DHS Is Not Coordinating 

the Department’s Efforts 

to Defend the Nation’s 

Food, Agriculture, and 

Veterinary Systems 

against Terrorism 

July 16, 2020 

OIG-20-53 
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DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department’s

 Efforts to Defend the Nation’s Food, Agriculture,

 and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism 

July 16, 2020 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

We conducted this audit to 

determine whether DHS’ 

CWMD Office implemented a 

program to coordinate the 

Department’s efforts to 

defend food, agriculture, and 

veterinary systems against 

terrorism and other highconsequence events in the 

United States as required by 

SAFA. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made three 

recommendations to DHS’ 

CWMD Office to improve 

oversight, policy initiatives, 

and coordination of the 

Department’s efforts to 

protect the Nation’s food, 

agriculture, and veterinary 

systems. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

The Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (SAFA) requires 

that DHS’ Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Office (CWMD) carry out a program to coordinate the 

Department’s efforts to defend the country’s food, 

agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and 

other high-consequence events. According to SAFA, the 

program should provide oversight, lead policy initiatives, 

and coordinate with DHS components and Federal 

agencies. However, CWMD has not yet carried out a 

program to meet SAFA’s requirements. 

This occurred because CWMD believes it does not have 

clearly defined authority from the Secretary to carry out 

the requirements of SAFA. In addition, since its 

establishment in December 2017, CWMD has not 

prioritized SAFA requirements but instead has focused its 

resources on other mission areas. As a result, CWMD 

has limited awareness of DHS’ ongoing efforts and cannot 

ensure it is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist 

attack against the Nation’s food, agriculture, or veterinary 

systems. 

CWMD Response 

CWMD concurred with all three recommendations and 

provided corrective action plans to address the 

recommendations. However, CWMD noted that since our 

audit fieldwork, it has undergone a change in senior 

leadership that reprioritized the critical role CWMD plays 

in implementing SAFA. Specifically, CWMD reconstituted 

a formal Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense 

program, which is now staffed with personnel supported 

by a budget. CWMD is also rebuilding and strengthening 

relationships with internal DHS components and 

interagency and external stakeholders. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-20-53 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background
 

The United States’ food, agriculture, and veterinary systems are vulnerable to 

threats of terrorism and other events that pose a high risk to homeland 

security such as natural and unintentional introduction of diseases, pests, or 

poisons. For example, evidence suggests terrorists have considered targeting 

people by adding toxic chemicals and pathogens1 directly to the food supply. 

To illustrate, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. 

military found a list of pathogens in an Afghanistan cave that Al-Qaeda 

planned to use as potential biological weapons to target humans and the food 

supply. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization, and Protection designated food and agriculture as one of the 

Nation’s critical infrastructure sectors, so vital to the United States that its 

incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, 

national economic security, national public health, or safety. Within the 

Department of Homeland Security, six components help protect the Nation’s 

food, agriculture, and veterinary systems: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Science and 

Technology Directorate, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 

(CISA), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD), and Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis. For example, CBP protects the United States from 

the threat of invasive plant pests and foreign animal diseases through an 

approach designed to prevent prohibited agricultural items from entering the 

country. FEMA conducts interagency exercises to respond to disasters, 

including large-scale agricultural or food incidents. In addition, among other 

activities, CISA manages a web-based platform for information sharing related 

to food, agriculture, and veterinary efforts. 

In 2017, the President signed into law the Securing Our Agriculture and Food 

Act2 (SAFA) requiring the Assistant Secretary for DHS’ Office of Health Affairs 

(OHA) to implement a program to carry out the Department’s efforts to defend 

food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other events 

that pose a high risk to homeland security. SAFA specifically required the 

program to provide oversight, lead policy initiatives, and coordinate with DHS 

components and Federal agencies that help support this mission. OHA’s Food, 

Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Branch, which was led by three veterinary 

medical officers and epidemiologists, became responsible for coordinating the 

Department’s activities and fulfilling the requirements of SAFA. In December 

2017, the Department moved all components with chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear functions, including relevant portions of OHA, under 

1 A pathogen is a specific causative agent (such as a bacterium or virus) of disease. 

2 On June 30, 2017, the President signed into law P.L. 115-43, Securing Our Agriculture and 

Food Act (SAFA), which amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-20-53 
 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the newly established CWMD. The mission of CWMD is to enable operational 

partners to prevent attacks against the United States from weapons of mass 

destruction and promote readiness for chemical, biological, nuclear, and health 

security threats. 

