115th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Reality vs. Rhetoric: Assessing the

Trump Administration’s Russia Policy

JUNE 15, 2018

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington: 2018


CSCESeal.EPS
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515

202–225–1901

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

@HelsinkiComm

Legislative Branch Commissioners

HOUSE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

Co-Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, TEXAS

STEVE COHEN, TENNESSEE

RICHARD HUDSON, NORTH CAROLINA

RANDY HULTGREN, ILLINOIS

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, TEXAS

GWEN MOORE, WISCONSIN

SENATE 

ROGER WICKER, MISSISSIPPI, 

Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. MARYLAND

JOHN BOOZMAN, ARKANSAS

CORY GARDNER, COLORADO

MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA

JEANNE SHAHEEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE

THOM TILLIS, NORTH CAROLINA

TOM UDALL, NEW MEXICO

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

Executive Branch Commissioners

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

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meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

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Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

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concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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Reality vs. Rhetoric: Assessing the

Trump Administration’s Russia Policy

JUNE 15, 2018

Page 

PARTICIPANTS 

Rachel Bauman, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........... 1

Herman Pirchner, Jr., President, American Foreign Policy Council .......................................... 2

Dr. Alina Polyakova, David M. Rubenstein Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution ..... 4

Yulia Latynina, Journalist, Echo Moskvy and Novaya Gazeta .................................................. 7

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Reality vs. Rhetoric: Assessing the

Trump Administration’s Russia Policy 

June 15, 2018

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

The briefing was held at 10:00 a.m. in Room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Rachel Bauman, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Panelists present: Rachel Bauman, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; Herman Pirchner, Jr., President, American Foreign Policy Council; 

Dr. Alina Polyakova, David M. Rubenstein Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution; 

and Yulia Latynina, Journalist, Echo Moskvy and Novaya Gazeta. 

Ms. BAUMAN. Good morning, everyone. Call to attention. Thanks, everyone, for 

coming out this morning and hi to everyone joining us on Facebook. My name is Rachel 

Bauman. I will be moderating the discussion today. I serve as a policy advisor for Russia, 

Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltics on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is also known as the Helsinki Commission. We’re an independent 

agency of the Federal Government charged with monitoring compliance with the Helsinki 

Accords and advancing comprehensive security through promotion of human rights, 

democracy, and economic, environmental, and military cooperation in 57 countries. 

Today we’re going to be focused on what the U.S. Government, and namely the 

Trump administration, has been saying and doing to address these issues in the context 

of Russia on a bilateral basis, as well as to see where the rhetoric meets the road. As 

we know, Trump has repeatedly expressed a desire to improve U.S.-Russia relations. 

Nevertheless, policies thus far during the Trump administration have been less than 

friendly to Putin’s regime, including quietly approving the first sale of lethal arms to 

Ukraine, which is a departure from the Obama administration’s de facto lethal arms 

embargo. And as we know, the recent escalation of sanctions has further shaken the 

Kremlin elite. 

Despite all of this, it’s natural to contrast the president’s rhetoric with concrete policy 

achievements. Where does Trump the man diverge from the Trump administration? How 

does that affect the way Moscow reacts to American policies? Does the United States even 

have a coherent Russia policy outside of sanctions? And is our relationship to Russia 

today really any different than it would be under a President Clinton? 

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To speak to some of these questions, as well as placing them in historical context, 

we have here today three distinguished panelists. Their full biographies can be found in 

your folders, but I will introduce them briefly. To my left I have Herman Pirchner. He’s 

the founding president of the American Foreign Policy Council. Next is Dr. Alina 

Polyakova, the David M. Rubenstein fellow in the foreign policy program at the Brookings 

Institution. And finally, Yulia Latynina, a journalist with Echo Moskvy and Novaya 

Gazeta, some of the few remaining Russian independent news outlets. 

So to start out, each of us are going to make a statement, and we’ll get into some 

discussion, and then a question and answer session from the audience. And a note to 

those of you on your phones, our Twitter handle is at @HelsinkiComm, C-O-M-M, if you 

would like to tweet about it. And you can also like us on Facebook at Facebook.com/

HelsinkiCommission. So without further ado, I’ll turn it over to Mr. Pirchner. 

Mr. PIRCHNER. As a student, when I first started thinking about politics, Richard 

Nixon was president. And I remember reading an article in The Economist where Nixon 

was telling his supporters: Don’t pay any attention to what I say, watch what I do. And 

I think, as Rachel indicated, we’re in a time when many people are starting to pay more 

attention to what Trump says than what he does. Actually, I think both formulations are 

incorrect. What is done is very important, but what is said also carries weight and has 

to be considered as part of overall policy. 

Briefly, what has he done? From the time that he came into office, there have been 

a long series of moves that can be regarded only as very unfriendly to the Putin regime. 

In April 2017, he bombed Syria after Assad’s use of chemical weapons, against Russian 

objections. In August, he signed a bill that placed sanctions on a variety of Russian industries. September 2017, training exercise in the Baltic States. December 2017, sanctions 

on the great Putin ally and Chechen warlord Kadyrov. 2017 December, the sale of sniper 

systems—which, by the way, is more important than you think because at the time the 

range of sniper systems that Russia had and were using against Ukraine had a much 

longer range. And therefore, Ukrainians could not adequately defend against these sniper 

attacks. 

More recently, in March 2018, you had—following the Skripal poisonings, five Russian entities and 19 individuals were sanctioned. Later 60 Russian diplomats were kicked 

out of Russia. In March, the Javelin missiles went to Ukraine. These are anti-tank missiles and reduce the chance of a Russian advance—certainly would raise the costs of any 

further military action. 

In April, sanctions against seven members of the Putin elite, including Putin’s sonin-law and Oleg Deripaska, who is known to be very close to the Kremlin. In April, when 

the Wagner Group, which is really under Putin’s control, moved against American positions in Syria, we launched an attack killing perhaps a few hundred ethnic Russians, Russian citizens. So the response has been tough to actual Putin actions. 

Now, some people have made the counter argument that this is only because Trump 

has been pushed into these positions. But who is pushing him? The people that had long 

documented pro-Russian positions—Bannon, the first national security advisor—they have 

been pushed out. Who has been picked by Trump since? You have Pompeo at State, you 

have Bolton at the National Security Council, and before that you had Mattis, all with 

demonstrably tough lines against the Putin administration. So you have—if you think 

that he’s being pushed by these people, remember that he’s the person that pushed—that 

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promoted them, that appointed them. And he did so with the knowledge of their longstanding positions against the Russian regime. 

Now, having said that, confusing signals have been sent. We have the recent statement that Russia should be readmitted to the G7 to make it G8 again. You have a constant reluctance to criticize Russian actions, and especially Putin directly. How does that 

play into the hard line that’s been taken in practice? In kindest interpretation, it perhaps 

encourages Europe to rearm, to begin to take care of its own defense, to look at the danger 

that comes from Russia. In non-kindest interpretation it’s a signal that maybe when an 

actual big summit happens between Putin and Trump, that Trump won’t hold the hard 

line. And this insecurity, which would be caused among American allies and American 

friends in the world, could well leave those countries to hedge their bets, to make an 

accommodation with Russia. It all depends on how Trump’s words are read. 

And in the words of Don Rumsfeld, I think what Trump is really thinking is a known 

unknown. I don’t believe it’s possible to get inside of Trump’s head to know what he’s 

doing. I’m reminded of a scene from the movie ‘‘Patton,’’ where the famous American 

World War II general addresses his senior commanders before a battle. And he goes into 

a rage and says: Don’t anybody—nobody should come back alive if we can’t secure victory. 

And when all the generals and colonels leave the room, Patton’s top aide turns to him 

and says: Sir, you have to understand that our officers don’t know when you’re kidding 

and not kidding. And Patton: it’s not necessary for them to know. I have to know. 

