DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General

Office of Inspections, Evaluations & Special Reviews

Survey of the Science and Technology

Directorate

OIG-04-24 March 2004

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Offi ce of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to DHS to 

identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the program, 

operation, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and offi cials of 

relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available 

to the OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is 

my hope that this report will result in more effective, effi cient, and/or economical operations. I 

express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 1

Contents

 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 3

Results in Brief .............................................................................................................................. 4

 Background.................................................................................................................................... 5

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.................................................................................................. 5

The Budgetary Programs and Organizational Elements of the Science and Technology

 Directorate..................................................................................................................................... 6

Management’s Response................................................................................................................19

Issues For Future OIG Reviews................................................................................................... 19

Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of S&T Statutory Functions ........................................................... 25

Appendix B: Budget and FTE Statistics for Fiscal Year 2003 and 2004.... .........................26

Appendix C: RDT&E Program Nomenclature......................................................................27

Appendix D: S&T Portfolios................................................................................................ 28

Appendix E: Major Contributors To This Report ................................................................ 35

Appendix F: Report Distribution ......................................................................................... 36

Abbreviations

BAA Broad Agency Announcement

CIP-MSAP Critical Infrastructure Protection-Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis Program

COS Chief of Staff 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DoD Department of Defense

DoE Department of Energy

EML Environmental Measurements Laboratory

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
Page 2 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

Contents

FTE Full Time Equivalent

FY Fiscal Year

HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002

HSI Homeland Security Institute

HS-Center Homeland Security-Center for Excellence

HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency

HSSTAC Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee

IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

IND Improvised Nuclear Device

IPT Integrated Product Team

IRCM InfraRed CounterMeasure

IT Information Technology

MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

NSF National Science Foundation

ORD Office of Research and Development

OIG Office of Inspector General

 OTA Other Transactions Authority

OWMDO-IM Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations-Incident Management

PIADC Plum Island Animal Disease Center

PPB Office of Plans, Programs, and Budget

RDD Radiological Dispersal Device

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

S&T Science and Technology Directorate

SED Office of Systems Engineering and Development

START Scientific and Technical Advisory and Response Teams

USC University of Southern California

USDA Department of Agriculture

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

TVTA Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 3

OIG

Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

Introduction

The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) was created to support the 

strategic mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by conducting, 

stimulating, and enabling research; and developing, testing, evaluating, and 

transferring homeland security capabilities to federal, state, and local operational 

end-users. The S&T will:

• Partner with operational end-users to identify requirements, and develop 

capabilities to counter threats and enhance mission operations;

• Engage government, academic, and private sectors in innovative 

research, development, rapid prototyping, and systems engineering and 

development; 

• Provide a rapid, efficient, and disciplined process for systems engineering 

and development;

• Provide DHS with an enduring research and development complex 

dedicated to homeland security. 

The S&T is unique in that no other federal organization has the statutory mandate 

to merge these responsibilities under one organizational framework. 

We conducted this survey to further our knowledge of the S&T. Particularly 

important were the following:

• The methodology for transferring and integrating the functions and 

resources from legacy agencies responsible for conducting research and 

development into the S&T;

• How the S&T offices and divisions are working or intend to work with 

other DHS entities and non-DHS entities to protect critical infrastructure; 

and

• The S&T’s ability to communicate information with entities within DHS 

and other federal, state, local, and private sector partners.
Page 4 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

Additionally, we endeavored to determine the obstacles the S&T faces in 

“standing-up” the organization and areas or issues that could result in future 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews. 

Results in Brief

On March 1, 2003, portions of programs, activities, and laboratories from three 

agencies – Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE) and 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) – merged to become the S&T. The S&T is 

known as the “technology arm” of the DHS. Some aspects of this merger were 

made easier because S&T was able to borrow some business processes from 

DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which has a 

federal research and development mission. In addition, S&T hired key personnel 

who had prior work experience with DARPA. However, the merger was not 

completely without its challenges. The S&T has had to contend with a set of 

administrative and logistical challenges similar to those encountered by other 

startup ventures, including: (1) the inability to hire personnel quickly who can 

work in a secure environment, (2) the lack of centralized space, and (3) the lack 

of consistent Information Technology (IT) systems and procurement support. 

These difficulties are partially the result of being dependent on services provided 

by other federal agencies and other DHS directorates that are themselves not fully 

staffed. 

We identified several areas that may warrant future evaluation, including: (1) the 

procedures for selecting persons to participate in both the Homeland Security 

Centers of Excellence program and the Scholars and Fellows program; (2) the 

level of coordination between S&T and other DHS directorates to formulate an 

integrated strategic plan and reduce the possibility for duplication when selecting 

new technologies for further research and development; (3) the governing 

doctrine between the S&T and the laboratories that it oversees, to make sure that 

responsibilities for facilities management and security are clearly defined; (4) 

the procedures and controls in place for managing Other Transactions Authority 

(OTA),1 and (5) the ability of friendly foreign scientists and students to contribute 

to S&T programs. 

1

 Other Transactions Authority exempts the S&T from having to follow the procurement rules found in various federal procurement 

regulations and is intended to greatly shorten the time it takes to procure goods and services.
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 5

Background

In response to the recognized need for a coordinated, national approach2 to protect 

the homeland against potential terrorist attacks, the United States Congress 

enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), resulting in the creation of the 

DHS. The primary strategic objectives of the DHS are:

• To prevent terrorist attacks within the homeland;

• To reduce the vulnerability of the homeland to terrorism; and

• To minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist acts that 

occur within the homeland. 

To sustain these strategic objectives, the S&T was created as the primary research 

and development arm of the DHS. The S&T organizes scientific, engineering, and 

technological resources of the United States to facilitate the rapid identification, 

development, and implementation of new, cost effective technologies in support 

of the homeland security mission. The S&T has three primary activity areas: 

(1) intramural, (2) extramural, and (3) educational. Intramural activities involve 

in-house research and development consisting of a group of scientists and 

engineers focusing on homeland security issues. Extramural activities involve 

soliciting innovative ideas from industry and academia. Educational activities 

involve providing scholarships and fellowships to those who wish to enter 

into careers and perform research that are important to the homeland security 

research and development enterprise. S&T fulfills its mission through its four 

major components, namely, the Office of Plans, Programs, and Budget (PPB); the 

Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA); the Office 

of Research and Development (ORD); and the Office of Systems Engineering and 

Development (SED). 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of our survey was twofold. First, we set out to gain a basic 

understanding of the S&T. This included learning the missions of the S&T 

offices, defining the operational relationships between its offices and divisions, 

2

 Before the DHS was created in November 2002, protecting the homeland was primarily a federal responsibility and was mainly 

coordinated through the military, the intelligence agencies, and Department of State. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, 

this has become a national rather than a federal responsibility, because the federal government alone cannot protect the homeland. This 

responsibility has now become a national responsibility, requiring close coordination among federal, state, and local governments and the 

private sector. 
Page 6 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

diagramming S&T’s organization and business processes, and identifying the 

obstacles impeding S&T’s ability to become fully operational. Second, our 

survey provided us an opportunity to identify issues suited for future OIG 

inspections or audits. We reviewed and analyzed documentation pertinent to the 

DHS and the S&T directorate including program guidance, policy memorandums, 

briefing packages, meeting notes, Internet websites, various news articles, and the 

HSA.

