DNA EVIDENCE

DOJ Should Improve 

Performance 

Measurement and 

Properly Design 

Controls for 

Nationwide Grant 

Program

Report to Congressional Requestors 

March 2019

GAO-19-216

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-19-216, a report to

congressional requestors

March 2019

DNA EVIDENCE

DOJ Should Improve Performance Measurement and 

Properly Design Controls for Nationwide Grant 

Program

What GAO Found

GAO found that the reported number of backlogged requests for crime scene 

DNA analysis at state and local government labs has increased by 85 percent 

from 2011 through 2017, the most recent full year for which grantee data were 

available (from about 91,000 to about 169,000). This growth has occurred 

despite labs’ collectively processing more requests over time, as shown below.

Requests for Crime Scene DNA Analysis, Requests Completed, and Backlogged 

Requests at State and Local Government Labs (2011-2017)

a

“DNA requests” means requests for biology screening and/or DNA testing such that if a request 

requires one or both, it is counted once. 

b

Some requests may be closed by administrative means rather than through analysis, such as when 

a suspect pleads guilty before the evidence is analyzed or when the victim has not consented to 

participate in the criminal justice process. These requests are included in the number of requests 

received but are not included in the number of requests completed. 

c

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) defines a “backlogged” request for crime scene DNA analysis 

as a request that has not been closed by the issuance of a report to the submitting agency within 30 

days of receipt in the lab. 

GAO found that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—the primary grant-making 

arm of the Department of Justice—has not consistently documented programwide goals for its DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction grant 

program (CEBR). For example, it has documented different meanings of 

“capacity enhancement.” Additionally, CEBR performance measures do not fully 

reflect selected attributes of successful performance measures, such as having 

measurable targets. These issues hinder OJP’s ability to assess program results.

GAO found that OJP has designed controls to achieve its objectives related to 

compliance with selected requirements for transparency in grantee procurement 

that apply to both OJP and CEBR grantees. However, OJP has not properly 

designed all controls related to selected requirements for conflicts of interest and 

lobbying. While OJP has designed a control to review confidential financial 

disclosure reports submitted by OJP employees who administer CEBR grants, 

OJP does not have the required documentation designating which officials are 

authorized to certify these reports. Similarly, OJP has designed controls to obtain 

required lobbying certification and disclosure forms from grantees, but OJP has 

not taken steps to ensure that grantees collect and forward to OJP, as 

appropriate, these forms from subgrantees and contractors, as required.

View GAO-19-216. For more information, 

contact Gretta L. Goodwin at (202) 512-8777 

or goodwing@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Many state and local government

crime labs continue to have backlogs 

of requests for crime scene DNA 

analysis, which may include sexual 

assault kits, despite DOJ awarding 

nearly $1 billion since 2004 through the 

CEBR grant program to enhance lab 

capacity and reduce backlogs. 

Additionally, questions have been 

raised about potential improper 

connections among those who profit 

from CEBR grants—such as private 

labs and DNA equipment vendors—

and those who advocate for CEBR 

funding.

This report examines, among other 

things, (1) what is known about the 

amount of backlogged DNA evidence 

at state and local government labs; (2) 

the extent to which OJP measures 

CEBR grant performance; and (3) the 

extent to which OJP has designed 

controls to identify conflicts of interest 

related to CEBR grants. GAO reviewed 

CEBR grantee data on DNA evidence 

backlogs from 2011-2017 (the most 

recent years of comparable data). 

GAO reviewed documentation on 

CEBR performance and controls 

related to conflicts of interest,

transparency in grantee procurement, 

and lobbying. GAO also reviewed 

relevant reports and studies, and

interviewed officials from DOJ.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations. 

OJP should (1) consistently document 

CEBR goals, (2) revise CEBR 

performance measures, (3) document

its designation of confidential financial 

disclosure certifiers, and (4) clarify 

guidance for lobbying requirements for 

CEBR grantees. DOJ concurred with 

all four recommendations.
Page i GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Letter 1

Background 6

Reported Backlog of Requests for Crime Scene DNA Analysis at 

State and Local Government Labs Nationwide Is Increasing 

Due to Various Factors 16

The Amount of Unsubmitted DNA Evidence Nationwide is 

Unknown and Various Factors Contribute to this Unsubmitted 

Evidence 23

CEBR Program Goals Are Not Consistently Documented and Its 

Performance Measures Do Not Fully Reflect Selected Attributes 

of Successful Performance Measures 27

OJP Has Designed Controls to Achieve Its Objectives Related to 

Compliance with Selected Federal Requirements for Grantee 

Procurement, but Has Not Properly Designed All Controls for 

Conflicts of Interest and Lobbying Related to CEBR Grants 38

Conclusions 51

Recommendations for Executive Action 52

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 53

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 55

Appendix II Additional Sources of Lab Data and Considerations When Reviewing 

DNA Evidence Data 65

Appendix III Information on Backlogs of Convicted Offender and Arrestee 

Samples 70

Appendix IV Grant Programs That Address DNA Evidence Backlogs and 

Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits 72

Appendix V Selected Efforts to Inventory or Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual 

Assault Kits and Associated Challenges 76

Contents
Page ii GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Appendix VI DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program-wide 

Performance Measures 85

Appendix VII Selected Attributes of Successful Performance Measures and 

Consequences if Not Met 87

Appendix VIII DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program 

Permissible Uses of Funds 88

Appendix IX Controls Related to Transparency in Grantee Procurement for DNA 

Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Grants 89

Appendix X Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest for DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Grants 92

Appendix XI Controls Related to Lobbying for DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Grants 96

Appendix XII Comments from the Department of Justice 99

Appendix XIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 103

Tables

Table 1: DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction 

Grant Program (CEBR) Goals Listed in National Institute 

of Justice (NIJ) Documentation and NIJ Officials’ 

Clarifications 28
Page iii GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 2: Assessment of DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Program-wide Performance Measures Against 

Five Selected Attributes of Successful Performance 

Measures 31

Table 3: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Transparency in Grantee Procurement 40

Table 4: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Conflicts of Interest for Federal Employees 42

Table 5: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Conflicts of Interest for Federal Awarding Agencies and 

Grantees 45

Table 6: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Lobbying 48

Table 7: Department of Justice (DOJ) Grant Programs that 

Address DNA Evidence Backlogs at Labs 73

Table 8: Department of Justice (DOJ) Grant Programs that 

Address Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) in Law Enforcement 

Custody that Have Not Been Submitted to Labs for DNA

Analysis 74

Table 9: Counts of Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) 

Inventoried, Analyzed, and Outcomes from Analysis and 

Investigation as Reported by 38 SAKI Grantees (October 

2015 – June 2018) 77

Table 10: Counts of Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) Submitted for 

Analysis, and Outcomes from Analysis and Investigation, 

as Reported by 32 Grantees Participating in the New York 

County District Attorney’s Office (DANY) SAK Grant 

Program (as of September 2018) 79

Table 11: Data Resulting from Laws Requiring Inventories of 

Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) in Idaho and 

Texas 80

Table 12: DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction 

(CEBR) Program-wide Performance Measures, Detailed 

Summary 85

Table 13: Summary of Selected Attributes of Successful 

Performance Measures and Adverse Consequences of 

Not Meeting Attribute 87

Table 14: DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction 

Program (CEBR) Permissible Uses of Funds in 2018 

Grant Solicitation 88

Table 15: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Transparency in Grantee Procurement 89
Page iv GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 16: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Conflicts of Interest for Federal Employees 92

Table 17: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Conflicts of Interest for Federal Awarding Agencies and 

Grantees 94

Table 18: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to 

Lobbying 97

Figures

Figure 1: Stages in Using DNA Evidence from Crime Scenes to 

Aid Investigations 6

Figure 2: How DNA Profiles Are Generated and Compared to Help 

Law Enforcement 11

Figure 3: “Unsubmitted” Crime Scene DNA Evidence and the Two 

Types of DNA Evidence “Backlogs” 13

Figure 4: Requests for Crime Scene DNA Analysis, Requests 

Completed, and Backlogged Requests at State and Local 

Government Labs, from Calendar Year 2011 through 

2017 18

Figure 5: Lobbying Certification and Disclosure Requirements for 

Recipients of Federal Awards over $100,000, per 28 

C.F.R. pt. 69 47

Figure 6: Convicted Offender and Arrestee DNA Profile Uploads 

into the National DNA Index System (NDIS) 70
Page v GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Abbreviations

AAG Assistant Attorney General

ASCLD American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics 

DAEO Designated Agency Ethics Official

DANY New York County District Attorney’s Office 

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid 

DOJ Department of Justice

EI&CE Forensic DNA Laboratory Efficiency Improvement and

Capacity Enhancement grant program 

CEBR DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction grant

program 

CODIS Combined DNA Index System 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police 

JMD Justice Management Division

NIJ National Institute of Justice

OGE U.S. Office of Government Ethics

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OJP Office of Justice Programs 

SAFE-ITR Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence-Inventory, Tracking, and

Reporting grant program 

SAK Sexual Assault Kit 

SAKI National Sexual Assault Kit Initiative

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Page 1 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 21, 2019

The Honorable Lindsey O. Graham

Chairman

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

United States Senate

At the end of 2017, about 169,000 requests for DNA analysis of crime 

scene evidence were backlogged at state and local government crime 

labs.1 Since 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has awarded nearly 

$1 billion to states and local jurisdictions through the DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) grant program (or CEBR 

legacy programs) to help increase lab capacity and reduce the amount of 

DNA evidence awaiting analysis at labs.2 Nevertheless, although labs are 

processing more requests, backlogs of crime scene evidence in labs 

continue to increase. Further, CEBR grantees can use funds to contract 

with third parties—such as private labs and DNA equipment vendors—

and questions have been raised about potential improper connections 

among these third parties and those who advocate for CEBR funding.

Additionally, thousands of sexual assault kits (SAKs) in law enforcement 

custody have not been submitted to crime labs for DNA analysis.3 DOJ, 

state and local governments, and a nonprofit organization have efforts 

underway to inventory or quantify these “unsubmitted” SAKs. However, 

the number of unsubmitted SAKs nationwide is not well understood and 

there are concerns that these unsubmitted SAKs have delayed justice or 

enabled serial offenders to reoffend.

 1

DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid and is the genetic material present in the nucleus 

of cells. According to the Department of Justice, a backlogged request for analysis of 

crime scene evidence is a request that has not been completed within 30 days of receipt 

in the laboratory. 

2

CEBR funds can be used for efforts related to processing (1) DNA evidence collected 

from crime scenes, and (2) DNA samples taken from convicted offenders, arrestees, and 

others pursuant to law. 

3

A SAK is a package of materials used to collect samples (evidence) from the victim’s or 

suspect’s body by a medical professional. The type of evidence collected depends on 

what occurred during the assault.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

In 2013, we issued a report that reviewed, among other things, data and 

outcomes associated with DOJ’s CEBR program (formerly named the 

DNA Backlog Reduction Program).4 You asked us to revisit CEBR 

program data and outcomes and address additional questions related to 

backlogs of DNA evidence in labs and unsubmitted SAKs in law 

enforcement custody. In July 2018, we issued a testimony statement with 

preliminary observations from our ongoing work.5

This report addresses the following questions:

1. What is known about the amount of backlogged crime scene DNA 

evidence, including SAKs, in state and local government labs and the 

factors that contribute to such backlogs?

2. What is known about the amount of unsubmitted DNA evidence, 

including SAKs, in law enforcement custody and the factors that 

contribute to this unsubmitted evidence?

3. To what extent does the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—the 

primary grant-making arm of DOJ—measure CEBR program 

performance?

4. To what extent has OJP designed controls related to conflicts of 

interest, transparency in grantee procurement, and lobbying 

requirements applicable to CEBR grants?

To describe what is known about the amount of backlogged crime scene 

DNA evidence in state and local labs, we collected yearly baseline data 

from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the component within OJP that

administers the CEBR program, for calendar years 2011 through 2017.6

We selected these years because in 2011 two previous grant programs 

were combined into what is now known as the CEBR grant program, and 

because 2017 is the most recent full calendar year for which CEBR 

 4

GAO, Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Could Improve Decision-Making Documentation and 

Better Assess Results of DNA Backlog Reduction Program Funds, GAO-13-605

(Washington, D.C.: July 2013). 

5

GAO, DNA Evidence: Preliminary Observations on DOJ’s DNA Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction Program, GAO-18-651T (Washington, D.C. July 2018).

6

NIJ collects baseline data—which includes data from all labs within grantees’ jurisdictions 

(not only those labs that use CEBR grant funds)—as part of the grant application process. 

We also reviewed data from other sources but determined that CEBR data were the most 

useful for showing aggregate nationwide trends. For our rationale for using CEBR data (as 

opposed to other sources), see the full description of our scope and methodology in 

appendix I. For more information on these other sources of data, see appendix II. 
Page 3 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

grantee data were available at the time of our review. To assess the 

extent to which NIJ-compiled CEBR baseline data are reliable, we 

completed a number of data reliability steps, including discussing data 

entry issues with grantees and running logic tests on the data, among 

others. We determined that the CEBR baseline data are sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes.7 To ensure we had identified all possible 

sources of data and to better understand how labs collect and report data, 

we met with knowledgeable officials from various entities, including 

national associations, research groups, CEBR grantees or grantee labs, 

and DOJ.

To identify and describe what is known about the amount of unsubmitted 

DNA evidence, including SAKs, in law enforcement custody, we obtained 

and reviewed information and/or data related to several efforts to 

inventory or quantify unsubmitted SAKs in law enforcement custody, 

including:

• Data from DOJ’s National Sexual Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI) grant 

program;

• Data from the New York County District Attorney’s Office (DANY) SAK 

grant program;

• State laws requiring SAK inventories, including state-specific data 

resulting from such laws in Idaho and Texas;8

• Information from reporting requirements under the Sexual Assault 

Forensic Evidence Reporting (SAFER) Act;

• Data from the Joyful Heart Foundation, a national nonprofit survivors’

advocacy organization; and

• Data from two prior nationwide studies on the amount of, and reasons 

for, unsubmitted DNA evidence in law enforcement custody (including 

DNA evidence associated with various types of crime, not just sexual 

assault).

 7

We determined that state and local government labs participating in the CEBR program 

from 2011 through 2017 generally represent the level of workloads and backlogs from 

state and local government labs that participate in CODIS nationwide. However, we found 

that CEBR turnaround time data for 2017 were not reported as consistently as data for 

workloads and backlogs and may not be representative of nationwide turnaround times for 

state and local government labs.

8

We selected Idaho and Texas as illustrative examples because, relative to each other, 

they differed with respect to legal requirements for conducting inventories, and timeframes 

associated with conducting those inventories.
Page 4 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

We include general information about all of these efforts and data from 

some of these efforts in this report. For the data we include in this report 

(SAKI, DANY, Idaho and Texas), we present all available data for the 

time periods the efforts have been active. We assessed the reliability of 

the data from these efforts and found they were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. For details about the specific steps we took to assess the 

reliability of data for each of these efforts, see appendix I.

To identify and describe factors that contribute to backlogs of unanalyzed 

DNA evidence at laboratories and unsubmitted DNA evidence, including 

SAKs, in law enforcement custody, we reviewed 22 reports, including 16 

government reports (or government-funded reports), 4 academic journal 

articles, 1 book, and 1 study from a non-governmental organization. Five 

of the government (or government-funded) reports included nationwide

studies of public crime labs and law enforcement agencies with original 

research. We also discussed these factors with a non-generalizable 

selection of DNA evidence stakeholders from 17 entities, including DOJ 

officials, CEBR grantees, forensic crime lab directors, and relevant 

academics and practitioners. For information about how we selected the 

reports we reviewed and the stakeholders we interviewed, see appendix 

I. Finally, we conducted legal research on state laws that require law 

enforcement to submit SAKs for analysis and that also require labs to 

analyze previously-unanalyzed SAKs. We summarized information from 

these sources to identify common factors, and we included illustrative 

examples of the types of factors we identified in this report.

To evaluate how OJP measures CEBR program performance, we first 

sought to identify CEBR program-wide goals. To do this, we reviewed 

OJP CEBR documentation, including the most recent CEBR grant 

solicitation and NIJ reports that include CEBR performance information. 

We also discussed CEBR goals with NIJ officials. We then assessed 

these CEBR program-wide goals against federal internal control 

standards that call for management to define goals clearly.9 As part of this 

effort, we also obtained and reviewed information on OJP’s 6 CEBR 

program-wide performance measures, and evaluated the extent to which 

 9

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014), Principle 6 – Define Objectives and Risk 

Tolerances (starts on page 35). 
Page 5 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

they reflected attributes of successful performance measures we 

previously established.10

To evaluate the extent to which OJP has designed controls related to 

conflicts of interest, transparency in grantee procurement, and lobbying 

requirements applicable to CEBR grants, we conducted legal research on 

these topic areas to identify federal statutes and regulations applicable to 

OJP and CEBR applicants, recipients, and subrecipients.11 To determine 

the extent to which OJP has designed controls to achieve its objectives 

related to compliance with these requirements, we reviewed DOJ or OJP 

documentation, which included, among others, the Fiscal Year 2018 

CEBR solicitation, the DOJ Departmental Ethics Website, and the DOJ 

Ethics Handbook for On and Off-Duty Conduct. To further determine the 

extent to which OJP has designed each control, we also obtained and 

reviewed a variety of CEBR program documents, including those 

associated with reviewing and approving CEBR grant applications, and 

grant monitoring. We also discussed some of the controls that we 

identified with four CEBR grantees. Finally, we assessed controls that 

were not properly designed against federal internal control standards, 

which specify how management should design controls to achieve its 

compliance objectives.12

We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to March 

2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

 10Successful performance measures help assess progress toward preestablished goals. 

Our prior work established nine attributes of successful performance measures: linkage, 

clarity, measurable targets, objectivity, reliability, core program activities, limited overlap, 

balance, and government-wide priorities. GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further 

Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143, (Washington, D.C.: 

November 2002). We selected 3 of the 9 attributes (linkage, clarity, and measurable 

targets) because they are foundational. By foundational, we mean that without them, other 

attributes are less relevant or important. We selected 2 of the 9 attributes (core program 

activities, balance) because they assess the extent to which the performance measures 

cover a variety of aspects of performance. For additional detail about our selection of 

these criteria, see appendix I.

11We did not review the extent to which controls were implemented effectively (e.g. 

through controls testing procedures such as conducting case file reviews), nor did we 

review the extent to which employees were trained to implement controls effectively (e.g.

through reviewing training material and/or outcomes of such training). We examined 

requirements applicable to subgrantees and contractors under CEBR grantees and 

subgrantees, and subcontractors. 

12GAO-14-704G. Per guidance in these standards, an existing control is not properly 

designed when, even if the control operates as designed, the control objective would not 

be met. 
Page 6 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DNA evidence from crime scenes can be used to help link perpetrators or 

victims to each other and to crime scenes, and ultimately bring 

perpetrators to justice. Figure 1 illustrates stages in the process of using 

DNA evidence from crime scenes to aid investigations.

Figure 1: Stages in Using DNA Evidence from Crime Scenes to Aid Investigations

After an alleged crime, law enforcement officials collect evidence that 

may contain DNA from crime scenes, victims, and suspects (hereafter 

referred to as “DNA evidence”). In the case of sexual assault, a victim 

may choose to undergo a medical-forensic exam where a medical 

Background

Using DNA Evidence from 

Crime Scenes to Aid 

Investigations

Collection and Storage 
Page 7 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

professional collects samples from the victim’s body.13 This evidence is 

placed in a SAK for storage and for potential future DNA analysis. 

According to NIJ, the contents of a SAK vary by jurisdiction but generally 

include swabs and collection envelopes for biological materials, debris, 

and underwear.

Most states have established statutes and/or policies for biological 

evidence retention, according to a report supported by the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and NIJ.14 Biological 

evidence refers to samples of biological material—such as hair, tissue, 

bones, teeth, blood, semen, or other bodily fluids—or to evidence items 

containing biological materials. However, this report states that existing 

state laws vary in (1) their definitions of what constitutes biological 

evidence for purposes of evidence retention, (2) categories of crime for 

which biological evidence should be retained, and (3) the length of time 

biological evidence should be retained.

Law enforcement officials and prosecutors may submit requests for 

analysis of DNA evidence to labs.15 These officials may opt not to submit 

DNA evidence to labs if they do not believe the results of the analysis 

would add value to the case. However, laws in some states require 

officials to submit DNA evidence to labs for analysis in cases of sexual 

assault. Additionally, DOJ, the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police (IACP), and the National Sheriffs’ Association, have reported that 

all SAKs should be analyzed if victims report the crime to law 

enforcement. According to OJP, the majority of sexual assaults are 

 13In this report, we use the term “sexual assault” to include attacks or attempted attacks 

generally involving unwanted sexual contact between victim and offender, including rape. 

14In 2013, the National Institute of Standards and Technology—a component of the 

Department of Commerce—and NIJ jointly supported the issuance of a report detailing 

best practices for biological evidence preservation. See Technical Working Group on 

Biological Evidence Preservation, The Biological Evidence Preservation handbook: Best 

Practices for Evidence Handlers, a report jointly supported NIST and NIJ, April 2013. 

15Other groups may also submit requests, such as public defenders and those who submit 

requests on behalf of convicted offenders (seeking to clear the innocent of wrongful 

convictions). According to NIJ and stakeholders we spoke with, all requests are not equal 

and do not take the same amount of resources. Specifically, requests for analysis may 

contain one or more “items” for examination, such as weapons, carpets, or bedsheets. 

Each item may contain multiple “samples” for analysis (e.g. multiple stains on clothing). 

Each sample, in turn, may be subject to multiple “tests,” such as instrumental analysis, 

extractions, or comparative examinations. Thus, depending on the number of items, 

samples, and tests needed, requests can vary greatly in the amount of resources needed 

to conduct the analysis.

Submission and Prioritization 
Page 8 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

committed by persons known to the victim.16 Although analysis of SAKs in 

these cases may not provide new information about the alleged 

perpetrator’s identity, the results may link the alleged perpetrator to other 

crimes within and across jurisdictions, as we discuss later.

According to officials from NIJ, IACP, and the American Society of Crime 

Lab Directors (ASCLD), law enforcement officials and prosecutors who 

submit requests for DNA analysis, and labs that process requests, 

generally prioritize requests based on various factors. These factors may 

include, among others, state laws, public safety concerns, the trial date of 

the associated case, whether there is a known suspect, or the type of 

crime—such as homicide, sexual assault, or property crime. According to 

these officials, law enforcement officials or prosecutors also generally 

have the option to mark a request as needing to be “expedited” or 

“rushed,” based on the same factors.

Once submitted and prioritized, labs perform analysis on DNA evidence. 

We define “DNA analysis” in this report as (1) biology screening (locating, 

screening, identifying, and characterizing blood and other biological stains 

and substances); and/or (2) DNA testing (identifying and comparing DNA 

profiles in biological samples).17 A DNA profile is generally considered a 

unique genetic identifier based on the genetic constitution of an 

individual.18 Comparing DNA profiles from crime scene evidence to DNA 

profiles from known sources can help lab analysts identify the source of 

unknown DNA profiles found on crime scene evidence. Thus, DNA 

samples used for such comparisons, called “reference” samples, are 

generally collected from victims and may also be collected from others 

whose DNA may be present in crime scene evidence—such as suspects, 

 16According to OJP’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), from 1994 through 2010, about 75 

to 80 percent of rapes and sexual assaults were perpetrated by someone known to the 

victim. DOJ, OJP, BJS, Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994-2010, (March 2013).

17We use this definition of “DNA analysis” because the CEBR program counts requests 

that undergo biology screening and/or DNA testing as one request (such that if a request 

requires one or both, it is counted once). 

18A DNA profile contains the genetic constitution of an individual at defined locations (also 

known as loci) in the DNA. Each person (except identical twins) has a unique DNA profile 

when used in the context of the national level of the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System 

(CODIS), which now evaluates 20 specific DNA locations. We discuss CODIS later in this 

report. 

Lab Analysis and Reporting 
Page 9 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

crime scene personnel, first responders, and consensual sexual partners 

(in cases of sexual assault).19

Upon completing DNA analysis and required reviews, the lab provides a 

report to law enforcement with the results.20 The results detail the extent 

to which any DNA profiles identified from crime scene evidence match 

DNA profiles from reference samples, and note whether any profiles that 

may be attributable to a potential perpetrator are eligible to be uploaded 

into the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), among other 

things. CODIS is a system that allows federal, state, and local labs to 

exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in order to develop 

investigative leads. CODIS has multiple levels where DNA profiles can be 

stored and searched: the local level, the state level, and the national 

level.21

Once labs upload one or more eligible DNA profiles into CODIS, CODIS 

compares the profile(s) to (1) profiles generated from evidence taken from 

other crime scenes and deemed to belong to other potential perpetrators; 

and (2) profiles generated from samples taken from convicted offenders 

 19Some sources distinguish between “reference” samples (from victims and suspects), 

and “elimination” samples (from others whose DNA may be present in crime scene 

evidence). However, for purposes of this report, we refer to all these samples as 

“reference” samples. In practice, evidence often contains a mixture of DNA from more 

than one person. These mixtures can be challenging to analyze and interpret. Additionally, 

DNA analysis may result in “partial” profiles, which may occur when samples have low 

quantities of DNA or are exposed to extreme environmental conditions, among other 

things. Not all biological evidence that undergoes DNA analysis yields usable DNA. 

20Labs must perform technical and administrative reviews prior to reporting results to law 

enforcement, according to the FBI’s Quality Assurance Standards (QAS), which labs that 

participate in the national level of CODIS must adhere to. The technical review is an 

evaluation of reports, notes, data, and other documents to ensure there is an appropriate 

and sufficient basis for the scientific conclusions. The administrative review is an 

evaluation of the report and supporting documentation for consistency with laboratory 

policies and for editorial correctness. 

21According to FBI officials, the FBI sets requirements for what DNA profiles are eligible to 

be uploaded into the national level of CODIS; and state and local governments set 

requirements for what DNA profiles are eligible to be uploaded at state and local levels of 

CODIS, respectively. 
Page 10 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

and arrestees as authorized by law.22 When a profile deemed to belong to 

a potential perpetrator matches another profile within CODIS, a “hit” or 

investigative lead may be developed.23 A hit may involve the linking of 

crimes to each other and/or to convicted offenders or arrestees. If this 

occurs, the lab will send a second report to law enforcement notifying 

them of the hit and providing additional information. Figure 2 below shows 

how CODIS can help develop investigative leads.