So my bottom line on this is we have to hope that when Trump is making all these 

statements on Russia, that he does know what he’s doing. Because if he doesn’t, then it 

could lead to things that are not too attractive. 

Maybe a couple words on where I think policy should go before turning it over to my 

colleagues. Solzhenitsyn talking about the Soviet Union said that such a system can only 

exist on the big lie. And while Putin’s Russia is certainly not the Soviet Union, the lie 

is important to keeping him in power. That’s why all the internal and external propaganda. And the West has done a very bad job about conquering that propaganda, both 

inside in Russia and externally. I think we can’t overstate really how effective this propaganda is, even among those in the Russian elite that understand that propaganda is being 

made. 

In the early 1990s, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, I hosted a prominent Russian economist who was clearly part of the elite—his first time in the U.S. And I took 

him to an upend grocery store. And this was at a time where you couldn’t with a thousand 

bucks buy a banana in Moscow. And even if you went to the [Communist] Party stores, 

which only party members could go into, it was not a very impressive array of food. And 

he looked at it for a while and said, well, that’s just how you rich people live. Then I took 

him to a Safeway in one of the poorest neighborhoods of Washington. And he looked at 

all the food there, and he was very silent. 

And finally he said to me—he said, you know, I had access to a lot of things from 

the West, and I thought I knew, but until now I didn’t understand how much I’d been 

lied to. And I think this is true very much of the Russian people, and even the Russian 

elites. And this lack of understanding reality, in my mind, leads very much to some of 

the predatory Russian policies today. It has to be counteracted. 

We also have to step up the pressure on the elites around Putin. Public opinion 

counts in Russia, but what really counts is opinion of a couple hundred KGB/oligarchs 

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that surround Putin. They’re the people who keep him in power. Now, many of these 

people not just did legitimate business, but worked very hard to steal their money. And 

if you want to know what they think about the future of Russia, or what any elite thinks 

about the future of the country, look what they do with their money and look what they 

do with their children. 

All these people in Russia have two, maybe three or four passports. They all have 

foreign bank accounts. They often have children abroad. And why? Because they don’t 

know when things could go bad for them in Russia. There’s no protection of law. Why? 

Because they don’t know when Russia itself could go bad. And they want a place to go 

where they can begin to live large. 

But the current Russian policies and the increasing isolation of Russia from the West 

has begun to cramp their lifestyle. And it becomes hard for them to enjoy their hardstolen money in Europe. It becomes hard for them to do business. And while nobody, I 

think, is willing to stick—in this crowd—is willing to raise their head to challenge Putin, 

Putin certainly understands that there is unease. And at some point, that unease will 

become a big problem for him. So to the extent that we can use the people around him 

to put pressure on Putin, we stand a better chance of improving relations, because Putin 

is the type of guy whose appetite is increased by the eating. And if he doesn’t find very 

hard reasons to stop things that cause him a problem, he’s not going to stop. And we’ve—

the pressure, to my mind, has to be increased. 

Additionally, things like Javelins to Ukraine, things like putting NATO troops in 

Poland and the Baltics, are real reminders of American commitment. And to the extent 

that the Russian elite understands that there is a firm commitment, there’s less chance 

that we will have fighting with Russia, and there’s a greater chance that some reasonable 

accommodation can be made, and there can become a sound basis for improving the relationship. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. So Herman took a lot of my talking points already, but I’ll try to 

add to those a little bit. [Laughs.] But I think it also says something that we actually 

agree on the basic premise that you outlined. And I think that is also a significant thing 

to note. Right now, we have in the United States the toughest Russia policy since the end 

of the Cold War. But if you just read the president’s tweets, you would never know it. 

And that’s the reality of the phenomena of decoupling between the president’s statements 

on Russia, which have been—as Herman also pointed out—more favorable, positive 

toward Mr. Putin, toward the Russian Government, and then the actual policy actions of 

this administration. 

So Herman and Rachel started to highlight some of those policy actions, but I think 

it’s actually much larger than we even can understand if we just look at very discrete 

things that happen month to month. Since January 2017, there have actually been 26 distinct policy actions that this administration has launched in relation to Russia. And some, 

there are 205 new sanctions against Russian entities and individuals, the largest expulsion of Russian so-called diplomats in the history of the United States, including Cold War 

history. This is significant. 

In addition to that, the National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, 

clearly points to Russia as an adversary and a competitor to the United States, alongside 

with China. We can quibble about whether Russia and China should actually be on the 

same level as competitors to the United States, but the reality is that this is a profound 

shift in how the U.S. sees its place in the world, and how the U.S. sees its relationship 

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vis-a`-vis Russia specifically. And this is a shift from what we’ve seen under Obama, Bush, 

Clinton, and going all the way back. 

And I think the other issue that I would highlight that’s significant is the National 

Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], which just went through markup in the Senate. And 

if we look at funding to shore up Europe’s east, the European Deterrence Initiative 

[EDI]—that used to be called the European Reassurance Initiative—that was started 

under President Obama. In 2017, 3.4 billion [dollars] was allocated to EDI. In the 2019 

NDAA, the amount that has been approved by the Senate is 6.3 billion [dollars], which 

is almost a 3 billion [dollar] increase in just a period of 2 years. 

These funds look a lot like—they reflect a strategy of very traditional deterrence 

against Russia. They reflect an investment in NATO’s eastern flank, an investment in 

protecting and expanding U.S. presence—forward presence in the Baltic States, also in 

Ukraine. There’s an additional 200 million [dollars] allocated and authorized for U.S. military training and support of Ukraine. This is separate from the weapons sales, the Javelin 

sales that Herman also talked about. 

So if we take the whole broad spectrum of what this administration has done on 

Russia, it is a significant and important set of actions and activities that, as I said, looks 

a lot like a very traditional deterrent strategy that I would argue we probably would have 

had—though I don’t like hypotheticals or counterfactuals—a pretty similar strategy or set 

of actions under a Hillary Clinton, if she had won the presidency. Now, we don’t know 

for sure. And I think the one profound difference is that, of course, it does matter what 

the president says. And what the president has been saying, though his administration 

has not been doing, has started to draw and ignite certain rifts and tensions in the transatlantic relationship. 

And that is a serious issue that I don’t think we would have had, had we had a different president. The biggest example that we just saw that I think encapsulates on the 

one hand the decoupling that I’ve talked about between rhetoric and action, but also the 

kinds of problems and tensions that this administration will continue to have—particularly Western European allies—is, of course, what just happened at the G7, where basically in one day you have the president suggesting that Russia should be readmitted, G7 

allies saying no. 

And then within, I think, hours of that you have the Director of National Intelligence 

Dan Coats giving a speech—I was actually at the speech where he gave it in France—

outlining a very, very hawkish and very tough Russia policy. This is within hours of the 

president’s tweets. And then you have an additional set of sanctions imposed on Russian 

entities and tech firms who the U.S. Government has charged as being enablers in Russian cyberattacks and intelligence-gathering operations. And this all happened within 24 

hours. 

And so I think we are in a situation where European allies—and I go to Europe quite 

often—don’t understand who to listen to in this administration. Should they be paying 

attention to the president’s tweets? Should they be listening to what Secretary Mattis or 

Director Dan Coats says? I think this is producing a certain set of confusion with our key 

allies in Europe. I think this is going to be kind of a continuing pattern that we’ll see 

throughout this administration. 

So that being said, just a few words on policy—and I completely agree with what 

Herman outlined in terms of where this should be heading. Where we are today is that 

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we have a very conventional deterrence, possibility the beginning of a containment 

strategy vis-a`-vis Russia. This administration is not communicating that very clearly. 

They could do a better job of that. It’s clear to me that the national security advisor and 

also the secretary of State and the secretary of defense are aligned on their views of 

Russia. And there also is continued bipartisan support in Congress on a much tougher 

approach to Russia. 

