Filed 6/13/22; Certified for Publication 7/6/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS RENAN MANZANILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

B313557

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. MA063994)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with instructions. 

Immigrant Defenders Law Center, Caitlin E. Anderson and 

Hannah K. Comstock for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stephanie 

A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

_________________________________
2

Carlos Renan Manzanilla moved to vacate a 2014 felony 

conviction under California Penal Code section 273.5,

1 which, 

with his sentence of 365 days’ county jail, is an aggravated felony 

under immigration law and subjects him to mandatory 

deportation. Manzanilla claimed three legal errors: That defense 

counsel failed to advise him that his nolo contendere plea meant 

mandatory deportation; that defense counsel failed to defend 

against the immigration consequences of his charge by seeking 

an immigration-safe plea, such as a one-day reduction in his 

sentence; and that he did not understand that he faced

mandatory deportation when he entered his plea. 

The trial court denied Manzanilla’s motion on all three 

claims of legal error. It also rejected the parties’ agreement to 

allow Manzanilla to vacate his conviction and enter an 

immigration-safe plea to a misdemeanor. Manzanilla appealed. 

We reverse on all grounds. Manzanilla’s defense counsel 

did not specifically advise him that he would be subject to 

mandatory deportation. Defense counsel also failed to adequately 

defend because she did not consider the immigration 

consequences in plea bargaining, as evidenced by, among other 

things, her failure to counter the prosecution’s initial offer of 365

days’ jail with 364 days’ jail, which would have prevented 

Manzanilla from having an aggravated felony conviction. 

Finally, there is contemporaneous, objective evidence that 

Manzanilla did not subjectively understand that his plea would 

subject him to mandatory deportation. Manzanilla has shown 

prejudice from these errors by a preponderance of the evidence, 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

including under the factors emphasized by our Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar).

We reverse and remand with instructions to grant the 

motion to vacate. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. 2014 Felony Conviction

On August 19, 2014, the People filled a felony complaint 

against Manzanilla, charging him with one count of injuring a 

cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition under section 273.5, 

subdivision (a), for having injured his girlfriend, Kellie Warner. 

According to the probation officer’s report, while inebriated,

Manzanilla became angry with Warner for allegedly driving his 

car without his consent. Manzanilla choked Warner, causing her 

to lose consciousness. When she woke up, Manzanilla hit her on 

her face and upper torso. Warner escaped and called the police. 

When the police arrived, they observed injuries on Warner. She 

was treated by paramedics at the scene after she refused to go to 

the hospital. Manzanilla was arrested. 

In a subsequent interview with police, Warner said that 

during this incident, Manzanilla also pulled a knife on her, cut 

her forehead, threated to kill her, and left her on the bathroom 

floor soaked in her own urine. Warner reported that Manzanilla 

had previously stabbed her, requiring surgery, and had been 

abusive “for a long time.” 

After being represented by a different attorney at 

arraignment, Manzanilla was represented by Deputy Public 

Defender Jodi Lin (Lin or counsel). Lin’s defense file from 2014 

has three entries for Manzanilla: Her evaluation of his case on 

August 26, a meeting with him on August 27, and plea

negotiations and a plea hearing on September 3. 
4

As the trial court summarized, Lin’s pre-plea notes “had 

nothing to do with immigration.” The August 26 entry reflects

the section 273.5, subdivision (a) charge, possible unalleged 

charges, and ways to impeach Warner. The August 27 entry 

records Lin’s first meeting with Manzanilla, where Lin explained 

her role, what Manzanilla should expect at the preliminary 

hearing, her defense plan, and possible unalleged charges. In her 

subsequent recollection of this meeting, Lin did not recall 

learning Manzanilla was a legal permanent resident nor 

discussing anything about the immigration consequences of his 

charge or potential charges.

2

 Lin’s third meeting with 

Manzanilla took place on September 3 at the preliminary hearing 

court’s “lock up.” This was the only day that Lin engaged in plea 

negotiations, and she does not remember raising Manzanilla’s

immigration status during them.

The People offered Manzanilla a plea to a felony section 

273.5, subdivision (a) conviction with 365 days’ jail, five years’ 

probation, domestic violence classes, and a protective order. 

Manzanilla initially rejected this offer, telling Lin that he wanted 

less jail time and release on his own recognizance before 

sentencing. Lin countered with the same terms, except for

requesting jail time of six and then nine months. The People 

denied both counteroffers. Manzanilla then accepted the initial 

offer of 365 days’ jail, along with the other terms. 

