Final Cut 8.5 X 11 with Full Blee

Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on

Iraq’s WMD

With Addendums 

30 Septemb

volume I o
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ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072488-6 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072488-0 (Vol. 1) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072489-3 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072489-9 (Vol. 2) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072490-9 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072490-2 (Vol. 3) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072491-6 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072491-0 (Addendum) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072492-3 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072492-9 (Set) 
1

The security situation in Iraq worsened following the submission of the 30 September 2004 

Comprehensive Report. The Iraq Survey Group lost two more brave individuals in a suicide car 

bomb attack. SFC Clinton Wisdom and SPC Don Clary were killed, and SPC Nathan Gray was 

seriously wounded while providing security for a convoy transporting ISG members to Baghdad. 

Their actions to fend off the attacking vehicle allowed others to survive the explosion—including 

the DCI’s Special Advisor and his deputy.

The knowledge acquired for this report was costly. An earlier explosion during an ISG mission 

on 26 April 2004 took the lives of SGT Sherwood Baker and SGT Lawrence Roukey and seriously wounded fi ve others—SGT Michelle Hufnagel; SPC Brian Messersmith; SGT Darren 

Miles; SPC Ryan Owlett; and SGT Joseph Washam. 

Knowledge is invaluable and marks our advancement as a nation and society; however, it must be 

used to inform future decisions. This report is intended for that purpose as well as to understand 

the past. All who make use of this report—for research, to shape future policies, to teach—will 

honor those who sacrifi ced so much in this endeavor.

Following the submission of the 30 September 2004 Comprehensive Report, additional investigation has been conducted on selected issues that bear on the current or future concerns related to 

WMD. Also, analysts recorded a more complete description of the key Iraqi Government body 

related to WMD, the Military Industrial Commission (MIC).

The addendums complete the record of the DCI’s Special Advisor on Iraq’s WMD. No doubt further information will become available over time. As Iraqi participants in these programs begin to 

speak more freely (publicly), new information and perspectives may emerge. It is a complicated 

set of events and perspectives will vary widely with the reporter. Of course, certain individual 

participants within the Regime were well positioned to observe the programs and decisions, but 

they are not without their own set of biases. Those Iraqis who are subject to judicial proceedings 

may well revise or reverse statements provided to ISG investigators. Nevertheless, when Iraqis 

look back on the events of the past three decades and develop their own versions of the role of 

WMD, it will add to overall understanding. I hope this will not contradict substantively this 

report, but add context and refi nement.

In addition to the Addendums, this printing includes a slightly revised version of the 30 September 2004 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s Weapons of 

Mass Destruction to accommodate minor technical and typographic corrections. The majority 

of changes were made to ensure consistency and accuracy of spelling of Arabic names. Some 

changes are attributed to correcting grammatical errors, deleting redundant statements, and 

rewording awkward statements for clarity. One signifi cant change corrects an error concerning a Danish company, Niro Atomizer, Inc. The Regime Finance and Procurement chapter, 

annex I section entitled “Possible Breeches of UN Sanctions by Danish Companies” was 

removed because the dual-use equipment transfer referred to in that section occurred prior to 

the imposition of sanctions and therefore was not a breach of sanctions.

Note for the Comprehensive 

Report With Addendums
2

For now, this report is the best picture that could be drawn concerning the events, programs, policies, and underlying dynamics of the relationship of the former Regime to WMD over the last 

three decades.

The addendums refl ect some further work on a few particular issues.

Residual Proliferation Concerns. Since the completion of the 30 September 2004 Comprehensive Report, ISG conducted interviews related to status of sites, equipment, and people formerly 

involved in Iraq WMD-related activities. Site visits were terminated in November due to security 

concerns. Interviews were also limited to members of the Iraq National Monitoring Directorate 

and blacklisted detainees at the Camp Cropper facility at Baghdad International Airport. Overall, 

the risk of Iraqi WMD expertise or material advancing the WMD potential in other countries is 

attenuated by many factors and is presently small (but not to be ignored). There is a continuing 

possibility that insurgents will attempt to draw on resident expertise to develop unconventional 

weapons for use against coalition forces. So far, insurgent efforts to attain unconventional weapons have been limited and contained by coalition actions.

Detainees. There is a brief discussion of the role of detainees as a primary source for the Comprehensive Report. Many of the individuals in custody were detained strictly because of their 

role in Iraq’s WMD programs. Many have been very cooperative and provided great assistance 

in understanding the WMD programs and the intentions of the Regime with respect to WMD. At 

this point, there is no further need to debrief detainees for WMD reasons. Some may have other 

issues to account for, including Regime fi nance questions, but certainly some have been quite 

helpful toward the compilation of an accurate picture of the Regime’s WMD efforts and intentions over the last three decades. For example, detainees provided exquisite detail about the Oil 

for Food program (only some of which is recorded in this report). In my view, certain detainees 

are overdue for release.

Military Industrial Commission. The addendums include a substantial section describing in 

some detail the evolution of the Iraqi Military Industrial Commission, which was the state-run 

military-industrial complex. It had a central role in the evolution of all the Regime’s weapons 

programs. ISG experts acquired a substantial body of information from key participants, and it is 

recorded as background to the overall direction of WMD in Iraq.

Remaining Uncertainties. Some uncertainties remain and some information will continue to 

emerge about the WMD programs or the former Regime. Reports cited in the Comprehensive 

Report concerning the possible movement of WMD or WMD materials from Iraq prior to the war 

remain unresolved. With the recent increase in security, planned efforts to investigate this issue 

were suspended. ISG developed an investigation plan that may be pursued when the security situation improves.

Documents. A substantial effort continues to examine the documents that have been recovered 

from the former Regime. This is an important task and some recent discoveries of additional 

Iraqi Intelligence Service and other government documents may offer insights into the specifi cs 

of a wide range of Regime actions—not just WMD. For example, a large collection of audiotapes from Revolutionary Command Council meetings chaired by Saddam is being translated 

and reviewed. These will provide great insight into the decision making of the former Regime on 

a range of key subjects. At present it is estimated that triaging and obtaining short summaries of 

the remaining documents will take several months at least. Even though this documentation may 
3

offer further understanding into the workings of the Regime and provide information for other 

inquiries such as the investigation into the Oil-For-Food program, it is not likely that signifi -

cant surprises remain with respect to the Regime’s WMD efforts. Nevertheless, documents may 

provide more texture and details of particular WMD programs and decisions. There may also be 

more specifi cs concerning who and how the WMD programs were conducted, including support 

from outside Iraq.

WMD Leftovers. There continue to be reports of WMD in Iraq. ISG has found that such reports 

are usually scams or misidentifi cation of materials or activities. A very limited number of cases 

involved the discovery of old chemical munitions produced before 1990. These types of reports 

(particularly scams) will likely continue for some time and local authorities will have to judge 

which merit further investigation.

Overall, I have confi dence in the picture of events and programs covered by this report. If there 

were to be a surprise in the future, it most likely would be in the biological weapons area, since 

the signature and facilities for these efforts are small compared to the other WMD types. ISG 

disproved much of the prewar reporting from a specifi c source concerning mobile BW capability, 

but it is still possible, though I would judge very unlikely, that such a capability remains undiscovered. Given the access to individuals involved in these programs, it would seem probable that 

someone would have given some concrete indication of surviving or undeclared capability. 

 The effort to investigate Iraq’s WMD programs has drawn on the skills and resources of individuals from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I am grateful for all their efforts 

and the efforts of Iraqis who chose to assist. I must also recognize the military leadership of the 

Iraq Survey Group’s USA General Keith Dayton and Brigadier General Joe McMenamin and 

their UK colleaques, Brigadier Tim Tyler and Brigadier Graeme Morrison. These men organized 

and ran the military organization that conducted the investigation in a very diffi cult environment. Hopefully, this report will help avoid similar tragedies as have surrounded Iraq for the last 

30 years.

Special Advisor to the Director

of Central Intelligence

March 2005 
1

Transmittal Message

23 September 2004

Introduction. Iraq has endured decades of collapsing hopes and accumulating tragedy. It is 

numbing to consider the waste of so much human and resource potential. Saddam’s ambitions 

confl icted with the region and the international community. True to his name, he too often chose 

confrontation over cooperation. Ultimately these decisions led to total collapse.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were an integral element in the range of tools Saddam 

drew upon to advance his ambitions. WMD was not an end in itself. Therefore, to examine meaningfully WMD in Iraq means examining the leadership of Iraq concomitantly. 

The Iraq experience with WMD stretches over 30 years and three wars. Thousands of victims 

died on battlefi elds, and civilians have been gassed in domestic terror campaigns. War and sanctions have ground civil society down to rudimentary levels. The most talented of Iraq have faced 

excruciating dilemmas—to comply with the Regime’s directions or risk careers, their lives, and 

the lives of loved ones. Chronic, systemic fear on the part of the best and the brightest was a 

feature of the intellectual elite. 

The international community has struggled with the Regime. Various attempts to coerce, co-opt, 

placate, or ignore Iraq produced confusion and inconstancy. It is understandable that Saddam 

may not have understood where international forces were headed. Indeed, the international community’s focus on Iraq and WMD was affected by serendipity as well as considered national policies. Had the events of 11 September 2001 not occurred, Saddam might well be still in power. 

But, he deeply miscalculated one last time and curtailed his own leadership. 

Saddam, his family, and cronies rose, enriched themselves, became corrupt, combusted, and 

collapsed. Saddam’s huge commitment to weapons technology consumed the best and brightest 

and led them to nothing but destruction. The Fertile Crescent was turned into a land fi lled with 

risk and chaos. In many ways the arms inspectors have merely been leading the way in exploring 

the decay that Iraq became, and, indeed the corrupt systems that grew parasitically on Iraq as it 

decayed. 

Dynamic Vice Static Analysis. The goal of this report is to provide facts and meaning concerning 

the Regime’s experience with WMD. It aims to provide a dynamic analysis rather than simple 

static accounting of the debris found following Operation Iraqi Freedom. The report will put 

into context the WMD activities of the Regime and the trends and directions of the Regime with 

respect to WMD. Artifi cially separating the WMD from the Regime would not provide a synthetic picture. Such a picture would seem to be more instructive than a simple frozen inventory of 

the program remnants at one point in time.

Readers will draw their own conclusions about various national and international actions and 

policies. This report will, hopefully, allow a more complete examination of these events by showing the dynamics involved within the Regime and where it was headed as well as the status of the 

WMD on the ground in 2003. The events surrounding Iraqi WMD have caused too much turmoil 

to be reduced to simple binary discussions of whether weapons existed at one moment in time 
2

versus another. They deserve at least an attempt to look at the dynamics rather than a description 

of a single frame of a movie. It deserves calculus not algebra. This report will deny the reader 

any simple answers. It will seek to force broader and deeper understanding from multiple perspectives over time. 

This report will also attempt to broaden understanding by recalibrating the perspective of the 

reader. The Regime was run by Saddam and the calculations he made concerning WMD were 

based on his view of relevant related factors—not ours. Optimally, we would remove the reader 

temporarily from his reality and time. We would collect the fl ow of images, sounds, feelings, and 

events that passed into Saddam’s mind and project them as with a Zeiss Planetarium projection 

instrument. The reader would see the Universe from Saddam’s point in space. Events would fl ow 

by the reader as they fl owed by Saddam. 

Ideally, the reader would see what Saddam saw—not our television pictures of him. Saddam saw 

adulation in a crowd cheering him when he fi red a rifl e over their heads—not what we Westerners may see as a guy in a funny hat recklessly fi ring a weapon. Imagine Saddam’s window to the 

outside world limited to television reports regularly reporting the statements by the President of 

the United States about him. . . calling him a madman. 

Imagine Saddam’s view of the fear/hate/confi dence/idolatry in the eyes of his chosen ministers 

and wonder if what they were saying was true or what they were not saying. How did he see the 

reports of uprisings tentatively offered to him by underlings fi lled with fear. The reader could 

see how various moves and pressures are either advancing or delaying greater achievement. The 

reader could see the dubious quality of the data presented directly and through the reports of 

underlings. 

Such a transmutation is impossible. However, this report will provide the reader a handrail to 

grasp in the form of a time line that will also serve as a constant reminder of contemporaneous 

events that fi lled the fi eld of Saddam’s view. The objective throughout this, perhaps unusual presentation, is to emphasize that WMD is always part and parcel of something else. The timeline is 

a tool to collect signifi cant events as they fl owed past Saddam. Examining this fl ow shows infl ection points where fundamental decisions were made concerning WMD. These will be addressed 

in detail since they are moments when factors determining the course selected by Saddam can be 

illuminated with some degree of confi dence. 

Expectations/Hidden Assumptions. Complicating understanding and analysis of the former 

Regime’s WMD is the tendency to bring our own assumptions and logic to the examination of 

the evidence. Western thought is fi lled with assumptions. Like the operating system of our computers, we have logic and assumptions that are virtually built in. We have been applying them 

successfully so long in our own frame of reference that we forget they are present and shape our 

thinking and conclusions. When considering the very different system that existed under the government of Saddam Hussein, there is a risk of not seeing the meaning and not seeing the implications of the evidence. 

Analysts were asked to look for something they may not expect or be able to see. A challenge 

like that faced by scientists engaged in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence. They have 

to consider what evidence they might see that they could not recognize. They cannot expect to 

detect radio transmissions like ours. Likewise, analysts here should not expect to fi nd extensive 
3

government documents or parliamentary records refl ecting Saddam’s decisions on WMD. The 

Regime simply did not operate that way. An obvious corollary is that not fi nding such documents 

is not meaningful one way or the other. 

The Regime Was Saddam—and Saddam Is Different. The former Regime was Saddam, and 

he was the one person who made important decisions. It was his assessment of the utility of 

various policy options that was determinant. It was Saddam’s calculations of risk and timing that 

mattered. 

A corollary to this is that the relevance and importance of his top advisors and ministers is also 

very different from that of similarly titled functionaries in other countries. The testimony of such 

individuals is interesting, but must be understood for what it is in the Iraqi context. These individuals had a role and existence vastly different than in other countries. 

Those around Saddam knew their future depended on their ability to divine what he wanted and 

to be able to respond favorably to his requests. Those who survived knew how to relate in this 

environment. This meant that they were often forced to anticipate what Saddam wanted because 

they did not want to be in a position to have to say no. 

Complicating their lives was the tendency of Saddam to hold his cards close while he allowed 

minions to debate. Saddam did not lead by espousing detailed goals and objectives. He tended to 

allow ideas to fl oat up and he would consider them—often never pronouncing on them one way 

or the other. This meant that much guidance to the government was implicit rather than explicit. 

For investigators, a consequence is that forensic evidence of Presidential direction may not 

exist, but it does not mean that such guidance was not there, but simply that we cannot see it in 

the usual ways. Implicit guidance may exist and be of equal or greater importance than explicit 

direction. This reality of life in Baghdad under Saddam has the consequence of diminishing the 

ability to document governmental policies of directions. 

Saddam’s Views. Debriefi ngs of Saddam and those around him must be evaluated in this light. 

There was no incentive and/or motivation for Saddam to cooperate with the debriefer, except to 

shape his legacy. Saddam is concerned with his place in history and how history will view him. 

Therefore, Saddam had no choice but to engage his debriefer in both formal and informal discussions on events that occurred during his reign.

The debriefi ng strategy was designed to elicit candid responses from Saddam, specifi cally 

regarding his previous actions and reasoning without the benefi t of incentives. These discussions 

were conducted and controlled by one debriefer and spanned several months. Some vital insights 

emerged during these discussions, which elicited views and information that may be considered 

revelatory. Undoubtedly, Saddam will continue to take advantage of any opportunity to defend 

his past actions and state his case while attempting to shape his legacy, very likely contradicting 

previous statements and actions.

We have tried to sort through the data available and have tried to judge candid views from 

Saddam on WMD as well as his likely vision of the future of Iraq and the role of WMD. What 

seems clear is that WMD was a tool of power or leverage that varied in its utility in advancing 

toward his goals for himself and Iraq.
4

In Saddam’s view, Iraq was the natural leader of the Arab world. Its people, history, and 

resources combined with his leadership made it the inevitable leader in the region—perhaps not 

without struggle, but struggle contributes to the overall glory. Saddam sees himself as the most 

recent of the great Iraqi leaders like, Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, and Saladin. In Babylon, 

where Iraq was reconstructing the historical city, the bricks were molded with the phrase, “Made 

in the era of Saddam Hussein”—mimicking the ancient bricks forged in ancient Babylon and 

demonstrating his assumption that he will be similarly remembered over the millennia. This narcissism characterizes his actions, and, while it is not always visible, it is always there.

Iran. Saddam sustained the historical Iraqi Arab animosity toward the Persians. His view on the 

threat of Iran was not just a simple present day calculation, but includes the emotive content of a 

sense of the long-standing rivalry over the centuries and his own desire to be seen as an historic 

military leader. This was an important motivation in his views on WMD—especially as it became 

obvious that Iran was pursuing the very capabilities he was denied. From Saddam’s viewpoint the 

Persian menace loomed large and was a challenge to his place in history. 

Gulf States. Saddam viewed the Gulf States as undeserving of the respect they were accorded in 

the West. His Regime viewed the Gulf Arabs as undeserving. They simply enjoyed the geological 

good fortune of sitting on large oil reserves. They did not earn respect; the West simply wanted 

their oil. In particular, Saddam resented the Saudis. The Saudi position of leadership in OPEC 

and by extension in the Western world rankled him. It was clearly an objective to supplant the 

Saudi position of leadership in whatever way he could. He strove to undermine their infl uence in 

the oil markets and the prestige they accrued through association with the United States. 

United States. Saddam’s view of the United States was complicated. He accrued power and 

prestige far beyond his inherent weight by positioning himself as the only leader to stand up to 

the last superpower. To the extent that you assume some of the stature of your enemy, Saddam 

derived prestige from being an enemy of the United States. Conversely, it would have been 

equally prestigious for him to be an ally of the United States—and regular entreaties were made, 

during the last decade to explore this alternative.

Saddam apparently calculated that Iraq’s natural resources, secular society, and dominance in 

the region would inevitably force the United States to deal with Iraq (He may have been correct, but he mistakenly thought his leadership of Iraq was immutable.) Indeed, throughout the 

1990s he tested Washington’s willingness to open a dialogue. On multiple occasions very senior 

Iraqis close to the President made proposals through intermediaries (the author among others) for 

dialogue with Washington. Baghdad offered fl exibility on many issues, including offers to assist 

in the Israel-Palestine confl ict. Moreover, in informal discussions, senior offi cials allowed that, 

if Iraq had a security relationship with the United States, it might be inclined to dispense with 

WMD programs and/or ambitions. 

Long View. Saddam’s perspective on the world and his place in history was naturally a very long 

view. He had long timelines—certainly as compared with Western democracies, which are driven 

by news and election cycles. He also had a strong sense of the glory of a long struggle. For example, he romanticized his period of exile from Iraq following his participation in the failed assassination attempt against Qasim. He accepts setbacks as noble challenges to be overcome. 
5

Saddam refused to admit that Iraq lost the war in 1991. His diplomats were always quick to point 

out that the resolution ending the war was a cease-fi re agreement, not a peace treaty or capitulation. This was not simply bombastic propaganda. Saddam saw it only as a temporary setback. 

Indeed, Saddam displayed a remarkable ability to recover from this loss. Following the war in 

1991, rebellions had broken out in all but two provinces. From this new nadir, Saddam restored 

his internal power and control with speed and devastating effi ciency—including another instance 

of his use of chemical munitions once again. In the decade that followed, his struggle against 

international constraints continued September 11, 2001. 

Levers of Power/Prestige. Saddam conducted his confrontation with the United States on many 

fronts. The main military front was the no-fl y zone skirmishes. It must be said that, as much as 

Saddam hated the intrusion over his airspace of American and British patrols (and, it may be 

recalled, with the French initially participating as well), this was a battle he was fi ghting with 

a very favorable exchange ratio. He cost the United States a lot with almost no cost to himself, 

and he could readily sustain the battle indefi nitely. Again, this was a typically shrewd method of 

exercising leverage. 

Saddam believed Iraq and its people should be leaders in all ways—sciences, art, engineering, 

military, economics, construction, etc. He supported the range of these functions, and in fact Iraq 

had a well-funded education and health system during his early years before the disasters of war. 

He aspired to the prestige associated with the advanced arts and sciences. In his view, the most 

advanced and potent were nuclear science and technology. By all accounts, and by the evidence 

of the massive effort expended by the Regime, nuclear programs were seen by Saddam as both 

a powerful lever and symbol of prestige. He also did not want to be second to the Persians in 

neighboring Iran.

Saddam has a remarkable sense for the use of power. For Saddam there was always a duality 

to infl uence. He consistently applied both positive and negative currents in all aspects of his 

rule. Reward and punishment would be presented to the same subject to contrive the behavior 

he desired. The approach was evident in his personal dealings with individuals as well as international relations. His staff would recount that he could have his immediate servants severely 

punished or jailed for some infraction. Yet, later, they would be released and Saddam might cook 

a meal for them himself. 

Jail was frequently on the resume of even some of his higher ranking staff. For example, Presidential Advisor and leader of the former Iraqi Nuclear Weapon program, Ja’far Dhia Ja’far, was 

jailed by Saddam and released only when he agreed to work on the nuclear weapon program. 

Saddam also, of course, rewarded handsomely those who supported him. New cars were a small 

token of appreciation, which he dispensed. 

The same duality of pressure and reward was used by Saddam internationally. For example, in 

the spring and summer of 1995, Iraq attempted to bring to closure the disarmament inspections 

of UNSCOM by offering a deal. UNSCOM experts had been pressuring Iraq to acknowledge an 

offensive biological weapons program. Tariq Aziz informed UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus 

that, if his upcoming June 1995 report to the Security Council was positive in the missile and 

chemical weapons areas, then Iraq would “satisfy” Ekeus in the biological weapons area. 
6

UNSCOM gave a suffi ciently positive report on Iraq to the Security Council, and Aziz invited 

Ekeus to Baghdad where he made a partial admission to having made biological weapons. 

During the same time (in a 17 July national day address), Saddam gave a speech threatening to 

end all cooperation with the Security Council unless the Council acted to fulfi ll its obligation 

to lift the oil embargo. Days later, Baghdad even set a deadline for the Security Council to act. 

Saddam regularly combined concessions with attempts at coercion.

This approach turned out badly for Iraq because only a few weeks later, Saddam’s son-in-law, 

Husayn Kamil, defected to Jordan. He had been the key Regime force in managing all WMD 

programs, and his defection forced the Regime to reveal that Iraq had not been fully forthcoming, 

thus undermining Iraq’s position and the position of Iraq’s key supporters in the Security Council. 

Security Threats Internally, it was always the case that, if Saddam perceived a challenge or a 

potential risk among those around him, he would address it early and vigorously. Those around 

him feared that he would know if they even thought of something that was less than fully supportive of the Regime. Jailing, or worse, of those thought to be disloyal was commonplace. It was 

not just an urban legend that, if someone became too popular or too powerful, he would quickly 

be removed. 

Externally, Saddam applied the same predilection to attack perceived threats preemptively. 

Saddam acted against Iran when he thought he had the advantage. Saddam attacked Kuwait in 

response to perceived economic aggression by Kuwait.

Saddam’s rule was driven fi rst by security concerns. Survival came fi rst. This produced the multiple security organs, and their prime objective was protection of the leadership. It was natural 

that the objectives of United Nations inspectors collided with the security apparatus. Inspections 

aimed at deciphering the most sensitive weapons programs would transgress the security apparatus protecting the president. This was obvious and unavoidable if both objectives were pursued to 

the maximum. 

Saddam also encouraged a multiplicity of reporting systems, formal and informal. Since no one 

ever knew for sure how certain their position was, it bred anxiety and uncertainty even among the 

longest serving Ministers. He fostered competition and distrust among those around him. There 

was survival value to him in this method of management. However, it greatly colored and contorted the perspectives of reality that his top aides had. 

This method of management makes interpreting their descriptions of the inner workings of 

Regime fi gures very diffi cult. They often did not know the truth. Hence, when they would 

describe something that is wrong, it is diffi cult or impossible to know if they are purposely dissembling. ISG investigators suffered some of the same problems as Saddam; not knowing if 

senior advisors are telling the truth, or leaving out important facts.

Evidence. The problem of discerning WMD in Iraq is highlighted by the prewar misapprehensions of weapons, which were not there. Distant technical analysts mistakenly identifi ed evidence 

and drew incorrect conclusions. There is also the potential of the obverse problem. Observers 
7

may have evidence before them and not recognize it because of unfamiliarity with the subject. 

Often ISG found no evidence of one thing or another. It may be that a more accurate formulation 

might be we recognized no evidence. This is a fundamental conundrum in assessing alien circumstances.

It is vital to understand that in such an environment—an environment alien to those accustomed 

to Western democracies—implicit guidance from the leader can be as compelling and real as 

explicit guidance. Indeed, in the security-conscious world of Saddam, it would be surprising to 

fi nd explicit direction related to sensitive topics like WMD. This would especially be the case 

for programs of presidential interest or direction. It is important to understand what one should 

expect to see and what one should not expect to see. 

Related to this is a further important factor that greatly affects how evidence is viewed. The key 

Regime fi gures in the WMD area had a much better understanding of how the West viewed their 

programs than the other way around. Consider how many Western technocrats studied in Baghdad compared with how many key WMD fi gures studied in the West (many, if not most, speak 

English). 

Likewise, many years of inspections taught the Iraqi WMD counterparts how their country was 

being examined. It might well be expected that they would seek to elude such examination as a 

result.

Two examples from interactions in the 1990s may be illustrative. An Iraqi minister in 1994 

asked, “Why do you Americans always attack buildings?” Iraq, of course had been subject to 

several bombing attacks, and the question seems simple on the surface. However, it reveals something about American assumptions. Intelligence analysts look at overhead imagery and identify 

buildings with some function. Digital Imagery is also used for targeting weapons such as cruise 

missiles. Implicit in this process is an assumption that destroying a building will destroy the 

capability. Discussions and observations of the Iraqis showed that they reacted to this understanding of the American process by effectively dissolving the images we were focusing on. They 

disassociated capability from the buildings we were able to image. To wit, they would simply 

take key equipment and move it out of buildings and disperse it in ways that we could not resolve 

into our targeting and intelligence-operating system. This was shrewd but obvious. It affected the 

data we were examining.

