DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of lns~ector General 

Follow-Up Audit of 

Passenger and Baggage Screening 

Procedures at Domestic Airports 

(Unclassified Summary) 

Office of Audits 

March 2005 
Ofice of [nspecfor General 

U.S DeparrmentdHomehnd 

secority 

Washington. DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296)by amendment 

to the Insaector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special re'ports prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to promote 

economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the Department. 

This report represents an abbreviated version of our classified report assessing 

compliance by the Transportation Security Administration with federal aviation 

requirements to inspect passengers and property for explosives and weapons. It is based 

on undercover penetration tests, interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The information contained in this report has been developed to the best knowledge 

available to us, and has been discussed in draft with appropriate management officials. It 

is our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical 

operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the 

preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Acting Inspector General 
 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 

Introduction 

We recently completed a review of screener performance at selected airports around the 

country. We began our review at the end of November 2004, and completed our 

fieldwork in early February 2005. Our review was a follow-up to similar work that we 

had performed at the same airports in 2003. It was initiated in response to a request from 

the Chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee. 

Background 

In 2003, we conducted an audit of the aviation security screening function at 15 domestic 

airports nationwide (OIG-04-37). The purpose was to evaluate compliance with federal 

aviation security requirements to inspect passengers and property for explosives and 

weapons. We identified four broad areas--training, equipment and technology, policy 

and procedures, and management and supervision--as the cause of most test failures, and 

made 7 recommendations addressing those areas that would improve overall screener 

performance. 

We began our follow-up testing on November 29, 2004, and concluded on 

February 4, 2005. During that time, our two 5-person teams conducted hundreds of 

screening checkpoint and checked baggage tests at airports of different sizes and annual 

passenger loads. 

We met with the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) Office of Internal 

Affairs and Program Review to discuss their internal testing. We also obtained and 

reviewed all pertinent TSA Security Directives (SDs) and Standard Operating Procedures 

(SOPs) relating to screening of checked baggage, and passengers and their carry-on 

items. We designed our test protocols from the SDs and SOPs. 

We obtained and discussed the SOPs and updates with TSA’s Office of Transportation 

Security Policy on an ongoing basis. In addition, we visited the Transportation Security 

Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic City, New Jersey, to discuss our test methodology and 

obtain technical guidance on the equipment available at the airports to screen passengers 

and their property. The TSL also provided us with some of the test items used during our 

testing. 

Follow-up Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 1
All ten DHS OIG team members conducted each type of test on a rotating schedule, to 

reduce the likelihood of being recognized as a tester by the screening workforce at any 

specific airport, and to introduce a real world element of variety into our test 

methodology. At each airport, we tested early and late shifts at all or almost all open 

screening checkpoints and at most of the lanes at each of those checkpoints. In addition, 

the team also tested checked baggage explosives detection systems (EDSs) and 

explosives trace detection (ETD) machines, which were installed in both lobbies and in 

baggage rooms, and their operators at each airport. 

Specifically, a “test” at a passenger screening checkpoint was defined as one tester 

attempting to take one threat object through the checkpoint into the sterile area 

undetected on his or her body or in his or her carry-on bag. A “test” at a checked 

baggage location was defined as one or two testers introducing a bag with a simulated 

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in it, and trace amounts of explosive contamination 

on the outside, into the checked baggage system. A “pass” occurred if the object was 

identified by screening personnel and prevented from being carried into the sterile area 

through the screening checkpoint or being put into the baggage system downstream from 

the checked baggage screening location. A “fail” occurred when the object was not 

detected at the screening checkpoint, or the checked bag was cleared for flight. 

At each airport, we met with local law enforcement officers to notify them of our 

presence at the airport and the nature of our work. We also notified the Federal Security 

Directors (FSD) or their offices moments prior to commencing testing. At the conclusion 

of each test, we met with the screeners involved and their supervisors, and discussed the 

nature and results of the test. We also met with the FSD, or the FSD’s representative if 

the FSD was unavailable, and the FSD’s staff at each airport at the end of each testing 

period to summarize and discuss the results of our testing. 

Results in Brief 

Improvements are still needed in the screening process to ensure that dangerous 

prohibited items are not being carried into the sterile areas of airports, or do not enter the 

checked baggage system. In our report on the results of our first round of testing (OIG04-036), which we issued in September 2004, we made several recommendations for 

improvements in the areas of training, equipment, policies and procedures, and 

management practices. For the most part, TSA agreed with our recommendations and is 

taking action to implement them. However, despite the fact that the majority of screeners 

with whom our testers came in contact were diligent in the performance of their duties 

and conscious of the responsibility those duties carry, the lack of improvement since our 

last audit indicates that significant improvement in performance may not be possible 

without greater use of new technology. 

We recommended in our previous report that the TSA administrator aggressively pursue 

the development and deployment of innovations and improvements to aviation security 

technologies, particularly for checkpoint screening. TSA is currently testing several such 

technologies, including backscatter x-ray, ETD portals, and document scanners. We 

Follow-up Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 2
encourage TSA to expedite its testing programs and give priority to technologies, such as 

backscatter x-ray, that will enable the screening workforce to better detect both weapons 

and explosives. 

Follow-up Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports Page 3
Appendix A 

Major Contributors To This Report 

Alexander Best, Director, Border and Transportation Security Division 

James Yeager, Audit Manager 

Sharon Trodden, Auditor-in-Charge 

Isabel Tumblin, Auditor 

Cecilia Barela, Auditor 

Leigh Johnson-Steele, Auditor 

Nadine Ramjohn, Auditor 

James Nelson, Auditor 

Dorningo Alvarez, Auditor 

Scott Sammons, Auditor 

Danny Helton, Auditor 

Followup Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures at Domestic Airports Page 4 
Appendix B 

Report Distribution 

Deoartment of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Under Secretary, BTS 

Assistant Secretary, TSA 

DHS-OIG Liaison 

TSA-OIG Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Follow-up Audit of Passager and Baggage Saeening Procedures at Domestic Airports Page 5 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at www. 

dhs.govloig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the 

OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of Inspector GenerallMAlL STOP 

2600, Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 

410, Washington, DC 20528, or email DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The OIG seeks to 

protect the identity of each writer and caller.