[Cite as Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. of Cleveland v. Pajany, 2020-Ohio-2753.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

THIRD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 

LOAN ASSOCIATION OF CLEVELAND 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsPEROUMAL PAJANY, et al. 

 Defendants-Appellants 

JUDGES: 

Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 19 CV E 08 0440 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 30, 2020 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendants-Appellants 

ERIC T. DEIGHTON PEROUMAL PAJANY, PRO SE 

CARLISLE, MCNELLIE, RINI, EZHILARASI MUNISAMY, PRO SE 

KRAMER & ULRICH, CO., LPA 3758 Shallow Creek Drive 

24755 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 200 Powell, Ohio 43065 

Cleveland, Ohio 44112 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 2

Wise, John, P. J. 

{¶1} This matter is before the Court upon an appeal filed by Appellants Peroumal 

Pajany and Ezhilarasi Munisamy (collectively, “Pajany”) from the Delaware County Court 

of Common Pleas. Mr. Pajany challenges the trial court’s Judgment Entry issued on 

December 10, 2019 that granted Appellee, Third Federal Savings and Loan Association’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} This matter involves a foreclosure action. On August 12, 2019, Third 

Federal filed a Complaint against Mr. Pajany demanding judgment on a note and 

foreclosure of a mortgage. The Complaint sets forth Third Federal’s interest in the note 

and mortgage that encumbered real property known as 3758 Shallow Creek Drive, 

Powell, Ohio 43065. On this same date, Third Federal also filed a Preliminary Judicial 

Report which indicated Mr. Pajany executed a mortgage with Third Federal that was 

recorded in Delaware County Ohio. It also indicated the mortgage had never been 

assigned. 

{¶3} Mr. Pajany filed an Answer on September 4, 2019. The Answer contains an 

admission that as of the Complaint’s filing date the note is in default because Mr. Pajany 

made no mortgage payments since at least May 11, 2019. (Answer at ¶ 2) Thereafter, on 

September 25, 2019, Third Federal moved for summary judgment. Attached to Third 

Federal’s motion was an affidavit from Michael Morris, a legal analyst employed by Third 

Federal, who opined that Third Federal possesses the note and mortgage; all conditions 

precedent have been satisfied; the loan is in default; and that a principal balance of 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 3

$230,275.15 is due and owing Third Federal on the note and mortgage. (Morris Affidavit 

at ¶¶ 4, 5, 7) 

{¶4} Mr. Pajany filed a response to Third Federal’s summary judgment motion 

on October 4, 2019, and attached 41 pages of unauthenticated and unverified documents 

identified as “Exhibits A through O.” On October 10, 2019, Third Federal filed a Reply in 

support of its summary judgment motion and a motion seeking to strike Mr. Pajany’s 

unauthenticated exhibits. Without leave of court, on October 14, 2019, Mr. Pajany filed a 

purported sur-reply again attaching the unauthenticated exhibits. On October 29, 2019, 

Third Federal filed a Final Judicial Report. Thereafter, Mr. Pajany filed a number of 

successive sur-replies without leave of court. 

{¶5} On December 10, 2019, the trial court granted Third Federal’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Unauthenticated Exhibits. The trial court also 

noted in this same entry that Mr. Pajany lacked authority to file his sur-replies and 

indicated the sur-replies/affidavits would not be considered. On this same date, the trial 

court entered a Judgment Entry of Foreclosure. 

{¶6} Mr. Pajany timely filed a notice of appeal and sets forth the following “Issues 

by Assignment of Error” for our consideration:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶7} “I. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) IN GRANTING JUDGMENT ENTRY. 

{¶8} “II. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) IN GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE 

EXHIBITS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 

{¶9} “III. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) IN APPRAISAL AND ORDER OF SALE. 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 4

{¶10} “IV. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) IN ANALYZING THE THIRD FEDERAL 

ACCOUNT FRAUD. 

{¶11} “V. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) IN ANALYZING THE THIRD FEDERAL 

HOME INSURANCE FRAUD. 

{¶12} “VI. COURT ERRORED (SIC) IN ANALYZING THE EXHIBITS A 

THROUGH O. 

