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******************************************************PHILIP A. MARASCO v. CONNECTICUT REGIONAL VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOL SYSTEM

(AC 35169)
Beach, Sheldon and Bishop, Js. Argued April 21—officially released September 30, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Waterbury, Dooley, J.) Philip A. Marasco, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
ColleenB. Valentine, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, andAnn E. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion BISHOP,J. Inthisemploymentrelatedcase, theplaintiff, Philip A. Marasco, appeals from the summaryjudgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the Connecticut RegionalVocational-Technical School System (school system). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that there

were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the school system had discriminated against him in violation of General Statutes § 46a-601 or in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19672 (ADEA). The plaintiff claims, as well, that the court incorrectly rendered summaryjudgment in favor ofthe school system onhis claimforretaliation onthe ground that were there no genuine issues of material fact in support of this claim.3
In response, the school system makes two contentions. First, the school system claims that summary judgment was appropriate on the state law discrimination and retaliation claims because there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding these claims. The school system asserts, as well, that although the court correctly rendered summary judgment in its favor as to the plaintiff’s federal ADEA claim, the court should have done so on the ground ofsovereign immunity and not because of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. In furtherance of this argument, the school system claims that neither the ADEA nor any state statute operates to denude the state of its traditional immunity from suit or liability. We agree with the school system.
The court’s memorandum ofdecision and the record reveal the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The school systemis astate regionalvocational andtechnicalschoolsystemthatprovidesstudentswith the opportunity to learn a technology or trade while completing their academic education. At some point in 2003, after the federal No Child Left Behind legislation4 hadpassed, theschoolsystemtookunderconsideration whether it should change its curriculum with regard to classes on reading blueprints in an effort to increase its focus on math, reading, and language arts classes. Thereafter, AbigailL. Hughes, the superintendent ofthe school system, approved of a curriculum change that incorporated blueprint reading into trade specific classes to significantly reduce the number of separate classesdedicatedsolelytoblueprintreading. Theimplementation of the curriculum change occurred on a school-by-school basis. Each school principal was asked to determine the best method for teaching blueprint reading, given the school system’s curriculum change as well as the federal and state educational mandates, the individual school’s available resources, and the students’ interest in the course. Teachers who taught blueprint reading classes were counseled toapply for other teaching positions within the school system or, alternatively, to seek certification in other subjectareas sothattheycouldteach differentsubjects within the school system.
The plaintiff, who at all relevanttimes was olderthan fifty, was employed as a blueprint reading teacher at EliWhitneyTechnicalHighSchoolinHamden(EliWhitney). Although he had not yet been directly affected by the curriculum change, the plaintifffiled administrative complaints in February, 2005, with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) as well

as the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), allegingage discriminationonthe basis of the school system’s decision to reduce the number of blueprint reading courses. While the plaintiff’s administrative complaints were pending, Eli Whitney decided to eliminate its blueprint reading class for the 2005–2006 academic year.5 The plaintiff was thus notified that the blueprint reading course he taught would be eliminated, and that if he did not find an alternative position for which he was qualified within the school system, he would serve as apermanent substitute teacher. The plaintiffelected to accept apermanent substitute position at Horace C. Wilcox Technical High School in Meriden (Wilcox) beginning on August 25, 2005. On June 29, 2005, however, the plaintiff was notified that Wilcox could no longer accommodate his position andthathewould, alternatively, betransferred to W. F. Kaynor Technical High School in Waterbury (Kaynor).
At some point after the plaintiff received notice of his transfer to Kaynor, his union, the State Vocational Federation ofTeachers, filedagrievance onthebasis of the school system’s reassignment of blueprint reading teachers to permanent substitute positions. In July, 2006, the school system and the union reached an agreement providing for a recall of these permanent substitute positions. The school system then offered the plaintiff, and he accepted, a full-time position to teach manufacturing technology at Kaynor, effective August 25, 2006.6 During his tenure at Kaynor, the plaintiff was the subject of numerous disciplinary actions. In response, the plaintiff amended his administrative complaints to include a claim for retaliation on the basis of these disciplinary actions. On July 19, 2006, the commission dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff, however, received arelease ofjurisdiction from the commission7

as well as aright to sue letterfrom the EEOC, authorizing him to commence a separate civil action.
On May 24, 2007, the plaintifffiled a two count complaintinthe United States District Courtforthe District of Connecticut, alleging that the school system had (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of the ADEA and § 46a-60, and (2) retaliatedagainst him because he had filed administrative complaints against the school system. After the school system filed a motion for summary judgment, the court, Underhill, J., first dismissed the plaintiff’s discrimination claims that were premised on the ADEA and § 46a60 without prejudice on the ground that they were barred by sovereign immunity. The court then concluded that there was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact that would support the plaintiff’s claim that the school system had retaliated against him and that, therefore, the school system was entitled to summary judgment

on that claim.
The plaintiff filed the underlying complaint in Superior Court, dated June 19, 2009, in which he alleged that the school system had (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of both § 46a60 and the ADEA, and (2) retaliated against him. In support of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the school system instituted its curriculum change in an effort to eliminate older teachers, as blueprint reading classes were taught predominantly by teachers older than age forty. The plaintiff further alleged that the schoolsystemthenbeganapatternofretaliationagainst him as a result of his complaints with the commission and the EEOC. Specifically, he claimed that the school system monitored his classwork on a constant basis, subjected himto numerous disciplinary actions, threatenedtoterminatehis employment, suspendedhimfrom work without pay, required him to attend disciplinary hearings, solicited students to make complaints against him, and made false accusations of incompetence and wrongdoing. The plaintiff asserted that the school system’s actions constituted treatment different from that experienced by other similarly situated teachers. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and an injunction requiring the school system to cease all retaliatory actions against him.
On August 1, 2012, the school system filed a motion for summary judgment, along with supporting documents, asserting that (1) the plaintiff’s claim under the ADEAwas barredby sovereign immunity, and (2) there

wasnogenuineissueofmaterialfactthatwouldsupport the plaintiff’s claims that it had discriminated against him regarding its curriculum decisions or that it had retaliated against him because he had filed administrative complaints against the school system. In response, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion but did not attach any evidence in support of his claims or that disputed any ofthe assertions made by the school systemin support ofits motion. See Practice Book § 17- 45. In a memorandum of decision filed October 15, 2012, the courtfoundthat, althoughtheplaintiff’sADEA claim was not barred by sovereign immunity, the evidence submitted in conjunction with the school system’s motion for summary judgment established that there was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact that wouldsupporttheplaintiff’sclaimsthatithaddiscriminatedor retaliated against him. Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the school system on both the state and federally based discrimination claims, as well as the plaintiff’s retaliation claim. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that the court improperly concludedthatthere was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether the school system had (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of the ADEA and § 46a-60, and (2) retaliated against him.8 In response, the school system argues that, although the court correctly rendered summary judgment in its favor on both counts, it improperly concluded that the plaintiff’s ADEA claim was not barred by sovereign immunity.
We begin by setting forth our standard ofreview and the principles that guide our analysis for appeals from the rendering of summary judgment. ‘‘Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendant’s] motion for summaryjudgment is plenary.

. . . The law governing summary judgment and the accompanying standardofreviewarewell settled. Practice Book § [17- 49] requiresthatjudgmentshallberenderedforthwithif the pleadings, affidavits and any other proofsubmitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.

. . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings.

. . . ‘‘In seeking summaryjudgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.

. . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.

. . . ‘‘The party opposing amotionfor summaryjudgment mustpresent evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue

. . . . The movant has the burden ofshowing the nonexistence ofsuch issues butthe evidence thuspresented, ifotherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist.

. . . To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts

. . . which contradict those stated in the movant’s affidavits and documents.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walker v. Dept. of Children & Families, 146 Conn. App. 863, 869–70, 80 A.3d 94 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 917, 85 A.3d 653 (2014). With these principles in mind, we turn now to the plaintiff’s individual claims.
I
We first address the school system’s argument concerning sovereign immunity because it implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Columbia AirServices, Inc

. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). In its memorandum of decision, the trial court correctly stated that General Statutes § 46a-100 explicitly waives the state’s sovereign immunity for claims against the state for employment discrimination brought under § 46a-60. The court additionally concluded, however, that the waiver ofthe state’s sovereign immunity set forth in § 46a-100 also extends to discrimination claims brought against the state under the ADEA. On appeal, the school system contends that the plaintiff’s claim brought under the ADEA is barred by sovereign immunity on the basis of its assertion that the state statutory scheme waiving sovereign immunity for violations of the state age discriminationstatute, § 46a-100, doesnotextendtoclaims based on the corresponding federal statute relating to age discrimination. We agree with the school system. ‘‘Sovereign immunity

. . . presents a question oflaw

over which we exercise de novo review.

. . . In so doing, we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.

. . . The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under

our case law.

. . . It has deep roots in this state and

our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient

common law.

. . . Not only have we recognized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state.

. . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under

ourjurisprudence.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) ColumbiaAirServices, Inc

. v.Dept. ofTransportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349. Our Supreme Court has held that tobypassthe doctrine ofsovereignimmunity, aplaintiff must demonstrate that ‘‘(1) the legislature, either expressly or by force ofa necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity

. . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess ofstatutory authority, orpursuant to an unconstitutional statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 397, 968 A.2d 416 (2009).
In Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2000), the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue ofwhether sovereign immunitybars anADEA discrimination suit brought by a private individual against a state. Id., 66–67. The court ultimately concluded that ‘‘the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity,’’ and, accordingly, affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. Id., 92. In so holding, the court opined: ‘‘Our decision today does not signalthe end of the line for employees who find themselves subject to age discrimination at the hands oftheir state employers. We hold only that, in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits byprivate individuals. State employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes, and may
recover money damages from their state employers, in almost everyState ofthe Union. Those avenues ofrelief remain available today, just as they were before this decision.’’ Id., 91–92.
In the present case, the trial court correctly noted that § 46a-100 operates to waive sovereign immunity for claims brought against the state pursuant to § 46a60. SeepartIIofthisopinion. Thecourtstated, however, thatitsaw ‘‘no basis uponwhichto confinethatholding to discrimination claims identified as grounded only in state statutes.’’ In so concluding, the court stated that neither the eleventh amendment9 nor Kimel had any bearing on the plaintiff’s ADEA claim because both precluded only claims under the ADEA brought infederal court and not those brought in state court. We do not so narrowly read Kimel

. Mindful of the basic tenets of sovereign immunity and given the absence of any state statute abrogating the protections of sovereign immunity for an ADEA claim against the school system, we believe that the school system is, in fact, immune from suit whether in stateorfederalcourt, onthebasisofanallegedviolation ofthe ADEA. Accordingly, we disagree with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s discrimination claim undertheADEAwasnotbarredbysovereignimmunity. Because our determination implicates the court’sjurisdiction overthe school system, as an agent ofthe state, regardingtheADEAclaim,wemustremandthatportion of the judgment to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the ADEA claim on the basis of sovereign immunity.
II
We turn next to the plaintiff’s claims that the court improperly rendered summaryjudgment in favor ofthe school system on his remaining discrimination claim, brought under § 46a-60, and on his retaliation claim. We discuss each claim in turn.
A
The plaintiff first claims that the court incorrectly rendered summaryjudgment in favor ofthe school system on his discrimination claim under § 46a-6010 becausetheevidencebeforethecourtpresentedagenuine issue of material fact. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. In his complaint, the plaintiff asserted that the schoolsystemhadeliminatedblueprintreadingcourses in an effort to reduce the number of older teachers it employed. In support of its motion for summaryjudg-ment and to rebut the plaintiff’s contention, the school system submitted school Superintendent Hughes’ affidavit, in which she stated in relevantpart: ‘‘The [school system] decided to implement the [curriculum] change to better prepare students for the requirements of [the No Child Left Behind Act] 11 and make students more skilled and competitive in their selected trade areas. This curriculum change reflected the [school system’s] decision that blueprint reading, which had always been taught in part in each trade program, fit better into the trade-specific classes as taught by trade specific instructors rather than through generalized blueprint reading classes. Byeliminatingthe redundancyin [blueprint reading] instruction, students would continue to receive [blueprint reading] instruction and, at the same time, gain access to enhanced math and language arts classes.’’ (Footnote added.) Hughesfurtherattested: ‘‘The decisionto consolidate the blueprint reading program into existing programs had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s age. In terms of general statistics, the majority of the school system’s instructors as a whole are [forty] years of age and older—specifically 80.21% of the total number of instructors, both male and female, and a specific percentage are over [fifty] years of age, approximately 51.23%

. . . of the total number of instructors.

. . . The [school system] employedthe plaintiffuntilAugust of 2005 as a blueprint reading instructor without any change to his status. After the [blueprint] course was eliminatedatEliWhitneyforthe 2005–2006schoolyear, the plaintiffwas placed in apermanent substitute position

. . . without any change to his position status, salary or benefits. The plaintiff was then offered an instructing position

. . . at W. F. Kaynor Technical High School

. . . and has served in that capacity since that time.

. . . The [school system] denies that age had anythingto do withits decisionto revamp the technical school system curriculum and states that the change

was made in the best interest of the [school system] and its students.’’
Intheplaintiff’sdeposition, transcriptsofwhichwere appended to the school system’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff testified that, although he was initiallyofferedapermanentsubstituteposition, hewas improperlyoverlookedforpositionssimilartohispreviousjob as ablueprint reading teacher in favor ofother, younger teachers. Notwithstanding that general claim, however, the plaintifftestified in his deposition that he could not recall which positions he was qualified for

or the names ofthe other teachers who were similarly situated but hired in his stead. The plaintiff conceded,

as well, that he was never demoted and that his pay and benefits remained the same at all times.
As apreludeto ourdiscussion ofthe court’sresponse to the school system’s motion for summaryjudgment,it is useful to briefly discuss the law as it relates to discrimination claims, and, in particular, to the burden shifting feature of discrimination claims. ‘‘[D]isparate treatment simply refers to those cases where certain individuals are treated differently than others.

. . . The principal inquiry of a disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was subjected to different treatment because ofhis or her protected status.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 104, 671 A.2d 349 (1996). As our Supreme Court has elucidated, ‘‘[w]hen a plaintiff claims disparate treatment underafaciallyneutral employmentpolicy, this court employs the burden-shifting analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp

. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Under this analysis, the employeemustfirstmakeaprimafacie caseofdiscrimination. The employer may then rebut the prima facie

casebystatingalegitimate, nondiscriminatoryjustification for the employment decision in question. The employee then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 636–37, 791 A.2d 518 (2002). Following this procedural pathway, the trial court determinedthat, throughthe affidavits, depositions and other documentary evidence attachedto the motionfor summary judgment, the school system had demonstrated that its actions regarding the plaintiff were not motivated by his age, but rather, were in furtherance oflegitimate pedagogical goals. The failure ofthe plaintiff to submit any documentary evidence or to present any facts beyond mere allegations did not put into dispute the school system’s recitation of the good faith basis for its personnel decisions and actions that affected the plaintiff.
We have reviewed thoroughly the complaint, the school system’s motion for summary judgment and appended exhibits, the plaintiff’s objection thereto and the court’s memorandum of decision, and conclude,

on the basis of our review, that the court correctly determined that the plaintifffailed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding his employment status. The plaintifffailedtoproduceanyevidenceto createagenuine issue ofmaterial fact demonstrating that the school system’s nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating the blueprint reading class he taught, namely, to meet the

new legislative mandates, was not the true reason for its employment decision.12 Evidence submitted by the schoolsystemestablished, withoutcontradictionbythe plaintiff, that the blueprint reading course was largely eliminated on the basis of the curriculum change and that the plaintiff’s transfer was not related to, or evenpartially motivated by, his age. Indeed, the record evidences that the school system assisted the plaintiffand other blueprint reading teachers in finding similar teachingpositions once it made its curriculum determination regarding this course offering. As a result ofthe school system’s efforts, the plaintiff did not lose his position, his benefits or his salary, but was, instead, relocated to another school with the available

resources. The plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which he assertedaclaim ofdisparatetreatment, was conclusory and unsupportedby any evidence. In short, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence to counter the facts attested to in Hughes’ affidavit regarding the reasons for terminating the blueprint reading classes. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly granted the school system’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s discrimination claim.
B
We turn last to the plaintiff’s claim that the court incorrectly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning his retaliation claim.
The following additional facts are relevant to the plaintiff’s final claim. When the school system submitted its motion for summary judgment, it attached

numerous affidavits from officials within the school system. One such affidavit was from Robert Axon, the principal of Kaynor, to which the plaintiff had been transferredafterthe curriculum change. Inhis affidavit, Axon attested to the numerous disciplinary letters sent to the plaintiff, the first of which was issued approximately twenty months after the plaintiff filed his complaints with the commission and the EEOC. The first letterwas a‘‘[l]etterof[c]ounseling’’thatconcernedthe plaintiff’s abilityto control students inthe classroom as well as his recurringtardiness to school. Axon attested,

as well, that the plaintiff had received numerous other ‘‘[l]etter[s] of [r]eprimand’’ that were based on, inter alia, hislackofclassroomsupervisionandabsencefrom hisclassroom, failuretosubmitlessonplans, andfailure to report a fire in the machine shop. As a result of his behavior, the plaintiff received a one day suspension in March, 2007. The plaintiff also received a three day suspension in October, 2007, on the basis ofhis lack of properclassroomsupervision, inappropriateworkplace conduct, poorjudgment and failure to follow direction from the administration.
The plaintiffalleged in his complaintthatthese disciplinary measures were in retaliation for the complaints he had filed with the commission and the EEOC. In his affidavit, however, Axon attested: ‘‘I had no knowledge that he had previously filed a complaint with the [commission] in2005abouttheconsolidationoftheblueprint readingprogramintothe regularcurriculum.’’Althoughthe plaintiffinsisted in his deposition thatAxon’s statement was not credible, he was unable to point to any evidencethatAxonoranyotherofficialsatKaynorwere
aware of the complaints he had filed. Also, although the plaintiff asserted that he had suffered retaliatory employment actions ‘‘constituting treatment different from that imposed upon other teachers similarly situatedto the plaintiff,’’ he was similarlyunable to provide the names of any such similarly situated teachers.
‘‘Inorderto establishaprimafacie case ofretaliation,

a plaintiff must show that: [1] he engaged in protected participation or opposition under [the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.]

. . . [2] that the employer was aware of this activity, [3] that the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff, and [4] that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action, i.e., that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DeMoss v. Board of Education, Docket No. 3:05-CV-00736 (DJS), 2014 WL 1875105, *13 (D. Conn. May 9, 2014).
On the basis of the evidence before the court, we conclude that there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact

as to whether the school system retaliated against the plaintiffforhaving filed administrative claims asserting discrimination by the school system. Indeed, as noted, the plaintiff offered no counterevidence to show that the officials at Kaynor knew ofhis complaints with the commission and the EEOC at the time they disciplined him for his perceived shortcomings. In sum, the plaintiff’s claims amounted to bare conclusory assertions that the school system discriminated and retaliated against him; such statements are insufficient to survive

a motion for summaryjudgment. See Chadha v. Charlotte HungerfordHospital, 97 Conn. App. 527, 540, 906 A.2d 14 (2006) (no genuine issue ofmaterial fact where plaintiffrelied on ‘‘conclusory statements and personal assessment ofthe motives ofthe defendants’’ in opposing summary judgment). The trial court properly rendered summaryjudgmentinfavor ofthe school system.
The form ofthejudgment is improper; thejudgment is reversed only as to the ADEA claim and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss that claim for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction. Thejudgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 46a-60 is aprovision ofthe Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. See General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
3 At trial, the school system raised the issue of res judicata concerning the retaliation claim. There, the school system claimed that because Judge Stefan F. Underhill of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut had determined in the federal litigation between the parties thattheplaintiffhadfailedto raise agenuine issue ofmaterialfactinsupport of the retaliation claim, he should have been foreclosed from again raising the claim in state court. From our review of the record, it does not appearthat the trial court responded to the resjudicata claim but, rather, rendered summary judgment on the same basis as had Judge Underhill. On appeal, the school system has not raised res judicata as an alternate ground for affirmance. See Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1). Therefore, we confine our analysis to whether the court correctly rendered summaryjudgment on the basis of its determination that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of any genuine issues of material fact.

4 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425, codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2006 & Sup. III 2009).

5 The record reflects that the plaintiff’s original administrative complaint pleaded discrimination on the basis ofthe school system’s decision to eliminate or to reduce blueprint reading courses across all schools. After the blueprint reading class at Eli Whitney was eliminated, the plaintiffamended his complaint with the commission and the EEOC on August 29, 2005, to specifically plead the elimination of the blueprint reading course he had taught there.

6 As ofFebruary 10, 2009, the plaintiffwas still employed as amanufacturing technology teacher at Kaynor although he was then on a medical leave of absence. The plaintifftestified at his deposition, dated October 30, 2008, that he was ‘‘pending retirement.’’

7 Since the enactment ofPublic Acts, 1991, No. 91-331, codified at General Statutes § 46a-101, that statute has allowed a complainant to seek a release from the commission that permits the complainant to proceed directly in Superior Court.

8 The plaintiffalso claims that the court erred in considering the affidavits providedbytheschoolsysteminsupportofitsmotionforsummaryjudgment without any additional evidence to support the affiants’ statements. The plaintiff’s argument is without merit. See Practice Book § 17-45 (‘‘[a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like’’).

9 The eleventh amendment to the United States constitution provides: ‘‘The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens ofanother State, or by Citizens or Subjects ofany Foreign State.’’

10 General Statutes § 46a-60 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: ‘‘(1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness

. . . .’’ We note that § 46a-60 (a) (1) has been amended since 2005, when the plaintifffirst filed his complaint ofdiscrimination with the commission. See PublicActs, 2011, No. 11-55, § 24; PublicActs, 2011, No. 11-129, § 20. Because those amendments are not relevant to the claims raised by the plaintiff, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of § 46a-60 (a) (1).

11 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2006 & Sup. III 2009).

12 In support of his discrimination claim, the plaintiff in his complaint quoted a New Britain Herald article, published April 4, 2007, in which a school system representative stated that the school system’s actions were to ‘‘tighten up because of federal cuts. We’re letting some of our older teachers phase out. We’re under pressure to make the bottom line balanced while bringing our system into the 21st Century.’’ This statement is hearsay and is therefore inadmissible. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-2; see also Walker

v. HousingAuthority, 148 Conn. App. 591, 600, 85A.3d 1230 (2014) (‘‘[h]earsay is generally inadmissible

. . . and therefore when deciding a motion for summary judgment a court may not consider material that would be hearsay at trial’’ [citation omitted]). Accordingly, the court properly disregarded this reference in concluding that the school system was entitled to summary judgment.