### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 9, 200 7
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA RQU ETTE HOU STON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-08488 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2006-00095-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jun e 29, 2007

The de fenda

nt, Marquette H ouston, appea ls as of right fr om his conviction of second de g ree murder for whic h he re ceive d a twenty -five- y ear sentenc e as a violent offende r. In this appeal, the de fenda nt c on te nd s tha t: (1 ) the e vid e nc e wa s insu ff ic ie nt to sup po rt his c on vic tio n; (2 ) the tr ia l court e rr e d in denying the admission of first ag g ressor e vidence ; (3) the tria l co u rt er re d in admitting the defe ndant’s stateme nt to police; and (4) t h e trial court e rre d in imposi ng an excessive se ntence

. Following our re view of the rec ord, par ties’ brief s and appli ca b l e l aw, we aff irm the defe ndant’s convictions. Howeve r, we vacate t he sentence imposed by the trial cour

t and re mand this case f

or rese ntencingunder the 1989 SentencingAct with c o n s id e r a ti o n o f th e c o n s ti tu

ti onal re strictions upon enhanc ing the defe ndant’s sente nce a bove the pr esumptive minimum

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t, Vacat ed in Par t, and Rem anded
J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H A Y ES and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined. Phylli s A luk o ( on

a ppe a l) and

Mic ha e l John so n a

nd Amy Ma y ne (at tr ia l) , A ssi sta

nt P ub lic Def ender s, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Marque tte Houston.
Rob e rt E. C o o p e r , Jr

. , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T ur

ne r, As sis tant A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, D i s t ri ct At torney Gene ral; and Char les Be ll and Pam Fleming , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND
Th e fa c ts g ivi ngri se to t

his a pp e a l are a s fo llo ws

. Ar izon a F ra nk lin te sti fi e d th a t in

the e arl y eveninghours of Apr il 28, 2003, her husband of fifty y ear s, C laude F ranklin, wa s shot and killed while he wa s outside mowing the la wn of thei r re s i d ence near Holly wood Street. Upon he aring-2-

g un fi re , M rs . F ra

nk lin we nt out sid e and fo un d he r hus ba nd lying in the y ard , ble e din g fr om h is c he st are a. Mrs. Fr anklin called 911 a nd acc ompanied her

husband to the hospital. Her husband died a few day s later. Serg eant James L . Fitzpatrick of the Me mphis P olice De partment, testified that he investigated the cr ime scene approximately one-a nd-a- half hours a fter the shooting oc c u r r e d

. H e a nd oth e r i nv e sti g a tiv e of

fi c e rs loc a te d a

nd g a the re d e vid e nc e inc lud ingse ve ra l .4 0 c a lib e r sh e ll c a sin g s. After talking with w itnesses, Serg eant Fitzpatrick and other office rs attempted to locate Mr. B erna rd “Chuck” Ba

rnes a nd Mr. Alber

t “Mac Al” Thomas. Mr. Barne s was eventually located and was e n route to the homicide of fice for que stionin g wh en M r. Thomas, Mr. Thomas’ brother a nd the de fe nd ant w e re se e n s itt ingin a ve hic le . The of

fi c e rs tr ans po rt ing Mr . Ba rn e s stop pe d the ve hic le
and de ta ine d M r. Th oma s and the de fe nd ant f

or qu e sti on ing . Se rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k to ok Mr . T ho ma s’ state me n t w h il e an o th e r o f f ic e r to o k th e d e f

e n d an t’ s s tate me n t. A f

te r f u rth e r inv e s ti g a ti o n, the defe ndant was a

rre sted and c harg ed.

Be rnar d “Chuck” Ba

rnes testified that at the time of the shooting, he had known Albe rt “Mac Al” Thomas f

or about thre e y ear s afte r rebuilding a motor in Mr. Thom as’ car in 2001. Mr. Bar nes stated that he a

nd Mr. Thomas had a

series of heate d arguments over a $35 repa ir bill owed for w ork done on the motor in 2001. Acc ording to Mr

. Ba rnes, on April 28, 2003, he was driving his 1985 Ca dil la c lim ou sine on Hol ly wo od Str e e t w he n h e wa s f

la g g e d d ow n b y

Mr . T ho ma s, wh o w a s a passeng er in a

“g oldish-looking” c ar, dr iven by a fe male. Mr. B arne s pulled over, g ot out of the Cadillac, and a sked Mr. Thomas w hy h e wa s bothering him. Mr. Ba rnes then r eturne d to the Cadillac and c ontinued to drive down Holly wood. Howeve r, Mr. Thomas and his female c ompanion follow e d h im , s o M r

. B ar n e s p u ll e d o v e r o n to th e r ig h t- h an d s id e o f th e s tr e e t. H e g o t out of the Cadillac and a

pproac hed Mr. Thoma s, where upon, he obser ved that Mr. Thom as wa s on the phone. Mr. B arne s ag ain told Mr. Thomas to leave him alone.

Mr. Ba rnes testified that seconds later a car came “zooming” down Holly wood, made a

rig ht turn, and drove up a hil l onto Vollintine Street. The car stopped at t he top of t he hil l and someone sta rt e d sh oo tin g a t hi m. O ne of the bu lle ts s tr

uc k th e ba c k w ind owof

the Ca dil la c and

dr op pe d in to the bac kseat. Mr. B arne s later identifie d the defe ndant as the shooter. Mr. Ba rnes testified that he
rea cted to the de fenda

nt’s shooting by

rea ching for a .9mm handg un in the Cadillac and shooting at the def endant’ s position on t he hill seven or e ight times. Mr. Ba rnes also attempted to shoot at Mr. Th oma s b ut c ou ld n ot b e c a us e he wa s o ut o f b ull e ts.

Mr

. B arn e s te sti fi e d that he dr ov e awa y fr om the are a , dr op pe d of f the Ca dil la c , and g ot i nto a brown Nissan M axim a. After dropping his stepbrother, Ma rcus Tate, and a

nother man, of

f at the liquor store, he e ventually drove to Mr. Thoma s’ house a nd, afte r re loading his .9mm handgun, shot
a t the ho us e

. He a vo ide d th e po lic e a ft e r l e a vin g the Ma xima a t hi s c ou sin ’s ho us e and re tur ne d to his ho me . H ow e ve r, the da y a ft e r t he sh oo tin g , he c on ta c te d the po lic e and ma de arr ang e me nts to be picke d up at his home. When the police a rrived, he showed police wher e he had hidden his g un and ammunition. He also told police whe re to find the Ca dillac. While being tr ansported to the po lic e statio n, he saw M r. Th oma s, Mr . T ho mas ’ b ro the r, and the de fe nd ant. He imm e diate ly-3-

identified the de fenda n t as t h e shooter. Mr . Ba rnes r eiterated that he did not know the de fenda nt pr ior to b e ingsh ot at by

him

. Severa l police d et ec t i v es testified re g ardingthe re cover y and collec tion of evidenc e. Acc ording to their t estimony , three live .9mm rounds were found in the M axim a. The .9mm g un and two ammunition clips were c ollected f rom the location where Mr. B arne s had hid them. A total of nine live rounds we re c ollecte d from the c lips. A bullet frag ment was c ollected f rom the re ar floorboar d of the Cadillac. Spent .9mm shell casing s and a bullet f rag ment we re fo u n d on Holly wood Street. Severa l spe nt .40 caliber bullet c asing s and a beer can wer e collecte d from the Vollintine St ree t are a. Pictures of bullet holes wer e taken of the c rime sce ne whe re the victim had been shot, but no bullets wer e re cover ed.