This was, of course, culminated in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act [CAATSA] legislation the president signed which, you know, nothing—

almost nothing ever passes Congress, it seems, with almost unanimous support. And this 

was the one bill that did. And I think this is really, really important. We shouldn’t forget 

that this happened. But we’re not really thinking about next steps, meaning right now 

the U.S. and also Europeans are using existing policy tools, primarily sanctions, expulsions, and various other elements of those two policy implements. But we’re not thinking 

about how to get ahead of the emerging threat that Russia and China represent to the 

United States. 

And those emerging threats are not going to be in the conventional military space. 

Yes, Russia is a nuclear superpower. So is the United States. I don’t think we’re going 

to be entering a nuclear war with Russia anytime soon. That’s not in the Russian interest. 

That’s not in the U.S. interest. But it’s become very clear that Russia tries to balance out 

its own asymmetries against the West—meaning the fact that the Russian military cannot 

compete with the Western alliance, meaning that the Russian economy cannot compete 

with the West either—and then try to balance against these imbalances, and so the more 

conventional space, by investing in its capabilities in the asymmetrical space. 

So things like hybrid war, right? These gray zone activities, disinformation, 

cyberattacks, using energy as a tool to try to continue European dependence on Russian 

gas, specifically the Nord Stream II project. These kinds of activities we have not developed a good set of deterrence strategies against, specifically when it comes to things like 

disinformation in the digital domain, and potential cyberattacks. 

In March of this year, the FBI and DHS released a joint report that found the same 

malware that existed on Ukraine’s electrical grids and caused a massive blackout in 

Ukraine two years ago on the critical infrastructure grids in this country, including 

nuclear, waterways, electrical, et cetera. What this looks like to me is that the Russian 

proxies, you could say the Russian government, has basically planted cyberbombs on our 

critical infrastructure systems. And so the question is, how will we respond to that kind 

of provocation, and do we think it’s a provocation? Have we responded to that provocation? 

Those things remain relatively unclear to me. 

So aside from developing our strategies in the asymmetric space, we also need to be 

thinking about how do we target the Russian elite, who have been stealing massive 

amounts of money from the Russian people, in a way that doesn’t actually hurt the living 

standards or the views of the Russian people toward the West, or toward the United 

States. And going after the oligarchs, as this administration has done with targeted sanctions, is a good first step, but it’s not enough. Because it’s very easy to get around those 

sanctions. Most people that are billionaires can easily transfer their wealth over to if not 

their grandmothers, their girlfriends, cousins, whoever else. And we have to work much 

harder to be able to maintain that sanctions regime. 

This administration has dissolved the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator in the State 

Department. And it’s not clear they’ve replaced that office with another unit that would 

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be involved in doing this. And this is something that I think I would encourage the 

administration to consider doing as sanctions become a bigger part of U.S. policy vis-a`-

vis Russia and other countries. But exposing the kinds of corruption that not just Putin 

but those individuals close to him that compose the Kremlin elite, is absolutely critical 

to trying to draw some cracks among the Kremlin elite and among the oligarchic system 

that this government in Russia has set up, to the detriment of its own people. 

And I think we shouldn’t forget that, that whenever we’re talking about Russia we’re 

not talking about—at least, I’m not talking about the Russian people. I’m talking about 

the regime, which is a kleptocratic, patrimonial, oligarchic system that functions basically 

as a parasite off the Russian people and the assets of the Russian economy. So I will stop 

there. 

Ms. LATYNINA. Well, it takes gumption to speak about American policy toward Russia 

to an American audience, being a Russian. [Laughter.] So I better stick to the Russian 

side of the equation. And first, I would like to underline the fact that Russia belongs to 

an ever-widening circle of countries, most of them failed or rogue states, that lead by 

hating America. And this sort of takes place of setting in their picture of the world. And 

that setting is responsible for everything, including the shortage of toilet paper in Venezuelan shops. And basically the worse the situation gets inside the country, the more desperately it needs this setting to explain away its problems. 

For instance, the Kremlin really believes the United States stands behind the Islamic 

extremists in Russian Caucasus. They really believe that the United States are behind 

Russian opposition. And their symbol of faith is that the United States created ISIS. It’s 

a very warped picture of the world. And it’s very hard to have a productive policy toward 

the country with psychic issues, because, well, how do we behave toward an abusive 

neighbor who, say, likes to crap on your lawn or who tortures your cat? If you try to 

accommodate him, he will think you’re a weakling and he will use the ground gained as 

a forward base for the next attacks. And if you retaliate, he will say to his family, see, 

we are surrounded by enemies. 

So basically there is no good diplomatic strategy in dealing with Mr. Putin, like there 

are no good diplomatic strategies in dealing with violent Islamists, because both are the 

worst type of aggressors—an aggressor who claims to be a victim. And this is bad news. 

The good news is that hybrid war, we are talking so much about against the West, is not 

actually Putin’s invention. It is a Soviet invention. And I think there is simply no 

comparison between Soviet hybrid war and the current Russian one, because the old 

Soviet subversion machine, especially in the 30s, was really powerful. These were the days 

of Harry Dexter White, of Alger Hiss, or Laurence Duggan. These were the days when 

half of American China hands were Soviet spies and, worse, they were not just spying, 

they were directing policies. 

These were the days when people like Ernest Hemingway were used as useful idiots 

by USSR. And people like my favorite detective writer, Dashiell Hammett, were simple 

and pure communists. So we have nothing comparable nowadays, because when Stalin 

stood up and said that Moscow trials of 1937 is the real thing, he was believed by half 

of European intellectuals. It was unfashionable not to believe Stalin then, as it is not to 

believe in global warming today. When right now, Russia stands up and says, for instance, 

that Skripals were injected with chemical agent after they came to hospital, as a Soviet 

representative—or, a Russian representative in the United Nations claimed—well, it’s just 

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hilarious. So basically my premise is if the open society survived the Soviet hybrid war, 

it will certainly survive Putin. 

The second important thing about the hybrid war is that you cannot really win it. 

It can wreak havoc on somebody you consider your enemy, but you get no gains, economic, 

territorial, for yourself. And we can also see that Russian hybrid war is not directed to 

support this or that person. What actually numerous investigations found is that Russia 

didn’t support Trump, per se. It supported those whom it considered to be the most 

disruptive and divisive. This is why it supported Trump, why it supported Bernie Sanders 

over Hillary. It supported every divisive view. It supported Black Lives Matter and white 

supremacists, militant Islamists and violent Islamophobia. Moreover, the minute Trump 

won, Russia switched its support to try and bash us. And actually, you should know that 

the most successful public event ever organized by Russian trolls was a public anti-Trump 

rally, organized on November 12th, 2016, just 4 days after his victory. Thousands 

attended, including filmmaker Michael Moore, who played the role of unwitting useful 

idiot. 

Actually, this makes us wonder, because when Kremlin so publicly and demonstratively supported Trump’s victory, was this just a visceral reaction to Hillary’s defeat, 

because by this time she was undoubtedly personally hated by Kremlin? Or this more 

strategic play, with Kremlin perfectly aware of its reputation, was expertly using its 

alleged support in order to weaken the institution of American presidency? Otherwise 

speaking, I think that the current job he’s doing—I’m completely in agreement he’s doing 

a very good job of containing something that’s really hard to contain. And its most important achievement actually I think is not sanctions; it’s the military containment. And 

that’s precisely what lacked during the previous administration. 

I would remind you that Putin embarked on a bloody career of hybrid aggression in 

year 2008 in the cause of Russia-Georgian war. It was an open act of aggression against 

a sovereign nation. It was carried out exactly in the same manner as all things Putin later 

did in Ukraine. For Putin operated through cutouts and volunteers, through the runaway 

republic of South Ossetia. He was an aggressor posing to be a victim. And he was claiming 

that the real aggressors are the United States. In Kremlin’s point of view, they stood 

behind Saakashvili. 

