Same-Sex Marriage Laws and Demand 

for Mortgage Credit

February 2016

Housing Finance

Joshua J. Miller

Kevin A. Park

W O R K I N G P A P E R S E R I E S

 Working Paper No. HF-020
Same-Sex Marriage Laws and Demand for Mortgage Credit

By JOSHUA J. MILLER AND KEVIN A. PARK*

Marriage for same-sex couples was only permitted in a limited 

number of states prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in 

Obergefell v. Hodges. We exploit this variation across states prior 

to the Supreme Court decision to investigate the effect of marriage 

laws on demand for mortgage credit. Identification relies on the fact 

that states permitted same-sex marriage at different points in time, 

often through court order whereby the outcome and timing of ruling 

was unknown. We estimate that states permitting same-sex marriage 

experienced an 8 to 13 percent increase in same-sex mortgage 

applications after the policy was implemented.

* Name: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 Seventh Street SW, Washington, DC, 20410 (e-mail: 

name@hud.gov). The opinions expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development or the Administration. The authors thank William Reeder and Richard K. 

Green for invaluable comments and suggestions. Any omissions and errors belong solely to the authors. 
I. Introduction

On June 26, 2015 the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges (576 U.S. 

___ (2015), Docket No. 14-556) that same-sex couples have the right to marry in 

the United States. That decision capped a decade of piecemeal yet remarkable 

change in state same-sex marriage laws. Beginning with Massachusetts in 2004, 

each state pursued a different path towards marriage equality. Some voluntarily 

implemented same-sex marriage laws through legislation or voter initiatives. 

Others were forced to repeal bans on same-sex marriage by state and federal 

courts. 

Nevertheless, the extension of the right-to-marry provided many benefits to gay 

and lesbian households that had previously been available only to heterosexual 

couples. Many of these benefits affect household formation and tenure choice. 

Certain benefits available through marriage can lower the cost of homeownership 

and thus could increase the demand for mortgage credit.

To test this hypothesis and identify the causal effect of marriage laws on the 

demand for mortgage credit we exploit the sporadic implementation of state 

same-sex marriage laws prior to the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling, often through 

court order in which the outcome and timing of ruling was unknown. Variation in 

timing is commonly used in the literature to estimate the causal impact of policy 

on economic outcomes (Autor et al. 2006; Adams and Cotti 2008). The strategy 

allows us to mitigate potential selection bias and estimate the response to the 

policy.

We estimate that states that introduced same-sex marriage experienced a 

roughly 8 to 13 percent increase in same-sex mortgage applications depending on 

the model specification and sample restriction. We also consider two additional 

policy changes that occurred concurrently with the enactment of same-sex 

marriage laws. We find positive and significant results for overturning Section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) but no statistically significant effect of 

civil unions on the demand for mortgage credit. 

Becker (1981) was the first to discuss the economics of households, including 

same-sex households, in the seminal work A Treatise on the Family. Subsequent 

work (Black et al. 2007) examines same-sex households under different laws and 

cultures. Our work furthers this research and gains important insight into the 

economics of the same-sex household. 

To our knowledge, this paper is the first to describe the pathways through 

which same-sex marriage laws are thought to increase same-sex mortgage 

applications. The paper is also the first to use the HMDA dataset to examine the 

pattern of same-sex mortgage applications over time and exploit state variation to 

estimate the causal effect of changes in same-sex marriage laws on same-sex 

mortgage applications. The findings further our understanding of the economics 

of the same-sex household at a crucial point in time in the evolution of legal 

equality and social acceptance.

II. Homeownership and the Economics of Same-Sex Households

Differences in homeownership rates between same-sex couples and married 

opposite-sex couples are not fully explained by differences in characteristics 

traditionally associated with homeownership such as income or education (Jespen 

and Jespen 2002; Leppel 2007a; Leppel 2007b). Instead, one plausible 

explanation for the same-sex homeownership gap is disparate treatment of samesex couples, including being denied the legal and economic benefits of the 

institution of marriage. 

The positive relationship between marital status and homeownership is well 

documented (Hoyt and Rosenthal 1990; Ioannides and Rosenthal 1994). Marriage 

encourages investments in marriage-specific capital including spouse’s education, 
children, household specialization, and homeownership (Becker 1981; Stevenson 

2007). More particularly for homeownership, marriage creates an explicit contract 

that protects both parties from lien by creditors of a spouse and transfers property 

automatically without probate to a surviving spouse in the event of death.1

 For 

example, in a related Supreme Court ruling, United States v. Windsor (570 U.S. 

___ (2013), Docket No. 12-307), the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of 

DOMA was an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. The petitioner, Edith Windsor, was prevented under the law from 

claiming a spousal exemption from the estate tax worth $363,053 after the death 

of her long-time partner and wife as recognized by the state of New York. 

