FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2023-2506

LT Case No. 2008-DR-2421

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RICHARD DAVIS, 

Appellant, 

v.

DAWN DAVIS, 

Appellee. 

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Hernando County. 

Don Barbee, Jr., Judge. 

Allison M. Perry, of Florida Appeals, P.A., Tampa, and John 

E. Napolitano, of Lucas, Macyszyn & Dyer, Spring Hill, for 

Appellant. 

Kimberly A. Scarano, of Jeffery P. Cario, P.A., Brooksville, 

for Appellee. 

July 12, 2024 

BOATWRIGHT, J. 

Appellant, Richard P. Davis (“Former Husband”), appeals 

the lower court’s order finding him in contempt of a final judgment 

of dissolution of marriage which adopted the marital settlement 

agreement into which he and Appellee, Dawn M. Davis (“Former 

Wife”), had entered in 2008. The appeal centers on the lower 
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court’s finding that Former Husband was obligated under the 

terms of the marital settlement agreement to pay half of the 

children’s college tuition and expenses. Former Husband argues 

that the court erred when it: 1) interpreted the marital settlement 

agreement to provide that he had contractually agreed to pay half 

of his children’s college tuition and expenses; 2) found him in 

contempt for failing to pay the college tuition and expenses, as a 

contractual obligation to pay college expenses for adult children 

cannot be enforced via contempt; and 3) determined there was no 

need to make a finding regarding Former Husband’s ability to pay 

before it ruled him to be in contempt. We reverse on the basis that 

the court erred in construing the marital settlement agreement to 

require Former Husband to pay half of the children’s college 

tuition and expenses; and because this issue is dispositive, we do 

not reach the remaining two issues on appeal.1

I.

Former Husband and Former Wife got divorced in December 

of 2008. They both represented themselves throughout the entirety 

of the divorce proceedings. At the time of the divorce, they had two 

minor children, “A.P.D.” and “I.Z.D.,” who were born in 2002 and 

2003, respectively. The final judgment of dissolution of marriage 

incorporated a marital settlement agreement that the parties had 

jointly drafted. Particular to this appeal, section 10 of the marital 

settlement agreement is entitled “Secondary School Expenses.” 

The provision reads as follows: 

The parties agree that the Husband will be 

responsible, above and beyond the standard monthly 

child support, for 50% of any secondary educational 

tuition and/or related expenses for all of the children. 

1 Although we do not reach the contempt issue on appeal, we 

note that a contractual duty to pay a child’s college tuition and 

expenses cannot be enforced by contempt. See Southard v. 

Southard, 756 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
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Should one of the children not attend a secondary 

educational institution prior to the age of twenty-one 

(21), the Husband is relieved of this financial 

responsibility for that child.

The case was dormant until March of 2023, when Former 

Wife filed a “Verified Motion for Contempt and Enforcement of 

Final Judgment” (the “contempt motion”) against Former 

Husband, alleging that he had failed to comply with section 10 of 

the marital settlement agreement by refusing to provide any 

reimbursement for the eldest child’s (A.P.D.) college tuition and 

expenses.

In the contempt motion, Former Wife alleged that A.P.D. 

had graduated from high school in 2020 at the age of 18 and had 

since been continuously enrolled in college full-time. As of the date 

the motion for contempt was filed, A.P.D. had incurred tuition 

costs and related expenses cumulatively totaling $21,212.77. 

Former Wife alleged that she had notified Former Husband of his 

obligation to provide reimbursement for half of A.P.D.’s college 

expenses under section 10 of the marital settlement agreement 

and that he had refused to provide her with any reimbursement. 

Former Husband responded with an answer, a motion for 

summary judgment, and a motion to dismiss the contempt motion. 

