### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 75 -C R

______________________________ ROGER DAL E GENTRY, Appe llant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 5th J udicial District Court

Cass County , Texas Trial Court No. 2006F 00129

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , M o s e l e y

an d C o r n e l i u s , * JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Cornelius

________________________ *Wil liam J . Cornelius, Chief J ustice, Retired, Sitting by Assignme ntWe no te that the jud g me nt ind ic a te s the statut e fo r the of fe ns e a s T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . 1 § 2 2. 02 1( 2) (A ). Th e c or

re c t st a tut e is T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (ii). Gentry appea ls f

rom three convictions. I n cause numbers 06-07-00175- CR and 06 -0 7- 2 00177-CR, he appe als from his convictions of a g g ravated sexual as s au l t o f a c hild, and was se nte nc e d in e a c h c a se to l if e imp ri so nme nt a

nd a $5 ,0 00 .0 0 f

ine . In c a us e numbe r 0 6- 07 -0 01 76 -C R, he a pp e a ls f ro m hi s c on vic tio n o f i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y se xua l c on ta c t, a

nd wa s se nte nc e d to twenty y ear s' imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine

. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Roge r Dale Gentry

appea ls from his conviction by a jury for a g g ravated sexual assault of a child. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (ii) (Vernon S upp. 2008). The jury assessed 1 his punishment at life imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine

. Gentry has two other c onvictions
c ur re ntl y on a pp e a l be fo re thi s Co ur

t. 2 Gentry ' s first four points of e rr o r contend he was de nied his rig ht of confr ontation of wi tne sse s w he n the tr ia l court re fu se d to allo w him to cr os s- e xami ne wi tne sse s and the c hil d v ic tim , H.G., about state ments H.G. alleg edly made to a sc h o o l m at e i n whi ch H.G. de scribed G entry as having come to her

house and r aped he r. I n tw o r e late d p oin ts, Ge ntr y c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in allo wi ng a State ' s e xpe rt wi tne ss to testify , al th o u g h th e St a te a ll e g e d ly h a d f a il e d to c o mp ly

w it h a d is c o v e r y o r d e r to g iv e G e n try
no tic e of the data on wh ic h the e xpe rt ' s op ini on wa s ba se d; and the tr ia l c ourt erred in pa rt ia lly closing the cour

troom when the c hild victim testified. In Gentry ' s final point, he contends the tria l court e rre d in allowing the State to introduce e vidence of an e x trane ous offe nse committed by Ge ntr y . We ov e rr

ule a ll the se po int s a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.3

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND H.G.' s pare nts divorced when H.G. was an infant. H.G. testified that, when she was six y ear s
o l d an d we n tt o v i s i th er

fa t h er , s h e w o u l d o f

t e n s p en d t i m e w i t h h er

au n t , S u e G en t ry , an d

S u e's hu sb and , G e ntr

y , the a pp e lla nt he re . Sue Ge ntr

y wa s the sis te r of JohnGa rr e tt, H. G. ' s f

a the r. Ga rr e tt
and Ge ntr y bo th w ork ed for the C a ss C ounty She ri ff ' s D e pa rtme nt. H. G. c a lle d G e ntr y " Un c le Dale." H.G. mad e o u tc r ie s to thr e e p e r s o n s a b o u t thr e e d if

f e r e n t in c id e n ts
. G e n tr

y d o e s not
c omp la in a

bo ut t he a dmi ssi bil ity

of the ou tc ry

state me nts . H .G . te sti fi e d th a t, whe n s he wo uld vis it the Gentr y s, "U ncle Da le" would take care of or watch over her a nd they would spend time tog ether while no one e lse was a

round. She said that, one day , Gentry laid her on the hood of a c ar, pulled down her shorts and panties, a

nd licked her privates. She said the Ge ntry s had a longdrivewa y that enable d one to see a car approa ching from a distanc e and tha t Gentry stopped this conduct when he saw H.G .' s father

coming up the drivew ay . H. G. sa id G e ntr

y wo uld so me tim e s le t he r sit on his la p as he dr ov e , a

nd sh e wo uld

he lp h im ste e r t he ve hic le . Sh e sa id t

hat, o ne da

y wh ile do ingthis, Gen tr y rea c he d d ow n a nd un zipp e d h is pants, allowing his se x ual org an to c ome out. Gentry then sat her

in the middle of the seat, force d her he ad down, a

nd put her mouth on his se x ual org an. H.G. also descr ibed a time she a nd Gentry went to a pond be hind Gentry ' s house. While there, Ge ntry laid her on a log, removed her shirt, a nd tou c he d h e r b re a sts
.4