{¶13} “VII. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) TO ANALYZE MICAHEL G. MORRIS 

(SIC) FALSE AND FRAUDULENT AFFIDAVIT (PERJURY). 

{¶14} “VIII. THE COURT ERRORED (SIC) TO ANALYZE THIRD FEDERAL 

RESPA VIOLATIONS. 

{¶15} “IX. ERROR IN THIRD FEDERAL (SIC) FALSE FORECLOSURE CASE 

AND ITS IMPACT ON OUR FAMILY.”

ANALYSIS

{¶16} For the ease of addressing Mr. Pajany’s nine assignments of error, those 

assigned errors that assert the same or similar arguments will be addressed 

simultaneously. It also appears the “Issues by Assignments of Errors” do not align as the 

arguments are presented in Mr. Pajany’s brief so the assigned errors will also be 

addressed out of order. 

A. Applicable standards of review 

{¶17} With regard to review of the trial court’s summary judgment decision, this 

Court applies a de novo standard of review and reviews the evidence in the same manner 

as the trial court. Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 

(1987). We will not give any deference to the trial court’s decision. Brown v. Scioto Cty. 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 5

Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993). Under Civ.R. 

56, a trial court may grant summary judgment if it determines: (1) no genuine issues as 

to any material fact remain to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to 

but one conclusion and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against 

whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. 

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). 

{¶18} The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating 

no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 

S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 

264 (1996), the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the applicable summary judgment standard: 

[A] party seeking summary judgment, on the grounds that the 

nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing 

the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of 

the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 

on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party’s claims. The moving 

party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making 

a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove 

its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to some 

evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates 

that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for 

summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving party has 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 6

satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden 

outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary 

judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party. 

{¶19} (Emphasis sic.)

{¶20} Finally, the record on summary judgment must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Citation omitted.) Williams v. First United 

Church of Christ, 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 151, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974). 

{¶21} With regard to the trial court’s decision to strike Mr. Pajany’s Exhibits A 

through O, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. State ex rel. Ebbing v. 

Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d 339, 2012-Ohio-4699, 978 N.E.2d 188, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. 

Dawson v. Bloom–Carroll Loc. School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 

N.E.2d 524, ¶ 23. A court's ruling on a motion to strike will be not reversed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 

Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509, 824 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 10. A decision constitutes an abuse 

of discretion when it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. (Citation omitted.) 

State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 130 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-5350, 957 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 11. 

{¶22} With these applicable standards, we proceed to address Mr. Pajany’s 

assignments of error. 

II, VI, VII

{¶23} We will address Mr. Pajany’s Second, Sixth, and Seventh Assignments of 

Error simultaneously as they challenge the trial court’s decision to strike Mr. Pajany’s 

Exhibits A through O that he filed in support of his response to Third Federal’s Motion for 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 7

Summary Judgment. After the trial court struck the exhibits, Mr. Pajany alleges he 

subsequently filed Civ.R. 56(C) evidence. He further maintains the trial court judge 

intentionally struck these exhibits “to cover up Third Federal’s fraudulent, deceptive, 

unfair, and unethical practices and violations.” (Appellants’ Brief at 14) Assignments of 

Error Two and Seven also challenge the validity of Mr. Morris’s affidavit. 

{¶24} Mr. Pajany suggests he should be granted leniency because he is not an 

attorney and he “responded to all Third Federal motions by calling the court for 

clarification and direction.” (Appellants’ Brief at 13) The Ohio Supreme Court stated in 

State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 N.E.2d 376, ¶ 5 

that “pro se litigants* * * must follow the same procedures as litigants represented by 

counsel.” (Citation omitted.) In St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hoyt, 4th Dist. Washington No. 

04CA20, 2005–Ohio–480, the Fourth District Court of Appeals expanded on this concept 

noting: 

[T]he pro se litigant is to be treated the same as one trained in the 

law as far as the requirement to follow procedural law and the adherence to 

court rules. If the courts treat pro se litigants differently, the court begins to 

depart from its duty of impartiality and prejudices the handling of the case 

as it relates to other litigants represented by counsel. 

{¶25} Id. at ¶ 27, quoting Justice v. Lutheran Social Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

92AP–1153, 1993 WL 112497, *2 (Apr. 8, 1993). 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 8

{¶26} Thus, Mr. Pajany was under the same obligation, as any attorney would be, 

to comply with the mandates of Civ.R. 56(C).1 However, the trial court found Mr. Pajany’s 

Exhibits A through O were “inadmissible, unauthenticated, and, unsupported by a suitable 

affidavit[.]” (Judgment Entry, Dec. 10, 2019, at 5) These exhibits consisted of: payment 

information with HUD (Exhibit A); insurance fraud (Exhibit B); government agencies 

response to Third Federal scam (Exhibit C); Third Federal gang’s murder attack (Exhibit 

D); Donald R. Kenney’s gangsters and beer-guy claiming home (Exhibit E); Donald R. 

Kenney and Brad Terman frauds (Exhibit F); CFPB system restriction (Exhibit G); Third 

Federal’s false report to the government (Exhibit H); Pajany responses to Third Federal 

(Exhibit I); Ezhilarasi Munisamy health condition (Exhibit J); obstruction of justice (Exhibit 

K); account missing in the IRS (Exhibit L); Capgemini federal cases (Exhibit M); August 

2018 through April 30, 2019 payment (Exhibit N); and Third Federal murder attempt 

(Exhibit O). (Appellants’ Brief at 15-16). 

{¶27} Civ.R. 56(C) identifies the type of evidence that may be considered by the 

trial court for purposes of summary judgment motions. This evidence includes, “pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 

evidence, and written stipulations of fact.” In fact, the rule further provides: “No evidence 

or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.” See Green v. B.F. Goodrich 

Co., 85 Ohio App.3d 223, 227, 619 N.E.2d 497 (9th Dist.1993). 

 

1 Mr. Pajany also failed to follow this Court’s Loc.App.R. 9(B) and instead filed a brief that 

exceeds 30 pages, without leave of this Court. He also did not comply with App.R. 

16(A)(7) by failing to set forth an argument with respect to each assignment of error “and 

the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 

parts of the record on which” he relies. Nonetheless, the Court will address the arguments 

presented in Mr. Pajany’s brief. 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 9

{¶28} This Court has previously held that uncertified documents need to be 

attached to an affidavit in order to be considered at the summary judgment stage. 

Hmeidan v. Muheisen, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00069, 2017-Ohio-7670, ¶ 32, citing

State ex rel. Corrigan v. Seminatore, 66 Ohio St.2d 459, 467, 423 N.E.2d 105 (1981). 

Further, the proper manner for introducing evidentiary material not specifically authorized 

by Civ.R. 56(C) is to incorporate the material by reference into a properly framed affidavit. 

Worldwide Asset Purchasing, L.L.C. v. Sandoval, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007-CA-00159, 

2008-Ohio-6343, ¶ 23. Sworn or certified copies of all papers filed in support of or in 

opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be accompanied by an affidavit 

swearing that the matters contained within the document were made on the affiant’s 

personal knowledge. Id. at ¶ 24.The failure to authenticate a document submitted on 

summary judgment renders the document void of evidentiary value. Id. 

{¶29} Here, Mr. Pajany’s Exhibits A through O were not evidentiary material 

recognized under Civ.R. 56(C). Therefore, these exhibits needed to be incorporated and 

authenticated in a proper affidavit. However, they were not and the trial court therefore 

did not abuse its discretion in striking Mr. Pajany’s Exhibits A through O. In an attempt to 

correct his failure to comply with Civ.R. 56, Mr. Pajany filed numerous, consecutive surreply briefs without leave of court. This Court has previously held that a non-movant in a 

summary judgment proceeding must seek leave of court before filing a sur-reply. Edwards 

v. Perry Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00107, 2016-Ohio-5125, ¶ 10 

citing Bank of New York Mellon v. Crates, 5th Dist. Licking No. 15-CA-70, 2016-Ohio2700, ¶ 22. Mr. Pajany never sought leave of court to file his numerous sur-replies. As 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 10

such, the trial court was under no obligation to consider these sur-replies in ruling on Third 

Federal’s summary judgment motion. 