Further, favorable treatment of homeownership by the federal tax system has 

been shown to have a direct effect on tenure choice (Rosen and Rosen 1980). 

Marriage laws affect housing demand by reducing the cost of homeownership 

through at least two tax expenditures; the mortgage interest deduction and capital 

gains exemption. Although the mortgage interest deduction and capital gains 

expenditures are available to married and unmarried homeowners, the reporting 

requirements for unmarried couples are more burdensome. Unmarried couples 

must carefully document ownership interest and mortgage payments to fully 

qualify.

III. Data

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) annually 

compiles information collected from financial institutions on home mortgage 

lending activities as required under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 

of 1975. Since revisions in 2004 to Regulation C that implements HMDA, the 

1 The distribution of property in the event of death is a complicated process for any couple. This was certainly so for 

same-sex couples without the benefit of the legal structure that marriage provides. Any couple contemplating joint 

purchase of property would be well-advised to carefully consider estate planning and seek legal advice.
loan-application register that each financial institution is required to submit 

included information on the loan purpose and lien status as well as the property 

type and occupancy. This paper focuses on non-business2 first-lien mortgage 

applications for purchase of owner-occupied, one-to-four unit properties. We 

examine mortgage applications from the beginning of 2004 until September 30, 

2014.3 

HMDA data is unique for several reasons. First, disclosure is required for loan 

originations as well as applications denied by the financial institution. Loan 

applications provide a more accurate measure of demand for mortgage credit than 

loan originations, which are influenced by the changes in underwriting standards 

and possible disparate treatment by mortgage lenders. 

Second, HMDA has the most complete coverage of the mortgage market of any 

database. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2011) 

estimates that HMDA covers between 75 and 85 percent of conventional (i.e., not 

government-insured) loan originations and between 90 and 95 percent of FHAinsured originations. 

Finally, HMDA data include information on applicant characteristics, such as 

race, ethnicity, and sex. HMDA is traditionally used to investigate the possibility 

of disparate treatment and redlining, in which minority applicants and 

neighborhoods are underserved by mortgage lenders (e.g., Dedman 1988; 

Munnell et al. 1996). The sex of the applicant is examined less often and the 

characteristics of any co-applicants are often ignored. This paper uses the reported 

2 Following Bhutta and Canner (2013), business-related loans are identified as those where the race, ethnicity, and sex 

of the applicant or co-applicant are reported by the lender as “not applicable.”

3 We excluded the last three months of 2014 because applications are not reported under HMDA until they are acted 

upon. Consequently, some applications submitted toward the end of one calendar year may not be reported until the 

following year. Between 2004 and 2013, on average 73 percent of applications submitted in December were not acted on 

until the following calendar year and therefore not reported in the year the application was submitted. Comparable figures 

for November and October are 31 percent and 15 percent, respectively.
sex of the both the applicant and co-applicant to identify demand for mortgage 

credit from same-sex applicants. The complete typology is provided below:4 

• Single (No co-applicant)

• Same-sex (Applicant and co-applicant of same sex)

• Opposite-sex (Applicant and co-applicant of opposite sex)

• Unknown (Co-applicant present but sex not reported)

According to the HMDA data, the number of first lien mortgage applications 

for purchase of owner-occupied site-built one-to-four unit properties from samesex applicants fell by half between 2004 and the trough in 2011 (Table 1; Figure 

1). But in the context of declines in all home purchase mortgage applications, the 

same-sex share has been relatively stable, ranging between 1.9 and 2.6 percent 

over the last eleven years. 

TABLE 1. AVERAGE ANNUAL MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE (THOUSANDS)

2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2014a

Household Type

Single Applicants 3,380 1,794 1,883

Same-Sex Applicants 112 78 73

Opposite-Sex Applicants 2,018 1,227 1,340

Unknown 145 97 87

All Applications 5,655 3,195 3,383

Same-Sex Share 2.0% 2.4% 2.2%

Source: Author calculations.

a Through September.

4 A growing literature suggests the order of mortgage applicants (male-female or female-male) may provide insight into 

local sentiment on gender equality (Agarwal et al. 2015). As such we also considered a finer topology and found consistent 

results including splitting into male-male and female-female pairings.
FIGURE 1. SAME-SEX MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS

Source: Author tabulations of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.

Admittedly, same-sex applications do not uniquely capture demand for 

mortgage credit for couples in a same-sex relationship. Applicants and coapplicants could be of the same sex but of another relationship, such as a father 

co-signing on his son’s mortgage application. In addition, same-sex households 

may have misreported sex of applicants or simply omitted a potential co-applicant 

because of social stigma and fear of discrimination. In spite of the inability to 

specifically identify applications from same-sex households, the same-sex share 

of applicants observed in the HMDA dataset in a state is correlated (ρ=0.714) 

with the same-sex share of owner-occupied households estimated from the 

American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata (Figure 2).5

 The

correlation suggests that the applicant and co-applicant characteristics are 

indicative of household type.