2 Manzanilla’s current counsel sent a questionnaire titled 

“Defense Counsel Questionnaire” to Lin, to which she responded 

on September 24, 2020 regarding her memory of the events in 

2014.
5

Lin’s notes from the September 3 plea negotiations reflect 

the prosecution’s offer, her counteroffers and reasons for them, 

and then the prosecution’s denial of those offers and Manzanilla’s 

acceptance of the initial offer. Then the notes state that Lin

advised Manzanilla on the criminal rights he was waiving by 

taking the plea and his acceptance of those waivers. Finally, Lin 

wrote: “Adv. Imm. Consequences. [Defendant] LPR. Adv. Plea 

will [change]3his status. Advised [Defendant] he will have an 

immig. hrg.” Lin’s notes then say that Manzanilla “understands”

and “says as long as hearing is in U.S., he’s fine.” Lin’s 

subsequently memory is that she told him “there would be a 

hearing and he would lose his LPR status. Mr. Manzanilla said 

that as long as the hearing is in the U.S., he’s fine. His focus at 

that hearing date was to get out of jail as quickly as possible.” 

Lin later recalled that she learned Manzanilla was a legal 

permanent resident “when Mr. Manzanilla told me as we went 

over the immigration consequences. I documented that in his 

file.” Manzanilla recalls Lin asking about his immigration status 

in the order reflected in her notes: After he told her he would 

take the plea offer. 

During the plea colloquy on September 3, the preliminary 

hearing court asked Manzanilla whether he understood his rights

and informed him of the consequences of his plea, but did not

3 Lin’s handwritten notes have a triangle, rather than the 

word “change,” which we read as the symbol for “change” given 

the context. In his opening brief, Manzanilla also read the 

triangle in this sentence as the symbol for “change” and the 

People did not object. 
6

mention immigration consequences. The court told Manzanilla 

that his plea was to a “felony conviction, which means you cannot 

own or possess a firearm for the remainder of your life. If you 

violate probation, you’re looking at up to four years in state 

prison.” The court informed Manzanilla that if he went to prison, 

then he could be on parole for up to three years. It also advised 

Manzanilla that he might owe fines between $300 and $400, and 

that his plea was to a “priorable offense,” so it could be used as an

enhancement to any subsequent criminal convictions. 

Manzanilla then waived his rights on the record. In Manzanilla’s 

Felony Advisement of Rights, Waiver, and Plea Form, he initialed 

next to the words, “Immigration Consequences – I understand 

that if I am not a citizen of the United States, I must expect my 

plea of guilty or no contest will result in my deportation . . . .” 

The court ended the preliminary hearing by setting 

sentencing for September 24, 2017. 

II. Initial Attempt to Revoke Plea in September 2014

Shortly after entering his plea on September 3, Manzanilla 

sent the court a letter requesting to retract his plea. The letter is 

not in the record, but at the September 24, 2014 sentencing 

hearing the court stated that it had received Manzanilla’s letter. 

The court said that it understood that Manzanilla wanted to 

withdraw his plea because he wanted a misdemeanor and he 

“wanted to withdraw his plea based on the fact that he might be 

deported.” Lin’s notes from the hearing also state that 

Manzanilla “says in letter he wants to [withdraw] plea [because] 

this conviction will affect his LPR status [and] wants 

misd[emeanor.]” Lin’s notes further state that she had advised 

Manzanilla of the “imm[igration] conseq[uences] at the last court 

date and we had in depth discussion re:[Defendant’s] LPR 
7

status.” Lin’s notes say that she asked Manzanilla if the reason 

he knew about the immigration consequences of his plea was 

because she told him, and he nodded yes. 

The sentencing court warned Manzanilla that if he were 

successful in withdrawing his plea, the prosecution “might take a 

more aggressive approach.” The court also reminded Manzanilla 

that he signed a felony advisement form that informed him of the

immigration consequences of his plea. The court then engaged in 

the following exchange with Manzanilla: 

“Understanding all of that do you still wish to go forward 

with this deal?” Manzanilla replied, “Yes. Does that mean 

automatically I’m not a permanent resident anymore?” The court

stated, “It means you will be deported, denied naturalization and 

excluded from admission. Yes.” Manzanilla replied, “So I will be 

deported?” The court said, “Yes. So do you still want to move

forward with the deal?” Manzanilla replied, “If I’m going to be 

deported, no.” The court responded, “I want to know, do you 

want to go forward with the deal?” and Manzanilla said, “No.” 

The court asked again, “And you want to withdraw it?” and 

Manzanilla said, “Yes.” And the court then clarified, “Based on 

the immigration consequences?” to which Manzanilla replied, 

“Yes.” 

The court then turned to Lin and stated that Manzanilla’s 

motion should “technically” be heard by the judge who took the 

plea a few weeks earlier. Lin responded that she was not the 

right person to handle the motion because she would “be 

testifying against myself.” The court responded that Manzanilla 

was not claiming she was “negligent,” but was just saying he did 

not like the plea. The court then denied the motion to withdraw

the plea, finding that Manzanilla had “buyer’s remorse.” 
8

It continued the sentencing hearing to October 8, 2014, at which 

time Manzanilla was sentenced to five years’ probation and 365 

days’ jail.

III. May 2021 Motion to Vacate 

On May 10, 2021, Manzanilla moved to vacate his 2014 

felony conviction by filing a motion under section 1473.7. 

