DHS CHALLENGES IN

CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST

WATCH LIST INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Offi ce of Inspector General

Office of Information Technology

OIG-04-31 August 2004

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, has redacted this report for public release 

based on input from relevant government entities. Those redactions are identifi ed as (b)(2), comparable to 5 U.S.C. section 

552(b)(2). A review under the Freedom of Information Act will be conducted upon request.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It 

is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, 

and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

Contents

 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 3

Results in Brief .............................................................................................................................. 3

Background .................................................................................................................................... 4

 Findings ......................................................................................................................................... 6

DHS Is Not Overseeing Interagency Consolidation Activities ............................................. 6

Interagency Watch List Consolidation Could Be Improved ............................................... 12

Additional Issues Relating to Interagency Sharing 

of Terrorist Information Need to be Addressed .................................................................. 25

 Recommendations..................................................................................................................... 30

Management Comments and OIG Evaluation ............................................................................. 31

Appendices 

Appendix A: Scope and Methodology ..................................................................................... 39

Appendix B: Management Comments..................................................................................... 41

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ..................................................................... 46

Appendix D: Report Distribution............................................................................................. 47

Abbreviations

 CAPPS II Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FTTTF Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 

GAO Government Accountability Office, (formerly General Accounting Offi ce) 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 1
Contents

IT information technology 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

 TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

Page 2 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Offi ce of Inspector General 

Introduction

Terrorist and criminal “watch lists” are important tools for controlling and 

protecting U.S. borders. Traditionally, federal agencies have used various 

means, developed in response to their individual missions, to manage watch 

list information. The attacks of September 11, 2001, underscored the need 

for standardization and consolidation of the terrorist watch lists to help ensure 

homeland security. According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1

 DHS is to 

play a major role in watch list consolidation activities. 

As part of its ongoing responsibilities to evaluate the effectiveness of DHS 

programs and activities, the OIG conducted a review of terrorist watch list 

consolidation efforts. The objectives of the review were to: (1) determine DHS’ 

role in working with other federal agencies to consolidate terrorist watch list 

systems and operations in response to recent legislation and executive branch 

direction; (2) evaluate the effectiveness of plans and activities to standardize 

and consolidate the watch lists to address the new requirements; and (3) identify 

any obstacles or challenges encountered and determine whether changes to 

the interagency systems integration approach are needed. The scope and 

methodology of this review are discussed in Appendix A. 

Results in Brief

DHS is not playing a lead role in consolidating terrorist watch list information. 

Instead, these consolidation activities are generally administered by the entities 

that were responsible for collecting and disseminating terrorist information 

prior to DHS’ formation. DHS officials said that the new department lacked the 

resources and infrastructure to assume leadership for the consolidation. While 

this contention has merit, DHS can still play a more robust role than at present 

by overseeing and coordinating watch list consolidation activities across agency 

lines. Such oversight would help DHS fulfill the role required by the Homeland 

Security Act and better ensure that the past ad hoc approach to managing watch 

list consolidation is not continued. 

1

 Public Law 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), codified at 6 USC 101 et seq. 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 3 
Stronger DHS leadership and oversight would also help improve current watch 

list consolidation efforts. Although some progress toward streamlined processes 

and enhanced interagency information sharing has been made, the consolidation 

is hampered by a number of issues that have not been coordinated effectively 

among interagency participants. Specifically, in the absence of central leadership 

and oversight for the watch list consolidation, planning, budgeting, staffi ng, and 

requirements definition continue to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, posing a risk 

to successful accomplishment of the goal. A number of additional challenges, 

such as i , privacy, 

 , could be pursued in 

the context of a centrally coordinated approach to watch list management. 

Background

Effective use of information technology (IT) is fundamental for the federal 

government to accomplish its counterterrorism mission. For example, compiling 

automated data on potential or known terrorists to check against the names 

of foreigners entering or already present in the U.S. is one critical means of 

protecting the homeland. In April 2003, the General Accounting Offi ce, recently 

renamed as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), reported that nine 

federal agencies used 12 separate systems and databases, each developed in 

response to the agencies’ individual legal, cultural, and systems environments, to 

support federal law enforcement and border security processes.2 

Generally called “watch lists,” these systems actually serve a variety of purposes 

and contain different types of information. For example, the Department of 

State’s Consular Lookout and Support System was designed to support visa and 

passport issuance. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Interagency 

Border Inspection System facilitates border crossing inspections and includes 

information on potential terrorists, as well as people suspected of narcotics 

trafficking or other law enforcement violations. The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s (FBI) Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File helps manage 

information on organized criminal activities, including domestic terrorism. 

Further, the Transportation Security Administration’s “no-fly” and selectee lists 

are used to determine whether a person may board an airplane. 

The Department of State’s TIPOFF database was the only one that can be 

considered purely a terrorist watch list. TIPOFF contained intelligence data that 

2 Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, U.S. General 

Accounting Office (GAO-03-322, April 2003). 

Page 4 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
3

 6 USC 121 (d)(10). 

4

 6 USC 121 (d)(8). 

5

 6 USC 482. 

was shared with other agencies responsible for ensuring that potential terrorists do 

not enter the U.S. For example, an unclassified subset of TIPOFF data was shared 

with the Consular Lookout and Support System, Interagency Border Inspection 

System, National Automated Immigration Lookout System, and the Canadian and 

Australian governments. 

Although TIPOFF data was being shared, the extent of sharing was inconsistent 

among other watch list systems. 

 Where information was shared, it was 

not supported by common architectures because individual agencies developed 

and implemented interfaces with other federal agency watch list systems on an ad 

hoc basis. This situation was complicated by a lack of policies and procedures 

to govern the sharing, and there was no way of ensuring that consistent data was 

on each agency’s watch list. The consequence, GAO reported, was the kind of 

overly complex, unnecessarily inefficient, and potentially ineffective network that 

is associated with unstructured and non-standard database environments. In the 

current environment of increased terrorist activity and security awareness, “stove 

piped” management of critical watch list information is no longer tolerable. 

Recognizing the need for a more concerted approach to ensuring national 

security, Congress passed legislation that calls for increased information sharing 

among government agencies. Specifically, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

established DHS and gave it significant responsibility to coordinate the sharing 

of information to protect the U.S. from terrorist threats. The law requires the 

DHS Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

(IAIP) to consult with the Director of Central Intelligence and other appropriate 

intelligence, law enforcement, or other elements of the federal government to 

establish collection priorities and strategies for information relating to threats 

of terrorism against the U.S.3 The law also directs the IAIP Under Secretary 

to review, analyze, and make recommendations to improve the policies and 

procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement, intelligence, intelligencerelated, and other information relating to homeland security.4 According to the 

law, “homeland security information” is defined as any information possessed by 

a federal, state, or local agency that: (1) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; 

(2) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (3) would 

improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist 

organization; or (4) would improve the response to a terrorist act. Terrorist watch 

lists and related consolidation activities are clearly covered by this defi nition.5 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 5 
Such legislation is kindred to earlier legislation that called for increased 

interagency sharing. The USA Patriot Act,6 enacted in October 2001, directed that 

foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information obtained during criminal 

investigations be disclosed to federal law enforcement, intelligence, immigration, 

national defense, or national security officials to assist them in performing their 

official duties. Further, in May 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 

Entry Reform Act7

 required federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies 

to share information with the Department of State and the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service regarding the admissibility and deportation of aliens. 

Findings 

DHS Is Not Overseeing Interagency Consolidation Activities 

DHS is not playing a lead role in coordinating the sharing of terrorist watch list 

information. Instead, terrorist watch list consolidation activities are conducted 

by the federal organizations that were primarily responsible for collecting and 

disseminating terrorist information prior to DHS’ formation. DHS offi cials said 

that the newly created department lacked the resources and infrastructure to 

assume leadership for the watch list consolidation effort. While this contention 

has merit, DHS can still play a more robust role than at present by overseeing 

and coordinating watch list consolidation activities across agency lines. Such 

oversight would help DHS fulfill its coordination responsibility as required by the 

Homeland Security Act, better ensuring that the ad hoc watch list management 

pattern of the past is not continued. 