Gentry ' s first four points conc ern se vera l stat em en t s alleg edly made by H.G. about whic h Ge ntr y wa nte d to c ro ss- e xami ne wi tne sse s. Th e re po rt of Rang e r Jay

Woma c k' s inve sti g a tio n o f t his matter c ontains a re fer ence to a statement alleg edly made by H.G. to a schoolmate, A.H., that Ge ntry would spy

on H.G. throug h h er bedroom window, the n come into her room and g et on top of her
. Both H.G . and her

m other said Ge ntry

had neve r bee n to the Gar rett home. At trial a

nd at ora l argument befor e this Court, the State and the de fense ag ree d that, if asked, H .G. would deny saying this to A.H. and that H.G. had denied this statement at a prior trial in this case. H .G. also desc ribed a "tattoo" Gentry purcha sed at a Shell service station and then put on his penis. But whe n Rang er Womack showed H.G . a condom a nd stick-on tatt o o s , H.G. said ne ither wa s what she ha d been talking a bout. The statement a

bout Gentry spy ing on her and coming into he r room wa s not allowed befor e th e ju

r y , b u t t h e s to r y a b o u t t h e tatt o o , a s w e ll a s e v id e n c e th a t H
. G
. to ld th e Ra n g e r tha t Gentry had sexually

assaulted two other

g irls, J ennie a

nd Kayla, when he had not, did come be fore the jury
. Also, H.G. testified that one time Ge ntry took her to a dogpen nea r his house and put he r in the pen with the dog s until her aunt Sue came. Gentr y and his wife, Sue, both testified the re w as no dog pen on their pr operty and no such inc ident happene d. H.G.' s school counselor, to whom H.G. made an outcry , testified t hat H.G. left her a note say ing that Gentry

pushed her

head unde r water. Gentry ' s counsel told the cou rt , o u t s ide the pre sence of the jury , that H.G. also said she inflated "f loaties" on her a

rms to keep f

rom g oing unde r. Sue testified she ha d never seen e vidence , when H.G. wa s at their house, that H.G. had be en put in water
.5

Ge n t ry co n t en d s t h e t ri al co u rt erre d i nl i m i t i n g h i s ab i l i t y

t o cr o s s -e x am i n e t h e S t at e's witnesses re g ardingthe statements alleg edly made by H.G. to A.H. LIM ITA TIO N O F CR OSS- EX AM IN AT ION OF STA TE'S W ITN ESSES State's Expert Laura G reuner L aura Gre uner, a

thera pist specializing in c hild se x ual abuse and child tra uma, testified for the State . Sh e te sti fi e d a

bo ut c omm on beh a vio r e xhibi te d b y c hil dr e n w ho have be e n th e vic tim s of se xua l a bu se . Sh e sa id t

y pic a l be havio r o r c ha

ra c te ri sti c s in c lud e a c tin g ou t, l owg ra de s, nightmar es, anxiety , and pseudomaturity . The State' s counsel asked her about other c hara cter istics of abused children and Gre uner acknowle dg ed them. Greuner said that H.G.' s theft of a cell phone and fa lsely

saying two c lassmates had a lso been sexually assaulted by Gentry wer e not unus ual for victims of sex ual assault. R ang er Womack ha d said that, while H.G. ha d told him about two classmates, in his investig ation, he found that one, J ennie, had not be en assaulted, and the sec ond, Kayla, was a name made up by H.G. Gre uner said such actions wer e consistent with a bused childre n b ec au s e t h ey

n ee d t o fi n d a va ri et y o f w ay s t o t el l wh at h ap p en edt o t h em . Gr eu n er s ai d t h at H. G. 's theft of a cell phone f

rom a tea cher , wher e H.G. ha d no prior history of such conduct, wa s consistent fo r a c hil d s e xua l a ssa

ult vic tim , in that the a c t cou ld re fl e c t a ng e r, fr e qu e ntl y

se e n in su c h v ic tim s. Ge ntr y argue s tha t the tr ia l court vio late d h is c ro ss- e xami natio n a nd c on fr on tatio n r ig hts in
re fu sin g to a llo w h im t o c ro ss- e xami ne Gr e un e r o n w he the r s he wa s a wa re that H .G . h a d p re vio us ly stated that Ge ntry

came to her house at night, spied on he r while she took a bath, and r aped he r.6

