[Cite as Stanley v. Parker , 2021-Ohio-1701.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KIMBERLY SUE STANLEY, et al. Plaintiffs-Appellees

-vsCLARENCE PARKER Defendant-Appellant JUDGES: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P. J. Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J.

Case No. CT2020-0050

O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. JV000033989

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 17, 2021

APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee Stanley For Defendant-Appellant KIMBERLY S. STANLEY, PRO SE CLARENCE PARKER, PRO SE 3585 Gorsuch Road, Apt 1-B 584 Glade Park Loop Nashport, Ohio 43830 Montgomery, Alabama 36109Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 2

Wise, J. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Clarence Parker appeals the September 24, 2 020, decision of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Domesti c Relations Division, approving and adopting the Magistrate’s Decision. {¶2} Plaintiff-Appellee Kimberly Sue Stanley has not filed a brief i n this matter.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE {¶3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: {¶4} On November 15, 1994, Appellee Kimberly Sue Stanley and the Mus kingum County Child Support Enforcement Agency (MCCSEA) filed a Compla int to Establish the Father-Child Relationship in the Muskingum County Court of Comm on Pleas, Juvenile Division, naming Clarence Parker as the natural father of Brodr ick (DOB 07/13/1989) and Terrence (DOB 11/25/1993). {¶5} On November 21, 1994, Clarence Parker was adjudicated as the fa ther of the two minor children. No order for child support was issued. {¶6} On July 24, 1996, Appellee Kimberly Sue Stanley and MCCSEA file d a second Complaint to Establish the Father-Child Relationship in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, with regard to Christ opher (04/24/1996). {¶7} On September 4, 1996, a hearing was held on Appellee’s motion. {¶8} By Judgment Entry filed October 8, 1996, the trial court adjudi cated Mr. Parker as the father of Kimberly Stanley's child Christopher (D OB 04/24/1996). In addition, the trial court ordered Mr. Parker to pay Kimberly St anley $123.71 per month per child for the support of the three children, beginning May 1, 1996. The trial court also granted the Ohio Department of Human Services judgment against Mr. Parker in theMuskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 3

amount of $8,103.07 for confinement costs 1 . The court ordered Mr. Parker to pay $52.00 per month toward the judgment for confinement costs and accumul ated child support

arrearages. {¶9} By Agreed Entry filed 04/14/1999, the trial court found Mr. Par ker in contempt for failure to pay child support as ordered. A thirty (30) day jail sentence was suspended on the condition that Mr. Parker purge his contempt b y paying not less than $107.50 per month toward arrearages in the approximate amount o f $12,890.43 as of

04/08/1999. {¶10} By Agreed Entry filed April 21, 1999, the trial court found tha t Kimberly Stanley waived all child support arrearages owed to her by Mr. Parker through 04/09/1999, being the amount of $6,156.80. The court found that Kimberly Stanley could not waive arrearages that had already been assigned to the stat e or the judgment for confinement costs. The trial court did not terminate or modify the current child support obligation of $123.71 per month per child or the purge conditio n of $107.50 per month, plus processing charge. {¶11} In May, 2000, the trial court imposed the previously suspended jail sentence because Mr. Parker failed to comply with the purge conditions. {¶12} On August 30, 2007, the trial court approved and adopted the No tice of Child Support Termination Investigation of 07/13/2007, indicati ng that Mr. Parker's

1 R.C. §3111.13(C) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the judgment or order may contain, at the request of a party and if not prohibited un der federal law, any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceed ing, concerning the duty of support, the payment of all or any part of the reasonable expen ses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement, the furnishing of bond or other secu rity for the payment of the judgment, or any other matter in the best interest of the c hild.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 4

obligation to pay child support for Brodrick terminated on 07/1 3/2007, and that he owed child support arrearages of $49,044.58 and processing charges o f $954.71 as of

05/31/2007. {¶13} On October 23, 2009, the trial court approved and adopted the N otice of Child Support Termination Investigation indicating that Mr. Par ker's obligation to pay child support for Christopher terminated on 09/01/2009, because the c hild was placed in Mr. Parker's custody as of that date, and that he owed $51,599.57 i n arrears and/or other

balance as of 08/31/2009. {¶14} On December 16, 2009, neither party having requested a hearing to contest the Findings and Recommendations for modification of child supp ort issued on 11/24/2009, the court adopted those Findings and Recommendation s. The trial court reduced Mr. Parker's current support obligation for Terrence to $6.16 per month when private health insurance is provided, or $88.88 per month, plus cash medical support of $64.58 per month, when private health insurance is not provided , plus processing charges. The trial court ordered Clarence Parker to pay $354.92 per month, plus processing charges, toward child support arrearages of $51,153. 16, plus processing charge, as of 11/24/2009. {¶15} On May 7, 2012, the Child Support Division (CSD) issued Finding s and a Recommendation to Terminate the Court Child Support Order relat ing to Terrence. CSD found that Terrence turned 18 years of age on November 25, 2011 , and graduated from Tri-Valley High School on May 25, 2012. Based on those findings , CSD recommended that Mr. Parker's current child support obligation for Terrence be terminated as of May 12, 2012. In addition, CSD found that Mr. Parker owed $44,309. 30 in arrears and/or otherMuskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 5

balances as of April 30, 2012. CSD recommended that Mr. Parker be ordered to pay $361.08 per month toward the arrears and/or other balances. {¶16} By motion filed July 16, 2012, Mr. Parker timely objected to the administrative child support termination decision issued by the Muskingum County Job and Family Services, Child Support Division on June 19, 2012. {¶17} On August 14, 2012, a hearing on the motion commenced and was later completed on October 9, 2012. Kimberly Stanley and Clarence Par ker appeared for hearing without counsel. {¶18} In his motion, Mr. Parker asserted that CSD erred in finding that he owed $44,309.30 in arrears and/or other balances (child support, con finement costs, and processing charges) as of April 30, 2012. {¶19} The trial court found that when it adopted the September 18, 2009, CSD Notice of Child Support Termination Investigation, it made a fi nding on 10/23/2009 that Clarence Parker owed arrears and/or other balances of $51,599.5 7 as of 08/31/2009, and that no appeal was taken from that finding. The court found tha t as result, both parties were legally bound by that finding and are barred by the doctri ne of res judicata from presenting any evidence or argument to challenge that 2009 arre arage finding. {¶20} At the same hearing, Mr. Parker asserted that he should be give n credit against his arrearage balance for the summer months during which the children visited him during their minority. The court found this argument to be without merit because Mr. Parker's obligation to pay child support to Kimberly Stanley was never suspended or otherwise modified during any parenting time periods. The court found that it could not retroactively modify the amount of Mr. Parker's arrearages base d upon such a claim.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 6

However, at the hearing on 10/09/2012, Kimberly Stanley knowingly and voluntarily waived the sum of $2,226.78 in unassigned child support arreara ges ($371.13 x 6 months) based upon the amount of extended parenting time Mr. Parker exercised with the children during their minority. Therefore, the court ordere d that CSD adjust its records to reflect the waiver of arrearages of $2,226.78 in unassigned child support owed to her

in this case. {¶21} Mr. Parker also asserted that he should receive some sort of credit against his support arrearages because Kimberly Stanley failed to permit him to claim the children as dependents on his taxes, thereby reducing the amount of his tax refunds that CSD intercepted. The court found that in its original child support order of 10/07/1996, the court allocated to Mr. Parker the right to claim all three children as dependents for purposes of local, state, and federal income taxation. {¶22} The court found that if Mr. Parker had or has a valid claim aga inst Kimberly Stanley for violating the court order relating to the dependenc y exemptions, he has a right to file the appropriate action to enforce the court order. The court went on to find, however, that the amount of Mr. Parker's child support obligation was ne ver conditioned on Kimberly Stanley's compliance with the order allocating depende ncy exemptions. The court found that he had not filed a motion charging her with co ntempt for violating the order allocating dependency exemptions; nor had he filed a moti on requesting a money judgment against her for this alleged violation. Therefore, any claim that Mr. Parker may or may not have against Kimberly Stanley for allegedly violatin g the order allocating dependency exemptions was outside the scope of this proceeding and without merit.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 7

{¶23} Mr. Parker also asserted that he requested a modification of hi s child support obligation to Kimberly Stanley in 1997, 1999, and 2009, but tha t no action was

ever taken on his requests. The court found that the Clerk's file revealed no motion from either party requesting a modification of child support at any time. The file does contain a letter from Mr. Parker, dated 12/21/2009, indicating that he was aware that CSD had informed him that his request for a court hearing to contest CSD's recommended modification was not submitted in a timely manner; however, the court had already adopted CSD's findings and recommendations on 12/16/2009 because neither party had requested a court hearing within the statutorily prescribed objection period. Thus, nothing in the Clerk's file supports Clarence Parker's assertion that the Court failed to act on any written motion requesting modification of the child support order in this case. Therefore, this argument is without merit. {¶24} At said hearing, Mr. Parker also asserted that he should not be required to pay the judgment for confinement costs because he was indigent at the time the judgment was entered against him. The trial court found that such argume nt could and should have been raised in a direct appeal of the judgment, and that it cou ld not be used to collaterally attack the judgment sixteen (16) years after it was granted. {¶25} Clarence Parker further asserted that CSD should not be entitle d to collect processing charge arrears from him for the period of time durin g which he has been making child support payments because CSD had failed to deduct its processing charge from his payments. In response, the court found Ohio Revised Co de and the Ohio Administrative Code govern the hierarchy under which monies col lected by the CSD must be applied toward support obligations. With the exception of ta x intercepts, CSD is notMuskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 8

permitted to apply monies collected from Mr. Parker toward arre ars owed to the State, including processing charges, until the obligation owed to Kimb erly Stanley has been paid

in full. See R.C. §3121.58. The court found that the CSD had been doing exa ctly what the law requires and found this argument is without merit. {¶26} Finally, Clarence Parker asserted that CSD had incorrectly dete rmined the amount of processing charge he owes. The court found the amount of processing charge is determined by statute, and that CSD is assessing a processin g charge in the appropriate amount. {¶27} Finally, the court ordered that Clarence Parker shall pay not l ess than $361.08 per month, plus processing charge, toward child support arrears, confinement costs, and processing charge arrears, until all balances are pa id in full. CSD shall issue the appropriate withholding notice in that amount. {¶28} On September 4, 2019, Appellant Clarence Parker filed a motion with the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Divisio n, requesting that the income withholding order issued to his employer by the Chil d Support Division be immediately rescinded and that “all funds, payments, garnishmen ts and all monies allocated or spent in reference to or pursuant to this case sin ce 2012” be returned. {¶29} On August 5, 2020, a hearing was held on Appellant’s motion bef ore a Magistrate. Present at the hearing were Appellant, who appeare d without counsel, and the attorney for the Muskingum County Department of Job and Fam ily Services, Child Support Division. Kimberly Stanley did not appear for the hear ing. {¶30} At the hearing, Appellant amended his motion to add a request t hat the court waive all arrearages in this case.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 9

{¶31} On September 24, 2020, the Magistrate filed his Decision wherei n he summarized the prior proceedings and decisions which had taken place in this case from October, 2009, through November, 2012. The Magistrate also incl uded tables showing the amount of child support due for each month beginning with S eptember, 2009, and ending with May, 2012. The court then prepared another table sh owing the processing charges for that same time period. Next, the court included a t able showing the payments received by the Child Support Division from September 1, 2009, through July 31, 2020. The court found that as of July 31, 2020, Appellant owed child support arrearages of $12,214.28, processing charges of $2,020.21, and confinement co sts of $8,103.07, for a total balance of $22,337.56. {¶32} The court further found that on November, 2012, the court order ed Appellant to make monthly payments of $361.08, plus processing charges, toward the arrearage balances he owed. {¶33} The court then found that Appellant had produced no evidence sh owing that the court’s order requiring him to make said monthly payments s hould be changed. The court further found that R.C. §3121.02 requires that any arrear ages be collected by withholding or deduction from the obligor’s income. {¶34} Based on the foregoing, the court dismissed Appellant’s motion and

amended motion. {¶35} By Judgment Entry filed September 24, 2020, the trial court app roved and adopted the decision of the Magistrate and entered it as the co urt’s judgment. {¶36} Appellant now appeals, raising the following assignment of erro r for review:Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 10

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶37} “I. THE COURT WRONGLY USES IT'S [SIC] FINDINGS ON OCTOBER, 2009 AS IT'S [SIC] STARTING POINT IN CALCULATING ARREARS OWED. THIS

ORDER HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE 1996.

THE COURT ERRS BY DISMISSING AND FAILING TO RULE ON MOTIONS FILED WITH IT'S [SIC] COURT.

THE COURT ERRS WHEN IT CHARGES MR. PARKER WITH CONFINEMENT COST IT SEEKS IN THE AMOUNT OF $8,103.07. THE COURT HAS NEVER D EFINED

"CONFINEMENT” AS USED IN THIS CASE.

THE COURT ERRED IN 2012 BY NOT AWARDING MR. PARKER FINANCIAL

SUPPORT FROM THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE MINOR CHILD IN HIS CUSTODY.

THE COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THIS ORDER

WITHOUT PREJUDICE WHEN IT WAS MADE AWARE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S FAI LURE

TO ADHERE TO IT IN 2012.

THE MUSKINGUM COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS HAS BEEN BIASED FOR THE PLAINTIFF, IGNORING THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS AND ARGUING FOR

THE PLAINTIFF IN ITS DECISIONS.

THE COURT CONTRADICTS THE NORMS OF THE COURT BY RULING IN

FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO APPEAR IN C OURT.

I. {¶38} Appellant set forth and argued the above-listed assignment of e rror as a single assignment of error.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 11

{¶39} Initially, we note that Appellant has failed to provide this Co urt with a transcript of the August 5, 2020, proceedings, or any of the pr oceedings in which he is alleging error occurred. {¶40} An appellant is required to provide a transcript for appellate review. Knapp

v. Edwards Laboratories , 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). Such is necessary because an appellant shoulders the burden of demonstr ating error by

reference to matters within the record. See , State v. Skaggs , 53 Ohio St.2d 162, 163, 372 N.E.2d 1355 (1978). {¶41} This principle is embodied in App.R. 9(B), which states in rele vant part: If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or co nclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all e vidence relevant to the findings or conclusion. App.R. 9(B). {¶42} Where portions of the transcript necessary for the resolution o f assigned errors are omitted from the record, an appellate court has noth ing to pass upon. As appellant cannot demonstrate those errors, the court has no cho ice but to presume the validity of the lower court's proceedings. State v. Ridgway , 5th Dist. Stark No.1998CA00147, 1999 WL 100349 (Feb. 1, 1999), citing Knapp , supra

. {¶43} Under the circumstances, a transcript of the proceedings is nec essary for a complete review of the errors assigned in Appellant's brief sin ce Appellant is challenging the Magistrate's findings. As Appellant has failed to provide t his Court with a transcript, we must presume regularity of the proceedings below and affirm.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 12

{¶44} Additionally, Appellant did not file objections to the Magistra te's Decision in this case. Civil Rule 53 governs matters referred to magistrate s. Civ.R. 53(D) states in pertinent part: (3) Magistrate's decision; objections to magistrate's decision.

* * * (b) Objections to magistrate's decision

* * * (iv) Waiver of right to assign adoption by court as error on ap peal. Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion , whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that f inding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). {¶45} In failing to object to the Magistrate's decision, Appellant wa ived any error. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) (stating that “[e]xcept for a claim of p lain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual f inding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53[D][3][a][ii], unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53[D][3][b]”). {¶46} As there is no record, there is likewise no demonstration of pl ain error in said record, rendering Appellant's assertions unpersuasive.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 13

{¶47} Furthermore, the decisions and calculations Appellant is challe nging were made in 1996, 2009 and 2012. Appellant failed to take issue wit h these decisions when they were made. {¶48} “A valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subs equent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction * * * that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, syllabus. {¶49} The doctrine of res judicata not only bars all claims that were litigated in a prior action but also all claims which might have been litigate d in that action. In Grava, the Supreme Court of Ohio reiterated its prior statement of the law made in Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62: * * * “It has long been the law of Ohio that ‘an existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims

which were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit’ ”(emphasis sic) (quoting Rogers v. Whitehall [1986], 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 25 OBR 89, 90, 494 N.E.2d 1387, 1388). We also declared that “[t]he doctrine o f res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.” Id. {¶50} Grava, at 382. {¶51} Because Appellant could have raised his objections in an appeal from the court’s 1996, 2009 and 2012 decisions, these matters are both i mproperly before this Court, raised for the first time on appeal, and such is barred by the doctrine of res judicata

.Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0050 14

Therefore, we cannot find error with the trial court’s calculat ions for purposes of determining Appellant's arrearages amount. {¶52} Based on the record before us, reviewed under the constraints o f Civ.R. 53,

we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision af firming and adopting the Magistrate’s Decision dismissing Appellant’s motions. {¶53} Accordingly, Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. {¶54} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Dom estic Relations Division, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J. Baldwin, P. J., and Gwin, J., concur.

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