Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 54793 

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, 

may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to make 

your request. 

(h) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact James Gray, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New 

England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 

01803; phone: 781–238–7742; fax: 781–238– 

7199; email: james.e.gray@faa.gov. 

(2) Pratt & Whitney Service Bulletin (SB) 

No. PWENG 72–721 and SB No. PW4G–100– 

72–166, pertain to the subject of this AD. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Pratt & Whitney, 400 Main 

St., East Hartford, CT 06108; phone: 860– 

565–8770; fax: 860–565–4503. 

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

August 16, 2012. 

Colleen M. D’Alessandro, 

Assistant Manager, Engine & Propeller 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–21821 Filed 9–5–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–1229; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–132–AD; Amendment 

39–17181; AD 2012–18–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; the Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model DC–9–10, 

DC–9–20, DC–9–30, DC–9–40, and DC– 

9–50 series airplanes; and Model DC–9– 

81 (MD–81), DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9– 

83 (MD–83), DC–9–87 (MD–87), MD–88, 

and MD–90–30 airplanes; equipped 

with center wing fuel tank and Boeing 

original equipment manufacturerinstalled auxiliary fuel tanks. This AD 

was prompted by fuel system reviews 

conducted by the manufacturer. This 

AD requires adding design features to 

detect electrical faults and to detect a 

pump running in an empty fuel tank. 

We are issuing this AD to reduce the 

potential of ignition sources inside fuel 

tanks, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in 

fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 11, 

2012. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Serj 

Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, 

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 

Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, California 90712–4137; 

phone: 562–627–5254; fax: 562–627– 

5210; email: serj.harutunian@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on November 14, 2011 (76 FR 

70377). That NPRM proposed to require 

adding design features to detect 

electrical faults, to detect a pump 

running in an empty fuel tank, and to 

ensure that a fuel pump’s operation is 

not affected by certain conditions. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (76 FR 70377, 

November 14, 2011) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Revise Applicability 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

applicability of the NPRM (76 FR 70377, 

November 14, 2011) to exclude 

airplanes from which auxiliary fuel 

tanks have been removed, and to add 

certain airplanes equipped with a center 

wing fuel tank. Boeing stated that the 

system safety assessments (SSAs) of 

Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 

88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ Amendment 21–78 (66 

FR 23086, May 7, 2001) concluded that 

design changes were required on all 

auxiliary fuel tanks on Model DC–9, 

MD–80, and MD–90 airplanes, and on 

the center wing fuel tank on Model MD– 

80 and MD–90 airplanes. American 

Airlines (American) concurred with 

Boeing’s position on this issue. 

We agree to limit the applicability of 

this AD to affected airplanes equipped 

with center wing fuel tanks and Boeing 

OEM-installed auxiliary fuel tanks. We 

also agree that airplanes on which 

auxiliary fuel tanks have been removed 

are not subject to the requirements of 

this AD. We have revised paragraph (c) 

in this final rule accordingly. 

Requests To Remove Criteria for Mean 

Time Between Failures (MTBF) 

Boeing and TDG Aerospace requested 

that we provide justification for the 

removal of pump nuisance trip relative 

to the 100,000-hour MTBF reliability 

requirements to mitigate the ignition 

prevention unsafe condition. The 

commenters asserted that the 100,000- 

hour MTBF reliability requirement is 

not a contributing factor to the ignition 

source unsafe condition for design 

changes mandated by the NPRM (76 FR 

70377, November 14, 2011). American 

concurred with Boeing’s position on 

this issue. 

We agree with the request. The MTBF 

of the component will be addressed in 

the design change package provided for 

certification to satisfy the criteria for 

compliance with the requirements of 

this AD. We have accordingly removed 

paragraph (g)(3) in this final rule. 

Request To Redefine Certain Failure 

Conditions 

Boeing claimed that the NPRM (76 FR 

70377, November 14, 2011) was too 

broad in its descriptions of the unsafe 

failure modes. Boeing requested that we 

revise paragraph (g) of the NPRM to 

define the failure modes that would 

require corrective action as electrical 

faults that are ‘‘capable of burning 

through the pump housing’s explosionproof boundaries’’ (instead of those that 

‘‘can cause arcing and burn through the 

fuel pump housing,’’ as specified in the 

NPRM). Boeing asserted that this 

clarification would ensure that the 

corrective actions would target only the 

potential fuel tank ignition sources 

identified during the SSAs, by 

identifying only those fuel pump 

electrical faults and fuel pump dryrunning conditions capable of 

developing a fuel tank ignition source. 