We review evidentiary

ruling s under a

n abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Sa laz ar

v . S tate , 38 S.W. 3d 14 1, 15 3– 54 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt a buses it s dis c re tio n w he n it a c ts without refe renc e to any

g uiding r ules and princ iples, or ac ts in an arbitra ry or capricious manne r. Mo ntgom e ry v . S

tate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh' g ). A trial c ourt does not a buse its discr etion if its ruling is at le ast within the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment. Salazar , 38 S.W .3d at 153–54. Wit h respe ct to bo t h t h e Confrontation Clause and the g ener al principle of permitting the imp e a c hme nt o f t

he c re dib ili ty

of any wi tne ss, the tr ial cou rt ret a ins br oa d d isc re tio n to imp os e
rea sonable limits on cross-examination i n o rd er to avoid hara ssment, prejudice , confusion of the issues, possible dang er to the wit ness, and the i njection of cumulative or collater al evidence. Lopez

v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The rights of confr ontation and impeac hment g ua r a nte e o n ly a n o p p o r tu n it y f o r e f f e c tive cross-e x amination, not cross-e x amination that is effe ctive in whateve r way and to w hateve r extent the defe nse may wish. De l v . V an Ar sd all , 475 U.S. 673, 67 9 ( 19 86 ); Delaware v. Fe rnsterer , 4 74 U. S. 1 5, 20 (1 98 5) ; se e als o B oo k e r v . S tate , 929 S.W .2d 57, 65 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 1996, pet. re f'd ). T he Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls has
rec og nized both the right a nd the limitations on the rig ht of cross- examination. I ssues reg ardingthe Confrontation Clause must be e x am i ned on a c ase- by -ca se basis, takinginto account both the defe ndant' s rig ht of cross- examination and the risk fa ct o rs associate d with the admission of the evidenc e. When there is a conflict be tween the C o n fr o ntation Clause and the Te x as Rules of7

Evidence , the C onstitut ion must control, but wher e possi ble, s uch inconsist ency should be remove d by rea sonable c onstruction. Lop e z v . S tate , 18 S.W .3d at 222–23. RejectingGentry ' s objection, the trial cour t stated: T h e f ac tt h at an ex p er tm ay

h av e a n d

re v i ew t h e R a n ger 's re p o rt d o es n 't nece ssarily

mean that e very

thing in the r eport then become s admissible into evidence an d s u b je c t to c r o s s e xa mi n a ti o n o f th e e xp e rt.
. . . T h e f a c t th at an e x pert may rea sonably

rely upon the conduct of a child victim, di scussing what happe ned to her with other play

mates is one thi ng . To then s ay that she can be cross examined about a stateme nt alleg edly

made by the victim to another play mate that the victim denies making , to me, strains the re ach of Rule 703. The trial c ourt clea

rly made its dec ision with refer ence to guiding rules and principles, and did not
ac t in an arbitra

ry or ca pricious manner
. Se e Lam v . S tate , 2 5 S
. W
. 3 d

2 3 3 , 2 3 6

– 3 7 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Ge ntr y c ite s W he e le r v . S

tate fo r the pr op os iti on that an o pp os ingpa rt y is a lw ay s e nti tle d to
cross-e x amine an expert witness conce rning the fa cts and data on which the e x pert re lied in forming
a conclusion or opinion, a nd also about information of which the e x pert wa s awa re but on whic h she did not rely
. W

he e le r v . S

tate , 6 7 S. W.3 d 8 79 , 8 83 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th e de c ision in W he e ler v . S

tate is not on point with the case befor e us. In W he e le r v . S

tate , the Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls ruled that the trial cour t had the discre tion to allow the cr oss-examination of the expert beca

use she had " opened the door" to the evidenc e. In our ca se, the que stion to be decided is whether the trial court ha d the discre tion to re fus e to allow the cr oss-examination because of theThis exclusi on is the subject of Ge ntry ' s fourth point of er ror. 3 8 dang er of unfair prejudice , hara ssment, c onfusion of issues, and the injection of cumulati v e or collater al evidenc e. We conc lude that the trial c ourt did have suc h discretion. I f it c an b e c o n s id e r e d th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in th is r e g ar d , w e c o n c lu d e , bey ond a
rea sonable doubt, that any err or wa s clea

rly harmless a

nd did not contribute to t h e co n v i ct i o n or punishment or aff

ect Ge ntry ' s substantial r ights. The trial court state d its reasons for not allowing Gentry to question Greune r on this collatera l issue. Additionally , we note that Gre uner was privy t o an d testified about other statements and c onduct by H.G. that ca lled into question H.G.'s
c re dib ili ty , e .g ., th at H.G
. had fa lse ly sa id t hat G e ntr y ha d a lso a

bu se d tw o s c ho olm a te s o f h e rs , "Jennie" and " Kayla" and that H.G. stole a teac her' s cell phone. Li mitati on of

