

2001, 206, 217, 219

2009, 206, 217–218, 219

2018, 219

“Outline on Comprehensively Building 

Modern Logistics, An,” 

CMC, 263

Overseas interests, Chinese

development of closer security 

cooperation with other 

countries, 174–177, 182

expansion of PLA power projection capabilities as a 

means to protect, 179–

182, 192

growth in the number of PRC 

citizens abroad, 172, 

173, 178

growth of, 172–173, 192, 560

logistics support for operations, 

279–280

options for protecting, 173–182, 

192–193

rel ia nc e on U. S . Nav y for 

patrolling the sea lanes, 

173–174, 180
Index

753

Pakistan

arms sales to, 399, 594

bilateral security relationship 

with, 174–176, 182

as potential site for overseas base, 

179, 188, 192

Red Mosque incident, 190–191

Paracel Islands, 127

People’s Armed Force’s Maritime Militia, 128

People’s Armed Police (PAP), 10, 75, 

105, 152, 331, 713

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

armament management system, 

592–594

attempts to change mindset 

regarding joint operations, 231, 247–248

attempts to use laws and regulations to control, 

527–528, 534

below-the-neck force structural 

changes announced in 

2017, 9–10

broad drivers of reform, 12–16, 

28–29, 86–93

budgetary restraints, 631

calls to develop commanders 

suited for modern military operations in the 

1990s, 206

calls to improve training for joint 

operations in the 1990s, 

206

challenges posed by centralization of space and cyber 

responsibilities, 492–

493, 496

civil-military integration, 15–16, 30, 

522–530. See also Civil-military integration

command structure, 230–231, 

235–236, 561–562, 713

commanders suffering from the 

“five cannots,” 59–60, 

218, 300, 355

concerns about operational leadership capabilities, 

140–141, 354–355

control over military intelligence 

and information about 

capabilities and operations, 524–525, 531–532

corruption, 521, 523–525, 526–

528, 558–559

and the Cultural Revolution, 523, 

527

effects of force reductions on the 

ratio of army personnel 

to that of other services, 

331, 346–347

efforts to improve its ability to 

conduct integrated joint 

operations, 229–232, 712

elevation of Xi’s status and authority in, 14–15, 558–560

emergence of joint operations as 

an imperative in the 

1990s, 204–206

failure of efforts to reform, 60–61

force reductions. See Force 

reductions
Index

754

improvements in the training of 

future commanders, 

216, 217–218

increased readiness as driver for 

introduction of theater 

commands, 236–238

Information system–based system 

of systems operations 

as approach to conflict, 

230, 235

informationization as a core concept 

in modernization, 208

institutional barriers in the defense 

research and development process, 519–520

integrated network and electronic 

warfare, 441, 463–464, 

465

interservice competition for 

resources, 715, 721

lack of joint command experience, 

140–141

lessons derived from U.S. operations in Kosovo and the 

Persian Gulf War, 89, 

204–206

logistics transformation, 257–280

as military arm of the CCP, 13–14, 

15, 29–30, 48–51, 529, 

535–536, 712

need for a domain-centric force 

for information warfare, 446

need for a force to protect growing 

global interests, 560

need for a permanent joint comm a nd a nd c ont rol 

structure as a driver of 

change, 519–520

need to rationalize the mix of 

combat to noncombat 

forces, 233–234

network protection responsibility, 

496

operations groups for a wartime 

campaign, 468–469

organizational grade structure, 

452–454

organizational structure as an 

impediment to change, 

220–221, 519–520, 716

overseas operations, 723–725

participation of civilian-owned 

companies in contracting, 639–640

prioritization of the maritime 

domain, 337–338

problems with acquisitions, 614–

616, 649

reliance on civilians to fill nonc o m b a t r o l e s a n d 

responsibilities, 637

responsibility for cyber operations, 495–496

restructuring of, 560, 564–565, 

661–662, 711–713

revenue from off-budget commercial activities, 524, 

526, 534

role in political affairs in the Mao 

era, 522–523
Index

755

role of advanced economy in 

military development, 

633–634

role of defense technology in military success, 629–630

Science and Technology Commission, 719

self-assessed shortcomings, 57

shift to an “active defense” strategy, 141–142

social support for, 639, 641

space missions, 455–456, 458–459

state of modernization compared 

with the world’s most 

advanced militaries, 

57–58

SSF support for joint operations 

“system of systems,” 