We interviewed the S&T Under Secretary, the Chief of Staff, and several key S&T 

officials.

We conducted our fieldwork from December 2003 to January 2004. This survey 

was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended. 

The Budgetary Programs and Organizational Elements of the Science 

and Technology Directorate

Guided by the requirements of the HSA, S&T is the principal directorate within 

DHS charged with leading the federal government’s civilian efforts in the research 

and development of technologies in support of homeland security. Included 

among these technologies are those geared toward: (1) preventing the importation 

of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and related weapons and materials; 

and (2) detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist 

attacks. In addition to its research and development function, S&T is also charged 

with supporting the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection by assessing and testing homeland security vulnerabilities and possible 

threats (Appendix A). S&T accomplishes this mission through an approved fiscal 

year (FY) 2004 personnel complement of 140 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) that 

manages its intramural and extramural research and development and educational 

programs through an extensive network of contacts at other federal agencies, 

public and non-profit laboratories, universities, and the private sector. 

The Budgetary Programs of S&T 

S&T budget statistics are reported in Appendix B. The S&T budget was $553 

million for March through September in FY 2003 and $918 million in FY 2004. 

Of the $918 million in funding approved for FY04, about $874 million, or 95.2 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 7

percent, will be spent on research and development programs, while the rest will 

cover personnel expenses. The FY 2004 budget request is designed to support 

homeland security by helping the nation maintain its technical superiority in 

science and technology. As new technologies are developed with this funding, 

S&T intends to share them with other federal, state, local and private sector 

partners. Highlights of S&T’s FY 2004 budget include:

• $198.5 million to develop and implement integrated systems to decrease 

the probability and effects of a biological attack on this country’s civilian 

population and agricultural system.

• $127 million to develop radiological and nuclear countermeasures that 

prevent the importation, transportation, and subsequent detonation of a 

radiological or nuclear device within our borders.

• $93 million to develop technologies and systems to enhance DHS’s ability 

to analyze threat information, assess and test vulnerability assessments for 

infrastructure protection, detect and mitigate sophisticated cyber threats, 

enhance the interoperability of new technologies, and determine hostile 

intent.

• $88 million for the construction of a National Biodefense Analysis and 

Countermeasures Center, which is to be the principal DHS component of 

the Fort Detrick Interagency Biodefense Campus in Maryland. 

• $75 million for the Rapid Prototyping/Technical Support Working Group 

(TSWG)3 to provide a competitive method to evaluate technologies during 

their initial phases of development. 

• $70 million to develop academic programs that support students by 

building learning and research environments in key areas such as 

bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling, and psychological and 

behavioral analysis.

3

 TSWG is the U.S. national forum that identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency (Departments of State, Defense, Energy, 

Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation) and international research and development requirements for combating 

terrorism.
Page 8 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

The Organizational Elements of S&T 

The S&T inherited programs, activities, and laboratories from three legacy 

agencies. Most came from DoE, while the others came from the DoD and USDA. 

The following list identifies the programs, activities, and laboratories that were 

merged to form the S&T:

 

• The chemical and biological national security and supporting programs 

and activities of the nonproliferation and verification research and 

development program (DoE)

• The life sciences activities related to microbial pathogens of the biological 

and environmental research program (DoE)

• The nuclear smuggling programs and activities within the proliferation 

detection program of the nonproliferation and verification research and 

development program (DoE)

• The nuclear assessment program and activities of the assessment, 

detection, and cooperation program of the international materials 

protection and cooperation program (DoE)

• The advanced scientific computing research program and activities at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (DoE) 

• The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (DoE)

• The National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center (DoD)

• Plum Island Animal Disease Center (USDA) 

Merging these programs, activities, and laboratories has been an ongoing process 

and has created challenges similar to those encountered by other startups. 

Fortunately, not all of S&T is without precedent. Less than ten percent of S&T’s 

mission involves conducting non-requirements driven research and development 

of new technologies. To provide us with an example of what non-requirements 

driven research and development means, an S&T executive provided the 

hypothetical example of the development of a mass bio-button network of 

sensors. In such a network, small bio-buttons would be passed out to millions 

of commuters. During their return trip home, people who received buttons 

during their commute into work would toss the bio-buttons into receptacles to 

be analyzed later as they exited their commuting destination. The purpose of 

the bio-buttons would be to sense where and when the button was exposed to 

a potential biological contagion. With thousands of people wearing these socalled bio-buttons, such a network of sensors could be useful in the early warning 

and detection of a massive biological attack on the nation. Currently, such a 

technology does not exist, nor are there any current requirements or concept of 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 9

operations for such a technology – the kind of technology that is so cutting edge 

that it will “knock your socks off.” The execution arm of S&T responsible for 

conducting this kind of research is the Homeland Security Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (HSARPA). HSARPA is modeled after a similar agency within 

the DoD known as the DARPA.

The S&T has recruited several key personnel from DARPA. These personnel 

have been able to draw from their overall knowledge of the DoD’s Research, 

Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program to assist the S&T in 

becoming fully operational. As part of this overall knowledge, these personnel 

continued to use RDT&E program nomenclature (Appendix C):

• Basic Research 6.1

• Applied Research 6.2

• Advanced Technology Development 6.3

• Demonstration and Validation 6.4 

• Engineering and Manufacturing Development 6.5

• Management Support 6.6

• Operational Systems Development 6.7

This RDT&E program nomenclature can be seen in the overall organizational 

structure of the S&T. Recruiting DARPA personnel and incorporating RDT&E 

program nomenclature into its overall organizational structure and into its 

business model has helped make the startup phase for S&T somewhat easier. 

Despite being able to borrow some RDT&E program nomenclature and business 

methodologies, it is important to reiterate that the merging process has not been 

without challenges. The S&T has had to contend with a myriad of administrative 

and logistical issues that include: (1) the inability to hire personnel quickly who 

can work in a secure environment, (2) the limited space in its central office, and 

(3) the lack of consistent IT systems and procurement support. These difficulties 

are partially the result of S&T’s dependence for these services on other DHS 

directorates that are in themselves not fully staffed and other federal agencies. 

