IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00137-CV

CITY OF DALLAS,

Appellant

v.

KATRINA AHRENS, S.A. AND M.A.,

Appellees

From the 18th District Court

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC-C2017-00365

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellee, Katrina Ahrens, added a claim against appellant, the City of Dallas (the 

“City”), for retaliation under the Texas Whistleblower Act.1 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§§ 554.001-.010. The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss this claim under the 

Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 

1 Although this lawsuit includes other claims brought on behalf of S.A. and M.A., Katrina’s minor 

children, neither S.A. nor M.A. asserted a retaliation claim against the City of Dallas. Thus, this appeal 

only involves the trial court’s denial of the City of Dallas’s TCPA motion to dismiss Katrina’s claim against 

the City of Dallas for retaliation.
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 2

27.001-.010. After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s TCPA motion to dismiss. 

Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the City’s TCPA motion 

to dismiss, we affirm.

Background

On July 7, 2016, four officers of the Dallas Police Department (“DPD”) and one 

Dallas Area Rapid Transit officer were tragically killed by a sniper in downtown Dallas. 

Among the five officers killed was Katrina’s husband, Senior Corporal Lorne Ahrens. 

After this incident, members of the public donated money intended for the families of the 

officers who were killed. Katrina contends that the vast majority of these gifts went to

the Assist the Officer Foundation, Inc. (“ATO”), which is a non-profit entity operated by 

the Dallas Police Association.

Approximately two years after the sniper incident, Katrina and her family 

allegedly had not received any of the donations made through the ATO. Katrina has 

alleged that the ATO “has stolen and cashed checks” written to her personally, as well as 

“’lost’ a substantial sum of the public’s cash donations and is holding donations meant 

for [her] and her family hostage, refusing to transfer them to her unless she agrees to the 

ATO’s conditions, like keeping quiet and releasing the ATO and its leaders from all 

liability.”

Katrina, S.A., and M.A. filed suit against the Dallas Police Association, the ATO, 

Frederick Frazier, the City of Dallas, Zak Products II, LLC, Michael Mata, Bob Gorsky, 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 3

Lyon, Gorsky & Gilbert, LLP, and Ronald C. Devine, alleging a variety of causes of action. 

Pertinent to this appeal, Katrina subsequently added a cause of action against only the 

City of Dallas for retaliation under the Texas Whistleblower Act. Katrina, who is also an 

officer with the DPD, alleged that she made good-faith reports to an appropriate lawenforcement authority of violations of law pertaining to the aforementioned handling of 

donations by her employing governmental entity and various public employees. As a 

result of her reports, Katrina contends that she suffered adverse personnel actions that 

would not have occurred but for her reporting of the alleged misconduct and that she 

suffered various damages.

The City answered and filed a TCPA motion to dismiss. In the recitation of the 

facts in its TCPA motion, the City noted that Katrina worked as a detective in the sexual 

assault unit for approximately five years. According to the City’s TCPA motion to 

dismiss, on October 9, 2018, the Chief of the Sexual Assault Unit of the Dallas County 

District Attorney’s Office contacted Katrina’s supervisor, Sergeant Jeramy Mills, to 

inform her that Katrina allegedly failed to reveal exculpatory information to the DA’s 

Office in two cases filed with their office. As a result of this alleged failure to disclose, 

the DA’s Office informed DPD that it can no longer support cases filed by Katrina. The 

City also referenced reported complaints from the DA’s Office regarding Katrina’s 

conduct in the grand-jury room and in the presentation of cases to the grand jury. As a 

result of the complaints from the DA’s Office and allegedly at the request of the DA’s 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 4

Office, DPD initiated an internal affairs investigation and placed Katrina on special 

assignment outside of the sexual assault unit while the investigation was pending.

Based on the foregoing facts, the City argued that the TCPA applies to the City’s 

statements made by City officials and employees regarding Katrina’s employment, that 

Katrina did not establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each element 

of her whistleblower claim, that the decision to investigate Katrina and the resulting 

statements made by the City came at the request of the DA’s Office, and that her 

placement on special assignment was based on information, observation, and evidence 

unrelated to her reporting of an alleged violation of law. Katrina filed a response to the 

City’s TCPA motion, and the City filed a reply to the response.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s TCPA motion in its entirety.

The TCPA

The TCPA protects persons who associate, petition, and speak on matters of public 

concern from legal actions that seek to intimidate or silence them. See State ex rel. Best v. 

Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2018); see also Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. 

2018); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015). Protection comes in the form of a 

special motion to dismiss, subject to expedited review, for any suit that appears to stifle 

a defendant’s exercise of those rights. See Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 679; In re Lipsky, 460 

S.W.3d at 584. The Texas Supreme Court has noted that the TCPA casts a wide net and 

is to be construed liberally to fully effectuate its purpose and intent. Adams v. Starside 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 5

Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018); see ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. 

Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). When determining whether a 

plaintiff’s legal action should be dismissed, a trial court considers the pleadings and 

supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is 

based. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a); see Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 892.

The TCPA establishes a multi-step process for the expedited dismissal of legal 

actions that are “based on, relate[] to, or [are] in response to a party’s exercise of the right 

of free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 27.003(a). Initially, the party who files a motion to dismiss under the TCPA must 

show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on, relates to, or 

is in response to” the movant’s exercise of the above-enumerated protected rights. Id. § 

27.005(b). If the movant meets that burden, then under the second step, the burden shifts 

to the non-movant to establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each 

essential element of the claim in question.” Id. § 27.005(c). If the non-movant fails to 

satisfy the burden to present a prima-facie case under section 27.005(c), the trial court 

must dismiss the action within the TCPA’s expedited time frame. See id. § 27.005(c)-(d); 

see also id. §§ 27.003(b), .004, .005(a), .007(b), .008 (establishing deadlines). However, if the 

non-movant satisfies the burden to present a prima-face case, the movant may still obtain 

dismissal by establishing “by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of 

a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim.” Id. § 27.005(d).
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 6

On appeal, our review of the trial court’s ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss is 

de novo. See Holcomb v. Waller County, 546 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Tervita, LLC v. Satterfield, 482 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2015, pet. denied); Johnson-Todd v. Morgan, 480 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 

2015, pet. denied); see also Arey v. Shipman Agency, Inc., No. 10-18-00100-CV, 2019 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 3513, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco May 1, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

In five issues, the City contends that the trial court erred by denying the City’s 

TCPA motion to dismiss. In its second issue, the City argues that the TCPA protects the 

government and governmental officials that speak on matters of public concern. In 

response, Katrina contends that the Legislature did not intend for governmental entities, 

such as the City, to have the right to file a TCPA motion to dismiss, focusing on 

amendments that were made to the TCPA in 2019.

First, we recognize that several changes were made to the TCPA in 2019. As 

relevant to this case, section 27.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was 

amended to exclude governmental entities from filing TCPA motions to dismiss. See Act 

of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 2, 2019 Tex. Gen Laws 684, 685 (amending TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a) to state that “[a] party under this section does 

not include a government entity, agency, or an official or employee acting in an official 

capacity”). However, this exclusion did not exist in the version of the TCPA that applied 

at the time this claim was filed. See Act of June 17, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2. 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 7

Nevertheless, Katrina argues that this 2019 amendment to the TCPA was actually a 

clarification that should be applied to this lawsuit.

The language of section 11 of House Bill 2730, which is the bill that Katrina relies

on when arguing that the governmental entities are precluded from filing a TCPA motion 

to dismiss, belies her contention. Specifically, section 11 of House Bill 2730 states:

Chapter 27, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, as amended by this Act, applies only 

to an action filed on or after the effective date of this Act. An action filed before 

the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect immediately 

before that date, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose. 

Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 11, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 684, 687 (emphasis 

added). In addition to the clear expression of the Legislature’s intent in section 11 of 

House Bill 2730, it is also true that: “When the Legislature amends a law it is presumed 

that the intention was to change the law.” Johnson v. McDaniel, 461 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. 

Civ. App.—Eastland 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

And finally, we note that the Texas Supreme Court and other intermediate 

appellate courts have concluded that there is no basis for the exclusion of the government 

and government employees from the protections of the former version of the TCPA based 

on the plain language of the former TCPA. See Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 12 (concluding that 

a removal action is not an “enforcement action” and that TCPA is available to a public 

official because removal action is a legal action); see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 

218-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (holding that “the TCPA’s 

plain language does not preclude its application to government officials sued in their 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 8

official capacity”); Hesse v. Howell, 07-16-00453-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4127, at *10 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo June 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that a lawsuit 

against a prosecutor is not exempt from the TCPA because the lawsuit was not an 

enforcement action). Accordingly, we conclude that the protections of the former TCPA 

extended to government and governmental officials sued in their official capacity who 

speak on matters of public concern. As such, we sustain the City’s second issue.

STEP ONE

Next, we address the City’s first, third, fourth, and fifth issues, which pertain to 

the application of the TCPA. In the first step of the TCPA, we must determine whether 

Katrina’s lawsuit was based on, related to, or in response to the City’s exercise of its right 

of free speech, right to petition, or right of association. In conducting our de novo review 

of this step, we consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating 

the facts on which the liability or defense is based, as the trial court was required to 

consider. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a); Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 892; 

Johnson-Todd, 480 S.W.3d at 609. When it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the 

action is covered by the TCPA, the defendant need show no more. Hersh v. Tatum, 526 

S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017).

With regard to the phrase “based on, relates to, or is in response to,” we consider 

whether there is a nexus between the “legal action” and the protected conduct under the 

TCPA. See Grant v. Pivot Tech. Solutions, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 865, 879 (Tex. App.—Austin 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 9

2018, pet. denied). The level of nexus required, which “includes no qualifications as to 

its limits,” is very broad. Id. at 880 (quoting Cavin v. Abbott, 545 S.W.3d 47, 53 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2017, no pet.); see Coleman, 512 S.W.3d at 901. “[A] plaintiff’s claims are ‘related’ 

to a protected communication when there is ‘some sort of connection, reference, or 

relationship between them,’ and are ‘in response to’ a protected communication when 

they ‘react[] to or [are] asserted subsequently’ to the communication.” Grant, 556 S.W.3d 

at 880 (quoting Cavin, 545 S.W.3d at 69).

A broad range of communications, in various mediums, are covered by the TCPA. 

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(1) (defining “communication” to include 

the “making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including 

oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic”); see also Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 894 

(recognizing that, under the TCPA, “[a]lmost every imaginable form of communication, 

in any medium, is covered”). Moreover, private communications are covered by the 

TCPA provided that they were made in connection with a matter of “public concern.” 

See Coleman, 512 S.W.3d at 901; see also Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 

2015) (noting that the “plain language of the statute imposes no requirement that the form 

of the communication be public”).

Here, it is undisputed that Katrina sued the City for retaliation under the Texas 

Whistleblower Act. In her fifth amended petition, Katrina characterized the City’s 

alleged retaliation as follows:
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 10

52. Det. Ahrens is [a] long-serving officer with the DPD. After she became 

aware of what she reasonably believed to be the unethical and unlawful 

activity described in extensive detail above, she reported the activity to 

appropriate law-enforcement authorities, including her DPD chain of 

command, the City Manager, and City Attorney’s Office.

53. But rather than thank her for her reporting, the City has taken adverse 

personnel actions against her, and it would have not done so but for her 

disclosure of the City’s and other Defendants’ misconduct.

54. The City has discriminated against Det. Ahrens in comparison to 

similarly situated employees and has stated reasons for its adverse 

employment actions against her that are false. For example, the DPD has 

commenced an investigation into Det. Ahrens’ decision not to expressly 

note in a particular prostitution report that a sexual assault claimant had a 

history of prostitution. Yet, having worked as a detective investigating 

sexual assaults for many years, she did not emphasize the victim’s 

prostitution history in accordance with her and her unit’s well-established 

practice. The DPD used the pending investigation as an excuse to remove 

Det. Ahrens from the detective role she has served in for years. In doing so, 

Det. Ahrens was told by supervisors that she had to be removed from her 

detective role pending the outcome of the investigation. But that stated 

excuse is false—numerous other DPD officers having similar open 

investigations continue to act as detectives.

55. Worse, after removing Det. Ahrens from her detective role, the City 

reassigned her to a position training other police officers in responding to 

“active shooter” scenarios. The City’s decision is outrageous: Det. Ahrens’ 

husband was murdered by an “active shooter”; her husband was himself a 

City employee; and her children with her murdered husband know their 

father was murdered by an “active shooter.” Yet, among the many 

positions the City could have put Det. Ahrens in—assuming its decision to 

do so had not itself constituted unlawful retaliation—it chose the one that 

would force her to face her husband’s death over and over again, on a daily 

basis.

56. In further contrast to the City’s treatment of Det. Ahrens, the City has 

essentially ignored its own and Defendants Frazier and Mata’s misconduct. 

The City’s retaliation against Det. Ahrens and her children is part of 

coordinated efforts to compel her to cease enforcing their rights.
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 11

57. Within 10 business days after Det. Ahrens learned that the City had 

taken adverse personnel actions against her, she initiated a grievance in 

accordance with the City’s rules. To Det. Ahrens’ knowledge, the City has 

not made any effort to rectify its retaliation against her. Indeed, the City 

unlawfully took additional adverse employment action against her 

immediately after she initiated a grievance under the City’s rules.

Further, in her response to the City’s TCPA motion to dismiss, Katrina attached an 

affidavit wherein she explained that:

On October 22, 2018, while I was still serving as a detective in CAP [Crimes 

Against Persons], I attended a meeting with Sgt. Mills, Lt. Patricia Mora, 

who was Sgt. Mills’s immediate supervisor at that time, and Thomas 

Castro, who was and is serving as the Deputy Chief for the Criminal 

Investigations Division for the DPD at the time. During that October 22, 

2018 meeting, Chief Castro alleged that the Dallas County District 

Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”) going forward was “not going to support 

your testimony,” allegedly because I did not disclose exculpatory evidence 

to the DA Office in two particular sexual assault causes that I recommended 

be filed. I was further told that an IAD investigation was being opened to 

investigate my handling of those two cases, and that during the pendency 

of that IAD investigation, I was being temporarily removed from my 

detective position in CAP and reassigned to a non-detective position in a 

different unit. I was told that I could not stay in a detective position because 

the DA’s Office would not support my testimony.

Katrina then explained that she objected to the reassignment and that she eventually filed 

a grievance and requested a hearing. According to Katrina, after filing the grievance, 

DPD permanently reassigned her to the Reality Based Training unit at the DPD’s Police 

Academy, which involved training DPD recruits on active-shooter situations.

The record evidence demonstrates that Katrina’s retaliation claims are “based on, 

relate[d] to, or [are] in response to” communications made by the City that implicate the 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 12

City’s exercise of the right of free speech. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 

27.001(3) (providing that the “[e]xercise of the right of free speech” means a 

communication made in connection with a matter of public concern); Cavin, 545 S.W.3d 

at 69 (concluding that the plaintiff’s claims “relate to” the defendants’ “exercise of the 

right of free speech” because “there is some sort of connection, reference, or relationship” 

between the claims and the exercise of the right of free speech). Specifically, the evidence 

shows communications between the City, the Dallas County DA’s Office, Katrina, and 

Katrina’s supervisor regarding Katrina’s alleged failure to turn over exculpatory Brady 

evidence in two sexual-assault cases Ahrens was investigating. Furthermore, Katrina’s 

claims are factually predicated on her allegation that the City’s statements for reassigning her work duties were false and that she was re-assigned in retaliation for 

reporting alleged misconduct regarding the ATO fund. We conclude that the evidence 

Katrina relies upon demonstrates that statements were made by the City with regard to 

her job performance and, thus, satisfies the broad meaning of “communication.” See 

Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 680; see also Fla. Metal Prods. v. Kreder, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 8163, 

at **7-8 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that alleged false 

statements about job performance and a derogatory comment about plaintiff’s injury 

were made with regard to plaintiff’s job performance and future employment status with 

the company and, thus, satisfied the broad meaning of “communication”). 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 13

Despite the foregoing, for the TCPA to apply, the communications must involve a 

matter of public concern because the communications made in this case were private. See 

Coleman, 512 S.W.3d at 901; see also Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 509. In Coleman, the Texas 

Supreme Court stated,

[t]he TCPA does not require that the statements specifically ‘mention’ 

health, safety, environmental, or economic concerns, nor does it require 

more than a ‘tangential relationship’ to the same; rather, TCPA applicability 

requires only that the defendant’s statements are ‘in connection with’ 

‘issue[s] related to’ health, safety, environmental, economic, and other 

identified matters of public concern chosen by the Legislature.

Coleman, 512 S.W.3d at 900 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(3), (7)).

The communications at issue relate to the job performance of a detective, the 

accuracy of information contained in police reports, the integrity of criminal 

investigations, the rights of criminal defendants to exculpatory information revealed in 

an investigation, and the conduct of a DPD detective in criminal investigations and 

criminal proceedings. Stated simply, the communications at issue involve matters of 

safety, community well-being, the government, and a public official, which are covered 

by the TCPA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7) (noting that a “[m]atter 

of public concern” includes issues related to health or safety; environmental, economic, 

or community well-being; the government; a public official or public figure; or a good, 

product, or service in the marketplace). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court and 

other courts have held that matters relating to the reporting of crimes and related 

proceedings, as well as the activities of government officials and law-enforcement 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 14

personnel, are matters of public concern. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 

95 S. Ct. 1029, 1045, 43 L. Ed. 328 (1975) (“The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting 

from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are without question 

events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility 

of the press to report the operations of government.”); Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 

F.2d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that alleged misconduct by public officials, 

particularly law-enforcement officials, is a matter of public concern); Adams, 547 S.W.3d 

at 896, 898 (holding that the appellate court erred concluding that defendants failed to 

meet their step one TCPA burden, in part, because plaintiff’s allegation that a developer 

and HOA repeatedly violated the law and engaged in corrupt or criminal activity is a 

matter of public concern); see also Opaltz v. Gannaway Web Holdings, LLC, 454 S.W.3d 61, 

66 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, pet. denied) (explaining that because of public trust placed 

in law-enforcement officials, the public has interest in information concerning an officer’s 

fitness for duty); Pardo v. Simons, 148 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) 

(holding that a police officer is a public official). We therefore hold that the first step is 

met. See Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467 (noting that when it is clear from the plaintiff’s 

pleadings that the action is covered by the TCPA, the defendant need show no more). 