5 Same-sex households are identified in the American Community Survey as households where a husband, wife or 

unmarried partner reported the same-sex as the reference person.

0.0%

0.6%

1.2%

1.8%

2.4%

3.0%

0

30

60

90

120

150

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Share of Purchase Applications

Purchase Applications (Thousands)

Number Share
FIGURE 2. SAME-SEX SHARE OF HOMEOWNERS AND MORTGAGE APPLICANTS BY STATE (2011-13)

Source: Author tabulations of American Community Survey Public Use Microdata and Home Mortgage 

Disclosure Act data.

IV. Methods and Results

The variation in timing and method of implementation of same-sex marriage 

laws is crucial to our identification strategy. Table 2 provides a list of the 36 states 

and District of Columbia that permitted same-sex marriages prior to the 

Obergefell v. Hodges decision, the dates the laws went into effect, and the method 

of implementation. The first state to permit same-sex marriages was 

Massachusetts in 2004. By the end of our study period, nineteen states and the 

District of Columbia permitted same-sex marriage. We model the effect of 

implementing same-sex marriage on the number of home purchase mortgage 

applications from applicants of the same sex using fixed effects (FE), differencein-difference (DD) and difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) models.

AL AK

AZ AR

CO CA

CT

DE

DC

FL

GA

HI

ID

IL

IN

IA

KS

KY

LA

ME

MD

MA

MI

MN

MS

MO

MTNE

NVNH

NJ

NM

NY

NC

ND

OH OK

OR PA

RI

SC

SD

TNTX

UT

VT

VA

WA

WVWI

WY

0.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

0.00% 0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00%

Same-Sex Share of Purchase Applications

Same-Sex Share of Homeowners
TABLE 2. MARRIAGE EQUALITY CHRONOLOGY PRIOR TO OBERGEFELL V. HODGES 

State Same-Sex Marriage Implementation Type Civil Union

Alabama 2/9/2015 Court Order

Alaska 10/12/2014 Court Order

Arizona 10/17/2014 Court Order

California 6/28/2013 Court Order

Colorado 10/6/2014 Court Order 5/1/2013

Connecticut 10/10/2008 Court Order 10/1/2005

Delaware 7/1/2013 Legislation 1/1/2012

District of Columbia 3/9/2010 Legislation

Florida 1/6/2015 Court Order

Hawaii 11/13/2013 Legislation 1/1/2012

Idaho 10/15/2014 Court Order

Illinois 6/1/2014 Legislation 1/31/2011

Indiana 10/6/2014 Court Order

Iowa 4/3/2009 Court Order

Maine 11/6/2012 Voter

Maryland 1/1/2013 Legislation

Massachusetts 5/17/2004 Court Order

Minnesota 8/1/2013 Legislation

Montana 11/19/2014 Court Order

Nevada 10/9/2014 Court Order

New Hampshire 1/1/2010 Legislation 1/1/2008

New Jersey 10/21/2013 Court Order 2/19/2007

New Mexico 12/19/2013 Court Order

New York 7/24/2011 Legislation

North Carolina 10/10/2014 Court Order

Oklahoma 10/6/2014 Court Order

Oregon 5/19/2014 Court Order

Pennsylvania 5/20/2014 Court Order

Rhode Island 8/1/2013 Legislation 7/1/2011

South Carolina 11/20/2014 Court Order

Utah 10/6/2014 Court Order

Vermont 4/7/2009 Legislation 7/1/2000

Virginia 10/6/2014 Court Order

Washington 11/6/2012 Voter

West Virginia 10/9/2014 Court Order

Wisconsin 10/6/2014 Court Order

Wyoming 10/21/2014 Court Order

Source: Los Angeles Times - Timeline Gay marriage chronology; National Conference of State Legislatures.

In addition to policy indicators of same-sex marriage, we include several timevarying state-level controls identified in the literature (Rosen 1980). The control 

variables are grouped into three categories: employment conditions, housing 

affordability, and housing market expectations (see Table 3). 
Employment Conditions: Household formation and demand for mortgage credit 

is related to employment conditions (Paciorek 2013). We measure the strength of 

the labor market in a state by both the monthly unemployment rate and change in 

the level of employment from the previous month. State level employment and 

unemployment information is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

Housing Affordability: Housing affordability is often measured by the ratio of 

mortgage debt payments to potential homeowner’s income. We estimate a general 

housing cost to income (HTI) ratio by applying prevailing mortgage rates to statelevel estimates of house prices6 and wages. Mortgage payments are calculated 

assuming an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio, fixed mortgage interest rates, a 30 

year amortization term and the cost of points spread over five years. Mortgage 

interest rates and points are obtained from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage 

Market Survey (PMMS). Monthly income is based on the average weekly wages 

reported in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).