In support of his motion, he submitted a declaration

signed under penalty of perjury, detailing, among other things, 

the following:

Manzanilla was born in Mexico in 1961. He came to the 

United States when he was four years old as a legal permanent 

resident, also known as a green card holder. Manzanilla has 

lived in the United States ever since. He attended elementary 

and high school in Venice and college in Santa Monica.

Manzanilla has two children who are United States citizens. 

His parents, who have passed away, and his siblings, all became 

or were born citizens. Manzanilla started the process to become a 

citizen in the 1990s, but never finished. 

In 2018, as a result of violating his parole due to financial 

barriers and a disability, Manzanilla spent three years in state

prison. He was then transferred directly from criminal custody to 

the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 

Bakersfield. He remains there today while he waits for the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals to resolve his immigration case.4 

4 The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in Manzanilla’s 

immigration case in May 2021 and placed it in mediation pending 

final resolution of this postconviction motion to vacate.
9

Manzanilla was charged with deportation based on his 

conviction for an aggravated felony, specifically his September 

2014 section 273.5, subdivision (a) conviction. 

Manzanilla declares that he would not have taken the plea 

if he knew it would result in his deportation. He declares that 

his “whole life—my kids, my family—is here in the United 

States.” He has no friends or family in Mexico. He is also afraid 

for his life if he returns to Mexico. He is bi-sexual, and last time 

he went to Mexico, in the 1990s, he was assaulted by the Mexican 

Federal Police based on his sexual orientation (as evidenced by 

derogatory language used during the assault) when they found 

him with a man, leaving him with broken ribs, a black eye, and 

other injuries.

Manzanilla also declares that when Lin went over the plea 

waiver form with him in 2014, he “was having a really hard time 

seeing because of my cataracts. I was taking a long time to read 

everything . . . she was standing over me and asking me to hurry 

up. She said it covered everything we had already talked about. 

I initialed and she walked away with the form.”

In support of his motion, Manzanilla also included a 

declaration by his former girlfriend/the victim, Warner,

(stating that she would have supported a plea that protected 

Manzanilla from deportation), transcripts from the September 

24, 2014 hearing, Lin’s case notes from 2014, Lin’s questionnaire 

responses from September 2020, and records from Manzanilla’s

immigration case. 

V. Hearing and Ruling on Motion to Vacate 

The trial court held a hearing on Manzanilla’s motion to 

vacate on May 25, 2021. The People opened by reporting that the

parties had reached an agreement for Manzanilla to vacate his 
10

conviction and to plead to an immigration-safe misdemeanor.

The trial court rejected the agreement, citing the facts in the

probation report and stating that Manzanilla was not “a person 

that deserves a misdemeanor.” 

The trial court then denied Manzanilla’s motion on all 

three claims of error. The court made its decision entirely on 

written documents. Manzanilla did not appear because he was in 

federal immigration detention. 

First, the trial court found that defense counsel sufficiently 

advised Manzanilla when she told him that the “plea will change 

his status” and he would “have an immigration hearing,” citing

Lin’s notes. The trial court subsequently characterized this 

advice as, “he was told he would be deported, and his whole point 

was as long as he had the hearing in the United States he was 

okay to go ahead and go forward. And that is what Ms. Lin’s 

notes indicated . . . .” The trial court did not hear from Lin nor 

Manzanilla at the hearing, but it found Lin’s credibility greater 

than Manzanilla’s on the written record because he wanted out of 

his plea. 

Second, the trial court found that defense counsel fulfilled 

her duty to defend against immigration consequences because 

defense counsel achieved a “good deal,” citing defense counsel’s 

characterization of the deal in her questionnaire and the 

allegations against Manzanilla in the probation report. The court 

also found that counsel “did her job” by countering the initial plea 

offer with six and then nine months of jail, rejecting Manzanilla’s 

argument that all he needed was a more reasonable offer of a

one-day reduction to 364 days to avoid an aggravated felony

conviction. 
11

Third, in rejecting Manzanilla’s claim that he subjectively 

misunderstood that he would face mandatory deportation at the 

time of his plea, the trial court cited Lin’s notes stating that she 

informed Manzanilla that his status would change and he would 

have an immigration hearing, concluding he “always understood 

he was going to be deported.” Regarding the transcript from the 

September 2014 hearing when Manzanilla asked to withdraw his 

plea, the trial court viewed it not as reflecting Manzanilla finally 

understanding that he would be deported, as his counsel 

characterized it, but rather as him verifying what he already 

knew from Lin. The trial court then surmised that Manzanilla

was not motivated by a fear of deportation, crediting the 2014 

court’s determination he had “buyer’s remorse.” The trial court

cited Manzanilla’s letter to the sentencing court from the days 

shortly after his plea, to which the trial court had access but 

Manzanilla’s counsel did not (nor is it in the record on appeal),

and stated that the letter showed that Manzanilla wanted to take 

back his plea because he was “pressured” by his public defender 

and that the letter did not mention his immigration concerns. 