Dr. Ka ren Elizabeth, the county ’s chief medical e x aminer, te stified that Claude F ranklin’s autopsy repor t reve aled he died of interna l bleeding cause d by a gunshot w o u n d t o h i s chest. A
c op pe r- ja c ke te d b ull e t w a s r e mov e d f ro m Mr . F ra

nk lin ’s bo dy

. Th e bu lle t wa s ide nti fi e d a s E xhibi t 11. Ag ent Don Carma

n, a for ensic fir ear

ms ex aminer f

or t h e T ennesse e B urea

u of Investig ation, testified that the bul l et re cover ed fr om Mr. Fr anklin’s body and identified a s Ex hibit 11 was deter mined to be a .40 c aliber. A g ent Carman a lso testified that the .40 ca liber bullet rec overe d from Mr. Fr anklin, a .40 ca l i b er bullet collected fr om the floorboar d of a ve hicle, and othe r .40 ca liber bu lle t f ra g me nts and

sh e ll c a sin g s f

ound on Ho lly

wo od and Vo lli nti ne we re sh ot f

ro m th e same fi re arm , th ou g h A g e nt C arm an n ote d h e did no t have thi s p art ic ula r f ir e arm in h is p os se ssi on

to t e st. Ag ent Carman f

urther note d that these .40 caliber bullets wer e not fired from t he .9mm pistol. Age nt Carman state d that he tested the .9mm bullet fra g ment and shell casing s found on Holly wood and deter mined that they

wer e all fire d from the same .9mm pistol which wa s tested and e x amined.

Detec tive J ames P. Smit h of the Memphis Police De partment testified that he and a nother de te c tiv e qu e sti on e d th e de fe nd ant a bo ut the s ho oti ng . A ft e r t he de fe nd ant w a s a dv ise d o f h is Miranda rig hts, t h e d efe ndant g ave a statement in response to Detec tive Smit h’s questions. The state me nt r e a ds a s f

oll ow s: Q : On M onday , A p r il 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 , Cl a u d e L e e F r an k li nw a s f

a ta ll y s h o t o u ts id e o f

9 50 Holly wood. Are y ou the per son responsible for his death?

A: No sir. Q: Do y ou know the per son or per son(s) re sponsible for F ranklin’s de ath?

A: No, sir. Q: Tell me the e vents that occ urre d during , befor e and a fter the shooting that oc curr ed on Monday , April 28, 2003 at the c orner of Holly wood and Vo[l]l intine.-4-

A: Chuck pulled down on me when I was walking down to my g randmother ’s street

. .

. . Ia m w a lki ngdo wn

the str e e t and

Chu c k is fol lowin g me . I sto pp e d a

nd he did too. Ithen walke d up to [ the] railroad tra ck an d we n t up the littl e ra mp thing. . . . Chu c k a nd I[wa s] ha vin g wo rd s, the n Ch

uc k g ot o ut t

he c ar on Ho lly

wo od and be g in to throw hand signs and say ing “B oy , y ou g ot me f**ked up!” By that time, Chuck fired some shots off at me, then I fired my 40 three times at Chuck but the g un had jammed. I

struck out running down t o Springda le t o my g irlfriend[’s] house . . . who liv e d in the Ev e rg re e n. Th a t w a s it be tw e e n u s. Th is a ll s tart e d o n Satur da y , Apr il 26 , 2 00 3 in

the c lub , H ay

B a by ’s , w he n Chuc k a

nd Ig ot i nto it a

bo ut a g ir l. Q: Where is the we apon . . . which you had the da y of April 28, 2003?

A: Ithrow it in the bushes on the hill near H olly wood and Vol[l] intine. Q : T e l l m e i nd e t a i l [ w h a t ] d i d y o ud o w i t h t h e g u na f

t e r t h e s h o o t i n g ?

A: After I finish[ ed] shooting I ran down the street I was shooting on. I don’t know the name of the stree t but it l ead me to Spring dale Street. I then [t hrew ] the g un behind [som ebody ’s] house.

. . . . Q: De s cr i b e t h e v eh i cl e i nwh i ch C h u ckwa s dri v i n g?

A: A white old model L imo with 20-inch rims. Q: How many

rounds did Chuck fire at y ou?

A: Man, I

know it was about seve n or nine. Q: [W as] there a

ny one in y our view w hen y ou fire[d] y our we apon?

A: No, sir. Q: When did y ou lear n about the death of Fr anklin?

A: Man, I swea

r I don’t want to be in this incident. I t hurt me man. I fee l it in my hear t that I did n’ t ki ll that man. Ab ou t 11 :00 p. m. or 12 :00 p. m., [sic ] my little c ou sin , Po Be ar, c alled me a

nd told me that the man was de ad. Q: I s the 40 ca liber the only g un y ou own?

A: Yes . . . .-5-

Q: Ar e y o ua m em b er o f a gan g?

A: No . . . . Q: How long have you known Chuck?

A: I t’ s b e e n li ke a

c ou ple of mon ths

. Q: During[y our] tim e knowing Chuck, has this been the fir st alterca tion between you and Chuck?

A: Yes Sir. Q: On the day

of the shooting , [was] there any one else involved in the alterc ation?

A: No Sir , [i]t w a s ju st m e and Chu c k n ob od

y e lse ha d a

ny thi ngto d o w ithit. Q: Why

did y ou have this g un?

A: Be cause people we re te lling me that Chuck w as on He roin and th at h e like to rob folks. Ihear d C h uck wa s involved in a ca rjac king where he took a Nissan w ith a ba by in i t. Q: De s cr i b e t h e w ea t h er an d l i gh tco n d i t i o nd

u ri n g t h e s h o o t i n g?

A: I t was hot and dusk. Q: Pr ior

to t he sh oo tin g , you

state d y ou st op ped ne ar a ra mp. Whe re is this ra

mp located?

A: Vol[l ]i ntine and Holly wood nea r the ra ilroad trac k are a.

