Filed 8/31/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

COASTAL HILLS RURAL 

PRESERVATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

JACK PETRANKER et al.,

Real Paries In Interest.

 A145573

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. SCV255694)

This action was brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)1

to challenge the proposed expansion of a Buddhist retreat center approved by defendant 

County of Sonoma (County). The County adopted a mitigated negative declaration 

(MND) in lieu of a formal environmental impact report (EIR) in approving the third in a 

series of master use permits (MUPs) for real parties in interest Jack Petranker and the 

Head Lama of the Tibetan Nyingma Meditation Center (TNMC). Plaintiff Coastal Hills 

Rural Preservation (CHRP) is a citizens’ group that contends the County violated CEQA 

by approving the master use permit without an EIR. CHRP petitioned the trial court for a 

writ of mandate, maintaining that an EIR was required because the proposed project

greatly expands an existing printing press operation that is housed on the subject 

property, which is located in a rural area. CHRP also asserted the approval was made in 

 

1

Public Resources Code sections 21000 through 21178. Unless otherwise 

indicated, all further statutory references are to that code.
2

violation of the County’s general plan and related zoning provisions. The trial court 

denied the petition. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Background

In 1975, TNMC purchased a property on Tin Barn Road in Cazadero, which it 

uses as a monastery and retreat center for senior members of its community (Odiyan

Retreat Center). Since the 1970’s, a significant religious practice of TNMC has been the 

printing of sacred Buddhist texts in the Tibetan language for shipment to Asia and free 

distribution to Buddhist monks, nuns, and lay practitioners whose libraries have been

destroyed by Chinese authorities. 

In 1983, the County approved a conditional use permit for Timberhill Ranch

(Timberhill), a resort also located in Cazadero.2 The property is within an area 

designated as Resources and Rural Development (RRD) in the County’s general plan. 

Timberhill’s use permit allowed for the construction of a lodge facility, a dining room, 

and 15 guest cabins. 

In 2000, the County’s Permit and Resource Management Department (PRMD) 

adopted an MND allowing the expansion of Timberhill to include five additional cabins, 

a new dining room and other guest facilities, and 10 dwelling units for staff housing. 

In 2004, TNMC purchased Timberhill and designated the property as the Ratna 

Ling Retreat Center (Ratna Ling).3 We hereafter refer to real parties in interest

collectively as Ratna Ling. 

II. History of Ratna Ling’s Use Permits

A. 2004 Master Use Permit Application

On April 15, 2004, Ratna Ling submitted a modified master use permit application 

(2004 MUP) to construct 19 additional cabins, a library, a healing center, a therapeutic 

pool, and a new 18,750-square-foot printing press facility on the Timberhill site. The 

 

2

The Timberhill Ranch property is 107 acres in size. 

3 Ratna Ling means “jeweled crest.” 
3

proposed maximum number of occupants was set at 60, comprised of up to 20 residents 

and 40 retreatants. The application also sought permission to convert the existing 

13,394-square-foot lodge into a meditation hall with a kitchen and dining facilities, as 

well as to continue utilizing the property’s other existing structures. Ratna Ling 

estimated the total number of truck trips for the press operation and for supplies to be 0.5 

per day, with total round trips for retreatants and staff at an average of 17 per day. The 

application was unopposed. 

On July 21, 2004, the PRMD filed an initial study, indicating that an MND would 

be prepared. Out of 17 environmental factors considered, the seven deemed potentially 

affected by the proposed project were (1) aesthetics, (2) biological resources, 

(3) utilities/service systems, (4) cultural resources, (5) hydrology/water quality, (6) air 

quality, and (7) transportation/traffic. 

On September 9, 2004, the County’s Board of Zoning Adjustments (BZA) adopted 

an MND (2004 MND) and approved the 2004 MUP, subject to 58 conditions of approval. 

Within the conditions of approval, the printing press operation was designated as a 

noncommercial “ancillary use.” Maximum occupancy for the printing press facility was 

limited to 27 persons, with hours of operation from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. seven days a 

week. The staff report prepared in conjunction with the 2004 MND states: “Total 

production at the press facility is estimated at a little under 100,000 books (including art) 

per year. To print this many books requires approximately twelve 40-foot truckloads of 

paper, or about one truckload per month. The other supplies required, such as ink and 

plates, would come in smaller trucks, at a rate of about one every three months.”4 The 

staff report also reflects that the facility was intended to house a single printing press,

along with related pieces of equipment. 

 

4

These estimates are identical to estimates provided by Ratna Ling in its MUP 

application. 
4

B. Post-2004 MUP Proposals and Activities

Not long after the 2004 MUP was approved, Ratna Ling’s printing press activities 

intensified. In 2006, the TNMC publishing entity known as Dharma Publishing closed its 

printing facility in Berkeley. TNMC transported five printing presses from Berkeley to 

Ratna Ling and placed them alongside the existing printing press in the 18,750-squarefoot building. Ratna Ling initiated communications with the County, seeking to further 

expand its onsite printing operation. An e-mail message to Petranker sent by a deputy 

director with PRMD on November 27, 2006 opined that Ratna Ling’s tentative proposal 

to construct a four-story 95,000-square-foot “text treasury” “would appear to make the 

printing and warehouse the predominant use,” rather than a permissible “accessory use”5

under the County’s general plan and zoning regulations. The e-mail further noted: 

“Your use permit allows the printing press and 18,000 sf of storage space, which we 

consider about the limit of what is reasonable for an accessory use.” The message 

explained: “An accessory use must be incidental to the primary use and must not 

‘significantly change the character, appearance or operation of the principal use of the 

building or property.’ ” 

On August 1, 2007, the PRMD approved Ratna Ling’s zoning permit application

for a small residential care facility to house up to six persons. 

C. 2008 Planning Application and Permits 

On February 26, 2008, Ratna Ling submitted a planning application seeking a 

general plan amendment/special area policy and a use permit to construct two large 

underground caves for text storage, as well as a large exhibition/assembly hall. 

