Children Waited for 

Extended Periods in 

Vehicles to Be Reunified 

with Their Parents 

at ICE’s Port Isabel 

Detention Center in July 

2018 

August 19, 2020 

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DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

Children Waited for Extended Periods in 

Vehicles to Be Reunified with Their Parents 

at ICE’s Port Isabel Detention Center in July 2018 

August 19, 2020 

Why We Did 

This Special 

Review 

We conducted this review to 

determine whether children 

were held in vehicles at the 

Port Isabel Detention Center 

(Port Isabel) for extended 

periods before being 

reunited with their parents 

in July 2018. We undertook 

this review after receiving 

two congressional requests 

in response to a news report 

that children who arrived at 

Port Isabel on the afternoon 

of July 15 waited as long as 

39 hours to be reunified 

with their parents, with 

most children spending at 

least 1 night in vans outside 

the facility. 

What We 

Recommend 

This report contains no 

recommendations. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

We confirmed that children brought to Port Isabel on July 

15, 2018 waited extended periods, and in many cases 

overnight, to be reunited with their parents. 

On this first day of attempted mass reunifications, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not 

prepared to promptly reunify all children who arrived at 

Port Isabel. ICE and the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services had fundamentally different 

understandings about the timing and pace of 

reunifications, and ICE personnel at Port Isabel 

underestimated the resources necessary to promptly outprocess the parents of arriving children. As a result, 

some children waited in vehicles at Port Isabel, while 

others waited in unused detention cells, though all 

children were in climate-controlled environments and had 

continuous access to food, water, and restrooms. 

As the mass reunifications continued in the following 

days, ICE personnel responded to processing and space 

issues, which generally resulted in shorter wait times for 

children. 

ICE Response 

ICE acknowledged our findings and said it “remains 

committed to ensuring the appropriate care of all 

individuals in its custody.” 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 2 

Results of Review ............................................................................................ 4 

Children Who Arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 Had Prolonged 

Waits to be Reunited with Their Parents ................................................ 5 

ICE Was Not Prepared to Promptly Reunify All Children Who Arrived at 

Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 .................................................................. 6 

Children Waited in Vehicles, but Had Access to ICE Facilities .............. 10 

ICE Responded to Processing and Space Issues ................................... 11 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 13 

Appendix B: ICE Comments to the Draft Report ................................... 18 

Appendix C:Report Distribution .......................................................... 20 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

FOD Field Office Director 

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

ORR Office of Refugee Resettlement 

SDDO Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer 

UAC Unaccompanied Alien Child(ren) 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

On May 5, 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security adopted the 

Administration’s Zero Tolerance Policy1 department-wide and began referring 

parents caught entering the United States illegally with their children for 

criminal prosecution. Because children could not be held in criminal custody 

with their parents, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) separated the 

parents and children, and transferred the children to the care and custody of 

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Refugee 

Resettlement (ORR).2 

On June 20, 2018, the Administration reversed course, ordering that alien 

families should be detained together unless child welfare concerns weighed 

against maintaining family unity.3 Six days later, on June 26, 2018, a Federal 

court ordered the Government to reunify separated parents and children. The 

court ordered the Government to reunify children under 5 years old with their 

parents within 14 days, and the remaining older children within 30 days.4 

HHS’ Incident Management Team coordinated and led the Government’s crossagency effort to comply with this order. Several agencies such as the U.S. 

Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of State, and CBP contributed to 

these efforts, but HHS worked most closely with U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is responsible for detaining certain adult 

aliens with pending immigration proceedings and removing aliens who receive 

final removal orders. 

1 On April 6, 2018, the U.S. Attorney General issued a memorandum directing all Federal 

prosecutors’ offices along the Southwest Border to work with DHS to adopt a Zero Tolerance 

Policy, which required criminal prosecution of DHS referrals of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) violations, to 

the extent practicable. See Dept. of Justice, Memorandum for Federal Prosecutors Along the 

Southwest Border, April 6, 2018. 

2 Upon separation from their parents, the children were deemed unaccompanied alien children 

(UAC), who are children under 18 years of age with no lawful immigration status in the United 

States who do not have a parent or legal guardian in the United States “available” to provide 

care and physical custody for them. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). DHS must transfer UACs to HHS 

within 72 hours unless there are “exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3). There are 

special requirements for UACs from Mexico and Canada that may permit a different process, 8 

U.S.C. § 1232(a)(2)(A), but if those requirements are not met, DHS must follow the same 

process established for UACs from other countries. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(3). 

3 Exec. Order No. 13841, Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separations, 

was announced and became effective on June 20, 2018, and was published in the Federal 

Register at 83 FR 29,435 on June 25, 2018. 