. . . . Q: Desc ribe to me what ty pe of gun did Chuck have?

A: Ib el i ev e i twa s a 9 m m , b ec au s e t h e w ay i twa s s h o o t i n g. Q: Did y ou g ive this statement fre ely and voluntarily

without threats, promises, or
coer cion?

A: Ye s.-6-

Q: I s there a

ny thing e lse that y ou would like to add to y our st atement that would aid us in this i nvestig ation?

A: No, Sir. Q: I ’m g oing to a sk y ou to rea d y our 4 pag e st atement and if y ou find it to be true and
corr ect plac e y our initials in the bottom rig ht ha nd corne r of the first pag es and pla ce y our sig nature , date a

nd t i m e o n t he last pag e in the spac e provide d. Do y ou understand?

A: Ye s.
The de fenda

nt then initialed eac h pag e and signe d the last pag e, “Ma rquette H ouston, 4/29/2003, at 8:10 P.M.” After r eadingthe defe ndant’s statement to the jury , Detec tive Smit h noted that the .40 caliber g un was ne ver f

ound.

Al b er t “Mac Al” Thomas testified that he was c urre ntly in fede ral c ustody

for unlaw ful possession of a we apon. Mr. Thoma s stated that Mr. B arne s was a me chanic in the neig hborhood and had worke d on his c ar. Acc ording to Mr

. Thomas, on April 28, 2003, Mr. B arne s approa ched him on Hunter St ree t to discuss a $30 debt i ncurr ed two y ear s ag o. Approxim ately thirty minutes later, Mr . Thomas enc ountere d Mr. B arne s ag ain while driving down Holly wood Street whe reupon Mr. B arne s pu l l ed u p b ehind him and beg an drivingerr atically . Mr. B arne s then drove pa st Mr. Thomas, pulled over

to the side of the road, and jumped out of his c ar with a g un pointed up in the air. Mr. B arne s was hollering , but Mr. Thomas could n o t u nderstand what he wa s saying. Mr

. Thomas saw a

black truc k drive by

an d t u rn u p t h e stree t ramp on Vollintine. Mr. Thomas then hear d g unshots and to his surprise saw the de fenda nt up on the street r amp shooting.
Mr. Thomas testified that he had been good friends with the def endant f or about thre e y ear s and had se en him ear lier on the da y of the shooting . Acc ording to Mr. Thom as , he had a
conver sation with the defe ndant about Mr. B arne s in which the def endant sa id he “wa s g oing to g et up wi th [M r. B arn e s] w he n h e se e him .” Mr. T ho ma s e xpla ine d th a t th e e xpre ssi on , “ g e t up wi th him ” wa s st

re e t sl angand

c ou ld me an many thi ng s inc lud ing “ y ou g oin g to fi g ht him , jum p on him , y ou know, shoot him, whatever .”
Mr. Thomas testified that Mr. B arne s had his g un pointed in the air, but the de fenda nt was the first per son to start shooting. W h en t h e defenda nt started shooting from the stre et ramp, Mr. Ba rnes r esponded by

shooting e very

wher e bec ause he did not kno w wh ere the def endant wa s positioned. At one point, Mr. Ba rnes f ired dire ctly at M r. Thomas but did not hit him. Mr. Thomas made a U-turn in the middle of Holly wood, parke d his c ar, and jumped into another car . He did not see the defe ndant ag ain unt il the nex t day . At that time, he and his brother picked up the de fenda

nt and the thre e of the m drove towa rd downtown to see an attorne y . Coincidentally , when they stopped at a traffic light, they wer e st opped by the s ame police transporting Mr. B arne s to the police station. Mr. Thomas further testified that in his written st atement, he told the police that the def endant ha d-7-

a .40 ca liber we apon. Mr. Thoma s also acknow ledg ed that he did not tell police a bout the de fe nd ant’ s r e mark

a bo ut “ g e tti ngup ” wi th M r. B arn e s.
The de fenda

nt testified that he had known Mr. Thomas si nce they wer e y oung children. H e had see n Mr. B arne s around the ne ighbor hood and knew

he had a reputation for robbingpeople. He had also he ard that Mr. Ba rnes did not like him beca use of a gi rl ; howeve r, Mr. B arne s had neve r approa ched him about the situation.
The de fenda

nt testified that on April 28, 2003, Mr. Barne s spoke t o him while t hey wer e on Winnona St ree t. After the conver sation, the defe ndant walked toward Mr. Thomas’ house. As he trave led down Hunter

Street, he saw Mr. Thomas jump into a car and leave. L ater

that day , around 5:30 p.m., Mr. Ba

rnes appea

red on H unter Stree t and blocked the path of the bla ck Suburban truc k the def endant wa s driving. T he def endant state d that Mr. B arne s appea red to be looking f

or someone in the truck.
The de fenda

nt testified that around 6:00 p.m., he w as driving down Holly wood when he saw Mr. Thomas and Miss Sharon pulled ove r on the side o f t h e roa d. He then sa w Mr. B arne s approa ching Mr. Thomas and Miss Sharon with a g un pointed at Mr. Thomas. B elieving that Mr. Ba rnes intende d to harm Mr. Thomas a nd Miss S haron, he drove up the ramp and shot his gun onc e in the air in an attempt to scar e Mr. Ba rnes away

. I n response , Mr. Barne s ducked into his ca r then started shooting at him, so he retur ned fire. A stipulation wa s admitted into evidence showing that Mr . B arn e s h a d b e e n p re vio us ly c on vic te d o f t

wo a ssa ult s.
Ba sed up on the evidenc e pre sented, the jury found the de fenda

nt guilty of sec ond deg ree murder. T here afte r, the de fenda nt was sentenc ed to twenty -five y ear s as a violent off ender

. AN AL YSI S

I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
The de fenda

n t first contends that the e vidence is insufficient to support his second deg ree murder c onviction beca

use the proof

shows he ac ted in defe nse of other s and in self-de fense

. I t i s well-esta

blished that once a

jury finds a def

endant guilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is remove d and re place d with a pre sumption of guilt. State v. Ev ans , 83 8 S

. W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) . There fore , on appea l, the convicted de fenda nt has the burde n of demonstrating to th is co ur

t w hy the e vid e nc e wi ll n ot s up po rt the jur y ’s ve rd ic t. Sta te v . Ca rru the rs , 3 5 S. W. 3d 51 6, 55 7- 58 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). To meet thi s burden, the de fe nd ant m

us t e sta bli sh that no “ ratio na l tr ie r of fa c t” c ou ld have fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) ; State v. Evans , 108 S.W. 3d

