J-S42033-18

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

LEWIS MARTIN MARTIN,

 Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 20 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 1, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005151-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MCLAUGHLIN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 17, 2018

Lewis Martin Martin (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on December 1, 2017, following his jury convictions for indecent 

exposure and corruption of minors. Upon review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history have been summarized by 

the trial court.

On September 23, 2016, a criminal complaint was filed charging 

[Appellant] with indecent exposure and corruption of minors. 

The basis for the charges was an allegation that [Appellant]

exposed his penis to the victim, L.M.[, born April 2006], in June 

2015 in East Cocalico Township, Lancaster County. A preliminary 

hearing was held on October 5, 2016, at which time the charges 

were waived over to the Court of Common Pleas.

On July 19, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a petition to 

admit testimony under the “tender years hearsay exception,” 42 

Pa.C.S.[] § 5985.1. The victim, L.M., was interviewed by 

Christina Vernerick, a forensic interviewer at the Lancaster 

County Children’s Alliance.2 This interview was videotaped.

During this interview, L.M. disclosed that [Appellant] exposed his 
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penis to him. A “tender years” hearing was scheduled for the 

time of trial.

3

__________

2 Lancaster County Children’s Alliance is a child 

advocacy center where investigations of child abuse 

are conducted through forensic interviews of children 

who have been referred either by the Children & 

Youth Agency or a law enforcement agency. The aim 

is to minimize the number of interviews a child must 

endure surrounding allegations of child abuse. 

3 The “tender years” hearing never took place as the 

Commonwealth chose not to have the minor victim 

testify at trial, nor to introduce the victim’s interview 

with Children’s Alliance.

On July 20, 2017, the Commonwealth gave notice of its 

intent to introduce evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to Pa.R.E. 

404(b)([3]). The older brothers and sisters of L.M. disclosed 

that when they were around the same age as the victim, 

[Appellant] exposed his penis to them as well.4 These actions 

resulted in [Appellant] being charged at Docket No. [CP-36-CR000]0432-2010 with indecent exposure and corruption of 

minors. [Appellant] pleaded guilty to the charges in January 

2011, and was sentenced to time-served to 23 months’

incarceration, followed by three years’ probation. [Appellant]

was subsequently charged with a probation violation and 

sentenced on December 30, 2011, to time–served to 23 months’

incarceration, with a consecutive one-year probation term. 

[Appellant] was ultimately released from probation on October 

10, 2014. [One of t]he incident[s] with L.M. occurred 

approximately two weeks after [Appellant] was released from 

probation for exposing himself to L.M.’s older siblings.[1] The 

Commonwealth intended to introduce evidence of Appellant’s 

prior bad acts against his other nieces and nephews to show the 

common scheme and plan, opportunity, knowledge, and absence 

of mistake. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

____________________________________________

1 The record indicates that Appellant was initially also charged with exposing 

himself to L.M. in October 2014, but the criminal information was amended 

to limit the charge to only the June 2015 incident. N.T., 8/30/2017, at 11-

13.
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__________

4 Specifically, J.M. [born September 2001] disclosed 

that when she was around the ages of six to nine, 

[Appellant] exposed his penis to her multiple times 

in the barn and shed, and would touch his penis. 

R.M. [born May 1999] disclosed that when she was 

nine years old and younger, [Appellant] would 

expose his penis to her in the barn and would touch 

his penis. C.M. [born December 1996] disclosed that 

when she was between the ages of six and eight, 

[Appellant] would expose his penis to her in the barn 

and would touch his penis. M.M. [born September 

1992] disclosed that when he was ten years old and 

younger, [Appellant] exposed his penis to him on 

multiple occasions.

This case went to trial on August 30, 2017. Immediately 

prior to trial, [the trial court] heard argument on the prior bad 

acts request by the Commonwealth. [The trial court] ruled at 

that time that M.M., the minor victim’s older brother, would be 

permitted to testify to the fact that Appellant repeatedly exposed 

himself to his nephew, M.M., when he was just a child. This 

evidence would be admissible to show an absence of mistake 

and intent. [The trial court] further ruled that should the 

defense argue that Appellant did not know that his actions would

affront or alarm or tend to corrupt the minor victim, then the 

door would be open to the Commonwealth’s introduction of 

Appellant’s prior convictions for indecent exposure and

corruption of minors. Defense counsel objected to the admission

of such prior bad acts testimony.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

M.M., Detective Keith Neff of the East Cocalico Township Police 

Department, and portions of the audio[-]recorded statement of 

Appellant’s police interview. M.M. testified to the fact that he 

walked in on Appellant exposing his penis to L.M. He further 

stated that he immediately told his mother about the incident. 