Cro ss -E xa mina ti on of

Ch il d Vi cti m, H. G. The trial c ourt ref

used to allow Ge ntry

to bring up H.G.' s purported state ment to A.H. when H.G. wa s testify ing. L ater , Gentry announce d that he int ended to call A.H. to testify , wher eupon the trial court r

uled it wo u l d not allow such testimony
. Gentry made a n offe r of pr oof as to what he 3

anti c ipate d A.H. wo uld

say if c a lle d, that is , s he wo uld sa y that H .G . to ld h e r t

hat G e ntr y c a me to H. G. ' s h ou se to s py

on H. G. , c a me int o H .G .' s r oo m, t oo k his c lot he s o ff , a nd ra pe d H .G . G e ntr

y tol d t h e t ri al co u rt h e w an t edt o qu es t i o nH. G. an d A. H. ab o u tt h e s t at em en t s co n t ai n edi nt h e R an ger 's repor t in order to impeac h H.G.' s cre dibilit y . Gentry argued that the a lleg ed stateme nt of H.G. to her schoolmate A.H . about Gentr y spy ing on he r at her home and coming into he r room and rapingher9

was inconsistent with her a lleg ations of sexual assault and indec ency by Gentry . Gentry

contende d that this qua lified as an inconsistent statement bec ause both H.G . and her mother would testify

that Gentry had neve r bee n to their house. Whe n c on sid e ri nghis ru lin g on Ge ntr y ' s r e qu e st t o q

ue sti on H. G. and

A. H. a bo ut t his purported statement, the trial court took the pos ition that the statement was conduc t and would be inadmissible for impeac hment purposes un d er Ru le 608(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence
. See T EX . R. E V ID . 608(b). The trial court state d, "T he conduc t is the lie. . . . that's what 608(b) sp e c if ic a lly pr oh ibi ts. " We h a ve he ld that a vic tim ' s f a lse a lle g a tio n o f s e xua l mi sc on du c t a g a ins t a per son other than the defe ndant could not be inquired into in a sex ual assault ca se to impeac h the vic tim ' s c re dib ili ty be c a

us e , a mon g oth e r re a so ns , it c on sti tut e d c on du c t wi thi n the me anin g of Rul e 608(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence
. Be nja mi n v. Sta te , No. 06-01-00022- CR, 2002 Tex . App. L E X I S 3 2 8 9 ( T e x. A p p . — T e xar k an a M ay 1 0 , 2 0 0 2 , p e t. r e f

' d ) ( n o t d e s ig n a te d

f o r p u b li c a ti o n )
. We also find seve ral other

proper leg al base s the trial court could have found that support its exclusi on of this cross-e x amination. We reiterate t he st andar ds and citations ref err ed to above reg arding the t rial cour t's discr etion in t he a dmi ssi on

or e xclu sio n o f e vid e nc e . T he tr ia l c ourt re ta ins br oa d d iscret ion to i mpo se
re a s o n a b le li mi ts o nc r o s s - e xa mi n a ti o nto a v o id h ar a s s me n t, u n d

u e p r e ju d ic e , c o n f

u s io no f the issues, endang eringthe wit n es s , an d t he injection of c umulative or collate ral e vidence
. Moody v

. Sta te , 827 S.W .2d 875, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).10

We find the trial cour

t here did not a

buse its discr etion in excluding this evidence . We rea ch this decision after

consideringthe trial cour t's sub s t an t i al discretion re g ardingthe admission or exclusion of evidence, as well as its discretion to limit cross-e x amination and to avoid allowingthe proce eding to devolve into a trial of multiple sub-issues on collater al matters. Additionally , we point out there a

re othe r alleg edly inconsistent or incre dible statements by H.G. that wer e befor e the jury that mi lit a te d a g a ins t he r c re dib ili ty , s uc h as the s tate me nt d e sc ri bin g a " tatto o" Ge ntr

y pu t on his penis; her f

ictionalization of a child named "Ka y la," and her alleg ation that Gentry had assa ulted that child and anothe r of H.G .' s schoolmates; H.G.' s claim that Gentry put he r in a dog pen, whe re the re was testimo n y n o dog pen existed; and H.G.' s statement that Gentr y put her he ad under

water , disputed by

Sue Gentry

who said she would have noticed if H.G . had shown e vidence of havingbeen put under water. The fact that substantial evidenc e casting doubt on H.G.' s vera city was put bef ore the jur y le sse ns any

po te nti a l va lue of

thi s e xclu de d " imp e a c hme nt" e vid e nc e and le nd s su pp or t to the trial court' s exercise of discretion in e x cluding it. I f the trial court' s action in e x cl u d i n g the
e vid e nc e wa s er ror , we f ind the e rr or wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, b e c a