23 1, 23 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) . I n contra st, the jury ’s ver dict approve d by

the trial judg e accr edits the s tate’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Ha rri

s , 8 39 S.W. 2d

54 , 7 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . T he state is e nti tle d to the str on g e st-8-

leg itimate view of the e vidence and al l re asonable infere nces w hich may be dra wn from that evidenc e. Car

ru the rs , 3 5 S. W.3 d at 55 8. Qu e sti on s c on c e rn ingthe c redi bi li ty of th e wi tne sse s, conflicts in trial testimony , the weig ht and va l ue to be g iven the evide nce, a nd all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the t rier of fac t and not this court. State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). We do not attempt to re-we igh or re- evaluate the evide nce. Sta te v . R e id , 91 S.W .3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002) . L ikewise, we do not replac e the jury ’s i nfer ence s drawn f rom the circ umstantial evidence with our own infer ence s. Id

. A conviction for second de g ree murder r equire s proof that the de fenda nt unlawfully

and knowing ly killed another. See Te nn

. Cod e Ann. § 39 -1 3- 21 0( a )( 1)

. A p e rs on a c ts k no wi ng ly wi th
re sp e c t to a

re su lt o f t

he pe rs on ’s c on du c t w he n th e pe rs on is a wa re tha t th e c on du c t is re a so na

bly
c e rta in to c a

u s e the result. See id. § 3 9- 11 -3 02 (b ). Te nn e sse e ’s se lf -d e fe ns e statut e pr ov ide s in
re le va nt p art : A per son is justified in thr eate ning or using forc e ag ainst another pe rson when a nd to t he deg re e the pe rs on

re a so na bly be lie ve s th e fo rc e is i mme diate ly ne c e ssa ry to pr ote c t a g a ins t th e oth e r' s u se or a tte mpt e d us e of un lawf ul fo rc e

. Th e pe rs on

mus t have a re a so na ble be lie f that the re is a

n im min e nt d ang e r o f d e a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily inj ur y
. Th e da ng e r c re a tin g the be lie f of imm ine nt de a th or se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y mus t be re al, or hone s t l y b el i eved to be rea l at the time, and must be founde d upon
rea sonable g rounds. Ther e is no duty to retre at bef

ore a person threatens or

uses forc e.

. . . . The thre at or use of

forc e ag ainst another is not justified if t he person provoked the oth e r i nd ivi du a l' s u se or

a tte mpt e d u se of

un lawf ul f or c e , unle ss: (1) The person a

bandons the e ncounter

or cle arly

communicates to t h e o ther the intent to do so; and ( 2) The othe r neve rtheless c ontinues or attempts to use unlawf ul forc e ag ainst the person.
Id. § 3 9- 11 -6 11 (a ) a

nd (d ). Te nn e sse e ’s “ de fe ns e of ano the r” statut e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: A per son is just i fi ed in threate ning or using f orce ag ainst another to pr otect a third person, if: (1) Under the circ umstances as the per son rea sonably believes the m to be, the per son would be j ustified under § 39-11-611 in thre atening or using forc e to protec t a g ainst the use or attempted use of unlawf ul fo rc e re a so na

bly be lie ve d to be thr e a te nin g the thi rd pe rs on so ug ht t o be prote cted; and-9- (2 ) T he p e rs on

re a so na bly be lie ve s th a t th e int e rv e nti on is immediately

nece ssary

to protect the third pe rson.
Id. § 39-11-612. The claim of self -def ense or defe nse of another is essentially a fact question for the jury

. See State v . Goode , 9 56 S.W. 2d 52 1, 52 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); State v. Clifton , 880 S.W. 2d 73 7, 74 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); S ta te v. I vy , 868 S.W .2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
After

revie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the state, we c onclude that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the de fenda nt’s conviction of sec ond deg ree mur d er. The evidenc e established that the defendant had some conflict with Mr. Barne s. On April 28, 2003, the d ef en d ant knowing ly

initiated a g un battle with Mr. B arne s by shooting at him in t he middle of a residential ne ighbor

hood. As a result of t he defenda nt’s conduct, Mr. Claude Fr anklin, an innoce nt by stander, w as struck by

a bullet fire d from the defe ndant’s g un and wa s killed. From the e vidence , the jury could have rationally

found that the defe ndant’s action in shooting the victim was excessive and unnec essar

y for the defe nse of other s or self- defe nse. In other wor ds, a rational jury could have deter mined that the def

endant’ s use of de adly

forc e wa s not founded on re asonable grounds. As previously noted, t he credibility and weight given to a witnesses’s testimony are issues resolved by the jury as the trier

of fa ct. See Bland , 95 8 S.W. 2d a t 65 9. Th e jur y , a s wa s the ir

pr e ro g a tiv e , c ho se no t to c re dit the de fe nd ant’ s the or y of se lf -d e fe ns e or

de fe ns e of

oth e rs , a nd we wi ll n ot s e c on d- g ue ss the fa c tua l de te rm in ati on s of th e jur y . A c c or din g ly , th e de fe nd ant i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

II. F irst Aggr essor Evidence
The de fenda

nt n ex t co n t en d s that the trial cour t erre d in excluding witness testimony of a pr ior ba d a c t of Mr . B arn e s. Th e de fe nd ant a rgue s th a t su c h te sti mony wo uld have a ide d th e de fe ns e by circ umstantially

proving Mr. B arne s was the f irst ag g ressor in the shooting

. Duringa hea

ring , out of the pre sence of the jury , the defe ndant prese nted as an off er of proof the te s ti mo n y o f A n g e la B r itte nu m. M s

. B r itte nu m te s ti f ie d th a t a b o u t a w e e k b e f

o r e trial, Mr. B e rn ard “ Chu c k” B arn e s g ot i nto an a rgume nt w ithhe r b ro ther, B oo ke r L e sh awn Hunte r. Ms. Br ittenum rec ounted t hat M r. Barne s was drunk and became ang ry at her brother a fter he r brother told Mr. B arne s he was “fixing” to ta ke him home. Mr. Ba

rnes and her brother wer e outside at the time. From inside the house , Ms. Brittenum h ea rd Mr. B arne s tell her brothe r “g ive me my g un, man, g ive me my

g un.” The n, Ms. B rittenum hear d g unshots. She ran outside a nd saw Mr. B arne s standing and her brother ly ing on the g round. She saw Mr . Ba rnes dr op a gun and pick it up ag ain. Ms. Brittenum stated that she st rug g led wit h Mr. Barne s and wrested the g un awa y from him and ra

n inside the house with it. Ms. Brittenum then ca lled 9-1-1.

