81250 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 247 / Monday, December 27, 2010 / Notices 

SYSTEM LOCATION: 

Primary Location: Reporting Systems, 

Inc., 851 Coho Way, Suite 301, 

Bellingham, WA 98225–2021. 

SECONDARY LOCATION: 

United States Marine Corps (USMC) 

Installation Fire and Emergency 

Services (F&ES) Departments. Official 

mailing addresses are contained in the 

Standard Navy Distribution List (SNDL). 

CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE

SYSTEM: 

Federal employees, Active Duty 

Marines, Reserve and retired Marines 

involved in responding to U.S. Marine 

Corps F&ES emergency incidents. 

CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: 

Individual’s name, Social Security 

Number (SSN), date of birth, home 

address, marital status, gender, ethnic 

group, home and work phone numbers, 

employment history, awards, years of 

service, administrative data consisting 

of; rank/grade, citizenship, emergency 

contact information (includes 

dependent information), military/ 

Federal employees and off-duty 

education. Training information 

includes fire and emergency service 

certifications and qualifications, fire and 

emergency service skills and schools. 

AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM: 

10 U.S.C. 5013, Secretary of Navy; 10 

U.S.C. 5041, Headquarters, Marine 

Corps; DoDI 6055.06, DoD Fire and 

Emergency Services (F&ES) Program; 

Marine Corps Order 11000.11B, Marine 

Corps Fire Protection and Emergency 

Services Program; and E.O. 9397 (SSN), 

as amended. 

PURPOSE(S): 

The Emergency Incident Reporting 

System provides records management 

and reporting for the Fire and 

Emergency Services (F&ES) program. 

The system collects and reports on all 

types of emergency incidents responded 

to by U.S. Marine Corps F&ES resources. 

It has the capability to collect, analyze 

and report prevention and inspection 

data as well as equipment inventories. 

The system also collects personnel 

training, certifications required for 

employment, and administrative data. 

Provides required reporting capabilities 

to plan, program, budget for, and 

execute the U.S. Corps Fire and 

Emergency Services (F&ES) program. 

ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE

SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND

THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES: 

In addition to those disclosures 

generally permitted under 5 U.S.C. 

552a(b) of the Privacy Act of 1974, these 

records contained therein may 

specifically be disclosed outside the 

DoD as a routine use pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. 552a(b)(3) as follows: 

To emergency care and definitive care 

medical professionals as allowed by law 

during the course of providing medical 

treatment. 

To Officials and employees of federal, 

state and local government through 

official request for information with 

respect to law enforcement, 

investigatory procedures, criminal 

prosecution, civil court action and 

regulatory order. 

To the United States Fire 

Administration National Fire Incident 

Reporting System (NFIRS) as required 

by DODI 6055.06, DoD Fire and 

Emergency Services (F&ES) Program for 

the collection and reporting of incident 

response information. 

To disaster related agencies and 

services such as the American Red Cross 

and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) as required in the 

provision of emergency related services. 

To the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) during 

the course of an on-site inspection. 

The DoD ‘‘Blanket Routine Uses’’ set 

forth at the beginning of the Marine 

Corps’ compilation of systems of records 

notices apply to this system. 

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, 

RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND

DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: 

STORAGE: 

Electronic storage media and paper 

records in file folders. 

RETRIEVABILITY: 

By name, Social Security Number 

(SSN), and/or date of birth. 

SAFEGUARDS: 

System login is accomplished by DoD 

Common Access Card (CAC). Public Key 

Infrastructure (PKI) network login is 

required and allows for documents to be 

digitally signed and encrypted. All U.S. 

unauthorized persons may enter and 

leave buildings only with an authorized 

escort. Records are maintained in areas 

accessible only to authorized personnel 

with a specific and recorded need-toknow. 

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL: 

Records generated by the system are 

considered permanent records and will 

retire to Washington National Records 

Center (WNRC) when 4 years old and 

transfer to National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA) when 

20 years old. 

SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS: 

Policy Official, Program Manager, Fire 

and Emergency Service Program (LFF– 

1) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2 

Navy Annex, Washington, DC 20380– 

1775. 

Fire Chiefs of the local U.S. Marine 

Corps F&ES Installations. Official 

mailing addresses are contained in the 

Standard Navy Distribution List (SNDL). 

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES: 

Individuals seeking to determine 

whether information about themselves 

is contained in this system of records 

should address written inquiries to the 

Installation Fire Chief. Official mailing 

addresses are contained in the Standard 

Navy Distribution List (SNDL). 

Request must include name, Social 

Security Number (SSN) and date of 

birth, the request must also be signed 

and contain a complete mailing address. 

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES: 

Individuals seeking to access records 

about themselves contained in this 

system of records should address 

written inquiries to the Installation Fire 

Chief. Official mailing addresses are 

published in the Standard Navy 

Distribution List (SNDL). 

Request must include name, Social 

Security Number (SSN) and date of 

birth, the request must also be signed 

and contain a complete mailing address. 

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: 

The U.S. Marine Corps rules for 

contesting contents and appealing 

initial agency determinations are 

published in Secretary of the Navy 

Instruction 5211.5E; 32 CFR part 701; or 

may be obtained from the system 

manager. 

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: 

From individuals; supervisors; 

personnel files; federal, state and local 

agencies; educational institutions; and 

automated system interfaces. 

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM: 

None. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32401 Filed 12–23–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

[Recommendation 2010–2] 

Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste 

Treatment and Immobilization Plant 

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board. 

ACTION: Notice, recommendation. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 247 / Monday, December 27, 2010 / Notices 81251 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

2286a(a)(5), the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board has made a 

recommendation to the Secretary of 

Energy concerning the use of pulse jet 

mixing at the Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant located in 

Washington State. 

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or before 

January 26, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, 

views, or arguments concerning this 

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 

Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, 

DC 20004–2901. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau 

at the address above or telephone 

number (202) 694–7000. 

Dated: December 20, 2010. 

Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman. 

Recommendation 2010–2 to the 

Secretary of Energy 

Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment 

and Immobilization Plant 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286(a)(5). 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

Amended. 

Dated: December 17, 2010. 

Introduction 

Legacy wastes from decades of 

nuclear weapons production by the 

Department of Energy (DOE) and its 

predecessor agencies include high-level 

radioactive waste stored in 177 

underground tanks at the Hanford Site. 

The risk posed by the continued storage 

of wastes in these tanks is considerable. 

Many of the tanks have a history of 

leakage, several are more than 60 years 

old, and most will be far beyond their 

intended service life by the time the 

wastes are retrieved and processed into 

stable forms. DOE must ensure that the 

Hanford Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant (WTP) in 

conjunction with the Hanford tank farm 

waste feed delivery system will operate 

safely and effectively for many decades 

to eliminate the safety hazards posed by 

the wastes. This imperative requires that 

the pulse jet mixing and transfer 

systems relied upon in the WTP design 

perform reliably and effectively for 

decades of WTP operations, and that 

technical issues with the performance of 

these components be resolved in time to 

enable DOE to meet its existing 

commitment to begin WTP operation in 

2019. 

Background 

In a letter to DOE’s Assistant 

Secretary for Environmental 

Management dated January 6, 2010, the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

(Board) summarized its concerns related 

to WTP’s mixing and transfer systems; 

specifically, that the pulse jet mixers 

(PJMS) lacked sufficient power to mix 

adequately and to transfer the most 

rapidly settling particles expected to be 

present in the Hanford waste inventory. 

In its letter, the Board identified three 

significant safety issues related to pulse 

jet mixing: (1) Retention of fissile 

materials in vessel heels would present 

a criticality safety concern, (2) retention 

of flammable gas due to the presence of 

solids in vessel heels, and (3) the 

presence of a large solids inventory 

could have a detrimental effect on the 

vessel level instrumentation, which is 

required to control the PJMs. 

In its May 17, 2010, response to the 

Board’s letter, DOE committed to take 

actions to increase confidence in 

successful operation of WTP. These 

actions included integrated testing of 

vessel mixing and transfer systems at a 

larger scale. However, DOE did not 

provide details such as the scope and 

schedule for this effort. 

On July 1, 2010, the Consortium for 

Risk Evaluation and Stakeholder 

Participation (CRESP), an independent 

technical review team under contract to 

DOE, issued a report that identified 

concerns similar to the Board’s. 

Specifically, CRESP found that there 

was uncertainty in PJM performance 

and that the absence of full-scale or near 

full-scale testing represented a large risk 

for the WTP program. The CRESP report 

presented DOE with thirteen 

recommendations that addressed topics 

of Board concern, e.g., large-scale 

testing, reliance upon computational 

fluid dynamics modeling, functional 

performance specifications for 

inspecting and accessing vessel bottoms, 

heel removal needs and operating 

strategies, and criticality safety. 

On October 7–8, 2010, the Board held 

a public hearing on WTP issues, of 

which one session focused on 

evaluating the state of the PJM design. 

In advance of the public hearing, the 

Board asked DOE to respond to written 

questions related to PJMs. These 

questions focused on the scope of 

integrated testing at larger scale and 

DOE’s actions to address the concerns 

raised by CRESP. DOE provided written 

responses to the Board’s questions on 

September 8, 2010, but did not provide 

insight into the scope or schedule of the 

large-scale testing. DOE’s responses 

stated that the objectives and schedule 

for the large-scale testing were projected 

to be established by the end of calendar 

year 2010; this has since been revised to 

January 2011. DOE’s response also 

stated that DOE and its contractors 

would address the recommendations 

from the CRESP report, but that 

schedules for addressing most of the 

recommendations had not yet been 

established. 

The Board’s written questions also 

asked DOE to describe each open safety 

issue related to PJM performance. DOE 

responded that the primary safetyrelated issue that remained open was 

associated with performance of the 

integrated mixing and transfer system, 

which includes the PJM mixing system 

and associated controls, the suction 

line, and the vessel sampling system. 

DOE did not identify any concerns 

related to accumulation of solids in 

WTP vessels. 

In response to the questions posed by 

the Board, DOE included a response 

from Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL) providing its expert 

opinion on the adequacy of the PJM 

design. PNNL has performed 

considerable testing and analysis in 

support of the WTP mixing system 

design. PNNL noted in part: 

• Phase 1 testing performed by PNNL 

predicted inadequate mixing in some 

vessels. The WTP project team 

subsequently changed the mixing 

criterion from complete off-bottom 

suspension to a bottom-clearing metric. 

This change represents a significant 

reduction of the mixing criterion. 

• The WTP project team 

commissioned additional testing to this 

new criterion using waste simulants. 

PNNL has several concerns related to 

the simulants used in the WTP project 

team’s tests, as the simulants were not 

necessarily physically representative or 

bounding of actual waste. PNNL 

expressed the concern that mixing 

performance observed in the WTP 

project team’s tests may be better than 

actual plant performance. 

• The current design lacks an 

adequate scaling basis to relate smallscale test results to full-scale plant 

performance. The scaling of the mixing, 

transfer system, and pump-down 

process is complex. The absence of an 

experimentally validated scaling basis 

for pump-down represents a significant 

weakness of the current design basis. 

During the Board’s public hearing, 

DOE and its contractors acknowledged 

the need for large-scale testing and 

committed to complete relevant 

portions of such testing before installing 

process vessels in the WTP Pretreatment 

Facility, which is currently under 

construction at the Hanford Site. DOE 


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81252 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 247 / Monday, December 27, 2010 / Notices 

informed the Board that development of 

suitable waste simulants would likely 

be the most time-consuming aspect of 

the preparations for large-scale testing. 

DOE’s commitment to complete 

applicable portions of a large-scale 

testing program prior to installation of 

the Pretreatment Facility vessels is a 

positive development. 

Unresolved Concerns 

The Board believes that the testing 

and analysis completed to date have 

been insufficient to establish, with 

confidence, that the pulse jet mixing 

and transfer systems will perform 

adequately at full scale. The Board’s 

unresolved technical concerns are 

summarized below: 

Limitations of the small-scale testing 

program—The small-scale testing 

program did not investigate the 

performance limits of the PJM design. 

Rather, it demonstrated that the mixing 

system met a reduced mixing criterion 

using simple simulant materials that 

were not fully representative of the 

characteristics of Hanford’s high-level 

wastes. The testing program did not 

evaluate the entire range of WTP 

operating conditions, used nonprototypic equipment for much of the 

testing, and did not include multi-batch 

test runs to establish whether the 

mixing and transfer systems could 

operate for long periods under a variety 

of operating conditions. The program 

did not address the behavior of nonNewtonian wastes, such as the effects of 

variations of viscosity within a vessel, 

or the unique arrangement of PJMs in 

vessels containing these wastes. Pumpout testing did not include prototypic 

simulant or transfer system components, 

and lacked a well-established scaling 

basis. Large-scale testing would remedy 

this issue. 

Modeling of mixing performance— 

Computer simulations of mixing 

performance, such as the Low Order 

Accumulation Model, have not been 

verified and validated, yet have been 

used to advance the WTP mixing 

design. DOE plans to use computer 

simulations in validating the final WTP 

mixing design and is working to verify 

and validate a computational fluid 

dynamics code (FLUENT) for this 

purpose. Any use of computer 

simulations must be technically 

defensible, and the limits of each 

computational fluid dynamics 

simulation need to be well understood 

to prevent potential safety issues from 

arising during operations. 

Waste characterization and feed 

certification—The WTP safety strategy 

depends upon obtaining representative 

samples from the high-level waste feed 

tanks to support WTP’s waste feed 

certification requirements, and from 

WTP process vessels to ensure safetyrelated criteria are met. This capability 

has not been demonstrated in the 

Hanford Tank Farms or WTP process 

vessels. Obtaining samples that are 

sufficiently representative to support 

bounding estimates of the composition 

and properties of both the solid and 

liquid fractions of the high-level waste 

is required in order to demonstrate that 

the WTP can be operated safely (e.g., 

prevent inadvertent criticality and 

plugging of transfer lines). 

The WTP project team has altered its 

mixing performance criterion and made 

changes to the waste acceptance criteria, 

such as reducing the allowable solids 

concentration for WTP feed to address 

unfavorable mixing test results. DOE 

and its contractors have not yet been 

able to explain the full impact of these 

changes on DOE’s ability to qualify WTP 

feed and process the entirety of 

Hanford’s high-level waste using WTP. 

Additionally, DOE and its contractors 

have not been able to explain how 

representative samples from PJM-mixed 

tanks will be obtained. 

Planned WTP process vessel 

modifications—DOE is planning to add 

capabilities for heel dilution, vessel 

pump-out, and visual inspection to 

address potential risks and uncertainties 

remaining from small-scale testing; 

however, the specifications for and 

capabilities of these systems have not 

been established. 

Limitations of PJM controller and 

instrumentation testing—DOE has not 

performed PJM controller and 

instrumentation tests with a 

combination of (1) A prototypic 

simulant; (2) a full-scale PJM system 

driven by jet pump pairs; and (3) 

prototypic level/density 

instrumentation and controllers. 

Pretreatment Engineering Platform 

testing revealed that the level/density 

probes provided spurious data because 

of plugging and interference resulting 

from hydrodynamic pressures from the 

PJMs and transfer pumps. In addition, 

PNNL stated that the PJM controller 

testing performed in 2009 had several 

limitations and that ‘‘any extrapolation 

of the data above and beyond the scope 

of the present work should be done with 

extreme caution.’’ 

Recommendation 

Therefore, the Board recommends that 

DOE: 

1. Develop a large-scale test plan, 

including a schedule and milestones 

that addresses the issues raised by the 

Board in this recommendation, by 

CRESP in its letter reports addressing 

pulse jet mixing, and by PNNL. The 

objective of the test plan should be to 

define the limits of the WTP pulse jet 

mixing and transfer systems given the 

complete range of physical properties 

for the high-level waste stored in the 

Hanford Tank Farms. The elements of 

the test plan should include: (1) Design 

of simulants; (2) design of the prototypic 

mixing systems, including PJM control 

and tank level control systems, and the 

transfer system for the large-scale test; 

and (3) criteria for review and 

interpretation of the large-scale test 

results. The test plan schedule should 

be constructed such that results from 

the testing can be used to inform WTP 

process vessel design decisions. The 

large-scale test platform must integrate 

the scaling of the mixing and transfer 

systems such that the scaling of the test 

platform is technically defensible. 

2. Develop waste simulants for the 

mixing and transfer system testing that 

envelope the complete range of physical 

properties for the high-level waste 

stored in the Hanford Tank Farms. The 

simulant selection should include 

simulants representative of the waste’s 

Newtonian and non-Newtonian 

properties and particle shape, e.g., 

irregularly shaped simulant particles. 

The physical properties selected for 

each simulant must reflect uncertainties 

in the existing characterization of the 

high-level wastes. 

3. Complete verification and 

validation of any computational models 

used by the WTP project team (e.g., Low 

Order Accumulation Model and 

FLUENT) based on the results from the 

large-scale testing. 

4. Demonstrate the ability to obtain 

representative samples of the solids and 

liquids in all of WTP’s vessels, 

including demonstrating that 

representative samples can be obtained 

even if the assumed WTP design 

particle size or density is exceeded. This 

will ensure that the sampling system 

does not exclude large, dense particles 

and artificially bias the measured 

particle size and density distribution. 

The representativeness of these samples 

must be statistically defensible and meet 

appropriate confidence limits given the 

significance of the safety-related issues 

in WTP. 

5. Define the impact on the waste 

retrieval, feed delivery, and feed 

certification processes due to any 

limitations of the WTP mixing and 

transfer systems, and demonstrate the 

ability to obtain adequately 

representative samples from the waste 

feed tanks to ensure the WTP waste 

acceptance criteria can be reliably 

enforced. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 247 / Monday, December 27, 2010 / Notices 81253 

6. Establish functional design criteria 

for the heel dilution, heel pump-out, 

and visual inspection functions, and 

demonstrate the capabilities and limits 

of these systems through the large-scale 

testing. 

7. Identify the technical and safetyrelated risks that remain unresolved 

upon completion of the large-scale 

testing and establish suitable risk 

management strategies to ensure that 

each remaining risk will have little, if 

any, potential impact on DOE’s ability 

to begin WTP operations safely and 

consistent with existing commitments. 

In order to preclude unnecessary 

delay in the WTP project, the Board 

urges the Secretary to avail himself of 

the authority under the Atomic Energy 

Act (U.S.C. 2286d(e)) to ‘‘implement any 

such recommendation (or part of any 

such recommendation) before, on, or 

after the date on which the Secretary 

transmits the implementation plan to 

the Board under this subsection.’’ 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D., 

Chairman. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32365 Filed 12–23–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

Office of Special Education and 

Rehabilitative Services; Overview 

Information; National Institute on 

Disability and Rehabilitation Research 

(NIDRR)—Research Fellowships 

Program; Notice Inviting Applications 

for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 

2011 

Catalog of Federal Domestic 

Assistance (CFDA) Number: 84.133F–1. 

Dates: 

Applications Available: December 27, 

2010. 

Deadline for Transmittal of 

Applications: February 25, 2011. 

Full Text of Announcement 

I. Funding Opportunity Description 

Purpose of Program: The purpose of 

the Research Fellowships Program is to 

build research capacity by providing 

support to enable highly qualified 

individuals, including those who are 

individuals with disabilities, to conduct 

research on the rehabilitation of 

individuals with disabilities. 

Note: This program is in concert with 

NIDRR’s currently approved long range plan 

(the Plan). The Plan is comprehensive and 

integrates many issues relating to disability 

and rehabilitation research topics. The Plan, 

which was published in the Federal Register 

on February 15, 2006 (71 FR 8165), can be 

accessed on the Internet at the following site: 

http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/ 

nidrr/policy.html. 

