NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

JOY RILEY, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

RANDY RILEY, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0398 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2016-093883

The Honorable Laura M. Reckart, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Fromm Smith & Gadow, PC, Phoenix

By Kathleen Stillman 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Randy Riley, Gilbert

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 6-19-2018
RILEY v. RILEY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Randy Riley (“Father”) appeals from the decree of dissolution 

ending his marriage to Joy Riley (“Mother”). For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father were married for nine years and have two 

children together. In 2016, Mother petitioned for dissolution of their

marriage. Following a half-day trial, the superior court entered a decree. 

As relevant here, the decree directed Father to pay child support of $535 per 

month. The decree also awarded Father the marital home, directing him to 

refinance by September 2017 and, if unsuccessful, to sell the home and 

divide the proceeds equally with Mother. The decree further provided for 

the division of community property and debt. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Child Support

¶3 Father argues the superior court erred in calculating child 

support. Specifically, he contends the court improperly attributed monthly 

childcare costs of $480 to Mother in completing the child support worksheet

even though Mother was not exclusively responsible for that cost and it 

would “end with the new school year.” We will not disturb an award of 

child support absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Robinson & 

Thiel, 201 Ariz. 328, 331, ¶ 5 (App. 2001).

¶4 The record supports the superior court’s inclusion of 

childcare costs on the child support worksheet. Mother offered into 

evidence six checks made out to Dawn Spier, with a notation of “preschool”

dating from August 2016 through January 2017. Four of the checks were 

for $480, the amount reflected on the worksheet. The checks were drawn 

on a bank account reflecting Mother’s name only. At trial, Mother testified 

that these checks were for schooling and aftercare. Father did not rebut this 
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evidence and therefore the record supports the court’s decision to attribute 

monthly childcare costs of $480 to Mother. 

B. The Marital Home

¶5 Father next argues the superior court abused its discretion by 

failing to determine a valuation date for the marital home. We review a 

court’s determination of a valuation date for an abuse of discretion. See 

Sample v. Sample, 152 Ariz. 239, 242-43 (App. 1986) (“[T]he selection of a 

valuation date rests within the wide discretion of the trial court and will be 

tested on review by the fairness of the result.”).

¶6 Per Father’s request, the superior court awarded the marital 

home to him with the following conditions:

IT IS ORDERED awarding the residence to Father and 

directing him to refinance the residence by no later than 

September 1, 2017. Within thirty days of the home being 

refinanced, Father shall pay to Mother her equal share of the 

equity in the home. If Father is unable to refinance by 

September 1, 2017, absent an extension being granted by this 

Court for good cause, Father shall then place the home up for 

sale and the proceeds equally divided between the parties.

We know from Father’s motion to stay, filed with this court, that Father did 

not refinance the home by September 1, 2017, and that Mother sought to 

enforce the sale of the home as provided in the decree.

¶7 “The meaning of a decree is to be determined from the 

language used.” Stine v. Stine, 179 Ariz. 385, 388 (App. 1994). Here, the 

decree provided that if Father was unable to refinance the home by

September 1, 2017, then he was obligated to “place the home up for sale” 

and divide the proceeds equally between the parties.1 Father asserts “there 

is a genuine dispute between the [p]arties” as to the value of the marital 

home and the superior court abused its discretion by “not identifying the 

 

1 Father offered no evidence that any increase in the home’s value was 

due to anything other than market forces. The superior court determined 

the equity in the home belonged to the marital community and both parties 

were entitled to share in the home’s appreciation. Although Father argues 

that Mother has not contributed to the mortgage payments since moving 

from the home, he fails to acknowledge he has continued to live in and 

enjoy the benefits of the home, while Mother has not. 
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value of the residence, which could have been done in Post Evidentiary 

Hearing.” Because Father did not refinance the home, a determination of 

the home’s value on any given date is moot. Pursuant to the decree, the 

home’s value will necessarily be established through its sales price. At 

closing, the proceeds will be applied first to cover outstanding indebtedness 

against the home, with the remaining proceeds to be divided equally 

between Mother and Father. 

¶8 We find no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s

treatment of the marital home.

C. Property Division

¶9 Father next argues there was a “very noticeable assignment of 

debts and assets which were not balanced, equitable, or proportionate.” As 

noted by Father, the superior court assigned him approximately $12,800 

more debt than it assigned to Mother; however, he fails to counter Mother’s 

argument that he received a greater share of the couple’s personal property. 

¶10 Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 25-

318(A), the superior court must divide all community property in a 

dissolution proceeding “equitably, though not necessarily in kind.” “The 

statute requires a substantially equal distribution of community assets in 

the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary.” Kelly v. Kelly, 198 Ariz. 

307, 309, ¶ 7 (2000). An equitable division “is a concept of fairness 

dependent upon the facts of particular cases.” Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 

221 (1997). We review the court’s apportionment of community property 

for an abuse of discretion. See Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 107, ¶ 2 (App. 

2005).

¶11 Father makes only general assertions in his opening brief 

about the superior court’s overall division of community assets and debts, 

and his reply brief fails to address Mother’s point that he received personal 

property worth “substantially more” than what she received. In their 

pretrial statements, each party included proposed lists of how the personal 

property division should be divided. Father indicated he was “not nearly 

as concerned with this division” as Mother, and “tried to be as generous as 

possible, but no agreement can be reached.” At trial, Husband confirmed 

he was not asking the court to value the personal property, and no other 

testimony was offered by either party as to how that property should be 

divided. The court ultimately adopted Father’s Exhibit D from his pretrial 

statement, which included his proposed division of the personal property

along with the estimated value of each item. But many of the values had 
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been crossed out, presumably by Father; some were replaced with different, 

handwritten values while many were now listed with no value. For 

example, the original values of the two vehicles, indicating that Mother’s 

Toyota van was “$2,000 upside down” and Father’s Toyota Truck was 

$5,000, were both crossed out. On this record, there is nothing to support 

Father’s assertion that the division of assets and debts was not equitable. 

Thus, we find no abuse of discretion.2

CONCLUSION

¶12 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree of dissolution. 

Mother requests attorneys’ fees on appeal. In the exercise of our discretion, 

we deny Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 25-324(A). As the successful party on appeal, Mother is entitled 

to taxable costs upon her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 21. 

 

2 Father also suggests the superior court made an unequal division of 

property in lieu of spousal maintenance. See In re Marriage of Foster, 125 

Ariz. 208, 210-11 (App. 1980) (A court may not award one party a 

substantially greater share of the community assets as a substitute for 

spousal maintenance). In the decree, the court initially stated that Mother 

was asking for spousal maintenance. However, the court later clarified that 

although Mother originally sought spousal maintenance, she ultimately 

withdrew her request. Thus, the court did not award spousal maintenance. 

Moreover, Father has not identified any evidence in the record supporting 

his assertion that the court’s allocation of community assets and debts was 

affected by Mother’s withdrawn request for spousal maintenance.