 22According to DOJ, the federal government, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 

Puerto Rico have laws requiring the collection of DNA samples from individuals convicted 

of certain crimes; in addition, according to DOJ, the federal government and over half the 

states have laws authorizing the collection of DNA from individuals arrested for certain 

crimes. According to FBI officials, federal statute authorizes the collection DNA samples 

from non-U.S. persons who are detained under the authority of the United States, and 

other categories of persons, as authorized by either federal or state law. 34 U.S.C. § 

40702.

23The FBI defines a hit as, “A confirmed match that aids an investigation and one or more 

of the case(s) involved in the match are unsolved.” According to FBI officials, not all profile 

matches result in “hits” because the matches may relate to cases already solved or may 

not provide new information. For instance, a match may confirm the identity of a 

perpetrator whose identity had already been confirmed by DNA analysis prior to entry into 

CODIS. 
Page 11 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Figure 2: How DNA Profiles Are Generated and Compared to Help Law Enforcement

a

We use the term “forensic casework lab” to refer to labs that perform DNA analysis on evidence from 

crime scenes, victims, and suspects; we use the term “offender lab” to refer to labs that perform DNA 

analysis on samples taken from convicted offenders, arrestees, and other categories of persons as 

authorized by law; some labs do both.

b

A DNA profile is generally considered to be a unique genetic identifier based on the genetic 

constitution of an individual.

c

”Reference samples,” as used in this report, are DNA samples collected from known individuals—

such as victims, suspects, crime scene personnel, first responders, and consensual sexual 

partners—for purposes of comparison to recovered crime scene DNA.

d

CODIS is the generic term used to describe the FBI’s program of support for criminal justice DNA 

databases as well as the software used to run these databases. CODIS has multiple levels where 

DNA profiles can be stored and searched; the local level (for city and county DNA labs), state level, 

and national level. According to FBI officials, the FBI sets requirements for what DNA profiles are 

eligible to be uploaded into CODIS at the national level; and state and local governments set 

requirements for what DNA profiles are eligible to be uploaded at state and local levels of CODIS, 

respectively.
Page 12 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

e

The FBI defines a hit as “a confirmed match that aids an investigation and one or more of the case(s) 

involved in the match are unsolved.”

Only federal, state, or local government labs that meet the FBI’s Quality 

Assurance Standards can participate in CODIS.24 Government labs may 

outsource DNA analysis or testing to private labs, but government labs 

must take ownership of the results of those analyses pursuant to FBI 

Quality Assurance Standards before entering any associated DNA data 

into CODIS.25

Upon receiving the results of lab analysis or CODIS hit information from a 

lab, law enforcement officials are responsible for investigating cases 

further and, as appropriate, prosecuting potential perpetrators. Additional 

resources may be needed for investigation, prosecution, and victim 

notification when jurisdictions receive many CODIS hits in a short period 

of time, such as after a jurisdiction decides to analyze all its old SAKs.

“Unsubmitted” crime scene DNA evidence in law enforcement custody is 

separate from, but related to, “backlogged” crime scene DNA evidence in 

labs. Further, there are two separate types of DNA evidence backlogs: (1) 

backlogs of crime scene evidence in labs, and (2) backlogs of convicted 

offender and arrestee samples in labs (see figure 3).

 24FBI, Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (September 1, 

2011). FBI, Quality Assurance Standards for DNA Databasing Laboratories (September 1, 

2011). According to FBI officials, the integrity of CODIS relies on the permanent 

ownership and maintenance of the samples that produced DNA profiles, and its 

participating labs provide such permanence. See also, 34 U.S.C. § 12592 (providing that 

only information on DNA identification records and analyses that are maintained by 

federal, state, or local criminal justice agencies (or the Secretary of Defense) can be 

included in CODIS). 

25According to NIJ, taking ‘ownership’ of data implies and requires a technical review of all 

the data. Moreover, NIJ reported that the requirement to technically review all of the data 

is a major bottleneck in labs that sometimes mitigates the expediency of outsourcing. 

Investigation and Prosecution 

“Unsubmitted” DNA 

Evidence and the Two 

Types of DNA Evidence 

“Backlogs”
Page 13 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Figure 3: “Unsubmitted” Crime Scene DNA Evidence and the Two Types of DNA Evidence “Backlogs”

a

Not all crime scene evidence collected by law enforcement is submitted to labs. Law enforcement 

may collect more evidence than is needed and labs may have capacity limitations.

b

NIJ defines a “completed” request for analysis of crime scene evidence as a request that has been 

closed by a report to law enforcement; and NIJ defines a “backlogged” request as one that has not 

been completed within 30 days of receipt in the lab.

c

According to OJP, DNA has not been collected from potentially thousands of convicted offenders 

across the United States due to the lack of coordinated DNA collections in some jurisdictions, as well 

as the frequent inability for rural and smaller municipalities to collect samples during processing.

d

NIJ defines a “completed” DNA convicted offender or arrestee sample as a sample that has been 

tested and uploaded to the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System; and NIJ defines a “backlogged”

request one that has not been completed within 30 days of receipt in the lab.
Page 14 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Efforts, systems, and methods used to audit and inventory “unsubmitted”

and “backlogged” crime scene DNA evidence are different.26 NIJ uses the 

term “unsubmitted” to refer to DNA evidence that has not been submitted 

to labs but remains in law enforcement custody.27 In contrast, NIJ uses 

the term “backlog” to refer to a request for DNA analysis that has been 

submitted to a lab but that has not been completed (closed by a report to 

the submitting agency) within 30 days of receipt.28

Backlogs of crime scene DNA evidence are separate from backlogs of 

convicted offender and arrestee DNA samples. DNA analysis of crime 

scene evidence and DNA testing of convicted offender and arrestee 

samples involve different processes, and some labs only perform one 

function or the other. According to NIJ, analyzing evidence from crime 

scenes is time consuming because it often must undergo biology 

screening to determine if biological materials are present before DNA 

testing can even begin. Further, some of the samples can be degraded or 

fragmented and can contain DNA from multiple contributors. In contrast, 

according to NIJ, DNA samples taken from convicted offenders and 

arrestees are easier, faster to analyze, and less expensive to analyze 

because they are taken from a single source (the convicted offender or 

arrestee) and generally do not require rigorous interpretation.

According to officials from NIJ, the FBI, and ASCLD, backlogs of 

convicted offender and arrestee samples are not a significant issue today. 

See appendix III for more information about backlogs of convicted 

offender and arrestee samples.

 26Although unsubmitted DNA evidence in law enforcement custody may be considered by 

some as part of a “backlog,” we do not use this this term to describe unsubmitted 

evidence for purposes of clarity. 

27For purposes of this report, “unsubmitted” SAKs also refer to SAKs being stored in 

laboratories, hospitals, or other medical facilities but for which a request for analysis has 

not been made. IACP officials said that most SAKs are stored in law enforcement storage 

facilities, but they may also be found in labs, hospitals, rape crisis centers, or other 

medical facilities. 

28According to NIJ officials, “receipt” refers to receipt in the area of the lab that performs 

DNA analysis. Evidence associated with a given request may need to first be processed in 

one or more other areas of the lab—such as areas that perform latent fingerprint analysis 

or firearms analysis—before being processed by the area of the lab that performs DNA 

analysis. 

“Unsubmitted” Crime Scene 

DNA Evidence versus 

“Backlogged” Crime Scene 

DNA Evidence

Backlogs of Crime Scene 

Evidence versus Backlogs of 

Convicted Offender and 

Arrestee Samples
Page 15 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

DOJ has two grant programs that primarily address DNA evidence 

backlogs at state and local government labs and two grant programs that 

primarily address unsubmitted SAKs in law enforcement custody. 

Specifically, the CEBR program and the Forensic DNA Laboratory 

Efficiency Improvement and Capacity Enhancement program (EI&CE) 

address DNA evidence backlogs at labs; and the Sexual Assault Kit 

Initiative (SAKI) and the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence—Inventory, 

Tracking, and Reporting program (SAFE-ITR) address unsubmitted SAKs 

in law enforcement custody. We primarily focus on the CEBR program in 

this report but have included additional information on all these grant 

programs in appendix IV.

CEBR is a grant program that dates back to 2004.29 Grant awards are 

made non-competitively to states and units of local government based on 

a formula set by DOJ that allocates certain amounts to each state.30 This 

formula takes into account each state’s population and associated crime 

levels, and guarantees a minimum amount for eligible applicants from 

each state. In fiscal year 2018 OJP awarded $67.8 million in CEBR grants 

to 127 grantees in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

The CEBR program is funded by an appropriation “for a DNA analysis 

and capacity enhancement program and for other local, State, and 

Federal forensic activities.”31 The broad appropriations language enables 

NIJ to allocate this funding for a variety of forensic programs. However, 

the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 mandated that at least 75 

percent of funds made available under this appropriation be used for 

 29In 2011, grant programs that separately funded labs that analyzed (1) crime scene DNA 

evidence, and (2) convicted offender and arrestee DNA samples, were combined into one 

grant program called the DNA Backlog Reduction Program. In 2014, this was renamed the 

DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program. 

30The formula is set by DOJ administratively as opposed to some formula grant programs 

where the formula is set by statute.

31The appropriation language states that funds are “for a DNA analysis and capacity 

enhancement program and for other local, State, and Federal forensic activities, including 

the purposes authorized under section 2 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 

2000 (Public Law 106–546) (the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program).” The 

purposes of the CEBR grant program are generally similar to the purposes of the Debbie 

Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program. There is no additional statutory authorization for the 

program.

DOJ Grant Programs That 

Address DNA Evidence 

Backlogs at Labs and 

Unsubmitted SAKs in Law 

Enforcement Custody
Page 16 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

grants for DNA analysis or to increase the capacity of government labs to 

carry out DNA analysis.32

Data from DOJ’s CEBR grant program show that the number of 

backlogged requests for analysis of DNA evidence at state and local 

government labs nationwide has increased from 2011 through 2017. 

Specifically, labs have continued to receive more requests for DNA 

analysis than they can complete each year, even though labs have 

consistently completed an increasing number of requests over time. 

These data also show that average turnaround time for these requests 

has stayed relatively constant among CEBR grantees, though these data 

may not be representative of turnaround times for state and local 

government labs nationwide. We identified several factors that are 

reported to have contributed to this increased demand for DNA analysis, 

including scientific advancements in DNA analysis technology and state 

laws requiring analysis of certain DNA evidence, among other factors.

 32The Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 3(a), requires 

that not less than 75 percent of the funds made available under this appropriation be 

provided for grants for activities described under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 

2(a) of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. Those purposes include (1) To 

carry out, for inclusion in the Combined DNA Index System of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, DNA analyses of samples collected under applicable legal authority; (2) To 

carry out, for inclusion in such Combined DNA Index System, DNA analyses of samples 

from crime scenes, including samples from rape kits, samples from other sexual assault 

evidence, and samples taken in cases without an identified suspect; and (3) To increase 

the capacity of laboratories owned by the State or by units of local government to carry out 

DNA analysis of samples specified in the purposes above. Prior to this, congressional 

reports accompanying the appropriation have directed that OJP make funding for DNA 

analysis and capacity enhancement a priority. OJP officials said they use CEBR funding to 

help meet the “75 percent” requirement discussed above. 

Reported Backlog of 

Requests for Crime 

Scene DNA Analysis 

at State and Local 

Government Labs 

Nationwide Is 

Increasing Due to 

Various Factors
Page 17 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Among CEBR grantees, the reported aggregated backlog of requests for 

crime scene DNA analysis has increased by nearly 85 percent from 2011 

through 2017 (from about 91,000 to about 169,000).33 As of January 1, 

2018 there were 194 state and local government labs in the United States 

that performed DNA analysis on evidence from crime scenes and 

participated in CODIS.34

These CEBR data show that from 2011 through 2017 requests for DNA 

analysis outpaced labs’ ability to complete new and existing requests 

each year, resulting in a backlog. However, labs have consistently 

completed more requests over time, as shown in figure 4 below. 

According to our analysis, state and local government labs participating in 

the CEBR program from 2011 through 2017 generally represent the level 

of workloads and backlogs from state and local government labs that 

perform DNA analysis on evidence taken from crime scenes and 

participate in CODIS nationwide.35

 33As part of the grant application process, NIJ requests applicants for CEBR grants to 

provide data from all labs in their jurisdiction, even if certain labs will not be using CEBR 

funds. 

34As of January 1, 2018, there were 201 total government labs that participated in CODIS 

in the U.S. Of these 201, 3 are federal labs and are thus not eligible for CEBR grants; of 

the remaining 198 state and local government labs, 194 perform DNA analysis on 

evidence taken from crime scenes and 56 perform analysis on samples taken from 

convicted offenders and arrestees (52 labs do both, which is why the two numbers are 

greater than 198). 

35NIJ seeks to collect data from CEBR grantees in years they did not apply for CEBR 

funding to keep the data consistent; we included this data in our analysis. According to 

information provided by OJP, as of January 1, 2018, CEBR grantees represented 189 of 

the 194 state and local government labs in the U.S. that perform DNA analysis on 

evidence taken from crime scenes and participate in CODIS. For the 5 labs not included, 

we determined that they constituted a small portion of backlog data in other years so as 

not to substantively affect results (for example, less than three percent since 2012). We 

were unable to identify the number of labs that did not participate in the CEBR program for 

years 2011 through 2016. However, NIJ officials said that CEBR grantees have generally 

been representative of all state and local government labs in the U.S. that participated in 

CODIS in prior years as well. In addition, to ensure that fluctuations in the population of 

CEBR grantees during these years did not significantly affect our results, we compared 

data on the number of requests backlogged and the annual rate of change in the number 

of requests backlogged for each year from all grantees (including those grantees who 

reported data from some but not all years between 2011 and 2016) to data from a subset 

of grantees (including those that provided data for all years between 2011 through 2016). 

We found that any fluctuations did not affect overall conclusions about trends in DNA 

analysis in these prior years. 

CEBR Data Show an 

Increasing Nationwide 

Backlog of Requests for 

Crime Scene DNA 

Analysis at State and 

Local Government Labs
Page 18 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Figure 4: Requests for Crime Scene DNA Analysis, Requests Completed, and 

Backlogged Requests at State and Local Government Labs, from Calendar Year 

2011 through 2017

a

By “DNA requests” we mean requests for biology screening and/or DNA testing such that if a request 

requires one or both, it is counted once.

b

Some requests may be closed by administrative means rather than through analysis, such as when 

a suspect pleads guilty before the evidence is analyzed or when the victim has not consented to 

participate in the criminal justice process. These requests are included in the number of requests 

received but are not included in the number of requests completed.

c

NIJ defines a “backlogged” request for crime scene DNA analysis as a request that has not been 

closed by the issuance of a report to the submitting agency within 30 days of receipt in the lab. The 

number of backlogged requests is larger than the difference between the number of new requests 

and the number of requests completed because backlogs also include outstanding requests from 

previous years.

In addition to reviewing CEBR data on workloads and backlogs, we also 

reviewed CEBR data to better understand average reported turnaround 

times. NIJ defines turnaround time for a request for DNA evidence as the 

time from when the lab receives the evidence to the time when the lab 

issues a report with the results of the analysis to the submitting agency. 

From 2011 through 2017, the average turnaround time for requests 
Page 19 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

across CEBR grantees remained relatively constant, around 150 days.36

Average turnaround time was generally higher for requests associated 

with nonviolent crimes than requests associated with violent crimes 

during this same time period. These turnaround time data provide insights 

but may not be representative of turnaround times for state and local 

government labs nationwide because the number of grantees that 

reported turnaround time data was smaller than those that reported 

workload and backlog data.37

Nevertheless, these data are consistent with what stakeholders we 

interviewed—including representatives from NIJ, IACP, and ASCLD—

said about turnaround times. They said that labs generally prioritize

requests associated with violent crime, such as homicide and sexual 

assault, ahead of those associated with less-violent crime, such as 

property crimes.38 Regarding sexual assault specifically, representatives 

from ASCLD and IACP said law enforcement and labs generally prioritize 

requests where the victim did not know the identity of the alleged offender 

(i.e. stranger sexual assault) ahead of requests where the identity of the 

alleged offender is known.39

Although aggregate trends show an increase in the nationwide backlog, 

individual labs have varying levels of requests awaiting analysis and differ 

 36The averages we present in this paragraph represent a weighted mean of the reported 

turnaround time for requests for DNA analysis in each calendar year. To obtain a weighted 

average for each calendar year, we weighted the mean turnaround time reported by each 

grantee by the number of requests completed in the calendar year. 

37CEBR grantees reported turnaround times less frequently than they reported other data, 

such as the number of requests received, the number of requests completed, and 

backlogged requests. For instance, for 2017 data, 40 of 138 grantees reported average 

turnaround times for requests associated with violent crimes, 42 of 138 grantees reported 

average turnaround times for requests associated with nonviolent crimes, and 89 of 138 

grantees reported average overall turnaround times (turnaround times that include all 

requests). These aggregated average turnaround times may not fully reflect turnaround 

times associated with “expedited” or “rushed” requests. Specifically, when NIJ collects 

turnaround times from grantees, NIJ asks for turnaround times associated with non-priority 

(i.e. non-expedited or non-rushed) requests. However, according to ASCLD officials, crime 

labs’ IT systems may or may not be able to separate requests into those that were 

expedited and those that were not expedited for purposes of reporting turnaround time to 

NIJ.

38According to IACP officials, prioritization practices may also be influenced by state law. 

39The Joyful Heart Foundation, a survivors’ advocacy organization, stated that as 

awareness around the sexual assault kit backlog and the value of DNA evidence has 

increased in the past several years, sexual assault is being more readily included in 

prioritization. 
Page 20 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

in average turnaround times. For example, among the 82 grantees for 

which we had complete data from 2011 through 2017, 22 grantees (27 

percent) reported an overall decrease in the backlog during this time. 

Additionally, while the average reported turnaround time (including 

requests associated with both violent and nonviolent crime) in 2017 was 

about 150 days, averages among grantees that spanned from 20 to 580 

days.

NIJ does not collect data on the number of backlogged SAKs at labs and 

NIJ officials stated that it may be difficult to quantify these data.

Data on Backlogged SAKs at Labs

The CEBR program does not specifically collect data on the number of backlogged SAKs 

at labs. NIJ officials said the CEBR program is designed to support DNA analysis for all 

crimes, thus NIJ does not focus on obtaining data associated with only one type of crime 

(i.e. sexual assault).

According to NIJ officials, obtaining data on the number of SAKs awaiting analysis may 

be burdensome for labs or may produce unreliable data. According to NIJ and ASCLD 

officials, SAKs are considered one piece of evidence within a request that may contain 

other pieces of evidence, such as weapons, carpets, and bedsheets—and labs’ IT 

systems may not be configured to track each piece of evidence separately. However, 

according to an ASCLD official and one lab official we interviewed, some labs have 

modified their IT systems to be able to track SAKs, usually in response to state laws 

mandating the tracking or reporting of SAKs.

Additionally, DNA stakeholders used differing terminology to identify SAKs within their 

labs and IT systems, which may further complicate reporting on the number of SAKs 

awaiting analysis at labs. Specifically, some DNA stakeholders described a SAK as an 

“item” with multiple “samples” inside; others described a SAK as an “item” with multiple 

“items” or “sub-items” inside; and yet others disagreed that SAKs were considered an 

“item” altogether and preferred the term “piece of evidence” or “package of items.”

Source: GAO analysis of NIJ and stakeholder interviews.| GAO-19-216

In addition to CEBR grantee data, we identified two other sources of 

nationwide data on DNA evidence processing at government labs: (1) the 

Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Census of Publicly Funded Forensic 

Crime Labs, and (2) Project FORESIGHT, a research project at West 

Virginia University’s College of Business and Economics. We determined 

that the most useful data for showing aggregate nationwide trends was 

CEBR data. Information about this determination can be found in 

appendix I. Information on these additional data sources and 

considerations for reviewing DNA evidence data can be found in 

appendix II.
Page 21 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Based on a review of a selection of literature and discussions with DNA 

evidence stakeholders, we identified the following factors that are 

reported to have contributed to an increased demand for DNA analysis of 

crime scene evidence beyond labs’ capacities, thereby contributing to 

increased backlogs:40

• Scientific advancements. Recent scientific advancements have 

increased the quality of DNA analysis by allowing lab analysts to 

obtain DNA profiles from smaller amounts of biological evidence. For 

instance, “touch DNA” samples—which become available when DNA 

is transferred by the simple touching of an object—can now be used 

to yield DNA profiles. Further, many older and unsolved cases from 

the “pre-DNA” era are being reopened and subjected to DNA analysis 

in hopes of solving these crimes. Thus, scientific advancements have 

increased the amount of evidence that is eligible to be analyzed and, 

as a result, have increased the demand for DNA analysis.

• Decreases in turnaround times. Labs that decrease their turnaround 

time for DNA analysis may see corresponding increases in requests 

from law enforcement, according to preliminary results from Project 

FORESIGHT, a research project designed to help crime labs evaluate 

their efficiency.41 Other DNA stakeholders, including NIJ and labs that 

we met with also made similar observations. Thus, as law 

enforcement officials are able to obtain the results of DNA analysis 

from labs more quickly, they may request DNA analysis more often.

• Increased awareness among law enforcement. Increased 

awareness among law enforcement officers of the value of DNA 

analysis in solving current and older cases has led to law enforcement 

agencies submitting more DNA evidence to labs for analysis. 

Additionally, law enforcement officials’ awareness of the usefulness of 

CODIS has contributed to increased demand. Specifically, NIJ and 

other stakeholders we interviewed stated that the volume of DNA 

profiles in CODIS from convicted offenders and arrestees as well as 

potential perpetrators has increased significantly over recent years. 

This, in turn, has increased the likelihood of obtaining a “hit” or 

 40For more information about how we selected the literature and a list of the stakeholders 

we interviewed for this review, see appendix I. 

41Project FORESIGHT, run out of West Virginia University’s College of Business and 

Economics, is a research project designed to help crime labs evaluate their efficiency and 

inform resource allocation decisions. Project FORESIGHT obtains data from public and 

private labs that participate in the project. 

Scientific Advancements 

and Other Factors Have 

Increased Demand for 

DNA Analysis of Crime 

Scene Evidence Beyond 

Labs’ Capacities
Page 22 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

investigative lead when comparing a DNA profile from a potential 

perpetrator to DNA profiles in CODIS.42

• Recent legislation requiring SAK analysis. State legislation 

requiring SAK analysis has contributed to an increase in demand for 

DNA analysis. As of September 2018, we identified at least 27 states 

that had enacted laws requiring law enforcement to submit SAKs for 

testing that come into law enforcement possession.43 Eleven of these 

states also required the submission for testing of previously untested 

SAKs. Twenty-three of these laws were passed in 2014 or later.

In addition to the factors that have contributed to increased demand, 

resource challenges and constraints on government labs’ capacities are 

reported to have helped contribute to backlogs. State and local labs 

generally receive appropriations from state or local governments, which 

may direct local funding priorities based on state law or local policy. 

Additionally, some of these labs report facing lengthy hiring and training 

processes for forensic analysts, and often lose staff to private or federal 

labs which may offer higher pay, further limiting lab capacity for 

completing analysis. Officials at one lab stated that increased quality 

standards from the FBI and accrediting bodies also require lab resources. 

Further, according to NIJ, some labs face space constraints that limit their 

ability to hire additional staff or purchase additional equipment.

 42Additionally, when deciding whether to submit DNA evidence for analysis, law 

enforcement and prosecutors may consider jurors’ expectations that DNA analysis is 

presented. The literature and stakeholders commonly refer to this as the “CSI effect,” 

which is named after a television program that features the use of DNA in solving criminal 

cases.

43Legislation varies by state. For instance, some states may require the analysis of SAKs 

as well as other evidence relating to sexual assault, or may require that unreported SAKs 

not be analyzed. 
Page 23 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

According to our review of data sources and the DNA evidence 

stakeholders with whom we spoke, there have not been any recent 

attempts to quantify levels of all types of unsubmitted DNA evidence in 

law enforcement custody nationwide. However, certain state and local 

jurisdictions have performed inventories of their previously unsubmitted 

SAKs, some of which have been supported by DOJ’s National Sexual 

Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI) grant program. We also identified factors that 

are reported to have contributed to unsubmitted SAKs, as well as other 

types of DNA evidence in law enforcement custody. These include 

archived biological evidence from the pre-DNA era and limited lab 

capacity, among other factors.

We were unable to find data that could definitively quantify levels of 

unsubmitted DNA evidence in law enforcement custody nationwide.

According to DNA evidence stakeholders and our own review of potential 

data sources, there have been no recent attempts to quantify unsubmitted 

DNA evidence associated with all types of crime nationwide.

Regarding non-SAK DNA evidence, stakeholders said there may be 

reasons why there have been no recent attempts to quantify this 

unsubmitted evidence. Specifically, they stated that it is difficult to 

quantify non-SAK DNA evidence because this evidence is generally not 

confined to standardized containers or known to contain biological 

evidence. In contrast, SAK evidence is generally confined to a box which 

is thought to contain at least some biological evidence. Further, there has 

been strong advocacy for the analysis of SAKs, which some stakeholders 

said has influenced the passage of state laws requiring SAK inventories 

and analysis, and otherwise increased attention on unsubmitted SAKs.

Regarding SAKs specifically, although there is no definitive count of 

unsubmitted SAKs in law enforcement custody nationwide, certain state 

and local jurisdictions have performed inventories to identify previously 

unsubmitted SAKs. Some of these efforts have been supported by SAKI 

grants. The information below provides a description of three large-scale 

efforts to inventory and/or submit to labs for analysis previously 

unsubmitted SAKs in law enforcement custody. Additional information on 

these and other efforts are in appendix V, along with a list of challenges 

The Amount of 

Unsubmitted DNA 

Evidence Nationwide 

is Unknown and 

Various Factors 

Contribute to this 

Unsubmitted 

Evidence

The Amount of 

Unsubmitted DNA 

Evidence Nationwide Is 

Unknown though Some 

Jurisdictions Have 

Inventoried Previously 

Unsubmitted SAKs
Page 24 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

associated with inventorying SAKs within jurisdictions or quantifying them 

across jurisdictions.44

SAKI grants provide funding to state law enforcement agencies and units 

of local government to help them address unsubmitted SAKs. SAKI 

grants require grantees to first take an inventory of unsubmitted SAKs; 

however, according to BJA officials, some jurisdictions had already 

identified unsubmitted SAKs prior to receiving SAKI funds. As of June 

2018, 38 SAKI grantees identified a total of 102,837 previously 

unsubmitted SAKs (59,614 SAKs identified prior to receiving SAKI funds, 

and 43,223 identified after receiving SAKI funds).

In 2015, New York County District Attorney’s Office (DANY) awarded 

nearly $38 million in grants to 32 jurisdictions (grantees) across 20 states 

to help them analyze SAKs. DANY and SAKI program administrators 

coordinated to ensure that the DANY and SAKI programs complemented 

each other and did not duplicate resources. Funding awarded through 

DANY’s program is only allowed to be used for costs associated with 

analyzing SAKs; thus, DANY did not provide funds for grantees to 

perform inventories.45 Nevertheless, DANY tracks the number of SAKs 

submitted to labs for analysis, which DANY officials said serves as a 

proxy for previously unsubmitted SAKs. As of September 2018, DANY 

program grantees submitted 62,915 SAKs to labs for analysis.

As of September 2018, we identified at least 26 states with laws that 

require the conducting of SAK inventories where evidence had not yet 

been submitted for lab analysis. We found that legislation varied by state. 

For example, some states require one-time inventories and other states 

require annual inventories; additionally, some states require inventories of 

SAKs and others require inventories of sexual assault cases (which often 

include SAKs). Twenty-four of these laws were passed in 2014 or later.

 44The additional information in appendix V includes data on activities resulting from 

inventorying and/or submitting for DNA analysis previously unsubmitted SAKs, including 

counts of SAKs for which DNA analysis was completed, and counts of resulting criminal 

investigations, among other things. Data from these efforts may overlap, therefore it is not 

possible to combine totals from each effort without potentially duplicating results. 

45The DANY grant solicitation did not distinguish between “unsubmitted” SAKs in law 

enforcement jurisdiction and “backlogged” SAKs in laboratories. Specifically, according to 

the DANY SAK Program grant solicitation, a SAK eligible for analysis with grant funds is 

one that is connected to a reported sexual assault that has not been analyzed within 365 

days of being booked into law enforcement evidence regardless of the reason it had not 

been analyzed.

Sexual Assault Kit Initiative 

Grantee Data

New York County District 

Attorney’s Office Grantee Data

Data from State Efforts to 

Inventory Unsubmitted SAKs
Page 25 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

For example, Idaho passed a law requiring a one-time inventory of 

unsubmitted SAKs by December 2016 and an annual inventory of SAKs 

beginning in January 2017. As of September 2018, Idaho had identified 

1,933 unsubmitted SAKs. Similarly, Texas passed a law requiring a onetime inventory of sexual assault cases with unsubmitted DNA evidence 

that was collected between September 1, 1996 and July 1, 2011. As of 

August 2017, Texas reported 18,955 cases.

Based on a review of a selection of literature and discussions with DNA 

evidence stakeholders, we identified the following factors that are 

reported to have contributed to unsubmitted DNA evidence—including 

non-SAK DNA evidence and SAKs—being stored in law enforcement 

custody. These factors are as follows:46

• Archived biological evidence not subjected to DNA analysis. For 

several decades before the relatively recent scientific advancements 

in DNA analysis and the widespread use of CODIS, law enforcement 

submitted evidence to labs to identify or analyze biological material to 

support investigations, and then archived that evidence for future use. 

For instance, they may have performed biology screening to identify 

what fluid was on clothing, or they may have tested blood samples to 

see if there was a blood type match. In addition, some evidence with 

biological material remains in law enforcement storage because other 

forensic evidence was used and the case was adjudicated without 

performing DNA analysis. For example, the lab could use other 

evidence such as a fingerprint to identify or confirm a potential 

perpetrator and the suspect could plead guilty before the lab analyzed 

the evidence.

• Evidence collection practices. Crime scene investigators often 

collect more evidence from crime scenes than is needed because 

they only have one chance to collect such evidence and they may not 

know which evidence will be most useful to the case. This evidence 

may or may not contain biological material and may remain in law 

enforcement custody, depending on the circumstances of the case 

and relevant laws and policies.

• Limited lab capacity. Labs may face resource constraints such as 

limited funding and lengthy hiring and training processes which can 

limit overall lab capacity for completing analysis. As a result, some 

 46For information about how we selected the literature and a list of the stakeholders we 

interviewed for this review, see Appendix I. 

Archived Evidence Not 

Subjected to DNA Analysis 

and Other Factors 

Contribute to Unsubmitted 

DNA Evidence in Law 

Enforcement Custody
Page 26 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

labs may implement policies which limit the amount of DNA evidence 

that law enforcement officials can submit. In addition, stakeholders 

said some law enforcement agencies may not submit DNA evidence 

to a lab if the lab has previously been slow to provide results.

• Misunderstandings between law enforcement and labs about 

evidence submission policies. In some jurisdictions, law 

enforcement policy may determine what evidence law enforcement 

agencies submit to labs, while in other jurisdictions lab policy may be 

the guiding protocol. Misunderstandings between law enforcement 

and labs about each other’s policies can be a source of confusion. In 

some instances, stakeholders said this may cause investigators not to 

submit evidence to the lab. For example, a law enforcement officer 

may not submit evidence to the lab for analysis if he or she believes 

that the crime lab will be unwilling to accept it or unable to analyze it.

• Case-specific determinations for SAKs. Law enforcement officials 

may not submit DNA evidence if they do not believe the evidence will 

add value to the case.47 For example, if a suspect in a sexual assault 

case claims that a sexual encounter was consensual, DNA analysis 

may not provide any value to the specific investigation because the 

suspect admitted to the sexual encounter. Further, law enforcement 

officials’ perception of the victim’s credibility or the circumstances of 

the case may influence the decision to pursue an investigation and 

submit DNA evidence for analysis. Law enforcement officials may 

have other reasons for not submitting SAKs, such as when charges 

have not been filed or the alleged offender has already been 

adjudicated.

• Sexual assault victim consent for DNA analysis. After undergoing 

a sexual assault exam at a hospital or rape crisis center, sexual 

assault victims may not want their SAKs submitted for DNA analysis 

for various reasons. NIJ refers to these SAKs—where the victim has 

consented to the collection of the SAK but has not consented to 

participate in the criminal justice process—as “unreported” SAKs. 

According to NIJ, an unreported SAK cannot be submitted to a 

laboratory for analysis, unless applicable law provides. As a result, the 

DNA evidence either remains in the hospital or rape crisis center, or is 

transferred to law enforcement where it remains in law enforcement 

custody.

 47In many jurisdictions, law enforcement officials and prosecutors no longer have the 

ability to make case-specific determinations because state laws mandate SAK 

submission.
Page 27 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

We identified statements in NIJ and CEBR program documentation that 

communicated program-wide goals, but the documentation did not 

consistently identify the same goals or the same number of goals.48 For 

example, a stated goal of improving the quality of DNA testing was 

included in 2 of 4 NIJ documents we reviewed and increasing the 

efficiency of testing was only stated in one of these documents. NIJ 

officials clarified that the CEBR program has two goals: (1) to increase 

laboratory capacity for DNA analysis, and (2) to reduce backlogs of DNA 

evidence awaiting analysis. The inconsistency of the goals can be seen 

across goal statements outlined in various NIJ sources as seen in table 1 

below.

 48Program-wide goals are different than goals for individual grants. The CEBR grant 

program allows grantees to create their own goals and objectives within the framework of 

overall program-wide goals.

CEBR Program Goals 

Are Not Consistently 

Documented and Its 

Performance 

Measures Do Not 

Fully Reflect Selected 

Attributes of 

Successful 

Performance 

Measures

CEBR Program Goals Are 

Not Consistently 

Documented So As to 

Clearly Communicate 

Intended Program Results
Page 28 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 1: DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Grant Program (CEBR) Goals Listed in National Institute of 

Justice (NIJ) Documentation and NIJ Officials’ Clarifications

Source CEBR Goal(s)

Goals as stated in NIJ documentation

CEBR grant solicitation 

(fiscal year 2018)

The overarching goal is to assist eligible States and units of local government to increase laboratory 

capacity and reduce the number of samples awaiting analysis in both the casework and database 

sections.a

NIJ website (2018)b The goals are to assist eligible states and units of local government to:

• Process, record, screen and analyze forensic DNA and/or DNA database samples.

• Increase the capacity of public forensic DNA and DNA database laboratories to process more DNA 

samples, thereby helping to reduce the number of forensic DNA and DNA database samples awaiting 

analysis.

NIJ report (2018)c The main objectives are to improve the quality of testing and increase the efficiency of evidence 

processing in forensic DNA laboratories.

NIJ report (2017)d The goal is to help increase the throughput of evidence processing at the nation’s forensic DNA 

laboratories and improve the quality of testing.

NIJ officials’ clarification of goals

NIJ officials’ clarification 

(2018)

The CEBR program has two goals:

Increase laboratory capacity for DNA analysis. This refers to increasing samples analyzed, reducing 

processing times, and increasing the number of DNA profiles uploaded into the FBI’s Combined DNA 

Index System (CODIS)—all while either maintaining or increasing the quality of DNA analysis at labs.

Reduce backlogs of DNA evidence awaiting analysis. This refers to reducing the number of backlogged 

requests awaiting analysis by more than the number of requests that become backlogged during the same 

timeframe. 

Source: GAO analysis of NIJ documentation and interview with NIJ officials. | GAO-19-216

a

“Sections” refers to areas within labs that perform different types of analysis; the “casework” section 

refers to the section that performs DNA analysis on evidence from crime scenes, victims, and 

suspects; the “database” section refers to the section that performs DNA analysis on samples 

collected from convicted offenders, arrestees, and others as authorized by law.

b

DOJ, OJP, NIJ, DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program, 

https://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/lab-operations/evidence-backlogs/Pages/backlog-reductionprogram.aspx. Accessed June 4, 2018.

c

DOJ, OJP, NIJ, Report Forensic Science Fiscal Year 2017 Funding for DNA Analysis, Capacity 

Enhancement, and Other Forensic Activities. (Washington D.C.: April 2018). NIJ officials stated that 

this report is intended for a different audience than grant applicants to emphasize that improvements 

in quality and throughput are achieved through innovations such as more sensitive chemistries, faster 

technologies, and streamlined workflows, all of which, according to NIJ officials, can help increase 

efficiency and decrease backlogs.

d

DOJ, OJP, NIJ, Report Forensic Science Fiscal Year 2016 Funding for DNA Analysis, Capacity 

Enhancement, and Other Forensic Activities. Washington D.C.: May 2017). NIJ officials stated that 

this report is intended for a different audience than grant applicants to emphasize that improvements 

in quality and throughput are achieved through innovations such as more sensitive chemistries, faster 

technologies, and streamlined workflows, all of which, according to NIJ officials, can help increase 

efficiency and decrease backlogs.
Page 29 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

While NIJ officials’ explanations help clarify their goals for us, such 

clarifications are not documented and thus are not available to 

congressional decision-makers who help determine if the CEBR program 

is achieving its intended results. Moreover, after NIJ officials clarified that 

the CEBR program has a goal to reduce backlogs, as described in the 

last row of table 1, NIJ later reported that eliminating the nationwide 

backlog is not a program goal. Officials stated they believe the goal of 

eliminating backlogs is unachievable in the foreseeable future because 

increases in demand for DNA analysis are driven by factors outside of 

NIJ’s control. Thus, officials said they are not comfortable setting an 

unachievable goal and reporting data related to that goal that may be 

misinterpreted. However, they also feel they need to have a goal to 

reduce or eliminate backlogs because this, they said, was an original 

purpose of the program. This further exacerbates the lack of consistency 

and clarity available to Congress.49

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that 

management should define goals clearly to enable the identification of 

risks and define risk tolerances.50 In doing so, management defines goals 

in clear and specific terms so they can be understood, including clearly 

defining what is to be achieved. Consistently documenting CEBR 

program goals would better position NIJ to clearly communicate intended 

program results.

 49NIJ officials reported that they have responded to Congress numerous times in the past 

and have provided context about the CEBR program and challenges related to backlog 

reduction.

50GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G

(September 2014). 
Page 30 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

We found that the CEBR program’s six program-wide performance 

measures do not fully reflect the five selected attributes of successful 

performance measures we evaluated them against.51 The purpose of 

performance measures is to assess progress against goals, and while 

there is no single correct method to develop successful performance 

measures, we have selected attributes that, if met, will help performance 

measures assess progress toward goals.52 See table 2 for a summary of 

our analysis, and see appendixes VI and VII for more information about 

CEBR performance measures and the criteria we evaluated them against.

 51NIJ requires data from grantees related to other performance measures, such as DNA 

analysis throughput for the lab and average turnaround times. However, we did not 

include these data or measures in our scope because NIJ does not use them for programwide reporting.

52Our prior work establishes 9 attributes of successful performance measures: linkage, 

clarity, measurable targets, objectivity, reliability, core program activities, limited overlap, 

balance, and government-wide priorities. GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further 

Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: 

November 2002). We selected 3 of the 9 attributes (linkage, clarity, and measurable 

targets) because they are foundational. By foundational, we mean that without them, other 

attributes are less relevant or important. We selected 2 of the 9 attributes (core program 

activities, balance) because they assess the extent to which the performance measures 

cover a variety of aspects of performance. For additional detail about our selection of 

these criteria, see appendix I.

CEBR Performance 

Measures Do Not Fully 

Reflect Selected Attributes 

of Successful 

Performance Measures
Page 31 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 2: Assessment of DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program-wide Performance Measures Against 

Five Selected Attributes of Successful Performance Measures

Linkage

Measure is 

aligned with 

program goals

Clarity

Measure is clearly 

stated and is 

consistent with the 

methodology used 

to calculate it

Measurable 

Target

Measure has a 

numerical goal

Core Program 

Activities

As a group, 

measures cover 

the activities that 

an entity is 

expected to 

perform to support 

the intent of the 

program

Balance

As a group, 

measures 

ensure that key 

program 

priorities are 

covered

Number of Forensic Cases 

Analyzeda ● ● ○

○

(Evaluated as a 

group)

◖

(Evaluated as a 

group)

Number of Forensic DNA 

Profilesb Uploaded to the 

FBI’s Combined DNA Index 

System (CODIS)c

● ● ○

Percentage Increase in 

Forensic DNA Profiles 

Uploaded to CODIS from 

the Previous Year 

● ◖ ●

Number of Convicted 

Offender and/or Arrestee 

Database Samples 

Analyzedd

● ● ○

Number of Convicted 

Offender and/or Arrestee 

Database Samples 

Uploaded to CODIS

● ● ○

Number of CODIS Hitse ● ● ○

Legend: Measure fully reflects criterion ●

Measure partially reflects criterion ◖

Measure does not reflect criterion ○

Source: GAO analysis of CEBR program-wide performance measures. | GAO-19-216

Note: Gray shading represents attributes that are foundational to successful performance 

measurement systems. By “foundational,” we mean that, without them, other attributes are less 

relevant or important.

Note: For all measures except one—percentage increase in forensic DNA profiles uploaded to 

CODIS from the previous year—NIJ directs grantees to only include requests analyzed or samples 

tested where CEBR funds were used to help with overtime, supplies, outsourcing, and/or personnel.

a

“Forensic cases” refers to requests for DNA analysis on evidence from crime scenes, victims, and 

suspects.

b

A DNA profile is generally considered a unique genetic identifier based on the genetic constitution of 

an individual.

c

CODIS is a system that allows federal, state, and local labs to exchange and compare DNA profiles 

electronically. As a result of processing evidence from crime scenes, only DNA profiles believed to 

belong to a potential perpetrator can be uploaded into CODIS.
Page 32 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

d

“Convicted offender and/or arrestee database samples” refers to DNA analysis on samples taken 

from convicted offenders, arrestees, and other categories of persons as authorized by law.

e

The FBI defines a hit as “a confirmed [DNA profile] match that aids an investigation and one or more 

of the case(s) involved in the match are unsolved.”

We determined that all six performance measures aligned with at least 

one CEBR program goal, although the goals are not consistent across 

documentation, as we have discussed.

We found that 5 of the 6 measures are clearly stated and the names and 

definitions are consistent with the methodologies used to calculate 

them.53 We also found that one measure—the Percentage Increase in 

Forensic DNA Profiles Uploaded to CODIS from the Previous Year—is 

partially consistent with the methodology used to calculate it. Specifically, 

by referencing “profiles uploaded to CODIS,” the name of the measure 

implies that it includes all DNA profiles uploaded into CODIS when, upon 

clarification, NIJ officials stated that it only reflects DNA profiles uploaded 

to the national level of CODIS.54

Additionally, we found that the name of the measure—as stated in OJP’s 

Fiscal Year 2018 Performance Budget (the most recent OJP performance 

budget in which the measure was included)—contained two 

inconsistencies in the wording, as compared to the documentation NIJ 

provided us that clarifies how the measure is worded and calculated. 

First, the name of the measure in the performance budget document—

percent increase in the number of DNA profile uploads into the Combined 

DNA Index System (CODIS) from the previous fiscal year—does not 

clearly specify that these are DNA profiles from crime scene evidence 

only, rather than a combination of DNA profiles from crime scene 

 53CEBR grantees we interviewed cited minor issues with reporting performance data to 

NIJ but generally said that, over time, NIJ has clarified any reporting issues when it comes 

to performance measures. We also found that NIJ provides clarifying instructions to 

grantees through its web-based data reporting tool. 

54CODIS has three levels where DNA profiles can be stored and searched (the Local DNA 

Index System – LDIS, the State DNA Index System – SDIS, and the National DNA Index 

System – NDIS. However, not all DNA profiles uploaded into LDIS and SDIS are searched 

at the NDIS level. Specifically, according to FBI officials, eligibility requirements for which 

DNA profiles may be uploaded and stored in LDIS, SDIS, and NDIS are based on 

applicable law and policy for each jurisdiction. According to officials, these laws and 

policies are written into CODIS software for each jurisdiction, and these rules (1) govern 

whether DNA profiles can be uploaded into LDIS, SDIS, or NDIS in the first place, and (2) 

dictate whether DNA profiles will be automatically “pushed” to the next level of CODIS 

(from LDIS to SDIS, and from SDIS to NDIS). 

Linkage

Clarity
Page 33 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

evidence and DNA profiles from convicted offenders and arrestees. In 

contrast, the name of the measure in documentation provided by NIJ 

uses the phrase “forensic DNA profiles,” which means profiles from crime 

scene evidence only. This is supported by NIJ documentation which 

shows how the measure is calculated.

Second, the name of the measure in the performance budget document 

says “from the previous fiscal year” but NIJ documentation shows that NIJ 

uses the calendar year as its basis for year-over-year comparison. 

Ensuring that performance measure information reported externally 

matches how NIJ calculates the measure would help ensure NIJ is 

accurately reporting results.

Five of the 6 measures do not have associated targets (numerical goals). 

One measure—percentage increase in forensic DNA profiles uploaded to 

CODIS from the previous year—had a target to increase the number of 

forensic DNA profiles uploaded to CODIS by 7 percent in 2018. Officials 

said setting targets associated with the other five performance measures 

would not be meaningful.55 Specifically, these measures assess 

outcomes associated with activities funded by CEBR grants and grantees 

can choose the amount of funds they spend on a variety of activities—

some of which are not easily or immediately measurable, such as training 

lab staff and procuring equipment.56 Thus, if NIJ were to set a programwide target, for instance, for the “number of forensic cases analyzed,” the 

target might be rendered useless because grantees could choose to 

spend most of their money on procuring equipment that year. However, 

this particular challenge can be overcome by first establishing a measure 

 55NIJ officials stated that award recipients are required to provide target measures to 

assess their goals but NIJ does not attach targets to many of its performance measures 

because there are numerous uncontrollable and unpredictable factors that can contribute 

to erratic changes in targets on a short term and long term basis.

56Other activities include: salary and benefits for additional lab employees, overtime for 

lab staff, outsourcing, efficiency studies, and costs associated with accreditation, among 

others. 

Measurable Target
Page 34 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

that has a clear direction that indicates progress, then setting an 

associated target.57

NIJ officials cited two additional reasons why they hesitate to set 

program-wide targets. First, officials said it is generally not NIJ’s role or 

responsibility to set such targets. Rather, NIJ is responsible for ensuring 

that each CEBR grantee sets and accomplishes its individual goals and 

targets. Second, NIJ officials said they do not want to be held 

accountable for outcomes that are out of NIJ’s control. For instance, NIJ 

cited the enactment of new laws, increases in crime rates, and 

technological advancements as factors outside of NIJ’s control that are 

increasing the demand for DNA analysis. Thus, officials said, setting a 

program-wide target for reducing the backlog, for example, and then not 

meeting it may be interpreted as reflecting poorly on the CEBR program, 

when, in reality, there may be outside factors at play.

We agree that monitoring the performance of individual grantees is 

important; however, we disagree that concerns about not meeting targets 

due to external factors is reason to avoid setting targets. To the contrary, 

reviewing instances where the program missed or exceeded targets can 

provide opportunities to identify factors that are outside of the control of 

 57We have previously reported that, prior to setting targets, managers must first create 

performance measures that have a clear direction that indicates progress (so that it is 

meaningful if the results of the measure go up or down). To do this, it may be necessary to 

utilize multiple data points that, understood together, indicate progress. Once a 

performance measure with a clear direction indicating progress has been established, 

managers can then set a numerical target. See GAO, Federal Prison System: Justice 

Could Better Measure Progress Addressing Incarceration Challenges, GAO-15-454, 

(Washington D.C.: June 2015), page 20. For example, NIJ could create a measure that 

assesses the “number of forensic cases analyzed” relative to the amount of funds 

expended for DNA analysis. Specifically, DOJ could determine a target or threshold for the 

number of cases analyzed while simultaneously taking into account the funding provided 

for DNA analysis as described in this simplified scenario: In 1 year, a grantee had a total 

of $100.00 in grant funds and expended $50.00 on DNA analysis and another $50.00 on 

equipment. In that year, the grantee was able to process fifty cases, so the level of 

production was $1.00 per case. During the next year, the grantee only expended $10.00 

on analysis and processed ten cases. The level of production was still $1.00 per case. 

The target when taking into account funding provided could remain steady at $1.00 per 

case or could aim for improved efficiencies with a target of $.80 per case. We have not 

fully explored this hypothetical example and are providing it only as a means to show how 

two or more data points, understood together, can be used to establish a performance 

measure with a clear direction; and once a measure with a clear direction is established, a 

target can be set. 
Page 35 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

the program, which if reported alongside measures, can clarify results.58

Thus, NIJ is not accountable for results driven by external factors; rather, 

NIJ is responsible for explaining external factors that affect reported 

results. If data collected are insufficient for gauging progress, or if 

additional detail is needed to fully explain performance, NIJ is responsible 

for obtaining the necessary information to make sense of performance 

results.59

Further, NIJ can set achievable targets to alleviate its concerns about 

being held accountable for unrealistic targets. For instance, targets 

related to reducing backlogs may focus on reductions in the rate of 

growth, which may be more achievable than focusing on reductions in 

size. In addition, other potential targets—such as targets related to the 

number or percent of grantees expected to achieve certain outputs or 

outcomes—may be set based on the grantees’ prior trends. Therefore, 

setting targets related to aspects of program performance beyond CODIS 

uploads—for which NIJ has already established a target—would better 

position NIJ to demonstrate the extent to which performance is meeting 

expectations in other areas to Congress and other stakeholders.

As a group, the measures do not cover any core program activities. “Core 

program activities” means that, as a group, measures cover the activities 

that an entity is expected to perform to support the intent of the program. 

Based on our review of “permissible uses of funds” listed in CEBR 

solicitations, we identified the following core program activities: adding 

staff or funding additional staff hours, adding equipment and supplies, 

providing training, outsourcing DNA analysis or testing, and 

 58As we have previously reported, performance reporting systems should include 

information to help clarify aspects of performance that are difficult to quantify or 

explanations for factors that were outside the control of the agency. This information is 

critical to understanding underlying factors that may affect reported performance. See 

GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define How it Plans to Meet Its State and 

Local Mission and Improve Performance Accountability, GAO-11-223 (Washington D.C.: 

December 2010), p. 50. Additionally, reviewing areas where the program missed or 

exceeded targets can also provide an opportunity to understand factors within NIJ’s 

control that contributed to program results. For example, in areas where the program 

exceeded expectations, NIJ may be able to identify and share best practices; and in areas 

where the program fell short of expectations, NIJ may be able to identify problems and 

develop corrective actions. See GAO, Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Under the 

Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking, 

GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18 (Washington, D.C.: February 1998). 

59See GAO, Managing For Results: Data-Driven Performance Reviews Show Promise But 

Agencies Should Explore How to Involve Other Relevant Agencies, GAO-13-228, 

(Washington, D.C.: February 2013), p.19. 

Core program activities
Page 36 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

other/crosscutting activities.60 For a list of NIJ’s permissible uses of funds, 

see appendix VIII. NIJ did not have its own list of core program activities 

and agreed that these uses of CEBR funds represented core program 

activities intended to achieve the purposes of the program. These core 

activities represent the strategies CEBR grantees use to achieve CEBR 

goals. These strategies can be used by grantees for labs that analyze 

crime scene DNA evidence and/or labs that test convicted offender and 

arrestee samples.

However, NIJ’s performance measures do not track the extent to which 

grantees use these strategies or the extent to which these tools may have 

an effect on desired outcomes. NIJ officials said NIJ’s financial IT 

system—the data system that tracks grantee spending of CEBR funds—

is not configured to track grantee spending by the activities listed in the 

“permissible uses of funds” for the purposes of performance 

measurement. According to NIJ, any insights that might be gained by 

obtaining this information—either from reconfiguring its financial IT 

system or through other means (such as reviewing grantee 

documentation after awards are closed)—would not be worth the effort to 

collect it. Further, NIJ reported that there are challenges to breaking down 

expenditures by type of DNA analysis (i.e., analysis of crime scene 

evidence vs. analysis of samples from convicted offenders and 

arrestees).

However, determining a reasonable approach to measure core program 

activities would help NIJ have the information managers and stakeholders 

need to understand how the program works and how it might be 

improved. For example, NIJ could compare how labs spend CEBR funds 

to industry best practices, and thereby inform strategy for the CEBR 

program.61 NIJ would not necessarily need to sort the various 

“permissible uses of funds” into the same groupings of “core program 

activities” we identified. Rather, NIJ could consider what information 

 60“Other/crosscutting” activities include: contracting for DNA audits, contracting for 

process mapping or other efficiency studies, administrative expenses, and activities 

associated with and including accreditation, among other things. 

61According to NIJ, NIJ and the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods—a 

national organization that serves as a forum to discuss, share, and evaluate forensic 

biology methods and protocols, among other things—will be developing a publication 

citing lab best practices for improving efficiencies to better assist lab stakeholders across 

the country. According to NIJ, they aim to have this publication available by spring of 

2020. To inform this effort, NIJ intends to identify CEBR award recipients that have 

improved their capacity, decreased their backlogs significantly, or have publicly presented 

their efforts to increase productivity.
Page 37 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

would be most useful for NIJ as it manages the program and for 

Congressional authorizers and appropriators as they oversee the 

program, and seek to obtain that information.

As a group, the measures cover 1 of 4 key program priorities. “Balance”

means that, as a group, measures should ensure that a balance of key 

program priorities is covered. Based on our review of CEBR program 

documentation, we identified the following key program priorities: 

increase samples analyzed, reduce turnaround time, actual decrease in 

the backlog (i.e. reduction of aggregate nationwide backlog), and 

increase quality of analysis.62 We found that all six performance

measures relate to increasing samples analyzed.

NIJ collects data associated with 2 of the 4 program priorities—

turnaround times and backlogs—from grantees, but NIJ does not 

consider these data to be associated with the six program-wide 

performance measures it uses to assess program progress, although NIJ 

does report these data to some extent in external reports.63 NIJ officials 

stated that they do not include these additional measures as part of their 

official measures because there are too many confounding factors that 

could make turnaround time and backlogs increase. Thus, officials said, 

reporting such data would require too many caveats and explanations to 

ensure stakeholders understand that the CEBR program is achieving 

success.

NIJ officials also stated that one CEBR performance measure—

percentage increase in forensic DNA profiles uploaded to CODIS from the 

previous year—reflects, among other things, CEBR contributions to 

 62NIJ officials agreed with these key program priorities but clarified that our original 

identification of the priority of increasing the quality of analysis should be changed to 

“maintain or increase” the quality of analysis. They also said that the priority “actual 

decrease in the backlog” should be viewed in context of increasing demand for DNA

analysis. 

63See DOJ, OJP, NIJ Report Forensic Science: Fiscal Year 2016 Funding for DNA 

Analysis, Capacity Enhancement, and Other Forensic Activities, (Washington, D.C.: May 

2017). See also DOJ, OJP, NIJ Report Forensic Science: Fiscal Year 2017 Funding for 

DNA Analysis, Capacity Enhancement, and Other Forensic Activities, (Washington, D.C.: 

April 2018). 

Balance
Page 38 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

enhancing the quality of DNA analysis (1 of the 4 program priorities).64

However, we determined that, although it is possible that this measure 

may reflect quality improvements to some degree, it more closely relates 

to an increase in samples analyzed.

We recognize there are challenges to assessing the program priorities of 

reducing turnaround time, decreasing the actual backlog, and maintaining 

or increasing the quality of analysis. Without reporting on a balance of 

program priorities, NIJ risks overemphasizing outcomes associated with 

one program priority—in this case, increasing samples analyzed—over 

the others. Further, reporting on a balance of priorities would better 

position NIJ to provide information to assist Congress as it develops 

strategies and allocates resources to address these issues.

 64Because DNA profiles must meet a certain standard of quality to be uploaded into 

CODIS, NIJ reported that this measure reflects improvements in the quality of the DNA 

analysis. Specifically NIJ noted this measure reflects lab investments in advancing 

technologies and methods, training new personnel, and implementing robotics. Further 

NIJ reported that this measure reflects investments in quality that prevent lab shutdowns. 

OJP Has Designed 

Controls to Achieve

Its Objectives Related 

to Compliance with 

Selected Federal 

Requirements for 

Grantee 

Procurement, but Has 

Not Properly 

Designed All Controls 

for Conflicts of 

Interest and Lobbying 

Related to CEBR 

Grants
Page 39 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

According to OJP officials, grantees often use grant funds to procure lab 

equipment and outsource DNA analysis, among other things.65

Procurement by grantees under CEBR awards is governed by federal 

regulation, which specifies that grantees that are states must use their 

own procurement procedures.66 Many CEBR grantees are states; 

nevertheless, OJP officials said they apply controls related to 

transparency in grantee procurement to state grantees and to non-state 

grantees in the same manner.

We found that OJP designed one control that went beyond what was 

required by regulation. Specifically, as part of the grant application 

process, OJP designed a control to ensure that it reviews budget 

documentation from grantees related to all proposed procurement 

contracts.67 It also has a process to review proposed new contracts, or 

significant modifications to existing contracts, during the award period. 

Table 3 provides a description of selected federal grantee procurement 

requirements, as well as OJP controls designed to achieve its objectives 

related to compliance with these requirements. For a more detailed 

explanation of these requirements and controls, see appendix IX.

 65While there are various requirements associated with grantee procurement, we selected 

requirements that provide OJP or others the opportunity to review the specific details of 

contracts, such as the name of the contractor, how much the contract is for, and what 

services are being procured, among other things. 

662 C.F.R. pt. 200 “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit 

Requirements for Federal Awards.” Per 2 C.F.R. § 200.317, grantees that are states 

(including their agencies and instrumentalities thereof) must follow the same policies and 

procedures they use for procurements from their non-federal funds. States must comply 

with 2 C.F.R. § 200.322, relating to procurement of recovered materials, and ensure that 

every purchase order or other contract comply with any clauses required by § 200.326. A 

state includes any state of the U.S., D.C., the territories, and any agency or instrumentality 

thereof; it does not include local governments. § 200.90. All other grantees and 

subgrantees, including subrecipients of a state, must follow the procurement standards set 

forth in 2 C.F.R. §§ 318-326.

67A contract is a legal instrument by which a non-federal entity purchases property or 

services needed to carry out the project or program under a federal award. A contract is 

separate from a subaward, which is an award provided by a pass-through entity to a 

subrecipient for the subrecipient to carry out part of a Federal award received by the passthrough entity. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.22, 200.92. 

OJP Has Designed 

Controls to Achieve Its 

Objectives Related to 

Compliance with Selected 

Federal Requirements for 

Transparency in Grantee 

Procurement Related to 

CEBR Grants
Page 40 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 3: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Transparency in Grantee Procurement

Select requirements for OJP and Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) program grantees 

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to 

compliance with requirements

OJP review of procurementsa

As part of the grant application process, grantees must provide 

information about proposed procurement contracts.b Grantees 

must also provide information to the awarding agency during the 

award period for proposed new contracts or significant changes 

to existing contracts.

OJP designed a process to review all budget documentation from 

grantees related to proposed procurement contracts. OJP has also 

designed a process to review proposed new contracts or significant 

modifications to existing contracts during the award period.

An awarding agency may conduct pre-procurement review of 

grantee procurement documents when the procurement is 

expected to exceed the Simplified Acquisition Threshold 

(currently set for grantees at $250,000)c and is to be awarded 

without competition. 

OJP designed has a process to review proposed sole-source 

contracts in excess of the Simplified Acquisition Threshold. 

Grantees cannot move forward with these procurement contracts 

until OJP provides approval of the non-competitive approach to the 

procurement.

Grantees are responsible for monitoring activities under federal 

awards to assure compliance with applicable federal 

requirements and performance expectations. 

OJP asks grantees about monitoring mechanisms and reviews 

related documentation while conducting their own monitoring 

activities over grantees, such as during site visits.

Reporting to Congressd

Beginning October 2018 and biennially thereafter, the Attorney 

General is to report to the Judiciary Committees the percentage 

of appropriated funds that each recipient—including CEBR 

grantees—paid to private labs to process DNA evidence, among 

other things. 

OJP added a requirement to the fiscal year 2018 CEBR solicitation 

and officials said they added a special condition to the grant terms 

and conditions for grantees to report the amounts expended under 

CEBR awards on contracts for DNA analysis.

Source: GAO analysis of grantee procurement requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

The first requirement comes from the CEBR grant solicitation and the DOJ Grants Financial Guide.

In addition to agreeing to comply with applicable statutes and regulations, CEBR recipients agree to 

comply with the terms specified in the DOJ Grants Financial Guide and the solicitation. OJP outlines 

these requirements in the grant terms and conditions. The requirements in the guide and the 

solicitation are also important elements of transparency in administering CEBR grants. Other 

requirements come from 2 C.F.R. pt. 200, “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, 

and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.”

b

A contract is a legal instrument by which a non-federal entity purchases property or services needed 

to carry out the project or program under a federal award. A contract is separate from a subaward, 

which is an award provided by a pass-through entity to a subrecipient for the subrecipient to carry out 

part of a federal award received by the pass-through entity. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.22, 200.92.

c

The “simplified acquisition threshold”—currently set for grantees at $250,000—means the dollar 

amount below which a non-federal entity may purchase property or services using small purchase 

methods. 2 C.F.R. § 200.88; OMB M-18-18. Small purchase procedures are those relatively simple 

and informal procurement methods for securing services, supplies, or other property.

d

Requirements come from Justice for All Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 3(b)(2)(C), 130 

Stat. 1948, 1950.
Page 41 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Federal law prohibits government employees from participating personally 

and substantially in particular government matters, such as the 

administration of federal grants, which will affect their financial interests.68

We identified 4 requirements related to conflicts of interest for OJP 

employees who administer CEBR grants. We found that OJP has 

designed controls to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 3 of 

the 4 requirements and has not properly designed a control for 1 of the 4 

requirements. We also found that OJP designed some controls that went 

beyond what was required by regulation. For example, OJP has a 

process for employees involved in administering CEBR grants whereby 

they must certify to their supervisor that they do not have conflicts of 

interest prior to each application cycle. In addition, in 2017 the U.S. Office 

of Government Ethics (OGE) cited a key DOJ resource—the DOJ Ethics 

Handbook for On and Off-Duty Conduct—as a model resource that other 

executive branch agency ethics programs may want to replicate.69

 68Criminal conflict of interest statutes governing OJP employees who administer CEBR 

grants are codified at 18 U.S.C. Chapter 11. Although these statutes cover a variety of 

topics related to conflicts of interest, our review focuses on the participation of OJP 

employees in government actions that may conflict with their personal financial interests, 

as specifically provided in 18 U.S.C. § 208. We focus on acts affecting personal financial 

interests because related regulatory requirements cover a broad range of issues directly 

applicable to OJP employees who administer CEBR grants. 

69OGE provides leadership and oversight of the executive branch ethics program, which is 

designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest. The office conducts ethics program 

reviews at executive branch agencies to ensure consistent and sustainable ethics 

program compliance with established executive branch ethics laws, regulations and 

policies and provides recommendations for meaningful program improvement. 

OJP Has Designed Some 

Controls to Achieve Its 

Objectives Related to 

Compliance with Selected 

Federal Requirements for 

Conflicts of Interest and 

Lobbying in the 

Administration of CEBR 

Grants, but Has Not 

Properly Designed All 

Controls

Conflicts of Interest
Page 42 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 4 provides a description of selected federal conflict of interest 

requirements applicable to OJP and its employees as they administer 

CEBR grants and OJP controls designed to achieve its objectives related 

to compliance with these requirements.70 For a more detailed explanation 

of these requirements and controls, see appendix X.

Table 4: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest for Federal Employees

Select requirements for OJP and OJP employees OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to 

compliance with requirements 

OJP employee conflict of interest requirementsa

Employees should not participate in matters involving specific 

parties, such as grants, that are likely to affect their financial 

interests or under circumstances that would cause a 

resonable person to question their impartiality. 

OJP designed a process for employees involved in administering 

grants to review conflict of interest requirements and certify to their 

supervisors that they do not have conflicts of interest during each 

application cycle.

Employees must not engage in outside employment or other 

outside activities that conflict with their official duties or 

employment that involves certain legal practice and matters, 

including grants.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has summarized applicable 

requirements on its ethics website the DOJ Ethics Handbook for On 

and Off-Duty Conduct. Employees are required to obtain written 

approval from the Deputy Attorney General to waive these 

prohibitions.

OJP ethics training requirementsb

New employees must complete initial ethics training and 

specified employees must complete annual ethics training.

OJP requires all new employees to complete initial ethics training. 

OJP assigns all employees to annual ethics training sessions.

OJP annual financial disclosure requirementsc

Senior-level employees must file public financial disclosure 

reports annually, and disclosures must be reviewed and 

certified by a designated agency ethics official. Specified less 

senior employees must file confidential financial disclosure 

reports annually, and disclosures must be reviewed and 

certified by a designated agency ethics official. 

OJP designed a process to collect annual financial disclosure reports 

from all staff who administer grants. OJP’s Ethics Office and OJP’s 

Assistant Attorney General review and sign senior-level employees’

reports. Less senior employees’ supervisors review and sign their 

reports. However, OJP does not have documentation designating 

which officials are authorized to certify (provide final signature) these 

reports or the levels of review required.

Source: GAO analysis of conflicts of interest requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

Requirements come from 5. C.F.R. pt. 2635, “Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the 

Executive Branch;” 5 C.F.R. pt. 3801, “Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of 

the Department of Justice.”

b

Requirements come from 5 C.F.R. pt. 2638, “Executive Branch Ethics Program”

c

Requirements come from 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-111, “Financial Disclosure Requirements of Federal 

Personnel” and 5 C.F.R. pt. 2634, “Executive Branch Financial Disclosure, Qualified Trusts, and 

Certificates of Divestiture.” Regarding the administration of CEBR grants, OJP officials stated that the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OJP, National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Director, and 

 70Because OJP administers CEBR as a formula grant program in which OJP generally 

allocates a specific amount of federal funds to applicants if they meet certain 

requirements, some risks associated with conflicts of interest that affect competitive 

grants, such as the appearance of or actual conflicts of interest among peer reviewers, do 

not apply to CEBR. Peer reviewers are subject-matter experts who provide objective, 

independent evaluations of competitive grant applications. 
Page 43 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

NIJ Principal Deputy Director positions are subject to public disclosure, and all other positions that 

administer CEBR grants are subject to confidential disclosure.

As shown in the last row of table 4, we found that OJP has not properly 

designed a control to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

federal requirements for confidential financial disclosure. OJP designed a 

process to collect and review annual confidential financial disclosure 

reports, which are required to be filed by specified less senior employees, 

including those who participate personally and substantially in 

government actions such as grants.71 Specifically, OJP officials stated 

that direct supervisors collect, review, and sign these reports. However, 

OJP does not have documentation designating which officials are 

authorized to certify (provide final signature) these reports, as required.

According to regulations issued by OGE, authority to certify confidential 

financial disclosure reports is held by an agency’s Designated Agency 

Ethics Official (DAEO).72 This certification authority may be delegated to 

an agency’s alternate DAEO or other qualified officials, such as a deputy 

ethics official, deputy ethics counselor, deputy standards of conduct 

counselor, or the equivalent. Certifiers are responsible for ensuring that 

reports are complete and that no interests or positions disclosed in the 

reports violate (or appear to violate) applicable laws and regulations.73

OGE guidance states that agencies’ written financial disclosure 

procedures should address which officials have been designated to 

review and certify reports and the levels of review and approval, among 

other requirements. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government state that management should establish an organizational 

structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the 

entity’s objectives (in this case, ensuring they are in compliance with 

 715 C.F.R. § 2634.904(a)(defining a confidential filer and providing examples of employees 

required to file). 

725 C.F.R. § 2634.605. OGE has the authority to establish a confidential financial 

disclosure system pursuant to section 107 of the Ethics and Governments Act, as 

amended, and has issued implementing regulations found at 5 C.F.R. part 2634, as well 

as additional guidance to executive branch agencies. The DAEO is the officer or 

employee who is designated by the head of an agency to administer the provisions of Title 

I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, and 5 C.F.R. part 2634 within an 

agency. See 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104 (detailing DAEO responsibilities, including review and 

certification of financial disclosure reports). 

735 C.F.R. § 2634.605(b)(1). Effective January 1, 2019, this review will also include 

applicable Executive Orders. 
Page 44 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

regulations and guidance intended to help them identify the appearance 

of or actual conflicts of interest).74 In doing so, management documents 

internal control to meet operational needs.

OJP officials said they follow guidance issued by DOJ’s Justice 

Management Division (JMD)—led by DOJ’s DAEO—which specifies the 

level of review that is required. Specifically, JMD’s guidance states that 

“the component head designates employees, generally supervisors, to 

collect, review, and sign reports.”75 Thus, while OJP officials acknowledge 

they have not documented specific employee positions that are to review 

and certify confidential financial disclosure reports, they believe doing so 

would be a formality because JMD guidance only specifies that 

supervisory review is required. However, per JMD guidance, the DAEO 

has delegated the authority to review confidential financial disclosure 

reports to component heads—in this case the Assistant Attorney General 

(AAG) for OJP—and has directed that further designation for review of 

such reports be made by them.

The designation of reviewers and certifiers by OJP’s AAG is unclear. For 

instance, OJP officials said that OJP’s deputy DAEO and office heads of 

OJP sub-components (or deputy office heads) have a role in the review 

process, but officials did not consistently describe those roles. Clear 

designations of roles within the review process is important given that 

OGE’s guidance states that supervisors or other intermediate officials 

may review and sign reports, but only those who have been delegated 

authority may certify reports.76 Without documenting which employees 

have been delegated the authority to certify employees’ confidential 

financial disclosure reports and the levels of review and approval 

required, the specific positions which have been delegated authority and 

 74GAO-14-704G. 

75Procedures for the Confidential Financial Disclosure System, available at, 

https://www.justice.gov/jmd/procedures-confidential-financial-disclosure-system. See 

also, Human Resources Order DOJ 1200.1(directing component heads to designate 

Reviewing Officials to collect, review, and sign confidential financial disclosure reports). 

76There are two places for signature on the reports (1) “Signature and Title of 

Supervisor/Other Intermediate Reviewer,” and (2) Signature and Title of Agency’s Final 

Reviewing Official” (certification). According to OGE regulation and guidance, review and 

signature of a supervisor or other intermediate reviewer is optional. See 5 C.F.R. § 

2634.605 (“The reviewing official may request an intermediate review by the filer's 

supervisor... After obtaining any intermediate review... the reviewing official shall examine 

the report ...[and] certify it by signature and date.”). 
Page 45 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

the required levels of review are not clear. This may limit OJP’s ability to 

ensure that those who review and certify reports are properly qualified to 

do so or that reports are reviewed by all persons OJP intends. This puts 

OJP at risk of failing to identify the appearance of or actual conflicts of 

interest among employees.

Finally, we found that OJP has designed controls to achieve its objectives 

related to compliance with federal requirements related to the disclosure 

of conflicts of interest by CEBR grantees. Table 5 provides a description 

of selected federal conflicts of interest requirements applicable to OJP 

and grantees as they administer CEBR grants and OJP controls designed 

to achieve its objectives related to compliance with these requirements. 

For a more detailed explanation of these requirements and controls, see 

appendix X.

Table 5: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest for Federal Awarding Agencies and 

Grantees

Select requirements for OJP employees and Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) program 

granteesa

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to 

compliance with requirements

Awarding agencies must establish conflicts of interest policies for 

grants. 

OJP’s conflict of interest policies for grantees require grantees to 

agree as a condition of award acceptance to disclose conflicts of 

interest in writing to OJP and to maintain written standards of 

conduct covering conflicts of interest for grants.

Grantees must disclose in writing any conflicts of interest to the 

awarding agency. 

OJP grant managers are to ask grantees about their policies and 

procedures that address conflicts of interest during grant 

monitoring activities, such as site visits. 

Source: GAO analysis of conflicts of interest requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

Requirements come from 2 C.F.R. pt. 200, “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, 

and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards”

We found that OJP has designed some controls to achieve its objectives 

related to compliance with federal lobbying requirements in the 

administration of CEBR grants but has not properly designed all controls. 

Federal laws contain prohibitions with respect to the use of appropriated 

Lobbying
Page 46 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

funds for lobbying activities and violations are subject to civil penalties.77

This includes a prohibition on recipients of federal awards using grant 

funds to lobby in connection with their award.

With respect to CEBR grants, we identified 4 requirements related to 

lobbying “certification” and “disclosure.”78 Lobbying certification refers to 

agreeing not to use appropriated funds to lobby. Lobbying disclosure 

refers to disclosing lobbying activities with respect to the covered federal 

action paid for with nonappropriated funds. Recipients of all federal 

awards over $100,000 are required to file certification documents and 

disclosure forms (if applicable) with the next tier above. Disclosure forms, 

but not certification documents, are to be forwarded from tier to tier until 

received by the federal agency.79 In the case of CEBR grants, tiers 

include OJP, grantees, subgrantees, contractors under grantees and 

subgrantees, and subcontractors. The specific requirements for filing 

lobbying certification and disclosure documents are shown in figure 5.

 77See 18 U.S.C. 1913; 31 U.S.C. § 1352. Commonly referred to as the “Anti-Lobbying 

Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 1913 prohibits appropriated funds from being used directly or indirectly 

to pay for activities (e.g., advertisements, printed materials, etc.) to influence government 

officials to support or oppose legislation, policies, or other matters (unless expressly 

authorized by Congress). OJP regards this lobbying prohibition as applicable to all federal 

funds, including grants, although some courts have continued to apply to only to federal 

employees even after its scope was expanded significantly in 2002. See, e.g., AFGE, 

Local 3721 v. District of Columbia, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8326, *33-34 (D.D.C. May 2, 

2005) (reaffirming that section 1913 only applies to federal departments or agencies and 

their employees despite broad prohibitory language).

7828 C.F.R. pt. 69, “New Restrictions on Lobbying,” implements 31 U.S.C. § 1352, 

commonly referred to as the “Byrd Amendment.” Lobbying in the context of this statute 

refers to paying any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or 

employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or 

an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with any covered Federal actions. 

See also 2 C.F.R. pt. 200, Appendix II(I), which contains similar requirements. These 

requirements are different from lobbying registration and disclosure requirements set forth 

in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et 

seq.). 

79The required certification document is set forth in appendix A to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69. The 

required disclosure form is set forth in appendix B to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69. Disclosure forms 

are only required if the recipient has used or plans to use nonappropriated funds to lobby 

with respect to the award. The forwarding requirements for disclosure forms are not 

included on the form set forth in appendix B to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69. Additional exceptions to 

the prohibition and disclosure requirements apply. Pursuant to the common rule for federal 

agencies issued by the Office of Management and Budget and implemented by DOJ, only 

disclosure forms, not certifications, are required to be forwarded from tier to tier until 

received by the awarding agency. 28 C.F.R. § 69.110(e). Any person who fails to file or 

amend a required disclosure form is subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and 

not more than $100,000 for each such failure. 31 U.S.C. § 1352(c)(2). 
Page 47 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Figure 5: Lobbying Certification and Disclosure Requirements for Recipients of Federal Awards over $100,000, per 28 C.F.R. 

pt. 69

Note: The Department of Justice’s regulations implement the Office of Management and Budget’s

government-wide guidance for 31 U.S.C. § 1352, commonly referred to as the “Byrd Amendment.” 

Lobbying in the context of this statute refers to paying any person for influencing or attempting to 

influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of 

Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with any covered Federal actions.

a

Lobbying certification refers primarily to agreeing not to use appropriated funds to lobby. The 

required certification document also requires the same certification language in all subgrant and 

contract documentation.

b

According to OJP attorneys, certifications can be “filed” by including the required certification 

language in award or subgrant and contract documentation. Thus, there is not a need to “file” a 

separate certification document.

c

Tiers can include the awarding agency, grantees, subgrantees, contractors under grantees and 

subgrantees, and subcontractors.

d

Lobbying disclosure refers to disclosing lobbying activities with respect to the covered federal action 

(in this case, a federal awards) paid for with nonappropriated funds. Disclosure forms are only 

required if the applicant, recipient, or subrecipient has used or plans to use nonappropriated funds to 

lobby with respect to the award. Additional exceptions to the prohibition and disclosure requirements 

apply.

e

Pursuant to the regulations issued by the Department of Justice to implement the Office of 

Management and Budget’s government-wide guidance for 31 U.S.C. § 1352, only disclosure forms, 

not certifications, are required to be forwarded from tier to tier until received by the awarding agency. 

28 C.F.R. § 69.110(e).
Page 48 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 6 provides a description of select federal lobbying requirements, 

including the requirements in figure 5 above, as well as OJP controls 

designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with these 

requirements. For a more detailed explanation of these requirements and 

controls, see appendix XI.

Table 6: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Lobbying

Select requirements for OJP, Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction (CEBR) program grantees, and 

othersa

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to 

compliance with requirements

Grantees are prohibited from using appropriated funds, 

directly or indirectly, to lobby.b As a condition of award acceptance, grantees must agree to comply with OJP’s “General Conditions,” which includes (1) language 

prohibiting the use of federal funds for lobbying, and (2) a requirement 

that grantees follow applicable lobbying laws, as set forth in DOJ’s 

Grants Financial Guide. OJP also follows the grantees’ use of grant 

funds through reviewing grantees’ financial reports as part of its grant 

approval and monitoring processes.

Agencies are required to collect certification documents and 

disclosure formsc from grantees.d OJP designed a process to collect certification documents and disclosure forms from CEBR grant applicants and grantees. 

If grantees issue subgrants or contracts over $100,000, 

agencies are to ensure grantees collect certification 

documents and disclosure forms from tierse below them. The 

agency must ensure that disclosure forms are forwarded from 

tier to tier until received by OJP.

Grantees and subrecipients are to disclose subsequent 

lobbying events that require disclosure or specified events 

that materially affect the accuracy of previously filed 

disclosures at the end of each quarter.

The certification document that CEBR grant applicants agree to as 

part of the award acceptance process provides some information 

about applicable requirements. However, it does not state in clear 

terms what the specific requirements of the law are or how they are to 

be carried out, and OJP does not provide clarifying guidance.

Agencies are to take such actions as are necessary to ensure 

that these lobbying requirements are implemented and 

enforced.f

As stated above, OJP designed a process to collect certification 

documents and disclosure forms from CEBR applicants. However, it is 

not taking actions to ensure that grantees are requiring subrecipients 

to certify and disclose, and that grantees forward disclosures 

according to the requirements set forth above.