M.M. also testified that when he was between the ages of 5 and 

10 years old, Appellant exposed himself “maybe 20 times” and 

spoke to M.M. in a sexual manner.
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Detective Neff testified that, after signing the Miranda[2]

warnings form, Appellant agreed to an interview. Portions of 

Appellant’s audio[-]recorded statement were played for the jury. 

Appellant acknowledged in his police interview that M.M. is a 

truthful person. Appellant would neither admit nor deny the 

charged criminal activity because he said he had no memory or 

recollection of the alleged events.

The defense presented no testimony or evidence. 

Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 

both charges. Following the verdict, sentencing was deferred 

pending a pre-sentence investigation.

On December 1, 2017, [Appellant] appeared for 

sentencing. [The trial court] imposed concurrent sentences of 9 

to 23 months’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation 

for the indecent exposure and corruption of minors convictions. 

As Appellant had already been in prison for over nine months

awaiting trial, Appellant was made immediately eligible for 

parole for admission to an inpatient treatment program that 

would address his psychiatric, psychological or behavioral issues 

related to these charges. Restitution in the amount of $1,000.00

was imposed.5 [Appellant] was ineligible for a Recidivism Risk 

Reduction Incentive (RRRI) sentence, and his ineligibility was not 

waived by the Commonwealth.

__________

5 [Appellant] was ordered to reimburse the 

Pennsylvania Department of Revenue $1[,]000.00

for the forensic examination of the minor victim, L.M.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 2/1/2018, at 1-5 (citations to the record 

omitted).

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal,

3 and both Appellant and the 

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant argues that “the trial court erred in allowing M.M. 

to testify that [Appellant] had exposed himself to M.M. several years prior in 

violation of Pa.[R.E.] 404(b) where this testimony was not relevant to a 

legitimate purpose and any probative value it may have had was outweighed 

by the unfair prejudice to [Appellant].” Appellant’s Brief at 4. We consider 

this issue mindful of the following.

The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter vested in the 

trial court’s sound discretion, and we may reverse the court’s 

ruling only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is 

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law or an exercise 

of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of 

record. Our scope of review is limited to an examination of the 

trial court’s stated reason for its decision. 

Commonwealth v. Wattley, 880 A.2d 682, 685 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence.

“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; 

and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant had 30 days from entry of the trial court’s sentencing order on 

December 1, 2107 to file his notice of appeal, but the last day of his appeal 

period fell on a Sunday (December 31, 2017) and the following day was a 

holiday (January 1, 2018). Thus, Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal

on January 2, 2018. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any 

such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday..., such day shall be omitted 

from the computation.”). 
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Pa.R.E. 401. “Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” 

Pa.R.E. 402. In addition, “[t]he court may exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one 

or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403; see 

Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 770 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (stating that even when evidence meets the relevance 

requirements, “such evidence may still be excluded where its 

probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice[]”).

However, [e]vidence will not be prohibited merely 

because it is harmful to the defendant. [E]xclusion 

is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would 

inflame the jury to make a decision based on 

something other than the legal propositions relevant 

to the case.... This Court has stated that it is not 

required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all 

unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where 

those facts are relevant to the issues at hand[.]

Kouma, 53 A.3d at 770 (citation omitted); see Pa.R.E. 403, 

cmt. (defining “unfair prejudice” as “a tendency to suggest a 

decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention 

away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially[]”).

Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 180 A.3d 368, 377 (Pa. Super. 2018) (some 

citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 

(Pa. 2007).

Our rules provide further direction when the evidence relates 

specifically to other crimes, wrongs, or acts.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 

act is not permissible to prove a person’s character in 

order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the character.
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(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for 

another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this 

evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the 

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404 (b)(1)-(2). In addition, 

while evidence of prior bad acts may be relevant and admissible, 

there is the potential for misunderstanding on the part of the 

jury when this type of evidence is admitted. This evidence must, 

therefore, be accompanied by a cautionary instruction which 

fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for 

which that evidence has been admitted.

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 798 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 

A.3d 287, 304 (Pa. 2017) (stating that “where evidence of a defendant’s 

prior bad acts is admitted, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that 

the evidence is admissible only for a limited purpose”). Jurors are presumed 

to follow the trial court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 

A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014).

Appellant argues that “[t]he fact that this happened to M.M. years 

prior was not relevant to the instant case and whether or not [Appellant] 

had exposed himself to L.M.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. He further argues that 

the evidence was “simply used to impress upon the jury that [Appellant] had 

acted in this manner before, so he must have acted this way again” and 

“just because [Appellant] exposed his penis to M.M. years prior does not 

mean he intended to show it to L.M. on this occasion.” Id. Finally, 
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Appellant contends that even if the evidence were admissible, it was unfairly

prejudicial. Id. at 13.

Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), the trial court admitted Appellant’s

prior other acts against M.M. “to show intent and lack of mistake or 

accident.” TCO, 2/1/2018, at 7-8, citing N.T., 8/30/2017, at 49-50. The 

trial court further found that the evidence was admissible as “the crimes are 

so related that proof of one tends to prove the others.”4 Id. at 8 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). Finally, the trial court held that the probative 

value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Id. at 9.

With respect to the common plan and lack of mistake or accident

exceptions, which are interrelated, this Court has explained that 

[w]hen ruling upon the admissibility of evidence 

under the common plan exception, the trial court 

must first examine the details and surrounding 

circumstances of each criminal incident to assure

that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is 

distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the 

signature of the same perpetrator. Relevant to such 

a finding will be the habits or patterns of action or 

conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to commit 

crime, as well as the time, place, and types of 

victims typically chosen by the perpetrator. Given 

this initial determination, the court is bound to 

engage in a careful balancing test to assure that the 

common plan evidence is not too remote in time to 

be probative. If the evidence reveals that the details 

of each criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact 

____________________________________________

4 This language is consistent with the “common plan” exception, discussed 

infra. See Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc).
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that the incidents are separated by a lapse of time 

will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence 

unless the time lapse is excessive. Finally, the trial 

court must assure that the probative value of the 

evidence is not outweighed by its potential 

prejudicial impact upon the trier of fact. To do so, 

the court must balance the potential prejudicial 

impact of the evidence with such factors as the 

degree of similarity established between the 

incidents of criminal conduct, the Commonwealth’s 

need to present evidence under the common plan 

exception, and the ability of the trial court to caution 

the jury concerning the proper use of such evidence 

by them in their deliberations. 

Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super.

2007).

Although “remoteness in time is a factor to be considered 

in determining the probative value of other crimes evidence 

under the theory of common scheme, plan or design, the 

importance of the time period is inversely proportional to the 

similarity of the crimes in question.” Commonwealth v. 

Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2010) [] (holding 

evidence of defendant’s prior sexual assault was admissible 

under common scheme exception despite nearly ten-year gap 

between periods of abuse, where victims were of similar age and 

both were daughters of defendant; defendant initiated contact 

with each victim during overnight visit in his apartment; 

defendant began sexual abuse by showing victims pornographic 

movies; and assaults occurred in bed at night). See also 

Commonwealth v. Luktisch, [] 680 A.2d 877 ([Pa. Super.] 

1996) (holding common scheme exception justified admission of 

testimony regarding defendant’s previous sexual assaults despite 

six-year lapse between periods of abuse, where three victims 

were nearly same age, victims were either daughter or stepdaughter of defendant and lived with him when acts occurred; 

and pattern of molestation—from improper touching to oral sex 

to sexual intercourse—was highly similar with respect to two 

victims).

Evidence of a prior crime may also be admitted to show a 

defendant’s actions were not the result of a mistake or accident, 

where the manner and circumstances of two crimes are 
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remarkably similar. See Commonwealth v. Sherwood, [] 982 

A.2d 483 ([Pa.] 2009) (holding evidence of defendant’s prior 

physical assaults of child was admissible to show absence of 

mistake or accident in prosecution for intentional beating death 

of child); Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, [] 846 A.2d 75 

([Pa.] 2004) (holding evidence of defendant’s murder of former 

wife was admissible to show absence of accident in prosecution 

for murder of defendant’s second wife, where both victims were 

found dead in bathtub or hot tub in highly similar 

circumstances).

Tyson, 119 A.3d at 358–59 (some internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Here, there are several victims who were the subject of the 

Commonwealth’s notice of intent to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior 

acts. The victims are all siblings and Appellant is their uncle. 

Commonwealth’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Prior Bad Acts, 

7/20/2017, at ¶ 2; N.T., 8/30/2017, at 78. L.M. is the victim in this case. 

J.M., R.M., and C.M. are victims from Appellant’s prior convictions, in 

January 2011, for indecent exposure and corruption of minors. Id. at ¶ 9. 

It appears that M.M. was not a subject of Appellant’s prior convictions. Id. 

The Commonwealth sought to admit evidence of Appellant’s prior other acts 

against all of these nieces and nephew, J.M., R.M., C.M., and M.M. Id. at 

¶ 12. However, the trial court limited the evidence admissible to only 

Appellant’s prior acts against his nephew, M.M.5 TCO, 2/1/2018, at 3, citing 

____________________________________________

5 The trial court also ruled that if Appellant argued he did not know exposing 

his penis to L.M. would affront, alarm or tend to corrupt the minor victim, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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N.T., 8/30/2017, at 50-51. At trial, M.M. testified, inter alia, that when he 

was between the ages of five and ten, Appellant exposed his penis to M.M. 

on about 20 different occasions when the two of them were alone. N.T., 

8/30/2017, at 83-84, 95-96. M.M. also testified that when he was a child, 

Appellant talked to him in a sexually suggestive manner. Id. at 97, 99.

In deciding that the evidence of Appellant’s prior acts against M.M. 

was admissible, the trial court explained that

Appellant suggested that L.M. misinterpreted his acts as having 

sexual purpose.6 The testimony of the other victim, M.M., about 

Appellant’s indecent exposure was admissible to demonstrate 

that Appellant’s actual intent in removing his penis from his 

pants was not to simply urinate[,] but to show his penis to a 9-

year old child for his own sexual gratification. Moreover, M.M.’s 

testimony was admissible to show that Appellant’s penis did not 

just accidentally come out of his pants. Rather, it was a 

deliberate and intentional act in this instance as it had been 

years previously with M.M. See N.T., [8/30/2017,] at 84. 

__________

6 Defense counsel suggested that Appellant might 

have exposed his penis to L.M. and his siblings when 

urinating. He further implied that corn fodder, which 

might have been stuck to Appellant’s clothing, had 

the appearance of a penis. N.T., [8/30/2017,] at 94-

95.

TCO, 2/1/2018, at 8 (some citations and quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the trial court that evidence of Appellant’s prior acts 

against M.M. was relevant and admissible. Admission of Appellant’s prior 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the door would be open for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of 

Appellant’s prior convictions relating to J.M., R.M., and C.M. TCO, 2/1/2018, 

at 3. No evidence of Appellant’s prior convictions was introduced at trial.
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acts of exposing his penis, on multiple occasions, to his nephew, M.M., 

demonstrates Appellant’s awareness that exposing his penis to his nephew, 

L.M., was not a mistake or accident. Appellant’s actions had significant 

similarities suggesting that Appellant planned intentionally to take advantage 

of a familial relationship and exposed his penis while he was alone with a

young nephew in a small outbuilding on the family farm where they lived. 

The manner and circumstances of the incidents are nearly identical as to 

time, place, and type of victim: both victims are Appellant’s nephews; 

Appellant committed the same acts against M.M. as he did against L.M. 

(exposing his penis); he committed them when M.M. and L.M. were about 

the same age (10 years old and younger); and he committed them in the 

same location (in a building on the family farm). See Tyson, supra. Thus, 

the challenged evidence was relevant to prove that the acts against L.M. 

were intentional, rather than a mistake or accident, and that the factual 

overlap between the two victims reflects a distinct pattern of Appellant 

intentionally exposing his penis to young nephews while they were isolated 

from other family members.

6

 Id.

____________________________________________

6 We note that, while Appellant has not raised an issue as to remoteness in 

time, we do not find the evidence of prior acts against M.M. to be too remote 

in time to negate its probative value. The remarkable similarities between 

the acts against M.M. and L.M. render the time gap less important. See 

Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359, quoting Aikens, supra (explaining that, while

“remoteness in time is a factor to be considered in determining the probative 

value of other crimes evidence under the theory of common scheme, plan or 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We now consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that “the 

probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.” TCO, 

2/1/2018, at 9. Appellant argues that M.M.’s testimony was “highly 

prejudicial” because it “clearly tended to suggest to the jury to make a 

decision on an improper basis: being that he must have exposed himself to 

L.M. since he had done it before” and it “suggested to the jury that because 

[Appellant] had done it so many times in the past, it was likely he had done

it again.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. 

In this case, evidence that Appellant had previously exposed his penis 

under nearly identical circumstances is certainly probative. However, we 

must still consider whether its admission was unduly prejudicial. 

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 870 (Pa. 1996); 

Commonwealth v. Diehl, 140 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“The 

admission of evidence becomes problematic only when its prejudicial effect 

creates a danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep [it]

beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial.”).

The trial court here explained that 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

design, the importance of the time period is inversely proportional to the 

similarity of the crimes in question”). In addition, Appellant was 

incarcerated for several years during the time at issue. See Tyson, 119 

A.3d at 361 (stating that “time spent in prison must be excluded in the 

calculation of how much time has elapsed since the prior crime”); see also

Aikens, supra (holding ten-year lapse was not excessive); Luktisch, 

supra. Moreover, remoteness in time is “only one factor in the common 

scheme analysis, but not the dispositive factor.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 361.
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Although evidence of the prior indecent exposure on the victim, 

M.M., may have been prejudicial, it was not unduly so. As 

noted..., “‘[u]fair prejudice’ means a tendency to suggest 

decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention 

away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” 

Pa.R.E. 403 cmt. The indecent exposure evidence, introduced 

for legitimate purposes, was not so prejudicial that it likely 

diverted the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the 

evidence impartially.

Moreover, “[w]hether relevant evidence is unduly 

prejudicial is a function in part of the degree to which it is 

necessary to prove the case of the opposing party.” 

Commonwealth v. Gordon, [] 673 A.2d 866, 870 ([Pa.] 1996). 

Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove indecent 

exposure, which includes knowingly exposing one’s genitals 

“under circumstances in which [the perpetrator] knows or should 

know that this conduct is likely to offend, affront or alarm.” 18 

Pa.C.S. [] § 3127(a). See also Commonwealth v. Thiry, 919 

A.2d 961, 963 (Pa. Super. 2007). Appellant denied that the 

exposure occurred, and since the uncorroborated testimony of 

the victim in this case might have reasonably led a jury to 

determine that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether 

Appellant committed the crimes charged, it was fair to conclude 

that the other [prior acts] evidence was necessary for the 

prosecution of the case. Without doubt, the [prior acts] 

evidence was prejudicial to Appellant. That is what it is designed 

to be. On the facts of this case, however, it was not unduly 

prejudicial, as it was required for the Commonwealth’s case. 

Moreover, it is “[t]he function of the trial court ... to balance the 

alleged prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative 

value and it is not for an appellate court to usurp that function.” 

Commonwealth v. Parker, 882 A.2d 488, 492 (Pa. Super. 

2005), aff’d on other grounds, [] 919 A.2d 943 ([Pa.] 2007). 

TCO, 2/1/2018, at 9-11.

We recognize M.M.’s testimony was prejudicial to Appellant. However, 

it was not such that it was an error of law or abuse of discretion for the trial 

court to believe a jury would be able to look past the particulars of 

Appellant’s prior acts and to consider the evidence only for the purpose for 
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which it was permitted. The evidence was critical in establishing the 

absence of mistake or accident and a common scheme or plan. The degree 

of similarity established between the incidents of criminal conduct and the 

Commonwealth’s need to present the evidence weigh against any prejudicial 

impact. See Tyson, supra.

Moreover, the trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction

regarding M.M.’s testimony and emphasized the limited purpose for which 

the evidence was admissible, thereby minimizing any prejudicial effect. See

Weiss, 81 A.3d at 798. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury at the 

close of evidence that this evidence was to be used only for the limited 

purpose of showing Appellant’s intent and absence of mistake or accident. 

The court further cautioned that it was not be considered for any other 

purpose other than what the trial court stated, and it must not be regarded 

as showing Appellant “is a person of bad moral character or criminal 

tendencies for which [the jury] might be inclined to infer guilt.” N.T., 

8/30/2017, at 141. The jury was advised at trial that the challenged 

evidence could not be considered to establish that Appellant had a 

propensity to commit a crime, and as we have noted, “the jury was free to 

accept or reject the evidence and to give it whatever weight it felt it 

deserved.” Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 287 (Pa. Super. 

2014); see also Hairston, 84 A.3d at 666 (“Jurors are presumed to follow 

the trial court’s instructions.”). Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we 
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conclude that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial here. Thus, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2018