One senior executive with significant private sector experience characterized the 

S&T as a “startup within a merger.”

Like DARPA, the S&T was endowed by Congress with Other Transactions 

Authority (OTA). The statutory OTA plays an important role in S&T’s ability 

to quickly implement new technologies in the field. OTA does this by providing 

a legal basis for exempting S&T from nearly all federal procurement rules and 

regulations. We were told that Congress’ intent was to substantially reduce the 
Page 10 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

normal procurement cycle for complex systems and advanced technologies, which 

under the existing federal procurement process can take as long as three to five 

years.

Presented below is the most recent organizational chart supplied by the S&T, 

dated October 1, 2003, with a graphical presentation of RDT&E program 

nomenclature integrated into the S&T organizational chart and business model as 

depicted by the OIG: 

 Chart 1 – The Science and Technology Directorate

One of the intended benefits of S&T’s business model is its relative simplicity and 

ability to assign projects based on criticality and national priorities to the bestsuited S&T execution arm for further research and development. As outlined in 

the above chart, portfolio managers within the PPB first vet incoming concepts 

of operations and operational needs that have applications for homeland security. 

The portfolio concept and the personnel that manage them are discussed later in 

this survey. Portfolio managers in conjunction with an Integrated Project Team 

(IPT) examine incoming concepts of operations and operational needs against 

Programs, Plans & Budgets Office of Research

& Development

Homeland Security

Advanced Research Projects

Agency

Systems Engineering

& Development

Chief of Staff

Office of the Under Secretary

Portfolio Managers within 

PPB prioritize the incoming 

concepts of operations and 

operational needs. Then 

they decide which S&T 

execution arm can produce 

the best solution and get it 

implemented in the field as 

quickly as possible.

Goes to ORD when 

one of the National 

labs can provide the 

best solution. Goes to HSARPA when 

the private sector can 

provide the best solution.

Blue Path

Green Path

Red Path

Goes to SED when 

the technology 

requires full scale 

development, 

manufacture, and 

deployment.

Business Processes of the

Science and Technology Directorate

DoD RDT&E activity 6.1 6.2 and 6.3 6.4 and 6.5
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 11

short-term and long-term goals in accordance with national priorities. The IPT 

concept is discussed in more detail later in this survey. After determining where 

these incoming concepts of operations and operational needs fit within national 

priorities, the portfolio managers submit recommendations to senior S&T

management as to which technologies should be selected for further research and 

development. Once final decisions on which technologies to further research 

and develop are made, portfolio managers continue to work closely with endusers to refine the technology’s concept of operation or to better understand the 

operational needs of the end-user. After the technology’s concept of operation 

or the end-user’s operational needs have been fully determined and prioritized, 

the portfolio manager, in conjunction with the rest of the IPT, decide which 

S&T execution arm can provide the best solution for getting the technology 

implemented in the field as quickly as possible. This decision is primarily based 

on the maturity of the selected technology, i.e., how close the technology is to 

production. If the technology requires extensive research and development 

before it can go into production, then it is assigned to the Office of Research 

& Development (ORD). If the technology requires minimal research and 

development and can be brought quickly to proof-of-concept, then it is assigned 

to HSARPA. If the technology is mature enough to go immediately into a preproduction demonstration or a pilot program, or if it is a production phase solution 

ready for validation and field test, then it is assigned to the Systems Engineering 

& Development (SED) execution arm of the S&T.

S&T’s organizational structure and business model, coupled with having OTA, 

supports the rapid identification, development, and implementation of new 

technologies that are a high priority for implementation in the field. This can be 

seen in how S&T chose to address the immediate potential threat that shoulderfired missiles, known as MANPADS, i.e., Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, 

pose to U.S. commercial aircraft. Congress approved $60 million for the counter 

MANPADS program in FY 2004, with approximately an additional $61 million 

likely to be approved for FY 2005. Initially, the counter MANPADS program 

was a portfolio in the PPB. However, with the prospect of new funding, S&T 

senior executives, in consultation with the counter MANPADS portfolio manager, 

decided to turn the counter MANPADS portfolio into a full-fledged program and 

moved it into the SED to be administered.

This organizational and OTA procurement flexibility enabled the S&T to 

announce contract awards to three separate companies for the first phase of the 

counter MANPADS initiative approximately three months after soliciting white 

papers from prospective contractors. According to the manager of the counter 
Page 12 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

MANPADS program, having OTA substantially shortened the time it took to 

reduce the 24 contractors that submitted white papers to a more exclusive group 

of five contractors that were allowed to continue with the bidding process. These 

five contractors were asked to submit more detailed proposals on how they would 

actually counter the threat that MANPADS pose to commercial aircraft. Rather 

than have them submit lengthy technical and cost proposals, OTA allowed S&T 

to require the five remaining contractors to present their proposals during a 

tight, five-hour oral presentation. All of these presentations were scheduled and 

conducted within one week and within several hours after the last presentation the 

three winning contractors were selected.

The Office of the Under Secretary

The Under Secretary for S&T reports directly to the Secretary of DHS and 

is responsible for carrying out the S&T mission as prescribed by the HSA. 

The Under Secretary is responsible for leading the S&T into functioning 

as a technological clearinghouse by encouraging and supporting research, 

development, testing, evaluation and timely transmission of new technologies to 

federal, state, and local operational end-users in the field to make the homeland 

more secure. In addition to leading the day-to-day operations of the S&T, the 

HSA states that the Under Secretary is responsible for administering: (1) the 

Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC), and 

(2) the Homeland Security Institute (HSI). 

As the sponsor of the HSSTAC, the Under Secretary is responsible for appointing 

all 20 members of the committee. He appointed the committee members in 

February 2004. In addition to scientists, engineers, and medical researchers, 

committee membership includes emergency first responders, representatives from 

organizations or associations of emergency first responders, and representatives 

from citizen groups, including those representing economically disadvantaged 

communities. All members will serve in a pro-bono capacity. The HSSTAC is 

designed to provide the Under Secretary with a direct end-user perspective and to 

make recommendations with respect to the utility of activities conducted by the 

S&T, as well as identify research areas of potential future importance. By statute, 

the HSSTAC will meet at least four times a year. The HSSTAC’s first meeting 

was scheduled for February 26, 2004.

The HSA also provides for the establishment of the HSI and requires it to be 

administered as a separate and distinct entity from the S&T. The HSI is to 

function as a federally funded research and development center. The law also 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 13

gives the Under Secretary considerable discretion in assigning responsibilities 

to the HSI. The program manager in charge of establishing the HSI on behalf 

of the Under Secretary described it as being “an operations-driven think-tank 

that will provide studies and analyses for the DHS similar in scope to those that 

organizations such as the Rand Corporation, Institute for Defense Analyses, 

Center for Naval Analyses, to name a few, have provided the DoD for many 

years.” The program manager expects the HSI to have a personnel complement 

of 150 FTE and will provide the Under Secretary with independent analysis on 

such topics as vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical infrastructures, economic and 

policy analyses of approaches to enhance security, metrics designs, and methods 

to evaluate federal government security programs. 