A second example of Iraq learning the signatures inspectors sought occurred while UNSCOM 

was attempting to investigate the governmental apparatus the Regime used to conceal material 

from UN inspectors. The inspectors assumed that only Saddam would give instructions on such 

sensitive matters. Hence, inspectors investigated those governmental arms directly connected to 

the Presidency, e.g., the Diwan, the Special Security Organization, the Special Republican Guard, 

etc. In effect, the inspectors were modeling an organization chart that branched out from the 

President. These organs became high-priority targets for the UN inspectors. This was perfectly 

logical from their perspective. 

Of course, one effect of this investigation was to teach the Iraqis how we investigated and what 

we looked for. And, like the previous case where Iraq reacted by dissolving the image that we 

looked for, it should be expected that Iraq would avoid using entities that would show up on 

organization charts or that would follow the types of order we had earlier tried to picture. 
8

The Regime, drawing on the experience of the 1990s with the UN and given the priorities to 

which it subscribed, scrambled the types of signatures they knew we would be searching for. This 

contributed to the diffi culty in verifying what happened to Iraq’s WMD.

The Timeline Tool. The role and use of WMD and how it played in Saddam’s calculations varied 

over the last 30 years. This analysis includes an examination of a few key infl ection points when 

Saddam made clear decisions regarding WMD. ISG analysts studied individual programs bearing 

in mind contemporaneous events. A timeline annotated with the events that would have fi lled the 

vision of Saddam is used as a device to continuously relate WMD to other changing factors.

 Through this methodology an attempt is made to understand the overall intentions of the 

Regime, i.e., Saddam. With this perspective a better understanding of the evidence of the elements of the WMD programs can be made. This is like having the picture on the box cover of a 

jigsaw puzzle to guide the assembly of the component puzzle pieces.

Throughout this report, timeline sections are repeated to remind continuously the reader of the 

events going on that impinge on Saddam’s fi eld of vision.

Key Infl ection Points. A few unique points in time shaped Saddam’s perspectives regarding 

WMD after the 1991 Gulf war. However, it must be stated that Saddam’s experience with WMD 

previously had been very positive. Senior Iraqis have said that it was their fi rm conviction that 

the use of ballistic missiles and chemical munitions saved them in the war against Iran. Missiles 

allowed them to hit Iranian cities, and chemical munitions (101,000 were used) countered the 

Iranian “human wave” attacks. 

In addition, the Iraqis believed that their possession and willingness to use WMD (CW and BW) 

contributed substantially to deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991. WMD 

demonstrated its worth to Saddam. Moreover, senior Iraqis have observed that, if Saddam had 

waited until he fi nished his nuclear weapon before invading Kuwait, the outcome would have 

been much different.

Therefore, it was a tough decision he faced when confronted by the UN resolution linking lifting the of sanctions with WMD disarmament. Ultimately, his top priority (after survival) was to 

get out of the UN constraints. That priority underlies the actions of the Regime during the past 

13 years. This may seem obvious but is easily forgotten. The spring and summer of 1991 were 

defi ning moments for Baghdad on this point. 

 During the fi rst few inspections (June-July 1991), it became clear that the inspectors were more 

serious and intrusive than Baghdad expected of the United Nations. Baghdad was still surrounded by a huge array of military force that was fully capable of invading. Baghdad nevertheless initially chose to conceal WMD capabilities with a goal of preserving future WMD options. 

Indeed, Iraq used CW against Shia within its own borders just two months earlier. 

Baghdad was found blatantly cheating. The immediate consequence during this period was that 

the UN Security Council, including the United States, did not restart the recently ended confl ict 

but did pass a new resolution on 15 August 1991 (UNSCR 707) demanding more access and 

more intrusive rights for UN inspectors. The message was thus mixed. The UN Security Council 

could agree on demands but not on enforcement. What was the impression received by Saddam? 

He was clearly refusing cooperation with the UN resolutions. Saddam crushed internal dissent, 
9

including the use of chemical weapons, just as he did in the late 1980s. Yet, military force was 

not used against him. However, more intrusive legal strictures were imposed. Saddam identifi ed 

the envelope of limits around him. 

The Regime continued to mix compliance with defi ance. It now appears clear that Saddam, 

despite internal reluctance, particularly on the part of the head of Iraq’s military industries, 

Husayn Kamil, resolved to eliminate the existing stocks of WMD weapons during the course of 

the summer of 1991 in support of the prime objective of getting rid of sanctions. The goal was to 

do enough to be able to argue that they had complied with UN requirements. Some production 

capacity that Baghdad thought could be passed off as serving a civilian function was retained, 

and no admission of biological weapons was made at all. But the clear prime theme of Saddam 

was to defeat the UN constraints. Dispensing with WMD was a tactical retreat in his ongoing 

struggle.

From the evidence available through the actions and statements of a range of Iraqis, it seems 

clear that the guiding theme for WMD was to sustain the intellectual capacity achieved over so 

many years at such a great cost and to be in a position to produce again with as short a lead 

time as possible—within the vital constraint that no action should threaten the prime objective of 

ending international sanctions and constraints. 

Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous 

impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the 

intellectual capabilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities 

that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue that 

would support long-range missile development. Virtually no senior Iraq; believed that Saddam 

had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect 

of supporting future WMD reconstitution. 

Yet, Saddam was not willing to give up sovereignty and security in an immediate gamble that the 

UN Security Council would lift sanctions. Bearing in mind that at this very time, Saddam was in 

a hugely weakened state domestically, still acting with defi ance by retaining some capacity and, 

at that time, refusing to accept certain UN resolutions, most notably UNSCR 707 and 715, which 

demanded that Iraq accept a system of monitoring to detect a reconstitution of Iraqi WMD programs. This Saddam fl at out refused as an invasion of his sovereignty that would be permanent, 

not temporary.

1996 Beginning of Oil-for-Food. Another example of a key infl ection point was the 1996 decision to accept the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program. Internally, Iraq was in trouble. The economy was 

in tatters. The middle class was decimated by the collapse of the dinar and the impact of sanctions. The hobbling of Saddam by the 1991 cease-fi re resolution, UNSCR 687, was still persisting despite vocal support of some members of the Security Council. Saddam had long refused 

to accept the option of exporting oil with constraints on revenues. He was concerned that, once 

started, the pressure on the Security Council to lift sanctions—his real goal—would be lifted. 

It was clear he was using the pain endured by his people and the concern by some members of 

the Security Council that sustaining civil destruction as pressure to get the Security Council to 

remove the sanctions. However, by 1996, it became apparent that the United States had a lock in 
10

the Security Council on lifting the sanctions and Saddam accepted UN Security Council Resolution 986 initiating the OFF program. 

The onset of the OFF program began what became a burgeoning source of real disposable 

income. The revenues Iraq garnered grew incredibly from an estimated $250 million in 1996 to 

$2.76 billion in 2001. The process of oil exports offered leverage in the international oil markets. 

The UN system for controlling Iraqi oil exports had the unintended consequence of allowing 

ample opportunities for corruption. Corruption of this process suited the objectives of Saddam of 

escaping the fetters of the sanctions controlled by the UN Security Council. 

As experience grew with the process of the Oil for Food program, Iraq found that the allocation 

of oil liftings was also a splendid opportunity to develop infl uence. Iraqi oil liftings were priced 

below market substantially; hence, obtaining the right to lift a tanker full of Iraqi oil was worth 

a considerable amount of money. While Iraq, due to the constraints imposed upon it by the UN 

system, could not legally receive cash, the price differentials could be pocketed by whatever 

trader designated to lift Iraqi oil. Saddam, again demonstrating his style of infl uence, distributed 

these allocations to those he deemed helpful in eroding support for sanctions.

Saddam applied a dual approach to this objective. On the one hand he emphasized the suffering of the innocent Iraqi civilian population and argued that the sanctions were immoral. At the 

same time he gave prominent vocal Iraq supporters and willing infl uential UN-offi cials lucrative 

oil allocations. He gave individuals a moral rationalization for their support and friendship to the 

Regime. This worked with individuals as well as countries. 

The Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council 

were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council. 

1998—End of Inspections. The patience and utility of cooperating with the Security Council 

and the UN inspectors were diminishing in the view of Baghdad during the course of 1998. 

The potential of the inspection process leading to a formal lifting of sanctions by the Security 

Council was seen as diminishing. The approach of eroding the constraints of sanctions until they 

collapsed appeared more promising. Certainly the fl ow of imports and revenues was growing. 

The divisions in the Security Council were greater between the United States and the United 

Kingdom on one side and France and Russia on the other. (Iraq encouraged competition between 

France and Russia to do more to support Baghdad.) 

At the same time, Baghdad viewed the domestic controversies in the United States as indicating, 

if not weakness, certainly a distraction to the White House. During the summer of 1998, when 

UNSCOM surfaced its concern over the evidence it found that Iraq had, contrary to its declarations, weaponized VX in missile warheads, Baghdad appears to have concluded that there was no 

prospect of satisfying the inspection teams. Cooperation with UNSCOM was seen as a trap, not a 

path to ending sanctions. 

Baghdad ended full cooperation in August and began a series of confrontations with the UN 

that aimed at bringing its dialogue to the Secretary General and Security Council directly, and 

marginalizing UNSCOM. Baghdad was largely successful in drawing the Secretary General into 

the controversy and causing France and Russia to take fi rmer positions on its behalf. Ultimately, 

Iraq did not fully cooperate with UNSCOM in a test period of renewed inspection activity during 
11

December 1998. The United States and United Kingdom reacted militarily with a circumscribed 

bombing campaign that took place between the time President Clinton completed a previously 

scheduled visit to Israel and the beginning of Ramadan, about four days later. 

The Security Council was left deeply divided. UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors departed Iraq just 

before the bombing and never returned. The Iraqis were satisfi ed with the outcome. They said, 

given a choice of sanctions with inspections or sanctions without inspections, they would prefer 

without. 

The UN Security Council struggled for a year to fi nd a new consensus on Iraq. Finally, after 

much debate they passed a new resolution in December 1999 (UNSCR 1284). It included 

(largely at Russian insistence) language about the suspension and ultimate lifting of sanctions. 

Nevertheless, Iraq ignored its demands and also paid no further consequences. Clearly their strategy was to erode sanctions, and they saw no need to accept a new set of inspectors. 

2000—The End is in Sight. By 2000, the erosion of sanctions accelerated. The semi-annual 

debates over the renewal of sanctions in the Security Council became the forum for Iraqi proponents to argue the case for relaxing sanctions further. Out of concern that this pillar of containment policy was about to collapse, the United States (under a new administration) proposed 

“Smart Sanctions” in early 2001. This was an attempt to bolster support for sanctions within the 

Security Council by narrowing the targeted items subject to scrutiny. There was a reversal of a 

presumption of denial to a presumption of approval of items to be acquired under the Oil-ForFood program. 

Syria had recently signed an oil export protocol that provided for reopening of the Iraq-Syria 

pipeline. Initially, the United States tried to curtail this program, but failed. Baghdad could read 

this turn of events only as growing momentum of its strategy to undermine sanctions with the 

goal of an ultimate collapse. 

The new administration in Washington gave no evidence of changing the approach toward Iraq. 

The sanctions debate in the Security Council in June 2001 was indicative with the Russians 

demanding further relaxation and a concrete signal from the Council that sanctions would be 

lifted if Iraq satisfi ed the elements of UNSCR 1284. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and the 

new Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, were making progress internationally. France, Russia, and 

Syria (then a member of the Security Council) were all quite vocally supporting Iraq in sanctions 

debates in the Security Council. 

Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem. The only 

notable items stopped in this fl ow were some aluminum tubes, which became the center of debate 

over the existence of a nuclear enrichment effort in Iraq. Major items had no trouble getting 

across the border, including 380 liquid-fuel rocket engines. Indeed, Iraq was designing missile 

systems with the assumption that sanctioned material would be readily available.

Politically, the Iraqis were losing their stigma. The Baghdad International Fair in November 2001 

was attended by hundreds of companies. The Rasheed Hotel was fi lled with businessmen from 

all over the world. The Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002 offered the headline photo of Taha 

Yasin Ramadan embracing his Saudi counterpart. Funding fi lled the coffers of various ministries. 

The Iraqi OPEC delegations were treated with as much or greater interest than the Saudis. The 
12

Oil Minister was treated like a rock star. The oil markets were extremely sensitive to the prospects for Iraqi oil on the market. In fact, the very uncertainty about Iraqi oil gave Baghdad even 

greater leverage over the international community since, by its whims, energy prices would vary 

signifi cantly and have corresponding effects on the world economy. 

In international politics, Saddam capitalized on his position as the only Arab leader willing to 

stand up to the Americans. This position undermined the positions of the leadership in neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Their populations, being sympathetic to the Palestinians, saw Saddam as bolder than their own leaders. By this stance, Saddam created a powerful 

lever against these governments at virtually no cost. 

From Baghdad the long struggle to outlast the containment policy of the United States imposed 

through the UN sanctions seemed tantalizingly close. There was considerable commitment and 

involvement on the part of states like Russia and Syria, who had developed economic and political stakes in the success of the Regime. From Baghdad’s perspective, they had fi rm allies, and it 

appeared the United States was in retreat. The United Nations mechanism to implement the Oil 

For Food program was being corrupted and undermined. The collapse or removal of sanctions 

was foreseeable. This goal, always foremost in Saddam’s eyes, was within reach. 

11 September 2001 The progress Baghdad had made toward escaping sanctions changed following 11 September 2001. Saddam did not immediately understand this. 

Refl ecting Saddam’s ill-formed understanding of the United States, Baghdad fully grasped 

neither the effect of the attacks on the United States nor their implications for Iraq’s position 

in the United Nations. The seriousness of the change in the international atmosphere and Iraq’s 

diplomatic position became clear to Saddam only after President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union 

speech. He saw a seriousness he had not earlier recognized. Still, he tried to bargain with the 

Security Council rather than outright accept new inspections. The dithering cost him. 

Washington was building a huge and expensive military force around Iraq. Efforts to secure 

access and support for potential military action were pursued. In the Security Council a new, 

tougher resolution was passed (UNSCR 1441). Momentum was building that would be increasingly hard to defl ect. Belatedly, following the speech by President Bush at the UN General 

Assembly in September 2002, Saddam fi nally agreed to unconditional acceptance of the 

UNMOVIC weapons inspectors. 

The work of UNMOVIC inspectors on the ground was pursued energetically and in a charged 

political environment. Iraq was surrounded by a large and expensive, military force. Sustaining such a force for any length of time would be impossible. It was not a stable situation, and 

Saddam realized his position far too late. 

Readers of this report can weigh for themselves the actions taken by all governments in response 

to Saddam and his WMD ambitions. It is a complicated story over a long period of time. Hopefully, this report will illuminate some of the important dynamics and the trends. 

Charles Duelfer

Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence

Baghdad, September 2004
1

Acknowledgements

(12 September 2004 2330)

This report is the product of the hundreds of individuals who participated in the efforts of Iraq 

Survey Group (ISG): The Australian, British, and American soldiers, analysts, and support personnel who fi lled its ranks. They carried out their roles with distinction, and their work refl ects 

creditably on the commitment of Washington, London, and Canberra to fi rmly support the mission throughout a long and diffi cult period.

Two of our colleagues gave their lives during ISG’s fi eld inspections. On April 26, Sgt. Sherwood 

R. Baker and Sgt. Lawrence A. Roukey died while providing security for one of the most critical 

ISG investigations when an explosion destroyed the facility being inspected. Their memory has 

been present throughout the creation of this report.

The analysts and case offi cers who came to Iraq, most for the fi rst time, worked hard to develop 

the information to support this report. They labored long hours to develop intelligence reports 

and the text that became this report, a diffi cult task to which they responded with enthusiasm.

This report also builds upon the work of a broader universe of people who have striven to understand the role of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq during the past decade or more. United 

Nations inspectors and analysts around the world have wrestled with this issue trying to sort out 

reality and develop policies to mitigate suffering and avoid confl ict. Hopefully this report will 

provide some answers or at least more data for constructive review.

Mention must be made of the Iraqis themselves. It is important for an outsider to understand 

fully the dilemmas encountered and choices made by individuals under the former Regime, many 

of them energetic and brilliant people who participated in the programs and decisions addressed 

here. ISG analysts have spoken with many of them—both in detention and free. Some have tried 

to help us understand what happened; others were too fearful to help. Still others had many reasons to reveal as little as possible. Nevertheless, I hope that the characterization of events offered 

here will be seen as a fair representation by those who are, after all, the real experts, the Iraqi 

participants.

The tragedy of Iraq is perhaps best seen on the individual level. I have known many of their most 

senior technocrats and political leaders for over a decade. I have spent hours with them in meetings trying to unravel circumstances and events. We have met in large government offi ces, the 

Untied Nations, in laboratories and now in jails or tents. They are some of the best and brightest the country has produced. How they dealt with the moral dilemmas of pursuing careers in 

a Regime like Saddam’s is diffi cult to understand. Some clearly did so with relish and happily 

reaped the rewards that were bestowed. Others, with better intentions, had limited options, given 

the nature of the Regime. Through the accident of birth, they were placed in circumstances most 

of us are never tested by.
2

The new Iraq could benefi t from the talents of some of these technocrats. The new Iraq should 

seek recompense from some others who profi ted from the promotion of the worst deeds of the 

Regime. Readers of the procurement and fi nance section of the report will gain some appreciation of how rewards were dispensed.

Many Iraqis over many years tried hard to explain Iraq and these programs to me. This was not 

easy for them and carried substantial risk. I am grateful to them beyond words.

The intelligence services of three nations supported ISG, a long and demanding task. In the 

United Kingdom, mention must be made of SIS and the Defense Intelligence Service (especially 

the Rockingham group) for their long support. In the United States, both the Defense Intelligence 

Agency and Central Intelligence Agency sustained the process at substantial cost. Australia provided some of the best intelligence analysts anywhere. While these institutions expressed interest 

in the fi nding and certainly were curious where their pre-war assessments went wrong, they did 

not try to steer in any way the judgments included here.

In the end, this is not an Intelligence Community product. Rather, it is my independent judgment 

as the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraqi WMD. I have had the assistance of many people, but I chose the directions and methodologies, which are not typical of the 

intelligence community. Yet, in future decisions, I chose the frame of reference outlined. Where 

there were decisions to be made on interpretation or judgment, they are mine.

This will not be the last word on the Iraqi experience with WMD. Many may argue with the 

interpretation given here. To further that public debate, and in the interest of the historian to 

whom this subject is likely to be of considerable interest, I have been fi rmly committed to 

making this report unclassifi ed. I have also opted on the side of inclusion of material – even if 

sensitive for one reason or another – rather than exclusion. The data can be interpreted by others, 

now and in the future, to form their own judgments.

Lastly, I offer my thanks to former DCI George Tenet who offered me the opportunity to pursue 

this endeavor. I was given neither guidance nor constraints, and tasked only to fi nd the truth. I 

have tried to do that.

Charles Duelfer

Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence


1

Scope Note

This report relays Iraq Survey Group’s fi ndings from its creation in June 2003 until September 

2004 and provides context and analysis to ISG’s physical fi ndings. It also attempts to place the 

events in their Political-Military context. For the purposes of this report, the term Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD) refers to the defi nition established by the United Nations Security 

Council in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).

The United States’ investigation of Iraqi WMD activities began during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

itself. In prewar planning, it was assumed chemical and possibly biological stocks were likely 

to be encountered and perhaps employed. Forces were equipped with protective equipment. A 

military unit designated Expeditionary Task Force-75 (XTF-75) was deployed during the war to 

investigate suspected locations for WMD stocks. Many sites were inspected but with an aim of 

discovering WMD, not inspecting and developing an analytical assessment of the Iraqi programs. 

Wartime conditions prevailed with concern about force protection primary. The work of XTF-75 

was therefore aimed at discovery of possible WMD locations (to eliminate a threat), not the compilation of evidence to build a picture of what happened to the weapons and programs.

This early approach, perhaps logical if the goal was simply to fi nd hidden weapons, undermined 

the subsequent approach of piecing together the evidence of the Iraqi WMD programs such 

as they existed. In fact, combined with the chaos of the war and the widespread looting in the 

immediate aftermath of the confl ict, it resulted in the loss of a great amount of potentially very 

valuable information and material for constructing a full picture of Iraqi WMD capabilities. Sites 

were looted. Documents were either ignored or collected haphazardly or burned by either the 

Regime or Coalition forces. 

To begin a more systematic collection of evidence to build an understanding of Iraqi WMD 

programs, DOD stood up ISG under the military command of Major General Keith Dayton. He 

brought together a unique blend of collection, analytic, and force maneuver assets to conduct 

both the ongoing WMD investigation and secondary tasks that included counterterrorism and the 

search for Captain Scott Speicher, a US Navy pilot shot down in 1991 during Desert Storm. Elements of ISG included:

Analytic Staff—Experts in the functional areas of Iraqi WMD from the CIA, DIA, DOE, State, 

DOD, as well as United Kingdom and Australia gathered and analyzed data to develop a picture 

of Iraq’s WMD program and plan further collection. Several participants were former United 

Nations inspectors with long experience in Iraq.

Documentation Exploitation—A forward linguistic element in Baghdad (approximately 190) 

identifi es documents of immediate importance from the millions recovered in the course of the 

war and occupation. A large facility housing more than 900 staff members in Qatar recorded, 

summarized, and translated documents. At the time of this writing, this facility houses about 36 

million pages that have been scanned into a database. Roughly a third of these—all that appeared 

of direct relevance to ISG’s mission—have been examined by a linguist and a gist prepared. 

Recently, ISG obtained about 20,000 boxes of additional documents, which had been stored in 

Coalition-occupied buildings. Many of these documents are from the Iraqi Intelligence Service 
2

and the Baath party. This is a volume roughly equivalent to the total received to date—a huge 

infusion. Triage of these documents will probably take several months. New information will 

inevitably derive from this process, but may not materially affect the overall elements of this 

report. 

Interrogation and Debriefi ng—ISG had dedicated linguists and debriefers for the so-called High 

Value Detainees. Statements by former key players in the Regime formed an important information source, but must be evaluated very cautiously since the prospect of prosecution inevitably 

affected what they said. It is also important to understand that the population of senior detainees 

held at the Camp Cropper facility interacted freely among themselves. They could consult on 

what they were asked, and the pressures and tensions among detainees over cooperation with 

ISG certainly affected their candor. In addition, debriefers were not experts in the fi eld of Iraq or 

WMD as a general rule. ISG compensated by having subject matter experts present as often as 

possible.

• Technical Analysts—Two laboratories, one British and one American, analyzed materials suspected of being related to WMD. Samples included nerve agent rounds, mustard shells, and a 

wide range of dangerous chemical substances.

• Explosive Ordnance Disposal—A team was always on hand to deal with unexploded ordnance 

hazards—a regular feature of the Iraqi landscape

• Movement Forces—A collection of teams to provide transportation and protection for ISG 

investigators. 

• HUMINT Collection Teams—Case offi cers to establish connections to individuals useful to the 

investigation of WMD infrastructure, security, and other support. 

• Support Staff—Base security, logistics, communications, computers, housing, food, etc. 

• National Geospatial Agency and National Security Agency representatives were also a part of 

ISG to bring analytic and technical collection assistance to the investigation.

The Director of Central Intelligence provided additional analytic and collection support and 

named a senior Special Advisor for Iraqi WMD to provide direction to the overall effort. David 

Kay was the fi rst Advisor, serving in Iraq from June until December 2003. Under his direction, 

ISG began a systematic survey and examination of the existence and location of WMD capabilities. Dr. Kay provided an initial report to the DCI in September 2003 on the early fi ndings of the 

investigation. Under his leadership, ISG interviewed many key participants in the WMD programs, undertook site visits, and began the review of captured documents. Under Dr. Kay, ISG 

focused on leads from Iraqi sources, documents, and physical evidence. Dr. Kay believed that, if 

ISG were to fi nd any WMD in Iraq, the Iraqis would probably have to lead ISG to it. 

Work in Iraq was very diffi cult. Contrary to expectations, ISG’s ability to gather information was 

in most ways more limited than was that of United Nations inspectors. First, many sites had been 

reduced to rubble either by the war or subsequent looting. The coalition did not have the man-
3

power to secure the various sites thought to be associated with WMD. Hence, as a military unit 

moved through an area, possible WMD sites might have been examined, but they were left soon 

after. Looters often destroyed the sites once they were abandoned.

A second diffi culty was the lack of incentive for WMD program participants to speak with ISG 

investigators. On the one hand, those who cooperated risked retribution from former Regime 

supporters for appearing to assist the occupying power. On the other hand, there was substantial 

risk that the Coalition would incarcerate these individuals. Hence, for the most part, individuals related to Iraqi WMD tried to avoid being found. Even long after the war, many Iraqi scientists and engineers fi nd little incentive to speak candidly about the WMD efforts of the previous 

Regime. This is exacerbated by their life-long experience of living with the threat of horrible 

punishment for speaking candidly.

The third constraint was the growing risk from the insurgency. From roughly November 2003 

onward, it was very diffi cult to simply travel to points of interest by investigators. Armored cars 

and protection by military units were required. Many ISG armored vehicles were damaged or 

destroyed by hostile fi re or improvised explosive devices, and two military personnel lost their 

lives assisting the investigation, SGT Sherwood R. Baker and SGT Lawrence A. Roukey. 

A fourth hurdle was that, given the diffi cult conditions existing in Iraq, many individuals had 

little interest in remaining in Iraq for a lengthy time, and typically an analyst would come to ISG 

for only a couple of months, which produced great ineffi ciencies: Individuals would become 

familiar with certain Iraqi issues and then depart. Many detainees were interviewed multiple 

times by a number of analysts seeking answers to the same question. The only ISG member who 

was present from the beginning until the drafting of this report was the ISG Chaplain.

Despite these obstacles, a core of knowledge was built, and some long-term Iraqi experts became 

key members of the ISG team. Several were former UN inspectors with over a decade of experience with the Iraqi WMD programs and, indeed, the Iraqi participants in WMD programs. Their 

background and knowledge were invaluable. For example, it is much more diffi cult (though still 

quite possible) for Iraqis to deceive investigators they had known for 10 years or more. At any 

given time, ISG staff included approximately 15 to 20 Iraq WMD experts, though as time went 

on, it became more diffi cult to retain a truly expert cadre.