Finally, the trial court did not directly address prejudice to 

Manzanilla. It simply found that Manzanilla was not motivated 

by deportation in seeking to retract his plea in 2014, and that Lin 

was more credible than Manzanilla, as stated above. 

Manzanilla timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

Our Supreme Court recently determined the standard of 

review for section 1473.7 motion proceedings. In Vivar, the court 

endorsed the independent standard of review. (Vivar, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at pp. 524–528.) Under independent review, we exercise 
12

our independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy 

the rule of law. (Id. at p. 527.) When appellate courts engage in 

independent review, they should be mindful that independent 

review is not the equivalent of de novo review. (Ibid.) An 

appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that 

are based on the trial court’s own observations. (Ibid.) Factual 

determinations that are based on the credibility of witnesses the 

trial court heard and observed are entitled to particular 

deference, even though courts reviewing such claims generally 

may reach a different conclusion from the trial court on an 

independent examination of the evidence, even where the 

evidence is conflicting. (Ibid.) In section 1473.7 motion 

proceedings, appellate courts should similarly give particular 

deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal 

observations of witnesses. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–

528.) Where, as here, the facts derive entirely from written 

declarations and other documents, there is no reason to conclude 

the trial court has special insight on the question at issue; as a 

practical matter, the trial court and appellate court are in the 

same position in interpreting written declarations when 

reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. 

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 528.) Ultimately it is for the 

appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, 

whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7. 

II. Applicable Law

A. Section 273.5 and Related Immigration Law 

At the time of Manzanilla’s plea, a section 273.5, 

subdivision (a) conviction, regardless of the sentence, qualified as 

a ground of deportability as a “crime of domestic violence.” 

(8 U.S.C.§ 1227(a)(2)(E) [making crime of domestic violence 
13

deportable]; United States v. Laurico-Yeno (9th Cir. 2010) 590 

F.3d 818, 822 [section 273.5 is a domestic violence crime].)

A conviction under section 273.5 with a sentence of 365 days or 

longer,

5

however, carries more significant immigration 

consequences because the sentence of 365 days or more renders it 

an “aggravated felony.” (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) & (a)(2)(E)(i)

[making a conviction for a “crime of violence” with a sentence of 

one year or more an aggravated felony]; Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder

(9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 1080, 1083 [holding section 273.5 is a 

“crime of violence”].) 

Mandatory removal from the United States is a 

consequence of being convicted of a crime deemed an aggravated 

felony under federal immigration law. (Moncrieffe v. Holder

(2013) 569 U.S. 184, 187–188 (Moncrieffe); 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) 

[aggravated felon is “conclusively presumed” deportable].) 

An aggravated felony conviction further renders a defendant 

ineligible for relief from deportation, such as asylum and 

cancellation of removal. (Moncrieffe, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 187.) 

B. Section 1473.7

Section 1473.7 authorizes a person who is no longer in 

criminal custody to move to vacate a conviction or sentence where 

the “conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial 

error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully 

understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or 

5 The section 273.5, subdivision (a) conviction did not require 

a sentence of a year or more. The charge range, as listed in the 

felony complaint, was zero to 365 days’ county jail or two to four

years in state prison. 
14

potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or 

sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) “Under this new provision, a 

court ‘shall’ vacate a conviction or sentence upon a showing, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, of ‘prejudicial error damaging the 

moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend 

against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse 

immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.’

[Citation.]” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 523.)

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended section 

1473.7 to clarify that a “finding of legal invalidity may, but need 

not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Therefore, a defendant asserting error 

need not prove the elements of a claim for ineffective assistance 

of counsel but may instead show prejudicial error. (People v. 

Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1008–1009 (Camacho).) 

To establish prejudice, a defendant must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he would not have entered 

the plea had he known about the immigration consequences. 

(Id. at pp. 1010–1011; see People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 

555, 565 [defendant may show prejudice by “convinc[ing] the 

court [that he] would have chosen to lose the benefits of the plea 

bargain despite the possibility or probability deportation would 

nonetheless follow”]; see Lee v. U.S. (2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 

1958, 1965] [a defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a 

reasonable probability he would not have pled guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial, but for counsel’s errors].)

III. Manzanilla Demonstrated Error Under Section 

1473.7, subdivision (a)(1)

Manzanilla claims prejudicial error based on all three 

possible errors enumerated in section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1): 
15

His “ ‘ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or 

knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration 

consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.’ (§ 1473.7, 

subds. (e)(1), (a)(1).).” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 523.) 

A. Counsel Did Not Specifically Advise Manzanilla 

That He Faced Near Certain Deportation 

Manzanilla claims that his motion to vacate should be 

granted because defense counsel failed to inform him that his 

plea would subject him to mandatory deportation. We agree that 

counsel’s advice was inadequate under applicable law. 