4 Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Ms. L. v. ICE), 18-cv-428 (S.D. Cal. June 

26, 2018). The court’s order covered “[a]ll adult parents who enter the United States at or 

between designated ports of entry who (1) have been, are, or will be detained in immigration 

custody by the DHS, and (2) have a minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS 

and detained in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody absent a determination that 

the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child.” 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

To reunify the separated families, HHS, ICE, and CBP first needed to identify 

which parents and children had been separated and were eligible for 

reunification under the court order. As detailed in prior DHS Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) reports, CBP did not always accurately or consistently 

record or track families that it separated as a result of the Zero Tolerance 

Policy.5 Consequently, following the court order, the agencies undertook a 

time-consuming and largely manual process of cross-checking DHS and HHS 

data to determine which UACs had been separated and the identity and 

location of their parents. 

As this process unfolded, the agencies also started reunifying children younger 

than age 5 pursuant to the court’s bifurcated timeline. For this stage, often 

referred to as “Phase 1,” ICE transported parents to ORR shelters across the 

country for reunification with their children. On July 12, 2018, 2 days after 

the Phase 1 deadline, the Government claimed it had completed its Phase 1 

obligation by reuniting 57 children younger than age 5 with their parents.6 

It was only after the Phase 1 reunifications were complete that the Government 

started reuniting most children aged 5 to 17 in “Phase 2.” Unlike Phase 1, the 

agencies planned that Phase 2 reunifications would occur at certain ICE 

facilities designated for reunifications. Some parents were already detained in 

these facilities, but for those parents held at other ICE facilities, ICE planned to 

transport the parents to the designated centers for reunification. ORR would 

then transport children to the designated centers and maintain custody of the 

children until ICE processed their parents for release. At that point, ORR 

would transfer custody of the children to ICE, which in short order would sign 

custody over to their parents, reunite the families, and arrange transportation 

for them out of the facility. 

Although the Government expected there could be as many as 2,551 Phase 2 

reunifications  nearly 50 times as many as Phase 1  children aged 5 to 17 

did not start arriving en masse at the reunification centers until July 15, 2018, 

only 11 days before the close of the court’s 30-day deadline. On August 2, 

2018, the day the Government first updated the court after the Phase 2 

5 Special Review - Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero 

Tolerance Policy, OIG-18-84, September 2018; DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully 

Account for Separated Migrant Families, OIG-20-06, November 2019 

6 See DHS Press Release, Trump Administration Completes Reunification for Eligible Children 

Under Age 5 (July 12, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/07/12/trump-administrationcompletes-reunification-eligible-children-under-age-5. Later that same day, the Government 

reported to the court that it had reunified one additional child under 5 years old. It also 

reported that parents of an additional 44 Phase 1 children either could not be reunited at that 

time (e.g., because they were in criminal custody or had been removed from the country) or 

were no longer eligible for reunification because of concerns about parentage, health, or safety 

of the children. See Ms. L. v. ICE, 18-cv-428 (S.D. Cal. July 12, 2018). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

deadline, the Government reported that it had reunited or otherwise 

appropriately discharged 1,979 children ages 5 to 17.7 

Almost 1 year later, on June 3, 2019, NBC News reported that children who 

arrived at one of ICE’s designated reunification centers — the Port Isabel 

Detention Center (Port Isabel) — on the afternoon of July 15, 2018, waited as 

long as 39 hours to be reunified with their parents, with most children 

spending at least 1 night in vans outside the facility.8 In light of this report 

and two congressional requests,9 DHS OIG reviewed the circumstances of the 

July 2018 reunifications at Port Isabel, particularly for children who arrived at 

the facility on July 15, 2018. This report does not address the efforts to 

reunify separated families at other ICE facilities, or the agencies’ overall effort 

to comply with the court order. 

Results of Review 

DHS OIG confirmed that, as reported in the NBC News story, children brought 

to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, waited extended periods — and in many cases 

overnight — to be reunited with their parents. On this first day of attempted 

mass reunifications, ICE was not prepared to promptly reunify all children who 

arrived at Port Isabel. ICE and HHS had fundamentally different 

understandings about the timing and pace of reunifications, and ICE personnel 

at Port Isabel10 underestimated the resources necessary to promptly outprocess the parents of arriving children. As a result, some children waited in 

vehicles at Port Isabel, while others waited in unused detention cells, though 

all children were in climate-controlled environments and had continuous 

access to food, water, and restrooms. As the mass reunifications continued in 

the following days, ICE personnel responded to processing and space issues, 

which generally resulted in shorter wait times for children who arrived at Port 

Isabel closer to the court’s deadline. 

7 This category also includes children released to another family member or sponsor, and 

children who turned 18. The Government also reported that an additional 572 children 

remained in ORR care because the associated adult was either not originally eligible for 

reunification or was not available for discharge. Supp. to Joint Status Report, at 1-2, Ms. L. v. 