On March 26, 2008, Ratna Ling received a temporary zoning permit for two steelframe membrane storage tents to house its “Sacred Text Treasury.” The permit was later 

revised to include two additional storage tents. The four storage tents have a combined 

 

5

The County reportedly uses the terms “ancillary use” and “accessory use” 

interchangeably. 
5

square footage of 39,270 square feet, which is more than double the size of the printing 

press facility. The permit was to expire on March 25, 2011. 

On June 19, 2008, Ratna Ling acquired an adjacent 13-acre parcel, increasing the 

retreat center’s total land area to 120 acres. 

On August 22, 2008, the PRMD adopted an MND (2008 MND) and approved a 

use permit allowing Ratna Ling to construct a 20-acre-foot reservoir for the site’s water 

system, and to modify the size and location of the healing center. 

D. Neighbor Opposition and Response

On January 8, 2009, a petition supported by 99 signers was filed with the PRMD

in opposition to Ratna Ling’s planning application for the underground caves and 

exhibition/assembly hall. 

On February 25, 2010, the “Steering Committee to Oppose Ratna Ling 

Expansion” (ORLE) filed a complaint with 172 signatures (Complaint) with the PRMD. 

The Complaint alleged Ratna Ling had been operating in violation of the conditions of 

approval contained in the 2004 MUP, as well as in violation of the County’s general plan

and zoning regulations. Specifically, ORLE alleged the printing press operation had 

exceeded its ancillary function, noting that the current combined square footage of the 

printing facility and the four temporary storage tents was equal to the square footage of 

Ratna Ling’s retreat-related facilities. Its six printing presses were allegedly operating 24 

hours a day, six days a week, with up to 40 workers on site per day. Additionally, truck 

traffic had increased 12 to 16 times over Ratna Ling’s reported 2004 estimate. ORLE

included extensive background information and documentation of the alleged violations. 

In an April 19, 2010 letter to Supervisor Efren Carrillo, Petranker responded to the 

Complaint’s allegations, observing the term “ ‘ancillary,’ reinforced by the Oxford 

English Dictionary, is that it means ‘providing essential support.’ Our book production is 

a central religious practice and provides essential support to the primary purpose of Ratna 

Ling and Odiyan as places for retreat, contemplation, meditation, prayer, and the spread 

of the Dharma.” In noting the many permits Ratna Ling had obtained since 2004, 

Petranker stated: “Over the years, we have repeatedly demonstrated our willingness to 
6

co-operate with the County. Most ironically, the very fact the neighbors cite as a 

‘problem’—that we have obtained more than 200 permits—demonstrates that we have 

sought and the County has provided thorough, careful oversight of our operations. 

We’ve paid the County over $195,000 in fees. We’ve attended dozens of meetings, filed 

hundreds upon hundreds of pages of reports, plans, analyses, environmental compliance 

documents and the like. And that cooperation will continue.”6 

E. Ratna Ling’s 2011 Revised Planning Application

On March 15, 2011, Ratna Ling submitted a revised planning application and 

proposal statement to the PRMD (2011 Project). The revised application omits the 

underground caves and the exhibition/assembly hall that were proposed in 2008. In 

addition to securing permanent status for the four temporary storage tents, Ratna Ling 

proposed to construct a six-bedroom residence on the newly acquired 13-acre parcel to 

house 12 occupants.7 It also proposed to erect up to eight tent cabins “to house a number 

of volunteers needed to support peak production periods for the sacred text activity,” and

sought authorization to raise the total occupancy limit for the retreat to 98 persons, with

24 additional persons to be allowed on a seasonal basis.

8

As to the printing facility, Ratna Ling sought to quantify production based on a

limit of one 24-foot truck per day to bring in supplies and transport out finished works for 

shipment, rather than limiting the number of books to be produced. The proposal 

requested a storage use not to exceed the combined square footage of the four temporary 

storage tents. Additionally, it provided that authorization for the printing facility would 

terminate if the property were to be conveyed to a third party not affiliated with the 

 

6

The total volume of reports, plans, analyses, and environmental documentation 

contained in the administrative record is quite substantial. It is unclear whether the 

Complaint itself was ever formally addressed. 

7

The proposed size of the house was later reduced to five bedrooms. 

8 Ratna Ling requested that occupancy for the printing facility be increased from 

27 to 60 persons for all months except June and July, when the limit would be raised to 

80 persons. 
7

traditions and practices of Tibetan Buddhism. In such case, Ratna Ling would dismantle 

and remove the printing equipment. 

On March 26, 2011, the PRMD approved a one-year time extension for the storage 

tent permits. 

On July 31, 2011, ORLE submitted revisions to its extensive (over 400-page) 

opposition to Ratna Ling’s 2011 Project proposal. 

On December 20, 2011, Ratna Ling submitted supplemental information regarding 

the printing facility, addressing energy efficiency, storage of hazardous materials, and the 

color of the four storage tents. An accompanying chart shows the printing operation 

occupies 1.25 percent of the retreat’s total land area, uses 24 percent of the energy at the 

site, accounts for 37 percent of Ratna Ling’s business property value, and generates 5.72

percent of the total vehicular traffic. The document reiterates the importance of sacred 

text preservation to the Ratna Ling community, noting “[t]he entire community of press 

volunteers observes strict rules of behavior; they also join in daily rituals held at the press 

building.” These rituals include chanting traditional Buddhist prayers in the Tibetan 

language, silent meditation, yoga, traditional water and incense offerings, daily spiritual 

practices, chanting of mantras, and closing prayers. 

F. BZA Proceedings

On February 14, 2012, the PRMD released a notice of public hearing and

intent to adopt an MND (2012 MND) for the 2011 Project. The notice indicated the 

PRMD had identified potential environmental impacts in the following areas: biological 

resources, greenhouse gas emission, and transportation/traffic. That same month, a 

petition circulated in opposition to the 2011 Project. The petition appears to have been 

signed by as many as 390 individuals. Many letters, both in support and in opposition,

are contained in the administrative record. 

On April 5, 2012 and June 7, 2012, the BZA conducted public hearings on the 

2012 MND. At the conclusion of public testimony, the BZA, by a five-to-zero vote,

adopted the 2012 MND and approved the MUP for the 2011 Project. 
8

On June 7, 2012, Ward Anderson filed an appeal with the board of supervisors

(Board), claiming the BZA had failed to address the 2010 Complaint. Anderson also 

alleged that in approving the 2011 Project, the BZA overlooked “comprehensive 

rebuttals” that had been advanced against adoption of the 2012 MND. 