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky

(2010) 559 U.S. 356 (Padilla), defense counsel has had a duty to 

properly explain the adverse immigration consequences of a plea 

to a defendant.6 The court observed that the right to remain in 

the United States can be more important to a defendant than any 

potential jail sentence. (Id. at p. 368.) Where immigration law is 

“ ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ that the conviction renders removal 

virtually certain, counsel must advise his client that removal is a 

virtual certainty.” (United States v. Rodriguez-Vega (9th Cir. 

2015) 797 F.3d 781, 786 (Rodriguez-Vega), citing Padilla, supra, 

559 U.S. at p. 369.) Immigration law is clear that removal is 

6 California later codified this principal, effective in 2016, in 

section 1016.3: “(a) Defense counsel shall provide accurate and 

affirmative advice about the immigration consequences of a 

proposed disposition, and when consistent with the goals of and 

with the informed consent of the defendant, and consistent with 

professional standards, defend against those consequences.” 

(§ 1016.3, subdivision (a).)
16

“virtually certain” when “the immigration statute or controlling 

case law expressly identifies the crime of conviction as a ground 

for removal,” which is the case here.7 (Rodriguez-Vega, supra, 

797 F.3d at p. 786.) 

Defense counsel’s contemporaneous notes reflect that she 

told Manzanilla that his plea would “[change] his status [and] he 

[would] have [an] immigration hearing.”8 This is the kind of 

description one would give if they wanted to avoid actually 

stating that deportation would ensue. Counsel did not explain 

that Manzanilla faced mandatory deportation. Counsel’s advice 

was deficient for lack of specificity despite clear law establishing 

that Manzanilla’s removal was virtually certain. (See Padilla, 

supra, 559 U.S. at p. 369; Cf. People v. Lopez (2021) 66 

Cal.App.5th 561, 579–580 (Lopez) [counsel’s failure to explain the 

difference between an “aggravated felony which meant virtually 

certain deportation and a nonaggravated felony which left open 

the possibility for relief” was inadequate advice]; accord People v. 

Espinoza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 908, 916 [where defendant was 

advised that he could be deported but not told deportation would 

7 As detailed above, the law was clear that a conviction 

under section 273.5, subdivision (a) with a 365-day or longer

sentence was an aggravated felony and made Manzanilla subject 

to mandatory deportation and ineligible for asylum and other 

forms of relief. The People do not dispute this. 

8 Defense counsel’s later memory is of telling Manzanilla he 

would “lose his LPR status,” not only that his status would 

“change.” 
17

be mandatory, advice constituted ineffective assistance of 

counsel].) “To warn merely ‘ “that his plea might have 

immigration consequences,” ’ in circumstances where the 

consequences were ‘certain,’ was ‘constitutionally deficient.’ ”

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 521.) 

That Manzanilla initialed the felony advisement, or Tahl

form as it is generally known,9did not absolve defense counsel of 

the duty to advise of immigration consequences. Even where the 

form says that the defendant “will” be deported, it does not 

substitute for the advice of counsel, and it is not a categorical bar 

to relief. “ ‘Although the Tahl form contains the word “will” and 

not “may,” it, standing alone, is akin to the “generic advisement”

required of the court under Penal Code section 1016.5 . . . and it 

similarly “is not designed, nor does it operate, as a substitute for 

such advice” of defense counsel regarding the applicable 

immigration consequences in a given case.’ [Citation.]” (Lopez, 

supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.) 

The only warning Manzanilla received that his plea would 

result in deportation was the Tahl form. Manzanilla initialed the 

Tahl form, but he said shortly afterwards that he felt pressured 

to sign it by counsel who told him to hurry up. He further

declared that he had difficultly reading it because of his 

cataracts, and counsel said it covered everything they had 

discussed, so he simply initialed. Regardless, in evaluating the 

Tahl form’s language, “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he defendant can be expected to rely 

9

See In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 (Tahl), overruled on 

other grounds by Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 

291.
18

on counsel’s independent evaluation of the charges’ ” ’ ” rather 

than the generic statements in the Tahl waiver and plea colloquy. 

(Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 577, quoting People v. 

Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 896.) Even if counsel went over 

the Tahl form in detail and Manzanilla read every word in it, 

there is no evidence that defense counsel fulfilled her duty to give 

him specific advice that he would be subject to mandatory 

deportation as a result of pleading no contest. 

The circumstances in People v. Tapia (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 

942 (Tapia), cited by the People, are materially different. In 

Tapia, the “only evidence” that the defendant was not properly 

advised by counsel was the defendant’s own declaration, which 

the trial court found not credible because the record showed 

defense counsel requested more time to determine the 

immigration consequences of the plea. (Id. at p. 953.) Here, 

counsel’s own notes and later memory state that she merely told 

Manzanilla his status would change or he would “lose his LPR 

status,” and he would have an immigration hearing in the United 

States—not that he would be deported. 

Accordingly, the record fails to support the conclusion that 

defense counsel advised Manzanilla that his plea would subject 

him to mandatory deportation. 

B. Counsel Did Not Defend Against Deportation

Manzanilla next asserts that counsel failed to adequately 

defend against the immigration consequences of his plea. 

We agree.

In Padilla, the Supreme Court described counsel’s duty to 

“plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a 

conviction and sentence that reduce[s] the likelihood of 

deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that 
19

automatically triggers the removal consequence.” (Padilla, 

supra, 559 U.S. at p. 373.)10

There are many ways to do this. Well before Padilla, 

the Court of Appeal, Sixth District, identified common ways that 

defense counsel can bargain to avoid a conviction that 

automatically triggers deportation, one of which is to negotiate a 

sentence of 364 days instead of 365 days for offenses that become

aggravated felonies at 365 days. (People v. Bautista (2004) 115 

Cal.App.4th 229, 240, fn. 8 (Bautista).) 

Defense counsel’s notes and actions show that she failed to 

bargain creatively with the prosecutor to reduce the likelihood of 

automatic deportation. (See Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 373.) 

It is undisputed that counsel failed to make a counteroffer of 364 

days in custody, which was more likely to be accepted by the 

prosecution than the more significant sentence reductions she 

sought of six or nine months. (See Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 580 [counsel “could have sought a plea agreement that was 

more likely to be accepted . . . yet avoided the worst of the 

adverse immigration consequences”].) Simply requesting jail 

terms of six and nine months was insufficient. For example, in 

Bautista, the court found a failure to defend despite counsel’s 

attempt to quash a warrant, which, if successful, would have 

prevented deportation. (Bautista, supra, 115 Cal App.4th at 

10 California subsequently codified this in 2015, effective 

2016, by adding a specific duty to “defend against [adverse 

immigration] consequences” to the Penal Code. (§ 1016.3, subd. 

(a).) This new statue was explicitly intended by the “Legislature 

to codify Padilla v. Kentucky and related California case 

law . . . .” (§ 1016.2, subd. (h).)
20

pp. 237–242.) This was also the case in Lopez, where the court 

found a failure to defend despite counsel’s “attempt to negotiate 

[an immigration-neutral] simple possession plea.” (Lopez, supra, 

66 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.) 

The People point out that in counsel’s questionnaire, she 

recalled asking for the six- and nine-month terms because she 

says she knew that a conviction of one year meant an 

“aggravated felony” and “he would be deported.” But counsel’s 

contemporaneous notes are silent as to the immigration 

consequences of her counteroffers. Instead, they state that they

were dictated by Manzanilla’s uninformed (as to the immigration 

consequences) interest in obtaining a misdemeanor and a shorter 

sentence, rather than counsel’s efforts to mitigate immigration 

consequences. Regardless, as in Bautista and Lopez, these 

counteroffers do not absolve her of her failure to defend. 

Moreover, counsel does not remember raising Manzanilla’s

immigration status in plea bargaining, and her notes confirm 

this. Her notes and memory also confirm that she learned 

Manzanilla was a legal permanent resident only when they 

discussed the consequences of the plea, after he stated he would 

take it, and after her counteroffers. This suggests that counsel

failed to bargain creatively with the prosecution in a manner that 

considered immigration consequences. (See Padilla, supra, 559 

U.S. at p. 373.)11 

11 Manzanilla also argues that defense counsel could have 

bargained for a false imprisonment charge. We need not address 

this argument as we find that counsel failed to discharge her 
21

The People counter that Manzanilla has not presented any 

“affirmative evidence” that the prosecution would have accepted 

an immigration-safe plea. This is not required to establish legal 

error; it goes to prejudice. Regardless, evidence that the 

prosecution would have accepted a 364-day plea is not required

even for prejudice. In the cases the People cite, there was no 

indication that an immigration-safe plea was available that 

would have been reasonable to the prosecution. (See, e.g., 

People v. Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1074 [“Nor is there 

any indication whatsoever that such a suggestion would have 

been acceptable in negotiations with the People or when 

presented to the trial court”]; People v. Olvera (2018) 24 

Cal.App.5th 1112, 1118 [defendant “does not identify any 

immigration-neutral disposition to which the prosecutor was 

reasonably likely to agree”]; People v. Perez (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 

818, 830 [“There is no indication in the record that the 

prosecution was willing to agree to an immigration safe 

disposition”].) Here, there is an indication the prosecution would 

reasonably accept a plea of 364 days because the prosecution’s

opening offer was 365 days. The People offer no explanation as to 

why the prosecution would have not found a one-day reduction 

reasonable.

12

duty based upon the failure to request a one-day sentence 

reduction. 

12 The People’s argument is particularly puzzling in light of 

their ultimate agreement (rejected by the trial court) in 2021 to 

allow Manzanilla to withdraw his plea and plead to an 

immigration-safe misdemeanor.
22

Relying on Bautista, the People nonetheless suggest that 

some higher evidentiary standard is required than what is 

present here. In Bautista, the defendant offered a declaration 

from his defense counsel admitting that he sought a lenient 

sentence and not an immigration-neutral charge, and a 

declaration from a law professor stating that the prosecution 

would have likely accepted an immigration-safe charge. 