Former Husband’s primary argument in said motions was that 

section 10 of the marital settlement agreement did not require him 

to pay half of A.P.D.’s college expenses because college is 

“postsecondary education,” as opposed to “secondary education,” 

which is the term used in the provision. He asserted that he was 

thus only responsible for half of any tuition and associated costs 

for “secondary education,” which under its ordinary meaning 

constituted “a school intermediate between elementary school and 

college and usually offering general, technical, vocational, or 

college-preparatory courses.”

A hearing was held on the contempt motion. Both parties 

were represented by counsel as they now are on appeal. The court 

agreed that the term “secondary education” did not mean college. 

The court referenced that the term meant high school. However, 

the court stated that when taken together with the second part of 

the provision at issue, the term “secondary education” did not 
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make any sense. In this regard, the court stated: “[T]he second 

paragraph . . . makes the first paragraph not make any sense if 

we’re talking about high school. Because people don’t elect to go to 

high school between the ages of 18 and 21 and incur tuition and 

fees.” As such, the court found that the provision was ambiguous 

and decided to allow the submission of parol evidence, over Former 

Husband’s objection, to ascertain the intent of the parties. 

Former Wife then testified that both she and Former 

Husband had been unrepresented during the course of the initial 

dissolution proceedings, and that they ultimately drafted the 

marital settlement agreement by mutual agreement via an online 

document assistant service called “3StepDivorce.com.” Her 

account of section 10 of the marital settlement agreement was that 

the provision was added because Former Husband was not able to 

pay his full child support obligation. She testified she agreed to a 

reduced child support amount in exchange for his agreement to 

pay for “half of college for each of the children,” and section 10 of 

the marital settlement agreement was drafted to embody this 

agreement. Former Husband, however, testified that he and 

Former Wife never discussed college expenses when they were 

drafting the marital settlement agreement.

The court issued a written order finding that the disputed 

provision applied to college and not secondary school. The court 

found that the language of the provision at issue was ambiguous. 

In so ruling, the court relied on Former Wife’s testimony, as the 

court found her to be more credible than Former Husband, to find 

that the parties had intended the provision to apply to college 

tuition and expenses. The court stated: “It would be an illogical 

reading of the entirety of paragraph 10 for the parties to have 

intended the [Former Husband] to pay 50% of high school costs 

unless one of the children decided not to attend prior to the age of 

21.” The court further explained: “That essentially means that the 

child could decide at 13 or 14 years old to quit high school and go 

another direction in life. Courts may not interpret contracts to 

reach absurd results.”

As a result of the court’s interpretation of the provision, the 

court denied Former Husband’s motion to dismiss and motion for 

summary judgment. The court held Former Husband in contempt 
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for violating the parties’ final judgment of dissolution of marriage 

because of his failure to reimburse his portion of A.P.D.’s college 

expenses under section 10 of the marital settlement agreement 

and ordered him to pay his half of the college tuition and expenses 

and attorney’s fees to Former Wife.

II.

We review the lower court’s interpretation of the marital 

settlement agreement de novo. Muir v. Muir, 925 So. 2d 356, 358 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“Interpretation of a marital settlement 

agreement is a matter of law and places the appellate court on an 

equal footing with the trial court as interpreter of the written 

document. Thus, the standard of review is de novo.” (citations 

omitted)).

“[A] marital agreement entered into by the parties and 

ratified by the court is a contract which is subject to interpretation, 

just like any other contract.” Id. at 358. “It is well settled that 

where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties are bound 

by the plain terms of their agreement.” Pack v. Wiechert, 285 So. 

3d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “When interpreting 

a marital settlement agreement, ‘the language itself is the best 

evidence of the parties’ intent, and its plain meaning controls.’” 

Walsh v. Walsh, 262 So. 3d 212, 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting

Crawford v. Baker, 64 So. 3d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2011)). Additionally, 

“the entire contract should be considered and provisions should not 

be considered in isolation to other provisions in the contract.” Id.

“The goal of contract interpretation is to arrive at a reasonable 

interpretation of the text in order to accomplish its 

stated meaning and purpose.” Id. (citing Am. K-9 Detection Servs., 

Inc. v. Cicero, 100 So. 3d 236, 238–39 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)).

Further, where the terms of a marital settlement agreement 

are clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be gleaned 

from the four corners of the document. Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d 

at 756, 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). “Florida courts will not rewrite 

the terms of a marital settlement agreement or any other contract 

in which the terms are clear and unambiguous.” Pack, 285 So. 3d 

at 1033; see also Cole v. Cole, 95 So. 3d 369, 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) 

(“We have repeatedly held that a court-approved marital 
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settlement agreement is nothing more or less than a contract, and 

we will not rewrite terms that are clear and unambiguous.”). As 

such, in contract interpretation, “extrinsic evidence . . . should not 

be used to introduce [a contractual] ambiguity where none exists.” 

EcoVirux, LLC v. BioPledge, LLC, 357 So. 3d 182, 187 (Fla. 3rd 

DCA 2022) (internal citation omitted).

“When interpreting contracts, we may consult references 

commonly relied upon to supply the accepted meaning of 

words.” Grove at Harbor Hills Homeowners v. Harbor Hills Dev.,

L.P., 158 So. 3d 611, 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (internal citations

omitted). As a result, when a contractual term is not defined in a 

contract, “[d]ictionaries aid us in establishing the publicly 

understood plain meaning of a word whose relevant definition is 

contested.” Parrish v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 356 So. 3d 771, 776

(Fla. 2023). Thus, 

“[d]ictionaries are commonly consulted to ascertain the plain 

meaning of words used in a contract.” Burlington & Rockenbach, 

P.A. v. Law Offs. of E. Clay Parker, 160 So. 3d 955, 958 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2015) (citing Beans v. Chohonis, 740 So. 2d 65, 67

(Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“One looks to the dictionary for the plain and

ordinary meaning of words.”)).

In determining the meaning of secondary school, the

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines secondary school as a 

school “intermediate between elementary school and college and 

usually offering general, technical, vocational, or collegepreparatory courses.” Secondary school, Merriam-Webster Online 

Dictionary,

https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/secondary%20school

(last visited June 20, 2024). Similarly, the online American 

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines a secondary 

school as “a school that is intermediate in level between 

elementary school and college and that usually offers general, 

technical, vocational, or college-preparatory curricula.” Secondary 

school, Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English Language Online, 

https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=secondaryschool)

(last visited June 20, 2024).

On appeal, the Former Husband argues that the trial court 

erred in interpreting the provision at issue to apply to college 
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tuition and expenses. We agree. First, the provision at issue is 

entitled “Secondary School Expenses,” and the provision contains 

only language referencing secondary education tuition and 

expenses. See Prop. Registration Champions, LLC v. Mulberry, 373 

So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (in interpreting a contractual 

provision, the language of a title or heading can be extremely 

valuable where it reinforces what the text independently 

suggests). The subject provision contains no reference to college or 

college related expenses. The terms “secondary education” and 

“secondary school” are clear and unambiguous. As stated 

previously, the term plainly means “a school intermediate between 

elementary school and college and usually offering general, 

technical, vocational, or college-preparatory courses.” A reasonable 

interpretation of the provision at issue is that it requires Former 

Husband to pay 50% of any secondary educational tuition and/or 

related expenses which could apply to middle, high school, or 

vocational school. Under the clear terms of the provision, Former 

Wife could have sought enforcement of the final judgment had

Former Husband refused to pay for tuition or expenses related to 

any of this type of schooling. However, the plain language of 

section 10 does not in any way require Former Husband to pay 

college tuition or related expenses as written.

The court agreed that under its plain meaning, the term 

“secondary school” or “secondary education” would encompass, for 

example, high school but not college. However, the court found that 

the second part of the provision did not make sense in reference to 

secondary education and produced an absurd result. The second 

part of the provision read, “[s]hould one of the children not attend 

a secondary educational institution prior to the age of twenty-one 

(21), the Husband is relieved of this financial responsibility for 

that child.” We do not find this provision produces an absurd 

result, but rather a reasonable interpretation is that the parties 

chose a limit as to the age of the children for which Former 

Husband would be responsible for the children’s educational 

tuition and expenses. It would be perfectly reasonable for a child 

to attend a private high school or vocational school and incur 

tuition costs. A child could also attend a public high school but 

incur expenses in relation to that schooling. Contrary to the trial 

court’s assertion that individuals do not attend a secondary school 

past 18 years of age, we find that it is not an unreasonable reading 
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to conclude that children could attend a private high school past 

the age of 18 or attend a vocational school up to the age of 21.

Indeed, both parties on appeal argue that language of the 

provision is unambiguous. Specifically, Former Wife argues that 

the language in the provision is unambiguous when reading the 

provision as a whole and that the court was correct in its 

interpretation that the provision applied to college tuition and 

expenses. However, the provision cannot reasonably be interpreted 

to apply to college education as written. The only way to read the 

provision as such would be to re-write the terms of the provision to 

change secondary education to post-secondary education or college 

education. 

Contrary to Former Wife’s assertion, the court, rather than 

finding that the plain language of the provision was clear and 

unambiguous, found that the provision at issue when read as a 

whole was ambiguous. The court acknowledged this when it found 

that the provision was illogical, absurd, and did not make sense. 

In essence, the trial court found that the provision contained a 

patent ambiguity. As such, the court relied on parol evidence to 

resolve the perceived ambiguity and effectively had to re-write the 

terms of the provision. 

“A patent ambiguity is one which appears on the face of a 

contract and arises from the use of defective, obscure, or insensible 

language.” Bike Street Bikes, Inc. v. Bourgett’s Bike Works, Inc.,

900 So. 2d 697, 700–01 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (quoting Emergency 

Assocs. of Tampa, P.A. v. Sassano, 664 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 1995)). Normally, a court may not resolve a patent ambiguity 

by consideration of extrinsic evidence. Id. Considering the court’s 

reasoning, it should not have attempted to resolve the purported 

patent ambiguity by considering parol evidence and re-write the 

terms of the provision, but rather should have found the provision 

unenforceable. See Bowein v. Sherman, 374 So. 3d 895, 897 (Fla. 

6th DCA 2023) (holding that parol evidence cannot be used to 

resolve a patent ambiguity where a material term is in conflict, but 

rather the provision is unenforceable; and a court errs when it 

chooses one contradictory provision of contract over another 

because it is “impermissibly rewriting the contract”). More 

importantly, neither party in this case claims that paragraph 10 is 
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ambiguous; thus, the court should have never relied on parol 

evidence in the first place as the language was unambiguous. See 

EcoVirux, 357 So. 3d at 187 (“It is axiomatic that ‘extrinsic 

evidence . . . should not be used to introduce [a contractual] 

ambiguity where none exists.’” (quoting Interwest Constr. v. 

Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 

III.

We hold the marital settlement provision at issue is clear and 

unambiguous and applies to secondary education tuition and 

expenses and not college tuition or expenses. As such, it was error 

for the court to resort to parol evidence and re-write the terms of 

the marital settlement agreement to find that the parties 

contemplated college tuition and expenses, rather than secondary 

school tuition and expenses as expressed by the provision. We 

therefore reverse the trial court’s order.

We understand the court’s concern that Former Husband pay 

for one-half of his child’s college tuition and expenses. However, 

absent a valid contractual agreement where the parties agree to 

educate their child after the child reaches the age of majority, any 

duty a parent has to pay an adult child’s college expenses is moral, 

rather than legal. Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla.

1984); see also Madson v. Madson, 636 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1994) (“Even though most financially able parents willingly 

assist their adult children in obtaining a higher education, any 

duty to do so is a moral rather than a legal one, absent either a 

finding of legal dependence or a binding contractual agreement by 

the parent to pay such support.”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and MACIVER, JJ., concur.
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_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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