There are two immediate organizational units that provide direct support for 

the Under Secretary: the Chief of Staff and the Office of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Operations and Incident Management (OWMDO-IM). The Chief of 

Staff is the Under Secretary’s principal advisor for daily administrative matters 

such as financial and strategic planning, facilities, and acquisition support that 

are essential to ensure that the S&T fulfills its mission. The Chief of Staff serves 

also as the principal S&T liaison to other DHS elements like the Management 

Directorate, Legislative Affairs, Public Affairs, General Counsel, and the 

Inspector General. Additionally, the Chief of Staff is responsible for assuring the 

dissemination and implementation of policies and directives throughout the S&T. 

The OWMDO-IM is staffed with response experts who provide architecture 

for the Scientific and Technical Advisory and Response Teams (START). The 

OWMDO-IM is primarily a “virtual” entity, but can insert START teams at 

or near the incident site for analysis and advisory support to state and local 

governments, or to Disaster Field Offices. START is staffed with highly technical 

scientists from other S&T offices, and serving in the START is considered to 

be a collateral duty. During crisis and near-crisis events, personnel from the 

OWMDO-IM are assigned to work in the Homeland Security Operations Center. 

Part of the process is making recommendations to the Director of the Interagency 

Incident Management Group during crisis operations. They are expected to 

ensure a “scientist-to-responder” link, by translating complex scientific and 

technical information into terms that are easier to understand for non-technical 

audiences on the ground. In addition to first responders, the work conducted 

by OWMDO-IM personnel assists executive management in decision-making. 

To illustrate, personnel from OWMDO-IM are able to direct various national 
Page 14 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

laboratories to conduct “plume modeling exercises”4 for possible scenarios 

involving the dispersion of chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants 

near certain potential terrorist targets. Upon receiving the results, the OWMDOIM can report the results within one hour in non-technical terms to executive 

management. Executives are then better able to make decisions regarding 

the type of medical remedies and equipment that first responders need when 

responding to any hypothetical catastrophic situation. 

Office of Programs, Plans, & Budget

The PPB plays a central role in S&T’s business model. The Portfolio Managers 

in PPB lead the interaction with S&T’s customers. They also play an important 

role in prioritizing and selecting which incoming concepts of operations and 

operational needs are ultimately chosen for further research and development. 

One senior executive described PPB as being a type of “conduit” for customers to 

communicate their technical and operational needs to S&T. 

The PPB interacts with customers through portfolio managers. An S&T portfolio 

can be defined as a compilation of subject material under one type of threat that 

has implications for existing or future research and development initiatives. The 

PPB employs 16 portfolio managers who oversee the same number of portfolios, 

with some having multiple sub-portfolios (Appendix D). In addition to being on 

the front-line of S&T customer interaction, portfolio managers are responsible for 

setting timelines and priorities to satisfy customer needs. In addition to portfolio 

managers, an IPT is made up of program managers from similar programs within 

the other three S&T operational elements, namely ORD, HSARPA, and SED. 

The role of portfolio managers is to provide the IPT with strategic guidance, while 

program managers provide the IPT with an assessment of the technical capability 

of their own individual S&T element and the public and private sectors to actually 

bring a new technology to production and eventually get it implemented in the 

field. By understanding the technical capability of the three S&T execution 

arms, portfolio managers can better decide which of them is best suited for 

beginning the research, development, and production cycle for the selected new 

technology. In the MANPADS illustration discussed previously that involved a 

mature technology that had been used in executive aircraft for years, knowing 

4

 When a chemica

of the agent great distances, depending largely on the wind conditions at the time of detonation. Plume modeling can be used to predict 

how far the

people the device may have contaminated. 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 15

the technical capabilities of the three S&T execution arms assisted the portfolio 

managers in making the decision to select the SED as the lead operational element 

for administering the counter MANPADS program.

It is through portfolio managers and their leadership positions on IPTs that 

the PPB is able to exert a considerable amount of influence on the technology 

selection process. In addition to leading IPTs, another avenue for influence 

that the PPB has on the selection process comes from its unique relationship 

with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate. 

The IAIP is the lead directorate within the DHS for formulating the national 

infrastructure protection plan. As part of this responsibility, the IAIP maintains 

a Protective Measures Target List that catalogues and prioritizes the nation’s 

critical infrastructure and key assets. The PPB has one portfolio and parts of 

another dedicated to working on IAIP matters. One senior executive described 

these portfolios as “where the S&T and IAIP are joined at the hip.” It is here 

where the S&T supports IAIP by researching and developing new tools to 

conduct vulnerability and risk assessments. In turn, it is here where the IAIP

communicates to the S&T which critical infrastructure and key assets are 

considered Tier I, i.e., the highest priority, requiring the greatest protection, and 

Tier II, i.e., lower priority, requiring less protection. In the ideal environment, 

the relationship between S&T and IAIP would be such that the IAIP would 

be equipped with state-of-the-art modeling and visualization tools capable of 

anticipating and mitigating against future terrorist attacks, while the S&T would 

be equipped with the terrorist threat picture facing the nation, ensuring that it 

focuses its attention on researching and developing new technologies designed 

to safeguard Tier I critical infrastructure and key assets, rather than on those 

designed to safeguard Tier II critical infrastructure and key assets.

In addition to utilizing the terrorist threat picture formulated by the IAIP, the 

PPB also utilizes a type of matrix system when selecting new technologies for 

further research and development. Along the horizontal x-axis of the matrix is a 

list of traditional portfolios, e.g., Border & Transportation Security, Emergency 

Preparedness & Response, Coast Guard, Secret Service, etc. Along the vertical 

y-axis of the matrix is a list of technical portfolios, e.g., Chem-Bio, Rad-Nuclear, 

Cyber, etc. As portfolio managers receive input from contacts within the technical 

and traditional portfolios, they record incoming concepts of operations and 

operational needs by populating corresponding cells within the matrix. Concepts 

of operations and operational needs that are requested by multiple portfolios in the 

matrix system receive a higher priority. Once a particular technology resulting 

from a concept of operation or operational need is selected for development, the 
Page 16 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

portfolio manager in conjunction with the rest of the IPT decide which of the 

three S&T execution arms is best suited for beginning the research, development, 

and production cycle for the selected new technology. 

Office of Research and Development

The Office of Research and Development (ORD) reports to the Under Secretary 

for S&T. Sections 308(c) and 309 of the Homeland Security Act prescribe the 

R&D mission. Generally, this is known as the intramural activity of the S&T. 

The intramural activities are all S&T requirements that the senior S&T leaders 

determine cannot be fulfilled by the private sector and must be carried out by 

national or university laboratories. Generally, the R&D receives projects that 

have needs for technologies that are not mature and need extensive research 

and development. ORD’s duties include research, development, testing, and 

evaluation; university and fellowship programs; and enduring research and 

development capability dedicated to homeland security.

The ORD manages and acts as the steward for the federal and national 

laboratories that are responsible for providing research and development 

activities for the protection of the homeland. The S&T has direct stewardship 

over the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) and the Environmental 

Measurements Laboratory (EML). A reorganization plan required by the HSA 

mandated that the PIADC be transferred from the Department of Agriculture to 

the DHS S&T on June 1, 2003. PIADC was used to conduct basic and applied 

research and diagnostic activities to protect the health of livestock on farms across 

America from foreign disease agents. Its role is to lead research and development 

to prevent, respond to, and recover from the intentional introduction of animal 

diseases. 

The HSA also mandated that the EML be transferred from the Department of 

Energy to DHS S&T. The EML mission is to advance and apply the science 

and technology required for preventing, protecting against, and responding 

to radiological and nuclear events in the service of homeland and national 

security. EML is responsible for using its expertise in radiation and radioactivity 

measurements to improve the science and technology available to the nation’s 

responders. 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 17

The S&T also works with laboratories that are owned and operated by other 

federal agencies. These laboratories are5:

• Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, (DOE)

• Los Alamos National Laboratory (DOE)

• Sandia National Laboratory (DOE)

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory (DOE)

• Pacific Northwest Laboratory (DOE)

• United States Secret Service Laboratory (DHS)

• Transportation Security Laboratory (DHS)

Homeland Security Advanced Research and Projects Agency

The Homeland Security Advanced Research and Projects Agency (HSARPA) 

reports to the Under Secretary for S&T. HSARPA is the external research and 

development funding unit of DHS. HSARPA has three primary missions: (1) 

to interact with the private sector and universities to identify and develop 

revolutionary technologies that can be used to better secure the homeland, with 

an emphasis on satisfying the operational needs of customers, (2) fill DHS 

customers’ operational needs for advanced technology by fostering emerging 

technologies to a developmental level where they can be demonstrated in a proofof-concept, i.e., furnish a pragmatic technology, and (3) move technology out of 

the labs and into the field quickly by rapid prototyping/commercial adaptation 

of technologies. HSARPA receives operational needs from PPB and provides 

technology infusion to ongoing SED and other DHS components’ programs, and 

may transfer large technology developments to SED for full-scale development 

and deployment.

As part of the rapid Prototyping program, HSARPA leverages its relationship with 

the TSWG. Rapid prototyping is used when a new technology needs to be in the 

field in less than one year. HSARPA contributed $33 million to TSWG in FY2003 

and another $30 million in FY2004 to issue a Broad Agency Announcement 

(BAA) before HSARPA was staffed to do so. The contracts resulting from this 

BAA are managed by TSWG with coordination with HSARPA.

HSARPA conducts its roles in part by awarding procurement contracts, grants, 

cooperative agreements, or other transactions for research or prototypes to public 

5

 We also identified another laboratory within DHS, but not under S&T control. This laboratory was the U.S. Customs Laboratory and 

Scientific Service that does testing to determine the origin of agricultural and manufactured products.
Page 18 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

or private institutions, businesses, federally funded research and development 

centers and universities.

Office of Systems Engineering and Development

The SED supervises and directs major acquisition programs and related 

activities. SED receives operational needs from PPB that have a “mature” 

technology, require little or no research and development, and are ready for a 

pilot program, pre-production integration and test, or systems development and 

demonstration. These projects are generally larger and involve more integration 

and test complexities than those handled by HSARPA. Also, HSARPA may 

transfer projects to SED when it needs to transition from a small project to a 

major initiative. SED develops solution-based systems, conducts rapid fullscale development and acceptance testing, and makes transition of cost-effective 

systems with a view to satisfying customer needs. The adoption of military 

technologies that are appropriate for homeland defense purposes, for instance, a 

commercial variant of InfraRed CounterMeasures (IRCM) equipment for use on 

civil aircraft, is one example of SED’s activities. 

During its brief tenure, SED has worked on major DHS initiatives, such as 

the counter MANPAD program, which aims to protect commercial aircraft 

from human-portable anti-aircraft missiles. SED is also involved with Safety 

Interoperable Communications Program (SAFECOM) and Biowatch. Established 

in 2002, SAFECOM is the first umbrella program within the federal government 

to assist local, tribal, state and federal agencies improve public safety response 

through efficient interoperable wireless communications. 

The Biowatch program involves the installation in several metropolitan areas 

across the country of detection devices to identify airborne pathogens like anthrax 

in time to hand out life-saving medicines to victims. SED is also assisting in the 

pilot programs with the Port Authorities of New York and New Jersey to test 

chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and explosive detection equipment. 

Other SED’s responsibilities include preparing the budget, determining the 

sequence of projects to be completed within the fiscal year, and ensuring they are 

executed according to law, regulation, and Departmental policies. In addition, 

SED proposes policies to ensure disciplined and efficient systems engineering and 

acquisition process for S&T.
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 19

Management’s Response 

Management generally concurred with the contents of this report. We 

incorporated some changes to the report based on their comments. 

Issues for Future OIG Reviews

As we studied the S&T in order to understand its mission and how its offices 

and divisions operate in the fulfillment of the directorate’s mission, we identified 

several issues that may be suitable for OIG follow-up reviews. These issues do 

not necessarily identify organizational weakness. Rather they highlight issues 

that either impede the S&T’s ability to become fully operational or are areas that 

will further clarify the role of the IAIP as the nation’s premier protector against 

terrorist attacks. 

Procedures in the selection of the Fellowship Programs and Centers for 

Excellence Program require further review 

To attract some of the nation’s most talented scientists and engineers into its 

programs and build partnerships among laboratory and university researchers, 

S&T established two programs: the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence 

program and the Scholars and Fellows program. The budget for these programs 

increased from $3 million in FY 2003 to $70 million in FY 2004. 

Among the initial 70 responses reviewed by DHS and outside advisors to 

establish the first Homeland Security Center for Excellence (HS-Center), 12 were 

selected to submit full proposals. During November 2003, DHS announced the 

selection of the University of Southern California (USC) as its first HS-Center. 

USC is entrusted with the task of studying risk analysis related to the economic 

consequences of terrorist threats and events.

Open to all U.S. citizens, the Fellowship program attracted 2,500 graduates, 

of which 102 were awarded scholarships. According to National Science 

Foundation standards, more than 100 experts from a variety of fields including 

physical, biological, social and behavioral sciences, engineering, mathematics, 

and computer science reviewed these applications. These scholars are pursuing 

academic programs that are consistent with the DHS mission.
Page 20 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

We could review how S&T selects the HS-Centers, how it ensures that the Centers 

fulfill their assignments, and how the fellowship funds are allotted and used to 

achieve the homeland security purposes in integration with the rest of S&T’s 

responsibilities.

 

The S&T must maintain close relationships with other DHS elements, 

especially with the IAIP

To successfully select the best new technologies that support a cohesive and 

integrated national plan for homeland security, it is critical for the S&T to have a 

clear understanding of: (1) the terrorist threat picture facing the nation, and (2) the 

current technical capabilities and ongoing research and development initiatives 

of other DHS elements. By having a clear understanding of these essential 

factors, the S&T will be better able to prioritize its investment decisions and avoid 

duplicating technology initiatives by other DHS components.

While many S&T executives agreed with the importance of maintaining a 

relationship with IAIP, personnel below them were not actively involved in 

obtaining terrorist threat information from IAIP and incorporating it into S&T’s 

selection of new technologies for homeland security. On a different level, 

however, S&T personnel were actively pursuing working relationships with the 

IAIP to assist with developing the next generation of threat vulnerability and 

risk assessment tools for the IAIP. Although S&T personnel were attempting 

to support the IAIP in this manner, the relationship between S&T and IAIP may 

not be as close as it should be. S&T personnel attributed the relationship with 

their IAIP counterparts as not being as close as it should to the following factors: 

(1) IAIP management not being aware of what S&T programs have to offer, (2) 

difficulties working with the Chief Information Officer’s delegates to the IAIP, 

and (3) IAIP staff being heavily focused on operational concerns and daily threat 

information.

Other DHS elements may be involved in research and development initiatives 

that diverge from the DHS strategic plan for new technology investment 

being developed by the S&T. For example, on January 21, 2004, the OIG was 

invited to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for a briefing and 

demonstration of the tools being developed by TSA to conduct threat vulnerability 

and risk assessments. According to the briefing, substantial funding already has 

been invested in developing such tools. The TSA demonstrated successfully 

a tool that utilized the Internet to promote interaction between end-users such 

as the New York City Port Authority and the TSA. However, TSA program 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 21

managers were not actively seeking to coordinate their research and development 

investments with the IAIP, and did not know whether S&T was active in the area 

of seaport security.

Section 302, subsections (2) and (12) of the HSA, requires the S&T to 

coordinate with other executive agencies, including those within the DHS, to 

develop an integrated national policy and strategic plan for identifying and 

procuring new technologies designed to safeguard the nation. Subsection (13) 

specifically requires coordination between S&T and other executive agencies 

to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs when selecting technologies 

to further review and develop, and subsection (3) specifically requires S&T 

to support the IAIP in assessing and testing homeland security vulnerabilities 

and possible threats. Given the emphasis on coordination between the S&T

and other executive agencies in the HSA, a future review could identify and 

make recommendations to improve areas where this kind of coordination is not 

occurring.

S&T needs to assess the vulnerability of the foreign human capital factor in 

light of security requirements imposed on foreign students and other aliens with 

expertise in science and engineering.

The National Science Foundation Act of 1950 established the National Science 

Board, which is the governing board of the National Science Foundation (NSF). 

The NSF mission is to (1) promote the progress of science, (2) advance the 

national health, prosperity, and welfare, and (3) secure the national defense. On 

August 14, 2003, the National Science Board issued a report titled The Science 

and Engineering Workforce Realizing America’s Potential. According to the 

report, it is more essential than ever to think about workforce development in 

a global context. Progress in science and engineering relies on knowledge and 

skills found throughout an international community. Also, according to the report, 

our nation needs the perspectives and talents of both the native-born and foreignborn for the best possible science and engineering workforce. 

Foreign students enrolled at U.S. colleges and universities are encountering visa 

problems when entering the U.S. because of a government crack down after the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our nation. Before September 11, 2001, 

it took students entering the U.S. about two weeks to get a student visa. Recent 

news articles stated that in 2003 foreign students had to wait approximately 6 

months to receive their visas in order to enter the U.S. America needs to attract 
Page 22 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

the world’s most accomplished students, scientists, and engineers and encourage 

them to share their capabilities with us. 

On the other hand, over 583,000 foreign students attend U.S. colleges and 

universities. One third or more of all U.S. science and engineering doctoral 

degrees and 40 percent of PhD’s in computer science go to foreigners. One-third 

or more of the research assistants in academic laboratories are foreigners. S&T

will need to assess whether, and how, to accommodate these facts when funding 

academic research involving potentially highly sensitive homeland defense 

efforts, and balance the benefit gained from obtaining foreign students’ intellectual 

skills with the cost of securing the country.

Prudent project management is key to S&T’s success and to ensure that the 

nation maintains trust in S&T’s efforts. This is especially true for S&T projects 

that depend on agreements with other federal entities. 

S&T works closely with national laboratories, universities, and the private 

sector for research and development for creating new technologies to address 

terrorist threats. S&T owns two of these national laboratories: Plum Island 

and Environmental Measurements Laboratory. However, S&T also relies 

on laboratories owned and operated by other federal agencies, such as the 

Department of Energy, and universities to fulfill S&T’s mission in regards to 

research and development. 

Some of the national laboratories have come under public scrutiny because of 

problems disclosed at the laboratories. To illustrate, a local California newspaper 

published an article on security concerns at the University of California Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory. According to the article, the laboratory is not 

fit to effectively resist a terrorist attack because of (1) ineffective and unsafe 

security procedures, and (2) high attrition rates and inadequate training to 

handle radioactive materials. Also, the article discussed millions of dollars in 

unaccounted lab property. 

According to a November 2003, newspaper article, a number of deficiencies exist 

at the Plum Island Laboratory that is owned and operated by DHS, and need to be 

fixed. 
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 23

Prudent business practices warrant that management oversight procedures should 

be in place to protect S&T’s interest in ensuring that laboratories deliver what is 

expected and that the government is protected. This is especially true for national 

laboratories and university facilities that S&T does not own, but depends on to 

satisfy S&T mission. 

S&T should have provisions in their agreements with non-DHS entities that 

require protective security measures, and other factors for prudent oversight 

of S&T’s projects. Also, S&T should have procedures in place to monitor the 

laboratories’ compliance with these requirements.

S&T should ensure that proper controls are in place when using Other 

Transaction Authority.

The HSA of 2002 statutorily gave OTA to the DHS for research and development 

projects. OTA gives DHS, specifically the S&T Directorate, flexibility in 

engaging non-traditional vendors, including contractors that are reluctant to 

do business with the federal government because of its unique accounting 

requirements and inability to freely negotiate intellectual property rights. OTA 

authority allows the S&T Directorate to function more like a commercial partner 

and negotiate flexible agreements that protect the DHS’s interest. 

However, according to the HSA, the OTA is only in effect for a five-year period 

following the effective date of the HSA. Furthermore, not later than two years 

after the effective date of the HSA, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller 

General shall report to the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate on: 

(1) whether the OTA attracts nontraditional government contracts and results in 

the acquisition of needed technologies, and (2) if such authorities were to be made 

permanent, whether additional safeguards are needed with respect to the use of 

such authorities. 

If DHS fails to prove that the use of OTA attracted nontraditional government 

contracts and put the proper controls in place regarding the use of OTA, then OTA 

may not be renewed at the end of the 5-year period as prescribed in the HSA. 

This could have a devastating effect on S&T’s ability to quickly implement new 

technology in the field. 

We could conduct a review to determine if S&T’s use of OTA has met the intent 

of Congress. The objective of the review could be to determine whether S&T’s 
Page 24 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

use of OTA did attract non-traditional vendors and quickly implemented new 

technologies necessary to protect our nation. This review could also determine 

if sufficient management controls were in place to ensure that the benefits gained 

were commensurate with reasonable cost incurred.
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 25

Appendix A

Summary of S&T Statutory Functions

S&T Major Responsibilities Outlined in the HSA

No. Statutory Responsibility

1 Advising the Secretary on research and development efforts 

and priorities in support of the DHS mission

2 Developing a national policy and strategic plan for 

coordinating the federal government’s civilian efforts to 

identify and develop countermeasures to terrorist threats

3 Assisting in assessing and testing homeland security 

vulnerabilities and possible threats

4 Leading DHS and national research efforts to prevent 

importation of terrorist weapons and materials and preventing 

or responding to terrorist attacks

5 Establishing a system to transfer homeland security 

developments and technologies to federal, state, local, and 

private sector partners
Page 26 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

Appendix B

Budget and FTE Statistics for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004

Budget and FTE Statistics for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004

Programs/Salaries & Expenses/Office of the 

Under Secretary

FY 2003 FY 2004

FTE Budget

($000) FTE

Budget

($000)

Biological Countermeasures 57 362,600 63 198,500

Nuclear & Radiological Countermeasures 4 75,000 22 127,000

Threat & Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment 

(TVTA) 7 36,100 18 93,500

National Biodefense Center ... ... 88,000

Rapid Prototyping/Technical Support Working 

Group (TSWG) 4 33,000 5 75,000

University & Fellowships Programs 1 3,000 2 70,000

Critical Infrastructure Protection ... ... 6,500

Chemical Countermeasures 2 7,000 10 52,000

Standards/State & Local Program 3 20,000 4 39,000

Conventional Missions ... ... 10 34,000

Emerging Threats 1 16,750 4 21,000

High Explosives Countermeasures ... ... 2 9,500

S&T Salaries & Expenses ... ... ... 39,000

Office of the Under Secretary ... ... ... 5,168

Total 79 553,450 140 918,168
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 27

Appendix C

RDT&E Program Nomenclature

RDT&E Program Nomenclature6

No. Title Description

6.1 Basic Research

Supports research that produces new knowledge in 

a scientific or technological area of interest to the 

military.

6.2 Applied Research

Supports the exploratory development and initial 

maturation of new technologies for specific 

military application (or further developing existing 

technology for new military applications).

6.3

Advanced 

Technology 

Development

Supports larger scale hardware development and 

integration and experiments that can demonstrate 

capability in more operationally realistic settings.

6.4 Demonstration and 

Validation

Supports the initial development and 

demonstration of a product designed specifically to 

meet an agreed upon set of performance standards 

associated with a validated operational need.

6.5

Engineering and 

Manufacturing 

Development

Supports the continued development and 

refinement of a specifically designed product 

that has demonstrated it can meet performance 

requirements and development of the necessary 

manufacturing processes needed to build that 

product.

6.6 Management 

Support

Supports the overhead costs associated with 

managing the RDT&E activities and running 

facilities.

6.7

Operational 

Support 

Development

Supports the continued improvement and 

upgrading of products already in production.

6

 Source: CRS Report for Congress, Defense Research: A Primer on the Department of Defense’s Research, Development, Test and 

Evaluation (RDT&E) Program, updated July 14, 1999.
Page 28 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-01 Biological Countermeasures This portfolio provides the science and 

technology required to decrease the likelihood 

and potential impact of a biological attack on our 

civilian population, infrastructure, or agricultural 

system.

Port-02 Border & Transportation Security This portfolio ensures that research, 

development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 

activities in relation to the homeland security 

are consistent with the goals and objectives of 

the BTS, the S&T Directorate, and the National 

Security Strategy.

Port-03 Chemical Countermeasures This portfolio provides the science and 

technology required to diminish the country’s 

vulnerability to chemical attacks on our civilian 

population and infrastructure.

Port-04 Threats & Vulnerability, Testing & 

Assessments (TV/TA)

This portfolio enhances the intelligence and 

vulnerability analysis of the DHS.

Port-04a TV/TA -- Physical Security This program is expected to significantly 

improve the capabilities of our nation to 

physically protect its critical infrastructure and 

key assets.

Port-04b TV/TA -- Critical Infrastructure 

Protection – Modeling, Simulation, 

and Analysis Program (CIP-MSAP)

The program has three essential goals: a) 

develop, implement, and evolve a rational 

approach for prioritizing CIP strategies and 

resource allocations using modeling, simulation, 

and analyses to assess vulnerabilities, 

consequences, and risks; b) propose and evaluate 

protection, mitigation, response, and recovery 

strategies and options; and c) provide real-time 

support to decision makers during crises and 

emergencies.
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 29

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-06 Cyber Security The portfolio engages in research, development, 

testing, and evaluation activities along several 

different dimensions. 

Port-07 ERP

Port-07a ERP – Technology Development 

for Emergency Preparedness and 

Response

The program identifies venues where significant 

improvements in capability can be facilitated 

by modern technologies, technology integration 

and/or advances in basic research.

Port-07b ERP – State and Local Program The State and Local Program provides the 

capability to obtain user requirements from 

State and Local Emergency Responders to 

advance the development, implementation, 

and reassessment of standards for Homeland 

Security Technologies that support their 

missions.

Port-07c ERP – Safe Cities Program This program supports the nation-wide regional 

security initiative under the aegis of DHS. 