On October 4, 2012, the attorney for CHRP amended Anderson’s appeal to 

include the claim that the 2011 Project was inconsistent with the County’s general plan

and zoning regulations. CHRP also asserted the BZA had violated CEQA by adopting an 

MND instead of requiring the preparation of an EIR. 

G. Subsequent Mitigated Negative Declaration

On March 26, 2013, Ratna Ling submitted an updated proposal statement for the 

2011 Project. While the updated proposal statement acknowledges Ratna Ling was 

seeking permanent status for the four storage tents, it does not include the tents in its list

of proposed new structures.

9

On December 2, 2013, an officer with the Timber Cove Fire Protection District 

(TCFPD) submitted a letter to the PRMD questioning whether the storage tents were in 

compliance with building code regulations. 

On January 21, 2014, Ratna Ling submitted documentation regarding the fire 

resistance ratings for the storage tents. 

On February 12, 2014, the County fire marshal submitted a memorandum to the 

PRMD stating that sufficient evidence had been provided to show the storage tents were

in compliance with required fire resistive requirements for membrane structures. 

Reportedly, the tents are equipped with sprinkler systems, and the tent fabric has been 

treated with a flame-retardant chemical. 

On February 24, 2014, CHRP refiled the 2010 Complaint. CHRP focused on the 

industrial character of Ratna Ling’s printing operation, asserting it was inconsistent with 

County land use regulations. 

 

9

In the updated statement, Ratna Ling noted it had donated a new fire truck 

costing $280,000 to the Timber Cove Fire Protection District, along with $15,000 worth 

of supplemental equipment. 
9

On February 28, 2014, PRMD released a 46-page subsequent mitigated negative 

declaration (SMND) to the 2004 MND and the 2008 MND, superseding the 2012 MND. 

The 2014 SMND assesses the potential environmental effects of the 2011 Project using

the 18-factor initial study checklist taken from the CEQA Guidelines. The PRMD found

the 2011 Project would have no impact as to six of these factors, and a less-thansignificant impact as to 12 of these factors.10 The SMND identifies measures designed to 

mitigate all of the identified less-than-significant impacts. PRMD also concluded the

storage tents would not expose the area to a significant risk of wildland fires because the 

structures were built in compliance with the fire safety regulations that were in effect at 

the time their permits were issued. 

H. Appeal to the Board 

On April 1, 2014, CHRP submitted its “Master Issue Statement” in support of its 

appeal to the Board. The related portion of administrative record contains hundreds of 

e-mails and comments from various parties. 

On April 8, 2014, the Board held a hearing on the appeal of the BZA’s 2012 

approval of the 2011 Project. After receiving public comments and testimony, the Board 

closed the hearing and conducted a vote, preliminarily denying the appeal and approving 

the 2011 Project by a vote of three to two. The Board also directed staff to meet with 

Ratna Ling to discuss possible revisions to some of the SMND’s conditions of approval. 

On June 24, 2014, the Board conducted a second public hearing. This hearing was 

limited to consideration of the revised conditions of approval. The changes included 

altering the times for operating the printing press, providing $2,500 annually to the 

TCFPD, and requiring Ratna Ling to coordinate with the County fire marshal and the 

TCFPD to review its onsite firefighting infrastructure. Again by a three-to-two vote, the 

 

10 The six no-impact factors relate to agricultural and forest resources, biological 

resources, mineral resources, population and housing, recreation, and the “mandatory 

findings of significance.” The 12 less-than-significant impact factors pertain to 

aesthetics, air quality, cultural resources, geology/soils, greenhouse gas emission, hazards 

and hazardous materials, hydrology/water quality, land use and planning, noise, public 

services, transportation/traffic, and utilities/service systems. 
10

Board formally denied the appeal, adopted the SMND, and approved the 2011 Project

subject to 96 conditions of approval. 

On June 25, 2014, the County recorded a Notice of Determination. 

III. Trial Court Proceedings

On July 24, 2014, CHRP filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for 

declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the Board’s action. CHRP alleged the 

Board’s decision to forgo preparation of an EIR violated CEQA because the SMND 

incorporated previously unpermitted activities into the baseline of its analysis. CHRP 

also argued substantial evidence in the record demonstrated that the 2011 Project will 

create new and significant environmental impacts with respect to fire hazards, public 

safety, public services, and land use, impacts that had not previously been analyzed in 

any CEQA document. Alternatively, CHRP claimed the SMND was not supported by 

substantial evidence. It also asserted the 2011 Project was inconsistent with the County’s 

general plan and zoning code. Finally, CHRP contended the SMND violates CEQA by 

deferring the implementation of mitigation measures, and by failing to analyze the 

cumulative impact of Ratna Ling’s activities. 

The trial court issued a tentative order denying the petition, and a hearing occurred 

on March 30, 2015. 

On April 7, 2015, the trial court filed its ruling denying the writ. CHRP timely 

appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

“ ‘[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 1094.5 makes administrative mandamus 

available for review of “any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a 

proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be 

taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, 

corporation, board or officer.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[I]mplicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement 

that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge 

the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.’ ” (West 
11

Chandler Boulevard Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 

1506, 1517 (West Chandler).)

“ ‘In reviewing an agency’s decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 

1094.5, the trial court determines whether (1) the agency proceeded without, or in excess 

of, jurisdiction; (2) there was a fair hearing; and (3) the agency abused its discretion. 

[Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not 

proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the 

findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘The trial court 

and appellate court apply the same standard; the trial court’s determination is not binding 

on us.’ ” (West Chandler, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1517–1518, fn. omitted.) 

II. CHRP Waived Its Religious Preference Arguments

Before we address CHRP’s land use and environmental claims, we observe CHRP 

spends much of its opening brief arguing that the County’s adoption of the SMND and 

approval of the 2011 Project violates California Constitutional provisions relating to the 

establishment of religion. This issue was not raised before the Board and is therefore not 

ripe for our review.