Housing Market Expectations: Expectations about the strength of the housing 

market are captured by two measures. First, year-over-year change in house 

prices, as measured by changes in FHFA’s quarterly house price index. 

Expectations of future house price appreciation that influence household behavior 

are found to be correlated with such backward-looking extrapolative heuristics 

(Mayer and Sinai 2007; Granziera and Kozicki 2012). Second, housing market 

expectations are also measured by the monthly number of (logged) new building 

permits in a given state. Building permits reflect home builder expectations of 

future housing market conditions, which may be assumed to be correlated with 

household expectations. 

6 Housing values are estimated by adjusting the median value of owner-occupied homes in the 2006-2010 ACS by the 

state-level repeat-sales house price index (HPI) created by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
New Housing Supply: We also account for changes in the housing stock that 

might affect the number of homes available to purchase. We use a 12 month lag7

in permits as a measure of new housing stock available for purchase. 

We include various fixed effects and time trends. State fixed effects capture 

time invariant factors unique to each region. Year and month fixed effects capture 

time specific changes common across all states such as seasonality in demand for 

mortgage credit. Linear applicant type- and state-specific time trends are also 

incorporated to address secular trends in mortgage applications that would have 

existed regardless of whether states permitted same-sex marriage.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE STATE MONTHLY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, 2004-2014

Building Permits (000s) 1.89

(2.85)

Housing Cost to Income Ratio 24.5

(11.3)

Unemployment Rate 6.3

(2.2)

Monthly Change in Employment 0.05

(0.21)

Annual Change in House Prices 2.4

(7.4)

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Source: Author calculations.

A. Fixed Effects Model

First, we employ a fixed effects (FE) model using variation in timing of 

implementation of same-sex marriage laws to measure the causal effect on the 

number of home purchase mortgage applications. Equation (1) shows the FE 

model.

7 According to the Census Bureau, the length of time from authorization to completion of new single-family privately 

owned residential buildings between 2004 and 2014 ranges between 6.7 and 8.9 months, with multi-family buildings 

ranging between 12 and 16.7 months.
(1)

ln(AAAA llllllllllllllllllssss)

= ααss + δδSSSSSSssss + ββXXssss + γγ1YYYY YY + γγ2 h + γγ3TT TTssss + εεssss

The outcome variable is the natural log8 of home purchase mortgage 

applications in state (s) in time period (t). The policy variable of interest (SSM) is 

equal to one if state s allowed same-sex marriages during year and month t and 

zero otherwise. 

The first column of Table 4 presents the results of the FE model using all home 

purchase mortgage applications. The controls for economic conditions are all

statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level and in the anticipated 

direction. A one percent increase in building permits increases home purchase 

mortgage applications by 8 percent in the current month and just over 1 percent a 

year later. A one percentage point increase in the HTI ratio causes applications to 

fall roughly half a percent. Similarly, a one point year-over-year increase in house 

prices is associated with an increase in application of roughly half a percent. A 

one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate causes applications to fall 

3 percent while a one percent month-over-month increase in employment is 

associated with over an 11 percent increase in applications.

8 Because the dependent variable is logged, estimated effects are discussed as percentage changes based on the 

exponeniated values of the coefficients (i.e., %Δ=(eβ-1)×100). To avoid dropping observations with no applications in a 

given month, we add one to all application counts before taking the natural log in this and all subsequent models.
TABLE 4. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE; FIXED EFFECTS MODEL

(1) (2)

All Applications Same-Sex Applicants

Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.

Same-Sex Marriage 0.0044 0.0152 0.0835** 0.0318

Economic Conditions

Building Permits (Log) 0.0801*** 0.0241 0.0591** 0.0236

12-Month Lag 0.0129** 0.0055 0.0115 0.0081

House Price-to-Income Ratio -0.0056*** 0.0019 -0.0045 0.0037

Unemployment Rate -0.0321*** 0.0056 -0.0311*** 0.0090

Monthly Change in Employment 0.1074*** 0.0306 0.1014*** 0.0340

Annual Change in House Prices 0.0045*** 0.0013 0.0005 0.0018

N 6,579 6,579

F 841.5 199.8 

Within R2 0.9105 0.7073 

Adjusted Within R2 0.9094 0.7038 

Notes: Robust standard errors. State time trends, and state, year and month fixed effects not shown.