us e thi s additional "impea ching statement" of H.G. w ould not likely have a dded to the we ight or forc e of the
o t h e r i mp e a c h m e n te v i d e n c e a l r e a dy b e f o r e t h e j u r

y. Cross-Exam ination of H .G.'s School Counselor Ge n t r y a l s o a s s e rt s t h e t r i a l c o u rt v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n r i g h t w he n it ref used to allow Ge ntry

to cross-e x amine school counselor Cassandr a Rhone a bout a statement11

purp or te dly ma de by H. G. to a sc ho olm a te
. Rho ne te sti fi e d sh e g a ve H. G. so me pa pe r a nd a pe nc il to "sort of jot down t hings .
. . ." A fter that, H.G. beg an leaving note s to Rhone under Rhone' s door. One of the notes said, " [H] e' s pushing me in the water ." T here was some que stion whether this had happene d. Rhone also testified H.G. told her about a time whe n she and G entry went out to see a dog pen whe re the y

wer e g oing to f

eed the dog s, but that Gentry fooled he r bec ause he had alr eady fed the dog s. H.G. said she sc rea med and Sue Ge ntry came out. Sue testified there was no dogpen on the prope rty , and she was equivocal as t o whether H.G. had ever scre amed a

nd draw n her outside. Ge ntr y wa nte d to c ro ss- e xami ne Rho ne a bo ut t he purp or te d s tate me nts by

H. G. to A. H. in order to impeach he r cr edibility . We note that Rhone, like Gre uner, w as privy to and testified about other stateme nts or conduct by H.G. that adver sely ref lected on H.G.' s cre dibilit y . Thus, the jury was prese nted with evidenc e that potentially impeache d H.G.' s cre dibilit y . Reviewing the totality of the testimony , we c onclude that the tr ial court did not abuse its discre tion in preclu d i n g Gentry from fu rt he r q ue sti on ingRho ne a

bo ut t he se state me nts
. AL L O W I NG S T AT E ' S E XPE RT MO O RE T O T E S T I FY Gentry also complains of the trial cour t's a llowing the State to pr esent e x pert testimony from Debor ah M o o r e . M o o r e te s ti f ie d th a t s h e w o r

k e d w it h ma le s w h o h a d

u n d e r g o n e s u rg ical proce dures to re move their prostate g lands. Moore testified that, eve n if a male could not achie ve
an er ection, a common result of the sur g ical re moval of the prostate, the inability did not preclude12

the pe rs on

fr om c omm itt ing a

se xua l a ssa

ult . G e ntr

y c la ime d h e ha d h is p ro state g land surg ic a lly
remove d, and as a

result, could not ac hieve a n ere ction. Gentry ' s complaint is that the trial court e ntere d, in J anuar y 2007, a discove ry

order requiring the State to pr ov ide Ge ntr y the name and a dd

re ss of any State e xpe rt

to b e us e d in

the tr ia l, a s w e ll as the unde rlying f

acts and data for t he experts' opinions. See T EX . R. E V ID . 705. Be fore trial, the Sta t e furnished Gentry

notices identifying the experts it would present, but did not furnish any specific fac ts or data on whic h Moore would r ely in her t est imony . The trial c ourt asked the pr os e c uto r i f Mo ore had

be e n p ro vid e d w ithany

thi ngthat ha d n ot p re vio us ly be e n f ur nis he d to defe nse counse l, and t he prosecutor said she had not. The trial c ourt overr uled Gentr

y ' s objection t o M o o r e ' s t e s t i m o n y. Gentry was allowed a running objection to Moor e' s testifying, where upon defe nse counse l questioned Moore on voir dire. Moore was a sked what fac ts or data she relie d o n in rea ching her opinions. S he said, " Twenty -five year s of ex perie nce working with sex ual offe nders who ha ve had various medica l conditions re sulting in a n inability to a chieve an ere ction." When a sked to tell what documentation she r elied on, she sa id, "I have se en medica l reports. I have r elied on sexual histories provided by

those clients and ve rified with polyg raph e x am. I think those are the two source s." The standa

rd of r eview for a trial court' s ruling on the admission of evidenc e is an a buse of discretion. Se e Ha rd

in v . S tate , 20 S.W.3 d 8 4, 88 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 00 , p e t. r e f' d) . O n th is issue, the trial cour

t stated clea

rly that its reason fo r ru l i n g as it did was that, as it understood the13

testi m o ny , Moore did not base her te stimony on materia l give n her by the State, but on her experiential knowledg e acquir ed in her work. Unde r questioning by the trial cour