11

 Recognizing this defect, CHRP urges us to exercise our discretion 

to consider its argument because the issue involves “a pure question of law” and 

implicates important issues of public policy. We decline the invitation.

Typically, constitutional issues not raised in earlier civil proceedings are waived 

on appeal. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394; see Sea & Sage Audubon 

 

11 CHRP asserts it did exhaust its administrative remedies, citing to isolated 

statements made over many years by various individuals that are found in noncontiguous 

portions of the 13,603-page administrative record. Significantly, neither Anderson nor 

CHRP expressly identified religious preference as a ground for the appeal to the Board. 

We further observe any argument based on religion was essentially disclaimed in 

CHRP’s opening brief in the trial court: “Petitioners do not object to the religious nature 

of the site, and are fully supportive of Ratna Ling as a Buddhist retreat center. Petitioners 

object to the location of an industrial printing operation in a rural area of Sonoma County 

that lacks the infrastructure to manage industrial fires and potentially hazardous 

emergencies associated with industrial operations.” 
12

Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417 (Sea & Sage); Thomas v. 

Duggins Construction Co., Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114.) A court may relax 

this rule to permit a party to raise belatedly “ ‘a pure question of law which is presented 

on undisputed facts.’ ” (Sea & Sage, at p. 417.) Only when the issue presented involves 

purely a legal question, on an uncontroverted record and requires no factual 

determinations, is it appropriate to address new theories. (Palmer v. Shawback (1993) 

17 Cal.App.4th 296, 300.) “This forgiving approach has been most frequently invoked 

when ‘important issues of public policy are at issue.’ ” (Sea & Sage, at p. 417.) Its 

application nevertheless “is largely a question of an appellate court’s discretion.” 

(Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869, 874.) 

Furthermore, it also is “the long-established rule that an appellate court will not 

enter upon the resolution of constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal.” (Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 

20 Cal.App.3d 1, 5–6.) Accordingly, a new constitutional issue may be raised on appeal 

only if it involves a pure question of law that is absolutely necessary to the disposition of 

this appeal, and concerns a matter of public interest based on undisputed facts. The 

present case does not satisfy this criteria. 

In arguing that the County’s approval of the 2011 Project violates federal and state 

constitutional prohibitions against the establishment of religion, CHRP asserts: “Here, 

the County approved [TNMC’s] massive industrial storage operation and drastic print 

facility expansion even though the Project would not otherwise be allowed in RRD land, 

according to the County’s own words.” We are unable to evaluate the constitutionality of 

this assertion without examining the record to assess whether the storage operation is 

indeed a “massive industrial” one, and whether the Board’s decision really does allow for 

a “drastic print facility expansion.” Not surprisingly, Ratna Ling and the County both 

take exception to this characterization of the record. Thus, the underlying facts are not 

uncontroverted. 

Additionally, the issue does not present itself to us on a clean slate. TNMC’s 

religious aspirations were clear when it first acquired the Timberhill site and obtained 
13

County approval for its printing activities in 2004. It is undisputed that the publication of 

sacred texts has long been understood to be an outgrowth of Ratna Ling’s spiritual 

practice. According to Ratna Ling, “[m]any people go on retreat primarily for the 

purpose of working on the sacred texts because ongoing transmission of the Dharma is a 

central practice of this spiritual community.” 

Against this backdrop, which includes several prior County approvals that were 

never challenged, we are being asked to evaluate whether the incremental increase in 

activities authorized under the SMND, in and of itself, violates constitutional principles 

concerning the establishment of religion. Framed as such, this narrow, fact-specific issue 

does not concern a matter of public interest.

12

 And even if we could properly exercise 

our discretion to overlook CHRP’s failure to raise this issue in the administrative 

proceeding below, we would decline to entertain its arguments based on this complex 

factual background alone. 

III. Consistency With The County’s General Plan

A. General Principles and Standard of Review

The Board specifically found the 2011 Project to be consistent with the applicable 

provisions of the County’s general plan and zoning code. CHRP challenges that finding 

on appeal. This challenge is based on the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov. Code, § 65000 

et seq.), rather than CEQA. (See Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose 

(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689, 707.)

“Government Code section 65300 requires each county . . . to ‘adopt a 

comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county . . . .’ 

 

12 Courts typically find public policy justifies appellate consideration when a 

ruling’s impact will extend beyond the parties to the case. (See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai 

Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 6 [whether to recognize a tort 

cause of action for intentional first party spoliation]; De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates 

Homeowners Assn. v. De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 

908 [whether Civ. Code, § 798.86 was intended to provide the exclusive penalty for a 

violation of the provisions of the Mobilehome Residency Law, thus precluding an award

of punitive damages for statutory violations].)
14

The general plan consists of ‘a statement of development policies . . . diagrams and text 

setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals . . .’ and includes, at a 

minimum, the following seven elements: land use, circulation, housing, conservation, 

open-space, noise, and safety. [Citation.] The general plan and each of its elements must 

‘comprise an integrated, internally consistent and compatible statement of policies . . . .’ 

[Citation.] Furthermore, zoning ordinances must be consistent with the general plan.” 

(No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 223, 242 (No Oil).)

“When we review an agency’s decision for consistency with its own general plan, 

we naturally accord great deference to the authoring agency’s determination. [Citation.] 

The agency has broad discretion, especially regarding general plan policies, which reflect 

competing interests. [Citation.] ‘A reviewing court’s role “is simply to decide whether 

the [agency] officials considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the 

proposed project conforms with those policies.” ’ [Citations.] If the agency’s decision is 

not arbitrary, capricious, unsupported, or procedurally unfair, it is upheld.” (Anderson 

First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1192.) We resolve 

reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative decision. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic 

Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514–515; Wollmer v. City of 

Berkeley (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 933, 940.) 

We show this deference because the body adopting a general plan has unique 

competence to interpret those policies when applying them to a proposed project. 

(Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1563; San 

Francisco Tomorrow v. City and County of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498, 

515 (San Francisco Tomorrow).) Given this expertise, it is not our role to micromanage 

a local agency’s development decisions. (California Native Plant Society v. City of 

Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603, 638; Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. 