Source: GAO analysis of lobbying requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

Unless otherwise noted, requirements are from 28 C.F.R. pt. 69, “New Restrictions on Lobbying,”

implementing 31 U.S.C. § 1352, commonly referred to as the “Byrd Amendment.”

b

18 U.S.C. § 1913 prohibits appropriated funds from being used directly or indirectly to pay for 

activities (e.g., advertisements, printed materials, etc.) to influence government officials to support or 

oppose legislation, policies, or other matters (unless the activity is expressly authorized by Congress).

OJP regards this lobbying prohibition as applicable to all federal funds, including grants, although 

some courts have continued to apply to only to federal employees even after its scope was expanded 

significantly in 2002. See, e.g., AFGE, Local 3721 v. District of Columbia, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

8326, *33-34 (D.D.C. May 2, 2005) (reaffirming that section 1913 only applies to federal departments 

or agencies and their employees despite broad prohibitory language).

c

Disclosure forms are only required by regulation if the award recipient or subrecipient used 

nonappropriated funds to lobby with respect to the CEBR grant. However, we found that OJP requires 

all CEBR grantees to submit a disclosure form when applying for a CEBR grant.
Page 49 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

d

This requirement is only applicable to federal awards over $100,000. However, all CEBR grants are 

for at least $150,000. Additional exceptions and requirements apply.

e

In the case of CEBR grants, tiers include OJP, grantees, subgrantees, contractors under grantees 

and subgrantees, and subcontractors.

f

31 U.S.C § 1352; see also 28 C.F.R. § 69.410.

As shown in table 6, we found that OJP has designed some controls to 

achieve its objectives related to compliance with federal lobbying 

requirements in the administration of CEBR grants. Specifically, we found 

that OJP has designed controls intended to ensure that grantees agree 

not to use, and agree not to allow tiers beneath them to use, appropriated 

funds to lobby. OJP also reviews grantees’ financial reports as part of its 

grant approval and monitoring processes. Additionally, we found that OJP 

designed a control intended to ensure OJP obtains lobbying certification 

documents and disclosure forms from grantees.

We found that OJP has not properly designed other controls to achieve its 

objectives related to compliance with federal lobbying requirements (see 

last two rows of table 5). Specifically, we found that, for subgrants and 

contracts over $100,000, OJP has not properly designed a control 

intended to ensure that (1) CEBR grantees obtain certification documents 

and disclosure forms, as applicable, from tiers below them, and (2) 

disclosure forms are forwarded from tier to tier until received by OJP. OJP 

requires grant applicants to agree to the certification document set forth in 

regulation.80 This certification document, in turn, lists certification and 

disclosure requirements, and states that, “The Applicant shall require that 

the language of this certification be included in the award documents for 

all subgrants and procurement contracts (and their subcontracts) funded 

with Federal award funds and shall ensure that any certifications or 

lobbying disclosures required of recipients of such subgrants and 

procurement contracts (or their subcontractors) are made and filed in 

accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1352.”

However, OJP’s certification document does not state in clear terms what 

the specific requirements of the law are or how they are to be carried out, 

and OJP does not provide guidance to grantees to clarify the 

requirements. Additionally, we found that OJP does not follow up with 

grantees to ensure they are implementing the requirements to obtain 

 80Appendix A to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69.
Page 50 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

lobbying certification documents and disclosure forms, as applicable, from 

tiers beneath them, and forwarding disclosure forms to OJP.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that 

management should (1) externally communicate the necessary quality 

information to achieve the entity’s objectives (in this case, compliance 

with this regulation), and (2) implement control activities through policies 

(in this case, following up with grantees to ensure they are implementing 

the requirements).81

Although referenced in OJP and DOJ documentation, OJP officials 

responsible for overseeing the implementation of these lobbying 

requirements were not fully aware of specific legal requirements. In 

particular, they were not aware that tiers beneath grantees were required 

to file certification documents and disclosure forms, as applicable, with 

tiers above them; nor were they aware that disclosure forms were 

required to be forwarded from tier to tier until received by OJP for 

subgrants and contracts over $100,000.

82 According to OJP officials, this 

was due, in part, to OJP focusing primarily on ensuring that grant funds 

are not used to lobby.83 Officials said that ensuring grant funds are not 

used to lobby is more important than ensuring non-grant funds used to 

lobby are disclosed. Moreover, OJP officials said, the specific 

requirements in the regulation pertaining to certification and disclosure of 

lobbying activities at tiers below grantees are confusing and take 

significant effort to understand.84

In 2009, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General recommended NIJ 

“establish procedures to ensure that the required lobbying disclosure 

forms are submitted for all grantees, subgrantees, and contractors, and 

that the disclosures are considered when evaluating grant applications for 

 81 GAO-14-704G. 

82As discussed above, OJP and DOJ have published information about the relevant 

lobbying regulation in agency documents, such as the lobbying certification form that 

recipients must execute prior to receiving award funds and the DOJ Grants Financial 

Guide which grantees agree to comply with as a condition of receiving award funds. 

83As noted in the table 5, OJP has designed controls to (1) ensure grantees agree not to 

use grants funds to lobby, and (2) review grantees’ financial reports as part of its grant 

approval and monitoring processes. 

8428 C.F.R. pt. 69. 
Page 51 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

award.”85 However, we found that OJP did not properly design controls 

intended to ensure that grantees obtain lobbying disclosure forms from 

subgrantees and contractors, as appropriate, and forward them to OJP, 

as required.

At least one other agency has taken steps to clarify federal lobbying 

certification and disclosure requirements. In 2012, the Department of 

Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration identified that its award 

recipients may not have been correctly applying these requirements. To 

address this issue, the Federal Transit Administration (1) issued guidance 

for its award administrators to remind award recipients of the 

requirements, and (2) requested that administrators ensure award 

recipients review their activities and take steps to ensure full 

compliance.86

Clearly communicating requirements to grantees would better position 

OJP to ensure that grantees and tiers beneath them (subgrantees and 

contractors) are fully aware of these requirements. For instance, while not 

generalizable, 3 out of the 4 CEBR grantees we spoke with were not 

aware of one or more of these requirements. As a result, OJP, grantees, 

and tiers beneath them may not be fully complying with all federal 

lobbying disclosure requirements. Further, CEBR subgrantees and 

contractors could be using their own non-grant funds to engage in 

lobbying activities related to CEBR grants that neither the grantee nor 

OJP are aware of.

While DOJ has awarded nearly $1 billion to CEBR and its legacy 

programs since 2004, as of 2017, about 169,000 requests for crime 

 85Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice Audit 

of the National Institute of Justice’s Practices for Awarding Grants and Contracts in Fiscal 

Years 2005 through 2007, Audit Report 09-38 (Washington, D.C.: September 2009). The 

text we use to quote this recommendation comes from the Executive Summary of the 

report. Notably, this same recommendation, as stated on page 41 of the report, does not 

reference contractors. We used the text from the recommendation in the Executive 

Summary because OJP restated it, and agreed with it, in its formal response to the audit 

(see appendix IX of the report). The OIG closed the recommendation as implemented in 

2011 as OJP designed controls intended to ensure OJP obtains lobbying disclosure forms 

from grantees. 

86Federal Transit Administration, Certifications and Disclosure of Lobbying Activities

(Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2012), www.transit.dot.gov/funding/granteeresources/certifications-and-assurances/certifications-and-disclosure-lobbying, accessed 

October 15, 2018. 

Conclusions
Page 52 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

scene DNA analysis were backlogged at state and local government 

crime labs. Backlogs persist for various reasons, including scientific 

advancements that enable law enforcement to obtain investigative leads 

from smaller amounts of biological evidence.

NIJ has not consistently documented CEBR program-wide goals and 

CEBR performance measures do not fully reflect attributes that would 

help NIJ assess progress toward those goals. Thus, NIJ is limited in its 

ability to communicate intended program results and progress toward 

those results. This information could inform Congress as it seeks to 

address challenges in the area of DNA evidence and allocate resources 

to address DNA evidence backlogs, capacity enhancement, and other 

priorities.

Further, while questions have been raised about potential improper 

connections among those who profit from DNA analysis and those who 

advocate for CEBR funding, we found that OJP has designed controls to 

achieve its objectives related to compliance with selected federal 

requirements associated with transparency in grantee procurement. 

However, OJP has not documented which employees have been 

delegated authority to certify employees’ confidential financial disclosure 

reports or clarified all applicable federal requirements associated with 

lobbying. Addressing these issues would increase transparency into how 

OJP identifies and addresses the appearance of or actual conflicts of 

interest.

We are making the following four recommendations to OJP:

The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OJP should 

consistently document CEBR program-wide goals to clarify intended 

program results. (Recommendation 1)

The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OJP should ensure 

that performance measures for each CEBR program-wide goal fully 

reflect appropriate attributes of successful performance measures. 

(Recommendation 2)

The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OJP should 

document which employee positions have been delegated certification 

(final signature) authority for confidential financial disclosure reports and 

specify required levels of review and approval. (Recommendation 3)

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 53 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OJP should (1) 

clarify its guidance to grantees to specify what their requirements are 

under 28 C.F.R. pt. 69 with regard to obtaining lobbying certification 

documents, and obtaining and forwarding to OJP lobbying disclosure 

forms, from tiers beneath them; and (2) design a control to follow-up with 

grantees to help ensure they are meeting these requirements. 

(Recommendation 4)

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for review and comment. In 

written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix XII, DOJ 

concurred with the four recommendations and described actions planned 

to address them. DOJ also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate.

DOJ concurred with our first recommendation to consistently document 

CEBR program-wide goals. Specifically, DOJ’s OJP stated that it will 

review how these goals are communicated to grant recipients, Congress 

and stakeholders to determine what changes may be needed to ensure 

that the goals are consistently communicated. 

DOJ also agreed to address our second recommendation on improving 

performance measures. OJP stated that it plans to develop a logic model 

that will more clearly indicate for grant recipients the measures and 

quantitative goals for their projects that may be achieved with CEBR 

funds. This model could be useful to grantees and could help address our 

recommendation if it establishes clear linkages between program 

activities, program-wide performance measures, and program-wide goals.

In addition, DOJ agreed to address our third recommendation related to 

documenting which employee positions have been delegated certification 

(final signature) authority for confidential disclosure reports. OJP stated 

that it would adopt its own version of a policy implemented by DOJ’s 

Justice Management Division, which specifies that supervisors can sign 

reports. We believe this action, if implemented, would address our 

recommendation if OJP’s version of the policy included a clear 

designation of which employee positions have been delegated 

certification (final signature) authority and specified required levels of 

review and approval.

Finally, DOJ concurred with our fourth recommendation to clarify 

guidance to grantees regarding their requirements under 28 C.F.R. pt. 69, 

and to design a control to ensure grantees are meeting these 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 54 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

requirements. Specifically, OJP stated that in February 2019, it 

implemented a centralized standard lobbying certification procedure so all 

award applicants will provide their certification at the point of registration. 

In addition, OJP stated that, beginning with the fiscal year 2019 grant 

awards, OJP plans to update a checklist it uses as part of its grant 

monitoring. According to OJP, this update will help OJP ensure that all 

applicable lobbying disclosure forms—including those from tiers beneath 

grantees—are collected and submitted to OJP. We look forward to 

reviewing these actions in more detail to determine if they meet the intent 

of our recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 GoodwinG@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix XIII.

Gretta L. Goodwin

Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 55 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

This report addresses the following questions:

1. What is known about the amount of backlogged crime scene DNA 

evidence, including sexual assault kits (SAK), in state and local 

government labs and the factors that contribute to such backlogs?

2. What is known about the amount of unsubmitted DNA evidence, 

including SAKs, in law enforcement custody and the factors that 

contribute to this unsubmitted evidence?

3. To what extent does the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—the 

primary grant-making arm of DOJ—measure DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction grant program (CEBR)

performance?

4. To what extent has OJP designed controls related to conflicts of 

interest, transparency in grantee procurement, and lobbying 

requirements applicable to CEBR grants?

To describe what is known about the amount of backlogged crime scene 

DNA evidence in state and local labs, we reviewed data from (1) the 

Bureau of Justice Statistic’s (BJS) Census of Publicly Funded Forensic 

Crime Labs,1 (2) West Virginia University’s Project FORESIGHT,2 and (3) 

DOJ’s CEBR grant program. We determined that the most useful data for 

 1

DOJ’s BJS, a component within OJP, surveys all publicly-funded crime labs in the U.S. 

periodically in order to provide aggregate information on services provided and resources 

required (according to BJS, the last survey covered 2014). This includes information on 

the number of requests for crime scene DNA analysis and convicted offender and arrestee 

samples received, the number of requests and samples completed, and the number of 

requests and samples backlogged.

2

Project FORESIGHT is a research project designed to help crime labs evaluate their 

efficiency and inform resource allocation decisions. It is run out of West Virginia 

University’s College of Business and Economics and uses data from participating national, 

state, and local labs. Data submitted from labs include data on DNA analysis workloads 

and backlogs, among other things. According to a representative of Project FORESIGHT, 

as of October 2018, 149 lab systems in the U.S. (143 government lab systems 

representing 275 facilities and 6 private lab systems representing 8 facilities) contributed 

data to the project. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

DNA Evidence 

Backlog Data 

(Objective 1)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 56 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

showing aggregate nationwide trends was CEBR data.3 Regarding CEBR 

data, we collected yearly “baseline” data from the National Institute of 

Justice (NIJ), the component within DOJ that administers the CEBR 

program, for calendar years 2011 through 2017.4 We selected these 

years because in 2011 two previous grant programs were combined into 

what is now known as the CEBR grant program, and because 2017 is the 

most recent full calendar year for which CEBR grantee data were 

available at the time of our review.

To assess the extent to which NIJ-compiled CEBR baseline data we use 

in this report are reliable, we completed a number of data reliability steps, 

including discussing data entry issues and data limitations with NIJ and 

select grantees; running logic tests on the data, verifying which grantees 

reported data each year (2011-2017), and comparing NIJ-compiled 

baseline data to a limited amount of source data from grantee reports, 

and comparing CEBR data against other data (BJS survey data for 2014 

only). After completing data reliability steps, we determined that the 

CEBR baseline data we use in this report are sufficiently reliable for our 

purpose, which is to show year-over-year trends in workloads and 

backlogs among state and local government labs.

We determined that state and local government labs participating in the 

CEBR program from 2011 through 2017 generally represent the level of 

workloads and backlogs from state and local government labs that 

 3

BJS’s Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Labs occurs periodically (e.g. 2005, 

2009 and 2014) and is thus not useful for showing year-over-year trends. Participation in 

Project FORESIGHT has increased over time; however, determining the extent to which it 

is generalizable to government labs in the U.S. for each year for which we desired to show 

trend data would have taken significant resources. In contrast, grantee participation in 

CEBR has been relatively consistent over time, and almost all state and local government 

labs are represented in CEBR data. 

4

NIJ collects baseline data—which includes data from all labs within grantees jurisdictions 

(not only those labs that use CEBR grant funds)—as part of the grant application process. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 57 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

participate in CODIS nationwide.5 However, we found that CEBR 

turnaround time data for 2017 were not reported as consistently as data 

for workloads and backlogs and may not be representative of nationwide 

turnaround times for state and local government labs. Thus, in the report, 

we provide an example of the types of turnaround times reported by 

CEBR grantees, which may provide insights into turnaround times at state 

and local government labs across the United States.

To ensure we had identified all possible sources of data and to better 

understand how labs collect and report data, we met with a nongeneralizable selection of knowledgeable officials and representatives 

from 11 entities, including 2 national associations, 2 academic research 

groups, 5 CEBR grantees (or grantee labs), and 2 components within 

DOJ.6 We selected the national association because it represents labs 

across the country; we selected CEBR grantees that differed by type of 

jurisdiction (state versus local) with one CEBR grantee also being a 

grantee of DOJ’s Sexual Assault Kit Initiative grant program; we selected 

the academic groups based on literature we had reviewed and a 

recommendation from DOJ officials; and we selected NIJ because it 

 5

As of January 1, 2018 there were 194 state and local government labs in the U.S. that 

performed DNA analysis on evidence from crime scenes and participated in the FBI’s 

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). According to information provided by OJP, also 

as of January 1, 2018, CEBR grantees represented 189 of these 194 state and local 

government labs. For the 5 labs not included, we determined that they constituted a small 

portion of backlog data in other years so as not to substantively affect results (for 

example, less than 3 percent since 2012). We were unable to identify the number of labs 

that did not participate in the CEBR program for years 2011 through 2016. However, NIJ 

officials said that CEBR grantees have generally been representative of all state and local 

government labs in the U.S. that participated in CODIS in prior years as well. In addition, 

to ensure that fluctuations in the population of CEBR grantees during these years did not 

significantly affect our results, we compared data on the number of requests backlogged 

and the annual rate of change in the number of requests backlogged for each year from all 

grantees (including those grantees who reported data from some but not all years 

between 2011 and 2016) to data from a subset of grantees (including those that provided 

data for all years between 2011 through 2016). We found that any fluctuations did not 

affect overall conclusions about trends in DNA analysis in these prior years.

6

Specifically, we met with representatives from the American Society of Crime Lab 

Directors and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. We also met with selected 

CEBR grantees or grantee labs, including: Washington D.C. Department of Forensic 

Sciences; Dallas County, TX, Southwestern Institute of Forensic Science; Harris County, 

TX, Institute of Forensic Sciences; Houston, TX, Houston Forensic Science Center; and 

Maryland State Police. We also met with academic researchers from West Virginia 

University’s Project FORESIGHT as well as authors of a 2010 report entitled Unanalyzed 

Evidence in Law Enforcement Agencies: A National Examination of Forensic Processing 

in Police Departments. Finally, we met with federal officials from OJP’s NIJ and BJS. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 58 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

administers the CEBR program and BJS because it has data on lab 

outcomes.

To identify and describe what is known about the amount of unsubmitted 

DNA evidence, including SAKs, in law enforcement custody, we reviewed 

information and/or data related to several efforts to inventory or quantify 

this evidence, including SAKs, in law enforcement custody.

• DOJ’s National Sexual Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI) grant 

program. We obtained SAKI data from OJP’s Bureau of Justice 

Assistance (BJA). BJA provided us with data from grantees that 

covered the time period of October 2015 through June 2018. We 

obtained data for this timeframe because the SAKI grant program 

began in October 2015, and June 2018 was the latest period for which 

SAKI data were available at the time of our analysis. To ensure the 

reliability of these data, we performed electronic checks for missing or 

duplicate data entries among grantees, and compared BJAmanipulated (i.e. “cleaned”) data to raw SAKI data to ensure that the 

only discrepancies between the two datasets were those 

discrepancies identified by BJA officials. We also reviewed related 

documentation, such as survey questions and instructions for 

reporting data, and interviewed BJA officials and representatives from 

a SAKI contractor. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for 

our purposes, which are to describe the extent to which SAKI (1) has 

contributed to an understanding of the number of unsubmitted SAKs 

in law enforcement possession among participating jurisdictions, and 

(2) has reported on activities and outcomes associated with analyzing 

previously unsubmitted SAKs.

• New York County District Attorney’s Office (DANY) SAK grant 

program. We obtained data from DANY’s Sexual Assault Kit Backlog 

Elimination Grant Program from DANY officials. DANY officials 

provided us with aggregated grantee data that covered the time 

period of October 2015 through September 2018. We obtained data 

for this timeframe because it reflects the first and last quarters from 

which data were available at the time of our analysis. To ensure the 

reliability of these data, we obtained and reviewed the forms and 

spreadsheets DANY used to obtain these data from grantees and 

aggregate them. We also interviewed DANY grant program 

administrators to understand the processes they use to aggregate 

grantee data. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our 

purpose, which is to describe the extent to which DANY grants have 

Unsubmitted DNA 

Evidence, Including 

SAKs, In Law 

Enforcement Custody 

(Objective 2)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 59 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

contributed to an understanding of the number of unsubmitted SAKs 

in law enforcement possession among participating jurisdictions.

• State SAK inventory data. We obtained publicly-available 

aggregated SAK inventory data from Idaho and Texas websites. To 

select these states, we first conducted legal research to identify states 

with laws requiring them to conduct inventories of SAKs where 

evidence had not yet been submitted for lab analysis. We selected 

Texas and Idaho as illustrative examples because they differed with 

respect to legal requirements for conducting inventories, and 

timeframes associated with conducting those inventories.7 To ensure 

the reliability of these data, we interviewed state officials about their 

data collection efforts and steps they took to ensure reliability; we also 

followed up with officials to ensure the data we present are accurate 

and up to date. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our 

purpose, which is to provide illustrative examples of how state laws 

contribute to understanding the number of unsubmitted SAKs in law 

enforcement possession.

• Reporting requirements under the Sexual Assault Forensic 

Evidence Reporting (SAFER) Act. We reviewed the reporting 

requirements for grantees and DOJ under the SAFER Act of 2013.8

However, no data had been reported under this Act at the time of our 

review.

• Joyful Heart Foundation. We reviewed the website where the Joyful 

Heart Foundation posts links to the sources of data it uses to quantify 

the number of unsubmitted SAKs in law enforcement custody in state 

and local jurisdictions nationwide. We also interviewed Joyful Heart 

Foundation representatives responsible for collecting and aggregating 

these data to discuss their methods for ensuring the data are reliable. 

However, given the many and varied sources of data, we did not 

independently perform steps to ensure each source was sufficiently 

reliable.

• Academic research. We reviewed two prior nationwide studies on 

the amount and reasons for unsubmitted DNA evidence in law 

enforcement custody (including DNA evidence associated with 

 7

Texas law required a one-time inventory by October 2011 and Idaho law required a onetime inventory by December 2016, to be followed by annual inventories.

8

The SAFER Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1002, 127 Stat. 54, 127-131, added a new 

purpose area and related requirements to the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program 

(34 U.S.C. § 40701). This Act authorizes grants for the purpose of conducting audits of 

sexual assault evidence, and requires the Attorney General to publish information from 

these audits online.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 60 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

various types of crime, not just sexual assault). These two studies 

were the only studies we were able to identify that assessed the 

amount of unsubmitted DNA evidence on a nationwide scale. 

However, we did not include findings from either of these studies in 

our report because the data supporting these studies were not 

current.9

Lastly, we identified challenges associated with inventorying SAKS within 

jurisdictions and quantifying SAKs across jurisdictions based on (1) 

qualitative survey responses that DANY officials provided us;10 (2) 

relevant DOJ reports; and (3) interviews with DNA evidence stakeholders.

To identify and describe factors that contribute to backlogs of unanalyzed 

DNA evidence at labs and unsubmitted DNA evidence, including SAKs, in 

law enforcement custody, we reviewed 22 reports, including 16 

government reports (or government-funded reports), 4 academic journal 

articles, 1 book, and 1 study from a non-governmental organization. Five 

of the government (or government-funded) reports included nationwide 

studies of public crime labs and law enforcement agencies with original 

research. We identified this collection of literature by conducting database 

searches of peer reviewed material, government reports, and conference 

papers using the Online Computer Library Center and ProQuest 

Professional database search engines. We used keywords including 

“DNA evidence,” “backlog,” “law enforcement,” “laboratories,” and 

“awaiting testing,” among others. We discussed these factors with DNA 

evidence stakeholders from 17 entities, including: 2 national associations; 

6 grantees of the CEBR, SAKI, and or DOJ’s Sexual Assault Forensic 

 9

One study provided nationwide estimates of homicide, rape, and property crime cases 

with forensic evidence that was not submitted to a lab. See Strom, Kevin J. et. al., The 

2007 Survey of Law Enforcement Forensic Evidence Processing (Washington, D.C.: 

2009). See https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228415.pdf, accessed Oct. 23, 2018. 

Another study provided nationwide estimates of homicide, rape, and property crime cases 

with possible biological evidence which local law enforcement agencies had not submitted 

to a lab. See Lovrich, Nicholas P. et.al., National Forensic DNA Study Report, Final 

Report (Washington, D.C.: 2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203970.pdf, 

accessed Oct. 23, 2018. 

10As part of the regular reporting DANY required of its grantees, DANY asked that 

grantees respond to the following question: “Have the kits that will be tested under this 

grant been fully inventoried?” For those grantees that responded “no,” the questionnaire 

asked “If no, how is your inventory process progressing?” DANY officials provided us with 

grantees responses to this question over time without identifying individual grantees by 

name. Grantees’ responses to this question provided insights into challenges they faced in 

performing SAK inventories.

Factors that 

Contribute to DNA 

Evidence Backlogs 

and Unsubmitted 

DNA Evidence, 

Including SAKs

(Objectives 1 and 2)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Evidence—Inventory, Tracking, and Reporting (SAFE-ITR) grant 

programs; 2 states’ law enforcement agencies; 4 academics and 

practitioners; 2 components within DOJ, and 1 additional federal 

agency.11 We selected these entities based on their knowledge of crime 

scene DNA evidence collection, storage, and analyses; as well as their 

familiarity with DOJ grant programs that address crime scene DNA 

evidence. Finally, we conducted legal research on state laws that require 

law enforcement to submit SAKs for testing and that also require labs to 

analyze previously unanalyzed SAKs. We summarized information from 

these sources to identify common factors, and we included illustrative 

examples of the types of factors we identified in this report.

To evaluate how DOJ measures CEBR program performance, we first 

sought to identify CEBR program-wide goals. To do this, we reviewed 

OJP CEBR documentation, including the most recent CEBR grant 

solicitation and NIJ reports that include CEBR performance information. 

We also discussed CEBR goals with NIJ officials. We then assessed the 

CEBR program-wide goals against federal internal control standards that 

call for management to define goals clearly.12

To evaluate the extent to which CEBR program-wide performance 

measures reflect attributes of successful performance measures, we 

obtained and reviewed OJP documentation that defined the six CEBR 

program-wide performance measures NIJ currently uses to assess CEBR 

program-wide performance. This documentation included definitions of 

 11Specifically, we met with representatives from the following national associations: the 

American Society of Crime Lab Directors and the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police. We also met with select state and local labs that are grantees of the CEBR, SAFEITR, and/or SAKI grant programs, including: Dallas County, TX, Southwestern Institute of 

Forensic Sciences; Washington D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences; Georgia Criminal 

Justice Coordinating Council; Harris County, TX, Institute of Forensic Sciences; Houston 

Forensic Science Center; and Maryland State Police. We also met with representatives 

from the Idaho State Police and Texas Department of Public Safety. We also met with 

academics and practitioners, including the director of West Virginia University’s Project 

FORESIGHT, authors of a 2010 report entitled Unanalyzed Evidence in Law Enforcement 

Agencies: A National Examination of Forensic Processing in Police Departments, the 

District Attorney of New York County, and a retired law enforcement officer. Additionally, 

we spoke to representatives from a survivors’ advocacy group (the Joyful Heart 

Foundation). Finally, we met with federal officials from DOJ’s NIJ and BJA, as well as 

officials from the Congressional Research Service. 

12GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014), Principle 6 – Define Objectives and Risk 

Tolerances (starts on page 35). 

CEBR Grant Program 

Performance 

Measurement 

(Objective 3)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 62 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

measures, the methodology used to calculate the measures, and any 

associated targets. To determine the extent to which DOJ’s six CEBR 

program-wide performance measures effectively assessed progress, we 

compared them against 5 of 9 attributes of successful performance 

measures identified in our previous work.13 We selected 3 of the 9 

attributes (linkage, clarity, and measurable targets) because they are 

foundational. By “foundational” we mean that, without them, other 

attributes are less relevant or important. We selected 2 of the 9 attributes 

(core program activities, balance) because they assess the extent to 

which the performance measures cover a variety of aspects of 

performance.14 To assess the extent to which NIJ’s six CEBR 

performance measures met these criteria, two GAO analysts 

independently assessed each performance measure against these 5 

criteria, and then met to discuss and reconcile differences. A GAO subject 

matter expert on performance measures provided input on the design, 

execution, and reporting of this audit objective.

 13Our prior work establishes 9 attributes of successful performance measures: linkage, 

clarity, measurable targets, objectivity, reliability, core program activities, limited overlap, 

balance, and government-wide priorities. GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further 

Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: 

November 2002). 

14We excluded 4 of the 9 attributes. Specifically, we excluded 3 of the 9 attributes 

(objectivity, reliability, and limited overlap) because they may not be relevant if 

performance measures are not aligned (linked) with program goals; they may be difficult to 

understand without clarity across measures; and they may lack meaning if the measures 

do not have targets and thus do not set performance expectations. We excluded 1 of the 9 

attributes (government-wide priorities) because we determined that it is not necessarily 

applicable to the CEBR program. The attribute of “government-wide priorities” specifies 

that performance measures should cover a range of priorities, such as quality, timeliness, 

efficiency, cost of service, and customer satisfaction. While important, we believe it is not 

realistic to expect that a single grant program include performance measures that cover 

most or all government-wide priorities. Rather, we believe that attributes of “balance” and 

“core program activities”—which we did include—are sufficient to ensure that the 

performance measures cover an appropriate variety of aspects of performance. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 63 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

To evaluate the extent to OJP has designed controls related to conflicts of 

interest, transparency in grantee procurement, and lobbying requirements 

applicable to CEBR grants, we conducted legal research in these topic 

areas to identify federal statutes and regulations applicable to OJP and 

CEBR applicants, recipients, and subrecipients.15 We also reviewed DOJ 

documentation such as the DOJ Ethics Handbook for On and Off-Duty 

Conduct, OJP Grants Management Manual, and the DOJ Grants 

Financial Guide to identify any additional requirements (including 

requirements that DOJ imposes on itself which may not stem from statute 

or regulation). OJP attorneys verified that the list of requirements we had 

compiled was complete and accurate. To determine the extent to which 

OJP designed controls to achieve its objectives related to compliance 

with these requirements, we reviewed the Fiscal Year 2018 CEBR 

solicitation, DOJ Departmental Ethics Website, DOJ Ethics Handbook for 

On and Off-Duty Conduct, DOJ Grants Financial Guide, OJP ethics 

training materials, and OJP’s “General Conditions” for grants (available 

on OJP’s website). To further determine the extent to which OJP has 

designed each control, we also obtained and reviewed a variety of CEBR 

program documents, including those associated with reviewing and 

approving CEBR grant applications, and grant monitoring. Examples of 

these documents include: CEBR grantee budget narratives and budget 

detail worksheets (submitted as part of a grant application), OJP’s 

checklist for ensuring grantee application packages have all required 

information, and OJP’s grant monitoring checklists (which OJP grant 

managers use when conducting grant monitoring activities).16 We also 

discussed some of the controls that we identified with four of the CEBR 

grantees discussed earlier. We did not review the extent to which controls 

were implemented effectively (e.g. through controls testing procedures 

such as conducting case file reviews), nor did we review the extent to 

which employees were trained to implement controls effectively (e.g. 

through reviewing training material and/or outcomes of such training). 

Finally, we assessed the controls we identified as not properly designed 

 15We examined requirements applicable to subgrantees and contractors under CEBR 

grantees and subgrantees, and subcontractors. 

16Grant monitoring allows grant managers to observe compliance with requirements and 

progress against project goals, and ensure that adequate controls are in place to improve 

accountability. Grant monitoring activities are carried out through communication with the 

grantee, desk reviews (reviews of documents in grantees’ files), and in-depth monitoring 

(consisting of site visits and enhanced programmatic desk reviews).

OJP Controls Related 

to Conflicts of 

Interest, 

Transparency in 

Grantee Contracting, 

and Lobbying 

Applicable to CEBR 

Grants (Objective 4)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 64 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

against federal internal control standards which specify how management 

should design controls to achieve its compliance objectives.17

We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to March 

2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 17GAO-14-704G. Per guidance in these standards, an existing control is not properly 

designed when, even if the control operates as designed, the control objective would not 

be met.
Appendix II: Additional Sources of Lab Data 

and Considerations When Reviewing DNA 

Evidence Data

Page 65 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

In addition to reviewing the DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction (CEBR) grant program data, we also reviewed data from (1) 

the Bureau of Justice Statistic’s (BJS) Census of Publicly Funded 

Forensic Crime Labs, and (2) West Virginia University’s Project 

FORESIGHT. We determined that the most useful data for showing 

aggregate nationwide trends was CEBR data and used CEBR data in our 

report.1 In reviewing these datasets and through discussions with lab 

officials, we identified a number of considerations related to analyzing and 

interpreting data from any of these sources, or from individual labs. These 

considerations may pose difficulties assessing data across labs or 

datasets. However, we did not find that these considerations invalidated 

the CEBR data we present in the report.

BJS, a component within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), surveys 

all publicly-funded crime labs in the U.S. periodically in order to provide 

aggregate information on services provided and resources required 

(according to BJS, the last survey covered 2014). This includes 

information on the number of requests for crime scene DNA analysis and 

convicted offender and arrestee samples received, the number of 

requests and samples completed, and the number of requests and 

samples backlogged.

Project FORESIGHT is a research project designed to help crime labs 

evaluate their efficiency and inform resource allocation decisions. It is 

operated through West Virginia University’s College of Business and 

Economics and uses data from participating national, state, and local 

labs. Data submitted from labs include data on DNA analysis workloads 

and backlogs, among other things. According to a representative of 

Project FORESIGHT, as of October 2018, 149 lab systems in the U.S. 

(143 government lab systems representing 275 facilities and 6 private lab 

systems representing 8 facilities) contributed data to the project. A recent 

 1

We also presented CEBR data in a testimony statement in July 2018. See GAO, DNA 

Evidence: Preliminary Observations on DOJ’s DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Grant Program, GAO-18-651T (Washington D.C.: July 18, 2018). 

Appendix II: Additional Sources of Lab Data 

and Considerations When Reviewing DNA 

Evidence Data

Additional Sources of 

State and Local Lab 

Data

BJS Census of Publicly 

Funded Forensic Crime 

Laboratories

Project FORESIGHT
Appendix II: Additional Sources of Lab Data 

and Considerations When Reviewing DNA 

Evidence Data

Page 66 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

software project, called FORESIGHT 20/20, enables participating labs to 

provide data, and receive reports back from project FORESIGHT, almost 

automatically (with a few mouse clicks).

Data on DNA-related workloads and backlogs may be reported at 

different levels. Specifically, data may be reported by a single lab facility, 

a multi-lab system (containing more than one lab facility), or a grantee 

(which also may represent more than one lab facility). Additionally, data 

sets may include data from government labs only, or government labs 

and private labs. Further, DNA analysis of crime scene evidence and 

DNA testing of convicted offender and arrestee samples involve different 

processes, and some labs only perform one function or the other.

Labs or datasets may refer to “requests” for DNA analysis, or they may 

refer to these requests for DNA analysis as “cases.” We use “requests” in 

this report, since there may be several requests associated with a law 

enforcement “case.”

Requests for DNA analysis may be defined and tabulated differently. In 

our report, we define DNA analysis as (1) biology screening (locating, 

screening, identifying, and characterizing blood and other biological stains 

and substances); and/or (2) DNA testing (identifying and comparing DNA 

profiles in biological samples). However, one data collection effort we 

reviewed and one lab we interviewed considered requests for biology 

screening and requests for DNA testing as separate requests. 

Specifically, we found that reported data on DNA requests may count 

requests in two ways:

1. Biology screening and/or DNA testing as one request. If the 

request requires biology screening and/or DNA testing, it is counted 

once as one request (such that if a request requires one or both, it is 

counted once)

Considerations When 

Reviewing Lab DNA 

Evidence Data

Identifying the Universe of 

Labs

Using “Cases” Versus 

“Requests”

Counting Requests for 

DNA Analysis as One 

Request or Two Requests
Appendix II: Additional Sources of Lab Data 

and Considerations When Reviewing DNA 

Evidence Data

Page 67 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

2. Biology screening and DNA testing as separate requests. If the 

request requires only biology screening, it is reported as a “request for 

biology screening;” if the request requires only DNA testing, it is 

counted as a “request for DNA testing;” and if the request requires 

both biology screening and DNA testing, it is counted as two 

requests—one request for biology screening and one request for DNA 

testing.

Data sets may or may not include requests closed by administrative 

means in reported data. Some requests may be closed by administrative 

means rather than through analysis, such as when a suspect pleads 

guilty before the evidence is analyzed or when the victim has not 

consented to participate in the criminal justice process. These requests 

may or may not be included in the number of requests received or the 

number of requests completed. A related issue occurs when law 

enforcement officials or prosecutors fail to withdraw requests from the 

lab’s queue when DNA analysis is no longer needed.

Including or excluding outsourced requests

Data sets may or may not include requests that government labs 

outsourced to other labs for DNA analysis (including private labs). A 

related issue occurs when local law enforcement agencies outsource 

DNA analysis directly to private labs. In these instances, the DNA 

evidence is shipped from the law enforcement agency directly to the 

private lab, which performs DNA analysis. After the private lab performs 

DNA analysis, it provides the results of the analysis to a government lab 

for review and potential upload of the results into the FBI’s Combined 

DNA Index System (CODIS).2

Labs or data sets may calculate turnaround times for requests differently, 

and interpreting turnaround time may require additional explanatory 

information to help understand how labs are performing, as described in 

the bullets below.

 2

CODIS is a system that allows federal, state, and local labs to exchange and compare 

DNA profiles electronically in order to develop investigative leads. Only federal, state, or 

local government labs that meet the FBI’s Quality Assurance Standards can participate in 

CODIS. 

Including or Excluding 

Requests Closed by 

Administrative Means

Calculating and 

Interpreting the Meaning 

of Turnaround Time for 

Requests
Appendix II: Additional Sources of Lab Data 

and Considerations When Reviewing DNA 

Evidence Data

Page 68 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

• Including/excluding “expedited” requests: Data on turnaround 

time may or may not include expedited requests, which occur when 

law enforcement officials or prosecutors mark a request as needing to 

be expedited or rushed due to various factors.

• Different start and end points: Labs or data sets may start or end 

the “clock” for measuring turnaround time at different points. For 

instance, according to two lab directors we interviewed, some labs 

may begin the clock for counting turnaround time when the area of the 

lab that performs DNA analysis takes custody of the evidence, and 

other labs may not begin the clock until an analyst begins working on 

the request.3 NIJ defines the ending of the clock for turnaround time 

as when the lab issues a report with the results to law enforcement. 

Lab directors also suggested there could be different ending points for 

turnaround time.

• Interpreting the link between turnaround time and performance:

According to NIJ officials, a high average turnaround time may not 

necessarily be an indicator of poor performance at a lab or across lab 

populations. This is because turnaround time is a measurement that 

looks backward at completed requests for analysis. Thus, a lab that 

has made a concerted effort to clear its backlog of old requests for 

analysis will, in the immediate aftermath, report a higher average 

turnaround time. Labs may also complete requests associated with 

violent crimes faster than requests associated with nonviolent crimes, 

which may or may not be reported separately.

Depending on the purpose of the analysis, it may be helpful to review 

data that goes beyond “requests.” According to NIJ and stakeholders we 

spoke with, all requests are not equal and do not take the same amount 

of resources. Specifically, requests for analysis may contain one or more 

“items” for examination, such as weapons, carpets, or bedsheets. Each 

item may contain multiple “samples” for analysis (e.g. multiple stains on 

clothing). Each sample, in turn, may be subject to multiple “tests,” such as 

instrumental analysis, extractions, or comparative examinations. Thus, 

 3

Evidence associated with a given request may need to first be processed in one or more 

other areas of the lab—such as areas that perform latent fingerprint analysis or firearms 

analysis—before being processed by the area of the lab that performs DNA analysis. 

Thus, another potential source of confusion is that turnaround time for a given request can 

be thought of as (1) the time it takes to process evidence only in the area of the lab that 

performs DNA analysis, or (2) the time it takes to process evidence in the area of the lab 

that performs DNA analysis and in other areas of the lab where evidence may also need 

to be processed.

Analyzing “Requests”

Versus More Granular 

Information
Appendix II: Additional Sources of Lab Data 

and Considerations When Reviewing DNA 

Evidence Data

Page 69 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

depending on the number of items, samples, and tests needed, requests

can vary greatly in the amount of resources needed.
Appendix III: Information on Backlogs of 

Convicted Offender and Arrestee Samples

Page 70 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The processing of convicted offender and arrestee samples involves the 

DNA testing of the samples and the subsequent review and upload of the 

resulting DNA profiles into the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System 

(CODIS). Data from the National DNA Index System (NDIS)—the national 

level of CODIS—show that convicted offender and arrestee sample DNA 

profile uploads into CODIS increased significantly from 2003 through 

2010, then have generally decreased since 2010, as shown in figure 6.1

Figure 6: Convicted Offender and Arrestee DNA Profile Uploads into the National DNA Index System (NDIS)

Note: A DNA profile is generally considered to be a unique genetic identifier based on the genetic 

constitution of an individual. DNA samples may be taken from convicted offenders, arrestees, and 

other categories of persons as authorized by law.

a

The data show a significant drop in profiles uploaded in 2014, followed by a large increase in 2015. 

FBI officials said this was the effect of a 2014 legal decision in California that forced state officials to 

remove many offender profiles from CODIS. Shortly after, California was able to reinstate the profiles, 

which explains the large increase in 2015.

According to NIJ, a primary reason for the growth in convicted offender 

and arrestee DNA profile uploads prior to 2010 was the passage of state 

laws requiring the collection and testing of DNA samples. For instance, 

NIJ reported that by 2009, the federal government and all 50 states had 

 1

CODIS has multiple levels where DNA profiles can be stored and searched: the local 

level, the state level, and the national level. NDIS is the national level of CODIS. 

Appendix III: Information on Backlogs of 

Convicted Offender and Arrestee Samples
Appendix III: Information on Backlogs of 

Convicted Offender and Arrestee Samples

Page 71 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

passed bills requiring collection of DNA from offenders convicted of 

certain crimes; in addition, the federal government and many states had 

also passed legislation to allow collection from people who are arrested 

for certain crimes. According to NIJ, between 2005 and 2010, it made 

more than $58 million available to reduce the backlog of samples of 

convicted offenders and arrestees. According to officials from NIJ, the 

FBI, and the American Society of Crime Lab Directors, this funding 

helped build labs’ capacities such that convicted offender and arrestee 

backlogs are no longer an issue of concern.
Appendix IV: Grant Programs That Address 

DNA Evidence Backlogs and Unsubmitted 

Sexual Assault Kits

Page 72 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has two grant programs that primarily 

address DNA evidence backlogs at labs and two grant programs that 

primarily address unsubmitted sexual assault kits (SAK) in law 

enforcement custody.

The DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction grant program 

(CEBR) dates back to 2004 and funds are available to address DNA 

evidence backlogs in labs, among other things. The CEBR program is 

funded by an appropriation “for a DNA analysis and capacity 

enhancement program and for other local, State, and Federal forensic 

activities.”1 The broad appropriations language enables the National 

Institute of Justice (NIJ) to allocate this funding for a variety of forensic 

programs. However, the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 

mandated that at least 75 percent of funds made available under this 

appropriation be used for grants for DNA analysis or to increase the 

capacity of government labs to carry out DNA analysis.2 In 2017, NIJ 

began the Forensic DNA Laboratory Efficiency Improvement and 

Capacity Enhancement (EI&CE) grant program which is intended to 

 1

The appropriation language states that funds are “for a DNA analysis and capacity 

enhancement program and for other local, State, and Federal forensic activities, including 

the purposes authorized under section 2 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 

2000 (Public Law 106–546) (the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program).” The 

purposes of the CEBR grant program are generally similar to the purposes of the Debbie 

Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program. There is no additional statutory authorization for the 

program.

2

The Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 3(a), requires that 

not less than 75 percent of the funds made available under this appropriation be provided 

for grants for activities described under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 2(a) of the 

DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. Those purposes include (1) To carry out, 

for inclusion in the Combined DNA Index System of the FBI, DNA analyses of samples 

collected under applicable legal authority; (2) To carry out, for inclusion in such Combined 

DNA Index System, DNA analyses of samples from crime scenes, including samples from 

rape kits, samples from other sexual assault evidence, and samples taken in cases 

without an identified suspect; and (3) To increase the capacity of laboratories owned by 

the State or by units of local government to carry out DNA analysis of samples specified in 

the purposes above. Prior to this, congressional reports accompanying the appropriation 

have directed that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) make funding for DNA analysis 

and capacity enhancement a priority. OJP officials said they use CEBR funding to help 

meet the “75 percent” requirement discussed above. 

Appendix IV: Grant Programs That Address 

DNA Evidence Backlogs and Unsubmitted 

Sexual Assault Kits

Grants That Primarily 

Address DNA 

Backlogs at Labs
Appendix IV: Grant Programs That Address 

DNA Evidence Backlogs and Unsubmitted 

Sexual Assault Kits

Page 73 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

complement the CEBR program by allowing more flexibility in how funds 

can be used.3 Both CEBR and EI&CE program details are in table 7.

Table 7: Department of Justice (DOJ) Grant Programs that Address DNA Evidence Backlogs at Labs

Grant program Year 

began

Fiscal year 2018

participation and 

amount awardeda

Description

DNA Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction 

(CEBR) Programb

2004 127 awards

$67.8 million awarded

CEBR is a formulac grant program administered by the 

National Institute of Justice (NIJ).

Eligible participants are states and units of local government 

with existing crime labs.

Award funds support capacity building and analysis at labs 

related to (1) DNA evidence collected from crime scenes, 

and (2) DNA samples taken from convicted offenders and 

arrestees. 

Forensic DNA Lab Efficiency 

Improvement and Capacity 

Enhancement (EI&CE) 

Program

2017 19 awards

$9.3 million

EI&CE is a grant program administered by NIJ. Awards are 

made competitively.

Eligible participants are states and units of local government 

with existing crime labs.

Applications must be project based.

Award funds may be used to support efficiency and capacitybuilding at labs related to DNA and non-DNA disciplines 

(such as forensic analysis of latent fingerprints and firearms). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ documents. | GAO-19-216.

a

These amounts reflect amounts awarded in fiscal year 2018, with the actual project period beginning 

January 1, 2019.

b

The CEBR program has several legacy names dating back to 2004. In 2011, grant programs that 

separately funded labs that (1) analyzed crime scene DNA evidence and (2) tested convicted 

offender and arrestee DNA samples, were combined into one grant program called the DNA Backlog 

Reduction Program. In 2014, this was renamed the DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Program.

c

Formula grant awards are made non-competitively to states and units of local government based on 

a formula set by DOJ (as opposed to a formula set by statue in the case of some grant programs) that 

allocates certain amounts to each state. This formula takes into account each state’s population and 

associated crime levels, and guarantees a minimum amount for eligible applicants from each state.

 3

The EI&CE program is funded by the same appropriation as the CEBR program, and 

OJP officials said they also use funding provided through this grant program to meet the 

“75 percent” requirement discussed in the previous footnote. The CEBR program does 

not permit the use of funds for non-DNA disciplines. According to DOJ, enhancing 

capacity and improving efficiency in the processing and testing of non-DNA evidence from 

cases that also involve a request for DNA analysis will ultimately reduce the backlog of 

DNA evidence. According to NIJ officials, this is because evidence associated with a given 

request may need to first be processed in one or more other areas of the lab—such as 

areas that perform latent fingerprint analysis or firearms analysis—before being processed 

by the area of the lab that performs DNA analysis. Thus, according to officials, enhancing 

capacity and improving efficiency in other areas of the lab will result in a shorter overall lab 

processing time for the request as a whole. 
Appendix IV: Grant Programs That Address 

DNA Evidence Backlogs and Unsubmitted 

Sexual Assault Kits

Page 74 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The Sexual Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI) program began in 2015 and 

addresses unsubmitted SAKs and other related challenges. SAKI is 

administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), a component 

within OJP which provides leadership and services in grant 

administration.4 In 2016, NIJ began the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence 

– Inventory, Tracking, and Reporting (SAFE-ITR) program, which 

provides funding to inventory SAKs, track their movement, and report on 

their status (e.g. in law enforcement custody, submitted to labs, etc.).5

These grant programs are detailed in table 8.

Table 8: Department of Justice (DOJ) Grant Programs that Address Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) in Law Enforcement Custody 

that Have Not Been Submitted to Labs for DNA Analysis

Grant program Year 

began

Fiscal year 2018 

participation and 

amount awardeda

Description

Sexual Assault Kit Initiative 

(SAKI)

2015 32 awards

$42.9 million

• SAKI is a grant program administered by DOJ’s Bureau of 

Justice Assistance. Awards are made competitively.

• Eligible participants include state law enforcement 

agencies and units of local government, among other 

entities.

• Award funds support multidisciplinary community 

response teams that inventory, track, and analyze 

previously unsubmitted SAKs, and perform a variety of 

other related services.b Award funds may also be used to 

collect lawfully-owed DNA samples and support 

investigation and prosecution of cold case sexual 

assaults.c

 4

According to OJP officials, SAKI is authorized and funded by an appropriation “for a grant 

program for community-based sexual assault response reform.” See Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 204. 

5

According to OJP the SAFE-ITR program for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 was authorized 

and funded by appropriations “for a grant program for community-based sexual assault 

response reform,” and/or “a DNA analysis and capacity enhancement program 

and...forensic activities.” See id. Program requirements for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 for 

the SAFE-ITR program are described in NIJ’s grant solicitations and are similar, but not 

identical, to the new authorized grant program area contained in the SAFER Act of 2013, 

Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1002, 127 Stat. 54, 127 (amending 34 U.S.C. § 40701). For fiscal 

year 2018, DOJ is required by the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 to allocate 

no less than 5 percent of funds authorized and funded by appropriations for “a DNA 

analysis and capacity enhancement program and...forensic activities” to this new purpose 

areas, in addition to other requirements Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 3, 130 Stat. 1948, 1949. 

According to OJP officials, the fiscal year 2018 SAFE-ITR grant program fulfills this 

allocation requirement. 

Grants That Primarily 

Address Unsubmitted 

SAKs in Law 

Enforcement Custody
Appendix IV: Grant Programs That Address 

DNA Evidence Backlogs and Unsubmitted 

Sexual Assault Kits

Page 75 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Grant program Year 

began

Fiscal year 2018 

participation and 

amount awardeda

Description

Sexual Assault Forensic 

Evidence – Inventory, 

Tracking, and Reporting 

(SAFE-ITR)

2016 3 awards

$1.4 million

SAFE-ITR is a grant program administered by DOJ’s National 

Institute of Justice. Awards are made competitively.

Eligible participants are states and units of local government.

Award funds support efforts to inventory, track, and report on 

previously unsubmitted SAKs as they move from collection 

through final disposition.

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ documents. | GAO-19-216

a

These amounts reflect amounts awarded in fiscal year 2018, with the actual project period beginning 

on October 1, 2018 for SAKI grantees and January 1, 2019 for SAFE-ITR grantees.

b

These other services may include, for example, producing necessary protocols and policies in 

support of improved coordination and collaboration among labs, police, prosecutors, and victim 

service providers; or providing resources to address sexual assault investigations and prosecutions.

c

Lawfully-owed DNA samples are DNA samples that have never been collected from convicted 

offenders, arrestees, and potentially others, even though applicable law allows for their collection. 

According to BJA, collection of lawfully-owed DNA samples and investigation and prosecution of cold 

case sexual assaults should be undertaken only after a jurisdiction has made significant progress in 

addressing issues associated with unsubmitted SAKs.
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 76 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The information listed below provides descriptions of, and data from, 

large-scale efforts to inventory or quantify unsubmitted sexual assault kits 

(SAK) in law enforcement custody. For some efforts, the data provided 

goes beyond counts of unsubmitted SAKs in law enforcement custody, 

and provides downstream outputs and outcomes associated with the 

previously unsubmitted SAKs—including counts of SAKs analyzed, and 

associated CODIS hits, criminal investigations, and prosecutions.

There are challenges to obtaining reliable data on unsubmitted SAKs, 

discussed below. Nevertheless, we took steps to ensure the data we 

present below are sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which is to provide 

data that accurately reflect the activities and outcomes of the large-scale 

efforts we discuss.1 We also note that data from these efforts may 

overlap, which means that it is not possible to combine totals from each 

effort without potentially duplicating results.

SAKI grants provide funding to state law enforcement agencies and units 

of local government to help them address unsubmitted SAKs. The SAKI 

program requires grantees to first take an inventory of unsubmitted SAKs; 

however, SAKI grantees may also use SAKI funds to test SAKs and 

pursue investigations, among other things.2 BJA collects SAKI 

performance data from grantees related to these SAKI-funded activities, 

as well as data on activities grantees completed prior to receiving SAKI 

funds. BJA officials who administer the SAKI program stated that they 

believe the number of CODIS hits, investigations, prosecutions, and 

convictions connected to many of these previously unsubmitted SAKs will 

continue to increase over time as these outputs and outcomes often take 

time to materialize. 

 1

See our scope and methodology in appendix I for the specific steps we took. 