479, 484

success of efforts to improve joint 

operations capability, 

720–721

talk of rebranding as a nationalist 

army, 529–530

thinking on the strategic role of 

information in warfare, 

440, 441, 442, 446–447

training reform as a means to 

improve joint force 

readiness, 139–140, 206, 

215, 217–220, 298–299, 

307–308, 414–415, 416, 

713–714, 720

unevenly modernized in equipment, 58, 362, 363, 

364–365

unevenly modernized in operational mindset, 58, 

59–60

and veterans, 686–687

views on OBOR, 183–187, 192

weakness of combining military 

administration and operational command, 233

PLA Air Force (PLAAF)

creation of brigades, 338

effects of force reductions on, 338

efforts to contribute to maritime 

missions, 142–144

growth in personnel and budget 

after 1985 force reduction, 331

improved training for pilots to 

emphasize operations 

over water, 143

joint training exercises with the 

navy, 140

potential growth in personnel end 

strength, 337

power projection capabilities, 

180–181

responsibilities with respect to 

OBOR, 185–186

space missions, 458–459, 564

strength, 337, 347

structural reorganization of, 10

use of transports to evacuate PRC 

citizens from Libya, 189

PLA Army (PLAA)

amphibious forces, 88, 338
Index

756

becoming the ground component 

of a joint force as best 

option, 106–108, 114

below-the-neck reforms, 112, 361

cuts in professional military education for, 376–377

effect of army’s lower priority for 

modernization on equipment upgrades, 362

headquarters for established at 

the national and theater levels, 6, 349–350, 

351–352

internal security mission, 105–106

joint amphibious training operations, 140

limitations from emphasis on 

deterrence and defense 

of China, 103–106

marine brigades, 361

missions, 348

need to accept its position as the 

PLA’s biggest loser in 

current reforms, 378–

380

need to develop a modernized 

education structure, 

375–377

order of battle, 358–361

organizational contributors to 

the slow adoption of 

reforms, 99–103, 106–114

potential responses to backsliding 

or risk-averse slowness in responding to 

reforms, 112–113

Special operations forces, 361

strength, 337, 347–348, 358–359

structural reorganization of, 9–10, 

336–337, 540–542

use of the Soviet system of command, 366

PLA Daily, 50, 186, 296, 365, 375, 528, 

541, 616

articles about anticorruption campaign, 51, 533

articles addressing the national 

security situation, 63, 

64–65, 68–69, 70

PLA Joint Combat Program, 1999, 261

PLA Joint Logistics Support Force 

(JLSF), 5–6, 47, 259, 

260, 271–275, 278, 295, 

374–375, 720

PLA Logistics Command University, 

265

PLA marine corps, 135, 180, 337–338

PLA National Defense University

collaboration with service comm a n d a c a d e m i e s 

in joint operations 

instruction, 297

expanded courses in joint operations, 304–306, 312

increasing the service diversity of 

students and faculty, 139

Joint Operations College, 217

lack of adequate joint operations 

content, 300

PLA Navy (PLAN)

aircraft carriers for, 132, 180

amphibious capabilities, 132
Index

757

budget increases, 128, 331

competition for maritime missions, 142–145

as a component of a joint force, 

138–147

counterpiracy patrols, 126–127, 

134, 135, 136

creation of a blue-water navy, 126, 

128, 129–132, 136–138, 

153

defending China’s maritime and 

sovereignty issues in 

the South China Sea 

and East China Sea, 

127–128, 142, 147–148, 

150–151

early attempts at joint education 

and training, 136, 139

education and training of recruits, 

133–136

effects of force reductions on, 338

evacuation of PRC and other foreign citizens from Libya 

and Yemen, 126–127, 

189–190

expansion of the marine corps, 

180

further development of an “interagency” maritime force, 

126, 128

growth in personnel and budget 

after 1985 force reduction, 331

increased participation in intern a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y 

exercises, 134, 137, 140

increased participation in military 

exercises with Russia, 

134, 140

increases in port calls, 137

joint training exercises with the 

air force, 140

naval aviation personnel, 133

new advanced ships, submarines, 

and weapons, 131–132

operational tempo increases, 134

operations with the coast guard, 

147, 148–151, 152

operations with the maritime 

militia, 147–148, 149–

151, 152

overseas bases, 178

potential growth in personnel and 

strength, 337–338

potential U.S. intervention in Taiwan as motivator for 

modernization, 131

reliance on Strategic Support Force 

for far seas deployments, 

477–478

research and development, 126, 

128, 130–132, 180, 587–

588, 589

shift to “open seas protection” 