{¶30} With regard to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, in his Second 

Assignment of Error, Mr. Pajany contends Third Federal “started a false and wrong 

foreclosure case with the false and fraudulent July 12, 2019 default notice to cover up its 

violations and crimes.” (Appellants’ Brief at 15) Mr. Pajany claims his mortgage was 

current as of May 11, 2019, and the amount of default alleged by Third Federal, 

$29,403.38, is a false and fabricated amount. (Id. at 14.) Mr. Pajany also asserts that Mr. 

Morris’s affidavit is “false” and “fraudulent” and that Mr. Morris committed perjury (Id. at 

14-15) Finally, Mr. Pajany contends Third Federal committed account fraud and insurance 

fraud and violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). (Id. at 15). 

[T]o properly support a motion for summary judgment in a foreclosure 

action, a plaintiff must present evidentiary-quality materials showing: (1) the 

movant is the holder of the note and mortgage, or is a party entitled to 

enforce the instrument; (2) if the movant is not the original mortgagee, the 

chain of assignments and transfers; (3) all conditions precedent have been 

met; (4) the mortgagor is in default; and (5) the amount of principal and 

interest due. 

{¶31} Wachovia Bank of Delaware, N.A. v. Jackson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010-CA00291, 2011-Ohio-3203, ¶¶ 40-45. 

{¶32} Here, Third Federal satisfied these requirements with the Civ.R. 56(C) 

evidence it submitted in support of its summary judgment motion. This evidence included 

the affidavit of Mr. Morris, the pleadings and the Preliminary and Final Judicial Reports. 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 11

This evidence establishes Third Federal is the holder of the note (Morris Affidavit at ¶¶ 3, 

4). Third Federal is also the holder of the mortgage. (See Preliminary and Final Judicial 

Reports and Morris Affidavit at ¶ 3.) These reports are the evidence or record title required 

by R.C. 2329.191 and Delaware County Loc.R. 38.01. Further, Mr. Pajany is in default on 

the note by failing to make payments. (Morris Affidavit at ¶ 6) All conditions precedent 

have been satisfied and the notice of default was mailed by first class mail to Mr. Pajany 

on June 12, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 5) Mr. Morris established the amount due and owing Third

Federal is the principal sum of $230,275.15 plus interest at the rate of 2.79% from August 

1, 2018, along with advances. (Morris Affidavit at ¶ 7) 

{¶33} Based on this evidence, the trial court did not err when it granted Third 

Federal’s summary judgment motion. Third Federal’s evidence in support of its summary 

judgment motion satisfies the evidentiary quality materials required to obtain summary 

judgment in a foreclosure action. Mr. Morris’s affidavit and the accompanying documents 

and pleadings established no genuine issue of material fact exists, shifting the burden to 

Mr. Pajany to supply specific facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial. See 

Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. We acknowledge the fact that Mr. Pajany 

attempted to do so by filing Exhibits A through O with his Response to Third Federal’s 

summary judgment motion. However, for the reasons discussed above, the trial court 

properly struck these exhibits and did not consider them in addressing Third Federal’s 

motion. 

{¶34} Mr. Pajany also attacks the validity of Mr. Morris’s affidavit in both his 

Second and Seventh Assignments of Error. In his Seventh Assignment of Error, Mr. 

Pajany claims the statements made by Mr. Morris, in his affidavit, are “false and 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 12

fabricated” and Mr. Pajany again asserts that Mr. Morris committed perjury. However, the 

affidavit is properly notarized. Mr. Morris opines that he is familiar with and has access to 

the records and the records were made or maintained in the regular and usual course of 

business. (Id. at ¶¶ 1,2) Mr. Morris also indicates the records were made at or near the 

time by, or from information from, a person with knowledge of the transactions. (Id. at ¶ 

2) Mr. Morris’s affidavit demonstrates Mr. Pajany is in default on the note and that all 

conditions precedent have been satisfied. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6) Finally, Mr. Morris indicates the 

amount of principal and interest due and owing. (Id. at ¶ 7) 

{¶35} Further, the trial court specifically found that Mr. Morris’s affidavit is 

“sufficient under Ohio law.” (Judgment Entry, Dec. 10, 2019, at 9) The trial court also 

determined Mr. Morris’s affidavit is a proper business records exception to the general 

hearsay rule. (Id. at 8). Evid.R. 803(6) provides that records of regularly conducted 

business activity are admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, if shown to be such 

“by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.” Further, this Court explained 

in Nationstar Mortg., L.L.C. v. Williams, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 14 CAE 04 0029, 2014-

Ohio-4553, ¶ 15, the question of who may lay a foundation for the admissibility of business 

records as a custodian or other qualified witness must be answered broadly. “It is not a 

requirement that the witness have firsthand knowledge of the transaction giving rise to 

the business record. (Citation omitted.) Id. 

Rather, it must be demonstrated that: the witness is sufficiently 

familiar with the operation of the business and with the circumstances of the 

record’s preparation, maintenance and retrieval, that he can reasonably 

testify on the basis of this knowledge that the record is what it purports to 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 13

be, and that it was made in the ordinary course of business consistent with 

the elements of Rule 803(6). 

{¶36} Id., quoting Citimortgage, Inc. v. Cathcart, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2013CA00179, 2014-Ohio-620, ¶ 28. 

{¶37} We do not find Mr. Morris’s affidavit to be perjured testimony. Mr. Morris is 

employed as a legal analyst for Third Federal and he possesses sufficient knowledge 

regarding how Third Federal’s business records are created and maintained. (Morris 

Affidavit at ¶¶ 1, 2, 3) Mr. Morris further averred the statements made in his affidavit were 

based on his personal knowledge and his review of Third Federal’s business records as 

it pertains to the note, mortgage, master mortgage, notice of default, and the loan 

payment history. (Id.) This Court has previously determined that such affidavits are 

sufficient to qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Evid.R. 803(6), as business 

documents. See Nationstar Mortg. at ¶ 18, citing OneWest Bank, FSB v. Albert, 5th Dist. 

Stark No. 2013CA00180, 2014-Ohio-2158 and Citimortgage, Inc. at ¶ 29. 

{¶38} Finally, Mr. Pajany’s Sixth Assignment of Error alleges the trial court erred 

in analyzing Exhibits A though O. We have reviewed Mr. Pajany’s brief and there is no 

separate argument set forth in the brief as to this particular assignment of error. For that 

reason, we have included this assignment of error in our discussion of Assignment of 

Error Two and based on the reasons explained in response to Mr. Pajany’s Second 

Assignment of Error, we find the trial court properly analyzed Exhibits A through O. 

{¶39} Mr. Pajany’s Second, Sixth, and Seventh Assignments of Error are 

overruled.

I
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 14

{¶40} In his First Assignment of Error, Mr. Pajany argues the trial court’s 

Judgment Entry is “improper and wrong.” (Appellants’ Brief at 12) He bases this argument 

on the fact that there was no general verdict by a jury, no decision announced, and no 

determination of a reasonable payment option. Mr. Pajany also maintains discovery was 

not open and he did not see the trial court judge. He further asserts that his account was 

current as of May 11, 2019, that payments were made for August, September, and 

October of 2018, and he allegedly had a “zero payment arrangement” from November 

2018 through April 30, 2019 because of the EEOC case. (Appellants’ Brief at 12-13) 

{¶41} As discussed above, Mr. Pajany did not properly submit his Civ.R. 56 

evidence for consideration by the trial court and the court properly struck this evidence. 

Once that occurred, the only evidence rebutting Third Federal’s summary judgment 

motion were the allegations contained in his Answer and Response to the summary 

judgment motion. These allegations lacked any evidentiary support as required by Civ.R. 

56(C). As such, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Third 

Federal since Mr. Pajany produced no evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact 

for trial. 

{¶42} Mr. Pajany’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.

IV, V, VIII

{¶43} We will address Mr. Pajany’s Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Assignments of Error 

collectively. In his Fourth Assignment of Error Mr. Pajany alleges the trial court erred in 

analyzing Third Federal’s account fraud. In his Fifth Assignment of Error, Mr. Pajany 

contends the trial court erred in analyzing Third Federal’s home insurance fraud. Mr. 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 15

Pajany’s Eighth Assignment of Error claims the trial court erred in analyzing Third 

Federal’s RESPA violations. 