ICE, 18-cv-428 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 

8 Jacob Soboroff and Julia Ainsley, “Botched family reunifications left migrant children waiting 

in vans overnight,” NBC News, June 3, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration 

/botched-family-reunifications-left-migrant-children-waiting-vans-overnight-n1013336. 9 Correspondence from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Homeland Security to Acting Inspector General, John V. Kelly, June 4, 2019; 

Correspondence from Kim Schrier, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives to John 

V. Kelly, June 5, 2019 

10 Hereinafter, when this report attributes actions to “Port Isabel,” it refers to ICE personnel at 

Port Isabel, as opposed to ICE staff at the field office or headquarters level. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Children Who Arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 Had 

Prolonged Waits to be Reunited with Their Parents 

DHS OIG confirmed that dozens of children who arrived at ICE’s Port Isabel 

facility on July 15, 2018 waited for extended periods with HHS contractors11 — 

many overnight — to be reunited with their parents. Although neither ICE nor 

HHS had complete, reliable records of children’s arrival or reunification times, 

we found that 75 children arrived at Port Isabel between 2:15 p.m. and 4:00 

p.m. on July 15. The available evidence shows the first child was reunited at 

approximately 1:40 a.m. on July 16, and children continued to be reunited 

throughout that day. All children waited a minimum of 10 hours at Port Isabel 

to be reunified. At least 28 children were reunited within 15 hours, while 4 

children waited more than 27 hours. 

The final 2 children were reunited with their parents on the morning of July 

17, after waiting approximately 37 hours in one case, and approximately 40 

hours in the other. We did not find conclusive evidence showing the reasons 

for these two children’s extended wait times, but email correspondence 

suggests confusion about whether these two children arrived at Port Isabel on 

July 15 or July 16. Late on the night of July 16, Port Isabel staff asked HHS to 

confirm whether all July 15 arrivals had been reunified, and HHS confirmed 

that they had. A few hours later, however, in the early morning of July 17, Port 

Isabel told HHS that these two children had in fact arrived on July 15, and 

were still waiting for reunification. 

Table 1 shows the wait times for 73 of the 75 children12 who arrived at Port 

Isabel on July 15, and figure 1 shows when they were reunified. The HHS and 

ICE records necessary to calculate the children’s wait times are incomplete 

and, at times, contradictory. Because we cannot determine which data are 

more reliable, table 1 and figure 1 show wait times using both the earliest and 

latest reunification times in available records, rounded to the nearest hour.13 

11 We use the term “HHS contractors” throughout this report to refer to both contractors and 

grantees of HHS and/or ORR. 

12 These estimated wait times exclude two children who returned to HHS shelters because their 

parents declined to be reunified after the children arrived at Port Isabel on July 15. 

13 In the initial days of Phase 2 reunifications, neither ICE nor HHS comprehensively recorded 

when children arrived at Port Isabel or when they were reunified. Inconsistencies in the 

records may be the result of human error associated with manual entry, but could also be the 

result of a lack of a methodical recording protocol. For example, while we refer to reunification 

times throughout this report, some times recorded by ICE officials may represent when families 

were transported out of Port Isabel, while some may reflect when families were physically 

reunified. See appendix A for more information on DHS OIG’s analysis of ICE and HHS data. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 1: Minimum and Maximum Reunification Wait Times for Children 

Arriving at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 

Minimum 

Wait Time 

Wait Time 

(hours) 

No. of 

Children 

Percent of 

Children 

10-15 41 56% 

18-27 28 38% 

29 2 3% 

37 1 1% 

39 1 1% 

Maximum 

Wait Time 

Wait Time 

(hours) 

No. of 

Children 

Percent of 

Children 

10-15 28 38% 

18-27 41 56% 

29 2 3% 

37 1 1% 

41 13 1 1% 

Source: OIG analysis based on ICE, HHS, and HHS contractor data 

Figure 1: Time of Reunification for Children Arriving at Port Isabel on 

July 15, 2018 

Source: OIG analysis based on ICE, HHS, and HHS contractor data 

ICE Was Not Prepared to Promptly Reunify All Children Who 

Arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 

Despite ICE’s and HHS’ efforts to coordinate reunifications in the days and 

weeks after the court’s order, delays occurred because of a disconnect between 

the agencies about the timing and pace of reunifications and because Port 

Isabel misjudged the resources it would need to promptly reunify families. 

