### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 4, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LU CILL E R ICHA RD SON

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04-03079 Joseph P . Dailey, Judge

No. W2004-01585-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 10, 2005

Th e app e lla nt, Luc ill e Ric ha rd so n, wi th the tr ia l c ou rt ’s perm iss ion , f ile d a n in te rl oc uto ry

app e a l, and, pursua nt to the appellant’s Rule 9 application, thi s Court ag ree d to review the appe llant’s appea l challeng ing the trial court’ s denial of pr etrial diver sion. After r eviewing the re cord a s a whole, w e conclude that the trial court erre d in deny ing pr etrial diver sion. Thus, the judgme nt of the trial court is r e ve rs e d, a ndthe ma tte r i s r e ma nd e d to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r fu rthe r pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Walter Bailey , J r., Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, L

ucille Richardson.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Willi am L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and A my

Weirich, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I n Marc h of 2004, the appellant, a Shelby Countyspecia l education teache r, wa s indicted by the Shelby

CountyGra nd J ury

on one count of

assault and one count of child abuse arising from an incident betwe en the a

ppellant and a

student. The appe llant sought pre trial diversion.

The district attorne y supported the g rant of pretria l diversion. The appellant holds a master ’s deg ree in special e ducation an d h as n o prior criminal recor d. Acc ording to the district attorney ’s statement of f

acts in support of pr etrial diversion, the victim, an autistic child, was discove red sitting-2-

a t hi s des k ble e din g fr om the he a d. Th e app e lla nt of fe re d no explanatio n at the tim e of the inc ide nt, but the victim’s mother was told that the appe llant had hit the victim on the head with her shoe.

I n the appellant’s application for pretria l diversion, s he ex plains that the victim beca me upset wh en h e wa s n o t give n the sports section of the newspa per. The victim beg an having a “se vere behavior episode.” The a

ppellant attempted to ca lm the victim down, but the victim beg an g rabbing the appe llant and assaulting her, e ven biting he r on the ha nd. The a ppellant conc luded her

statement by admitt i n g that she “hit and pushe d the student to g et loose” and that “the student’s he ad wa s injured at the e nd of the orde al.”

The trial c ourt held a he aring on the matter of pretria l diversion and ultimately en t er ed an order deny ing pr etrial diver sion. The trial cour t deter m i n ed t hat the district attorne y acte d

“ arb itr ari ly

a ndc apric iou sly

in e nte ri ng int o th is d ive rs iona g re e me nt w ith ou t requ irin g so me statement of a dmission and remorse on the part of the defe ndant, g iven the shocking nature of the fac ts of this case.” At the hea ring , the trial court expl ained the r easoning behind the den ial of the

re qu e st f or pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion a s f

oll ow s:

[M] y conce rn has be en, and continues t o be, the shocking nature of this offense and the fa ct that the defenda nt hasn’t really shown any remorse beca

use she ha sn’t, at any point, that I ’m awa

re of , admitted that she committed this offense

.
She sort of talked a

round it and talks about steppi n g o u t o f t he room a nd coming back and, lo-and-be hold, some thing has happene d to this child; but never has she stated that she conce des that she did this; and it was a ter rible mistak e and a terrible thing , and she’ s sorry , and she wants to put it behind her and move on. No statement of that sort appea rs any wher e in the re cord. N otwithstanding the f act that y ou made a

statement a w eek or

two ag o that y ou thought, on y our client’s be half, that sh e ha s a dmi tte d g uil t in thi s c a se a ndis s or ry , no thi ng that’ s b e e n p re se nte d to me would bea

r that out.

An d I sti l l h a v e t o a s k

t h e q u e s t i o n : D o e s s o c i e t y h a v e a n y i n t e r e s ta ta l l in

e ns uring that a

vic tim in a c a se lik e thi s e me rg e s f ro m th e wh ole pr oc e ss i n at le a st as g ood of a situation as the de fendant does.

And we have to ke ep in mind that the reque st he re is f o r t h e e x traordina

ry relief of diversion whe re y our client would then be allowed to complete the period of di version and era se any rec ord, whatsoever, of this offe nse ever having occur red.