strategy, 141–142

Soviet assistance for modernization of, 130–131

special operations forces unit, 135

strength, 337, 347

structural reorganization of, 10

submarine force, 180, 420–421
Index

758

use of tri-f leet exercises to 

maintain operational 

control, 136

Vessel Training Centers, 133–134

PLA personnel

assignment changes as anticorruption measure, 536–537

corruption in the promotions system, 526, 527, 543

educational options for those demobilized, 688, 690–691

effects of anticorruption campaign 

on, 51, 53, 688–690

effects of economic reforms on reintegration of demobilized 

military personnel into 

society, 680–684

full government support for all 

personnel disabled in 

public service, 672

improvement in the selection of 

commanders, 216

initial protection of senior PLA 

officers’ career interests 

during restructuring, 

540

integration of downsized military personnel back 

into society, 662–663, 

665–691

political loyalty of officers, 533, 

535–536, 562

quality of, 10–11, 60, 295, 716

requirement for ideological education at all levels, 535

responsibility for resettlement 

of downsized military 

personnel, 662–691

resettlement options for officers, 

671–672, 673–674, 676, 

678–681, 684, 686–687

role of joint experience in promotion, 721

separation of conscripts, 669–670, 

672–673, 688

separation of noncommissioned 

officers, 670–671, 673–

674, 688

separation options broadened 

under Xi, 688, 690–691

subsidies for those demobilized, 

683, 688

theater commanders and theater 

political commissars, 541

training, 206, 216, 217–218, 639, 

641, 713–714

waning ideological appeal of the 

CCP to, 528–530, 536, 

545

Xi’s engagement in selection of 

senior officers, 543–544

PLA Rocket Force, 393, 567–568

Base 61, 241, 401, 418, 419

Base 67, 407

bases, 401–402

challenges to integrating units 

into joint operations, 

415–416, 423

command and control arrangem e n t s , 4 0 1 , 4 0 6 , 

409–412, 415–417
Index

759

created, 539

effect of force reductions on, 

338–339

impact on recent military reforms 

on, 393–394, 420

inventory of missiles, 397, 399–

400

maritime missions for, 144–145

missile brigades, command and 

control of, 236–237, 239, 

241, 401, 402, 406, 409–

412, 415–417, 420–421

missile brigades, for conventional 

missiles, 401–404

missile brigades, for nuclear missiles, 401, 402–406, 408

missions, 410, 413, 417–419, 420

organizational structure of, 400–

406

reliance on Strategic Support 

Forces to support operations, 477, 493

responsibility for conventional 

m issi les , 4 0 0 – 4 05, 

417–419

responsibility for nuclear weapons, 401–406, 417–419

strength, 337

training, 408, 411, 414–415, 416, 422

upgraded to full-service status, 

5, 409–410, 412–413, 

421–422

use of solid-fueled missiles, 395

PLA Rocket Force Command College, 

305

PLA Second Artillery Force, 567

growth in personnel and budget 

after 1985 force reduction, 331

missions, 394, 412

organizational structure of, 400–

406, 412, 449

relationship to military regions, 

412

renamed the Rocket Force, 5, 393, 

409

responsibility for nuclear weapons, 393–394, 395, 399

space mission, 458–459

strength, 347

PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF)