And Russian media were telling that, yes, fighter pilots attacked Tskhinvali. This is 

the capital of this runaway republic. And actually, I do remember a press conference in 

which none other than a deputy commander of Russian general staff produced a passport 

of an American citizen, the citizen in this case was Michael Lee White, as a proof that 

it was the U.S. military who were fighting Russian in Georgia. This was classic, vintage, 

fake news, for it was later proved that this Michael Lee White, he lived in China for 10 

years, his passport was stolen from him in year 2005, when he transited from Beijing to 

United States via Moscow. 

And after all this, President Obama announced the reset policy. And by doing so, in 

Kremlin’s eyes, he was a weakling. Moreover, in Kremlin’s eyes, that meant he acknowledged the basic Kremlin narrative about the war, that is the narrative that the United 

States was somehow responsible. In Kremlin’s eyes, he said, oh yes, we did all these 

things you claim we did, and we are sorry. He acknowledged that Michael Lee White was 

fighting in Georgia. And I think if there was no reset, there would have been no Crimea 

annexation. 

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We can see this story repeating itself in August 2013, when Assad used chemical 

weapons against thousands of civilians and crossed the red line. Instead of bombing the 

hell out of Assad, President Obama said that he will explore other options. And these 

other options involved President Putin’s offer to act as intermediary. Putin volunteered 

to supervise the destruction of Assad’s chemical weapons. Well, we all know that Assad 

kept his chemical weapons. 

And I’m not criticizing American administration. I’m just saying that this was basically one way to deal with a wild neighbor who pisses on your lawn and tortures your 

cat. You try to engage him. And you get more aggression in return. And by year 2014, 

Putin was thinking he can get away with anything. So after year 2014, after Crimea 

annexation, and especially after Putin tried to meddle in U.S. elections, we’re in phase 

two. The police has been called for the wild neighbor. The wild neighbor got his due and 

Russia is under sanctions. 

Actually, does this change the situation? Well, no, because Putin is using sanctions 

to build up hysteria inside Russia. Kremlin is saying we are surrounded by enemies. They 

love us not. Actually, an even worse thing is happening because prior to 2014, main Putin 

support base was Russian elite who, as you put it, stole in Russia and kept money in the 

West. Now, and that’s unfortunate and that’s part of the sanctions, this support base is 

shifting more and more toward underclass, toward the poor people who have never been 

in the West, never seen it, never had any money, and who want a reason for all their 

suffering. And they get this reason. Yes, we are suffering, but this is because in the 

West—they in the West, they hate us. And why do they hate us? Oh, because we are so 

spiritual. 

Does this mean that sanctions are counterproductive? Of course not. That’s the same 

conundrum society has faced when dealing with criminals. Every social worker worth his 

mettle will tell you that it is counterproductive to put a criminal in jail. And jail is a bad 

place. It does no good. Yes, jail is a very, very bad way to deal with criminals, not 

counting all the others. And you can say the same about Kremlin. Sanctions are very bad 

with the Kremlin, not counting all the others. But the most important point I would like 

to point out is that the only effective strategy is not sanctions, it is the military containment. And we can point to very significant developments. They have been talked already 

about by Herman and by Alina. 

The first was Deir Ez-Zor, when on April 8th around 200 Russians were wiped out 

by U.S. air strikes because they attacked United States positions and the positions of the 

allies. And actually these—by this time, Kremlin was stating for years on end that the 

United States are attacking Russia. And we would have supposed all hell to break loose 

on Russian TV. Instead, there was not a peep. Why? Precisely because it was a 

humiliating defeat, and because United States acted and not talked. If United States were 

to show notice, address the issue, convene the United Nations, I guess there would have 

been very strong Russian reaction. Where 200 Russians were just killed, there was zero 

reaction. 

And then, of course, we had the red line story once again this April, when President 

Trump ordered the air strikes against Assad, and Russia made a great show and issued 

a lot of warnings, but in the end were very careful not to shoot down a single U.S. missile, 

let alone to sink a U.S. ship. So President Trump basically stared Mr. Putin down. And 

actually, that’s the last point I want to make. And that’s a question I wanted to address 

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specifically—what is more valuable to Mr. Putin? Statements of false moral equivalence 

or sanctions relief, which is not forthcoming? 

And then finish with another striking example. And this is the example of Israeli 

Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, Benjamin Netanyahu, who came to Russia on Russia’s 

Victory Day. He marched with Putin in celebratory columns. And the very next day, the 

Israelis wiped out nearly all Iranian air defense systems in Syria. They had tried to call 

it Iranian names, like Pantsir, Buk, Dvina—the famous Buk that is superb, as we know, 

against civilian airliners. But it did not perform, it seems, as well against Israeli F16s. 

And again, Putin did not as much as beep. 

So this shows that PR reality that is Israeli prime minister marching alongside with 

him was much more important to Putin than the real thing. And actually at Deir Ez-Zor, 

we could see that Putin does not want a real war. He doesn’t want a short, victorious 

war, which he has ample grounds to believe will be neither short nor victorious. What 

he wants is a PR war, a war in which he has all the advantages and none of the setbacks. 

And it is to Russia to fear the conventional war, and not the West. 

So there are two basic advantages of the current administration. President Trump 

is not afraid to use force, and he is unpredictable. This is his greatest asset and his 

greatest liability, because actually unpredictability in foreign policy is associated with 

authoritarian leaders. It is an authoritarian leader who can flip and flip back and forth, 

who can turn in 2 days 200 degrees. The democracy is a ponderous thing to turn. So it 

turns out that what is probably the last line, is that Mr. Trump is superbly equipped to 

deal with bullies because he is not a small bully himself. And it is a good thing in a world 

of bullies. 

Ms. BAUMAN. Okay. Thank you guys for that. I just want to start off with a little 

bit of discussion before we go to question and answer. Herman and Alina both mentioned 

the problem of Trump’s statements, alienating European allies over things such as trade 

as well as Russia recently, we see. I’m wondering if you think that these squabbles on 

other issues that maybe aren’t directly related to Russia might cripple U.S. policy by 

making Russia appear more favorable in comparison? Do Europeans place more value on 

what Trump says than what’s actually going on? I don’t know if any of you want to speak 

to that. 

Mr. PIRCHNER. Russian economic penetration, especially of Germany, plays a big 

factor into how our relationships with Europe as a whole play out. And to the extent that 

statements are made by the president that are subject to a variety of interpretations, I 

think it strengthens the hand of pro-Western forces within Germany. Having said that, 

eventually Europe will have to grips with the reality of Russian aggression. They’ll have 

to come to grips with the need to defend themselves. They’ll have to come to grips with 

the Russian propaganda, which will become less rather than more effective as greater portions of the European elite and European intelligentsia understands how they’re being 

lied to and how their own individual internal political processes are being manipulated. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. So I think the bigger question you’re asking, Rachel, is whether 

President Trump’s statements and potential alienation of our European allies is kind of 

pushing them toward Russia, right? 

Ms. BAUMAN. Yes, and undermining our——

Dr. POLYAKOVA. And our interest and the alliance—transatlantic alliance. I don’t 

think those are related. There have been so-called Putinversteher in German for a very 

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long time among the central left. Gerhard Schroder stands out as the Number 1, who is 

the former chancellor of the SPD, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, who now, 

within a month of losing his election in Germany, became chairman of the board of 

Gazprom and now also serves a similar position for the Russian State oil monopoly, 

Rosneft. And continually lobbies for Kremlin interests within Germany, including for Nord 

Stream II, the pipeline project that would make Europe deeply dependent on Russian gas 

for many years to come and would cut Ukraine out from transit fees. 