t, Moore said she had not, in prepa

ration for her te stimony , revie wed medic al re cords or histories of her clients. She did say she had r eviewe d a re port g iven her by the State that was prepa

red by Rang er Womack a

nd she had r eviewe d that repor t, but her testimony

was ba sed solely

on her ow n knowledg e. Ge ntr y do e s n ot d isp ute that he wa s g ive n the Rang e r' s re po rt , alb e it in a dif fe re nt c on te xt. Moore did not testify as t o any of Gentry ' s medical recor ds, but only discussed t he g ener al medica l imp lic a tio ns of

a ra dic a l pr os tate c tomy . T he tr ia l c ourt ru le d th a t th e Sta

te ha d s ub sta

nti a lly complied with the discovery order by furnishing Gentry

with the Rang er' s repor

t. We find that Gentry had ade quate notice of what Moore revie wed. The re cord doe s not support a finding of bad fa ithon the part o f t

he State , a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a llo wi ngMo or e to t e s t i f y. DENIAL OF M OTION FOR A C ONTINUANCE When t h e trial court denied Ge ntry ' s objection to Moore' s testimony , Gentry moved for a
c on tin ua nc e , w hic h th e c ourt

de nie d. Th e tr ia l c ourt ' s r uli ngon a mo tion f or a c on tin ua nc e is revie wed f

or an a buse of discr etion. He ise lbe tz v . S tate , 906 S.W .2d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995);

see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . arts
. 2 9
. 0 3 , 2 9
. 0 6 ( 6 ) ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 6 )
. T o e s ta

b li s h an a b u s e of discretion, ther e must be a showing that the defe ndant was actua lly prejudice d by the denial of the motion. J

an e c k a v . S tate , 937 S.W .2d 456, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Moreove r, a motion for14

a continuanc e must be in writing
. De wbe rry v . S tate , 4 S.W .3d 735, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The re cord doe s not show a written motion for a continuance , and Gentry has not show n prejudice
. We find no abuse of

discretion in this reg ard. TR IA L C OU RT 'S D ISC RE TIO N T O P AR TIA LLYCL OSE C OU RT RO OM When H.G. was a

bout to take the stand, the trial court pa rtially closed the c ourtroom. The
ma tt er wa s d isc us se d at a pr e tr ia l he ari ngwh e re the c ourt state d it s in te nti on

of a llo wi ngon ly i m m e d i a t e f

a m i l y an d n e c e s s ar y p e r s o n n e l t o b e p r e s e n td u r i n g H
. G
. ' s t e s t i m o n y. Ge ntr y c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ourt ' s a c tio n in pa rt ia lly c los ingthe c ourt

ro om vio late d his Sixth Amendment rig ht to a public trial. To protec t the well-be ing of a child complaina

nt, the trial court may partially close an other

wise public trial. Faye rweather v. Moran , 749 F.Supp. 43 (D. R.I . 1990). T h e t ri al cour

t has broad disc retion to administer proc eeding s in the courtroom. S e e S t a t e e xr e l. Rosenthal v. Poe , 98 S.W .3d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). This discre tion includes the rig ht to p art ia lly

c los e the c ourt

ro om b y e xclu din g c e rt a in no ne sse nti a l pe rs on s b e c a us e of the e xtre me ly sensitive nature of the evidenc e being develope d and the youthful ag e of the witness. Mo sb yv . S tate , 703 S.W .2d 714 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.). More over, the re is a f irmly established prac tice in Texas of allowingchild victims to t estify via closed circ uit television. See Be lt v . S tate , 22 7 S.W. 3d 33 9 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 07 , n o p e t.) ; Ru iz v . S

tate , 9 3 9 S. W. 2 d

2 4 5 , 2 4 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

19 97 , n o p e t.) ; se e als o Mar y lan d v. Cra ig , 497 U.S. 836, 855 ( 1990). We find the15

trial court a cted within its discr etion in pa rtially closing the courtroom during the testimony of the child victim in thi s case . IN TR OD UC TIO N O F EX TR AN EOU S OF F EN SE The State attempted to introduce e vidence of two extraneous sexual offe nses committed by Gentry . One of

those offe nses was a

sexual offense a ll ege d l y co m m i t t ed ag ainst a two- or three

y ear -old child that occ urre d more than twe nty y ear s ag o. The trial c ourt ref used to allow evide nce of that off

ense on the basis of re moteness since the victim was only two or t h re e y ea rs o l d at the time. The other e x trane ous offe nse wa s one ag ainst L inda Marte al Kitching s when she w as about ten y ear s of ag e. The trial court allowed evidenc e of that extraneous offe nse. Ki t ch i n gs testified that, i n 1 97 8, he r par ent s were f ri e nd s w ithGe ntr