City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 719.) 

B. The Resources and Rural Development Designation

As noted above, the Ratna Ling site has a RRD land use designation under the 

County’s current general plan, known as “General Plan 2020.” The stated purpose of the 
15

RRD land use designation is to “protect lands used for timber, geothermal and mineral 

resource production and for natural resource conservation.” The RRD category is 

intended, in part, to guard against intensive development in fire and flood prone areas, 

and to protect county residents from proliferation of growth in areas where there are 

inadequate public services and infrastructure. The RRD designation expressly permits 

“[l]odging, campgrounds, and similar recreational and visitor serving uses,” provided 

they are not inconsistent with the resource purposes of the area.13 The County considers

the Ratna Ling’s operation, like the Timberhill Ranch before it, as a “visitor-serving” use. 

The related zoning ordinance also permits visitor-serving uses “where compatible 

with resource use and available public services.” (Sonoma County Code of Ordinances 

(Sonoma County Code), § 26-10-005.) Allowable uses can include “[a]ccessory” 

buildings, as well as uses that are appurtenant to the operation of allowable uses. (Id., 

§ 26-10-010, subd. (p).) Uses allowed under an approved use permit include 

“[n]oncommercial clubs and lodges.” (Id., § 26-10-020, subd. (v).) 

C. The Board’s Findings

In its resolution approving the 2011 Project, the Board found the proposed uses to 

be consistent with the County’s land use regulations because, by that point, Ratna Ling 

was merely seeking “clarifications and expansions of the previously approved uses” 

(italics added), all of which had been found by the BZA in 2004 to be consistent with 

relevant land use policies and regulations. In particular, the Board found the printing 

facility “has been and will continue to be an accessory use permitted under Section 

26-10-010(p) of the Zoning Code since it is related to, subordinate to, and appurtenant to 

the retreat use.”14 The Board further found various arguments seeking to reopen the prior 

“accessory use” determination for the print facility were untimely. 

 

13 The RRD designation also allows public and private schools and places of 

religious worship. 

14 Sonoma County Code section 26-10-010, subdivision (p) is titled, “Accessory 

buildings and uses appurtenant to the operation of the permitted uses.” It provides, in 

part: “Accessory buildings may be constructed on vacant parcels of two (2) acres or more 
16

In the resolution approving the 2004 MUP, the BZA found the mitigation 

measures set forth in the permit rendered Ratna Ling’s use “consistent with the RRD . . . 

General Plan land use designation and the zoning district regulations as a noncommercial retreat center because it would not detract from or impinge upon lands used 

for timber, geothermal and mineral resource production or natural resource 

conservation.” The 18,750-square-foot religious printing facility was described as “noncommercial,” and was deemed “an ancillary use to the monastery and non-commercial 

retreat center.” The BZA also found Ratna Ling’s overall activities to be consistent with 

the RRD land use designation because the retreat operation was “similar to a 

noncommercial club or lodge.”

D. Argument on Appeal

On appeal, CHRP asserts the project is inconsistent with the County’s general plan

and related zoning provisions. It contends the County’s continued categorization of 

Ratna Ling as the equivalent of a “noncommercial club or lodge” is unsupported by 

substantial evidence. CHRP claims the Board’s approval “sanctions rampant commercial 

activity already taking place and permits [Ratna Ling] to store commercial products, as 

they are produced, in the immense warehouses as inventory.” Specifically, it points to 

the “extraordinary levels of manufacturing productions (books and objects), massive 

storage structures and commercial Internet sales.” 

As the County notes, there is no evidence in the record that Ratna Ling’s printing 

activities are undertaken for profit. The undisputed evidence is that 89 percent of Ratna 

Ling’s total revenue is generated by its retreat use, with 11 percent coming from the 

printing press use. Ninety-eight percent of its total printing output is given away for free.

Two percent of this output is used to produce religious texts in English, which are offered 

for sale. The revenue generated by these sales is then used to support the production of 

more religious texts. The record shows that Internet sales generated $6,000 per month for 

 

in advance of a primary permitted use.” “Accessory use” is defined in Sonoma County 

Code section 26-02-140 as “a use of land or a building that is related to and subordinate 

to the primary use of the land or building located on the same lot.” 
17

Ratna Ling in 2014. By contrast, the retreat use produces an average of $450,000 in 

income per year, or $37,500 per month. Notably, CHRP does not argue that the retreat 

use is a commercial activity, even though that use generates six times more income per 

year for Ratna Ling than the printing use. Accordingly, we disagree with CHRP’s claim 

that Ratna Ling’s printing operation is inconsistent with its primary function as a

religious retreat merely because some of its output enters the stream of commerce. 

CHRP also urges that the “industrial-size storage structures and expanded press 

operations” should be deemed “industrial” uses for purposes of land use regulation, and 

that the County erred in finding these uses to be consistent with the RRD criteria.

15

While it is undeniable that Ratna Ling’s printing activities have intensified over time, we 

cannot say the County abused its discretion in categorizing the printing use as ancillary to 

the retreat center use. As a qualitative matter, the printing press use has been permitted 

since 2004, and the time within which to make any challenge to that qualitative 

determination has passed. 

Further, our review of the administrative record, including the Board’s 15-page 

resolution dated June 24, 2014, confirms that the Board fully considered the County’s 

land use policies and the extent to which the 2011 Project conforms to those policies. 

The Board specifically found Ratna Ling’s housing of sacred texts in the storage tents

was not an industrial use, but was an accessory use to the religious retreat. CHRP 

stresses that the 2011 Project “exposes county residents to a fire department unequipped 

for industrial fires and narrow rural roads burdened by large trucks and increased traffic.”

Suffice it to say, our review of the administrative record shows the Board fully 

considered the “industrial” aspects of Ratna Ling’s printing operation, including the 

potential impacts related to fire safety. 

 

15 Industrial uses are not necessarily prohibited in RRD zones. As the County 

notes, with a conditional use permit the RRD designation and related zoning regulations 

allow for intensive industrial uses, including large-scale geothermal power plants, energy 

transmission facilities and pipelines, biomass energy facilities, oil and gas production 

wells, mining, hardrock quarries, and lumber mills. (Sonoma County Code, § 26-10-020, 

subds. (t), (jj).)
18

We acknowledge the decision to allow for the printing press expansion was 

controversial, as evidenced by the Board’s three-to-two vote in favor of approval. 