Same thing in Italy. We now have a new government composed of right-wing populists, League and the Five Star Movement, who have for a very long time been proRussian, very clearly. And we have these similar kinds of political forces essentially across 

all European countries today. So that was happening before the U.S. elections in 2016. 

In Europe, it’s been happening at least since the 1990s, frankly. And the Russian Government, as part of its asymmetric warfare against the West, has strategically cultivated alliances and relationships with fringe political parties, primarily on the right but also on 

the left. 

As Yulia was saying, this is part of the chaos strategy. It’s not about choosing a specific individual or associating yourself with specific ideology. It’s about chaos, right? So 

you support challenger, insurgent political forces on both sides. 

So my last comment is that Putin, though, is, I think, very good at seeing power 

vacuums and divisions, and then knowing how to insert himself into those divisions 

between allies or between member states within the EU itself. And we saw him doing this 

recently. 

So just at the end of May, Russia hosted the St. Petersburg economic forum, to which 

President Macron attended directly after this very well-publicized bromance with President Trump that he had here. Angela Merkel also flew to meet with President Putin in 

Moscow. We don’t actually know why. There was—I didn’t see an official readout as to 

the visit. And what was interesting is that Putin greeted her with a bouquet of roses. And 

in the past, he’s greeted her with his black Labrador retriever, because she has a fear 

of dogs. So this was a very marked change in how Putin himself, I think, was trying to 

court European allies. 

He then, himself, went to Austria for a series of meetings. Austria’s also a country 

like Germany, that has its share of Putinversteher. And he’s been doing this, cultivating 

these kinds of relationships to try to pull away some of the European allies from the 

United States. So, yes, the tensions that we currently have in the relationship, Putin is 

trying to step in to make those divisions wider. But is the Trump policy actually pushing 

Europeans toward Russia? I think these trends have been going on in Europe for a very 

long time. 

Ms. LATYNINA. Probably I would add that there was this thing—this roses bouquet 

thing was quite controversial, because this meant he presented it to a woman and not 

a head of state. So there was a lot of discussion about this as well, whether it was 

intended as insult after the Labrador—nobody saw the Labrador around. Probably it probably died. [Laughs.] So actually, I would agree that Putin is very good at exploding cracks. 

And this is why it is important not to overestimate that—not to ascribe to him all the—

all the divisions that are happening both in European and American society because the 

cracks are here for real. The cracks are about serious issues. And if you don’t want the 

Kremlin to be inserted into these cracks, then the Western world should really address 

the issues. 

12

For instance, immigration is a very serious issue in Europe. And if the current mainstream parties don’t address the issue, then of course the marginal parties would. And 

it is not a good thing to explain all these things, oh, it’s just Putin’s influence and Putin’s 

money. Otherwise, we will be behaving themselves. Just as sure as the Kremlin one says, 

well, all the Russian opposition is financed by United States and there’s no real ground 

for discontent. 

Ms. BAUMAN. And one more thing I would talk about, since we are here in Congress, 

is the role of Congress in policy toward Russia. I know we mentioned CAATSA, which 

Trump signed and eventually implemented. [Laughs.] But that, of course, did originate 

in Congress. And I was wondering if any of you saw that as a kind of insurance policy? 

Maybe in case Trump did something or said something—in the beginning of his presidency there were thoughts that he might actually get rid of the sanctions. So what do 

you think Congress’ role is, in light of CAATSA as well as possible future endeavors? 

Mr. PIRCHNER. I note that that bill, which passed with large bipartisan majorities, 

was signed by Trump. He could have let it go into law without signing it. So I think the 

charge that he wasn’t going along with it is not completely accurate. If he really had 

strong objections, he would not have signed it. I think there remains skepticism in Congress regarding how hard a line the president will continue to take on Donbas and other 

situations in the world. And the large bipartisan majority I think certainly will be a factor 

in shaping policy, because it’s a reality of power in D.C. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. I actually think right now is a really important moment for Congress, which typically is not as involved in foreign policy, which is the domain of the 

executive in the United States, to play a much more leading role when it comes to Russia. 

And Congress has done this with CAATSA very clearly, by stepping into fill what I think 

some members of Congress probably saw a potential threat that this administration 

moved quickly to remove sanctions. Certainly candidate Trump talked about that during 

the campaign. So I think that was a fear that many congressional members had at the 

time. 

I don’t think that was the main motivator for CAATSA, because it was so much more 

expansive than just codifying the Obama-era executive orders related to sanctions. It 

could have just done that, but it went much, much further and actually gave the administration a significant mandate and authority to impose new sanctions related to energy, 

related to illicit finance from Russia, and also related to the defense and intelligence 

sector. And they have used those authorities. Again, they didn’t have to use them. 

The Kremlin—so-called Kremlin list that the administration released as a part of 

CAATSA at the end of January, the public version was a bit of a joke because it was basically a culmination of a Forbes list and added there was some Russian officials from the 

Kremlin website. But the classified version—which I have not seen but I’ve talked to 

people who have, maybe some of you have—was a real report that was well done, well 

researched. And I have no doubt the sanctions that came afterwards that we talked about 

in early April, that were really tough, were based on that classified information and net 

assessments about specific individuals and companies that are involved in some of the 

dirty dealings of the Kremlin’s hybrid war. 

So I think there’s a lot more that Congress can still do. But specifically, much more—

and what we’ve all been talking about—in this hybrid war, asymmetric warfare space. We 

haven’t done very much to really understand how American tech firms, like Facebook and 

Twitter and Google, have played a significant role in propagating Russian propaganda and 

13

disinformation alongside so-called fake news. I was, frankly, a bit disappointed—a bit—

[laughs]—with the Mark Zuckerberg hearings that happened in Congress, that didn’t 

really get to the heart of the matter. And I think this industry and the role that it’s 

served in being manipulated by the Kremlin will continue to be an issue. And at some 

point, regulatory measures will have to come, in the same way that regulatory measures 

came over television and radio and print. 

And so this is, I think, a place where Congress can continue to have a very important 

role in understanding: How do we get the situation under control? Because it’s not getting 

any better based on the voluntary actions of these companies. 

Ms. BAUMAN. And, Herman, did you want to make a quick statement here? 

Mr. PIRCHNER. There’s been a long and very vigorous debate among constitutional 

scholars about the role in national security of Congress versus the executive branch. And 

the reason it’s been so vigorous is there’s a lot of ambiguity in the Constitution. In practice, when the executive branch or Congress has gone so far, the opposing branch has 

made a big effort to reassert its rights on things like war powers, but not only. And my 

personal view is in recent years Congress has abnegated a lot of power it could exert if 

it was willing to do so. 

Ms. BAUMAN. And Yulia? No comments? That’s fine. [Laughter.] All right. 

So we’re going to turn it over to the audience. For question and answers, please state 

your name and your affiliation. And keep it brief. I also want to hear actual questions 

rather than comments. If you keep going for too long, I will cut you off. So if anyone has 

any questions? Yes. We have a microphone here. Yes. It’s coming. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you. Hello. My name is Kristen Chang [sp]. I’m with the office 

of Senator Schumer. I’m an intern there. 

Dr. Polyakova, you spoke briefly on Facebook’s impact on what’s happening, what 

we’re looking at. I was wondering if I could get all of your thoughts on how we should 

move forward with the cybersecurity threat? I know you’ve spoken a little bit about that, 

but I’d love to hear more about it if you have anything else to say. 

Thank you. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. Should we take them one at a time? 

Ms. BAUMAN. Yes, if anyone wants to respond. Not required, but——

Dr. POLYAKOVA. Well, I do think when I mentioned about the role of social media 

companies is different than the cybersecurity element. They’re intertwined, but different. 