Source: Author calculations.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

We find that the coefficient of interest, same-sex marriage, is small and 

positive. The result, however, is not significantly different from zero. It is not 

entirely surprising that we find an effect from same-sex marriage laws that is not 

statistically significant on the entire volume of mortgage applications as same-sex 

mortgage applications represent a small share of the market. The second column 

shows the results from restricting the population to same-sex applicants. We find 

that the implementation of a same-sex marriage law increased same-sex mortgage 

applications 8.4 percent and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

B. Differences-in-Differences Model

The estimation strategy can be improved by employing a difference-indifference (DD) model in which other applicant types serve as a counterfactual to 
changes in same-sex applications. Specifically, the relative change in the volume 

of same-sex mortgage applications after the implementation of same-sex marriage 

is compared the equivalent relative changes in states and months where the law 

regarding same-sex marriage did not change. 

Equation (2) shows the DD regression model.

(2) 

ln(AAAAAA ii )

= ααii + δδ1SSSSSSssss + δδ2(TTTT ii × SSSSSSssss) + ββXXssss + γγ1YYYY YY + γγ2 h

+ γγ3TT TTssss + γγ4TT TTh + εεii

The outcome variable in equation (2) is the natural log of mortgage applications 

by a given applicant type (i) in state (s) at period (t). Applicant types are the four 

possible combinations of applicants and co-applicants based on sex. The 

coefficient δ2 on the interaction of the policy variable SSM and applicant type 

captures any disproportionate change in applications among certain applicant 

types (e.g., same-sex applicants) in a state at the time same-sex marriage became 

legal (i.e., the DD estimator). Single applicants (no co-applicants) are used as the 

reference group. 

The first column of Table 5 presents the results of the DD estimation for all 

states. Eleven years of monthly data, 50 states and the District of Columbia, and 

four different applicant types yields 26,316 observations. The coefficients on 

state-level time-varying economic conditions all have anticipated signs and are 

similar in magnitude to the estimates from the previous FE estimation. 

Coefficients on economic conditions are also all statistically significant with the 

exception of 12 month lag in building permit activity. 
TABLE 5. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE; DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL

(1) (2) (3)

All States Court Order Early Adopters

Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.

Same-Sex Marriage -0.0196 0.0242 -0.0633** 0.0302 -0.0348 0.0329

× Opposite-Sex 0.0442 0.0299 0.0528 0.0360 0.0501 0.0393

× Same-Sex 0.0866** 0.0390 0.1252*** 0.0334 0.1291** 0.0525

× Unknown -0.0179 0.0450 -0.0209 0.0493 0.0195 0.0585

Economic Conditions

Building Permits (Log) 0.0725*** 0.0123 0.1093*** 0.0087 0.0699*** 0.0133

12-Month Lag 0.0075 0.0052 0.0083 0.0074 0.0071 0.0057

House Price-to-Income Ratio -0.0060*** 0.0016 -0.0081*** 0.0020 -0.0045** 0.0018

Unemployment Rate -0.0347*** 0.0046 -0.0359*** 0.0055 -0.0365*** 0.0052

Monthly Change in Employment 0.1141*** 0.0188 0.0881*** 0.0190 0.0979*** 0.0194

Annual Change in House Prices 0.0043*** 0.0010 0.0040*** 0.0011 0.0042*** 0.0012

N 26,316 20,124 20,640

F 362.5 1011.9 451.9

Within R2 0.7507 0.7600 0.7411

Adjusted Within R2 0.7499 0.7592 0.7402

Notes: Robust standard errors. State time trends, and state, year and month fixed effects not shown.

Source: Author calculations.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

The estimated change in the number of home purchase mortgage applications in 

the reference group (single applicants) associated with same-sex marriage laws 

was negative but not statistically significant. Further, the interaction between 

applicant type and same-sex marriage shows that mortgage applications from 

opposite-sex applicants and applications where the sex of the applicants was not 

reported did not change significantly relative to applications from single 

applicants. On the other hand, same-sex marriage mortgage applications are 9 

percent higher in months that states permitted same-sex marriage relative to 

applications from single applicants. The coefficient is significant at the 5 percent 

level. 

There are potential threats to identification in DD estimation as detailed in 

Meyers (1995). The most important concern is that of policy endogeneity: the 
possibility that state laws are responding to a population of interest rather than 

that population responding to changes in state laws. Vermont, for example, was 

the first state to implement civil unions in 2000 that extended many of the benefits 

of marriage to same-sex couples. In 2009, Vermont became the fourth state to 

permit same-sex couples the right-to-marry and the first through the legislative 

process. Vermont is also the state with the highest same-sex share of 

homeowners. It is possible that changes in Vermont’s same-sex marriage law was 

a response to a demand from same-sex households within the state for the legal 

protections that come with marriage, including legal benefits that relate to 

homeownership. This would produce an estimated effect of same-sex marriage 

that is upwardly biased. 