. . . .
But in a situation where she ha s come to the c ourt - first to the attorney g ener al and now it’s be fore me - a sking f or this ext raor dinary

relief , I do think that there is some need to have some acknow ledg ment of t he guilt of t he off ense c harg ed-3-

in the whole proc ess for the sy stem to work prope rly and for the victim, in a case like thi s, to h a ve a ny

me a su re of

sa tis fa c tio n o ut o f the sy ste m a ndthe pr oc e ss.

I t h i n k t h e r e i s a

l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s tb y

s o c i e t y i n h o w t h i s w h o l e p r o c e ss
a ff e c ts the vic tim , in a dd iti on to y ou r c lie nt.

. . . . So that, so, there is a continuing interest in not only what’s b es t fo r t he defe ndant but what’s be st for justice and the public and socie ty in my opinion.

. . . . Ag ain, while I acknow ledg e the fac t that y our client has willing ly participated in c ou ns e lin g se ssi on s a ndha s n o p ri or re c or d; and , o th e r tha n th is i nc ide nt, ha s a g oo d em pl oy men t r e c or d; i t’ s st ill my op ini on that be c a us e of

the natur e of

thi s offe nse - the c ircumstance s of this offe n s e - t h e cir cumstance s of the victim - an

a u t i s t i c c h i l d w h o , a s t h e f a c t s a l l e g e , w a s b e a t e n b y h i s t e a c h e r

- t h a t if sh e is t o
rec eive the ext raor dinary relief of di version in this case , then I do not think that it’s

unrea sonable to expect her to make some statement admitting g uilt and expressing

remorse for he r conduc t - not just for the fac t that the victim got a bloodied head but fo r h e r p art ic ipatio n - he r c on du c t - he r a c tio n th a t r e su lte d inthat.

And t h erefore , in my

opinion, it i s, to track the la ng uag e of the statute for pu rp os e s o f thi s ru lin g - in my op ini on , the pr os e c uto r in thi s c a se dida c t arb itr ari ly

a ndc aprici ou sl yin e nte ri ng int o th is d ive rs iona g re e me nt w ith ou t r e qu ir ing so me statement of a dmission and remorse on the part of the def endant g iven the shocking nature of the fa cts of this case ; and, there fore , in my role in t his whole proce ss, I ’m reje cting the application for diversion.

Subsequently , the appe llant f i l ed a motion to certify

an appe al pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Proc edure . The a ppellant soug ht review of the trial c ourt’s denia l of pretria l diversion. The trial court g rante d the motion on March 21, 2005, a nd this Court gra nted the appellant’ s Rule 9 application on May 5, 2005.

An a ly sis

On app e a l, the app e lla nt a rg ue s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inde nying pr e tr ia l di ve rs ionbe c aus e “once a pre liminary

determination of elig ibilit y for diver sion has been ma de, the only conditions are those imposed by

the statute, and since an expression of re morsefulne ss is not se t f orth as one of

the fe w co nditions of eligibility , the trial court cannot impose judicially such a c ondition and deny div e rs ion pr e dic a te d o n a n a bu se of pr os e c uto ri a l di sc re tio n. ” Th e Sta te a g re e s.-4-

To be e ligible f

or pre trial diversion, a de fendant must not have be en pre viouslyg rante d diversion; must not have a prior misdemeanor c onviction for which a sentenc e of confine ment was

serve d or a prior felony

con v i ct i o n within a five-y ear period a fter c ompleting the se ntence or probationary

period for

the convict i o n ; an d m u st not have bee n char g ed with a Class A fe lony , a Class B fe lony
, certain Class C felonies, a sexual offe nse, driving under the influence , or vehic ular assault. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105( a)( 1)(B )(i)( a)- (c)

. Howeve r, statutory qualification for pretria l diversion does not g ive rise to automatic entitl ement. See S tate v. Be ll, 69 S.W .3d 171, 176 (Tenn. 2002) ; State v. Curry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999). Rather, the de cision to gr ant or deny pretria l diversion rests within the sound discretion of the prosec uting attorney