Nevertheless, under the deferential standard that governs our review, we will not reweigh 

conflicting evidence nor substitute our views for those of the Board. (San Francisco 

Tomorrow, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 514.) 

IV. The Board Did Not Violate CEQA

A. The CEQA Review Process

We now turn to CHRP’s CEQA claims. “CEQA is a comprehensive scheme 

designed to provide long-term protection to the environment. [Citation.] In enacting 

CEQA, the Legislature declared its intention that all public agencies responsible for 

regulating activities affecting the environment give prime consideration to preventing 

environmental damage when carrying out their duties. [Citations.] CEQA is to be 

interpreted ‘to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the 

reasonable scope of the statutory language.’ ” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & 

Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 112.) 

“The ‘heart of CEQA’ is the EIR, whose purpose is to inform the public and 

government officials of the environmental consequences of decisions before they are 

made.” (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San 

Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 687–688.) With certain limited exceptions, a 

public agency must prepare an EIR whenever substantial evidence supports a fair 

argument that a proposed project “may have a significant effect on the environment.” 

(§§ 21100, 21151, 21080, 21082.2; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14 (Guidelines), §§ 15002, 

subd. (f)(1), (2), 15063;16 No Oil, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 75.) A “ ‘[s]ignificant effect on 

 

16 The Guidelines are regulations “prescribed by the Secretary for Resources to be 

followed by all state and local agencies in California in the implementation of” CEQA. 

(Guidelines, § 15000; § 21083.) “In interpreting CEQA, we accord the Guidelines great 

weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or erroneous.” (Vineyard Area 

Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 

428, fn. 5.)
19

the environment’ ” means “a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the 

environment.” (§ 21068; see Guidelines, § 15382.) 

If conditions imposed upon the project “avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to 

a point where clearly no significant effect on the environment would occur,” and “there is 

no substantial evidence in light of the whole record before the public agency that the 

project, as revised, may have a significant effect on the environment,” an MND may be 

adopted in lieu of an EIR. (§ 21064.5.) 

B. The Fair Argument Test Does Not Apply

CHRP and amicus curiae Friends of the Gualala River and Forest Unlimited 

(FoGR) argue that the “fair argument” test applies to our review of the Board’s decision 

to proceed with an SMND in lieu of an EIR because the change in the status of the 

storage tents from temporary to permanent constituted a new project under CEQA, as 

opposed to a modification of Ratna Ling’s prior MUPs. We elect to apply substantial 

evidence review to the Board’s decision to adopt the SMND. (See Latinos Unidos de 

Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 192, 202.)17 

In Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 1112, 1135, our Supreme Court observed: “[T]he ‘fair argument’ test has been 

applied only to the decision whether to prepare an original EIR or a negative declaration.” 

“Section 21166[18]provides that once an agency prepares an EIR, no EIR shall thereafter 

 

17 We note the issue of whether an agency’s decision to forgo preparation of an 

EIR under section 21166 is reviewed under a substantial evidence standard or subject to 

an initial de novo determination is currently before the California Supreme Court. 

(Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Community College Dist.

(Sept. 26, 2013, A135892 [nonpub. opn.]), review granted Nov. 5, 2013, S214061).)

18 Section 21166 provides: “When an environmental impact report has been 

prepared for a project pursuant to this division, no subsequent or supplemental 

environmental impact report shall be required by the lead agency or by any responsible 

agency, unless one or more of the following events occurs: [¶] (a) Substantial changes 

are proposed in the project which will require major revisions of the environmental 

impact report. [¶] (b) Substantial changes occur with respect to the circumstances under 

which the project is being undertaken which will require major revisions in the 

environmental impact report. [¶] (c) New information, which was not known and could 
20

be required for the project unless certain statutorily prescribed circumstances occur, such 

as substantial changes to the project or to the circumstances under which the project is 

being undertaken. Guidelines section 15162 [citation] provides a similar limitation on 

subsequent environmental review following an agency’s adoption of a negative 

declaration. Guidelines section 15162 has been held to be a valid regulation that 

implements the principles contained in section 21166.” (Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation 

Dist. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 650, 653, fn. omitted, citing Benton v. Board of Supervisors

(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1467, 1479–1481 (Benton).)

CHRP relies on Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 

1316 (Sierra Club). That case is distinguishable. In Sierra Club, the county had certified 

a program EIR for a resource management plan that regulated mining. The plan specified 

lands available for future mining and provided for preservation of identified agricultural 

lands. (Sierra Club, at pp. 1313–1314.) Years later, a mining company proposed to 

amend the EIR to designate for mining a large parcel that had been identified as 

agricultural in the EIR. (Id. at p. 1314.) We held that the deferential review provided by 

section 21166 did not apply in this context because the proposed project was not “either 

the same as or within the scope of” the program described in the EIR (id. at p. 1321), 

which had expressly exempted the agricultural land from future mining. (Id. at p. 1320.) 

The present case is more similar to Benton. In Benton, a county board of 

supervisors had previously issued an MND in connection with a use permit for the 

construction of a winery on a particular parcel of land. (Benton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 1473.) The owner of the land acquired an adjoining parcel and nine months later 

applied for another use permit, seeking permission to build the winery on the new parcel. 

The planning commission compared what the owner could construct under the first 

permit to what it requested in the new application, approved grading and use permits, and 

adopted a new MND. (Ibid.) The appellant sought to set aside the MND and the use 

permit, and compel the preparation of an EIR. (Id. at p. 1474.)