American concurred with Boeing’s 

position on this issue. 

We disagree with the request. 

Narrowing the failure conditions to 

certain types of failures or certain 

explosion-proof pump boundaries 

would limit the application of a broader 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
54794 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

array of ignition prevention solutions. 

We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Remove Certain Restriction 

Paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM (76 FR 

70377, November 14, 2011) specified 

that the new pump shutoff system must 

shut off each pump no later than 60 

seconds after the fuel tank is emptied. 

Noting that the SFAR 88 SSAs 

recommended minimizing dry-running 

time but provided no specific dryrunning time limit, Boeing requested 

that we remove the 60-second 

restriction. Boeing suggested basing dryrunning time limits on the risk of 

developing a fuel tank ignition source 

threat by the affected designs, and 

added that the pump shutoff design 

feature must balance that risk against 

adding to crew workload to correct 

nuisance pump shutoffs in a near-empty 

fuel tank. Boeing noted that the FAA 

has approved auto-shutoff timers on 

other airplane designs that may allow 

pumps to run longer than 60 seconds 

after a fuel tank was emptied. American 

concurred with Boeing’s position on 

this issue. 

We do not agree to remove the 60- 

second pump shutoff restriction. The 

intent of this AD is to mandate that fuel 

pumps be shut off after fuel tanks empty 

to prevent pump dry running. The FAA 

has mandated a 15-second shutoff time 

on other applications, and has 

determined that a 60-second shutoff 

time is not unreasonable in this case. 

We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Mandate Airworthiness 

Limitations 

Boeing noted that the NPRM (76 FR 

70377, November 14, 2011) would not 

mandate airworthiness limitations such 

as critical design configuration control 

limitations (CDCCLs) and/or repetitive 

inspections or functional checks for the 

proposed changes. Boeing requested 

that we revise Note 1 of the NPRM to 

require operators to comply with any 

related airworthiness limitations. 

American concurred with Boeing’s 

position on this issue. 

We disagree with the request to 

mandate airworthiness limitations. 

CDCCLs for this design are not defined 

yet and will be included in the 

certification approval, as required under 

paragraph (g) of this AD. We have 

removed Note 1 in this final rule, but 

have otherwise not changed the AD 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Delay Issuance of Final 

Rule 

American requested that we delay 

issuing the final rule pending the 

release of service information associated 

with the design features proposed by the 

NPRM (76 FR 70377, November 14, 

2011). American indicated that 

additional time is necessary to allow 

operators time for reviewing the 

modification options, planning, 

ordering modification parts, and 

completing the required work during a 

heavy maintenance check. 

We disagree with the request. 

Delaying issuance of this AD would 

have adverse safety implications. We 

anticipate that FAA-approved design 

solutions will be available in sufficient 

time for operators to comply with the 

AD within 60 months. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Terminology 

TDG Aerospace requested that we 

clarify the term ‘‘preclude’’ as used in 

the NPRM (76 FR 70377, November 14, 

2011) in paragraph (g)(2): ‘‘The pump 

shutoff system design must preclude 

undetected running of a fuel pump in an 

empty tank, after the pump was 

commanded off manually or 

automatically.’’ TDG Aerospace 

considered ‘‘undetected running of a 

fuel pump’’ a significant latent failure 

condition, as defined by FAA Advisory 

Circular 25.981–1C, ‘‘Fuel Tank Ignition 

Source Prevention Guidelines,’’ dated 

September 19, 2008 (http:// 

www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/ 

Advisory_Circular/AC%2025_981- 

1.pdf). TDG therefore requested that we 

confirm that use of the word ‘‘preclude’’ 

is done in the context of the allowable 

period of latency for significant latent 

failure conditions (i.e., one flight cycle). 

The commenter did not justify or further 

explain the request. 

We agree that the word ‘‘preclude’’ is 

consistent with failure latency period 

equal to one flight accommodated in 

paragraph 10.c.(3) of FAA AC 25.981– 

1C. We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Approve Modification 

American requested that we approve 

for compliance with the NPRM (76 FR 

70377, November 14, 2011) the 

installation of a certain universal fault 

interrupter that American alleges will 

adequately address the unsafe 

condition. American stated that the 

functionality of this modification has 

been demonstrated and approved as 

equivalent or exceeding the protection 

provided by that of a standard ground 

fault interrupter (GFI) relay previously 

approved for AD 2011–18–03, 

Amendment 39–16785 (76 FR 53317, 

August 26, 2011); and AD 2011–20–07, 

Amendment 39–16818 (76 FR 60710, 

September 30, 2011). 