Same-sex marriage permitted by court order rather than legislative action or 

voter initiative has a stronger argument for exogeneity. Prior to the 2015 the 

majority of states (23), implemented same-sex marriage laws through court order 

for which the outcome was not assured and timing of implementation was 

unknown. The second column of Table 5 shows the results of the DD estimation 

after excluding states that implemented same-sex marriage in the study period by 

legislation or voter initiative. The remaining eight states that implemented samesex marriage in the study period were required to do so by judicial decree. The 

coefficient on the interaction between same-sex applicants and the 

implementation of same-sex marriage is even stronger in this sample of states. 

The court mandated implementation of same-sex marriage is associated with a 

12.5 percent increase in home purchase applications relative to the applications 

with no co-applicant. The finding is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Another concern is that the concentration of policy changes toward the end of 

the period of observation prevents adequate measurement of post-intervention 

applicant behavior and whether any increase in demand for mortgage credit is 

temporary or persistent. The third column of Table 5 presents the results of the 
DD model after excluding states that implemented same-sex marriage after 2012. 

The implementation of same-sex marriage in the remaining nine “early adopters” 

is associated with a 12.9 percent relative increase in home purchase mortgage 

applications from same-sex applicants. The finding is statistically significant at 

the 5 percent level. 

A supplementary model (not shown) includes the number of months since the 

implementation of same-sex marriage as well as the binary policy indicator.9 The 

estimated coefficient on the interaction with same-sex applicants is negative but 

not statistically significant while the estimated coefficient on original policy 

variable is not meaningfully altered. This suggests that the change in mortgage 

applications from same-sex applicants in response to same-sex marriage is a 

persistent increase rather than a temporary spike driven by pent-up demand.

Table 6 shows the results of replacing the policy variable SSM in the DD model 

with a binary indicator of civil unions. Civil unions offer a legal alternative to 

marriage that may also affect the behavior of same-sex households. However, the 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) maintains that “the term ‘marriage’ does not 

include registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, or other similar formal 

relationships recognized under state law that are not denominated as a marriage 

under that state’s law” (Rev. Rul. 2013-17). Given the importance of federal tax 

expenditures to the cost of homeownership, same-sex couples may be less 

responsive to civil unions with regard to purchasing a home. The coefficient on 

the interaction with applicant type shows civil unions do not produce a 

statistically significant change in home purchase mortgage applications from 

same-sex applicants. The finding holds even if indicators for both same-sex 

marriage and civil unions are estimated in the same model.

9 Results for the supplementary model are provided upon request.
TABLE 6. CIVIL UNIONS; DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL

Coeff. Std. Err.

Civil Union -0.0169 0.0329

× Opposite-Sex 0.0189 0.0403

× Same-Sex 0.0137 0.0464

× Unknown 0.0348 0.0424

Economic Conditions

Building Permits (Log) 0.0726*** 0.0122

12-Month Lag 0.0075 0.0052

House Price-to-Income Ratio -0.0060*** 0.0015

Unemployment Rate -0.0347*** 0.0046

Monthly Change in Employment 0.1140*** 0.0188

Annual Change in House Prices 0.0043*** 0.0010

N 26,316

F 352.9

Within R2 0.7502

Adjusted Within R2 0.7494

Notes: Robust standard errors. State time trends, and state, year and month fixed effects not shown.

Source: Author calculations.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

Finally, in a falsification test (not shown), we randomly assign same-sex 

marriage to 20 states and then randomly assign the timing of implementation to a 

date within the study period.10 The results show that this randomized policy 

variable and its interaction with applicant type is not statistically significant.

C. Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Model

The repeal of Section 3 of DOMA provides another source of variation with 

respect to same-sex marriage laws.11 The benefit and portability of same-sex 

marriage was limited as long as the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 

10 Results from the falsification test are provided upon request.

11 We model the effect of overturning DOMA as occurring in September 2013 even though the Supreme Court ruling 

was June 26. The IRS did not issue guidance on federal taxation until August 29 and the Department of Defense did not 

issue guidance on veterans’ benefits until September 3.
(DOMA) was in effect. Section 3 of DOMA stated that for purposes of federal 

regulations “the word `marriage' means only a legal union between one man and 

one woman as husband and wife, and the word `spouse' refers only to a person of 

the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” DOMA hindered same-sex spouses 

from benefiting from certain federal tax expenditures, including benefits that 

affect the cost of homeownership. In United States v. Windsor (570 U.S. ___ 

(2013), Docket No. 12-307), the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of DOMA 

was an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. Overturning Section 3 of DOMA opened federal benefits to samesex households. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified a 

total of 1,138 federal statutory provisions in which marital status was a factor in 

receiving benefits, rights, and privileges (GAO 2004). 