Through the implementation of the 

Plan, NIDRR seeks to: (1) Improve the 

quality and utility of disability and 

rehabilitation research; (2) foster an 

exchange of expertise, information, and 

training to facilitate the advancement of 

knowledge and understanding of the 

unique needs of traditionally 

underserved populations; (3) determine 

the best strategies and programs to 

improve rehabilitation outcomes for 

underserved populations; (4) identify 

research gaps; (5) identify mechanisms 

of integrating research and practice; and 

(6) disseminate findings. 

Priorities: This competition contains 

one absolute priority and one 

invitational priority. 

Absolute Priority: For FY 2011, this 

priority is an absolute priority. In 

accordance with 34 CFR 75.105(b)(2)(ii), 

these priorities are from the regulations 

for this program (34 CFR 356.10). Under 

34 CFR 75.105(c)(3) we consider only 

applications that meet this priority. 

This priority is: 

Research Fellowships Program 

Fellows must conduct original 

research in an area authorized by 

section 204 of the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973, as amended (the Act). Section 204 

authorizes research demonstration 

projects, training, and related activities, 

the purpose of which are to develop 

methods, procedures, and rehabilitation 

technology that maximize the full 

inclusion and integration into society, 

employment, independent living, family 

support, and economic and social selfsufficiency, of individuals with 

disabilities, especially individuals with 

the most significant disabilities, and to 

improve the effectiveness of services 

authorized under the Act. 

Within this absolute priority, we are 

particularly interested in applications 

that address the following invitational 

priority. 

Invitational Priority: Under 34 CFR 

75.105(c)(1) we do not give an 

application that meets this invitational 

priority a competitive or absolute 

preference over other applications. 

This priority is: 

For FY 2011, the Secretary is 

particularly interested in applications 

from eligible applicants who are 

individuals with disabilities. 

Program Authority: 29 U.S.C. 762(e). 

Applicable Regulations: (a) The 

Education Department General 

Administrative Regulations (EDGAR) in 

34 CFR 75.60 and 75.61, and parts 77, 

82, 84, 85, and 97. (b) The regulations 

for this program in 34 CFR part 356. (c) 

The regulations in 34 CFR 350.51 and 

350.52. 

II. Award Information 

Type of Award: Discretionary grants. 

Estimated Available Funds: The 

Administration has requested 

$111,919,000 for the NIDRR program for 

FY 2011, of which we intend to use an 

estimated $505,000 for the Research 

Fellowships Program. The actual level 

of funding, if any, depends on final 

congressional action. However, we are 

inviting applications to allow enough 

time to complete the grant process if 

Congress appropriates funds for this 

program. 

Estimated Range of Awards: $60,000 

to $65,000 for Merit Fellowships and 

$70,000 to $75,000 for Distinguished 

Fellowships. 

Estimated Average Size of Awards: 

$63,000 for Merit Fellowships and 

$73,000 for Distinguished Fellowships. 

Maximum Awards: We will reject any 

application that proposes a budget 

exceeding $65,000 for Merit 

Fellowships and $75,000 for 

Distinguished Fellowships for a single 

budget period of 12 months. (These 

Fellowships are described in the Eligible 

Applicant section of this notice.) The 

Assistant Secretary for Special 

Education and Rehabilitative Services 

may change the maximum amount 

through a notice published in the 

Federal Register. 

Estimated Number of Awards: Seven 

total, including both Merit Fellowships 

and Distinguished Fellowships. 

Note: The Department is not bound by any 

estimates in this notice. 

Maximum Project Period: We will 

reject any application that proposes a 

project period exceeding 12 months. 

The Assistant Secretary for Special 

Education and Rehabilitative Services 

may change the maximum project 

period through a notice published in the 

Federal Register. 

III. Eligibility Information 

1. Eligible Applicants: Eligible 

individuals must have training and 

experience that indicate a potential for 

engaging in scientific research related to 

the solution of rehabilitation problems 

of individuals with disabilities. The 

program provides two categories of 

Research Fellowships: Merit 

Fellowships and Distinguished 

Fellowships. 

(a) To be eligible for a Merit 

Fellowship, an individual must have 

either advanced professional training or 

independent study experience in an 

area that is directly pertinent to 

disability and rehabilitation. In the most 


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