Af te r h e ari ngMs. B ri tte num’ s te sti mony , th e tr ia l c ourt ru le d a s f oll ow s:As a n as i de, d i f f er ent ad mi s s i bi l i t y rul es ap pl y when t es t i mo ny i s o f f er ed t o dem ons t r at e t he def endan t ’ s f

ear 1

o f t he victi m (i .e., t he d efen d an t ’ s m en t al st ate) ve rsus wh en t esti m o ny i s o f f ere d t o d em o n st r a te w h o w as the fi rst
a g g re sso r. See S ta te v . H ill , 8 8 5 S .W .2 d 3 5 7 , 3 6 1 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ), per m

. t o ap p. deni ed (T enn. 19 9 4 ). T he d i f f erent rul es ar e ap t l y exp l ai ned by t hi s co urt i n S ta te v . Je rry D a le B e n n e tt , N o. 03C01- 9304- CR

- 00115, 1994 W L 53 64 5 (T enn

. Cri m. Ap p. , at K noxv i l l e, Feb. 24, 199 4), an d quot ed i n per t i nen t par t bel ow:

W h en s el f

- def en s e i s r ai s ed, (c o n tinu e d ...)
-10- [T] he testi mony of Ms

. Ang ela Brittenum, as to the i ncident involving Mr

. Ba rnes two we eks ag o, that testimony is not sufficient in this Court’s opini on to show in a cl ea r and convinc ing ma nner that Mr. Ba

rnes wa s an ag g ressor in that transac tion.

Ms. B rittenum did not see the incident. The testimony that she g ave w as that there was a

disag ree ment g oing on be tween Mr. B arne s and her brother. She he ard Mr. B arne s ask for his gun f rom her br other, a

nd then there wer e shots fired a nd her br oth e r w a s sh ot, and

Mr . B arn e s h a s b e e n a

rr e ste d a nd c ha rg e d w iththa

t.
But the re ’s no indication of what occur red, howit occurr ed, under what circ ums t ance s it occurr ed, and I ’m not satisfied that there ’s enoug h clea r and
c on vin c in g ev ide nc e that Mr . B arn e s w a s a c tin g in a n a g g re ssi ve na

tur e sim ply beca use he’ s been c harg ed.

Ijust haven’t hear d sufficie nt proof that I think would allow that testimony to c ome be fo re the jur

y un de r t he [g uis e ] of

c or ro bo ratio n o f s e lf

-d e fe ns e argume nt; or i f I understand c orre ctly . . . defe nse of a

nother that ha s not actually been show n or pu t be fo re the jur

y y e t.

. . . Ido not find that Ms

. Brittenum’s testimony was suff icient, clea

r and convincingevidenc e of a g g ressive behavior by Mr. Ba rnes that I would allow that in. So if that’s what’s be en pre sented to me at this point I rule that [her testimony ] i s not admissible . . . .
We b e g in o ur

review by no ti ngthat “ [r]u lin g s o n th e a dmi ssi bil ity of e vid e nc e are larg e ly wi thi n the so un d disc re tio n of the tr ia l court , an d on ap pe llate re vie w, a tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g to a dmi t or e xclu de e vid e nc e wi ll n ot b e dis tur be d un le ss it a

pp e ars that su c h a

ru lin g a mou

nts to a n a bu se of that discre tion.” State v. Jam es , 81 S.W.3 d 7 51 , 7 60 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . “ An a pp e llate c ourt

sh ou ld find an abuse of discretion when it appea rs that the trial c ourt applied a n incorre ct leg al standar d, or
re a c he d a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t lo g ic or re a so ni ng that

c a us e d a n in jus tic e to t

he pa rt y complaining .” Id

. Un de r l imi te d c ir c ums tanc e s, “ sp e c if ic vio len t act s o f t

he vic timare a dmi ssi ble to corroborate the def

endant’ s assertion that the victim was the ag g ressor.” State v. Furlough , 797 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1 1. T h e def

en dan t a n d ot h er w i t n es s es ma y t es t i f y t o t h e v i ct i m' s g en er al r epu t at i on f or v i ol en ce or p eaceful ness i n t he co m m uni t y on d i rect or cross- exam i nat i o n.

2

. T he d ef

end ant m ay t est i f

y on d i rect e xam i nat i o n a b o ut thr eat s o r vi o l ence t o t he d ef end ant or o t hers if the d e fen d a n t kn e w a b o u t t h e thr e a ts a t t h e ti m e o f t h e o ff e n se . S inc e thi s t e s ti m o n y i s o ff e re d to
e stab l i sh d efen d an t ' s st ate of m i nd at t he t i m e o f t he o f f en se, t he kn o w l ed ge o f t ho se eve nts i s a prer equi s i t e.

3. T hi r d pers ons m ay t es t i f y ab out vi ol ent act s or t hr eat s t owar d t hem about wh i ch t he def endan t ha d no kn owl edge at t he t i me of t he of f ens e i f t he evi dence of

t he vi ct i m' s vi ol ent act s or t hr eat s i s of f er ed t o co rr o b o rat e a cl ai m of sel f

- d ef ense by proving t hat t he vi ct i m was t he f i rs t aggres sor.

. . . .
Id . at *4 n.6

.

-11- S.W .2d 631, 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990 ), perm. to app. denie d , (Tenn. 1990) (e mphasis added) ; se e als o S tate v . H ill , 885 S.W .2d 357, 361-62 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994), perm. to app. denie d (Tenn. 19 94 ). F ir st ag g re sso r ev ide nc e is ev ide nc e wh ic h wou ld ad dr e ss “the anim us of the [vic tim ], hi s co n d u ct and mot ives, and [is] offe red to show whic h party beg an or pr ovoked the f

ight.” State v. J e rr y Da le B enn e tt , No. 03C01-9304-CR-00115, 1994 WL53645, *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Kn o x v i l l e, Fe b

. 2 4 , 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Litt le v . S tate , 65 Tenn. 490, 493 (1873)) . “[B]efore a def endant
c an o ff e r p ro of of e vid e nc e of fi rs t a g g re ssi on

. . . [s]e lf de fe ns e mus t be a t iss ue by the e vid e nc e in the re cord, not by

the words a

nd statements of c ounsel.” Sta te v . La te rra l J oll y , No. 02C01-9207-CR-00169, 1993 WL 523590, *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, D ec. 15, 1993) , perm. to app. denied

(Tenn. 1994)

. L ikewise, fir st ag g ressor e vidence , albeit admissible to corrobor ate a defe ndant’s cla im of self-defe nse, i s, at m inimum, subject t o the balancing test set forth in Tennessee Rule of Evidenc e 403. See F urlough , 797 S.W. 2d

a t 65 0; se e als o J

oll y , 1993 WL 523590, *4; but
c om pa re , State v. Ruane

, 912 S.W .2d 766, 779-80 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1995) (sugg esting that defe ndant’s desire d use of witness testimony to prove f irst ag g ression amounts to char acte r evide nce of the victim’s propensity for violence and is thus subj ect to evide ntiary limit ations set forth in Tenn. R. Evid. 404 and 405).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion i n ex cl u d ing Ms. B rittenum’s testimony