Concerns about policy endogeneity should be ameliorated because this change 

in national policy was prompted by a Supreme Court ruling but should 

nevertheless affect states differently based on existing marriage laws. Equation 

(3) shows the differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) regression model.

(3)

ln(AAAAAA ii )

= ααii + δδ1SSSSSSssss + δδ2(TTTT ii × SSSSSSssss) + δδ3DDDD + δδ4(TTTT ii × DDDD )

+ δδ5(SSSSSSssss × DDDD ) + δδ6(TTTT ii × SSSSSSssss × DDDD ) + ββXXssss + γγ1YYYY YY

+ γγ2 h + γγ3TT TTssss + γγ4TT TTh + εεii

Equation (3) captures both the DD estimate of enacting same-sex marriage but 

also the effect of overturning DOMA in states that had implemented same-sex 

marriage, represented by the coefficient δ6 on the interaction between DOMA, 

SSM and Type. 
TABLE 7. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE; DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL

(1) (2) (3)

All States Court Order Early Adopters

Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.

Same-Sex Marriage -0.0095 0.0252 -0.0485* 0.0285 -0.0271 0.0322

× Opposite-Sex 0.0394 0.0325 0.0345 0.0293 0.0457 0.0379

× Same-Sex 0.0686 0.0507 0.1087*** 0.0331 0.0973* 0.0565

× Unknown 0.0099 0.0468 0.0044 0.0430 0.0269 0.0558

DOMA Repeal 0.0194 0.0156 0.0140 0.0158 0.0079 0.0161

× Opposite-Sex -0.0248 0.0203 -0.0208 0.0198 -0.0169 0.0204

× Same-Sex -0.1115*** 0.0274 -0.1045*** 0.0283 -0.1025*** 0.0292

× Unknown -0.1077*** 0.0355 -0.0742** 0.0362 -0.0827** 0.0381

× Same-Sex Marriage -0.0546** 0.0232 -0.0543* 0.0284 -0.0685** 0.0279

× Opposite-Sex 0.0237 0.0310 0.0491 0.0372 0.0182 0.0342

× Same-Sex 0.0990** 0.0500 0.0841* 0.0440 0.1305** 0.0509

× Unknown -0.0028 0.0514 -0.0199 0.0581 -0.0253 0.0535

Economic Conditions

Building Permits (Log) 0.0721*** 0.0122 0.1087*** 0.0086 0.0697*** 0.0133

12-Month Lag 0.0086* 0.0051 0.0096 0.0073 0.0081 0.0056

House Price-to-Income Ratio -0.0056*** 0.0016 -0.0077*** 0.0021 -0.0038** 0.0019

Unemployment Rate -0.0349*** 0.0045 -0.0360*** 0.0054 -0.0364*** 0.0051

Monthly Change in Employment 0.1166*** 0.0191 0.0906*** 0.0193 0.0998*** 0.0195

Annual Change in House Prices 0.0042*** 0.0010 0.0039*** 0.0011 0.0041*** 0.0012

N 26,316 20,124 20,640

F 407.2 903.1 494.3

Within R2 0.7522 0.7611 0.7426

Adjusted Within R2 0.7513 0.7601 0.7416

Notes: Robust standard errors. State time trends, and state, year and month fixed effects not shown.

Source: Author calculations.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.

The first three columns of Table 7 show the results of the DDD model for all 

states, states that implemented same-sex marriage by court order, and early 

adopters. Prior to the repeal of DOMA, the implementation of same-sex marriage 

was associated with an increase in home purchase mortgage applications from 

same sex applicants of between 6.9 and 10.9 percent, although the change in not 

statistically significant in the model using all states and only significant at the 10 

percent level in the model using only early adopters. Same-sex applications in 
states without same-sex marriage were not expected to be affected by United 

States v. Windsor, but the overturning of DOMA is associated with a statistically 

significant decline in same-sex mortgage applications of between 10.3 and 11.1

percent in these states. On the other hand, the overturning of DOMA is associated 

with an increase of 8.4 to 13.0 percent in states that had enacted same-sex 

marriage. The increase among early adopters is particularly notable given that 

these states had all implemented same-sex marriage prior to the Supreme Court 

decision, whereas the results in the first two columns confound the state 

implementation of same-sex marriage with the federal repeal of DOMA. As such, 

the effect of the repeal among early adopters constitutes a clear incremental 

increase in demand for mortgage credit in response to change in federal policy.