y and his wi fe a t th a t ti me . K itc hin g s sa id t hat, when she was a

bout ten y ear s old and during a time when G entry and his wife w ere baby sitti ng Kitching s, Gentry

corne red h er i n t he bathr oom of his house. He r emoved Kitching s' clothes and forc ed her to perfor m oral sex on him. Kitching s said Gentry ejac ulated. She said that, on a sec ond
occa sion, Gentry

came into a bedroom whe re she was ly ing down. Wit h his pants down, he c limbed on top of her, a chieve d an er ection, and e jaculate d. Ag a in, w e no te that th e tr ia l c ourt ' s r uli ngon the a dmi ssi on

or e xclu sio n o f e vid e nc e is revie wed for an abuse of discretion. Howeve r, as conce rns the admission of evidenc e of e x trane ous of fe ns e s, the re are lim its
. A de fe nd ant is not to be tr ie d for his g e ne ra l disp os iti on to b e a c ri min a l, but only for the spe cific a cts alleg ed in the char g ing instrument. Ab dn or v . S tate , 871 S.W .2d 726,16

73 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); see T EX . R. E V ID . 404(b). Rule 404(b) of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e
a llo ws the int

ro du cti on of e vid e nc e of e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s to pr ov e mot ive , o pp or tun ity , in te nt, prepa ration, plan, knowledg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or ac cident. T EX . R. E V ID . 404 . T his list i s not ex haustive, but illustrative. J oh ns on v . S

tate , 145 S.W .3d 215, 219 (T ex . Crim. App. 2004); 1 Steven Goode , et al., Texas Practice: Guide to the T exas Rule s of Evidence§ 404.6.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2008). I n this case, the State a dvised the trial cour t it was offe ring evidence o f t h e assault on Kitching s as evidenc e of plan, m ethod of operation, and common scheme . But whe n the trial cour t allowed the introduc tion of the evidenc e, it ba sed its ruling on Gentry ' s asser ted defe nse of medic al imp os sib ili ty . G e ntr

y ha d p ro du c e d e vid e nc e that, i n 1 99 9, he ha d h is p ro state g land sur g ic a lly
re mov e d, and the op e ratio n re nd e re d him tota lly un a ble to have an er e c tio n an d he c ou ld n ot c omm it a sexual assault. The a lleg ed assa ult on Kitchings, howe ver, oc curr ed som e t we n t y y ea rs before G e n t r y h a d h i s s u r g e r

y. We will uphold t he trial c ourt' s ruling if it is leg ally corr ect, even if the court's state d rea son for a dmitti ng the evidenc e is err oneous. Ro me ro v . S tate , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 90 ); Du

ga rd v . S tate , 688 S.W .2d 5 2 4 , 5 3 0 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on othe r gr ou nd s b yW ill iam s v . S

tate , 780 S .W .2 d 80 2, 80 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ); Ab sh irev . S tate , 62 S.W. 3d 85 7, 86 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , p e t. r e f' d) . T he State or ig ina lly pr of fe re d K itc hin g s' te sti mony un de r t he e xce pti on

to R ule 40 4( b) that a llo ws e vid e nc e of e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s to17

establish a common sche me or method of ope ration. The State pointed out tha t b o t h H. G. and Kitching s testified they wer e assaulted by Gentry while they wer e in his char g e, as i f h e was ba by sittin g the m; h e le t bo th o f t he m he lp h im " dr ive " a

ve hic le wh ile sittin g on

his la p; and bo th
c h i l dr e nw e r e o f

e l e m e n t ar

y a g e , H
. G
. s i x a n d

K i t c h i n g s t e n . K i t c h i n g s s a i d t h a tG e n t r

y a l w ays pulled her ha ir to assert c ontrol over he r whil e abusing her. H.G. said Ge ntry would hit her in the side of the head and forc e her mouth down on his sexual org an. I n addition to his defensive theor y t h at h e c o u l d

n o t h av e s ex u al l y

as s au l t edH. G. b ec au s e o f h i s p ro s t at e r em o v al , G en t ry , t h ro u gh direc t testimony , cross-e x amination, and ar g ument, implied that H.G
. was making up or fa bricating her a lleg ations. Gentry

took the stand and de nied H.G.' s ac cusations. And the de fense related or
r e f e r r e d t o nu m e r o u s s t a t e m e n t s b y H
. G
. t h a ti tc l a i m e d w e r e f a l s e an d d e s t r

