Filed 11/22/13 Estate of Sprott CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Estate of BEARL SPROTT, Deceased. B237989

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. P421084)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL SPROTT,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Mary Thornton House, Judge. Affirmed.

Daniel Sprott, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.

Samuel D. Ingham III for Petitioner and Respondent.

_____________________________
2

Daniel Sprott appeals from an order by the probate court awarding sanctions 

against him in the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by Wells Fargo Bank, as 

trustee for a testamentary trust, and an appointed guardian ad litem for the minor 

beneficiaries. The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the sanctions, and we 

affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

Bearl Sprott died in 1959. An April 1964 “ORDER SETTLING FINAL 

ACCOUNT, APPOINTING TRUSTEES OF TESTAMENTARY TRUST, AND 

DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION” (Trust Order) provided that the trust’s duration was until 

“the death of the last person entitled to any income or benefits,” or 21 years after the 

death of the last children or grandchildren living when Bearl Sprott died, “for as long a 

period as allowed by law.” The trust was funded with $344,758.16 in cash. The Trust 

Order provided that the trustees “shall use the income of said trust estate for the 

education and training of any and all of the blood issue and their blood descendants of 

testator that shall desire to take advantage thereof, . . . for a fulltime college course at any 

fully accredited college or university of their choice . . . .” The Trust Order also stated 

that the trustees had discretion to provide for beneficiaries who became disabled. If the 

trustees deemed it necessary, they could make additional distributions to beneficiaries for 

their proper support and education, taking their financial resources and income into 

consideration. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo, or trustee) is the trustee for the 

trust. Daniel Sprott (Sprott), one of Bearl Sprott’s grandchildren at the time of his death, 

and his children Barbara, Richard, Matthew, David, and Michael Sprott, were among the 

trust beneficiaries. In October 2011, the filing date of the order appealed from, the fair 

market value of the trust was approximately $300,000, with an annual income of 

approximately $8,000.

In September 2007, Sprott wrote a letter to the trust demanding that 24 

beneficiaries be removed from the list of beneficiaries because they were not “known by 

the last name of ‘Sprott,’” and threatening legal action against Wells Fargo if it did not 
3

comply. In response, in October 2007 Wells Fargo filed a “Petition for Order 

Ascertaining Beneficiaries” clarifying that the 24 were indeed blood issue of Bearl Sprott 

who, as a result of marriage, did not use the last name “Sprott.” Sprott first filed an 

objection requesting that the petition not be heard until he obtained counsel, and later

(represented by counsel) filed an objection to the petition. Sprott also filed, in pro. per., a

“Motion for Reconsideration,” apparently before receiving a court order granting the 

trustee’s petition. The court granted Wells Fargo’s petition on October 23, 2008, based 

on the trust’s provision specifically excluding from disqualification any beneficiary who 

changed his or her name as a result of marriage.

In January 2010, Wells Fargo filed a verified “PETITION FOR ORDER 

MODIFYING TRUST DUE TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES,” stating that the fair 

market value of the trust had decreased by half in just two years, as a result of extensive 

distributions under the discretionary provisions of the Trust Order. Wells Fargo therefore 

recommended the modification of the trust by adding new language providing that annual 

distributions for college educational expenses were limited to five percent of the value of 

the trust’s assets at the beginning of each year to be paid from trust income, and to the 

extent that income was not sufficient, from the trust principal. On March 5, 2010, Sprott 

filed in pro. per. an “OBJECTION TO MODIFICATION OF TRUST: FRIVOLOUS & 

WASTE OF TRUST ASSETS.” The objection argued that only trust income should be 

used. In a pro. per. “ADDENDOM [sic] OBJECTION,” Sprott argued that if given 

discretion, the Trustee would favor other, less needy family members over Sprott’s 

family. Sprott also complained that the Trustee had not provided financial assistance 

when he was hospitalized for a heart attack. The court ordered the appointment of a 

guardian ad litem, Lawrence J. Kalfayan, to represent minor and unascertained trust 

beneficiaries.

After a hearing, the court ordered the parties to participate in mediation. At a 

further hearing in September 2010, the parties reported that three meetings with a 

mediator had not resolved the issues. Sprott objected that Kalfayan was subject to a 
4

conflict of interest, in that he was representing not only minors but unborn potential 

beneficiaries, and expressed his concerns that his sons now attending college might not 

receive enough to remain in school. The court ordered further briefing.

Kalfayan filed a supplemental report, stating that in order to accommodate one of 

Sprott’s objections, he supported an order requiring no modification of the trust language. 

He also supported limiting annual distributions to five percent of the fair market value of 

the trust, and allowing for trustee discretion within that fixed amount. The report also 

noted that at the current rate of distribution, the trust would be completely exhausted by 

the time Sprott’s two youngest children were ready to enroll in college. Sprott filed 

another objection, accusing Kalfayan of a conflict of interest in that he would favor the 

wealthy families over Sprott’s family. Wells Fargo filed a response to the objection, 

noting that the trust corpus had diminished in the nine months since the filing of Sprott’s 

objections, due to distributions and the cost of litigation. Pursuant to a request by 

Kalfayan based on the conflict identified by Sprott, the court ordered that Sprott’s 

children be excluded from the class of beneficiaries represented by Kalfayan. The court 

declined to appoint an additional guardian ad litem for Sprott’s children. Sprott filed 

additional briefing, continuing to object on several grounds. On November 5, 2010, 

Sprott filed a pro. per. and in forma pauperis “Petition for Order Restricting Further 

Restrictions for Persons Not Born with the Name ‘SPROTT.’”

The court signed a decision dated November 29, 2010, stating: “It is the duty of 

this court to adhere as closely to the testamentary intent of Bearl Sprott; the compromise 

reached between Wells Fargo and the [guardian ad litem], after considering the concerns 

of Daniel Sprott, comprises this goal.” The court pointed out that the trust document 

made no provisions for a “need analysis” in determining distributions. In an “ORDER 

INSTRUCTING TRUSTEE,” filed December 28, 2010, the court noted that the scope of 

Kalfayan’s representation as guardian ad litem was modified to exclude Sprott’s children. 

The order denied the request for modification without prejudice, and instructed Wells 

Fargo to make distributions for educational purposes in an amount not more than five 
5

percent of the net fair market value of the trust assets, paid from income and, if income 

was insufficient, from principal. The order included distribution guidelines.1

On March 2, 2011, Wells Fargo filed another petition for an order modifying the 

trust based on changed circumstances. “The proposed modification would deem a 

beneficiary whose litigation concerning this trust causes him or her to qualify as a 

‘vexatious litigant’ as defined in Code of Civil Procedure [section] 391[, subdivision] (b) 

a ‘Vexatious Litigant Beneficiary.’ Any mandatory or discretionary distributions which a 

Vexatious Litigant Beneficiary would otherwise receive from this trust would be reduced 

dollar for dollar by the reasonable costs of litigation with the Vexatious Litigant 

Beneficiary incurred by the trustee.” The petition also requested orders determining that 

Sprott was a vexatious litigant beneficiary. Sprott filed in pro. per. and in forma pauperis 

a motion to dismiss the petition, and an objection to paying the guardian ad litem fees and 

costs. On April 27, 2011, Sprott also filed a pro. per. “INNOCENCENT [sic] OF 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT CHARGE: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL” as well as a 

request for change of venue and an objection to the modification, arguing: “Wells Fargo 

Bank is threatening to ‘euthanize’ Daniel Sprott if he continues to exercise his right of 

due process under the law.”

Wells Fargo filed an amended petition to modify the trust on May 13, 2011, 

requesting that the trust “deem a beneficiary whose litigation concerning this trust meets 

specific standards to be an ‘Injurious Beneficiary,’” and seeking an order determining 

that Sprott was an injurious beneficiary. Kalfayan, the guardian ad litem, filed a report 

stating that he supported the petition. Sprott filed an “INNOCENCENT [sic] OF 

‘INJURIOUS BENEFICIARY’ CHARGE: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL,” which 

 

1 Sprott and his minor sons Michael and David filed a pro. per. appeal from the 

order. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Sprott and his 

sons lacked standing to appeal, and ordered each party to bear its own costs; no attorney 

fees were awarded. We draw some of the operative facts from the statement of facts in 

our unpublished opinion dismissing Sprott’s earlier appeal, In re Estate of Sprott

(Oct. 26, 2012, B230531) [nonpub. opn.].
6

also requested appointment of a new trustee, and a change of venue, made a request for 

mediation, and further objections to the trust modification, and asked for a continuance to 

obtain legal counsel. Sprott argued the trustee was acting in bad faith and with malice. 

At a hearing on June 17, 2011, with Sprott representing himself, the trial court noted that 

it had yet to adjudicate whether Sprott “ha[s] been filing . . . repeatedly frivolous 

petitions,” but the trust was being dissipated by the cost of responding. The court 

suggested that Wells Fargo proceed under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.52rather 

than requesting a modification of the trust, and denied Wells Fargo’s amended petition.

On July 28, 2011, Wells Fargo filed the motion for sanctions. The motion argued 

that Sprott’s litigation had cost the trust over $100,000, Sprott’s sole purpose was to 

benefit himself and his family, and although he had been unsuccessful, he continued 

without regard to the cost to the other beneficiaries. His actions were in bad faith and 

were frivolous. The motion requested instructions to the effect that Sprott’s future 

distributions would be reduced by the amount of the sanctions until the amount was paid 

in full. The motion listed 17 matters that resulted from Sprott’s actions. Sprott filed an 

opposition with points and authorities, and a demand for jury trial. Sprott argued that he 

acted in good faith because he was acting to protect and provide for his family, and 

because he was known to have good character in his community. Sprott also argued that 

the trustee sought to use the distributions to pay its legal fees “and let Mr. Sprott die,” as 

he would no longer receive distributions that he needed for medical care.

At a hearing on September 30, 2011, Sprott argued that he was not acting in bad 

faith; instead he was “outmanned,” “like a David and Goliath,” as he had no money to 

hire an attorney. He continued to argue that Kalfayan’s appointment as guardian ad litem 

discriminated against his family in favor of wealthier beneficiaries. The court responded: 

“Mr. Sprott, this is the problem that exists right how. You have made the same argument 

over and over and over again. You’ve made, I think, 16 petitions.” It was unfortunate 

 

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise indicated.
7

that Sprott was unrepresented, but Sprott was held to the same level as an attorney. The 

court explained: “I think you’re confusing bad faith with having a bad character. And 

that’s because, in a legal sense, frivolous or tactics that are cause for delay, don’t 

necessarily mean the person who’s making—doing those actions has a bad character, but 

that the actions of the continual filing in the face of the arguments having already been 

determined—or the theme of the arguments having been determined is what we’re talking 

about here.”

The court issued its decision on the motion on October 28, 2011. The decision 

noted that if Sprott’s arguments had been successful, the outcome would benefit his 

immediate family to the detriment of other trust beneficiaries (because those with the last 

name “Sprott” numbered 13, of which Sprott’s family would be seven, in contrast to the 

44 beneficiaries currently entitled to distributions). Every judicial officer reviewing 

Sprott’s arguments since 2007 had told him that the trust instrument did not require that 

only those surnamed “Sprott” receive distributions, and had rejected the argument that 

wealthier beneficiaries should receive a smaller distribution amount. The court referred 

to the list of the petitions and motions included in the motion for sanctions as made by 

Sprott or required to be made in response to Sprott’s litigation, and stated that all but two 

had been decided adversely to Sprott.3 The court concluded: “Daniel Sprott’s actions 

were calculated not only to cause delay but were also (1) intended to alter the terms of the 

trust so as to benefit his own children, and (2) were frivolous in that the positions he took 

were not supported by legal authority or the plain language of the trust document. The 

rulings of the court made it clear to Daniel Sprott that his arguments were without merit, 

yet he continued to re-make them.” These tactics were “frivolous and injurious to the 

other trust beneficiaries” because the trustee, Wells Fargo, had expended $119,783.55 in 

attorney fees and costs and had also paid the guardian ad litem’s fees and costs of 

 

3 These two included the prior appeal which we later dismissed for lack of 

standing, and the amended petition to modify the trust and declare Sprott an injurious 

beneficiary, which the court had denied.
8

$14,181.70. The other beneficiaries should not have to share in those costs. The court 

awarded as sanctions attorney fees and costs of $91,125 incurred by Wells Fargo4 and 

$14,181.70 in fees and costs incurred by the guardian ad litem, to be deducted from 

Sprott’s discretionary distributions.

Sprott filed this timely appeal in pro. per.

DISCUSSION

Under its equitable powers and its authority to administer the trust, as well as 

under section 128.5,5the trial court has the authority to charge one beneficiary’s share of 

the trust for the attorney fees and costs incurred by the trust in defending against the 

frivolous claims of that beneficiary. (Estate of Ivey (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 873, 882–883; 

Rudnick v. Rudnick (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1334–1335; see Wells Fargo Bank v. 

Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 201, 213, fn. 4.) As in Estate of Ivey, supra, 22 

Cal.App.4th at page 880, the court in this case found that the beneficiary’s (Sprott’s) 

court filings were frivolous and in bad faith. Further, the trial court concluded that 

Sprott’s actions were “intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (§ 128.5, subd. (a).)

“On appeal, our function is limited to determining if there is any substantial 

evidence to support the trial court’s order. We may not reweigh the evidence or 

substitute our discretion for that of the trial judge. [Citations.]” (Estate of Ivey, supra, 22 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 881–882.) The trial court’s order is amply supported by the record.

As we describe in some detail above, Sprott wrote to the trust in 2007 arguing that 

the beneficiaries who did not have the surname “Sprott” should be removed from the list

of beneficiaries. In response, the trust filed a petition in the probate court, which Sprott 

 

4 The court reduced the attorney’s hourly rate to reach this total.

5 Section 128.5, subdivision (a), provides that the court may order a party “to pay 

any reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result 

of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary 

delay,” including in subdivision (b) making or opposing motions. Subdivision (c) 

provides that the court’s order “shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances 

justifying the order.”
9

opposed, represented by counsel. (Subsequently Sprott proceeded in pro. per.) The court 

granted the petition based on a trust provision specifically excluding from 

disqualification those with a different last name as a result of marriage. In 2010, Sprott 

objected to the trustee’s petition to modify the trust given a drastic decrease in its fair 

market value, by arguing that the trust should be limited to distributions from income 

only, the trustee would favor wealthier families than his, and the trust had failed to help 

him when he was hospitalized with a heart attack. After the court appointed Kalfayan as 

guardian ad litem for the minor and unborn beneficiaries, and after three fruitless 

meetings with a mediator, Kalfayan filed a supplemental report attempting to 

accommodate Sprott, who filed an objection that Kalfayan had a conflict of interest. The 

trial court excluded Sprott’s children from the class represented by Kalfayan. Sprott 

continued to object on the previously rejected ground that only those with the surname 

“Sprott” should receive distributions. The court entered an order allowing the 

modification that Sprott opposed. He appealed and we dismissed his appeal for lack of 

standing. Wells Fargo then filed petitions requesting modification of the trust to declare 

Sprott a vexatious litigant and an injurious beneficiary; Sprott opposed these petitions and 

demanded a jury trial, the appointment of a new trustee, and a change of venue, arguing 

that the trustee was acting in bad faith and with malice. At the court’s suggestion Wells 

Fargo filed another petition for sanctions under section 128.5, which Sprott opposed, 

arguing that Wells Fargo was acting in bad faith (including by attempting to deprive him 

of the money he needed for his medical care). He continued throughout to assert that his 

family was being discriminated against in favor of wealthier beneficiaries.

The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Sprott’s objections were 

frivolous, as they were “totally and completely without merit.” (§ 128.5, 

subd. (b)(2)(A).) Sprott’s continual reassertion of his rejected objections also supports a 

finding that they were frivolous because they were “for the sole purpose of harassing an 

opposing party.” (Id. at subd. (b)(2)(B).) Further, we will not second-guess the trial 

court’s determination that Sprott’s actions were in bad faith, as that determination is 
10

supported by Sprott’s repeated assertion of objections that had as their goal only the 

enrichment of Sprott and his children, at the expense of most of the trust beneficiaries and 

to the detriment of the trust, which was required to spend more than $100,000 in legal 

fees (and whose value at the time of the sanctions order was approximately $300,000). 

Finally, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Sprott’s actions were 

for purposes of delaying the implementation of the trust’s requested modification in the 

manner of making distributions for educational expenses, which Sprott repeatedly 

claimed (to no avail) would benefit wealthier beneficiaries.

Sprott argues that the trial court’s order was not sufficiently detailed. While the 

order did not list each of the filings that resulted from Sprott’s frivolous arguments, it 

referred to the pages in the moving papers listing the petitions or motions made by Sprott 

or made in response to Sprott’s arguments. The court identified the arguments that Sprott 

made and which the court had repeatedly rejected. The order was not deficient in detail.

As we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the

probate court, and we perceive no abuse of discretion, we affirm the order awarding 

sanctions.6

 

6

In his reply brief Sprott requests sanctions against Wells Fargo and its counsel in 

the event that we reverse the trial court’s order. No sanctions are in order, as we affirm 

the court’s order, and as Sprott’s request for sanctions does not meet the requirements of 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b)(1).
11

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.

CHANEY, J.