2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-28-2011

Wilson v. Mobilex USA Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-2414

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Recommended Citation

"Wilson v. Mobilex USA Inc" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1897.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1897
1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-2414

_____________

PAMELA WILSON, 

 Appellant

v.

MOBILEX USA, INC.

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 5-09-cv-03606

District Judge: The Honorable Juan R. Sanchez

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 25, 2011

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge,

and STEARNS, District Judge∗

(Filed: January 28, 2011)

_____________________

OPINION

_____________________

 ∗ The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the District of 

Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
2

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

This is an employment-discrimination case. The plaintiff Pamela Wilson asserts 

that her former employer Mobilex USA fired her on the basis of age and gender, in 

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 

seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq., and the 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. The 

District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mobilex. Wilson appeals. We will 

affirm. 

I.

Before moving to the merits, we need to address an issue regarding the record. 

Wilson was deposed in connection with this lawsuit. Yet she chose not to submit a 

transcript of her deposition testimony in response to Mobilex’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Mobilex had submitted excerpts of the transcript with its motion, and Wilson 

assumed that they would be enough.) After the District Court granted Mobilex’s motion, 

Wilson moved for reconsideration; she attached a complete transcript of her deposition 

and asked the Court to revisit its ruling in light of it. The Court declined the invitation. 

In the Court’s view, reconsideration was not warranted because the testimony was 

available at the time Wilson filed her response. Wilson asserts that the District Court 

erred in denying the motion for reconsideration. We review for an abuse of discretion. 

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 

2010). 
3

The District Court acted within its discretion in denying the motion. We have 

observed that “[a] district court may properly refuse to consider evidence presented in a 

motion for reconsideration when the evidence was available prior to summary judgment.”

Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Harsco Corp. v. 

Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)). The deposition testimony, of course, was 

available prior to summary judgment. Thus we have considered only the excerpts of the 

transcript that Mobilex submitted with its summary-judgment motion. 

II.

The summary-judgment record establishes the following undisputed facts. 

Mobilex, a company that provides mobile x-ray services, hired Wilson as a field 

technician in early 2001. Things went relatively well until 2007, at which time Wilson

began having problems: she refused to do work that she had been assigned, failed to 

return calls as required, failed to check in with Mobilex’s dispatcher as required, had 

disagreements with coworkers and raised her voice at a coworker on one occasion, used 

her cell phone while taking a patient’s x-ray (about which Mobilex received a complaint), 

and raised her voice at a staff member in a nursing home (about which the nursing home 

complained). In January 2008, Mobilex fired Wilson; she was 61 years old at the time. 

In April 2008, Mobilex hired a 21 year-old male as Wilson’s replacement. 

ADEA and Title VII claims are governed by the familiar burden-shifting 

framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Sarullo 

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). The same analysis applies to age-
4

and gender-discrimination claims brought under the PHRA. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 

F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996); Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 412 A.2d 860, 871 (Pa. 1980). 

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must shoulder the initial burden of making 

out a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the 

defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. 

Once the defendant does so, the presumption of discriminatory action is rebutted and the 

plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s stated reasons are a pretext for unlawful 

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04.

We assume arguendo that Wilson made out a prima facie case of age and gender 

discrimination. Even so, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to rebut 

Mobilex’s explanation that she was fired, not because of age or gender, but because of 

poor performance, as detailed above. The District Court thus correctly granted Mobilex’s 

motion for summary judgment.

1

III.

 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

 1 Although we have excluded Wilson’s complete deposition transcript from our consideration, 

we have reviewed it and do not believe that considering it would change the outcome.