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67–304PDF 2011

TIME TO PAUSE THE RESET? DEFENDING U.S.

INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF RUSSIAN

AGGRESSION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 7, 2011

Serial No. 112–47

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D., president, Lantos Foundation for Human 

Rights .................................................................................................................... 12

Mr. Ariel Cohen, senior research fellow, Russian Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Heritage Foundation ............................................ 15

The Honorable Steve Sestanovich, George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian 

and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ....................................... 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................... 14

Mr. Ariel Cohen: Prepared statement .................................................................... 17

The Honorable Steve Sestanovich: Prepared statement ....................................... 33

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 63

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 66

(1)

TIME TO PAUSE THE RESET? DEFENDING U.S. 

INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. At 

the start of the hearing I would like to recognize Annette Lantos, 

the widow of former Congressman Tom Lantos who participated, 

along with her family members, in the inauguration of the Tom 

Lantos Institute in their native Hungary, and it will be undoubtedly the premier human rights institute in the world. So we always 

welcome you back, Annette. Thank you for being with us. And I am 

sorry I could not be on that trip to participate in such a momentous 

occasion. 

Also at the start of the hearing, I would like to capitalize on the 

presence of a range of State Department personnel and remind the 

Department of this committee’s longstanding pending request for 

the Secretary of State to testify on Afghanistan and Pakistan at 

the end of this month, we hope, and immediately upon full Senate 

confirmation, Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, whom we 

would like to have testify on Iran and Syria. And we had requested 

Ambassador Burns when he was still Under Secretary of State and 

had just been nominated for the Deputy Secretary post. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my friend, Mr. 

Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize each member of the committee for 1 minute for their opening remarks. 

We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that you 

summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before we 

move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-

minute rule. Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days 

to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to length 

limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. The Obama administration came into office intending to ‘‘reset’’ the U.S.-Russia 

relationship. Their assumption was that the Bush administration 

had needlessly antagonized Moscow with overly aggressive policies, 

2

and that a more conciliatory approach would produce Russian cooperation in a broad range of issues. To that end, the Obama administration has offered one concession after another, but the concrete results have been meager at best. 

Russian cooperation on Iran is usually cited as a major accomplishment. But other than agreeing not to block U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1929, which Moscow insisted be watered down, 

Russia’s approach to Iran remains essentially unchanged even as 

Iran accelerates its march toward a nuclear weapons capability. 

Russia is also committed to stopping U.S. missile defense efforts. 

The Obama administration has said that the recently ratified Strategic Arms Control Treaty, known as the New START, places no 

restrictions on U.S. missile defense efforts. However, the Russian 

Government has repeatedly stated that the treaty does, in fact, 

come with such restrictions and has unambiguously stated that it 

will not honor the terms of the agreement if the U.S. proceeds with 

its plans. 

Russian claims that U.S. missile defense efforts in Europe are a 

threat to their security, and we know that those claims are absurd 

on their face. Independent experts say that not only does the proposed system pose no threat but that it cannot do so, a fact that 

Russia’s leadership is well aware of. Russia’s true motive is a political one; namely, to divide NATO and to demonstrate to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that, despite their close alliance with the U.S., Moscow intends to retain a dominant influence 

over their affairs. This is how the government and the people in 

that region see it. 

Putin’s government claims a privileged position for Russia regarding the countries on or near its borders and has repeatedly 

used its muscle to enforce this assertion of rights. Moscow has exploited their dependence on Russian energy supplies—including oil, 

natural gas, and electricity—to pressure governments to accommodate Russian demands, going so far as to cut off supply in the middle of winter. 

When Estonia defied the demands of Russian officials not to relocate a Soviet memorial in its capital, a massive cyberattack was 

launched on that country, almost paralyzing it. Worst of all, in 

2008 Russia’s longstanding efforts to reimpose its control over 

Georgia moved beyond sowing political and economic turmoil and 

promoting separatist movements to an all-out invasion of large 

parts of that American ally. The tepid U.S. response has set a dangerous precedent and convinced Moscow that it has little to worry 

about. 

Moscow’s actions have demonstrated the lengths that it is prepared to take to assert its influence on an even larger scale, a fact 

that is especially troubling in light of Europe’s growing dependence 

on Russian energy. There are many other areas in which Russia 

still targets U.S. interests, such as its arms sales to the Chavez regime in Venezuela, but the list is too long to go into here. 

So it appears that the benefits for the U.S. of the reset are few 

and far between. But we have paid a high price for them. Last 

year’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia was a gift, pure 

and simple. The U.S. market was opened to Russian nuclear companies, but U.S. companies will find no corresponding opportunities 

3

in that country, where they will be shut out by its state-owned nuclear monopolies. Russia did receive the U.S. seal of approval for 

its efforts to become the world’s one-stop shop for all things nuclear. This reward was given even as Russia was continuing to assist Iran in its nuclear program. 

The latest offer to Moscow is support for Russia’s entry into the 

World Trade Organization. This, despite Russia’s continuing refusal to clamp down on the massive piracy of American intellectual 

property, which is second in scale only to China’s, and much of 

which occurs on state-owned property. 

It also comes as the Russian Government’s abuses of human 

rights and brutal approach toward those seeking a truly democratic 

government in Russia has only worsened. After the Russian authorities broke up opposition protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg late last year, detaining scores of activists, Russia’s Vladimir 

Putin stated, ‘‘If [the protesters] demonstrate without permission, 

they’ll take a cudgel to the head. That’s all there is to it.’’

This disturbing statement underscores the brutal nature of the 

Russian Government and its abusive treatment of anyone who 

challenges its policies. There has been a particularly shameful pattern of beatings and murders of journalists in Russia, and no one 

has been held accountable. And yet in another effort to prevent the 

democratic opposition from participating in the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Kremlin has banned Boris Nemtsov, one 

of Russia’s most prominent democratic leaders—whom I met with 

last year—from leaving Russia again, should he return from his 

current visit to France. 

What have we bought for all of our concessions to Moscow? How 

many times do we have to relearn the painful lesson that aggressors cannot be bought off, that allies must not be abandoned, and 

that naively trusting our adversaries to do anything other than 

pursue their own interests will produce no other outcome than to 

needlessly sacrifice our interests and undermine our security? 

It is my hope that the administration will reconsider its approach 

to the Russian regime. 

And I now turn to my good friend and distinguished ranking 

member for his opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I appreciate you calling this hearing. Before I start my opening comment 

I would simply like to join you in welcoming Annette Lantos. And 

it is quite fitting that we are holding a hearing on U.S.-Russia relationships with one of our witnesses being Katrina Lantos Swett 

and Annette Lantos in the audience, because there really was no 

more knowledgeable and articulate Member of Congress on the 

issue of U.S.-Soviet and then U.S.-Russia relationships than our 

late chairman, Mr. Lantos. And it is very good to have you here. 

When the Obama administration took office in January 2009, the 

U.S.-Russia relationship was at one of its lowest points since the 

fall of communism at the end of the Cold War. President Obama 

wisely decided that permitting this relationship to falter did not 

serve U.S. interests, and the administration set a new policy, 

branded as the reset, to increase engagement on a number of levels. 

While there remain significant areas of disagreement between 

the U.S. and Russia, no doubt, including Russia’s record on human 

rights, democracy, and rule of law, its conflict with Georgia, and 

Moscow’s arms sales to dictatorial regimes, there can be no doubt 

that the reset has led to increased cooperation between our two 

countries in a number of critical areas. Most importantly, Russia, 

whose training and technology during the 1990s played a significant role in the advancement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, 

Russia has played a far more constructive role in efforts to prevent 

Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Yes, they watered down the U.N. resolution, but the resolution that they voted 

for was the strongest by far resolution on this subject that the U.N. 

Security Council had ever adopted. 

The Russians at the same time canceled a contract to sell Tehran 

the sophisticated S–300 air defense system, an air defense system 

that would have rendered talk of a military option much weaker 

in terms of its import and effect on Iranian behavior. 

In April 2010, President Obama and Medvedev signed the landmark New START agreement. And Russia already cut their nuclear arsenal below the 1,550 ceiling it is obligated to reach by 

2018. Some dismiss this significant achievement, saying Moscow 

would have reduced their nuclear missiles to this level for economic 

reasons anyway. These critics neglect to mention that without New 

START there would be no legal inspection, no verification monitoring regime, as the previous one expired with START 1. There 

would also be no limits on the numbers and types of new nuclear 

missiles Moscow could deploy. 

President Reagan famously said, ‘‘Trust but verify.’’ It seems that 

some critics would have preferred to trust their assumptions about 

Russian nuclear security outlays and to trust Russia not to build 

more and more newer missiles than give President Obama credit 

for safeguarding U.S. nuclear security. 

Russia has also supported the Northern Distribution Network. 

This is very important. Since early 2009 it has served as a critical 

transit route through Russia and Central Asia to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Almost two-thirds of the nonlethal 

materials we need to support our troops are now shipped on this 

7

route, and it is especially critical today, given the increasing difficulty of moving goods through Pakistan. 

Russia and the United States also have a mutual interest in preventing the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan, and cooperation on 

counternarcotics efforts have also increased as a result of reset. 

And finally, as Russia continues to negotiate its entry into the 

World Trade Organization, it has reopened its markets to imports 

of U.S.-produced meat, a market that largely was closed when 

President Obama took office. Those exports could total as much as 

$500 million this year. This means more jobs for Americans. 

I do associate myself with the chairman’s remarks regarding 

Russian enforcement of intellectual property issue. This is a critical 

trade issue. Russia’s laws, to have meaning, must be enforced. 

Now, there is part of this glass that is half empty. Despite repeated calls by President Obama and Secretary Clinton, Russia 

still refuses to comply with the cease-fire agreement that ended the 

August 2008 conflict with Georgia. As a result, there are more Russian troops stationed in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia than before the conflict. This is a clear violation of 

the agreement hammered out by President Nicholas Sarkozy. 