After United States v. Windsor, the IRS made many of the newly acquired 

federal benefits portable by recognizing “the validity of a same-sex marriage that 

was valid in the state where it was entered into, regardless of the married couple’s 

place of domicile” (Rev. Rul. 2013-17). However, other federal benefits remained 

tied to residency. For example, veteran’s spousal benefits require a marriage to be 

valid according to “the law of the place where the parties resided when the right 

to benefits accrued” (38 U.S.C. § 103(c)). Consequently, the Veterans 

Administration (VA) could only guarantee the veteran’s portion of a mortgage 

loan even if a gay or lesbian veteran was legally married but resided in a state that 

did not recognize that same-sex marriage. 

The residency-based eligibility requirement strengthens the DDD model 

because same-sex households could not be married in one state but apply for a 

VA guaranteed mortgage in another state that did not recognize that marriage. 

Table 8 shows the results of the DDD model using only applications for VA 

guaranteed home purchase mortgages. 
TABLE 8. VA=GUARANTEED MORTGAGES; DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL

Coeff. Std. Err.

Same-Sex Marriage 0.1892*** 0.0638

× Opposite-Sex -0.0030 0.0892

× Same-Sex -0.2701*** 0.0829

× Unknown -0.3087*** 0.0794

DOMA Repeal 0.0318 0.0278

× Opposite-Sex 0.1088*** 0.0363

× Same-Sex 0.1093** 0.0502

× Unknown -0.1014** 0.0469

× Same-Sex Marriage -0.1285** 0.0514

× Opposite-Sex -0.0414 0.0821

× Same-Sex 0.2702*** 0.0819

× Unknown 0.1260 0.0804

Economic Conditions

Building Permits (Log) 0.0482*** 0.0121

12-Month Lag -0.0113 0.0114

House Price-to-Income Ratio -0.0215*** 0.0058

Unemployment Rate -0.0014 0.0078

Monthly Change in Employment 0.0632*** 0.0189

Annual Change in House Prices -0.0081*** 0.0013

N 26,316

F 306.4

Within R2 0.5388

Adjusted Within R2 0.5372

Notes: Robust standard errors. State time trends, and state, year and month fixed effects not shown.

Source: Author calculations.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 

** Significant at the 5 percent level.

* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Although the coefficients for most of the controls for economic conditions 

remain similar to prior models, the unemployment rate is no longer statistically 

significant while the year-over-year change in house price is statistically 

significant, but the direction is reversed. These changes are likely the result of VA 

guaranteed mortgage lending filling the void left by conventional mortgage 

lenders in the aftermath of the housing crisis and therefore being inversely 

correlated with common indicators of demand for mortgage credit.

Contrary to the model of all mortgage applications, the state enactment of samesex marriage prior to United States v. Windsor is associated with a 27.0 percent 

decrease in applications for VA-guaranteed home purchase mortgage loans. The 

difference may reflect same-sex applicants shifting from VA to a mortgage 

channel that can recognize their marriage. The repeal of Section 3 of DOMA is 

associated with an 10.9 percent increase in applications for VA-guaranteed 

mortgages in states without same-sex marriage and a larger 27.0 percent increase 

in states that recognize same-sex marriage. These changes are statistically 

significant at least at the 5 percent level.

V. Conclusion

The many benefits of marriage include better physical health, longevity, mental 

health, economic well-being, and child outcomes (Waite and Lehrer 2003). 

Additionally same-sex marriage laws are thought to increases household 

formation and demand for mortgage credit. In this paper we test the hypothesis 

that the introduction of same-sex marriage increases same-sex mortgage 

applications. We rely on data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 

and state variation in same-sex marriage laws. This paper is to be first to our 

knowledge that exploits state variation in same-sex marriage laws to estimate the 

increase in same-sex mortgage applications.
Our analysis provides evidence that same-sex marriage laws increase the 

number of same-sex mortgage applications. We estimate that states with same-sex 

marriage experienced an increase in the number of same-sex mortgage 

applications of between 8 and 13 percent. We also consider the method of 

enactment, civil unions and the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 

and find that same-sex households respond to marriage equality by increasing 

demand for mortgage credit.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges extended the right-tomarry to all same-sex households in the United States. The ruling also made 

existing same-sex marriages more portable by superseding Section 2 of DOMA, 

which allowed states to not recognize same-sex marriages performed in other 

states. These changes will likely further increase the demand for mortgage credit 

from same-sex households. However, because same-sex households constitute a 

small share of the market, the impact on the overall volume of market applications 

is unlikely to be dramatic. Further, our focus on the demand for mortgage credit 

does not consider the degree to which an increase in mortgage applications 

translates into actual loan originations or ultimately to an increase in 

homeownership. 

The relatively small share of mortgage market should not discourage further 

study of the economics of the same-sex household. Instead the sudden 

introduction of marriage to a population previously denied that right provides 

important insight in the economics of all households.
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