. Be ll, 69 S.W.3d

a t 17 6. Whe n ma

kin g a de te rminat ionof

e lig ibi lit y

fo r p re tr ia l di ve rs ion , th e pr os e c uto r s ho uld focus on the de fenda nt’s amena bilityto corre ction. I d. I n other words, the pr osecutor should foc us on any fac tors which ac cu ra t el y ref lect the likelihood that a pa rticular de fendant will or will not be c ome a re pe a t of fe nd e r. I d. Am on g the fa c tor s th e pr os e c uto r s ho uldc on sid e r w he n ma kin g thi s de c isi on are : ( 1) the lik e lih oo d th a t pr e tr ia l div e rs ion wi ll se rv e the e nd s of jus tic e , a s w e ll a s, bo th the def endant’ s and the public’s interest; (2) the c ircumstance s of the off ense; a nd (3) the de fenda nt’s criminal re cord, soc ial history , and phy sical and me ntal condition where appropr iate. See id. (c iting State v. Hammer sley , 650 S.W .2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1983) ).

Although it is the defendant’s responsibility to demonstrate suitabili ty for pr etrial diver sion, the prosec utor is not relieved f rom the oblig ation to examine and consider a ll releva nt fac tors. I d. at 177. I n fac t, when deny ing pr etrial diver sion the prosec utor must discuss in writing all re levant fac tors considere d and the we ight attributed to eac h fac tor. I d.; Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 157. Moreove r, the prosec utor’s written de nial statement must identify any fac tual discrepanci es b etween the evidenc e re lied upon by

the prosec utor and the e vidence prese nted by the def endant. Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 157. Failure to consider and articulate all of the rele vant fa ctors constitutes an a buse of discretion. See id.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-15-105(b)( 2) direc ts a tri al court to approve the memorandum of unde rstanding rec ommending pr etrial d i version unless: (1) the prosec ution has acte d arbitra

rily or capriciously ; (2) the memorandum of understanding was obtained by fraud; (3) diversion of the case is unlawful; or (4) the ce rtificate from the Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation

a s r e qu ir e d b y

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 15 -1 06 is n ot atta c he d to the m e mor a nd um.

The de cision of the prose cutor to g rant or deny pretria l diversion is presumptively corr ect a nd will not be set aside abse n t ab u s e o f discretion. Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 158. When revie wing for abuse of discretion, the trial court must c onsider only the evidenc e conside red by the prosec utor. I d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ma y no t re -w e ig h the e vid e nc e or su bs titute its vie w f or that of the pr os e c uto r. State v. Yanc ey , 69 S.W .3d 553, 559 (Tenn. 2002)

.

I n evaluating whe ther there has been an abuse of di scre tion, the trial court must determine whether the prosec utor has we ighe d an d co nsidered a ll of the rele vant fa ctors or w hether the prosec utor rea ched a

decision not supported by substantial evidenc e in the record. Bell, 69 S.W.3d

a t 17 9; s e e a lso Ya nc e y , 6 9 S. W.3 d at 55 9. Th e tr ial c ou rt ma y c on du c t a

he ari ng , b ut o nly

to-5-

resolve any

fac tual d i sputes raised by the prosec utor or the de fendant. Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 158.

I n the ca se her ein, the trial court denied pretria l dive rsion beca use the trial court de termined that diversion was ina

ppropriate when the a

ppellant fa iled to express g uilt or remorse for the ac tions le a din g up to the ind ic tme nt. Af te r a re vie w o f the re c or d, we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt inc or re c tly substitut ed its view of the e vidence for that of the prosec utor. The memorandum of understa nding

wa s n ot procure d by

fraud, the diversion wa s not unlawful, the memorandum complied with the statutory require ments, and the pr osecutor did not ac t arbitrarily wher e the a

ppellant’s criminal and social history

amply supported a g rant of dive rsion. Moreove r, it appea rs that this was an isolated incident. While we sy mpathize with the victim and his family
, we note that there is no require ment that the appe llant admit guilt or ex press re morse as a prer equisite for e ligibility for diver sion. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed a nd the matter is re manded to the tria l court for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE