Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

TSA's Preparedness for 
 

Mass Transit and Passenger 
 

Rail Emergencies 
 

OIG-10-68 March 2010 
Office ofInspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the Transportation Security Administration's effectiveness in 

supporting mass transit and passenger rail stakeholders with preparing for and responding 

to emergencies. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

~~~.~

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 


Background..........................................................................................................................2
 


Results of Audit ...................................................................................................................5
 


TSA Can Improve Its Assistance to Passenger Rail Agencies ......................................5 
 

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................9
 


Recommendations..........................................................................................................9 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................10 
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................14 
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report.......................................16 
 

Appendix C: Average Daily Trips per Region in 2007.............................................26 
 

Appendix D: TSA Security Directives, Rulemakings, and Transportation Sector 
 

Specific Plan ........................................................................................27 
 

Appendix E: TSA’s 17 Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items..........29 
 

Appendix F: TSA Components and Other Initiatives Focused on Public 
 

Transportation Emergency Preparedness ..................................30 
 

Appendix G: TSA Component and Workflow Diagram ...........................................33 
 

Appendix H: Major Contributors to This Report ......................................................34 
 

Appendix I: Report Distribution ............................................................................35 
 

Abbreviations 

BASE Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement 
 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 
 

I-STEP Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program
 


TSA Transportation Security Administration 
 

TSGP Transit Security Grant Program
 

OIG
 


Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The Transportation Security Administration is responsible for 

security in all modes of transportation, including mass transit and 

passenger rail systems. Passenger rail systems face a dynamic 

landscape of potential natural disasters, accidents, and terrorist 

attacks. Since 1995, there have been more than 250 terrorist 

attacks worldwide against rail targets, resulting in nearly 

900 deaths and more than 6,000 injuries. The Transportation 

Security Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the 

Federal Railroad Administration, and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency share responsibilities, programs, and 

resource investments to mass transit and passenger rail 

emergencies. We evaluated the Transportation Security 

Administration’s effectiveness in supporting mass transit and 

passenger rail agencies in preparing for and responding to 

emergency incidents. 

The Transportation Security Administration can better support 

passenger rail agencies by improving its assessments of emergency 

preparedness and response capabilities. The agency can also 

improve its efforts to train passenger rail agencies and first 

responders, and ensure that drills and exercises are live and more 

realistic to help strengthen response capabilities. The agency has 

focused primarily on security and terrorism prevention efforts, 

while providing limited staff and resources to emergency 

preparedness and response. As a result, passenger rail agencies 

and the first responders they rely upon may not be adequately 

prepared to handle all emergencies or mitigate their consequences. 

We are making four recommendations that, if implemented, would 

improve the agency’s overall management and effectiveness in 

supporting passenger rail agencies’ emergency preparedness and 

response capabilities. The Transportation Security Administration 

concurred with all four recommendations and has taken actions to 

address them. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 1 

Background 

Passenger rail systems face a dynamic landscape of potential 

natural disasters, accidents, and terrorist attacks. Since 1995, there 

have been more than 250 terrorist attacks worldwide against 

passenger rail targets, resulting in nearly 900 deaths and more than 

6,000 injuries. This mode of transportation has been targeted in 

Moscow, Madrid, London, and Mumbai. (See figure 1.) 

Figure 1. On March 11, 2004, terrorists bombed passenger trains near 

Madrid’s Atocha station, killing 191 people and injuring 1,800. 

Source: Reuters 

Also, accidents can cause fatalities and injuries. For instance, in 

2008, a collision between a freight train and commuter rail train 

occurred in Chatsworth, California, when the commuter rail train 

failed to stop at a control point. This accident killed 25 people and 

injured 135 others. 

Passenger rail systems consist primarily of three types of 

transportation: 

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Commuter rail operates between city centers and their adjacent 

suburbs. 

Heavy rail, also known as metro, subway, and rapid transit, 

supports a heavy volume of passenger traffic. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 2 

�	 Light rail, also called streetcar, tramway, or trolley, operates 

electric passenger cars on fixed rails. 

Our Nation’s passenger rail network is critical to our way of life, 

transporting more than 12 million commuters each day. See 

appendix C for detailed statistics. The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) is responsible for security in all modes of 

transportation, employing various programs and processes to 

support passenger rail stakeholders’ preparedness and response 

capabilities. See appendix D for information regarding TSA 

Security Directives and the Transportation Security Sector Specific 

Plans. 

Our review focused on four TSA efforts: 

1. The Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement (BASE) 

program is a voluntary program implemented by Transportation 

Security Inspectors in the Office of Security Operations. The 

BASE program assessment is composed of more than 200 

questions for reviewing a transit system’s security and emergency 

preparedness posture regarding 17 Security and Emergency 

Preparedness Action Items. See appendix E for these action items. 

Inspectors review documents, question passenger rail personnel, 

and observe security measures within the transit system. The 

inspectors use a database tool to assign numerical scores to the 

transit system based on the evidence gathered for each of the 

action items. The BASE program seeks to identify program gaps 

or weaknesses and develop best practices applicable to all 

passenger rail systems. As of December 2009, inspectors have 

completed more that 130 BASE assessments, covering most of the 

largest 100 agencies in passenger volume. 

2. The Public Transportation Emergency Preparedness Workshops 

(Connecting Communities) are jointly managed and funded by 

TSA’s Mass Transit Division and the Department of 

Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration. The workshops 

integrate mass transit and passenger rail security, operations, and 

emergency management officials with law enforcement and 

emergency response partners in their operating areas. The goal of 

the workshops is to unite passenger rail stakeholders from a variety 

of organizations, including first responders, to foster dialogue, 

improve planning efforts, review past experiences, analyze best 

practices, and identify assets and resources to enhance overall 

interoperability and response during passenger rail incidents. First 

responders include firefighters and emergency medical personnel 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 

Page 3 
who arrive first on the scene of an emergency incident and take 

action to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. 

3. The Training Matrix and Recommended Courses List is 

coordinated by the Office of Transportation Sector Network 

Management to support mass transit and passenger rail agencies’ 

security and emergency management training. The list includes 

recommended instruction in security awareness, behavior 

recognition, immediate-emergency response, the National Incident 

Management System, and Operations Control Center Readiness. 

Instruction is provided through the Transit Security Grant Program 

(TSGP), which is jointly managed by TSA and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. The TSGP provides funds to 

owners and operators of mass transit and passenger rail systems to 

protect the critical surface transportation infrastructure and the 

traveling public from acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. 

4. The Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (ISTEP) is designed to improve the intermodal transportation 

industry’s ability to prepare for and respond to transportation 

security incidents by increasing awareness, improving processes, 

creating partnerships, and delivering training exercises to mass 

transit and passenger rail stakeholders. Through the I-STEP, TSA 

employs multi-phased workshops, table top exercises, and working 

groups to integrate mass transit and passenger rail agencies with 

regional law enforcement and emergency response partners to 

expand and enhance coordinated deterrent and incident 

management capabilities. This program is prepared and presented 

by TSA’s Office of Security Training and Exercise Coordination, 

along with TSA’s Port and Intermodal Security Division. 

For additional information on the TSA offices mentioned above 

and other related initiatives, see appendix F. For a description of 

the various programs and processes to support passenger rail 

stakeholders’ preparedness and response capabilities, see appendix 

G. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


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Results of Audit 

TSA Can Improve Its Assistance to Passenger Rail Agencies 

TSA, the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Railroad 

Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency share 

responsibilities, programs, and resource investments to mass transit and 

passenger rail emergencies. Although TSA has a limited role in this area, 

the agency can better support mass transit and passenger rail agencies by 

improving the tools and processes used to assess emergency preparedness 

and response capabilities. The agency can also improve its efforts to train 

passenger rail agencies and first responders, and ensure that drills and 

exercises are live and realistic to help strengthen response capabilities. 

TSA has focused primarily on security efforts, while providing limited 

staff and resources to emergency preparedness and response. As a result, 

passenger rail agencies and the first responders they rely on may not be 

adequately prepared to respond to emergencies or mitigate the 

consequences of emergency incidents. 

BASE Tools, Processes, and Training 

TSA needs to provide a more effective database tool along with 

increased detailed training and guidance for inspectors to ensure 

that BASE assessments gather effective, objective data. The 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007, Section 1405, requires DHS to review passenger rail plans 

and security assessments to identify weaknesses in emergency 

response planning and employee training. Section 1408 of the Act 

requires DHS to promulgate regulations requiring public 

transportation agencies determined by the Secretary to be at high 

risk of terrorism to develop and implement security plans. The 

security plans must specify which elements need to be addressed. 

TSA implemented the BASE program to develop a baseline 

understanding of passenger rail agencies’ security and emergency 

preparedness; however, the program employs assessment processes 

and a database tool that do not consistently gather, review, and 

score data regarding passenger rail stakeholders’ emergency 

preparedness and response capabilities. Currently, TSA provides 

only 7.5 hours of inspection and assessment training in the 80-hour 

basic training curriculum, and the database tool consists of generic 

fill-in-the-blank sections that allow inspectors to use their 

discretion when entering or omitting any assessment information. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 

Page 5 
Some Assistant Federal Security Directors and inspectors at 

different locations described inconsistent processes for conducting 

BASE assessments. One Assistant Federal Security Director 

informed us that the BASE process consisted primarily of a 

documentation review. Two Transportation Security Inspectors in 

another location stated that interviews are conducted following the 

documentation review. One inspector allowed passenger rail 

agencies to answer the BASE questions alone, while two 

inspectors from a different location explained that inspectors 

collaborate with the stakeholders to answer the questions. 

Inspectors, Assistant Federal Security Directors, and other TSA 

officials confirmed that more training is needed to conduct BASE 

assessments. 

TSA officials confirm that they have begun updating the BASE 

database tool and assessment procedures, as well as the inspectors’ 

training curriculum. In 2010, the Office of Security Operations 

plans to improve the database tool with standardized drop-down 

menus requiring inspectors to select their assigned scores for 

designated fields. This will enable TSA to gather more 

standardized data. The new database tool will also have a 

verification section, which will require inspectors to support their 

findings and scoring decisions with detailed evidence. 

TSA officials explained that the inspector training curriculum will 

be expanded by 40 hours in length, with 8-12 hours dedicated to 

more in-depth BASE training for new inspectors, in addition to 

increased on-the-job and refresher training. TSA is also building a 

dedicated surface training facility, which is expected to open in 

2010. This facility will be used for BASE assessment training and 

will also provide simulations of emergency situations for 

inspectors and other passenger rail stakeholders to practice 

implementing emergency response plans and procedures. 

Emergency Preparedness Workshops 

TSA should provide increased support to programs focused on 

expanding and enhancing regional collaboration in terrorism 

prevention and emergency response. In September 2005, DHS and 

the Department of Transportation signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding to jointly fund and sponsor the Connecting 

Communities workshops. The Memorandum of Understanding 

requires that TSA and the Federal Transit Administration jointly 

sponsor the Connecting Communities workshops, and that all 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 

Page 6 
aspects of the workshops be closely coordinated among the parties. 

The goal of these workshops is to train and better coordinate assets 

and specialized resources of transit and transportation systems with 

their local, county, and state emergency managers and first 

responders. 

TSA officials noted that TSA primarily focused on security 

and counterterrorism issues and did not recognize the Connecting 

Communities workshops effort as a priority. According to the 

Federal Transit Administration, TSA has provided only $25,000 

for the Connecting Communities workshops since 2006. The 

Federal Transit Administration has funded all but 1 of the 20 

workshops. Based on the current level of funding, only eight 

Connecting Communities workshops may be held annually. 

According to TSA officials, the agency was able and willing to 

provide more funding to the Connecting Communities workshops; 

however, the Federal Transit Administration did not seek 

additional support. 

Training Matrix and Course List 

TSA should provide more training focused on emergency 

preparedness and response for passenger rail stakeholders and first 

responders. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007, Sections 1408 and 1517, direct DHS to 

develop and issue regulations for training programs to prepare 

public transportation employees and railroad frontline employees 

for potential security threats and conditions. DHS designated TSA 

to develop these regulations in consultation with appropriate law 

enforcement, fire service, emergency response experts, passenger 

rail stakeholders, and nonprofit employee labor organizations 

representing railroad employees or emergency response personnel. 

Based on insight gained from the BASE assessments, TSA 

developed the Mass Transit Security Training Program matrix and 

course list. The list includes 103 courses sponsored by TSA, the 

Federal Transit Administration, and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, with subjects ranging from cyber-security to 

citizen preparedness. More than half of the courses focus on law 

enforcement management of security incidents based on weapons 

of mass destruction scenarios, such as Prevention and Deterrence 

of Terrorist Acts by Law Enforcement and Managing the Incident: 

A Leadership Guide to WMD Events. Few training courses focus 

on passenger rail frontline employees, firefighter response efforts, 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 7 

or the threats posed specifically by improvised explosive devices. 

For example, 

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Fifty-four courses focus on law enforcement management of 

security incidents. 

Two courses focus on mass transit and passenger rail systems. 

Two courses focus on preparing emergency responders to 

perform critical response actions during improvised explosive 

device incidents. 

One course focuses on performance-level training for 

firefighters. 

TSA officials stated that they made the conscious decision to focus 

on security and law enforcement efforts because they believed that 

much of the training and exercises occurring in DHS, and at the 

state and local levels, was already heavily focused on response and 

recovery efforts. As a result, passenger rail frontline employees 

and firefighters may not be receiving the training needed to 

respond to emergencies in the passenger rail systems. 

Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program 

TSA should conduct more Intermodal Security Training and 

Exercise Program (I-STEP) sessions that include an increased 

number of firefighter representatives and live field drills. The 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007, Sections 1407 and 1516, require DHS to establish a program 

for conducting security exercises for public transportation agencies 

and railroad carriers for the purpose of assessing and improving 

their abilities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, 

and recover from acts of terrorism. These exercises should be live 

and realistic. TSA’s I-STEP is implemented to fulfill this 

requirement. 

TSA has not dedicated a full staff and resources to support I-STEP. 

TSA’s Mass Transit Division is responsible for coordinating mass 

transit and passenger rail applications of I-STEP, but the limited 

staff and resources hampers I-STEP’s efforts. The division has 

one director with no other full-time staff to conduct the outreach 

and coordinate with regional passenger rail stakeholders while 

helping develop a series of training workshops. The Mass Transit 

Division is in the process of hiring a dedicated transportation 

security specialist to work for the director of the I-STEP and 

related efforts. Planning and coordinating these sessions is laborTSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 8 

intensive because it involves preparing for the exercises in 

different geographic regions and building and maintaining 

relationships to get the right passenger rail stakeholder 

participation. 

TSA has conducted only three I-STEP sessions in the past 2 years. 

In contrast, the Port and Intermodal Security Division, when 

coordinating with the Coast Guard, conducted 40 Port-STEP 

exercises in 2 years. I-STEP primarily focuses on security 

operations during a Table Top Exercise, and does not include a live 

drill or exercise component regarding security or first responder 

emergency response. 

TSA officials confirmed that they consciously focused I-STEP on 

security and prevention efforts, not on emergency response or 

recovery. TSA decided to exclude a live drill component from the 

program because it believed that the component would hamper the 

program implementation in its early stages. TSA also wanted to 

get the program up and running as soon as possible. 

Conclusion 

Without consistently assessing emergency preparedness and 

response capabilities of passenger rail agencies, TSA is unable to 

effectively develop corrective actions for these agencies to 

implement prepare for, and respond to emergencies in their mass 

transit systems. The insufficient funding and resources provided to 

emergency response workshops prevent TSA from ensuring that 

key stakeholders are ready to handle emergency events. Because 

TSA has not provided enough training, including live field drills 

with first responders well represented, passenger rail 

employees and the first responders they rely on may not be 

prepared to respond to emergency incidents in their systems. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Acting Administrator: 

Recommendation #1: Improve the Baseline Assessment and 

Security Enhancement program by (a) expediting the process to 

develop and implement the new database tool to ensure that the 

assessments effectively capture consistent and objective data; and 

(b) ensuring more comprehensive and recurring BASE assessment 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 9 

training for Transportation Security Inspectors to ensure consistent, 

effective, and objective data gathering. 

Recommendation #2: Improve the emergency preparedness 

workshops, such as the Connecting Communities workshops by (a) 

increasing coordination with the Federal Transit Administration to 

ensure compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding, and 

(b) providing financial support to increase the number of sessions 

held annually. 

Recommendation #3: Improve the Training Matrix and 

Recommended Courses List in the Transportation Security Grant 

Program by (a) ensuring that the Transportation Security 

Administration coordinates and communicates with passenger rail 

stakeholders when developing the new list, and (b) increasing the 

number of emergency preparedness and response courses focused 

on mass transit and passenger rail systems and the threats posed by 

improvised explosive devices. 

Recommendation #4: Strengthen the Intermodal-Security 

Training and Exercise Program by (a) increasing the number of 

full-time employees in the Mass Transit Division, (b) expediting 

delivery of an increased number of Intermodal-Security Training 

and Exercise Program sessions to passenger rail stakeholders, (c) 

increasing the number of firefighters participating in the sessions, 

and (d) incorporating live, realistic field drills and exercises into 

the Intermodal-Security Training and Exercise Program sessions. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA’s Mass Transit Division provided technical comments before 

providing official management comments to our draft report, 

concurring with all four recommendations. A copy of the Mass 

Transit Division’s response, in its entirety, appears in Appendix B. 

Our summary and analysis of TSA’s written official response 

follows. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 1 

TSA Concurs: TSA responded that the Office of Compliance is in 

the process of developing a 40-hour surface transportation 

specialty training program at TSA's surface transportation training 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 

Page 10 
center in Pueblo, Colorado. The program will incorporate an 

additional 8-12 hours of in-depth BASE program training for TSA 

Surface Inspectors. This training will also include the application 

of the automated BASE assessment tool that has been developed to 

enhance efficiency of data collection, integration, and analysis. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains 

open pending confirmation that (a) TSA has begun implementing 

the BASE program’s new database tool, and that (b) 

Transportation Security Inspectors are receiving the more 

comprehensive BASE assessment training. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 2 

TSA Concurs: TSA indicated that a flexible approach, adaptable 

to changing circumstances, should be maintained in efforts to 

enhance security and emergency preparedness. As opposed to 

citing a particular program such as Connecting Communities, TSA 

agreed with providing increased support to broader efforts to 

expand and enhance emergency preparedness in mass transit and 

passenger rail systems through coordination with regional law 

enforcement, first responders, state and local officials, and federal 

partners. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains 

open pending confirmation that TSA is increasing coordination 

efforts with regional law enforcement, first responders, State and 

local officials, and federal partners to expand and enhance 

emergency preparedness in mass transit and passenger rail 

systems. TSA should increase coordination with the Federal 

Transit Administration to ensure compliance with the current 

Memorandum of Understanding providing for financial support to 

increase the number of emergency preparedness workshop sessions 

held annually, specifically considering the Connecting 

Communities workshops. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 3 

TSA Concurs: TSA is working to develop a more comprehensive 

training matrix that identifies types of training across the spectrum 

of emergency prevention, continuity of operations, response, post 

event recovery, and restoration to normal service. The improved 

matrix will identify the key participants and employees, as well as 

the training available to those groups. The matrix will also present 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 11 

a general baseline training that should be provided to mass transit 

and passenger rail employees. 

TSA noted that emphasis will be placed on training to recognize, 

report, and respond effectively to suspected or confirmed 

improvised explosive devices. This effort will be conducted with 

the participation of the Federal Transit Administration and Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, recognizing the broader roles 

and responsibilities these organizations have in this area. As with 

other TSA initiatives, input will be sought from mass transit and 

passenger rail security partners on training they see as critical to 

secure their facilities, as well as on the content and format of the 

updated training matrix. Of particular relevance to this 

collaborative effort, TSA partnered with FEMA to provide 

language for a FY 2010 DHS grant in the amount of $5 million for 

surface transportation and emergency preparedness response 

training courses. Courses such as Bomb Squad Response to 

Transportation Systems-Mass Transit will focus on awareness of 

and threats posed by improvised explosive devices. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

open pending confirmation that TSA has made progress in its plans 

to improve the Training Matrix and Recommended Courses 

through coordination and communication with passenger rail 

stakeholders. TSA’s operational program, Bomb Squad Response 

to Transportation Systems-Mass Transit, may increase the amount 

of training focused on the threats posed by improvised explosive 

devices; however, we would like confirmation on the status of the 

sessions planned during 2010. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 4 

TSA Concurs: TSA’s Mass Transit Division is in the process of 

hiring a dedicated transportation security specialist to work directly 

for the director of the I-STEP and related efforts. TSA has 4 to 6 

iterations of I-STEP currently projected for 2010. The agency is 

considering integrating live elements into I-STEP. 

TSA envisions using the surface transportation training center, 

scheduled to open in Pueblo, CO in the spring of 2010, to help 

expand and conduct live exercises focused on terrorism prevention 

and response in mass transit and passenger rail. The capabilities 

projected for the training center will allow for increased 

participation by law enforcement officers, firefighters, other 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 

Page 12 
emergency responders, and federal security partners, as well as the 

incorporation of live, realistic, field drills and exercises. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

open until TSA provides confirmation that the agency has 

increased the number of full-time employees in the Mass Transit 

Division, increased the number of I-STEP sessions, increased the 

number of firefighters participating in the sessions, and 

coordinated and incorporated live, realistic field drills and 

exercises into the I-STEP sessions. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Our audit objective was to evaluate TSA’s effectiveness in 

assisting passenger rail and mass transit stakeholders with 

preparing for and responding to emergencies. 

To answer our objective, we obtained and reviewed applicable 

federal laws and regulations, TSA’s security directives and 

requirements, the Mass Transit Modal Annex, the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Incident Management 

System, and other related documents. 

To determine TSA’s role in assisting passenger rail stakeholders to 

prepare for and respond to emergencies, we interviewed personnel 

from TSA’s Office of Transportation Security Network 

Management, the Office of Security Training and Exercise 

Coordination, the Office of Security Operations, and Surface 

Transportation Security Inspection Program Offices. 

To gain an understanding of TSA’s interactions at the local level, 

we interviewed passenger rail stakeholder emergency management 

personnel and fire department personnel. We interviewed Federal 

Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration 

personnel at Department of Transportation headquarters to 

determine the level of coordination between TSA and the 

Department of Transportation on emergency preparedness and 

response efforts. 

We interviewed officials and reviewed documents at TSA 

headquarters, as well as federal, state, and local passenger rail 

stakeholders in Washington, DC; Philadelphia; Los Angeles; and 

New York. 

To comprehend standard emergency operational procedures on a 

local level, we also toured Office of Emergency Management 

facilities, passenger rail operational control centers, and a 

passenger rail emergency response training facility. 

We observed TSA’s Intermodal Security Training and Exercise 

Program exercise in Los Angeles to determine the emphasis on 

emergency preparedness and response throughout these Table Top 

Exercises. We also attended two Connecting Communities 

training sessions; one held in Atlanta, GA and the other in 

Chicago, IL, to survey the emergency preparedness and response 

efforts made within the sessions. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted this performance audit between April and August 

2009 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


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INFOR.MATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard L. Skinner

Inspector General

U.S. Depanment of Homeland sec~ (DH~) .

FROM: Gale D. Rossides h ~~ ()

Acting Admini~

SUBJECT: Transportation Security Administtation's (TSA) Response to

DHS's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report,

TSA '5 Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail

Emergenc;es, JanUMy 2010 - FOR. OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(FOUO)

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) response to

the recommendations for Agency action as well as issues relaling to both the substance and

overall presentation of the draft report, TSA '5 Preparednessfor Mass Transit and Passenger Rail

Emergencies, January 2010- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). This memorandum brings

current (as of the date of this memorandum) any references made by the report to ongoing,

developing, or maturing programs v.;trun TSA to ensure the integrity of any actions or decisions

premised on this review. We recognize that this report represents a snapshot ofTSA initiatives

as of the time of its compilation, and TSA remains prepared to provide current program status al

any time in the future.

Backeround:

The methodology pursued in the reporting ofthis audit raised concerns expressed by TSA

officials from the outset. By focusing solely on TSA 's effons that support emergency

preparedness in mass transit and passenger rail, the report's findings and recommendations do

not account for the much broader responsibilities, programs, and resource investments by other

key Federal entities -the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), bOlh within the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). While the report recognizes the existence of these

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 16
 

2

other Federal partners, it does nol appropriately clarify their critical role in mass transit and

passenger rail preparedness. TSA's focus primarily on lerrorism prevention and immediate

response to a threat or incident recognizes the broader tole and means DOT and FEMA dedicate

to general emergency preparedness and response and recovery. Thjs approach also aligns with

the statutory authorities and responsibilities of each ofthese Federal components while

advancing specific responsibilities of DHS as defined by the Secretary - building stronger

partnerships and securing transportation infrastructure.

Discussion:

Prior 10 responding to the Recommendations in me draft report, TSA wishes to specifically

address several provisions of the draft report. FiISl, the second full paragraph on page 5 most

directly implicates the concern regarding the separation of authority and roles among OHS,

DOT, and FEMA by concluding "passenger rail agencies and the first responders they rely 00

may not be adequately prepared to respond to emergencies or mitigate lhe consequences of

emergency incidents." By not accounting for the broader role and means DOT and FEMA

dedicate to general emergency preparedness and response and recovery, this statement conveys

an inaccurate and misleading impression.

Second, the draft report focuses primarily on just four programs, relegating to Appendix F

limited descriptions ofTSA components and other initiatives essential to TSA 's mUlti-faceted

approach to enhancing security and emergency preparedness in mass transit and passenger raiL

In born aspects, the draft report does not adequately convey the integration of these efTons in

advancing TSA 's strategic security priorities. In brief summary, these priorities, which are based

on the concepts addressed in the Mass Transit Annex to the Transportation Systems Sector

Specific Plan, are discussed below and should be acknowledged in the report:

Expand Partnerships for Security EnbaDcement: A proactive and continuous

collaboration with senior executives, law enforcement chiefs, and security managers for mass

transit and passenger rail agencies; State and local government officials, Law enforcement,

and emergency responders; and Federal partners to foster regional security coordination and

to integrate the spectrum of available resources for enhanced deterrent and response

capabilities.

Elevate tbe Security Baseline: A continuous improvement process implemented through

comprehensive security assessments conducted by TSA surface inspectors under the Baseline

Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program \\:;th collaborative follow-up aClion

to address identified concerns. The results of these assessments infonn risk mitigation

priorities, security enhancement programs, resource allocations, and compilation and

distribution of effective security practices.

Build Security Force Multipliers: A persistent effon to expand infonned, capable "eyes

and ears" for security through targeted awards under the Transit Security Grant Program

(TSGP), funded through FEMA appropriations. These grants support employee security

training, anti-terrorism exercises, public awareness campaigns, and fielding specially trained

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 17
 

3

and equipped anti-terrorism law enforcement teams and technological systems to enhance

detection and deterrent capabilities.

Lead JDformatioD Assurance: Deliver timely, accurate intelligence and security

information to officials in mass transit and passenger rail agencies and Stale and local

governments through mulLiple means, includingjoinl classified intelligence and analysis

briermgs, deployment ofsecure communications capabilities, and periodic dissemination of

TSA Mass Transit Security Awareness Messages.

Protect High Risk Assets and Systems: Expanded and sustainable active deterrence

achieved through coordinated, joint security operations and random security inspections;

TSGP awards that focus on expanding operational capabilities in mass transit and passenger

rail systems; planning and execution of Visible lnlerrnodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)

operations in mass transit and passenger rail systems; risk-based deployment ofTSAcertified explosives detection canine teams expand systems' deterrent and detection

capabilities~ and coordinated technology development and testing that focuses on enhancing

capabilities, through flexibly applicable mobile and fixed technologies, to protect high-risk

assets and systems, notably underwater tunnels and high-volume tenninals and stations, and

to detect and deter terrorist activity and prevent anacks in the demanding transit

environment.

Each program and initiative TSA pursues in mass transit and passenger rail security aims to

advance one or more of these priorities, which is not apparent from the sununaries provided in

Appendix F of the draft report.

For example, the Transit Safety & Security Roundtables, held semi-annually through me joint

sponsorship ofTSA, FTA, and FEMA, foster a national partnership with security and safety

professionals in mass transit and passenger rail and meet a DHS priority of expanded integration

by the federal Government with local officials directly respoosible for securiry, safety, and

emergency management. Representatives of TSA, FTA, and FEMA join with the responsible

law enforcement chiefs, security directors, and safety managers in the Nation's largesl 50 mass

transit and passenger rail agencies and Amtrak in focused exchanges on tmealS 10 the mode and

effective handling ofsecurity and safety-related emergencies. In each session, the presentations

and discussions collectively address each ofTSA's strategic security priorities.

Through the International Working Group on Land Transport Security (IWGLTS), TSA

meets the DHS responsibility of building stronger international partnerships. As Chair ofthe

Group during 2008-09, TSA led a concerted multi-national effon to produce a compilation of

international smart security practices. To dale, practices have been accepted and shared among

the participating countries in the areas of risk assessment, partnerships, technology, public

awareness, and mitigating consequences ofan incident. As this effon progresses, TSA will share

the assembled international smart security practices with law enforcement and security

professionals in mass transit and passenger rail agencies across the U.S., advancing Ihe strategic

security priorities of building security force multipliers, assuring information leadership, and

protecting high-risk assets and systems.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 18
 

4

A key element ofemergency preparedness is the capability to sustain prevention and response

efforts in the face ofsecurity threats or incidents. Two operational programs focus on this

critical objective. The Visible Jntermodal Prevention and Response (VlPR) Program

deploys varying force packages that may consist of Federal Air Marshals, Behavior Detection

Officers, Transportation Security lnspectors (ISIs), Transportation Security Officers. explosives

detection canine teams, Explosives Security Specialists, and necessary supporting equipment.

With these elements, TSA provides a range of capabilities to augment detection and deterrence

in mass transit and passenger rail, mcluding surveillance detection. behavior observation, mobile

explosives trace detection for random bag inspections, explosives detection canine teams,

specialization to resolve suspected explosive devices. and other visible, random, and

unpredictable security activities. During 2009, TSA conducted more than t,050 V[PR

operations with mass transit and passenger rail systems across the Nation.

The second operational program meets three ofTSA's strategic security priorities by expanding

partnerships, building security force multipliers, and enhancing means and capabilities to prolect

.assets and systems. The Bomb Squad Response to Transportation Systems·Mass Transit

integrates State and local authorities with mass transit and passenger rail systems operating in

their jurisdictions through training and practical exercises. Bomb squads from local and State

police deparunents and city, counry, and State emergency management agencies receive training

on the challenges ofthe mass transit and passenger rail operating envirownent and participate in

response exercises involving improvised explosive devices on trains and buses and in stations.

The cooperative relationships fostered through this program provide a foundation for expanded

and sustained collaboration by the transit or rail agency with its local Jaw enforcement and

emergency management partners in security enhancement activities. Through January 2010, this

program has been conducted in the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (September

2008); King County Metro Transit in !.he Seattle area (March 2009); San Diego Metropolitan

Transit System (May 2009); the Denver Regional Transportation District (August 2009); and the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (January 2010). Interest in this program

among transit and rail agencies and law enforcement partners in their service areas is high. Eight

to 10 iterations are projected ror20IO.

The Field Operational Risk and Criticality Evaluation (FORCE). also referenced in

Appendix F, assesses a rail or transit system's operations and facilities in the context ofan area's

broader transportation network and neigbboring critical infrastructure. Particular attention is

devoted to analyzing potential high·consequence vulnerabilities and proposing attainable

security solutions. The resulting repon provides a thorough framework for integraled effort

among the rail or transit agency and its local, State, and Federal partners to enhance

preparedness, in a sustainable manner, for both the prevention and response missions. Five of

these assessments have been completed to date - Port Authority of Allegheny County,

Pittsburgh, PA (in advance of the G-20 Summit); Hampton Roads Transit, greater NorfolkHampton area. VA (in preparalion for initiation of opening of a new light rail system); King

Count)' Metro Transit and connecting and neighboring systems in the greater Seartle, WA,

metropolitan area (broad assessment in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics in nearby

Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada); Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (in

support ofsecurity preparations for the Rose Bowl); and Miami-Dade Transit (in support of

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 19
 

5

securiry preparations for the Super Bowl). TSA will implement this program in partnership with

several more transit and rail agencies during 2010.

In some cases, the draft repon's more focused lrcatmenl of fouiTSA programs relating to

emergency preparedness in mass transit and passenger rail omits key elements and does not

discuss the broader strategic context in which they are developed and implemented.

• On pages 5-6, the repon comments critically on the Baseline Assessment for Security

Enhancement (BASE) program. without providing essentiaJ context to assure

understanding ofits purpose and effectiveness. With the BASE program, TSA has

implemented a continuous improvement process via comprehensive security assessments

conducted by TSIs-Surface. The assessments evaluate posture in 17 Security and

Emergency Management Action Items foundational to an effective security program,

covering such areas as security program management and accountabiliry, security and

emergency response training, drills and exercises, public awareness, protective measures

for Homeland Security Adviso!)' Syslem (HSAS) threat levels, physical security,

personnel security, and information sharing and security. TSA pays particular attention

10 transit agency posture in six fundamental areas: protection of high-risk

underwater/underground assets and systems; protection of other high-risk assets that have

been identified through system-wide risk assessments; use of visible, unpredictable

deterrence; targeted counter-terrorism training for key frontline staff; emergency

preparedness drills and exercises; and public awareness and preparedness campaigns. A

dedicated quality control lead at TSA Headquarters reviews all BASE assessment reports

to ensure they accord "''ith set standards and are supported by relevant accompanying

docwnentation and justifications.

o With regard to the report's comments on training ofTSls-Surface, it is important

to note that the 7.5 hours focused on the BASE program in the basic training

curriculum is augmented by on-the-job experience conveyed by senior ranking

inspectors and the in-depth quality review accomplished at TSA Headquarters that

jnlegrates the TSIs who performed the assessment in the process. The specialized

surface security trainjng under development will be 40 hours in length, with a

significant portion (8-12 hours) dedicated to more in-depth BASE training.

o The strategic objective of the BASE program is twofold - elevate performance in

security and emergency management to a high standard anlOng at-risk agencies

and reduce risk scores thIOugh continuing assessments and follow-up security

support actions to improve performance. The BASE assessment results infonn

the set1ing of risk mitigation priorities, facilitate review of agencies applications

for awards under the TSGP, and drive development and implementalion of

security enhancement programs and initiatives, notably in such critical areas as

security training, terrorism prevention exercises, and expanded anti-terrorism

operational capabilities.

o A significant omission in the draft report's discussion of the BASE program is the

compilation of Smart Security Practices produced from the assessment results.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 20
 

6

During their conduct oflhe assessments, TSIs-Surface cite and summarize the

most effective security practices they observe. With the December 2009 update,

Lhe compilation now consis1s ofsome 80 Srnar1 Security Practices, many of which

focus on regional partnerships; random security patTols, sweeps, and surges:

intelligence and security information sharing; and trainjng and public awareness.

TSA coordinated the preparation of this product witb each agency with one or

more practices recognized in a BASE assessment, ensuring an accurate

description ofthe practice and securing contact information for an official in the

agency that professional colleagues may consult for more information. The

compliation is distributed to law enforcement chiefs and security directors of

mass transit and passenger rail agencies nationally, and fosters communicarion

among security professionals with the specific objective ofexpanding adoption of

these mosl effective practices, tailored as necessary to each agency's operating

environment.

On pages 7·8, the report discusses the "Training Matrix and Course List," referencing

the Implementing Recommendations of(he 9/l J Commission Act of2007 \¥ithout

providing context on TSA's efforts to expand Ihe scope and quality ofsecurity training in

mass transit and passenger rail. When the initial BASE assessment results demonstrated

a need lO improve in recurring security training of employees, TSA developed and

implemented a focused security training initiative under the TSGP in February 2007,

derajls of which may be accessed at

http://W'hw.tsa.gov/asselsJpdflTSGP Training IB243.pdf. TSA cOOi:dinated

development ofthis initiative through the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council,

formed under the Nationallnfrastructwe Protection Plan (NIPP), and the Transit Policing

and Security Peer Advisory Group.

o The Mass Transit Security Training Program provides guidelines to mass transit

and passenger rail agencies on the types oftraining to be provided by ca(egoI)' of

employee, encompassing frontline employees, management, and law enforcement

and security officers. The guidance further identifies specific courses developed

under Federal auspices through FTA, FEMA, and TSA that are available (0 ensure

employees are trained in the designated areas. Finally, DHS revised the eligible

costs under the TSGP to allow coverage of overtime expenses incurred when

employees attend training courses and streamlined the application process to

simplify requests and expedite awards for security training.

o Collectively, these program enhancements produced a dramatic increase in (he

investment of grant funding in security tTaining, with tens ofthousands of

frontline employees receiving ClUTent courses in such areas as security awareness,

behavior Tecognition, and immediale actions LO respond to a threat or securiry

incident. We anticipate the future regulatory requirement will focus security

training of frontljne employees on these three COre areas.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 21
 

7

The limited discussion ofthe Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program

(l-STEP) on pages 8-9 of the report omits I-STEP's vital role in advancing TSA's

strategic security priorities. While BASE assessment results indicated a significant

volume of activity in this area, they also revealed insufficient conduct of exercises aimed

at enhancing capabilities to address a developing Weal and prevent a terrorist attack in

mass transit and passenger rail. Existing DHS programs seemed to focus almost

exclusively on response actions and capabilities. TSA developed the I-STEP application

in mass transit and passenger rall specifically to Ii II this gap in exercise programs for the

mode.

o The report's reference to "only three I-STEP sessions in the past 2 years"

compared to "40 Port-STEP exercises in 2 years" conveys a misleading

impression without the necessary, additional context demonSlrating the distinctive

attributes of how this program is implemented in mass transit and passenger rail.

First. the I-STEP application in mass transit and passenger rail dates only from the

initiation of the pilot effort in the National Capital Region in January 2008.

Second, as demonstrated in the pilot and subsequent applications, I-STEP in mass

transit and passenger rail dedicates substantial lime and effort to enhancing

regional collaboration and building integrated preventive capabilities. Over a

period of months. TSA employs multi-phased workshops, table-top exercise, and

"lessons learned" working groups to integrate mass transit and passenger rail

agencies with regional law enforcement and emergency response partners to

expand and enhance coordinated deterrent and incident management capabilities.

Scenario-based anti-terrorism workshops conducted over a period of weeks to

months integrate a region's principal mass transit and passenger rail agencies with

local, State, and Federal security partners, including law enforcement and flfSt

response agencies. The joint effort culminates in a large-scale regional table top

exercise. Focused after action working groups address lessons learned to produce

collaborative regional security enhancement efforts, a key step in both elevating

and sustaining preparedness.

• Finally, the "Conclusion" section on pages 9-10 illustrates the narrow scope of the audit

and the breadth of its conclusions.

• As staled above, because the report does not account for the responsibilities, programs,

and resource investments by the two other key Federal entities in the emergency

preparedness mission, DOT and FEMA, there is an incomplete analysis of the subject

area, which incorrectly conveys the impression thai TSA is the lead and solely

responsible entity. TSA's focus primarily on terrorism prevention and immediate

response recognizes the broader role and means DOT and FEMA dedicate to general

emergency preparedness and response and recovery. This approach aligns with the

statutory authorities and responsibilities of each of these Federal components and meets

!.he DHS responsibilities of building stronger partnerships and securing transportation

infrastructure.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 22
 

8

As TSA is nOI the lead or solely responsible entity for emergency preparedness io mass

transit and passenger rail, the statement that "insufficient funding and resources provided

to emergency response workshops prevent TSA from ensuring that key stakeholders are

ready to handle emergency events" overstates the agency's role. TSA's mission does not

encompass aJl types of emergency events. Olher Federal components, mosl notably DOT

and FEMA, have responsibilities encompassing emergency preparedness and

management generally. AdditionaJly, exercises in mass transit and passenger rail are

funded by FEMA through the TSGP. I-STEP focuses on building integrated prevention

and immediate response capabilities.

• Finally, the conclusion that "TSA has not provided enough training, including live field

drills, with first responders well represented, passenger rail employees and the first

responders they rely on may not be prepared to respond to emergency incidents in their

systems" both understates TSA's efforts in security training and overstates TSA '5

mission responsibilities. Since fiscal year (FY) 2006, TSA has worked in conjunction

with FEM.A. to award more than $83 million under the TSGP that has funded security

training for more than 158,000 participants in mass transit and passenger rail syslems.

DOT and FEMA provide emergency response and preparedness training to transit and

rail employees and first responders for non-terrorism related incidents.

Conclusion:

TSA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report and the professionalism

demonstrated by the OIG learn, in particular Andrew Smith, in conductiog the review. TSA has

demonstrated an effective strategy and implemented comprehensive efforts to improve the

security of mass transit and passenger rail systems. TSA focuses primarily on terrorism

prevention and immediate response to a threat or incident while supporting the leading role of

FEMA and DOT in more general emergency preparedness and response and recovery efforts.

Despite the concerns discussed above. TSA concurs with each ofthe report's recommendations.

TSA's responses to the specific recommendations are attached.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 23
 

9

United States Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Security AdministnHion

Response to Draft Recommendations

TSA 's Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies

Recommendation #1: Improve the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement

program by (a) exped.iting the process to develop and implemeot tbe new database tool to

ensure that the assessments effectively capture consistent and objectin data; and (b)

ensuring more comprehensive and ...ecurring BASE assessment training for TSls to ensure

consistent, effective, and objective data gathering.

TSA Concurs: The TSA Office of Compliance is in the process of developing a 40-hour surface

transportation specialty training program at TSA's surface transportation training center in

Pueblo, CO, that will incorporate an additional 8-12 hours of in-depth BASE program training

for TSls-Surface. This lralning will also include the application of the aUlOmated BASE

assessment tool that has been developed to enhance efficiency of data collection, integration, and

analysis.

Recommendation #2: Improve the emergency preparedness workshops, such as

Connecting Communities workshops, by (a) increasing coordination with tbe Federal

Transit Administration to ensure compliance with tbe Memorandum of Understanding,

and (b) providing financial support to increase tbe number or sessions beld annually.

TSA Concurs: A flexible approach, adaptable to cbanging circwnstances, should be maintained

in efforts to enhance security and emergency preparedness. As opposed to citing a particular

program, TSA concurs with providing increased support to efforts 10 expand and enhance

emergency preparedness in mass transit and passenger rail systems in a coordinated effort with

regional law enforcement, first responders, State and local officials, and Federal partners.

Recommendation #3: Improve tbe Training Matrix and Recommended Courses List in the

Transportation Security Grant Program b}' (a) ensuring that the Transportation Security

Administration coordinates and communicates with passenger rail sfakeholders when

developing the new list, and (b) increasing the Dumber of emergency preparedness and

response courses focused on mass traosit and passenger rail systems and the threats posed

by improvised explosive devices.

TSA Concurs: TSA is working 10 develop a more comprehensive training matrix that identifies

types oftraining across the speclrum of prevention, continuity of operations, response, postevent recovery, atld restoration to normal service. Further, the matrix will identify categories of

employees (such as frontline, station managers, maintenance, track workers, and bus operators)

and training specific to those groups, as well as general baseline training [hat should be provided

to mass transit and passenger rail employees generally. Particular emphasis wilt be placed on

training to recognize, report, and respond effectively to suspected or confiffiled improvised

explosive devices. This effort will be conducted with the participation of FTA and FEMA,

recognizing the broader roles and responsibilities these organizations have in this area. As with

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 24
 

10

other initiatives, input will be sought from mass training and passenger rail securit), partners on

training they see as critical to secure their facilities and on the content and formal ofthe updated

matrix. OfparticuJar relevance to this collaborative effort, TSA partnered with FEMA to

provide language for a FY 20 I0 $SM DHS grant for surface transportation and emergency

preparedness response training courses focusing on the awareness of and the threats posed by

improvised explosive devices.

Recommendation #4: Strengthen the Jotermodal-Security Training and Exercise Program

by (a) increasing tbe Dumber of full-time employees in the Mass Transit Division, (b)

expediting delivery of an increased Dumber of Intermodal-Security Training and Enrcise

Program sessions to passenger rail stakeholders, (c) increasing the number of firefighters

participating in the sessions, and (d) incorporating live, realistic field drills and exercises

iDto the IntermodaJ-Sccurit)' Training and Exercise Program sessions.

TSA Concurs: The Mass Transit Division is in the process of hiring a dedicated transportation

security specialist to work for the director ofsecurity training and exercise programs in I-STEP

and related efforts. Four to six iterations of I-STEP are currently projected for calendar year

2010. TSA is considering integrating live elements into I-STEP. Additionally, TSA envisions

using Ihe surface transportation training cenler, scheduled to open in Pueblo, CO, in April 2010,

to help expand conduct of live exercises focused on terrorism prevention and response in mass

transil and passenger rail. The capabilities projected for the training center wiU allow for

increased participation of law enforcement officers, firefighters, and other emergency

responders, with Federal security partners, as well as the incorporation of live, realistic field

drills and exercises.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 25
 

Appendix C 

Average Daily Trips per Region in 2007 

Our Nation’s passenger rail network is critical to our way of life, 

transporting more than 12 million commuters each day. The top 

eight regions transport more than 9 million passenger rail 

commuters each day, as shown below. 

Average Daily Trips Per Region in 2007 

Regional trips as 

Percentage of National 

Total 

Top Eight Regions 

6,088,210 (51%) New York–New Jersey 

834,042 (7%) Virginia–District of 

Columbia–Maryland 

736,387 (6%) Boston 

732,146 (6%) Chicago 

566,332 (5%) San Francisco 

420,793 (4%) Philadelphia 

354,489 (3%) Los Angeles 

189,613 (3%) Atlanta 

Source: American Public Transportation Association, 2009 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 26
 

TSA’s Six Transit Security Fundamentals 

1. Protection of high-risk underwater/underground assets and systems 

2. Protection of other high-risk assets that have been identified through systemwide risk assessments 

3. Use of visible, unpredictable deterrence 

4. Targeted counterterrorism training for key frontline staff 

5. Emergency preparedness drills and exercises 

6. Public awareness and preparedness campaigns. 

Source: TSA 

Appendix D 
 

TSA Security Directives, Rulemakings, and Transportation Sector Specific Plan
 


In 2004, TSA issued two Security Directives requiring passenger 

rail agencies to increase security operations, including assigning 

security coordinators, conducting frequent inspections of facilities 

and vehicles for items that do not belong, and requiring them to 

immediately report any suspicious activity to TSA. Recently, TSA 

issued a third directive requiring passenger rail agencies to allow 

TSA inspectors to enter and conduct inspections, as well as 

provide for a secure chain of custody and control of rail cars 

containing a specified quantity and type of hazardous material. 

In 2007, TSA published Transportation Systems – Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to 

the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which includes the 

Mass Transit Modal Annex. These documents describe how the 

transportation sector will improve the security of its critical 

infrastructure and key resource assets, systems, networks, and 

functions. The Mass Transit Modal Annex focuses on the Six 

Transit Security Fundamentals that provide the foundation for a 

successful security program. (See figure below.) 

On November 26, 2008, TSA issued a final rule to enhance the 

security of our Nation's rail transportation system, which included 

requirements for intercity, commuter, and short-haul passenger 

train service providers and rail transit systems. The rule codifies 

the scope of TSA's existing inspection program and requires 

regulated parties to allow TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect, 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 27 

Appendix D 

TSA Security Directives and Transportation Sector Specific Plan 

and test property, facilities, conveyances, and records relevant to 

rail security. The rule requires that regulated parties designate rail 

security coordinators and report significant security concerns. The 

rule further requires that freight rail carriers and certain facilities 

handling specified hazardous materials be able to report location 

and shipping information to TSA upon request and implement 

chain of custody requirements to ensure positive and secure 

exchange of specified hazardous materials. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 28 

Appendix E 

TSA’s 17 Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items 

DO NOT DELETE THIS BOOKMARK 

1. Establish written System Security Programs and Emergency Management Plans. 

2. Define roles and responsibilities for security and emergency management. 

3. Ensure that operations and maintenance supervisors, forepersons, and managers are 

held accountable for security issues under their control. 

4. Coordinate Security and Emergency Management Plan(s) with local and regional 

agencies. 

5. Establish and maintain a security and emergency training program. 

6. Establish plans and protocols to respond to the DHS Homeland Security Advisory 

System threat levels. 

7. Implement and reinforce a public security and emergency awareness program. 

8. Conduct Table Top and Functional drills. 

9. Establish and use a risk management process to assess and manage threats, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences. 

10. Participate in an information-sharing process for threat and intelligence information. 

11. Establish and use a reporting process for suspicious activity (internal and external). 

12. Control access to security-critical facilities with identification badges for all visitors, 

employees, and contractors. 

13. Conduct physical security inspections. 

14. Conduct background investigations of employees and contractors. 

15. Control access to documents of security-critical systems and facilities. 

16. Implement a process for handling and access to sensitive security information 

17. Conduct security program audits 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 29
 

Appendix F 

TSA Components and Other Initiatives Focused on Public Transportation 

Emergency Preparedness 

Within TSA, the following components focus on meeting the goals 

and objectives of the Transportation Security – Sector Specific Plan: 

�	 

�	 

�	 

�	 

The Office of Transportation Sector Network Management 

leads the unified national effort to protect and secure the 

Nation’s intermodal transportation systems. Its primary 

mission is to ensure the safe movement of passengers and 

promote the free flow of commerce by building a resilient, 

robust, and sustainable network with the public and private 

sector partners, including passenger rail stakeholders. 

The Mass Transit Division coordinates drills, training, 

exercises, and public outreach regarding mass transit and 

passenger rail security and emergency management. This 

includes coordination of the Intermodal Security Training and 

Exercise Program, National Roundtables with mass transit and 

passenger rail security leadership, and development of new and 

improved training courses and curriculum in the Transportation 

Security Grant Program. 

The Port and Intermodal Security Division was established to 

develop and deliver the Port Security Exercise and Training 

Program, which provides exercise and evaluation services and 

solutions for maritime and surface industry partners. TSA 

developed the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise 

Program to support the Nation’s surface transportation sector 

by evaluating its capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and 

respond to terrorist-related incidents. 

TSA’s Office of Security Operations is responsible for special 

programs designed to secure all assigned transportation modes. 

The Office of Security Operations manages the Surface 

Transportation Security Inspections Program, Surface 

Transportation Security Inspectors, and the BASE program. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 30 

Appendix F 

TSA Components and Other Initiatives Focused on Public Transportation 

Emergency Preparedness 

There are other TSA programs that support preparedness for 

emergencies in public transportation, but we did not review these 

programs in detail. Other related TSA initiatives include: 

�	 

�	 

�	 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Program ­

TSA deploys teams to augment security in mass transit and 

passenger rail systems, expanding capabilities to implement 

random, unpredictable security activities for deterrent 

effect. Through a joint planning process between TSA, the 

transit or rail agency's law enforcement and security team, 

and local law enforcement officials, the Visible Intermodal 

Prevention and Response teams' composition and activities 

are tailored to the needs of the participating system. 

Transit Safety and Security Roundtables - Twice each year, 

TSA and the Federal Transit Administration jointly sponsor 

Transit Safety and Security Roundtables, which bring 

together law enforcement chiefs, security directors, and 

safety directors from the nation's 50 largest mass transit and 

passenger rail agencies and Amtrak with federal security 

partners. In a workshop format, the participants discuss 

specific terrorism prevention and response challenges and 

work collaboratively in developing effective risk 

mitigation, security enhancement, and emergency 

preparedness solutions. The roundtables enable the transit 

and rail agencies' safety and security officials to share 

effective practices and develop relationships to improve 

coordination and collaboration. 

The International Working Group on Land Transport 

Security - A collaborative forum for government officials 

responsible for surface transportation security, in particular 

mass transit and passenger rail security, to share best 

practices and lessons learned relevant to prevention, 

response, and recovery. The composition of the working 

group includes representatives from Australia, Canada, the 

European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, 

Italy, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Republic of 

Korea, Malaysia, Israel, China, and the United States. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 31 

Appendix F 

TSA Components Responsible for Meeting Transportation Plan Goals 

�

�

Bomb Squad Response to Transportation Systems-Mass 

Transit - This program expands regional capabilities to 

respond to a threat or incident involving a suspected 

explosive device in mass transit and passenger rail systems. 

Bomb technicians from law enforcement agencies in the 

system's operating area are placed in the mass transit or 

passenger rail environment to confront exercise situations 

necessitating coordinated planning and execution of 

operations to identify, resolve, and, if appropriate, render 

harmless improvised explosive devices. These joint 

activities build relationships and skills in a challenging 

operational setting. 

Field Operational Risk and Criticality Evaluation – Field 

operational risk assessments complement the BASE 

assessment process. This program was developed to help 

identify potential gaps in operational security within the 

transit or rail system and vulnerabilities derived from 

regional dependencies and interconnections and nearby 

infrastructure. The overall objective of this program is to 

enable more effective application of resources to maximize 

prevention and response capabilities. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 32 

 

 

 

Appendix G 

TSA Component and Workflow Diagram 

1. BASE Assessments 2. Connecting 

Communities 

3. Training Matrix 

and Course Lists 

4. I-STEP Table Top 

Exercises 

TSA’s Office of Security 

Operations 

- To determine security 

baseline and find gaps to be 

addressed in passenger rail 

systems. 

- Help determine required 

preparatory training and 

workshops to prepare 

identified passenger rail 

stakeholders to attend the ISTEP Table Top Exercises 

Joint between TSA and 

Department of 

Transportation’s Federal 

Transit Administration 

based on the Memorandum 

of Understanding 

- To coordinate the assets 

and specialized resources of 

transit and transportation 

systems, with their local, 

county, and state response 

and emergency management 

agencies, including law 

enforcement, fire fighters, 

and emergency medical 

services. 

- BASE Assessment tool is 

subjective; 

- Transportation Security 

Inspectors are not 

adequately trained to 

conduct the BASE 

Assessments or effectively 

implement the BASE tool. 

Joint between TSA and 

FEMA within the 

Transportation Security 

Grant Program 

- To develop and issue 

regulations for training 

programs to prepare railroad 

frontline employees for 

potential security threats and 

conditions. 

Joint between TSA’s Office 

of Security Training & 

Exercise Coordination and 

the Port and Intermodal 

Security Division 

- To establish a program for 

conducting security 

exercises for railroad 

carriers, emergency 

response providers, law 

enforcement, and railroad 

and transit police to prevent, 

prepare for, mitigate, and 

respond to and recover from 

acts of terrorism. 

- Exercises should be live 

and as realistic as possible. 

- Inadequate number of 

Connecting Communities 

workshops conducted 

- Lack of attendance by key 

participants, including fire 

fighters and state Office of 

Emergency Management 

personnel 

- Training not sufficiently 

focused on emergency 

preparedness and response 

for passenger rail agencies 

and stakeholders, including 

employees and fire fighters 

- Limited number of courses 

focused on response to 

incidents involving an 

improvised explosive 

device. 

- Inadequate number of ISTEP sessions being 

conducted 

- I-STEP sessions not 

including an adequate 

number of fire fighters 

- I-STEP only consists of a 

table top exercise and does 

not include a live realistic 

field drill component. 

Intermodal Security Training Exercise Program encompasses all of these programs and 

processes to complete an I-STEP Table Top Exercise Initiatives Ownership Purpose Problems 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 33
 

Appendix H 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Patrick O’Malley, Director 

Sam Bellino, Audit Manager 

Andrew Smith, Auditor-in-Charge 

Corneliu Buzesan, Program Analyst 

Ebenezer Jackson, Program Analyst 

Ashley Smith, Program Analyst 

James Bess, Independent Referencer 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 


Page 34 

Appendix I 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Audit Liaison 

TSA Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies 
 

Page 35
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

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