14 We identified email correspondence related to this child, which suggests that the minimum 

wait time might refer to when the child was physically reunited with his parent and the 

maximum wait time might refer to when they left Port Isabel. However, because this evidence 

was not conclusive, and to be consistent with our methodology for all other children who 

arrived on July 15, table 1 and figure 1 present both possibilities. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ICE and HHS Had Fundamentally Different Expectations for the Timing 

and Pace of Reunifications 

Following the June 26, 2018 court order to reunify separated families, HHS 

and ICE promptly began coordinating and taking steps to meet the court’s 

deadlines. Senior officials from both agencies worked together at a joint 

operations center in Washington, D.C. to accomplish this mission, making 

collective decisions and providing guidance to their respective field personnel. 

Although the lead operational officials from HHS and ICE recalled working 

closely in this period, they relayed different understandings about the timing 

and pace of reunifications. This disconnect contributed to increased wait times 

when children were first brought to Port Isabel for reunification. 

Reuniting more than 2,000 children within 30 days required significant 

interagency cooperation and agreement. For example, the agencies needed to 

reach a consensus as to the scope of the court order, identify parents and 

children who qualified for reunification, determine where eligible parents and 

children were located, develop an appropriate logistical process to effect the 

reunifications, and transport adults and children to reunification centers 

across the country. HHS and ICE witnesses generally reported that their 

collaboration during this period, given that this was an entirely novel process, 

was challenging but successful. 

However, despite their close collaboration, ICE and HHS had very different 

understandings about when children would be transported to ICE facilities for 

reunification. The lead HHS operational official told us he directed HHS staff to 

transport children to the appropriate ICE reunification centers as soon as the 

children were “cleared” for reunification and ICE confirmed parents were onsite at the centers.15 While he understood ICE wanted to receive children’s 

estimated arrival times more than 24 hours in advance, he did not believe this 

was possible given the challenges associated with transporting children. He 

also stated that he felt reunification would never happen if they waited until 

everyone was ready, and was willing to accept the “discomfort” of children 

waiting at an ICE facility to prevent the “serious harm” of them potentially 

missing their chance to be reunified with their parents. For these reasons, the 

HHS lead told his staff that as long as there were no health or safety concerns, 

they should bring the children to the ICE facilities as soon as possible, and 

that any delays should “be at ICE’s door.” 

15 Both ICE and HHS played roles in clearing families for reunification, which required verifying 

parentage, confirming the parent desired reunification, completing background checks, and 

identifying any reason a parent might present a danger to his or her child. See HHS News 

Release, The Trump Administration Plan for Reunifying Children (Jul. 18, 2018), 

https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/07/18/the-trump-administration-plan-forreunifying-children.html. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In contrast, ICE’s operational lead, who worked “shoulder-to-shoulder” with 

HHS’ lead, stated he was unaware HHS planned to transport children without 

first checking whether the individual ICE facilities were ready to receive them, 

and did not believe the HHS lead would take this approach. Instead, he 

believed ground-level HHS and ICE officials communicated with each other to 

make common sense decisions about when children would arrive. Similarly, 

before Phase 2 reunifications began, the ground-level ICE personnel at Port 

Isabel expected they would have some control over the flow of children to their 

facility and would receive advance notice of children’s estimated arrival times. 

It was only on July 15, 2018 that ICE officials at Port Isabel learned they would 

have little if any input on children’s arrival times, and would not always have 

as much advance notice as they expected. Just hours before the first children 

arrived, Port Isabel finally started receiving a series of emails with travel 

manifests containing the names and estimated arrival times for the children 

individual HHS contractors would be bringing to the facility.16 Over the course 

of a few hours, Port Isabel received more than a dozen manifests, covering 

transports for that afternoon and the coming days, as well as various one-off 

emails noting changes to arrival times and passengers in individual transports. 

Port Isabel staff had to consolidate and repeatedly update these lists as new 

information came in. By that evening, with 75 children and their caregivers 

waiting at the facility, Port Isabel realized it would not be able to complete all 

reunifications by 4:00 p.m., as originally intended. 

ICE Staff at Port Isabel Engaged in Some Planning and Preparation, but 

Underestimated the Resources Necessary for Family Reunifications 

Following the court’s order to reunify families, staff at Port Isabel began to plan 

for the facility’s role as a family reunification center. Despite these efforts, as 

van after van full of children arrived on July 15, 2018, it became apparent that 

Port Isabel had not assembled enough personnel. 

Port Isabel took a number of actions to prepare for the facility’s role as a family 

reunification center. First, to help focus the facility’s staff and resources on the 

reunification efforts, Port Isabel began transferring out adult detainees not 

affected by the court’s order and stopped accepting new detainees unrelated to 

reunifications. Additionally, two Supervisory Detention and Deportation 

Officers (SDDO) were designated as headquarters’ points of contact for 

reunifications, and they in turn identified several “top performing” detention 

16 Before this, Port Isabel had received lists of children, but no arrival times. For example, on 

July 13, Port Isabel staff received what was purported to be the first group of 24 children that 

ORR would transport, but the arrival time was “forthcoming.” On the morning of July 15, 

before the manifests started coming, they received an updated roster of the “first batch,” which 

included the original 24 plus an additional 111 children, but still no arrival dates or times. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

officers to lead Port Isabel’s logistical efforts. Anticipating they might need even 

more manpower, Port Isabel leadership pre-approved some officers’ overtime 

and subsequently asked every detention officer to volunteer to work overtime to 

support the reunification effort. 