A timeline methodology was used to integrate key elements of the analysis and to assist the 

building of the corporate knowledge base. Through regular meetings of all functional teams, 

analysis of the range of events that interacted with respect to WMD was conducted. This work 

was much aided by the regular participation of Saddam’s debriefer. Relevant data points were 

identifi ed and manipulated on a timeline tool, and major infl ection points that related to Saddam 

and WMD were established. These were then used by teams, especially the Regime Strategic 

Intent team, to cue further analysis and to develop their respective portions of the report. 

Looking to the future, there will continue to be reports of WMD-related material that must be 

addressed. Virtually every week some WMD-related report—often involving the delivery of 

items thought to be WMD-related—is received and investigated by ISG. This is a continuous task 

that often requires the removal of dangerous objects (like mortar rounds or dangerous chemicals). 

This element of ISG work accounts for much of the effort of many of the staff during the past 

18 months. The necessary investigation of all reasonable leads has led to dozens of missions that 
4

have been important, though they have found no signifi cant stocks of WMD. Such missions have 

included, for example, extensive underwater searches using sophisticated sensor equipment in 

Iraqi lakes and rivers. 

Since there remains the possibility (though small) of remaining WMD, such reports will continue 

to be evaluated and investigated as judged necessary.

Sources of Information

Iraqi detainees were a major source of information. Many WMD-associated fi gures have been 

detained at Camp Cropper where the so-called high-value detainees are incarcerated. Analysts 

questioned them repeatedly about aspects of the program and Regime decisionmaking. Their 

answers form a large part of the data ISG has used in this report, but must be considered for what 

they are. These individuals have had long experience living under a severe Regime that imposed 

harsh consequences for revealing state secrets and have no way of knowing what will happen to 

them when they get out. Certainly there are strong Regime supporters among the Camp Cropper 

population. The word inevitably circulates among them who is cooperative and who is not. Once 

released, such detainees may fear for their lives from Regime supporters. 

Another consideration is that many senior Regime fi gures are concerned about prosecution and 

will shape their tales to serve their interests. There is a tendency, for example, to blame the dead 

guy—for example Saddam’s son Qusay or son-in-law and former top weapons development 

manager, Husayn Kamil. 

On the other hand, some of these individuals have been long-term technocrats with no particular 

love of the Regime. Of these, some have been quite helpful, particularly with former inspectors 

whom they have known well over the years. Nevertheless, it must also be remembered that their 

perspectives, even if honestly conveyed, may not refl ect the views of the Regime leadership. It 

has also been the case that with the Regime’s hypersecurity measures, compartmentalization was 

quite extensive. For example, many very senior Iraqis did not know whether Iraq had WMD or 

not before the war. 

The documentation that ISG has accumulated is extensive. It has yielded important nuggets, 

which pop out as linguists make their way though the massive amount of material. The magnitude of the task is huge and complicated by the potential of errors in transliteration or in the 

original documents. Since it is impossible to forecast when relevant documents will be found in 

this largely unordered collection, it may well be that documents or electronic media may emerge 

that could signifi cantly add to the themes and background presented here. 

A vital part of the picture of how the Regime proceeded with respect to UN sanctions is illustrated in its implementation of the Oil for Food program. We received much detailed information 

from the Iraqi Oil Ministry, State Oil Marketing Organization, and individual participants. The 

data presented here are intended only to demonstrate the tactics and strategy of the Regime. Iraq 

sought to infl uence these data links to many countries and individuals. This report stops at that 

point. The report does not intend to analyze or assess the implications for non-Iraqis. Participation in Iraq’s voucher system may have been perfectly legal and appropriate depending upon the 
5

circumstances. Others are charged with investigating these transactions. What is clear is that the 

Regime sought to reward and infl uence using this tool. 

Physical inspection of sites has been pursued to the extent possible. This is a dangerous activity 

under the circumstances of 2004: We had two fatalities, and ISG teams have been shot at many 

times with some serious injuries. Many armored cars have been destroyed in attacks. This has 

made site investigations more diffi cult. 

Moreover, many locations associated with the previous WMD programs and sites under monitoring by the United Nations have been completely looted. In fact, the sites that fi lled the database 

of monitored locations are radically different postwar. Equipment and material in the majority 

of locations have been removed or ruined. Often there is nothing but a concrete slab at locations 

where once stood plants or laboratories.

A fi nal consideration of the work of ISG concerns the return of sovereignty to Iraq. Since 28 June 

2004, Iraq has been responsible for its own territory, and that includes matters associated with 

WMD questions. ISG has been consulting with the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) concerning its 

work. Gradually, more cooperation in investigatory work can take place. It is a natural transition 

of responsibility and knowledge to the new government. 

WMD concerns are not merely of historic interest. ISG chemical weapons (CW) and counterterrorism experts uncovered and tracked down an active insurgent group that had been using 

former Regime CW experts to attempt to create and use CW for use against the Coalition. This 

was dubbed the Al Abud network after the location of the fi rst raid where insurgents were found 

attempting to acquire ricin. A very aggressive investigation by ISG and a series of raids have 

apparently been successful in containing this threat. This has been a major success, but will 

require sustained attention by both Coalition and IIG since terrorists have long demonstrated an 

intention to obtain WMD and use it. This could occur inside or outside Iraq. 

While the future size and direction of the Iraq Survey Group are currently under review, the 

requirement remains to collect further information related to threats posed by residual elements of 

the former Regime’s WMD programs. There will also be new information from individuals and 

sources, which will come to light. Moreover, certain defi ned questions remain unanswered. For 

example, we cannot express a fi rm view on the possibility that WMD elements were relocated out 

of Iraq prior to the war. Reports of such actions exist, but we have not yet been able to investigate 

this possibility thoroughly. Likewise, there remains some uncertainty concerning reports of mobile 

BW capabilities—though we have conducted an extensive investigation and we have a paucity of 

confi rmatory information, there is still some possibility that such a capability did exist. 

As new information becomes available and is analyzed and assembled into meaningful packages, 

further unclassifi ed additions to this report may be issued. 

This report addresses the actions and considerations of the Regime until it fell in April 2003. It 

attempts to show the WMD programs and their context. It combines analysis of both physical 

evidence and an examination of the considerations of the Regime leadership with regard to WMD. 

The report is not intended to be predictive but should provide data from which others may consider such questions and indeed, consider implications for other circumstances elsewhere.
Regime Strategic

 Intent

Regime Strategic Intent

“We will never lower our heads as long as 

we live, even if we have to destroy everybody.”

Saddam Husayn, January 1991
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i

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Contents

Key Findings............................................................................................................................................ 1

Who Made Iraq’s Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy..................................................... 5

Saddam’s Place in the Regime ..................................................................................................... 5

The Apex of Power.............................................................................................................. 5

Personalized Rule................................................................................................................ 5

Saddam’s Unsettled Lieutenants................................................................................................... 5

A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment ............................................................................ 7

Saddam Calls the Shots ................................................................................................................ 8

Saddam Shows the Way................................................................................................................ 9

Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting.................................................................. 10

Weaving a Culture of Lies .......................................................................................................... 11

Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible................................................................................ 11

Saddam’s Command By Violence .............................................................................................. 12

Saddam’s Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government .................................................................. 13

Suspicion of Structures............................................................................................................... 13

Powerless Structures................................................................................................................... 13

The Higher Committee............................................................................................................... 14

The Foreign Policy Committees................................................................................................. 15

Saddam’s Grip on National Security and WMD Development.................................................. 16

Saddam Holding Court............................................................................................................... 18

Saddam and Fiscal Policy........................................................................................................... 18

How Saddam Saw His Subordinates...................................................................................................... 19

Mining Respect and Expertise.................................................................................................... 19

Mutuality of Fear........................................................................................................................ 19

Dazzled by Science..................................................................................................................... 19

How Saddam Saw Himself .................................................................................................................... 21

Saddam’s Psychology................................................................................................................. 21

Saddam’s Personal Security ....................................................................................................... 21

Saddam the Dynasty Founder..................................................................................................... 21

Saddam and His Sense of Legacy............................................................................................... 22
ii

Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD ........................................................................ 23

Saddam’s Role in WMD Policy.................................................................................................. 23

What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD...................................................... 24

What Saddam Thought: External Concerns ............................................................................... 28

Iran.............................................................................................................................................. 29

Israel ........................................................................................................................................... 31

The United States ....................................................................................................................... 31

WMD Possession—Real or Imagined—Acts as a Deterrent ..................................................... 34

Saddam’s Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions................................................. 34

Efforts To Lift Sanctions ............................................................................................................ 35

Realizing Saddam’s Veiled WMD Intent ............................................................................................... 41

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline ........................................................................................ 41

Ambition (1980-1991)................................................................................................................ 41

Decline (1991-1996)................................................................................................................... 42

Scientifi c Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD........................................................... 44

Reaction to Sanctions ................................................................................................................. 44

Husayn Kamil’s Departure ......................................................................................................... 46

Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD.............................................................. 47

Recovery (1996-1998)................................................................................................................ 48

Impact of the “Chicken Farm” Documents ................................................................................ 49

Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs.............................................................................. 49

Guarding WMD Capabilities...................................................................................................... 51

Iraq’s Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs....................................... 53

Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM.................................................................................. 55

Transition (1998-2001)............................................................................................................... 56

Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions ..................................................................... 57

Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise................................................... 59

Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams............................................................................................ 60

Miscalculation (2002-2003) ....................................................................................................... 61

Renewing UN Inspections.......................................................................................................... 63

Iraq’s Other Security Concerns .................................................................................................. 64

Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom.................................... 64

Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq’s Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom.............. 66
iii

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Annexes

A. The Quartet—Infl uence and Disharmony Among Saddam’s Lieutenants ........................................ 69

B. Iraq’s Intelligence Services ............................................................................................................... 73

C. Iraq’s Security Services..................................................................................................................... 85

D. Saddam’s Personal Involvement in WMD Planning......................................................................... 97
iv

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1

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Key Findings

Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end 

sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when 

sanctions were lifted.

• Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic 

thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), 

maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on 

strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic 

policy.

• Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security 

of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting 

sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign 

intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any 

WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and 

jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

• The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime.

OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came 

to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to 

provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.

• By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their 

international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in 

terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.

Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that 

which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, 

irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic 

missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

• Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi offi cials considered Iran to be Iraq’s 

principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and infl uence in the Arab world 

were also considerations, but secondary.

• Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the 

value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during 

the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks 

on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred 

Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role 

in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fi re.

• The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither 

was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, 

but fi rm, verbal comments and directions to them.
2

Note on Methodological Approach

Interviews with former Regime offi cials who were active in Iraq’s governing, economic, security, and intelligence structures were critical to ISG’s assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy. While some 

detainees’ statements were made to minimize their involvement or culpability leading to potential prosecution, 

in some cases those who were interviewed spoke relatively candidly and at length about the Regime’s strategic 

intent.

• ISG analysts—because of unprecedented access to detainees—undertook interviews of national policy 

makers, the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, as well as concentrated debriefs of core Regime leaders in custody, to identify cross-Regime issues and perceptions. 

• As part of the effort aimed at the core leadership, analysts also gave detainees “homework” to give them 

more opportunity to discuss in writing various aspects of former Regime strategy. Many of these responses 

were lengthy and detailed. Secretary of the President, ‘Abd Hamid Al Khatab Al Nasiri, Deputy Prime 

Minister Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Aysa, and Minister of Military Industry ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh 

answered questions in writing several times, providing information on both the former Regime and the mindset of those who ran it.

• Saddam’s debriefer was fully aware of ISG’s information needs and developed a strategy to elicit candid 

answers and insights into Saddam’s personality and role in strategy-related issues. Remarks from the 

debriefer are included.

• Analysts also used working groups to study themes and trends—such as intelligence and security service 

activity, weaponization, dual-use/break-out capabilities and timeline analysis—that cut across ISG’s functional teams, as well as to pool efforts to debrief members of the core leadership.

Analysts used subsource development and document exploitation to crosscheck detainee testimony, leverage detainees in debriefs, and to fi ll gaps in information. For example, analysts interviewing Huwaysh gained 

insights into his personality from subsources, while translated technical and procurement-related documents 

were critical to verifying the accuracy of his testimony. Likewise, we confronted Vice President Taha Yasin 

Ramadan Al Jizrawi with a captured document indicating his major role in allocating oil contracts and he 

divulged details on corruption stemming from the UN’s OFF program.

Nonetheless, the interview process had several shortcomings. Detainees were very concerned about their fate 

and therefore would not be willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in 

light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the use of passive interrogation resistance techniques collectively by a large number of detainees to avoid their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues; place blame 

or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as 

deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fl ed the country; and provide debriefers with previously known information. However, the reader should keep in mind the Arab proverb: “Even a 

liar tells many truths.”

Some former Regime offi cials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial 

information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. He never discussed actions, which would implicate him 

in a crime. Moreover, for some aspects of the Regime’s WMD strategy, like the role of the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), analysts could only speak with a few senior-level offi cials, which limited ISG’s 

assessment to the perspectives of these individuals.
3

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Former Iraqi Regime Offi cials Varied in Their Level of Cooperation

The quality of cooperation and assistance provided to ISG by former senior Iraqi Regime offi cials in custody 

varied widely. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former 

Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination. 

The two extremes of cooperation are epitomized by ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid—a key Presidential Adviser and RCC 

member—and Sabir ‘Abd-al-Aziz Husayn Al Duri, a former Lieutenant General who served in both the Directorate of General Military Intelligence and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid was loquacious 

on many subjects, but remained adamant in denying any involvement in the use of CW in attacks on the Kurds 

and dissembling in any discussion of the subject. His circumlocution extends to most other sensitive subjects of 

Regime behavior. By contrast, Sabir has been forthcoming to the point of direct association with a wide range 

of Iraqi activities, including the management of Kuwaiti prisoners, the organization of assassinations abroad 

by the former Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), and the torture of political prisoners.
4

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5

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Who Made Iraq’s Strategic 

Decisions and Determined WMD 

Policy

Saddam’s Place in the Regime

The Apex of Power

Saddam controlled every peak position of authority 

in Iraq and formally dominated its state, administrative, Ba’th party and military hierarchies. By 

the time of Desert Storm, there was no constitutional threat to his position of authority. He had also 

appointed himself “Paramount Sheikh” in a bid to 

dominate the country’s tribal system. By the late 

1990s, he began seeking more formal control over the 

nation’s religious structures.

• Saddam was simultaneously President, Prime 

Minister, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), General Secretary of the 

Ba’th Party, and Commander in Chief of the Armed 

Forces. Also directly reporting to him were the 

Republican Guard (RG), Special Republican Guard 

(SRG), Fedayeen Saddam, the four intelligence 

agencies, the Military Industrialization Commission 

(MIC)a and the Al Quds Army.

• Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa says that Saddam had enhanced 

the role of the tribal leaders, giving them money, 

weapons, land and authority, to turn them into an 

instrument of support for himself.

Personalized Rule

Saddam dominated all Iraqi institutions by the early 

1990s and increasingly administered by personal 

direction. Major strategic decisions were made by 

Saddam’s fi at alone, although subordinates acted 

upon what they perceived to be indirect or implied 

orders from him. Moreover, Saddam, particularly 

early in his rule, was fond of micromanagement in all 

aspects of government.

• Former advisors suggest that Saddam was healthy, 

rational and deliberate. He would ponder key decisions—such as the invasion of Kuwait—for months 

but share his thoughts with few advisors. He was 

cool under pressure. Even his fi rmest supporters, such as ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al 

Nasiri, the former presidential secretary from 1991 

to 2003, characterize his decision-making style as 

secretive.

• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh—

former Deputy Prime Minister from 2001 to 2003 

and Minister of Military Industrialization from 

1997 to 2003—believed there was a “big gap” 

between Saddam and his advisors and that, despite 

the lengthy pondering of an issue, he could be emotive at the point of decision. For example, Huwaysh, 

while not in a position of power at the time, pointed 

to the sudden and unconsultative manner in which 

Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, despite the 

amount of planning and forethought that had gone 

into the scheme.

• Saddam had shown a detailed, technical interest in 

military affairs during the Iran-Iraq war, frequently 

visiting army units and giving direct instructions, 

whether or not the defense minister or the chief-ofstaff was present. In contrast, limited evidence suggests that after 1991 Saddam attempted to detach 

himself from the minutiae of working with the UN.

• Nevertheless, Saddam was prone to take personal 

control of projects that spanned military industry, higher education, electricity, and air defense, 

according to former Presidential Advisor ‘Ali Hasan 

Al Majid.

Saddam’s Unsettled Lieutenants

Most of Saddam’s key lieutenants were active, 

experienced and committed to the Regime, but by 

the mid-1990s they were tightly constrained by their 

fear of Saddam, isolation and a loss of power. Many 

accepted the limits of their personal infl uence in 

return for membership in a privileged class, because 

of a personal identifi cation with the goals of the 

Regime and realization of the personal consequences 

should it fall.

a As a convention, “Military Industrialization Commission” is used 

throughout this text to refer to the Arabic Name Hi’at al-Tasnia 

Al-‘Askarri. Other translations of the name include Organization 

of Military Industrialization (OMI) and Military Industrial Organization (MIO). All refer to the same institution.
6

Key Iraqi Organizations and Offi cials (2003)

(Note: Names bolded and italicized have been interviewed by ISG)

President Saddam Husayn

Prime Minister Saddam Husayn

Vice President Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma’ruf [still at large]

Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi

Secretary of the President ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri

Deputy Prime Ministers Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa

Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al Samarra’i

Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim Al ‘Azzawi 

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh

Chairman, Presidential Diwan Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al Samarra’i

Minister of Foreign Affairs Naji Sabri Ahmad Al Hadithi

Minister of Defense Staff Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta’i

Army Chief-of-Staff Staff Gen. Ibrahim Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Sattar Muhammad

Minister of Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh

National Monitoring Directorate Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, Director

Committee of Three (Military Matters) Qusay Saddam Husayn [deceased]

Staff Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta’i

Staff Gen. Husayn Rashid Muhammad ‘Arab Al Tikriti

Council of Ministers Heads of all major departments

Revolutionary Command Council Saddam Husayn (Chairman)

‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (Vice-Chairman) [still at large]

Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi

Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma’ruf [still at large]

Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa

‘Ali Hasan Al Majid

Mizban Khadr Hadi

Committee of Four (“The Quartet”) ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri [still at large]

Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi

Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa

‘Ali Hasan Al Majid

National Security Council ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (Chairman) [still at large]

‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri (Secretary)

Qusay Saddam Husayn, Special Security Organization [deceased]

Tahir Jalil Habbush, IIS [still at large]

Zuhayr Talib ‘Abd-al-Sattar, DGMI

Rafi ’ ‘Abd-al-Latif Tulfah Al Nasiri, Directorate of General 

Security [still at large]

Higher Inspection Committee Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi (Chairman 2002-2003)

Tariq ‘Aziz Issa (Chairman 1991-1998)

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh

Naji Sabri Ahmad Al Hadithi

Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin

Qusay Saddam Husayn [deceased]

‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi

‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi (scientifi c advisor)

Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far Hashim (scientifi c advisor)
7

Regime Strategic

 Intent

• Tariq ‘Aziz described the requirements for a leader 

in Iraq as “power and an iron fi st.” He was happy 

initially with Saddam’s use of these attributes and 

“for the fi rst ten years we thought he was doing the 

right thing.”

• Former RCC member Muhammad Hamzah Al 

Zubaydi was totally acquiescent, uncritical, and 

thought Saddam was “a good president.”

• According to former Vice President Ramadan, 

when Saddam announced to the RCC in 1990 that 

he was going to invade Kuwait, only he and Tariq 

‘Aziz expressed doubts about the plan, but they felt 

they could only do so on preparedness grounds. 

Nevertheless, the invasion resolution passed unanimously and whatever dissent Ramadan and Tariq 

‘Aziz registered was insuffi ciently robust to have 

stayed in the memories of other participants in the 

meeting.

• Yet Saddam’s lieutenants in the RCC and other 

upper echelons were seen by lower levels of the 

Regime and the public as powerful and infl uential. Saddam was keen to maintain this perception. Opposition to his lieutenants’ views from 

within the Regime was discouraged as criticism of 

them refl ected on him. “When he gave his trust to 

someone, he didn’t want to hear criticism about that 

person,” according to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid.

A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment

Iraq’s policymaking on national security issues, 

including WMD, rested with Saddam and major 

decisions were by his fi at. He consulted a few 

long-serving advisors, but large deliberative bodies 

like the RCC, the Ba’th Party leadership, Cabinet, 

Ministries, the military or the intelligence agencies and industrial establishment were incidental 

to critical decisions. Saddam reserved the right to 

make fi nal decisions, and former advisors reveal that 

he often disregarded their advice. Saddam made few 

public statements regarding WMD, and his deliberations were tightly compartmented and undocumented 

after the 1980s. Saddam’s advisors have revealed 

much about a deliberate, secretive decision-making 

style, which accounts for the lack of information (for 

example, the lack of documentary evidence) on his 

strategic intent for WMD. Many, however, believe 

that Saddam would have resumed WMD programs 

after sanctions were lifted.

• Saddam maintained continuity and secrecy by 

repeatedly turning to a few individuals and smallcompartmented committees for foreign policy and 

national security advice. Tariq ‘Aziz, although 

deputy prime minister, served as the pre-eminent 

foreign policy advisor from the early years of the 

Regime until 2001. Saddam praised ‘Aziz for his 

knowledge of the west and foreign affairs, in general, despite ‘Aziz falling out of favor in the later 

stages of the Regime. Two successive committees 

deliberated over foreign policy issues referred to 

them by Saddam: the Political Operations Room 

(1991 to mid-1990s), and its successor the Committee of Four (the “Quartet” from1996 to 2003), (see 

Annex A, The Quartet—Infl uence and Disharmony 

Among Saddam’s Lieutenants for additional information). Additionally, Iraq established the Higher 

Committee in 1991 to orchestrate relations with 

UN Weapons inspectors (see section on the Higher 

Committee).

Life Near Saddam—A Characterization

Saddam’s Iraq was similar to other dictatorships. 

The primary characteristics of such regimes are: (1) 

an almost exclusive reliance upon a single decisionmaker, his perceptions and objectives; (2) fear and 

intimidation; (3) little dissent from the “leader’s” 

views; (4) compartmented expertise with little or no 

cross-fertilization; (5) the passing of misinformation 

through the chain of command; (6) internal personal 

confl icts among second and third tier leadership; (7) 

a second level of leadership whose power and infl uence is derived entirely from above, not particularly 

from the constituencies they represent; (8) avoidance 

of responsibility. Toward the end of his rule Saddam 

became more reclusive and relied even less upon 

advisors for decision-making, while turning more and 

more to relatives.
8

• Party and governmental organizations implemented and legitimized Saddam’s foreign policy 

decisions more than they directed them. Saddam 

routinely met with the Cabinet, its committees 

and the RCC, but participants say they often 

had little latitude. He also met frequently with 

key technocrats, such as the Minister of Military 

Industrialization, who oversaw MIC. Detainees 

from various organizations suggest they carried 

out national security policy rather than created it, 

although Huwaysh had considerable autonomy in 

his planning efforts. Nonetheless, even as a favored 

technocrat, Huwaysh found his decisions subject to 

Saddam’s changes.

• Saddam lacked a full grasp of international affairs, 

according to Tariq ‘Aziz. Saddam perceived Iraqi 

foreign policy through the prism of the Arab world 

and Arabic language. He listened to the Arabic 

services of Voice of America and the BBC, and 

his press offi cers would read him translations of 

foreign media, but he appeared more interested in 

books and topics about the Arab world. Secretary 

of the President ‘Abd claimed that Saddam was 

open to American culture—he watched classic US 

movies—and that he did not perceive the USIraqi relationship to be necessarily one of confl ict. 

Saddam told a US interviewer he tried to understand Western culture, and admitted he relied on 

movies to achieve this.

Saddam Calls the Shots

Saddam’s command style with subordinates was 

verbal and direct. Detainees frequently mention 

verbal instructions from Saddam. His subordinates 

regarded these commands, whether given in private 

or in public, as something to be taken seriously and 

at face value. Saddam was explicit—particularly on 

issues of a personal or state security nature, which 

were one and the same to him. The Regime did not 

take action on WMD or security issues in a documented way using the Iraqi equivalent of public 

policy statements, cabinet minutes or written presidential executive orders.

• Saddam verbally referred matters for consideration 

to the Quartet. He was verbally back-briefed by 

‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri on the results.

• According to Husayn Rashid Muhammad ‘Arab Al 

Tikriti, a former Iraqi Army Chief-of-Staff, Saddam 

established a key state committee—the Committee 

of Three, which managed the military—without 

any initiating or directing documentation. The three 

members were ordered verbally by Saddam to form 

and operate the committee.

Saddam’s custom of verbal instructions to subordinates on key issues was a preference driven largely 

by his security concerns, which fi tted well with the 

style and capability of Iraqi public administration.

• Close documentation of decision-making chains 

was incomplete in Iraq, and there was inconsistency 

in what was recorded. Regime policy fi les on security issues have not been found following the fall 

of the Regime and—judging by the ashes found in 

Iraqi Government offi ces—may have been comprehensively destroyed. We do not have a complete 

paper trail of the execution of Saddam’s decisions 

on state security issues or WMD at a senior level. 

But there is some documentary evidence.

Former Director of the Directorate

of General Military Intelligence 

Discusses Information for Strategic 

Operational Planning

“We gathered information from the fi ve embassies 

where we have (military) attaches: Jordan, Turkey, 

Qatar, Yugoslavia and Russia. Another source is the 

Internet—it has everything. For example, the attaché 

in Qatar reports that the coalition [as it prepares 

for war] has 15,000 to 18,000 [troops] arriving. We 

could see it on the Internet, as well—it was all there. 

For another example, we know that there was preplanned storage equipment in Qatar and Kuwait, 

equipment without personnel. [We got these messages 

by] electronic format or the offi cer would hand-carry 

the information back to Iraq.”
9

Regime Strategic

 Intent

• Instead, voluminous fi les were often kept on 

personnel management issues, and trivial and nonoffi cial aspects of even very junior personnel were 

recorded.

• Offi cial record keeping was highly inconsistent in 

content and form. Access to electronic information 

technology varied widely. Even manual typewriters were not available in some places. Pre-electronic copying systems such as carbon paper do 

not appear to have been widespread. Hand-written 

records (including many of limited legibility) are 

common. A high level order in the 1980s directed 

that Top Secret orders were to be hand-written to 

avoid the need for typing staff to see them.

Saddam’s subordinates feared him and sought to 

anticipate his wishes on matters where he had not 

yet issued characteristically clear and unquestionable orders. At the very least they would seek to 

avoid outcomes he was known to detest or dislike.

Senior subordinates would in these circumstances 

issue instructions refl ecting what they believed was 

Saddam’s line of thinking on an issue. His more experienced associates, such as Ramadan, found Saddam 

to be predictable and they were able to work to the 

limits of his tolerance. That said, fear of Saddam 

meant that rumor about his wishes could acquire considerable force and make Regime attempts to change 

course sometimes awkward to implement. MIC staff, 

for example, initially did not believe that Saddam 

had decided to abandon the program to withhold 

information from inspectors. They were accustomed 

to the earlier Saddam-endorsed policy of deception, 

and feared transgressing what they earlier knew to 

be Saddam’s wishes. Vice President Ramadan had to 

be dispatched in early 2003 to personally explain the 

new policy to skeptical and fearful MIC staff.

• Ramadan spoke for three hours at a mass meeting 

of MIC staff in 2003 to overcome their skepticism, 

according to Huwaysh.

Saddam’s penchant for both centralized verbal 

instruction and administrative compartmentation 

lent itself to accidental or intended competition 

among subordinates. Compartmentation, when 

accompanied by his encouragement of backchannel 

communication, (see Harvesting Ideas and Advice 

in Byzantine Setting section), occasionally led to two 

(or more) teams working the same problem. This 

was particularly the case in security and intelligence 

issues, allowing the possibility that more than one 

“order” might be given. Saddam was normally able 

to realign projects when he needed to but checks and 

balances among political and security forces of the 

Regime remained a feature of his rule to the end.

• Intended competition resulting from two competing 

“orders” possibly occurred in WMD activities. For 

example, the Regime had two competing ballistic 

missile programs under Ra’ad Jasim Isma’il Al 

Adhami and Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ Al Tamimi in 

1994, as well as the separate development of two 

different binary CW rounds by the Al Muthanna 

State Establishment (MSE) and the Technical 

Research Centre (TRC) in the late 1980s.

Saddam Shows the Way

Saddam gave periodic unambiguous guidance to a 

wider audience than his immediate subordinates.

He wrote his own speeches. He was unafraid of 

detail and personally intervened with instructions in 

all areas of government administration at all levels. 

Problems arose if Saddam or his lieutenants had 

not given junior subordinates his views on an issue, 

leaving them in doubt about policy or their authority 

in a system where conformity was valued and failure to follow orders often brutally punished. Initiative suffered and the system could be infl exible as it 

worked on old interpretations of Saddam’s wishes. 

This latter problem became acute after 1998 when 

Saddam became more reclusive and his comprehensive speeches became less frequent. A problem also 

arose when subordinates occasionally moved ahead 

of Saddam’s decisions, relying on older guidance to 

anticipate his wishes.

• During a custodial interview, Saddam said major 

speeches he drafted and gave, such as the June 2000 

speech, on why Iraq could not give up its strategic 

weapons capability if its neighbors did not, were 

intended to shape internal and external conditions, 

in this case the positions of both Iran and the UN.
10

• Saddam also wrote key speeches of offi cials, 

notably that of Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Ahmad 

Al Hadithi to the UN General Assembly on 

19 September 2002, following President Bush’s 

“Grave and Gathering Danger” speech to the same 

body on 12 September.

• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh said 

Saddam “intervened in all of his ministries and 

agencies where and when he saw fi t.”

• Saddam appointed Ramadan to lead the “Higher 

Committee” in 2002 to implement UN Security 

Council (UNSCR) Resolution 1441. Ramadan was 

unsure of his authority to deal with UN inspectors 

under this arrangement, and he would guess at both 

the limits of his authority and his personal safety 

from Saddam’s wrath, a situation compounded by 

the inability to contact Saddam at critical moments.

• Tariq ‘Aziz said that in reporting to Saddam on the 

proceedings of the Committee of Four (the Quartet), chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri would guess 

at what he thought Saddam wanted to hear. ‘Ali 

Hasan Al Majid supported ‘Izzat Ibrahim in this 

approach.

• Ramadan pointed to the overactive attitude of 

factory managers in 2002-2003 in blocking UN 

inspectors as an example of Iraqis anticipating a 

position Saddam wanted them to take, when in fact 

his policy had moved in a different direction.

Saddam was strictly opposed to corruption—in the 

sense of Regime personnel soliciting bribes or expropriating public assets—on the part of family members 

or subordinate members of the Regime, seeing it as 

corrosive of respect for authority. Personal corruption could be punished drastically and Saddam issued 

many directions about what he expected in terms of 

personal fi nancial behavior. Instead, Saddam reserved 

for himself the right to dispense the fruits of the 

Regime, thereby making those who benefi ted from 

power sure they were doing so exclusively at his will.

• According to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, Saddam 

required all offi cial personnel to submit periodic 

inventories of their assets. Assets could not be 

above “suffi cient” levels, nor could assets be listed 

under other people’s names. He directed that half 

of hidden property be given as a reward to whoever 

reported the deception.

Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine 

Setting

Saddam did not encourage advice from subordinates 

unless he had fi rst signaled he wanted it. Advisory 

groups he established, such as the Committee of Four 

(the Quartet) on foreign, political and strategic policy, 

considered only those issues he referred to them. 

Committees generally assumed Saddam already had a 

preferred position on such issues and commonly spent 

time trying to guess what it was and tailor their advice 

to it. More conscientious members of the Regime 

sought to work around sycophantic or timid superiors 

by cultivating alternative, direct lines of communication to Saddam—a development that pleased Saddam 

because it put another check on subordinates. The 

result, however, was a corrosive gossip culture in 

senior government circles that further undercut any 

semblance of developing policy through conventional 

government procedures.

• Ramadan thought Saddam’s preference for informal 

chains of command encouraged a gossip culture 

in his immediate circle that undercut good policy 

development.

• ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Ramadan, and ‘Ali Hasan 

Al Majid in the Quartet would usually argue for 

whatever policy they thought Saddam would want, 

according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

• In some areas, alternative channels were formalized. Special Security Organization (SSO) personnel were able to regularly bypass superiors, and 

senior SSO offi cers bypassed the SSO Director if 

they had links to Qusay Saddam Husayn. Similarly, 

certain sections of the SSO could bypass the SSO 

Director and report straight to Saddam.

• Saddam claimed he regularly met with the Iraqi 

people as he found them to be the best source of 

accurate information. Additionally, Saddam said he 

found women to be great sources of information, 

particularly within the various government ministries.

• Saddam’s interest in science meant that some Iraqi 

weapons-related scientists were able to use back 

channels to by-pass military industry gatekeepers 

such as Huwaysh. This enabled them to sometimes 
11

Regime Strategic

 Intent

secure Saddam’s support for odd or marginal programs of little use to defense. For example, retired 

defense scientist ‘Imad ‘Abd-al-Latif ‘Abd-al-Ridha 

secured Saddam’s backing in January 2000 for the 

Al Quds Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program 

over the objections of Huwaysh. The project never 

progressed beyond two prototypes and Huwaysh 

stated that the program was ultimately an expensive 

failure.

• Saddam was “like a computer,” according to ‘Abd: 

if he received reliable information he would make 

good decisions, but if the inputs were fl awed, the 

resulting policies would suffer.

Weaving a Culture of Lies

The growth of a culture of lying to superiors hurt 

policymaking more than did the attendant gossip. 

Lying to superiors was driven by fear of the Regime 

and the inability to achieve results as resources deteriorated under sanctions in the fi rst half of the 1990s. 

Lack of structural checks and balances allowed false 

information to affect Iraqi decision making with 

disastrous effects. Saddam knew his subordinates had 

a tendency to lie, but his earlier efforts to check their 

claims by “ground-truthing” them through personal 

tours of inspection decreased by 1998 as he became 

more reclusive.

• Tariq ‘Aziz asserts that before Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, the Iraqi military lied to Saddam about its 

preparedness, which led Saddam to grossly miscalculate Iraq’s ability to deter an attack.

• Several sources claim that reporting up the party, 

government, and military chain of command 

became less trustworthy before Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. Key commanders overstated their combat 

readiness and willingness to fi ght, and Saddam no 

longer sought ground truth by visiting units and 

asking pointed questions as he had during the IranIraq war. He instead relied upon reports by offi cers 

who later admitted misleading Saddam about military readiness out of fear for their lives.

• ‘Abd said key Regime members “habitually” concealed from Saddam unpleasant realities of Iraq’s 

industrial and military capabilities and of public 

opinion. Fear of the loss of position motivated this 

deception, which continued until the fi nal days of 

the Regime.

• Asked how Saddam treated people who brought 

him bad news, ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid replied, “I don’t 

know.” ISG assesses that ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid has 

never known any instance of anybody bringing bad 

news to Saddam.

Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible

Saddam encouraged a sense of his omnipotence 

among his subordinates, a condition that increased 

after 1998 as Saddam became more physically 

reclusive. The former workaholic and micromanager 

appeared less engaged after this time, although he 

would involve himself in issues of interest, such as air 

defense. Saddam’s inaccessibility was driven by an 

extreme fear of assassination and also apparently by 

a personal prioritization of other activities, including 

writing. While there is no evidence Saddam’s control 

of the Regime slipped, many of his lieutenants saw a 

sharp lessening of Saddam’s attention to detail and an 

absence of his previous desire to “ground proof” high 

level advice through fi eld inspections. They suggest 

his formerly detailed interest in military affairs diminished compared to that shown during the Iran-Iraq 

war or Desert Storm.

• By Saddam’s own account, he had only used a telephone twice since 1990, for fear of being located 

for a US attack.

• According to Ramadan, he never phoned Saddam 

directly after 1991, never privately socialized 

with him and was often unable to locate Saddam 

for days, even in periods of crisis. Simply locating Saddam could be a problem even for senior 

offi cials. Ramadan said, “Sometimes it would take 

three days to get in touch with Saddam.”
12

• Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim Al ‘Azzawi, Deputy 

Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, thought 

that because of extensive security measures, there 

was little possibility that Saddam would be assassinated. Hikmat said Saddam was confi dent no 

one could assassinate him because no one knew 

where he slept, and ministerial meetings were held 

at undisclosed locations. Ministers were picked 

up and driven to the meeting locations in vehicles 

with blacked out windows, and they were never 

told where they were once they arrived at meetings, 

according to a former senior offi cial.

• According to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, notice of RCC 

meetings was given only hours and sometimes 

minutes before they occurred; it was normal for 

RCC members to be collected by offi cial cars, and 

then be switched to different cars between the pickup point and the meeting place, and sometimes the 

meeting place would be changed as well.

• Despite the extensive measures used to protect 

Saddam, his family, and senior leaders, an assassination attempt in December 1996 seriously 

wounded ‘Uday Saddam Husayn. This critical 

failure of the Regime’s security infrastructure is 

likely to have contributed signifi cantly to Saddam’s 

withdrawal.

• Saddam was more reclusive during his last years 

as president, according to a former senior offi cial. 

He lost much of his contact with the government. 

He still attended RCC meetings, but he met only 

infrequently with the Quartet. Beginning in 1999, 

“when he was writing his novels,” Saddam would 

often come to his ministers’ meetings unprepared. 

“He had not even read the summary notes his staff 

prepared for him for the meeting,” according to the 

Minister of Military Industrialization.

• Tariq ‘Aziz stated that during the 1990s, Saddam 

became less involved in tactical issues and concentrated more on strategic matters. During the 

late 1990s, he spent more time in his palaces; 

subordinates had to forward documents to him 

because they could no longer communicate directly 

with him. ‘Aziz claims that in the months before 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, he had little interaction 

with Saddam and he was reduced to spending the 

time watching TV and reading newspapers (part 

of ‘Aziz’s isolation was a result of the growing 

prominence, at ‘Aziz’s expense, of Foreign Minister 

Naji Sabri). Although Saddam still sought detailed 

reporting, he did not process it with the diligence 

that characterized his approach to paperwork a 

decade earlier. In ‘Aziz’s view, Saddam listened less 

to advisory boards such as the Quartet and rejected 

their advice more frequently. Instead, he turned 

more toward family members, such as Qusay.

Saddam’s Command By Violence

Saddam used violence liberally as an administrative method, to ensure loyalty, repress even helpful 

criticism and to ensure prompt compliance with 

his orders. Saddam’s use of violence stood in stark 

contrast to the public image he created of a benevolent father fi gure, interested in all aspects of Iraqi life, 

from children’s poetry to public hygiene.

• In 1979, during Saddam’s transition from Vice 

President to President, he directed the execution of 

a “number of the leadership” for supposedly plotting with Syrian Ba’thists against him. Tariq ‘Aziz 

described this episode as the cruelest action he 

witnessed under Saddam.

• Huwaysh confi rmed that in 1982, Saddam ordered 

the execution of his Health Minister Riyad Al 

‘Ani (a relative of Huwaysh) and delivery of the 

dismembered body to the victim’s wife. Riyad, in 

response to an appeal by Saddam for creative ideas 

on how to end the war with Iran, had made the fatal 

mistake of suggesting that Saddam temporarily 

resign and resume offi ce after peace was achieved.

• Muhsin Khadr Al Khafaji, Ba’th Party Chairman 

in the Al Qadisiyah Governorate, “never refused to 

do anything he was asked to by Saddam as he fully 

expected to be executed if he failed to comply with 

orders given to him. In the 1980s, (he) witnessed 

a number of soldiers being executed after they 

deserted.”
13

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Saddam’s Effect on the Workings 

of the Iraqi Government

Suspicion of Structures

Saddam profoundly distrusted constitutional structures because they risked accruing power independent of his. The legally powerful cabinet never met 

in later years as a deliberative body. When it did 

meet—for information or ratifi cation purposes—

Saddam avoided agendas. The same occurred at RCC 

meetings. Instead, when business required an agenda, 

such as dealing with issues requiring cross-portfolio 

decisions, Saddam met Ministers individually or as 

sub-committees. Likewise, attendees often had no 

preparation for what Saddam might raise.

• “Meetings of the political leadership were not 

scheduled . . . many times they were convened 

without knowing the subject of the meeting. He 

would simply raise an issue . . . without warning,” 

according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

Powerless Structures

Iraq under Saddam had all the formal decisionmaking structures and staff of a modern state, but 

they did not make national strategic policy. Iraq 

possessed a skilled foreign ministry and able technocrats in all branches of government. They could route 

proposals upward in the Regime almost to its end, but 

not if they confl icted with Saddam’s strategic intent or 

if they proposed an alternate national strategy.

Iraq possessed a full array of government organs 

familiar to any “Western” country: president, 

national assembly, judiciary, civil service; but their 

actual functions and relationship with each other 

bore no resemblance to Western counterparts.

Instead, they fi lled control or cosmetic roles in support of Saddam’s dictatorship. They played little part 

in the effective chain of command under Saddam, and 

they did not exercise a decision-making or executive role comparable to nominally similar organs in 

Western states.

Saddam’s Use of Execution—Management 

by Threat

Fear of Presidential violence was widespread under 

the former Regime, but some situations merited 

explicit threats. The return from Jordan in February 

1996 of Saddam’s son-in-law, Husayn Kamil Hasan 

Al Majid, “the traitor,” was such an event. This SSO 

administrative order was found after Operation Iraqi 

Freedom:

An administrative order

The order of the Special Security Organization Director

The traitor Husayn Kamil Hasan is to be treated as 

any citizens in the state and his, or his traitorous 

group’s orders are not to be obeyed in any way or in 

any location in the country. Anyone who obeys his 

orders will be punished by execution, by order of the 

Leader, The President, God Bless Him.

This order is posted by the Security Unit division 

manager and it is timed below.

Dated 20 Feb 96.
14

After the Ba’thist seizure of power in 1968, the RCC 

became a key Regime institution. It gave Saddam the 

right to make emergency decisions in its name in the 

1980s, and he used this authority to reduce the RCC 

to irrelevance. This propensity extended to Saddam 

assuming authority over national policy on WMD 

development and retention.

• According to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, the RCC had 

voted in the 1980s to allow Saddam to make decisions in its name. Since then, Saddam made such 

decisions “whenever he liked.” By the 1990s, RCC 

members often fi rst heard on the radio or television 

about decisions made by Saddam in their name. 

Moreover, only Saddam could call an RCC meeting.

• According to Ramadan, the RCC discussed 

UNSCR 687 after Desert Storm, but Husayn Kamil 

was placed in charge of implementation, even 

though he was not a RCC member. Communication between Saddam and Husayn Kamil on WMD 

therefore bypassed the RCC. After 1991, the RCC 

had no collective decision-making about retention 

or development of WMD.

• After 1995, Saddam would usually have his decisions drafted by the Legal Offi ce in the Presidential 

Diwan and then proclaimed without reference to the 

Cabinet or the RCC.

• Muhammad Hamzah Al Zubaydi said of the RCC, 

that Saddam made decisions and “there was never 

any objection to his decisions.”

• Similarly, membership of the RCC became a matter 

of Saddam’s fi at, not a refl ection of internal party 

election or opinion. Saddam had ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al 

Duri, Deputy Chairman of the RCC, order members 

who he wished to move off the RCC to retire. Soon 

to be ex-members were told not to submit their 

nominations for “re-election.” Similarly, ‘Izzat notifi ed individuals chosen as new members they were 

to “nominate” themselves as candidates, according 

to Muhammad Hamzah.

• ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid said “I don’t remember the 

Cabinet ever discussing foreign affairs” and that 

the Foreign Minister reported directly to Saddam. 

Saddam exercised a high degree of personal control 

by taking over leadership of the ministers’ council 

and by getting involved in its details. He additionally enhanced his control through regular meetings 

with experts and leaders in industry and academia, 

according to Ramadan.

The Higher Committee

Saddam established the Higher Committee in June 

1991 following Desert Storm to manage Iraq’s relationship with the UN on WMD disarmament. The 

Committee was also to develop a strategy for determining what WMD information would be disclosed 

to the UN. The Higher Committee displayed from the 

outset all the dysfunctional characteristics of administration under Saddam. It was beset by backchannel 

communications to Saddam from individual members that prevented the Committee from developing 

policy on WMD that was not prone to intervention 

from Saddam. The Committee was plagued by a lack 

of transparency, gossip and family court interests. 

According to presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid 

Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri, the Committee was 

disrupted by a philosophical tug-of-war between 

Husayn Kamil, Saddam’s favorite son-in-law and 

military industry czar—who sought to limit UN 

access to hidden nuclear and biological programs—

and Tariq ‘Aziz, the chairperson, who pursued greater 

cooperation with the UN, including advocating early 

acceptance of OFF. This unresolved dispute contributed to Iraq’s confl icted posture in dealing with the 

UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).

• Saddam gave the committee a substantial amount 

of working level leeway, according to the former 

presidential secretary. He only wanted to retain 

oversight on decisions that the committee found 

insolvable or costly, such as the destruction of a 

large industrial complex.

• Nevertheless, Husayn Kamil sought to undermine 

Tariq ‘Aziz’s infl uence by going directly to Saddam 

and misrepresenting UN policies to him. He sought 

to turn Saddam against the UN by telling him that 

UNSCOM wanted to destroy facilities created 
15

Regime Strategic

 Intent

solely for civilian use when the reality was they 

were dual use facilities, according to the former 

presidential secretary, ‘Abd.

• Husayn Kamil masterminded the undeclared 

destruction of large stocks of WMD in July 1991. 

This undermined Iraq’s and specifi cally Tariq 

‘Aziz’s credibility with the UN. Husayn Kamil also 

persuaded Saddam to hide and to deny the existence 

of Iraq’s nuclear program in 1991, conceal the 

biological weapons program, and to reject early UN 

offers (UNSCR 712, a forerunner to the OFF program) of monitored oil sales as a means of limited 

sanctions relief.

• Tariq ‘Aziz said that in contrast he sought concessions from the UN in return for Iraq’s gradual compliance with UN sanctions. He cooperated with the 

UN, but was undercut by Husayn Kamil’s machinations and was unable to extract concessions, an 

outcome that eventually led Saddam and other leaders to criticize him, according to the presidential 

secretary.

The Foreign Policy Committees

Saddam created a committee called the Political 

Operations Room after 1991 as a deliberative body 

to provide political advice. The committee, comprising Foreign Minister Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al 

Samarra’i, Prime Minister Sa’dun Hamadi (chair), 

Tariq ‘Aziz and either Latif Nusayyif Jasim Al 

Dulaymi or Hamid Yusif Hammadi, replaced a system 

in which ministers met with Saddam individually to 

discuss such issues. Tariq ‘Aziz was assigned to chair 

the committee when Saddam fi red Hamid in October 

1991.

• Important decisions were left to Saddam, although

the committee sought to react quickly to secondary 

political developments by issuing statements and 

comments according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

Saddam created the Committee of Four, or Quartet, 

in 1996 as a foreign policy advisory body to replace 

the Political Operations Room. ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri 

served as the informal chair and Tariq ‘Aziz, Vice 

President Taha Yasin Ramadan and ‘Ali Hasan Al 

Majid, who was put on the committee to monitor the 

others, served as members. Saddam set the agenda, 

which was ad hoc and varied. The Quartet might 

consider WMD-related topics such as UNSCOM 

cooperation, but it did not address overall strategy 

for acquiring or employing WMD, according to Tariq 

‘Aziz.

Neither the Political Operations Room nor the 

Quartet had a policymaking role. Instead, they 

offered advice, but only on issues referred to them by 

Saddam. They had none of the proactive or directive 

powers normally associated with such senior committees in the West or elsewhere. Moreover, they were 

weakened by the Byzantine administrative practices 

common to the higher levels of the Regime.

• The Quartet addressed an extensive range of topics, 

including policies toward Russia, France, Syria, the 

UN and the Kurds. It also discussed the Arab-Israeli 

situation and the dispatch of envoys. ‘Izzat Ibrahim 

would prepare a few working minutes, uncoordinated with any of the other members, after the 

meeting and forward them to Saddam.

• The Quartet assigned specifi c government agencies to research specifi c topics and provide answers 

to Saddam, if the president required it, but did not 

have a dedicated assessments staff of its own.

The RCC also considered foreign policy issues but 

usually in the form of briefi ngs from Saddam or 

expert staff and usually did little more than endorse 

the decision Saddam had already determined. It 

served increasingly as a forum for Saddam to make 

announcements or as a face-saving foil to explain 

Iraq’s policy changes.

• Saddam would on occasion elicit foreign policy 

advice from the RCC, but would not accept it very 

often, even after lengthy discussion, according to 

former Vice President Ramadan. The RCC at other 

times would simply parrot what they knew was 

Saddam’s opinion. Saddam was more inclined to 

accept RCC advice about more junior level government appointments.
16

• The RCC represented the outer limit of awareness 

in government circles of WMD in Iraq and was 

not part of the normal decision-making process 

on the issue. Saddam’s address to the RCC in late 

2002 announcing Iraq had no WMD was news to 

many members. WMD-related topics were never 

discussed outside the RCC and rarely outside the 

Quartet members, according to the former presidential secretary. The RCC had no role in WMD or 

missile strategy, according to former Vice President 

Ramadan, and did not usually consider military 

issues, according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

• Saddam approached the RCC for recommendations 

on how to deal with UNSCR 1441 of 8 November 

2002, but he opened the discussion by stating that 

Iraq would not accept reconnaissance fl ights, interviews with scientists, or visits to presidential sites 

such as palaces. These topics would not be open for 

discussion. Ramadan, along with other key members, realized limited compliance with UNSCR 

1441 would be futile and counterproductive, but 

he did not use the RCC to debate Iraq’s response 

to UNSCR 1441. Instead he fi rst used the Higher 

Committee to lobby Saddam to approve UN over 

fl ights and to allow UN inspectors to interview Iraqi 

scientists, but without success. Faced with a UN 

ultimatum to agree, and with Saddam in one of his 

periods of self-imposed seclusion, Ramadan exhibited a rare display of independent decision-making 

and exercised his own authority to authorize the UN 

over fl ights.

Saddam’s Grip on National Security and WMD 

Development

Saddam’s disregard for civil and constitutional 

forms of administration meant he turned to an array 

of security and military industrial organizations 

to implement policy or to provide technical advice 

during the sanctions period. Paramount among these 

were the SSO, IIS, RG, MIC and the armed forces, all 

of which answered directly to him.

• Saddam addressed military and military industrialization issues directly with the people he installed 

in the positions of Defense Minister or the Minister of Military Industrialization, according to the 

former Defense Minister, without the fi lter of the 

Cabinet, the RCC or any equivalent of a National 

Security Council. Similarly, Saddam discussed any 

Republican Guard issues directly with Qusay and 

the RG Chief-of-Staff.

• The defense minister, who had no authority over 

the Republican Guard, forwarded all other military 

matters of any signifi cance to Saddam, according to 

Tariq ‘Aziz.

Saddam had direct command of the Iraqi intelligence services and the armed forces, including 

direct authority over plans and operations of both. 

The Directorate of General Military Intelligence 

(DGMI) and the IIS assembled detailed orders of 

battle and summaries of the general military capability of potential adversaries, particularly Iran, Israel 

and the United States, and gave them to Saddam and 

his military leadership. The IIS also ran a large covert 

procurement program, undeclared chemical laboratories, and supported denial and deception operations 

(See Annex B “Iraqi Intelligence Services” and Annex 

C “Iraqi Security Services” for additional information).

• The intelligence services collected foreign intelligence and relayed the raw reporting to Saddam 

via his presidential secretary. The Regime tightly 

controlled dissemination of such material. Material 

going to Saddam would not necessarily be shared 

with the responsible deputy prime minister or the 

military.

Saddam’s hold on the state and its security infrastructure extended to the military-industrial complex. 

MIC oversaw Iraq’s substantial and centrally planned 

military-industrial infrastructure. MIC at certain times 

in its history covered all industries and most activities 

that supported the research, development, production 

and weaponization of CBW agents and missile delivery systems. While as an institution MIC had organizational continuity, substantively there were two 

MICs, each distinguishable by unique historical circumstances and its links to a prominent leader. Both 

leaders were close protégés of Saddam and answered 
17

Regime Strategic

 Intent

directly and continuously to him. Husayn Kamil created the fi rst MIC in 1987, which continued in various 

forms—including a major overhaul in 1992—until 

his fl ight to Jordan in 1995. ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah 

Al Mullah Huwaysh restructured the organization in 

1997 into its second form, which remained until the 

onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Both Husayn Kamil and Huwaysh represent partial 

anomalies in Saddam’s command and control structure. Saddam was interested in their loyalty, discretion 

and ability to achieve results. The assets they commanded were not threats to his rule in the way the 

army or the Ba’th Party could be. Both Husayn Kamil 

and Huwaysh were therefore given more license 

and less direct oversight than the army leadership or 

the RCC, although Saddam would often ask about 

particular projects or facilities. Ironically, in Husayn 

Kamil’s case, this lack of oversight eventually created 

major problems for the Regime.

• When Husayn Kamil assumed responsibility 

for military scientifi c research and industry in 

1987, Saddam gave him broad administrative and 

fi nancial authority to consolidate Iraq’s research, 

development, and industrial resources into military 

capabilities essential for winning the Iran-Iraq war. 

Husayn Kamil had notable successes, developing 

long-range missiles and BW and CW capabilities for Saddam. In the aftermath of Desert Storm, 

Husayn Kamil used MIC in attempts to conceal 

banned weapons and deceive UNSCOM inspectors. 

His capricious and self-serving leadership of MIC 

and lack of accountability eventually destroyed its 

institutional integrity, a process further aggravated 

by his departure in 1995.

• By 1997, MIC was on the verge of collapse. The 

Ministry of Defense, MIC’s primary customer, 

had lost confi dence in its ability to meet military 

production requirements. To halt the slide, Saddam 

plucked ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah 

Huwaysh from nine years of bureaucratic exile, and 

installed him as the Minister of Military Industrialization. Huwaysh instituted strict organizational and 

fi nancial reforms, centered on mandatory planning 

and personnel accountability. By 2002, MIC was 

thriving, its total revenues increasing over forty 

fold as had its revenue base, despite continuing UN 

sanctions and coalition attacks on its facilities.

The Military Industrialization Commission

As an institution, the MIC had historical continuity 

emerging in the 1980s from the State Organization for 

Technical Industries (SOTI) as the “Military Industrialization Organization,” progressing through the 

Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization 

(MIMI), and fi nally in 1991, transforming into the 

MIC.

MIC ran Iraq’s military-industrial complex, 

including at certain times, all weaponization of 

chemical and biological agents and delivery systems. Iraq’s nuclear program, however, was separate 

from MIC’s institutional framework through much 

of its history. Desert Storm destroyed much of Iraq’s 

military-industrial infrastructure, including many 

chemical bombs and rockets. But, despite the war, 

some of Iraq’s WMD arsenal remained intact, and 

was preserved by MIC. MIC assisted in concealing 

banned weapons and attempting to deceive the UN 

weapon inspectors up until 1995, when Husayn Kamil 

Hasan Al Majid, Saddam’s son-in-law and MIC 

director, fl ed to Jordan (see the “Husayn Kamil” text 

box for additional information).

By 1997, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) had 

lost faith in the ability of MIC to develop or produce 

the goods required of it. Re-creation of MIC began 

in 1997 under Huwaysh, who by 1999 had reorganized and completely restructured the organization. 

Saddam’s growing confi dence in Huwaysh saw him 

eventually appointed as the Minister of Military 

Industrialization and, later, as one of the Deputy 

Prime Ministers of Iraq. MIC’s re-emergence provided the research, development and industrial base 

upon which Saddam hoped to rebuild and modernize Iraq’s military-industrial capabilities. Huwaysh 

introduced mandatory planning, fi nancial oversight 

and personal accountability in order to set the 

organization on a modern accountable management 

base. Salaries were raised and re-engagement with 

the MoD took place. Universities were encouraged 

to contribute to MIC projects and research, while 

production was outsourced to the private sector, with 

considerable success.
18

Saddam Holding Court

Saddam made shells of state institutions that in most 

other countries would be organs of executive power.

Under Saddam, they existed largely for appearance 

and as lightning rods for blame. For example, the 

RCC would be summoned for a public session so that 

a potentially embarrassing change of course could 

be attributed to the RCC, rather than be seen as an 

earlier misjudgment on Saddam’s part. This division 

of responsibilities allowed Saddam to take the credit, 

while institutions took the blame.

• For example, according to Taha Yasin Ramadan, 

he, the RCC and the Higher Committee assumed 

responsibility for embarrassments such as acquiescence to UN “intrusions” and agreeing to U2 

fl ights. Blame shifting was typical of Saddam. 

Nonetheless, from time to time in uncontroversial 

non-crisis situations, Saddam would revert back to 

formal decision-making structures to conduct business. Ramadan commented that he did not know 

what would prompt Saddam to resort to the formal 

chain of command at a particular point of time.

Saddam and Fiscal Policy

Saddam ignored his economic advisors in the Ministries of Finance and Planning with respect to strategic 

planning. For example, Saddam entered the Iran-Iraq 

war heedless of Ministry warnings about the economic consequences. He had no plan or strategy for 

how the war was to be fi nanced and generally displayed little interest in economic policy. He showed 

little concern about adjusting disastrous economic 

policies (such as those causing infl ation) in the interests of social stability. He did, however, pay close 

attention to disbursements. He made sure he could 

take the credit for public sector pay raises or special 

allocations such as bonuses to particular sections of 

the Iraqi population. He took less interest in whether 

such outlays were affordable or their effect on fi scal 

management.

• A senior Iraqi Finance Ministry offi cial said the 

Ministry consciously conducted its budgeting in the 

1980s as if foreign debt did not exist. Internal debt 

was paid by printing dinars and concocting artifi cial 

exchange rates, regardless of the infl ationary consequences.

• Saddam appointed Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim Al 

‘Azzawi as Finance Minister in 1995 and Deputy 

Prime Minister and head of the Financial Committee in 1999. He reported directly to Saddam and 

not to the cabinet. Saddam gave direct instructions 

to Hikmat on how to allocate funds for salaries, 

bonuses, farm subsidies and to adjust ration prices, 

according to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid.

• Financial matters were Saddam’s third governmental priority after security and political management, 

but ahead of technical, industrial and social administration according to Huwaysh reviewing in 2004 

the last years of Saddam’s governance. Huwaysh’s 

description of Saddam’s fi nancial discussions, 

however, shows Saddam was preoccupied with 

disbursals and cash fl ow, not fi scal policy or macroeconomic management. Huwaysh based his view of 

Saddam’s priorities on the order of precedence 

of the four Deputy Prime Ministers who were 

responsible respectively for international security 

(Tariq ‘Aziz), political management through the 

Presidential Diwan (Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al 

Samarra’i), Finance (Hikmat) and fi nally Huwaysh.
19

Regime Strategic

 Intent

How Saddam Saw His 

Subordinates

Mining Respect and Expertise

Saddam recognized and respected talent and public 

esteem in individual subordinates and area experts, 

but not to the point where they could contradict his 

goals, power or his judgment. He worked systematically to extract what they could contribute to the 

Regime, while keeping them politically isolated. 

Saddam was careful to keep subordinates from gaining popularity.

• According to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, “If some person 

makes good work and gets the admiration of . . . the 

Ba’thists, he does not keep that person . . . he never 

let an offi cial admired by the Iraqis [stay] in the 

same position for more than three years.”

Mutuality of Fear

Saddam feared that his subordinates could gather 

enough strength to challenge his position, or even a 

particular policy, and he acted to prevent it. He was 

routinely suspicious of subordinates—even those with 

long standing loyalty. His subordinates remained fearful of him, and they were incapable of common action 

against him or key policies.

• Tariq ‘Aziz said that he opposed the invasion of 

Kuwait, but could not dissuade Saddam. Asked why 

he did not resign in protest, he denied he thought he 

would be killed, but said, “ . . . there would be no 

income, no job.” Tariq ‘Aziz denied Saddam killed 

anyone personally while President. “But he would 

tell the security services to take care of things [dissenters], and they would take care of it.”

• Ramadan believed that from late 2002, Iraqi policy 

toward the UN and the United States was taking 

the Regime toward a disastrous war, but he said, 

“I couldn’t convince Saddam that an attack was 

coming. I didn’t try that hard. He was monitoring 

my performance in managing [UN] inspectors.”

• Huwaysh was sacked as Minister of Industry in 

1988 after a clash with Husayn Kamil and was 

ostracized for nine years. He believed he only 

avoided prison because of Ramadan’s intervention 

with Saddam. According to Huwaysh, no minister 

ever argued in meetings against Saddam’s stated 

position because it “ . . . was unforgivable. It would 

be suicide.”

• ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid said he feared Saddam and 

cited the killing of many people close to Saddam as 

the basis of his fear.

• Huwaysh said Saddam “loved the use of force.”

• Fear worked both ways. At Saddam’s “one-on-one” 

weekly meetings with individual heads of security 

agencies, he would always be accompanied by a 

bodyguard, according to Hamid Yusif Hammadi, 

Minister of Culture and Information. “Saddam did 

not trust anyone, even his cousin.”

• Nevertheless, Saddam said he believed “Good personal relations bring out the best in people.”

Dazzled by Science

Saddam was awed by science and inspired by the 

possibilities it offered for national development and 

military power. Saddam had an enthusiastic attitude 

toward science dating back to when, in the early 

1970s, he found himself in charge of the Iraqi Atomic 

Energy Commission (IAEC) as part of his responsibilities as Vice President. Saddam venerated Iraq’s 

history as a center of scientifi c achievement under 

individuals like the famous mathematician and astronomer Ibn-al-Haytham (c. 965 AD—c. 1040 AD). He 

retained a respect for many aspects of science to the 

end, but became less interested in detail and more 

detached from developments in Iraq’s scientifi c 

infrastructure.

• Deputy Prime Minister Huwaysh believed Saddam 

had “a special affection for his nuclear scientists” 

from the inception of the Iraqi nuclear program in 

the 1970s.
20

• ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid noted Saddam’s expansion of 

the university system “ . . . to the point of [having] a 

university in every governorate of the country.”

• Saddam kept three scientifi c advisers on his staff: 

‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi, former deputy 

director at MIC, who held that position since 1994, 

‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi, the former 

Minister of Oil, and Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far Hashim, 

former head of PC-3.

“A Man Can Be Destroyed, But Not Defeated”

 Ernest Hemingway, “The 

 Old Man and the Sea”

Saddam’s fondness for certain examples of Western 

culture was highly selective and did not refl ect a 

sophisticated awareness of Western cultural values 

or motivations. Saddam—not unlike other dictators throughout history—fi xed upon foreign cultural examples to reinforce his view of himself and 

his own behavior, not to moderate it through the 

development of a broader, global or more inclusive perspective. One of Saddam’s favorite books is 

Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and The Sea, the 

Nobel Prize-winning story of one man—Santiago, a 

poor Cuban fi sherman—and his struggle to master 

the challenges posed by nature. Saddam’s affi nity 

for Hemingway’s story is understandable, given the 

former president’s background, rise to power, conception of himself and Hemingway’s use of a rustic 

setting similar to Tikrit to express timeless themes. In 

Hemingway’s story, Santiago hooks a great marlin, 

which drags his boat out to sea. When the marlin 

fi nally dies, Santiago fi ghts a losing battle to defend 

his prize from sharks, which reduce the great fi sh, by 

the time he returns to his village, to a skeleton. The 

story sheds light on Saddam’s view of the world and 

his place in it.

The parallels that Saddam may have drawn between 

himself and Santiago were in their willingness to 

endure suffering and hardship to prove a point and in 

their willingness to infl ict pain on the victims of their 

struggles to accomplish their objectives. Saddam’s 

rise to “greatness” is marked by jail and exile, as 

well as violence. Saddam tended to characterize, in 

a very Hemingway-esque way, his life as a relentless 

struggle against overwhelming odds, but carried out 

with courage, perseverance and dignity. Certainly in 

the context of the “Mother of All Battles”—his name 

for the 1991 Gulf War—and his subsequent struggle 

against UN sanctions, Saddam showed a stubbornness arising from such a mindset and a refusal to 

accept conventional defi nitions of defeat. Much like 

Santiago, ultimately left with only the marlin’s skeleton as the trophy of his success, to Saddam even a 

hollow victory was by his reckoning a real one.
21

Regime Strategic

 Intent

was at the point of collapse. His rationale for this 

was concern for his personal security. He stated that 

by building many palaces the US would be unable 

to ascertain his whereabouts and thus target him.

• Military offi cers as senior as the Commander of the 

SRG, who was responsible for physical protection 

of Presidential palaces, were barred from entering 

any palace without prior written permission.

• Huwaysh attributed much of this paranoia to Saddam’s sense of betrayal following the defection of 

Husayn Kamil in 1995, who he had previously seen 

as close to him as a son. The attempt on ‘Uday’s 

life in December 1996 also had a deep impact on 

Saddam, because the extensive security infrastructure designed to protect him and his family failed in 

a spectacular and public way. The attack marks the 

start of Saddam’s decreased visibility with senior 

offi cials and increased preoccupation with Regime 

security.

Saddam the Dynasty Founder

Saddam’s resort to dynastic and familial means of 

running Iraq did the most to undermine institutional 

decision-making. Saddam saw the state in personal 

terms and his career was marked by a steady retreat 

from the Ba’thist ideal of a modern state to governance modeled on a rural Arab clan. His administration became reliant on family and clan members 

throughout the 1990s. Tariq ‘Aziz and Taha Yasin 

Ramadan commented on the growing and corrosive 

infl uence of the Tikriti clan on state control at this 

time. Relatives dominated leadership positions and 

progressively diminished the policy (as opposed 

to coercive) role of the Ba’th Party. Every senior 

non-Tikriti in the Regime has pointed to Saddam’s 

increasing and destructive resort to family and clan 

members to staff sensitive government positions. Nevertheless, while inclined toward a dynastic succession, 

Saddam prioritized preservation of his legacy. He was 

still searching for a competent and reliable succession 

that would guarantee his legacy at the time of his fall.

• Saddam gradually shifted his reliance on advice 

from technocrats to family members from 1995 

onward, according to Tariq ‘Aziz. This favored 

How Saddam Saw Himself

Saddam’s Psychology

Saddam’s psychology was shaped powerfully by 

a deprived and violent childhood in a village and 

tribal society bound by powerful mores. Many of his 

associates noted how early experiences had a lasting 

effect on Saddam’s outlook.

• ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid thought that “As any village 

child, he was affected by the traditions and customs 

of his tribe . . . you see him having an infl uence on 

most . . . Iraqis because they have come from the 

same country and tribal origin.”

• Huwaysh believed much of Saddam’s personality 

was shaped by the circumstances of his childhood, 

particularly his violent and xenophobic guardian 

uncle.

• Saddam had few friends among top leaders even in 

the 1970s and 1980s. These ties diminished further after 1995 and he focused more on relatives, 

according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

Saddam’s Personal Security

Saddam thought he was under constant threat 

and he prioritized his personal safety above all 

administrative issues. ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al 

Mullah Huwaysh said Saddam put the priority for 

personal safety at the absolute peak of a hierarchy of 

interests. Some of his fear was well founded, but he 

grew increasingly paranoid as the 1990s progressed. 

His personal security measures were extreme. For 

example, the SSO operated a laboratory specifi cally 

for the testing of Saddam’s food. An outgrowth of 

his fear was the building of multiple palaces, in part 

designed to foil attempts by attackers or assassins to 

locate him. The palaces also refl ected the fact that 

Saddam increasingly saw himself as the state and that 

what was good for him was good for Iraq.

• Saddam went on a palace and mosque building 

extravaganza in the late 1990s, employing 7000 

construction workers, when much of the economy 
22

family, who was not necessarily competent, such 

as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, weakened good decisionmaking, according to former Vice President Ramadan. Nonetheless it was accepted as a seemingly 

normal part of administration in Iraq.

• Ramadan thought, “The last three years with 

Saddam bothered me the most. There were too 

many relatives in sensitive jobs. When I was put in 

charge of inspections, I was qualifi ed to do the job. 

My staff will tell you I could have fi xed it.”

• He said, “Saddam was weak with his family members. He punished them, but let them go right back 

to doing what they were doing in the fi rst place.” 

Moreover, ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid thought the only 

occasions he saw Saddam yield under “pressure” 

was in dealing with relatives. “He used to stand by 

their side regardless of any reason.”

It seems clear that Saddam was grooming Qusay as 

his heir by gradually giving him increasing responsibilities starting in the late 1990s. According to ‘Ali 

Hasan Al Majid, “He was paving the way for his son 

Qusay more than ‘Uday, because Qusay was lovely, 

having a noble character.” For many senior Iraqis, 

however, Qusay’s signifi cance stemmed from his 

perceived infl uence on his father. These former senior 

offi cials dismiss Qusay’s intelligence and leadership 

ability. Saddam gave him security, and some military 

responsibilities, but never signifi cant political, scientifi c or economic tasks in government. There was also 

a view that Qusay already had more responsibility 

than he could handle.

• Saddam gave Qusay control of the RG, SRG, and 

SSO. He was elected in 2001 to the Ba’th Party 

Command, a stepping-stone to eventual RCC membership, which would have been the most signifi -

cant mark of his growing importance in the Regime 

hierarchy.

• Saddam also assigned Qusay to the Higher Committee as a watchdog in 2002 in response to 

Saddam’s dissatisfaction with committee concessions to the UN, according to Ramadan.

The Heir Apparent

Different sources portray Qusay Saddam Husayn, 

Saddam’s potential successor, as ambitious, distrustful and fawning.

• Qusay in 1998 began to marginalize certain senior 

Regime offi cials who had been appointed by 

Saddam and installed his own trusted aides in key 

positions, including within the SSO, according to a 

former senior offi cial.

• Qusay was a member of the (military) Committee 

of Three, which controlled armed forces offi cer 

promotions and recommended to Saddam General 

Offi cer appointments and promotion. He showed 

himself profoundly suspicious of recommendations 

from within the army and often disregarded them, 

according to a former senior offi cer.

• Qusay was keen to provide Saddam with good 

military news, according to Walid Hamid Tawfi q. 

However, he lived in fear of incurring Saddam’s 

displeasure and optimistically exaggerated information that he gave to Saddam.

• The former MIC director, Huwaysh, recounted that 

on one occasion in late 2002 when he met with 

Saddam and Qusay, Qusay boasted to his father, 

“we are ten times more powerful than in 1991.” 

Immediately disagreeing, Huwaysh said, “Actually, 

we are 100 times weaker than in 1991, because 

the people are not ready to fi ght.” Saddam did not 

respond, but Qusay was angry that Huwaysh had 

contradicted him.

Saddam and His Sense of Legacy

Saddam was most concerned with his legacy, and 

he saw it in grand historic terms. His management 

of the present was always with a view to its appearance in the future, and this tended to distort foreign 

protagonists’ perceptions of his current motivations. 

He wanted to be remembered as a ruler who had been 

as signifi cant to Iraq as Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar 

and Salah-al-Din [Saladin]. His problem lay in how to 

defi ne and to achieve this greatness. Even what it was 
23

Regime Strategic

 Intent

to consist of was hazy. His drive to preserve his place 

in Iraqi history outweighed even his feelings toward 

his family. Saddam wanted a dynasty as seemingly 

the best way to guarantee his legacy, but he was clear 

about the distinction between dynasty and legacy 

and of the two, he was most concerned about legacy. 

At the time of the fall of the Regime, he was leaning 

toward Qusay as successor, but with his second son 

still very much on probation.

• A US interviewer noted Saddam spoke of his place 

in Iraqi history and his family in the same context, 

but showed a far greater concern for the former.

• Huwaysh thought Saddam saw himself in “larger 

than life” terms comparable to Nebuchadnezzar and 

Salah-al-Din [Saladin]. More modestly, Saddam 

when speaking to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid compared 

his rule to Al Mansur, the Abbasid Caliph who 

founded Baghdad, and Al Hajjaj, the Umayyad 

founder of Arab rule in Iraq. ‘Ali also thought 

Saddam “dreamed of making Iraq the biggest 

power in the region and the Middle East.”

• According to Huwaysh, Saddam’s economic vision 

for Iraq—looking out ten years—was a recreation 

of Iraq’s industrial strength and a planned manufacturing economy that would not be dependent on 

oil exports. Saddam, however, had no plans for an 

information-based or service sector economy, nor 

was there a place for tourism. The likelihood was 

that even with peace and no sanctions, Iraq would 

have been as self-isolated and unconnected to a free 

world as it ever had been under his rule.

Desire . . . Dominance and 

Deterrence Through WMD

Saddam’s Role in WMD Policy

Saddam’s centrality to the Regime’s political structure meant that he was the hub of Iraqi WMD 

policy and intent. His personalized and intricate 

administrative methods meant that control of WMD 

development and its deployment was never far from 

his touch (see the “Excerpts from a Closed-Door 

Meeting” inset). His chain of command for WMD 

was optimized for his control rather than to ensure the 

participation of Iraq’s normal political, administrative 

or military structures. Under this arrangement, the 

absence of information about WMD in routine structures and the Iraqi military’s order of battle would not 

mean it did not exist. Even so, if WMD existed, its 

absence from Iraqi military formations and planning 

when war was imminent in 2003 would be hard to 

explain.

As with past use, Saddam would have rigorously and 

personally controlled the relevant formations, and 

have had sole release authority. Saddam’s doctrine in 

the Iran-Iraq war was to separate WMD control from 

the military’s leadership, but to have its use available (and controlled by security agencies) if military 

operations required it.

The defense ministry and the senior military staffs 

formulated national war plans, but according to Staff 

Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta’i, the former Minister of Defense, these organizations did not incorporate WMD in their planning, training, and supply 

systems during the Iran-Iraq war. Sultan’s recollection, however seems thin given the likely degree of 

planning and training necessary for the extensive use 

of CW by both sides during the confl ict.

• During and after the late 1990s, the few times 

Saddam evidently asked about the potential of 

certain Iraqi WMD options suggest he was not 

consistently focused on this issue. He asked ad hoc 

questions about feasibility of reconstituting programs and confi ned his confi dences to hinting that 

Iraq might reconstitute WMD after sanctions. While 
24

he may have said he had the desire, no source 

has claimed that Saddam had an explicit strategy 

or program for the development or use of WMD 

during the sanctions period. Given the sensitivity 

of the subject, however, to share such thinking with 

anybody but a few close associates would have 

been out of character for Saddam. This lack of a 

formal statement would chime with his autocratic 

style of governance—especially given past experience with UN inspections searching for documents.

• Saddam spoke often in one-to-one sessions with 

fi rst Husayn Kamil and later Huwaysh on research 

and industrial issues supporting WMD. There 

are no indications that Saddam issued detailed 

written instructions to either individual to direct 

WMD work.

• There are multiple references, however, to Saddam 

ordering the MIC to pursue military technology 

“pet projects” he had received from other government agencies, individual scientists, or academics. 

Often the projects’ proponents had exaggerated 

their technical merits to obtain Saddam’s backing. 

Desperate to fi nd and exploit any potential military 

advantage, Saddam would direct the projects for 

further research and development. However, none 

of these projects involved WMD.

Saddam’s rationale for the possession of WMD 

derived from a need for survival and domination. 

This included a mixture of individual, ethnic, and 

nationalistic pride as well as national security 

concerns particularly regarding Iran. Saddam 

wanted personal greatness, a powerful Iraq that could 

project infl uence on the world stage, and a succession that guaranteed both. Saddam sought the further 

industrialization of Iraq, held great hopes for Iraqi 

science, and saw himself as the liberator of Palestine. His vision was clearest—and seemingly most 

achievable—in terms of leaving Iraq militarily strong, 

within appropriate borders and safe from external 

aggressors, especially Iran. WMD was one of the 

means to these interrelated ends.

Saddam felt that any country that had the technological ability to develop WMD had an intrinsic 

right to do so. He saw WMD as both a symbol and 

a normal process of modernity. Saddam’s national 

security policy demanded victory in war, deterrence 

of hostile neighbors (including infi ltration into Iraq), 

and prestige and strategic infl uence throughout the 

Arab world. These concerns led Iraq to develop and 

maintain WMD programs.

• Saddam sought foremost personal and Regime survival against several foreign and domestic enemies. 

At the same time, he sought to restore Iraq’s 

regional infl uence and to eliminate sanctions.

• In particular, Saddam was focused on the eventual 

acquisition of a nuclear weapon, which Tariq ‘Aziz 

said Saddam was fully committed to acquiring 

despite the absence of an effective program after 

1991.

What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes 

of WMD

The former Regime viewed the four WMD areas 

(nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles) differently. Differences between the views are explained 

by a complex web of historical military signifi cance, 

level of prestige it afforded Iraq, capability as a deterrent or a coercive tool, and technical factors such as 

cost and diffi culty of production. We would expect to 

see varying levels of attention to the four programs 

and varying efforts to prepare for, or engage in, 

actions to restart them.

Saddam concluded that Iraq’s use of CW prevented 

Iran, with its much greater population and tolerance 

for casualties, from completely overrunning Iraqi 

forces, according to former Vice President Ramadan. Iraq used CW extensively in the Iran-Iraq war 

(1980-88) to repel the Iranian army.

• Iraq suffered from a quantitative imbalance between 

its conventional forces and those of Iran.

• Saddam’s subordinates realized that the tactical use 

of WMD had beaten Iran. Even Taha Yasin Rama-
25

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Iraq’s Use of CW in 1991 Against Internal Unrest

The former Regime also saw chemical weapons as a 

tool to control domestic unrest, in addition to their 

war-fi ghting role. In March 1991, the former Regime 

used multiple helicopter sorties to drop CW-fi lled 

bombs on rebel groups as a part of its strategy to 

end the revolt in the South. That the Regime would 

consider this option with Coalition forces still operating within Iraq’s boundaries demonstrates both the 

dire nature of the situation and the Regime’s faith in 

“special weapons.”

• All but two of Iraq’s provinces in 1991 were in 

open revolt and the Regime was worried. The fall 

of Karbala deeply affected key decision-makers. 

According to a former senior member of the CW 

program, the Regime was shaking and wanted 

something “very quick and effective” to put down 

the revolt.

• In the early morning of 7 March 1991 an unidentifi ed Iraqi requested permission to use “liquids” 

against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regime 

forces intended to use the “liquid” to defeat dug-in 

forces as part of a larger assault.

• Husayn Kamil, then Director of MIC, ordered 

senior offi cials in the chemical weapons program 

to ready CW for use against the revolt. His initial 

instruction was to use VX. When informed that no 

VX was available he ordered mustard to be used. 

However, mustard was ruled out and Sarin 

selected because the persistence of mustard 

made it more likely to be detected.

• On or about 7 March 1991, R-400 aerial bombs 

located at the Tamuz Airbase were readied for 

use. Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) 

technicians mixed the two components of the 

Iraqi “binary” nerve agent system inside the R400s. Explosive burster charges were loaded into 

the bombs and the weapons assembled near the 

runway.

• Helicopters from nearby bases fl ew to Tamuz, 

were armed with the Sarin-laden R-400s and other 

conventional ordnance. Dozens of sorties were 

fl own against Shi’a rebels in Karbala and the surrounding areas. A senior participant from the CW 

program estimates that 10 to 20 R-400s were used. 

Other reporting suggests as many as 32 R-400s 

may have been dropped. As of March 1991, about 

a dozen MI-8 helicopters were staged at Tamuz 

Airbase.

• MI-8 helicopters were used during the Iran-Iraq 

war to drop chemical munitions, according to an 

Iraqi helicopter pilot.

• Following the initial helicopter sorties, the senior 

chemical weapons program offi cer overseeing the 

operation received an angry call from Husayn 

Kamil’s offi ce. The caller said the attacks had been 

unsuccessful and further measures were required. 

The R-400s were designed for high-speed delivery 

from higher altitude and most likely did not activate properly when dropped from a slow-moving 

helicopter.

• As an alternative to the R-400s, the Al Muthanna 

State Establishment began fi lling CS (tear gas) 

into large aerial bombs. Over the next two weeks 

helicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded with 

CS-fi lled bombs. One participant estimated that 

more than 200 CS fi lled aerial bombs were used on 

rebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf.

• Trailers loaded with mustard-fi lled aerial bombs 

were also transported to the Tamuz Air Base. A 

participant in the operation stated that mustard gas 

was not used on the rebels because of the likelihood of discovery by the Coalition. According to 

the source, the mustard fi lled bombs were never 

unloaded and were not used.

• Reports of attacks in 1991 from refugees and Iraqi 

military deserters include descriptions of a range 

of CW and improvised poisons used in the areas 

around Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah, as well as 

Basrah.
26

dan, one of Saddam’s more independent-minded 

underlings, acknowledged that the use of CW saved 

Iraq during ground fi ghting in the Iran-Iraq war.

• Saddam announced at the end of the war that the 

Iranian army’s backbone had been shattered by the 

war, according to the presidential secretary. Saddam 

stated that Iran would be unable to confront Iraq for 

a decade. Political divisions in Iran, weaknesses in 

Iranian military capabilities, and Iran’s inability to 

sustain long-term offensive operations also reduced 

the risk of attack, according to the former chief-ofstaff.

• Hamid Yusif Hammadi, former Secretary of the 

President and presidential offi ce director (1982-

1991), said that after the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam 

was intoxicated with conceit. He believed he was 

unbeatable. He spoke of this to the Iraqi Government offi cials and to visiting dignitaries from other 

Arab countries.”

Saddam concluded that missile strikes on Tehran, 

late in the Iran-Iraq war, along with the Al Faw 

ground offensive had forced Iran to agree to a 

cease-fi re, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization.

• Saddam’s logic was that the “war of the cities”—

when Al Husayn missiles were fi red at Iranian targets from February to April 1988—had shown that 

Tehran was more vulnerable to missiles because 

its population density was greater than Baghdad’s. 

This gave Iraq a strategic incentive to maintain ballistic-missile capabilities.

• According to Saddam, Iraq accelerated its missile 

development after Iran demonstrated the range 

capability of its imported ballistic missiles in the 

1980s. Saddam said missile technology had been 

important to Iraq because Iraq could build its own 

ballistic missiles whereas Iran could not.

Saddam saw Iraq’s nuclear program as a logical 

result of scientifi c and technical progress and was 

unconvinced by the notion of non-proliferation. He 

considered nuclear programs a symbol of a modern 

nation, indicative of technological progress, a byproduct of economic development, and essential to 

political freedom at the international level (what he 

described as “strategic balance”). He wanted nuclear 

weapons to guarantee his legacy and to compete with 

powerful and antagonistic neighbors; to him, nuclear 

weapons were necessary for Iraq to survive. Saddam 

wished to keep the IAEC active and his scientists 

employed and continuing their research. “I,” maintained Saddam, “am the Godfather of the IAEC and 

I love the IAEC.” In a captured audio tape, Saddam 

said in a conversation (of unknown date) with Tariq 

‘Aziz and other unidentifi ed senior offi cials:

This conversation was very useful. We have had a 

look at the international situation, and arrange (present tense) our present and future steps during these 

studies. I believe that the USA is concentrating on the 

Far East, and all of the areas of South East Asia, for 

two main reasons—Korea and Pakistan. The existence 

of the nuclear weapons in other countries makes 

the USA and Europe get worried. Having nuclear 

weapons in these areas, with their economic situation known by the US, gives these countries a chance 

to face the European countries and the Americans. A 

long time ago economic recovery existed in only in 

two areas of the world. In the last fi fteen years Japan 

appears to have improved itself to what they see 

now. Not only Japan but all of these countries have 

developed economically. When it appears that there 

are nuclear weapons in Korea others will be allowed, 

under the doctrine of “self defense and balance of 

power,” to create the same industry. As a result, when 

South Korea or Japan decides to create nuclear 

weapons they won’t need a long time to produce it. 

The money and the weapons will be in an area outside 

Europe and the USA. At the same time there will be 

more pressure on China to stop their [South Korea or 

Japan’s] nuclear experiments. When nuclear centers are allowed in different places this pressure will 

decrease, and China will have the chance to develop 

its nuclear programs with less pressure from USA 

and Europe. As a result, as it was previously with 

China, with the high technology, will put the USA and 

Europe in the situation we mentioned before: they will 

be worried about their international trading and their 

international effect. This is what the USA is 

interested in.
27

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Excerpts from a Closed-Door Meeting 

Between Saddam and Senior Personnel, January 

1991

The Iraqi Regime routinely, almost obsessively, 

engaged in the recording of its high level meetings, 

not in the conventional documentary form of more 

ordinary bureaucracies, but by way of audio and 

videotapes. Despite the highly secret and sensitive 

nature of CBW, even discussions in this area are 

known to have been recorded in this manner. Below is 

an example of an audio recording recovered by ISG, 

probably made during the second week of January 

1991. Saddam and senior offi cials move from making 

routine, even jocular, small talk about ceremonial 

clothing, to engaging in a detailed discussion of 

chemical and biological weapons. The following are 

excerpts from a conversation lasting a quarter of an 

hour between Saddam, director of the MIC Husayn 

Kamil Hasan Al Majid, Iraqi Air Force Commander 

Muzahim Sa’b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, and, at 

least, one other senior offi cial in which they discuss 

the prospect for WMD attacks on Saudi and Israeli 

cities (see Annex D “Saddam’s Personal Involvement 

in WMD Planning” for the complete meeting transcript).

Begin Transcript:

Speaker 2: Sir, the design of the suit is with a white 

shirt and a collar (neck line) like dishdasha.

Saddam: Then my design is right.

Husayn Kamil and Speaker 2: Absolutely right, sir . . .

Saddam: I want to make sure that—close the door 

please (door slams)—the germ and chemical warheads, as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are 

available to [those concerned], so that in case we 

ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any 

of their targets?

Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you’ll allow me. Some of the 

chemicals now are distributed, this is according to the 

last report from the Minister of Defense, which was 

submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads are stored 

and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and 

when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, 

some other artillery machines and rockets (missiles) 

are available from the army. While some of the empty 

“stuff” is available for us, our position is very good, 

and we don’t have any operational problems. Moreover, in the past, many substantial items and materials were imported; now, we were able to establish a 

local project, which was established to comply with 

daily production. Also, another bigger project will be 

fi nalized within a month, as well as a third project in 

the coming two to three months that will keep us on 

the safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir, only deal in 

common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol and 

methyl (interrupted) . . .

Saddam: what is it doing with you, I need these germs 

to be fi xed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because 

starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the 

action to happen at anytime, and I consider Riyadh as 

a target . . .

Husayn Kamil: (door slams) Sir, we have three types 

of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one we 

should use, some types stay capable for many years 

(interrupted).

Saddam: we want the long term, the many years kind . . .

Husayn Kamil: . . . There has to be a decision about 

which method of attack we use; a missile, a fi ghter 

bomb or a fi ghter plane.

Saddam: With them all, all the methods . . . I want as 

soon as possible, if we are not transferring the weapons, to issue a clear order to [those concerned] that 

the weapon should be in their hands ASAP. I might 

even give them a “non-return access.” (Translator 

Comment: to have access to the weapons; to take 

them with them and not to return them). I will give 

them an order stating that at “one moment,” if I ‘m 

not there and you don’t hear my voice, you will hear 

somebody else’s voice, so you can receive the order 

from him, and then you can go attack your targets. I 

want the weapons to be distributed to targets; I want 

Riyadh and Jeddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities 

with all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live 

there. This is for the germ and chemical weapons . . . 

Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you 

should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport this 

weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would 

come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. 

This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful. This is 

according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted) . . .

Saddam: May God help us do it . . . We will never 

lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we 

have to destroy everybody.
28

Iraq began a nuclear program shortly after the 

Ba’thists took power in 1968. The program expanded 

considerably in 1976 when Saddam purchased the 

Osirak reactor from France, which was destroyed by 

an Israeli air strike in 1981. Saddam became very 

concerned about Iran’s nuclear weapons program late 

in the Iran-Iraq war and accelerated Iraq’s nuclear 

weapons research in response, according to Vice 

President Ramadan. Massive funds were allocated to 

develop infrastructure, equipment, scientifi c talent, 

and research. By January 1991, Iraq was within a few 

years of producing a nuclear weapon.

Coalition bombing during Desert Storm, however, 

signifi cantly damaged Iraq’s nuclear facilities and the 

imposition of UN sanctions and inspections teams 

after the war further hobbled the program. It appears 

Saddam shifted tactics to preserve what he could of 

his program (scientifi c talent, dual-use equipment, 

and designs) while simultaneously attempting to rid 

Iraq of sanctions.

In comparison to Iraq’s nuclear and CW programs, the BW program was more dependent 

upon a smaller body of individual expertise. Iraq’s 

BW program began in the 1970s under President 

Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr. Scientists conducted research 

into fundamental aspects of bacteria, toxins, and 

viruses, emphasizing production, pathogenicity, 

dissemination and storage of agents, such as 

Clostridium botulinum, spores of Bacillus anthracis, 

and infl uenza. Despite investing considerable effort 

in this fi rst attempt, Iraq’s BW program faltered. In 

1979, after Saddam assumed the Presidency, Iraq 

reorganized its CW and BW effort. Iraq rebuilt 

and expanded the infrastructure for BW research 

between 1979 and 1985, but undertook little work on 

military applications, aside from assassination-related 

research for the IIS (see Annex B “Iraq’s Intelligence 

Services” for additional information).

At the height of the Iran-Iraq war in 1985, the Regime 

revitalized the BW program. A new BW group was 

recruited and research began on gas gangrene and 

botulinum toxin. In 1986, the Regime developed a 

5-year plan leading to weaponization of BW agents. 

By early 1990, Iraq was methodically advancing 

toward the addition of a BW component to its WMD 

arsenal. In April 1990, Husayn Kamil gave orders to 

weaponize BW as quickly as possible and by August 

1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the BW program 

had moved into high gear to fi eld BW-fi lled weapons. 

By the time of Desert Storm, Iraq had a BW program 

that included production of large quantities of several 

agents—anthrax, botulinum toxin, Clostridium 

perfringens, afl atoxin, and small quantities of ricin. 

Iraq successfully weaponized some of these agents 

into ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, artillery shells, 

and aircraft spray tanks.

The Coalition destroyed all of Iraq’s known BW 

facilities and bombed some of the suspect BW sites 

during the 1991 Gulf war. After Desert Storm, the 

Regime fabricated an elaborate cover story to hide 

the function of its premiere BW production facility 

at Al Hakam, while at the same time it continued to 

develop the sites potential. The UN suspected but 

could not confi rm any major BW agent production 

sites until Iraq partially declared its BW program 

prior to the departure of Husayn Kamil in 1995. Iraq 

eventually owned up to its offensive BW program 

later that year and destroyed the remaining facilities 

in 1996 under UN supervision. From 1994 until their 

departure at the end of 1998, and from late 2002 until 

the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, UN inspectors 

monitored nearly 200 sites deemed to have some 

potential use in a BW program. Iraq’s actions in the 

period up to 1996 suggest that the former Regime 

intended to preserve its BW capability and return 

to steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW 

program when and if the opportunity arose. After 

1996, limited evidence suggests that Iraq abandoned 

its existing BW program and that one Iraqi offi cial 

considered BW personnel to be second rate, heading an expensive program that had not delivered on 

its potential (see Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program 

chapter for additional information).

What Saddam Thought: External Concerns

Saddam viewed Iraq as “underdeveloped” and 

therefore vulnerable to regional and global adversaries. Senior Regime members generally ranked 

Tehran fi rst and Tel Aviv as a more distant second 

as their primary adversaries, but no Iraqi decision-
29

Regime Strategic

 Intent

maker asserted that either country was an imminent 

challenge between 1991 and 2003. Late during this 

period, Saddam became concerned about the growing military imbalance between Iran and Iraq; Iran 

was making signifi cant advances in WMD while Iraq 

was being deprived of the opportunity to maintain or 

advance its WMD capacity. He also privately told his 

top advisors, on multiple occasions, that he sought to 

establish a strategic balance between the Arabs and 

Israel, a different objective from deterring an Iranian 

strategic attack or blunting an Iranian invasion.

• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, Saddam 

“desired for Iraq to possess WMD, nuclear, biological, and chemical because he always said that 

he desired for balance in the Middle East region.” 

Saddam said this was because there were other 

countries in the area that possessed such weapons, 

like Israel, and others on the way to possession, like 

Iran.

Iran

Saddam believed that WMD was necessary to counter Iran. He saw Iran as Iraq’s abiding enemy and he 

sought to keep it in check. Saddam was keenly aware 

that, in addition to the potential of invasion, Iranian 

infi ltrators could cause internal unrest. Therefore, the 

orientation of most Iraqi ground forces toward the 

Iranian border remained unchanged throughout the 

sanctions period. Saddam argued Iraqi WMD development, while driven in part by the growth of Iranian 

capabilities, was also intended to provide Iraq with a 

winning edge against Iran.

• Saddam considered WMD as the only sure counterbalance to an enemy developing WMD of its 

own. He said Iran was the main concern because 

it wanted to annex southern Iraq. Saddam said US 

air strikes were less of a worry than an Iranian land 

attack.

• Ramadan thought WMD programs might only be 

suspended for a short period of time in order to 

normalize Iraq’s relations with the international 

community, and would have to be resumed if no 

substitute counterbalance to Iran was forthcoming.

• Saddam and the Quartet discussed Iran many times, 

according to offi cials close to Saddam. Both ‘Aziz 

and Huwaysh have stated in interviews that Saddam’s main focus was the danger from Iran.

• Iran attacked a Mujahiddin è Khaliq (MEK) facility 

in April 2001 with more than 60 rockets. Earlier 

strikes on MEK targets had occurred in November 

1994 and June 1999, but Iran had only fi red a small 

number of rockets.

Saddam was very concerned about Iranian military production capabilities, particularly its nuclear 

weapons program, according to former Vice President 

Ramadan. A Ministry of Defense conference concluded in January 2003 that Iranian WMD posed a 

looming menace to Iraq and the region, according to 

a sensitive source. Attended by 200 senior offi cers, 

the conference discussed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 

weapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, and 

possession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BW

warheads over a range of 1,000 kilometers. Saddam 

believed that Iran had benefi ted from the breakup of 

the former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMD 

as well as conventional technologies.

Iraqi military troops trained with the expectation 

that Iran would use CW if Iran invaded. If Iraq came 

under chemical or biological attack, the army would 

attempt to survive until the international community 

intervened. Tariq ‘Aziz also expressed hope that the 

close UN monitoring of Iraq might force international 

intervention in this scenario. Saddam felt that the 

United States would intervene to protect oilfi elds, 

according to a former senior Iraqi offi cial.

A former Corps commander stated that Saddam 

believed the next war would be fought in a chemical 

environment with heavy reliance upon missiles. Iraq 

assumed that Iran could manufacture CW and would 

use it, according to a former senior Iraqi intelligence 

offi cer. The Iraqis had identifi ed Iranian nuclear and 

chemical facilities as well as 240 factories in Iran that 

they assessed produced missile components.

Between 1998 and 2003, Iraqi leaders determined that 

Tehran was more of a long-term danger than an imminent one because of defi ciencies in Iranian readiness 

and morale when compared against Iraqi training and 
30

preparedness. Some Iraqis also believed the international community would halt if not deter an Iranian 

invasion. Saddam accordingly decided to use diplomacy as his primary tool against Iran, but he never 

wielded it successfully. Iraq really had no coherent 

policy on how to deal with Tehran after Desert Storm, 

although, from the Iraqi point of view, the immediate 

risk was deemed to be low.

• According to the former Iraqi Army Chief-of-Staff 

(COS), Iran would have diffi culty conducting a 

large surprise attack because Iraq would detect the 

extensive mobilization required for it. Iraqi forward observers would detect Iranian troops as they 

assembled along probable invasion corridors.

• DGMI maintained over 10,000 fi les on Iranian 

order of battle, including 3,000 photographs, 

according to a former intelligence offi cer. Intelligence reports with detailed, tactical information 

about Iranian infi ltration attempts also were forwarded directly to Saddam, according to captured 

documents.

• The RG and Air Force provided detailed air order 

of battle information for Israel and Iran, according to captured Iraqi documents. The documents 

assessed probable Israeli Air Force tactics against 

Iraqi forces. Although much of this information 

could be obtained from open sources, it is signifi cant that Iraq could “mine” it and apply it to 

military planning.

• Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclear 

program in 2001, but did not contradict Iranian 

claims that their reactors being used for peaceful 

purposes, according to the former deputy director of the IIS. Regardless, Iraq assumed Iran was 

attempting to develop nuclear weapons. IIS assets 

often passed along open source information as if it 

were intelligence, allowing disinformation to reach 

the upper levels of the former Regime. Iraqi leaders 

acknowledged Iran’s advantages in population, 

income, and access to international arms markets—especially as Iraq’s former ally Russia began 

to arm Iran.

Iraqi Intelligence Collection Against Iran

Iraq’s intelligence services collected foreign intelligence on Iran and relayed the raw reporting to 

Saddam via his presidential secretary. The government tightly controlled dissemination of material. 

This raw intelligence that went to Saddam would not 

necessarily be shared even with the deputy prime minister or military.

• The National Security Committee, the body that

coordinated Iraq’s intelligence services, advised 

the vice president in October 2001 that Iran would 

remain Iraq’s foremost enemy and that the Iranians would rely heavily on missiles in a future war, 

according to captured documents.

• IIS conducted extensive collection operations 

against Iran, according to a former IIS senior offi -

cer and various captured documents. Intelligence 

collection as a whole targeted Iran’s weapons programs, its nuclear program, economic issues, and 

international relations. Human intelligence sources 

were the primary means of intelligence collection 

against Iran, supported by signals intelligence 

conducted by the IIS Directorate for Signals Intelligence (M17).

• IIS had assigned 150 offi cers to work the Iranian 

target, according to a former senior IIS offi cer. The 

IIS relied heavily on the MEK and independent 

assets in every province to monitor Iranian military 

and WMD developments. The Iraqis also studied 

Jane’s publications for information on foreign 

weapons systems. One senior offi cer spotlighted 

how important the Internet was to their understanding of general threat capabilities.

• Iraqi units were at least as good as their Iranian 

counterparts. The former Iraqi Army COS said 

Iran enjoyed quantitative—not qualitative—ground 

superiority, according to the former defense minister. Although sanctions would have had a major 

impact, Iraqi forces arrayed along the border could 

survive the fi rst two echelons of an Iranian invading force without resorting to WMD. After that they 

would be overrun.

• One senior Regime offi cial, however, said that 

although the Iranian threat was real, Saddam exaggerated it. Iraq considered Iran a historical enemy 

with desires for Iraqi territory.
31

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Israel

“There can never be stability, security or peace in the 

region so long as there are immigrant Jews usurping 

the land of Palestine,” Saddam Husayn, Baghdad TV 

political discussion, 17 January 2001

Saddam’s attitude toward Israel, although refl ecting 

defensive concerns, was hostile. Saddam considered 

Israel the common enemy of all Arabs and this mirrored the attitudes of the Arab street in their opposition to a Zionist state. Moreover, it was reported that 

he considered himself the next Salah-al-Din (Saladin) 

with a divine mission to liberate Jerusalem. This 

was a tactic to win popular support in countries like 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. He was aware of his 

prestige as a champion of Palestine against Israel and 

consistently called for the liberation of Palestine from 

the “river to the sea” and warned that any Arab ruler 

who abandoned the Palestinians would “pay a heavy 

price.” In February 2001, he said publicly:

“When we speak about the enemies of Iraq, this 

means the enemies of the Arab nation. When we speak 

about the enemies of the Arab nation, we mean the 

enemies of Iraq. This is because Iraq is in the heart, 

mind, and chest of the Arab nation,”

Saddam implied, according to the former presidential secretary, that Iraq would resume WMD 

programs after sanctions in order to restore the 

“strategic balance” within the region. Saddam was 

conscious of Israel’s WMD arsenal and saw Israel 

as a formidable challenge to Arab interests. Israel 

appeared to be a rival that had strategic dominance 

because it possessed WMD and the ability to build 

relations with countries neighboring Iraq, such as 

Turkey and Iran, which could destabilize Iraq from 

within using the Shi’a or Kurds. Iraq faced a more 

focused risk of air and missile strikes from Israeli 

strategic forces, rather than a ground attack. According to a former senior offi cial, Israel’s bombing of 

Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build 

up Iraq’s military to confront Israel in the early 1980s. 

Other Iraqi policy makers stated they could otherwise 

do little to infl uence Israel. Saddam judged Israel to 

be a lesser adversary than Iran because Israel could 

not invade Iraq, according to former Vice President 

Ramadan.

The United States

Saddam did not consider the United States a natural 

adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped 

that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with 

the United States, according to Tariq ‘Aziz and the 

presidential secretary. Tariq ‘Aziz pointed to a series 

of issues, which occurred between the end of the 

Iran-Iraq war and 1991, to explain why Saddam failed 

to improve relations with the United States: Irangate 

(the covert supplying of Iran with missiles, leaked in 

1986), a continuing US fl eet presence in the Gulf, suspected CIA links with Kurds and Iraqi dissidents and 

the withdrawal of agricultural export credits. After 

Irangate, Saddam believed that Washington could 

not be trusted and that it was out to get him personally. His outlook encouraged him to attack Kuwait, 

and helps explain his later half-hearted concessions 

to the West. These concerns collectively indicated to 

Saddam that there was no hope of a positive relationship with the United States in the period before the 

attack on Kuwait.

Although the United States was not considered 

a natural adversary, some Iraqi decision-makers 

viewed it as Iraq’s most pressing concern, according to former Vice President Ramadan. Throughout 

the 1990s, Saddam and the Ba’th Regime considered full-scale invasion by US forces to be the most 

dangerous potential threat to unseating the Regime, 

although Saddam rated the probability of an invasion 

as very low. Throughout the UNSCOM period, Iraqi 

leaders extended a number of feelers to the United 

States through senior UNSCOM personnel offering 

strategic concessions in return for an end to sanctions. 

The stumbling block in these feelers was the apparent 

Iraqi priority on maintaining both the Saddam Regime 

and the option of Iraqi WMD.

• In a custodial debriefi ng, Saddam said he wanted to 

develop better relations with the US over the latter 

part of the 1990s. He said, however, that he was not 

given a chance because the US refused to listen to 

anything Iraq had to say.

• In 2004, Charles Duelfer of ISG said that between 

1994 and 1998, both he and UNSCOM Executive 

Chairman Rolf Ekeus were approached multiple 

times by senior Iraqis with the message that Bagh-
32

dad wanted a dialogue with the United States, and 

that Iraq was in a position to be Washington’s “best 

friend in the region bar none.”

While Iran was a more enduring enemy, after 1991, 

the temporary challenge from the United States posed 

a more immediate danger. Those who had detailed 

information about US capabilities also concluded 

there was little Iraq could do to counter a US invasion. Iraqi military commanders who did perceive the 

risk of invasion realized that the imbalance in power 

between Iraq and the United States was so disparate 

that they were incapable of halting a US invasion. 

Even if Iraq’s military performed better during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq would only have increased 

the number of Coalition casualties without altering 

the war’s outcome, according to the former defense 

minister.

Saddam failed to understand the United States, its 

internal or foreign drivers, or what it saw as its interests in the Gulf region. Little short of the prospect 

of military action would get Saddam to focus on US 

policies. He told subordinates many times that following Desert Storm the United States had achieved 

all it wanted in the Gulf. He had no illusions about 

US military or technological capabilities, although 

he believed the United States would not invade 

Iraq because of exaggerated US fears of casualties. 

Saddam also had a more pessimistic view of the 

United States. By late 2002 Saddam had persuaded 

himself, just as he did in 1991, that the United States 

would not attack Iraq because it already had achieved 

its objectives of establishing a military presence in the 

region, according to detainee interviews.

• Saddam speculated that the United States would 

instead seek to avoid casualties and, if Iraq was 

attacked at all, the campaign would resemble Desert 

Fox.

• Some Iraqi leaders did not consider the United 

States to be a long-term enemy, but many knew 

little about the United States and less about its foreign policy formulation. Former advisors have also 

suggested that Saddam never concluded that the 

United States would attempt to overthrow him with 

an invasion.

Saddam, however, portrayed the United States and 

Israel as inseparable and believed Israel could not 

attack Iraq without permission from the United 

States. In February 2001, Saddam stated in a television broadcast, “The United States and Israel are one 

thing now . . . the rulers of the United States have 

become a toy in the hands of the Zionist octopus, 

which has created the midget Zionist entity at the 

expense of Arabs in occupied Palestine.” In May of 

the same year he stated, “We will draw the sword 

against whoever attacks us and chop off his head.” 

Saddam directed the Iraqi media “to highlight the 

motive of the covetous [US] leadership that succumbs 

to the wishes of Zionism” and “seeks to establish an 

artifi cial homeland at the Arabs’ expense.” Ramadan 

noted that the Regime considered Israel to be an 

extension of the danger posed by the United States.

Iraq’s Limited Intelligence on US Military 

Operations

Iraq derived much of its understanding of US military 

capabilities from television and the Internet, according to the former DGMI director. Iraq obtained only 

limited information about US military capabilities 

from its own intelligence assets, although they closely 

monitored the US buildup in Kuwait.

• The army staff prepared a comprehensive study on 

how US attacks against Iraq might unfold in 2002, 

according to captured documents. The assessment 

evaluated the size, composition, and probable disposition of US forces and identifi ed the US aircraft 

carriers immediately available to attack Iraq.

• The DGMI provided the Higher Military College an 

assessment about how the US XVIII Airborne Corps 

might attack Iraq, according to captured documents. 

The Al Bakr University was using this information 

in computer modeling and war gaming.

• Iraq collected reliable tactical intelligence against 

US forces in Kuwait and even knew when Operation 

Iraqi Freedom would start, according to a former 

fi eld-grade Republican Guard offi cer. One senior 

offi cer spotlighted how important the Internet was 

to their understanding of general threat capabilities.
33

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Saddam’s handling of Iraq’s response to the 9/11 

attacks probably refl ects a lack of understanding of 

US politics and may explain why Baghdad failed 

to appreciate how profoundly US attitudes had 

changed following September 2001. Saddam’s poor 

understanding of US attitudes contributed to fl awed 

decision-making, according to Tariq ‘Aziz. According to ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, 

Saddam rejected advice from his cabinet to offer 

condolences after the attacks:

• Ministers discussing the attacks recommended that 

Iraq should issue an offi cial statement condemning 

the terrorists and offering condolences to the people 

of the United States, despite American hostility 

toward Iraq.

• Saddam refused on the grounds that he could not 

extend offi cial condolences, given the hardships 

the Iraqi people had suffered at the hands of the US 

Government—without any US apology. Saddam 

was happy after the 11 September 2001 attacks 

because it hurt the United States, according to Tariq 

‘Aziz, and he declined to issue any statements of 

condolence.

• Saddam’s response dissatisfi ed most ministers, who 

saw the catastrophe as being beyond state-to-state 

relations. They feared that offi cial Iraqi non-reaction would associate Baghdad with Al Qa’ida. 

Moreover, they perceived that the net result of the 

attack would align the United States against Islam 

and the Arabs.

• Saddam dismissed these concerns, but he authorized Tariq ‘Aziz to pursue a “people to people” 

program by privately expressing condolences individually to a few US citizens (the persons named 

were once US offi cials but held no offi cial offi ces in 

2001).

• Iraq’s media was unique among Middle Eastern 

services in praising the attackers, according to the 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Former Iraqi offi cials concluded, time and time 

again, that the threat inherent in their WMD arsenal and weapons delivery systems helped preserve 

Saddam’s Regime.

• In April 1990, Saddam threatened “by God, we will 

make fi re eat up half of Israel, if it tried [to strike] 

against Iraq.” Saddam’s statement was part of a 

lengthy speech in which he denied having a nuclear 

weapons program. His warning might have been 

meant to deter Israel from preemptively attacking 

an industrial facility, which manufactured electrical capacitors alleged to be used in the trigger of 

a nuclear device, as it had done when it struck the 

Osirak reactor in June 1981.

• Prior to Desert Storm, Saddam threatened to use 

missile- and aircraft-delivered chemical and biological munitions to deter Israel and the coalition from 

attacking Iraq or at worst unseating the Regime. 

Former Iraqi offi cials concluded the threat inherent 

in their WMD arsenal and delivery systems helped 

preserve the Regime when Coalition Forces did not 

invade Baghdad in 1991.

• Saddam’s public and private statements in 1990 

and 1991 reveal that Iraq envisioned using WMD 

against Israel and invading Coalition Forces under 

certain conditions. Iraq later declared to UNSCOM 

inspectors that just prior to the Gulf war it dispersed 

CBW munitions to selected airfi elds and other locations. This included 75 “special warheads” for the 

Al Husayn missile deployed at four sites, with the 

warheads and missile bodies stored separately. Iraq 

told UNSCOM these weapons were only to be used 

in response to a nuclear attack on Baghdad, and that 

the government had delegated retaliatory authority 

to fi eld commanders. (See “Excerpts from a Closed 

Door Meeting” inset below for additional information).

• Public statements, intensifi ed research and development, production, weaponization, and dispersal 

of WMD suggest that Saddam sought the option 

of using WMD strategically before and during 

Desert Storm. He hoped to prolong the war with 

the United States, expecting that the US population 

would grow war-weary and stop the attack.

• Saddam announced on the eve of the ground campaign that the Al Husayn missile was “capable of 

carrying nuclear, chemical and biological warheads.” He warned that Iraq “will use weapons 
34

that will match the weapons used against us by our 

enemy, but in any case, under no circumstances 

shall we ever relinquish Iraq.” He explained that 

“Iraq” included territory extending from “Zakho in 

the north to the sea in the south, all of Iraq.”

• Saddam warned in a statement to the press in 

February 1993 “any attempt to strike against our 

scientifi c or military installations will be confronted 

with a precise reaction.” He also used a Quranic 

citation he rarely used “God be my witness that 

I have delivered the message.” He used a similar 

construct in a July 1990 warning to Kuwait.

WMD Possession—Real or Imagined—Acts as a 

Deterrent

The Iran-Iraq war and the ongoing suppression of 

internal unrest taught Saddam the importance of 

WMD to the dominance and survival of the Regime. 

Following the destruction of much of the Iraqi WMD 

infrastructure during Desert Storm, however, the 

threats to the Regime remained; especially his perception of the overarching danger from Iran. In order 

to counter these threats, Saddam continued with his 

public posture of retaining the WMD capability. This 

led to a diffi cult balancing act between the need to 

disarm to achieve sanctions relief while at the same 

time retaining a strategic deterrent. The Regime never 

resolved the contradiction inherent in this approach. 

Ultimately, foreign perceptions of these tensions contributed to the destruction of the Regime.

• Saddam never discussed using deception as a 

policy, but he used to say privately that the “better 

part of war was deceiving,” according to ‘Ali Hasan 

Al Majid. He stated that Saddam wanted to avoid 

appearing weak and did not reveal he was deceiving 

the world about the presence of WMD.

• The UN’s inconclusive assessment of Iraq’s possession of WMD, in Saddam’s view, gave pause to 

Iran. Saddam was concerned that the UN inspection 

process would expose Iraq’s vulnerability, thereby 

magnifying the effect of Iran’s own capability. 

Saddam compared the analogy of a warrior striking 

the wrist of another, with the potential effect of the 

UN inspection process. He clarifi ed by saying that, 

despite the strength of the arm, striking the wrist 

or elbow can be a more decisive blow to incapacitate the entire arm; knowledge of your opponents’ 

weaknesses is a weapon in itself.

Saddam’s Prioritization of Getting Out From 

Under Sanctions

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 led to 

the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory 

trade and fi nancial sanctions under UNSCR 661 of 

6 August 1990. These sanctions remained in place 

after the military ceasefi re on 28 February 1991. The 

“Political Ceasefi re” incorporated in UNSCR 687 of 

3 April 1991 explicitly linked Iraq’s WMD disarmament to Iraq’s right to resume oil exports. Withdrawal 

of wider sanctions was made dependent on this step.

Saddam continually underestimated the economic 

consequences of his actions. His belief that sanctions would prove ineffective led him to conclude he 

could avoid WMD disarmament. (Saddam may have 

been encouraged in this belief by a miss-appreciation 

of the relative effectiveness of sanctions against the 

apartheid regime in South Africa.) As early as 1992, 

however, Saddam began to form a more sober impression of the power of sanctions and their deleterious 

effect on Iraq.

The compounding economic, military, and infrastructure damage caused by sanctions—not to mention 

their effect on internal opinion in Iraq—focused 

Saddam by the mid-90s on the need to lift sanctions 

before any thought of resuming WMD development 

could be entertained. Saddam’s proximate objective 

was therefore lifting sanctions, but efforts had to be 

compatible with preservation of Regime security.

While it appears that Iraq, by the mid-1990s, was 

essentially free of militarily signifi cant WMD stocks, 

Saddam’s perceived requirement to bluff about WMD 

capabilities made it too dangerous to clearly reveal 
35

Regime Strategic

 Intent

this to the international community, especially Iran. 

Barring a direct approach to fulfi llment of the requirements of 687, Iraq was left with an end-run strategy 

focusing on the de facto elimination of sanctions 

rather than the formal and open Security Council 

process.

• In the late 1990s, Saddam realized he had no WMD 

capabilities but his ego prevented him from publicly acknowledging that the Iraqi WMD program 

was ineffective, according to the former Minister of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research 

Humam ‘Abd-al-Khaliq ‘Abd-al-Ghafur. He added 

that Saddam never talked openly about bluffi ng in 

regard to WMD.

Efforts To Lift Sanctions

As part of his efforts to escape sanctions, Saddam 

launched a vigorous campaign to shape international opinion. The Regime drew attention to everything from poor sanitation to the absence of electric 

power; the main effort, however, focused on the 

impact of sanctions upon children, especially those 

under fi ve years of age. Sanctions did indeed have an 

enormous impact upon Iraq, and Saddam’s campaign 

utilized and amplifi ed that impact. The campaign 

eventually involved everyone from ministers of the 

Iraqi Government to journalists around the world, 

humanitarian groups, and UN offi cials.

• The London Observer amplifi ed a BBC2 documentary which aired in 2002 and exposed Saddam’s 

tactics. “Small coffi ns, decorated with grisly 

photographs of dead babies and their ages—’three 

days’, ‘four days’, written useful for the Englishspeaking media—are paraded through the streets of 

Baghdad on the roofs of taxis, the procession led by 

a throng of professional mourners.” There is only 

one problem, the program observes: because there 

are not enough dead babies around, the Regime 

prevents parents from burying infants immediately, 

as is the Muslim tradition, to create more powerful 

propaganda. An Iraqi taxi driver interviewed on the 

program observed, “They would collect bodies of 

children who had died months before and been held 

for mass processions.” A Western source visited an 

Iraqi hospital and, in the absence of his “minder,” 

was shown “a number of dead babies, lying stacked 

in a mortuary, waiting for the next offi cial procession.”

Saddam used Iraq’s oil resources, in what Baghdad 

perceived to be a moderately successful attempt, to 

undermine and remove UN sanctions. Iraq’s proven 

oil reserves are assessed to be second only to those 

of Saudi Arabia, with estimates ranging from 90.8 to 

147.8 billion barrels (the most common is 112.5 billion barrels). The former Regime played its “oil card” 

in two distinct ways: fi rst, Saddam either stopped or 

reduced oil exports to increase upward pressure on 

world oil prices. Iraq successfully used this tactic 

from November 1999 through the spring 2000. 

Second, Saddam attempted to link the interests of 

other nations with those of Iraq through the allocation 

of OFF oil and trade contracts, which were granted 

to companies whose governments were willing to 

exercise their infl uence within the Security Council to 

lift sanctions. This effort also included the award of 

oil contracts to individuals and groups willing to use 

Buying Your Way Out

As a way of generating international support, the 

Regime gave to others an economic stake in the 

Regime’s survival; an example of this is the curious 

cash disbursement to a senior member of Russian 

Intelligence.

According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al 

Nasiri, the Secretary of the President, Tariq ‘Aziz 

and the Iraqi Ambassador to Russia, ‘Abbas Al 

Kunfadhi, arranged the payment of 15-20 million 

USD to a female colonel in the Russian Intelligence 

Service. She wanted ‘Aziz to accommodate the 

companies nominated by the Russian Intelligence. 

Saddam was approached with this issue by ‘Aziz 

during or after the Council of Ministers’ meeting. 

Later, Saddam called ‘Abd and told him to expect 

a call from Tariq ‘Aziz to authorize the payment 

and channel it through Muhib ‘Abd-al-Razzaq, the 

director of the accounting offi ce of the Presidential 

Diwan. The payments were made in installments 

rather than a lump-sum over every six months 

starting on or about 20 September 2002.
36

their infl uence with their governments to encourage 

policies favorable to removing sanctions.

The condition of international oil markets after 

the adoption of OFF in 1996 enabled Saddam to 

use his oil resources in disputes with UN Sanctions Committee 661, and he did so until other oil 

producing nations began to cope with his tactics.

Saddam intended to use the threat of higher oil prices, 

or market uncertainty (volatility), to infl uence UN 

decision-making toward the removal of sanctions. 

He was initially successful, but he could not sustain 

pressure on oil markets, in part because he could not 

always time his threats to when the balance between 

world supply of and demand for oil would favor 

upward pressure on prices. Second, oil-producing 

states eventually started to adjust their production and 

exports to lessen the impact of Saddam’s tactics. As 

a result, Saddam had far less effect than he wished or 

intended.

• Saddam stopped oil exports in November-December 1999 in an effort to prevent the passage of 

UNSCR 1284, which called for sanctions renewal. 

Oil prices increased slightly more than a dollar a 

barrel between November and December and by 

almost a dollar between December 1999 and January 2000 (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, UNSCR 

1284 was adopted.

• Saddam reduced Iraqi oil exports from January 

through March 2000 in an effort to force the delivery of spare parts held up by UN Committee 661. 

The price of a barrel of oil increased from $23 in 

December 1999 to $27 in March. The UN released 

the parts, Saddam started exporting, and the cost of 

a barrel of oil fell to $22 in April.

• When the United States and United Kingdom 

announced plans in June 2001 to impose “smart 

sanctions,” Saddam once more stopped exporting 

oil to halt the effort. This time, however, the price 

of a barrel of oil declined to $23 in July from a 

price of $25 in May. Saddam restarted exporting the 

following month, August.

• The Iraqi Presidential Council in September 2000 

received a staff paper proposing that Iraq threaten 

to withdraw oil from the OFF program to induce 

upward pressure on world oil prices. The paper 

claimed that this would compel the United States 

and United Kingdom to remove their objections 

to contracts being held up in UN Committee 661. 

The paper also assumed that there was insuffi cient 

excess capacity among oil producing nations to 

counter Iraq’s move. The Council, however, disagreed and did not approve the proposal.

• In addition, Saddam introduced a “surcharge” 

on Iraqi oil exports in September 2000. The UN 

objected to the surcharge because it would give Iraq 

more money than it was authorized under the OFF 

program. Attempting to defeat the UN’s objections, 

Saddam once again stopped oil exports in December, and between December 2000 and January 2001 

oil increased by 3 dollars a barrel but thereafter 

declined. Saddam restarted oil exports but the surcharge stayed in place, although “under the table.”

The former Regime also used Iraq’s oil resources 

to seek diplomatic support for the lifting or easing 

of sanctions. According to Rashid, in early 1997 

Foreign Minister ‘Aziz and Vice President Ramadan 

approached him to propose selling oil only to those 

who were “friendly” toward the former Regime. By 

“friendly,” Rashid said that ‘Aziz and Ramadan meant 

“those nations that would help [Iraq] get sanctions 

lifted or individuals who were infl uential with their 

government leaders and who could persuade them to 

help get sanctions lifted.” Saddam ordered the proposal be undertaken.

• Saddam gave preferential treatment to Russian 

and French companies hoping for Russian and 

French support on the UN Security Council. (See 

the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for 

additional information.)

Figure 1. Average oil price per year (1973-2003).
37

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Figure 2. Average oil price by month (1999-2001).

Figure 3. OPEC oil production (1973-2003).

Note: Red cells indicate periods of no exports; yellow 

 cells, periods of reduced exports; blue cells indicate 

 periods where Iraq imposed surcharges on oil sales.
38

Iraq’s Surcharge on Oil and Regime Decision Making

from SOMO (State Oil Marketing Organization). They 

told the committee that it was impossible to 

do more than 10 cents a barrel. Nevertheless, the 

committee recommended 50 cents. What happened? 

They stopped buying from us. Our exports were about 

2.2 to 3.1 mbd over the time period in question.

After two weeks I went to Saddam and got him to 

lower the price to 40 cents. Our exports rose about 

30%. The companies put pressure on SOMO to lower 

the price.

A third meeting was held. I participated together with 

SOMO. ‘Aziz and Ramadan supported me, but they 

were afraid to speak up. Finally we decided on 30 

cents a barrel selling to the US and 25 cents a barrel 

selling to Europe.

Now the problem became how to explain the situation 

to OPEC. We couldn’t tell them about the surcharge 

because it was illegal. Of course we thought the oil 

was Iraq’s and we could do what we wished with it. 

But that was not the international situation.

This situation remained through part of 2002. I 

decided to fi ght. No one was lifting Iraqi oil. I talked 

to Foreign Minister ‘Aziz and he pointed out that we 

had lost all our friends. So we fi nally went back to 10 

cents a barrel for the last part of 2002.

Overall, we lost $10,000,000 in exports.

The description of the surcharge episode by the 

former Minister of Oil, ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al 

‘Ubaydi, while a detainee, provides an interesting 

example of the Regime’s decision-making process.

In the autumn of 2000 the talk of a surcharge began. 

Saddam never asked me about the surcharge. He 

talked to a group of sycophants who simply told 

him he had a great idea. Huwaysh would make a 

recommendation and Saddam would follow him 

blindly. Huwaysh suggested 10 percent [suggesting 10 percent of the oil company’s profi t margin]. 

I never attended a meeting and without me it was 

not a proper meeting. Ramadan formed a committee to determine how to divert some fi xed part of the 

buyer’s profi t margin to the Iraqi Government. The 

idea was supported by both Ramadan and ‘Aziz. 

They fi nally agreed on 10 percent a barrel.

What happened? The professionals (France, Italy, 

Spain, Russia) refused to buy from us. [The effect 

of the surcharge was to remove Iraqi oil from the 

market.] However, the individuals with whom we 

were trading had contracts with the trading companies. I went to the trading companies to get them 

to share their profi t margin with us. They refused. 

Saddam was very critical of my efforts but I didn’t 

care if I lost my job.

A new committee was formed. This committee 

included the sycophants and the “genius.” When I 

went to the meeting I brought the three top experts 
39

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Iraq’s Relationship With Russia

The former Iraqi Regime sought a relationship 

with Russia to engage in extensive arms purchases 

and to gain support for lifting the sanctions in the 

UNSC. Saddam followed a two-pronged strategy to 

pursue weapons capability while also coping with 

sanctions imposed following invasion of Kuwait. The 

Regime continued to import weapons and technical expertise, while seeking diplomatic support for 

lifting/easing sanctions. Iraq sought to tie other countries’ interests to Iraq’s through allocating contracts 

under the OFF program and entering into lucrative 

construction projects to be executed once sanctions 

had been lifted. At best, the Iraqi strategy produced 

mixed results. Russian commercial interests provided 

a motivation for supporting Iraq; Russian political 

and strategic interests set limits to that support.

• March 1997: Russian Energy and Fuels Minister 

Rodinov went to Baghdad to discuss a $12 billion 

deal in an effort to build economic relations with 

Iraq. The deal was signed and was scheduled to 

begin once sanctions were lifted.

• 1999: A Russian delegation traveled to Iraq to provide expertise on airframes and guidance systems 

for missiles.

• Under OFF, 32 percent of the Iraqi contracts went 

to Russia.

Iraqi attempts to use oil gifts to infl uence Russian 

policy makers were on a lavish and almost indiscriminate scale. Oil voucher gifts were directed across 

the political spectrum targeting the new oligarch 

class, Russian political parties and offi cials. Lukoil, 

a Russian oligarch-controlled company received in 

excess of 65 million barrels (amounting to a profi t of 

nearly 10 million dollars); other oligarch companies 

such as Gazprom and Yukos received lesser amounts; 

the Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky was 

a recipient, as was the Russian Communist party 

and the Foreign Ministry itself, according to Iraqi 

documents. (See Oil Voucher Allocations within the 

Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for additional information.)

• In 1991, only 15 of Iraq’s 73 discovered fi elds had 

been exploited. Development of these reserves in 

the post-sanctions period would provide the former 

Regime with greater leverage in the world oil 

market. Accordingly, Iraq entered into lucrative oil 

exploration and exploitation contracts. The lion’s 

share of these contracts went to Russian companies. 

For example, Lukoil received a $4 billion contract 

in 1997 to develop the second Qurna fi eld, and in 

April 2001 Zarubezhchneft and Tatneft received a 

contract worth $11.1 billion to drill in three Iraqi oil 

fi elds. In 2002, a contract was negotiated—but not 

signed—for Russian fi rms to begin exploration of 

several Iraqi oil fi elds over a ten-year period. Execution of these contracts was to commence during 

sanctions and be fully implemented once sanction 

had been lifted. Iraq hoped these contracts would 

provide Russia, and other nations, with a signifi cant 

economic interest in pushing for the removal of 

sanctions.
40

Iraq’s Relationship With France

The former Iraqi Regime sought a relationship 

with France to gain support in the UNSC for lifting 

the sanctions. Saddam’s Regime, in order to induce 

France to aid in getting sanctions lifted, targeted 

friendly companies and foreign political parties that 

possessed either extensive business ties to Iraq or 

held pro-Iraqi positions. In addition, Iraq sought out 

individuals whom they believed were in a position to 

infl uence French policy. Saddam authorized lucrative 

oil contracts be granted to such parties, businesses, 

and individuals.

• In 1988, Iraq paid 1 million dollars to the French 

Socialist Party, according to a captured IIS 

report dated 9 September 1992. ‘Abd-al-Razzaq 

Al Hashimi, former Iraqi ambassador to France, 

handed the money to French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, according the report. The IIS 

instructed ‘Abd-al-Razzaq to “utilize it to remind 

French Defense Minister, Pierre Joxe, indirectly 

about Iraq’s previous positions toward France, in 

general, and the French Socialist party, in particular.”

• ‘Aziz says he personally awarded several French 

individuals substantial oil allotments. According 

to ‘Aziz, both parties understood that resale of the 

oil was to be reciprocated through efforts to lift UN 

sanctions, or through opposition to American initiatives within the UNSC.

• As of June 2000, Iraq had awarded short term contracts under the OFF program to France totaling 

$1.78 billion, equaling approximately 15 percent of 

the oil contracts allocated under the OFF program. 

(See the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter.)

The IIS fl agged two groups of people to infl uence 

French policy in the UNSC: French Governmental 

offi cials and infl uential French citizens. IIS documents recovered by ISG identify those persons of 

interest, to include ministers and politicians, journalists, and business people. On 25 January 2004, 

the Baghdad periodical Al Mada published a list of 

names of companies, individuals and other groups 

that received oil allocations from the former Regime 

under the auspices of the OFF program. These infl uential individuals often had little prior connection to 

the oil industry and generally engaged European oil 

companies to lift the oil, but were still in a position to 

extract a substantial profi t for themselves. Individuals named included Charles Pascua, a former French 

Interior Minister, who received almost 11 million 

barrels; Patrick Maugein, whom the Iraqis considered 

a conduit to Chirac (which we have not confi rmed), 

who received 13 million barrels through his Dutchregistered company, Michel Grimard, founder of the 

French-Iraqi Export Club, who received over 5.5 

million barrels through Swiss companies and the 

Iraqi-French Friendship Society, which received over 

10 million barrels. The French oil companies Total 

and SOCAP received over 105 million and 93 million 

barrels, respectively (see Oil Voucher Allocations of 

the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for 

additional information).
41

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Realizing Saddam’s Veiled 

WMD Intent

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy 

choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy 

and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate 

foldout and tabular form at the back of Volume I. 

Covering the period from 1980 to 2003, the timeline 

shows specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s efforts 

in the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms 

and their chronological relationship with political 

and military developments that had direct bearing on 

the Regime’s policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion 

of each volume of text, we have also included foldout 

summary charts that relate infl ection points—critical turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—to particular events, initiatives, or decisions the 

Regime took with respect to specifi c WMD programs. 

Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the 

body of the text with a gray triangle.

In the years following Iraq’s war with Iran and invasion of Kuwait, Saddam’s Regime sought to preserve 

the ability to reconstitute his WMD, while seeking 

sanctions relief through the appearance of cooperation with UNSCOM and UN Monitoring, Verifi cation and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Saddam’s initial approach under sanctions was driven 

by his perceived requirements for WMD and his 

confi dence in Iraq’s ability to ride out inspections 

without fully cooperating. Interwoven into this basic 

fabric of Iraq’s interaction with the UN were equally 

signifi cant domestic, international, and family events, 

all infl uenced by and refl ective of Saddam’s strategic 

intent. These events can be divided into fi ve phases 

that cover the entire period 1980 to 2003. 

Ambition (1980-1991)

The opening years of Saddam’s Regime are defi ned 

by a period of ambition. The 1980 to 1991 period is 

dominated by the Iran-Iraq war and its aftershock. 

The war was costly in fi nancial, human and materiel 

resources and led Iraq towards a period of insolvency 

and decline. Further, the war taught Saddam the 

importance of WMD to national and Regime survival; 

in doing so, however, it also highlighted Iraq’s active 

WMD program to the world.

A sharp increase in the price of oil in 1979, following a series of earlier spikes, provided Saddam with a 

fi nancial base that he hoped to use to improve Iraq’s 

civilian infrastructure and modernize its military. 

Indeed the 1979 gains created a new plateau for 

higher prices (more than $30 a barrel) through the 

mid-1980s and created a hard currency windfall for 

Iraq in 1980.

The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, however, interrupted Saddam’s plans. Although Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threatened to “export [his] revolution 

to the four corners of the world,” he viewed his best 

opportunity to be among Iraq’s Shi’a majority in 

southern Iraq. Khomeini therefore supported Shi’a 

demonstrations in 1979 and an civil unrest in 1980. 

