J-A15013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

VALERIE GOLIK

v.

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1110 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 31, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at GD-20-011632

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: JULY 17, 2023

Erie Insurance Exchange (Appellant) appeals from the judgment entered 

in favor of Valerie Golik (Mrs. Golik) in this declaratory judgment and breach 

of contract action. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the judgment 

in favor of Mrs. Golik, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in 

favor of Appellant.

The trial court detailed the underlying facts and procedural history as 

follows:

In 1992, [Mrs. Golick’s husband, Mark Golick (Mr. Golick),]

received an automobile insurance policy (“the Policy”) from 

[Appellant] through the Fisher Agency (“Fisher”). NJT 32:6-12. 

He was the only individual that the Policy covered at that time, 

and he only had one vehicle on the Policy as well. Id. at 32:18-

23. In 1998, Mr. Golick replaced the vehicle on the Policy with a 

different one, and the Fisher Agency subsequently sent him a 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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stacking waiver. Id. at 32:24-34:9. He signed the 1998 waiver. 

Id. The Policy still only covered himself and one vehicle. Id. at 

33:15-19.

Following the Goliks’ marriage in 2000, Mrs. Golik and her 

vehicle were added to the Policy in 2001. Id. at 22:2-9. The 

spouses each testified that this was the first time the Policy 

covered multiple persons and vehicles. Id. at 22:22-25, 34:5-8. 

Mr. Golick did not receive any stacking waivers or discuss stacking 

insurance with their agent in 2001 after Mrs. Golick was added to 

the Policy. Id. at 35:9-19.

In 2004, [Appellant] or Fisher mailed stacking waivers to 

the Goliks’ residence that Mr. Golik ultimately signed. Id. at 

35:24-36:17. No changes had been made to the Policy. Id. at 

24:6-8. Mr. Golik testified that he believes the waivers had been 

addressed to him only, and upon reviewing the documents at trial, 

he confirmed that only his name appeared printed on the waivers 

themselves. Id. at 36:18-23. He had no specific recollection of 

sharing the waivers with Mrs. Golik, but he testified that it is his 

habit to share mail with his wife whenever it is addressed to []

both []. Id. at 37:3-22. He further testified that he does not 

recall any cover letter or instructions being included with the 

waivers. Id. at 37:15-19. Mrs. Golik testified that she also does 

not recall either seeing the stacking waivers or having any 

conversations with anyone about stacked motor vehicle insurance 

in 2004. Id. at 24:11-24.

On October 21, 2019, Mrs. Golik was severely injured in a 

motor vehicle accident when an uninsured motorist made an 

errant turn into the path of her vehicle. Id. at 18:7-20:7. She 

subsequently filed a claim with [Appellant] for [uninsured motorist 

(UM)] benefits, id. at 25:5-10, believing at the time that the Policy 

provided $100,000 per accident in UM coverage. Id. 21:23-22:1. 

[Appellant] responded with a copy of the 2004 stacking waiver 

three months later, id. at 26:13-27:2, and subsequently tendered 

a $50,000 payout per the Policy, which Mrs. Golik did not accept. 

Id. at 30:1-3. This lawsuit ensued.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2-3 (unnumbered) (paragraph designations

omitted).
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Mrs. Golick filed the instant action on November 10, 2020. Mrs. Golick 

averred Appellant “failed its statutory obligation to present her with the 

opportunity to stack limits of [UM] and underinsured motorist coverage 

[UIM.]” Id. at 1 (unnumbered). Mrs. Golick claimed she was entitled to 

$100,000 in stacked UM coverage. Id.

The trial court commenced a non-jury trial on March 1, 2022. On August 

11, 2022, the court entered a verdict in favor of Mrs. Golick in the amount of 

$100,000. Appellant filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied on 

August 29, 2022. On August 31, 2022, the trial court entered judgment in 

favor of Mrs. Golick. This timely appeal followed.1 

Appellant raises three issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in determining [Mrs. 

Golick] could recover “stacked” uninsured motorist benefits 

despite the presence of a [UM] benefits “stacking waiver” on the 

subject auto insurance policy executed by the first named insured 

consistent with the language of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 

determining that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738 imposes additional 

requirements on insurers beyond securing a statutorily-prescribed 

“stacking waiver” signed and dated by the first named insured on 

the policy to preclude recovery of “stacked” benefits by [Mrs. 

Golick]?

3. Whether the trial court erred in disregarding stare 

decisis in Rupert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. [Rupert I], 781 A.2d 

132 (Pa. 2001), wherein a unanimous Supreme Court reasoned 

that a statutorily-prescribed “stacking waiver” signed and dated 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement

and did not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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by the current first name insured effectively binds all other named 

insureds?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

As Appellant’s issues are related, we address them together. We begin 

by recognizing:

Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is 

to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported 

by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed 

error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial 

judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the 

verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court 

only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence 

in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. 

However, [where] the issue ... concerns a question of law, our 

scope of review is plenary. 

Metro Real Estate Investment, LLC v. Bembry, 207 A.3d 336, 339 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

With respect to a declaratory judgment action involving insurance policy 

coverage,

the proper construction of an insurance policy is resolved as a 

matter of law to be decided by the court in a declaratory judgment 

action. Hence, as with all issues of law, our review is de novo. 

Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is narrow. 

We review the decision of the trial court as we would a decree in 

equity and set aside factual conclusions only where they are not 

supported by adequate evidence. We give plenary review, 

however, to the trial court’s legal conclusions. We are limited to 

determining whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or

committed an error of law.

Swarner v. Mutual Ben. Group, 72 A.3d 641, 644 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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This case involves interpretation of Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle 

Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799.7. Section 

1738 addresses stacking of UM/UIM coverage and waiver of stacked coverage. 

Section 1738 provides:

(a) Limit for each vehicle.--When more than one vehicle is 

insured under one or more policies providing uninsured or 

underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for uninsured or 

underinsured coverage shall apply separately to each vehicle so 

insured. The limits of coverages available under this subchapter 

for an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle 

as to which the injured person is an insured.

(b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), a 

named insured may waive coverage providing stacking of 

uninsured or underinsured coverages in which case the limits of 

coverage available under the policy for an insured shall be the 

stated limits for the motor vehicle as to which the injured person 

is an insured.

(c) More than one vehicle.--Each named insured 

purchasing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage

for more than one vehicle under a policy shall be provided the 

opportunity to waive the stacked limits of coverage and instead 

purchase coverage as described in subsection (b). The premiums 

for an insured who exercises such waiver shall be reduced to 

reflect the different cost of such coverage.

(d) Forms.—

(1) The named insured shall be informed that he may 

exercise the waiver of the stacked limits of uninsured 

motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection 

form:

UNINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS

By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of 

uninsured motorist coverage under the policy for 

myself and members of my household under 

which the limits of coverage available would be the 
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sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the 

policy. Instead, the limits of coverage that I am 

purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the 

policy. ... I understand that my premiums will be 

reduced if I reject this coverage.

....

Signature of First Named Insured

....

(2) The named insured shall be informed that he may 

exercise the waiver of the stacked limits of underinsured 

motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection 

form:

UNDERINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS

By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of 

underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for 

myself and members of my household under 

which the limits of coverage available would be the 

sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the

policy. Instead, the limits of coverage that I am 

purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the 

policy....

....

Signature of First Named Insured

....

(e) Signature and date.--The forms described in subsection (d) 

must be signed by the first named insured and dated to be valid. 

Any rejection form that does not comply with this section is void.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738 (emphasis added).

When interpreting the MVFRL:

We are guided in our analysis by the Statutory Construction Act 

of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991, 
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which provides that the object of all statutory interpretation “is to 

ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 

1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, the plain language of the statute 

“provides the best indication of legislative intent.” Miller v. Cnty. 

of Centre, 643 Pa. 560, 173 A.3d 1162, 1168 (2017). If the 

statutory language is clear and unambiguous in setting forth the 

intent of the General Assembly, then “we cannot disregard the 

letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 

Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 603 Pa. 452, 

985 A.2d 678, 684 (2009) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)). In this 

vein, “we should not insert words into [a statute] that are plainly 

not there.” Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada 

Nurses, Inc.), 616 Pa. 592, 52 A.3d 241, 245 (2012). When the 

statutory language is ambiguous, however, we may ascertain the 

General Assembly’s intent by considering the factors set forth in 

Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. § 

1921(c), and other rules of statutory construction. See Pa. Sch. 

Bds. Ass'n, Inc. v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd., 580 Pa. 610, 863 

A.2d 432, 436 (2004) (observing that “other interpretative rules 

of statutory construction are to be utilized only where the statute 

at issue is ambiguous”). Additionally, “[w]ords and phrases shall 

be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their 

common and approved usage,” though “technical words and 

phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 

appropriate meaning or are defined in [the Statutory Construction 

Act] shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate 

meaning or definition.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a). “We also presume 

that ‘the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, 

impossible of execution or unreasonable,’ and that ‘the General 

Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.’” 

Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 655 Pa. 137, 217 

A.3d 238, 245 (2019) (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1)-(2)).

Goodwin v. Goodwin, 280 A.3d 937, 943-44 (Pa. 2022). 

Here, the trial court identified the issue as: “Whether, under Section 

1738 of the [MVFRL], only the signature of the first named insured is needed 

to execute a valid waiver of stacked UM coverage.” Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law, 8/11/22, at 3. The trial court concluded the answer was 

“no.” Id. In so doing, the trial court found there was no “binding case law 
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that answer[ed] the legal issue in this matter.” Id. The trial court turned to 

the language of Section 1738 and opined:

Because there is no relevant, binding case law that interprets 

Section 1738, the [trial c]ourt now interprets Section 1738 itself 

and finds that its plain language is ambiguous as to whether the 

signature of the first named insured alone is sufficient to execute 

a valid waiver of stacked coverage. In light of the tools of 

statutory construction that Pennsylvania courts utilize in such 

cases, the [trial c]ourt here ultimately concludes that Section 

1738 has two discrete requirements that must be met to execute 

a valid stacking waiver: a) The signature of the first named 

insured on the waiver form[; a]nd b) evidence of a reasonable 

effort on the insurer’s part to provide each named insured 

the opportunity to waive stacked coverage.

Id. at 6 (paragraph numbers and some emphasis omitted, some emphasis in 

original). 

The trial court focused on Section 1738’s alternating use of “named 

insured” and “first named insured,” noting correctly that neither term is 

defined in the statute. Id. at 7-8. The trial court stated:

At first blush, a cursory reading of Section 1738 seems to 

unambiguously suggest that the first named insured’s signature is 

all the statute requires for a valid UM or UIM stacking waiver.

....

The plain language of [subsections 1738(d) and (e)], 

standing alone, strongly point to the conclusion that the General 

Assembly’s intent was to require only the first named insured’s 

signature to execute a valid stacking waiver. Not only do both 

subsections make zero reference to any other named insured’s 

signature, but subsection (d)’s language “for myself and members 

of my household” further suggests that our legislature intended to 

give the first named insured unilateral power to waive stacked 

coverage on behalf of all others on the policy.
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Section 1738(c), however, muddies the waters by 

unambiguously stating that “[e]ach named insured purchasing

uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for more than one 

vehicle under a policy shall be provided the opportunity to waive 

the stacked limits of coverage.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1738(c) (emphasis 

added). That language flies in the face of the plain meaning of 

subsections (d) and (e) to suggest the legislature intended for 

each named insured to have an opportunity to waive stacking 

before a waiver would be finalized.

....

Because the plain language of Section 1738 leads to two 

plausible but contradictory interpretations, the [trial c]ourt finds 

the statute ambiguous on its face as to what it requires for a valid 

waiver of stacked UM or UIM coverage.

Id. at 6-8 (paragraph numbers omitted, emphasis in original). Upon review, 

we are constrained to disagree. 

Although there is no case law directly on point, our Supreme Court’s 

split decision in Rupert I offers meaningful guidance. In Rupert I, Cynthia 

Winters (Winters) purchased automobile insurance in 1984, listing her 

boyfriend Timothy Rupert (Rupert) as a “driver.” Rupert I, 781 A.2d at 132. 

The couple married in 1988. Id. In 1991, Winters signed a waiver of stacked 

UM coverage. In 1993, Winters added Rupert to the policy as a “named

insured.” Id. In 1997, Winters died and Rupert removed Winters’ name from

the policy; he subsequently renewed the policy. Id. In July 1997, Rupert was 

seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Id. 

Rupert filed a federal court action, arguing the “waiver form signed by 

[Winters] was no longer a valid waiver because, at the time of [Rupert’s]

accident, it did not conform” with Section 1738(e), as Winters was no longer 
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the first named insured. Id. at 135. The United States Court of Appeals for 

the Third Circuit certified the case as a question of law to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. Id. at 132. After one justice recused, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court was evening divided. Id. at 132.

