Filed 12/18/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TINO ALEXANDER PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

C078452

(Super. Ct. No. 13F02646)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Raoul M. 

Thorbourne, Judge. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Timothy E. Warriner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Kathleen Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, 

Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Paul A. Bernardino, Deputy Attorneys

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

At trial, this case was about the five eyewitness identifications of the shooter at a 

party for the California State University, Sacramento golf team. On appeal, the major 

1
issues involve defendant Tino Alexander Perez’s gang affiliation and whether there is 

sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that he specifically intended to benefit the 

Norteño street gang. The reason for the chasm between the trial and the appeal is the 

unusual fact pattern for a gang case—while the shooter was a validated and heavily 

tattooed gang member, there is no evidence the party was in gang territory, there were no 

rival gangs present or involved, there were no gang epithets or gang attire, and there is no 

evidence the shooting was in retaliation or for revenge. On appeal, defendant challenges 

the imposition of the gang enhancement on a number of grounds. He also objects to the 

admission of text messages exchanged between one of the victims and defendant’s 

girlfriend, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the finding the four attempted murders 

were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We find there is insufficient evidence to 

support the gang enhancement and the life terms for willful, deliberate, and premeditated 

attempted murder are unauthorized. We therefore strike the gang enhancement and the 

four life terms and remand for resentencing on counts one through four, but in all other 

respects, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Evidence Supporting the Substantive Crimes

Because defendant does not challenge the eyewitness identifications on appeal, we 

need not describe each witness’s account of what transpired on the night of May 10, 

2013. Suffice it to say, the evidence that defendant shot four college students at the party 

is overwhelming and the jury convicted him of four counts of willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated attempted murder and assault with a firearm as well as enhancements for 

the personal use of a firearm and the infliction of great bodily injury. The evidence 

consists of five eyewitnesses who positively identified defendant as the shooter,1

1 An expert in experimental psychology specializing in human perception and memory 

explained to the jury many of the pitfalls in eyewitness identifications and lineup 

2

 
incriminatory jail house calls, and a gun and ammunition that match photographs of a gun 

and ammunition on defendant’s cell phone. The evidence that the shooting was related to 

defendant’s gang affiliation, as described post, is much, much thinner.

Four close friends, Dwayne Hines, Kevin Booze, Jacarri Brown, and Jahi Vaughn 

arrived together at the party hosted by the California State University, Sacramento (Sac 

State) golf team. Their friend, Brandon Garcia, arrived sometime later. Hines attended 

Sacramento City College and the others were students at Sac State. Vaughn did not 

testify.

The others testified they saw defendant at the party. He stood out with a darkcolored hat, hair shaved on the sides but with a long ponytail, and lots of tattoos, 

including an owl figure and the number “90” around his neck, a diamond on his forearm, 

an image of the State of California on his face, and skeletons on his fingers. Booze 

attempted to socialize with him and defendant told him, “I’m E.”

The party wound down around midnight and many of the partygoers mingled on 

the court in front of the house. Hines, Booze, and Vaughn began walking to their car 

when they heard shots and returned to find their friends. Booze and Brown intervened in 

a heated argument between a Hispanic woman and an African-American man, and the 

man walked away. But defendant approached and appeared very agitated and angry. The 

woman reassured him that Booze and Brown had been helping her. She stated, “It’s 

okay, baby. They’re cool. Like, they helped me out.” But defendant pulled out a gun 

from his waistband and began shooting.

Vaughn, the first to be shot, was shot in the leg. Defendant shot Hines in the thigh 

before Hines jumped behind a parked truck for cover. As Booze tried to run away, 

defendant shot him below the buttocks and in his calf. Brown and Garcia hid behind a 

procedures diminishing the reliability of identifications, despite multiple witnesses and 

their abiding confidence in the accuracy of their memories.

3

 
car, but defendant pursued them shooting over the top of the car in their direction. Brown 

felt a bullet whiz by his shoulder. As he made a run for the bushes, defendant shot him in 

the right leg.

Another Sac State student who had attended the party saw defendant shooting and 

tackled him. Garcia jumped in as well and disarmed him. Defendant broke free and ran 

down the street and into a car with a number of Hispanic females.

At the crime scene, police officers collected a black Holt pistol grip, a bullet, a 

blood-stained wristwatch, and nine casings. The bullet that was removed from Brown’s 

leg and the bullet recovered from the scene were both .22-caliber Winchester 

ammunition. All nine casings were also .22-caliber Winchester ammunition and they 

were all fired from the same revolver.

Defendant’s cell phone stored many incriminating photographs. There were 

photos of defendant flashing gang signs. There were photos of a box of .22-caliber 

Winchester ammunition. And there was a photo of defendant’s wallet next to a .22-

caliber long rifle revolver. The revolver had a black grip that appeared to be the same as 

the black pistol grip recovered from the scene.

Defendant had a propensity for incriminating himself. His phone calls from jail 

were recorded. When asked what happened, in one call defendant responded: “Yeah, I 

shot four people, bro. [¶] . . . [¶] [T]hat’s what they’re charging me with . . . . I didn’t 

kill nobody but them niggers got hit with bullets . . . .” In another call, he admitted being 

present at the party. “You remember that party that we went to when I went with my 

brother and all them and we end up fighting after the party . . . .”

Defendant’s girlfriend, Sara-Tessa Hayes, was a classmate of Jacarri Brown. In 

September 2013, they exchanged text messages about the shooting. Hayes sent the 

following message: “Well, the man that you picked out of the lineup is my son’s dad. 

You sent him to jail two weeks before our baby was born. You took everything away 

from us. My son was born underdeveloped with a lot of medical problems, so my 

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boyfriend can’t be there for a sick baby, and I can’t even go back to work because it’s 

just me to take care of my son’s medical needs. They want to give Tino -- that means my 

son grows up without his dad. So I just thought you should know what you did to me and 

my family, and had it been the other way around, Tino wouldn’t have gone out like no 

snitch. What you did was wrong. Good night.”

Brown offered to contribute financially for the care of the baby. In a later text 

message, Hayes wrote: “Instead of showing concern, he changed the subject and asked 

me to lie and tell you that you must have recognized him from when he would come to 

Sac State to see me and to make sure you don’t testify because they are getting ready for 

trial.” She apologized for everything she had said previously and stated: “[Y]ou didn’t 

ruin my family. He ruined us himself. I was just too shortsighted and lonely to realize it. 

I’m just not making excuses for him anymore.” She concluded, “He did what he did and 

it was wrong, just like you said.”

Evidence Supporting the Gang Enhancement

The attorneys entered into the following stipulation: “Norteños are a criminal 

street gang. It is an ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, 

whether formal or informal that has a common name or common identifying sign or 

symbol. The chief primary activities of the Norteños are murder, attempted murder, 

robbery, assault, assault with a firearm, and kidnapping. The members of the Norteños, 

whether acting alone or together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 

activity. The pattern of criminal activity has occurred after September 26, 1988. The 

defense stipulates that this agreement satisfies the elements located in the jury 

instructions concerning what is needed to prove that the Norteños are a criminal street 

gang. The defense disputes whether the defendant is a member of the Norteños.”

Detective John Sample opined that defendant was a Varrio Garden Land Norteño

(VGLN) based on (1) his interviews of defendant’s brother; (2) his review of eight police 

reports involving defendant, four of those reports documenting defendant in the company 

5
of Norteños; (3) his search of defendant’s cell phone and monitoring of his Facebook 

account; and (4) his examination of photographs of defendant’s tattoos. Detective 

Sample testified that VGLN is affiliated with the Norteño Broderick Boys of West 

Sacramento, where defendant’s family lives. He explained that a person must satisfy 

only two of 10 criteria to be validated as a gang member. Defendant was validated in 

2010 as a Norteño gang member. He was housed with “northerners” at the county jail.

Detective Sample described three tattoos connoting a gang affiliation, two on 

defendant’s chest and back that were not visible at the party and one on his hands that 

had been covered up. “Nutty North” appeared on his chest and the word “Nutty” 

appeared on a portion of his back. The latter tattoo looked like it was incomplete. One 

dot and four dots signified the number 14 and the 14th letter of the alphabet is “N.” 

According to Detective Sample, the four dots had been covered and could be perceived 

by gang members as disavowing the gang. Covering tattoos and forsaking gang colors 

are two ways a gang member can drop out and distance himself from a gang. Defendant 

was not wearing red at the party. Detective Sample acknowledged that gang membership 

was an “ever-changing situation.”

Detective Sample gave the jury a basic primer on the sociology and psychology of 

gangs. Central to gang membership and cohesiveness, according to the detective, is 

instilling fear in the community and among rival gang members as a vehicle to achieve 

respect. He opined, therefore, that defendant intended to benefit the gang with his 

shooting rampage because it would instill fear in the minds of the students and thereby 

enhance the gang’s reputation.

Two other officers testified to personal contacts they had with defendant. In 2008 

one officer detained defendant with two validated members of the Broderick Boys. 

Although defendant denied being in a gang, the officer observed tattoos on both of his 

hands. In 2012 another officer observed defendant with three individuals, two who were 

validated members of the Norteño gang, in a car that contained a firearm in the trunk and 

6
a bag of ammunition tucked in between the seats where defendant had been seated. 

Defendant again denied gang membership, but the officer testified defendant remained a 

validated Norteño gang member based on his tattoos, his association with Norteños, and 

his wearing of gang colors.

The defense subpoenaed two female students who had attended the May 10 golf 

team party to testify to the appearances of other Mexicans at the party. Neither witnessed 

the shooting; one had left before it began and the other was in the house when it occurred. 

Both were interviewed by the defense over a year after the shooting and neither had a 

clear recollection of the other partygoers. Neither talked to any of the Mexicans they 

vaguely recalled. Unlike the small get-togethers they usually had, the party grew to about 

150 people.

Jordan Bidlack admitted to stereotyping. She described four or five Mexican 

males she saw at the party, and although she could only recall one tattoo on one of them, 

she assumed they all had tattoos. She specifically remembered the one tattoo on the neck 

region. She thought they were “sketchy” so she did not talk to them and she tried to stay 

away from them. To her, they did not fit the “Sac State mold.” They dressed similarly 

and were “roughly shorter than a lot of the student athletes” attending the party. More 

than one had a rattail. She did not recognize any of the six photographs in the photo 

lineup the defense investigator showed her and she could not remember any of their facial 

features.

Ellese Dias, a former member of the golf team, was also at the party with her 

boyfriend before the shooting began. She too testified that the party grew larger 

throughout the evening and many people stuck out “as not fitting the typical mold of Sac 

State students.” She described seven to 10 Mexicans, dressed similarly, but admitted she 

did not interact with them. They were primarily in white T-shirts and jeans or shorts. 

She estimated that seven to eight of the Mexicans had excessive tattoos. Like Bidlack, 

7
she was unable to identify anyone in the photographic lineup the defense showed her. 

She did remember that three of the Mexicans had long hair.

A jury found defendant guilty of four counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 

§§ 664/187, subd. (a))2 and four counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). 

The jury found that each of the attempted murders was willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated. As to the attempted murder counts, the jury found he personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). As 

to the assault with a firearm counts, the jury found he personally inflicted great bodily 

injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). And as to all the counts the jury found defendant acted to 

benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and he personally used a firearm 

(§§ 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d), 12022.53, subd. (b)).

DISCUSSION

I

Gang Enhancement

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that 

he committed the substantive offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the 

meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), which provides: “[A]ny person who is 

convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 

with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 

criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and 

consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he 

or she has been convicted, be punished . . . .” “Like a conviction unsupported by 

substantial evidence, a true finding on a gang enhancement without sufficient support in 

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

8

 
the evidence violates a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights and must be 

reversed.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 947 (Franklin).)

The evidence must establish both of the two prongs to the gang enhancement 

under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). “First, the prosecution is required to prove that 

the underlying felonies were ‘committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 

association with any criminal street gang.’ (§ 186.22[, subdivision ](b)(1).) Second,

there must be evidence that the crimes were committed ‘with the specific intent to 

promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.’ ” (People v. Rios

(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 561 (Rios).)

In deciding whether substantial evidence supports both prongs, we apply the 

familiar standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re 

Daniel C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.) We review the entire record in search of 

reasonable and credible evidence of solid value, viewing all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s 

findings. (People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 850 (Ramon); In re Frank S.

(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1196.) We cannot, however, go beyond reasonable 

inferences into the realm of speculation, conjecture, surmise, or guesswork. (Ramon, at 

p. 851.) “A trier of fact may rely on inferences to support a conviction only if those 

inferences are ‘of such substantiality that a reasonable trier of fact could determine 

beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the inferred facts are true.” (Rios, supra, 

222 Cal.App.4th at p. 564.)

Not every crime committed by a gang member is gang related. (People v. Albillar

(2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 (Albillar); Rios, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 565.) Nor can a 

crime be found to be gang related simply because the perpetrator is a gang member with a 

criminal history. (In re Frank S., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) Although a lone 

actor is subject to a gang enhancement, merely belonging to a gang at the time of the 

commission of the charged conduct does not constitute substantial evidence to support an 

9
inference the sole actor specifically intended to promote, further, or assist any criminal 

conduct by gang members. (Rios, at p. 566) Otherwise, as the court observed in Rios, 

“gang enhancement would be used merely to punish gang membership.” (Id. at p. 574.) 

Rarely is the perpetrator’s intent proven by direct evidence; usually it must be inferred 

from the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. (Id. at pp. 567-568.)

A cottage industry of gang experts has grown to meet a perceived need to assist 

juries in understanding all things gang related. While a gang expert is prohibited from 

opining on a defendant’s specific intent when committing a crime, the prosecution can 

ask hypothetical questions based on the evidence presented to the jury whether the 

alleged crime was committed to benefit a gang and whether the hypothetical perpetrator 

harbored the requisite specific intent. (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045-

1046.) A hypothetical question must pose facts shown by the evidence because “[a] 

hypothetical question not based on the evidence is irrelevant and of no help to the jury.” 

(Id. at p. 1046.)

Indeed, there are caveats to the sufficiency of gang expert testimony to support the 

imposition of a gang enhancement. General opinion testimony when offered by a gang 

expert “ ‘opens the door for prosecutors to enhance many felonies as gang-related’ (In re

Frank S., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199), by expanding the gang enhancement statute 

to cover virtually any crime committed by someone while in the company of gang 

affiliates, no matter how minor the crime, and no matter how tenuous its connection with 

gang members or core gang activities.” (In re Daniel C., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1364.) Moreover, “purely conclusory and factually unsupported opinions” that the 

charged crimes are for the benefit of the gang because any violent crime enhances the 

gang’s reputation is insufficient to support a gang enhancement. (People v. Ramirez

(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 800, 819-820 (Ramirez).) 

That is not to belittle or understate the central role of gang experts in establishing 

both prongs of the section 186.22 enhancement. It is certainly true “ ‘[e]xpert opinion 

10
that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang’ is not only permissible but can be 

sufficient to support the Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), gang 

enhancement. [Citation.]” (People v. Vang, supra, at p. 1048.) “Expert opinion that 

particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness 

can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was ‘committed for the benefit of

. . . a[] criminal street gang’ within the meaning of section 186.22[, subdivision ](b)(1).” 

(Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.) The facts in Albillar, however, stand in stark 

contrast to the facts before us and, on those facts, the Supreme Court’s deference to the 

gang expert’s testimony is unremarkable.

In Albillar, three 20-something gang members, heavily tattooed with gang signs,

assisted each other in raping a 15-year-old girl in their apartment, which was cluttered 

with gang paraphernalia including gang clothing, photographs of the defendants and 

fellow gang members wearing gang clothing and flashing gang signs, papers with gang 

graffiti, and a phone list of fellow gang members. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 51-

52, 62.) The Supreme Court summarized the gang expert’s testimony this way: 

“Because each defendant was a member of the Southside Chiques, he could and did rely 

on the others’ cooperation in committing the offenses against Amanda M.: Albert 

suppressed his own personal interest in having sex with the victim and immediately 

yielded to the others when they asked if they could ‘get in’; without another word being 

spoken, Albert and Madrigal held the victim’s legs down while Alex raped her; Albert 

and Alex blocked the door while Madrigal raped her; and Alex and Madrigal remained in 

the apartment while Albert raped her. Defendants knew, because of the nature of the 

gang, that no one would be a ‘rat,’ which would be ‘one of the worst things, if not the 

worst thing the gang can have within itself.’ ” (Id. at p. 61.)

The gang expert testified that, not only did gang members work in association, but 

also that the rapes were perpetrated to benefit the Southside Chiques gang. (Albillar, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.) He responded to a hypothetical based on the facts of the 

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charged crimes where the victim knew that at least two of the perpetrators were gang 

members. The expert stated that “More than likely this crime is reported as not three 

individual named Defendants conducting a rape, but members of [Southside] Chiques 

conducting a rape, and that goes out in the community by way of mainstream media or by 

way of word of mouth. That is elevating [Southside] Chiques’ reputation to be a violent, 

aggressive gang that stops at nothing and does not care for anyone’s humanity.” (Id. at 

p. 63.)

Here, by contrast, the only shred of evidence possibly connecting the shooting to 

VGLN is the fact defendant was a tattooed, validated gang member and there were four 

to 10 other Mexicans at the party, some of whom had tattoos. Most striking is the 

absence of gang evidence. Unlike the defendants in Albillar, there is no evidence that 

any of the visible tattoos on defendant or any of the tattoos on the other Mexican 

partygoers were gang related and there is no evidence that any of the other Mexicans 

were present during the shooting, let alone assisting defendant in any way. There is no 

evidence the other Mexicans at the party were members of any gang whatsoever. There 

is no evidence that any participant shouted out a gang name or threw up a gang sign. 

There is no evidence defendant or any of the other Mexicans were wearing gang colors. 

There is no evidence any of the students at the party knew defendant was a member of a 

gang. There is no evidence that any rival gang members were present at the party or that 

the shooting was done in retaliation or retribution for prior gang activity. There is no 

evidence the shooting occurred in gang territory. None of the students who testified at 

trial attributed the shooting to a gang. Thus, there was no eyewitness testimony that even 

hinted the shooting was gang related.

The only evidence offered in support of the gang enhancement was the testimony 

of Detective Sample, the prosecution’s gang expert. He too was asked a hypothetical 

based on the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecutor inquired: “And if a Norteño gang 

member crashes a party, after the party shoots a gun several times in the air, and then 

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proceeds to shoot several college students for trying to assist a friend of that gang 

member, would you think that that shooting of the college students was for the benefit of 

and in association with or at the direction of the Norteños?” 

Detective Sample answered affirmatively and explained his rationale. “Again, we 

talked about the reputation for Norteños. You have a violent act, like this shooting, 

especially in a public setting, that’s going to instill fear in anybody who knows about that 

shooting occurring. That fear is going to be now attributed to the reputation of the 

Norteños.

“And an individual who committed that crime being a specific Norteño, he also 

will receive that same benefit as an enhanced reputation. He’s going to be more feared. 

He’s also going to enhance his reputation in the gang as somebody not to be trifled with 

and is to be feared.

“So overall the crime would be that violent reputation would transpose itself 

straight on to the Norteño gang.”

In this gang expert’s view, therefore, essentially any shooting by a gang member is 

gang related because the use of violence enhances the gang member’s reputation, and 

thereby inures to the gang’s benefit by instilling fear in the community. Many courts 

have soundly rejected such a sweeping generalization untethered, as it is, to specific 

evidence of both prongs of the gang enhancement. (See, e.g. Ramirez, supra, 

244 Cal.App.4th at p.819; In re Daniel C., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363; People v. 

Ochoa (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 650, 662 (Ochoa); Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 853.) And the glaring absence of evidence connecting the shooting to a gang, other 

than the mere fact the perpetrator was a gang member, leaves the evidence woefully short 

of the sufficiency needed to sustain the enhancement. In short, the prosecution’s 

evidence, including the gang expert’s speculation about the hypothetical benefit to the 

Norteños and the hypothetical shooter’s specific intent to promote, further, or assist the 

gang is far more analogous to cases in which the evidence was found insufficient to 

13
support the enhancement than to the abundance of gang-related evidence in Albillar, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th 47.

3

In In re Frank S., a minor was charged with the possession of a dirk or dagger and 

a small bindle of methamphetamine, as well as false representation to a police officer.

(In re Frank S., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) He was also carrying a red bandana. 

(Ibid.) He was alone at the time he was stopped on his bicycle with the knife and told the 

police officer he had been jumped two days earlier and needed the knife for protection 

against “the Southerners.” (Ibid.) During intake, he described himself as an affiliate of 

the Norteños. (Ibid.) The gang expert opined that the knife benefits the Norteños 

because “ ‘it helps provide them protection should they be assaulted by rival gang 

members.’ ” (Id. at p. 1199.) The court found the evidence insufficient to support the 

gang enhancement, emphasizing the lack of gang-related evidence. “The prosecution did 

not present any evidence that the minor was in gang territory, had gang members with 

him, or had any reason to expect to use the knife in a gang-related offense.” (Ibid.) The 

court rejected the notion that the gang expert’s opinion that the minor harbored the 

specific intent to use the knife for a gang-related purpose and that the knife, under these 

circumstances, benefited the Norteños, constituted substantial evidence to support the 

enhancement. (Ibid.)

In Ochoa, the gang expert testified the carjacking and weapon possession 

benefited the gang “by providing general transportation to the gang’s members, by 

enabling transportation of narcotics for sale by the gang, by enabling transportation to 

3 We characterize the evidence as abundant in Albillar in comparison to the 

prosecution’s meager gang-related evidence in the case before us, but we note that the 

dissenting justices found even that evidence insufficient to sustain the gang enhancement 

because the three gang members were family members, the rapes occurred in the family 

apartment, which was not in gang territory, and rapes were not condoned, let alone 

celebrated, within the Hispanic gang culture. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 69, 71 

(conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)

14

 
commit further crimes by the gang, by providing economic benefit to the gang by sale of 

the vehicle, by elevating defendant’s status within the gang, and by raising the gang’s 

reputation in the community.” (Ochoa, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 656.) He 

acknowledged, however, there was no evidence the defendant transported any gang 

members or claimed responsibility for the carjacking in the name of the gang. (Ibid.) 

The defendant, a self-identified member of the Moreno Trece, was alone when he 

approached the victim sitting in his mother’s car, pointed a gun at his face, and demanded 

that he give him the car. (Id. at p. 653.) The expert’s testimony, “as to how defendant’s 

crimes would benefit Moreno Valley 13, was based solely on speculation, not evidence.” 

(Id. at p. 663.)

The court found the evidence insufficient to sustain the gang enhancement. The 

opinion provides a penetrating summary of what was lacking. “Defendant did not call 

out a gang name, display gang signs, wear gang clothing, or engage in gang graffiti while 

committing the instant offenses. There was no evidence of bragging or graffiti to take 

credit for the crimes. There was no testimony that the victim saw any of defendant’s 

tattoos. There was no evidence the crimes were committed in Moreno Valley 13 gang 

territory or the territory of any of its rivals. There was no evidence that the victim of the 

crimes was a gang member or a Moreno Valley 13 rival. Defendant did not tell anyone, 

as the defendant did in [People v. ]Ferraez [(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 925], that he had 

special gang permission to commit the carjacking. [Citation.] Defendant was not 

accompanied by a fellow gang member.” (Ochoa, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 662, fn. 

omitted.)

In re Daniel C. distinguishes the sufficiency of the evidence to support the first 

prong from the second prong of the gang enhancement. There was substantial evidence 

to support the first prong, that is, that the robbery was committed “in association with” 

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) a criminal street gang because the defendant, a gang member, 

was accompanied by an admitted Norteño and another young affiliate of the gang. (In re 

15
Daniel C., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358-1359.) They all wore red. (Id. at p. 1359.) 

But the court found the evidence was insufficient that the defendant committed his crime 

“with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 

members.” (Id. at p. 1361.) Again the deficiency was in the gang expert’s testimony.

“Here, [the gang expert] based his opinion that appellant committed the robbery to 

further the interests of the Norteño gang on the premise that it was a violent crime, and 

gangs commit violent crimes in order to gain respect and to intimidate others in their 

community. But, nothing in the record indicates that appellant or his companions did 

anything while in the supermarket to identify themselves with any gang, other than 

wearing clothing with red on it. No gang signs or words were used, and there was no 

evidence that [the assistant manager of the supermarket] or any of the other persons who 

witnessed the crime knew that gang members or affiliates were involved. Therefore, the 

crime could not have enhanced respect for the gang members or intimidated others in 

their community, as suggested by [the gang expert.]” (In re Daniel C., supra, 

195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.)

The gang expert testimony also came up short in Rios. “The only facts that the 

prosecution asked the expert to consider in the hypothetical were (1) the person was a 

gang member and (2) he possessed a gun. In our view this was insufficient to impose the 

gang enhancement (§ 186.22[, subd. ](b)(1)) on the carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle 

count (former § 12031, subd. (a)(1); count 1). Although Albillar instructs that the 

prosecution may rely on the charged offense as the criminal conduct supporting the 

enhancement when the defendant acts in concert with others, in a case such as this, where 

the defendant acts alone, the combination of the charged offense and gang membership 

alone is insufficient to support an inference on the specific intent prong of the gang 

enhancement. Otherwise, the gang enhancement would be used merely to punish gang 

membership. “As the court stated in Rodriguez, ‘[m]ere active and knowing participation 

in a criminal street gang is not a crime.’ ([People v. ]Rodriguez[ (2012)] 55 Cal.4th

16
[1125,] 1130.) We therefore hold that the expert testimony in response to the 

hypothetical in this case was insufficient to support an inference that defendant carried 

the gun in the vehicle with the specific intent required for the gang enhancement.” (Rios, 

supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 573-574.)

The evidence missing was the same as in In re Frank S., Ochoa, and the case 

before us. “[T]here was no evidence that defendant was in Norteño territory or rival gang 

territory when he stole the car; that he called out a gang name, displayed gang signs or 

otherwise stated his gang affiliation; or that the victims of the car theft were rival gang 

members or saw his tattoos or gang clothing.” (Rios, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 574.)

A pattern emerges in the challenges to gang expert testimony. Echoing the 

testimony offered in In re Frank S., Ochoa, and Rios, the gang expert in Franklin also 

opined that the defendant made criminal threats, assaulted, and falsely imprisoned his 

victim for the benefit of a criminal street gang, particularly by instilling fear in the 

victims and their larger community. (Franklin, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 943, 950.) 

But there was no evidence that any of the defendant’s fellow gang members were aware

of the crimes or participated in them. There was no evidence showing the defendant 

committed the crimes in association with other gang members. Given the lack of 

evidentiary support for the gang expert’s testimony, the court struck the gang allegations. 

(Id. at p. 952.)

The Attorney General argues that Detective Sample’s testimony provides ample 

evidence defendant specifically intended to promote, further, or assist the commission of 

crimes by other gang members. The Attorney General cites to Detective Sample’s 

testimony that defendant stood out because he had tattoos on his face, neck, arms, and 

fingers, the other Mexicans also had tattoos and dressed similarly to defendant, and he 

fired gunshots to intimidate the college students and to further the gang’s reputation. 

Cumulatively, this testimony is as unsubstantiated and insubstantial as the gang expert 

testimony found lacking in In re Frank S., Ochoa, Rios, and Franklin.

17
Essentially, Detective Sample testified to no more than the fact a Mexican tattooed 

gang member was involved in a shooting and possibly three of the other Mexicans at the 

party, who appeared to be his companions, all had tattoos. Although the Attorney 

General characterizes the tattoos as “gang tattoos” there was no evidence whatsoever that 

any of his Mexican companions’ tattoos were gang related. Nor were any of defendant’s 

visible tattoos. Rather the Attorney General ascribes a gang connotation to any tattoo, an 

inference based solely on impermissible speculation. Given that defendant had tattooed 

over the gang-related symbols on his fingers and the Nutty North tattoo was not visible to 

the partygoers, we conclude the mere presence of tattoos was insufficient to sustain a 

gang enhancement.

And, as in all of the cited cases, there simply was no other evidence to support the 

enhancement. Missing was all evidence typical of crimes committed for the benefit of 

the gang and intended to promote, further, or assist the commission of crimes by gang 

members—gang colors, gang clothing, gang accruements, gang signs, gang epithets, help 

by other gang members. Here there is no evidence any of the college students knew of 

defendant’s gang affiliation. The evidence consists only of a gang member committing a 

violent crime alone. The courts in the above-cited cases have found such a dearth of 

evidence insufficient for all the reasons we have discussed at length and we follow their 

lead in striking the gang enhancement for lack of substantial evidence to support it.4

II

Premeditated Attempted Murder Life Terms

Pursuant to section 664, attempted murder is punishable with a term of five, seven, 

or nine years, unless the fact that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated is alleged in the accusatory pleading and found true by the trier of fact, in 

4 Because we must strike the gang enhancement for insufficiency of the evidence, we 

need not address the multiple other challenges to the gang enhancement defendant raises.

18

 
which case the defendant is subject to life imprisonment. Defendant contends his life 

sentence was unauthorized and violated his constitutional right to due process because the 

prosecutor failed to allege the attempted murder counts were committed willfully, 

deliberately, and with premeditation as required by section 664. He is correct and the 

Attorney General does not contend otherwise. But the Attorney General insists defendant 

forfeited his objection by failing to challenge the issue in the trial court. The question is 

whether the mere mention of the possibility of an enhanced sentence for premeditated 

attempted murder during the court’s discussion of unrelated jury instructions imparts the 

notice required by due process as described in People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186

(Houston) or whether we should adopt the rationale of People v. Arias (2010) 

182 Cal.App.4th 1009 (Arias) in holding the sentence was unauthorized in light of the 

prosecution’s failure to satisfy the express statutory requirement coupled with the failure 

to advise defendant of the potential enhanced penalty.

We begin with Arias. Arias, a gang member, shot three African-American males 

in gang territory, one of whom died. (Arias, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1012-1014.) 

His defense, like defendant’s, was misidentification. (Id. at p. 1015.) Arias was charged 

with one count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder,

but the information did not allege that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated. (Id. at p. 1017.) The prosecution never sought to amend the information. 

(Ibid.) As here, the judge did instruct “that if the jury found defendant guilty of 

attempted murder, it must make a separate determination of whether the prosecution 

proved the attempted murder was done willfully and with premeditation and 

deliberation.” (Ibid.) The jury did not make any express findings as to premeditation and 

deliberation, but did find defendant guilty of two counts of “ ‘first degree attempted 

murder.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court sentenced Arias to life in prison pursuant to section 664 

for the attempted murder convictions. (Arias, at p. 1017.)

19
Like defendant, Arias argued the life term was unauthorized. The Court of Appeal 

agreed. The prosecution, the court explained, “failed to comply with the unambiguous 

pleading requirement set forth in section 664, subdivision (a).” (Arias, supra, 

182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in People v. 

Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735 (Mancebo), the court struck the life sentences based on 

the plain meaning of the statute and due process considerations. “[I]n addition to the 

statutory requirements that enhancement provisions be pleaded and proven, a defendant 

has a cognizable due process right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement 

allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.” (Id. at p. 747.)

Mancebo was a one strike case that did not involve section 664. But, like section 

664, the pertinent one strike statute provided enhanced penalties only if any of the 

qualifying circumstances “is alleged in the accusatory pleading pursuant to this section, 

and is either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of 

fact.” (§ 667.61, subd. (o); Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 742.) The information 

generally alleged the existence of multiple victims, albeit not specifically within the one 

strike law allegations. (Mancebo, at p. 745.) At sentencing, in order to impose a one

strike law sentence and a firearm enhancement without improper double use of one 

finding, the trial court utilized the multiple victim circumstance under section 667.61,

subdivision (e)(5). (Mancebo, at pp. 739-740.)

The court found the sentence was unauthorized. Nothing in the charging 

documents or pleadings “informed defendant that if he was convicted of the underlying 

charged offenses, the court would consider his multiple convictions as a basis for One 

Strike sentencing under section 667.61, subdivision (a). Thus, the pleading was 

inadequate because it failed to put defendant on notice that the People, for the first time at 

sentencing, would seek to use the multiple victim circumstance to secure indeterminate 

One Strike terms under section 667.61, subdivision (a) and use the circumstance of gun 

20
use to secure additional enhancements under section 12022.5(a).” (Mancebo, supra, 

27 Cal.4th at p. 745.)

Similarly, no information or other pleading gave Arias notice of the life terms he 

could receive if convicted of attempted first degree murder. The court found the lack of 

notice more egregious than in Mancebo. “As we have pointed out, the lack of notice was 

greater in [Arias’s case] because nothing in the information gave [him] reason to suspect 

the enhanced punishment statute for attempted murder applied to him.” (Arias, supra, 

182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020.) The court rejected the Attorney General’s characterization 

as an imperfection in the form of the pleading. “This was no mere formal defect in the 

information. Rather, defendant was not given notice of the special sentencing 

enhancement that would be used to increase his punishment from a maximum of nine 

years to a life term. Nor is this error reviewable under the abuse of discretion or harmless 

error analysis applicable to situations in which the information was amended during trial. 

Defendant’s charging document was never amended.” (Ibid.) In short, the prosecution 

had not complied with the notice requirements imposed by section 664, the defendant had 

no actual notice of his risk of an enhanced sentence, the life terms were stricken, and the 

case was remanded for resentencing. (Arias, at pp. 1020-1021.)

Here, the Attorney General insists the issue was forfeited, despite the flagrant 

deficiency in the accusatory pleading in violation of section 664, based on the holding in 

Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th 1186. An unhappy alumnus returned to the high school he 

had attended three years earlier and shot and killed four people, including one of the 

teachers who had given him a failing grade, and wounded many others. (Id. at pp. 1192, 

1194.) On appeal, he too argued he was improperly given life sentences because the 

indictment failed to allege that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated. (Id. at p. 1225.) The Supreme Court upheld the life terms on facts very 

different from those presented in Arias. The issue, it turns out, is rooted in due process 

concerns and the fundamental right of a criminal defendant to have sufficient notice of 

21
the potential punishment he faces. In Houston, unlike Arias, the issue arose midtrial and 

the defendant was given explicit notice of the possible enhanced punishment. (Houston, 

at pp. 1226-1227.)

Again, the prosecution failed to comply with section 664’s pleading requirement. 

But there the similarity ends. In Houston, the trial court raised the issue at the end of the 

first day of the defendant’s presentation of his case. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

p. 1226.) The court discussed the issue at some length and put the defendant on notice 

that the verdict forms would ask the jury to distinguish the two types of attempted 

murder. “ ‘And the final thing that is not completely clear in the verdict form, because I 

don’t think I had it clear in my mind when I was putting it together, is the distinction 

between the two kinds of attempted murder, and if I understand what the prosecution is 

doing in [the attempted murder counts], I believe the prosecution is intending to charge 

premeditated attempted murder. [¶] If that’s not right, you should tell me now, or as 

soon hereafter as you are able to, because it would help me. [¶] In other words, the type 

of attempted murder [that is] punished by life imprisonment rather than five, seven, 

nine.’ ” (Ibid.) 

A week later, the trial court announced it would include deliberate and 

premeditated attempted murder as a special finding. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

p. 1226.) After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury to determine 

whether the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (Ibid.) The 

defendant registered no objection. The Supreme Court concluded: “On the facts here, 

defendant received adequate notice of the sentence he faced, and the jury made an 

express finding that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. A 

timely objection to the adequacy of the indictment would have provided an opportunity to 

craft an appropriate remedy. Because defendant had notice of the sentence he faced and 

did not raise an objection in the trial court, he has forfeited this claim on appeal.” (Id. at

p. 1228.)

22
The Supreme Court did not overrule Arias. The court noted that the jury had been 

properly instructed but conceded it was unclear from the record when the trial court 

issued its proposed instructions and special findings and, most importantly, whether the 

potential life terms were discussed. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) Apparently, 

the Supreme Court was undecided whether Arias received adequate notice, and therefore, 

it left the case intact.

The Attorney General maintains that defendant received notice comparable to the 

shooter in Houston. The Attorney General points out that during a discussion whether 

the court should give the jury an unanimity instruction, the prosecutor mentioned, “We 

haven’t discussed voluntary manslaughter, but let’s say with the two attempted 

murder[s], they can find him guilty of attempted murder with premeditation or guilty of 

regular attempted murder, and they can disagree on for which victim it was premeditated 

attempted murder and which one was just normal attempted murder. So I can see in that 

situation where that instruction [on unanimity] would apply.” In the Attorney General’s 

view, in essence, the prosecution can ignore its responsibility to plead premeditated 

attempted first degree murder as required by section 664, and a defendant forfeits his or 

her right to challenge the deficiency as long as the prosecutor at some point during trial 

mentions or alludes to the two types of attempted murder. Such a rule would eviscerate 

section 664, do violence to the meaning and rationale of Houston, and undermine any 

fair-minded understanding of notice and due process. 

We begin with emphasis on the plain meaning of the statute. The Legislature 

clearly states that a sentence with a maximum term of nine years cannot be enhanced to a 

life term unless “the fact that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted or found to be true by 

the trier of fact.” (§ 664, subd. (a).) Here no one disputes that the prosecution failed to 

allege the fact that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. 

23
Thus, according to the terms of the statute, life terms cannot be imposed. This conclusion 

is consistent with the holdings in Arias and Mancebo.

Nor do we believe that Houston dictates a different result. In Houston, the trial 

court directly and plainly informed the defendant that it was planning to instruct the jury 

on the two options for attempted murder. Not only did the trial court expressly raise the 

issue, but it invited a response from the parties. Receiving none, it again informed the 

defendant that it had prepared a verdict form directing the jury to make a special finding 

whether the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Having been 

given notice twice during the trial that he would be subject to an attempted first degree 

murder verdict, the court then instructed on the additional elements necessary to find 

premeditated attempted murder. As a result, even though the prosecution violated section 

664’s directive to give the defendant advance notice in the accusatory pleading, the court 

found that he was given ample notice of the charges against him and the opportunity to 

object.

Here, by contrast, it is not even clear on the record whether defendant was present 

when the prosecutor, not the judge, while arguing the propriety of an unanimity 

instruction, made an off-hand reference to the two types of attempted murders and the 

possibility the jury might convict him of different degrees for different victims. Unlike 

the trial court in Houston, which clearly telegraphed the issue for the defendant, the 

prosecutor’s brief allusion to the attempted murder counts when discussing an unrelated 

jury instruction did not give defendant fair notice that his sentence could jump from a 

maximum of nine years to a life term for each of the four counts. In short, we find 

Houston factually inapposite. 

Both Arias and Houston recognize the due process implications of a failure to 

comply with section 664. While the Supreme Court was willing to forgive the 

prosecutor’s transgression in Houston, it was precisely because the trial court had 

provided what the prosecutor had failed to do; that is, the court was satisfied the 

24
defendant was accorded fair notice of the charges he faced and an adequate opportunity 

to object or to tailor his defense. In Arias, however, the court struck the life term when 

the violation of section 664 compromised the defendant’s right to due process. Here, too, 

the violation of section 664 deprived defendant of fair notice that he would be subject to a 

life term if the jury found him guilty of premeditated attempted murder. Because there is 

no showing in this record that defendant was present, was informed of the charges against 

him, or that he waived his right to object, we conclude that, as in Arias, we must strike 

the four life terms. The sentence was unauthorized and we can find no forfeiture on these 

facts.

III

Text Messages

It is important to put defendant’s next issue into context because, as framed, it 

appears disproportionately impactful. Five eyewitnesses identified defendant as the 

shooter. One of the five, Jacarri Brown, was a friend and classmate of Hayes, 

defendant’s girlfriend. Two weeks after the shooting, Hayes gave birth to defendant’s 

son, who was born with special needs. Apparently overwhelmed and distraught, she sent 

a series of text messages to Brown. She did not testify at trial.

Brown, however, did testify. He provided a detailed description of the events 

leading up to, and including, the shooting. It was during cross-examination that defense 

counsel explored Brown’s relationship with Hayes, including their numerous and lengthy 

text messages. He asked a series of questions to expose Brown’s potential bias. “Do you 

recall that after Tino Perez was arrested that Sara-Tessa Hayes confronted you about your 

identification of Tino Perez?” “And she texted you, correct?” “And you texted her back, 

correct?” “It wasn’t just one text to her. It was more than ten texts, right?” “And they 

weren’t short texts . . . . They were long texts, correct?” “She was accusing you of being 

a liar for falsely accusing Tino Perez, right?”

25
Brown testified Hayes, in the text messages, confronted him about his 

identification of defendant. He reported that Hayes “was asking me what had happened 

that night and she knew he was there.” But he denied that she was accusing him of 

“being a liar for falsely accusing” defendant or for falsely identifying him. According to 

Brown, “[t]here came a point where she told me I was snitching and that he wouldn’t 

have done that to me if it was the other way around.” Brown assured Hayes he would 

help take care of the baby while defendant was in prison.

Defense counsel further probed as to why Brown had kept the text messages secret 

and had not divulged them to the police. When asked if he had saved the text messages, 

Brown stated that he was not sure. Brown found all the saved text messages and, during 

the lunch break, the judge and lawyers went over them. The court found some of text 

messages relevant, and others, irrelevant. The court then informed the jury, “So we’re 

going to recall Mr. Brown for a limited purpose of going over some of the information in 

these text messages as counsel views them, that they wanted to put them in, and I have at 

least ruled that they are relevant in the sense that you should at least listen to them and 

ultimately do with them as you deem appropriate.”

The prosecution thereafter recalled Brown to testify to their contents. In one text 

message, Hayes wrote: “Well, the man that you picked out of the lineup is my son’s dad. 

You sent him to jail two weeks before our baby was born. You took everything away 

from us. My son was born underdeveloped with a lot of medical problems, so my 

boyfriend can’t be there for a sick baby, and I can’t even go back to work because it’s 

just me to take care of my son’s medical needs. They want to give Tino -- that means my 

son grows up without his dad. So I just thought you should know what you did to me and 

my family, and had it been the other way around, Tino wouldn’t have gone out like no 

snitch. What you did was wrong. Good night.”

Brown suggested that they end their conversation. Sometime later, Hayes 

apologized, again by text message. The messages read: “I’m sorry for everything I said 

26
to you before,” and “you didn’t ruin my family. He ruined us himself. I was just too 

shortsighted and lonely to realize that. I’m just not making excuses for him anymore. He 

did what he did and it was wrong, just like you said,” and “instead of showing concern, 

he changed the subject and asked me to lie and tell you that you must have recognized 

him from when he would come to Sac State to see me and to make sure you don’t testify 

because they are getting ready for trial.” Defense counsel registered his objections to the 

admissibility of all of these text messages.

Later during the trial, the prosecutor wanted to recall Brown to expand on the 

content of one of the text messages. The court denied the prosecutor’s request.

On appeal, defendant challenges the admissibility of the text messages on four 

grounds: lack of foundation, hearsay, more prejudicial than probative, and an ineffective 

limiting instruction. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People 

v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 485.)

Defendant first contends the prosecution failed to introduce a sufficient foundation

to authenticate the text messages. He complains the prosecution did not call Hayes to 

testify that she wrote the texts and insists that “in a technological era where 

impersonation is often a simple task,” the admissibility of text messages raises troubling 

concerns about authenticity, thereby impinging on his right to due process and a fair trial. 

We turn to well established rules of authentication and defer to the trial court’s broad 

exercise of discretion. (In re K.B. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 989, 995.)

While the scope of the trial court’s discretion is exceedingly broad, the scope of 

the foundational question presented is quite narrow. “The foundation requires that there 

be sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it purports to be, 

i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered. [Citation.] Essentially, what is necessary is 

a prima facie case. ‘As long as the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the 

writing is admissible. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity 

27
goes to the document’s weight as evidence, not its admissibility.’ ” (People v. Goldsmith

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267.)

“Importantly, ‘the fact that the judge permits [a] writing to be admitted in evidence 

does not necessarily establish the authenticity of the writing; all that the judge has 

determined is that there has been a sufficient showing of the authenticity of the writing to 

permit the trier of fact to find that it is authentic.’ [Citation.] Thus, while all writings 

must be authenticated before they are received into evidence ([Evid. Code, ]§ 1401), the 

proponent’s burden of producing evidence to show authenticity ([Evid. Code, ]§ 1400) is 

met ‘when sufficient evidence has been produced to sustain a finding that the document is 

what it purports to be. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The author’s testimony is not required to 

authenticate a document ([Evid. Code, ]§ 1411); instead, its authenticity may be 

established by the contents of the writing ([Evid. Code, ]§ 1421) or by other means 

([Evid. Code, ]§ 1410 [no restriction on the ‘means by which a writing may be 

authenticated’]).” (People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434-1435.)

Brown testified that screenshots of his phone showed “CSUS, Sara.” He identified 

an exhibit depicting screen shots of their text messages on his phone. He also described 

the content of their texts in his testimony, content which supported the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion in finding a sufficient foundation for admissibility. There was no 

abuse of discretion in admitting the text messages for the jury to ultimately decide on 

their authenticity.

Defendant also contends the text messages are inadmissible hearsay. Brown’s 

texts do not constitute hearsay because he testified at trial and authored his own text 

messages. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) The text messages from Hayes were not 

admitted for the truth of the matters asserted but to rehabilitate Brown’s testimony on 

redirect. On cross-examination, defense counsel insinuated that Brown had hopes of 

starting a romantic relationship with Hayes, thereby establishing a motive for 

misidentifying her boyfriend as the shooter and thereby removing him from the scene. 

28
Without understanding the stream of text messages to provide context, the crossexamination cast doubt on Brown’s credibility as an eyewitness. Thus, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by admitting the text messages for the permissible nonhearsay 

purpose of rehabilitating Brown’s credibility. The fact the court may have also admitted 

the evidence on erroneous grounds is inconsequential because there was a legitimate 

basis for admitting the evidence. (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 901.)

Even if the evidence surmounts the authentication and hearsay obstacles, 

defendant maintains the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence that was 

substantially more prejudicial than probative and, therefore, violated Evidence Code 

section 352 and his right to due process. He argues that Hayes’ representations that 

defendant had asked her to lie, that he was present at the party, and that he had ruined her 

family were unduly prejudicial, particularly because she did not testify and he did not 

have the opportunity to cross-examine her. 

But defendant forgets that he opened the door to the admission of the text 

messages when, during cross-examination, he impugned Brown’s credibility by creating 

the impression Brown had something to hide given his secret text messaging with Hayes. 

As previously discussed, the text messages were admitted to rehabilitate his credibility. 

The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of the text 

messages and the questioning of Brown about them on redirect to provide the jury with 

the whole story and not the misleading impression defense counsel had generated during 

cross-examination.

Lastly, defendant contends the limiting instruction was useless. During the 

prosecutor’s closing argument, defense counsel objected and the trial court admonished 

the jury that the texts were not admitted for their truth. Defendant argues the limiting 

instruction was given too late, and because it contradicted an earlier instruction, it was 

ineffectual. It is true that the court initially, after a laborious process of determining 

which texts were relevant and which were not, told the jurors they could “do with them as 

29
you deem appropriate.” We do not, however, believe the earlier comment pertaining to 

relevancy contaminated the court’s later, careful admonition that the text messages were 

not admitted for their truth. The messages themselves were admissible as discussed ante, 

were not unduly prejudicial, and the limiting instruction properly guided the jury not to 

consider them for the truth of their comments. There was no abuse of discretion.

IV

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant accuses the prosecutor of undermining the presumption of innocence, 

misstating the reasonable doubt standard, disparaging the defense function, and 

mischaracterizing the purpose for which the text messages were admitted during closing 

argument. The arguments, in defendant’s view, constitute prosecutorial misconduct. He 

further argues that his lawyer and the court let him down as well; his lawyer by failing to 

object to the improper argument except to the prosecutor’s remarks about the text 

messages, a dereliction of duty that deprived him of his constitutional right to competent 

counsel, and the trial court by denying his motion for a new trial based on the improper 

argument about the text messages. We find nothing deceptive or reprehensible in the 

closing argument and nothing so egregious it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. As 

a result, his lawyer had no reason to object and the trial court properly denied the motion 

for a new trial. 

 Under federal jurisprudence, a prosecutor’s misconduct constitutes a deprivation 

of due process when the pattern of conduct is so egregious that it infects the trial with 

unfairness. (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 594-595.) Under state 

jurisprudence, the misconduct must involve the use of deceptive or reprehensible 

methods to persuade the court or the jury. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 733.) 

When the alleged misconduct involves argument to the jury, “the question is whether 

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained30
of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 

1072.)

Defendant first objects to the following argument by the prosecutor: “It’s time for 

him to take responsibility for what he did. Because the way our justice system works is 

this. When you’re accused of a crime, no matter how guilty you know you are, you have 

the right in our country to have 12 citizens from the community leave their job, leave 

their retirement and have to sit through a boring trial and hear the evidence. No matter 

how guilty you know you are. Every person in this country has that right. And you’ve 

given him that right. You’ve done that.”

Defendant contends it is reasonably likely that the jurors understood the 

prosecutor’s argument to mean the presumption of innocence is a farce, nothing more 

than a legal fiction. We disagree. The prosecutor said nothing to denigrate the 

presumption of innocence and no reasonable juror was likely to construe the argument in 

the manner defendant suggests. Based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt that the 

prosecutor had already laid out for the jury in meticulous detail including the five 

eyewitness identifications, defendant’s jailhouse telephone call during which he admitted 

shooting four people, and his recorded police interview during which he lied to the 

officer, the prosecutor assured the jurors that defendant had been accorded his 

fundamental right to a fair trial. The prosecutor emphasized that a criminal defendant has 

that right to a fair trial even if he knows he is guilty. This argument does not suggest 

defendant is not presumed innocent, only that he retains the right to a determination of his 

guilt or innocence by his peers even though he may be guilty. The argument is neither 

deceptive nor reprehensible.

Next defendant contends the prosecutor twice misstated the reasonable doubt 

standard, once during his initial closing argument and again during rebuttal. The 

prosecutor argued: “Rule number two, you cannot go back there and play devil’s 

advocate. This is not a game. This is a real life courtroom. You can’t go back there and 

31
start a sentence with ‘what if.’ You can’t go back there and say, ‘Hey, I feel that he’s 

guilty, but let’s just throw out this hypothetical.’ You are judges of facts. You base your 

decision on the facts that you have before you.”

During rebuttal, the argument spoke more directly about reasonable doubt. He

explained: “Reasonable doubt. You already have the description of what reasonable 

doubt is. But I want to make sure we all know. It is not beyond all possible doubt. It is 

not I’m 100 percent sure that it happened.

“Because this is not Back to the Future. I can’t call Marty McFly and we get into 

a car and we all look down and see exactly what happened. This is not A Christmas Story

where there’s Ebenezer Scrooge and we can have an angel taking us to the scene. We 

weren’t there. So reasonable doubt is I’m 100 percent sure it happened. That is not 

reasonable doubt.

“You can have doubt and still find someone guilty.”

We begin with the prosecutor’s explanation of reasonable doubt. Many courts 

have admonished prosecutors not to stray from the time-tested description of reasonable 

doubt embodied in the standardized jury instructions. (People v. Centeno (2014) 

60 Cal.4th 659, 667; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 744-745; People v. 

Johnson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 976, 985-986.) Here the prosecutor reminded the jurors 

they had been given such an instruction. CALCRIM No. 220 states: “The evidence need 

not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or 

imaginary doubt.” The prosecutor then attempted to paraphrase CALCRIM No. 220 that 

the evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt, which is an accurate statement of the 

law.

But defendant contends the prosecutor’s argument diluted his burden of proof by 

essentially suggesting the jurors did not need to be convinced defendant was guilty, and 

could convict him even if they had a reasonable doubt, because absolute certainty was 

impossible. Defendant’s argument is quite a stretch; one we do not believe reasonable 

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jurors would make. Nothing in the argument or instructions hinted that the jurors did not 

need to be convinced that defendant was guilty. To the contrary, they were properly 

instructed on the prosecution’s burden of proof, the elements of the offense, and, most 

importantly, that the instructions prevailed over any contradictory comments by the 

attorneys. The prosecutor’s reminder, consistent with CALCRIM No. 220, that the 

evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt, did not mean they could find defendant 

guilty even if they had a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s contention to the contrary is 

unreasonable.

The prosecutor’s initial closing argument, in context, is even more innocuous. At 

the outset, he attempted to establish some basic ground rules for the jury to follow. The 

first rule, the prosecutor argued to the jury, was that they alone were the arbiters of the 

facts and the facts determined guilt or innocence. It is the prosecutor’s second rule that 

has come under fire. Again the emphasis was on the jury’s essential role as fact finder 

and he instructed the jurors to base their decision on the facts they had before them. The 

second rule, insofar as it embodied this basic principle, is above reproach. Where the 

prosecutor’s argument may have been slightly misleading is when he told them not to 

play devil’s advocate, not to ask “what if” questions, and not to throw out hypotheticals. 

It is true, as defendant suggests, that the jurors should ask hard questions and it is entirely 

appropriate for them to consider hypothetical “what ifs.” But the thrust of the argument, 

and the reason for the prosecutor’s rules, was that the jury’s essential role was to decide 

what the facts were and those facts, not hypotheses or personal opinions, were 

determinative of guilt or innocence. In this context, we conclude the argument does not 

constitute deceptive or reprehensible conduct nor infect the trial with fundamental 

unfairness. At its worse, it might have been slightly confusing; but it does not come close 

to constituting prosecutorial error.

The prosecutor also argued that “[o]nly in the mind of a defense attorney will they 

say, if you didn’t say it when you’re in the hospital right after you got shot, then you 

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can’t ever change your story. You can’t ever add anything. Because if you do, that 

means you’re lying. Only in the mind of a defense attorney would they say that.” 

Without citation to any authority, defendant analogizes the prosecutor’s disparagement of 

defense counsel to misstating the prosecution’s burden of proof. He contends that the 

prosecutor was asking the jury to disregard a legitimate argument because it came from 

an “ ‘illegitimate’ or ‘suspect’ source”—a defense attorney. Defendant is mistaken.

The prosecutor’s argument had absolutely nothing to do with the burden of proof 

and no reasonable juror would draw such an inference. Advocates are given a wide 

latitude in argument, and this latitude applies to the prosecution as well as to the defense. 

During cross-examination the defense attorney insinuated that the eyewitness accounts 

provided at the hospital were more reliable than the enhanced accounts they later 

provided. Thus, the prosecutor was mocking the notion that any subsequent change in 

their descriptions indicated they were lying by stating that “only in the mind of a defense 

attorney” would subsequent elaboration constitute deception. Closing argument is not for 

the fainthearted. We find nothing untoward in the prosecutor’s fiery argument and, 

certainly, no misconduct so serious as to jeopardize defendant’s right to due process.

Finally, we return to the text message issue now in the guise of prosecutorial 

misconduct. In this iteration, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that 

the text messages were true. Read in context, his argument was ambiguous. His 

emphasis was the important fact that Brown had first testified to the existence and content 

of the text messages before discovering they had been saved on his phone and the content 

of the messages when introduced into evidence corroborated his earlier testimony. 

“True” in that sense meant the text messages actually existed and they were consistent 

with Brown’s testimony.

If, however, the argument is construed to mean the statements attributed to 

defendant in the messages were true, then the argument allows for the improper use of 

blatant hearsay. But, to his credit, defense counsel raised a timely and vehement 

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objection to the argument and insisted the misconduct merited a new trial. The trial court 

gave a curative limiting instruction and denied the motion for a new trial. The limiting 

instruction clearly and decisively distinguished between the fact the existence of the text 

messages was true and corroborated Brown’s testimony and admonished the jury they 

were not to consider the truth of the hearsay evidence itself. In light of the following 

curative instruction there was no prosecutorial misconduct:

“Folks, what we were discussing, the text messages that you heard, I allowed them 

in mainly because when Jacarri Brown was on the witness stand and he was being crossexamined by [defense counsel], who asked him about his contact or lack thereof with the 

defendant and the defendant’s girlfriend, there was some discrepancy regarding whether 

or not or the extent of which he had those contacts.

“And over lunch apparently he found these other texts and I allowed you to hear 

that just in order then to show that what Jacarri Brown testified to when he was being 

cross-examined by [defense counsel] was, in fact, true. All right. That he did have these 

contacts. I did not allow that in for its truth; i.e., that the statements attributed to the 

defendant in these texts were actually uttered by the defendant.

“That was only -- they were only allowed in for the purpose of supporting Jacarri’s

statement that he did have these exchanges with the defendant’s friend because he was 

being asked about that by [defense counsel]. And then he had some evidence to 

corroborate his answers that he did have these contacts and that’s why I allowed that in.

“But the statements that she attributes to the defendant at that time and that she 

said, those are all hearsay, so those were admitted for a limited purpose, not for its truth. 

I just want to make that clear.”

Defendant urges us to remand the case to the trial court because the court was 

under the misapprehension that it had given a previous limiting instruction to the jury 

when it had not. A remand is unnecessary. The instruction quoted above was given 

immediately after the defense objected to the prosecutor’s argument and promptly and 

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properly rectified any misunderstanding the argument may have generated. We conclude 

the argument did not constitute misconduct, the jury was properly instructed, and the 

defendant received a fair trial.

DISPOSITION

The gang enhancement and four life terms are stricken and the case is remanded

for resentencing on counts one through four. In all other respects, the judgment is 

affirmed.

 RAYE , P. J.

We concur:

 BLEASE , J.

 HULL , J.

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