(Bautista, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 238–240.) But here there

is even stronger evidence in the form of the prosecution’s actual 

opening offer of just one additional day in jail than Manzanilla 

needed to prevent the conviction from being an aggravated 

felony. There is certainly nothing in the record indicating an 

effort to reduce the sentence by one day would have been doomed 

to failure. And, as Manzanilla suggests, that time could have 

been made up in a reduction in time served (such as a waiver of 

section 4019 credits) or other creative bargaining techniques. 

Moreover, requiring an admission from defense counsel or 

expert testimony, as existed in Bautista, would impose a 

condition on obtaining relief under section 1473.7 that is not 

contained in the statute. The court can certainly consider what 

evidence is or is not in the record, but there is no litmus test 

requiring that the original defense counsel agrees they failed to 

adequately negotiate on behalf of their client.

In sum, we find a failure to adequately defend against 

Manzanilla’s deportation in plea bargaining by defense counsel.
23

C. Manzanilla Did Not Subjectively Understand That 

His Plea Made Him Subject to Deportation 

In his final claim of error, Manzanilla asserts that he did 

not subjectively understand that his plea exposed him to 

mandatory deportation. Objective record evidence supports this 

contention. 

The focus of our inquiry “is on the ‘defendant’s own error

in . . . not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory 

deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States.’ ” 

(People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871 (Mejia), italics in 

original, citing Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.) The

defendant must show that “he did not ‘meaningfully understand’ 

or “knowingly accept” the mandatory deportation consequences 

when he pleaded guilty in 2014. [Citation.]” (Mejia, supra, 36 

Cal.App.5th at p. 872.) 

Objective evidence contemporaneous with Manzanilla’s

plea shows he did not meaningfully understand its consequences. 

According to counsel’s notes, she did not warn Manzanilla that he 

would be deported, but only said that his status would change,

and he would have an immigration hearing. Manzanilla then 

responded that if the hearing was in the United States, then it 

was “fine.” This statement suggests subjective 

misunderstanding. If Manzanilla knew he was subject to 

mandatory deportation to Mexico, then his concern about the 

location of his immigration hearing seems irrelevant. 

The transcript of the sentencing hearing just 21 days after 

his plea also shows that Manzanilla did not understand his plea 

meant mandatory deportation. In fact, it confirms that he only 

thought, as counsel advised, that his immigration status would 

change. After the judge asked, “do you still wish to go forward 
24

with this deal?” he replied “Yes. Does that mean automatically

I’m not a permanent resident anymore?” The court elaborated:

“It means you will be deported.” Manzanilla then asked, “So I 

will be deported?” The court confirmed this, and Manzanilla 

said, “If I’m going to be deported, no” he did not want the deal. 

The trial court erred in rejecting this evidence and 

concluding, “[h]e always understood he was going to be deported,” 

citing counsel’s notes. Counsel’s notes do not mention 

deportation. Moreover, they are irrelevant to Manzanilla’s 

subjective understanding. “[W]hat the defense attorney said or 

did not say about the immigration consequences of the plea” does 

not govern the inquiry into subjective misunderstanding. (People 

v. Jung (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 842, 857 (Jung), disapproved of on 

other grounds in Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 526, fn. 4; accord 

Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.)

The People claim that Manzanilla’s signature and initials 

on the Tahl form show he subjectively understood he would be 

deported. This argument has been rejected by numerous courts

where there is contemporaneous evidence to the contrary, and we 

reject it today. (See, e.g., Jung, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 847, 

857–858; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865, 872–873.) The

People cite no authority for their claim that this is sufficient

when there is contemporaneous evidence to the contrary. 

The People also argue that we should give deference to the 

2014 sentencing court that addressed Manzanilla’s letter and 

request to withdraw his plea because that court witnessed

Manzanilla testify and determined he had “buyers remorse.”

We disagree. Factual determinations based on credibility are 

entitled to deference when they have record support. (People v. 

Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 79 [“If the trial court had 
25

heard live testimony, instead of reading written declarations, its 

credibility determinations would be entitled to deference if 

supported by the record”].) The 2014 sentencing court did not 

have a section 1473.7 motion before it, let alone any evidence in 

support of the motion going to subjective misunderstanding. For 

example, it did not have Lin’s notes showing that her advisal was 

only that Manzanilla’s status would change and he would have 

an immigration hearing, which Manzanilla found acceptable if 

the hearing was in the U.S, a bizarre concern if he meaningfully 

understood he would be deported. 

The sentencing judge also curtailed any arguments by

Manzanilla that he did not understand he would be deported at 

the time of his plea. It rejected counsel’s suggestion that she 

should conflict off the motion, and ended the hearing without 

further testimony from Manzanilla after he requested to take 

back his plea based on the immigration consequences. 