. As the trial court aptly noted, Ms. B rittenum observe d no act of violence by

Mr. B erna

rd. As such, the testimony

of Ms. Br ittenum was of little to no probative value in cor ro b o ra t i n g the defe ndant’s cla im that Mr. Be rnar d was the first ag g ressor. Additionally , under the unique fa cts of this case, Mr. Be rn ard w as thoroug hly questioned by

the def ense at trial and a stipulation was
a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e ind ic a tin g that Mr

. B e rn ard ha d be e n pr e vio us ly c on vic te d of tw o a ssa ult s. Th e de fe nd ant a lso te sti fi e d. Th e re fo re , th e de fe nd ant h a d ampl e op po rt un ity to e sta bli shhis c la im that Mr . B e rn ard

wa s th e fi rs t ag g re sso r. Ac c or din g ly , the tr ia l cou rt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in
e xclu din g the e vid e nce be c a us e the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e in q

ue sti on wa s su bs tanti a lly outweig hed by

prejudice , confusion of the issues, and nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence

. M o re o v er , ev en as s u m i n g arguendo t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g t h e s p e c u l a t i v e t e s t i m o n y,T h e re c o rd re flec ts tha t S e rg e a n t S im s p a sse d a w a y p rio r to the he a rin g o n the m o tio n to d ism iss. 2

-12- which wa s only

admissible for a limit ed cor roborative purpose, the e rror was ha rmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). III. Motion to Sup press Statem ent to P olice
The de fenda

nt next contends that the tria l court er red in a dmitti n g h i s statement to police beca use it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
Both the U nited States and Ten n essee Constit utions protect the ac cused f rom compelled self-inc rimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. C o n st. art. I , § 9. As a re sult, gove rnment authorities ar e prohibited fr om using stateme nts made by the ac cused dur ing c ustodial interrog ation unless the ac cused has been previously advised of his or her c onstitut ional rig ht ag ainst compulsory
se lf -i nc ri min a tio n a

nd ri g ht t o a n atto rn e y , a

nd the a c c us e d k

no wi ng ly and vo lun tari ly

wa ive s th os e rig hts. See M

iranda v. Arizona , 38 4 U. S. 43 6, 44 4 ( 19 66 ). Whe the r w a ive r o f a ri g ht i s v olu

nta ri ly and k nowing ly

made is dete rmined by

the totality

of the c ircumstance s under whic h the rig ht was waived. See State v. Middlebrook s , 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992). Howeve r, “[a] defenda nt’s subjective pe rce ption alone is not sufficient to j u s t i fy a conclusion of involuntarine ss in the
c on sti tut ion a l se ns e . Rathe r, c oe rc ive po lic e a c tiv ity is a ne c e ssary predi c a te to f ind ingthat a confe ssion is not voluntary .” Sta te v . S mi th , 933 S.W .2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
When revie wing the t rial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, this court conducts a de
n o v o r e v ie w o f

th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s c o n c lu s io n s o f la w an d a p p li c a ti o nof l aw to fac ts. See State v

. W alton , 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) . Howeve r, the trial c ourt' s findin gs o f fac t are presumed
corr ect unless the evidence contained in the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ainst them. See State v . Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000) . “Que stions of credibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the e vidence , and re solution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the tr ial judge as the trier of

fac t.” State v. Lawrence , 1 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 , 7 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Odom , 928 S.W. 2d 18 , 2 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ). Mo re ov e r, the pr e va ili ngpa rt y is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti mate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble and leg itimate infere nces th at m ay be dra wn from that evidenc e. State v. Hick

s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001)

. At the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , Se rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k te sti fi e d that the de fe nd ant wa s b ro ug ht t o the homicide off

ice sometime in the a fternoon of April 29, 2003. Ther eaf

ter, a round 6:00 p.m., he
and Se rg e ant Sims re a d th e de fe nd ant h is Miranda rig hts prior to conductinga brie f ora l interview. 2 After rea ding the defe ndant his r ights, they g ave the defe ndant the waiver of rig hts doc um en t and had him rea d aloud the first line to make sure he could read. The defe ndant was the n allowed r ead the re ma ind e r o f t

he wa ive r t o h ims e lf

. T he de fe nd ant s ig ne d a nd date d th e wa ive r o f r ig hts document and indicated he unde rstood his rights.-13-

Serg eant F itz patrick te stified that h e had not c oerc ed the de fenda nt to sign the wa iver of rig hts document and no promises or thre ats wer e made to the defe ndant. Acc ording to Serg eant Fitzpatrick, the de fenda

nt was ver y cooper ative in r esponding to que stions about the homicide . The d e f e n d an t d i d n o t a

p p e ar u n d e r t h e i n f

l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l o r dr

u g s an d d i d n o t a

p p e ar u nu s u a l l y s l e e p y. Duri ngthe br ie f o ra l in ter vi e w, the de fe nd ant i nd ic a te d h e ha d a te nth g ra de e du c a tio n a

nd c ou ld
rea d an d wr ite. Although Ser g eant F itz patrick w as only prese nt for the initial oral intervie w, he testified that there wer e no signific ant discrepa ncies betwee n the oral interview and the def endant’ s subsequent stateme nt. Serg eant F itz patrick f urther te stified that afte r the init i al i n t ervie w, he a nd Serg eant Sims both left the defendant in order to interview othe r suspec ts. At no tim e did he obse rve Serg eant Sims strike the defe ndant. At no time did the defe ndant ask for a lawyer.
Detec tive J .P. Smit h testified t hat around 7:00 p.m., he and anothe r dete ctive we re dire cted by Se rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k to take the de fe nd ant’ s st a te me nt. Pr ior to takin g the de fe nd ant’ s st a te me nt, the def endant wa s escor

ted from the inte rvi ew r oom to Detective Smith’s desk in an ope n are a. Acc or din g to D e te c tiv e Smith, the de fe nd ant w a s r e a d h is Miranda rig hts. The def endant did not smell or appea

r to be under t he influence of a ny drug s or alcohol. The defe ndant was c ooperative and no thre ats or promises we re ma de to him. The def endant wa s not hit, t hreatened, or coer ced. The de fenda

nt was g iven a Coke to dr ink a nd some cra cker s. I t took a littl e over an hour to take the defe ndant’s stateme nt. The def endant was g iven hi s statement for revie w and wa s told to m ake a ny corr ections on the stateme nt. The defenda nt initialed eac h pag e of the statement without making any corr ections and sig ned the last pa g e with the time re flec ting 8:10 p.m., on April 29, 2003.
The de fenda

nt testified that he wa s arr ested a round 1: 30 p.m., wher eupon he told police he wanted his law y er pr esent whe n he wa s to be questioned

