Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-836 |November 13, 2019 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael C. Borschel

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Lauren A. Jacobsen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keenan Thurman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 13, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-836

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Anne Flannelly, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1809-F4-31259

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-836 |November 13, 2019 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Keenan Thurman was convicted of level 4 felony unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon (“SVF”) and sentenced to seven years, with 

four years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and 

three years in community corrections. He challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction. He also claims that his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm

his conviction and sentence. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts most favorable to the verdict are as follows. On September 14, 2018, 

Thurman was driving a vehicle that he had borrowed from his longtime 

girlfriend, Aireyonna Calvert. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department 

Lt. John McVay saw Thurman run a stop sign, so he initiated a traffic stop. 

When he approached the vehicle, he observed Thurman and an adult male 

passenger in the front seats and a young boy in the back seat. When Thurman 

rolled down the driver’s side window, Lt. McVay detected the odor of 

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Thurman told the lieutenant that he did 

not have his driver’s license with him, but he gave him his name. As Lt. 

McVay searched the BMV and National Crime Information Center databases, 

Officer Cory Lindley arrived on the scene and ordered the occupants out of the 

vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the young boy (Calvert’s five-year-old nephew) was 

released to his mother and Calvert, who had arrived at the scene. 
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[3] Lt. McVay searched the vehicle and found a loaded firearm in the glove 

compartment and some marijuana. Officer Lindley Mirandized Thurman, and 

Thurman volunteered that everything in the vehicle belonged to him. Moments 

later, a firearm liaison officer, Eric Rosenbaum, arrived and spoke to Thurman, 

who told him, “The firearm is my girl’s gun. I know she keeps it in there.” Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 63. The officer began the process of collecting fingerprints and DNA 

from the firearm. Later testing showed no discernible fingerprints but found

DNA from three people, one of whom was male. Before he was taken from the 

scene, Thurman told Lt. McVay, “everything you found in the vehicle, I take 

responsibility for.” Id. at 44. 

[4] The State charged Thurman with level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm 

by an SVF, level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license, and level 6 

felony dealing in marijuana. The level 5 and level 6 felony counts were later 

dismissed on the State’s motion. Thurman stipulated to his 2012 conviction for 

class D felony criminal confinement, which served as the basis for his 

designation as an SVF. A jury convicted him of level 4 felony unlawful 

possession of a firearm by an SVF. During sentencing, the trial court identified 

as aggravators Thurman’s criminal record, probation revocations, jail 

misconduct, and the fact that he was on pretrial release when he committed the 

current offense. The court identified as a mitigator the undue hardship that 

Thurman’s imprisonment would place on his three children, one of whom 

suffers significant health problems. The court sentenced Thurman to seven 

years, with four years to be served in the DOC and three years to be served in 
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community corrections. Thurman appeals his conviction and sentence. 

Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The evidence is sufficient to support Thurman’s 

conviction.

[5] Thurman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. 

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we neither reweigh 

evidence nor judge witness credibility. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 

2015). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most 

favorable to the verdict and will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable 

factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would be 

unable to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. McCray v. 

State, 850 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The evidence 

need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Dalton v. State, 

56 N.E.3d 644, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 

144, 147 (Ind. 2007)), trans. denied. Circumstantial evidence alone may sustain 

a conviction if that circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of 

guilt. Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000).

[6] To convict Thurman of unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF, the State 

was required to demonstrate that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a 

firearm and that he is a serious violent felon. Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c). “A 
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person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is 

aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). 

Thurman stipulated to his previous conviction for criminal confinement, which 

the statute defines as a “serious violent felony.” Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(b)(8). He 

therefore is a serious violent felon, prohibited from possessing a firearm. Ind. 

Code §§ 35-47-4-5(a), -(c). 

[7] Thurman asserts that he simply borrowed his girlfriend’s vehicle and that he did 

not know that she had put her firearm in the glove compartment and thus did 

not knowingly possess it. The issue is not ownership of the vehicle or premises 

where the contraband is found but rather possession of it. Goliday v. State, 708 

N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). A conviction for possession of contraband may rest on 

proof of either actual or constructive possession. Houston v. State, 997 N.E.2d 

407, 409-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Actual possession occurs when the defendant

has direct physical control over the item; constructive possession is established 

when the defendant has both the intent and the capability to maintain dominion 

and control over the contraband. Id. at 410. Thurman’s possession of the 

vehicle which housed the firearm is sufficient to satisfy the capability prong. Id. 

With respect to the intent prong, we note that in circumstances such as these 

where Thurman did not have exclusive possession of the vehicle, the inference 

that he intended to maintain dominion and control over the firearm must be 

supported by additional circumstances implicating his knowledge of the 

firearm’s presence. Id. These include:
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(1) incriminating statements made by the defendant, (2) 

attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like 

drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the 

contraband to the defendant, (5) location of the contraband 

within the defendant’s plain view, and (6) the mingling of the 

contraband with other items owned by the defendant.

Id. (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[8] Here, officers found the loaded firearm in the glove compartment with the grip

on the far left, angled toward the driver’s seat, and within Thurman’s reach. 

Moreover, at the scene, Thurman made three incriminating statements to three 

different officers. After the officers found marijuana and the loaded firearm 

inside the vehicle and Thurman was Mirandized, Thurman made an unsolicited 

admission to Officer Lindley that everything in the vehicle belonged to him. He 

also told Lt. McVay, “everything you found in the vehicle, I take responsibility 

for.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 44. He separately told firearm liaison Officer Rosenbaum, 

“The firearm is my girl’s gun. I know she keeps it in there.” Id. at 63; see also 

id. at 89-90 (testimony of Calvert, Thurman’s long-term girlfriend, that she 

always carries her firearm with her and keeps it in her vehicle to avoid accidents 

inside the home). To the extent that Thurman relies on the absence of 

discernible fingerprints on the firearm, his and Calvert’s trial testimony that he 

was unaware of the firearm’s presence in the vehicle, and his testimony denying 

any admissions to officers at the scene, he invites us to reweigh evidence and 

reassess witness credibility, which we may not do. The evidence most favorable 

to the verdict is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that he 
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constructively possessed the firearm. Consequently, we affirm Thurman’s 

conviction.

Section 2 – Thurman has failed to demonstrate that his 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and his character.

[9] Thurman asks that we reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B), which states that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after 

due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [this] Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.” “Sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which 

the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). When a defendant requests appellate 

review and revision of his sentence, we have the power to affirm or reduce the 

sentence. Akard v. State, 937 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. 2010). 

[10] In conducting our review, our principal role is to leaven the outliers, focusing 

on the length of the sentence and how it is to be served. Bess v. State, 58 N.E.3d 

174, 175 (Ind. 2016); Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 

This allows for consideration of all aspects of the penal consequences imposed 

by the trial court in sentencing, i.e., whether it consists of executed time, 

probation, suspension, home detention, or placement in community 

corrections. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). We do “not 

look to see whether the defendant’s sentence is appropriate or if another 

sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test is whether the sentence is 
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‘inappropriate.’” Foutch, 53 N.E.3d at 581 (quoting Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 

306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (2014)). The defendant bears the 

burden of persuading this Court that his sentence meets the inappropriateness 

standard. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016). 

[11] In considering the nature of Thurman’s offense, “the advisory sentence is the 

starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence.” Green v. 

State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 637-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017). When 

determining the appropriateness of a sentence that deviates from an advisory 

sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about 

the offense as committed by the defendant that “makes it different from the 

typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory 

sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

Thurman was convicted of a level 4 felony, which carries a sentencing range of 

two to twelve years, with a six-year advisory term. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. 

The trial court sentenced him to seven years, comprising four years executed in 

the DOC and a three-year commitment to community corrections. 

[12] Thurman’s offense is, in part, a status offense. He stipulated to the criminal 

confinement conviction that served as the basis for his SVF status. As an SVF,

he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Yet, he borrowed Calvert’s 

vehicle and drove it with a loaded handgun within his reach, a five-year-old 

child present in the vehicle, and an illegal drug inside. Thurman’s sentence was 

just one year over the advisory and was only partially executed in the DOC. 
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The dangerous nature of his offense simply does not militate toward a shorter 

sentence. 

[13] Nor does Thurman’s character. We conduct our review of his character by 

engaging in a broad consideration of his qualities. Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 

95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 11 N.E.3d 571. 

“When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the 

defendant’s criminal history.” Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015), trans. denied (2016). Thurman’s criminal record includes felony 

convictions for narcotics possession and criminal confinement as well as four 

misdemeanor convictions, including invasion of privacy related to domestic 

violence, resisting law enforcement, and two for driving while suspended. He 

was on pretrial release when he was arrested on the current charge, and he has 

accumulated several probation revocations and jail misconduct reports. 

Nevertheless, the court afforded him a measure of grace in the form of serving 

three years of his sentence in community corrections. We believe this to be 

reflective of the court’s consideration of Thurman’s obligations as a father of

three children, one with a significant health condition. While we are mindful of 

his employment and his child support obligations, we simply cannot say that his 

sentence is inappropriate, especially given his poor record of responding to 

more lenient sentencing options. 

[14] In sum, Thurman has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. 

Accordingly, we affirm his sentence. 
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[15] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.