Following the establishment of CWMD, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

issued a memorandum delegating the Assistant Secretary of CWMD 

responsibility for fulfilling SAFA’s requirements. We conducted this audit to 

determine whether CWMD implemented a program to coordinate the 

Department’s efforts to defend the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems 

against terrorism and other high-consequence events3 in the United States as 

required by SAFA. 

Results of Audit 

CWMD Has Not Carried Out a Program to Coordinate the Department’s 

Efforts to Defend the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against 

Terrorism 

SAFA requires CWMD to carry out a program to coordinate the Department’s 

efforts to defend the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism 

and other events that pose a high risk to homeland security. SAFA specifies 

that the program, at a minimum, should: 

(1) provide oversight and management of the Department’s responsibilities 

pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) (see 

appendix B);4 

(2) provide oversight and integration of the Department’s activities related to 

veterinary public health, food defense, and agricultural security; 

(3) lead the Department’s policy initiatives related to food, animal, and 

agricultural incidents, and the impact of such incidents on animal and 

public health; 

(4) lead the Department’s policy initiatives related to overall domestic 

preparedness for and collective response to agricultural terrorism; 

(5) coordinate with other Department components, including CBP, as 

appropriate, on activities related to food and agriculture security and 

screening procedures for domestic and imported products; and 

(6) coordinate with appropriate Federal departments and agencies. 

3 Neither CWMD nor SAFA has defined high-consequence events. Based on HSPD-9, we believe 

examples of high-consequence events include major disasters and other emergencies. 

4 In 2004, HSPD-9 – Defense of United States Agriculture and Food established a national policy 

to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Despite these requirements, CWMD has not yet carried out a program to 

oversee and manage the Department’s efforts to defend the food and 

agriculture system, lead policy initiatives, or coordinate with DHS components 

or Federal agencies. We interviewed CWMD officials and requested 

documentation to determine any ongoing progress to fulfill SAFA’s 

requirements in lieu of having a program. CWMD officials could not provide 

adequate documentationand responded that the office is not actively 

monitoring or tracking the Department’s food, agriculture, and veterinary 

systems defense activities. 

CWMD also could not provide any published or draft policy initiatives as 

required by SAFA. Congress, through the Act, intended for the Department to 

lead internal policy initiatives to clarify roles and responsibilities throughout 

the Department and coordinate actions related to food, agriculture, and 

veterinary defense. However, since becoming an office, CWMD has not 

developed any policies or led any initiatives in this area. We asked three of the 

six DHS components ― CBP, FEMA, and CISA ― that help protect the food, 

agriculture, and veterinary systems to describe CWMD’s involvement in 

developing policy on related incidents and impact; and policy related to overall 

domestic preparedness and response. FEMA indicated it worked with CWMD 

on the 2018 National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex, which is an annex to 

the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The annex 

highlights the unique attributes of a food, plant, or agricultural incident, 

including intentional acts of terrorism. CBP indicated it worked with CWMD 

on a draft policy related to food, agriculture, and veterinary defense, which was 

not finalized during our audit. Although we acknowledge CWMD’s work, we do 

not believe CWMD’s participation in these policies satisfies the intent of SAFA 

to lead policy initiatives. 

Further, CWMD did not provide any evidence that it regularly coordinates with 

DHS components or Federal partners on food and agriculture security and 

screening procedures for domestic and imported products as SAFA requires. 