35th Base, 451

311 Base, 466–467

331 Base, 452

academic and research institutes 

reassigned to, 461, 462, 

463

advantages of unity of command, 

planning, and force 

development, 481–485

command and control of, 467–

474, 491–492

created as an independent branch, 

5, 437, 442, 443, 467, 

498, 539

Cyber Force, 488–490, 493–494, 

496–498

electronic countermeasures brigades, 462–463

forces organized as “bases,” 451

grade structure in transition, 452–

455, 494
Index

760

information support for power 

projection activities, 

477–478

informational support operations, 

474–479

as likely core of an information 

operations group in 

wartime, 469, 481–482

missions, 437–438, 439, 442, 458–

459, 465–467, 474, 493

Network Systems Department 

(NSD), 449, 450–451, 

452, 454–455, 459–463, 

465, 493–495

organizational structure, 438–

439, 444–446, 447–450, 

493–494

primary force for information 

warfare, 479–485, 487, 

493

protection of critical information 

infrastructure, 496–497

psychological and political warfare missions, 465–467, 

490

responsibilities, 27, 295, 333, 349, 

488–489

space surveillance responsibilities, 

478–479

Space Systems Department (SSD), 

449, 450–451, 454–459, 

493, 494–495

Staff Department, 450–451, 455

Three Warfares missions, 444, 

452, 465–467

under direct command of the 

Central Military Commission, 447, 449–451, 

467

U.S. Strategic Command as example for, 442–443

Persian Gulf War, 1991, 89, 205, 229–

230, 261, 4 40, 629, 

634–635

Personnel management system

changes to still being debated, 

307–308, 310–314

potential for disruption of PLA officers’ lives, 310–311, 716

promot ion systems role i n 

development of joint 

commanders, 312–313, 

713, 716

proposed changes to promote the 

development of joint 

c om m a nder s , 3 03, 

306–308, 310–312

Polang, tall ship, 133

Pollpeter, Kevin, 230–231

Practical Handbook on Maritime 

Live-Fire Training with 

Trainer Aircraft, A, 143

Professional military education (PME)

changes made to better educate officers in joint operational 

arts, 297, 302–303, 305

credentialing problems, 301, 

304–305

cuts in number of cadets selected 

for, 375–377
Index

761

development of stronger ties 

among PME institutes, 

theater commands, and 

the services, 305

innovative cross-training at service 

command colleges, 205

need to improve education in joint 

operations, 216–217, 

219–220, 300, 712, 713

restructuring of, 10–11

Proposal on Deepening Defense and 

M i l i t a r y G e n e r a l 

Reform Plan, 2015, 591

Provisional Measures for Resettling 

Transferred Officers, 

668, 679, 689

Public Security, Ministry of (MPS), 497

Qi Jiguang, training ship, 133

Qiao Liang, PLAAF Maj. Gen., 184

Qin Shengxiang, Lt. Gen., 32, 539–540

Qiushi, 529, 628, 635

Renmin Haijun, 185

Research and development (R&D)

becoming an original innovation 

leader, 591–594, 595–

598, 600–601, 602, 603, 

616–617, 629–630, 719

and civil-military integration, 

634 – 635, 641, 642, 

646–647

defense-related, 395, 565, 566, 586, 

588, 590, 591–605, 613, 

630, 639, 641, 647

funding for, 586–587, 596–597, 

602, 604, 607– 608, 

630–631

PLA Navy, 126, 128, 130–132, 180, 

587–588, 589

reform of the civilian R&D system, 604–605

Resolution on Preferential Treatment of 

Red Army Dependents, 

664

Rocket Force. See, PLA Rocket Force

Rocket Force News, 411, 413, 415, 416

Russia, 175, 176, 238

Safety Checklist for Maritime Live-Fire 

Training, 143

Satellites

Beidou navigation, 441, 451, 458, 

478

communications, 473–474

intelligence, 457

maritime surveillance, 478

responsibility for antisatellite missions, 458, 478–479

space-based communications, 

457– 458 , 473 – 474 , 

478–479

Saunders, Phillip, 246

Science, Technology, and Innovation 

2030, 596

Science and Technology, Ministry of, 

596, 597, 600, 604

Science of Campaigns, The, 2006, 144–

145, 207

Science of Military Strategy, 1999, 93, 96

Science of Military Strategy, 2001, 93
Index

762

Science of Military Strategy, 2013, 65, 

94, 106, 141–142, 151, 

237, 303, 442, 467, 475, 

479–480, 629

Science of Military Strategy, 2015, 446

Scobell, Andrew, 525

Second Artillery Force. See PLA Second 

Artillery Force

Security environment, changes in 

China’s perception of 

as driver for changes, 

86–88, 92, 93–95

Selected Important Expositions of Xi Jinping on National Defense 

and Army Building, The, 

55–56

Seychelles, potential for an overseas 

base in, 179, 187–188

Shang Hong, Maj. Gen., 455

Shanghai Base, 241

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 

174

Shen Dingli, 178

Sheng Bin, Lt. Gen., 35, 356

Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, 589

Shenyang Military Region, 212, 243, 

297, 298, 371–372

Shichang, air training ship, 133

Shijiazhuang Army Command College, 

305

Shijiazhuang Flying Academy, 245

Shipbuilding industry, 587–588, 598, 

603, 605, 608, 609

Silk Road Economic Belt, 184

Sino-Vietnamese War, 234–235, 238, 

261

Song Dan, Lt. Gen., 36

Song Puxuan, Gen., 34, 259–260, 298, 

569, 571

South China Morning Post, 648

South China Sea, 127–128, 142–144, 

147–151, 723, 724

South Sudan, 188, 371–372

Southern Theater Command, 8, 238, 

241–242, 305, 306, 309, 

370, 724

Soviet Union, 87, 95, 176, 529

Space

space-based technical collection 

system, 476–477

space operations, 438, 440, 441, 

442, 443, 445–446, 

451–52, 480, 489

Space and missile industry, 588, 609–

610

Spratly Islands, 127

State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry 

for National Defense 

(SASTIND), 586, 594, 

597–598, 601–602, 603, 

607, 616

State Council

and civil-military integration, 601, 

602, 646–647

and demobilized military personnel, 668, 674, 679

State Council Military Cadre Transfer 

and Resettlement Work 

Small Group, 674, 676, 

678

State Security, Ministry of, 495–496
Index

763

State Strong Manufacturing Power 

Building Leading Small 

Group, 601–602

Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute, 594

Strategic Support Force. See PLA Strategic 

Support Force

Submarines

armed with ballistic missiles, 180, 

397, 398, 399, 405–406, 

420–421

Jin-class, 399, 405–406, 420

Xia-class, 398, 420

Sudan, 372

Sun Jianguo, Adm., 66, 67

Supporting Policies on the Restructuring of Defense Research 

Institutes under Public 

Institution Reform, 603

System-of-systems operations

concepts explored, 208–209, 

212–214

defined, 208–209

Taiwan, 95, 114, 141, 147, 338, 723, 724

1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, 

139, 260–261

Eastern Theater Command responsibility for, 240–241

sovereignty disputes with, 127–

128, 131

Target-centric warfare, 210–211

Theater commands

army commanders, 352–355

army headquarters in, 351–352, 

356–357

army headquarters support 

department, 373

army political commissars, 352–

354

challenges to the success of, 246–

249, 713–716

control of conventional missile 

forces, 411, 416–417

creation of, 7–8, 61–62, 227, 229–

232, 295

creation of service headquarters for 

PLA Army units in, 240

geographic limits on ability 

to plan and execute 

military operations, 

723–725

joint logistics support bases, 374

joint logistics support centers, 

272–275, 276–277, 278

joint operations as a focus of training, 309

joint operations command centers, 306, 309, 410, 

415–416

Network-Electronics Countermeasures dui, 471, 473

relationship with Strategic Support Force, 476, 479, 

484, 491, 493

responsibilities, 235, 238–245, 

713–717

responsibility for combat-related 

joint training, 215, 218, 

235–237, 713–714

service component commanders, 

715
Index

764

service headquarters, 240

service logistics departments, 273, 

277–278

strategic drivers that led to the 

switch to, 234–238

structure, 713–714

training for staff officers, 305

Theater Joint Operations Command, 140

Three Warfares concept, 444, 452, 

465–466

Tiananmen Square, Beijing, 529, 682–

683

Tibet, 68, 355, 356

Tibet Military District, 355, 359, 360–

361, 373

Training

improvements in joint training, 139–140, 206, 215, 

217–2 2 0 , 29 8 –29 9, 

3 07–3 0 8 , 414 – 415, 

416, 713–714, 720

PLA Air Force, 140, 143

PLA Navy, 133–136, 139, 140

reforms at the theater command 

level, 309

of Rocket Force units, 408, 411, 

414, 416, 422

Training exercises

ADMM-Plus, 370

Firepower 2009, 212–213

Firepower 2014, 368

Firepower 2015, 368

Firepower 2016, 368

Firepower 2017, 368

with foreign militaries, 370–371

goals of, 367–368, 369–371

Joint 2008, 367

Joint Action 2014, 414

Khan Quest 2016, 370

Kowari 2016, 370

Mission Action 2010, 212, 213, 368

Mission Action 2013, 368, 369

Panda-Kangaroo 2016, 370

Peace Mission 2016, 370–371

for the Rocket Force, 408, 414

Sharp Edge 2017, 368

Sharp Sword 2005, 211

Sharpening Troops 2008, 367

Stride 2009, 212–213, 368

Stride 2014, 368

Stride 2015, 368

Stride 2016, 368

Stride 2017, 368

transregional, 366–369

Tropical Twilight, 370

use of dedicated opposition forces, 

212

Two Inabilities, 365–366, 377–378

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 187, 188, 371–372

Congo, 371–372

Darfur, 372

Lebanon, 188, 371–372

Liberia, 371–372

Mali, 371–372

South Sudan, 188, 371–372

Sudan, 372

U.S. Cyber Command, 442, 488–489, 

490, 495, 496, 497

U.S. Defense Information Systems 

Agency, 496
Index

765

U.S. Department of Defense, assessment 

of Chinese military 

power, 58–59

U.S. efforts to achieve greater jointness, 

248–249, 293, 409

U.S. Joint Vision 2020, 258

U.S. military operations

Desert Storm, 230

as example to China of how far 

behind their forces were 

technologically, 204, 

229–230, 232–233, 238

Iraqi Freedom, 230

U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 400, 404

U.S. National Security Strategy, 2017, 

489

U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 588

U.S. Strategic Command, 442–443, 

491, 493

U.S. Third Offset Strategy, 617

Urumqi Base, 243

Veterans

benefits for, 542

protests against failure of government to care for, 

682–684, 686, 691

reintegration into society, 662–

663, 681–682

Veterans Affairs, Ministry of, 138, 662–

663, 691–692

Vietnam, 149–150, 234–235

Wang Chengzhi, Maj. Gen., 37

Wang Huiqing, Maj. Gen., 37

Wang Jiaocheng, Gen., 235–236, 242

Wang Ning, Gen., PAP Cmdr., 569, 571, 

572

Wang Pei, Maj. Gen., 66, 68

Wang Xiaohui, Sr. Col., 232–234

Wang Xiaoming, Maj. Gen., 471

Weapons research and development 

process, 395, 565, 566, 

588, 590–594, 639, 641, 

646–647

Wei Fenghe, Gen., 412, 562, 567–568, 

574

Western Theater Command, 8, 242–

243, 305, 334, 370

Winged Missiles, 185

Work Conference on Central Military 

Commission Reform, 

661

Wu Shengli, Adm., Navy Cmdr., 186–

187, 298, 562–563

Wu Xiandong, 611

Wu Zheng, 149

Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base, 

245, 272–273, 374

Wuthnow, Joel, 246

Xi Jinping

and 2017–2018 reduction of the 

PLA, 9, 328–329

advocacy for a new regional 

security cooperation 

architecture in Asia, 177

ambition to reshape and modernize the PLA, 1–2, 521, 

711–712
Index

766

anticorruption campaign in the 

PLA, 51, 53, 270–271, 

526, 558 –559, 560, 

572–573, 574, 575, 687, 

688–690, 712, 717–718

assessment of China’s security 

environment, 13, 63, 

65–67, 573

below-the-neck force structural 

changes announced in 

2017, 9–10

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 127

CMC Chairmanship responsibility system, 14–15, 

31, 32, 53, 538, 559, 

576, 717

changes to the professional military 

education system, 304

civil-military challenges to modernization of the PLA, 

524, 718–720

as commander-in-chief of the 

Joint Operations Command Center, 54, 559

concerns about CCP control and 

discipline in the PLA, 

13 –15, 52–5 4, 521, 

530–531, 535, 537–538, 

558–559, 711, 717–718, 

721–722

concerns about the need to achieve 

political security for the 

CCP, 49, 521, 530–531

and control of strategic missile 

forces, 410–411, 417

and disbanding of the four general departments of the 