In an opinion authored by Justice Zappala and joined by two justices,

Justice Zappala opined: “[F]or purposes of Section 1738, the signature of the 

first named insured on a valid waiver at the inception of the policy is evidence 

that each named insured under the policy was fully aware of the options 

regarding stacked policy limits.” Id. at 135. Pertinently, Justice Zappala 

recognized the statute’s alternating use of the terms “first named insured” 

and “named insured,” but found no resulting ambiguity. Id. Justice Zappala 

reasoned:

At first blush, Section 1738 appears to interchange the terms “first 

named insured” and “named insured”. Section 1738(c) allows 

each named insured the option of waiving stacked coverage. 

Section 1738(c) also states that premiums for “an insured” should 

reflect the difference in cost. I see no conflict in terms here, 

as each named insured must categorically be an insured. 

Conversely, any insured that is not a named insured is not entitled 

to the waiver option provided in Section 1738(b).

Pursuant to Section 1738(d), each named insured must be 

informed of the option to waive stacked coverage. The statute 

mandates the notification be presented in the specific manner of 

the prescribed form described in Section 1738(d)(1). That form 

calls only for the signature of the first named insured. Likewise, 

Section 1738(e) also mandates the signature of the first named 

insured. My reading of the plain meaning of Section 1738(d) and 

(e) is that the signature of the first named insured 

evidences the insurer’s fulfillment of its obligation of 

offering and informing the named insured of his or her right 

to waiver. 
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Id. (emphasis added).

Justice Cappy, also joined by two justices, reached a different 

conclusion, opining: “In light of the legislative goal of ensuring knowledgeable 

rejection of coverage, and the conclusive effect of the first named insured’s 

signature upon other insureds, it is of paramount importance that any new 

first named insureds receive the notice prescribed by § 1738.” Id. at 136

(emphasis added). While disagreeing with Justice Zappala’s conclusion, 

Justice Cappy did not disagree that the signature of the first named insured is 

sufficient to meet the requirement that other “named insureds” be given 

notice of the waiver. Id. at 135-36. Justice Cappy wrote:

The legislature placed the burden of obtaining a valid rejection of 

stacked coverage on the insurance company: The rejection forms 

in § 1738(d) must be signed and dated by the first named insured, 

or else the rejection of stacked coverage is void. 75 Pa.C.S. § 

1738(e). It is evident that the General Assembly sought to 

ensure that policyholders would be given full information 

regarding availability of stacked coverage before deciding 

whether or not to reject it. Cf. Salazar v. Allstate Insurance 

Co., 549 Pa. 658, 702 A.2d 1038, 1044 (1997) (sections 1731, 

1791 and 1791.1 describe information that insurer must provide 

“in order that the insured may make a knowing and intelligent 

decision on whether to waive [uninsured motorists] benefits 

coverage.”).

The first named insured’s signature on the form rejects 

“coverage under the policy for myself and members of my 

household ....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(d). By employing this 

language, the legislature adopted the fiction of 

“constructive knowledge” as to all other insureds-that is, if 

the first named insured rejected stacked coverage, then it 

would be presumed that all other insureds had knowledge 

of the option, and acquiesced in the rejection of coverage. 
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Thus, notice to the first named insured is all that the 

statute requires.

Id. (emphasis added).

The Third Circuit adopted Justice Zappala’s reasoning, stating:

The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the [MVFRL] “in large 

part” to check the rapidly rising cost of automobile insurance. 

Huber v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 587 A.2d 333, 334 (Pa. Super. 

1991). The underlying aim of the MVFRL is “to provide broad 

coverage to assure the financial integrity of the policyholder.” 

Danko v. Erie Ins. Exch., 630 A.2d 1219, 1222 (Pa. Super. 

1993), aff’d, 649 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1994). Accordingly, Pennsylvania 

courts have held that “the MVFRL is to be construed liberally to 

afford the greatest possible coverage to injured claimants.” 

Sturkie v. Erie Ins. Group, 595 A.2d 152, 157-58 (Pa. Super. 

1991). Courts should refrain, however, from rewriting the MVFRL 

“‘under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’” Wolgemuth v. 

Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 535 A.2d 1145, 1151 (Pa. Super. 

1987) (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)).

Rupert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. [Rupert II], 291 F.3d 243, 246 (3d. Cir. 

2002) (citations modified).2 In adopting Justice Zappala’s view, the Third 

Circuit reasoned that Section 1738 “does not explicitly require the valid waiver 

form be signed by the current first named insured.” Id. at 247 (emphasis in 

original). The court agreed “individuals added to a policy as named insureds 

subsequent to the execution of a stacking waiver, such as [Rupert], will 

receive adequate notice of the stacking waiver through the first named 

insured.” Id. The Third Circuit emphasized that Section 1738(c) supported 

____________________________________________

2 Pennsylvania Courts “may look to federal case law for its persuasive value.” 

Rudalavage v. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., 268 A.3d 470, 479 n.7 (Pa. Super. 

2022) (citation omitted).
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this interpretation because it stated that each “named insured purchasing ... 

coverage ... shall be provided with the opportunity to waive the stacked limits 

of coverage.” Id. at 248 (citation omitted, emphasis in original). 

While neither Rupert I nor Rupert II is binding, both decisions are 

highly instructive, particularly when read with prior Pennsylvania case law. 

Our Courts have long held that third parties, drivers, and named insureds are 

bound by the decisions of the first named insured. 

In Kimball v. Cigna Ins. Co., 660 A.2d 1386 (Pa. Super. 1995), a 

daughter was identified as a “driver” under her father’s automobile insurance 

policy. Id. at 1386-87. The parents divorced in 1984, and the mother 

replaced the father as the only “named insured” on the policy. Id. at 1387. 

In 1990, the mother executed a form reducing the UM/UIM coverage limits. 

Id. Although daughter was identified as a “named insured” under the policy 

in 1991, rather than a “driver”, the daughter never executed documentation 

regarding the reduction in UM/UIM coverage limits. Id. The daughter was 

injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist and sued. Id. The insurance 

company argued the daughter was bound by the reduction in coverage form 

signed by her mother; the trial court agreed. Id. 

On appeal, this Court discussed prior case law, observing that most of 

the cases were “limited to common pleas and federal court cases.” Id. at 

1387. However, we discerned a pattern. We ascertained that courts found 

other named insureds or drivers to be bound by the decisions of the first 
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named insured, absent evidence that the named insureds or drivers 

affirmatively acted to either increase the coverage and/or sought to purchase

their own policy. Id. at 1387-89. Thus, this Court held that where the

daughter took “no action ... to rectify this level of coverage”, she was bound 

by the actions of the first named insured. Id. at 1389.

In General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Parker, 665 A.3d 502 (Pa. 

Super. 1992), we addressed whether a third-party beneficiary of an insurance 

policy was bound by the policyholder’s waiver of UM benefits. The plaintiff 

argued that because she was “not a resident relative of the policy holder, 

neither [insurer] nor their named insured [could] reject [UM] coverage on her 

behalf.” Id. at 504. We disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s “rights, as a 

third party beneficiary, are ... subject to the same limitations in the policy as 

... the policy holder.” Id. 

In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2000), 

the plaintiff married Saverio Buffetta (Buffetta) in 1979. Nationwide Mut., 

230 F.3d at 635. In 1981, Buffetta obtained the insurance policy and 

subsequently added the plaintiff to the policy. Id. The plaintiff and Buffetta 

divorced in 1995. Id. at 636. Prior to the divorce, Buffetta elected lower 

coverage limits for UM/UIM. Id. Following the divorce, Buffetta transferred 

the policy to the plaintiff, who requested the policy be placed in her name. 

Id. The plaintiff never signed any authorization regarding the lower UM/UIM 

limits. Id. In 1997, the plaintiff’s father, who resided with the plaintiff, was 
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killed in a motor vehicle accident. Id. The plaintiff filed suit, arguing her 

UM/UIM coverage should not be limited to the lower amount because “she 

never executed a writing for that amount[.]” Id. The Third Circuit disagreed. 

Id. at 640-42.

Noting plaintiff’s situation was “not precisely the situation in Kimball,” 

the Third Circuit stated:

[D]rawing on the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s repeated 

references to a later named insured’s being bound by having 

understood the policy limits and acquiesced in them by 

paying lower premiums, we conclude that the instant factual 

setting is sufficiently analogous to Kimball to require the same 

result. ...

While we concede that a policy argument could be made to the 

effect that a new named insured should always have his or her 

voice count as to whether a reduced uninsured motorist coverage 

is requested, this is not evident in the [MVFRL], nor was it 

expressed in Kimball. ... [T]he statute requires only that a waiver 

form be provided upon issuance of a policy. There is no statutory 

requirement that an insured be given a reduction authorization 

form without the insured’s having requested one. The [MVFRL] is 

written in permissive terms, leaving it to a named insured, who 

“may” request reduced coverage. The option exists to request 

such a reduction and, we submit, Kimball was decided on the 

basis that a later named insured, upon being added to the policy, 

could have notified the insurance company that she did not 

want to be bound by another’s election of reduced 

coverage.

Id. at 641 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 

The above cases suggest a named insured, even when subsequently

added to a policy, is presumed to have known about available options and is 

bound by the first named insured’s election of lesser coverage, unless the

insured takes an affirmative step to change the coverage. See Rupert I, 718 
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A.2d at 135-36; General Acc. Ins. Co., 665 A.2d at 304-05; Kimball, 660 

A.2d at 1388-89. See also Rupert II, 291 F.3d at 247-48; Nationwide 

Mut. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d at 640-42.

Here, Mr. Golick purchased the Policy in 1992, and executed a stacking 

waiver in 1998. Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2 (unnumbered). The parties 

married in 2000 and added Mrs. Golick to the Policy in 2001; 

Mr. Golick executed a second stacking waiver in 2004. Id. The Golicks 

continued to pay reduced premiums for unstacked UM/UIM insurance. N.T., 

3/1/22, at 31-32, 51. Mr. Golick, the first named insured, affirmed his 

execution of the stacking waiver. Id. at 40. He admitted his annual policy 

declaration sheets changed his coverage status from stacked to unstacked 

after he signed the waiver. Id. at 41-51. Mr. Golick claimed he did not 

understand what he was signing. Id. However, he acknowledged he never 

asked for assistance or clarification, but signed and returned the forms. Id. 

at 51. 

Mrs. Golick testified that she was aware Appellant provided UM/UIM 

coverage and she and Mr. Golick were current on their premiums at the time 

of the accident. Id. at 21. Mrs. Golick stated she never signed or heard about 

the stacking waivers. Id. at 23. 

The record reflects the Golicks enjoyed the benefit of reduced premiums 

for more than 20 years. See id. at 51. The record also confirms that despite 

claiming he did not understand the waiver, Mr. Golick signed it in 1998, and 
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again in 2004, without asking for any explanation or assistance. See id. at 

40-51; Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2. Prior to, and for approximately one 

year after marriage, Mrs. Golick was insured under a separate policy. N.T., 

3/1/22, at 22-23. During the subsequent 18 years when Mrs. Golick was 

insured under the joint policy, she took no affirmative steps to request a 

change to the policy to stack the insurance, or obtain a separate policy. See 

id. at 23-30. Consistent with the evidence and foregoing case law, we 

conclude that Mrs. Golick had constructive knowledge of the stacking waiver 

and is bound by the signature of the first named insured, Mr. Golick, on the 

stacking waiver.

Even if we were not persuaded by the above case law, we would not find

Section 1738 of the MVFRL ambiguous. The trial court acknowledged that the 

plain language of subsections 1738(d) and (e) only required the signature of 

the first named insured for a valid stacking waiver. Trial Court Opinion, 

8/11/22, at 6-7; 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1738(d) and (e). The trial court found 

ambiguity because Section 1738(c) refers to “[e]ach named insured.” Id. at 

8; 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738(c).

However, when read in context, Section 1738(c) provides: 

Each named insured purchasing uninsured or underinsured 

motorist coverage for more than one vehicle under a policy shall 

be provided the opportunity to waive the stacked limits of 

coverage and instead purchase coverage as described in 

subsection (b). 
J-A15013-23

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75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738(c) (emphasis added). Critically, the phrase “each named 

insured” is modified by the word “purchasing.” See id. 

The word “purchasing” is defined as “to obtain for money or by paying 

a price; buy[.]” Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 1181 (5th ed. 2020). 

Thus, the plain language of Section 1738(c) only requires notice to the named 

insured who purchased the policy, who is the first named insured referenced 

in Section 1738(d) and (e). See Rupert II, 291 F.3d at 248 (emphasizing 

importance of the word “purchasing” in Section (c); discussing how it supports 

Justice Zappala’s conclusion in Rupert I that all that is required for a valid 

stacking waiver is the signature of the first named insured at the inception of 

the policy). Based on the plain language of Section 1738(c), we conclude the 

trial court committed an error of law in finding Section 1738 ambiguous. See 

Goodwin, 280 A.3d at 943-44.

For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the judgment entered in 

favor of Mrs. Golick and remand to the trial court for the entry of judgment in 

favor of Appellant.

Judgment vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 
J-A15013-23

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023