We determined CWMD’s coordination with three of the six components 

included in our audit was informal and ad hoc. For example, CISA officials 

reported they regularly attend interagency meetings of the Food and 

Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating Council and the Food and 

Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council. These councils consist of Federal 

departments and state, local, and tribal governments that coordinate 

agricultural security, food defense strategies, and related activities. They also 

provide an avenue to communicate across government and the private sector 

on food, agriculture, and defense efforts. However, CWMD does not routinely 

attend these meetings or coordinate with CISA on information obtained and 

presented during these meetings. In addition, Federal partners, such as the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

said that since the establishment of CWMD, their contact with CWMD has been 

limited or non-existent. 

These issues occurred because, although the Secretary of Homeland Security 

delegated responsibility to CWMD to coordinate DHS' efforts pursuant to SAFA, 

CWMD believes it does not have clearly defined authority from the Secretary to 

carry it out. According to the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of CWMD, 

CWMD does not have the authority to direct or influence resources and 

priorities of the other components. This official further stated CWMD has no 

authority over other DHS components because each component operates under 

its own chain of command. 

In addition, CWMD has not made food, agriculture, and veterinary defense a 

priority within its organization. Since becoming an office in December 2017, 

CWMD has not devoted the staff necessary to oversee the Department’s food, 

agriculture, and veterinary defense efforts. When we initiated our audit, two 

Veterinary Medical Officers worked in CWMD’s Food, Agriculture, and 

Veterinary Resilience Joint Program Activity full time.5 CWMD later informed 

us the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Resilience Joint Program Activity no 

longer existed due to limited personnel and the mission would be addressed as 

a capability across CWMD. CWMD provided documentation that as of August 

2019 showed the majority of employees, including the once full-time Veterinary 

Medical Officer,6 only spend about 1 percent of their time on the food, 

agriculture, and veterinary systems defense mission. 

In its first year, CWMD focused its resources on other priorities and mission 

areas instead of food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense. According 

to CWMD’s Acting Secretary, the office spent that year conducting more than 

150 deployments of surge capabilities to support law enforcement and public 

safety officials with radiological and nuclear detection, participating in 

exercises and training events to help local jurisdictions prepare for a biological 

attack, and procuring more than 11,400 portable radiation detection systems 

for DHS operational partners. Although these activities are important they 

should not negate the need for CWMD to meet the requirements of SAFA in 

order to address the potential risks related to food, agriculture, and veterinary 

systems defense. CWMD recognizes it needs to apply additional resources 

such as personnel and budget to fulfill SAFA requirements. Without dedicated 

staff to support SAFA implementation and associated coordination activities 

CWMD has limited awareness of the Department’s ongoing efforts and cannot 

5 One of the two Veterinary Medical Officers was on long-term leave during our audit. In 

addition, CWMD had one Veterinary Medical Officer vacancy approved for hire. 

6 On August 9, 2019, CWMD reassigned the Veterinary Medical Officer, along with two other 

employees who joined the mission later in our audit because food, agriculture, and veterinary 

defense would not be a separate program or program office, but would be addressed as a 

capability across CWMD. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-20-53 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ensure DHS is adequately prepared to respond to a potential terrorist attack 

against the food, agriculture, or veterinary systems. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Assistant Secretary for the 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office coordinate with the DHS 

Secretary to reinforce the office’s authority to implement a coordinated program 

in accordance with the Public Law 115-43, Securing our Agriculture and Food 

Act. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Assistant Secretary for the 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office reprioritize the food, 

agriculture, and veterinary defense mission within the Department to ensure 

adherence to requirements of Public Law 115-43, Securing our Agriculture and 

Food Act. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend the Assistant Secretary for the 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office conduct a capability 

assessment to identify needs and gaps in DHS’ food, agriculture, and 

veterinary defense mission. The assessment should identify the necessary 

resources (staffing and budget) needed to fulfill requirements of Public Law 

115-43, Securing our Agriculture and Food Act, including Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-9 responsibilities. Based on the results of the 

assessment, the Assistant Secretary should develop an implementation plan for 

execution. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CWMD concurred with all three recommendations and provided corrective 