These efforts notwithstanding, management at Port Isabel misjudged the 

staffing levels and expertise necessary to effect the reunifications. Both lead 

SDDOs acknowledged that Port Isabel underestimated the workload when 

planning for staffing needs, and that it ultimately took many more staff 

members, working many more hours, to complete the reunifications. 

Nor did Port Isabel staff fully appreciate the challenges and difficulties of 

processing adults for reunification. To reunify families, Port Isabel needed to 

process the parents for release from the facility. However, many parents at 

Port Isabel were subject to expedited removal. To release those parents, Port 

Isabel staff first reprocessed them out of expedited removal, and the paperwork 

associated with that process led to delays. This type of reprocessing was not 

common at Port Isabel, and many officers were unfamiliar with the 

procedure.17 Several ICE witnesses attributed processing delays, particularly 

early in Phase 2, to the staff’s inexperience with this process.18 

Although the NBC News report asserted that Port Isabel staff were “clocking out 

for the day while the parking lot filled with children eager to see their parents 

again,” we did not find that staff departures on the evening of July 15, 2018 

significantly delayed the reunifications of children. To the contrary, as ICE 

realized how many children would be arriving that day, Port Isabel abandoned 

its set hours of operation and instructed staff to prepare to work well into the 

evening. Port Isabel’s time and attendance records reflect that a significant 

number of officers worked overtime on July 15, and one HHS contractor 

recalled that Port Isabel staff members were still present and processing 

parents when he arrived onsite at approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 16. ICE 

and HHS records also reflect that families were reunified overnight. Finally, 

ICE and HHS witnesses who were on the ground at Port Isabel did not recall 

mass departures of Port Isabel staff on July 15. 

17 One lead SDDO could not recall ICE Headquarters providing reprocessing guidance to Port 

Isabel before reunifications started. 

18 ICE and HHS witnesses cited various other reasons for long waits, though they could not 

recall if these issues occurred on July 15 or on later days. For example, witnesses mentioned 

that some children arrived while their parents were still en route to Port Isabel; and that Port 

Isabel received inaccurate or modified travel schedules for children, which at times caused Port 

Isabel to incorrectly prioritize the out-processing of parents under the mistaken impression 

that their children’s arrival was imminent. ICE and HHS witnesses also attributed more 

extended delays to factors outside of Port Isabel’s control, including medical issues, parents 

declining reunification, and children being transported to the wrong reunification center. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Children Waited in Vehicles, but Had Access to ICE Facilities 

During the planning process, Port Isabel decided to reunify families in 

“Building 9,” a detention building that was no longer in use and was located 

outside of the facility’s secure areas. The building was not designed or 

intended to hold children comfortably for extended periods, and when Port 

Isabel staff selected Building 9 to effect reunifications, they did not appreciate 

how many children would be waiting there at a given time or how long they 

would be waiting. The portion of Building 9 used for reunifications included an 

officer work space, a small lobby, and several detention cells. Multiple ICE and 

HHS witnesses opined that the limited space, jail-like atmosphere, and lack of 

comfortable places for children to sleep made it unsuitable to effect 

reunifications. Given the space constraints and discomfort of waiting in former 

detention cells, some children and caregivers instead waited in the vehicles 

that brought them to Port Isabel. Once it became clear the children would not 

be reunified promptly, one HHS contractor sent a coach bus to Port Isabel, 

which provided a more comfortable environment to wait and sleep. 

While the children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 had lengthy 

waits, witnesses did not identify conditions that raised substantial concerns 

regarding the children’s health or safety. For example, both ICE and HHS 

witnesses consistently stated that regardless of whether they waited in vehicles 

or in Building 9, the children were in climate-controlled environments, had 

access to bathroom facilities, and were adequately supervised. Witnesses also 

recalled, and ICE records corroborated, that HHS contractors and/or Port 

Isabel staff provided children with food and water. Finally, neither DHS OIG, 

HHS OIG, nor ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility received any 

complaints of mistreatment of children at Port Isabel on July 15 and 16, 2018. 

Although it likely would have been more comfortable to wait for reunifications 

at nearby shelters or hotels, the HHS operational lead told us he directed 

HHS’s transportation contractors to stay at ICE facilities until the 

reunifications were effected  even if children had to sleep there. The HHS 

operational lead said his primary goal was to safely reunify families as quickly 

as possible, and he heard from HHS contractors that reunifications could be 

delayed if children left.19 The HHS lead told us he stood by this decision, 

because he believed children waiting in an ICE facility or a vehicle was 

preferable to missing a chance to be reunified with their parents. 

19 Some HHS witnesses told us that ICE staff told them to wait or suggested reunifications 

could be delayed if children left Port Isabel. ICE officials did not recall any staff saying this; 

one noted ICE had no control over whether the children stayed or left. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ICE Responded to Processing and Space Issues 

After the first afternoon and night of Phase 2 reunifications, ICE took steps to 

engage additional resources to respond to the unexpected influx of children to 

their facility. DHS OIG found that Port Isabel’s processing improved over time, 

resulting in shorter wait times for children. 

Despite being on leave during the prior week and returning from international 

travel earlier that day, ICE’s San Antonio Field Office Director (FOD) traveled to 

Port Isabel on the night of July 15, after he learned about the situation there. 

He worked long hours onsite over the following days, and multiple witnesses, 

including the HHS operational lead, credited the FOD’s presence as critical to 

increasing the sense of urgency at Port Isabel and meeting the court’s Phase 2 

deadline. Because he oversaw the entire region, the FOD also was able to 

marshal additional resources to assist Port Isabel. He directed members of his 

field office staff to travel to Port Isabel to add onsite support, and enlisted 

personnel in the region familiar with the necessary type of processing to assist 

remotely. 

Some witnesses stated that, given the unique nature of the reunification 

mission, the FOD’s presence onsite at Port Isabel was also critical to 

implementing non-standard procedures necessary to meet the court’s deadline. 

Significantly, after early frustrations with children’s unpredictable travel 

itineraries, the FOD authorized Port Isabel staff to begin out-processing all 

parents, even if HHS had not yet notified them that their children were en 

route. Out-processed mothers and fathers whose children had not yet arrived 

were housed in separate dorms, dressed in personal clothing. Multiple ICE 

witnesses credited this non-standard procedure with significantly shortening 

the time children had to wait for reunification because, once a child arrived, 

ICE simply needed to locate the child’s parent and reunite them. 

HHS and ICE witnesses consistently reported that Port Isabel’s processing 

improved over the course of Phase 2 reunifications, resulting in shorter waits. 

While the available data is not entirely reliable,20 our analysis of the records 

generally supports the witnesses’ impressions that children waited less time in 

the final days of reunifications. For example, reunification data 

contemporaneously recorded by ICE personnel shows children waited slightly 

more than 4 hours on average during the final week of reunifications, while 

children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15 waited more than four times as 

long on average. 

Finally, Port Isabel responded to concerns about children waiting in Building 9. 

On July 18, Port Isabel began converting training rooms into waiting areas for 

20 See footnote 13 and appendix A. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

children and reunited families. These rooms were more modern, larger, and 

equipped with more chairs and mats. Port Isabel staff also set up a television, 

and began serving popcorn to waiting children. ICE staff believed these 

changes made for more comfortable waiting areas for the children and 

caregivers. Although we saw photographs depicting these improvements, 

employees from one HHS contractor told us they were unaware of the changes, 

and they continued to wait with children in their own coach bus. 

Conclusion 

Complying with the court order to reunite more than 2,000 children within 30 

days required significant cooperation and agreement between DHS and HHS. 

Despite coordination and planning efforts, ICE was not prepared to promptly 

reunify all children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018. ICE and HHS 

had fundamentally different understandings about the timing and pace of 

reunifications, and Port Isabel underestimated the resources necessary to 

promptly out-process the parents of arriving children. As a result, the dozens 

of children who arrived at Port Isabel on that date waited for extended periods 

to be reunified with their parents. As the reunifications continued, however, 

Port Isabel responded to processing and space issues, which generally resulted 

in shorter wait times. 

DHS and HHS Comments 

DHS and HHS each provided technical comments in response to our draft 

report and ICE provided formal management comments. We addressed the 

technical comments throughout our report as appropriate and included a copy 

of ICE’s management comments in their entirety in appendix B. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 3XEOLF/DZïE\

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

We conducted this review to determine whether children were held in vehicles 

at Port Isabel for extended periods before being reunited with their parents in 

July 2018; and if so, why that occurred and whether ICE took corrective action 

to prevent it from happening again. We focused on Port Isabel because of a 

June 2019 news report addressing these issues at that location. 

We conducted fieldwork for this review between August and December 2019, in 

Washington, D.C. and onsite in south Texas. We interviewed 15 current and 

former ICE employees and contractors, including staff at Port Isabel, the San 

Antonio field office, and headquarters. We also spoke with 10 HHS employees 

and contractors, including representatives from ORR and officers with the U.S. 

Public Health Service Commissioned Corps. These interviews included senior 

management officials who coordinated HHS’ and ICE’s response to the June 

2018 court order, along with detention officers, direct care workers who 

transported UACs, and others who supported the reunification effort. 

We reviewed communications and guidance related to the July 2018 family 

reunifications, as well as documents and communications related to the Zero 

Tolerance Policy and Ms. L. v. ICE Federal court pleadings and orders, including 

the June 2018 order to reunite separated parents. 

Additionally, to calculate how many children arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 

2018 and how long they waited, we analyzed relevant data relating to children’s 

travel plans, their arrival times at Port Isabel, and the times of their 

reunification or departure from the facility. ICE and HHS officials both told us 

that the haste of the reunification effort did not always allow them to 

consistently or promptly record arrival or reunification information. Both 

agencies manually recorded this data in multiple ways, all of which were 

susceptible to varying degrees of human error. As a result, calculating wait 

times required synthesizing and reconciling several sources of information of 

varying reliability. The most reliable and relevant data we used were: 

“Port Isabel Tracking Sheet”: Multiple individuals from Port Isabel and 

the San Antonio Field Office manually entered data into a spreadsheet to 

track when children arrived and were reunified at Port Isabel. Although 

this was the most complete data set that ICE could provide, several ICE 

officials cautioned that this data might not be entirely accurate or 

complete. Our independent analysis supports this assessment. For 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-20-65 

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Department of Homeland Security 

example, while ICE personnel appear to have input data more regularly 

as Phase 2 progressed, there were almost no arrival times recorded in the 

“Time In” column for children who arrived on July 15. The spreadsheet 

also contains errors likely associated with manual input (e.g., for some 

children, the arrival time is after the reunification time). More 

substantively, our review of this data suggests that not all personnel 

used consistent criteria when recording information. For example, some 

officers may have recorded the time that children were reunited with 

their parents in the “Time Out” column; but based on the number of 

children whose “Time Out” was identical, other officers may have 

recorded the time that families were physically transported out of Port 

Isabel. 

x	 “Port Isabel Gate Logs”: In the summer of 2018, Port Isabel logged 

vehicles entering and leaving the facility on a handwritten gate log. For 

July 15, 2018 this log includes, among other information, vehicles’ 

license plate numbers, arrival times, the names of adult passengers, 

their employer and/or the purpose of their visit, and the number and 

gender (but not names) of children in each vehicle. The legibility and 

completeness of these entries vary. For example, the employer for one of 

the vehicles is illegible, and not all entries for adult passengers include 

the time they left the facility or whether they departed with children. 

Some entries also include information that appears to be implausible. 

For example, one vehicle carrying three employees of an HHS contractor 

is listed as arriving at 2:32 p.m., and 15 minutes later, a vehicle with the 

same license plate number is listed as arriving with three different adult 

passengers. Additionally, because the gate logs lack the names of 

children and the specific facility from which they were transported, we 

could not always match specific children or travel manifests to gate log 

entries. 

x	 “Port Isabel Emails”: We obtained contemporaneous email 

correspondence reflecting Port Isabel staff’s efforts to compile information 

on the children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018. We 

primarily relied on three of these email strings. These emails include 

spreadsheets that purport to combine data from several individual 

manifests of children traveling to Port Isabel, as well as correspondence 

about discrepancies between the agencies’ records. 

x	 “ORR Correspondence”: We obtained email correspondence from the 

early morning hours of July 16, 2018, in which ORR staff discussed 

children who were still awaiting reunification at Port Isabel. This email 

string included a chart containing the names and alien numbers of 75 

children transported to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018 along with their 

arrival time at Port Isabel and the facility from which they were 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14	 OIG-20-65 
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

transported. ORR collected the information in this chart from HHS 

contractors who accompanied children to Port Isabel or otherwise 

supported reunification there. The contractors transmitted the 

information via email, phone, and/or text, sometimes through multiple 

parties, before it was manually compiled by ORR staff. For example, one 

contractor employee provided hourly reunification updates to his 

supervisor. An ORR staff member told us that while they attempted to 

keep complete and accurate records, some of the arrival times listed in 

this email string may have been projected, rather than actual. 

“HHS Contractor Records”: An HHS contractor provided us with arrival 

and reunification data for the 37 children it transported to Port Isabel on 

July 15, 2018. The contractor represented that this data was collected 

from the children’s “discharge paperwork.” 