We now proceed to the second step in our analysis.
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 15

STEP TWO

In the second step, the burden shifts to Katrina to establish, by clear and specific 

evidence, a prima facie case for each element of the applicable claims alleged in the 

petition. See TEX. CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c); see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 

at 587. “Clear” means unambiguous, sure or free from doubt, and “specific” means 

explicit or relating to a particular named thing. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590. A prima 

facie case is “the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference 

that the allegation of fact is true.” Id. It refers to evidence sufficient as a matter of law to 

establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted. Id. To meet the standard for 

“clear and specific evidence,” a plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual 

basis for its claim. Id. at 591. The TCPA does not require direct evidence of each essential 

element of the underlying claim to avoid dismissal. Id. However, conjecture, guess, or 

speculation cannot survive “clear and specific” scrutiny under the TCPA. See Van der 

Linden v. Khan, 535 S.W.3d 179, 195 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied).

At the outset, we address the City’s contention that sworn responses made by 

Katrina to interrogatories propounded by the City should not be considered because the 

responses are not affidavits or pleadings, as contemplated by Texas Rule of Civil 

Procedure 45. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 45. Section 27.006(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code provides that the trial court shall consider “the pleadings and supporting 

and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based.” TEX.
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 16

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a). However, the complained-of sworn responses 

to the City’s interrogatories were attached as “Exhibit C” to the City’s TCPA motion to 

dismiss and were incorporated in Katrina’s affidavit that was filed with her response to 

the City’s TCPA motion to dismiss. We cannot say Katrina’s sworn responses were not 

properly before the trial court when determining the City’s TCPA motion to dismiss.2 See 

Lane v. Phares, 544 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (allowing a 

three-hour deposition of a TCPA movant); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. Jones, 538 S.W.3d 

781, 797 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017), aff’d, 611 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2020) (allowing “limited 

discovery, including document production” and the deposition of one of the TCPA 

movants); see also In re Spex Grp. US LLC, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1884, at **10-13 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Mar. 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Neither the TCPA nor Texas courts 

have defined the scope of ‘specified and limited discovery relevant to the motion to 

dismiss.’ However, it has been determined that it is proper to allow the non-movant to 

depose the movant and obtain limited document production. . . . Some merits-based 

discovery may also be relevant, however, to the extent it seeks information to assist the 

2 We note that the City propounded its interrogatories on Katrina on January 4, 2019, and Katrina

provided sworn responses to the City’s interrogatories on February 4, 2019. The City then filed its TCPA 

motion to dismiss on February 8, 2019. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(c) (“Except as 

provided by Section 27.006(b), on the filing of a motion under this section, all discovery in the legal action 

is suspended until the court has ruled on the motion to dismiss.”); see also id. § 27.006(b) (“On a motion by 

a party or on the court’s own motion and on a showing of good cause, the court may allow specified and 

limited discovery relevant to the motion.”).
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 17

non-movant to meet its burden to present a prima facie case for each element of the nonmovant’s claims to defeat the motion to dismiss.” (internal citations omitted).

As stated earlier, Katrina added a claim to her previously-filed suit for retaliation 

under the Texas Whistleblower Act. The Whistleblower Act prohibits a government 

employer from taking an adverse personnel action against a public employee who in 

good faith reports a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002(a); Office of Att’y Gen. v. Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d 183, 191 

(Tex. 2020). However, the Whistleblower Act “does not afford unlimited protection from 

adverse personnel actions based on legitimate reasons.” See Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d at 192. 

Employers have the right to make employment decisions based on conduct that arises 

after an employee reports a legal violation. Id. at 192, 196. The Whistleblower Act also 

preserves an employer’s right to terminate an employee “when it has ‘sufficient sound 

reasons’ or even ‘harbor[s] bad motives never acted upon.’” Id. at 192 (quoting Tex. Dep’t 

of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 635-36 (Tex. 1995) (alteration in original)).

To establish a claim under the Whistleblower Act, an employee must demonstrate 

that the employer took an adverse employment action because the employee made a 

report in good faith. See id.; see also Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633. The employee need not 

establish that her report was the sole or substantial reason for the employer’s adverse 

action. Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d at 192. Rather, the employee must present some evidence 

that “but for” the report, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 18

it did. Id. (“An adverse employment action ‘based solely’ on reasons unrelated to a goodfaith report of a legal violation destroys the causal link.”); see City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 

29 S.W.3d 62, 68 (Tex. 2000).

Moreover, while circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish the 

requisite causal link, such evidence must, at a minimum, show that the person who took 

the adverse employment action knew of the employee’s report. Harris County v. 

Vernagallo, 181 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see 

Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 70. In other words, a “decision-maker could not fire an employee 

because of the employee’s report of alleged illegal conduct if the decision-maker did not 

even know the employee made such a report.” Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Perry, 440 S.W.3d 

228, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).

With regard to circumstantial evidence of causation, the Texas Supreme Court has 

stated that a court must examine all of the circumstances, including knowledge of the 

report of illegal conduct, the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 

adverse action, knowledge of the protected activity, expression of a negative attitude 

toward the employee’s protected activity, failure to adhere to relevant established 

company policies, discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly-situated 

employees, and evidence the employer’s stated reason is false. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69.

On appeal, Katrina contends that a letter sent by her counsel to the Dallas City 

Manager, the City Attorney’s Office, and her DPD chain of command on December 7, 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 19

2017, is clear and specific evidence that Katrina, through her attorney, reported a 

violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. The City counters that: (1)

the December 7, 2017 letter is not contained in the record; and (2) Katrina did not report 

a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority, as required by the 

Whistleblower Act.

Although the December 7, 2017 letter is not contained in the record, it is of no 

consequence. This is because we are to view the pleadings and evidence in a holistic 

manner and in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 897.

We note that the pleadings and Katrina’s supporting affidavit recount in detail the 

alleged thefts and violations of the City Code. Furthermore, Katrina states in her live 

pleading, as well as her affidavit, that she reported the alleged thefts and violations of the 

City Code to the Dallas City Manager, the City Attorney’s Office, and her DPD chain of 

command. The parties do not dispute that the DPD has authority to investigate and 

enforce criminal laws, and the evidence suggests that the City Manager has the authority 

to enforce municipal ordinances. Thus, Katrina has made a prima-facie showing of a 

violation of the law and a report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002(b); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli, 440 S.W.3d 611, 614 

(Tex. 2014); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d 680, 683-86 (Tex. 2013); Tex. 

Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 320-21 (Tex. 2002).
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 20

Next, the City contends that Katrina failed to introduce any evidence that Katrina 

suffered an adverse personnel action as a result of her purported Whistleblower report. 

In her live pleading, Katrina alleged that in response to Katrina’s December 7, 2017 

Whistleblower report, the City “discriminated” against her “in comparison to similarly 

situated employees and has stated reasons for its adverse employment actions against 

her that are false.” They further allege that:

DPD has commenced an investigation into Det. Ahrens’ decision not to 

expressly note in a particular prosecution report that a sexual assault 

claimant had a history of prostitution. Yet, having worked as a detective 

investigating sexual assaults for many years, she did not emphasize the 

victim’s prostitution history in accordance with her and her unit’s wellestablished practice.

Allegedly, DPD used this investigation as an excuse to remove Katrina from her detective 

role pending the outcome of the investigation.

In her affidavit, Katrina provided more background regarding the aforementioned 

investigation. On October 22, 2018, approximately ten months after Katrina sent her 

December 7, 2017 Whistleblower report, Katrina attended a meeting with her immediate 

supervisor, Sergeant Jeramy Mills; Lieutenant Patricia Mora, who was Sergeant Mills’s 

immediate supervisor at the time; and Thomas Castro, who served as the Deputy Chief 

for the Criminal Investigations Division for DPD at the time. At this meeting, Chief 

Castro stated that the Dallas County DA’s Office was not going to support Katrina’s 

testimony because of the alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in two sexual 

assault cases Katrina recommended be filed. As a result of this, the Internal Affairs 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 21

Division initiated an investigation into Katrina’s actions in those two sexual-assault cases, 

and Katrina was removed from her detective position.

Thereafter, as noted in her sworn interrogatory responses, on November 5, 2018, 

Katrina filed a grievance, alleging that the “City of Dallas has unlawfully retaliated 

against her for her prior reports of City of Dallas employee misconduct.” Katrina sent 

her grievance to Mills, Mora, Charles Young, Castro, Nina Arias, Patsy Palmer, and Janet 

Melancon. After sending the grievance, Katrina allegedly was permanently reassigned 

to the Reality Based Training unit at the DPD’s Police Academy, which involved training 

recruits on active-shooter situations and watching videos of police officers being shot and 

killed similarly to her husband.

Based on the foregoing, Katrina made a prima-facie showing that she suffered an 

adverse personnel action. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.001(3) (defining “[p]ersonnel 

action” as “an action that affects a public employee’s compensation, promotion, 

demotion, transfer, work assignment, or performance evaluation”); see also Montgomery 

County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. 2007) (noting that “for a personnel action to be 

adverse within the meaning of the Act, it must be material, and thus likely to deter a 

reasonable, similarly situated employee from reporting a violation of the law”).

Also related to the foregoing analysis is the City’s challenge to causation. To prove 

causation in a Whistleblower case, an employee need not prove that her reporting of the 

illegal conduct was the sole reason for the employer’s adverse action. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 22

at 634. Rather, to show causation, a public employee must demonstrate that after she 

reported a violation of law, in good faith, to an appropriate law-enforcement authority, 

the employee suffered discriminatory conduct by her employer that would not have 

occurred when it did had the report not been made. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 67; Hinds, 904 

S.W.2d at 634. This causation standard is known as the “but for” causal nexus 

requirement. Town of Flower Mound v. Teague, 111 S.W.3d 742, 755 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2003, pet. denied).

In this case, Katrina made a prima-facie showing that DPD decision makers, 

including Mills, Castro, and Mora likely received, at a minimum, her November 5, 2018 

grievance, which referenced her December 7, 2017 Whistleblower letter. See Zimlich, 29 

S.W.3d at 70; see also Perry, 440 S.W.3d at 238; Vernagallo, 181 S.W.3d at 25. Further, 

Katrina noted that she was removed as a detective approximately ten months after her 

December 7, 2017 Whistleblower letter and that she was reassigned to the Reality-Based 

Training Unit shortly after making her November 5, 2018 grievance. Additionally, in her 

affidavit, Katrina described several other instances within her personal knowledge of 

DPD detectives that were not barred from detective positions pending the outcome of 

Internal Affairs investigations.

Given the above, we conclude that Katrina made a prima-facie showing of “but 

for” causation that she suffered discriminatory conduct by DPD that would not have 

occurred when it did had she not reported, in good faith, a violation of law to an 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 23

appropriate law-enforcement authority. See Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d at 192; Zimlich, 29 

S.W.3d at 68; Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 635-36; see also D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 

529 S.W.3d 429, 440 & n.9 (Tex. 2017) (refusing to consider TCPA movant’s rebuttal 

evidence in determining whether non-movant established a prima-facie case, stating that 

although movant “disputes [non-movant’s factual assertion,] . . . at this stage of the 

proceedings we assume its truth.”).

Finally, with regard to Step Two, the City argues that Katrina did not present any 

evidence concerning damages regarding her claims under the Whistleblower Act.

It was Katrina’s burden to produce evidence from which a jury may reasonably 

infer that, but for the City’s conduct, she would be awarded damages. See, e.g., Winstead 

PC v. USA Lending Grp., Inc., NO. 12-20-00172-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2106, at *19 (Tex. 

App.—Tyler Mar. 21, 2021, no pet.) (citing Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 

113, 118-20 (Tex. 2004)). As noted above, in the TCPA context, we apply the “clear and 

specific evidence” requirement. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587. This means that 

Katrina must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for her claim and provide 

enough evidence to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true. See 

Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019).

Section 554.003 of the Texas Government Code outlines relief available to public 

employees under the Whistleblower Act. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.003. Subsection 

(a) allows for injunctive relief, actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees. 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 24

Id. § 554.003(a). Subsection (b) entitles a successful claimant under the Whistleblower Act 

to reinstatement to the employee’s former position or an equivalent position, lost wages, 

and reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights lost. Id. § 554.003(b).

In her sworn interrogatory responses, Katrina alleged the following:

Det. Ahrens seeks actual damages, including . . . front pay, fringe benefits, 

injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. Gov’t Code § 554.003(a)(1), reasonable 

attorney’s fees, pre-and post-judgment interest, court costs, and exemplary 

damages. At this time, it is not possible to calculate a specific dollar amount 

given the documents withheld by Defendants in this suit, including those 

being withheld by the ATO. Further, Det. Ahrens contends the City is 

jointly and severally liable for all damages she is entitled to from other 

defendants, including the ATO and DPA, and those damages include all 

amounts subject to the Court’s injunction entered against the ATO in this 

lawsuit.

Katrina provided extensive explanation of the basis for her damages. Furthermore, in 

her November 5, 2018 grievance that was included with her response to the City’s TCPA 

motion to dismiss, Katrina demanded “my reassignment away from CID be undone, the 

negative performance rating be expunged from my employment records, the IAD 

investigation be terminated, and the allegations that led to the opening of that 

investigation be disregarded.”

At this stage, Katrina was not required to produce evidence supporting an amount 

or the constituent parts of her damages; rather, she needed only to show a factual basis 

for her damages claim to meet her TCPA burden. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590-91 

(holding that pleadings and evidence showing the factual basis for a claim is sufficient to 

meet the TCPA burden); see also Deuell v. Tex. Right to Life Comm., Inc., 508 S.W.3d 679, 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 25

689 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (rejecting an argument that the 

TCPA non-movant needed to adduce more specific evidence about its damages and 

noting: “But the TCPA does not impose such a requirement. While this evidence could 

be necessary or at least useful at an eventual trial on the merits, a TCPA non[-]movant is 

not required to adduce all the evidence that they would, or could, need at trial”). After 

reviewing the record, we conclude Katrina presented a prima-facie showing that the 

alleged retaliation caused her injuries, including loss of front pay, loss of fringe benefits 

and seniority, reassignment and demotion from detective status, and negative 

performance ratings on her employment record.3 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.003(a)-

(b); see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 59-91; Deuell, 508 S.W.3d at 689. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Katrina met her Step Two obligation to present clear and specific evidence 

of all the essential elements of her claim under the Whistleblower Act.

STEP THREE

In Step Three of the TCPA analysis, the burden shifts back to the City to prove 

each essential element of any valid defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(d); Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 679-80; see also Arey, 

2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 3513, at *3. To meet this burden, the City contends that the affidavit 

of Sergeant Mills, which was attached to its TCPA motion to dismiss, established the 

3 We also note that Katrina, S.A., and M.A. have alleged that certain documents have been withheld 

by several defendants, including the ATO.
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 26

affirmative defense that the City would have taken the same actions toward Katrina 

regardless of whether Katrina filed this claim or reported any purported violations of the 

law. In other words, the City attacks the causation element of Katrina’s whistleblower 

action.

Under section 554.004(b) of the Texas Government Code, 

[i]t is an affirmative defense to a suit under this chapter that the employing 

state or local governmental entity would have taken the action against the 

employee that forms the basis of the suit based solely on information, 

observation, or evidence that is not related to the fact that the employee 

made a report protected under this chapter of a violation of law.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.004(b). However, the Texas Supreme Court has applied the 

“but for” causation standard to whistleblower actions, meaning “the employee’s 

protected conduct must be such that, without it, the employer’s prohibited conduct 

would not have occurred when it did.” Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 636. Under this standard, 

the City cannot negate the causation element merely by showing that it had other reasons 

for taking negative personnel actions against Katrina. See id.; see also Torres v. City of San 

Antonio, No. 04-15-00664-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12907, at *13 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Dec. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rather, in the context of step three in a TCPA 

claim, the “but for” standard requires conclusive proof that Katrina’s report did not play 

a role, however small, in the City’s decision to take negative personnel actions against 

Katrina. See, e.g., Torres, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12907, at **13-14 (citing Ender v. City of 

Austin, No. 03-97-00329-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5571, at **7-8 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 27

23, 1997, no pet.)); see also City of Fort Worth v. Prigden, No. 05-19-00652-CV, 2020 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 4544, at *22 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18, 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op.).

In her affidavit, Sergeant Mills, Katrina’s supervisor from 2013 to October 22, 2018, 

noted that, on October 8, 2018, she received an email from Amy Derrick, the Chief of the 

Sexual Assault Unit in the Dallas County DA’s Office, which informed her that the DA’s 

Office had rejected a sexual assault case filed by Katrina. The following day, Sergeant 

Mills called the Dallas County DA’s Office and learned that the DA’s Office would no 

longer support any cases filed by Katrina because she had failed to provide required 

exculpatory information to the DA’s Office in two cases. Sergeant Mills further 

mentioned that Derrick requested that the Internal Affairs Division of DPD investigate 

Katrina’s conduct. Sergeant Mills also denied that the investigation was initiated in 

response to Katrina’s lawsuit or her reporting of alleged violations of law by DPD or the 

City. Sergeant Mills recounted that, prior to the October 22, 2018 meeting in which 

Katrina was notified of the assertions made by the DA’s Office, she was unaware that 

Katrina had filed suit against the City. Despite the close temporal proximity to Katrina’s 

reports of alleged violations of law, Sergeant Mills opined that Katrina “was placed on 

special assignment outside of the Sex Assaults Unit because the DA’s Office could no 

longer support Detective Ahrens’s testimony.”

Based on a de novo review of the evidence, we cannot say that the City 

conclusively proved that Katrina’s report did not play a role in the decision to take 
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 28

adverse personnel actions against her when it did. In her response to the City’s TCPA 

motion to dismiss, Katrina included an affidavit and email from Judge Michael Snipes, 

who was formerly employed by the Dallas County DA’s Office as the first assistant to 

former District Attorney Faith Johnson. In his affidavit, Judge Snipes recounted an email 

he sent to Katrina’s counsel, which noted the following:

I will bring this to Judge Johnson’s attention so that she can make a final 

decision, but your client [Katrina] is not currently on a no testify list. She 

can be sponsored as a witness so long as her Brady allegations are disclosed. 

Our office has nothing to do with your client’s assignment. Thank you.

This information, coming from an individual who outranked Derrick, contradicts the 

City’s claim that it initiated the investigation and took adverse personnel actions against 

Katrina at the request of the DA. Thus, there is a fact issue regarding the City’s reasons 

for initiating the investigation and taking adverse personnel actions against Katrina, 

much of it dependent on the witnesses’ credibility. Credibility determinations are the 

sole province of the fact finder. See City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 229 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (noting that the jury was the sole judge of 

witnesses’ credibility where the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the 

employer’s reasons for firing the employee). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 

court did not err when it denied the City’s TCPA motion to dismiss. See Holcomb, 546 

S.W.3d at 839; Tervita, LLC, 482 S.W.3d at 282; Johnson-Todd, 480 S.W.3d at 609; see also 

Arey, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 3513, at *3. And as such, we overrule the City’s remaining 

issues.
City of Dallas v. Ahrens, et al. Page 29

Conclusion

Having overruled all of the City’s issues on appeal, we affirm the order of the trial 

court.

STEVE SMITH

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson,

and Justice Smith

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 23, 2022

[CV06]