So we’re talking about the spread of disinformation, which is different from misinformation, is the intentional spread of inaccurate information to try to manipulate society and 

certain narratives, which is what the Kremlin has been doing, but also others have been 

doing. And that’s different than just, you know, putting up false stories to make a little 

bit of money from advertising. So I think we have to separate those. 

And the cyberthreats question, I think a lot of the actions on that end have to happen 

in the classified space, and have to be led by the intelligence community, for obvious reasons. And as a result, I don’t know exactly—because I don’t have clearance—what we have 

already done in that space. But I would hope that the Department of Defense, along with 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, are thinking through their own 

vulnerabilities. I was happy to see the early administration, they banned the use of 

Kaspersky Lab software on U.S. Government computers. That was a good first step, but 

that was a small first step. 

14

I think the bigger threat in the cybersecurity domain is not as much Russia as China. 

And what we’ve seen Russia actually become is more of a hub for cyber criminals, which 

the Russian Government sometimes uses to do its own things, its own projects. But I also 

think that this is a really deeply complex issue. I know I’m not giving you a satisfying 

answer, but I think that’s because a lot of the actions have to happen in the intelligence 

space. And if any of you are working for the intel communities, I would hope that you’re 

thinking through this. 

Mr. PIRCHNER. The American Foreign Policy Council has run a series of briefings on 

cybersecurity. I think 52 Senate offices attended those briefings over the past year. And 

we have them summarized in a primer on cybersecurity. And there’s also a full book that’s 

gotten rave reviews from Harvard Law. And if anybody in the audience wants to do a 

deep dive on it, talk to Amanda Eisenhower—if she raises her hand—from the American 

Foreign Policy Council, and we’ll get them to you. 

Ms. LATYNINA. Okay. I would just like to add up a couple of things. Maybe not many 

people remember, but the first attack that ever happened—that ever was devised by 

Kremlin was in Estonia. And it was called Bronze Soldier Riots, when the Estonian 

Government decided to move a monument to Russian—well, to Russian liberators who liberated Estonia from Nazis, and at the same time included it into Soviet Union, to another 

place. And besides the attacks—besides the riots, there were immediate cyberattacks on 

Estonian eGovernment. And as Estonia has one of the most advanced systems of 

eGovernment in the world, this was of course quite dangerous. And this led to the fact 

that right now the cybersecurity center of NATO is situated in Estonia. 

I would like to point out about this Estonia thing two things. First, the attack—the 

Bronze Soldier Riots were actually organized in a very interesting way. I tried to pay more 

attention to the detail, and that’s what I found out. That actually it was a perfect setup 

because what happened is that a lot of Russians who live in Estonia, they listen to Russian State TV. And the Russian State TV started announcing that people are rioting. And 

after it started announcing that people are rioting and publishing news about it, they 

came and rioted. It was as simple as that. And actually, I think it was perfect type of 

an organization of an event. And that’s one thing to think about, that Russian cyberwar 

actually started with Estonia, and Estonia’s a member of NATO. 

And actually, I think that Russia can be dangerous when it comes to cyberattacks. 

And actually, there’s one thing I never mentioned—I never heard any consequences and 

any news after it happened, because several weeks before the American presidential elections there was a huge DDOS attack, distributed denial of service attack, on various 

American commercial services, and they went down. And actually, somebody said, yes, it 

was probably due to Russia. And it was not followed up. And I think this is actually much 

more serious than Russian fake news. Because I think there’s a lot of hype about Russian 

fake news and what’s happening in Twitter and in Facebook. 

And I’ll tell you one thing, there’s one case that’s—there’s one thing that is malicious 

intent. And there were obviously these troll farms who were trying to meddle. But there 

is another thing that is a real influence. And I don’t think they exerted any real influence 

for one very specific thing. Here am I, sitting before you and talking in English. And my 

English is not a native language. And despite the fact that I’m a fairly good speaker and 

I read in English more than Russian, I certainly cannot pass as a native American in my 

Facebook messages. So don’t you believe for a second that Russian people, Russian 

15

Facebook trolls who are uneducated, who don’t even have the level of English I have, can 

pass for an American. It’s as simple as that. 

As I said, there’s a question of malicious intent. And the intent is something that 

also should be punished. But there’s also a question of real influence, which is almost negligible. In Russian law there’s a specific thing for this, it’s an attempt with the means 

that are not sufficient for the attempt. I don’t know whether such a thing exists in American law. 

Ms. BAUMAN. Okay. Another question? Right there. Thank you. 

QUESTIONER. Hi. I’m Brooke Hartsuff with the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission. 

Continuing the topic with hybrid warfare, with Wagner’s private military company 

operating in southwestern Syria and ties to Putin’s regime, and then obviously their 

attack on U.S. troops in February of this year that’s making it the deadliest U.S.-Russian 

clash since the Cold War—as private military companies have shown ties to Putin’s 

regime, what does this mean for the future of U.S.-Russian relations and military action? 

Ms. LATYNINA. Well, first of all, I think we should understand that private military 

company in Russia actually do not very compatible things. Because, see, if you look at 

Russian regime carefully, well, Kremlin nationalized everything, beginning with oil and 

going down to TV. So it beggars belief that a leader who is as intent as Putin is on governing anything in his country leaves a private military company operating like in some 

medieval times. There are no private military companies that go to war in the presentday world, except, as I’ve said, for medieval times, because obviously the state monopoly 

on violence is one thing that makes the state tick. 

So I think that instead of private military companies, we should talk of the policy 

of plausible deniability by Mr. Putin. He wants to create a common structure in which 

he will not be held responsible for what is happening under his broad guidance. And I 

think that this possible—what Putin wants is diminished liability. And actually, what he 

gets—this is also true—is diminished control because in things like shooting down 

Malaysia Boeing, or maybe even at this Deir Ez-Zor thing, we cannot be 100 percent sure 

that Putin controlled the whole of the operation, because he had definitely given an 

umbrella permission. But unfortunately, when people get arms into their hands and it’s 

a private guy who has these arms, he starts going after his own goals. 

I would like you to direct your attention to a piece you probably know. There’s a very 

perfect piece in The Washington Post, on what actually happened at Deir Ez-Zor, because 

it had some leaked information. And this leaked information was as following: That, first, 

Mr. Prigozhin—this is the guy who is the head of—who is the nominal head of this 

Wagner brigade, who is responsible for it—for the upkeep of it—that first, Mr. Prigozhin 

was contacted by some Syrian official who promised him a reward for doing this. And then 

Mr. Prigozhin contracted a man whose name was Mr. Ostrovenko. And Mr. Ostrovenko 

was a deputy to the head—to the chief of staff of Mr. Putin’s administration. 

So what I’m trying to point out, that actually for an operation that is planned from 

the top, it’s sort of a very roundabout way of carrying out an operation, because, you 

know, Mr. Prigozhin is no military man himself. And he’s contacting a guy who is, God 

forbid, the civilian deputy of the chief of staff of Mr. Putin. So what I make out of it—

of course, I can’t just suppose it. But what do I make out of it, is that Mr. Prigozhin has 

got a sort of umbrella permission and go-ahead from Mr. Putin. Then he sorted out the 

16

details with these Syrian guys, and he was promised some remuneration, which is okay 

by Kremlin. It is not something that is not permitted. It is okay. So then he contacted 

Ostrovenko in order to inform him of the details of the operations, because he had no 

direct access to Mr. Putin himself, right, at this time. 

And he was doing this because Mr. Shoygu—that’s the Russian minister of defense—

hates his guts, which is just obvious because when you’re a private military contract and 

the regular army, they hate each other’s guts. And he wanted to sort of, you know, have 

an insurance policy in case things go south. So actually, things went south, and Mr. 

Prigozhin was probably able to say, well, Mr. Shoygu sanctioned this. So this is a very, 

very roundabout way. And what I’m trying to say, that this all goes under the heading 

of plausible deniability and the resultant diminished control. So this is just exactly 

intended. So we could not sort head or tail of it, and understand, was Kremlin really 

responsible for trying to attack U.S. troops, or was it just a freak [thing]? 