. S ubsequently , he wa s taken downtown to the homicide offic e. Af ter sitting f

or a c ouple hours, he w as esc orted to anothe r room by Serg eant Sims and anothe r g uy . Once there , he told Serg eant Sims he wanted his law y er pr esent. Serg eant Sims r e s p o n d e d

b y ma k in g thr e a ts , p o u n d in g th e d e s k , an d s la p p in g th e b a c k

o f th e d e fenda nt’s head. T he def

endant wa s then left i n the room for another couple of hours. At some point, Detec tive Smith a nd ano the r d e te c tiv e too k h is s tate me nt.
The de fenda

nt testified that prior to be ing arr ested he had stay ed up all night a nd had take n some coc aine a

nd liquid h eroin. How ever , the def endant a cknowledg ed that he did not tell the de te c tiv e s a

bo ut thi s. Th e de fe nd ant re c ounte d that he wa s arr e ste d wh ile e n ro ute to see hi s attorney . The de fenda

nt acknowle dg ed that he signe d the waiver of rig hts doc ument prior to the oral interview, but he asser

ted that he did not re ad the doc ument befor e sig ning it. The defe ndant
a dmi tte d that pr ior to g ivi ng his state me nt t o D e te c tiv e Smith, he wa s a g a in a dv ise d o f h is Miranda rig hts, and he told the dete ctives that he understood his r ights. How ever , the def endant a sserted that he re a lly did no t un de rs tand

his rig hts and

did no t kn owhis state me nt c ou ld b e us e d a g a ins t hi m. He f urther a sserted that he did not rea d over his statement beca use he c ould not read, but he did not tell the detec tives that he could not re ad. The defenda nt admitted that he si g ned his statement and initialed ever

y pag e. The defe ndant furthe r admit ted t hat he did not tell Detec tive Smit h or the other detec tive that he wa

nted a lawy er.-14-

At the c on c lus ion

of the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt a c c re dit e d th e te sti mony of the state wi tne sse s. Th e tr ia l c ourt no te d th a t th e de fe nd ant i nd ic a te d h e un de rs too d h is Miranda rig hts by sig nin g the wa ive r o f r ig hts do c ume nt, by ve rb a l a c kn ow le dg me nt, and by sig nin g and

ini tia lin g his statement. The c ourt also noted that ther e wa s no indication that the defe ndant w as t h re at ened or
coer ced into g iving a

statement. The court observe d that the defe ndant indicated he could re ad by
rea ding a line from the wa iver of r ights doc ument. The c ourt fu rt h er o bserve d that the evidenc e indicated that the defe ndant was aler t, attentive, and coope rative a nd did not appear

to be under

the i n fl u en ce o f a ni n t o x i ca n to r d ru g o f a n y k i n d

. T h e c o u rt t h en fo u n d t h e f o l l o wi n g:
I do not f ind that [ the def

endant’ s] rights wer e violated. I do not find that the members of the Police Depa rtment violated his constitutional rights either under the United States or the State of Tenne ssee. I find that he was advised of his rig hts, that he ac knowl ed ged an understandingof those rig hts, that he ac knowledg ed a w aiver of tho se ri g hts and

tha t he g a ve his state me nt fr e e ly and vo lun tari ly

wi tho ut t hr e a ts, without coerc ion, without int imidation of any kind and sig ned not only the waive r of rig hts form b u t t h e s t atement of the details that he ha d g iven to the offic ers, a g ain, fr e e ly and vo lun tari ly , fu lly kn ow ing wh a t hi s r ig hts we re and wa ivi ngtho se ri g hts in giving this statement. So I find that there ’s no basis for the Court to suppress the

. . . s tate me nt t

hat w a s g ive n, and

Iwi ll d e ny

the Mo tio n to Sup pr e ss. Upon revie w of the rec ord, we conclude that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s th a t th e de fe nd ant k no wi ng ly and vo lun tari ly

wa ive d h is Miranda ri g hts and fre ely g ave statemen ts conce rning his involvement in the shooting death of Mr. F ranklin. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y de nie d th e de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss, and

thi s iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

IV . Se nt e nc ing
The de fenda

nt next contends that the trial court e rre d by imposing an e x cessive se ntence of twenty -five- y ear s for his se cond deg ree murder c onviction. Specifica lly , the def endant a rg ues that the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in no t fi nd ingany

statut or y mit ig a tin g fa c tor s and

imp ro pe rl y

a pp lyingc e rt a in enhanc ement fa ctors.
When an acc used cha lleng es the leng th and manner of ser vice of a sente nce, this cour

t conducts a de novo revie w of the record with a presumption that the trial court' s determinations ar e corr ect. T en n

. C o d e Ann. § 40- 35-401. This presumption of cor rec tness is conditioned upon the
a ff i r m a t i v e s h o w i n g i nt h e r e c o r d t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rtc o n s i d e r e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r i n c i p l e s an d a ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s. State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W .2d 540, 543-44 (Tenn. 1999) . Howeve r, if the re cord shows that the trial court f ailed to consider

the sent en ci n g principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances, then r eview of t h e ch al leng ed sente nce is pure ly de novo without the presumption of cor

rec tness. State v. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2d 16 6, 16 9 (T e nn . 199 1) . On a pp e a l, t he pa rt y challeng ing the sentenc e im posed by the t rial court has t he burden of establishi ng that the sentenc e is e rr on e ou s. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 40 -3 5- 40 1, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Comme nts . We wi ll u ph oldAt t h e s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g , t h e t r i al c ou r t s t at ed: 3

U nd er t he sent enci ng l aws as t hey no w st and , t here’ s no presum p t i ve m i ni m um

. T h e re’ s no presum p t i ve sta rting p o int. T h e C o u rt is to c o n sid e r th e full ra n g e o f p u n ish m e n t f o r th is o ff

e n se , w h ic h is a C la ss-A felo n y,
w hich wo uld b e fifte e n to t w en t y- f i ve years. T he C o urt i s no t m an d ated o r req uired t o co nsid er a l l o f t he se e n h a n c e m e n t f

a c to rs . T h e C o u rt is g ive n g u id a n c e a n d is to lo o k a t an d to c o n sid e r th e se fac to rs a s to w h a t i f any emphas i s an d wei gh t t he C our t wan t s t o gi ve t o t hem i n i mp osi ng s ent enc es

. So t hat ’ s t he s t at us of t he l aw a s I u n d e rs ta n d it a t t h is ti m e

.