The administration should continue to hold Russia to its commitments at the ongoing talks with Georgia in Geneva. While Russia 

remains one of the least free countries in Europe, and we are right 

to raise serious concerns about Russia’s dismal record on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 

The recent decision by the Russian Ministry of Justice to deny 

registration to the People’s Freedom Party is emblematic of the obstacles faced by opponents of the government. Yet the space for 

public discourse in Russia has widened to some extent in the last 

2 years. Russia’s young tech-savvy President has steadfastly fought 

efforts to restrict the Internet, and an increasing number of Russians are taking on their government with new-found activism. 

A significant number of Russian citizens has stepped forward to 

protest the destruction of a forest to build a highway between Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Regrettably, those who engage in such 

protests sometimes pay a very steep price. After exposing corruption by tax authorities, lawyer Sergei Magnitsky was murdered. 

Even if the investigation of his death ordered by President 

Medvedev is allowed to run its course and the perpetrators brought 

to justice, it will not bring back a husband to his wife, a father to 

his children, or a son to his parents. 

Madam Chairman, focusing only on areas of disagreement with 

Russia creates a distorted picture of the complex U.S.-Russia relationship, but it is critical that these troubling issues not get swept 

under the rug. I look forward to hearing the views of our panel on 

areas of both cooperation and disagreement with Russia, and yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. 

And I would like to thank the chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Europe and Eurasia, Mr. Burton, for yielding his spot for the opening statements. So I would like to recognize Mr. Smith, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa Global Health and Human 

Rights for his 1-minute statement. 

8

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you, 

Dan. 

Ms. Swett, glad to see you again and welcome to the panel. The 

reality is that Russia has a dismal human rights record, thanks to 

a decade of Vladimir Putin’s self-styled managed democracy that 

has more to do with control than freedom. While some fixated with 

the pursuit of arms control and other agreements with Moscow, as 

important as they are, the human rights situation on the ground 

in Russia has deteriorated across the board. In category after category, we have witnessed the conditions going from bad to worse. 

Whether you are speaking about freedom of expression in the 

media, the right of all believers to freely profess and practice their 

faith, or the ability of human rights defenders, NGOs, and independent journalists and political parties to operate without fear of 

government harassment, the space for such activity has suddenly 

shrunk. 

The absence of an independent judiciary and meaningful checks 

and balances on the Executive power has contributed to this reality. Illustrative, though, of this case is the tragic case of Sergei 

Magnitsky, mentioned by Mr. Berman, I should say. And instead 

of featuring prominently in the administration’s bilateral agenda, 

human rights clearly take a back seat to other considerations. At 

times one is left with the strong impression that preserving reset 

itself has become a priority for Washington. 

I ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made a part 

of the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Without objection. 

Mr. Meeks, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe 

and Eurasia is recognized. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Indeed the relationship 

between the United States and Russia a comprehensive and a complex one and you can look at it whether the glass is half full or half 

empty. But the reset agenda has produced, as Mr. Berman said, a 

New START treaty, diplomatic cooperation on issues ranging from 

North Korea to Iran, a transit agreement to facilitate the logistical 

supplies for international forces in Afghanistan, and cooperation in 

Arctic resources. 

As a result of the U.S. engagement with Russia, Russia canceled 

the sale of advanced S–300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran, and 

agreed to U.N.-based sanctions in carrying economic loss in the 

process. 

What begs the question is, what is actually the alternative to 

reset? Pausing the reset entails curbing U.S. engagement and hereby our strong support for economic reforms and limitization and 

modernization that is already underway in Russia. This rule would 

strengthen Russia’s regressive elements with vested interest in 

maintaining the status quo for personal gain as opposed to expanding prosperity and economic opportunity across a wider section of 

Western population. 

It is important to note that even Russia’s political opposition has 

expressed support for the Obama administration’s reset policy, notably at a recent meeting in Moscow with members of this committee. They also support Russia’s WTO accession precisely because this enhances the rule of law paradigm in Russia and they 

9

support a repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment because it undermines U.S. moral credibility in Russia. 

And I think that with this complicated issue, we need to look at 

what the alternative would be. The alternative would be to regress 

or continue to progress. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you Mr. Meeks. 

Now Mr. Burton, the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia 

chairman, is recognized. Thank you, Dan, for yielding your spot. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes, Madam Chairman. We lead a delegation to 

Moscow last week and met with the members of the Foreign Affairs 

or Federal Council over there. We met with the chairman, the 

Duma, and the Ministry of Economic Development. We also met 

with the American Chamber of Commerce. 

And I don’t want to be redundant. I think my colleagues, you, 

Madam Chairman, and the ranking member have covered the 

issues very well. But what I would like to say is the reset issue 

ought to include very strongly the issue of Georgia and the building 

in Belarus of the nuclear power plant that is very close to Vilnius, 

which may endanger those people down the road if there is a nuclear mishap. 

The last thing I would like to say is that there is a lot of corruption in the government. The American Chamber talked about that. 

But they also said they think there is an opportunity for changing 

the attitude of the Russian Government in areas of commerce if we 

pursue this path. 

So I share all of your concerns, but I think there is a possibility 

that through the private sector we may be able to make some gains 

over there. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Faleomavaega, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 

Asia and the Pacific is recognized. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Chair, thank you for giving me this 

opportunity. I would like to also associate myself and personally 

welcoming our distinguished lady and Mrs. Annette Lantos for joining us this morning and also for having members of her family join 

us. 

Madam Chair, I don’t have an opening statement but I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I do have some questions. 

Thank you for initiating this hearing this morning. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Rohrabacher, the 

Subcommittee on Oversight Investigations chair, who always has 

an opening statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

find it very significant that there are American decision makers 

whose frame of reference on issues dealing with Russia has not 

changed—excuse me, please——

Mr. BURTON. Pardon me, Dan, I am sorry. Give him an additional 15 seconds, please 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher will reset the clock. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reset, I like that. There you go. 

I find it significant that many of the decision makers, our decision makers, have a frame of reference in dealing with Russia that 

has not changed since the end of the Cold War. And there was no 

one, as Mr. Sestanovich can testify, who is more belligerent to the 

10

Soviet Union than I was, especially during my time when I worked 

with him in the Reagan White House. And there are reasons for 

concern which you expressed, Madam Chairman, but I find many 

of the people want to focus on some of the concerns and maybe perhaps expand, have an expansionary view of those concerns, have 

not appreciated the dramatic change that has taken place in Russia in the last 20 years. Many of those criticizing Russia have this 

same Cold War mentality and haven’t even been to Russia in the 

last 20 years. 

They have had tremendous successes in reforms. We should be 

encouraging them and working with them to that end, not 

nitpicking with what I might suggest are sinister descriptions of 

certain activities. 

And let me just note, Georgia attacked two provinces. It was a 

Georgian violation of a longstanding truce. It wasn’t a Soviet or 

Russian attack on Georgia that precipitated that problem. And if 

we keep acting this way, nobody in Russia will ever take us seriously unless we start to be more precise about using those words. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and 

welcome to our panel. 

The relationship between the United States and Russia is a terribly important one. It is not perfect. It is a work in progress. I believe that Secretary Clinton and President Obama in setting the 

reset button took a wise and pragmatic course. We need to continue 

to put democratic pressure on institution building in Russia. We 

need to insist on transparency and accountability, but at the same 

time we must also recognize that its strategic location is unavoidable. We must engage with Russia and they must engage with us. 

One of the criticisms contained in some of the testimony today 

has to do with, of course, arms limitations treaties. That is a long 

tradition of American foreign policy on a bipartisan basis, and to 

call it a cornerstone of President Obama’s dangerously naive policy 

of unilateral disarmament is, in my opinion, entirely over the top, 

unwarranted, and nothing but pure ideology, I look forward to 

hearing the testimony today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

My Florida colleague, Mr. Rivera, is recognized. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I look forward to 

hearing the testimony as well, particularly given the fact that there 

have been so many concerns raised about Russia’s involvement in 

the region raised by colleagues earlier, particularly Chairman 

Rohrabacher, but also Russia’s perhaps involvement around the 

world that runs counter to U.S. interests. 

And I will be interested to hear about commentary regarding 

Russia’s involvement in this hemisphere as well. I will get into that 

during the question and answer session. But I also believe that it 

is important that we raise the issue of naivete ́ with respect to Russia’s previous performance on nuclear proliferation issues and what 

exactly should be the U.S. posture, given their track record which 

has been counter to U.S. interests. So I look forward to hearing 

that comment. 

11

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chabot, our last opening remarker, the Subcommittee on 

Middle East and South Asia chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will forgo making an 

opening statement. I will note two things. I have a markup going 

on in Judiciary, so please note that is the reason for my absence 

in part of this meeting today, and I apologize for that. 

Secondly, I noted when I walked in, the presence of Tom Lantos’ 

widow here today, and she of course attended many, many meetings over the years. And I have the distinct honor and pleasure of 

working both with Tom Lantos and under him when he was chair 

of the committee as well, and he is deeply, deeply missed. And he 

was one who truly stood for collegiality and bipartisanship, and we 

fought on various issues but we actually—this happens on this 

committee, we actually agree on some issues too, which is good. 

This chair is following in his footsteps in many ways. As Henry 

Hyde and Ben Gilman and some of the other real stars on Capitol 

Hill. So thank you; we miss him very deeply and we are glad to 

see you here today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And now we are so pleased to present our wonderful witnesses 

today. 

Katrina Lantos Swett established the Lantos Foundation for 

Human Rights and Justice in 2008, where she serves as President 

and CEO. She also teaches human rights and American foreign policy at Tufts University. Dr. Swett is, of course, the daughter of our 

former colleague, Tom Lantos, who was a leading member of our 

committee for many years and a former chairman. And we also had 

many of us, old-timers had the pleasure of serving with your husband Richard when he so well represented New Hampshire here in 

Congress. So thank you for being here with us, Dr. Swett. 