 

not have been known at the time the environmental impact report was certified as 

complete, becomes available.”
21

On appeal, the Benton court found even though the county staff labeled the new 

application as one for a new permit, the planning commission had treated the application 

as if it were a request for modification of the already permitted project. (Benton, supra,

226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1476.) Staff explained that the owner had already acquired vested 

rights to build under its initial use permit and could build the existing winery as 

previously approved, and the commission limited its review to a comparison between 

what had already been approved and what was being proposed. (Ibid.) Because the new 

application was a modification, a limited review was appropriate: “[The winery’s] initial 

project received full CEQA review; only those aspects of the proposal that were changed 

as a result of the modified winery plan were subject to later CEQA review.” (Id. at 

p. 1477, fn. 10; see Fund for Environmental Defense v. County of Orange (1988) 

204 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1552–1553; Temecula Band of Luiseño Mission Indians v. Rancho 

Cal. Water Dist. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 425, 438–439.) 

As in Benton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 1467, here we deal with a purported 

modification to a project after initial environmental documents, i.e., the 2004 MND and 

the 2008 MND, had been adopted. The printing press operation was authorized in 2004 

after an initial study was conducted and an MND was prepared. The Board concluded 

the 2011 Project would not result in any significant changes in circumstances or impacts 

under Guideline section 15162, concluding only an addendum to the 2004 and 2008 

MNDs was required. However, since addendums are not circulated to the public, the 

County elected to prepare the SMND. 

The County’s decision was proper. While the storage tents were not included in 

the prior environmental documents, it is undisputed that these structures are integral to

Ratna Ling’s existing printing press operation. Further, unlike the mining of exempt 

agricultural land in Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, the storage tents do not 

violate any prior approved conditions. Moreover, as we discuss below, there is 

substantial evidence that the 2011 Project will not expose people or structures to a 

significant risk of loss, injury or death involving wildland fires. Accordingly, we review 
22

the record to determine if substantial evidence supports the County’s adoption of the 

SMND.

C. The SMND Is Supported by Substantial Evidence

1. Scope of Our Review

In considering whether the Board’s decision to adopt the SMND is supported by 

substantial evidence, the scope of our review is identical with that of the superior court. 

(Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 334.) We examine all 

relevant evidence in the entire record, considering both the evidence that supports the 

administrative decision and the evidence against it, in order to determine whether or not 

the findings of the agency are supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 335.) 

Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, 

credible, and of solid value, evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. (Ibid.) The burden is on the appellant to show there is no 

substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency. (Id. at p. 336.)

2. Wildland Fire Impact

CHRP asserts the Board improperly concluded that the 2011 Project will not have 

a significant impact with respect to wildland fires. While acknowledging the region

benefits from a community-wide mutual aid agreement that provides supplemental fire 

protection in the event of an emergency, CHRP faults the Board for failing to analyze the 

response times of the other districts or their ability to “fight an industrial fire at the 

Project site.” It also faults the Board for relying on statements made by the current fire 

marshal because she indicated that fire officials expected to engage in continued 

discussions with Ratna Ling to assess fire risks, hazards, and mitigation measures.

Our review of the record shows substantial evidence supports the Board’s

conclusion that the fire risks posed by the storage tents were adequately mitigated. For 

example, as we have already noted, the membrane covering the steel framed storage tents 
23

was found to have met applicable fire protection standards.19 There is evidence in the 

record that the fabric is self-extinguishing and “cannot support combustion nor contribute 

fuel to a fire.” The tents also have heat detection and fire sprinkler systems, along with a 

backup generator. Ratna Ling has 200 to 300 feet of defensible space around each tent. 

A condition of approval requires Ratna Ling to provide and maintain its own onsite fire 

engine. 

 

19 FoGR contends the 2014 SMND fails to apply the appropriate California 

Building Standards Code provisions (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24) (CBC) to its analysis of the 

storage tents, noting the tents do not meet the wildfire protection standards in Chapter 7A 

of the CBC. It notes that no membrane fabric structures currently meet the higher 

standards imposed by Chapter 7A. However, it is undisputed that the stricter standards 

did not become effective until January 2010, well after the storage tents were permitted. 

During oral argument, appellant contended the now permanent tents were not 

covered by the 2007 CBC but by the 2011 CBC. The county maintained the structures 

approved in the 2008 MUP were regulated by the 2007 CBC. The county’s position was 

previously detailed in a letter from DeWayne Starnes, Chief Building Official for 

Sonoma County, to counsel for Ratna Ling, dated October 10, 2013. Under Chapter 7 of 

the Sonoma County Code, the existing CBC in place at the “time an application for 

building permit is submitted shall apply to the plans and specifications for, and to the 

construction performed under, that permit. . . .” (Sonoma County Code, § 7.13, quoting 

CBC, § 101.9; see CBC, § 102.6.) The permits to store manuscripts and books were 

submitted during 2008. Hence, the 2007 CBC applied. Any change arising by a later 

modification in the 2010 CBC does not apply, according to the PRMD. Starnes’s letter 

also states that “changing the classification of the tent structures from temporary to 

permanent has no practical effect. When PRMD reviewed and checked the plans for the 

tent structures, PRMD required that the tent structures meet all criteria for permanent 

structures [under the existing CBC]. The change from temporary to permanent is not a 

change of occupancy under the CBC that triggers any additional requirement.” (Italics 

added.) 

The determination of the applicable features of the CBC to a county project was an 

appropriate conclusion by Starnes in his position as the Chief Building Official of the 

county. As such it is entitled to deference. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City 

of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 219.) “We have generally accorded respect to 

administrative interpretations of a law and, unless clearly erroneous, have deemed them 

significant factors in ascertaining statutory meaning and purpose.” (Nipper v. California 

Auto. Assigned Risk Plan (1977) 19 Cal.3d 35, 45.) Counsel for appellants presents no 

case authority for us to deviate from this position.
24

Additionally, Vern Losh, a qualified fire professional with 40 years of experience, 

who previously served as the Chief/Director of the County’s Department of Emergency 

Services from 1995 through 2008, testified that he had never seen a large-scale fire or 

even a significant fire event originate from a structure that has heat detection, automatic 

sprinklers, and defensible space. In sum, we find substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s conclusion that the conditions of approval contained in the SMND adequate 

address any outstanding fire safety concerns. 

3. Baseline Argument

CHRP and FoGR claim the county improperly included the storage tents in the 

baseline assumptions of its environmental impact analysis. “To decide whether a given 

project’s environmental effects are likely to be significant, the agency must use some 

measure of the environment’s state absent the project, a measure sometimes referred to as 

the ‘baseline’ for environmental analysis.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. 