-15- the s entenc e im posed by the t rial court if (1) the sentenc e complies with our sentencing statutes, and (2) the trial court’s f

indings a re a dequate ly

supported by

the re cord. Se e Sta te v . A rn e tt , 49 S.W .3d 25 0, 25 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(f ).
The re cord r efle cts that the trial court found the following enhanc ement fa ctors applica ble:
The de fe n dant has a

previous history

of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha vior, in addition to thos e nec essar y to establish the appropr iate ra ng e;
Th e of fe ns e inv olv e d mo re tha

n o ne vic tim ;
Th e de fe nd ant po sses se d o r e mpl oy e d a fi re arm , e xplos ive de vic e , o r o the r d e a dly
wea pon during the commission of the offe nse;
The de fenda

nt had no hesitation about committing a crime w hen the risk to human life wa s high;
The c rime was committed under c ircumstance s which the potential for bodily injury to t he vic timwa s g re a t.
The trial c ourt stat ed t h at it found no statutory mitigating fac tors but it would consider mitigating fa c tor s o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s y ou ng age and hi s so me wh a t st a ble wo rk his tor y . T he tr ia l c ourt

a lso indicated that it was se ntencingthe defe ndant pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the sentenc ing
a c t. 3

We need not rea ch the merits of t his sentenc ing issue as i t appea rs from the r ecor d that the trial court incorre ctly sentenc ed the defe ndant pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the 1989 SentencingAct. To c larify , cer tain provisions of the 1989 SentencingAct we re a mended in 2005 to refle ct an a dvisory , non-mandatory sentenc ing sc heme. See e .g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114, -210. I t was spec ifically noted that the ame nded provisions ap p l i ed t o s entencing f or cr iminal offe nses committed on or af ter June 7, 2005, but that offense s committed prior to J un e 7, 2005, would be g overne d by

prior law. It was also noted that a defe ndant who is se ntence d afte r J une 7, 2005, for of

fense s committed on or afte r Jul y 1, 1982, may

elec t to be sentenc ed under the amende d-16-

provisions of the Act by executing a waiver of ex post fac to pr otections. See Pub. Acts, Ch. 353, § 18; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210 (Supp. 2005). How ever , the re cord r efle cts that the def endant
comm itted the offe nse of se cond deg ree murder pr ior to the eff ective date of these amende d provisions. W hile the def endant c ould have e lected t o be sente nced pur suant to these ame nded p rovisions, the rec ord on appe al does not conta in a waive r showing that he did so. Thus, the amende d 2005 provisions are not a pplicable in t h e def

endant’ s case and the de fenda nt must be
rese ntence d pursuant to the sente ncing statutes in effe ct at the time the of fense was c ommitt ed.

Pur su ant t o th e pr e -2 00 5 s tatut or y se nte nc ingsc he me , the tr ia l c ourt is r e qu ir e d to imp os e a pres u m p t i v e sentence, star ting at the midpoint of the sentencingrang e, then a djust the sentence within the rang e as a

ppropriate based upon the prese nce or absenc e of mitigating a

nd enhanc ement fac tors set out in sections 40-35-113 and 40-35- 114. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c ) (2003)

. I n th is c a se , th e pr e sumpt ive se nte nc e is t we nty y e ars be c a

us e se c on d d e g re e mur de r i s a Cla ss A fe lony and the se nte nc ingra

ng e fo r a Rang e I , sta

nd ard of fe nd e r who c omm its a

Cla ss Afe lony

is fiftee n to twenty -five year s. See id. §§ 39-13-210( c), - 40-35-112( 1). Also, the use of t h e p re -2005 sentenc ing sc heme r equire s the trial cour t to evaluate the defe ndant’s Six th Amendment rig hts pursuant to Blakely v. W ashington , 5 4 2 U

. S

. 2 9 6 ( 2 0 0 4 )

. In Blak e ly , th e Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court

he ld t hat th e ma ximumse nte nc e a jud g e may imp os e is one base d solely

on the fa cts ref

lecte d in a jury

verdic t or admitted by

the def endant. Id. at 303. Although in State v. Gome z , 163 S.W .3d 632 (T en n

. 2005), the Te nnessee Supreme Court char acte rized t h e p re -2005 statutory sentenc ing sc heme a s a non-mandatory , advisory sentenc ing scheme which did not violate the Blakely de c isi on ; Gomez was rec ently vacated by the United States Supreme Court and the case rema nded for rec onsideration in light of Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif or nia , --- U.S. ---- , 127 S.Ct . 856 (2007).

I n Cunningham , the United States S upreme Court essentially extended the Blak

e ly ana ly sis to California’s de terminate se ntencingscheme . I ndeed, in Cunningham , the Court reiter ated Blak e ly ’s deter

mination that, “[e]x cept for a prior convic tion, ‘any fac t that increa ses the pena lty for
a cr ime bey ond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and prove d bey ond
a re asonable doubt.’” Cunningham , --- U.S. at --- -, 127 S.Ct. at 868 (citations omitt ed). The Court further stated:
We cautioned in Blak

e ly , howeve r, t h at broad discretion to dec ide what f acts may support an enha nced se nten ce , o r to deter mine whether

an enha nced se ntence is warr anted in any particula r ca se, does n ot shield a sentenc ing sy stem from the for ce of our dec isions. I f the jury ’s ver dict alone doe s not authorize the sentenc e, if, i n s t ea d , t h e judge must find an additional fac t to impos e the longer term, the Six th Amendment re quirement is not satisfied.
Id. a t 86 9 ( c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Th e re fo re , it a pp e ars that Cun nin gh am -B lak e ly pr e c e de nts a

pp ly to our pre -2005 sentencing scheme and re quire that e nhance ment fac tors other than pr ior convictions be found by

a jury or spec ifically

admitted by

the def endant. Se e Sta te v . M

ar k A. Sc hie fe lbe in , No. M2005-00166-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL465151, *48 (T en n

. C ri m. App., at Nashville, Mar . 7,-17-

2007), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. June 18, 2007), (holding Tenne ssee’ s pre- 2005-re vision sentencing law wa s “just as deter

minative as W as hington’ s scheme [as denounc ed in Blak e ly ], because the sentenc e wa s fix ed by

statute in the absenc e of f act- finding not e mbrac ed in the jury ’s verdic t, and just as mandatory , as we ll because the judg e wa s no t authorized to depar t from the pre sumptive sentenc e unless he or she found cer tain fac ts not embrace d in the jury ’s ver dict”). A ccor dingly , the trial court’ s sentencingorder is vacated and the cause is remande d for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with this opi nion.

CO NC LU SION Following our re view of the parties’ briefs a nd applicable law, we aff ir m the def

endant’ s convictions. Howeve r, we vacate the sentenc e imposed by the trial court a nd rema nd this case f

or rese ntencingunder the sentenc ing sc heme in plac e prior to the 2005 ame ndments with consideration of the c onstitut ional restric tions upon enhanc i n g the def endant’ s sentence above the presumptive min imum.

___________________________________ J .C. McL I

N, J UDGE