Ariel Cohen is the senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Heritage 

Foundation. He is a frequent witness on Capitol Hill, including the 

House and Senate Foreign and Defense Committees, as well as the 

Helsinki Commission. Dr. Cohen has worked extensively with a 

range of national security agencies, including the Department of 

State, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and many others. So thank you for being with us 

today, Dr. Cohen. 

And then we will hear from Dr. Steven Sestanovich, who is the 

Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Diplomacy at Columbia University School of International and Public 

Affairs, as well as Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Sestanovich was Ambassador-at-Large and senior advisor 

to the Secretary of State for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 

2001. He was also a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff and senior director for policy development at the National Security Council during the Reagan administration. And as 

we know, this year is the 100th anniversary of Ronald Reagan’s 

birth, and we hope that his legacy is recognized and celebrated 

every day for freedom and liberty. Thank you for all the enslaved 

people of the world. 

12

So thank you, excellent witnesses here today, and we will begin 

with Dr. Swett. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF KATRINA LANTOS SWETT, PH.D., PRESIDENT, 

LANTOS FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 

Ms. SWETT. I want to thank you, Madam Chairman, for the opportunity to come today to present my views on the state of human 

rights and the rule of law in Russia. As you know, my late father, 

Tom Lantos, was a former chairman of this committee, and I am 

honored to have the opportunity to appear before his colleagues 

whom he both admired and deeply respected. My father was in 

some ways an old-fashioned man and he believed in the traditional 

notion that our partisan, if not our policy differences, should stop 

at the water’s edge. For this reason he was one of the most profoundly bipartisan Members of the Congress when it came to matters of national security and foreign policy. And it is in that same 

spirit that I hope to present my remarks today. 

In December of last year I traveled to Moscow to witness the culmination of the second show trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia’s most prominent political prisoner. I went in order to speak out 

against the mockery of justice that it represented, and in doing so 

I was quite literally following in my father’s footsteps. 

In May 2005 Congressman Lantos stood on the steps of the 

courthouse in Moscow to denounce the outrageous manipulation 

and abuse of the Russian judicial system represented by the targeted prosecution of Mr. Khodorkovsky. Sadly, things have only degenerated in the intervening 5 years. Whatever small shreds of 

legal plausibility the first Khodorkovsky trial may have had, there 

can be no doubt that the second trial had only one true purpose, 

and that was to keep a charismatic and compelling political adversary of Mr. Putin carefully locked away behind bars for as long as 

necessary. 

And what is it that makes Mr. Khodorkovsky such a threat to 

Mr. Putin? Above all, it is his vision of a Russia, open, transparent, 

and genuinely Democratic. Khodorkovsky stated with humility and 

conviction in his closing words to the court at the end of his trial 

when he said, ‘‘I am not an ideal person, but I am a person of 

ideas.’’

And over the nearly 8 years of his incarceration Mr. 

Khodorkovsky has shown that he is prepared to make great sacrifices for those ideas, ideas of a Russia with an independent judiciary, where an individual’s rights don’t depend on the whim of the 

czar; ideas of a Russia where democracy and freedom of the press 

are a reality and not a facade; ideas of a Russia where the government is not the source of corruption and lawlessness but, rather, 

they are the nation’s defender against such scourges. 

Mikhail Khodorkovsky is far from alone in believing in the importance of these ideas for the future of his country. While I was 

in Russia, I had the opportunity to meet with a variety of human 

rights activists, and they uniformly expressed the conviction that 

things were moving in a very bad direction in their country, from 

the unexplained violent deaths of over 150 journalists, to ongoing 

violation of article 31 of the Russian Constitution, which protects 

the right of the people to peacefully assemble. They are deeply conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Aug 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\070711\67304 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cerned about the future of democracy and pluralism, and they want 

our help in standing up for these rights. 

It was a bitter cold December day when I went to the Moscow 

courthouse, and I was taken aback to see many dozens of protesters standing across the street, quietly but eloquently expressing 

their support for Mr. Khodorkovsky, for Platon Lebedev, Sergei 

Magnitsky and other victims of an increasingly corrupt and undemocratic system in Russia. Their message to me was simple: 

Don’t sacrifice the values on which we want to see the new Russia 

built. It is a message I believe we need to heed. 

Thank you very much and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Swett. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Swett follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Cohen. And I apologize that our 

name plates do not recognize your academic credentials, as someone who worked mightily to finish my doctorate and earn my doctorate—I think those name plates were done by an embittered allbut-the-dissertation individual. Dr. Cohen is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ARIEL COHEN, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, RUSSIAN EURASIAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL 

ENERGY POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. COHEN. Madam Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here. I am 

a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and my views 

are my own and should not be construed as presenting the official 

position of the Heritage Foundation. 

I would like to thank you and Chairman Burton, before whom I 

testified recently on energy, and particularly my old friend Doug 

Seay for facilitating these hearings. 

For the last 2 years the Obama administration had touted Russia’s reset policy as one the great diplomatic achievements. In 

March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov with a red button symbolizing a 

new reset policy. Symbolic and prophetic as a result of the incompetent translation, the inscription on the button read ‘‘overload’’ instead of ‘‘reset.’’

Ever since, President Obama has spent an inordinate amount of 

time cultivating Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in making 

him his principal diplomatic interlocutor, despite the fact that 

Medvedev is Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s appointed protege 

with no political base of his own. The grave error of judgment made 

in assessing who was really in charge led to a chain of strategic 

miscalculations in relations with Moscow. 

While grooming Medvedev, the administration agreed to cut our 

strategic nuclear forces under the New START treaty; abandoned 

its original program of missile defense deployment in Poland and 

the Czech Republic; engaged Russia in futile missile defense talks; 

pursued a policy of geopolitical neglect in the former Soviet Union; 

and toned down the criticism of violations of the political freedom 

of which Dr. Lantos spoke so eloquently. 

However, the reality remains that Medvedev has only limited capability to deliver and looks increasingly like he is unlikely to continue in office. Putin still is Russia’s ‘‘national leader’’ and the real 

power behind and on the throne. 

Even with Medvedev as President, Russia still is willing to use 

force to achieve his geoeconomic goals as well. Control of energy 

corridors from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and beyond was 

the objective of the Russian military operation against Georgia in 

August 2008. This year Gazprom opened the Nord Stream pipeline 

from Russia to Germany with spurs to other European countries, 

increasing their dependence on Russian energy. This has been 

clearly confirmed by incidents of the last 2 decades involving delays 

in energy supplies to Azerbaijan and a number of other countries 

from the Black Sea to the Baltics. 

The concerns that U.S. policymakers should have vis-a`-vis Russia 

to date are not limited to arms control, to Russia’s vehement resistance to our missile defense plans in Europe, to energy policy and 

16

security in Europe. The concerns also should include the deterioration in this situation with human rights and rule of law. 

Just recently, in July, Russians banned Boris Nemtsov, the 

prominent opposition leader, from traveling abroad for 6 months. 

In June the Russian Minister of Justice denied registration to 

Party of People’s Freedom. In May, prosecutors opened the criminal 

investigation of a prominent anti-corruption whistleblower, Aleksey 

Navalny, for what he said was revenge for exposing alleged fraud 

in Russian state companies. And in December 2010, former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev were sentenced 

in the second trial for additional lengthy terms in Siberian prisons 

on charges of embezzlement and money laundering the majority of 

legal experts agree are spurious. 

On May 31, the European Court of Justice ruled the Russian 

State had seriously violated Khodorkovsky’s rights during his arrest and trial detention, and despite President Medvedev’s clear 

statement about Khodorkovsky not being a threat to the public, the 

courts continued to reject his appeals for early release. 

Can I have 1 more minute? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you so much. 

To conclude, the Obama administration and Congress need to 

recognize the reset with Russia, which would require huge payoffs 

with small results, is in a dire need of reassessment. The U.S. 

should pursue its national interests in relations with Moscow instead of chasing a mirage. 

The U.S. and Russia have multiple mutual interests in opposing 

Islamic radicalism and terrorism. We have joint concerns about 

non-proliferation, counternarcotics, boosting trade, investment expansion, tourism, business, and exchanges. Twenty years after the 

end of the Cold War and collapse of Communist Russia, Russia’s 

anti-American policies should be over. 

The administration needs to stop its policy of pleasing Moscow, 

and instead add pressure on Russia to start its own reset for the 

benefit of its own people. In particular, Congress should ensure 

that missile defenses are developed for the benefit of American 

troops and allies, and prevent the administration from granting 

far-reaching concessions to Russia in negotiating short-range nuclear arms deals. 

Congress has an important role to play in changing relations 

with Russia in the energy field for the better, for the benefit of 

American business and the Russian people. 

Congress should send a strong signal that it cares about America’s friends in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and 

expand U.S. ties with those who reach out for freedom. And you 

have a great role to play to pass the bipartisan Senate 1039, the 

expanded Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, that 

will deny visas to corrupt Russian businessmen and officials examining their banking practices and acquisitions and target Russian 

police and prosecutors——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Who fabricate evidence, torture, and 

murder opponents. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Cohen. 

17

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And Ambassador Sestanovich. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVE SESTANOVICH, 

GEORGE F. KENNAN SENIOR FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN AND 

EURASIAN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Madam Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to join in today’s discussion. The 

20th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s collapse is a good moment 

to reflect on Russian-American relations. I too wish we could hear 

what Tom Lantos had to say about it. 

I will focus my remarks today on three issues: First, how Russia 

and the U.S. restored broadly cooperative ties after 2008; second, 

why their relations are still marked by frustration and friction; 

and, third, how to address areas of disagreement going forward. 

Three years ago many experts thought Russian-American relations were in for a prolonged chill. Their expectations proved almost entirely wrong. Russia and the U.S. ratified a new treaty on 

strategic arms reductions. They have cooperated in support of military operations in Afghanistan. They joined in passing a new round 

of U.N. sanctions against Iran. They collaborate against the proliferation of missile materials and international drug trafficking. 

Even popular attitudes are beginning to change. Last year the 

percentage of Russians who had a favorable view of the United 

States reached its highest level, 60 percent, in a decade and a half. 