PLA, 6, 7

dissatisfaction with PLA’s training, 219

emphasis on combat readiness of 

the PLA, 237

emphasis on maritime operations, 

715

emphasis on the ability of the 

PLA to fight and win 

informationized local 

wars, 54, 55–56, 294, 

559–560, 711

emphasis on training joint commanders, 296

engagement in officer selection 

process, 543–544, 562–

573, 717–718

establishment of large-scale 

national laboratories, 

596–597

force reduction announcements, 9, 

85, 109, 327, 539, 661–663

impact on joint operations development, 214–218, 219–221

improving the defense acquisition, technology, and 

industrial system, 585, 

589 –591, 592 , 595, 

596, 630

keys to his ability to overcome 

bureaucratic resistance 

to PLA reform, 3, 537–

546

and logistics reform, 271
Index

767

opposition to military alliances, 

176–177

overhaul of the CMC membership, 

11, 557–560, 561–573

personal involvement in the military reform process, 53, 

55, 71, 98–99, 538–540, 

559, 712, 717–718

personal power over the military, 

521, 559, 562, 575–576, 

687, 690, 717

“Polar Silk Road” through the 

Arctic Ocean, 127

policies to cultivate better joint 

commanders, 219, 296

promotion of military-civil fusion, 

599–600, 627–628, 637, 

639, 640–642, 648–650

recognition of need for improvement in joint operations 

capacity, 203

Rocket Force mission, 410

service-related changes announced 

December 31, 2015, 5–6

speech at the All Army Political 

Work Conference at 

Gutian, November 2014, 

50, 53, 528, 529, 530–531, 

535, 559

speech at the National Science 

and Technology Conference, 2016, 595–596

timeline for PLA reforms, 347–

348, 661, 687

Xi’an Flying Academy, 243

Xinjiang, 68, 355, 356

Xinjiang Military District, 335, 355, 

359, 360–361, 371–372, 

373

Xizang (Tibet) Military District, 335

Xu Caihou, Gen., CMC Vice-Chairman, 

98, 526, 543, 567–568, 

572, 717

Xu Dazhe, 601, 619

Xu Qiliang, PLAAF Gen., CMC 

Vice-Chairman, 54, 60, 

69, 74, 295, 304, 533, 534, 

562–565, 573, 616, 648

Yan Xuetong, 175, 179

Yang Yujun, Sr. Col., 238, 410

Ye Zheng, Maj. Gen., 442, 469, 484–

485, 487–488

Yemen, 126–127, 181, 189–190

Yi Xiaoguang, PLAAF Gen., 146, 244, 

247, 380

Yijiangshan Islands, 138

Yin Zhuo, Adm., 496–497

Yu Chuanxin, 634

Yuan Yubai, Vice Adm., 146, 242, 244, 

247, 380

Yupeng, training ship, 133

Zhang Aiping, Gen., 395, 398

Zhang Gaoli, 648

Zhang Haiyang, Gen., 566

Zhang Shengmin, Gen., 36, 568, 571–

573, 574

Z h a n g Wa n n i a n , G e n . , C M C 

Vice-Chairman, 346

Zhang Xudong, Lt. Gen., 366
Index

768

Zhang Yang, Gen., 11, 33, 543, 560, 570, 

575

Zhang Youxia, Gen., 34, 301, 565–566, 

573–574, 593

Zhang Yu, Maj. Gen., 37

Zhang Zhaozhong, Rear Adm., 178

Zhang Zhen, Gen., 346, 563–564

Zhang Zhihui, Maj. Gen., 66

Zhang Zongxun, Gen., 566

Zhao Keshi, Gen., 34

Zhao Ziyang, 529

Zheng He, Lt. Gen., 35

Zheng He, training ship, 133

Zheng Junjie, Lt. Gen., 460

Zheng Weiping, Gen., 447

Zhong Shaojun, Maj. Gen., 29, 32, 539–

540, 575, 717–718

Zhou Enlai, 260

Zhou Yaning, Lt. Gen., 412

Zhou Yongkang, 36, 191, 543

Zhu Chenghu, Maj. Gen., 184

Zhurihe Combined Arms Training 

Base, 367
C

hina’s current military reforms are unprecedented in their 

ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational 

changes. Virtually every part of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and 

responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or 

has undergone a major internal reorganization.

Drawing on papers presented at two conferences co-organized 

by the U.S. National Defense University, RAND, and Taiwan’s Council 

of Advanced Policy Studies, this edited volume brings together some of 

the world’s best experts on the Chinese military to analyze the various 

dimensions of the reforms in detail and assess their implications for the 

PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations, for the Chinese Communist 

Party’s control of the army, and for civil-military integration.

The contributors review the drivers and strategic context underpinning the reform effort, explore the various dimensions of PLA 

efforts to build a force capable of conducting joint operations, consider the implications for the PLA services, and examine Xi Jinping’s 

role in driving the reforms through and using them to strengthen 

control over the military. The chapters chronicle successes and 

outstanding problems in the reform effort, and consider what the net 

effect will be as the PLA strives to become a “world- class” military 

by mid-century, if not much sooner.