Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed February 8, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-2146

Lower Tribunal No. 20-19229

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Luis A. Padron,

Petitioner,

vs.

Alysendrina Padron,

Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

Kaplan Loebl, LLC, and Amanda B. Haberman and Liliana Loebl, for 

petitioner.

Velegal PLLC, and Laline Concepcion-Veloso, for respondent.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ. 

EMAS, J. 

INTRODUCTION
2

Petitioner, Luis A. Padron, Former Husband, filed a petition for writ of 

prohibition, asserting that the trial court acted without continuing jurisdiction 

in sua sponte vacating a portion of a final judgment of dissolution of 

marriage. We agree and, for the reasons that follow, we quash the trial 

court’s sua sponte vacatur order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The salient facts do not appear to be in dispute: The underlying matter 

is a dissolution of marriage proceeding between the parties, who together 

share three children. On September 20, 2022, the parties executed a Marital 

Settlement Agreement and Parenting Plan (MSA). Two of the three children 

were minors at the time of the MSA. Pursuant to the terms of the MSA, the 

parties agreed to continue utilizing the appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) to 

assist the parties in performing the agreed upon timesharing schedule.

Two days later, on September 22, 2022, the trial court entered a Final 

Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, which ratified, approved, and 

incorporated the terms of the parties' MSA. In ratifying the MSA, the Final 

Judgment provides: “The Court finds that the Agreement was executed 

voluntarily by the parties, that it is fair and reasonable and that it is in the 

best interest of the parties and their minor children." 
3

Neither party sought rehearing, filed a notice of appeal, filed a 

supplemental petition for modification, or moved to vacate or modify the final 

judgment. However, on September 29, 2022, the GAL filed a request for a 

case management conference, which stated merely: “Guardian ad Litem for 

the minor children hereby requests that the Court set a case management 

conference in this matter under Fla.Fam.L.R.12.200.” The request

contained no allegations and did not provide any factual or legal basis for the 

request. No other pleading, motion or other paper was filed by either party. 

On October 21, 2022, twenty-nine days after entry of the final judgment 

and more than three weeks after the GAL’s request, the trial court held a 

hearing. The record contains no transcript of that hearing; however, on that

same day, the trial court entered a “Uniform Order Setting Non-Jury Trial” for 

March 6 and a separate order setting non-jury trial for March 7, 2023, as 

well. On November 28, 2022 (more than sixty days after entry of the final 

judgment) the trial court entered an order entitled “Temporary Vacating 

Portion of Final Judgment Dealing with Children’s Issues.” The vacatur order 

states, in its entirety: “The Court's Motion to partially vacate the portion of 

the final judgment dealing with children issues is granted.” 
4

Former Husband requested a stay of the trial court proceedings 

pending appeal, which the trial court denied. This petition for writ of 

prohibition followed. 

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

It is apodictic that a “writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy to 

prevent a trial court from proceeding in a cause over which it no longer has 

jurisdiction.” Renovaship, Inc. v. Quatremain, 208 So. 3d 280, 282 n.1 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2016) (citing English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977) and

Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc., 193 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)). The 

writ is available to prevent the improper exercise not only of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, but so-called “continuing jurisdiction” (also termed “case 

jurisdiction” or “procedural jurisdiction”) as well. Renovaship, 208 So. 3d at 

283 n. 6, 287 (discussing distinction between subject-matter and continuing 

jurisdiction; and issuing writ of prohibition upon determination that “trial court 

was without continuing jurisdiction to vacate the prior dismissal order and 

reinstate the action”); Sanchez v. Sanchez, 285 So. 3d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2019). See also Stokes v. Jones, 319 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) 

(“While prohibition is often used in cases where a court does not have 

subject matter jurisdiction, it is also used where the lower court had subject 

matter jurisdiction but no longer has jurisdiction over the case—sometimes 
5

referred to as ‘case jurisdiction’”); Baden v. Baden, 260 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2018) (granting prohibition where trial court continued to exercise 

jurisdiction over a trust case after plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed action); 

Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (granting 

prohibition where complaint had been voluntarily dismissed, thereby 

divesting the court of “case jurisdiction” to proceed on the matter); Wolfe v. 

Newton, 310 So. 3d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Prohibition may be 

appropriate where, as here, a trial court that had subject matter jurisdiction 

attempts to exercise an unreserved power to adjudicate further substantive 

matters when a case has definitively concluded"). 

And as we held in Ross v. Damas, 31 So. 3d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d DCA

2010), “after entry of a final judgment and expiration of time to file a motion 

for rehearing or for a new trial, the trial court loses jurisdiction of the case . . 

. unless jurisdiction was reserved to address that matter or the issue is 

allowed to be considered post-judgment by statute or under a provision of 

the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.”

While properly acknowledging the trial court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the post-judgment dissolution proceeding, Former Husband 

contends that once the time had passed for rehearing or new trial under 
6

Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530,

1 the trial court no longer had 

continuing jurisdiction to enter an order sua sponte vacating the final 

judgment (or a portion thereof) in the absence of a reservation of jurisdiction 

in the final judgment, a supplemental petition for modification, or a pleading 

that satisfied the narrow requirements of Florida Family Law Rules of 

Procedure 12.540. We agree. 

While Former Wife suggests that the trial court had the authority to 

enter the sua sponte vacatur order based on “newly-discovered evidence,” 

see rule 12.540(b)(5),

2 neither the record nor the vacatur order contains any 

1 Rule 12.530(b), which is modeled after Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.530, provides:

A motion for new trial or for rehearing must be served not later 

than 15 days after the return of the verdict in a jury action or the 

date of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action.

In addition, rule 12.530(d) provides:

Not later than 15 days after entry of judgment or within the time 

of ruling on a timely motion for a rehearing or a new trial made 

by a party, the court of its own initiative may order a rehearing or 

a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a 

rehearing or a new trial on motion of a party.

2 Rule 12.540(b)(2), which is modeled after Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 

1.540(b)(2), provides: 

On motion and on such terms as are just, the court may relieve 

a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 

order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
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allegation, discussion or finding of the existence of any such evidence or that 

this served as a basis for the vacatur order. Indeed, neither party filed any 

pleading, motion or petition seeking to modify or vacate the final judgment.3 

Nor did the guardian ad litem do so, instead filing a one-sentence request 

for a case management conference without any additional allegation or 

***

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing.

. . .

 3 Of course, the trial court possesses continuing jurisdiction to enforce its 

own final judgment, including the incorporated MSA, see Paulucci v. Gen.

Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2003); Demorizi v. Demorizi, 851 So. 

2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 638 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1994), and to continue to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to a proper 

reservation contained in the final judgment, see Selman v. Progressive Am.

Insur. Co., 335 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Miller v. Miller, 911 So. 2d 

1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2004). 

In addition, we recognize that in the context of dissolution of marriage cases, 

a trial may exercise continuing jurisdiction in a considerable number of postjudgment matters. For example, the trial court has the authority, pursuant to 

sections 61.13 and 61.14, Florida Statutes (2022)—under certain 

circumstances not present here—to modify the parenting plan of the child,

the terms and conditions of child support payments, and agreements or 

orders regarding support, maintenance and alimony. However, the trial 

court’s sua sponte vacatur order in the instant case did not fall within the 

scope of any of the above categories, nor was the trial court’s order preceded 

by the filing of a supplemental petition to modify the final judgment, see rule 

12.110(h), or a motion for relief pursuant to rule 12.530 or rule 12.540.
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proffered basis for making such a request after final judgment had already 

been entered.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court was without continuing jurisdiction at the time it 

rendered its sua sponte post-judgment order vacating a portion of the final 

judgment and setting this matter for nonjury trial, we grant the petition for writ 

of prohibition and quash the sua sponte orders vacating a portion of the final 

judgment and setting the cause for non-jury trial.

Petition granted and orders quashed.