The reset has, of course, focused on issues where the practical benefits for both sides are clear-cut: Predictability in strategic arms reductions, nuclear non-proliferation, counterterrorism and so on. 

But the fact that the benefits of cooperation are obvious does not 

make them less important to our national interests. And there are 

tentative signs that Russia may be rethinking—in our direction—

what is in its interest. 

In light of these benefits, why does the reset evoke so many 

mixed feelings? There is clear hesitation in both countries about 

the next steps that seem to be on the agenda. Madam Chairman, 

both you and Mr. Berman have rightly mentioned many of these 

problems, from aggression against Georgia to human rights abuses. 

In the U.S. there is ambivalence about graduating Russia from the 

coverage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. In Russia there is ambivalence about cooperating with NATO on missile defense. 

The legacy of the Cold War plays a part in these attitudes, but 

something deeper is at work. The next steps of the reset require 

a level of mutual respect and trust that Russia and the U.S. have 

not yet developed. Russia’s domestic evolution since the Soviet collapse has been deeply disappointing. Its own President complains 

of corruption and lack of political competition. He is right; Russia 

lags behind other post-Communist nations in its embrace of democratic norms. In this light, it is hardly surprising that Members of 

Congress hesitate to abandon legislation that embodies our human 

rights concerns. 

Russia’s reluctance to work with NATO and missile defense may 

originate in Cold War thinking, but that is not the only factor. 

Even close allies have great difficulty sharing information and 

plans that affect their ultimate security, and Russia and NATO are 

not close allies. 

32

Given these obstacles to cooperation, does the reset need a 

pause? I know that is in the title of today’s hearing, Madam Chairman, but it is the wrong approach. It does not serve our interest 

to undo cooperation developed over 20 years by Presidents of both 

parties. Our troops in Afghanistan don’t want to pause, nor do our 

New START Treaty inspectors. But we do need to carry forward 

the reset without pretending that Russia and the United States 

have obtained a greater degree of mutual trust and respect than 

they have. 

To keep this policy on the realistic footing it requires, we need 

to develop relations step by step. Let me say a word about how to 

do so on two important issues. Congress is, for good reason, uncomfortable about graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik unless we 

have a clearly articulated policy toward human rights and democracy in Russia. Legislation to take the place of Jackson-Vanik can 

play a part. Members of both houses have proposed to focus on the 

worst abuses by individual Russian officials. Such measures, carefully designed, may strengthen American policy, but they are not 

the end of the story. Congress needs to look at other ways of modernizing our human rights policy in the spirit of Jackson-Vanik by 

increasing support for civil society groups, for electoral monitoring 

and so forth. 

As for missile defense, if Russia resists full-blown cooperation 

with NATO, other approaches are available to it. This should hardly be a crisis in Russian-American relations. Administration officials have publicly suggested that the best way for Russia to explore the pluses and minuses of greater cooperation is to get inside 

the tent. This is good advice. 

The agreement to create a joint data exchange center, signed 

back in 2000, is one place to start. It would be a clearinghouse for 

trading early warning information on missile launches; 11 years 

later it is still waiting to be implemented. 

Madam Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these 

and the other issues with you and your colleagues and with the 

other witnesses here today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sestanovich follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to all of our witnesses. I 

will begin the question and answer period, thank you. 

The news that the Kremlin has banned Boris Nemtsov, a leader 

of Russia’s democratic movement as I spoke about in my opening 

statement, from leaving Russia if he returns from his current visit 

to France, is I believe a dramatic evidence that Putin’s government 

intends to continue to persecute its opponents and prevent their 

participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This is more 

evidence, if more were needed, that the Obama administration’s 

reset policy of giving Moscow one concession after another in an effort to buy better behavior from Russia has failed. 

And let me ask each of the witnesses three questions. I know our 

time is limited. 

What can the U.S. do to provide assistance to Russia’s democratic movement efforts to bring democracy to their country? 

Number two, what steps should the Obama administration take 

regarding this latest action by the Kremlin about Mr. Nemtsov? 


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And, three, what will the impact on the democratic movement be 

if the U.S. reaction to this act is only mild criticism? 

And we will start with Dr. Swett. 

Ms. SWETT. Well, I think that the most critical thing that the 

U.S. Government can do—and this is where I think there are concerns with the way the reset policy has been perceived both within 

Russia and outside of Russia—that is, that we must get away from 

the notion that we completely delink Russia’s behavior and performance on issues of human rights, rule of law and democracy 

from all of our other broad-ranging concerns in our relationship to 

Russia. 

The notion of delinking what are our most profound values and 

which, frankly, are the values that ensure the ongoing stability, 

strength, vitality, and success of any society from other concerns is, 

I think, where we begin to go off the track. 

And so I believe that in specific response to your question we 

need to once again make it clear to the Russian Government that 

we will not confine our response to their slide away from democracy and toward authoritarianism. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. SWETT. To simply, you know, mild and weak-kneed protestations that are routinely ignored and frankly are viewed as simply 

something for domestic consumption. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. SWETT. And that is understood not only by the Russian Government but by the very democracy activists, the very human 

rights leaders who we need to express strong support for. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Cohen, and Ambassador? 

Mr. COHEN. First of all, Congress could, I think, invite Boris 

Nemtsov at the earliest opportunity to testify about the conditions 

of democracy and human rights in Russia. Mr. Nemtsov is a former 

first Deputy Prime Minister. He was a very high-ranking official. 

He is no extremist, he is no terrorist, and this is inexcusable that 

he was treated like that. He also was jailed for 10 days for attending a nonviolent demonstration. 

Secondly, what I already mentioned, the Sergei Magnitsky Rule 

of Law Accountability Act against people who are abusing the old 

laws, against people who are abusing their old legal system. And 

just as we failed to send strong messages of when Khodorkovsky 

was first jailed in 2003, when Magnitsky got killed in 2009—these 

are signature events that the Russian Government is watching like 

a hawk, how does the West react? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. COHEN. Not only do we need to react but our Western European allies also need to react. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Cohen. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Madam Chairman, it would be hard to think 

of a better way for Putin’s government to look like Leonid Brezhnev’s government than by what they did with Boris Nemtsov. And 

it is the kind of opportunity for senior officials in the legislative 

and executive branches to convey to their Russian counterparts 

that if the reset is to advance, actions of this kind are a threat to 

it. 

40

I agree with my colleagues; the right response in the first instance is attention, attention, attention. Dr. Cohen is exactly right. 

The Magnitsky bill has gotten a lot of attention in Moscow. 

I would add two other points. Our friends in Europe and 

throughout Europe, and particularly in European Parliament and 

the Council of Europe have taken the lead in talking about a lot 

of these issues. We want to speak with one voice with them. 

Secondly, it seems to me important that American efforts to support Russian civil society, election monitoring, and other activities 

of this kind be fully funded. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Berman is 

recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you. The chair’s question brought a 

certain level of consensus to the three panelists in terms of linkage 

and particular reference to the Magnitsky bill. 

Boris Nemtsov was always thought of as one of the most enlightened and progressive thinkers of the post-Soviet era, and did some 

amazing things as a local governor and later on in Moscow, and it 

was sort of a shocking development to see that action taken. 

But on the larger scale, Dr. Cohen and Ambassador Sestanovich 

seem to have very different conclusions about the reset. Dr. Cohen 

talks about naivete ́, paltry gains, totally misplaced judgment by the 

administration in focusing on Medvedev. And Ambassador 

Sestanovich thinks the notion of a pause right now is a mistake. 

In a careful, calculated way, once you continue to pursue the 

reset with very realistic understandings about our differences, and 

without any intent of sweeping those differences under the rug, I 

would like each of you to—perhaps starting with you Ambassador 

Sestanovich—to take the fundamental thrust of Dr. Cohen’s testimony and address where you differ from it, and Dr. Cohen with 

Ambassador Sestanovich. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Berman. I would dispute the 

idea that the principal theme of the reset has been pleasing Russia. 

I would say it has been to find areas where cooperation between 

Russia and the United States can serve American interests. And I 

think the record has been good there. And I don’t think that the 

Russian Government has been particularly pleased by the way in 

which American officials have kept the issue of Russia’s domestic 

evolution prominent in their public discussion. 

Dr. Cohen and others have talked about Russian aims in a way 

that I find perfectly accurate. There is, to my mind, no doubt that 

Russia would like to divide NATO. Madam Chairman, you said 

that yourself. I don’t think there is any doubt that Russia would 

like to strengthen a sphere of influence on its borders. I think it 

wants the international respect that enables it to ignore criticism. 

But my question would be, to quote a well-known American politician, ‘‘How’s it working out?’’ I don’t think all that well. Just this 

week the Ambassadors of NATO and the Secretary General went 

to Russia to say Russia’s objections to NATO’s missile defense 

plans are a nonstarter. You know, let’s keep talking, but we are not 

interested in the kind of proposal you have in mind. They are getting nowhere there. 

On a sphere of influence, the Russians began the Obama administration trying to bribe the Kyrgyz Government to oust the United 

41

States from its base in Kyrgyzstan. Today that base is still there 

and the Russians have had to back off. 

International respect. I say in my testimony that Russia enjoys 

less respect internationally than other post-Communist nations. 

And this hearing and the comments of all the witnesses and of all 

the members indicate that Russia’s internal evolution remains a 

hot topic in the West. 

Mr. BERMAN. Let me just, since there is not really enough time 

for you to respond, I will use my last 20 seconds to make my own 

point and hopefully we can get your response later. 

But I have vivid memories. By 2008, it was that administration, 

the administration that preceded Obama’s, that had delinked all 

issues. It was pursuing U.S. nuclear cooperation with Russia even 

as Iran was—Russia was doing nothing to help us deal with Iran’s 

nuclear weapons program. It was pushing the missile defense without getting any particular broader support from Russia on any 

issue. Every issue was in its own different category, and there was 

no linkage. 

I do think one wants to have a coherent and comprehensive policy here and that things are much closer to that these days than 

they were 21⁄2 years ago. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized, the Subcommittee on Oversight Investigations chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. Swett, how many political prisoners are there in Russia 

today? 

Ms. SWETT. Well, I couldn’t give you a specific figure on how 

many political prisoners there are, but I can tell you there are millions of intimidated Russians. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am not asking that. 

Ms. SWETT. There are untold numbers of people in Russia who 

are intimidated from fully exercising their rights to——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, I am not asking you that at all. How 

many political—you have an organization that focuses on political 

prisoners. You cannot tell me the number of political prisoners that 

Russia has. Of the deaths—you said there were 150 deaths of journalists in Russia. 

Ms. SWETT. Yes. Unexplained violent deaths. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Over what period of time? 

Ms. SWETT. Over a period of about 7 years now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 7 years. So in the last 7 years there have 

been 150 journalists who have met death, of some sort of violent 

death. 

Ms. SWETT. Have met their deaths under extremely suspicious 

circumstances; not in a war zone, but while covering corruption, 

human rights abuses. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you send us for the record the list of 

people you consider specifically political prisoners? 

Ms. SWETT. I would be happy to. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And a list of those journalists? 

Ms. SWETT. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I went to a meeting with Russian journalists 

who were complaining, and their numbers were far less than what 

42

you are presenting to us today. And when I questioned them specifically—you were there, Ileana—whether or not they were blaming these deaths on the administration, meaning Putin and 

Medvedev, or whether they were just saying that Medvedev and 

Putin had not done enough to follow through after the deaths to 

deter future type attacks, they were very clear that they were not 

blaming Medvedev and Putin for these deaths. And this is a whole 

different image that is being presented to us today. 

Mr. Sestanovich, when we worked in the Reagan White House, 

wasn’t that your impression, as it was mine, that President Reagan 

expected that someday we would actually work on a joint missile 

defense system with a democratic Russia? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Uh——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The answer is yes, because I was there for 

a while. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I think the answer is certainly yes, Congressman. It would have to be described as his hope. I don’t know 

whether it was his strong expectation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. That was his goal. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Yeah. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. His goal was to have a situation with Russia. 

Was his goal to continue NATO after Russia pulled back from Eastern Europe and went through a democratic process? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Gee, it would only be common sense to think 

it was. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. Would you think it would be fair for 

Russia to think of that as a belligerent act for us, instead of—when 

they had pulled back all of their troops from Eastern Europe, but 

instead we expanded NATO to their doorstep? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You wouldn’t think that that would be considered belligerent? How about if Russia during that time period 

decided that they would send nuclear weapons to, let’s say, Venezuela or some other country that was deciding they didn’t like the 

United States? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. In politics, Congressman, I think you have to 

ask what the purpose of any action is, and I guess I would be a 

little disturbed by thinking about what the purpose of such an action on the Russian part would be. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would think the Russians might be concerned that maybe we weren’t being as friendly as we said we were 

going to be, once the disintegration of the Communist Party leadership in Russia took place, by us expanding NATO to their borders 

and expanding a missile defense system which would neutralize 

their missiles. 

Listen, I am not saying these things. These things are not—and 

the people are saying, is this a moral equivalency argument? The 

answer is, yes, it is. And the bottom line is we have lots of problems in the United States, and so do the Russians. For example, 

we heard that today Madam Chairman mentioned a statement 

about a billy club and a protest. 

Dr. Cohen, am I mistaken that there are protests that are permitted in Russia today as compared to the Soviet Union? There 

were no protests. Am I wrong that you go to the kiosk and you can 

43

actually find newspapers that are printed against the regime, and 

even in broadcasts you can hear radio people like Rush Limbaugh 

in Russia complaining about Mr. Putin. Well, my visits to Russia, 

people say that that is what they are hearing; and these are not 

communists, former communists, so they are all wrong; is that correct? 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Rohrabacher, you know as well as I do——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. The time is up. But you 

can answer, just a short answer if you could. 

Mr. COHEN. I thought I was asked a question. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I know but his time is up. 

Mr. COHEN. All right. Russian national television is under 100 

percent state control. Russian protesters are beaten by the heavily 

armed special police called the OMON. And yes, there are political 

prisoners in Russia, Mr. Rohrabacher. Amnesty International. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. 

Faleomavaega, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific, is recognized. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the 

dialogue and certainly the statements that have been made from 

our witnesses. It is very interesting to note that we have two highly respected experts who have such divergent views concerning our 

relations, our bilateral relations, with Russia. 

In the 4 years that I held the chairmanship of the Subcommittee 

on Asia and the Pacific it was my privilege to visit Central Asian 

countries. And one of the things that always seems to gnaw at me 

are the criticisms that we say that these Central Asian countries 

are not moving fast enough to become full democracies. 

I suspect that probably 99 percent of our community, the country, in our country, probably have no idea that these Central Asian 

countries were colonies of the Soviet Union for some 100 years. So 

when we talk about democracy and human rights and all these 

issues, certainly very, very high as far as we are concerned as a 

country, but these countries have had a very different mentality 

that they were living under, under the former Soviet Union. 

As I recall, I think it was a couple of years ago that President 

Medvedev for the first time ever since after the Cold War, he visited Berlin and he gave what I thought was one of the very profound speeches that I have ever read and tried to pay it a little attention was the fact that, why are Western countries so put out 

about having to continue NATO, other than the fact that the Cold 

War is over, and as far as Russia is concerned, having this missile 

system wasn’t really pointed at Iran, it was really pointed at Russia. 

Now, I would like to ask Ambassador Sestanovich for his comment on this. Do you think that President Medvedev’s observations 

of what has happened between—another problem here, when Russia became more democratic, or after the Cold War, it is my understanding that for some 10 years we failed as a country to assist 

Russia with its economic needs. And I want Ambassador 

Sestanovich to comment on that. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Can I say a word first about Central Asia and 

not moving fast enough? Some are and some aren’t. You have a 

very broad spectrum of developments there with Kyrgystan on the 

44

verge of being a real democracy and others deep in dictatorship. I 

think there is undoubted Russian disappointment about the level 

of assistance that it got from the West in the 1990s. That doesn’t 

mean there wasn’t a lot of assistance and in fact—if you take together all assistance programs, it comes to a rather substantial 

level. 

But I think most—a lot of Russians would tell you it all went 

into the pockets of criminal businessmen or corrupt bureaucrats. 

There is a sense that they didn’t get much out of the assistance 

that you are talking about——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador. My time is 

running, and I know Madam Chair is very good about this. Can 

you comment about what was she doing on the Jackson-Vanik law 

that seems to aid us all these years? Why should we get rid of this? 

Is it still relevant in our current relations with Russia? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Jackson-Vanik doesn’t do us much good anymore, and Russia should be graduated from Jackson-Vanik when 

it joins the WTO. But Congress can play an important role in finding and helping to articulate a new policy for human rights and democracy in Russia. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The problem that I have is that sometimes 

the Members use Jackson-Vanik as leverage for other unrelated 

issues that come before the legislative calendar or the schedule 

that we have here as Members of the Congress. 

Dr. Swett, I just wanted to ask you—I know as a great champion 

of human rights—I just wanted to ask you, when we have bilateral 

relations—let’s take Russia—sometimes we have to make priorities. 

Our country is not an angel either. The fact that at the height of 

the Cold War, talk about human rights, forget it. We were propping 

up dictators all over the world just for the simple fact, as long as 

they are supportive of our policies, we didn’t mind them abusing 

and all the terrible things that they did to their respective countries. And that didn’t go very well. 

I just wanted to ask you, you put all these things together, 

human rights, national security, economic interests, and democracy. How would you put human rights in this pot or this chop 

suey, if you will? Where does human rights come in? Should it be 

a number one priority? Or should it be considered in other issues 

that are more important than just human rights? 

Ms. SWETT. Well, obviously, human rights——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time is up. 

Ms. SWETT. Obviously, human rights cannot be the only driver 

of our foreign policy. We have a huge range of concerns from our 

national security concerns, our economic concerns, our energy 

needs. There are a wide range of issues. But I think if the recent 

events, particularly in the Middle East, have shown us anything, 

it has shown us that we make a poor deal when we decide to settle 

for the so-called friendly tyrant relationship; that if a tyrant is 

friendly to our other interests, we sort of overlook their rampant 

abuses of their own population. Because we have seen stunning 

speeds of collapse of regimes in other parts of the world that we 

were convinced were our bulwarks in that region. So I think it 

needs to be a central priority but certainly not the only one. 

45

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Rivera of Florida is 

recognized. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Before I begin 

with my questions, I also want to recognize and acknowledge Dr. 

Swett’s father, Tom Lantos, and Mrs. Lantos for being here. Certainly his passion for human rights around the world has been 

noted. But in particular, I want to acknowledge his work on behalf 

of human rights in Cuba. I know for years and years he was an 

advocate and a friend of the human rights movement, and certainly 

his passion on behalf of human rights in Cuba in recent years, in 

particular with what we’ve seen on the human rights crackdowns 

under Raul Castro, Congressman Lantos’ passion has been vindicated and his vision for what needs to be done with human rights 

in Cuba has been vindicated. 

I will begin my questions with Ambassador Sestanovich regarding Belarus. As we know, one of the last bastions of Stalinist totalitarian communism rule in the world, other than Cuba and North 

Korea certainly, what exactly is Russia’s role in sustaining that 

Stalinist dictatorship in Belarus? What has been their role perhaps 

in terms of making sure that there could be any types of reforms 

whatsoever, if any has existed, would that Stalinist dictatorship 

exist but for Russia’s support? Just generally, what is their role? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. The Russians can’t figure out what to do with 

Belarus, because you are right, they sustain it with subsidies, with 

cheap energy, with a measure of investment. But they put recurrent pressure on the regime. They have been cutting off electricity. 

They cut off gas. If there is any one government in the world that 

has done more to put the Lukashenko regime under threat than 

the Russian Government, I don’t know which one it is. So there is 

a kind of incoherence there. 