action plans to address the recommendations. CWMD noted that since our 

audit fieldwork, it has undergone a change in senior leadership that 

reprioritized the critical role CWMD plays in implementing SAFA. CWMD has 

subsequently reconstituted a formal Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense 

program, which is now staffed with personnel supported by a budget. CWMD 

is also rebuilding and strengthening relationships with internal DHS 

components and interagency and external stakeholders. Appendix A contains 

a copy of the CWMD’s management comments in their entirety. We also 

received technical comments from CWMD and revised the report where 

appropriate. A summary of CWMD’s responses and our analysis follows. 

CWMD Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. CWMD’s current senior 

leadership agrees that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s DHS Delegation 

25000, Delegation to the Assistant Secretary for The Countering Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Office, dated May 21, 2018, and the CWMD Act of 2018, 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

clearly delineate CWMD’s responsibility for fulfilling SAFA’s requirements. 

Therefore, CWMD believes coordination with the Secretary to clarify CWMD’s 

authority in this regard is not needed. CWMD requests that the OIG consider 

this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented. 

OIG Analysis: We agree that the DHS Delegation 25000 and the CWMD Act of 

2018 clearly delineate CWMD’s responsibility for fulfilling SAFA requirements. 

CWMD’s acknowledgment of the authority and actions taken to reprioritize the 

critical role CWMD plays in implementing SAFA satisfies the intent of this 

recommendation. We consider this recommendation resolved and open until 

CWMD provides support for the corrective actions taken. 

CWMD Response to Recommendation 2: Concur. CWMD has re-established 

the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense program to rebuild and prioritize 

CWMD’s role in the DHS food and agriculture mission space and reprioritize 

engagement with DHS components. CWMD plans to announce reconstitution 

of Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense and will work with the Science 

and Technology Directorate to develop a research and development (R&D) 

Strategic Plan to reprioritize and better align food and agriculture defense R&D 

across the Department. CWMD estimates a completion date of September 30, 

2020. 

OIG Analysis: CWMD’s actions satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We 

consider this recommendation resolved, but it will remain open until CWMD 

provides support for the corrective actions taken. 

CWMD Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. The Food, Agriculture, and 

Veterinary Defense Division is developing an initial vision, mission, and 

roadmap to guide implementation efforts over the next year. The roadmap will 

include an external Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense mission needs 

and capability gaps assessment. CWMD estimates a completion date of May 

31, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: CWMD’s actions satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We 

consider this recommendation resolved, but it will remain open until CWMD 

provides support for the corrective actions taken. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology
 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

We performed this audit to determine whether CWMD implemented a program 

to coordinate the Department’s efforts related to defending the food, 

agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high 

consequence events within the United States as required by SAFA. 

To answer our audit objective, we performed the following activities: 

x	 Reviewed applicable Federal laws, regulations, and DHS’ policies 

regarding the security and defense of the food, agriculture, and 

veterinary systems. 

x Reviewed prior OIG and external reports to identify challenges in DHS’ 

food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense mission. 

x Obtained an understanding of CWMD's internal controls significant to 

determining whether it complied with the SAFA. 

x	 Interviewed and distributed questionnaires to representatives of CWMD7 

and the Office of Chief Human Capital Officer to obtain an 

understanding of their roles and responsibilities in coordinating the 

Department’s efforts related to food, agriculture, and veterinary systems 

defense in accordance with SAFA. In addition, we distributed data 

collection instruments to selected officials to obtain information on the 

status of each HSPD-9 responsibility and short-term food, agriculture, 

and veterinary systems defense activities. 

x	 Interviewed or distributed questionnaires to CBP, FEMA, CISA, and the 

National Biosurveillance Integration Center to obtain an understanding 

of their food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense activities and 

coordination with CWMD. 

x	 Interviewed or distributed questionnaires to Federal partners such as 

USDA and U.S. Food and Drug Administration to obtain an 

understanding of their coordination with CWMD. 

