U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

29–458 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–80] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE AND 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 7, 2018 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

RO KHANNA, California 

SARAH MINEIRO, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .................. 6 

Rood, Hon. John C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hyten, Gen John E. .......................................................................................... 27 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 19 

Rood, Hon. John C. ........................................................................................... 21 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 59 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 59 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 62 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 60 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 49 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 58 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 60 

(1) 

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE AND THE FISCAL 

YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2018. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. This hearing of the Strategic Forces Committee of 

the House Armed Services will come to order. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Carbajal be allowed 

to sit on this hearing since he is a member of the full HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee]. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

We are pleased today to have two witnesses with us, General 

John Hyten, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, no stranger to 

this subcommittee; and a newer one, Mr. John Rood, Under Secretary for Defense Policy. 

Thank you both for testifying and being here with us today. We 

know it takes a lot of time to get ready for these hearings, and we 

appreciate the time you put into it and your service to our country. 

What we are going to do, because we are going to be called for 

votes at 4 o’clock—Jim and I are going to—the ranking member 

and I are going to submit our opening statements for the record so 

that we can go directly to questions if that is okay with you all. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

And what I will do is I will ask either one of you, who wants to 

start first with your opening statement? And we will recognize Mr. 

Rood for your opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 19.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary ROOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cooper, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify on the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget 

request for strategic forces. 

In terms of the security environment and strategic priorities, I 

will just briefly summarize that. 
2 

Today the United States faces an increasingly complex global security environment in which the central challenge to our prosperity 

and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition 

by revisionist powers in China and Russia. 

While they pose separate challenges with unique attributes, both 

China and Russia seek to reshape the world order and change territorial borders. Consequently, they pose increasing security 

threats to us, our allies, and our partners. 

Long-term competition with China and Russia requires increased 

U.S. and allied military investment, because of the magnitude of 

the threats they pose today and the potential that these threats 

will increase in the future. 

We must also simultaneously strengthen our efforts to deter and 

counter the clear and present dangers posed by rogue regimes such 

as North Korea and Iran. 

The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world. However, 

our advantages are eroding as potential adversaries modernize and 

build up their conventional and nuclear forces. They now field a 

broad arsenal of advanced missiles, including variants that can 

reach the American homeland. 

For example, only last week Russian President Putin claimed 

publicly that Russia now possesses unprecedented new types of nuclear forces with which to target the U.S. and our allies. 

While this picture is unsettling and clearly not what we desire, 

as Secretary of Defense Mattis has pointed out, quote, ‘‘We must 

look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish 

it to be,’’ end quote. 

The administration has heeded this admonition in our recent 

strategic reviews: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review. They reflect a consistent and pragmatic assessment of threats and uncertainties we 

face regarding the future security environment. 

Our task at the Defense Department is to ensure that the U.S. 

military advantages endure and, in combination with other elements of national power, that we are fully able to meet the increasing challenges to our national security. 

Weakness invites challenges and provocation, but as both George 

Washington and Thomas Jefferson observed, American strength deters war and promotes peace. It also assures our allies and attracts 

new partners. 

Strengthening our alliances and attracting new partners is a critical element of retaining our advantages. As the National Defense 

Strategy points out, quote, ‘‘Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric advantage that no competitor or rival can match. This approach has served the United States well in peace and war,’’ end 

quote. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects DOD’s [Department of 

Defense’s] strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable, 

and effective nuclear deterrent. The logic of the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] was best articulated by Secretary Mattis when he 

said, quote, ‘‘This review rests on a bedrock truth: Nuclear weapons 

have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear 

attack and preventing large-scale conventional warfare between 
3 

nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future. U.S. nuclear weapons not only defend our allies against conventional nuclear threats, 

they also help them avoid the need to develop their own nuclear 

arsenals. This in turn furthers global security,’’ end quote. 

Effective deterrence is critical to our security, and in a complex 

and dynamic security environment there is no one-size-fits-all approach to deterrents. The requirements for effective U.S. deterrence 

can vary greatly depending on the perceptions, goals, interests, 

strengths, strategies, and vulnerabilities of different potential adversaries. 

The deterrent strategy effective against one potential adversary 

may not deter another. Consequently, the 2018 NPR calls for the 

United States to tailor deterrence as necessary across a spectrum 

of adversaries, threats, and contexts. 

The 2018 NPR confirms the findings of all previous NPRs that 

the diverse capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility 

and resilience needed for deterrence. Unfortunately, each leg of the 

triad is now operating far beyond its originally planned service life. 

Consequently, we must not delay the recapitalization of the triad 

initiated by the previous administration. 

We’re off to a good start. The 2019 budget request funds all critical Defense Department modernization requirements, helping to 

ensure that modern replacements will be available before the Nation’s legacy systems reach the end of their extended service lives. The fiscal year 2019 budget request for nuclear forces is $24 bil- lion, which includes $11 billion for nuclear force sustainment and 

operations; $7 billion for recapitalization programs, including the 

LRSO [Long Range Standoff Weapon], B–21, GBSD [Ground Based 

Strategic Deterrent], and Columbia-class SSBN [ballistic missile 

submarine]; and $6 billion for nuclear command, control, and communications. 

In addition, the President’s budget request includes two supplemental capabilities to enhance deterrence against emerging challenges in the near- and mid-term. The Department requests funds 

to modify a small number of existing SLBM [submarine-launched 

ballistic missile] warheads to provide a low-yield ballistic missile 

option in the near-term. 

We also request funds to initiate an analysis of the performance 

requirements and costs to pursue a modern nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missile that could be available in the mid-term. 

These proposed supplements would contribute to deterrence by 

raising the threshold for nuclear use. They would do so by denying 

potential adversaries confidence that their coercive threats of limited nuclear first use or actual first use can provide a useful advantage over us and our allies. 

These supplements do not and are not intended to mimic adversary nuclear capabilities. They can nonetheless help address the 

imbalance in U.S. and Russian non-nuclear strategic forces and 

create incentives for Russia to return to compliance with its nuclear arms control commitments. 

The U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and arms control remains strong. The U.S. remains committed to all of our obligations 

under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article VI. 

We will continue to use arms control measures like the New 
4 

START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaty, nonproliferation measures, and counter-nuclear terrorism measures to advance the security of the United States and our allies and partners. 

Let me now turn to missile defense. The Department’s fiscal year 

2019 budget request supports the President’s directions as set out 

in the National Security Strategy to develop a layered missile defense system to protect the American homeland from North Korean 

and Iranian missile threats. Our missile defense system not only 

protects the American people, it strengthens deterrence of war and 

assurance of allies. 

Today, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense [GMD] system provides this protection for the U.S. homeland. It consists of 44 

ground-based interceptors [GBI] deployed in Alaska and California; 

land-, sea-, and space-based sensors; and a command and control 

system. 

We are strengthened in this GMD system and investing in technologies to ensure that we can continue to counter rogue state missile threats to our homeland. Doing so is one of our highest priorities. 

For this purpose, last September DOD requested the reprogram- ming of fiscal year 2017 funding of over $400 million to counter the 

North Korean missile threat. Congress approved this request. 

A portion of these funds support important homeland defense activities, including initiating work on the procurement of 20 additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska as early as 2023, which 

will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors. The reprogramming 

also funded a service life extension to the COBRA DANE radar in 

Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-band radar. 

In November, the President submitted an amendment to his fiscal year 2018 budget request for $4 billion for homeland and regional missile defense, which included construction of a new missile 

field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional procurement for 20 additional GBIs. 

The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $9.9 billion for the 

Missile Defense Agency and $3 billion for air and missile defense 

activities in the military services. The budget includes funding for 

a more capable GBI with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, the deployment of new missile tracking and discrimination sensors in Alaska, 

Hawaii, and the Pacific region, and a new Space-based Kill Assessment capability. 

We are also moving forward to bolster homeland defenses against 

air and cruise missile threats. In 2018, we will complete the first 

part of a two-phase effort to provide surveillance against these 

threats for the National Capital Region. Doing so will enhance our 

ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, as well 

as cruise missiles, and when necessary, cue our missile defense systems. 

We are on track to complete the second phase of this effort in fiscal year 2019. We are also looking into technologies and concepts 

that could be used to provide scalable and deployable options for 

the rest of North America. 

The Department’s fiscal year 2019 budget request also continues 

deployment of regional missile defenses tailored to meet threats to 

U.S. forces abroad, allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, 
5 

and the Asia-Pacific region. The budget seeks to enhance our regional missile defense capability through additional Patriot, 

THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], and SM–3 [Standard Missile-3] Block IB and IIA interceptors. 

Because systems such as Patriot and THAAD and our Aegis ballistic missile defense capable ships can be surged when and where 

required, they make it possible to deploy layered missile defense 

capabilities that are responsive to regional missile threats as they 

arise. 

We are encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defense capabilities and to strengthen cooperation and interoperability. We are pleased with the progress at NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] to build greater missile defense capabilities 

and important collaborative efforts with allies in the Middle East 

and Asia. 

Potential adversaries are modernizing and expanding their missile capabilities. We must ensure, therefore, our missile defense investment strategy and priorities enable us to meet the most dangerous threats we face today, while also enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand. 

Areas for work on advanced technology include improved discrimination in our missile defense system sensor architecture, lasers to intercept offensive missiles during their most vulnerable 

boost phase of flight, and the multi-object kill vehicle. 

With respect to our space policy and posture, let me say U.S. 

space systems are essential to our prosperity, security, and way of 

life; and DOD’s space capabilities are critical for effective deterrence, defense, and U.S. force projection capabilities. Consequently, 

DOD must be prepared to address threats to our national security 

assets located in space. 

Due to the critical importance of these assets, the National Security Strategy states, quote, ‘‘Any harmful interference with or an 

attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate 

response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing,’’ 

end quote. 

The President’s fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $12.5 

billion to take steps to establish a more resilient, defendable space 

architecture. This is an increase of $1.1 billion from the fiscal year 

2018 budget request. 

The United States, however, I would add, does not fight alone. 

Bringing together our allies and partners to share capabilities and 

information strengthens deterrence and defense. Cost-sharing 

agreements, hosting U.S. national security payloads on foreign systems, and data-sharing arrangements to bolster shared space situational awareness are just a few of the opportunities that our allies 

and partners provide. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in this increasingly complex and threatening security environment the Defense 

Department must sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against attacks on our homeland, U.S. forces deployed abroad, 

allies and partners. We must make the investments needed to address the ongoing erosion of our advantages and remain the preeminent military power in the world. 
6 

Along with our allies and partners we must ensure that we have 

the capabilities needed now and in the future to protect our people 

and the freedoms we so cherish, and are able to engage potential 

adversaries diplomatically from a position of strength. To do so, I 

urge you to support the important capabilities funded in the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget request. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be here before 

you today. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rood can be found in the 

Appendix on page 21.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

General Hyten, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General HYTEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cooper. It is an honor to be here today with Under Secretary Rood. 

And it is a continuing privilege to represent the 184,000 Americans 

that serve the missions of U.S. Strategic Command. 

I want to start by thanking this committee for your enduring 

support for our Nation’s defense. And with your approval, I would 

like my full statement to be made part of the record. 

Mr. ROGERS. So ordered. 

General HYTEN. So as we begin today, it is important for me to 

note that although we now have a bipartisan budget act, which is 

a very significant step to ensuring our future security, we are nonetheless still operating under a continuing resolution which will expire on March the 23rd. So I respectfully request quick action by 

the Congress to pass a final budget to ensure that our All-Volunteer Force remains fully trained and equipped to meet not only the 

threats of today, but the emerging threats of the future. 

And the first and most important message I want to deliver 

today is that the forces under my command are fully ready to deter 

our adversaries and respond decisively should that deterrence fail. 

We are ready for all the threats that are out there, and no one— 

no one—should doubt this. We just have to make sure that future 

STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] commanders will always be 

able to make that statement. 

Because we are a global warfighting command, we set the conditions across the globe. As the ultimate guarantor of our national 

and allied security, our forces and capabilities underpin and enable 

all other joint force operations. 

We are a global warfighting command. The strength of the command is its people. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians of the enterprise have the most important mission in our entire Department. Their hard work and dedication ensure our Nation’s strategic capabilities remains safe, secure, reliable, and 

ready. And sustained congressional support will ensure that we remain ready, agile, and effective for deterring strategic attack, assuring our allies and partners today and in the future. 

Secretary Rood already talked about the NPR. He also talked 

about our modernization. I will defer the comments I have on that 

to your questions and answers. 
7 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here 

again today, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General Hyten. 

Thank you both for being here as we begin to examine the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget proposal. 

I will recognize myself first for questions. 

Under Secretary Rood, many discuss strategic stability in the 

context of missile defense and the need to be cognizant of how the 

U.S. actions, development efforts, and deployment of capability can 

disrupt this balance. 

From your perspective, especially in light of the recent statements from Russia regarding their capability to strike the U.S. 

with a quote, ‘‘invincible weapon,’’ close quote, can our missile defense systems be compared to what is being done by Russia and 

China that threaten this strategic stability? 

Secretary ROOD. Mr. Chairman, the missile defense system that 

the United States has developed and fielded to date would not have 

the capability to negate the Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear 

arsenal. That has not been our planning focus and the capabilities 

developed do not enable us to do that. 

I think the statements made by Russian President Putin, while 

not surprising, were nonetheless disappointing. While we have 

been aware of the development of Russia’s capabilities and watching with concern some of the development that has occurred in 

terms of Russia’s doctrine and their exercise program, it is nonetheless disappointing to see that the President of Russian Federation choose to feature these capabilities in the way that he did. 

I think with respect to China, they are developing a very large 

strategic offensive nuclear force, and so that is of concern. Both 

countries are pursuing hypersonic weapons and other capabilities 

and their behavior in the cyber domain and elsewhere concerns us. 

All of those things as a piece are concerning and why in the National Defense Strategy we highlighted those two countries as our 

primary and central focus for our national security efforts going 

forward. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Recently, President Putin announced that Russia was pursuing 

and fielding four new nuclear weapons because the U.S. refuses to 

engage in arms control and is developing missile defenses to thwart 

Russia’s strategic forces. Are these reactions to the 2018 NPR or 

have they been in development for years? 

Secretary ROOD. No, you are correct, Mr. Chairman. Those capabilities have obviously been in development for quite some time. 

President Putin talked about their maturity. They are clearly not 

capabilities that were developed within the last few months or last 

year. They have been at work. 

With regard to our commitment to arms control, the United 

States remains committed to our arms control obligations. That remains unchanged. Regrettably, the Russian Federation’s track record in terms of its adherence to its arms control obligations leaves 

a great deal wanting. 
8 

As you know, it has been a policy of the United States Government, in the last administration and this, to find that Russia is in 

violation of its commitments under the INF [Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces] Treaty, for example. We have seen Russian violations on other agreements. 

Nonetheless, we remain committed to our obligations in the New 

START treaty and prepared to have conversations in this regard 

with our Russian colleagues. But I think it would be a mistake to 

assign the development of capabilities that have been at work for 

many years to any developments that happened in the last few 

months. 

Mr. ROGERS. You made reference in your opening statement to 

the additional 20 GBIs that we authorized and appropriated money 

for in this current NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], 

which we are all very excited about, because while we did have 44, 

you know they all aren’t available at all times because of work that 

is having to be done on some of them. 

But I am a big believer that that 20 was a good start to where 

we need to go. I would be curious to know your thoughts and General Hyten’s thoughts on the need for more after these 20 are implemented, given the threats around the world and our shot doctrine, which we won’t go into. 

Secretary ROOD. Yes, sir. 

Regrettably, the missile threats that we face around the world, 

that threat picture is continuing to mature, both in scale and in 

complexity. It is incumbent on us that we continue to maintain the 

ability to defend this Nation from those kinds of ballistic missile 

capabilities in the hands of countries like North Korea and Iran. 

And so we have sought, as you noted, in the reprogramming request and the supplemental budget request last year to give a 

boost to those efforts, and the fiscal year 2019 budget request carries that forward. 

It is always—and this is one of the questions we are seeking to 

answer as part of the Missile Defense Review—what is the best 

way of doing that? The additional systems, such as the GBIs, measured as well with sensor capabilities and improvements in discrimination, and the robustness of the overall architecture. 

And so all of those things working as a system of systems to 

produce the improvement is what we are trying to optimize. And 

so clearly greater capability than what the United States possesses 

today will be required. And the threat is not resting. So we must 

keep pace with it. 

General. 

General HYTEN. So I believe you will see the details in the Missile Defense Review shortly. But I have been consistent in my view 

that we need to continue to monitor the missile defense capabilities 

that we are building to make sure they respond to the threats that 

we face. And I believe that prioritization of resources that we have 

in the future should go along the following construct. 

The first thing we need is better sensor capability, better tracking capabilities, to make sure we understand and can characterize 

and then respond to that threat. 
9 

The second piece we need is better kill vehicles on the top of our 

interceptors, so that those kill vehicles become more and more lethal in terms of their ability to respond. 

And then the third thing we need is more capacity. 

I think we have to do those three things simultaneously. I think 

those are the priorities that I have, that I have stated, both in my 

statement for the record, as well as multiple times over the year. 

I will continue to be consistent in pushing for those three elements 

of future missile defense capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay, great. 

My last question is for you, General Hyten. You are known to say 

that you want to see us go fast, faster than we have been going. 

And one of the reasons, as I understand it, that the Missile Defense Agency was created was so it could go faster, and it was 

pulled out from the Department for that reason. 

There is discussion now about pulling it back into the Department under the R&E [Research and Engineering] section. I am concerned that that is going to bureaucratize it again and slow it 

down. What are your thoughts about that? 

General HYTEN. So I hate bureaucracy. I hate any additional bureaucracy that causes the Department to go slow. 

I don’t think the organizational issue is necessarily a concern. I 

like the authorities the Missile Defense Agency has. And whatever 

structure we talk about coming out of the Missile Defense Review, 

we have to make sure that we maintain those authorities to allow 

it to go fast. 

We can still go faster on the missile defense side as well. The one 

thing I will point out about R&E, though, is that Mike Griffin has 

now been confirmed to be R&E in the Department of Defense. 

There is nobody I know that is more technically sound and hates 

bureaucracy and wants to go fast than Mike Griffin. 

So I believe there is a partnership there that can be made. But 

I would not advocate for lessening the authorities that the Missile 

Defense Agency has right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes the ranking member for any questions he 

may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses. 

In view of the number of participants in this hearing and the 

shortness of time, I am going to defer my question to the closed 

session. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 

being here and the ways that you have served our country. 

Thank you, General Hyten, for coming by earlier. It is always 

good to touch base. 

And because of the shortness of the time, like the ranking member said, I am just going to ask one question, and this is for both 

of you. 

We all know that—and you have just addressed it, General 

Hyten—that we need to have better space sensors. We need to look 

for other strategic uses of directed energy and things like that so 

we stay ahead of potential adversaries. 
10 

But when I look at the fiscal year 2019 President’s budget, I see 

that those kinds of things are zeroed out. So what is going on there 

from a funding standpoint? 

Secretary ROOD. In terms of what is going on from a funding 

standpoint for efforts to be zeroed out for directed energies? 

Mr. LAMBORN. No. For, well, space sensors in particular and the 

missile defense tracking system, which is a space-based sensor 

layer. 

General HYTEN. So I will address that, Congressman Lamborn. 

So as you look across those pieces, and you talked about the need 

for increased space sensors and where that is in the 2019 budget, 

you talked about the need for directed energy pieces. 

So concerning the midcourse tracking system, the MTS system, 

it was in the 2018 supplemental for MDA [Missile Defense Agency], 

a small number, I think, somewhere over $10 million, to begin the 

pursuit of that capability. We had that discussion within the Department. 

The Department made a decision that what we will do in the 

2019 budget, and you will find it actually in the Air Force budget 

line, under the missile warning sensor technology, a line for $42 

million to build demonstration capabilities to explore that piece. 

That $42 million will go at developing the technology we need for 

those capabilities. 

The second piece of the puzzle, maybe more important, is not a 

funding issue, and that is the United States Air Force and the Missile Defense Agency this year, under the Department of Defense, 

have agreed to get together to work out an integrated set of requirements and programs for how we use space and the infrared 

[IR] element in space, overhead persistent IR, to do all of these 

missions, and to come into the Department and come into the Congress next year with a fully integrated program to do the missile 

warning missions, the missile defense missions, the threat characterization missions, all those pieces together. 

So that work will be ongoing this year, while at the same time 

the technology work will be ongoing. Nonetheless, I have advocated 

for that capability for a long time, 30 years of my life I have advocated. I believe we are ready to go into that. We need to move 

quickly. I appreciate where the Department is on that. We have to 

make the decisions this year where we are going in the future. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you so much. I understand better 

that things are moving forward. My initial impression and my staff 

needed to be updated, so I really appreciate that. I am glad to see 

that these efforts are indeed starting to pay off. Thank you. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Mrs. 

Davis, for any questions you may have. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will defer to closed session as well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Chair now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for his questions. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

It is always good to see General Hyten, a local boy done well, 

from Huntsville, Alabama. I don’t know if the chairman mentioned 

that, but I wanted to emphasize it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Roll Tide. 

General HYTEN. Roll Tide, for the record. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. That works with me. And also, go Duke 

Blue Devils, since that is my other alma mater. But that doesn’t 

do so well with those Carolina folks. 

Mutually assured destruction doctrine, that has kept the peace 

to a very large degree between the United States and China on the 

one hand, and the Soviet Union, now Russia, on the other. 

With the improvements in technology and capabilities of China 

and Russia, does the mutually assured destruction doctrine still 

work or have either China or Russia been able to get to the point 

where they have been able to overcome that counterthreat that has 

helped keep the peace? 

Secretary ROOD. Congressman, nuclear deterrence remains vitally important to our country. We rely principally on nuclear deterrence to address those kinds of challenges from Russia and 

China, and certainly to an extent other countries, such as North 

Korea. 

I think the concepts and the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence 

still hold in this environment, but in the way that we approach 

those, utilize those fundamental principles, we need to be more 

supple and more tailored and have a broader range of capabilities 

in our approach. And the Nuclear Posture Review talks about a tailored approach to deterrence. 

For example, we are concerned about some of the doctrine we see 

emanating from Russia, talking about early escalation, a greater 

reliance on nuclear capabilities in a conflict, perhaps some mistaken belief that the United States and our allies would not have 

the ability to respond to those sorts of capabilities. 

And so what you see in the Nuclear Posture Review is a recommendation for some supplementary capabilities, because nuclear 

deterrence is not static and it won’t be one-size-fits-all. We have to 

update our tool kit and be flexible in our application of our principles and our tools to deal with this new environment. 

So I think nuclear deterrence still holds and it is still a bedrock 

principle of our defense capability, but our application of it, we 

need to adjust ourselves to the new environment we face in order 

to keep the nuclear threshold high and not allow for some erosion 

of that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Assuming for the moment that we do not update 

our tool kit, to use your phraseology, how long do you think it 

would be before the mutually assured destruction doctrine no 

longer worked with China and Russia? Are we talking years or decades? 

Secretary ROOD. It is a hard question to answer because the circumstances in which it may arise and the contexts in which we 

face these kinds of challenges would be the case. There is the technical capabilities, the destructive capabilities that are on a certain 

vector in Russia and China, but there are also the specific consequences and circumstances around an application. 
12 

So the short answer to your question, Congressman, would be, it 

is very hard to predict, but I don’t recommend that we take the 

risk of remaining static and not being flexible and adjusting our 

approach and our capabilities as we go forward. 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand it is hard to give an estimate, but do 

you have an opinion or a judgment that you can share with us as 

to when we need to start feeling insecure about the mutually assured destruction doctrine that has kept a nuclear war at bay for 

roughly six decades? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, I don’t think we have to worry 

about that for at least a decade. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. 

General HYTEN. I think the capabilities that we have that we 

will operate for the next decade will allow us to maintain the basis 

of nuclear deterrence. 

But what we have to guard against is we have to guard against 

a miscalculation on behalf of our potential adversaries, particularly 

Russia and China. We can’t allow them to think that they can employ a nuclear weapon, whether on the battlefield or strategically, 

and the United States will not be able to respond. 

That is why the mix of capabilities, the diverse capabilities that 

we talk about in a Nuclear Posture Review, help us to increase 

that deterrent posture. It raises the bar for the Russians or the 

Chinese to take that step across the line and do something foolish 

that would cause a significant issue. 

But there is nothing they can do outside of a massive attack 

against our country that we would not have the ability to respond 

to. And, oh, by the way, our submarines, they do not know where 

they are, and they have the ability to decimate their country if we 

go down that path. 

So I am confident in that. But we have to modernize these capabilities, because 10, 12 years from now all the capabilities that I 

operate today will be reaching end of life. We can’t allow that to 

happen without modernizing and replacing them. 

Mr. BROOKS. I agree with learning from history, and certainly 

with what happened on December 7, 1941, in Pearl Harbor indicates that it is best to make sure that the other side knows that 

we are always capable of doing more than they want to deal with. 

So it seems that our missile interceptor system, to a very large 

degree, is designed to deal with rogue lesser nations like North 

Korea and perhaps Iran. How many interceptors do you think we 

need in the near future, how many more? And also, do you think 

we need an East Coast interceptor system as Iran appears to become more and more capable? 

And I am almost out of time, so I don’t know if the chairman will 

allow an answer or not. 

Mr. ROGERS. Briefly. 

Secretary ROOD. The precise number of interceptors is one of the 

things we are evaluating as part of the Missile Defense Review. In 

our budget request you see a request for an increase up to 64, that 

we will initially—those are our present plans for ground-based 

interceptors. We are looking at a mix of capabilities to improve 

that, to include the potential for a third site, but we haven’t yet 

made a formal decision as to whether to pursue that and where. 
13 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. What we are going to do, we have been called for 

votes. I am going to recognize Mr. Norcross from New Jersey and 

then Mr. Hunter from California. Then we are going to recess while 

we go vote and we will come back to the closed session after that. 

So the gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. I don’t need 5 minutes. I will wait for closed session, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are moving along. 

The gentleman from California is recognized. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go ahead 

and ask. 

General Hyten, multiple combatant commanders, including yourself, have expressed a need for boost-phase intercept capability, yet 

there is not a single line in MDA’s budget to holistically address. 

It could be the same answer you gave to Mr. Lamborn. You do 

mention nascent energy, directed energy efforts. Super risky. Super 

new. 

From your perspective, I guess this is down to brass tacks here, 

what is the fastest way to get boost-phase intercept in the hands 

of the warfighter? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, boost-phase intercept is an 

area of significant interest to STRATCOM. We have stated clearly 

our requirement to move as far left as we can, including left of 

launch, to get after the missile defense threat. If you noticed, the 

review that is currently underway has changed from a ballistic 

missile defense review to an overall defense review to talk about 

all of those things. I expect those things will be discussed in the 

Missile Defense Review as well. 

But, to me, it is really not a technical question. To me, it is a 

policy question. And the challenge that we have is that if it is a 

kinetic weapon and we want to attack in the boost phase, that 

means we have to employ a kinetic weapon inside an adversary’s 

territory. That is a significant decision for the policymakers in 

order to make. 

I am a big fan of continuing to pursue directed energy, as Congressman Lamborn talked about a while ago, because I think the 

great thing about directed energy is that, if we can employ that in 

that kind of, directed energy actually continues out into space, it 

does not come down in an adversary’s territory. 

The technology is advancing rapidly in that area right now. But 

I will also point out that we have been working that for multiple 

decades now. And I had a boss once that told me: Just remember, 

you know directed energy has always been 5 years away. So we 

have to be careful not to put too much, too many eggs in one basket. 

Mr. HUNTER. But you only mentioned directed energy. In MDA’s 

budget it only talks about directed energy, nothing else. 

General HYTEN. We will talk about, we can talk about details in 

the classified session. It would be much more effective to talk about 

the details in the classified session. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 
14 

Mr. ROGERS. I hate that we get interrupted for votes. We have 

quality witnesses like you and we have a lot of questions. But they 

didn’t ask us when we get called for votes. So we are going to have 

to recess. And your time is valuable. 

So we are going to meet in closed session when we return. We 

will be gone for about 20 minutes. 

So with that, we are now in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 7, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 7, 2018 

(19) 

Opening Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

U.S. Strategic Forces Posture and the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request 

Wednesday March 7, 2018 at 3:30pm Rayburn 2118 

The subcommittee will come to order. 

We're here today to discuss the Posture of U.S. Strategic Forces and the 

FY 19 Budget Request. 

I 'II start by introducing our witnesses- we have appearing before us: 

General John Hyten, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. 

And, the Honorable John Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Thank you both for testifYing today and for your continued service to our 

nation. 

Today's hearing is the first in a series this subcommittee will hold to 

examine the Fiscal Year 2019 President's Budget Request and what it means for 

Strategic Forces programs and policies. 

And, there is plenty to talk about. 

Just this past month, the Administration released its Nuclear Posture 

Review, which reaffirmed the comprehensive nuclear modernization program 

initiated by President Obama and suggested a few modest tweaks to policies and 

programs. 

Most notably, the NPR recommends pursuing two supplemental capabilities 

to the existing triad modernization plan: 

They are: 

(1) modification of an existing submarine launched ballistic missile warhead 

to provide a lower-yield option; and 

(2) redeployment of a sea-launched cruise-missile capability, similar to the 

nuclear Tomahawk that was retired in 201 0. 

Although much of the attention has focused on these areas, one of the most 

important aspects in my mind is the level of continuity between the Obama and 

Trump NPRs, which the media seems to disregard. 

The other point I'll make here about the NPR, and this applies equally when 

we talk about changes in space and missile defense, is that the nuclear security 

environment has deteriorated dramatically in recent years. 

There's no better example that I can think of than this quote from the 20 I 0 

Nuclear Posture Review: "Russia is not an enemy, and is increasingly a partner." 

Well, if you heard President Putin's speech last week and his boasting of 

four new and horrific nuclear weapons Russia is developing and fielding-and you 

still think Russia is "increasingly a partner"-then I have a bridge to sell you. 

Great power competition must be acknowledged. 
20 

We must apply a critical eye to our space and missile defense missions, just 

as we've reassessed our nuclear mission. 

Unfortunately, we don't yet have the Missile Defense Review- but I am 

hoping it will be released shortly. And I expect its findings will support the themes 

of the National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review. 

While missile defense has received a recent significant boost to its funding 

with the FY18 Budget Amendment and the FY19 request there is still a lot more 

that must be done. Particularly in space sensing and directed energy capabilities 

for missile defense where l believe we need to be more aggressive- and to borrow 

General Hyten's phrase- go faster. North Korea and Iran show no signs of slowing 

their pace, and we can't either. 

On space, last year's NDAA mandated a number of organizational changes 

and provided enhanced authorities to the Air Force as we transition to 

acknowledging that space is a warfighting domain. 

These were the first steps down a long path in the right direction. Much 

remains to be done here to ensure we're postured to both successfully deter a 

conflict in space, and if need be, prevail over any adversary if a conflict extends 

into space. 

l have tremendous faith in the men and women of our space cadre, I want to 

make sure we're not hamstringing them by failing to provide the right tools for 

them to succeed. 

I've heard the Air Force talk about a number of promising ideas- such as 

disaggregating our space capabilities among many smaller satellites instead of a 

few larger ones, but what I've seen so far in the FY19 budget isn't convincing me 

we're heading in that direction fast enough. 

Lastly, I'd like to acknowledge the special contributions of one ofthe 

audience members today to the mission ofUSSTRATCOM. Mrs. Laura Hyten has 

gone out of her way to consistently demonstrate her commitment to helping 

military families and has provided the foundational support to her husband as he 

leads the men and women ofUSSTRATCOM. I'd like to acknowledge the 

sacrifice she makes to our nation, and thank her for making perhaps the best choice 

she's ever made in marrying a man from Alabama. Roll Tide! 

With that, I'll turn it over to my friend and colleague from Tennessee for any 

comments he'd like to make. 
21 

HASC-SF Hearing on the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for Strategic 

Forces: Nuclear, Space and Missile Defense 

Mr. John Rood 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

March 7, 2018 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for 

Strategic Forces. 

Security Environment and Strategic Priorities 

Today, the United States faces an increasingly complex global security environment, in which 

the central challenge to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic 

competition by revisionist powers in China and Russia. 

While they pose separate challenges with unique attributes, both China and Russia seek to 

reshape the world order and change territorial borders. Consequently, they pose increasing 

security threats to us, our allies and partners. 

Long-tenn competition with China and Russia requires increased U.S and allied military 

investment because of the magnitude of the threats they pose today, and the potential that these 

threats will increase in the future. We also must simultaneously strengthen our efforts to deter 

and counter the clear and present dangers posed by rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran. 

The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world. However, our advantages are eroding as 

potential adversaries modernize and build-up their conventional and nuclear forces. They now 

1ield a broad arsenal of advanced missiles, including variants that can reach the American 

homeland. For example, only last week Russian President Putin claimed publicly that Russia 

now possesses unprecedented, new types of nuclear forces with which to target the United States 

and allies. 

While this picture is unsettling and clearly not what we desire, as Secretary of Defense Mattis 

has pointed out, "We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to 

be." 

The administration has heeded this admonition in recent strategic reviews the National Security 

Strategy, the National Defense StrateJ,ry, and the Nuclear Posture Review. They reflect a 

1 
22 

consistent and pragmatic assessment of the threats and uncertainties we face regarding the future 

security environment. 

Our task at the Defense Department is to ensure that U.S. military advantages endure and, in 

combination with other elements of national power, we are fully able to meet the increasing 

challenges to our national security. Weakness invites challenges and provocation, but as both 

George Washington and Thomas Jefferson observed, American strength deters war and promotes 

peace. It also assures allies and attracts new partners. 

Strengthening our alliances and attracting new partners is a critical element of retaining our 

advantages. As the National Defense Strategy points out, "Mutually beneficial alliances and 

partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric advantage that no 

competitor or rival can match. This approach has served the United States well, in peace and 

war." 

Nuclear Policy and Posture 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects DoD's strategic priority to maintain a safe, 

secure, survivable and effective nuclear deterrent. 

The logic of the NPR was best articulated by Secretmy Mattis: "This review rests on a bedrock 

truth: nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack 

and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states for the 

foreseeable future. U.S. nuclear weapons not only defend our allies against conventional and 

nuclear threats, they also help them avoid the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals. This, in 

turn, furthers global security." 

Effective deterrence is critical to our security, and in a complex and dynamic security 

environment there is no "one size fits all" deterrence strategy. The requirements for effective 

U.S. deterrence can vary greatly given the unique perceptions, goals, interests, strengths, 

strategies, and vulnerabilities of different potential adversaries. The dete!Tence strategy effective 

against one potential adversary may not deter another. Consequently, the 2018 NPR calls for the 

United States to tailor deterrence as necessary across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and 

contexts. Tailoring our deterrence strategy requires a diverse set ofnuelear capabilities to 

counter a spectrum of threats, and the flexibility needed to adjust our deterrent to new threats as 

they emerge over time. 

The 2018 NPR confinns the findings of all previous NPRs that the diverse capabilities of the 

nuclear triad provide the flexibility and resilience needed for deterrence. Unfortunately, each leg 

of the triad is now operating far beyond its originally-planned service life. Consequently, we 

must not delay the recapitalization of the triad initiated by the previous Administration. 

We are off to a good stmi. The FY20 19 budget request funds all critical Department of De tense 

(DoD) modernization requirements, helping to ensure that modern replacements will be available 

2 
23 

before the Nation's legacy systems reach the end of their extended service lives. The FY 19 

budget request for nuclear forces is $24 billion, which includes $11 billion for nuclear force 

sustainment and operations, $7 billion for recapitalization programs (including LRSO, B-21, 

GBSD, and the Columbia Class SSBN), and $6 billion for Nuclear Command, Control and 

Communications (including MILSATCOM). 

In addition, the President's budget request includes two supplemental capabilities designed to 

enhance deten·ence against emerging challenges in the near- and mid-term. The Department 

requests funds to modifY a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield 

ballistic missile option in the near term. We also request funds to initiate an analysis of the 

performance requirements and costs to pursue a modem nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise 

missile (SLCM) that could be available in the mid-term. 

These proposed supplements would contribute to deten·ence by raising the threshold for nuclear 

use. They would do so by denying potential adversaries confidence that their coercive threats of 

limited nuclear first use, or their actual first use can provide a useful advantage over us and our 

allies. These supplements do not, and are not, intended to mimic adversary nuclear capabilities. 

They can, nevertheless, help address the imbalance in U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear 

forces, and may create incentives for Russia to return to compliance with its nuclear arms control 

commitments. 

The U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and anns control remains strong. The United States 

remains committed to all of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including 

Article VI. We will continue to use arms control measures like the New Start Treaty, 

nonproliferation measures, and counter nuclear terrorism measures to advance the security of the 

United States and our allies and partners. 

Missile Defense Policy and Posture 

Let me turn now to missile defense. The Department's FY19 budget request supports the 

President's direction set out in the National Security Strategy to deploy a layered missile defense 

system to protect the American homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile threats. Our 

missile defense system not only protects the American people, it strengthens the deterrence of 

war and the assurance of allies. 

Today, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system provides this protection for the 

U.S. homeland. It consists of 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and 

California; land-, sea-, and space-based sensors; and a command and control system. We are 

strengthening this GMD system and investing in technologies to ensure that we can continue to 

counter rogue state missile threats to our homeland. Doing so is one of our highest priorities. 

3 
24 

For this purpose, in September 2017, DoD requested the reprogramming ofFYI7 funding of 

over $400 million to counter the North Korean missile threat. Congress approved this request. 

A pmiion of these funds support important homeland defense activities, including initiating work 

on the procurement of20 additional OBis in Alaska as early as 2023, which will bring the total 

to 64 fielded interceptors. The reprogramming also funded a service life extension to the 

COBRA DANE radar in Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar. 

In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment to his FY18 budget request for $4.0 

billion for homeland and regional missile defense which includes construction of a new missile 

field at Fort Greely, Alaska and additional procurement funding for the 20 new OBis. 

The FY19 budget request includes $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and $3 billion for 

air and missile defense activities in the military Services. The budget includes funding for: a 

more capable OBI with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle; the deployment of new missile tracking and 

discrimination sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific region; and a new Space-based Kill 

Assessment capability. 

W c are also moving forward to bolster homeland defenses against air and cruise missile threats. 

In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-phase effmi to provide effective surveillance 

against these missile threats to the National Capital Region. Doing so will enhance our ability 

to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, as well as cruise missiles, and when 

necessary, cue our missile defense systems. We are on track to begin the second phase of this 

effort in FY19. We are also looking into technologies and concepts that could be used to 

provide scalable and deployable options for the rest of North America. 

The Department's FY 2019 budget request also continues deployment of regional missile 

defenses tailored to meet missile threats to U.S. forces abroad, allies and partners in Europe, the 

Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. The budget seeks to enhance our regional missile 

defense capacity through additional Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3 Block IB and liA interceptors. 

Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and our Aegis BMD capable ships can be surged 

when and where required, they make it possible to deploy layered missile defense capabilities 

that are responsive to regional missile threats as they arise. 

We arc also encouraging our allies and pmincrs to acquire missile defense capabilities, and to 

strengthen missile defense cooperation and interoperability. We are pleased with the progress at 

NATO to build greater missile defense capabilities and important collaborative efforts with allies 

in Asia and Middle East. 

Potential adversaries are modernizing and expanding their missile capabilities. We must ensure 

that our missile defense investment strategy and priorities enable us to meet the most dangerous 

missile threats today, while also enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand. 

Areas for work on advanced technology include improved discrimination in our missile defense 

system sensor architecture, lasers to intercept offensive missiles during their most vulnerable 

boost phase of flight, and the multi-object kill vehicle. 

4 
25 

Space Policy and Posture 

U.S. space systems are essential to our prosperity, security and way of life, and DoD's space 

capabilities are critical for effective deterrence, defense, and U.S. force projection capabilities. 

Consequently, DoD must be prepared to address threats to our national security assets located in 

space. 

Due to the critical importance of these assets, the National Security Strategy states that "any 

harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that 

directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, 

manner, and domain of our choosing." The President's FY 19 Budget Request includes $12.5 

billion to take steps to establish a more resilient, defendable space architecture. This is an 

increase of$1.1 billion from the FY18 budget. 

The United States does not fight alone. Bringing together our allies and partners to share 

capabilities and information strengthens deterrence and defense, and increases the effectiveness 

of our combined space force. Cost sharing agreements, hosting U.S. national security payloads 

on foreign systems, and data sharing arrangements to bolster shared space situational awareness 

are just a few of the opportunities that our allies and partners provide. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in an increasingly complex and threatening 

security environment, DoD must sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against 

attacks on our homeland, U.S. forces deployed abroad, allies and partners. We must make the 

investments needed to address the on-going erosion of our advantages and remain the preeminent 

military power in the world. Along with our allies and partners, we must ensure that we have the 

capabilities needed, now and in the future, to protect our people and the freedoms we cherish, 

and are able to engage potential adversaries diplomatically from a position of strength. 

To do so, I urge you to support the important capabilities funded in the President's FY19 budget 

request. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testifY. I look f(lfward to your questions. 

5 
26 

John C. Rood 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

John C. Rood serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He assumed this position on 

January 9, 2018. In this role he serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for 

defense policy and leads the formulation and coordination of national security policy within the 

Department of Defense. Mr. Rood oversees integration of defense polices and plans to achieve 

desired objectives. He is responsible for efforts to build partnerships and defense cooperation 

with U.S. friends and allies. 

Mr. Rood brings more than three decades of public and private sector experience to this position, 

including over 20 years of service in the U.S. Government at the Department of State, 

Department of Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and as a Staff 

Member in the U.S. Senate. At the Department of State, he served as Acting Under Secretary of 

State for Arms Control and International Security, and as Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Security and Nonproliferation. Mr. Rood served in the Department of Defense as 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy. He served twice at the National 

Security Council where he was a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director lor 

Counterproliferation, as well as the Director of Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and 

Homeland Defense. At the Central Intelligence Agency, he served as an analyst following 

missile programs in foreign countries. In addition, Mr. Rood worked as a Senior Policy Advisor 

to U.S. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona. 

In the private sector, Mr. Rood was Senior Vice President of Lockheed Martin International 

where he led cftorts to grow the corporation's international business. He also served as Vice 

President tor Corporate Domestic Business Development at Lockheed Martin. Prior to joining 

Lockheed Martin, he was a Vice President at the Raytheon Company. 

Mr. Rood holds a Bachelor of Science in Economics from Arizona State University. 
27 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

STATEMENT OF 

JOHN E. HYTEN 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

7MARCH2018 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
28 

INTRODUCTION 

USSTRA TCOM is a global warfighting command, setting the conditions across the globe as the 

ultimate guarantor of national and allied security. Our forces and capabilities underpin and enable all 

other Joint Force operations. 

USSTRA TCOM is globally dispersed from the depths of the ocean, on land, in the air, across 

cyber, and into space, with a matching breadth of mission areas. The men and women of this command 

are responsible for Strategic Deterrence, Nuclear Operations, Space Operations, Joint Electromagnetic 

Spectrum Operations, Global Strike, Missile Defense, Analysis and Targeting, and Cyberspace 

Operations (until USCYBERCOM is elevated). Nearly 184,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and 

Civilians support the USSTRATCOM mission, providing an umbrella of security for the United States 

and its allies every day. These critical capabilities are an integral part of our combat operations and enable 

warfighters across all domains to preserve the peace and when called upon, dominate in conflict and win. 

This past year, USSTRATCOM began restructuring in alignment with our wartighting mission. 

We now have an air component and will soon have a maritime component. Due to the command's unique 

responsibilities, we are also leading doctrine with our new Joint Force Space Component Commander. 

Our new Command and Control Facility is moving toward completion and will support the longterm viability and credibility of our strategic deterrent force. From this new facility, we will conduct 

strategic planning, wartighting operations, aid the President's nuclear response decision-making process, 

provide global situational awareness to the National Command Authorities and combatant commands, 

and, when necessary, deliver a decisive response in all domains. 

The focus of this command remains to deter strategic attack on the United States and its allies. 

USSTRATCOM stands ready to respond to threats anywhere, anytime across the globe. We acknowledge 

that we cannot do this alone and must continually work towards enhancing our alliances and partnerships, 

in all areas. 

The command's priorities remain: 

-Above all else, we will provide Strategic Deterrence; 

- If deterrence fails, we are prepared to deliver a Decisive Response; 

-We will do this with a resilient, equipped, and trained Combat-Ready Force. 

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GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

The strategic landscape of today is increasingly uncertain, complex, and volatile. Long-term, 

inter-state strategic competition between nation states is reemerging, rogue regimes are taking actions that 

threaten regional and global stability, and violent extremist organizations are bent on destroying peace 

across the globe. Nevertheless, we remain committed to strategic stability with China and Russia. 

China continues to challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and our allies and partners look to the 

U.S. to provide balance. China's excessive maritime claims and aggressive conduct in both the South 

China Sea and East China Sea undermine international law and global maritime standards. Moreover, 

China's continued long-term military modernization of both conventional and strategic forces has 

implications in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. They are aggressively modernizing their mobile 

nuclear forces and re-engineering their long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear warheads. 

China is swiftly developing and testing a hypersonic-glide vehicle capability, a technology used to defeat 

ballistic missile defenses. China's pursuit of conventional global strike capabilities, otlensive 

counterspace capabilities, and exploitation of computer networks also raises questions about its global 

aspirations. These developments coupled with a lack of transparency on nuclear issues such as force 

disposition and size impact regional and strategic stability. 

Russia continues to pose challenges that require consistent and deliberate focus. Russia's support 

to forces in eastern Ukraine (which it continues to fight alongside with), occupation and purported 

annexation of Crimea, operations in the Middle East, and efTorts to present itself as the mediator for 

concerns in Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions reinforce its goal of being seen as a military and 

diplomatic global power. Russia continues to tout advances in cyber and counterspace capabilities along 

with improvements in its strategic nuclear and general purpose forces. In June 2017, as part of an effort to 

destabilize Ukraine, the Russian military launched the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history. 

The effects of this atrack spread globally and included devastating damage to U.S. businesses. On March 

1, President Putin announced Russia's development of six new strategic nuclear weapons systems 

including an intercontinental-range nuclear-powered cruise missile, an intercontinental-range underwater 

drone, and a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle. President Putin's statements are not surprising and 

only reinforce Russia's commitment to develop weapons designed to intimidate and coerce the U.S. and 

its allies. Finally, Russia's violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the 

development of the SSC-8 ground launched cruise missile remains a significant issue as delivery of the 

treaty-violating system continues. 

North Korea remains a dangerous and unpredictahle actor in the Pacific region, continuing to 

develop the capability to threaten the U.S. and allies with Pyongyang's evolving ballistic missile and 

nuclear weapons program. Kim Jong Un continues to defy international norms and resolutions through 

3 
30 

provocative actions including their sixth nuclear test, three tests claimed to be of Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missiles (ICBM), and the WannaCry cyber-attack. North Korea is progressing in development of 

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. These 

developments highlight its commitment to diversifY its missile forces and nuclear delivery options, while 

strengthening missile force survivability. North Korea continues efforts to expand its stockpile of 

weapons-grade fissile material and demonstrated its capability and willingness to conduct destructive 

cyber-attacks against the U.S. and its allies. 

Iran continues to develop ballistic, space, and cyberspace capabilities and we remain focused on 

preventing the development of the new threats in the region. While the International Atomic Energy 

Agency continues to verifY Iran is meeting its nuclear-related Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

obligations, we must remain vigilant to any Iranian intentions that indicate it will abrogate its 

commitments and pursue nuclear weapons. 

Ungoverned or ineffectively governed regions remain incubators for those who seek to attack the 

world's peaceful societies. Transregional Terrorist Organizations (TTOs) recruit and operate freely across 

political, social, and cyberspace boundaries. The effect of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the 

hands ofTTOs could be catastrophic, which highlights the importance of our national nonproliferation 

and counter-WMD efforts. 

THE PROBLEM 

Today, our deterrent force is safe, secure, ready, and reliable, but the pace of change in the 

strategic environment is rapid and demands adapting how we operate in order to stay ahead of evolving 

threats. Failure to meet the pace of change will result in decreasing U.S. global influence, eroding 

cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access to markets contributing to a decline in our 

prosperity and standard of living. The actions we take today assure continued American primacy in the 

future. 

Our budget, requirement, acquisition, and testing processes are too slow. We need integrated 

processes that are faster and tolerate a greater acceptance of risk. The velocity of change required to 

resolve our operational challenges is far higher than we have attained to date. Our culture must embrace 

competition, seek higher performance levels, and generate urgency in achieving innovative outcomes. We 

must remember that our military superiority is not a birthright, but rather actively sustained by each 

generation. 

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STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 

We must look at deterrence through a new lens. We are no longer defined by the bi-polar world 

of two superpowers that simplified our approach to deterrence. The U.S. is challenged by multiple 

adversaries with an expanding range of capabilities available to them. With each potential adversary 

comes a different set of perceptions and internal dynamics. Deterrence is more complex and a 'one size 

fits all' approach no longer applies. Operations countering one adversary have potential second and third 

order consequences when interpreted by other potential adversaries or our allies. This multipolar and alldomain environment requires collaboration among combatant commands, other DoD elements, allies, and 

partners ensuring individual efforts do not adversely affect the globally integrated approaches to each 

problem set. To maintain military superiority in this multipolar world, we must out-think, out-maneuver, 

out-partner, and out-innovate our adversaries. 

The bedrock of our deterrence is our safe, secure, ready, and reliable nuclear Triad. The surest 

way to prevent war is to be prepared for it. While the current Triad continues to provide the backbone to 

our national security, we will eventually consume the last remaining margin from our investments made 

during the Cold War. Our modernization programs including the B-21 bomber; COLUMBIA-Class 

Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN); the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD); Long Range 

Standoff(LRSO) cruise missile; Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3); and lifeextended nuclear warheads will provide- without a doubt- the nuclear deterrent capabilities our nation 

needs, now and well into the future. 

Today, deterrence is more than just our nuclear capabilities. Deterrence requires integrated 

planning for all capabilities, across all domains. This enables the synchronized operation and decisive 

response to adversary aggression anytime, anywhere. We must make this concept operational for all 

domain warfighting throughout the DoD. We must nonnalize space and cyberspace as warfighling 

domains. There is no war in space, just as there is no war in cyberspace. There is only war, and war can 

extend into any domain. To fight wars in these domains we must develop the appropriate rules of 

engagement that allow for rapid response and delegate authority to the appropriate level to operate more 

quickly. 

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (NPR) 

The 2018 NPR guides nuclear modernization efforts and establishes U.S. deterrence policy, 

strategy, and posture over the coming years. This document responds to the threats oftoday, the 

burgeoning challenges of tomorrow, and underscores nuclear deterrence as a foundational element of U.S. 

national strength. The NPR clearly ties to USSTRATCOM's priorities. 
32 

The guidance in the NPR is based on the strategic environment of today. As Secretary Mattis 

states in the document's preface, "We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we 

wish it to be." Our previous efforts to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons and reduce the size and 

variety of capabilities within our nuclear force did not have the reciprocal effect on other nuclear-armed 

states. China and Russia continue to place increased importance on nuclear weapons in their strategy and 

doctrine as well as expand the number and diversity of their nuclear weapons and weapon systems. We 

remain committed to strengthening nonproliferation and nuclear security, and we stand ready to reengage 

on future arms control agreements. However, a commitment to arms control and other reductions cannot 

be unilateral in the face of ever-increasing threats. This would harm the readiness of our nuclear deterrent, 

destabilize relations with potential adversaries, and reduce the confidence our allies place in our extended 

deterrence guarantees. 

While our nuclear posture is successful in deterring our adversaries today, we require a mix of 

yields and improved platforms to credibly deter the threats of the ncar future. The NPR directs near-term 

fielding of a low-yield SLBM capability, and in the longer term, pursuit of a modern nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missile (SLCM). These capabilities are necessary to enhance the flexibility and 

responsiveness of our nuclear forces to ensure potential adversaries understand they cannot achieve their 

objectives through force and there is no benefit in the use of nuclear weapons- in any scenario. Russia's 

increased "non-strategic nuclear weapons" and evolving doctrine of first-use in a limited conflict, give 

evidence of their perceived advantage at lower levels of conflict. North Korea's burgeoning nuclear 

capabilities demonstrate the belief that nuclear weapons provide escalation options against the U.S. and 

our allies in the Pacific. We must counter these dangerous perceptions with supplemental capabilities to 

our previously planned modernization programs. These enhanced deterrence capabilities ensure 

adversaries clearly understand U.S. resolve and do not miscalculate the consequences of nuclear use, 

raising the nuclear threshold and reducing the likelihood of nuclear weapon employment. 

The NPR clearly states the role of nuclear weapons in hedging against an uncertain future. While 

hedging is not new, this explicit statement communicates importance of nuclear weapons in ensuring we 

are ready and confident to address future threats. As we have witnessed over the past decade, the security 

environment can change quickly. Technology is constantly evolving, and countries are seeking to use 

these technologies to advance their own capabilities and diminish ours. This requires an agile, ready force 

that is flexible enough to meet the ever-changing strategic environment, and men and women who are 

dedicated to the mission and postured to win. 

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE 

To remain a credible nuclear state, the U.S. must have modern facilities and a highly skilled 

workforce able to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Across the nuclear enterprise, many of the 

specialized capabilities required to complete stockpile work have either atrophied or become obsolete. As 

a result, the U.S is not capable of producing and/or manufacturing many of the materials and unique 

components in the quantities needed to sustain the stockpile over the long term. 

Re-establishing the capability to produce plutonium pits at a production rate sufficient to support 

planned weapon sustainment activities must be a national priority. Specifically, USSTRA TCOM requires 

no less than 80 War Reserve plutonium pits delivered to the stockpile per year by 2030 to support future 

deterrent requirements. Delays in developing a viable plutonium pit production capability will eventually 

affect our ability to meet the nation's deterrence mission requirements. 

In addition to plutonium manufacturing, we require critical infrastructure investments in uranium 

processing, tritium processing, and lithium component production. Any shortcomings in these 

infrastructure projects represent a real risk to maintain force readiness and our capability to respond to 

either a technical issue with our stockpile or adversary advancements in their capabilities. 

Modern facilities are oflittle value without a highly skilled workforce to conduct the necessary 

surveillance, sustainment, and modernization activities necessary to maintain our deterrent. National 

Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Administrator and each of our national security laboratory 

directors have expressed concerns with recruiting, developing, and retaining the workforce essential to 

sustain our stockpile. The U.S. must have a workforce and industrial base capable of designing, 

engineering, and producing materials and components necessary to sustain the number of warheads and 

develop a flexible stockpile to hedge against future risks. 

Since the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) approved the Long Term Stockpile Sustainment 

Strategy, we have made solid progress in life extending our aged weapon stockpile. The Navy's W76-l 

ballistic missile warhead Life Extension Program (LEP) is over 90% complete and on track to finish in 

2019. The B61-12 gravity bomb program is on schedule, on budget, and exceeding operational 

expectations. This weapon supports extended deterrence commitments to NATO and allows the U.S. to 

retire legacy gravity weapons that are approaching the end of their service lives. The Air Force and 

NNSA are progressing with work on the LRSO cruise missile and the associated WS0-4 warhead design 

work to deliver that weapon system on schedule. 

Our next significant weapon LEP decision pertains to future ballistic missile warhead 

modernization. We must determine the appropriate approach for the replacement ofthe Air Force's W78 

ICBM warhead. The NWC's Strategic Plan is examining the feasibility of producing a warhead with 

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interoperable features for both Air Force and Navy ballistic missile systems. The W78 replacement study 

will determine the appropriate approach for developing and deploying this much needed capability. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY 

Protection of nuclear weapons, installations, and personnel is the utmost priority. We continue to 

work closely with the Navy and Air Force to assess nuclear security requirements and adjust our force 

posture, training, and equipment to maintain the high standards this mission demands. While we continue 

to upgrade our security capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are required to ensure 

the absolute denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. 

We need to replace the Vietnam-era UH-IN helicopters that provide security across our vast 

ICBM complex. I strongly support any effort that delivers a replacement helicopter with the necessary 

speed, armament, and carrying capacity to meet our security requirements as soon as possible. 

Additionally, we need to address the escalating costs of an aging security infrastructure. Our 

nuclear security program relies heavily on manpower that requires appropriate investments to ensure our 

existing nuclear security programs are capable of protecting this Nation's most vital assets against a widerange of technological and human threats. 

The continued proliferation of sophisticated small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) is 

concerning. The availability, ease of use, and capabilities of these sUAS vehicles represents a growing 

threat to our deterrence operations. We rapidly implemented counter-sUAS systems into our security 

architecture, and continue to refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the developing 

threat. Pacing this sUAS threat will require vigilance and dedicated investment as these capabilities 

continue to evolve. 

NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (NC3) 

Our nation's nuclear deterrent continues to be as effective as the command, control, and 

communications capabilities that enable it to function; therefore, we require an assured, reliable, and 

resilient NC3 system across the full spectrum of conflict. Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent 

requires sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of key systems and capabilities throughout the 

NC3 architecture that ensures effective command and control of the Nation's nuclear forces throughout 

today's complex multi-domain, multi-threat security environment. These capabilities must provide 

assured communications capabilities to the President and nuclear forces throughout all phases of 

hostilities and under all conditions. 

lJSSTRATCOM requires a robust NC3 capability operating throughout the space, aerial, and 

terrestrial domains to both effectively execute strategic deterrence operations and provide support for the 

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President as an essential component of the National Leadership Command Capability. As an example of 

this, USSTRA TCOM is working with the White House, national laboratories, and the private sector to 

develop decision support capabilities, setting the conditions for timely and informed senior leader 

decision-making under any circumstance. 

In the space domain, we are transitioning from the aging Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 

(MILST AR) satellite communications system to the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) 

satellite communications systems. The AEHF satellite constellation system, coupled with requisite ground 

node and airborne platform Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight terminals (FAB-T) extends 

enhanced capabilities to enable collaboration between the President and senior advisors under any 

circumstances and improves connectivity with the nuclear forces. 

Within the aerial domain, we are continuing to replace aging communications systems on theE6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Take Charge and Move Out (T ACAMO) aircraft as well as 

the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) to provide assured and worldwide connectivity to 

the nuclear forces. In conjunction with communications update efforts, the Air Force is pursuing a course 

of action to recapitalize the E-4B platform, which is approaching its end of service life. The Air Force 

continues efforts to field a very low frequency (VLF) capability for the B-2 bomber tleet and will 

leverage that capability to modernize the B-52's legacy VLF systems. These advancements, combined 

with our extremely high frequency communications, provide bombers with beyond line-ot~sight 

connectivity throughout the spectrum of contlict. 

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES 

The U.S. relies on ICBMs as a critical component of a credible and effective nuclear deterrent 

force. ICBMs promote strategic stability as no adversary can defeat our highly responsive and widely 

dispersed ICBM force with a limited, surprise attack. Additionally, our ICBM force provides the bulk of 

our day-to-day nuclear alert force with precision and professionalism. Serving over 60 years, our 

Minuteman force will retire in the mid-2030s, well beyond any deployed strategic missile in the world. 

We must execute a comprehensive ICBM modernization program to keep the force effective in this 

rapidly evolving strategic environment. 

In August 20 !7, the Air Force achieved a significant milestone when it awarded the GBSD 

Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction contract. The future GBSD weapon system will employ 

modern, proven technology to meet the varied threats of today and incorporate modular architectures able 

to adjust quickly to advancing adversary technologies. GBSD will employ enhanced security features to 

counter evolving threats while reducing resource demands. Likewise, GBSD's maintenance processes 

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employ advanced diagnostic tools allowing us to predict and resolve technical issues before affecting 

operations. 

Finally, replacing 1960 and 1970s technology with state-of-the-art systems will increase 

effectiveness and provide better platform performance with greater resilience against improving adversary 

defenses. GBSD will deliver a modern missile system, supported by a fully updated infrastructure, all 

delivered at lower cost. 

BOMBERS AND AIR DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Bombers represent the most visible and flexible leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad. Their presence 

unambiguously demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve to deter potential adversaries and assure our 

allies and global security partners. The bomber's operational flexibility provides the President a number 

of options in response to a crisis. The combination of stealth and long range denies adversaries the ability 

to use geography to protect high value assets. 

The B-52 will remain in our arsenal for several more decades and is receiving a communications 

upgrade to ensure command and control connectivity. Additionally, the B-52 requires a radar system 

upgrade to enhance weapons delivery, improve targeting capability, and improve weather detection and 

avoidance. Replacing the B-52's engines provides increased combat range, reduced air refueling demand, 

longer on-station time, and a significantly reduced maintenance footprint. 

As our nation's only penetrating long-range strike aircraft, we are enhancing the B-2's 

survivability to retain the platform's stealth attributes against modern air defenses. Beyond the B-2, the B21 will ensure we maintain an effective penetrating bomber capable of striking any target around the 

world even as potential adversaries deploy increasingly sophisticated air defenses. 

While legacy gravity bombs and the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) meet current military 

requirements, declining sustainability and survivability challenges require a focus on replacement 

systems. The B61-12 gravity bomb and LRSO cruise missile programs must deliver on schedule to avoid 

any strategic or extended deterrence capability gaps. 

Legacy bombers and their associated weapons are beyond or quickly approaching their intended 

service life, requiring focused attention and resources to maintain combat readiness. To ensure our air 

delivered deterrent remains effective, ongoing sustainment and planned modernization activities must 

remain on schedule. 

SEA-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT 

Every day, a sizable portion of our OHIO-class SSBN fleet is silently patrolling at sea, unlocatable to our adversaries, and ready to respond when called upon. These submarines, and their highly 

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capable Trident II (05) SLBM, constitute the most survivable leg of our strategic deterrent force. As 

such, they send a very clear message to any adversary that they cannot hope to gain any benefit from a 

strategic attack against the U.S. or its allies. 

The robust design of the OHIO-class SSBN, along with a comprehensive maintenance program, 

allowed its operational life to extend from 30 to 42 years. However, with no engineering margin to extend 

them further, the OHIO-class SSBNs will retire starting in 2027. To avoid a capability gap in our strategic 

deterrent, the COLUMBIA-class SSBN must deliver on time for its first strategic deterrent patrol in 2031. 

Building the COLUMBIA-class SSBN requires highly technical and unique skill sets spanning multiple 

manufacturing and trade disciplines. As production draws near, we must support our industrial partners' 

expansion of both infrastructure and training programs to minimize the risk of potential delays. 

To avoid two concurrent strategic weapon programs, the Navy extended the life ofthe D5 SLBM, 

enabling it to serve as the initial ballistic missile for the COLUMBIA-class SSBN. The D5 SLBM was 

fielded over 25 years ago, and we must begin a follow-on SLBM program for the COLUMBIA-class 

SSBN to remain effective to its projected end of life in the 2080s. USSTRA TCOM and the Navy will 

work together in developing the strategic requirements tor this follow-on SLBM that continues the 

unparalleled success of the 05 SLBM. 

SPACE 

Space is a warfighting domain just like the air, ground, maritime, and cyberspace domains. The 

DoD, with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), is implementing the Space Warfighting Construct. 

This construct supports the National Space Policy and focuses on the forces, operations, and systems 

needed to prevail in a conflict that extends into space. As an enterprise, we must normalize how we think 

of space, operate in it, and describe it to each other. It is unique for many reasons, but the concepts that 

govern other military operations such as intelligence, maneuver, fires, protection, logistics, and command 

and control apply just the same. 

In April20 17, we re-named the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) 

to the National Space Defense Center (NSDC). The NSDC is a partnership organization strongly 

supported by both the DoD and Intelligence Community (lC) that develops and improves our ability to 

rapidly detect, warn, characterize, attribute and defend against threats to our nation's vital space systems. 

The NSOC directly supports space defense unity of effort and expands information sharing in space 

defense operations among the DoD, NRO, and other interagency partners. Recently, the NSDC 

transitioned to 24/7 operations, marking a significant step for the growing interagency team focused on 

protecting and defending the nation's critical space assets. 

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In 2016, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and NRO developed the joint Space Enterprise 

Vision (SEV) to advance their shared interest in designing, acquiring, and operating more agile and 

resilient space capabilities in response to emerging threats. A key goal of the SEV is to leverage synergies 

in AFSPCINRO acquisition activities, where feasible, as the two organizations pursue architectures and 

operational approaches in support of their respective missions. 

Multi-national space operations initiatives are paramount in the safety and security of the space 

domain. As we continue our combined space operations initiative with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 

and the United Kingdom, we are expanding the initiative with the addition of France and Germany. I have 

directed the Joint Force Space Component Commander to transition our Joint Space Operations Center 

(JSpOC) to a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) by the end of2018. The CSpOC model 

envisions a centralized hub for operational planning and tasking with distributed execution through 

contributing partners. 

Exercises and wargamcs continue to refine how we coordinate today and determine how we will 

work together in the future. This year, Japan is participating in the Schriever Wargame,joining France, 

Germany, and our Five Eye partners. GLOBAL SENTINEL, our operational experiment for space 

situational awareness, increased its international participation in 2017 and now includes Australia, 

Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 

Future satellite communications (SATCOM) systems arc key to our continued strategic posture in 

space. We must design and fund replacement systems and remain on schedule for smooth transition of 

operations to these new systems. We must expand international SATCOM partnerships, strengthen our 

industrial base response to acquisition challenges, and integrate commercial pathfinder opportunities to 

leverage space operations. 

We must continue to build a robust SATCOM network that includes our allies and partners and 

leverages commercial SATCOM industries to integrate, synchronize, and share global SA TCOM 

resources. Through multilateral SA TCOM agreements Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 

and New Zealand provided funding for Wideband Global SATCOM-9 (WGS-9) that launched in March 

2017. These international partners receive a proportional share of the bandwidth provided by the WGS 

constellation based on their financial contribution. 

The department continues to close the gap in synchronizing terminals and ground infrastructure to 

match available satellite capability, a time-critical and essential element in operating freely in all other 

domains. Our protected wide band communications are essential for allowing the warlighter to 

communicate in contested environments. Our narrowband legacy constellation is approaching the end of 

its life cycle in a matter of years, and any additional loss of satellites will reduce our narrowband 

SA TCOM capabilities. The narrowband follow-on Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) using 

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Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) has experienced delays due to program 

development, waveform challenges, and Service terminal fielding schedules. The fielding of new AEHF 

Extended Data Rate (XDR) capabilities is improving over time, but delayed XDR terminal programs are 

hampering the transitions from MlLST AR to AEHF. 

USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with AFSPC, Fleet Cyber Command, and U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command I Army Forces Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT), is standing up the 

SATCOM Integrated Operations Environment (SlOE). The SlOE is designed to leverage key wideband, 

narrowband, protected band, and commercial SA TCOM enterprise capabilities and expertise to improve 

the Joint Force Space Component Commander's ability to mitigate and fight through SATCOM 

degradation and continue to support the wartighter in a potentially contested domain. Interim SlOE 

operations will be located at headquarters SMDC/ARSTRAT and is scheduled for completion in March 

2018. SlOE is currently operating in a limited fashion, and we are working on providing additional joint 

manning positions to bring it to initial operational capability. 

In accordance with the direction of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, 

USSTRATCOM will deliver a space warfighting concept of operations (CONOPs) no later than June 11, 

2018. This CONOPs will guide the Service's space capabilities development and acquisition programs. 

JOINT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 

Achieving superiority throughout the electromagnetic spectrum is an essential prerequisite for 

achieving superiority across all other military domains. USSTRA TCOM developed an electromagnetic 

spectrum operational employment guide for standardized and synchronized electromagnetic battle 

management, and we are working with the other combatant commands on the implementation of this 

guide in joint electromagnetic spectrum operations planning. In coordination with the Joint Staff, we are 

initiating development of a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations doctrine publication, working to 

re-align electronic warfare universal joint tasks, advocating for advancing joint training in realistic 

congested and contested electromagnetic spectrum environments, and identifying electromagnetic battle 

management requirements. 

This comes at a time when our ability to maneuver freely within the electromagnetic spectrum is 

at risk. Many countries have adapted their militaries for spectrum warfare, developing speci fie 

electronic/spectrum warfare units and electronic attack capabilities to counter our spectrum dependent 

systems. The electromagnetic spectrum is not a utility to be managed, it is a maneuver space, the same as 

other warfighting domains. If we fail to change the way we resource, train, and operate within the 

spectrum, we risk allowing an adversary to control key terrain in the future. 

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MISSILE DEFENSE 

Missile proliferation and lethality continues to increase as more countries acquire greater numbers 

of missiles and are increasing their technical sophistication specifically to defeat U.S. missile defense 

systems. In the past year, we continne to see missile tests from North Korea and Iran as well as other 

nations that are introducing increasingly sophisticated missiles- all of which cause us and our allies deep 

concern. Their efforts to advance missile technologies threaten global stability and seek to degrade our 

ability to project power. In response, we must continue our efforts to advance missile defense forces and 

capabilities to assure allies of our commitment for a common defense and to deter further aggressions 

from these regional and transregional actors. 

In addition to the NPR, the Department is conducting a 2018 Missile Defense Review (MDR). 

The MDR is broader in scope than the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, addressing more than the 

ballistic missile threat, specifically hypersonic vehicles and cruise missiles. 

We cannot be successful in this endeavor by investing solely in active missile defense capabilities 

-we must strengthen and integrate all pillars of missile defense including the capability to defeat 

adversary missiles before they launch. We are exploring efficiencies gained by fusing non-kinetic, cyber, 

electromagnetic, and kinetic capabilities to deny, defend, and defeat adversary threats. Furthermore, we 

are requesting additional efforts invested in the Department's ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and 

assess (F2T2EA) threats and the adoption of corresponding policy and organizational constructs. We 

continue to gain synergy through integrated missile defense planning, force management, and operations 

support ensuring global coordination of regional missile defense execution thereby, matching the best 

interceptor with the best sensor. 

We must strengthen our collaboration with our allies and explore further integration of our 

collective capabilities toward an effective mutual defense. We are investing in collaboration with our 

allies across multiple venues, including the USSTRATCOM-hosted NIMBLE TITAN wargame. We 

conduct this biennial wargame with key allies and in partnership with the Department of State and other 

combatant commands. We continually explore and experiment with potential collaboration and 

integration approaches with our allies to inform development of options for operations, policies, and 

investments. 

As an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence 

against states of concern, we continue to deploy missile defense capabilities and strengthen our missile 

defense postures. We operationally deployed the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Complex in Romania 

completing the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase II to defend against threats from the Middle 

East, particularly Iran. We deployed additional Ground Based Interceptors (GBls) to meet the objective of 

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44 GB!s by the end of 20 I 7. We are continuing investments toward our warfighting missile defense 

priorities, which are essential. Priority missile defense upgrades and capability advancements include: 

Sensor and discrimination capabilities. Continued development of the Long Range 

Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. A new homeland discrimination radar to support 

the defense of Hawaii. A new Medium Range Discrimination Radar to provide additional 

precision and tracking. Upgraded and expanded land, sea, and space based detection and 

tracking sensors. 

Kill vehicles. Increase the reliability and lethality of our interceptors including the 

development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) for the GBl, completion of testing and 

deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA capability, and enhancements to the GBI, most notably 

the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV). 

GBls. Increase the GBI inventory to 64 and complete Missile Field-4 at Fort Greely, Alaska 

to provide silos for 20 additional fielded interceptors as early as December 2023. 

Capability and capacity. Increase the robustness of regional missile defense capability and 

capacity including deployment of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Terminal HighAltitude Area Defense (THAAD) capabilities and implementation of recommendations from 

the Department's Joint Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability Mix (JRlCM) 

study. 

Finally, we depend on flight-testing, which is critical in assessing and validating the performance 

of the operational system in actual flight environments. The high cost of flight-testing often limits the 

number of flight test opportunities. The Missile Defense Agency strives to maximize opportunities for 

learning through flight test success or failure. The body of data collected in flight-testing is robust, and we 

discover unexpected findings with each test. Flight test failures are unplanned, but when failures happen 

learning occurs. The root cause of failure is determined, corrective actions are implemented, and the 

overall capability of the system improves. 

CONVENTIONAL PROMPT STRIKE (CPS) I HYPERSONIC STRIKE 

Adversary anti-access I area denial strategies are challenging traditional U.S. approaches to power 

projection. Advancements in adversary integrated air defense systems and offensive missiles inhibit our 

ability to maneuver within the battlespace. Additionally, our strategic competitors are investing 

significant resources in hypersonic weapon research and development with the goal of deploying 

hypersonic strike weapons in the next few years. The Department is pursuing hypersonic capabilities 

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along several lines of effort, but we need to prioritize and accelerate development if we are to field our 

own capability in the near term. 

New long-range, survivable, lethal, and time-sensitive strike capabilities, such as a hypersonic 

CPS weapon, will allow the U.S. to achieve its military objectives in these environments. This new 

weapon class prevents adversaries from exploiting time and distance and provides additional response 

options below the nuclear threshold. The Navy's successful CPS flight test last October demonstrated the 

technical maturity required to field an effective hypersonic strike solution within the near future. As our 

competitors continue to move fast in this area, we must retake the initiative and commit the necessary 

resources to develop and field hypersonic conventional weapons. 

CONCLUSION 

USSTRA TCOM truly is a global warfighting command, and the strength of this command is its 

people. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians in this enterprise have the most important 

mission in the entire Department. We expect them to perform to the highest standard, yet mission success 

often looks as if nothing happened. The hard work and dedication of the nearly 184,000 men and women 

supporting the USSTRATCOM mission ensures our nation's strategic capabilities remain safe, secure, 

reliable, and ready. Sustained Congressional support will ensure we remain ready, agile, and effective in 

deterring strategic attack, assuring our allies and partners today and into the future. 

Peace is our profession ... 

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General John E. Hyten 

Gen. John E. Hyten is Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRA TCOM), one of nine 

Unified Commands under the Department of Defense. USSTRA TCOM is responsible for the 

global command and control of U.S. strategic forces to meet decisive national security 

objectives, providing a broad range of strategic capabilities and options for the President and 

Secretary of Defense. 

General Hytcn attended Harvard University on ru1 Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps 

scholarship, graduated in 1981 with a bachelor's degree in engineering and applied sciences and 

was commissioned a second lieutenant. GeneraiHyten's career includes assignments in a variety 

of space acquisition and operations positions. He served in senior engineering positions on both 

Air Force and Army anti-satellite weapon system programs. 

The general's staff assignments include tours with the Air Force Secretariat, the Air Staft~ the 

Joint Staff and the Commander's Action Group at Headquarters Air Force Space Command as 

Director. He served as mission director in Cheyenne Mountain and was the last active-duty 

commander of the 6th Space Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. In 2006, he 

deployed to Southwest Asia as Director of Space Forces for operations Enduring Freedom aJJd 

Iraqi Freedom. General Hyten commanded the 595th Space Group and the 50th Space Wing at 

Schriever AFB, Colo. Prior to assuming command of Air Force Space Command, he served as 

the Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command. 

EHUCATION 

1981 Bachelor's degree in engineering and applied sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

1985 Master of Business Administration degree, Auburn University, Montgomery, Ala. 

1985 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1994 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

I 999 National Defense Fellow. University of Illinois, Champaign 

20 I I Senior Managers in Government Course, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 

ASSIGNMENTS 

I. November 1981- December 1985, Configuration Management Officer and Chief, Configuration 

Management Division, Automated Systems Program Office, Gunter AFB, Ala. 

2. December I 985- July I 989, Chief, Software Development Branch; and Chief, Engineering and 

Acquisition Division, Space Defense Programs Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 

3. August 1989- July 1990, Special Adviser to the U.S. Army, Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Program 

Office, U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, Huntsville, Ala. 

4. July 1990- August 1991, Deputy for Engineering, Strategic Defense Initiatives Program Office, Los 

Angeles AFB, Calif. 

5. August 1991 -May 1992, Executive Spccchwriter and Systems Analyst, Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Acquisition), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

6. May 1992- July 1993, Program Element Monitor, Advanced Technology Programs, Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

7. July 1993- June 1994, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

8. July 1994- June 1996, Mission Director, Space Operations Officer, and Chief, Command Center 

Training, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colo. 

9. August 1996- August 1998, Commander, 6th Space Operations Squadron, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

I 0. August 1998 -June 1999, National Defense Fellow, University of Illinois, Champaign 

11. June I 999- June 2001, Operations Officer, and Chief, Space Branch, Defense and Space Operations 

Division, Deputy Director for Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities), J3, Joint Staff, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

12. June 200 I -June 2003, Chiet~ Space Control Division, Directorate for Space Operations and 

Integration, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 
44 

Washington, D.C. 

13. June 2003- July 2004, Director, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

14. July 2004- April2005, Commander, 595th Space Group, Schriever AFB, Colo. 

15. April 2005- May 2007, Commander, 50th Space Wing, Schriever AFB, Colo. (May 2006- October 

2006, Director of Space Forces, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Southwest Asia) 

16. May 2007- September 2009, Director of Requirements, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, 

Peterson AFB, Colo. 

17. September 2009 -February 2010, Director, Cyber and Space Operations, Directorate of Operations. 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washint,>ton, 

D.C. 

18. February 2010- August 2010, Director, Space Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air 

Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

19. September 2010- May 2012, Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C. 

20. May 2012- Aug 2014, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

21. Aug 2014- Oct 2016, Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

22. Nov 2016- present, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1994- June 1996, Mission Director, Space Operations Officer, and Chief, Command Center 

Training, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, CO., as a major 

2. June 1999- June 2001, Operations Officer, and Chief, Space Branch, Defense and Space Operations 

Division, Deputy Director for Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities), 13, Joint Staff, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel 

BADGES 

Master Space Operations Badge 

Master Cyberspace Operator Badge 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Anny Commendation Medal 

Joint Service Achievement Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 

1991 Recipient of the William Jump Award tor Excellence within the Federal Government 

1998 Recipient of a Laurels Award, Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine 

2009 Gen. Jerome F. O'Malley Distinguished Space Leadership Award 

PUBLICATIONS 

"A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space," The Program in 

Anns Control, Disarmament, and International Security Occasional Paper, University of Illinois, 2000 

"A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War," Air and Space Power Journal, Air University Press, 2002 

"Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare," with Dr. Robett Uy, Air and Space Power 

Journal, Air University Press, 2004 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant Aug. 23, I 981 

First Lieutenant Aug. 23, 1983 

Captain Aug. 23, 1985 
45 

Major May I, 1993 

Lieutenant Colonel Jan. I, 1997 

Colonel June I, 2002 

Brigadier General Oct. I, 2007 

MajorGeneral Nov.l0,2010 

Lieutenant General May 18, 2012 

General Aug. 15,2014 

(Current as of November 2016) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 7, 2018 

(49) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. STRATCOM has been providing foundational space situational 

awareness data to non-USG entities in accordance with 10USC2274 since 2012. At 

a time when legitimate DOD space situational awareness requirements will be increasing, does it still make sense for STRATCOM to be providing this data to the 

public or is this better suited to a different federal agency? 

Secretary ROOD. Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2274, the Department 

of Defense (DOD), through U.S. Strategic Command, provides a variety of space situational awareness (SSA) data and services to non-U.S. Government entities worldwide. These SSA data and services promote space flight safety, protection of the 

space environment, and contribute to the U.S. vital interest in unfettered access to 

and freedom to operate in space. DOD is the only U.S. Government entity currently 

capable of providing these SSA support services. However, providing such SSA support services to non-U.S. Government entities is not inherently a military mission. 

A different Federal department or agency could perform this function if provided appropriate resources and authorities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, Secretary Mattis is now the third consecutive 

Secretary of Defense that has identified nuclear deterrence as the highest-priority 

mission of the Department of Defense. Do you believe 6 or 7 percent of our defense 

budget is an appropriate level of spending for the nation’s #1 priority defense mission? Do you believe this is affordable? 

Secretary ROOD. Yes. Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we fail to deter. We can afford this level of investment against one of the few existential threats that we face. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, do you believe DOD should develop a detailed 

30-year cost estimate for modernizing, sustaining, and operating our nuclear force? 

Do you believe this type of report would be accurate and useful, or just inject misleading information into the debate? Do you believe the current 10-year plan and 

estimate DOD already provides each year to Congress is sufficient? 

Secretary ROOD. The Department of Defense (DOD) has multiple tools with which 

to assess the cost of modernizing, sustaining, and operating U.S. nuclear forces. 

DOD’s primary tool is the current 10-year plan and estimate that we provide to 

Congress annually. We believe this is the best mechanism for formally reporting 

costs to Congress because it is a more reliable estimate given large degrees of uncertainty, such as inflation, material costs, and labor rates inherent in any longer term 

estimate of the nuclear enterprise. A 30-year estimate would introduce a high degree of uncertainty that would risk providing Congress with imprecise and potentially misleading data. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, how do the supplemental capabilities proposed by the NPR—a low-yield submarine-launched weapon and a sea-launched 

cruise missile—help shore up deterrence and assurance in this new era of great 

power competition? 

Secretary ROOD. The low-yield ballistic missile (LYBM) and sea-launched cruise 

missile (SLCM) are necessary to address our concerns that potential adversaries 

may believe they can effectively threaten or employ limited nuclear strikes. These 

supplemental capabilities, along with the existing elements of our Triad, provide a 

diverse set of nuclear capabilities that will provide flexibility to tailor the U.S. approach to deterring different potential adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, do the supplemental capabilities proposed by 

the NPR lower the threshold for nuclear use? Are they about nuclear warfighting 

or about ensuring conflict is avoided altogether? Do you believe the addition of these 

capabilities to the U.S. nuclear arsenal increase or decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war? 

Secretary ROOD. By taking steps to help convince adversaries that even limited 

use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, we in fact raise 

that threshold for nuclear weapons use, thereby decreasing the likelihood of nuclear 

war. The supplemental capabilities proposed by the NPR are intended to ensure 

conflict is avoided altogether and decrease the likelihood of nuclear war. 
50 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, do we need a low-yield SLBM when we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb? Are these capabilities redundant? How 

do adversary air defenses factor into the recommendation for a low-yield SLBM? 

Secretary ROOD. The low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is 

highly survivable when deployed in ballistic missile submarines at sea, while our 

gravity bombs are more vulnerable in fixed storage and operating locations. SLBMs 

are highly accurate and, given their speed and trajectory, are better able to penetrate modern defenses that could challenge air-delivered weapons. The low-yield 

SLBM does not reduce the need for air-delivered gravity bombs and dual-capable 

aircraft, which can be forward deployed, contribute to allied burden sharing, provide 

visible assurance to both allies and partners, and serve as a tangible demonstration 

of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, what is your assessment of the impacts from 

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty? What impact may this violation have on our 

military, defense posture, and that of our allies? How does the NPR and the administration’s December 2016 Russia strategy propose to address this violation? How 

long should the U.S. continue to remain in the INF Treaty if Russia continues to 

violate it? 

Secretary ROOD. Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and partners in Europe 

and Asia. Therefore, the United States is pursuing an integrated strategy supported 

by diplomatic and economic measures as well as Treaty-compliant research and development actions intended to persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. This includes a review of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched, 

intermediate-range missile systems which would enable the United States to defend 

ourselves and our allies and partners should Russia not return to compliance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, should we be considering extending the New 

START Treaty while Russia is violating the INF Treaty, violating the Open Skies 

Treaty, violating the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and failing to comply 

with the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 

many other arms control commitments? Do you believe we should pursue further 

nuclear arms control measures with Russia while Russia is in violation of so many 

existing arms control agreements? 

Secretary ROOD. The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent arms 

control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return 

parties to predictability and transparency, and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States and its allies and partners. The United States will continue 

to implement the New START Treaty fully, which complements the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and predictable strategic balance 

between the United States and Russia. We will consider next steps related to the 

New START Treaty at the appropriate time, taking into account Russia’s compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty and other arms control 

agreements. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, were our allies consulted as the NPR was 

being considered and drafted? What did they say? How are they reacting to the proposal to continue the Obama administration’s program of record and add two supplemental capabilities? 

Secretary ROOD. Throughout the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, we consulted extensively with allies and partners. They were unanimous in the view that the security environment has changed for the worse since 2010; they offered a range of opinions on the environment and the continued need for nuclear deterrence; and they 

appreciated our efforts to consult with them. Our East Asian allies in particular appreciated the reaffirmation of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. In Europe, reactions were positive, particularly our proposed moves to strengthen deterrence, reaffirm our declaratory policy, and further the goals of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A number of European allies emphasized the importance 

of balancing deterrence with arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. Reactions to continuation of the U.S. nuclear modernization program were generally 

positive. No European allies objected to the inclusion of the supplemental capabilities. Many viewed these supplemental capabilities as an appropriate counter-balance to Russian, Chinese and North Korean developments. In briefings and meetings at NATO, Allies recently have reacted positively to the NPR. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, the NPR recommends the U.S. retain the 

longstanding ability to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft, like F–15s and eventually F–35s, around the world—not just in Europe. This includes Asia, correct? Why 

is the ability to deploy dual-capable aircraft like F–35s to Asia—in support of allies 

like Japan and South Korea—important? Do our dual-capable aircraft help reassure 
51 

our allies in Asia? How have our Asian allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, 

reacted to the NPR? 

Secretary ROOD. The United States will continue to maintain, and enhance as 

necessary, the capability to forward deploy dual-capable aircraft (DCA) around the 

world, including in Asia. Because DCA can be forward deployed to any region, they 

can provide a clear signal to potential adversaries that the United States possesses 

the forward-deployed capabilities to respond promptly to potential escalation. Their 

tangible presence also contributes significantly to the assurance of allies and partners. As such, they make the U.S. nuclear deterrent more flexible and enable better 

tailoring of our strategy to possible regional adversaries. 

Both Japan and South Korea have expressed support for the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and appreciation for the close consultations throughout the process. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, are you satisfied with DOD’s relationship 

with the National Nuclear Security Administration (which supplies and maintains 

U.S. nuclear warheads)? What works best in this relationship? What would you 

change? Is the forum for this relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council, functioning as it should? How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the 

Department of Energy? 

Secretary ROOD. The Department of Defense works closely with the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that the 

U.S. nuclear stockpile and its supporting infrastructure provide the warheads our 

forces need to reliably deter strategic attacks against the United States, and our allies and partners. I look forward to working closely with Secretary Perry and NNSA 

Administrator, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, on modernizing and recapitalizing all aspects 

of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and U.S. nuclear infrastructure to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent that protects the homeland, assures allies and partners 

and above all, deters adversaries. I speak regularly to my counterparts at NNSA. 

We use the Nuclear Weapons Council as a key means to ensure the DOD and DOE/ 

NNSA are coordinated in our approaches and this is an effective forum to discuss 

and resolve issues. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, the Obama administration had a policy of not 

pursuing any new U.S. nuclear capabilities and reducing the role of U.S. nuclear 

weapons in our national security strategy. The 2010 NPR claimed this would show 

leadership and discourage other nations from pursing their own new nuclear capabilities. Has this policy influenced the behavior of foreign nuclear powers, in particular of Russia? If our potential adversaries are not following our lead here, is it 

dangerous for us to continue down this road indefinitely if no other nation—except 

perhaps our closest ally in the U.K.—is doing the same? In your view, how likely 

is it that the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain credible to 2050 or beyond if we 

never modify or improve its nuclear capabilities while other countries continue to 

advance? 

Secretary ROOD. For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce 

the roles and number of nuclear weapons. Although the United States has reduced 

its nuclear arsenal by more than eighty-five percent since its Cold War peak, others 

have not followed our example. Russia, China and North Korea are growing their 

stockpiles, increasing the prominence of nuclear weapons in their security strategies, and—in some cases—pursuing the development of new nuclear capabilities to 

threaten peaceful nations. In this environment, it is not possible to delay modernization of U.S. nuclear forces if we are to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent. This 

is a top priority of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, does the U.S. currently have a ‘‘launch-onwarning’’ or ‘‘launch-on-alert’’ posture in our nuclear forces? Or do we just retain 

the option to ‘‘launch-under-attack?’’ In what scenario do you envision the U.S. potentially ‘‘launching-under-attack?’’ How does the U.S. verify it is under attack in 

such a scenario? Are you concerned the U.S. may mistakenly launch a nuclear 

strike, either in a day-to-day posture or during a crisis? Do you believe we should 

de-alert our ICBMs or other nuclear forces? 

Secretary ROOD. The United States maintains a portion of its nuclear forces on 

alert day-to-day, and retains the option of launching those forces promptly. This posture maximizes decision time and preserves the range of U.S. response options. 

Forces on day-to-day alert are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear 

civilian oversight and, when needed, Presidential decision-making. Over more than 

half a century, the United States has established a series of measures and protocols 

to ensure that intercontinental ballistic missiles on land and at sea are safe, secure, 

and under constant control. Any U.S. decision to employ nuclear weapons would follow a deliberative process. 
52 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, do you support a U.S. policy of no-first-use 

of nuclear weapons? What do our allies think of the U.S. potentially adopting such 

a policy? Would such a policy increase the deterrence of adversaries and the assurance of allies? 

Secretary ROOD. I do not support a policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. The 

United States has never adopted a ‘‘no-first-use’’ policy and, given the contemporary 

threat environment, such a policy is not justified today. Such a policy would undermine both deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies and partners. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, President Putin announced last week that 

Russia was pursuing and fielding four new nuclear weapons because the U.S. refuses to engage in arms control and is developing missile defenses to thwart Russia’s strategic forces. Are these reactions to the 2018 NPR or have they been in development for years/decades? Does the U.S. plan to respond with additional new nuclear weapons of its own, or stick to the triad and dual-capable aircraft modernization program initiated by President Obama plus the two supplemental capabilities 

proposed by the NPR? 

Secretary ROOD. President Putin’s announcement, was not a reaction to the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The systems he referenced in his comments were 

in development for years before the NPR’s publication. The NPR affirms the U.S. 

commitment to recapitalizing and modernizing the nuclear Triad and dual-capable 

aircraft, and announces the intent to modify existing submarine-launched ballistic 

missile warheads to provide a low-yield option and to pursue a modern nucleararmed sea-launched cruise missile. These decisions were not in response to the capabilities announced by President Putin but were made to ensure that the United 

States maintains a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent so we make certain 

nuclear weapons are never used. 

Mr. ROGERS. Under Secretary Rood, what does the NPR recommend regarding our 

nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system? What actions is DOD 

considering or pursuing? How do you think DOD should be organized for NC3 

issues? As NC3 recapitalization takes place, what are you doing to ensure the systems are secure from both cyber-attacks and supply chain insertions? 

Secretary ROOD. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review provides for the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deliver a plan no later than May 1, 2018 to reform NC3 

governance to ensure its modernization and effective functioning against current 

and future environments. In addition to NC3 governance reform, the Administration 

will pursue a series of initiatives to strengthen NC3, including: 1) strengthening 

protection against space-based and cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical 

warning and attack assessment; 3) improving command post and communication 

links; 4) advancing decision-support technology; and 5) integrating planning and operations. Airborne NC3 capabilities are key to the overall survivability of the NC3 

system; their modernization and sustainment are well-warranted. 

Mr. ROGERS. When do you anticipate the Missile Defense Review will be completed? 

Secretary ROOD. We will be completing the Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the 

near future; we need to ensure we get it right. The MDR will respond to the President’s guidance to strengthen defenses for the homeland and protect our deployed 

forces and allies and partners from growing missile threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review was a requirement in the FY17 

NDAA, with a due date of January 31, 2018. We have yet to see this document, understanding that a significant re-write is taking place. When can we realistically expect to see this review, and can you give us a preview of what we will be getting? 

Secretary ROOD. We will be completing the Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the 

near future; we need to ensure we get it right. The MDR will respond to the President’s guidance to strengthen defenses for the homeland and protect our deployed 

forces and allies and partners from growing missile threats. The MDR will be responsive to the broader challenges the Administration has identified in the National 

Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. The review will also address 

a broader array of threats, including cruise and hypersonic missiles, thus the new 

title, Missile Defense Review. 

Mr. ROGERS. Officials in the Department, and several combatant commanders, 

have expressed the need to develop next generation technologies in directed energy, 

space sensing, and boost phase intercept when addressing future ballistic missile 

threats. I agree with that statement wholeheartedly; however, that is not what is 

reflected in the PB19 budget submission, which arguably contains ‘‘more of the 

same’’ interceptor procurements, terrestrial sensors, and spiral development of our 

current systems. Further, it zeroes programs out like the Missile Defense Tracking 

System—a needed space-based sensor layer. From an overall strategic standpoint, 

can you explain this mismatch? 
53 

Secretary ROOD. I agree that we must invest in these advanced technologies to 

cope with increasingly sophisticated missile threats, but we also believe we should 

invest in near-term improvements to ensure protection against urgent missile 

threats from North Korea. The President’s Budget 2019 does begin to address the 

issue of advanced technologies. We are funding the development of a demonstration 

project for space-based discrimination. The Missile Defense Agency is developing 

and demonstrating directed energy and laser technologies and is testing a range of 

potential concepts, including both tracking and defensive lasers that could be deployed on a variety of platforms. Simultaneously, we are developing several new radars that will improve our ability to discriminate among and address more complex 

missile threats, and we are developing an advanced warhead for the Ground-Based 

Interceptor (GBI)—called Multiple Objective Kill Vehicle (MOKV). 

Mr. ROGERS. The NDS highlights a need to continue international collaboration 

for missile defense. How is OSD Policy adapting that guidance to increase both development cooperation and also making Foreign Military Sales of U. S. systems 

more enticing, affordable, and ‘‘easy’’ for our allies and partners around the world? 

Secretary ROOD. This Administration is integrating FMS with the larger set of security cooperation programs, and identifying process improvements that will enable 

additional defense exports. 

In particular, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is currently pursuing initiatives under our National Defense Strategy to reform aspects of the FMS 

process and ensure DSCA is able to deliver effective, enduring, and timely partner 

capabilities that advance U.S. interests. Some of these may require legislation. Others have to do with changing our internal processes. We have already implemented 

several changes to the processes such as measures to use forecasted sales to inform 

both advanced technology transfer decisions and advanced negotiations of priced 

contract options for an anticipated weapon system, thus enabling a faster timeline 

to system delivery. We have also identified and implemented ways to leverage 

multi-country acquisitions with NATO more effectively. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is working cross-functionally as well 

as with its interagency partners to facilitate international collaboration in missile 

defense. OSD is supporting allies and partners bilaterally to ensure they are 

equipped with advanced capabilities to meet threats. This includes DOD efforts, in 

close coordination with interagency partners and in consultation with U.S. industry, 

as appropriate, to fulfill Poland’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) requirement. This also includes supporting Germany in its development of a Ground 

Based Air Defense system. The United States continues SM–3 Block IIA guided missile co-development efforts with Japan. To aid Japan’s potential acquisition of Aegis 

Ashore through FMS, the United States highlighted options that will improve delivery timelines. We are also actively pursuing FMS opportunities with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, to include a completed sale of THAAD to the UAE 

and potential acquisition of THAAD by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. ROGERS. STRATCOM has been providing foundational space situational 

awareness data to non-USG entities in accordance with 10USC2274 since 2012. At 

a time when legitimate DOD space situational awareness requirements will be increasing, does it still make sense for STRATCOM to be providing this data to the 

public or is this better suited to a different Federal agency? 

General HYTEN. USSTRATCOM will continue to provide basic space situational 

awareness data for the public. We must collect that data for our military requirements. As additional sources become available, the United States will have the opportunity to leverage civil, commercial, international and other data to refine this 

service. 

To facilitate enhanced data sharing, and recognizing the need for the DOD to 

focus on maintaining access to and freedom of action in space, I continue to support 

designating a civil agency to become the interface for the publicly-releasable portions of the DOD data catalog. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, we’ve now had three consecutive Secretaries of Defense identify nuclear deterrence as the highest-priority mission of the Department 

of Defense. Do you agree with this prioritization? Do you believe 6 or 7 percent of 

our defense budget is an appropriate level of spending for the nation’s #1 priority 

defense mission? Do you believe this is affordable? 

General HYTEN. Yes, the commitment to nuclear deterrence is not only affordable 

it is essential to our National Security—America can afford survival. Maintaining 

an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we 

are unable to deter. We can afford this level of investment against one of the few 

existential threats that we face. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, do the supplemental capabilities proposed by the 

NPR lower the threshold for nuclear use? Are they about nuclear warfighting or 
54 

about ensuring conflict is avoided altogether? Do you believe the addition of these 

capabilities to the U.S. nuclear arsenal increase or decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war? 

General HYTEN. The NPR concluded deterrence requires a wider range of options 

than those provided by current forces to ensure the adversary understands the U.S. 

has the capability and will to respond. 

The supplemental capabilities are designed to raise the nuclear threshold by convincing adversaries even the limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than 

they can tolerate. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, in your professional military judgment, do we need 

a low-yield SLBM when we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb? Are 

these capabilities redundant? How do adversary air defenses factor into the recommendation for a low-yield SLBM? 

General HYTEN. Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabilities call for the limited 

use of nuclear weapons to coerce NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional forces. 

They would not have adopted this strategy and doctrine, and would not be expending resources to modernize and expand their non-strategic nuclear forces (which are 

already approximately ten times larger than NATO’s), if they perceived current U.S. 

and NATO nuclear posture as sufficient to deter such nuclear use. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review took a deliberate threat-policy-posture approach 

to examine the strategic environment. The NPR determined that our deterrent approach must be tailored and flexible to address today’s challenges and future uncertainty. 

Low yield weapons are a critical piece of our force structure and defense posture 

but are currently limited to our bomber force—a low yield ballistic missile (LYBM) 

weapon and sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) provide unique attributes to enhance existing capabilities: • LYBM: survivable, prompt, can strike targets that are heavily defended against 

bombers and air-delivered weapons. • SLCM: assured response capability, forward-deployable, non-host nation dependent, and provides additional diversity in delivery platforms, range, survivability, and future hedging. 

Reintroducing a low-yield option for our sea leg addresses adversary perception 

of advantage, improves our nuclear deterrent, allows the U.S. to negotiate from a 

position of strength, and bring an enhanced assurance element to our allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, please discuss the requirement for the LRSO cruise 

missile. Some are saying we don’t need the LRSO if we already have a penetrating 

bomber, such as the B–2 or B–21, armed with nuclear gravity bombs. But the new 

Nuclear Posture Review states very clearly that we need both LRSO and the B–21 

bomber. How do capabilities like LRSO, our bombers, and the nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missiles contribute to assurance and deterrence in Asia? Do they 

reassure allies like Japan and South Korea while deterring potential adversaries 

like China and North Korea? Do you believe LRSO is de-stabilizing? Don’t we and 

the Russians already have dual-capable cruise missiles? Please discuss aging and 

maintenance in our current air-launched cruise missiles. What happens to these 

missiles and this capability if LRSO is not fielded on time? What is the risk to a 

credible nuclear deterrent? 

General HYTEN. The B–21 and LRSO are required to ensure the continued effectiveness of the air leg of the Triad. The bombers, delivering both gravity bombs and 

the LRSO, ensure maximum operational flexibility against a wide variety of targets 

anywhere in the world and provide a visible and recallable response option intended 

to deter adversaries and assure allies. The SLCM demonstrates our commitment to 

allies by providing additional in-theater options to respond to regional instability. 

I do not view cruise missiles as destabilizing. Cruise missiles have been fielded 

on bombers and other platforms (e.g., sea-launched) since the late 1960s. Moreover, 

Russia has air launched cruise missiles, which implies that they do not view them 

as destabilizing. 

LRSO is a just-in-time replacement for the AGM–86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The ALCM, fielded in the 1980s and decades beyond its planned lifetime, is increasingly difficult to sustain and its ability to survive modern air defenses is eroding. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, is the U.S. in a nuclear arms race with Russia? 

Please describe Russia’s nuclear forces modernization program, comparing and contrasting it to ours. When did Russia embark on its nuclear modernization program 

and when was ours initiated? When will Russia have largely completed its nuclear 

modernization program? When will ours largely be completed? 

General HYTEN. The systems President Putin mentioned in his recent speech do 

not change the military balance, nor do they necessitate a change in our deterrence 
55 

posture. However, my job is to ensure we can effectively deter and respond to any 

threats our country faces. The U.S. nuclear modernization program is not increasing 

the numbers of our strategic nuclear weapons, rather we are replacing systems that 

are decades past their original design life. Modernization is necessary to preserve 

our deterrent and hedge against prospective risks. 

Russia initiated nuclear modernization in 2009, and is estimated to be 80% complete by 2020 and 100% complete by 2025. The U.S. by comparison has just initiated 

modernization and will not complete modernization until ∼2040. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, the previous administration had a policy of not pursuing any new U.S. nuclear capabilities and reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. The 2010 NPR claimed this would show leadership and discourage other nations from pursing their own new nuclear capabilities. Has this policy influenced the behavior of foreign nuclear powers, in particular 

of Russia? If our potential adversaries are not following our lead here, is it dangerous for us to continue down this road indefinitely if no other nation—except perhaps our closest ally in the U.K.—is doing the same? In your view, how likely is 

it that the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain credible to 2050 or beyond if we never 

modify or improve its nuclear capabilities while other countries continue to advance? 

General HYTEN. No, Russia, China and North Korea did not follow our lead. 

I remain confident in our existing nuclear deterrent force; however our legacy capabilities are serving well beyond their intended design lives and are rapidly approaching end of life. The NPR recognized maintaining a safe, secure and reliable 

nuclear deterrent is predicated on modernizing the TRIAD, nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), dual capable aircraft (DCA), stockpile and infrastructure. 

The President’s Budget addresses the Department’s nuclear modernization requirements and with continued congressional support, I am confident we will continue to have a credible deterrent for the foreseeable future. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, would putting a single, lower-yield warhead on a D5 

submarine-launched missile increase the vulnerability of the submarine beyond the 

risks it already entails in current war plans? Do current war plans include options 

for single-missile launches from submarines? 

General HYTEN. No, the introduction of a low yield SLBM warhead will not 

change the operating patterns of SSBNs. Our nuclear forces are postured to decisively respond to a range of contingencies spanning various levels of conflict. 

Further, our SSBNs are designed and operated in such a manner as to minimize 

opportunities for adversaries to attack them, and launching one or more SLBMs will 

not introduce additional risk to SSBN survivability. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, does the U.S. currently have a ‘‘launch-on-warning’’ 

or ‘‘launch-on-alert’’ posture in our nuclear forces? Or do we retain the option to 

‘‘launch-under-attack?’’ In what scenario do you envision the U.S. potentially 

‘‘launching-under-attack?’’ How does the U.S. verify it is under attack in such a scenario? Why did the Obama administration conclude to retain the option to ‘‘launchunder-attack?’’ Are you concerned the U.S. may mistakenly launch a nuclear strike, 

either in a day-to-day posture or during a crisis? Do you believe we should de-alert 

our ICBMs or other nuclear forces? 

General HYTEN. It remains the policy of the U.S. to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstance that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Further, 

our forces are postured in such a way that no adversary could conceivably be confident they could achieve their objectives in a large scale attack. 

The U.S. retains a robust attack warning and assessment capability, and deliberative conferencing procedures to determine the validity and scope of a potential attack, convey information to the President, discuss potential responses and, when directed, execute the President’s orders. 

The Obama administration in the 2010 NPR and the Trump administration in the 

2018 NPR assessed the threat environment and determined the capacity to respond 

at any time and in any scenario enhances our deterrent. Our forces are postured 

appropriately to address the threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, are you concerned that an adversary may not know 

whether a single D5 missile launched at it is carrying a single warhead or multiple 

warheads? 

General HYTEN. No, but this is not a new dilemma. An adversary would understand the scale of the attack—regardless of the number of Reentry Vehicles—is limited and does not represent an existential threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, is the nuclear declaratory policy in the 2018 NPR 

in any significant way different from the Obama administration’s declaratory policy? 

General HYTEN. No, the 2018 NPR does not expand the circumstances in which 

the U.S. might consider using nuclear weapons. 
56 

The 2018 NPR declaratory policy states ‘‘the United States would only consider 

the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances in defense of the vital 

interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.’’ The 2010 NPR contained 

the same language. 

The 2018 NPR further clarifies ‘extreme circumstances’ by providing examples 

that might elicit U.S. consideration of a nuclear response. Clarification reduces the 

potential for adversary miscalculation which enhances deterrence. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, do you believe the U.S. deploying a low-yield SLBM 

warhead is simply mirror-imaging the Russian ‘‘escalate-to-deescalate’’ or ‘‘escalateto-win’’ strategy? Is this low-yield U.S. weapon about fighting and winning a nuclear 

war or about deterring a nuclear war in the first place? 

General HYTEN. The NPR concluded that U.S. nuclear forces require supplemental capabilities to provide a credible response to adversary limited first use of 

nuclear weapons in order to deter such use. 

The supplemental capabilities are designed to raise the nuclear threshold by convincing adversaries even the limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than 

they can tolerate. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, do you support a U.S. policy of no-first-use of nuclear 

weapons? Why did the Obama administration ultimately conclude in 2016 to not 

pursue such a policy? 

General HYTEN. No, I do not support a ‘‘no-first-use’’ policy. 

The Obama Administration in the 2010 NPR and the Trump Administration in 

the 2018 NPR concluded elimination of the ‘‘first-use’’ policy would unnecessarily 

constrain options available to the President, particularly in times of extremis. 

First use policy also acts as a deterrent to conventional escalation/coercion, 

assures allies, and is a key element of our extended deterrence policy. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, do you support efforts to go faster on major nuclear 

modernization programs? What could be done to go faster on the GBSD and LRSO 

programs? 

General HYTEN. Yes, I strongly support service efforts to accelerate modernization. Legacy weapon systems are well past their planned service life and have eroding margin. 

The Air Force is executing GBSD and LRSO on schedule and the best way to sustain this momentum is to: 1) pass budgets on-time; 2) keep program requirements 

stable from Milestone-B through deployment; and 3) pursue mature, low-risk technologies capable of adapting to future changes. I also support initiatives to streamline acquisition and test, and minimize burdensome oversight. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, what types of ‘‘non-strategic’’ nuclear weapons does 

Russia have? How many non-strategic nuclear weapons does Russia have? How 

many types and how many numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons does the U.S. 

have? What steps does the NPR recommend regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons? 

General HYTEN. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, please describe the military requirements that are 

driving U.S. nuclear modernization plans. What do we see other countries doing and 

how does that impact our requirements? How does aging or vulnerabilities in our 

own U.S. nuclear forces impact requirements and modernization plans? 

General HYTEN. Nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role 

in deterring nuclear attack and preventing large-scale conventional warfare between 

nuclear armed states for the foreseeable future. The military requirements driving 

U.S. nuclear modernization plans are based on a pragmatic assessment of the 

threats we face and the uncertainties regarding the future global security environment. 

U.S. nuclear forces must be survivable, forward deployable, responsive, visible, 

penetrating and accurate. 

Our legacy nuclear weapon systems are operating well past their designed service 

life and have eroding margin, while adversaries are modernizing their nuclear 

forces, strategic systems, and conventional capabilities to achieve their national security objectives in today’s complex and demanding global security environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, what is the military requirement for a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead and a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)? Isn’t it correct that the low-yield SLBM warhead is a simple modification to an existing weapon? Not a new weapon? And isn’t it correct that the U.S. 

deployed SLCMs for several decades—before giving them up in 2010. Wouldn’t this 

be updating and redeploying a capability we used to have? 

General HYTEN. The military requirement for a low-yield SLBM warhead and a 

SLCM is in direct response to the threat. Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabili-
57 

ties call for the limited use of nuclear weapons to coerce NATO, and to defeat NATO 

conventional forces through the wider use of nuclear weapons if their coercive use 

fails. 

Modification of the SLBM warhead and reintroduction of the SLCM will strengthen deterrence by convincing adversaries the U.S. has credible and effective options 

at any level of escalation, and they cannot escalate their way out of a failing conflict 

through the use of nuclear weapons. 

The nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile is a capability the U.S. deployed 

for a number of years and is not a new capability. The Department is in the process 

of determining the technical approach to pursue this capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, why does the NPR recommend retaining the B83 nuclear gravity bomb? Does STRATCOM have targets that only the B83 nuclear gravity bomb can hold at risk? 

General HYTEN. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, what does the NPR recommend regarding our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system? What actions is DOD 

considering or pursuing? How do you think DOD should be organized for NC3 

issues? As NC3 recapitalization takes place, what are you doing to ensure the systems are secure from both cyber attacks and supply chain insertions? 

General HYTEN. What does the NPR recommend regarding our NC3 system? 

NC3 system must assure integrity of transmitted information and be resilient and 

survivable to overcome effects of adversary nuclear attack. NC3 must be increasingly flexible to tailor deterrence strategies across a range of potential adversaries 

and threats, and enable adjustments over time. We must sustain and replace nuclear capabilities, modernize NC3, and strengthen the integration of nuclear and 

non-nuclear military planning. 

What actions is DOD considering or pursuing? 

Space assets that are agile and resilient against 21st century threats; enhanced 

threat warning systems that keep pace with modern threats. Communications links 

between command centers and Triad forces that are assured, resilient, and reliable 

at all levels of conflict. Protection of NC3 components against current and future 

cyber threats. Advanced Decision Support for senior leadership to enable more informed response to any event in most timely manner. Planning systems capable of 

providing integrated options across the full spectrum of effects (e.g. conventional/nuclear). 

How do you think DOD should be organized for NC3 issues? 

As noted in the 2018 NPR, DOD authority and responsibility for governance of 

the NC3 system is broadly diffused and must be integrated. To get at this problem, 

the Chairman was tasked through the NPR to provide Secretary Mattis a recommended plan to reform NC3 governance. I’ll have to defer further comment until 

after the SECDEF makes his determination. 

As NC3 recapitalization takes place, what are you doing to ensure the systems are 

secure from both cyberattacks and supply chain insertions? 

While efforts are ongoing at the Joint Staff level to modify existing practices of 

contract enforcement and/or oversight, I have directed Cyber Protection Teams to 

continue to conduct Defensive Cyber Operations on our most critical NC3 systems. 

Additionally, USSTRATCOM is working with the interagency and partnering with 

OUSD(I), to: 1) incorporate rigorous supply chain security measures throughout the 

lifecycle of our most sensitive systems and 2) guide Intelligence Community and law 

enforcement efforts to quickly detect and respond to supply chain threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. Officials in the Department, and several combatant commanders, 

have expressed the need to develop next generation technologies in directed energy, 

space sensing, and boost phase intercept when addressing future ballistic missile 

threats. I agree with that statement wholeheartedly; however, that is not what is 

reflected in the PB19 budget submission, which arguably contains ‘‘more of the 

same’’ interceptor procurements, terrestrial sensors, and spiral development of our 

current systems. Further, it zeroes programs out like the Missile Defense Tracking 

System—a needed space-based sensor layer. From an overall strategic standpoint, 

can you explain this mismatch? 

General HYTEN. I agree there is a need to develop next generation technologies 

in directed energy, space sensing, and boost phase intercept. It is important to note, 

the PB funds both existing capabilities as a near-term hedge and begins development of next generation upgrades and capability advancements to strengthen our 

missile defense posture. 

I concur MTS is a needed space-based sensor capability and although the PB does 

not fund MDA to pursue this program directly, the PB does fund the AF, in close 
58 

cooperation with MDA, to develop a missile warning sensor demo to inform the future next generation MTS/OPIR programs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. What was the reason to reverse the decision to retire the B83 bomb, 

and instead keep it in the U.S. arsenal? Is there a change in military requirements 

that requires keeping these nuclear weapons? 

Secretary ROOD. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterates the prior Administration’s commitment to retain the B83–1 in the stockpile until there is sufficient 

confidence in the B61–12 gravity bomb. Given the changed threat environment, deterrence requirements to hold a variety of protected targets at risk, and the unique 

capabilities of the B83–1 bomb to fulfill those requirements, the Administration decided to postpone B83–1 retirement until a suitable replacement is validated. 

Mr. SMITH. Why are additional low-yield capabilities on sea-based platforms (lowyield D5 on SSBNs and a new sea-launched cruise missile) needed, when the United 

States already has low-yield options on its air-launched platforms, with the B61 

bomb and the air-launched nuclear cruise missile (both of which are being modernized)? 

Secretary ROOD. These supplements to the planned nuclear force replacement program are prudent options for enhancing the flexibility and diversity of U.S. nuclear 

capabilities to help address emerging deterrence requirements in the near term and 

beyond. Together, they will: provide a more diverse set of capabilities enhancing our 

ability to tailor deterrence and assurance; expand the range of credible U.S. options 

for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack; and enhance deterrence 

by signaling to potential adversaries that their concepts of coercive, limited nuclear 

escalation offer no exploitable advantage. 

Mr. SMITH. Has the United States ever used low-yield warheads on SSBNs? How 

might using low-yield nuclear warheads on SSBNs, which seems to have never have 

been done in the decades of U.S. nuclear deterrence, change when SSBNs might be 

used in a nuclear conflict? Are they likely to be used early in a conflict to respond 

to an attempt by Russia to use a low-yield nuclear weapon in a regional, conventional conflict where they might attempt to ‘‘escalate-to-deescalate’’? And would the 

purpose be to target Russian territory with a low-yield nuclear weapon? 

Secretary ROOD. The United States has never deployed a low-yield submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead. A low-yield warhead was used in the 

Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile before the system was retired from the U.S. 

nuclear inventory. The low-yield capabilities announced in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) are intended to enhance the credibility of our deterrent against limited 

nuclear first-use by an adversary at any stage of a conflict. They will improve our 

deterrence posture by dispelling any perception among nuclear-armed adversaries, 

especially Russia, of an exploitable ‘‘gap’’ in our ability to respond to their limited 

nuclear weapon use strategies (e.g., ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’). 

Mr. SMITH. Has the United States ever used low-yield warheads on SSBNs? How 

might using low-yield nuclear warheads on SSBNs, which seems to have never have 

been done in the decades of U.S. nuclear deterrence, change when SSBNs might be 

used in a nuclear conflict? Are they likely to be used early in a conflict to respond 

to an attempt by Russia to use a low-yield nuclear weapon in a regional, conventional conflict where they might attempt to ‘‘escalate-to-deescalate?’’ And would the 

purpose be to target Russian territory with a low-yield nuclear weapon? 

General HYTEN. Low-yield warheads have never been deployed on a SSBN. Los 

Angeles-class SSNs employed the TLAM–N with a low yield nuclear option from 

1984–2010. 

Introduction of a low-yield SLBM warhead is intended to enhance deterrence, 

raise the nuclear threshold, and prevent escalation of the conflict by providing a 

flexible, credible capability to tailor U.S. deterrence across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. 

The targets and weapons used to achieve U.S. objectives are highly dependent 

upon the context of the conflict. 

Mr. SMITH. What was the reason to reverse the decision to retire the B83 bomb, 

and instead keep it in the U.S. arsenal? Is there a change in military requirements 

that requires keeping these nuclear weapons? 

General HYTEN. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. SMITH. Why are additional low-yield capabilities on sea-based platforms (lowyield D5 on SSBNs and a new sea-launched cruise missile) needed, when the United 

States already has low-yield options on its air-launched platforms, with the B61 
59 

bomb and the air-launched nuclear cruise missile (both of which are being modernized)? 

General HYTEN. Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabilities call for the limited 

use of nuclear weapons to coerce NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional forces. 

They would not have adopted this strategy and doctrine, and would not be expending resources to modernize and expand their non-strategic nuclear forces (which are 

already approximately ten times larger than NATO’s), if they perceived current U.S. 

and NATO nuclear posture as sufficient to deter such nuclear use. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review took a deliberate threat-policy-posture approach 

to examine the strategic environment. The NPR determined that our deterrent approach must be tailored and flexible to address today’s challenges and future uncertainty. 

Low yield weapons are a critical piece of our force structure and defense posture 

but are currently limited to our bomber force—a low yield ballistic missile (LYBM) 

weapon and sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) provide unique attributes to enhance existing capabilities: 

LYBM: survivable, prompt, can strike targets that are heavily defended against 

bombers and air-delivered weapons. 

SLCM: assured response capability, forward-deployable, non-host nation dependent, and provides additional diversity in delivery platforms, range, survivability, and 

future hedging. 

Reintroducing a low-yield option for our sea leg addresses adversary perception 

of advantage, improves our nuclear deterrent, allows the U.S. to negotiate from a 

position of strength, and bring an enhanced assurance element to our allies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

Mrs. DAVIS. The Russian doctrine of ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’ by using low-yield 

nuclear weapons is dangerous and reckless. We shouldn’t mirror their reckless strategy. So what do we hope to gain by proliferating low-yield weapons? What is the 

strategic gain of their employment? 

General HYTEN. The supplemental low-yield capabilities directed in the NPR— 

low-yield ballistic missiles (LYBM) and a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)—are 

a measured response to the threat and are intended to deter Russia from acting on 

their ‘escalate to deescalate’ strategy. If Russia believes they can successfully use 

a low-yield nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict and achieve their objectives, we risk deterrence failure. 

The supplemental capabilities are intended to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment would provide an advantage restoring the nuclear threshold and increasing the likelihood of conflict is avoided altogether. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Cost estimates for nuclear modernization range from $700B to $1.5T. 

Leveraging diplomatic instruments of power in these times is crucial. Russia has a 

weak economy; they don’t want to spend the money on nuclear modernization if they 

don’t have to. As the only peer nuclear competitor, shouldn’t we be looking for ways 

to shore up current treaties to engage Russia in further bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons? 

General HYTEN. While the United States has continued to reduce the number and 

salience of its nuclear weapons, Russia has expanded and improved its strategic and 

non-strategic nuclear forces. 

The NPR makes clear the United States sees negotiated arms control agreements 

as a valuable tool to reduce the threats potential adversaries pose to the U.S. and 

its allies and partners, to increase transparency and predictability and reduce the 

likelihood of misperception and miscalculation, and to prevent unnecessary competition in nuclear arms. 

However, for arms control agreements to serve these purposes effectively we must 

have a willing partner that complies with the commitments they make in such 

agreements. This is why a satisfactory resolution of Russia’s ongoing violation of the 

INF Treaty is so important. Without a verifiable return of Russia to compliance 

with the INF Treaty our ability to use arms control as a means of enhancing U.S. 

and allied security is profoundly undermined. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. STRATCOM has stated a need for a Prompt Global Strike weapon, 

either land- or sea-launched. From our understanding, the Joint Staff has not completed validation of this requirement, despite ongoing development efforts and plans 
60 

for the Navy to assume the program in 2019. Do you know why the delay in Joint 

Staff validation? How is this delay impacting delivery of a capability to fulfill your 

requirement? 

General HYTEN. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) revalidated 

system requirements and capability needs for a Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) 

system in 2016. The JROC supported prioritizing deployment of a sea-based prompt 

strike capability in the near-term and supported further efforts on additional basing 

modes. The Department took a significant step forward this cycle towards realizing 

an operational capability by transferring the program to the Navy in 2020 and adding significant resources beginning in FY19. These actions place us on a clear transition path from experimentation to a fielded capability. 

Mr. BROOKS. In your opening remarks you stated that the Department is pursuing 

several lines of effort with hypersonic capabilities, and that we need to prioritize 

and accelerate development. I assume the several lines of effort you mention are the 

AT&L (now A&S)/Navy program and the Air Force/DARPA efforts. With the requirement from STRATCOM driving the A&S/Navy development, how do you see 

the air-launched Air Force efforts competing with what you have stated is the need? 

General HYTEN. We continue working closely with other Combatant Commands 

and Services to ensure warfighter requirements for this capability are addressed. 

The Air Force and DARPA development of air-launched hypersonic strike capabilities are complimentary to A&S and Navy Conventional Prompt Strike program. The 

diversity of ranges, survivability, lethality, and delivery options will provide operational commanders flexibility in all phases of conflict. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. What is your advice to the President on whether to extend New 

START Treaty? Is the New START Treaty still in U.S. security interests? What 

would the risk to national security and strategic stability be if the treaty were not 

extended or updated? 

General HYTEN. The New START Treaty has, and continues to be, an essential 

transparency and confidence building measure in maintaining U.S.-Russia strategic 

stability. 

The verification regime (i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications 

and so on) permits visibility into Russian strategic offensive capabilities which significantly contribute to our understanding of their force structure and pace of modernization. 

It also allows us to demonstrate to the Russians that we are compliant, stable and 

capable. That said, I would advise further dialogue and analysis is prudent on any 

matters pertaining to extending the Treaty. 

Mr. LARSEN. Would the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon from a submarine risk 

increasing ambiguity? Could an adversary differentiate between a sub-launched missile carrying a single, low-yield nuclear weapon or whether it carried many highyield nuclear warheads, or whether it carried a conventional hypersonic weapon? Is 

this an acceptable risk? 

General HYTEN. Adversaries cannot determine the yield or number of warheads 

mated on a launch vehicle. Employment of a low yield SLBM does not change the 

equation and/or increase ambiguity. 

An adversary would understand the scale of the attack—single missile vs multiple 

launches—and the fact the attack does not represent an existential threat. 

Especially during a crisis or conflict, U.S. and Russian decision-makers take the 

entire threat environment into account—not simply one action. Just as there is no 

automaticity to respond to limited Russian nuclear employment with a massive response, we should not expect Russia to do so either. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Last year’s conference report for NDAA FY18 terminated the position and office of the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor and transferred the duties, responsibilities and personnel to a single official selected by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. How does that impact the Department and how does 

that affect our readiness in the space warfighting domain? 

Secretary ROOD. Pursuant to Section 1601 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA for FY 2018) (Public Law 115–91), the position and 

the office of the Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA) were terminated. The Deputy 

Secretary of Defense realigned the duties, responsibilities, personnel, and resources 

of the PDSA directly under the purview of the Deputy Secretary of Defense as an 
61 

interim measure as he leads the Department in a comprehensive review of options 

for space organization and management. The Deputy Secretary carried out this Congressional direction through a January 18, 2018 memorandum, ‘‘Guidance for Increasing Lethality and Warfighting Readiness in Space,’’ which ‘‘ensures continuity 

of responsibilities and authorities throughout the DOD space enterprise while this 

review is conducted.’’ This guidance also reflects the National Defense Strategy’s 

emphasis in its first line of effort to rebuild military readiness as we build a more 

lethal Joint Force. As a result, DOD is implementing the Congressional direction 

pursuant to Section 1601 in a manner that strengthens warfighting readiness and 

lethality in the space domain. 

Mr. TURNER. Earlier this year you reorganized your Joint Functional Component 

Command for Space into a Joint Force Space Component Command and dual-hatted 

that organization with Air Force Space Command. Can you explain why you did 

that, what effect you were trying to achieve? What benefit were you trying to derive 

by dual-hatting the Air Forces’ organize, train, and equip major command with the 

joint responsibility for commanding and operating space units? 

General HYTEN. This change was part of a broader command organizational restructure intended to build a coherent and streamlined warfighting construct, consistent with doctrine, to enable more effective command and control of forces and 

direct lines of authority. 

This shift to a dual-hatted joint and service commander elevates and emphasizes 

the role of space in the joint warfighting environment and improves both unity of 

command and effort for joint space operations. 

Mr. TURNER. You have been a vocal advocate for moving faster in space acquisition. And I agree with that sentiment completely, but where do you think the biggest problem is for space acquisition? How would you redesign the space acquisition 

process? 

General HYTEN. One impediment to moving faster in space acquisition has been 

our inability to innovate, prototype and field new space capabilities on the timeline 

of need. We need to stop excessive risk reduction activities where we spend years 

designing and analyzing exquisite systems rather than pushing to get the right capability on orbit for the warfighter. I see that changing now in both the AF and 

the DOD. Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, Dr. Roper, Deputy Secretary 

Shanahan, Undersecretary Lord, and Undersecretary Griffin are pushing in just 

this direction. 

I also support a process to more easily replace capabilities in a conflict by fielding 

smaller and cheaper satellites that can quickly integrate with a modular payload 

bus and inexpensive ground architecture. 

To replace capabilities based on warfighter need, we also need to adopt more commercial space procurement practices to push satellite development down to 3 to 5 

years and continue to leverage the increasingly affordable launch market. 

Eliminating excess bureaucracy is also critical to accelerating acquisition to the 

speed of relevance, and I believe we have the right leadership in the Department 

to make strides in this area. 

Mr. TURNER. Last year’s conference report for NDAA FY18 terminated the position and office of the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor and transferred the duties, responsibilities and personnel to a single official selected by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. How does that impact the Department and how does 

that affect our readiness in the space warfighting domain? 

General HYTEN. I agree with the NDAA’s decision to eliminate the PDSA. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has not made a decision on where the duties, 

responsibilities and personnel will transfer. As such, it would be premature for me 

to comment on effectiveness. 

Mr. TURNER. We see an array of new threats that are driving improved missile 

warning; many of those involve surveillance over the North Pole. How would you 

characterize polar coverage priorities for Next Gen Missile Warning, and how can 

our country get more resilient capabilities operational quickly? Should we start with 

one part of the constellation, the other, or both, based on your assessment of the 

threats? 

General HYTEN. To be clear, our missile warning constellation does provide global 

coverage (including the North Pole) and is effective against existing ballistic missile 

threats. 

As threats evolve, we must ensure our missile warning capabilities outpace our 

adversaries through innovation and fielding at the speed of relevance. 

I am encouraged with the direction of the President’s Budget (PB). The PB accelerates development of a more resilient, global missile warning architecture and begins development of capabilities required to address advanced adversary threats. 
62 

Mr. TURNER. Recently we have received the DSD’s Space Organization Interim 

Report which highlights acquisition as a major focus in order for us to move at the 

speed of relevance with incorporating innovation into the space acquisition process. 

How important or helpful do you think the final report will be for space acquisition 

redesign? 

General HYTEN. I believe the framework laid out in the interim report moves us 

in the right direction. I’m optimistic the changes the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

recommends will be the basis for the modifications necessary to move at the speed 

of relevance. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The current plan to modernize and recapitalize the nuclear deterrent and its supporting infrastructure requires a great deal of concurrent work 

and spending in the 2020s and into the 2030s. In fact, outgoing NNSA Administrator Gen. Klotz stated last month that ‘‘We’ve never done more than one life extension program at a time, since the end of the Cold War. We’re now doing essentially four . . . We’re pretty much at capacity in terms of people.’’ How is DOD planning for the high concurrency in modernization programs, and now having to add 

two more capabilities (a low-yield D5 and a new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile)? What risks are there in this plan? 

General HYTEN. I agree with Administrator Gordon-Hagerty’s assessment in recent testimony to the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee. The 

nuclear weapons enterprise is prepared and has the capabilities and capacity to execute planned programs including the added requirements from the 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review. 

We will work through the Nuclear Weapons Council to synchronize DOD acquisition programs with NNSA stockpile activities. Risks include the need for continued 

support from Congress for predictable and stable program funding and recruiting, 

training, and equipping the personnel in the workforce to execute the programs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does DOD have a comprehensive nuclear modernization plan (to 

complement NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship and Modernization Plan) identifying 

major programs and capability sustainment and modernization requirements? 

General HYTEN. Yes, section 1043 of the FY12 NDAA requires an annual report 

to Congress on all Service sustainment/modernization plans with ten-year cost projection. Additionally, Service modernization plans are included in the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) long-range Strategic Plan. The NWC plan aligns DOD platform 

programs and DOE NNSA stockpile and infrastructure programs to ensure capabilities are concurrently developed to meet deterrence requirements. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We have never used SSBNs for a single low-yield nuclear warhead. SSBNs are our survivable second strike capability to deter a massive nuclear 

exchange. Are we changing the mission or use of this platform? Would using a D5 

to launch a low-yield nuclear weapons risk undermining strategic requirements? 

Specifically, is there any increased risk that a submarine, having launched a single 

low-yield missile, would be vulnerable to attack? Could DOD meet strategic requirements if the sub cannot escape safely after such a launch? 

General HYTEN. No, the introduction of a low yield SLBM will not change the operating patterns of SSBNs. Our nuclear forces are postured to decisively respond to 

a range of contingencies spanning various levels of conflict. Further, our SSBNs are 

designed and operated in such a manner as to minimize opportunities for adversaries to conduct prosecution. Employment of a low-yield weapon will not introduce 

additional risk to SSBN survivability. 

The Triad provides the inherent flexibility required to mitigate the loss of any single platform. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Given Putin’s statements this week about Russia’s nuclear weapons capability, do you see a risk of a nuclear arms race with Russia? How can this 

risk be mitigated? 

General HYTEN. The systems President Putin mentioned in his recent speech do 

not change the military balance, nor do they necessitate a change in our deterrence 

posture. With that said, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM, it is my responsibility to ensure this country can deter and respond to any threat. The recommendations made in the NPR to modernize our TRIAD and incorporate select low-yield 

supplements are needed to maintain and enhance the flexibility, diversity and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces now and in the future. 

I completely agree with former Secretary of Defense Carter’s statement, 

‘‘. . . During the past 25 years, the United States has made no major new investments in its nuclear forces, yet other countries have conducted vigorous buildups. 
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This history does not support the contention that U.S. investments fuel the nuclear 

programs of others. . .’’ (Spring 2018 Newsletter, Harvard School of Government’s 

Belfer Center). 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why do you recommend pursuing new low-yield nuclear weapon 

options? The U.S. arsenal already deploys low-yield options with the B61 (which we 

are spending $12 billion to modernize) and the planned LRSO. Why do we need 

other options, including redeploying a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and 

fielding a low-yield option for the submarine-launched D5 missile? 

General HYTEN. Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabilities call for the limited 

use of nuclear weapons to coerce NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional forces. 

They would not have adopted this strategy and doctrine, and would not be expending resources to modernize and expand their non-strategic nuclear forces (which are 

already approximately ten times larger than NATO’s), if they perceived current U.S. 

and NATO nuclear posture as sufficient to deter such nuclear use. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review took a deliberate threat-policy-posture approach 

to examine the strategic environment. The NPR determined that our deterrent approach must be tailored and flexible to address today’s challenges and future uncertainty. 

Low yield weapons are a critical piece of our force structure and defense posture 

but are currently limited to our bomber force—a low yield ballistic missile (LYBM) 

weapon & sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) provide unique attributes to enhance 

existing capabilities: 

• LYBM: survivable, prompt, can strike targets that are heavily defended against 

bombers and air-delivered weapons. 

• SLCM: assured response capability, forward-deployable, non-host nation dependent, and provides additional diversity in delivery platforms, range, survivability, and future hedging. 

Reintroducing a low-yield option for our sea leg addresses adversary perception 

of advantage, improves our nuclear deterrent, allows the U.S. to negotiate from a 

position of strength, and bring an enhanced assurance element to our allies. 

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