Mr. RIVERA. And anything that can be done on our part? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. We have to continue to work with Belarus’ 

democratic neighbors, with other European countries that are very 

concerned and have kept their attention on this issue. Lukashenko 

has been a stubborn and rather resilient force. But he is totally isolated in Europe, and that can’t last. 

Mr. RIVERA. And certainly a threat to some of our critical allies 

such as Poland. We know what happened in terms of their relationship there. 

But in my last 2 minutes, I will yield to Chairman Rohrabacher 

who I believe wanted to continue his colloquy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Let me just note, I 

love Tom Lantos and I miss him every day and especially in the 

fight for human rights. And with that said, we have had enormous, 

enormous progress in Russia in human rights compared to what it 

was 25 years ago. And by ignoring that and by focusing totally on 

the shortcomings—and there are many shortcomings in the current 

Russia—we are not doing justice by Mr. Lantos or anybody else. 

The bottom line is, we should be siding with those people who are 

struggling for democracy, but not ignoring the fact that today the 

churches are filled in Russia. 

And Dr. Cohen, I don’t know where you were, but I have been 

in Russia and have been shown, just walked right down the street 

and said, here are several publications that are being sold right 

46

here that are anti-Medvedev and Putin. Those things would have 

never happened under the old Russia, never. 

And let us also note, China is the world’s worst human rights 

abuser and the comparison of how we treat China economically as 

compared to Russia, there is just no comparison. We are bending 

over backwards to send all sorts of investment into China and to 

strengthen them while they have no reform, no human rights reform. And in Russia where they have at least had a lot of progress 

and that, we still keep them under the grips of Jackson-Vanik and 

other restrictions that were put on the Cold War. This is ridiculous. 

And I would hope that we understand they have future progress 

with Russia, but we need to treat it I think a little more honestly. 

So that is all I needed to say. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. 

Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Meeks, the ranking member on 

the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, is recognized. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. I just want to note for the record that 

I agree with Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The Earth is shaking. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask real quick because some of—I guess 

the reason we are here is asking whether or not the administration 

is moving in the right direction or the wrong direction. So I will 

ask each panelist first, what are your thoughts? Should we pause 

reset or continue with reset? 

Ms. SWETT. I would not so much suggest pausing reset as 

supplementing reset with a more vigorous and outspoken human 

rights dimension to our policy vis-a`-vis Russia, and I think, Congressman Rohrabacher, the reason there is such a heightened level 

of concern about the human rights situation in Russia is because 

it has been moving decidedly in the wrong direction. I agree with 

you. China’s situation is more abusive, is more troubling. But what 

is always disturbing is to see when you lose ground. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me go on. I don’t want to lose my time. 

Ms. SWETT. Yes, sir. Sorry. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. I think this is the time for reassessment. 

The reset policy was applied for about 21⁄2 years. We are at a good 

midpoint. We need to reassess. For example, on Syria, Russia still 

insists on selling arms to Syria. On Iran, Russia is pushing back. 

Even on the U.S. unilateral sanctions that we are sovereign to do, 

there is Russian pushback. 

Mr. MEEKS. So should we pause reset or should we continue it? 

Mr. COHEN. We should pause and reassess. Not just pause. We 

have to rethink it, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Well, the reset policy has included an awareness of the kinds of difficulties that Dr. Cohen mentioned, and has 

tried to keep them in perspective while seeking cooperation that 

will serve our interests. And that seems like an approach that is 

worth continuing, although I would note that to go forward in the 

next step of the reset that the administration cares about most, 

which is WTO, Jackson-Vanik graduation, I think it will need to 

think harder and the Congress will need to think harder about how 

to come up with a modernized approach to democracy and human 

rights in Russia. 

47

Mr. MEEKS. You are headed toward what my next question was. 

And I guess I will go to Dr. Cohen real quick, because the opposition and a lot of the human rights groups seem to be in favor of 

continuing reset. So I am wondering if we pause reset, then who 

really would be the beneficiaries and what would happen on the 

ground when you see individuals who are most affected by what 

has taken place saying, reset is a good thing? What would happen 

if we did pause, who would be the beneficiaries? 

Mr. COHEN. Sir, I am a native Russian speaker. I read what the 

opposition says in the original, and I talk to them personally, and 

I know a lot of these people. I pretty much know all of the leaders 

of the opposition. It is my impression that the opposition is very 

critical of the human rights, rule of law and property rights protection aspects of the reset. 

For example, we have a commission that is co-chaired by Dr. 

McFall, the Ambassador-designate, and Vladislav Surkov, the architect of the current Russian political system. The opposition is 

very critical that this commission is not making its voice heard on 

those abuses of human rights. They are doing everything, from assisting pregnant mothers to other things that have very little to do 

with the opposition. I would argue this administration subverted 

their original agenda of our concern about human rights in Russia. 

Mr. MEEKS. Dr. Swett. 

Ms. SWETT. Well, I think that I experienced the same thing when 

I met with human rights leaders in Russia in December. And that 

is what the current Russian Government would like to do, would 

be to focus on sort of, if you will, the feel-good aspects of human 

rights—social assistance and things like that—but that there is an 

increasingly hostile and difficult climate when it comes to securing 

the architecture of rule of law, the architecture of——

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask because I only have 20 seconds left. Just 

asking, should Russia get into the WTO? Yes or no? I only have 

14 seconds. Yes or no, Dr. Swett? 

Ms. SWETT. Well, I think that—I am not going to give you a yes 

or no answer on that because I do not consider myself an expert 

on that issue. But I think we need to proceed with caution on Jackson-Vanik. 

Mr. MEEKS. Ambassador, yes or no? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. If they meet the usual commercial terms. 

Mr. MEEKS. Dr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Not yet, but eventually, when they meet the usual 

criteria. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Bilirakis, our Florida colleague. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate 

it. I am not sure if this issue has been addressed, but I was wondering what the panelists think about any potential conflict that 

could arise over the claims of the Arctic sovereignty. As we know, 

natural resources are abundant in the Arctic and there has been 

a concern that Russia is trying to exercise exclusive control over 

this area. While we currently are in a state of peace with regard 

to the Arctic, do any of you believe there will be a future so-called 

Cold War when it comes to sharing the Arctic? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I am sure there will be competition over resources, but I am not an expert on this issue. 

48

Mr. COHEN. The Russian claims for 4 million square miles in the 

Arctic are spurious. They did not succeed to prove these claims, in 

the U.N. Tribunal under the Law of the Sea Treaty, but I think 

that the military competition is avoidable. I think we have the Arctic Council that the Russians are a party of. 

We do not have enough resources currently. We don’t have the 

icebreakers, we don’t have the military capabilities to seriously protect our rights and our territorial waters and resources in Russia. 

But yes, Russia does have Arctic policy and Arctic claims, and it 

is a huge priority for them, because they own huge amounts of oil 

and gas, in particular, in their exclusive economic zone and possibly beyond. 

Ms. SWETT. It is not an area of my expertise, but one certainly 

gets the impression that—to use a basketball metaphor—they are 

trying to box out there. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield 

back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Connolly of 

Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador Sestanovich—and I welcome comments from the 

other panelists as well. In the West, there is lots of speculation 

about whether there really is this sort of a byplay between Prime 

Minister Putin and President Medvedev or is it just sort of for 

show, more of a good cop/bad cop routine but actually beneath the 

surface nothing changes? 

And I guess I would ask two questions about that. One is, do you 

think that the differences between the two are real and perhaps, 

over time, telling? And secondly and aside from that, were there 

the course of democratic institution building, it seems to me that 

in the last decade or so, we are seeing enormous retrogression—you 

know, the appointment of governors rather than the election of governors, the suppression of political parties, the suppression of the 

media. It sort of starts to look like the old Russia, not only in the 

Soviet times, but even in the czarist times, the lack of free expression and free institution. 

So I have every reason to be hopeful that over time we are making progress, or is that just American naivete ́ that doesn’t really 

take into account the situation on the ground? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. There is no doubt that Putin picked Medvedev 

because he thought he was the most controllable President he could 

imagine, and there is no doubt that since Medvedev became President, Putin has remained the dominant political figure in Russia. 

But I think it is wrong to say that beneath this—to use your 

words—beneath the surface, nothing changes. The area is more political ferment, more political debate, more questioning of precisely 

the institutional arrangements that you have talked about in Russia 3 years ago, 6 years ago, 9 years ago. And while we shouldn’t 

be naive about where that can go, it is to me significant that as 

many Russian political figures that speak on this subject have 

talked about the need for more political competition. Polls show 

that the Russian people want more political competition. So something is happening, even below the surface and on the surface, and 

we need to watch it carefully. 

49

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Medvedev and Putin publicly disagree on a number 

of very important issues, both symbolic, and on issues directly relevant to American national interests. For example, as I am saying 

in my testimony, Putin is consistently criticizing the U.S., he accuses us of fomenting the descent and revolution in the Middle 

East. He accuses us of using social media such as Facebook, et 

cetera. He recognizes the legacy of Joseph Stalin, calling him an effective manager. He called the collapse of the Soviet Union the 

greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. And 

Medvedev responded and said, ‘‘No, the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century for Russia was the October Bolshevik 

putsch.’’ This is highly symbolic. 

Medvedev is much more outspoken on human rights and the 

rule-of-law issues. He recognizes the corruption, including corruption in courts. This is a real ideological competition. But as a politician, you recognize that if one side has the political power and the 

other side is very weak politically, as is the case, unfortunately, for 

Mr. Medvedev, it is no contest. And even if—which I think these 

chances are declining—even if Medvedev is going to be renominated and then formally elected as the next President of Russia, 

the deal with Putin is going to be, Putin is the boss and Medvedev 

is—excuse my French—the Queen of England. 

Now, I think at the end of the day it is not going to happen. I 

think Putin is going to be the President of Russia with full powers, 

but I don’t have my crystal ball with me here today, and I will not 

bet money on that. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Connolly, I want to ask—you had 

7 seconds left—but Mr. Deutch is needed for a Judiciary vote and 

so is Mr. Berman. So could I steal those 7 seconds from you? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Absolutely, Madam Chairman. And I apologize to 

Dr. Swett for the fact that she does not have time to respond. Perhaps at the end of the hearing we will allow her to. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would also like to say 

to Dr. Swett and Mrs. Lantos, I would like to particularly acknowledge Tom Lantos’ fight for Soviet Jewry. I spent last Friday 

evening in a synagogue in Moscow, something that would have 

been awfully hard to imagine some 20 years ago. And I just wanted 

to acknowledge his leadership in that struggle. 

Ambassador Sestanovich, I spent much of last week while in 

Russia talking about accession to the WTO with various members 

of the Russian Government. In particular, I spoke at length with 

the Minister of Economic Development, who happens to be here 

this week on that issue. And it is clear that WTO membership is 

a priority for the Russians and for the United States. But casting 

a shadow over this whole process is the Russian occupation of 20 

percent of our strategic ally, Georgia. There is a fundamental disagreement between the United States and Russia, and between 

Russia and the rest of the international community for that matter, 

on Georgia’s territorial integrity. And any resolution to Georgia’s 

wish to have their customs agents on its borders, should accession 

be completed, could actually have a significant impact on deciding 

50

where those borders ultimately lie, where they are recognized 

internationally. Can you speak to how you see this playing out? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. It is hard to be hopeful that there will be a 

compromise on the issue, because for all the parties there are rather fundamental issues involved, and for Georgia in particular. It is 

hard to put pressure on the Georgians to yield on an issue that involves its sovereignty, where there is a military occupation of two 

of its provinces. Both the Russians and the Georgians seem pretty 

dug in here, and the United States has said that they do not want 

to mediate the discussion—that it has to be resolved between Moscow and Tbilisi. 

There are formulas that are being addressed that do involve compromise, but I can’t say that from what I have heard they are particularly promising ones. The discussions, however, continue. I 

don’t think either Russia or Georgia or the United States is prepared to let this issue derail, a goal that all of them in some way 

share. So, I can’t help you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Doesn’t there have to be some resolution, at least 

as to these borders issues, in advance of WTO accession? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Well, there needs to be a Russian withdrawal 

from Georgian territory. But that is a broader and long-term problem. The question is, is there a small fix, a small step forward that 

will make WTO accession easier? And I don’t know the answer to 

that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Cohen, in the meetings there were some statements made alluding to the long-term—having to wait to see the 

long-term economic viability of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It 

wasn’t clear whether that suggestion meant that ultimately if they 

weren’t economically viable the Russians might ultimately withdraw, or if they weren’t economically viable that the Russians 

might ultimately try to incorporate them into Russia. Do you have 

thoughts on that? 

Mr. COHEN. An excellent nuanced question, sir. I would say that 

Russia definitely recognizes that South Ossetia is not economically 

viable, is depopulated, it is heavily subsidized, it is run by former 

KGB and Communist Party ethnic Russians. As far as Abkhazia, 

it may or may not be economically viable. The coastline is so gorgeous, the Russians will never give it up as long as they can. And 

I think you are putting your finger on something absolutely vital. 

And that is that both the United States and our European allies 

should be doing more to support territorial integrity of Georgia; 

and also our Government that, as a part of the reset, is not providing sales of defensive arms to Georgia. Maybe as a part of a 

reset rethink that I am advocating, we should look at that again, 

because why is it that we are denying Georgia defensive arms? 

The Secretary of State while visiting there says, it is democracy 

that will make you safe. Senior State Department officials say, 

‘‘Georgia is oversecuritizing’’ the South Caucasus issues. And in the 

meantime, we have four military bases of Russia in Abkhazia, in 

South Ossetia. We have the extension of a huge base in Armenia 

called Gyumri until 2044. The one who is securitizing South 

Caucasus is Russia. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

51

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And Mr. Marino is recognized from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MARINO. I thank the chairwoman. Good morning. So far it 

is good morning. 

I don’t know if my colleague and friend, Mr. Deutch, prefaced his 

statements and questions, but we both just got back from Russia. 

And four points that I would like to bring out—and I would like 

each of you to respond, knowing that we only have 5 minutes. 

First of all, it was very clear when we visited Moscow and sat 

down with Duma members, simply saying that—and the one individual, I think he was a part of the Socialist Party that formed a 

larger majority, simply stated that as long as the existing President of Georgia is not only in that position, but has any influence, 

Russia does not want to have any communications whatsoever and 

there are no deals on the table. So it is a personal issue that it appeared to me, or at least I inferred from the comments. 

The second issue, the same member of the Duma stated that—

well, tried to chastise us a little bit, that why are we picking on 

Iran, because we thought Iran was a very friendly country. What 

are we doing in Afghanistan, et cetera. I politely said to him, I will 

take you to task on that when we have the time. They chose to 

have no response, but then turned around to say that not only the 

world but Russia is looking at the United States to get its economic 

affairs in order because we have an impact on the international 

economy, and we still should be able to help Russia. Now, criticizing us and then turn around and say, we need your money. 

The next issue is that the Russians have an ability to politely—

politely agree with an issue that we raised, and then history has 

proven over the years that they do nothing about it. In fact, they 

almost ignore it. 

And the last issue is the corruption taking place in Russia, and 

the emphasis was put on the wealth that Putin has accumulated 

so rapidly, the wealth to the extent—from several individuals saying he is probably one, if not the richest man in the world. 

Would you care to address those issues and comment on those, 

please, Doctor? 

Ms. SWETT. Well, on the question of it being personal vis-a`-vis 

the President of Georgia, I think that there are a lot of decisions 

in Russia that are based on personal animus and animosity. And 

certainly the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a classic example of 

that, where Putin has viewed Mikhail Khodorkovsky, now Russia’s 

most prominent political prisoner, as a direct threat to his power. 

So they have thrown aside all semblance of rule of law in the continued and excessive pursuit of this individual. So I think that that 

kind of personal politics is very prevalent there. 

On the issue of corruption, it is rampant. It is sometimes called 

vertical corruption. It is taking place at every level. And it represents a kind of plundering of the Russian people by the Russian 

bureaucracy. And it is one of I think the most severe issues holding 

back any sort of hopeful future for the Russian people until this 

rampant inbred corruption by the governmental bureaucracy is 

brought under control. 

And maybe I will leave some of the other issues to my colleagues 

because I know time is short. 

52

Mr. MARINO. Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. I couldn’t agree more on Saakashvili, but also countries have interest. And I would submit to you that it is not in the 

Russian interest to have this chronic long-term irritant, which is 

occupation of Georgia. They need to think how to resolve it, 

Saakashvili or no Saakashvili. A lot of people don’t like each other 

and don’t get along. 

Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, is a revolting individual and 

nevertheless the Obama administration reached out to him. Well, 

it didn’t work. But what I am saying is, you have to get over it and 

deal with the issues. On Iran, I think many Russians don’t recognize that Iran having the medium-range ballistic missiles, especially if they are tipped with nuclear weapons, not just with technology from Russia—North Korea, China, Pakistan, all play a role 

in building the Iranian nuclear power—this is going to be a threat 

to Russia. It will take 5 minutes for such a missile to reach Moscow 

or any other Russian city. 

And finally on corruption, yes, it is systemic. Yes, it is getting 

worse. Yes, President Medvedev spent a tremendous amount of 

time talking about it, with no visible results for now. And as Dr. 

Swett mentioned, Khodorkovsky and his company Yukos, Yukos 

was expropriated by the state. Its assets were put in the possession 

of a state-owned oil company called Rosneft, and it was done in a 

corrupt way, in a corrupt fashion, and people benefited from that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And thank you, 

Mr. Marino. I would like to recognize Mr. Connolly before I recognize Mr. Engel. Mr. Connolly had asked a question of the panelists 

and we wanted to get Dr. Swett’s answer to it. Do you remember 

or you could reframe it? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. My question was 

sort of twofold. One was, what is your take on the ostensible differences between Medvedev and Putin; and then, secondly, even 

aside from that, are we seeing a healthy evolution, however slow, 

in democratic institution building and democratic aspirations? Because it would seem that over the last decade or so, we have actually seen retrogression. 

Ms. SWETT. Well, I would agree with your last point. I don’t 

think we are seeing healthy development. It is going in the opposite direction. But as it relates to the issue of the interrelationship 

between Putin and Medvedev, President Medvedev has spoken 

clearly. In fact, one of the first things he said upon assuming the 

Presidency was that he wanted to combat the legalism nihilism—

and those are his words—that characterized Russia. And many 

people are watching this second trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev 

because it is the ultimate example of legal nihilism. 

As Dr. Cohen said, legal experts across the spectrum and across 

the globe acknowledge that it is an absurd Kafkaesque trial in 

every sense where they are now being sort of convicted for charges 

that are absolutely inconsistent with the facts on which they were 

initially convicted 8 years earlier. And I think the outcome of that 

case, the fact that basically it was an example of telephone justice, 

that from Mr. Putin came the telephone call to the judge ordering 

the outcome that he desired. I don’t think there is any doubt about 

that. The judge expelled reporters from the courtroom when he 

53

read the verdict, because I think his own shame and sense of guilt 

at being a party to this was so great that he didn’t want all those 

witnesses there as he read the verdict. 

So certainly the outcome of the Khodorkovsky case is emblematic 

of the fact that in this conflict between Medvedev—more of a reformer, somebody who has a law background himself—and Putin, 

Putin clearly was triumphant. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, I want to thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Thank you, 

Dr. Swett. 

Mr. Engel, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere, is now recognized. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wanted to ask any of the 

panelists if they care to comment—since I chaired the Western 

Hemisphere Subcommittee for a number of years and am now the 

ranking member—of Russia’s intent in Latin America. That is 

something that is sort of under the radar screen. We know, for instance, that Iran, sitting down with Hugo Chavez, has tried to infiltrate a number of places in Latin America. 

I am wondering if any of you would care to comment on what you 

see as Russia trying to do, because I am a believer that if the 

United States doesn’t engage the way we should, then we have 

Russia and China and certainly the likes of Chavez and his people 

moving into the void. 

So, Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Engel, first let me thank you for everything you 

are doing on foreign policy. I am a great admirer. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. COHEN. Russia has a special relationship with Hugo Chavez. 

Mr. Sechin, a Putin confidante, a Spanish speaker and Portuguese 

speaker and deputy prime minister in charge of, among other 

things, oil and gas, is in charge of the Venezuela dossier. Russia 

promised, in a very dangerous way, I think, to build a nuclear reactor in Venezuela. If they do that—this is the trajectory that started 

with Iran, with Bushehr—and under the guise of building a civilian 

nuclear reactor—you can train nuclear engineers, you can train 

physicists, and you can launch, God forbid, a Venezuelan Chavista 

nuclear weapons program. And of course this is not something you 

would like to have. 

Moreover, Russia is selling sophisticated weapons, but also less 

sophisticated weapons that should be a cause for concern of this 

administration. And maybe I missed something, but I haven’t 

heard that concern really expressed by this administration. I am 

specifically talking about the Kalashnikov assault rifle factory in 

Venezuela. Now, Venezuela can arm 500,000 people with Kalashnikov, and people in this town pooh-poohed it. But there is nothing 

to pooh-pooh if it comes to support of FARC and the threat to Colombia. 

Finally, let’s note the Russian efforts at soft power. Russia Today 

is an anti-American television channel. It has not only a massive 

presence in Washington, DC, it has American broadcasting, Arabic 

broadcasting and, importantly, Spanish broadcasting. Russia Today 

is broadcasting in this country in Spanish and is broadcasting in 

54

Latin America. So it is the combination of hard power and energy. 

The Russians managed to push out Western oil companies from 

Venezuela and get, in their stead, to develop very lucrative Venezuelan oil resources, and soft power, such as Russia Today, in 

combination, should be taken seriously. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Dr. Cohen. I appreciate your testimony. 

Thank you for your comment. 

I don’t know if Israel had been discussed before I came, but I 

wanted to mention that. What kind of a role, if any, destructive 

role or positive role, is Russia playing in the Middle East today, 

particularly with the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Russia, as you know, is a member of the quartet. They tend to be one of the less active members of the quartet 

and to shape their agenda in relation to the others—the lead taken 

by others. There have been some exceptions to that. Periodically, 

Russia tries to make itself a mediator between Hamas and other 

governments, but not a great deal has come of those efforts. 

Mr. ENGEL. How about Russian attempts to, what I think, is to 

trivialize the fact that under the quartet, the Palestinians are supposed to renounce terror and, of course, Hamas has done anything 

but? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Yes. The encouragement of Hamas and the 

opening of the channel to Hamas has definitely carried that implication. What the exact communications with Hamas have been, I 

don’t know. 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes, Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Real brief. Despite the fact that Hamas is recognized 

as a terrorist organization by both the United States and the European Union, the Russians are treating them as a legitimate organization. And this is despite the fact that Hamas’ charter states that 

its goal is not just to destroy the State of Israel, but to engage in 

violent acts against Jews anywhere they can be found. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Can I just ask one quick thing? I know it is near and 

dear to your heart, Madam Chair. I don’t know if there was discussion about the Russian connection to the Castro regime in Cuba. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. For that, I may give you additional 

time. But let’s go to Ms. Schmidt, in order to be fair. Thank you, 

Mr. Engel. Mrs. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. First off, I am delighted to see the 

family of a very good colleague of mine in the audience today. Mrs. 

Lantos, it is so nice to see you. And Dr. Swett, you look just like 

your father. I don’t think there is any DNA test needed for you. 

I am going to continue with Congressman Engel’s question on 

the relationship between Castro and Putin. And I will let all of you 

answer that. 

Mr. COHEN. There is a residual relationship that comes from the 

Soviet era. My understanding is that there is direction, or directive 

from above, to improve, encourage, and intensify the relationship 

between Russia and Cuba, but nothing on the level of the old Soviet support and subsidy, the multibillion-dollar subsidy, and the 

spying facility. Although I heard—I didn’t look into that that 

55

much—a spying facility was transferred from the Russian tutelage 

to the Chinese tutelage. But I would need to look more into that. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. If you can’t pay for weapons or nuclear power 

plants or other Russian exports, you are not really interesting to 

the Russians. There is a tiny bit of residual tail-pulling value for 

Cuba in Russian policy, but it is pretty minor. The Russians are 

more interested in Brazil as a member of the BRICs, or of Venezuela because it is an energy exporter and generally irresponsible 

player in the hemisphere. Those countries offer more fun and profit 

for Russia. Castro seems very much yesterday’s man by comparison. 

Ms. SWETT. I would agree with that. But I think it is nonetheless 

instructive and illuminating that the Castro regime remains an oppressive, autocratic, antidemocratic regime and Russia supports 

them. I think that is something worth noting. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. And the Obama administration said 

that the New START agreement with Russia does not undermine 

U.S. missile defense plans. And the Russian Government has repeatedly stated that in fact the treaty is predicated in a way that—

on that very thing, and that it will not honor the agreement with 

the U.S. missile defense plans if the U.S. missile defense plans proceed. So who is correct, Obama or Putin? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. The Russians have backed themselves into a 

corner here. I predict they will be able to get out of it. But they 

have taken a rather absolutist position that the administration—

that no U.S. administration is going to support. It is an absolute 

red line in American policy that you are not going to yield on missile defense just to please the Russians. The Russians, I believe, 

are getting that message. They have got it loud and clear from 

NATO this week. 

Mr. COHEN. I think that the concessions were made, and we recognize the nexus between defensive and offensive weapons. That 

was opening the gate for the Russian claims. We in this way facilitate the Russian claims. We are engaging in negotiations on missile 

defense. And unlike what Congressman Rohrabacher said before—

unfortunately, he is not here—that this missile defense in some 

way is threatening the massive Russian strategic ballistic missile 

arsenal, that is just not the case. These missiles in Europe are 

aimed at the Iranian threat. It is a very small deployment. They 

can intercept a small number of warheads. Russians have thousands of warheads. 

So what they are doing is posturing in an attempt to gain a say 

in an area that we thought that they are out of, which is Central 

Europe. What the Poles do, what the Czechs do, as members of 

NATO, is no Russian business, especially when this deployment 

does not threaten Russia. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. My question on this is always, how is it working out? No one agrees with the Russian position. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you very much. I yield back my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Sherman, the ranking 

member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade. 

56

Mr. SHERMAN. It is great to have you here. We all admired your 

father and many of us look forward to the day when you are on 

this side of the room. 

Ms. SWETT. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The easiest thing for us to do in this room is to 

say that all of the tension between the United States and Russia 

is Russia’s fault, that we are blameless, that our policies are logical. 

I think there is enough blame to go around; that we can give 

Russia its fair share and still assume a little bit for ourselves. Now, 

one of the great philosophical debates in foreign policy is territorial 

integrity versus self-determination, the two great wars of America’s 

history, our Revolutionary War for our self-determination and the 

Civil War to retain our territorial integrity and prevent the socalled self-determination of the southern States. 

We see this tension in areas much closer to Russia. We supported the independence of Georgia, Moldova, and all the Soviet Socialist republics. We supported the independence of Bosnia and 

Croatia, and even of the Kosovo province of the Republic of Serbia. 

We opposed the independence of the northern part of Kosovo that 

wanted to break away and rejoin Serbia. We opposed the independence of Trans-Dniester, Moldova. We opposed the independence of 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

Now we seem to be on both sides of this issue. It seems like there 

is no logic in this issue. It seems like there is no logic in our position. There is logic. There is consistency. We are absolutely, insistently, anti-Russian on a host of issues very important to them and 

seemingly philosophically schizoid for us. 

My first question, Ambassador, is, other than things that are in 

the economic interest of Russia and/or feathering the economic interests of particular elements of the leadership team, what does 

Russia want from the United States? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Congressman, I have to comment on your 

point about consistent anti-Russian policy on the issue of territorial 

integrity. The issue of territorial integrity that has mattered most 

to Russia in the past 20 years has been Chechnya. And the United 

States has never in any way questioned that territorial integrity. 

We have objected to the way in which Russia repressed the 

Chechen people and brutally——

Mr. SHERMAN. I will ask you to respond back. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. But on that issue there has been——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. We haven’t totally called for the dismemberment of the Russian Federation. Aside from that—well, you can answer my question. 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Yes. I think that Russia has a desire to have 

its great power status respected, its status as a nuclear superpower 

respected, its growing position as an energy power advanced 

through cooperation, and sometimes not cooperation, with other 

consuming countries. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can, the Russians have made the most difficult national psychological change ever from superpower to nonsuperpower. The Germans tried to make that change, having lost 

World War I, just as Russia lost the Cold War. They were unsucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Aug 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\070711\67304 HFA PsN: SHIRL
57

cessful in making that psychological adjustment until the Second 

World War. 

Have we done everything possible to assuage Russia to make 

sure that it is being treated with proper respect, or has the Cold 

War mentality in the United States led to gratuitous acts of humiliation? 

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I think that every administration since the 

end of the Cold War has tried to find a way of according Russia 

respect without giving Russia veto over issues where we want to 

pursue our interests. And as with territorial integrity and self-determination, that is sometimes a hard balance to strike. I would 

say most of the administrations have gotten it pretty much right. 

But on the receiving end for the Russians, the feeling is always we 

don’t get enough deference. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope we do a second round so I have a chance 

to get the opinions of the other two witnesses, and I regret that I 

only had 5 minutes. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, 

we will not have a second round. We will be voting pretty soon. But 

I want to thank the wonderful panelists. And thank you to all the 

members for terrific questions. And thank you to the visitors who 

joined us. And the committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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