{¶44} The trial court addressed these allegations contained in Mr. Pajany’s 

Answer as affirmative defenses. (Judgment Entry, Dec. 10, 2019, at 2) With regard to his 

affirmative defense of account fraud, Mr. Pajany states he was current on his loan 

payments and Third Federal falsely issued a default notice on June 12, 2019, stating he 

did not make any mortgage payments since August of 2018. (Appellants’ Brief at 17) Mr. 

Pajany maintains this notice was false and fraudulent. (Id.) Mr. Pajany references Exhibits 

A, N, and A12 in support of his account fraud arguments. However, these exhibits were 

properly stricken. Therefore, Mr. Pajany has no evidence to support his affirmative 

defense of account fraud. 

{¶45} Mr. Pajany’s Fifth Assignment of Error concerned an affirmative defense of 

insurance fraud. This defense addressed the fact that Third Federal was aware of 

insurance cancellation on his residence, but Third Federal failed to notify him or inform 

him that someone else was paying his home insurance from November 2018 through July 

15, 2019. (Id. at 18). Mr. Pajany cites Exhibit B in support of this argument. Again, this 

exhibit was properly stricken by the trial court. Thus, Mr. Pajany has no evidence to 

support this affirmative defense. Further, we do not see how this defense impacts the 

foreclosure action filed against Mr. Pajany. 

{¶46} In his Eighth Assignment of Error, Mr. Pajany contends the trial court erred 

when it analyzed Third Federal’s RESPA violations. Mr. Pajany’s RESPA violations are 

allegedly based on: (1) Third Federal’s account fraud; (2) Third Federal’s home insurance 

fraud; and (3) Third Federal’s failure to act in good faith. (Id. at 30) In support of these 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 16

defenses, Mr. Pajany makes a number of unsupported allegations against Third Federal 

and extensively discusses how Third Federal’s conduct impacted his family. (Id. at 30-31) 

None of these allegations are supported by any evidence. Therefore, the trial court 

properly granted summary judgment finding no merit as to this affirmative defense. 

{¶47} Mr. Pajany’s Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Assignments of Error are overruled.

III

{¶48} Mr. Pajany makes a single sentence argument in support of his Third 

Assignment of Error maintaining “there were errors in the Judgment Entry, Judgment 

Summary, and Motion to Strike, Judge ordered the Delaware Sheriff to appraise and sell 

my home is wrong.” (Id. at 16) Mr. Pajany appears to be challenging the trial court’s

appraisal and Order of Sale. 

{¶49} Mr. Pajany has not sufficiently briefed or argued this issue for us to address 

it. See Chem. Bank of New York v. Neman, 52 Ohio St.3d 204, 207, 556 N.E.2d 490 

(1990). We do not know on what basis Mr. Pajany challenges the Order of Sale and Order 

of Appraisal. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires a brief to contain “the contentions of the appellant 

with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support 

of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on 

which appellant relies.” Mr. Pajany’s argument on page 16 of his brief fails to satisfy 

App.R. 16(A)(7) and the Court has no basis upon which to consider and address this 

assignment of error. 

{¶50} Mr. Pajany’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.

 
Delaware County, Case No. 19 CAE 12 0072 17

IX

{¶51} Mr. Pajany asserts in his Ninth Assignment of Error that Third Federal had 

a false foreclosure case and it negatively impacted his family. As discussed above, we 

concluded based on a de novo review of the record the trial court properly granted Third 

Federal’s summary judgment motion foreclosing on the property. Mr. Pajany has no 

evidence in the record evidencing otherwise. Further, the Court acknowledges the impact 

the foreclosure action had upon Mr. Pajany’s family, but there is nothing in the trial court’s 

record to indicate this matter was handled improperly. 

{¶52} Mr. Pajany’s Ninth Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶53} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 

Delaware County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

By: Wise, John, P. J. 

Baldwin, J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur. 

JWW/d 0427