South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 315 (Communities for 

a Better Environment).) Under the Guidelines, “the baseline ‘normally’ consists of ‘the 

physical environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time 

. . . environmental analysis is commenced . . . .’ ” (Communities for a Better 

Environment, at p. 315, citing Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a).) “This is so even if the 

current condition includes unauthorized and even environmentally harmful conditions 

that never received, and, as a result of being incorporated into the baseline, may never 

receive environmental review.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & 

Wildlife (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 214, 249.) 

Not surprisingly, the SMND notes that the storage tents were part of the existing 

physical conditions on the site. However, the storage tents were not simply carved out of 

the impact discussion in the SMND. Our review of the record shows the Board fully 

considered its own regulations and policies, as well as the fire hazards posed by the 

storage tents, conditioning its approval on compliance with comprehensive fire safety 

mitigation measures. We disagree with FoGR’s assertion that the county failed to 

analyze the potential environmental impacts created by the tents. Instead, we agree with 
25

the County’s assertion that FoGR’s brief “simply ignore[s] the extensive fire protection 

and suppression measures that applied to the project.” 

The record indicates that the storage tents were fully evaluated by the Board. The 

SMND discloses that inspections and site visits had confirmed the structures were 

operating with appropriate fire safety measures. Moreover, the fire marshal required 

Ratna Ling to upgrade the tents’ existing sprinkler systems, which it agreed to do. 

Ultimately, the Board required Ratna Ling to have its own fire truck on site along with a 

minimum of two trained and qualified volunteer firefighters to respond to emergency 

calls. Even if the storage tents were improperly incorporated into the SMND’s baseline, 

we again find substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the SMND adequately 

addresses the fire safety concerns raised by the storage tents. 

4. Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Plan

FoGR also asserts the County erred in not following chapter 4 (Wildfire Hazard 

and Risk Assessment) of its own Hazard Mitigation Plan. That plan provides, in part, 

“New buildings located in any Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Area designated by the 

enforcing agency shall comply with the Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Area Building 

Standards which establish minimum standards for buildings in Wildland-Urban Interface 

Fire Areas.” (Id., § 47.5, italics added.) The mitigation plan was adopted effective 

October 25, 2011, well after the four storage tents at issue here were permitted and 

constructed. FoGR does not cite to any provision that requires existing structures to 

comply with these building standards. 

5. Deferred Mitigation

FoGR claims the County improperly deferred study of fire impacts until after 

adoption of the SMND. Condition 82 of the 2014 SMND provides: “The applicant shall 

coordinate with the Sonoma County Fire Marshal and the [TCFPD] to review the 

previously approved and existing onsite fire fighting infrastructure for the sacred text 

storage structures and to install any additional onsite infrastructure deemed appropriate 

by the Sonoma County Fire Marshal.” 
26

CEQA usually requires mitigation measures to be defined in advance. 

(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council

(1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027.) But deferral is permitted if, in addition to 

demonstrating some need for deferral, the agency (1) commits itself to mitigation; and 

(2) spells out, in its environmental impact report, the possible mitigation options that 

would meet “specific performance criteria” contained in the report. (Id. at pp. 1027–

1029; § 21100, subd. (b)(3).)

In our view, Condition 82 does not constitute unlawful deferred mitigation. In

Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 

794–796, which addressed CEQA review of a proposed residential development, the EIR 

included several mitigation measures that required the developer to conduct studies and 

develop plans for regulating the fuel used during construction, tree restoration, and water 

runoff, subject to specified criteria and the approval of appropriate local agencies. The 

appellate court found no improperly deferred mitigation. (Ibid.)

We reach the same conclusion here. The mitigation measure requires Ratna Ling 

to comply with all fire-related conditions, and does not defer the implementation of any 

of these requirements. Rather, it grants the County the right to impose new, stricter 

requirements should such requirements be deemed necessary, without first having to 

initiate an enforcement action. Accordingly, there is no unlawful deferred mitigation.

V. The County’s Approval Did Not Involve Spot Zoning

Finally, we agree with Ratna Ling and the County that CHRP cannot argue on 

appeal that the County engaged in impermissible spot zoning when it approved the 

Project. As with its religious preference argument, this issue was not squarely raised 

during the administrative proceeding. 

Regardless, the case CHRP primarily relies on, Neighbors in Support of 

Appropriate Land Use v. County of Tuolumne (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 997 (Neighbors) is 

inapposite. The precise issue in that case was whether Government Code section 65852 

“prohibit[s] a county from granting a parcel’s owner the right to engage in a use 

prohibited to all other parcels in the same zone, even though it does not rezone the 
27

property, amend the ordinance to permit the use, grant a valid conditional use permit, or 

grant a variance[.]” (Neighbors, at p. 1008.) Government Code section 65852 provides: 

“All such [zoning] regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building or use 

of land throughout each zone, but the regulation in one type of zone may differ from 

those in other types of zones.” Nothing in the record or in the relevant zoning regulations 

suggests that the use the County has authorized with respect to Ratna Ling is prohibited 

as to all other parcels in the same zone.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

DONDERO, J.

We concur:

_________________________

HUMES, P. J.

_________________________

MARGULIES, J.
28

Trial Court: Sonoma County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Elliot Lee Daum

Counsel: 

Provencher & Flatt LLP, Janis H. Grattan for plaintiff and appellant Coastal Hills Rural 

Preservation.

O’Brien Watters & Davis LLP, Noreen Evans for Friends of the Gualala River and Forest 

Unlimited as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

American Athiests Legal Center, Amanda Knief for American Atheists as amicus curiae 

on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

County Counsel of Sonoma County, Bruce D. Goldstein, County Counsel, Verne Ball, 

Deputy County Counsel for respondents County of Sonoma, Sonoma County Board of 

Supervisors, Sonoma County Permit and Resource Management Department.

Clement, Fitzpatrick & Kenworthy, Law Offices of Tina Wallis, and Christina Wallis for 

real parties in interest Jack Petranker and The Head Lama of the Tibetan Nyingma 

Meditation Center.

A145573