Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

The Responsibilities of the 
 

Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

OIG-10-80 April 2010 
I 

Office ofInspector General 

U.s. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses how the DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement has 

implemented its statutory responsibilities. It is based on interviews with employees and 

officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

~~d.~

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 


Background..........................................................................................................................2
 


Results of Review ................................................................................................................4
 


Improved Relationships Will Facilitate CNE’s Policy Coordination Role ...................4 
 

CNE’s Resource Analysis Role Has Developed Slowly .............................................11 
 

An Operational Component Can More Effectively Discharge CNE’s “Track and 
 

Sever” Responsibility...................................................................................................13 
 

CNE Should Remain in the Office of the Secretary ....................................................17 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................17 
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................25 
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report.......................................26 
 

Appendix C: Management Directive 6400................................................................30 
 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report........................................................33 
 

Appendix E: Report Distribution ..............................................................................34 
 

Abbreviations 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 
 

CNE Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice 
 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 
 

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center, Department of Justice 
 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice 
 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
 

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 
 

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center, Department of Justice 
 

OIA Office of International Affairs 
 

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office 
 

of the President 


PA&E Program Analysis & Evaluation 


SOD Special Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration 


USCG United States Coast Guard 


USIC United States Interdiction Coordinator 

OIG
 


Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

This report assesses the effectiveness of the Office of 

Counternarcotics Enforcement. The office, created in 2004 by the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, is charged with 

coordinating Department of Homeland Security counternarcotics 

policies, ensuring the adequacy of the department’s 

counternarcotics resources, reviewing agency budgets, tracking 

and severing drug-terror connections, and representing the 

department in counternarcotics working groups and other entities. 

We evaluated whether the office has fulfilled its statutory 

responsibilities. Some staff in the Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement we interviewed, as well as personnel at other 

agencies, expressed concern about the office’s ability to 

accomplish its mandates. As we examined the office’s 

performance, we identified an assortment of challenges that have 

hampered staff and diminished mission effectiveness. 

We determined that the office faces inherent difficulties. Although 

the office has had trouble fulfilling statutory responsibilities, it 

could be more efficient and effective by establishing better 

relationships with partners, coordinating counternarcotics policy, 

and ensuring the adequacy of the department’s interdiction 

resources. We are making nine recommendations to enhance the 

ability of the office to meet its various responsibilities. The Office 

of Counternarcotics Enforcement concurred with six of those 

recommendations. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 1 

 

Background 

Among many responsibilities, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) is charged with preventing the entry of illegal 

drugs into the United States and diminishing the threat of drug 

trafficking, the world’s most lucrative criminal activity.1 Reducing 

this threat is of special interest to the department because some 

terrorists finance operations with money raised through narcotics 

trafficking. For example, terrorists financed the 2004 Madrid train 

bombings mainly through the sale of hashish.2 In 2008, a Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) assistant administrator noted 

that Hamas and Hezbollah remain active in the South American 

drug trade.3

 Even if these groups do not directly threaten the 

United States, narcotics traffickers have the capacity to destabilize 

friendly governments, undermine U.S. foreign policy, and generate 

widespread violence. 

Several DHS components have a role in counternarcotics activities. 

Four prominent DHS players are illustrated in Table 1. 

Table 1. Counternarcotics Roles of Various DHS Entities 

Entity Counternarcotics Roles 

Customs and Border 

Protection 

Interdict narcotics while facilitating the flow of legitimate 

travel and commerce along U.S. land borders and at ports 

of entry. 

Intelligence & Analysis 

Assist communication and information exchange among 

law enforcement agencies; process information on border 

threats to produce intelligence products. 

Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement 

United States Coast 

Guard 

Develop drug seizure leads on money laundering networks 

and drug trafficking organizations; participate in joint 

investigations; and reduce illegal arms trafficking. 

Coordinate maritime security; decrease maritime 

vulnerability; and interdict narcotics in the maritime 

environment. 

Other parts of the department, such as the Science and Technology 

Directorate and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center also 

play a role in the counternarcotics field. Because these diverse 

1 Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?, July 2008, 
 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2914 


2 The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances, November 2008, page 51.
 


www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus89.pdf 


3 Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?, July 2008, 
 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2914 
 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 2 
counternarcotics missions would require coordination, the 2002 

Homeland Security Act established the position of DHS 

Counternarcotics Officer to facilitate policy implementation, 

review agency counternarcotics budgets, and sever links between 

drug traffickers and terrorists. The Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) replaced the 

Counternarcotics Officer with the Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement (CNE).4

 A 2005 DHS management directive 

established the Director of CNE as the Secretary’s principal 

advisor on the adequacy of DHS counternarcotics resources.5 The 

management directive is attached as Appendix C. 

Section 7407(e) of IRTPA states that the CNE Director is required: 

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“To coordinate policy and operations within [DHS], between 

[DHS] and other Federal departments and agencies, and 

between [DHS] and State and local agencies with respect to 

stopping the entry of illegal drugs into the United States; 

To ensure the adequacy of resources within [DHS] for stopping 

the entry of illegal drugs into the United States; 

To recommend the appropriate financial and personnel 

resources necessary to help [DHS] fulfill its responsibility to 

stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United States; 

Within the Joint Terrorism Task Force construct to track and 

sever connections between illegal drug trafficking and 

terrorism; and 

To be a representative of [DHS] on all task forces, committee, 

or other entities whose purpose is to coordinate the 

counternarcotics enforcement activities of [DHS] and other 

Federal, State or local agencies.”6 

As an independent office that reports directly to the DHS 

Secretary, CNE oversees DHS counternarcotics policy and 

resource allocation, but does not control DHS operations.7 The 

2002 Homeland Security Act had given the Counternarcotics 

Officer the title of United States Interdiction Coordinator (USIC), a 

position statutorily charged with coordinating interagency 

counternarcotics efforts.8

 When IRTPA established CNE, the 

statute did not give the CNE Director the USIC role. IRTPA 

assigns responsibility for naming the USIC to the Office of 

4 6 U.S.C. § 458. 
 

5

 DHS Management Director 6400, “Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement Mission and Functions,” 
 

October 2005. 
 

6 6 U.S.C. § 458(d) 
 

7 6 U.S.C. § 458(e). 
 

8 Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469. 
 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 3 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). ONDCP is not required 

to select CNE’s Director as the USIC. However, CNE does have a 

role on the Interdiction Committee, a group of 13 agencies, which 

serves as an advisory board to the USIC and ONDCP. 

Results of Review 

CNE has encountered difficulties meeting its statutory responsibilities. 

Several factors have contributed to this. The inability of CNE to gain and 

empower agency liaisons has limited the office’s role as a policy 

coordinator. Moreover, CNE has not fully implemented its responsibility 

to be a DHS counternarcotics representative. Although CNE needs to 

conduct reviews of agency budgets, we determined that this role has not 

been developed. We also concluded that CNE’s statutory responsibility to 

track and sever drug-terror connections was more appropriately suited for 

another component. CNE has the potential to function successfully while 

meeting statutory mandates. Much work is needed to make CNE the 

dynamic organization envisioned in statute. 

Improved Relationships Will Facilitate CNE’s Policy 
 

Coordination Role 
 

CNE Has Helped Develop Some Strategy Documents 

Prior to 2009, CNE achieved little regarding the statutory mandate 

to coordinate DHS counternarcotics policy and operations. 

Because of the extensive counternarcotics experience in the 

operational components that joined the department, CNE staff had 

a limited ability to lead efforts to coordinate activities. 

Components outside of CNE perceived that the office did not have 

the experience or resources to coordinate general DHS efforts. 

Even with clear statutory authority and support from Management 

Directive 6400, CNE could not implement its mandates. 

Interviewees from DHS operational components noted that early 

efforts from CNE had little measurable value. 

CNE has contributed to the development of three strategy 

documents: the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics 

Strategy, the Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy, and the 

Maritime Border and Transit Zone Counternarcotics Strategy. 

ONDCP, within the Executive Office of the President, among 

other duties, oversees counternarcotics efforts of federal agencies. 

For the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 

ONDCP designated CNE as a lead agency to develop the strategy, 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 4 
along with the Department of Justice. The National Southwest 

Border Counternarcotics Strategy focused on reducing the flow of 

illegal drugs, drug proceeds, and correlated methods of violence 

across the United States-Mexico border. This document also 

addressed the roles that the outgoing flows of illegal currency and 

weapons play in sustaining drug cartels. 

CNE also helped develop two other strategies, the Northern Border 

Counternarcotics Strategy and Maritime Border and Transit Zone 

Counternarcotics Strategy, to articulate how DHS will address the 

full range of geographic threats and entry points for illegal drugs. 

Many staff in other components commented favorably regarding 

CNE’s contribution to these strategies. However, some believed 

that CNE merely compiled the work of others, or fulfilled a role 

that another entity could have completed. Although there is 

disagreement about CNE’s contributions, CNE gained important 

experience working with other agencies in the creation of these 

documents. 

In May 2009, a CNE analyst began to develop a counternarcotics 

doctrine. This document would establish a commonality of 

purpose to the range of DHS counternarcotics activities, essentially 

creating a roadmap for DHS entities. To establish an overall 

strategic direction in the counternarcotics area, this basic document 

should have been created during the first few months of CNE’s 

existence. The draft doctrine, completed in July 2009, included 

eight tenets designed to link the department’s counternarcotics 

effort through a common approach to fundamental principles. 

When finalized, the doctrine will set the standard for DHS 

counternarcotics components to maintain adequate interdiction 

resources and promote continued partnerships and the evaluation 

of program efficiencies. 

The Deputy Secretary received the draft doctrine in October 2009. 

Such a delay is a testament to CNE’s slow progress during the 

early years. The office is currently making positive strides toward 

becoming the coordinator of DHS counternarcotics policy. 

The Requirement for Component Liaisons Has Not Been 

Fulfilled 

Effective interaction with components is necessary for CNE to 

create credible policy documents. However, these important 

relationships did not develop quickly. Prior to its work on the 

strategy documents, CNE did not achieve much in the policy 

coordination area. CNE’s role as a policy coordinator created 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 5 
areas of overlap among various components. For example, United 

States Coast Guard (USCG) interviewees said that CNE’s work on 

the Maritime Strategy was somewhat duplicative with operational 

documents in the maritime interdiction field. In addition, concerns 

existed regarding the quality of CNE’s work. For example, some 

members of the USCG believed that CNE’s contribution to a 

strategy on Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible watercraft was 

incomplete and inaccurate. According to a USCG member, the 

USCG offered to rewrite the strategy for CNE, but CNE published 

the document before the rewrite could occur. 

CNE would have broader and more effective interaction with 

component experts if DHS implemented one of the basic 

requirements of the statute. Congress directed that9 

The Secretary shall designate senior employees from each 

appropriate subdivision of the Department that has significant 

counternarcotics responsibilities to act as a liaison between that 

subdivision and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. 

We were unable to determine that this has occurred. Employees 

from the GS-13 to GS-15 level have been detailed to CNE from 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE). The duties, responsibilities, or 

authorities of these detailees have not been well documented. On 

occasion, these employees have been referred to as liaisons; 

however, they have not served as meaningful liaisons. The USCG 

also provided staff to CNE, but these individuals performed duties 

to support the USIC, rather than to meet the statutory liaison role. 

We believe that it is not the intent of the statute to mandate 

detailees, but rather to identify a senior individual in ICE, CBP, 

and the USCG to serve in their own component as the principal 

counternarcotics liaison with CNE. This would enhance the ability 

of CNE to coordinate counternarcotics policy. The absence of 

liaisons in DHS operational components has hampered CNE’s 

effectiveness. 

According to data we received, CNE had 14 detailees between 

June 2004 and May 2007. Nine of these individuals were from 

organizations outside of DHS. CNE currently has one detailee, 

who represents the National Security Agency. Because the statute 

focuses on DHS staff, this individual and the bulk of CNE’s 

previous detailees would not meet statutory intent. 

9 6 USC § 458(b)(2). 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 6 
Interviewees from both in and outside CNE noted that employees 

detailed from other components to work in CNE did not have an 

established role, position descriptions, or meaningful work. Our 

review revealed that there were only two written agreements issued 

for CNE detailees through May 2007. The agreements assigned 

limited specific duties, but few fully defined roles. Institutional 

support for the employees on detail did not exist, which cost CNE 

its ability to establish long-term, productive relationships with 

DHS components. This disconnect must be corrected. 

The management directive conflicts with the statutory language in 

IRTPA with respect to liaisons. The statute requires the Secretary 

to designate component liaisons, while the management directive 

states that the CNE Director may request liaisons from 

components, which will select the employee. 

Interviewees at components with a counternarcotics mission 

informed us that the ineffective liaison support has diminished 

CNE’s ability to articulate policy. In one instance, a component’s 

employee noted that CNE included incorrect information in a 

strategy document that a liaison could have corrected. Through a 

comprehensive liaison program, CNE could create a viable policy 

coordination vision for DHS. Without effective liaisons, CNE has 

a diminished ability to create true partnerships with the 

components that have a counternarcotics mission. New liaison 

policy could also further define the role of detailees, solidify their 

positioning in CNE, and improve their interaction with CNE staff. 

In addition to improving policy coordination, greater use of senior 

liaisons and mid-level detailees should diminish the potential for 

duplication across components. For example, at the request of 

ICE’s Assistant Secretary, CNE initiated a contract to study how 

drug traffickers used criminal proceeds. This study included 

discussions of bulk cash smuggling and its effect on the flow of 

illicit narcotics. CNE staff said, however, that the office did not 

contact experts at ICE’s Bulk Cash Smuggling Center to determine 

whether ICE had already completed or had a study in progress 

before initiating the $500,000 contract. Although initiated at the 

request of ICE leadership, CNE should have contacted ICE’s bulk 

cash smuggling experts before beginning the work. An ICE liaison 

would have been able to facilitate interaction between CNE and 

ICE experts to determine the proper focus for this effort, or to 

prevent possible duplication. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 7 
As the liaison role is developed, CNE must ensure that its policy 

coordination role is appropriately empowered. Although the 

creation of strategy documents provided some experience, CNE is 

not completely functioning as the department’s coordinator of 

counternarcotics policy. New guidance is necessary to clarify the 

meaning of CNE’s policy coordination role, because the 2005 

directive did not specify how DHS offices would interact to 

implement CNE’s policy coordination mandate. A new directive 

should require component liaisons and CNE staff to form a 

partnership to achieve cooperation between operational 

components of the department and CNE. 

We recommend that the Secretary: 

Recommendation #1: Formally designate, in accordance with the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, a senior 

position in the USCG, CBP, and ICE as Counternarcotics Liaison 

Officer. 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation #2: Create position descriptions and supporting 

documents that specifically describe the duties and responsibilities 

of detailees assigned to CNE. 

Recommendation #3: Develop a counternarcotics policy 

coordination directive that would describe the procedures CNE 

would follow to fulfill its statutory mandate to coordinate 

component counternarcotics policies. 

CNE Has Attempted to Improve Its Role as a DHS 


Representative 


Unlike CNE, the department’s legacy agencies have longstanding 

linkages to federal and state partners. These relationships facilitate 

accomplishment of counternarcotics operations across levels of 

government. A list of regular meetings that CNE staff attends 

demonstrates that CNE staff has some connections with the 

interagency community, but the responsibility to be a 

representative of the department still needs development. CNE has 

given more emphasis to external partnerships recently and plans to 

continue to stress the importance of CNE’s external partnerships. 

Efforts to expand its role as a DHS representative include the 

creation of the DHS Counternarcotics Coordinating Council. This 

council includes senior leaders from DHS components that have 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 8 
drug interdiction and departmental policy formation responsibility. 

These individuals advise the CNE Director in the fulfillment of his 

statutory duties. We did not evaluate the Council’s role or its 

effectiveness. 

CNE’s attendance at various meetings and working groups has not 

always been productive. A staff member who attends several 

interagency meetings each week said that experts at other entities 

are not familiar with CNE’s work or mission. Thus, CNE’s good 

faith efforts to fulfill its representation responsibility are hindered 

because of its limited power and relatively few accomplishments 

during the office’s early years. 

DHS Management Directive 6400 made the CNE Director the 

principal coordinating official for all DHS counter drug policy 

matters. However, in early 2009, CNE’s former acting director 

wrote a memorandum to ICE seeking support for CNE’s inclusion 

in DEA’s Special Operations Division (SOD). The SOD targets 

major drug trafficking and narcoterrorism organizations. With a 

presence at the SOD, CNE could interact with partners as a way to 

expand its policy coordination and DHS representation roles. 

Because of its mandate, CNE should have been able to address its 

request directly to DEA or other offices. Moreover, that request 

could have been made as early as 2005. This absence from an 

important interagency counternarcotics entity has diminished 

CNE’s ability to coordinate policy and establish external 

partnerships. 

Section 7407(e)(1) of IRTPA makes partnerships with state, local, 

and tribal entities an explicit requirement for CNE, but the office 

has conducted little outreach in this area. One staff member noted 

that CNE created a 20-page state and local outreach document, but 

the document was dramatically edited and not used. There was 

also limited interaction between CNE and state governments when 

the office served as the co-chair for development of the 

implementation plan for the 2007 National Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics Strategy. The states’ contributions to the plan 

might have aided in the development of a more comprehensive 

document. For the 2009 border strategy, CNE did solicit 

comments from 160 state, local, and tribal officials. Although 

fewer than 20 state, local, or tribal officials responded, CNE’s new 

Director, confirmed in December 2009, is poised to develop better 

relationships with partners. The office should continue to conduct 

more useful interaction with state, local, and tribal governments. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 9 
To make this new emphasis more effective, a formalized approach, 

through the establishment of a standard operating procedure, is 

necessary. This will create an opportunity for CNE to learn more 

about state, local, and tribal operations and how interaction at those 

levels can help ensure that CNE fully meets its policy coordination 

responsibility. 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement, working with the Office of the Secretary: 

Recommendation #4: Establish a presence at the DEA Special 

Operations Division to facilitate the statutory requirements to be a 

representative of the department and facilitate policy coordination. 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement, working with the Assistant Secretary for State and 

Local Law Enforcement: 

Recommendation #5: Create a standard operating procedure that 

establishes policies for CNE’s interaction with state, tribal, and 

local law enforcement agencies. 

CNE Cannot Effectively Coordinate Counternarcotics 

Operations 

DHS operational components work in the field to stem the flow of 

narcotics into the United States. CBP seizes nearly four tons of 

narcotics daily, while the USCG, as part of its statutory duties, 

interdicts narcotics in the maritime environment.10 ICE uses its 

range of investigative capabilities to provide additional support to 

the department’s counternarcotics operations. 

6 U.S.C. § 458(e) 

Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize direct 

control of the operations conducted by the Directorate of Border 

and Transportation Security {CBP and ICE}, the Coast Guard, or 

joint terrorism task forces. 

Because CNE has no operational authority, it should not serve as 

the coordinator of DHS operations. For example, according to the 

Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy, various agencies are 

assigned action items, while CNE’s charge is sharing information 

about the drug-terror nexus with the Office of Intelligence & 

10 Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2008, Customs and Border Protection 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 10 
Analysis, ICE, CBP, and the USCG. CNE can coordinate policy 

and formulate strategy, but implementation of these items is the 

responsibility of entities with the ability to conduct operations, 

such as CBP, ICE, and the USCG. 

The management directive, unlike the statute that created CNE, 

does not make CNE a coordinator of DHS counternarcotics 

operations. Rather, the directive states that CNE is to function as 

“the principal coordinating official for all DHS counter drug policy 

matters.” We view this language as a more reasonable articulation 

of CNE’s capabilities. CNE’s leadership should seek a legislative 

change to ensure recognition of its nonoperational status by not 

positioning the office as a coordinator of counternarcotics 

operations. The USIC and the Interdiction Committee can work 

with DHS components on operational coordination, but this role is 

not a good use of CNE’s resources. 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation #6: In the next report to Congress, recommend 

that CNE coordinate policy only, rather than policy and operations. 

CNE’s Resource Analysis Role Has Developed Slowly 

CNE is required to ensure the adequacy of DHS counternarcotics 

resources and to recommend the appropriate financial and personnel 

resources that will allow DHS to interdict illegal drugs.11 CNE must also 

provide Congress an annual budget review that identifies how proposed 

funding levels could affect departmental counternarcotics activities.12 

CNE has not fully met these responsibilities. 

Recommending the proper level of counternarcotics resources is 

complicated because the DHS components with counternarcotics 

operations – USCG, CBP, and ICE – are multi-mission agencies. These 

components engage in various types of work that might be unrelated to 

counternarcotics operations. CBP and USCG aircraft on patrol interdict 

migrants, contraband, or narcotics, all simultaneously. Thus, it is difficult 

for budget analysts to quantify DHS resources used specifically to 

interdict drugs. Establishing a precise dollar amount for the 

counternarcotics portion of components’ work is therefore complicated. 

11 6 USC § 458(d)(2) and (3). 12 6 USC § 458(f)(1). 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 11 
The Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) staff in the DHS Office of 

the Chief Financial Officer manages the annual DHS resource allocation 

process, which projects components’ needs to meet program objectives. 

Departmental components develop their budgets after resource allocation 

decisions are made. PA&E experts provided information about CNE’s 

contribution to the annual process. CNE’s contribution has helped clarify 

ONDCP policy guidance, strategy implementation, and air/marine 

resource discussions. PA&E staff noted that CNE’s position outside of 

operational components ensures that the resource allocation process has 

perspective on general DHS counternarcotics goals. PA&E staff said this 

type of information obtained at the early stage of the budget process could 

be very useful. 

Nonetheless, PA&E staff said CNE does not have sufficient influence 

because it has not historically had much interaction directly with ICE, 

CBP, and USCG budget experts. Therefore, CNE has not been able to 

interact successfully with legacy counternarcotics agencies on budget 

matters. Additionally, CNE has only one full-time budget analyst. This 

staffing constraint has decreased the office’s ability to provide expertise to 

the resource allocation teams that consider how agencies can meet 

departmental objectives. 

DHS counternarcotics components historically submitted budgets to 

ONDCP and the Office of Management and Budget instead of CNE. 

Without the ability to review agency budgets, CNE cannot perform its 

responsibilities. We learned that the USCG submitted its FY2011 budget 

to CNE directly. This is a positive sign. However, DHS should establish 

a standard operating procedure for the DHS counternarcotics budget 

process that will clearly set forth CNE’s counternarcotics budget 

authorities. Moreover, the new procedure must place requirements on 

DHS counternarcotics agencies to submit timely budget information to 

CNE. 

CNE staff also noted that even with a budget review authority, the office 

cannot change specific line items submitted by the USCG, CBP, or ICE. 

However, CNE can be given greater authority to analyze DHS 

counternarcotics spending in a strategic manner. A PA&E official said 

that such a role would help the department understand where the marginal 

dollar is best spent. Through such analysis, CNE could find potential 

efficiencies in the DHS interdiction effort, such as the sharing of air assets 

between the USCG and CBP. This type of analysis would be of interest to 

Congress, because one of CNE’s statutory requirements is to recommend 

changes to improve the performance of DHS counternarcotics 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 12 
responsibilities.13 We acknowledge that CNE would need more staff to 

conduct this analysis. 

CNE’s annual reports to Congress have not strategically analyzed budget 

and resource issues. Congress, in FY2009 appropriations language, 

concluded that CNE’s reports are often late and not substantive. Advice 

from CNE on how DHS can improve resource allocation is in line with the 

statute and the Director’s role as the Secretary’s primary counternarcotics 

advisor. Developing greater analytical capability on budget and resource 

issues, with timely advice to Congress, should become a CNE priority. 

Currently CNE has only one analyst devoted to DHS budget work. 

Additional staffing is necessary for CNE to attend more PA&E resource 

allocation team meetings and to conduct more strategic analysis of DHS 

counternarcotics resources. ONDCP officials said that CNE cannot meet 

statutory mandates related to DHS counternarcotics budget issues with its 

current staffing level. 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement, with participation from the Office of Chief Financial Officer 

and the Office of the Secretary: 

Recommendation #7: Develop a standard operating procedure for the 

DHS budget process that provides CNE an opportunity to review and 

make recommendations on component budget requests before adoption by 

the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. 

Recommendation #8: Conduct ongoing strategic analysis of DHS 

counternarcotics spending and resources across components. 

An Operational Component Can More Effectively Discharge 

CNE’s “Track and Sever” Responsibility 

One of the primary missions DHS assumed upon its inception was to: 

. . . monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and 

terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and 

otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking. 

Congress used similar language in giving CNE the responsibility to track 

and sever drug-terror connections within the Joint Terrorism Task Force 

(JTTF) construct.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established 

13 6 USC § 458 (f)(2)(D). 
 14 6 USC § 111(b)(1)(H) and 6 USC § 458(d)(4). 
 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

Page 13
 

JTTFs as a primary interagency resource to fight terrorism. JTTFs strive 

to coordinate anti-terrorism activities across all levels of government. The 

FBI established a National JTTF at its headquarters. 

Only an operational component can sever drug-terror connections. 

However, Congress expressly kept CNE from having control over CBP, 

ICE, USCG, or JTTF operations. Such control is not necessary for CNE 

to accomplish some goals, such as policy coordination or budget reviews, 

but counternarcotics agencies have a range of field experience and 

authority that CNE cannot duplicate. 

Various interviewees said that even a component with interdiction 

authorities could find a track and sever mission difficult. A definitive link 

between narcotics traffickers and terrorists might be unknown to an 

interdicting agency, meaning that a nexus would be established in some 

cases only after further agency analysis or a subsequent FBI investigation. 

Thus, components generally cannot make operational interdiction and 

budgetary decisions based on the motivation behind illicit activities. 

Tracking drug-terror connections is possible to some degree at CNE, but 

only law enforcement components can take action to sever links between 

narcotics and terrorism. In April 2009 Congressional testimony, CNE’s 

former Acting Director said that the office promotes information sharing 

to help accomplish the track and sever mission. To this end, CNE 

contributes reports and analysis to Intellipedia, an information sharing 

Internet tool used by the intelligence community. Documentation we 

received during our fieldwork revealed that some experts were satisfied 

with CNE’s Intellipedia work. 

Nonetheless, one CNE staff member was “mystified” that CNE was given 

the operational function of severing the drug-terror connection. Another 

CNE staff member with experience at the National JTTF said that CNE 

cannot sever the narco-terror nexus. Additional interviewees noted that 

other organizations analyze and report on the drug-terror problem, which 

means that CNE could be duplicating other entities’ efforts. 

Many federal entities are involved in counternarcotics intelligence and 

operational analysis. DEA’s International Narcoterrorism Operations 

Center, for example, serves as the central point of contact to track 

terrorism-related leads and share data with other agencies. Additionally, 

�	 DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) brings together 

representatives from national and state agencies to coordinate 

counternarcotics operations, including possible links between drug 

traffickers and terrorism. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 14 
�	 

�	 

�	 

�	 

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and 

Financial Intelligence targets terrorists and drug traffickers using 

intelligence and statutory authorities.15 

The Crime and Narcotics Center at the Central Intelligence Agency 

works to track, analyze, and report on the drug trade’s effect on 

U.S. national security interests. 

The Joint Interagency Task Force – South monitors illicit 

activities, with a primary goal to eliminate the flow of drugs into 

the country. Congress recently praised this entity for its 

coordination of counternarcotics operations across the 

government.16 

The United States Southern Command collaborates with friendly 

nations to interdict illegal narcotics and conduct operations against 

narcoterrorist organizations. 

Perhaps most significant of all, the National Drug Intelligence Center 

(NDIC), coordinates all law enforcement information related to the 

structure and activities of drug traffickers. NDIC, part of the Department 

of Justice, releases an annual National Drug Threat Assessment, a 

comprehensive review of narcotics trafficking and related issues. NDIC 

staff has worked on narcotics intelligence issues for many years. In 1993, 

NDIC compiled information regarding the structure, membership, 

finances, communications, and activities of drug trafficking organizations. 

Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, ONDCP designated 

NDIC as the principal center for domestic strategic counterdrug analysis. 

The NDIC continues to focus on production of strategic domestic drug 

intelligence assessments. As part of its mandate, NDIC creates a range of 

documents, such as Drug Market Analyses for each of the 32 High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas in the United States. These documents 

discuss drug-related issues and developments that focus on significant 

trends and law enforcement concerns. 

CNE’s drug-terror nexus reports have included useful information, but 

since so many other entities have intelligence gathering and information 

sharing capabilities, we question the need for CNE to have a statutory role 

in this effort. In 2008, CNE reported to Congress that the office was 

merely a conduit for information. A DEA manager told us that he has 

never seen any CNE intelligence products. CNE’s lack of a role in 

creating such reports diminishes its value to other components that are 

charged with counternarcotics operations. Additionally, an ONDCP 

interdiction expert informed us that his work with CNE has been strained 

15 GAO, Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Could 
 

Manage More Effectively to Achieve Its Mission, GAO-09-794, September 2009. 
 16 House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, House Report 111­


166, page 377.
 


The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 15 
 

and largely unproductive. This individual also said that it is impossible 

for CNE to perform the track and sever role. CNE has not been present at 

ONDCP’s weekly drug interdiction intelligence briefings and is not 

represented at DEA’s EPIC or SOD, although CNE is working to correct 

this. The range of existing operational experience and authority across 

various agencies moots CNE’s track and sever effort. That CNE has no 

operational role and cannot coordinate DHS operations may explain why 

ONDCP no longer designates the CNE Director to serve as USIC. 

A CNE manager provided us with plans for improving the effectiveness of 

CNE’s Drug-Terror Nexus Division. However, DHS operational 

components, as well as experts at DEA and other agencies, can facilitate 

information sharing based on extensive field experience and intelligence 

expertise. These organizations, not CNE, can most effectively track and 

sever narcoterror connections. 

The reality of CNE’s nonoperational status has led other agencies to act. 

The 2009 Interagency Cooperation Agreement between ICE and DEA 

notes that ICE attachés will work with DEA on overseas operations, 

deconflicting drug enforcement issues, and tracking and severing 

connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. Interviewees 

said that CNE staff facilitated this action, which placed a CNE statutory 

responsibility into an operational component, where such authority can be 

implemented more effectively. 

A statutory change should reassign the track and sever function to another 

federal component with operational and law enforcement authority. CBP, 

ICE, or the USCG, in coordination with DEA, could more effectively 

implement this responsibility at DHS. As two counternarcotics experts 

wrote in 2008, “Since drug traffickers and terrorist groups are located in 

many of the same ungoverned locations, and use the same facilitation 

networks, the DEA is well positioned to address both threats, particularly 

as they overlap.”17 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Counternarcotics 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation #9: Pursuant to authority at 6 USC § 458(f)(2)(D), 

recommend to Congress that CNE be relieved of its track and sever 

responsibility. 

17 The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances, November 2008, page 17. 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus89.pdf 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 16 
 

CNE Should Remain in the Office of the Secretary 

The conference report for the FY 2010 DHS appropriations bill raised the 

issue of CNE’s placement within DHS. The report suggested it might be 

appropriate to shift the functions of CNE into the Office of Policy. We 

believe any reorganization is less important than the office’s needed 

revitalization. Because of the congressional interest in the question, 

however, we still wish to address where CNE should be located within the 

department. CNE should remain outside of the DHS operational 

components. Moving CNE into ICE, CBP, or the USCG could raise 

concerns about the office’s independence. CNE must work with agencies 

that have significant counternarcotics responsibilities and view each as an 

important partner. A perception of bias in CNE’s efforts could hamper the 

office’s ability to work with all DHS counternarcotics agencies. 

Interviewees provided their opinions concerning whether CNE should 

become part of the Office of International Affairs (OIA) or be under the 

control of the Office of Policy. Our interviewees were generally opposed 

to either move, or did not see value in a change. 

We concur with these views. Although international issues are a vital part 

of counternarcotics operations, CNE must work with various domestic 

stakeholders. Even if such linkages did not suffer after placement in OIA, 

the change would require modifications to OIA’s statutory authorities, 

which we do not view as preferable to CNE’s current location. 

Interviewees were also opposed to making CNE a subcomponent of the 

Office of Policy. Some suggested that such a change could enhance 

CNE’s authority within the department. However, we do not understand 

how distancing the Director of CNE from the Secretary will lead to the 

office’s empowerment. Another factor that argues against placing CNE in 

the Office of Policy is the CNE Director’s statutory role of being the 

Secretary’s principal counternarcotics advisor, which implies that the CNE 

Director should report directly to the Secretary. CNE’s current location in 

DHS is appropriate. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CNE concurred with six of our nine recommendations. We evaluated 

CNE’s written comments and made changes to the report where we 

deemed appropriate. A summary of the CNE response to our 

recommendations and our analysis is included below. A copy of the entire 

CNE response is included as Appendix B. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 17 
Additional information that discusses actions taken on the 

recommendations should be included in the CNE corrective action plan 

due within 90 days of the issuance of this report. 

Recommendation #1: Formally designate, in accordance with the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, a senior position in the 

USCG, CBP, and ICE as Counternarcotics Liaison Officer 

Management Comments to Recommendation #1 

CNE concurred with this recommendation. The office believes that the 

individuals designated by the Secretary as liaisons would form the 

membership of the Counternarcotics Coordinating Council with the 

Director of CNE. Senior leaders currently part of the Council are: 

o CBP’s Deputy Commissioner 

o ICE’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations 

o USCG’s Assistant Commandant for Operations 

o I & A’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

o The Deputy Director, Office of Operations Coordination, and 

o The Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy 

OIG Analysis 

Although we directed this recommendation to the Secretary, we viewed 

CNE’s response as reflective of the department’s view on the assignment 

of liaisons to CNE. This recommendation is resolved and open pending 

further developments in the selection of DHS liaisons to CNE. We concur 

with CNE that liaisons must become a central component of the office’s 

operations. The current membership of the Counternarcotics Coordinating 

Council aligns perfectly with the statutory requirement. It may not be 

difficult to add to the Council charter, if necessary, language that ties the 

Council to the purposes of the statute. We suggest that CNE work closely 

with the Office of the Secretary to ensure that liaisons are selected that 

will best serve the department’s counternarcotics mission. 

Recommendation #2: Create position descriptions and supporting 

documents that specifically describe the duties and responsibilities of 

detailees assigned to CNE. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #2 

CNE concurred with this recommendation. A template Memorandum of 

Agreement, which includes position descriptions for detailees, has been 

drafted. The first agreement is for an ICE detailee in CNE and should be 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 18 
finalized in March 2010. CNE views the detailees as important to the 

development of the fulfillment of the office’s statutory responsibilities. 

OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is resolved and open pending additional information 

on detailee position descriptions. CNE has taken credible action in this 

area. Detailees will serve to facilitate day-to-day contact between 

operational components and CNE. Equally important, they will bring 

subject matter expertise gained at the component that is loaning them on 

detail to CNE. 

There is a significant difference between the responsibilities of senior 

officers in other components who serve as designated liaisons and the 

responsibilities of mid-level employees loaned by components to work as 

detailees inside CNE. Senior liaisons, designated by the Secretary and 

serving on the Counternarcotics Coordinating Council, work for the 

directors of their components and closely with the CNE Director to steer 

the DHS counternarcotics enterprise. Detailees perform CNE duties as 

assigned under the supervision of CNE managers. One key role for the 

detailees is to execute the interaction with components necessary for CNE 

to fulfill the policy and budgetary responsibilities envisioned in the statute. 

Recommendation #3: Develop a counternarcotics policy coordination 

directive that would describe the procedures CNE would follow to fulfill 

its statutory mandate to coordinate component counternarcotics policies. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #3 

CNE concurred with this recommendation. A series of steps has been 

taken to improve departmental counternarcotics policy coordination. CNE 

has developed an internal document that is guiding staff on issues related 

to DHS policy. Additionally, the revitalized Counternarcotics 

Coordination Council is designed to ensure CNE understands the priorities 

of operational components. CNE reiterated its view that the use of 

detailees will be an important means to effect necessary change in this 

area. 

OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is resolved and open. CNE’s policy coordination 

actions should help the office meet its policy coordination responsibilities. 

However, CNE said that it would only consider the development of a 

policy coordination directive. We believe that the directive is necessary to 

guide CNE’s fulfillment of its statutory responsibility to coordinate policy. 

Specific procedures and instructions for staff will augment CNE’s 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 19 
effectiveness as it works across government entities to meet the mandate 

of policy coordination. Current office practices should be formalized with 

a CNE directive. The office should not wait for detailee positions to be 

filled before an internal policy coordination document is developed. 

Recommendation #4: Establish a presence at the DEA Special 

Operations Division to facilitate the statutory requirements to be a 

representative of the department and facilitate policy coordination. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #4 

CNE did not concur with this recommendation. The office believes that 

working with ICE and CBP representatives in the Special Operations 

Division is a better approach than maintaining a CNE staff presence there. 

The SOD neither coordinates policy nor engages in policy creation. 

Rather, the SOD coordinates governmental analytical and investigations 

resources related to counternarcotics. CNE does not believe that the 

intelligence information sharing or case analysis functions performed at 

the SOD are directly relevant to meeting the office’s statutory mandates. 

OIG Analysis 

CNE has a credible alternative to our recommendation. Through further 

work with departmental components at the SOD, CNE should be able to 

augment its policy coordination and representation roles without a direct 

staff presence. This recommendation is resolved and open pending further 

information about how CNE will meet the intention of the 

recommendation. . 

Recommendation #5: Create a standard operating procedure that 

establishes policies for CNE’s interaction with state, tribal, and local law 

enforcement agencies. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #5 

CNE concurs with this recommendation, and has created a plan to enhance 

outreach to state, local, and tribal partners. This document will be 

provided to the department’s Office of State and Local Law Enforcement. 

CNE views the outreach plan as a way to improve contacts with a variety 

of officials throughout the country. Through this improved flow of 

information, CNE will be able to suggest ways for the department to meet 

counternarcotics interdiction responsibilities. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 20 
OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is resolved and open pending further information 

about implementation of the final outreach plan. CNE has made important 

strides in its interaction with state, local, and tribal governments. As CNE 

interacts more with these levels of government, it will be better positioned 

to coordinate policy and serve as a departmental representative. 

Recommendation #6: In the next report to Congress, recommend that 

CNE coordinate policy only, rather than policy and operations. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #6 

CNE did not concur with this recommendation. After quoting the 

statutory provision that prohibits its control over DHS operations, CNE 

suggested that our various interviewees might have been concerned that 

the statutory authority to coordinate counternarcotics operations would 

lead CNE to control departmental operations. CNE noted that it 

successfully coordinated the DHS position on two major counternarcotics 

operations coordination operations in Mexico and the Caribbean. 

OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is unresolved and open. Through ongoing 

improvements, CNE can successfully coordinate DHS counternarcotics 

policy, but the office is not positioned to fulfill a role in the coordination 

of operations. CNE receives some information on departmental operations 

to coordinate policy and be a DHS representative, but coordination of 

operations is outside the realm of an entity that has, by law, no authority 

over DHS counternarcotics operations. Without authority to affect the 

timing or scope of DHS counternarcotics operations, CNE cannot 

coordinate them. We do not believe that CNE offers value as an 

operational coordinator, although it can have a positive influence on 

counternarcotics operational improvements. CNE’s partners in the field, 

including CBP, ICE, and the Coast Guard, can most effectively coordinate 

DHS operations. 

Recommendation #7: Develop a standard operating procedure for the 

DHS budget process that provides CNE an opportunity to review and 

make recommendations on component budget requests before adoption by 

the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #7 

CNE concurs with the recommendation. The office has worked with the 

Office of Chief Financial Officer to ensure that CNE receives 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 21 
components’ budget requests. CNE also plans to increase its involvement 

in the resource allocation process for future years. CNE will work with 

component budget offices, as well, as a means to create a better 

understanding of strategic priorities across the department’s 

counternarcotics agencies. This will include work to make 

recommendations to improve DHS mission performance. 

OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is resolved and open. We request that CNE use the 

corrective action process to provide further updates on its budget 

coordination and review responsibilities. Formalized policy is central to 

this effort. CNE should also provide an update on how it has worked with 

DHS resource allocation and budget staff to guarantee that budgets are 

sent to CNE in a timely fashion. The policy would serve as the overall 

vision of the important part that CNE must play in determining how DHS 

budgetary practices will augment the department’s ability to interdict 

illegal drugs. 

Recommendation #8: Conduct ongoing strategic analysis of DHS 

counternarcotics spending and resources across components. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #8 

CNE concurred with this recommendation by listing a variety of budget 

coordination activities. These steps include CNE’s participation on 

resource allocation teams and leadership’s interaction with the Deputy 

Secretary’s Program Review Boards. Through these efforts, CNE engages 

in strategic analysis that leads to recommendations about the proper level 

of resources for DHS programs. CNE intends to provide representation on 

all budget review teams. Additionally, program execution can be 

reviewed through an examination of components’ annual reports. These 

actions will lead to a better understanding of the department’s strategic 

vision for counternarcotics. CNE will recommend overall enhancements, 

as appropriate. 

OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is resolved and open. CNE’s response shows a 

commendable level of commitment to the implementation of its budgetary 

responsibilities. Our recommendation envisioned additional work in this 

area, however. Congress has expressed an interest in receiving budget 

reports with greater analytical rigor regarding DHS counternarcotics 

spending. CNE should ensure that its work includes formal strategic 

analysis of how DHS can better spend counternarcotics resources, which 

we view as separate from the completed and planned contributions to the 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 22 
 

resource allocation process. This information is of interest to Congress 

and is within CNE’s statutory responsibilities. Additional work on 

department teams is a necessary component of this recommendation, but 

CNE must also conduct independent analysis that will inform Congress of 

possible efficiencies in DHS counternarcotics spending. CNE must also 

consider the additional staff and resources it may need to fulfill both the 

plans it has articulated and the more detailed analysis that is the intention 

of this recommendation. 

Recommendation #9: Pursuant to authority at 6 USC § 458 (f)(2)(d), 

recommend to Congress that CNE be relieved of its track and sever 

responsibility. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #9 

CNE did not concur with this recommendation. The office suggested that 

Congress created the track and sever authority to position CNE as the 

coordinator of the DHS counternarcotics enterprise, although CNE was 

not given intelligence or law enforcement functions nor authority over the 

counternarcotics operations of the components that do. CNE suggests that 

it discharges this responsibility by leveraging the department’s 

counternarcotics resources to enhance the tracking and severing of drugterror links. Through strategic analysis that assists components and 

reports to the Secretary, CNE adds value to the track and sever effort. 

OIG Analysis 

This recommendation is unresolved and open. CNE’s past work in this 

area does not seem to meet the responsibility created in the statute. No 

operational component told us that CNE provides useful strategic analysis. 

On the contrary, CNE is normally a consumer of analysis performed by 

others. When CNE provides DHS components, the Secretary, or Congress 

reports about drug-terror links, the office is not working within the Joint 

Terrorism Task Force construct to track and sever connections between 

illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. Even without this responsibility, 

CNE may conduct research and share information on the linkages between 

drug organizations and terrorist groups as part of its advisory, policy 

coordination, and budgetary responsibilities. However, we concluded that 

CNE is not positioned to lead the track and sever effort. Various parts of 

the federal government are a better location for this responsibility. CNE 

serves as a conduit for track and sever information developed largely by 

others, but it is not equipped to be the primary office to sever drug-terror 

connections. The fact that CNE staff facilitated changes to an 

interdepartmental (ICE-DEA) agreement that gave a track and sever 

function to ICE attachés is illustrative of those parts of the department that 

are better equipped to fulfill the track and sever responsibility. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Page 23 
Organizations that conduct counternarcotics intelligence work and 

operations, arrest drug traffickers, and seize illicit narcotics are the best 

entities to lead the government’s effort to prevent a union between 

narcotics and terrorist activities. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 24 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We initiated this review based on our interest in determining the 

effectiveness of CNE. We explored the office, its roles and 

responsibilities, and its ability to fulfill statutory mandates. We 

focused on CNE progress since its establishment in the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

Our fieldwork consisted of 34 interviews, including each CNE 

staff member, and experts at ICE, CBP, USCG, DEA, ONDCP, the 

Office of Intelligence & Analysis, the Office of the Chief Financial 

Officer, and the Office of Policy, and the former Director of CNE. 

We also observed various meetings that included CNE personnel, 

including weekly staff meetings that the new Acting Director led to 

develop the office’s FY2010 goals. 

This review initially began in January 2009. Shortly thereafter, it 

was suspended because the review team needed to augment 

another team that was completing Congressionally mandated work. 

In June, the review resumed and fieldwork was completed in 

November 2009 under the authority of the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for 

Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 25 

U_". l)<par1",n. or 1I~",,"nd S«uri'y

W.,hinglOn. OC 20528

iS~ e Homeland

Security

March 3, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR: Carlton I. Mann

Assistant IlIsp«:tor General for Ins])C\:tions

Office n....... 'rill.

FROM: O~ylingoflnspcetor Gcncrnl .

O. Williams O. 1ft W~ Dlrcctor

Ollicc ofCountemarcotics Enforcement

SUBJECT: Draji Report: The Re~p(JIl.\·ihilities of/he Office vfCoullternarcotics

Enforcemem - FOR OFFICIAl. USE ONLY (FOUO)

The Office ofCounlematootics Enforcement (CNE) appreeiatt'S the opportunity to review and

comment on the Office of Inspector Gener-d's (OIG) report referenced above. We thank you for

taking the time to meet with our staff and for Ihe thoroughness with whieh you approached your

task. We sec this report as an oPJXlnunity to make positive, lasting improvements to CNE.

We appreciate the aflinnative reference to the Countemarcotics Doctrine (CN Doctrine) and agree

that it is a fundamentally important document thaI should have been produced shortly after the

creation ofthe office. We are pleased 10 report that we ell;pecllo disseminate the CN Doctrine

within a few weeks. In addition. we thank you for your constroctive comments regarding our

Intellipcdia framework in support of our drog-lerror nexus mandate.

CNE also appreciates the OIG 's strong endorsement for the Office to remain an independent entily.

We concur wholeheartedly with this assessment. and believe the coordination ofcountemarcotics

matters must reside within CNE. The legislation which crealed the Office specifically contemplated

the need for an independent voice and advocate for the Department's cOllnternarcotics policies and

resources.

The folJowing are CNE's specific responses to each recommendation in the report:

010 Recommendation I: "Formally designate, ill accordance with the Intelligence Refoml and

Terrorism Prevention Act. :l senior position in the USCG, CBP, and ICE as Counternarcotics

Liaison Officer."

• CNE Response: CNE agrees with lhis recommendation and believes it is necessary for the

dcsignalion of liaisons to come from the Secrelary as the Chief Executive Officer ofthe

Department. These senior liaisons would then fonn the membership ofthe COllnlel1llrrCotics

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

Page 26
 

Coordinating Council (Ccq with the CNE Director. The CCC Charter currently identifies

the component membership to include the following representatives:

o Deputy Commissioner. U.S. Customs and Border Protection

o Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforc<,:ment

o Principal Deputy As~istant Secretary, Intelligence and Analysis

o Deputy Director, Office ofOperations Coordination

o Deputy As~i~tant Secretary, Office of Policy

o A~sistant Commandant for Operations, United State~ Coast Guard

DIG Recommendation 2: "Create position descriptions and supporting documents that specifically

describe the duties and responsibilities of detailces assigned to CNE.~

• CNE Response; CNE concurs with the recommendation and has developed a template for a

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between CNE and DHS Components for the

assignment of detailees to CNE. This template inciudl..'S draft position descriptions to be

included in the MOA. The first MOA, for an ICE detailee, is currently under final review

and CNE expects to finalize the agrl..'Cmcnt in March 2010. CNE appreeiate~ the recognition

the 010 gives 10 the importance of detailees in aceolllplishing CNE's mission. The

assignment of detailees from Department components with counternareotics responsibilities

is critical to the office's ability to effectively develop and coordinate counternareotics policy

and operations.

DIG Recommendation 3: "Develop a countemarcotics policy coordination directive that would

describe the procedure~ CNE would follow to fulfill its statutory mandate to coordinate component

counternarcotics policies."

• CNE Response: CNE agrees with this recommendation and has developed a "crosswalk" for

internal use by staff to facilitate the office's ability to coordinate DI-IS component

counternarcotics policies. In furtherance of this objective, CNE has reinvigorated the

Counternarcotics Coordinating Council (Ccq - a senior-level advisory body comprised of

representatives ofthe DHS countemarcotics components - the purpose ofwhich is to align

component CN priorities with CNE's efforts. In addition, CNE is now filling detailce

positions with subjl..'Ct mailer experts from the Department's CN components. Based on this

recommendation, CNE will give active consideration to creating a policy coordination

directive.

0[0 Recommendation 4; "Establish a presence at the DEA Special Operntions Division (SOD) to

facilitate the slaltltory requirements to be a representative ofthe department and facilitate policy

coordination."

• CNE Response: CNE disagrees with this recommendation and believes the best approach to

working with SOD is to leverage existing ICE and CBP personnel already assigned there.

The SOD is not a policy coordinating entity, nor docs it engage in countcrnarcotics policy

fornlUlation. The function ofSOD is to utilize criminal investigators and intelligence

analysts from various federal law enforcement agencies to identify links between drug

trafficking targets, and then coordinate investigative interagency operations under the

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

Page 27
 

auspices ofthe Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forcc program. In ordcr to be

assigned to SOD, you must be capable ofsupporting investigations either through

investigative case analysis or intelligence information sharing.

OIG Recommendation 5: "Create a standard opl;:rating procl'dure that establishes policies for

CNE's interaction with state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies."

• CNE Response: CNE concurs with this recommendation and has already dmfted a State,

Local, and Tribal Outreach Plan. CNE will provide this plan to the DHS Office ofState and

Local Law Enforcement (SLLE) by March 15. 20 IO. This plan outlines an organized

approach through which CNE can appropriately reach out to State, local. and tribal drug law

enforcement authorities. By communicating with these stakeholders. CNE stall' will

facilitate the fiow of information between entities most closely involved in countering the

drug threat and more easily determine if and how DHS can assist those entities in fulfilling

their countemareoties missions.

O[G Recommendation 6: "In the nei<t report to Congress. recommend that CNE coordinatl;: policy

only. rather than policy and operations."

• CNE Response: CNE disagrees with this recommendation and notes that per existing

legislation CNE is tasked to coordinate. not direct, operations, thus leaving operational

control to the components. Specifically, the legislation's Savings Clause states: "Nothing in

this section shall be construed to authorize direct control ofthe operations conducted by the

Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, the Coast Guard. or joint terrorism ta.~k

forees.,,1 CNE believes it might be the case that component interviewees, as referenced in

the report. may have been concerned about CNE controlling operations, rather than

coordinating operational matters. CNE has successfully coordinated lhe Department's

position on operational eountemarcoties mallers including air and marine support to

Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) and air suppon to Mexico (through

Opermion HALCON).

OIG Recommendation 7: "Develop a standard operating procedure for the DHS budget process thaI

provides CNE an opportunity to review componcnt requests before adoption by the Office oflhe

Chief Financial Officer,"

• CNE Response: CNE agrees with this recommendation and has already re.engaged with

DHS-CFO to ensure we ret:eive all component budget rl'quests. Component requests are

always routed to CNE via the EXe<:utive Secretariat process, In the past, CNE has nol

engaged in the Rl;:source Allocation Program review - at the le\'cl of Principal reviewhoweverCNE's Director \\~II engage in this process at this year's FY 12·16 FUlllre Years

Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) Resourcc Allocation Plan Program Review Board.

CNE will continue to engage with component budget offices to dctermine strategic

rcsoureing priorities, formulate budget requests, and making rl;:Commendalions whl;:re

appropriate for improving the Department's counternarcotics mission pcrfom\ance and

elTectiveness.

'6USC§458{f).

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

Page 28
 

OIG Recommendation 8: "Conduct ongoing strategic analysis of DHS counternarcotics spending

and resources across components."

• CNE Response: CNE agrees with this recommendation and intends to continue its

engagement in the Resource Allocation Plan production process. which inherently

necessitates that CNE provide strategic analyses that support the Department's FYHSP

report, and Homeland Security President's Budgt:t productiun. CNE's role has bt:en to

provide strategic analyses via the Deputy Secretary's Resource Allocation Issue Teams. In

FY 09. CNE provided analyses to four issue teams, most significantly the Border Control

Issue Team. In FY 10, CNE wiJlllgain provide analyses and the CNE Director wiJ1

participllte in the Deputy Secretary's Program Review Boards (PRO's) - where costs arc

compared to the FYHSP guidance and recommend resourees tradeoff recommendations are

conveyed to the Deputy Secretary and ultimately to the Secretary. The CNE DireelOr will

participatc in the initial meeting ofthe FY 12·I6 FYHSP Resource Allocation Plan PRD on

Mnreh 29, 2010 wherc DHS drug control agencies will present their proposed RAPs to the

Deputy Secretary, who will subsequently identify FY 12·16 Issue Team projects. CNE will

provide representatives to all CN-related Issue Teams and will monitor DHS Component

rcsource execution through a regular review ofthe Components' arumal reports. CNE will

make recommendations. where appropriate, to improvt: the Department's counternarcotics

mission perfonnanee and dTectivem:ss.

OIG Recommendation 9: "Pursuant to authority at 6 USC § 458 (t)(2Xd), recommend to Congress

that CNE bt: relieved of its track and sever responsibility."

CNE Response: CNE disagrees with this recommendation. Congress' intent in levying this

requirement was to put CNE in the position of coordinating the DHS counternarcotics

emerprisc, rather than mandating that CNE personnel conduct intelligence, investigations,

and apprehensions. The current Congressional mandate facilitates CNE's ability to leverage

the Department's intelligence and operational resources towards tracking and severing drugterror links. This includes providing strategic analysis to assist our components in

identifying the connections between drugs and terrorism. and reporting to the Secretary on

strategic drug-terror issues.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this report.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

Page 29
 

Appendix C 

Management Directive Number 6400 

Department of Homeland Security
 


Management Directive 6400 
 

Issue Date: 10/05/2005 
 

OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT 

MISSION AND FUNCTIONS 

I. Purpose 

The purpose of this Management Directive (MD) is to define the mission and functions of 

the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

and to designate the Director, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, a direct report to 

the Office of the Secretary, as the principal coordinating official for all DHS counter drug 

policy matters. 

II. Scope
 


This MD applies to all DHS Organizational Components.
 


III. Authorities 
 

The following law governs this MD:
 


Section 878 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 458) as amended by the 
 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). 
 

IV. Definitions 

None. 

V. Responsibilities
 


Director, Counternarcotics Enforcement (DCNE) will:
 


A. Assume primary responsibility for developing and coordinating counter drug policy 

within the Department and coordinating counter drug policy between DHS and other 

Federal departments and agencies, and between DHS and State, local, and tribal agencies. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 30 

Appendix C 

Management Directive Number 6400 

B. Serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary for ensuring the adequacy of counter 

drug resources within DHS. 

VI. Policy & Procedures 

A. Policy: 

1. The DCNE reviews and evaluates the counter drug activities of the Department and its 

components, including efforts in cooperating with other branches of the Federal 

Government, State and local, or tribal agencies. 

2. The DCNE reviews the budget requests of all DHS components with existing or 

proposed counter drug activities or activities that affect the ability of the Department or 

its components to meet counter drug policy objectives. 

3. The DCNE recommends to the Secretary the appropriate financial and personnel 

resources necessary to implement the Department’s counter drug policy and to achieve 

performance targets within the Department’s counter drug policy. 

4. The DCNE integrates DHS efforts to track and sever connections between illegal drug 

trafficking and terrorism in cooperation and consultation with other Federal, State, local 

and tribal agencies. 

5. The DCNE serves as a DHS representative on all task forces, committees, or other 

entities whose purpose is to coordinate the counter drug policy and activities of DHS and 

other Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies and international partners. 

6. The DCNE ensures that all DHS components are provided an opportunity to 

participate, as appropriate, in all counter drug task forces, committees or other entities. 

7. The DCNE reviews and provides comments on all reports that involve or have an 

impact on the counter drug policies or activities of the Department and Departmental 

components, including reports to Congress and other entities, including the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. 

NOTE: Any reports generated by the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement will follow 

legislative procedures as outlined in MD 420 and other Department guidance as 

appropriate. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 31 

Appendix C 

Management Directive Number 6400 

8. The DCNE advises the Secretary on all policy and resource issues regarding the 
 

National Drug Control Strategy. 
 

NOTE: Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize direct control of the 
 

operations conducted by any DHS component. 
 

B. Procedures: 

1. Staffing: The Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement shall be staffed as follows: 

a. The DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement will be staffed by permanent 

Federal employees. 

b. Upon the request of the Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, a 

component of the Department shall designate a senior employee with significant counter 

drug responsibilities to act as a liaison between the Departmental component and the 

Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. 

c. The Office will seek to obtain liaisons from the non-DHS Departments and agencies 

with significant counter drug interdiction and enforcement responsibilities to include the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Department of State, the Intelligence community and others as appropriate. 

2. Data: Departmental components shall provide all data and information identified by 

the Director, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, as necessary to carry out the policy 

and resource responsibilities of the Office as identified in Section V of this Management 

Directive. 

NOTE: Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legal restrictions on the 

distribution or use of any data or other information. 

VII. Questions 

Address any questions or concerns regarding this MD to the Chief of Staff, Office of 

Counternarcotics Enforcement. 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 32 

Appendix D 

Majors Contributors to this Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections 

Lorraine Eide, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspections 

Darin Wipperman, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspections 

LaDana Crowell, Inspector, Office of Inspections 

Michael Brooks, Inspector, Office of Inspections 

Susan Fischer, Inspector, Office of Inspections 

Megan Reedy, Inspector, Office of Inspections 

Ericka Kristine Odiña, Inspector, Office of Inspections 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 


Page 33 

Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Director, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement 
 

Page 34
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.