Working directly with state and local emergency 

responders and law enforcement agencies, 

this program aims to obtain the best available 

science and technology to prevent, detect, 

and respond to “all-hazard” emergencies into 

existing command, control and communication 

infrastructures.

Port-08 Explosives During fiscal year 2004, the portfolio will 

primarily address terrorist attacks against 

buildings and the general public.

Port-09 International Program This portfolio supports the Under Secretary in 

encouraging and facilitating involvement of the 

world community on homeland security issues.
Page 30 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-11 Radiological and Nuclear 

Countermeasures

This portfolio has a comprehensive strategy 

to deter a radiological and nuclear attack. It 

also provides the best available technologies, 

training, and information to aid in crisis 

response, incident management and recovery, 

and attrition.

Port-11a Preplanned Product 

Improvements

(P3I)

The two goals of this program are: 

a) to quickly develop and transition 

enhanced capability to deployed detectors/

systems and b) to quickly include recent 

improvements in prototype technologies 

into the near commercial offerings of 

radiological and nuclear detectors/systems 

used in DHS operational environments. 

Port-11b Detection Technology 

Initiatives

The program conducts the underlying 

research and development to develop 

modern or enhanced technologies for 

the detection of nuclear and radiological 

materials.

Port-11c Incident Management and 

Recovery

The primary goals of this program are 

to save human lives, and to minimize 

environmental and economic impacts.

Port-11d Systems Architecture and Pilot

Deployments

This program focuses on the development 

of radiological and nuclear countermeasure 

systems that improve the nation’s capability 

to address the threat of terrorist use of a 

radiological dispersal device (RDD) or 

improvised nuclear device (IND) in the U.S.

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 31

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-13 Standards Program

Port-13a Biological Countermeasures This program for biological 

countermeasures develops comprehensive 

standards for development, testing, and 

certification of effective detection, response, 

remediation, and forensics tools for specific 

bioagents.

Port-13b BTS Biometrics The program for biometrics develops 

comprehensive standards for the 

development, testing, and certification of 

effective technologies for identification, 

authentication and security of biometric 

data.

Port-13c Certification/Attestation/

SAFETY Act Implementation 

This program provides the ability for the 

DHS to perform the conformity assessments 

for specific homeland security technology 

tools.

Port-13d Chemical Countermeasures This program provides the science and 

technology required for reducing our 

country’s vulnerability to chemical 

attacks on our civilian population and 

infrastructure.

Port-13e Interoperability of 

Communication 

 and Information

The program develops comprehensive 

standards for the development, testing, and 

certification of enabling technologies for 

interoperable and compatible detection and 

information exchange tools. 

Port-13f Conventional Missions 

Standards Program

The program offers the capability to provide 

standards, best practices and guidelines to 

assist conventional missions within DHS to 

operate effectively and consistently. 

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios
Page 32 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-13h IAIP Critical Infrastructure

 Protection

This program provides the capability for 

the provision of security standards, best 

practices and guidelines to protect the 

nation’s critical infrastructure.

Port-13i IAIP Cyber Security The program develops comprehensive 

standards for the development, testing, and 

certification of effective technologies for 

the authentication of persons attempting to 

access information systems and the security 

of data critical to the needs of homeland 

security.

Port-13j Modeling, Simulation and 

Analysis

The program develops comprehensive 

standards for the validation and verification 

of modeling, simulation and analysis tools.

Port-13k Radiation/Nuclear 

Countermeasures

The program develops comprehensive 

standards for the development, testing, 

and certification of effective detection, 

response, remediation, and forensics tools 

for radiological and nuclear materials.

Port-13l Training This training program develops 

comprehensive standards for the 

development, testing, and certification of 

effective responders at all levels. It has the 

ability to provide guidance to local/state/

federal homeland security entities regarding 

the appropriate testing and certification for 

all levels of emergency responders.

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 33

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-15 Threat and Vulnerability 

Testing & Assessments

Port-15a Advanced Scientific 

Computing Research and 

Development

This program supports advanced scientific 

computing research and development 

in four technical areas-Simulation 

Technologies, Discrete and Stochastic 

Alogarithms, Large-Scale Data Integration 

and Information Extraction, and Computer 

Science and Mathematics Foundationsand will demonstrate the value of these 

capabilities to DHS operational assets via 

pilot projects.

Port-15b Behavioral Research Program The three goals of this program are: a) to 

understand terrorism behavior to the level 

that enables disruption of both organized 

and individual terrorist activities, b) to 

create a reliable method for accurately 

interpreting indications of threat, both 

directly communicated and intercepted, 

and c) to understand the impact and public 

acceptance of DHS activities to obtain their 

cooperation.

Port-15c Biometrics Program The program’s goal is determination of 

rapid biometrics feasibility which will be 

conducted on both individual biometrics 

and fusion approaches. 

Port-15d Integrated Feasibility 

Experiment (IFE)

The objective of this program is to develop 

and demonstrate the ability to track 

terrorists coming across our borders using a 

quick-start project followed by aggressive 

research and experimentation effort that is 

grounded and shaped by the use of real data.

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios
Page 34 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

S&T Portfolios

Port No. Name Description

Port-15f Threat—Vulnerability 

Integration System Prototype

The program enables analysts to rapidly 

search, integrate, and gain insight from 

information that lies buried in terabytes and 

petabytes of digital information that are 

overwhelming by today’s standards.

Port-15g Threat – Vulnerability 

Mapping and 

Warning Systems R&D

This program is responsible for advancing 

the Threat-Vulnerability, intelligence 

and information analysis, and warning 

capabilities of the Homeland Security.

Port-15h Information Analysis -- WMD 

Assessments Programs

The program establishes an end to end 

national capability, built on the technical 

expertise of the Homeland Security 

community of resources, to assess the 

validity of communicated threats for all 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to 

create a comprehensive strategic and current 

awareness of WMD material flows and 

illicit trafficking through distributed sensor 

and information systems integration, to 

characterize the capabilities of adversaries 

through integrated analytic and technical 

teams, and rapidly characterize composition 

and sources of WMD materials.

Port-16 Secret Service This portfolio has twin missions- protection 

and investigations. In addition to protecting 

our nation’s leaders and visiting world 

leaders, and also has sole jurisdiction for 

investigating counterfeit U.S. currency.

Appendix D

S&T Portfolios
Survey of the S&T Directorate Page 35

Appendix E

Major Contributors to this Report

Carlton I. Mann, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Frank A. Parrott (Team Leader), Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

M. Faizul Islam, Ph.D., Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Bradley J. Harp, MBA, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews
Page 36 Survey of the S&T Directorate 

Appendix F

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland 

Security

Additional Information and Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov.

OIG Hotline

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland, Washington, DC 20528, 

Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to 

protect the identity of each writer and caller.