u c t i v e o f h e r c r e d i b i l i t y. Gentry ' s counsel empha siz ed in his opening state ment that H.G. had be en spendinga sig nificant
a mou nt o f t ime a t the Ge ntr

y s, and sh e did no t li ke it b e c a

us e sh e wa

nte d to sp e nd

mor e tim e wi th her f ather . Counsel indicated that H.G. wanted to a void spending time with Gentry . Then c ounsel told the jury , "H ow does a man who has dedicated his life to la w enfor ceme nt e nd up acc used of a
c ri me ?
. . . A ll it tak e s is fo r one . . . littl e g ir l to sa y , some thi ng ba d ha

pp e ne d to me an d he did

it. That' s all it takes. That' s all it takes, just her word a nd his life turns upside down." A def ensive theor

y of fa brication may

open the door

to rebuttal evide nce of

extra n eous offe nses. Ba ss v . S

tate , Nos. PD-0494/95-07, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. L EXI S 859 (Tex. C rim. App. Se pt. 10 , 2 00 8) ; Mo se

s v . S tate , 105 S.W .3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Her e, it wa s at the18

ve ry le a st s ub je c t to re a so na

ble dis a g re e me nt whe ther the e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e re latin g to the assaults on Kitching s was admissible for the nonchar acte r-c onformity purpose of

re b u tting Gentry ' s defe nsive theory
. B a s s v . S t ate , 2 0 0 8 T ex. C rim. App. L EXI S 859. I n Ba ss v . S tate , the Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls held t hat evidence the defe ndant had molested two other c hildren in circumstanc es that bore some similarity to the alleg ations in the case on trial re n d ere d the extraneous evidenc e admissible to rebut the de fenda nt's theory that the child victim had fa bricated he r a lle g a tio ns and the de fe ns ive the or y that as a pa sto r, B a ss wa s not the kin d of pe rs on that w ou ld eng ag e in the cha

rg ed off ense. The extr an e o u s - o f

f e n s e e v id e n c e r e lati n g to K it c h in g s c o u ld a ls o h a v e b e e na dmi s s ib le as evidenc e of G entry ' s common scheme or method of operation, a s urg ed by the State. Both H.G . and Ki t ch i n gs t es t i fi edt h at t h e ab u s es o cc u rr edwh i l e t h ey we re i n Ge n t ry 's ca re , as a re s u l to f G en t ry 's friendship with the victims' pare nts; both victims testified t hat, whil e in Gentry ' s car e, he let them h el p h i m "dri v e" w h i l e t h ey s at o nh i s l ap , an d

H. G. s ai d

t h at , o no n e oc ca s i o n , t h i s l edt o Ge n t ry 's
se xua l a bu se ; and bo th vic tim s sai d Ge ntr

y us e d for c e a

pp lie d to the ir he a ds or ha ir to f a c ili tate his abuse. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has re cently stated, " [n] o ri gid rules dictate what
con st it ut es s uff

ici ent si mi lar it ies
. . . . " Se gu nd o v . S tate , No. AP-75,604 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 20 08 ). Th e sim ila

ri tie s h e re pla c e d th e de c isi on to a dmi t the e vid e nc e wi thi n th e zon e of re a so na ble disag ree ment, and ther efor e, within the trial cour t's discr etion.19

As noted pre viously , howeve r, the trial court' s judgme nt in this c ase indicates the statute for the of fe ns e is " 22 .0 21 (2 )( A) Pe na l Code ." Th is Court ha s th e a uth or ity to r e fo rm the jud g me nt t o make the rec ord speak the truth when the matter has been called to our attention by any s o u rc e. Fr e nc h v . S

tate , 830 S.W .2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). I n As be rry v . S tate , 8 1 3 S. W. 2 d

5 2 6 ( T e x. App.—D a ll a s 1 9 9 1 , p e t. r e f ' d ) , th e c o u rt n o te d

th a t t h e a u th o r it y o f th e a p p e ll a te c o u rt t o r e form incorre ct judg ments is not depende nt on reque st of any party ; the appellate court may act sua sponte. The Te xa s Ru le s o f

A p p e ll a te Pr o c e d

u r e p r o v id e d ir e c t a

u th o r it y f o r th is Co u rt t o mo d if

y the judgme nt of the trial cour t. T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2. We h e re by

re fo rm the jud g me nt to ind ic a te the c or re c t st a tut e fo r t

he of fe ns e : T EX . P EN AL C ODE ANN . § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (ii). As re fo rm e d, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.

Wil liam J . Cornelius J ustice* *Chief J ustice, Retired, Sitting by Assignme nt
Date Submitted: October 8, 2008 Date D ecide d: Dec ember 18, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh