IV 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 577 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the conditions 

for the United States to become a signatory to any multilateral agreement on trade resulting from the World Trade Organization’s Doha 

Development Agenda Round. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2005 

Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. REYNOLDS, and Ms. HART) 

submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the conditions for the United States to become a 

signatory to any multilateral agreement on trade resulting from the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Agenda Round. 

Whereas members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 

are currently engaged in a round of trade negotiations 

known as the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round); 

Whereas the Doha Round includes negotiations aimed at 

clarifying and improving disciplines under the Agreement 

on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agree-
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ment) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement); 

Whereas the WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 14, 2001 (WTO Paper No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/ 

1), specifically provides that the Doha Round negotiations are to preserve the ‘‘basic concepts, principles and 

effectiveness’’ of the Antidumping Agreement and the 

Subsidies Agreement; 

Whereas in section 2102(b)(14)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade 

Promotion Authority Act of 2002, the Congress mandated that the principal negotiating objective of the 

United States with respect to trade remedy laws was to 

‘‘preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws . . . and avoid agreements that 

lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies’’; 

Whereas the countries that have been the most persistent and 

egregious violators of international fair trade rules are 

engaged in an aggressive effort to significantly weaken 

the disciplines provided in the Antidumping Agreement 

and the Subsidies Agreement and undermine the ability 

of the United States to effectively enforce its trade remedy laws; 

Whereas chronic violators of fair trade disciplines have put 

forward proposals that would substantially weaken 

United States trade remedy laws and practices, including 

mandating that unfair trade orders terminate after a set 

number of years even if unfair trade and injury are likely 

to recur, mandating that trade remedy duties reflect less 

than the full margin of dumping or subsidization, mandating higher de minimis levels of unfair trade, making 
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cumulation of the effects of imports from multiple countries more difficult in unfair trade investigations, outlawing the critical practice of ‘‘zeroing’’ in antidumping 

investigations, mandating the weighing of causes, and 

mandating other provisions that make it more difficult to 

prove injury; 

Whereas United States trade remedy laws have already been 

significantly weakened by numerous unjust and activist 

WTO dispute settlement decisions which have created 

new obligations to which the United States never agreed; 

Whereas trade remedy laws remain a critical resource for 

American manufacturers, agricultural producers, and 

aquacultural producers in responding to closed foreign 

markets, subsidized imports, and other forms of unfair 

trade, particularly in the context of the challenges currently faced by these vital sectors of the United States 

economy; 

Whereas the United States had a current account trade deficit of approximately $668,000,000,000 in 2004, including a trade deficit of almost $162,000,000,000 with 

China alone, as well as a trade deficit of 

$40,000,000,000 in advanced technology; 

Whereas United States manufacturers have lost over 

3,000,000 jobs since June 2000, and United States manufacturing employment is currently at its lowest level 

since 1950; 

Whereas many industries critical to United States national 

security are at severe risk from unfair foreign competition; and 

Whereas the House of Representatives strongly believes that 

the proposals put forward by countries seeking to under-
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mine trade remedy disciplines in the Doha Round would 

result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job losses and trade disadvantages: 

Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that— 

3 (1) the United States should not be a signatory 

4 to any agreement or protocol with respect to the 

5 Doha Development Round of the World Trade Orga6 nization negotiations, or any other bilateral or multi7 lateral trade negotiations, that— 

8 (A) adopts any proposal to lessen the effec9 tiveness of domestic and international dis10 ciplines on unfair trade or safeguard provisions, 

11 including proposals— 

12 (i) mandating that unfair trade orders 

13 terminate after a set number of years even 

14 if unfair trade and injury are likely to 

15 recur; 

16 (ii) mandating that trade remedy du17 ties reflect less than the full margin of 

18 dumping or subsidization; 

19 (iii) mandating higher de minimis lev20 els of unfair trade; 
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1 (iv) making cumulation of the effects 

2 of imports from multiple countries more 

3 difficult in unfair trade investigations; 

4 (v) outlawing the critical practice of 

5 ‘‘zeroing’’ in antidumping investigations; or 

6 (vi) mandating the weighing of causes 

7 or other provisions making it more difficult 

8 to prove injury in unfair trade cases; or 

9 (B) would lessen in any manner the ability 

10 of the United States to enforce rigorously its 

11 trade laws, including the antidumping, counter12 vailing duty, and safeguard laws; 

13 (2) the United States trade laws and inter14 national rules appropriately serve the public interest 

15 by offsetting injurious unfair trade, and further 

16 ‘‘balancing modifications’’ or other similar provisions 

17 are unnecessary and would add to the complexity 

18 and difficulty of achieving relief against injurious 

19 unfair trade practices; and 

20 (3) the United States should ensure that any 

21 new agreement relating to international disciplines 

22 on unfair trade or safeguard provisions fully rectifies 

23 and corrects decisions by WTO dispute settlement 

24 panels or the Appellate Body that have unjustifiably 

25 and negatively impacted, or threaten to negatively 
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1 impact, United States law or practice, including a 

2 law or practice with respect to foreign dumping or 

3 subsidization. 

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