We disagree with the request. Those 

parts have not been approved for these 

airplanes. The referenced ADs apply to 

airplanes not affected by this AD, and 

do not address the same unsafe 

condition identified in this AD. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Add Flight Crew 

Notification 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA) fully supported 

the proposed requirements of the NPRM 

(76 FR 70377, November 14, 2011), and 

requested an additional design feature 

that would notify the flight crew when 

the fuel pump has been automatically 

shut off if an electrical anomaly is 

detected or if the fuel tank is empty. 

We disagree with the request. When 

the fuel pump is automatically shut off 

because of an electrical anomaly, the 

flight crew will be unable to take any 

further action to start up the pump, so 

notifications of this condition to the 

flight crew would serve no purpose. 

Electrical failures that automatically 

shut off the pump are logged for 

maintenance action after landing to 

safely restart the pump. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

cost estimates specified in the NPRM 

(76 FR 70377, November 14, 2011) to 

reflect updated fleet size information. 

American concurred with this request. 

We have reviewed the fleet 

information provided by Boeing, and 

have revised the estimated costs 

accordingly in this final rule. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (76 FR 

70377, November 14, 2011) for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (76 FR 70377, 

November 14, 2011). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 54795 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 809 

airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate 

the following costs to comply with this 

AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Installing design features—for airplanes with center wing 

and auxiliary tanks (263 airplanes).

50 work-hours × $85 per hour 

= $4,250.

$35,000 $39,250 $10,322,750 

Installing design features—for airplanes with center wing 

tank (546 airplanes).

35 work-hours × $85 per hour 

= $2,975.

17,000 19,975 10,906,350 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2012–18–05 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–17181; Docket No. 

FAA–2011–1229; Directorate Identifier 

2011–NM–132–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective October 11, 2012. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

airplanes, certificated in any category, as 

identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(8) 

of this AD, and equipped with center wing 

fuel tanks and Boeing original equipment 

manufacturer-installed auxiliary fuel tanks. 

For airplanes from which the auxiliary fuel 

tanks have been removed, the actions 

specified in this AD are not required. 

(1) Model DC–9–11, DC–9–12, DC–9–13, 

DC–9–14, DC–9–15, and DC–9–15F airplanes. 

(2) Model DC–9–21 airplanes. 

(3) Model DC–9–31, DC–9–32, DC–9–32 

(VC–9C), DC–9–32F, DC–9–33F, DC–9–34, 

DC–9–34F, and DC–9–32F (C–9A, C–9B) 

airplanes. 

(4) Model DC–9–41 airplanes. 

(5) Model DC–9–51 airplanes. 

(6) Model DC–9–81 (MD–81), DC–9–82 

(MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD–83), and DC–9–87 

(MD–87) airplanes. 

(7) Model MD–88 airplanes. 

(8) Model MD–90–30 airplanes. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/ 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America 

Code 28: Fuel. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of 

ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in fuel tank explosions and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Criteria for Operation 

As of 60 months after the effective date of 

this AD, no person may operate any airplane 

affected by this AD unless an amended type 

certificate or supplemental type certificate 

that incorporates the design features and 

requirements described in paragraphs (g)(1) 

and (g)(2) of this AD has been approved by 

the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, and those 

design features are installed on the airplane. 

(1) Each electrically powered fuel pump 

installed in the center wing tank or auxiliary 

fuel tank must have a protective device 

installed to detect electrical faults that can 

cause arcing and burn through the fuel pump 

housing. The same device must shut off the 

pump by automatically removing electrical 

power from the pump when such faults are 

detected. When a fuel pump is shut off as the 

result of detection of an electrical fault, the 

device must stay latched off until the fault is 

cleared through maintenance action and 

verified that the pump and the electrical 

power feed is safe for operation. 