Mr. PIRCHNER. And I think it’s important that this plausible deniability is understood 

to exist in Ukraine as well. This whole fantasy of separatists. Make no mistake, the operation there is Russian planned, financed, equipped, directed. Officer corps is all Russian. 

But under the umbrella of deniability, even though there’s full control out of Moscow. And 

if you have somebody local that gets out of line, as happened in Donbas, they get assassinated, and everybody else gets in line. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. Just very briefly, because you asked about what does this mean for 

the future, I think Yulia’s detail of the Wagner conflict in Syria is absolutely correct. But 

what it points to is this plausible deniability leads inevitably to warfare by proxy. 

Whether that be in the conventional space, which is the situation with Ukraine and the 

Syrian example, and also in the nonconventional space, meaning the use of cyber criminals, activists, as Mr. Putin volunteers—patriotic volunteers, as Mr. Putin has called 

them, and the disinformation space as well. 

So there’s no—it’s not maybe a coincidence, but it is interesting that Prigozhin was 

also in charge of the Internet Research Agency, the troll factory project, and the Wagner 

Group, right? So it seems that there is a system of control that is ambiguous—purposely 

ambiguous, where a certain guidance or directive is given from the Kremlin, from Mr. 

Putin, but then the details are figured out on the ground. And sometimes things go wrong 

and the Kremlin can deny. And sometimes when they go well they can take some credit 

for it, which is what happened with Crimea eventually—though Crimea might be a 

slightly different example. 

And I think we’re going to see more and more and more of this. And I think the 

role—what does that mean for policy? It means that European and American policymakers have to be much more clear about pointing the finger, even if you don’t have, you 

know, smoking gun attribution. So this administration did that with the NotPetya 

attacks, where they clearly said this was the responsibility of the GRU, the Russian military intelligence. And we need to do more of this instead of being fearful about saying, 

as the Obama administration was during Ukraine, where I remember in 2014 no one was 

willing to use the words war, Russian war, invasion. The favored term was crisis. I was 

like, we know it wasn’t a crisis. This was a war. But nobody was willing to say those 

words. And now we have a very different situation. Those word are being used. And the 

reality is being spoken about. And we need more of this kind of communication. 

Ms. BAUMAN. Paul, there. 

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QUESTIONER. Thank you. Hi, my name is Paul Massaro. I’m the policy advisor for 

anticorruption at the Helsinki Commission. And thank you all so much for being here 

today. 

Dr. Polyakova, thank you for pointing out the parasitic, kleptocratic nature of the 

Putin regime. Something that we talk about quite a lot in the circles I run in is the way 

that those that steal all this money need to go then and hide it in the West and hide 

it in a rule-of-law country for a number of reasons. Three that come to mind are so the 

next bigger fish won’t steal it, so your people don’t see it necessarily, and so you can 

hedge, of course, against the collapse of the regime. And that’s something that you pointed 

out. 

So my question is, when it comes to those within the United States and perhaps in 

the United Kingdom that assist in the transfer of this wealth, in the hiding of this wealth, 

and then perhaps also the middlemen that clean this money in Cyprus and Latvia, what 

has the administration done and what can the administration do further, seeing as this 

is truly the Achilles heel of the Putin regime? 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. Thanks for the question. Just a quick comment, but all of us have 

talked about this to a certain extent because this is the area of focus, to my mind, that 

will really get at the heart of the Kremlin under Putin. I think there’s a few things that 

can be done. Clearly, the U.K. has a serious problem with dirty Russian money. It’s, I 

would say, probably less of a problem in the United States, although certainly in New 

York, in Miami, and in Delaware—[laughs]—there—in New York and Miami there are 

these empty apartment buildings that we all know about now that have been bought up 

with—as a way to clean dirty money, basically. 

And what this is doing to real estate price is very obvious, that normal citizens can’t 

afford to live in these places because prices are going up. I think most citizens, whether 

it be in the U.K., in Europe, or in the U.S. are not making those connections, right? One 

reason why you can’t afford an apartment in Miami is because of this dirty money that’s 

just being parked there, and these apartments are empty. But the real estate doesn’t 

exist. 

One major thing that worries me about the U.K., because of Brexit, is that the U.K.’s 

financial system has become so deeply dependent on this foreign money—not just from 

Russia, from China as well, and elsewhere. But as they exit, supposedly, the European 

Union, they will inevitably have capital flight. And as a result, they will need to be much 

more dependent on attacking this kind of money to maintain the current financial prestige 

that London city has acquired. And so the U.K. is considering much more strict legislation. Those specifically point to identifying transparency and disclosures around the final 

beneficiary of accounts. 

We still have that loophole here. And it’s one of the few places we have that loophole. 

But I think to get really shell companies—which is really complicated—you have clear 

laws about disclosing the final beneficiary of accounts. And that, I think, would also go 

for funding for political ads as well online, where you can’t set up a shell company or a 

shell group to put a local ad, like Young Muslims for America, by some, you know, Americans for Puppies kind of organization or something. So I think also somewhere Congress 

could act to enforce those kinds of disclosures. 

Mr. PIRCHNER. Congress should take a look at the laws that were put into place 

during the last days of Cameron, before May came to power. And they require substantial 

18

disclosure of where the money originated, the source of the money. As Alina pointed out, 

they haven’t been implemented because of the penetration of Russian money into the coffers of the Tory Party and the Labour Party. And many legitimate businessmen make 

money out of the Russian oligarchs that are there. I went to England, I don’t know, maybe 

5, 6 weeks ago. And I understand that the debate is alive on how far they should go to 

implement these laws. But there are pretty good laws on the books. And it may be worth 

a look-see for those of you who are on staff here to see what may have applicability here. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. Just as a followup, law firms are also being used as money laundering organizations—they don’t have to disclose because of client confidentiality privilege 

where their money is coming from. So what happens is Oligarch X, Company Y, you know, 

you transfer millions to a law firm, which is recorded as client fees. And the law firm, 

by law, does not have to reveal where that money comes from and what it was for. And 

that also sets up—it’s not just real estate and it’s not just bank account holdings that 

there be disclosures around. And this is why Delaware has become, oddly, a place where 

there’s high concentrations of these firms that are being used to launder money. 

Ms. LATYNINA. Just one thing I would like to add. What I think is, first of all, you 

need to know about Russian money is to differentiate. Because if you use the highest ethical standards, that all Russian money is dirty money because, you know, everything in 

Soviet Union was state property. And the minute it was privatized, I can assure you that 

no Russian oligarch worth his mettle was paying any taxes. And I know how they were 

going around about not paying it. And of course, even in Yeltsin’s time they were all using 

administrative resources to get more money. And I would concede that this is normal, 

because business is not about politics. Business is about making profits. And if the guy 

could make more profits by using administrative resources, he was using it. 

So if we don’t differentiate between the people who say, well, oligarchs became 

oligarchs under Yeltsin, in a sort of competitive corruption. Yes, and people who became 

oligarchs simply because they were Putin’s friends or because they were Putin’s officials 

who were just taking money as bribes. Then we are doing a very bad thing, because actually if we judge by the highest ethical standards we should ask ourselves a question: What 

would Rockefeller or Vanderbilt do if he were brought in Russia and he were a businessman in Russia in 1990s? And probably, he would behave very much like, say, a guy whom 

I don’t like, like Mr. Deripaska or other guys. 

So first, I think that actually each case should be treated individually. And when it’s 

individually, it means it’s not treated by a law, but it’s treated by a special service. And 

a special service looks into the guy, and maybe even he’s a Putin official and all his money 

is stolen. And maybe it can make a deal with him, and he will rat on his comrades. Maybe 

it is better to make a deal. 