Finally, the People are not asking us to review the trial 

court’s factual finding based on credibility, but the 2014

sentencing court’s conclusion. Even so, appellate courts 

reviewing factual determinations based on the credibility of 

witnesses that a trial court observed may reach a different 

conclusion on an independent examination of the evidence. 

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–528.)

The swiftness with which Manzanilla brought his concern 

about deportation to the attention of the trial court after entry of 

the plea supports our conclusion that he did not meaningfully 

understand the immigration consequences of the plea. He did not 

wait months or years to claim he did not realize he would be 

deported. He did not wait to claim he did not understand the 

consequences only after efforts to avoid deportation proceedings 
26

had failed. He was not making a desperate allegation to avoid 

the consequences of an immigration proceeding that had gone 

unexpectedly bad. Manzanilla advised the court at the first court 

hearing after entry of the plea, 21 days later, with no deportation 

proceeding underway, that he had not understood that 

deportation was a certainty.

Objective, contemporaneous evidence establishes 

Manzanilla did not subjectively understand he would be deported 

when he entered his plea. 

IV. Manzanilla Demonstrated Prejudicial Error 

“[P]rejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) 

means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant 

would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly 

understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” 

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “When courts assess 

whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they 

consider the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] Factors 

particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties 

to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on 

avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea 

bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an 

immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” (Id. at 

pp. 529–530.)

Manzanilla has established prejudice under all four factors 

that Vivar identified as particularly relevant. First, at the time 

of his plea, Manzanilla had been in the United States since 1965, 

when he arrived as a four-year-old child, so had called the United 

States home for approximately 55 years. He went to school and 

started a family in California, and his family members, including 

his U.S. citizen minor children, are in the United States. 
27

In contrast, he has no family ties to Mexico, and the last time he 

was there, on vacation with his family in the 1990s, he was 

assaulted due to his sexual orientation and never returned. 

This evidence “constitute[s] contemporaneous objective facts that 

corroborate [the defendant’s] concern about the immigration 

consequences of his plea options.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 530.) 

Second, the facts near the time of Manzanilla’s plea show 

that he would not have pled guilty had he known he would be 

deported. In his sentencing hearing just 21 days after his plea, 

he asked to take back his plea when he was told it meant not only 

that he would lose his legal permanent resident status, but that 

he would be deported. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 531 

[finding contemporaneous evidence of prejudice where defendant 

wrote court three months after his plea saying he would not have 

taken it if he knew he would be deported].) According to 

counsel’s notes from the hearing, he said that he wanted to 

withdraw his plea because “this conviction will affect his [legal 

permanent resident] status.” In addition, Manzanilla’s response

to counsel that the plea was acceptable if the immigration 

hearing was in the United States is contemporaneous evidence 

that he was concerned with his physical location and would not

have wanted to be deported to Mexico.

Third, a defendant’s stated interests during plea 

negotiations are relevant to the prejudice inquiry if they were 

based on a full and accurate understanding of the immigration 

consequences at issue. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 532.) 

A defendant’s stated interests during plea bargaining “can hardly 

serve as evidence that he didn’t care about immigration 

consequences when it is undisputed that [he] was not properly 
28

advised—and thus was ignorant—of the immigration 

consequences attached to his various plea options.” (Ibid.) 

In Vivar, the defendant even rejected—unknowingly—an 

immigration neutral plea offered by the prosecution, and the 

court found prejudice: “[T]hat he unknowingly rejected an 

immigration-neutral option cannot, in itself, demonstrate that 

‘immigration consequences were not defendant’s primary 

consideration.’ ” (Ibid.) The objective evidence of Manzanilla’s 

goals during plea bargaining, according to counsel’s notes, are 

that he wanted a misdemeanor, minimal jail time, and his 

immigration hearing in the United States. Because counsel

never told Manzanilla his plea would result in mandatory 

deportation, his uninformed interests during plea negotiations do 

not show that he was indifferent to immigration consequences. 

Fourth, Manzanilla had reason to believe an immigrationneutral disposition was possible, because all he needed was a 

one-day reduction in jail time. A defendant need not have a 

subjective understanding that the disposition is possible, as 

evidenced by Vivar where the defendant rejected an immigration 

safe plea in favor of one that subjected him to deportation

because counsel failed to advise him adequately. (Vivar, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 532.) 

Manzanilla has established a reasonable probability that 

he would have rejected the plea if he had correctly understood its 

actual or potential immigration consequences of deportation; 

indeed, he tried to take back the plea just 21 days later. 
29

DISPOSITION

We reverse the order denying Manzanilla’s motion to 

vacate his conviction. On remand the trial court should grant the 

motion, vacate Manzanilla’s 2014 conviction, and set the matter 

for further proceedings. 

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

*

Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 7/6/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS RENAN MANZANILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

B313557

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. MA063994)

 ORDER CERTIFYING 

 PUBLICATION 

 [No change in the judgment]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above entitled matter was filed on June 

13, 2022, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. 

For good cause it now appears that the opinion should be 

published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________ 

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J. HARUTUNIAN, J.

*

*

Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.