NO. 07-10-0023-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL E DECEMBER 2, 2010

__________________ ____________ SAM BOOKER, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________ _____________ FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COUR T NUMBER ONE OF TARRANT COUNTY; NO. 0922782D; HON. SHAREN WILSON, PRESIDING

__________________ _____________ Memorandum Opinion

__________________ _____________ Before QUINN, C.J., HANCOCK, J., and BOYD, S.J. 1 In this appeal, appellant Sam Booker, Jr. s eeks reversal of the trial court’s action in revoking his deferred adjudication probat ion, adjudging him guilty of the offense of failing to register as a sex offender, and assessing his punishment at three years

1 John T. Boyd, Senior Justice, sitting by assignment.2 confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Departm ent of Criminal Justice. Disagreeing that t he record shows reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court. In submitting his appeal, appellant pres ents two issues which, he contends, demonstrate the trial court revers ibly erred in its decision. In his first issue, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he failed to timely pay his required supervision fees or that he failed to complete the required one-third of his sex offender treatment within the first year of his probation. In his sec ond issue, he contends that the trial court erred in modifyin g and changing his conditions of probation by adding the condition that he “successfully complete psychological counseling, treatment, and aftercare sessions for sex offenders” almost four years after he was initially placed on probation. The standard by which we review a trial court’s revocation of probation is well established. The order revoking probatio n is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (T ex. Crim. App. 2006), quoting Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In further clarification, the Rickels court instructs that in probation revocation cases such as the instant one in which the sufficiency of the evidence is que stioned, the burden of proof to sustain the trial court’s action is by a preponderance of t he evidence. Id . at 763. That is, the evidence must be sufficient to “create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation.” Id . at 764. In such a proc eeding, the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, Taylor v. State , 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Cr im. App. 1980), and the3 appellate court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d at 493. One violation of the conditions of probation is sufficient to support a revo cation of the probation. Sanchez v. State , 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). In its petition seeking the re vocation, the State alleged that appellant had failed to timely pay his required probation supervision fees and that he had failed to complete the mandated one-third of his sex offender treatment within the fi rst year after that treatment was required. This proceedi ng arises from appellant’s S eptember 2004 no-contest plea to a charge that, as a conv icted sex offender, he had failed to timely report in person to the Fort Worth police his intended change of residence. His pr obation was modified three times in April, July, and August of 2008. His August 2008 modification required him to submit to sex offender treatment ev aluations as directed by his supervision officer with the treatment to be completed within three years. In that modification, it was provided that if appellant co mpleted one-third of the tr eatment within a year, an extension of the probationary term woul d be considered by t he trial court. At the revocation hearing, although appellant testified that he eventually made his payments, appellant’s proba tion supervisor, Judith Choat e, testified that appellant did not pay his probation fees during that peri od alleged in the revocation petition. Ms. Choate also testified that appellant did not meet the sex offender treatment goals and evaluations required under the 2008 modification of his probation. Appellant averred that in order to acco mplish the treatment goals, he had to do homework and complete responses which he c ould not do because he could not read or write. However, Ms. Choate stated that he could have received help from the probation4 office had he requested it. She said th at appellant had not ta ken the treatment procedure seriously, and that he blamed every one else for his troubles rather than himself. Dr. Mike Strain, a sex offender therapis t, said that although appellant did have problems reading and writing, his slow pr ogress was caused by “his not being very motivated . . . to do the goals and to accept information [they] were working on in treatment.” Dr. Strain also testified that most of the tr eatment goals coul d have been completed by appellant on available casse tte tapes. He averred that appellant understood the cassette tape pr ocedure and had put on tape a lis t of rules related to a child avoidance plan used by pr obationers such as himself. In sum, viewed in the light by which we review evidence in appeals such as this one, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in assessing the evidence and revoking appellant’s probation. Appel lant’s first point is overruled. In his second point, appellant contends that the trial court erred by modifying his probation conditions. He was originally placed on probation on S eptember 30, 2004. Subsequently, on August 27, 2008, his pr obation conditions were modified, and included in that modificati on was the condition that he “successfully complete psychological counseling, treatment, and afterc are sessions for sex offenders.” As we have noted, the violation of this conditio n was one of the things that led to the revocation which is the subject of this appeal . However, §11(a) of article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that the court may, “at any time during the period of community supervision, alter or modify the conditions,” and that the judge “may impose any reasonable c ondition that is designed to protect or restore . . .5 the victim, or punish, rehabili tate, or reform the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.11 §11(a) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Additionally, we note the condition specifically provided that even though the required sex o ffender treatment was expected to take three years and appellant had only one year left on his probation term, if appellant successfully completed one-third of the required treatment within one year, an extension would be consider ed. Thus, appellant would not be in danger of being revoked, even though he had not completed t he full course within the one year. Thus, the trial court did not act beyond its discret ion in adding the condition. Appellant’s second point is overruled. In sum, both of appellant’s points are ov erruled, and the judg ment of the trial court is affirmed.

John T. Boyd Senior Justice Do not publish.