Ms. BAUMAN. Okay. I’m going to see if I can go to this side of the room. Won’t 

discriminate. In the front here. 

QUESTIONER. Zdravstvuyte i spasiba [hello and thank you]. So, hello, my name is William Lee. I’m with Senator Murkowski’s office in Alaska. 

So several weeks ago the Ukrainian Government executed a sting operation involving 

anti-Kremlin journalist Arkady Babchenko. My question for you is, what do you think this 

tells us about Eastern European states’ effort to resist Russian expansion, and perhaps 

what can we do to help them? 

19

Dr. POLYAKOVA. The Babchenko case is really interesting. Thanks for that question. 

And highly controversial, obviously. Aside from that case, which had a lot of unique 

characteristics to it—there have been many, many assassinations or attempted assassinations of critics of the Putin regime who went to Ukraine to escape persecution or because 

they were fearing for their lives. I think Yulia can speak to that in more detail than I 

can. But there’s been a long-standing pattern of Russian independent journalists being 

harassed, being killed, even if they leave Russia. 

So the Babchenko case is different from that. Babchenko was a Russian journalist, 

who was controversial in Russia as well, who went to Ukraine because he said he had 

fears for his own safety. What happened in that operation, was, I think, basically a 

botched PR media operation by the Ukrainian intelligence services. So I don’t know if all 

of you are familiar with it, but just very quickly Babchenko, the journalist, was living in 

Ukraine at the time from Russia. A big report comes out that he’s been killed, shot. But 

then 24 hours later, after every single Western media source has reported that this was 

the Russian intelligence services, he appears, giving a press conference alive and well. 

And the Ukrainian intelligence services say, well, this was a sting operation to try to 

catch his actual assassins. 

And a lot of questions have been raised about that. But in terms of was this really 

a good thing to do, was their reputational risk for the Ukrainian intelligence authorities, 

should they have taken on that risk—because it made it look like they were spreading 

fake news—my comment on that is there’s a very big difference between a strategic intent 

to undermine and try to influence narratives and discourses and societies over time, which 

is what the Kremlin has been doing, versus a discrete intelligence operation which you 

could say has been botched, because it didn’t really communicate well. So there’s two very 

different cases that we can point to. 

I think the bigger picture, though, is that the message that many of those who dissent to the Putin regime is that you’re not safe anywhere anymore. And that goes true 

for former intelligence operatives, like Skripal. It goes true for many Russian journalists. 

And I think this is just the reality that we live in. 

Mr. PIRCHNER. I agree completely. It’s important to note that Putin feels vulnerability. 

And that’s why he has the need to make examples of anybody who sticks their head 

up to dissent. If he were truly secure, he could ignore them. 

Ms. LATYNINA. I’d just address a little bit specifically the Babchenko case, because 

just as Alina has said, there were many people who were killed in Ukraine, including 

Pavel Sheremet, a very famous journalist. Another case was Denis Voronenkov. Not a 

very good guy and actually a fraudster, but a fraudster proclaimed to fight Putin’s regime, 

and who was killed for it. There were two attempts on the life of a guy called [Okuyeva?], 

that’s the Chechen field commander, actually an Islamist who was fighting on the 

Ukrainian side. There were two attempts on the life of Anton Gerashchenko. We can 

roughly say that this is the PR secretary for their ministry of internal affairs. 

So the Babchenko case is perfectly believable. And I don’t classify it as fake news. 

I classify it as a sting operation. And actually, I can claim that I believe the majority of 

things the Ukrainian intelligence says about the operation. But the biggest problem with 

me is precisely this word ‘‘belief.’’ Because as a journalist, and especially in an age where 

there is video recording, audio recordings, I don’t have to believe anything. I have to know 

20

the facts. And now instead of the real proof, electronic proof, the Ukrainian intelligence 

services just asked to believe that this is the culprit, this is the organizer, and these are 

the guys who in Russia were standing behind this. And so I think the Ukrainian intelligence definitely underperformed. That they should have continued with the case. That 

it cannot be argued that this is just a sting operation and everything will be evident 

during the trial, because it was as much a PR operation as a sting one. So the minute 

we found out that Babchenko is alive, we had to see the proof. And if we are not seeing 

the proof, as I said, it’s probably not a sign that it was, you know, fake. But it’s probably 

a sign that Ukrainian services, as usual I would say, performed very, very much—underperformed. 

Ms. BAUMAN. Okay. I think we have time for one more question. So are there any 

more questions? If there aren’t—ah, there’s one here. 

QUESTIONER. Hi. I’m Viola Gienger. I’m a writer, reporter and editor for Just Security, the blog at NYU Law. 

And I’m wondering about—there have been some comments in recent events where 

U.S. officials, to the extent of Russia continuing its operations in the United States—

disinformation operations—in advance of the midterm elections. Do you have any sense 

of what entities are in charge and running those? And has there been any information 

about any replacement for the Internet Research Agency? 

Ms. LATYNINA. Well, actually, right now there are just rumors. I haven’t seen any 

clear facts. But I would like to point out two things. Just recently Mr. Putin has been 

asked by an Australian journalist about the activities of Mr. Prigozhin. Yes, and he 

replied that, well, the United States has George Soros. And I have my Mr. Prigozhin. That 

was basically his contention. This is a picture of the world in which Mr. Putin lives. As 

I said, he really believes that the United States is standing behind everything bad—everything problematic that’s happening in Russia. And he’s really thinking George Soros to 

be the agent of U.S. Government. I just forget whose president’s personal cook George 

Soros was. [Laughter.] Maybe he earned his money by cooking for President Bush. I sort 

of forgot. [Laughs.] 

So that’s one thing. This is a very clear picture of Putin—what Mr. Putin is thinking 

about. That’s how he believes the world to function. And the second thing, which we’re 

not talking about and which is actually very important in Russia, is that we all think 

of these operations as pursuing some political gains. But for a lot of people who are carrying out these operations, it just an operation to earn some money. And actually, the reason these operations go horribly wrong when it comes to killing, or when it comes to 

infiltration, or when it comes to fake news, is precisely that there’s a lot of money which 

comes from the top. And then it sort of trickles to a very, very shallow stream, because 

a lot of money gets appropriated at the top. And the guy who carries out the operation 

just gets peanuts. And for peanuts, you can hire only a guy who is not very good. 

So if we think of this fake news propaganda machine as a machine that is earning 

money and producing money for the people who operate it, that means it will stay in operation precisely because they need something to show for their efforts and later claim, say, 

war contracts or other things because they’ll say, okay, we spent so much money on this, 

we did such a great thing, please give us some money. So I think it is not the kind of 

operation that can be wound down. And the only thing that can be really done is that 

if the United States does not discern whether it is Putin or somebody beneath him and 

puts responsibility square on the guy who is responsible for the general thing. 

21

Mr. PIRCHNER. I think it’s important to remember that this isn’t anything new. 

During the whole Cold War the Soviet Union, to a greater or lesser extent, interfered in 

U.S. elections. What’s different now is you have social media and the computers and so 

much more can be done than could be done in the days of paper and carrying around bags 

of cash. 

Dr. POLYAKOVA. Just a very quick comment. If you’re interested in this question of 

what specifically can Congress do on this disinformation front, there’s a paper I wrote 

recently with Ambassador Daniel Fried, who used to be the U.S. sanctions coordinator and 

served for 40 years in the U.S. Government, called ‘‘Democratic Defense Against 

Disinformation,’’ that lays out just policy recommendations for the U.S. Congress. And the 

other compendium to it is ‘‘The Future of Political Warfare,’’ which looks at the emerging 

threats that are coming in this space. But that’s just a plug for that. 

Ms. BAUMAN. No problem. All right. Thank you guys for coming. And hope it was 

equal parts entertaining and informational. [Applause.] 

[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the briefing ended.] 

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