J-S44014-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARVIN RAVENELL, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3501 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0008357-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 17, 2018

Marvin Ravenell appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, after a jury found him guilty 

of firearms not to be carried without a license. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a). After 

review, we affirm.

On October 18, 2016, police responded to a call from Ravenell’s coworker, who alleged Ravenell threatened to shoot him over a quarrel. At the 

time, Ravenell worked as a mechanic at Firestone Complete Auto Care

(“Firestone”), in Wynnewood, Pennsylvania. When police responded, Ravenell 

denied having a firearm on his person. After further questioning, Ravenell 

admitted that he had concealed a Smith and Wesson 9MM handgun on his 

person while working at Firestone that day. The handgun was not registered 

or licensed to Ravenell. 
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Police arrested Ravenell and charged him with one count of firearms not 

to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a), and one count of 

terroristic threats. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706. A jury found Ravenell guilty only of 

firearms not to be carried without a license, and on September 11, 2017, the 

trial court sentenced him to two years’ probation. On September 21, 2017, 

Ravenell filed a post-sentence motion challenging the constitutionality of 

section 6106(a), which the trial court denied. On October 25, 2017, Ravenell 

filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Ravenell and the trial court have complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Ravenell raises the following issues for our 

review:

1. Whether [section 6106(a)] is unconstitutional and void for 

vagueness, as the meaning of the language in the statute, 

“fixed place of business,” is not clearly understood by people 

of ordinary intelligence, and therefore the public is not given 

fair notice as to whether or not a permit to carry is required to 

possess a firearm at their place of employment?

2. Whether the trial court erred and committed an abuse of 

discretion by denying [Ravenell’s] post-sentence motion for 

judgment of acquittal, due to the unconstitutionality of [section 

6106(a)]?

Brief of Appellant, at 5.

Ravenell first claims that section 6106(a) is unconstitutional and void 

for vagueness because people of ordinary intelligence cannot understand the 

statutory language therein, i.e., the clause “except in his . . . fixed place of 

business.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a). Relatedly, Ravenell argues the trial court 

erred in denying his post-sentence motion for acquittal because section 
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6106(a) is unconstitutional. Ravenell frames his challenge to section 6106(a) 

as “a good faith request to reevaluate whether the majority holding from this 

Court 24 years ago in [Commonwealth v. Carr, 483 A.2d 542 (Pa. Super. 

1984),] is still good law.” Brief of Appellant, at 10. After review, we find 

Ravenell’s claims are meritless.

Initially, we note that challenges to “[t]he constitutionality of a statute 

can be waived.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. Super. 

2013). “An appellate court should not address constitutional issues 

unnecessarily or when they are not properly presented and preserved in the 

trial court for our appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Berryman, 649 

A.2d 961, 973 (Pa. Super. 1994); see Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in 

the [trial] court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly held that constitutional issues . 

. . are waived if not properly raised in the trial court.” Id. Furthermore, this 

court may not raise a constitutional issue sua sponte. Id.

Instantly, Ravenell first challenged the constitutionality of section 

6106(a) in a post-sentence motion. Ravenell did not raise this issue prior to 

the conclusion of his trial or prior to sentencing, and thus, his motion is 

untimely. See Commonwealth v. Danko, 421 A.2d 1165, 1167 (Pa. Super. 

1980) (defendant waived argument that criminal statute was unconstitutional 

where defendant failed to raise any specific constitutional challenge to the 

statute at any time during trial, even though defendant had clear opportunity 

to do so). Therefore, Ravenell has waived this claim.
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In any event, Ravenell’s challenge to section 6106(a) is meritless. The 

question raised by Ravenell involves constitutional challenges, and thus our 

standard of review of is plenary. Commonwealth v. McCoy, 895 A.2d 18, 

24 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

A statute is vague if it fails to give people of ordinary intelligence 

fair notice as to what conduct is forbidden, or if they cannot gauge 

their future, contemplated conduct, or if it encourages arbitrary or 

discriminatory enforcement. A vague law is one whose terms 

necessarily require people to guess at its meaning. If a law is 

deficient – vague – in any of these ways, then it violates due 

process and is constitutionally void. By contrast, to be valid, a 

penal statute must set forth a crime with sufficient definiteness 

that an ordinary person can understand and predict what conduct 

is prohibited. The law must provide reasonable standards which 

people can use to gauge the legality of their contemplated, future 

behavior. At the same time, however, the void for vagueness 

doctrine does not mean that statutes must detail criminal conduct 

with utter precision. Condemned to the use of words, we can 

never expect mathematical certainty from our language. Indeed, 

due process and the void for vagueness doctrine are not intended 

to elevate the practical difficulties of drafting legislation into a 

constitutional dilemma. Rather, these doctrines are rooted in a 

rough idea of fairness. As such, statutes may be general enough 

to embrace a range of human conduct as long as they speak fair 

warning about what behavior is unlawful. 

Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 560 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). “A law is overly broad if 

it punishes constitutionally protected activity as well as illegal conduct.” Id. 

Section 6106(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

(a) Offense defined.--

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who 

carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a 
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firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place 

of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and 

lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony 

of the third degree.

(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid 

license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any 

vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or 

about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place 

of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and 

has not committed any other criminal violation commits a 

misdemeanor of the first degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a) (emphasis added).

This Court, as Ravenell concedes, has previously addressed his

constitutional issue in Carr, and it has found that section 6106(a) is neither 

vague nor overbroad. “The Statutory Construction Act at 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

1903(a) states in relevant part that ‘words and phrases shall be construed 

according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved 

usage.’” Carr, 483 A.2d at 543. “‘His’ as used in 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a) is 

a possessive pronoun connoting ownership or control over the ‘fixed place of 

business.’” Id. Thus, the “fixed place of business” language in section 

6106(a) is limited to individuals with a “controlling, proprietary, or possessory 

interest” therein. Id. Furthermore, as the majority in Carr observed astutely,

“our legislature could not have intended to permit every employed individual 

in the Commonwealth to carry without a license a concealed, loaded firearm 

on the job site.” Id. (emphasis added).

In Carr, police obtained and executed a search warrant for controlled 

substances they believed were stored at and sold from a gasoline service 
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station. During the execution of the search warrant, police identified the sole 

proprietor of the gasoline service station. Shortly thereafter, they observed 

another individual, defendant Carr, drop a loaded .32 caliber revolver into a 

cardboard box. At trial, Carr conceded that he had been carrying the revolver, 

but argued that because (1) the service station was his place of employment 

and (2) he had been working when he was arrested, he met the “fixed place 

of business” exception pursuant to section 6106(a). This Court held that the 

gasoline service station was the fixed place of business of the proprietor and 

not the fixed place of business of Carr because he had no controlling, 

proprietary or possessory interest in the service station, and thus, Carr was 

in violation of section 6106. Carr, supra.

The facts here are nearly identical. Ravenell has no controlling, 

proprietary or possessory interest in Firestone; he was merely an employee. 

Accordingly, Ravenell was not present at his “fixed place of business” for 

purpose of section 6106(a). Therefore, even had Ravenell properly preserved 

this issue for our review, he was not exempt from the requirement that he 

have a valid and lawfully issued license to carry a concealed firearm while 

working at Firestone.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/17/2018