To determine the number of children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 

2018, we relied on the Port Isabel Gate Logs, the Port Isabel Emails, ORR 

Correspondence, and HHS Contractor Records. The ORR Correspondence 

names 75 children who purportedly arrived at Port Isabel that day from 8 

separate contractor locations, including 37 children also named in the HHS 

Contractor Records. One of the Port Isabel Emails identifies 73 of these same 

children as July 15 arrivals from the same 8 contractor locations, and in a 

subsequent Port Isabel email, an official says Port Isabel learned that the 

remaining 2 children also arrived on July 15. Notations on the Port Isabel Gate 

Logs indicate only 70 unnamed children arrived at Port Isabel on the afternoon 

of July 15. Given the limitations of the Port Isabel Gate Logs described above, 

and the fact that documents from both ICE and ORR explicitly name the same 

75 children as July 15 arrivals, we concluded that those 75 children arrived at 

Port Isabel on July 15. ICE did not record most July 15 arrivals on the Port 

Isabel Tracking Sheet, so we could not use this document. 

To determine the arrival time for children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 

2018, we used the earliest time recorded in the Port Isabel Gate Logs, the ORR 

Correspondence, and the HHS Contractor Records. There was minimal 

variation in the children’s arrival times across these records: the arrival times 

for the 37 children included in the HHS Contractor Records were identical to 

those in the ORR Correspondence, and the largest discrepancy among any of 

these sources for any child was 19 minutes. We could not use the Port Isabel 

Tracking Sheet because it only contained arrival times for two children who 

arrived on July 15, 2018, and Port Isabel Emails generally included projected, 

not actual, arrival times. 

The records varied more significantly with respect to the reunification time for 

children who arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018. The ORR 

Correspondence and Port Isabel Emails included few if any reunification times 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-20-65 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

for individual children, so we did not use email evidence in our calculations. 

We did not use the Port Isabel Gate Logs, which tracked only some exiting 

adults, and no names of exiting children. Neither of the remaining two data 

sources had complete data. The HHS Contractor Records only included the 

reunification times of the 37 children in its care; and the Port Isabel Tracking 

Sheet only has “Time Out” data for 71 of the 73 children who arrived on July 

15.21 As a result, for 40 of the 73 children, we had only 1 recorded 

reunification time. For the remaining 33 children, in some cases, the HHS 

data showed an earlier reunification than the ICE data; in some cases, the ICE 

data showed an earlier reunification; and in some cases, the 2 recorded times 

were the same. We cannot determine which data is more reliable. Therefore, 

for these 33 children, we calculated each child’s shortest and longest possible 

wait times based on both of the available records, and summarized those 

calculations in table 1 and figure 1. 

Finally, to calculate the average wait time for the children who arrived at Port 

Isabel during the final week of reunifications, we relied solely on the Port Isabel 

Tracking Sheet. We did not use the Port Isabel Emails, ORR Correspondence, 

and HHS Contractor Records because they generally pertained to the initial 

days of Phase 2 reunifications, and the Port Isabel Gate Logs were not helpful 

because they did not identify arriving children by name or include children’s 

reunification or departure times. Although the Port Isabel Tracking Sheet lacks 

arrival times for the initial days of reunifications, that information is included 

for most children in the last week of reunifications. That said, the later entries 

in the Port Isabel Tracking Sheet suffer from many of the same manual entry 

and reliability issues discussed above. As a result, our calculations of the 

average wait time for children who arrived in the final week of reunifications 

(between July 20 and July 26, 2018) is based on the arrival and departure 

times of 469 of the 496 children recorded in the Port Isabel Tracking Sheet. We 

disregarded the entries for 4 children who did not have recorded arrival and/or 

reunification times; 1 child whose reunification and arrival times were 

identical; 7 children whose arrival times were after their reunification times; 

and 15 children whose entries included notations indicating they were not 

reunited with their parents for one reason or another. 

We conducted this special review in accordance with the DHS OIG Special 

Reviews Group’s quality control standards and the Quality Standards for 

Federal Offices of Inspector General issued by the Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency. These standards require that we carry out 

work with integrity, objectivity, and independence, and provide information 

that is factually accurate and reliable. This report reflects work performed by 

the DHS OIG Special Reviews Group pursuant to Section 2 of the Inspector 

21 As previously noted, 75 children actually arrived at Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, but we did 

not calculate estimated wait times for the 2 children whose parents declined reunification after 

the children arrived at Port Isabel that day. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-20-65 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

General Act of 1978, as amended. Specifically, this report provides information 

related to ICE’s efforts to reunify families that had been separated as a result of 

the Zero Tolerance Policy, for the purpose of keeping the Secretary of DHS and 

Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating 

to the administration of DHS programs and operations and the necessity for 

and progress of corrective action. This report is designed to promote the 

efficient and effective administration of, and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, 

and abuse in, the programs and operations of DHS. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

ICE Comments to the Draft Report 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Director, ICE 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

Congresswoman Kim Schrier, M.D. (WA-08) 

External 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-20-65 
Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305