x	 Interviewed a representative of the former Minority Counsel to the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee who 

helped draft the companion bill to SAFA, to obtain an understanding of 

the intent of SAFA. 

x	 Interviewed officials from Kansas State University and the University of 

Minnesota’s Food Protection and Defense Institute to obtain an 

7 During the course of our audit, we interviewed several officials who worked for CWMD but 

were later reassigned or left the agency. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8	 OIG-20-53 
 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

understanding of challenges within the Department related to HSPD-9 

and food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense activities. 

x Interviewed a representative of DHS’ Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 

to gain an understanding of its role in issuing and providing oversight of 

Delegation to the Assistant Secretary for CWMD Office - DHS Delegation 

25000.8 

x Reviewed DHS’ budget documentation to identify funds allocated for 

food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense. 

x Interviewed representatives of DHS’ Science and Technology Directorate 

to gain an understanding of its historical funding for food, agriculture, 

and veterinary systems defense. 

During the course of our audit, we identified instances where CWMD officials 

were vetting documents requested by the audit team. We also experienced 

significant delays in obtaining documents from CWMD. Once documents were 

provided, CWMD officials informed OIG that deliverables were either legacy 

OHA documents, draft/pre-decisional documents, or no longer operable. In 

most cases, CWMD could not provide OIG with reasonable evidence and 

adequate documents to support their compliance with SAFA. CWMD’s vetting 

of information and delays in cooperating with OIG is not in compliance with the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Department of Homeland 

Security Management Directive 0810.1. 

We conducted this performance audit between August 2018 and September 

2019 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Robert Greene, 

Director; Shelley Howes, Director; Modupe Ogunduyile, Audit Manager; 

Katherine “Nikki” McCall, Auditor-in-Charge; Ebonyee Brincefield, Auditor; 

Peter Charboneau, Program Analyst; Sabrina Paul, Program Analyst; Mary 

Stevens, Auditor; Lindsey Koch, Communications Analyst; and Renee Gradin, 

Independent Reference Reviewer. 

8 Issued in May 2018, this document assigns responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of CWMD 

to fulfill SAFA’s requirements. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

CWMD Comments to the Draft Report 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies under HSPD-9 

Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food 

Areas of Responsibility in HSPD 9 Federal Agencies Responsible* 

Awareness and Warning 

Intelligence operations and analysis capabilities 

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA); U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

Biological threat awareness capacity DHS; USDA, HHS, EPA, and Others 

Vulnerability Assessments 

Vulnerability assessments USDA, HHS, DHS 

Mitigation Strategies 

Mitigation strategies DHS, DOJ; USDA, HHS, EPA, CIA, and Others 

Common screening procedures USDA, HHS, DHS 

Response Planning and Recovery 

Federal, state, and local response capabilities DHS; USDA, HHS, DOJ, EPA 

Coordinated and food-specific response plan DHS; USDA, HHS, DOJ, EPA 

Recovery systems USDA, HHS; DHS, EPA 

National Veterinary Stockpile USDA; DHS, HHS, EPA 

National Plant Disease Recovery System USDA; DHS, HHS, EPA 

Outreach and Professional Development 

Information sharing and analysis mechanism DHS; USDA, HHS, and Others 

Higher education programs for protection of 

animal, plant, and public health USDA, HHS; DHS, Department of Education (ED) 

Higher education programs for protection of the 

food supply USDA, HHS; DHS, ED 

Specialized training in agriculture and food 

protection USDA, HHS, DHS 

Research and Development 

Countermeasures DHS, USDA, HHS, EPA, & Others; Office of Science and 

Technology Policy 

Plan to provide agriculture biocontainment labs USDA, DHS 

Centers of excellence DHS; USDA, HHS 

Budget 

Integrated budget plan for defense of food system USDA, HHS, DHS 

Source: HSPD-9 

*Federal Agencies with primary responsibility, as listed in HSPD-9, are in bold, underlined text.
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Acting Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Office of the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy and Plans 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-20-53 
Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

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