DHS HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY 

With passage of the Homeland Security Act, Congress expected that DHS would 

help put an end to the ineffective counterterrorist information sharing activities 

of the past. Forged from 22 separate agencies with a range of homeland security 

related missions, the new department was designed to facilitate interagency 

coordination and cooperation, as well as to conduct terrorist threat risk analysis 

and assessment. Not just Congress, but officials both internal and external to 

6

 Public Law 107-56, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 

(USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, October 26, 2001. 7

 Public Law 107-173, May 14, 2002.

Page 6 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
DHS, anticipated that in this context DHS would play a lead role in terrorist 

watch list consolidation. With its range of customs, immigration, transportation 

security, infrastructure protection, and threat analysis responsibilities, it appeared 

logical for DHS to assume this lead responsibility. Such a role would include 

coordinating interagency planning, policy formation, and oversight of watch list 

consolidation activities. Such a role also would include taking an overarching 

view of watch list consolidation activities across government and no longer 

managing on an organization-by-organization basis. Given its responsibilities 

under the Homeland Security Act to improve the policies and procedures 

governing the sharing of information relating to homeland security threats, IAIP is 

the organization within the department that should play this role. 

Despite these expectations, IAIP has not provided the leadership of the watch 

list consolidation effort that is needed. Specifically, DHS is not carrying out 

significant responsibilities assigned to it under the Homeland Security Act, i.e., 

orchestrating the integration of terrorist information and establishing national 

policies and guidelines governing the use of such information. Instead, other 

federal entities that have traditionally collected, analyzed, and disseminated watch 

list information continue to conduct these efforts under the auspices of two newly 

created interagency organizations: The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) 

and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). 

The President called for the creation of the TTIC in his State of the Union 

address in January 2003, by directing that the leaders of the FBI, DHS, Central 

Intelligence Agency, and Department of Defense develop a single location for 

merging, analyzing, and disseminating terrorist threat related information to 

appropriate recipients. The President directed that this new organization be 

placed under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence. Accordingly, 

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/4 provided guidance for establishing 

the new center. While a director for the new center was appointed from the 

Central Intelligence Agency, a deputy director was assigned from the FBI. To 

support TTIC operations, staff have been drawn from a number of intelligence, 

defense, law enforcement, and national security agencies, including DHS. TTIC 

was established on May 1, 2003, just over three months after the President 

announced its creation. 

Further, on September 16, 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

– 6 (HSPD) directed the establishment of a second organization, the TSC, to 

consolidate the government’s initiatives for the appropriate and lawful use of 

information in terrorist screening processes. On that same date, the Secretary of 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 7 
Homeland Security, along with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and 

the Director of Central Intelligence, signed a memorandum of understanding that 

outlined general guidelines for TSC operations. In signing that memorandum, the 

DHS Secretary agreed that the FBI would have responsibility for administering 

the center. TSC began operations on December 1, 2003, just over two months 

after its creation. 

The FBI had extensive involvement in establishing the TSC. Its Foreign Terrorist 

Tracking Task Force (FTTTF), an organization established to prevent terrorists 

from entering the country and track those already in the country, was located with 

the TSC. The FTTTF provided IT contractors and equipment to help initiate TSC 

operations. The FBI also developed TSC’s initial concept of operations and took 

much of the responsibility for its day-to-day management. More recently, FBI 

support has included developing a “business case”8

 to request funding from the 

Office of Management and Budget for the center for FY 2005. Currently, the TSC 

director reports to FBI leadership. 

DHS REASONS FOR NOT ASSUMING LEADERSHIP 

DHS officials offered various reasons as to why the department did not assume 

responsibility under the Homeland Security Act for leading and coordinating the 

watch list consolidation effort. Primarily, DHS officials said that DHS initially 

lacked the internal resources and infrastructure to carry out the effort. DHS faced 

the enormous task of getting its own internal operations up and running. When 

DHS was established, it assumed control of approximately 180,000 employees 

from 22 federal agencies and offices. As the OIG reported in March 2004,9

 DHS 

faced major challenges in consolidating and integrating the myriad fi nancial 

systems and operations inherited from its legacy agencies. Also, DHS was 

working to design a human capital management system, develop a departmentwide IT infrastructure, consolidate its redundant procurement functions, and 

institute an information assurance program. 

In addition, DHS’ IAIP directorate, which has responsibility for coordination 

and oversight of terrorist information sharing, was not prepared to take on 

this interagency effort. The IAIP directorate lacked the resources to assume 

responsibility for coordinating the interagency effort and had a number of other 

8 A business case is an outline of the objectives, desirable outputs, and benefits of a proposed project.

9 Review of the Status of Department of Homeland Security Efforts to Address Its Major Management Challenges, (OIG-04-21, March 

2004).

10 Survey of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, (OIG-04-13, February 2004).

Page 8 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
internal issues that it first needed to resolve.

10 Many of the issues reportedly

are being addressed at the highest levels within IAIP. Specifically, IAIP is 

having difficulty hiring staff with the appropriate clearances to support its

risk and threat analysis mission. Because IAIP is a new organization, it needs

to hire experienced intelligence analysts to undertake its mission. However,

IAIP is competing with other federal organizations whose needs for intelligence

analysts have increased since September 11, 2001. An IAIP official estimated

that there are about five or six positions available within the intelligence

community for every potential applicant with the proper clearance. This 

official also said that it is unrealistic to hire people without clearances and 

expect them to get the clearances soon after they come on board because the 

clearance process for new hires requires about 14 months. The resulting shortage 

of staff within IAIP has created long workdays for employees, which negatively 

affects morale and results in reactionary rather than proactive operations, 

according to a senior IAIP representative. Sending staff to support TTIC and TSC 

operations only exacerbates the diffi cult staffing situation. 

Another problem that IAIP faced was inadequate capabilities for managing 

national security information. When it was first created, the directorate did not 

have an accredited “high-side” classified network and adequate, secure offi ce 

space, and equipment. The directorate also lacked established procedures and 

guidelines for handling classified data. Because of this, other federal agencies 

were unable to send it classified materials. More recently, in May 2004, an IAIP 

official told the OIG that it has since put in place policies and procedures for 

handling classified information, as well as a secure infrastructure for receiving 

such information. 

Further, IAIP officials said that HSPD – 6 and the related memorandum 

of understanding established the TSC under the FBI and limited DHS to a 

supporting role in the watch list consolidation. These officials further said that the 

directive gave the FBI not only operational control, but also strategic and policy 

coordination responsibility for the TSC and watch list consolidation activities. 

IAIP officials could not provide documented legal assessments to support these 

assertions, however. 

According to the provisions of HSPD – 6, it should be carried out consistent with 

applicable laws, thereby supplementing, rather than supplanting, existing DHS 

authorities and responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act. Indeed, by 

giving the Attorney General responsibility for establishing TSC operations, the 

directive provides supplemental direction for carrying out provisions of the act. 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 9 
The directive does not assign to the FBI responsibility for oversight, policy, or 

coordination across the various federal, state, and local government participants. 

As such, the directive does not preclude DHS from carrying out such oversight 

responsibilities pursuant to the Homeland Security Act. 

In contrast to the situation at DHS, the intelligence community, and the FBI 

were viewed as well positioned to get the job done quickly. The TTIC, under the 

auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence, was able to incorporate resources 

from the Department of State unit that had collected the majority of the terrorist 

watch list information in the past. Specifically, in November 2003, in accordance 

with provisions of the interagency memorandum of understanding that clarifi ed 

HSPD – 6, the Department of State’s TIPOFF database was transferred to the 

newly established TTIC. For 17 years, the TIPOFF database had been the only 

U.S. government database containing purely terrorist information. Along with the 

database, some of the Department of State’s employees from the TIPOFF program 

were also transferred to TTIC to conduct research and analysis, providing the 

center with the benefit of experienced staff. A Department of State representative 

said that these employees formed the core of the TTIC. 

Further, the FBI was experienced in establishing command centers and well 

prepared to mobilize the necessary personnel from across the country quickly 

to establish the TSC. The FBI’s FTTTF had previously been tasked with 

responsibilities similar to the TSC under HSPD – 2. A January 2003 Director 

of Central Intelligence annual report11 supports this assertion. Specifi cally, this 

report noted that the FTTTF would maintain a unifi ed, unclassifi ed, consolidated 

tracking list and co-locate critical law enforcement, intelligence, and open source 

data for analysis and decision making support. An FTTTF official said that, as 

a result of this effort, FTTTF created in 2002 a consolidated tracking list, which 

consists of TIPOFF, the FBI’s Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File, and 

the FBI’s 22 Most Wanted List to support its analysis to identify associates of 

known terrorists and their supporters. 

A senior IAIP official said that having more experienced federal agencies move 

ahead with watch list consolidation was the most expeditious way to proceed. 

However, several DHS officials said that the expectation is to place the TSC 

under DHS control eventually. Specifically, the September 2003 interagency 

memorandum of understanding includes a clause that requires a review of the 

organization, structure, and progress of the TSC and allows for modifi cations 

based on any recommendations that result from the review. Officials both internal 

11 The 2002 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community, January 2003. 

Page 10 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
and external to DHS have suggested that such modifications might include a 

transfer of responsibility for the watch list consolidation to DHS, specifi cally the 

IAIP directorate, as the Homeland Security Act requires. DHS could prepare for 

the transition by developing an operational plan outlining what needs to be done 

to take on the responsibility. But DHS’ assumption of the watch list consolidation 

effort as it currently exists would not be enough. Rather, DHS would need to 

provide the central oversight and strategic vision to ensure that interagency 

consolidation efforts are effective, coordinated, and progressing in the right 

direction. 

AD HOC APPROACH TO WATCH LIST 

CONSOLIDATION CONTINUES 

The manner through which the watch list consolidation has unfolded has not 

helped the nation break from its pattern of ad hoc approaches to counterterrorism. 

Specifically, in the years since the September 11 terrorist attacks, just as in the 

past, the government has continued to implement solutions in an uncoordinated 

manner. While the requirement to consolidate the multiple watch lists was clear, 

the approach to accomplishing it has not been so. Responsibility for consolidating 

multiple databases of watch list information has shifted among various federal 

organizations; the results of repeated efforts have been limited. 

Beginning in 2001, the White House Office of Homeland Security became very 

involved in this issue, developing both short and long-term plans for watch list 

consolidation. According to a senior DHS official, the plans should have been 

implemented by the beginning of 2003. However, this was not accomplished, for 

reasons undisclosed to the OIG. In July 2002, the White House offi ce nonetheless 

released a “National Strategy for Homeland Security,” which discussed federal 

agency roles and comprehensive steps for mobilizing and organizing to protect 

against terrorist attacks, including watch list consolidation. According to the 

National Strategy, the FBI was establishing a consolidated watch list to serve as 

a central access point for information about people of investigative interest that 

would be fully accessible to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. 

Along these lines, the White House created an organization within the Department 

of Justice with specific responsibility for improving the sharing of terrorist 

information. On October 29, 2001, just over a month after the attacks of 

September 11th, the White House issued HSPD – 2, which directed the Attorney 

General to establish the FTTTF in coordination with the Department of State, 

the intelligence community, and other federal organizations. These entities 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 11 
were to work together to deny entry to suspected terrorists, as well as to locate, 

detain, prosecute, or deport any aliens already present in the U.S. who were 

suspected of supporting terrorism. Another FTTTF mission was to develop and 

implement multi-year plans to enhance the investigative and intelligence analysis 

capabilities of the CBP and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although 

the presidential directive specifically did not require that these entities create a 

consolidated database, it did direct them to recommend ways in which existing 

federal databases could best be utilized to locate and apprehend potential terrorists 

in the country. Further, in a January 2003 report to the Congress, the Director of 

Central Intelligence said that the FTTTF would maintain a consolidated tracking 

list and bring together law enforcement, intelligence, and open source data for 

analysis and decision-making support. 

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200312 also required the 

creation of a “watch list” of suspected terrorists. It specifically required the 

Director of Central Intelligence to establish and maintain a list of suspected 

international terrorists and international terrorist organizations. The law further 

called for the Director to prescribe requirements for the inclusion of an individual 

or organization on the list, as well as provide for the sharing of that information 

with federal, state, and local governments. 

At about the same time that the Intelligence Authorization Act was approved, 

the Homeland Security Act was passed. The Homeland Security Act required 

the Under Secretary of IAIP to review, analyze, and make recommendations 

for improvements in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of 

law enforcement information, intelligence information, intelligence related 

information, and other information related to homeland security within the federal 

government, and between the federal government and state and local government 

agencies and authorities. However, before IAIP began operations within the new 

department, the President announced the creation of the TTIC. Establishment of 

TSC followed in late 2003. 

Interagency Watch List Consolidation Could Be Improved 

While some progress has been made with the current watch list consolidation 

approach, there remain a number of issues and challenges to effective interagency 

sharing that have not yet been addressed. In the absence of central oversight and 

a strategic approach to watch list consolidation, problems with uncoordinated 

12 Public Law 107-306, released on November 27, 2002. 

Page 12 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
interagency planning, budgeting, staffing, requirements definition, and policy 

management persist. 

PROGRESS IN WATCH LIST CONSOLIDATION 

With the current approach, the federal government has made some progress 

toward streamlined processes and enhanced terrorist information sharing. 

Whereas earlier, multiple agencies were independently collecting and reviewing 

watch list information to meet their respective missions, the federal government 

has, with the establishment of the TTIC and the TSC, brought agencies together 

to consolidate two of the main watch list processes: compiling intelligence 

information on suspected international terrorists; and filtering and disseminating 

that information to help apprehend or track suspected terrorists within this 

country or keep them from entering U.S. territory in the first place. Each of these 

processes and the responsible entities is discussed below. 

TTIC Has Helped Consolidate Terrorist Intelligence Information 

Establishment of TTIC brought together analysts from the Departments of State, 

Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as others in the intelligence 

community to compile and analyze intelligence data on potential terrorists. Under 

the auspices of TTIC, these analysts are managing and upgrading a consolidated 

all-source database on known and suspected foreign terrorists. The Department 

of State’s TIPOFF counterterrorist program served as a basis for the upgraded 

database. TTIC analysts enhanced TIPOFF to increase the functions of the 

database, and they are currently working on the next generation database to 

provide even greater functionality. 

Other improvements resulting from TTIC’s creation are improved coordination 

and more consistent information sharing. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 13 
Further, TTIC has provided greater access to its classified website, which has 

more than 2,600 registered intelligence community users, including DHS and 

Justice. When TTIC moves to its new location, the center will be located 

with counterterrorism divisions of the Central Intelligence Agency and the 

FBI, possibly resulting in even greater cooperation among federal intelligence 

agencies. 

TSC Has Consolidated Management and Dissemination of Terrorist Data 

TSC uses information from a range of sources to populate its watch list database. 

Most of the information that TSC receives is a sensitive but unclassifi ed version 

of the intelligence information that TTIC maintains in its classified database. 

TSC also receives information about domestic terrorists from the FBI. Prior 

to September 11, 2001, this domestic information was not widely disseminated 

among federal agencies due to legal restrictions. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The TSC has brought together representatives from the FBI, Department of 

State, and a number of DHS component organizations, including the CBP, 

Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and Coast Guard to consolidate the information dissemination 

functions of the watch list process. These functions involve proposing names 

for inclusion in each agency’s database, operating a call center, and providing 

customer service. Some of the functions previously were done by federal 

agencies prior to watch list consolidation, while others are entirely new. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 14 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
 

 

 

 

 

 

One of the most important contributions of the TSC is the new link it establishes 

between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Traditionally, law 

enforcement agencies have not coordinated with intelligence officials to obtain 

information about suspected terrorists due to legal restrictions. Also, such 

detailed intelligence information, compiled to support the inclusion of individuals 

on watch lists, is highly classified and therefore not widely disseminated. 

However, the Patriot Act has provided for greater sharing of intelligence 

information among federal, state, and local law enforcement offi cials. These 

officials require this supporting information to supplement basic information 

contained in the unclassified TSC database. The additional information provides 

a better basis for identifying suspected terrorists among the people they encounter 

in the performance of their respective duties. 

TSC created a call center of screeners, available 24 hours a day and 7 days 

a week, to assist in verifying the identities of the persons encountered. TSC 

officials said that these call center operations are expected to improve support for 

personnel in the field, as well as help save time and money. TSC receives about 

 percent of its calls from CBP personnel, while approximately percent come 

from state and local law enforcement officers. TSC personnel help these callers 

determine whether the person they have in front of them is the person listed in the 

database. If there is a negative match, no further action is taken. When there is 

a positive or inconclusive match, call center personnel ensure that callers get the 

help they need to determine how to handle suspected individuals. For example, 

a local law enforcement officer may be advised to arrest, detain, or question a 

suspect. Concurrently, TSC’s call center contacts the FBI’s Counter Terrorism 

Division, known as “CT Watch,” which ensures that local Joint Terrorism Task 

Force personnel provide assistance to law enforcement offi cials. 

Further, TSC established a customer service department to provide outreach 

and disseminate information regarding federal counterterrorism activities. The 

customer service functions include responding to calls and e-mails for information 

from federal, state, and local organizations, as well as monitoring media and press 

releases. The customer service department also receives calls about individuals 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 15 
whose names have mistakenly been included on terrorist watch lists. TSC 

representatives said that they planned to establish a program to address the calls 

about such misidentifi cation. 

CHALLENGES FACING THE CURRENT CONSOLIDATION 

APPROACH 

Despite the progress made, the watch list consolidation effort is hampered by a 

number of issues that have not been effectively coordinated among all interagency 

participants. Given the lack of central leadership and oversight of current watch 

list consolidation efforts, matters such as planning, budgeting, staffi ng, and 

requirements definition continue to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, posing a risk 

to successful accomplishment of the goal. 

Lack of a Strategic Plan 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,13 requires agencies to 

prepare strategic plans that describe mission objectives and methods to attain 

them. These agency plans must establish measurable goals for program activities 

and describe the methods by which performance against those goals will be 

measured. 

A strategic and performance management approach could prove benefi cial for 

managing the sharing of terrorist threat information, including watch list data. 

Although the watch list consolidation is a highly visible, complex, and critical 

undertaking, no strategic plan has been put in place to outline an interagency 

approach to determining program scope, objectives, costs, alternatives, and 

resource requirements. No interagency structure has been established to govern 

the program, thereby ensuring active involvement of all relevant parties and their 

commitment to sharing information and providing the staff and funding needed to 

accomplish mission objectives. Also, no provision has been made for monitoring 

program activities and measuring performance to ensure that the consolidated 

watch list is delivered on time and within budget to meet user needs. 

TSC officials told us that they are relying on the September 2003 homeland 

security directive, the corresponding memorandum of understanding, and other 

operational documents to guide them. However, the directive and memorandum 

do not provide sufficient detail on how the relevant parties will work together 

to oversee the program and address the crosscutting challenges faced. At the 

13 Public Law 103-62. 

Page 16 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
point that these documents were developed, planning for the consolidation 

effort was limited to involvement by agency heads and other senior level agency 

representatives. The resulting documents are directive and general in nature, not 

prescriptive and specific. 

Further, working level officials developed a concept of operations for watch list 

consolidation based on this general guidance. The concept of operations was 

a good start, outlining the mission and vision for the program, and addressing 

the roles, responsibilities, and need for coordination among watch list partners 

and customers. However, it does not discuss an interagency forum or approach 

to overseeing program performance. At this operational level, managers were 

working to establish the TSC to meet the initial December 2003 deadline. In 

the press for time, they did not address the need for a strategy or an interagency 

program management structure to govern their activities. Rather, they have 

focused on a phased approach to establishing the screening center and managing 

day-to-day operations. Along the way, they have had to contend with a number of 

interagency challenges–budgeting, staffing, requirements, and policy issues–that 

could be better addressed by a cross-federal decision-making forum. 

Budget 

The need for central oversight and strategic vision is reflected in the ad hoc 

manner in which program funding has been managed. The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security calls for federal agencies to allocate resources effi ciently in 

carrying out activities to safeguard the nation against terrorism. However, in the 

case of watch list consolidation, it is not clear that this has been done, because the 

funding was provided from a number of different agencies and at different times 

with no central coordination. For example, TTIC received money from a number 

of federal sources, including DHS. DHS components also provided funding to 

the unclassified screening center operations. However, overall funding from other 

agencies for the first year of these screening center operations was not managed in 

a coherent manner. 

One of the first efforts to establish a terrorist screening and information 

dissemination organization began in FY 2002 with the FTTTF, administered 

by the FBI. FTTTF initially received interagency funds from the Defense 

Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as its parent 

organization. In contrast, FTTTF funding for FY 2003 came from the FBI 

through a direct appropriation of $62 million, making the FBI solely responsible 

for the task force’s operations. Similarly, pursuant to HSPD – 6, the TSC received 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 17 
multi-agency funding in FY 2004 from the FBI, the Department of State, TTIC, 

and DHS. The FBI contributed about $15 million to TSC in FY 2004. The 

Department of State contributed over $1.5 million to the watch list consolidation 

effort from funds allocated for the TIPOFF program. 

Additionally, the chief information officer organization within DHS received 

$10 million for the watch list consolidation and provided $3 million of that 

amount to the TSC. Approximately $3 million of the remaining $7 million was 

allocated within DHS to align systems for integration with TSC’s systems. As of 

February 2004, DHS had not yet allocated the remaining $4 million, but the chief 

information officer said that some of those funds still could be sent to TSC, if 

needed. DHS’ IAIP directorate also provided money to the TSC and TTIC, in an 

undisclosed, classified amount. 

Whereas in FY 2004, TSC received interagency funding, TSC funding in FY 2005 

may come solely from the FBI, following the same funding pattern as FTTTF. 

Specifically, the Office of Management and Budget noted in its December 

2003 response to DHS’ budget submission that no funds for FY 2005 would 

be provided directly to the department for the TSC and TTIC. Rather, the TSC 

had requested its own appropriation of $29 million through the FBI for that 

year. Accordingly, the TSC is developing a business case to support FY 2005 

funding for its watch list consolidation activities managed by the FBI. By totally 

controlling the funding, the FBI will also control much of the consolidation effort, 

potentially making it more difficult to obtain commitment or address the needs of 

other federal agencies involved in terrorist watch list management, particularly 

DHS, which was created specifically to help coordinate these efforts. 

Although the Office of Management and Budget provided some coordination of 

the multi-agency funding for the watch list consolidation program, offi cials from 

this office said that their primary role is to facilitate. For example, these offi cials 

assisted the various agencies in determining an equitable amount to contribute to 

the TSC, based on a cost-benefit analysis. The Office of Management and Budget 

did not get involved in managing the day-to-day operations or decision-making of 

the TSC. In the absence of such central oversight, there has been no mechanism 

fully to coordinate funding across agencies, develop cost estimates, or ensure 

that the money spent is achieving measurable results. Office of Management and 

Budget Circular A-1114 suggests that development of a multi-agency business case 

14 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, Part 7, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of Capital Assets, July 25, 

2003. 

Page 18 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
would be an effective way to help address these issues. Such businesses cases are 

used typically when a number of agencies share a common vision and mission. 

Staffi ng Issues 

Staffing the interagency consolidation effort is a significant problem. TTIC and 

TSC require personnel with a range of skills to support their various program 

management, data analysis, IT specialist, law enforcement, and customer service 

functions. Given the responsibility for handling sensitive information and 

classified databases, such personnel generally need high-level clearances to be 

assigned. However, in the absence of a strategy and central leadership, there has 

been no effective means of coordinating among federal agencies to ensure that 

TTIC and TSC obtain the personnel resources they need. As such, while the TTIC 

plans to have about 300 analysts when fully staffed, in December of 2003 they 

had less than half of that number. Similarly, while TSC indicated a need for over 

160 employees by June 2004 to become fully operational, as of March 2004, it 

had only 84 staff on board. 

The problems with staffing result from the fact that, since the TTIC and the TSC 

have no direct staff allocations, they have relied on the individual participating 

federal organizations to support their efforts. For national security reasons, 

the breakdown of staff provided to the TTIC remains undisclosed. However, 

component organizations within the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland 

Security have all provided personnel to these organizations, but in an inconsistent 

manner. Few full-time staff have been provided; the majority of the staff have 

been provided on a temporary basis, either as detailees or assignees. A number of 

contractors also have been brought in to supplement the staff. 

For example, pursuant to the September 2003 memorandum of understanding 

on how the interagency TSC would operate, the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research transferred to TTIC and TSC most of the full-time and 

contractor staff who had previously been responsible for the TIPOFF program. 

The FBI brought personnel from across the country experienced in establishing 

command centers to support the TSC on a temporary duty basis. Further, Justice’s 

FTTTF lent contractors to TSC to provide technical support. 

Despite requirements to play a major role in watch list consolidation, as of April 

2004 the DHS components collectively had provided only a mix of 19 full-time 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 19 
and contractor staff to TSC. The breakdown of staff from the various DHS 

components is as follows: 

• IAIP – 1 

• Customs and Border Protection – 2 

• Transportation Security Administration – 6 

• Immigration and Customs Enforcement – 2 

• U.S. Secret Service – 5 

• U.S. Coast Guard – 3 

A senior TSC official said that in the long run having temporary personnel could 

be a problem because of the institutional knowledge lost when staff depart after 

their assignments are completed and the need to retrain incoming personnel. 

This official would prefer having permanent employees, but has had problems 

attracting cleared workers with the needed skill sets. As a result of not having 

enough employees, some consolidation activities are inadequately staffed or not 

getting done at all. For example, TSC has not completed many of the required 

memoranda of understanding to govern interagency operations because it does 

not have adequate legal staff. In addition, TSC has a shortage of IT personnel to 

develop and maintain the database. 

Due to the difficulty TSC has experienced in obtaining qualified permanent staff, 

some temporary positions are being extended. Not all employees are happy 

about this situation. Several DHS assignees said that they were not interested 

in working at TSC for an extended period of time for various reasons. For 

example, some believed that their work at the center was mundane and not career 

enhancing. 

User and Technical Requirements for Consolidated Watch List 

System Not Defi ned 

Although the agencies participating in watch list consolidation have the common 

goal of supporting the identification and arrest of terrorists, each agency has 

different requirements and restrictions concerning these activities due to the 

various statutes governing their work. For example, the laws concerning federal 

agency dealings with foreigners are less stringent than those that address dealings 

with U.S. citizens. In addition, law enforcers may have an immediate need for 

information to identify individuals, while consular officers can generally take 

more time to obtain, review, or follow-up on the identifying information they 

receive. 

Page 20 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
 

 

 

Inadequate User Participation in Requirements Defi nition 

There are a number of federal guidelines regarding gathering requirements for 

system development projects. According to Office of Management and Budget 

Circular A-130,15 agencies should ensure the participation and commitment 

of users when designing new IT systems. This helps ensure that the systems 

developed deliver intended benefits and meet mission needs. Addressing user 

concerns is also critical to obtain the commitment of participating agencies. If 

agency users do not think that their opinions are being heard, or if they do not 

understand overall program directions, they are less likely to participate in a 

meaningful way, reducing the chances of program success. 

As of February 2004, TSC had not developed formal requirements for its 

consolidated watch list database. Interagency working groups managed by the 

FBI have been documenting watch list processes of the various agencies as a basis 

for developing a concept of operations for the projected system. This is a critical 

first step to determine how technology will be applied to help improve watch list 

processes. To a limited extent, this has involved identifying corresponding user 

requirements, such as standard operating procedures and criteria for proposing 

names for inclusion in the watch list database. 

However, not all essential agencies were asked to participate in these initial 

interagency working groups. For example, because the two organizations work 

in close coordination with each other, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

represented the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services bureau at the working 

group meetings. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials should have 

had their own representatives present at the meetings since their bureau collects 

a large amount of information on foreigners through its immigration services 

processes. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services could play a key role in 

terrorist watch lists, but generally it is not consulted or included in such matters. 

Additionally, the Department of State’s Consular Affairs bureau was not 

represented at the working group meetings, although the officials it has stationed 

worldwide to review and approve applications for U.S. visas are often the fi rst 

15 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources, November 28, 2000. 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 21 
to obtain identifying information on foreigners before they enter this country. 

The only information that consular affairs officials have received from the TSC 

and TTIC has been through the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence 

and Research, which has its own unique requirements and cannot speak for the 

consular function. Also, there are no Consular Affairs representatives working at 

TSC or TTIC. 

Further, some users who attended the working group meetings to develop 

the concept of operations for TSC did not think that their needs were taken 

into consideration. One DHS representative said that a “top-down” approach 

was taken, in which the concept of operations was “pushed out” rather than 

built on input from working group participants. In January 2004, another 

DHS representative said that no working group meetings had been held since 

November 2003 and that he had not received anything from TSC outlining how 

the center would be managed, how personnel issues would be handled, or what 

the governance structure would be. As a result, this official was not sure how his 

agency’s watch list requirements were being addressed. 

Senior TSC officials acknowledged that that there had been some problems 

with the FBI’s approach to develop the initial concept of operations. However, 

the director of the TSC said that she disbanded the working group shortly after 

beginning work at the TSC because she was not happy with the approach it had 

taken. In February 2004, TSC managers said that they would resume efforts to 

develop user requirements for the watch list consolidation the following month. 

These officials said that they had assigned a project manager and planned to 

outline a schedule and an approach for the requirements gathering process. TSC 

will have a number of significant issues to contend with as part of this process, as 

discussed below. 

Differing Needs Regarding Name-Matching Algorithms 

Federal agencies have different requirements regarding the algorithms that will be 

used in the consolidated watch list database. “Algorithms” are formulas or rules 

for solving a problem in a finite number of steps. For counterterrorism purposes, 

algorithms support the capability to search watch list databases and check 

peoples’ names against those on the lists. The level of complexity that agencies 

require for algorithms varies greatly. For example, due to its responsibility to 

provide passport and visa processing worldwide, the Department of State has 

developed sophisticated name-searching algorithms that recognize names from 

Page 22 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
many diverse countries. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reliance on the National Crime Information Center’s System 

Perhaps one of the TSC’s greatest accomplishments is the support that it 

provides to state and local law enforcement officials in identifying domestic 

and international terrorists. Now these officials can use the National Crime 

Information Center’s system to check suspects against TSC’s consolidated watch 

list database. However, according to testimony by an FBI offi cial in November 

2003, the National Crime Information Center’s system will be able to handle user 

processing demands only through FY 2006, with an estimated growth rate of 17 

percent each year. This is a critical issue to consider as watch list requirements 

are developed because the center’s system may be one of the principal ones 

connected to TSC’s database once it is integrated. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 23 
Technical Solutions to Integration of Watch List Systems 

Have Not Been Determined

Once user requirements are defined to provide a sound basis on which to proceed, 

interagency participants face the challenge of engineering an automated system 

that will integrate existing systems and provide real time access to a consolidated 

terrorist watch list database. This is a highly complex undertaking and, contrary 

to popular belief, was not expected to occur when TSC was created in December 

2003. 

Rather, TSC is taking an iterative approach to watch list consolidation. Phase 

1, which began with the September 2003 agreements to establish the TSC, 

 

 

 

 

 Phase 

2 of the program, from December 2003 to March 2004, consisted of developing 

the first version of the consolidated database containing all suspected international 

and domestic terrorists. It is in Phase 3, scheduled for March to December 2004, 

that the single, integrated system, allowing either update of agency systems or 

online query of the TSC database, will be developed. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 24 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Additional Issues Relating to Interagency Sharing 

of Terrorist Information Need to be Addressed 

While not central to ongoing watch list consolidation efforts, there are a 

number of additional challenges that affect interagency counterterrorist efforts. 

 

 

 Privacy is 

another issue that could hinder both the watch list consolidation and related 

systems. 

 Such issues 

could be pursued in the context of DHS orchestration of the interagency watch list 

consolidation effort. 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 25 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 26 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
PRIVACY 

Privacy is a subject that is raised frequently with regard to creation of TTIC and 

TSC. However, several privacy concerns related to watch list consolidation have 

yet to be addressed. One concern is the lack of a privacy policy, agreed to by all 

participants involved in watch list consolidation. Section 222 of the Homeland 

Security Act created a management position with primary responsibility for 

establishing privacy policy. Among other things, this policy formulation effort 

was to be based on a privacy impact assessment of proposed DHS rules. A 

DHS official said that TSC was created so quickly that the necessary privacy 

impact review was not conducted. As a result, each participating organization is 

following its own approved guidelines for addressing privacy issues. 

A second concern is that citizens’ privacy rights may be violated due to methods 

that airlines use to identify terrorists and threats to civil aviation. Recently, 

the American Civil Liberties Union filed a class action lawsuit that challenged 

DHS’ no-fly list, claiming that the list violates passengers’ constitutional rights 

to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, as well as their right to due 

process of law. In addition, DHS has suspended CAPPS II, designed to replace 

the no-fly list, due to similar concerns about potential privacy violations. CAPPS 

II would have required each passenger to give the airlines a birth date, home 

phone number, and address prior to boarding a flight. This information would 

have been checked against government and commercial databases. Based on 

analysis of the crosschecked information, passengers were to be assigned a 

color-coded score, indicating the level of security risk that they may pose. GAO 

reported that CAPPS II, as originally planned, did not provide adequate controls 

over privacy.16 

Third, a number of organizations involved in watch list consolidation were 

conducting data mining activities without central oversight to ensure that they 

complied with Homeland Security Act provisions regarding privacy. “Data 

mining” involves analyzing large amounts of data to extract new kinds of useful 

information. The Homeland Security Act authorizes the Under Secretary for 

IAIP to utilize data mining and other advanced tools to analyze data to conduct 

its threat assessment mission. However, several other DHS components, such as 

the National Targeting Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, CBP, 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, also were conducting data mining 

activities without coordinating with IAIP. 

16 Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, U.S. General Accounting 

Office, (GAO-04-504T, March 17, 2004). 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 27 
As a result of such uncoordinated data mining activities, there is a potential for 

greater civil liberties violations and law enforcement errors. For example, in a 

January 2003 letter to the Attorney General, a U.S. senator raised concerns about 

the Department of Justice’s data mining activities. Two of the concerns expressed 

were (1) excessive government surveillance that infringes on privacy interests; 

and (2) the potential for an increase in false leads and law enforcement mistakes 

with regard to surveillance or arrests due to the sheer volume of information being 

collected and analyzed. Both such concerns could also apply to DHS data mining 

operations. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 28 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

17 GAO-03-322, April 2003. 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 29 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recommendations

The OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 

Infrastructure Protection: 

1. Clarify DHS’ and IAIP’s respective legal responsibilities under the 

Homeland Security Act relative to the sharing of law enforcement, 

intelligence, intelligence-related, and other homeland security 

information; and, establish collection priorities and strategies for this 

information. 

2. Establish and chair an interagency forum to build commitment; identify 

staff, capital, technology, and other resource requirements; coordinate 

allocation of the resources identified; establish performance goals; and, 

oversee results of terrorist information sharing activities, including watch 

list consolidation, across agency lines. 

3. Assign the staff and other resources needed to support the work of the 

interagency forum. 

 

 

 

Page 30 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
4. Ensure, within the context of the interagency forum, that user 

requirements, policy concerns, and other issues related to terrorist 

information sharing are reviewed and adequately addressed. 

Management Comments and OIG Evaluation

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Under Secretary 

for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. We have included a copy 

of the comments in their entirety at Appendix B. 

In the comments, the Under Secretary agreed that effective consolidation of the 

terrorist watch lists maintained by different government agencies is a critical 

step in defending the nation against future terrorist attacks. However, the Under 

Secretary disagreed with the report’s premise that either DHS or IAIP has lead 

responsibility within the federal government for consolidating terrorist watch lists. 

Specifically, the Under Secretary said that the report fails to recognize the 

legal authority of HSPD-6, which assigned the lead role for consolidating 

terrorist screening data to the Attorney General, Department of Justice. The 

Under Secretary commented that, in leading the TSC, the Attorney General has 

government-wide broad authority and not just an operational responsibility for 

watch list consolidation. The Under Secretary stated that the Homeland Security 

Act also does not mention watch list consolidation and does not provide any 

specific authority to DHS in this regard. The Under Secretary said that the OIG’s 

report does not cite any statute, regulation, legislative history, HSPD, or other 

authority to back up its assumption that DHS is to have responsibility for the 

watch list consolidation. Nonetheless, the Under Secretary noted that within the 

HSPD-6 structure, DHS is playing a leadership role. 

On the basis of these views, the Under Secretary non-concurred with the OIG’s 

recommendations. The following discussion provides the OIG’s evaluation of 

each of the Under Secretary’s comments, as well as a response to his more general 

observations concerning the OIG’s audit approach. 

• Views on What Constitutes Watch List Consolidation: The Under 

Secretary is working from a narrow view that the TSC alone constitutes 

watch list consolidation. On the contrary, the TSC and its functions are 

just one part of a larger process, which the OIG outlines in its report. 

The process involves different agencies with various roles and, as such, 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 31 
is supported principally by two interagency organizations. Specifi cally, 

the TTIC, under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence, 

is responsible for gathering, coordinating, and assessing terroristrelated intelligence, which the Department of State and the intelligence 

community principally provide. The TSC subsequently screens and 

disseminates that information to a variety of customers. HSPD-6 

discusses not just the TSC, but also the TTIC, and outlines the TSC’s role 

relative to that of the TTIC. For example, among other functions, the 

TSC is to maintain a consolidated terrorist screening database containing 

a sensitive but unclassified subset of the information obtained from the 

TTIC and the FBI. 

• Overriding Authority of HSPD-6: The OIG agrees with the Under 

Secretary that HSPD-6 directed the Attorney General to establish the 

TSC. Also, according to the related September 2003 memorandum of 

understanding, the Attorney General is responsible for administering 

TSC operations in coordination with the various participating agencies. 

However, it is not the responsibility of the TSC to coordinate general 

policies or strategies for managing terrorist information across 

agency lines. Although the TSC brings together in one location the 

representatives of the various participating agencies, the representatives 

work to fulfill their individual agency missions in screening and 

disseminating terrorist watch list information to those who need it. 

In contrast, per the Homeland Security Act, ensuring effective 

management of terrorist information across agency lines is an intrinsic 

part of DHS’ primary mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the 

U.S. Given its responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act to 

improve the policies and procedures governing the sharing of information 

relating to homeland security threats, IAIP is the organization within the 

department that should play this role. The Homeland Security Act not 

only establishes an Under Secretary for IAIP, but also delineates about 

20 explicit functions for this offi cial.19 No less that six of these functions, 

and perhaps more, relate in some capacity to the creation, maintenance, 

and dissemination of watch list information. While none of these 

functions explicitly identify “watch list” information, neither do they 

exclude it. Specifically, according to the various parts of 6 USC 121 (d), 

the Under Secretary is to: 

19 6 USC 121(d). 

Page 32 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
(1) “assess, receive, and analyze...information...and to integrate such 

information” to identify, detect and assess terrorist threats; 

(8) “review, analyze, and make recommendations for improvements 

in the policies and procedures governing the sharing” of 

homeland security information; 

(10) in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and 

others, “establish collection priorities and strategies for 

information... relating to threats of terrorism;” 

(13) request and to obtain additional information from other federal, 

as well as state and local government agencies, as well as 

the private sector, relating to threats of terrorism; 

(14) establish and utilize secure communications to “disseminate 

information acquired and analyzed by the Department;” and 

(15) ensure that information databases and analytical tools developed 

or used by DHS are compatible with relevant information 

databases of other federal agencies. 

Based on these citations, DHS has an important and dominant role to 

play in watch list consolidation—a role that it is not fully executing. 

To the extent the department is suggesting that HSPD-6 supersedes the 

Homeland Security Act, such an argument clearly fails. First established 

by the President in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks, this and other directives provide guidance to the executive 

branch, but have not been published in the Federal Register. Such 

directives plainly cannot supersede a statute passed by the Congress and 

signed into law by the President. HSPD-6, by its very terms, “is intended 

only to improve the internal management of the executive branch” and 

“does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities of department and 

agency heads.....” 

As such, HSPD–6 does not preclude DHS from carrying out its 

interagency coordination and oversight responsibility. However, DHS 

has not conducted or documented a legal assessment of the Homeland 

Security Act to clearly define these responsibilities. That is why the OIG 

recommends that such an assessment be conducted. 

• Government-wide Attorney General Authority for Watch List 

Consolidation: Despite the Under Secretary’s comment that the 

Attorney General has government-wide broad authority for watch list 

consolidation, the OIG could find no reference in HSPD-6 or the related 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 33 
memorandum of understanding to this effect. Rather, as previously 

stated, HSPD-6 directed that the Attorney General establish and 

administer the interagency TSC organization in coordination with the 

Department of State, DHS, and the Director of Central Intelligence. 

Under the Attorney General’s administration, the TSC is staffed 

with assignees and other officials from the federal departments and 

agencies that the TSC supports. Working together, the interagency TSC 

representatives collaborate on terrorist screening and dissemination 

activities. The Attorney General does not have broad authority for 

the entire watch list process, which involves both TTIC and TSC, as 

discussed above. 

• Homeland Security Act Citations Regarding DHS’ Leadership Role: 

The OIG disagrees with the Under Secretary’s comments that the 

report includes no specific citations from the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 to back up its assertion that DHS is to have a leadership role 

in watch list consolidation. Specifically, the OIG states on page 4 of 

the report that the Homeland Security Act requires the Under Secretary 

for IAIP to consult with the Director of Central Intelligence and other 

appropriate intelligence, law enforcement, or other elements of the 

federal government to establish collection priorities and strategies for 

information relating to threats of terrorism against the U.S.20 The Act 

also directs the Under Secretary for IAIP to review, analyze, and make 

recommendations to improve the policies and procedures governing the 

sharing of law enforcement, intelligence, intelligence-related, and other 

information relating to homeland security.21 

In line with these requirements, in the DHS strategic plan, the Secretary 

identified seven key priorities for the department in its second year 

of operations, including establishment of a fully integrated watch list 

database in the TSC by the end of 2004 to provide immediate updates to 

federal border-screening and law-enforcement systems. Building upon 

this stated DHS priority, the Senate Appropriations Committee, in its 

report accompanying the DHS Appropriations Bill for 2005, requests that 

the department report on the status of its efforts to consolidate multiple, 

20 6 USC 121 (d)(10). 

21 6 USC 121 (d)(8). 

Page 34 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
overlapping, and inconsistent terrorist watch lists; reconcile different 

policies and procedures governing whether and how terrorist watch 

list data are shared with other agencies and organizations; and resolve 

fundamental differences in the design of the system that houses the watch 

list so as to achieve consistency and expeditious access to accurate, 

complete, and current information. 

• “Watch List Consolidation” Not Specified in the Homeland Security 

Act: OIG agrees with the Under Secretary that the Homeland Security 

Act does not include the term “watch list consolidation.” Laws typically 

are not written to include such specific terminology, which has almost 

become a buzzword in the current environment. It should be noted, 

furthermore, that HSPD-6 also does not use the term “watch list.” 

However, by assigning responsibility to IAIP for “establishing collection 

priorities and strategies for information relating to threats of terrorism 

against the U.S” and “improving the policies and procedures governing 

the sharing of homeland security information,” the law gives DHS broad 

responsibilities that encompass watch list consolidation. 

As the OIG states on page 4 of this report, section 6 USC 482 of the 

law also defines, “homeland security information” as any information 

possessed by a federal, state, or local agency that: (1) relates to the 

threat of terrorist activity; (2) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, 

or disrupt terrorist activity; (3) would improve the identifi cation or 

investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (4) 

would improve the response to a terrorist act. The OIG agrees with 

the Under Secretary that this definition is drawn from a section of 

the Homeland Security Act regarding facilitating homeland security 

information sharing procedures and not from the portion of the law 

regarding specific IAIP responsibilities. However, that does not make the 

definition any less relevant to the topic of watch list consolidation. The 

OIG does not assert that section 6 USC 482 ascribes authority to DHS for 

watch list consolidation. The OIG cites the definition in section 6 USC 

482 only to help clarify language in another section of the law that does 

give IAIP such authority. 

• DHS Leadership Role in Watch List Consolidation: Although the Under 

Secretary comments that within the HSPD-6 structure, DHS is playing 

a leadership role in watch list consolidation, throughout his comments, 

he also says that the FBI is leading the effort. The Under Secretary’s 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 35 
comments appear to be contradictory. Since the OIG agrees that the 

FBI is leading the TSC, DHS inevitably is left to play a supporting 

role in its operations. To this end, DHS has provided fi nancial and 

human resources to the TSC, as well as similar support to the TTIC. 

Nonetheless, the Under Secretary tends to equate leadership of the watch 

list consolidation with administration of the TSC’s terrorist information 

screening and dissemination function alone and, as such, perceives the 

effort from an operational point of view, narrowly focused on the TSC. 

In contrast, in its report, the OIG assesses the end-to-end watch list 

consolidation process, which requires a larger, more overarching strategic 

planning and coordination approach. The OIG does not intend to suggest 

by this analysis that the TSC has no role to play in the consolidation of 

watch lists, but only that whatever role it does play must be subordinated 

to that of IAIP. 

• OIG Report Goes Beyond the Scope of Stated Objectives: The Under 

Secretary says that the OIG report details assumptions that are beyond 

the scope of its objectives. The OIG does not agree and believes that it 

conducted its review well within the parameters of both its legal authority 

and its stated goals. Specifically, the OIG based its review on Homeland 

Security Act requirements that DHS lead and coordinate interagency 

activities to share terrorist information. This legal requirement provides 

a broad basis for DHS OIG review of the watch list consolidation effort. 

Further, because DHS has contributed significant resources to the watch 

list consolidation and its CBP bureau alone comprises about percent 

of the TSC’s customers, the OIG has a valid interest in ensuring that the 

department effectively meets its responsibility for ensuring successful 

accomplishment of the program. As such, the OIG conducted its review 

with the stated objectives of: (1) determining DHS’ role in working with 

other agencies to consolidate terrorist watch list systems and operations; 

(2) evaluating the effectiveness of plans and activities to standardize 

and consolidate the watch list; and (3) identifying any obstacles and 

challenges encountered. 

The OIG’s audit work and findings directly correlate to these 

objectives. Specifically, the OIG examined legal and background 

information and met with representatives of each of the principal 

agencies participating in watch list coordination—including DHS, the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department 

of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency—to determine how well 

Page 36 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
DHS was coordinating with them. The OIG also evaluated extensive 

documentation concerning the interagency approach to accomplishing the 

end-to-end watch list consolidation, not just the TSC function. Neither 

the OIG review nor its report was intended to provide an assessment of 

operations at either the TTIC or the TSC. Rather, the OIG provides a 

factual and balanced discussion of the watch list consolidation process, 

including accomplishments as well as challenges at both organizations. 

To validate its findings, the OIG obtained informal comments on a draft 

of the report from all of the agencies visited as part of its review. The 

OIG reviewed the comments and made changes to the report where 

deemed appropriate. 

• OIG Meetings with Department of Justice, FBI Offi cials: The Under 

Secretary’s comment that the OIG did not meet with any of the FBI 

leadership or other employees at the TSC is not correct. The OIG met 

with senior officials at the TSC, the FTTTF, and a Department of Justice 

inspections unit, all of whom had pertinent information and management 

perspectives to provide concerning terrorist watch list consolidation. 

The OIG would have welcomed the opportunity to interview other 

Department of Justice personnel at the TSC, but was specifi cally 

prohibited from doing so by senior department managers. Given that the 

OIG focused its audit on watch list consolidation management strategies 

and coordination from a DHS perspective, it was not essential that 

the OIG meet extensively with FBI personnel regarding internal TSC 

operations. 

• Sweeping Observations Regarding the TSC: The report does not make 

sweeping observations about the TSC, as the Under Secretary suggests. 

Rather, as previously stated, the OIG based its findings and conclusions 

on cumulative data collected and interviews conducted at all of the 

principal organizations involved in the end-to-end interagency watch list 

consolidation effort. The OIG’s report findings and observations largely 

concern DHS’ leadership responsibility for watch list consolidation and 

the issues and challenges that need to be coordinated and addressed 

across agency lines. It is both inevitable and appropriate that a number 

of the more specific issues that the OIG presents in its report involve 

the TSC because this is where much of the activity and a majority of 

DHS’ resources for watch list consolidation were concentrated during 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 37 
the course of the OIG’s review. However, the report also discusses 

issues with regard to the TTIC and other agencies that comprised the 

consolidation effort. 

Finally, the Under Secretary offers no comments regarding the critical need 

for improved oversight and strategic management of the interagency terrorist 

watch list consolidation program. The Under Secretary does not address issues 

that the OIG raised concerning the need for coordinated planning, budgeting, 

staffing, and requirements definition activities across agency lines to ensure 

successful accomplishment of watch list consolidation goals. Due to HSPD-6, 

the Under Secretary repeatedly disavows DHS responsibility for leadership of 

terrorist information sharing activities as they concern watch list consolidation. 

However, the Under Secretary also does not address the issue of IAIP’s broad, 

standing responsibility under the Homeland Security Act for governance of 

terrorist information sharing across agency and government lines, HSPD-6 

notwithstanding. Coordinating terrorist information sharing is a major part of 

achieving DHS’ broad mission to prevent and reduce the vulnerability of the 

United States to terrorist attack. “Connecting the dots” and ensuring better 

communications and information exchange among disparate federal, state, and 

local government entities for counter-terrorist purposes is a large part of why 

DHS was created. If DHS, or specifically IAIP, does not assume this interagency 

coordination responsibility, the question remains, who will? 

Page 38 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
Appendix A 

Scope and Methodology 

The OIG researched laws related to DHS’ responsibility for coordinating federal 

information sharing activities in support of counterterrorism. The OIG reviewed 

prior GAO reports and contacted GAO officials to learn more about their fi ndings 

on terrorist watch lists. Additionally, OIG researched the internet to obtain 

published news articles, congressional testimony, and private industry studies on 

watch list consolidation activities. 

The OIG met with senior IAIP officials to learn about their roles, responsibilities, 

and activities concerning terrorist watch list consolidation. The OIG interviewed 

attorneys from the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Office of General Counsel 

to find out about DHS’ involvement in establishing the TTIC and the TSC. 

Officials within the Office of the Chief Information Officer told the OIG about 

strategies for integrating DHS systems with the TSC database. The OIG met with 

representatives from the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, Border and Transportation Security, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, CBP, and the National Targeting Center—to learn about 

their involvement and commitment to the overall watch list consolidation effort. 

TTIC officials provided an overview of their systems and processes for managing 

intelligence information on terrorists and their working relationships with the 

various federal participants in the watch list consolidation. Further, the OIG met 

with TSC officials to learn about coordination with DHS to establish the screening 

center, processes for proposing individuals for inclusion on terrorist watch lists, 

dissemination of terrorist information, and development of the consolidated 

database. The OIG discussed TSC’s approach to gathering user requirements to 

support implementation of the integrated watch list database. The OIG reviewed 

plans, memoranda, and other documents that TSC officials provided pursuant 

to these discussions. The OIG met with DHS employees detailed to the TSC 

to discuss their roles and responsibilities for supporting watch list nominations, 

call center operations, and customer service. The OIG discussed with both TTIC 

and TSC officials their interagency plans for providing the systems, facilities, 

personnel, and financial resources to support the overall consolidation. 

Representatives from other federal agencies told the OIG about their participation 

and commitment to watch list consolidation efforts. Specifically, a Defense 

Intelligence Agency representative told the OIG about Defense coordination with 

TTIC. An official at the Department of Justice’s National Crime Information 

Center discussed the center’s system for disseminating watch list information 

to federal, state, and local law enforcement officials. The OIG also interviewed 

a representative from Justice’s FTTTF to learn about their involvement in the 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 39 
Appendix A 

Scope and Methodology 

establishment of TSC and their continuing coordination with TSC concerning 

counterterrorist activities. A representative of the FBI’s Inspection Division 

provided highlights of an internal inspection that involved watch list activities. 

The OIG met with representatives from the Department of State regarding their 

systems for managing watch list data. To gain perspectives on interagency 

funding of the consolidation effort, the OIG met with the Offi ce of Management 

and Budget. 

Further, representatives from the Heritage Foundation discussed studies they 

recently published on terrorist information sharing. A representative from the 

9/11 Commission met with the OIG to learn about its review objectives, approach, 

and preliminary findings. The OIG also attended several congressional hearings 

to learn about watch list consolidation progress. 

The OIG conducted this review from October 2003 to May 2004 at DHS, 

Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of State, and Central 

Intelligence Agency locations in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, and at the 

Criminal Justice Information Service in Clarksburg, WV. The OIG performed its 

work according to generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The principal OIG points of contact for the audit are Frank Deffer, Assistant 

Inspector General for Information Technology Audits, (202) 254-4100; and 

Sondra McCauley, Director, Information Management, (202) 254-4212. Major 

OIG contributors to the audit are identified in Appendix C. 

Page 40 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 41 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

Page 42 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 43 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

Page 44 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 45 
Appendix C 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Frank Deffer, Assistant Inspector General, Information Technology Audits

Sondra McCauley, Director, Information Management Division;

Barbara Ferris, IT Audit Manager; 

John Shiffer, IT Auditor; and

Marlow Henderson, IT Auditor.

Page 46 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 
Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Chief Information Offi cer 

DHS OIG Liaison 

DHS Public Affairs 

Office of Management and Budget 

Homeland Bureau Chief 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 47 
Page 48 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.