(2) Additional design features must be 

installed to detect when any center wing tank 

or auxiliary fuel tank pump is running in an 

empty fuel tank. The prospective pump 

shutoff system must shut off each pump no 

later than 60 seconds after the fuel tank is 

emptied. The pump shutoff system design 

must preclude undetected running of a fuel 

pump in an empty tank, after the pump was 

commanded off manually or automatically. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, 

has the authority to approve AMOCs for this 

AD, if requested using the procedures found 

in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 

39.19, send your request to your principal 

inspector or local Flight Standards District 

Office, as appropriate. If sending information 

directly to the manager of the ACO, send it 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
54796 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

to the attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(i) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los 

Angeles ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, California 90712–4137; phone: 

562–627–5254; fax: 562–627–5210; email: 

serj.harutunian@faa.gov. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 

6, 2012. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–21838 Filed 9–5–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0222; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–SW–007–AD; Amendment 

39–17166; AD 2012–17–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter 

France Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Eurocopter France Model AS350 

helicopters. This AD requires installing 

protection sleeves over certain forward 

(pitch) servo-control hydraulic hoses. 

This AD was prompted by an in-flight 

fire caused by the ignition of hydraulic 

fluid leaking from a damaged forward 

servo-control hydraulic hose. This AD’s 

actions are intended to prevent the 

forward servo-control hydraulic hoses 

from becoming damaged and leaking 

hydraulic fluid that could ignite in 

flight, which could result in loss of 

main rotor (M/R) control, power loss, 

structural damage, propagation of fire, 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 11, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain documents listed in this AD 

as of October 11, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact American 

Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 N. Forum 

Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052, 

telephone (972) 641–0000 or (800) 232– 

0323, fax (972) 641–3775, or at http:// 

www.eurocopter.com/techpub. You may 

review the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

Docket Operations Office between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, any 

incorporated-by-reference service 

information, the economic evaluation, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Operations Office (phone: 800– 

647–5527) is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations 

Office, M–30, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt 

Wilbanks, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and 

Policy Group, 2601 Meacham 

Boulevard, Fort Worth, Texas 76137; 

telephone (817) 222–5051; email 

matt.wilbanks@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On March 9, 2012, at 77 FR 14310, the 

Federal Register published our notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which 

proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 to 

include an AD that would apply to 

Eurocopter AS350 B, BA, D, B1, B2, and 

B3 helicopters with a single hydraulic 

power system and forward (pitch) servocontrol hydraulic hoses part number (P/ 

N) 704A34–412–033 (other reference 

manufacturer’s part number (MP/N) 

675–102–05–01) or P/N 704A34–412– 

035 (other reference MP/N 675–102–06– 

01) installed. That NPRM proposed to 

require installing protection sleeves 

over certain forward servo-control 

hydraulic hoses. The proposed 

requirements were intended to prevent 

the forward servo-control hydraulic 

hoses from becoming damaged and 

leaking hydraulic fluid that could ignite 

in flight. Such an ignition could result 

in loss of M/R control, power loss, 

propagation of fire, structural damage, 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, has issued EASA AD No. 2011– 

0033, dated March 1, 2011 (AD 2011– 

0033), to correct an unsafe condition for 

the Eurocopter helicopters. EASA 

advises that an in-flight fire in the main 

gearbox compartment occurred on an 

AS350B2 helicopter. The fire was 

‘‘caused by ignition of hydraulic fluid 

leaking from a hydraulic hose, which 

had been damaged following an 

electrical fault in a circuit located in the 

compartment that is not fire protected. 

An in-flight fire in the main gearbox 

compartment during a continued flight, 

when undetected or if a landing could 

not be performed immediately, can 

result in loss of hydraulics, shutdown of 

the engine because of fire effects, and 

damage to the Main Rotor (MR) control 

system.’’ This condition, if not 

prevented, could lead to loss of M/R 

control, power loss, structural damage, 

propagation of fire into the cabin or 

other compartments, and subsequent 

loss of control of the helicopter. For 

these reasons, AD 2011–0033 requires 

installation of protection sleeves on the 

affected hydraulic hoses. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD, but 

we did not receive any comments on the 

NPRM. 

FAA’s Determination 

These helicopters have been approved 

by the aviation authority of France and 

are approved for operation in the United 

States. Pursuant to our bilateral 

agreement with France, EASA, its 

technical representative, has notified us 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

EASA AD. We are issuing this AD 

because we evaluated all information 

provided by EASA and determined the 

unsafe condition exists and is likely to 

exist or develop on other helicopters of 

these same type designs and that air 

safety and the public interest require 

adopting the AD requirements as 

proposed. 

Related Service Information 

Eurocopter has issued Alert Service 

Bulletin No. 29.00.13, dated July 26, 

2010, which specifies installing two 

siliconed glass wool sleeves over both 

forward main rotor servo-control 

hydraulic hoses. EASA classified this 

ASB as mandatory and issued AD 2011– 

0033 to ensure the continued 

airworthiness of these helicopters. 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES