RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0896-17T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH P. BLANC,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________

Argued January 23, 2019 – Decided February 6, 2019

Before Judges Hoffman and Suter.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 16-08-

1399.

Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for appellant (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Barbara E. Ungar argued the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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The Middlesex County Prosecutor (prosecutor) appeals the order granting 

defendant Joseph P. Blanc's admission into the Middlesex County Pretrial 

Intervention (PTI) Program over the prosecutor's objection. We reverse the 

order and remand defendant's PTI application to the prosecutor for further 

consideration. 

I.

In August 2014, the police found two latent fingerprints on a bedroom 

window of an apartment that had been burglarized. These identified defendant 

as a participant in the burglary. 

Defendant was indicted for third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary, 

theft and receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:18-2(a)(1), 2C:20-3(a), 

2C:20-7(a); third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1); and third-degree 

theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). The burglary and theft counts related solely to the 

August 2014 burglary. 

Defendant's cousin, Anthony D. Armstrong, charged in the same 

indictment with conspiracy to commit burglary, theft and receiving stolen 

property, additionally was indicted with thirteen counts of third-degree burglary, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1); twelve counts of third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
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3(a); two counts of third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; 

and a count of third-degree attempted burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, 2C:18-2(a)(1).

Armstrong pleaded guilty to various counts including conspiracy. At his plea 

hearing, Armstrong answered questions about the conspiracy count. 

[Prosecutor]: Just one follow up question. And . . . you 

had agreed with these individuals to break into these 

residences between the dates of August 14th of 2014 

and February 2nd of 2016; correct?

[Armstrong]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: And those were in various . . . counties, 

including Middlesex and Union County?

[Armstrong]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: And one of those co-conspirators was 

Joseph Blanc?

[Armstrong]: Yes.

A few months later, defendant applied for PTI, but the Criminal Division 

Manager recommended against it. The prosecutor thereafter rejected 

defendant's application based on a review of the criteria in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). 

With respect to factors one and two,

1 nature of the offense and facts of the case, 

the prosecutor's rejection letter alleged that the charges against defendant were 

 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) and (2).
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based on a multi-jurisdictional burglary and theft investigation involving 

residential burglaries at garden-style apartments located in three counties and 

seven towns, all involving the same modus operandi. The prosecutor alleged 

this was a "complex and protracted burglary spree" with multiple coconspirators, many victims and significant financial losses. The prosecutor's 

letter explained that Armstrong was identified as a suspect in the burglaries and

defendant was linked to Armstrong though Armstrong's social media accounts. 

Two of defendant's fingerprints were found at one of the burglarized apartments. 

That burglary involved $4680.57 in stolen items. 

The prosecutor took into consideration that defendant was twenty-nine, 

not gainfully employed, had no mental or physical issues, smoked marijuana 

daily and had not shown sufficient effort to "effect any behavior change." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(3). The robbery victim did not take a position on 

defendant's PTI request, but the prosecutor expressed "a strong societal need to 

deter" this type of crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(4). Defendant did not appear to 

have personal problems or character traits for which services were unavailable. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) (5) and (6). 

The prosecutor considered defendant's minimal involvement with law 

enforcement. He had no criminal convictions, two municipal court convictions 
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for theft (2006) and shoplifting (2009) and two active warrants from municipal 

court. He was arrested in New York for robbery in 2012 but the disposition of 

that charge was unknown. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) (8) and (9). Defendant's 

charges did not involve an assault and were not violent in nature; defendant had 

no history of violence toward others or involvement with organized crime. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) (10), (12), and (13). However, the prosecutor argued that 

residential burglary was a serious offense that merited prosecution rather than 

diversion to PTI. Defendant was charged with engaging in a conspiracy that 

"spanned a couple of years and included multiple jurisdictions and residences," 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) (14) and (17). PTI admission would "minimize the 

seriousness of his conduct" and was contrary to "the strong need to protect the 

public from this type of activity and deter this conduct." 

Defendant appealed to the Law Division, alleging the prosecutor's 

rejection of his PTI application was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. 

Defendant was charged with only one burglary and one count of conspiracy. He 

argued he only had municipal court convictions. Defendant asserted he should 

not be excluded from PTI because of these or the pending robbery charge from 

New York. Armstrong took responsibility for the other robberies when he pled 

guilty; he did not specifically relate defendant to any of them. Defendant argued 
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he would benefit from a short term supervisory program such as PTI, particularly 

given his age and the program could be extended if appropriate. Otherwise, if 

convicted, his career choices would be restricted, hindering employment. 

Defendant argued he was denied PTI based on the charges against Armstrong 

and not based on his individual charges. 

The Law Division judge granted defendant's PTI application over the 

prosecutor's objection, finding rejection of defendant's PTI application was 

"unsustainable." The prosecutor had a "skewed view of the evidence" that 

"distort[ed] the true nature of the case against [defendant]" and tended to make 

him appear more "villainous and nefarious" to negatively assess his PTI 

application. The prosecutor had not given "due and proper consideration and 

weight" to the factors, thereby denying defendant an individualized assessment. 

The judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor 

"gross[ly] and patently abused its discretion" and made a clear error in judgment. 

The prosecutor erred by "characterizing defendant as a serial burglar." 

Defendant was only indicted for one burglary; Armstrong "[was] solely 

responsible" for the others. Armstrong's plea colloquy supported this, referring 

to defendant simply as a "co-conspirator." The court found there was no 

individualized assessment of defendant because of the prosecutor's "skewed" 
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characterization of defendant's role. This prevented a proper evaluation of his 

rehabilitative opportunity, repentance and motivation. A conviction could 

"seriously impact his future." The prosecutor failed to consider that defendant's 

daily use of marijuana could explain his "present circumstances, and how the 

statute itself recognizes the correlation between the two." There was little risk 

of recidivism and no significant harm to be protected from. The prosecutor's

assessment of the factors was "misplaced, unwarranted, and unsupported by the 

evidence in the case." The court conditioned defendant's PTI on completing a 

drug and alcohol evaluation, paying penalties and assessments, full restitution 

to the victim and maintaining employment. PTI was for three years. The court 

stayed its order pending appeal. 

On appeal, the prosecutor contends that the PTI court erred by finding the 

prosecutor's denial of defendant's PTI application was based on a patent and 

gross abuse of discretion and by ordering defendant's admission into the PTI 

program. It argues the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for the 

prosecutor. 

II.

Prosecutors have "wide latitude in deciding whom to divert into the PTI 

program and whom to prosecute through a traditional trial." State v. Negran, 
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178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (citing State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 249 (1995)). The 

scope of review of a PTI rejection is "severely limited." Ibid. (citing Nwobu, 

139 N.J. at 249). We apply the same deferential standard as the PTI court and 

review its decision de novo. State v. Nicholson, 451 N.J. Super. 534, 553 (App. 

Div. 2017) (citing State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 2015)). 

"In order to overturn a prosecutor's rejection, a defendant must 'clearly 

and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and 

gross abuse of discretion.'" State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008) (quoting 

State v. Watkins, 390 N.J. Super. 302, 305-06 (App. Div. 2007)). An abuse of 

discretion is manifested where it can be shown that the PTI denial "(a) was not 

premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a 

consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear 

error in judgment[.]" State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979). An abuse of 

discretion rises to the level of "patent and gross" when "the prosecutorial error 

complained of will clearly subvert the goals underlying [PTI]." Bender, 80 N.J. 

at 93. 

This standard applies because the decision to permit a defendant to divert 

to PTI "is a quintessentially prosecutorial function." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J.

576, 582 (1996) (citing State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 513 (1981)). Prosecutors 
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are given "broad discretion" in determining whether to divert a defendant into 

PTI. State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015) (citing Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582). 

Prosecutors consider a non-exhaustive list of seventeen statutory factors, see

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), in order to "make an individualized assessment of the 

defendant considering his or her 'amenability to correction' and potential 

'responsiveness to rehabilitation.'" State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621-22 

(citing Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520). 

"Eligibility for PTI is broad enough to include all defendants who 

demonstrate sufficient effort to effect necessary behavioral change and show 

that future criminal behavior will not occur." Id. at 622. "[It] is a 'diversionary 

program through which certain offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution 

by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future criminal 

behavior.'" Id. at 621 (quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 240). Its goal is to allow, in 

appropriate situations, defendants to avoid the potential stigma of a guilty 

conviction and the State to avoid "the full criminal justice mechanism of a trial." 

State v. Bell, 217 N.J. 336, 348 (2014). 

In reviewing the prosecutor's rejection of a PTI application, there are 

instances where a remand is appropriate. "When a reviewing court determines 

that the 'prosecutor's decision was arbitrary, irrational, or otherwise an abuse of 
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discretion, but not a patent and gross abuse' of discretion, the reviewing court 

may remand to the prosecutor for further consideration." K.S., 220 N.J. at 200 

(quoting Dalglish, 86 N.J. at 509). The Court said that "[r]emand is the proper 

remedy when, for example, the prosecutor considers inappropriate factors, or 

fails to consider relevant factors." Ibid. This is done to allow the prosecutor to 

"apply the standards set forth by the court" but "'without supplanting the 

prosecutor's primacy in determining whether [PTI] is appropriate in individual 

cases.'" Ibid. (quoting Dalglish, 86 N.J. at 514). 

We agree with the PTI court that the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's 

PTI application constituted a misapplication of discretion. Defendant was 

indicted for conspiracy to commit burglary. That conspiracy was alleged to span 

a nearly two-year timeframe with other alleged burglaries, but Armstrong did 

not relate any specifics about defendant's involvement with those crimes when 

he pled guilty. The prosecutor's letter stated that defendant participated in a 

"complex and protracted burglary spree" with "several victims." It referenced 

the crime "spree" in analyzing factors one, two, fourteen, and seventeen. It is 

clear the letter was referencing all the burglaries for which Armstrong was 

indicted. The prosecutor misapplied her discretion because there was nothing 

linking defendant to those other burglaries. 
11 A-0896-17T2

An additional error involved factor nine. In considering that factor, 

regarding the defendant's record of criminal and penal violations, the prosecutor 

considered defendant's municipal court convictions. Under Negran, 178 N.J. at 

83, "petty offenses" cannot be considered in assessing a defendant's past 

criminal and penal violations.

We part company with the PTI court's order that this misapplication of 

discretion by the prosecutor constituted a "patent and gross" abuse; the 

prosecutor's error did not clearly undermine the goals of PTI. These goals are 

multi-fold involving "opportunities to avoid ordinary prosecution by receiving 

early rehabilitative services;" "an alternative to prosecution" for those that might 

be harmed where an alternative can "deter criminal conduct;" "a mechanism for 

permitting the least burdensome form of prosecution" for "victimless offenses;" 

"assistance to criminal calendars . . . to focus" on "serious criminality and severe 

correctional problems;" and "deterrence of future criminal or disorderly 

behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(a) (1) to (5).

Defendant's application was analyzed consistent with these goals to 

determine if he was appropriate for diversion and whether this would deter any 

further criminal behavior. For much of the analysis, the prosecutor 

appropriately analyzed the relevant factors. However, threading through the 
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analysis was consideration of burglaries charged against Armstrong that were 

not linked to defendant, and "resulted in a decision that although not clearly 

subversive to the underlying goals of PTI, might not otherwise have been 

reached." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 583. We conclude there was a misapplication of 

discretion by the prosecutor but that it was not clearly patent and gross. The 

PTI court should have remanded the case to the prosecutor for an appropriate 

consideration of the PTI factors. The prosecutor must consider defendant's PTI 

application consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.