2

According to BJA documentation, SAKI aims to create a coordinated community 

response to achieve just resolution to sexual assault cases by (1) establishing or 

strengthening a comprehensive and victim-centered approach, (2) capacity building to 

prevent high numbers of unsubmitted SAKs in the future, and (3) supporting the 

investigation and prosecution of cases for which SAKs were previously unsubmitted. More 

information on the SAKI program is in appendix IV.

Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits 

and Associated Challenges

National Sexual Assault Kit 

Initiative (SAKI) Grantee Data
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 77 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 9: Counts of Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) Inventoried, Analyzed, and Outcomes from Analysis and 

Investigation as Reported by 38 SAKI Grantees (October 2015 – June 2018)

Prior to SAKIa SAKI-fundedb Total 

Collection and Storage

Number of SAKs Inventoried

(a SAKI requirement)

70,611 53,929 124,540

Number of unsubmitted SAKs Identified 59,614 43,223 102,837

Submission and Prioritization

Number of previously-analyzed SAKsc 10,997 10,705 21,702

Number of SAKs determined not to require DNA analysisd 2,225 5,544 7,769

Number of SAKs determined to require DNA analysis 49,847 30,991 80,838

Number of SAKs submitted for DNA analysis 26,196 42,484 68,680

Lab Analysis and Reporting

Number of SAKs tested to completion - 33,228 33,228

Number of uploads to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)e 9,599 11,336 20,935

Number of CODIS hitsf 6,110 5,001 11,111

Number of CODIS hits to known serial sex offenders - 832 832

Investigation and Prosecution

Potential Investigations - 4,602 4,602

Potential Prosecutions - 3,682 3,682

Charges Resulting in Plea Bargains - 378 378

Post-Trial Convictions - 93 93

Source: GAO analysis of National Sexual Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI) grantee data. | GAO-19-216

Note: Blank entries indicate data from prior to the SAKI program that SAKI did not ask for or were not 

able to obtain from grantees.

a

These data reflect outputs and outcomes from activities that took place by jurisdictions before the 

first allocation of SAKI funding. According to BJA, the SAKI program does not collect data for some 

pre-SAKI activities in the “Lab Analysis and Reporting” and “Investigation and Prosecution”

categories, which are reflected by blank cells. As such, total activities in these instances should be 

considered representative of SAKI-funded activities only. BJA officials stated that they believe the 

actual totals for these categories would be larger if such data were available.

b

SAKI-funded data includes only those outputs and outcomes from activities that took place as a 

result of SAKI funds. The SAKI program does not allow grantees to use SAKI funds to inventory 

SAKs that were collected after the grant application date.

c

Previously-analyzed SAKs may appear in an inventory because the kit was discovered to have been 

analyzed only after it was included in the inventory. However, a previously-tested SAK may be 

determined to require testing under SAKI if it was only partially tested in the past—such as only 

subject to biological screening or analyzed using non-CODIS eligible DNA methodologies.

d

A SAK may be determined not to require analysis if, for example, the victim chose not to participate 

in the criminal justice process or law enforcement determined through the facts of the case that a 

crime did not occur.

e

CODIS is a database that allows federal, state, and local labs to exchange and compare DNA 

profiles electronically. As a result of processing evidence from crime scenes, only DNA profiles 

believed to belong to a potential perpetrator can be uploaded into CODIS.
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 78 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

f

The FBI defines a hit as “a confirmed [DNA profile] match that aids an investigation and one or more 

of the case(s) involved in the match are unsolved.”

In 2015, DANY awarded nearly $38 million in grants to 32 jurisdictions 

(grantees) across 20 states to help them analyze SAKs.3 DANY and SAKI 

program administrators coordinated to ensure that the DANY and SAKI 

programs complemented each other and did not duplicate resources. 

Funding awarded through DANY’s SAK Program is only allowed to be 

used for costs associated with analyzing SAKs; thus, DANY did not 

provide funds for grantees to perform inventories.4 Nevertheless, DANY 

tracks the number of SAKs submitted to labs for analysis, which DANY 

officials said serves as a proxy for previously unsubmitted SAKs. In 

addition, DANY collects data on outputs and outcomes that occur as a 

result of SAK analysis. According to DANY officials, the number of 

investigations, prosecutions, and convictions will increase following the 

end of the grant program as these outcomes often take time to 

materialize. Though the DANY grant program ended in September 2018, 

grantees will continue to share results for another year.

 3

According to DANY documentation, New York City was the first major jurisdiction to make 

a comprehensive effort to eliminate previously unsubmitted SAKs. According to DANY 

documentation, between 2000 and 2003, New York City sent out approximately 17,000 

SAKs for DNA analysis. DANY officials we spoke with said that when New York County—

one of the 5 counties in New York City—received windfall money from a legal settlement, 

the county wanted to use the money to help other jurisdictions replicate what New York 

City had done. 

4

The DANY grant solicitation did not distinguish between “unsubmitted” SAKs in law 

enforcement jurisdiction and “backlogged” SAKs in laboratories. Specifically, according to 

the DANY SAK Program grant solicitation, a SAK eligible for analysis with grant funds is 

one that is connected to a reported sexual assault that has not been analyzed within 365 

days of being booked into law enforcement evidence regardless of the reason it had not 

been analyzed. 

New York County District 

Attorney’s Office (DANY) 

Grantee Data
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 79 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 10: Counts of Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) Submitted for Analysis, and Outcomes from Analysis and Investigation, as 

Reported by 32 Grantees Participating in the New York County District Attorney’s Office (DANY) SAK Grant Program (as of 

September 2018)

DANY program data 

Collection and storage

This step is outside of the scope of the DANY program 

Submission and prioritization

Number of SAKs submitted for DNA analysisa 62,915

Lab analysis and reporting

Number of uploads to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)b 16,657

Number of CODIS hitsc 8,185d

Investigation and prosecution

Arrests 196

Prosecutions 184

Convictions 58

Source: GAO presentation of DANY’s Sexual Assault Kit Backlog Elimination Program data. | GAO-19-216

Note: Fields under headings “Lab analysis and reporting” and “Investigation and prosecution”

represent grantee-reported outputs and outcomes resulting from DANY-funded SAK analysis. DANY 

funds were not used to directly assist grantees with these activities.

a

Data collected by DANY grant administrators do not include the number of unsubmitted SAKs 

identified. These data do, however, provide a count of the number of SAKs submitted to labs for 

analysis, which DANY officials said serves as a proxy for previously unsubmitted SAKs.

b

CODIS is the generic term used to describe the FBI’s program of support for criminal justice DNA 

databases as well as the software used to run these databases. It enables federal, state, and local 

labs to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically, thereby linking crimes to each other and 

to known convicted offenders and arrestees.

c

The FBI defines a hit as “a confirmed [DNA profile] match that aids an investigation and one or more 

of the case(s) involved in the match are unsolved.”

d

Of these 8,185 CODIS hits, DANY labeled 2,785 of them as “confirmatory” hits (more of the 8,185 

hits may be confirmatory hits since, at the time of our review, two of the grantees had not reported to 

DANY how many of their total hits were confirmatory hits). According to DANY, confirmatory hits 

reflect instances where the suspected perpetrator was identified and potentially convicted of the 

associated sexual assault prior to SAK analysis. Thus, SAK analysis and the related CODIS profile 

match confirm the known suspect or perpetrator. Some of these confirmatory hits may meet the FBI’s 

definition of a CODIS hit, and others may not (see the FBI’s definition of a hit in table note “c”). For 

instance, according to FBI officials, CODIS matches that confirm the identity of known suspects in 

unsolved cases—where such confirmation through DNA analysis had not already occurred—qualify 

as hits; however, CODIS matches that identify known perpetrators in solved cases do not qualify as 

hits.
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 80 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

As of September 2018, we identified at least 26 states with laws that 

require the conducting of SAK inventories where evidence had not yet 

been submitted for lab analysis.5 Twenty-four of these laws were passed 

in 2014 or later. We provide data on unsubmitted SAKs identified in Idaho 

and Texas in table 11 as illustrative examples of the results of these types 

of laws.

Table 11: Data Resulting from Laws Requiring Inventories of Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits (SAK) in Idaho and Texas

State Summary of law Inventory data

Idaho One-time inventory 

by December 2016 

and annual inventory 

beginning January 

2017

• December 2016: 1,116 unsubmitted SAKs inventoried, 541 of which required analysisa

• Update through end of 2017: 463 additional SAKs were collected during 2017 (making a total of 

1,572 SAKs from both 2016 and 2017); of these, 509 were submitted to a lab and 316 were 

analyzed by a lab during 2017

• Update through September 2018: 354 additional SAKs were collected from January 2017 

through September 2018 (making a total of 1,933 SAKs since the one-time inventory in 2016); 

of these, 541 were submitted to a lab during this time and 218 were analyzed during this time 

Texas One-time inventory 

by October 2011b

• February 2013: 15,823 sexual assault cases with unsubmitted evidence inventoriedc

• Update through August 2017: 3,132 additional sexual assault cases with unsubmitted evidence 

inventoried, making a total of 18,955 cases; of these, 16,773 have been analyzed and 2,142 

remain to be analyzed.

Source: Analysis of state laws, reports, and interviews with state officials. | GAO-19-216

a

Under the Idaho code, a SAK is not required to be analyzed if (1) there is no evidence to support a 

crime being committed, (2) it is no longer being investigated as a crime, or (3) an adult victim 

expressly indicates that no further forensic examination or testing occur. Idaho Code. Ann. § 67-

2919(8).

b

This law became effective on September 1, 2011. 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1105, § 18. Guidance 

provided by the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) to law enforcement agencies instructed 

them to provide TDPS with data on evidence collected prior to July 31, 2011. A report was due from 

TDPS by February 2013.

c

The law required law enforcement agencies to inventory “all active criminal cases for which sexual 

assault evidence had not yet been submitted for laboratory analysis,” as opposed to an inventory of 

SAKs. 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1105, § 15(a)(1). According to a senior official from TDPS, law 

enforcement primarily reported cases that included SAKs. Additionally, TDPS provided guidelines to 

law enforcement agencies that operationalized the statutory definition of “active criminal cases.” See 

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 420.003. Specifically, the guidance states that (1) the offense has to have 

been reported to law enforcement and the evidence must be in the custody of the law enforcement 

agency or an accredited crime lab, and (2) this does not apply to sexual assault evidence that was 

collected prior to September 1, 1996.

 5

Legislation varies by state. For example, some states require one-time inventories and 

other states require annual inventories; additionally, some states require inventories of 

SAKs and others require inventories of sexual assault cases (which often include SAKs). 

Other variations may apply. 

Data from State Efforts to 

Address Unsubmitted SAKs
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 81 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The SAFER Act of 2013 authorizes grants for the purpose of conducting 

audits of sexual assault evidence, and requires the Attorney General to 

publish information from these audits online.6 According to OJP officials, 

because no appropriations were required to be allocated for grants under 

this new grant purpose area until 2018, OJP was under no obligation to 

collect or report on this information until that time.7 However, according to 

OJP officials, now that an appropriation has been made for grants for this 

new purpose area, OJP has taken steps to modify an existing grant 

program to ensure it complies with related requirements.8 Specifically, 

according to OJP officials, NIJ made changes to the Sexual Assault 

Forensic Evidence – Inventory, Tracking, and Reporting (SAFE-ITR) 

grant program to ensure it fully complies with the additional statutory 

requirements of the SAFER Act.9 The intent of this program is to support 

states and local governments as they inventory, track, and report on 

previously unsubmitted SAKs.10 OJP officials said they plan to begin 

publishing information online from fiscal year 2018 SAFE-ITR grantees, 

but they said the information will be limited at first because grantees will 

have just begun their award periods (begins January 1, 2019).

 6

The SAFER Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1002, 127 Stat. 54, 127-131, added a new 

purpose area and related requirements to the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program 

(34 U.S.C. § 40701). 

7

Specifically, according to OJP officials, until 2018, NIJ grantees were under no statutory 

obligation to submit the reports described at 34 U.S.C. § 40701(n)(4) that would have 

been required consistent with the SAFER Act of 2013 amendments to the Debbie Smith

DNA Backlog Grant Program statutory authorization. 

8

DOJ is required by the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 to allocate no less than 

5 percent of funds authorized and funded by appropriations for “a DNA analysis and 

capacity enhancement program and...forensic activities” for the new purpose area 

authorized by the SAFER Act of 2013. Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 3, 130 Stat. 1948, 1949. 

The Justice for All Reauthorization Act also contained additional requirements related 

these activities; in particular, the funds must also be used to create and operate 

associated tracking systems and to prioritize cases in which the statute of limitations will 

soon expire. 

9

The SAFE-ITR grant program began in 2016. According to OJP officials, the SAFE-ITR 

program for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 was authorized and funded by appropriations “for 

a grant program for community-based sexual assault response reform,” and “a DNA 

analysis and capacity enhancement program and...forensic activities.” According to these 

officials, program requirements for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 for the SAFE-ITR program 

are described in NIJ’s grant solicitations and are similar, but not identical, to requirements 

added by the SAFER Act of 2013 to the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program 

statutory authorization. 

10We include more information on SAFE-ITR in appendix IV. 

Reporting Requirements under 

the Sexual Assault Forensic 

Evidence Reporting (SAFER) 

Act
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 82 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

The SAFER Act requires that grantees provide reports to DOJ every 60 

days, and that DOJ publish these reports online within 7 additional days.11

Per the Act, these reports are to include, for each grantee, among other 

things, the cumulative total number of samples of sexual assault evidence 

that, at the end of the reporting period that: (1) are in the possession of 

the state or unit of local government, (2) have been submitted to a lab, (3) 

have been analyzed to completion.12 OJP officials said that potential 

SAFE-ITR grantees may consider these and other reporting requirements 

(not listed here) to be burdensome, especially when compared to the 

reporting requirements of SAKI grants.13 As evidence of this sentiment 

among potential SAFE-ITR grantees, OJP officials stated that, in fiscal 

year 2018, they only awarded $1.4 million out of a total of $5.5 million 

available to SAFE-ITR grantees, due to a lack of interest among 

applicants. In contrast, in fiscal year 2018, the SAKI program received 

more applications for federal funding than they had available (they 

awarded $42.9 million).

The SAFER Act also allows for optional reporting of sexual assault 

forensic evidence information from non-grantee states and local 

governments. Specifically, the Act requires that the Attorney General 

make the reporting form that SAFE-ITR grantees use available to all 

states and units of local government. States and local governments can 

then, at their sole discretion, submit reports to DOJ for publication.14 OJP 

reported that it plans to have the SAFE-ITR reporting form finalized by 

January 1, 2019, the start date for fiscal year 2018 SAFE-ITR grantees.

The Joyful Heart Foundation, a survivors’ advocacy organization, has 

ongoing work to quantify the number of unsubmitted SAKs in law 

enforcement custody nationwide. According to representatives from 

Joyful Heart, as of October 2018, they had obtained data from 35 states 

and 32 cities or counties.15 The Joyful Heart Foundation reported that it 

obtained data made available through legislative mandates, executive 

 1134 U.S.C. § 40701(n)(4)(A),(C). 

1234 U.S.C. § 40701(n)(4)(B). 

13SAKI grants also allow funds to be used to conduct inventories of unsubmitted SAKs, 

and also require grantees to report data associated with those inventories.

1434 U.S.C. § 40701(n)(4)(E)(ii). 

15Joyful Heart Foundation representatives said that in instances where they obtain data on 

unsubmitted SAKs in cities or counties that are located in states where they have obtained 

statewide data, they adjust the state data to avoid double-counting. 

Joyful Heart Foundation 

Project to Aggregate State and 

Local Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted SAKs
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 83 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

actions, or audits required under federal funding requirements. The 

Foundation reported that it also obtained data through its own public 

records requests. They publish the data and provide links to their sources 

on a publicly-available website. Representatives said they do their best to 

ensure the sources they obtain data from are reliable, the data is not 

double-counted, and the data are up to date. Nevertheless, given the 

many and varied sources of government and other publicly-available data 

used to calculate the figure, we did not independently perform steps to 

ensure each source was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

We identified several challenges associated with inventorying SAKs 

within jurisdictions and quantifying them across jurisdictions.16 These 

challenges make it difficult to obtain complete and accurate counts at the 

jurisdiction level, and contribute to the difficulty of obtaining a definitive 

count of unsubmitted SAKs nationwide. The challenges we identified 

include the following:

• Difficulty locating SAKs. DOJ has reported that inconsistencies in 

how and where SAKs are stored may pose difficulties for SAK 

tracking and management. DOJ also reported that SAKs may be in 

law enforcement property rooms; crime labs; or in rape crisis centers, 

hospitals, or other medical facilities where they were originally 

collected. Additionally, DNA evidence stakeholders we interviewed 

said that a significant challenge to inventorying SAKs is the act of 

physically locating them.

• Insufficient or inconsistent information technology (IT) systems.

NIJ has reported that the quality of law enforcement evidence tracking 

systems may be a significant challenge in many law enforcement 

agencies across the country.17 Additionally, BJA officials stated that 

the multitude of disparate and sometimes incompatible data systems 

used within and across jurisdictions can make tracking and identifying 

a SAK difficult.18

 16For information about the steps we took to identify these challenges, see our scope and 

methodology in appendix I. 

17For example, when NIJ began a project to help the city of Detroit, Michigan, address its 

SAK backlog, NIJ reported that Detroit’s police department property room “database” was 

a simple spreadsheet, and it was not easy to figure out which SAKs might have been 

analyzed over the years. 

18For example, there may be different data systems used by the lab, the police 

department, and the district attorney’s office within a single jurisdiction and these 

differences are magnified when working across different jurisdictions. 

Challenges to Inventorying 

SAKs Within Jurisdictions and 

Quantifying SAKs Across 

Jurisdictions
Appendix V: Selected Efforts to Inventory or 

Quantify Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits and 

Associated Challenges

Page 84 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

• Lack of incentive or awareness. According to NIJ-funded research 

on unsubmitted SAKs, law enforcement may be hesitant to provide 

counts of these SAKs since reporting the number of unsubmitted 

SAKs publicly may be seen as a reflection of poor performance or 

may expose law enforcement to legal action. Representatives from 

the Joyful Heart Foundation suggested that this may also reflect a 

lack of priority given to sexual assault cases. Additionally, BJA 

officials stated that some SAKI grantees have found that certain law 

enforcement jurisdictions may not be aware that they had unsubmitted 

SAKs in their custody.

• Resource constraints. Some stakeholders we interviewed stated, 

and NIJ has reported, that when law enforcement agencies perform 

inventories, they do not always have the needed funding, personnel, 

or training and technical expertise to provide complete and accurate 

counts. However, OJP officials and survivor advocacy representatives 

said that, generally speaking, jurisdictions were able to mobilize 

resources to perform inventories of unsubmitted SAKs once they 

made it a priority to do so.

• Understanding which SAKs should be included in inventories.

There is no single definition of what qualifies as an ‘unsubmitted SAK.’

For instance, depending on the effort, an inventory of SAKs may or 

may not include SAKs that are past the statute of limitations or that 

were collected before a certain time period. An inventory also may or 

may not include unreported SAKs.19

• Ensuring counts are reliable and up to date. The number of 

unsubmitted SAKs is constantly changing as (1) law enforcement 

agencies locate or identify old SAKs in storage, (2) SAKs are 

submitted to labs and are therefore no longer considered 

“unsubmitted,” and (3) new SAKs are booked into evidence. Thus, 

counts or inventories are a snapshot of unsubmitted SAKs at a given 

time and require constant monitoring and updating.

 19According to NIJ, an unreported SAK is a SAK from a victim who has consented to the 

collection of the SAK but has not consented to participate in the criminal justice process. 

Also according to NIJ, an unreported SAK cannot be submitted to a laboratory for 

analysis, unless applicable law allows.
Appendix VI: DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Program-wide Performance 

Measures

Page 85 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 12: DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) Program-wide Performance Measures, Detailed 

Summary

Performance measure Definition

(according to the National 

Institute of Justice) 

Years in use 

since 2011

Data source Scope of performance 

measure

Crime scene DNA analysis

Number of Forensic Cases 

Analyzeda Performance measure captures the number of cases that 

grantees analyzed using DNA 

CEBR grants, including all 

outsourced cases.

2011-2017 CEBR grantee 

performance reports 

(aggregated) 

Lab activities funded by 

CEBR grants

Number of Forensic DNA 

Profilesb Uploaded to the 

FBI’s Combined DNA Index 

System (CODIS)c

Performance measure captures 

the number of forensic profiles 

that were uploaded to CODIS 

from cases that grantees 

analyzed using DNA CEBR grant 

funds.

2011-2017 CEBR grantee 

performance reports 

(aggregated)

Lab activities funded by 

CEBR grants

Percentage Increase in 

Forensic DNA Profiles 

Uploaded to CODIS from the 

Previous Year 

Performance measure captures 

the percentage increase in the 

total number of forensic DNA 

profiles uploaded to NDIS from 

the previous calendar year.d

2014-2017 FBI website hosting 

data from its National 

DNA Index System

All lab activities 

Offender sample DNA testing

Number of Convicted 

Offender and/or Arrestee 

Database Samples 

Analyzede

Performance measure captures 

the number of convicted offender 

and/or arrestee DNA database 

samples analyzed using DNA 

CEBR grant funds.

2011-2017 CEBR grantee 

performance reports 

(aggregated)

Lab activities funded by 

CEBR grants

Number of Convicted 

Offender and/or Arrestee 

Database Profiles Uploaded 

to CODIS

Performance measure captures 

the number of convicted offender 

and/or arrestee DNA database 

profiles that are uploaded to 

CODIS from samples using DNA 

CEBR grant funds.

2011-2017 CEBR grantee 

performance reports 

(aggregated)

Lab activities funded by 

CEBR grants

Crime scene DNA analysis and offender sample testing

Number of CODIS Hitsf This performance measure 

captures the number of CODIS 

hits made from forensic or 

convicted offender and/or 

arrestee DNA database profiles 

that are uploaded to CODIS 

using DNA grant funds. 

2011-2017 CEBR grantee 

performance reports 

(aggregated)

Lab activities funded by 

CEBR grants

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by the National Institute of Justice | GAO-19-216

a

Forensic cases refers to requests for DNA analysis on evidence from crime scenes, victims, and 

suspects.

b

A DNA profile contains the genetic constitution of an individual at defined locations (also known as 

loci) in the DNA. Each person (except identical twins) has a unique DNA profile when used in the 

context of the national level of the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which now evaluates 

20 specific DNA locations.

Appendix VI: DNA Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction Program-wide 

Performance Measures
Appendix VI: DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Program-wide Performance 

Measures

Page 86 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

c

CODIS is a system that allows federal, state, and local labs to exchange and compare DNA profiles 

electronically. As a result of processing evidence from crime scenes, only DNA profiles believed to 

belong to an unknown potential perpetrator can be uploaded into CODIS.

d

NDIS is one part of CODIS—the national level—containing the DNA profiles contributed by federal, 

state, and local participating forensic labs. NDIS was implemented in October 1998. All 50 states, the 

District of Columbia, the federal government, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Lab, and Puerto 

Rico participate in NDIS.

e

”Convicted offender/arrestee database samples” to refer to DNA analysis on samples taken from 

convicted offenders, arrestees, and other categories of persons as authorized by law.

f

The FBI defines a hit as “A confirmed [DNA profile] match that aids an investigation and one or more 

of the case(s) involved in the match are unsolved.”
Appendix VII: Selected Attributes of 

Successful Performance Measures and 

Consequences if Not Met

Page 87 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 13 is a summary of selected attributes of successful performance 

measures, including the potentially adverse consequences if they are 

missing, that we identified in prior work.

Table 13: Summary of Selected Attributes of Successful Performance Measures and Adverse Consequences of Not Meeting 

Attribute

Attribute of successful performance measure Potential adverse consequence of not meeting attribute

Linkage

Measure is aligned with program goals.

Behaviors and incentives created by measures do not support 

program goals.

Clarity

Measure is clearly stated and the name and definition are 

consistent with the methodology used to calculate it.

Data could be confusing and misleading to users.

Measurable target

Measure has a numerical goal.

Inability to determine whether performance is meeting expectations. 

Core program activities

As a group, measures cover the activities that an entity is 

expected to perform to support the intent of the program.

Not enough information available in core program areas for managers 

and stakeholders to make key decisions.

Balance

As a group, measures ensure that key program priorities are 

covered.

Lack of balance could create skewed incentives when measures 

overemphasize some goals.

Source: GAO. | GAO-19-216

Appendix VII: Selected Attributes of 

Successful Performance Measures and 

Consequences if Not Met
Appendix VIII: DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Program Permissible Uses 

of Funds

Page 88 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 14: DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program (CEBR) Permissible Uses of Funds in 2018 Grant 

Solicitation

Permissible use of CEBR funds Description

1. Salary and benefits of lab 

employees

Funds for additional full-time or part-time employees to directly process, record, screen, and/or 

analyze forensic DNA and/or DNA database samples. Funds may also be used to hire 

additional staff to directly perform capacity enhancement-specific activities, such as validating 

new DNA analysis technologies for the forensic DNA or DNA database lab. Funds are subject 

to applicable restrictions on supplanting. 

2. Overtime for lab staff Overtime for lab employees (excluding executive personnel) to directly process, record, 

screen, and/or analyze forensic DNA and/or DNA database samples. Funds may also be used 

to pay overtime for existing lab employees to directly perform capacity enhancement-specific 

activities, such as validating new DNA analysis technologies for the forensic DNA or DNA 

database lab.

3. Training Funds for training (1) directly related to DNA lab, (2) appropriate continuing and professional 

education associated with professional meetings and conferences (no more than 8 percent of 

the award) and (3) travel expenses, registration fees, and learning aids not associated with 

professional meetings and conferences (no more than 8 percent of the award). 

4. Travel Funds for travel to conduct required site visits to public or private accredited labs that will be 

conducting DNA analyses on behalf of the eligible state or unit of local government to review 

procedures and practices prior to initial sample shipment; funds may also be used to make one 

additional unannounced site visit.

5. Equipment Funds to upgrade, replace, or purchase lab equipment, instrumentation, and associated 

computer hardware for the lab.

6. Supplies Lab supplies for (a) validation, (b) DNA sample analysis and (c) collection kits for 

offender/arrestee samples. 

7. Contracts Contracts for (a) outsourcing sample processing, (b) DNA audits, (c) process mapping or 

efficiency studies, (d) warranty, service, or maintenance contracts for equipment, (e) temporary 

lab employees, (f) validation studies for new DNA analysis technologies and (g) in-house 

training. 

8. Direct administrative expenses Direct administrative expenses for grant management, not to exceed 3 percent of the federal 

portion. 

9. Costs associated with and 

including accreditation 

Costs associated with accreditation

10. Software Software expenses associated with running the DNA lab 

11. Lab Information Management 

System (LIMS) 

Funds may be used to support existing LIMS and existing LIMS accessories 

Source: GAO analysis of CEBR grant program documentation. | GAO-19-216

Appendix VIII: DNA Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction Program Permissible 

Uses of Funds
Appendix IX: Controls Related to Transparency 

in Grantee Procurement for DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 89 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Contracting by grantees and subgrantees under DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) awards is governed by 2 

C.F.R. pt. 200 “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, 

and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.” Per the regulation, grantees 

that are states (including their agencies and instrumentalities thereof) 

must follow the same policies and procedures they use for procurements 

from their non-federal funds.1 All other grantees and subgrantees, 

including subrecipients of grantees that are states, must follow the 

procurement standards set forth in the regulation.2 Many CEBR grantees 

are states; nevertheless, Office of Justice Programs (OJP) officials said 

they apply controls related to transparency in grantee procurement to 

state grantees and to non-state grantees in the same manner. Table 15 

provides a description of selected federal requirements related to 

transparency in grantee procurement, as well as OJP controls designed 

to achieve its objectives related to compliance with these requirements. 

Table 15: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Transparency in Grantee Procurement

Select requirements for OJP and Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) 

program grantees 

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

requirements

OJP review of procurementsa

As part of the grant application process, grantees 

must provide information about proposed 

procurement contracts.b Specifically, grantees 

should provide the name of the contractor (if 

known), the amount of the contract, the service to 

be performed or purchase to be made, and a 

detailed narrative justification for each contract.

OJP has designed a process to review all budget documentation from grant 

applicants, including proposed procurement contracts. Specifically, upon receipt 

of the grant application, the OJP grant manager reviews the documentation to 

ensure that the proposed budget equals the proposed award amount, and that 

all proposed costs are allowable, necessary, and applicable, and forwards the 

documents to a senior grant manager for approval. OJP’s Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer (OCFO) then conducts a second review to ensure that the 

proposed budget equals the proposed award amount. Grantees cannot move 

forward with proposed procurement contracts until OJP provides approval. 

 1

See 2 C.F.R. § 200.317. States must comply with 2 C.F.R. § 200.322, relating to 

procurement of recovered materials, and ensure that every purchase order or other 

contract comply with any clauses required by § 200.326. A state includes any state of the 

U.S., D.C., the territories, and any agency or instrumentality thereof; it does not include 

local governments. §200.90.

2

See requirements in 2 C.F.R. §§ 318-326. 

Appendix IX: Controls Related to 

Transparency in Grantee Procurement for 

DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Grants
Appendix IX: Controls Related to Transparency 

in Grantee Procurement for DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 90 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Select requirements for OJP and Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) 

program grantees 

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

requirements

Grantees must also provide information to OJP 

during the award period for proposed new contracts 

or significant changes to existing contracts.

OJP has also designed a process to review proposed new contracts or 

significant modifications to existing contracts during the award period.

OJP grant managers review the requests to determine if the requested changes 

are allowable under the grant terms and conditions, are necessary and 

reasonable, and are consistent with the goals and objectives of the grant 

program. Then, grant managers’ supervisors and the National Institute of 

Justice’s Director of the Office of Grant Management review the request.

OJP also has grant monitoring checklists for grant managers to use when 

conducting grant monitoring activities, such as site visits. The checklists include 

sections for grant managers to review documentation related to contracts that 

were modified. The grant manager ensures that OJP provided the necessary 

approvals. Grant managers must certify that they completed all checklist items.

Grant recipients are required to submit quarterly 

financial reports to show obligations and 

expenditures for contracts.

OJP grant managers review grant recipients’ financial reports in conjunction 

with grant recipients’ progress reports to compare the rate of expenditures with 

the project activity level noted in the progress report and to identify potential 

problems with the reports. Then, officials from OJP’s OCFO perform a financial 

review to assess and resolve potential problems with the financial report. If OJP 

notifies a grant recipient of a problem with its financial report but the recipient 

does not submit a revised financial report, OJP may withhold grant funds. 

An awarding agency may conduct pre-procurement 

review of an applicant’s procurement documents 

when the procurement is expected to exceed the 

Simplified Acquisition Thresholdc (currently 

$250,000 for grantees) and is to be awarded without 

competition, or if a proposed contract modification 

changes the scope of a contract or increases the 

contract amount by more than the Simplified 

Acquisition Threshold, among other reasons. 

When a proposed sole-sourced contract exceeds the Simplified Acquisition 

Threshold, or when a contract modification changes the contract to exceed the 

Simplified Acquisition Threshold, grant mangers review the requests against 

criteria in 2 C.F.R. §200.320(f).d Senior grant managers and the National 

Institute of Justice’s Director of the Office of Grants Management provide 

additional layers of review. Financial analysts in OJP’s OCFO then review the 

procurement information and provide final approval of the non-competitive 

approach to the procurement.

OJP also has grant monitoring checklists for grant managers to use when 

conducting grant monitoring activities, such as site visits. The checklists include 

sections for grant managers to review documentation related to contracts that 

exceed the Simplified Acquisition Threshold and contracts that were modified. 

The grant manager ensures that OJP provided the necessary approvals. Grant 

managers must certify that they completed all checklist items. 

Grantees are responsible for monitoring subgrantee 

or contractor activities under federal awards and 

must assure compliance with applicable federal 

requirements and performance expectations.

OJP has grant monitoring checklists for grant managers to use when conducting 

grant monitoring activities, such as site visits. The checklists include a section 

for grant managers to ask grantees about their monitoring mechanisms for

subgrantees and contractors and to review documentation related to such 

mechanisms, including documentation that demonstrates the grantee is actually 

conducting monitoring activities for its subgrantees or contractors. Grant 

managers must certify that they completed all checklist items.

Single auditse

OJP is responsible for following up on single audit 

findings to provide reasonable assurance that 

grantees take timely and appropriate action to 

correct any deficiencies.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has designed a notification system that helps 

to ensure that OJP is aware of and responds to findings related to procurements 

that are discovered during single audits. The Federal Audit Clearinghouse 

notifies the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of significant single audit 

findings related to procurements. The OIG then notifies OJP, which follows-up 

with grantees, as applicable. 
Appendix IX: Controls Related to Transparency 

in Grantee Procurement for DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 91 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Select requirements for OJP and Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) 

program grantees 

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

requirements

Reporting to Congressf

Beginning October 2018 and biannually thereafter, 

for each recipient of funds from the appropriation for 

“a DNA analysis and capacity enhancement 

program and for other local, State, and Federal 

forensic activities”—which includes CEBR 

grantees—the Attorney General is to report to 

Senate and House Judiciary Committees the 

percentage of the amounts that were paid to private 

laboratories.

OJP added a requirement to the fiscal year 2018 CEBR solicitation for grantees 

to report the amounts expended under CEBR awards on contracts for DNA 

analysis. Specifically, the language says: “Recipients will be expected to report 

amounts expended under the award on contracts to private accredited DNA 

laboratories for analysis of forensic DNA casework samples or DNA database 

samples as detailed in the award terms and conditions. Future awards and fund 

drawdowns may be withheld if reports are delinquent. (In appropriate cases, 

OJP may require additional reports.)” OJP officials stated they added a special 

condition to the grant terms and conditions to require CEBR recipients to 

acknowledge grant funds will be withheld if they do not meet their reporting 

requirements. OJP officials said they would likely report this information to 

Congress for each grantee (as opposed to an aggregated amount for all 

grantees). However, they said they had not finalized the details.

Source: GAO analysis of grantee procurement requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

The first three requirements come from the CEBR grant solicitation and/or the DOJ Grants Financial 

Guide. In addition to agreeing to comply with applicable statutes and regulations, CEBR recipients 

agree to comply with the terms specified in the DOJ Grants Financial Guide and the solicitation. OJP 

outlines these requirements in the grant terms and conditions. The requirements in the guide and the 

solicitation are also important elements of transparency in administering CEBR grants. Other 

requirements come from 2 C.F.R. pt. 200, “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, 

and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.”

b

A contract is a legal instrument by which a non-federal entity purchases property or services needed 

to carry out the project or program under a federal award. A contract is separate from a subaward, 

which is an award provided by a pass-through entity to a subrecipient for the subrecipient to carry out 

part of a federal award received by the pass-through entity. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.22, 200.92.

c

The “simplified acquisition threshold”—currently set for grantees at $250,000—means the dollar 

amount below which a non-federal entity may purchase property or services using small purchase 

methods. 2 C.F.R. § 200.88. Small purchase procedures are those relatively simple and informal 

procurement methods for securing services, supplies, or other property.

d

Under 2 C.F.R. § 200.320(f), procurement by noncompetitive proposals may be used only when the 

item is available only from a single source; the public exigency or emergency for the requirement will 

not permit a delay resulting from competitive solicitation; the federal awarding agency or pass-through 

entity expressly authorizes noncompetitive proposals in response to a written request from the nonfederal entity; or after solicitation of a number sources, competition is determined inadequate.

e

Grantees that expend a total of $750,000 or more in federal awards in a fiscal year are required to 

undergo a single audit of its financial statements and federal awards or a program-specific audit, for 

the fiscal year. Requirements come from the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

156, 110 Stat. 1396 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7506).

f

Requirements come from Justice for All Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 3(b)(2)(C), 130 

Stat. 1948, 1950.
Appendix X: Controls Related to Conflicts of 

Interest for DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 92 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Criminal conflicts of interest statutes governing Office of Justice Program 

(OJP) employees who administer DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction (CEBR) grants are codified at 18 U.S.C. Chapter 11. 

Although these statutes cover a variety of topics related to conflicts of 

interest, our review focuses on the participation of OJP employees in 

government actions that may conflict with their personal financial 

interests, as specifically provided in 18 U.S.C. § 208. We focus on acts 

affecting personal financial interests because related regulatory 

requirements cover a broad range of issues directly applicable to OJP 

employees who administer CEBR grants. Table 16 provides a description 

of selected federal requirements related to conflicts of interest for federal 

employees, as well as OJP controls designed to achieve its objectives 

related to compliance with these requirements.

Table 16: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest for Federal Employees

Select requirements for OJP and OJP employees OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance 

with requirements

OJP employee conflict of interest requirementsa

Unless employees divest their financial interests or 

obtain a waiver or exemption, they must disqualify 

themselves from participating in particular matters in 

which they, or any person whose interests are imputed 

to them, have a financial interest.

Employees should not participate in matters involving 

specific parties where it is likely to affect the financial 

interests of a member of their household, a covered 

party is involved, or under other such circumstances that 

would cause a reasonable person to question their 

impartiality. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has summarized applicable requirements 

on its ethics website and in the DOJ Ethics Handbook for On and Off-Duty 

Conduct (Handbook). The Handbook directs employees who may have a 

conflict of interest or believe their impartiality might be questioned to either 

disqualify themselves from taking action that could affect their interest, or 

see OJP’s Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) about 

authorized alternatives, such as obtaining a waiver or divesting their 

financial interest.

Further, OJP has a web-based tracking system for employees involved in 

administering Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program 

(CEBR) grants to certify that they do not have conflicts of interest. During 

each application cycle, employees use the web-based system to (1) review 

the solicitation and relevant conflicts of interest guidance, (2) review the 

organizations that submitted applications, and (3) certify that they do not 

have any conflicts of interest. Employees’ supervisors are notified of these 

certifications. If an employee reports the appearance of a conflict of interest 

and the supervisor determines a conflict exists, the supervisor may require 

the staff member to recuse himself or herself from dealing with a specific 

application or from participating in the entire application cycle.

Employees must not engage in outside employment or 

other outside activities that conflict with their official 

duties or employment that involves certain legal practice 

and matters, including grants.

DOJ has summarized applicable requirements on its ethics website and in 

the Handbook. Employees are required to obtain written approval from the 

Deputy Attorney General for OJP to waive these prohibitions. 

OJP ethics training requirementsb

Agencies must carry out a government ethics education 

program to teach employees how to identify government 

ethics issues and obtain assistance in complying with 

government ethics laws and regulations.

The DOJ has an agency-wide ethics program, which is administered by 

DOJ’s Justice Management Division under the direction of DOJ’s DAEO. 

The DOJ DAEO assigned the Deputy DAEO in OJP to oversee OJP’s 

agency ethics program, as noted above. 

Appendix X: Controls Related to Conflicts of 

Interest for DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Grants
Appendix X: Controls Related to Conflicts of 

Interest for DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 93 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Select requirements for OJP and OJP employees OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance 

with requirements

Each new employee must complete initial ethics training. Each new OJP employee receives new employee ethics training and a copy 

of the Handbook. At this training, employees are also made aware of the 

DOJ ethics website.

Those required to file financial disclosure forms must 

complete annual ethics training.

OJP requires all employees who file public or confidential financial 

disclosure reports to attend OJP ethics training annually. OJP assigns 

employees to annual ethics training sessions and makes available a copy of 

the Handbook to employees at training sessions. 

OJP annual financial disclosure requirementsc

Senior-level employees must file public financial 

disclosure reports within 30 days of entering a covered 

position, and annually thereafter; disclosures must be 

reviewed and certified by a designated agency ethics 

offical. 

OJP employees in these positions are notified of their obligation to file 

reports via email. OJP’s Ethics Office collects the reports and reviews them 

to identify the appearance of or actual conflicts of interest within 60 days of 

receipt. OJP’s Ethics Office signs the reports if they believe they are 

complete and disclose no conflicts of interest. If the OJP Ethics Office finds 

a conflict, the Deputy DAEO for OJP imposes a remedy, such as 

disqualification (not participating in the matter), divesture (selling off 

interests or investments), or waiver (a waiver of the prohibition must be 

approved by the agency head). Then, OJP’s Assistant Attorney General 

reviews and signs the reports. The Deputy DAEO for OJP notifies DOJ’s 

Departmental Ethics Office when all reports have been filed, reviewed, and 

signed. DOJ’s Departmental Ethics Office then forwards all public financial 

disclosure reports to the U.S. Office of Government Ethics.

Specified less senior employees must file confidential 

financial disclosure reports within 30 days of entering a

covered position; and annually thereafter; and 

disclosures must be reviewed and certified by a 

designated agency ethics official.

OJP employees in these positions are notified of their 

obligation to file reports via email. Employees’ supervisors 

collect the reports and review them to identify the 

appearance of or actual conflicts of interest within 30 days 

of receipt. Employees’ supervisors sign the reports if they 

believe they are complete and disclose no conflicts of 

interest. If the supervisor finds a conflict, the supervisor and 

the Deputy DAEO for OJP impose a remedy, such as 

disqualification, divesture, or waiver. The Deputy DAEO for 

OJP notifies DOJ’s Departmental Ethics Office when all 

reports have been filed, reviewed, and signed.

Despite the process described, OJP does not have 

documentation designating which officials are authorized to 

certify (provide final signature) these reports or the levels of 

review required. Further, the designation of reviewers and 

certifiers within OJP is unclear. OJP officials said that OJP’s 

Deputy DAEO and office heads of OJP sub-components (or 

deputy office heads) have a role in the review process, but 

officials did not consistently describe those roles.

Source: GAO analysis of conflicts of interest requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

Requirements come from 5. C.F.R. pt. 2635, “Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the 

Executive Branch;” 5 C.F.R. pt. 3801, “Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of 

the Department of Justice.”

b

Requirements come from 5 C.F.R. pt. 2638, “Executive Branch Ethics Program”

c

Requirements come from 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-111, “Financial Disclosure Requirements of Federal 

Personnel” and 5 C.F.R. pt. 2634, “Executive Branch Financial Disclosure, Qualified Trusts, and 

Certificates of Divestiture. “Senior-level” employees include, among others, employees whose 

positions are classified above GS-15; or employees whose rate of basic pay is fixed, other than under 

the General Schedule, at a rate equal to or greater than 120% of the minimum rate of basic pay for a 
Appendix X: Controls Related to Conflicts of 

Interest for DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 94 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

GS-15. “Specified less senior employees” include, among others, employees who occupy positions 

classified at GS-15 or below or employees whose rate of basic pay is fixed, other than under the 

General Schedule, at a rate less than 120% of the minimum rate of basic pay for a GS-15. Regarding 

the administration of CEBR grants, officials said that the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

for OJP, National Institute of Justice Director and Principal Deputy Director positions are subject to 

public disclosure, and all other positions that administer CEBR grants are subject to confidential 

disclosure.

Federal requirements related to the disclosure of conflicts of interest by 

grantees are found in 2 C.F.R. pt. 200 “Uniform Administrative 

Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal 

Awards.” These requirements apply to OJP as they oversee grantees, 

and to CEBR grantees as they interact with OJP and administer grant 

funding through subgrants or contracts.1 Table 17 provides a description 

of selected federal requirements related to conflicts of interest for federal 

awarding agencies and grantees, as well as OJP controls designed to

achieve its objectives related to compliance with these requirements.

Table 17: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest for Federal Awarding Agencies and 

Grantees

Select requirements for OJP and granteesa OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

requirements

Awarding agencies must establish conflicts of 

interest policies for grants.

OJP requires grantees to agree during the application process to (1) disclose 

conflicts of interest in writing to OJP, (2) maintain written standards of conduct 

covering conflicts of interest and employees participating in the selection, award, and 

administration of contracts for grants, and (3) have a documented process to check 

for organizational conflicts of interest with potential contractors.b As a condition of 

award acceptance, grantees must (through execution of the grant award document) 

agree to comply with (among other award terms and conditions) the Department of 

Justice’s Grants Financial Guide, available on its website, which provides additional 

guidance concerning conflicts of interest. If a grantee does not agree to these 

requirements, it will not receive the award.

OJP also has grant monitoring checklists for grant managers to use when conducting 

grant monitoring activities, such as site visits. One of the policies grant managers are 

instructed to check for when reviewing requirements for procurement policies and 

procedures is a conflicts of interest policy. Grant managers must certify that they 

completed all checklist items.

Grantees must disclose in writing any conflicts 

of interest to the awarding agency.

Same control as above.

Source: GAO analysis of conflicts of interest requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

 1

A contract is a legal instrument by which a non-federal entity purchases property or 

services needed to carry out the project or program under a federal award. A contract is 

separate from a subaward, which is an award provided by a pass-through entity to a 

subrecipient for the subrecipient to carry out part of a federal award received by the passthrough entity. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.22, 200.92
Appendix X: Controls Related to Conflicts of 

Interest for DNA Capacity Enhancement and 

Backlog Reduction Grants

Page 95 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

a

Requirements come from 2 C.F.R. pt. 200, “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, 

and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards”

b

Under these regulations, a contract is a legal instrument by which a non-federal entity purchases 

property or services needed to carry out the project or program under a federal award. 2 C.F.R. § 

200.22.
Appendix XI: Controls Related to Lobbying for 

DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Grants

Page 96 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Federal law prohibits recipients of federal awards from using appropriated 

funds for lobbying activities in connection with the award, and sets forth 

several requirements related to lobbying “certification” and “disclosure.”1

Lobbying certification refers to agreeing not to use appropriated funds to 

lobby. Lobbying disclosure refers to disclosing lobbying activities with 

respect to the covered federal action (in this case, DNA Capacity 

Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) program grants) paid for 

with nonappropriated funds. Federal regulation requires recipients of all 

federal awards over $100,000 to file certification documents and 

disclosure forms (if applicable) with the next tier above. Disclosure forms, 

but not certification documents, are to be forwarded from tier to tier until 

received by the federal agency).2 In the case of CEBR grants, tiers 

include the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), grantees, subgrantees, 

contractors under grantees and subgrantees, and subcontractors. Table 

18 provides a description of selected federal requirements related to 

lobbying, as well as OJP controls designed to achieve its objectives 

related to compliance with these requirements.

 1

28 C.F.R. pt. 69, “New Restrictions on Lobbying,” implements 31 U.S.C. § 1352, 

commonly referred to as the “Byrd Amendment.” Lobbying in the context of this statute 

refers to paying any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or 

employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or 

an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with any covered Federal actions. 

See also, 2 C.F.R. pt. 200, Appendix II(I) which contains similar requirements. These 

requirements are different from lobbying registration and disclosure requirements set forth 

in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et 

seq.). 

2

The required certification document is set forth in appendix A to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69. The 

required disclosure form is set forth in appendix B to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69. Disclosure forms 

are only required if the recipient has used or plans to use nonappropriated funds to lobby 

with respect to the award. Additional exceptions to the prohibition and disclosure 

requirements apply. 

Appendix XI: Controls Related to Lobbying 

for DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Grants
Appendix XI: Controls Related to Lobbying for 

DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Grants

Page 97 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Table 18: Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Controls Related to Lobbying

Select requirements for Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) grantees and 

othersa

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

requirements

Grantees are prohibited from using appropriated 

funds, directly or indirectly, to pay for activities (e.g., 

advertisements, printed materials, etc.) to influence 

government officials to support or oppose legislation, 

policies, or other matters (unless the activity is 

expressly authorized by Congress).b

As a condition of award acceptance, grantees must agree to comply with OJP’s 

“General Conditions,” which includes (1) language prohibiting the use of federal 

funds for lobbying, and (2) a requirement that grantees follow applicable

lobbying laws, as set forth in the Department of Justice’s Grants Financial 

Guide. OJP also follows the grantees’ use of grant funds through grant 

monitoring activities. For example, OJP grant managers review grant 

recipients’ financial reports in conjunction with grant recipients’ progress 

reports to compare the rate of expenditures with the project activity level noted 

in the progress report and to identify potential problems with the reports, 

among other monitoring steps.

Applicants and recipients of federal awards must file 

with the agency a certification with specific language 

from appendix A to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69, that the 

applicant or grantee has not made and will not make 

prohibited lobbying payments.

As a condition of award acceptance, grantees must (through execution of the 

grant award document) agree to the certification document (among other award 

terms and conditions). When accepting the award, grantees must print, initial 

each page, and sign all award documents, and then email a scanned copy of 

the signed documents to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) for 

review. If a grantee does not agree to these requirements, it will not receive the 

award.

If the applicant or grantee has made or has agreed 

to make a payment using nonappropriated funds that 

would be prohibited if appropriated funds were used, 

it must file with the agency a disclosure form as set 

forth in appendix B to 28 C.F.R. pt. 69. 

OJP requires that all CEBR applicants submit the lobbying disclosure form as 

part of the grant application process. Upon submission, a grant manager 

reviews the form for completeness and content and checks a box in an 

application review checklist. In the event there is lobbying activity disclosed, the 

grant manager forwards the form to OJP attorneys and alerts them to the 

lobbying activity for their review. 

Certifications and disclosure forms are required to be 

filed with the tierc above for subgrants and contracts 

greater than $100,000. All disclosure forms, but not 

certifications, are to be forwarded from tier to tier 

until received by the agency.

Grantees and subrecipients are to disclose 

subsequent lobbying events that require disclosure 

or specified events that materially affect the accuracy 

of previously filed disclosures at the end of each 

quarter.

As stated above, OJP has designed a process to collect certification 

documents and disclosure forms from CEBR applicants.

However, the certification document that CEBR grant applicants agree to does 

not state in clear terms what the specific requirements of the regulation are or 

how they are to be carried out. The certification document sets forth the 

requirements for filing certifications and disclosures, as detailed above. It 

states: “The Applicant shall require that the language of this certification be 

included in the award documents for all subgrants and procurement contracts 

(and their subcontracts) funded with Federal award funds and shall ensure that 

any certifications or lobbying disclosures required of recipients of such 

subgrants and procurement contracts (or their subcontractors) are made and 

filed in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1352.” Upon reading this, grantees or 

subrecipients may still be unsure of their responsibilities under the regulation 

and when they are to carry them out. For example, they may not understand 

what mechanism to use to obtain a certification document or that disclosure 

forms must be forwarded to the tier above until received by OJP. 
Appendix XI: Controls Related to Lobbying for 

DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 

Reduction Grants

Page 98 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Select requirements for Capacity Enhancement 

and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) grantees and 

othersa

OJP control designed to achieve its objectives related to compliance with 

requirements

The agency is to take such actions as are necessary 

to ensure that the lobbying requirements are 

vigorously implemented and enforced.d

As stated above, OJP has designed a process to collect certification 

documents and disclosure forms from CEBR applicants. However, it is not 

taking actions to ensure that grantees are requiring subrecipients to certify and 

disclose, and that grantees forward disclosures according to the requirements 

set forth above. For example, grant managers use checklists to guide grant 

monitoring activities, such as site visits, to ensure that grantees are following 

the grant requirements they agreed to during the grant application process. 

While these checklists have instructions for asking questions about other grant 

requirements, they do not include instructions to ensure grantees are collecting 

certifications documents and disclosure forms from tiers below them and 

forwarding disclosure forms to OJP.

Source: GAO analysis of federal lobbying requirements and OJP information. | GAO-19-216

a

Unless otherwise noted, requirements come from 28 C.F.R. pt. 69, “New Restrictions on Lobbying”

which implements 31 U.S.C § 1352, commonly referred to as the “Byrd Amendment.” See also, 2 

C.F.R. pt. 200, Appendix II(I) which contains similar requirements. Requirements are applicable to 

federal awards over $100,000. However, all CEBR grants are for at least $150,000. Additional 

exceptions and requirements apply.

b

This requirement is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1913.

c

In the case of CEBR grants, tiers include OJP, grantees, subgrantees, contractors under grantees 

and subgrantees, and subcontractors.

d

31 U.S.C. § 1352; see also 28 C.F.R. § 69.410.
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 99 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Appendix XII: Comments from the 

Department of Justice
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 100 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 101 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 102 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 
Appendix XIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 103 GAO-19-216 DNA Evidence Backlogs 

Gretta L. Goodwin, (202) 512-8777, GoodwinG@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Locke (Assistant Director) 

and Jeff Jensen (Analyst-in-Charge) managed this review. Stephanie 

Heiken and Adrian Pavia, along with Pamela Davidson, Janet TemkoBlinder, Christine San, and Khristi Wilkins made significant contributions 

to this work. Also contributing were Charles Bausell, Daniel Bibeault, Eric 

Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Ben Licht, Samuel Portnow, Rebecca Riklin, 

Rebecca Shea, Erinn Sauer, Adam Vogt, and William Woods.

Appendix XIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102274)
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