Saddam sought to punish Khomeini for his meddling 

and also sought to reestablish total Iraqi control over 

the Shatt al-’Arab waterway, Iraq’s primary outlet to 

the Persian Gulf. In 1975, Saddam had agreed under 

duress to share the waterway with the Iranians. In the 

fall of 1980, with Iran’s military weakened by internal 

purges, Saddam believed an attack would be successful. He also felt that attacking Iran would enhance 

his prestige with fellow Arab leaders who feared 

Khomeini’s infl uence. Saddam launched in September what he expected to be a short “blitzkrieg” 

campaign to take and hold territory in southern Iran

to extort concessions from Khomeini and possibly 

cause his overthrow. The plan backfi red. After several 

initial Iraqi victories, stiff Iranian resistance, stopped 

and then rolled back Iraqi gains with heavy casualties 

on both sides. This pattern of brutal thrusts, counterattacks, and prolonged stalemate continued for another 

eight years, eventually drawing in the United States 

and the Soviet Union (both supporting Iraq), the UN, 

and several other regional and Third World states.

Hostilities ended in August 1988, with no change 

from the 1980 political status quo, after both parties 

agreed to a cease-fi re on the basis of UNSCR 598. 

The war exacted a signifi cant toll on Iraq, which lost 

an estimated 375,000 casualties and 60,000 prison-
42

ers and cost $150 billion, much of it borrowed from 

Gulf neighbors and the Soviet Union (for arms). 

Having survived, Saddam learned that defeating 

superior numbers of Iranian forces, especially massed 

infantry attacks, required the use of CW. He was also 

convinced that Iraq’s ability to retaliate with missile 

strikes against Tehran in the 1988 “War of the Cities” 

fi nally forced Khomeini to agree to a ceasefi re. The 

importance of a mutually supporting system of 

WMD, with theater ballistic missiles in securing 

Iraq’s national security became an article of faith 

for Saddam and the vast majority of Regime members.

Despite Iraq’s heavy burden of debt after the war, 

Saddam emerged with an experienced and expanded 

military force, poised to dominate the Gulf. Economic diffi culties were Saddam’s main motive for 

the invasion of Kuwait, with irredentist grievances a 

secondary concern. Absorbing Kuwait as Iraq’s 19th

province was viewed as having historical justifi cation and being the key to revitalizing Iraq’s economy.

Saddam had planned for an invasion of Kuwait for 

some weeks beforehand, but the timeframe in which 

to conduct the attack had not been formalized. The 

impulsive decision to invade in August 1990 was 

precipitated by what Saddam chose to perceive as 

Kuwait’s arrogance in negotiations over disputed oil 

drilling along the common border.

As in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam’s ambition led him to 

miscalculate the impact of his actions. He was unprepared for the harsh reaction to the Kuwaiti invasion 

by the United States and the other permanent members of the UNSC, especially the Soviet Union, and 

surprised by the condemnation of fellow Arab leaders, 

many of whom he knew detested the Kuwaitis. In the 

face of this criticism, however, Saddam refused to 

back down, believing he could prevail, just as he did 

against Iran. While Coalition forces ousted Iraq from 

Kuwait, Saddam maintained his grip on power inside 

Iraq, as well as his conviction that the key to successfully defending Iraq was to possess WMD and an 

effective means of delivering them.

Decline (1991-1996)

The costliness of the Iran-Iraq war and the resulting 

invasion of Kuwait ushered in a period of economic 

and military decline. The years 1991—1996 were 

a tense and diffi cult period that threatened Regime 

survival. The Iraqi economy hit rock bottom in 1995 

and forced Saddam to accept the OFF program the 

following year; bolstering the position of the Regime 

generally and Saddam’s survival specifi cally.

UNSCR 715, passed on 11 October 1991, required 

Iraq’s unconditional acceptance of an ongoing 

monitoring and verifi cation presence to verify Iraq’s 

compliance with the weapons-related provisions 

of UNSCR 687 (1991). UNSCR 715 also required 

national implementing legislation to ban future Iraqi 

WMD work. The former Regime refused to accept 

these provisions until November 1993. (However, 

national implementing legislation was not enacted 

until February 2003.) The former Regime objected 

to the open-ended nature of long-term monitoring, 

because Iraq equated the presence of inspectors 

with the continuation of sanctions. As this wrangling continued, sanctions took their toll on the Iraqi 

economy—government and private-sector revenues 

collapsed, rampant infl ation undermined business 

confi dence, and Iraqis at all levels were impoverished—and the former Regime in late 1994 threatened to end cooperation with inspectors unless the oil 

embargo was lifted. The Iraqi Government was unable 

to invest in rebuilding its infrastructure, already devastated by the Desert Storm and the Iran-Iraq war.

The “no-fl y zones” over northern and southern Iraq, 

patrolled by Coalition aircraft, were an affront to Iraqi 

sovereignty. Although severely weakened militarily, Iraq used troop movements into southern Iraq 

in 1994 to threaten the Kuwaitis and into northern 

Iraq in 1996 to punish disaffected Kurds. Internally, 

the departure to Jordan in August 1995 of Saddam’s 

son-in-law and close confi dante Husayn Kamil created further disarray among senior members of the 

Iraqi Regime. Through it all, Saddam endured and his 

desire to end sanctions and rebuild his WMD capability persisted.
43

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Selected UN Security Council Resolutions

UNSCR 687, 3 April 1991—created UNSCOM and 

required Iraq to accept “the destruction, removal, or 

rendering harmless, under international supervision” 

of its chemical and biological weapons and missiles 

with a range greater than 150 kilometers and their 

associated programs, stocks, components, research, 

and facilities. The International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq’s 

nuclear weapons program.

UNSCR 706, 15 August 1991—proposed allowing Iraq to export oil to pay for food, medicine, and 

compensation payments to Kuwait and cost of UN 

operations.

UNSCR 707, 15 August 1991—noted Iraq’s “fl agrant violation” of UNSCR 687 and demanded that 

Iraq provide “full, fi nal, and complete disclosure” 

(FFCD) of its WMD programs, provide inspectors 

with “immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted 

access” to inspection sites, and cease all attempts 

to conceal material or equipment from its WMD and 

missile programs.

UNSCR 712, 2 September 1991—Authorizes 

immediate release of funds from escrow to fi nance 

payments for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines 

and materials and supplies for essential civilian 

needs, and confi rmed that funds from other sources 

may be deposited in the escrow account to be immediately available to meet Iraq’s humanitarian needs, 

and urges that any provision be undertaken through 

arrangements which assure their equitable distribution to meet humanitarian needs.

UNSCR 715, 11 October 1991—approved 

UNSCOM and IAEA plans for Ongoing Monitoring 

and Verifi cation (OMV) to prevent Iraq from reconstituting its WMD programs.

UNSCR 986, 14 April 1995—allowed Iraq to export 

$1,000,000,000 of petroleum and petroleum products 

every 90 days, placed the funds in an escrow account, 

and allowed Iraq to purchase food, medicines, and 

humanitarian supplies with the proceeds. Laid the 

groundwork of what came to be known as the Oil-ForFood Program.

UNSCR 1051, 27 March 1996—approved a mechanism for monitoring Iraqi imports and exports as 

required by UNSCR 715. The mechanism allowed the 

UN and the IAEA to monitor the import of dual-use 

goods in Iraq.

UNSCR 1154, 2 March 1998—provide UNSC 

endorsement for a Memorandum of Understanding 

between the UN Secretary-General and the Iraqi 

Regime that governed the inspection of presidential 

palaces and other sensitive sites.

UNSCR 1194, 9 September 1998—condemned 

Iraq’s decision to halt cooperation with UNSCOM 

and IAEA inspections in August 1998 as a “fl agrant 

violation” of its obligations and demanded that Iraq 

restore cooperation with UNSCOM. The resolution 

suspended sanctions reviews but promised Iraq a 

“comprehensive review” of its situation once cooperation resumed and Iraq demonstrated its willingness 

to comply.

UNSCR 1205, 5 November 1998—condemned Iraq 

“fl agrant violation” of earlier UNSCRs in suspending 

cooperation with UN monitoring activities in Iraq on 

31 October 1998.

UNSCR 1284, 17 December 1999—established 

UNMOVIC to take over the responsibilities mandated 

to UNSCOM under UNSCR 687. It also linked Iraqi 

cooperation in settling disarmament issues with 

the suspension and subsequent lifting of sanctions. 

UNSCR 1284 also abolished the ceiling on Iraqi oil 

exports.

UNSCR 1441, 8 November 2002—declared Iraq in 

material breach of its obligations under previous 

resolutions including UNSCR 687, required new 

weapons declarations from Iraq, and included stringent provisions for Iraqi compliance, including access 

to all sites, interviews with scientists, and landing and 

over fl ight rights.
44

Scientifi c Research and Intention to Reconstitute 

WMD

Many former Iraqi offi cials close to Saddam 

either heard him say or inferred that he intended 

to resume WMD programs when sanctions were 

lifted. Those around him at the time do not believe 

that he made a decision to permanently abandon 

WMD programs.Saddam encouraged Iraqi offi cials 

to preserve the nation’s scientifi c brain trust essential for WMD. Saddam told his advisors as early as 

1991 that he wanted to keep Iraq’s nuclear scientists 

fully employed. This theme of preserving personnel 

resources persisted throughout the sanctions period.

• Saddam’s primary concern was retaining a cadre 

of skilled scientists to facilitate reconstitution 

of WMD programs after sanctions were lifted, 

according to former science advisor Ja’far Diya’ 

Ja’far Hashim. Saddam communicated his policy 

in several meetings with offi cials from MIC, 

Ministry of Industry and Minerals, and the IAEC 

in 1991-1992. Saddam instructed general directors 

of Iraqi state establishments and other state entities 

to prevent key scientists from the pre-1991 WMD 

program from leaving the country. This retention of 

scientists was Iraq’s only step taken to prepare for a 

resumption of WMD, in Ja’far’s opinion.

• Presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud wrote 

that in 1991 Saddam told the scientists that they 

should “preserve plans in their minds” and “keep 

the brains of Iraq’s scientists fresh.” Iraq was to 

destroy everything apart from knowledge, which 

would be used to reconstitute a WMD program.

• Saddam wanted people to keep knowledge in their 

heads rather than retain documents that could have 

been exposed, according to former Deputy Prime 

Minister Tariq ‘Aziz. Nuclear scientists were told 

in general terms that the program was over after 

1991, and Tariq ‘Aziz inferred that the scientists 

understood that they should not keep documents 

or equipment. ‘Aziz also noted that if Saddam had 

the same opportunity as he did in the 1980s, he 

probably would have resumed research on nuclear 

weapons.

• Ja’far said that Saddam stated on several occasions that he did not consider ballistic missiles to 

be WMD and therefore Iraq should not be subject 

to missile restrictions. Ja’far was unaware of any 

WMD activities in Iraq after Desert Storm, but said 

he thought Saddam would reconstitute all WMD 

disciplines when sanctions were lifted, although 

he cautioned that he never heard Saddam say this 

explicitly. Several former senior Regime offi cials 

also contended that nuclear weapons would have 

been important—if not central—components of 

Saddam’s future WMD force.

• According to two senior Iraqi scientists, in 1993 

Husayn Kamil, then the Minister of Military 

Industrialization, announced in a speech to a large 

audience of WMD scientists at the Space Research 

Center in Baghdad that WMD programs would 

resume and be expanded, when UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq. Husayn Kamil’s intimate relationship 

with Saddam added particular credibility to his 

remarks.

Reaction to Sanctions

Baghdad reluctantly submitted to inspections, 

declaring only part of its ballistic missile and chemical warfare programs to the UN, but not its nuclear 

weapon and biological warfare programs, which it 

attempted to hide from inspectors. In 1991, Husayn 

Kamil and Qusay Saddam Husayn attempted to retain 

Iraq’s WMD and theater missile capability by using 

MIC, along with the SSO, RG, SRG, and Surface-toSurface Missile Command to conceal banned weapons and deceive UNSCOM inspectors.

• MIC organizations–the Technical Research Center 

and the Al Muthanna State Establishment–dispersed 

Iraq’s biological and chemical bombs and missile 

warheads in cooperation with the Iraqi Air Force 

and Surface-to-Surface Missile Command prior 

to Desert Storm. These undeclared or partially 

declared weapons remained in dispersal sites, allegedly, until July 1991.
45

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Husayn Kamil

Born in 1955 within the Al Majid branch of Saddam’s 

family, Husayn Kamil was the son of Saddam’s fi rst 

cousin on his father’s side, Kamil Hasan Al Majid. 

More importantly, Husayn Kamil became Saddam’s 

son-in-law, married in 1983 to Saddam’s eldest and 

favorite daughter, Raghad. Husayn Kamil began his 

rise to power within the Regime’s security services as 

part of Saddam’s personal detail. According to Tariq 

‘Aziz, Husayn Kamil was a second lieutenant when 

Saddam became president in July 1979.

In 1983, Saddam appointed him Director of the SSO 

and later Supervisor, or “Overseer”(Mushrif), of the 

RG (including the SRG). In effect, he controlled all of 

Saddam’s security organizations, an unprecedented 

level of trust for any single individual. In 1987, 

Saddam appointed Husayn Kamil as Overseer of Military Industrialization. He rose to Minister of Industry 

and Military Industrialization (MIMI) in 1988 after 

acquiring the Ministries of Heavy Industry and Light 

Industry as well as exerting control over the Ministry 

of Petroleum, the Atomic Energy Commission, and 

Petrochemical Complex 3 (Iraq’s clandestine nuclear 

program). By 1990, Husayn Kamil was, very likely, 

the second most powerful man in Iraq.

Husayn Kamil received broad administrative and 

fi nancial authority from Saddam to consolidate both 

Iraq’s research and development programs, and its 

industrial resources into military production, including WMD and missile delivery systems production. 

Although not technically trained, Kamil oversaw 

Iraq’s program to modify the Regime’s SCUD 

missiles to the longer-range Al Husayn variant, and 

the development and production of nerve agents, 

including Tabun, Sarin and VX.

His relationship with Saddam gave Husayn Kamil 

opportunities to act outside the law and with minimal 

personal and fi scal oversight. Because of his family 

ties and proximity to Saddam, he could have anyone 

fi red or placed under suspicion. Although ‘Amir 

Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi was the Deputy Director 

of MIC and a key subordinate, Kamil did not rely 

on deputies. A former subordinate noted: “Husayn 

Kamil did not have a right-hand man, as he was too 

arrogant.” His successor at MIC, who was also one 

of Kamil’s former subordinates said, “No one in MIC 

could control him and everyone feared him.”

By 1995 the impact of sanctions meant Iraq was on 

the verge of bankruptcy—Kamil’s capricious and selfserving oversight of MIC, his lack of accountability, 

and the intrusive nature of UN inspections combined 

to erode Iraq’s military industrial capability. Husayn 

Kamil, his brother Saddam Kamil, and their wives 

and children (Saddam Husayn’s grandchildren) fl ed 

Iraq and sought political asylum in Jordan on 9 

August 1995.

Various reasons may explain why Husayn Kamil left 

Iraq. The most important reason may have been the 

growing tension between him and his bitter familyrival ‘Uday Saddam Husayn. According to King 

Hussein of Jordan, “as far as we know, this was a 

family crisis, in the personal context, for a fairly long 

period.” A further explanation revolves around the 

terrible state of the Iraqi economy under sanctions 

and the possibility that he wanted to escape Iraq 

before a popular or tribal revolt unseated Saddam 

and his family. For his part, Husyan Kamil said Saddam’s rule had “lost its creditability on the international and Arab level,” and that his defection “shows 

to what extent the situation in Iraq has deteriorated.” 

The Iraqi media and leadership fi rst accused him of 

fi nancial improprieties, and then said he was “no 

more than an employee in this state and his responsibilities were limited.” Finally, they made him the 

ultimate “fall guy” for all Iraq’s problems—from the 

Regime’s decision to invade Kuwait, to Iraq’s duplicitous relations with UNSCOM.

Despite the level of invective on both sides, Husayn 

Kamil, Saddam Kamil, and their families decided 

Saddam Husayn’s family 

(top)—Husayn Kamil on far 

left; Kamil in uniform (left). 
46

• The Surface-to-Surface Missile Command concealed undeclared Al Husayn and Scud missiles, 

launchers, and chemical and biological warheads.

• Particularly in the early 1990s, the SRG concealed 

uranium enrichment equipment, missiles, missile 

manufacturing equipment, “know-how” documents 

from all the programs, as well as a supply of strategic materials.

• The RG Security Directorate of the SSO conveyed 

instruction from Husayn Kamil and Qusay to the 

SRG elements that were hiding material and documents, and SSO political offi cers at SRG units often 

knew the whereabouts of the hidden material.

Senior Regime members failed to anticipate the duration of sanctions and the rigor of UN inspections.

• Saddam initially expected the sanctions would 

last no more than three years, and many Iraqis 

doubted the sanctions would be so comprehensive, 

according to several detainee interviews. These 

perceptions probably persuaded senior Regime 

leaders that they could weather a short-lived sanctions regime by making limited concessions, hiding 

much of their pre-existing weapons and documentation, and even expanding biological warfare potential by enhancing dual-use facilities.

• Following unexpectedly thorough inspections, 

Saddam ordered Husayn Kamil in July 1991 to 

destroy unilaterally large numbers of undeclared 

weapons and related materials to conceal Iraq’s 

WMD capabilities. This destruction–and Iraq’s 

failure to document the destruction–greatly complicated UN verifi cation efforts and thereby prolonged UN economic sanctions on Iraq. According 

to Iraqi Presidential Advisor ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan 

Al Sa’adi, the unilateral destruction decision was 

comparable in its negative consequences for Iraq 

with the decision to invade Kuwait.

• Intrusive inspections also affected potential WMD 

programs by guaranteeing the presence of inspection teams in Iraqi military, and research and development facilities.

• Sanctions imposed constraints on potential WMD 

programs through limitations on resources and 

restraints on imports. The sanctions forced Iraq to 

slash funding that might have been used to refurbish the military establishment and complicated the 

import of military goods. Rebuilding the military, 

including any WMD capability, required an end to 

sanctions.

• The economic bite of the sanctions instead grew 

increasingly painful and forced the Regime to adopt 

an unprecedented range of austerity measures by 

1996. Disclosure of new evidence of Iraqi WMD 

activity following Husayn Kamil’s 1995 fl ight to 

Jordan undermined Baghdad’s case before the UN.

Husayn Kamil’s Departure

Senior Iraqi offi cials—especially Saddam—were 

caught off-guard by Husayn Kamil’s fl ight to Jordan 

in August 1995. The Regime was forced to quickly 

assess what the fallout would be from any revelations 

and what damage they would infl ict on Iraqi 

Husayn Kamil (continued)

to return to Iraq in February 1996, supposedly with 

the promise of a pardon from Saddam. Upon their 

return from Jordan, he and his brother were detained, 

separated from their families, and placed under house 

arrest. Within days, Saddam’s daughters divorced 

their husbands. While under house arrest Husayn 

Kamil and his brother were confronted by ‘Ali Hasan 

Al Majid and members of their family tribe, come to 

reclaim “tribal honor.” Husayn Kamil, his brother 

Saddam, their father, their sister and her children 

were killed in the ensuing shoot-out. Saddam Husayn 

“explicitly endorsed the killings, which, as he saw 

them, ‘purifi ed’ and healed the family by amputating from the ‘hand’ an ‘ailing fi nger.’” Trying at the 

same time to distance himself, however, he assured 

his listeners that, had he been notifi ed about it ahead 

of time, he would have prevented the assault, because 

“when I pardon, I mean it.”
47

Regime Strategic

 Intent

credibility with UNSCOM. Iraqi demands to end 

sanctions and threats to stop cooperation with 

UNSCOM became increasingly shrill in the two 

months prior to Husayn Kamil’s defection. Vice President Ramadan said on 14 June that Iraq had decided 

“not to continue cooperation with the Council” if 

UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus’ 

19 June 1995 report to the UNSC did not bring about 

“a positive position that contributes to ending the 

siege imposed on Iraq.” On 17 July, the anniversary of 

the Ba’th party revolution, Saddam again threatened 

to stop cooperation with the UN unless sanctions 

were lifted. Two days later, after meetings with his 

Egyptian counterpart, Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa’id Kazim Al Sahaf insisted that Iraq had 

complied with its obligations under UNSC resolutions 

and demanded the oil embargo and other sanctions 

be lifted by the UNSC after the next review on 

14 September.

By the time Husayn Kamil fl ed, Iraq already had submitted another “full, fi nal, and complete declaration 

(FFCD)” on its biological program to UNSCOM. On 

1 July 1995, Iraq had admitted to the production of 

bulk biological agent, but had denied weaponizing it. 

To maintain the appearance of cooperation, however, 

Iraq had to provide more information to inspectors 

and withdraw the earlier FFCD. After making such 

strident demands of Rolf Ekeus and the UN, Iraq was 

now forced—to great embarrassment—to withdraw 

its threat to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and 

admit that its biological program was more extensive 

than previously acknowledged.

• Husayn Kamil’s fl ight set the stage for further 

disclosures to the UN, particularly in the BW and 

nuclear fi elds. The UN responded by destroying 

extensive dual-use facilities critical to the BW program, such as the facilities at Al Hakam and 

Al Dawrah. The revelations also triggered contentious UNSCOM inspections in 1996 designed to 

counter Regime deception efforts and led to showdowns over access to sensitive facilities, including 

presidential sites.

• After Husayn Kamil’s departure, about 500 scientists and other nuclear offi cials assembled and 

signed documents affi rming they would hide neither 

equipment nor documents, according to a former 

nuclear scientist.

• The director of the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) responded to Husayn Kamil’s departure 

by installing representatives in each ministry and 

company, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al 

Mullah Huwaysh. These individuals, fully aware of 

all the UNSC resolutions, were to report any violations to the NMD. When they detected potential 

violations, such as trying to procure materials and 

conducting illicit research, they halted them.

Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving 

WMD

Iraq attempted to balance competing desires to 

appear to cooperate with the UN and have sanctions 

lifted, and to preserve the ability to eventually reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi behavior under sanctions refl ects the interplay between 

Saddam’s perceived requirements for WMD and his 

confi dence in the Regime’s ability to ride out inspections without full compliance, and the perceived costs 

and longevity of sanctions. The Iraqis never got the 

balance right.

• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, Saddam 

privately told him that Iraq would reacquire WMD 

post-sanctions and that he was concerned about 

Iraq’s vulnerability to Israeli WMD and Iran’s 

growing nuclear threat.

• Baghdad tried to balance perceived opportunities 

offered by denial and deception, and diplomacy, 

against costs imposed by the continuation of 

sanctions, the UN’s introduction of more rigorous 

inspection techniques, and Coalition air attacks.

• Saddam repeatedly told his ministers not to participate in WMD-related activity, according to Tariq 

‘Aziz.

• A former MIC employee stated he was directed to 

sign an affi davit in 1993 acknowledging he understood that he was under orders to comply with UN 

restrictions and that the penalty for non-compliance 

was death. He signed a similar affi davit in 1994-
48

1995, and again in 1999, under orders from Minister of Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab 

‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh through his 

supervisor.

• In 1991, however, Husayn Kamil stated to presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud that it was not 

necessary to declare Iraq’s BW program to the UN 

and indicated that he would order the scientists to 

hide all evidence in their homes.

• Initially, the Iraqi Regime’s deception strategy 

responded only to the movement and actions of 

the UN inspectors. From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqis 

modifi ed their tactics to continue the concealment 

of proscribed materials. During the early phases of 

the inspections in 1991, UNSCOM inspectors often 

gave notice of inspection sites 24 hours in advance 

of movements. This gave Iraqi offi cials a day to 

remove materials, if required. The materials could 

then be returned when the inspection was complete.

The continual decline led to the economic low point 

of 1995 and convinced the Regime to adopt different 

tactics.

Recovery (1996-1998)

Iraq’s economic decline forced the Regime to accept 

the UN OFF program; this resulted in economic 

recovery and underpinned a more confi dent Regime 

posture.

The tightening economic sanctions, Iraq’s declaration of a BW program, the fl ight of Husayn Kamil, 

and the subsequent failure of Iraq’s attempt to 

disclose the “chicken farm” documents sent the 

nation into a downward spiral. If Saddam was going 

to do something—it had to be soon. Iraq’s reluctant acceptance of UNSCR 986—the Oil-For-Food 

program approved by the UN on 14 April 1995—and 

its negotiation of the formal, unchallenged trade 

protocol with Jordan set the pattern for similar 

illegal deals with Syria and Turkey in 2000. These 

became the foundation for Iraq’s economic recovery.

Although initially approved by the UN in April 1995, 

Iraq waited until 20 May 1996 to accept UNSCR 986, 

and it wasn’t until December of 1996 that the actual 

implementation of the program began funding this 

recovery.

According to Tariq ‘Aziz, Husayn Kamil’s defection 

was the turning point in Iraqi sanctions history in 

that afterwards Saddam agreed to accept OFF. In 

the early 1990s, Saddam and his advisors had failed 

to realize the strategic trade (and thereby political) 

opportunities that OFF program offered Iraq. France, 

Russia and China pushed Iraq to accept OFF because 

the Iraqis had consistently complained about the 

deprivation sanctions had imposed on the populace 

(‘Aziz had repeatedly tried to get Saddam to accept 

the program during the early 1990s). In the opinion 

of senior Iraqi leaders, OFF allowed Iraq to rejoin the 

world of international trade and its position began to 

improve by 1997. ‘Aziz said Iraq began “accumulating partners,” life became “less diffi cult,” and the 

Iraqi Government increased the amount of rations 

being provided.

Prior to the implementation of UNSCR 986, internally, the former Iraqi Regime struggled with its 

Kurdish enemies in northern Iraq, and used military 

force to recapture the city of Irbil in August 1996. 

Coalition military retaliation appeared in the form of 

Desert Strike and the subsequent extension of Iraq’s 

No-Fly-Zones, further constricting Iraqi controlled 

airspace. Russian and France continued to chide the 

United States for, what they viewed as, US unilateral 

action against the sovereignty of Iraq.

Iraq’s relationship with UNSCOM remained mercurial. Early Iraqi hopes for a quick resolution of outstanding inspection issues were swallowed up in ever 

increasing mistrust and substantive disputes between 

the two sides. Saddam had hoped to gain favor after 

a massive turnover of WMD-related documents that 

the Regime “discovered” at Husayn Kamil’s “chicken 

farm,” which validated suspicions about Iraqi concealment operations and raised additional questions. 

UNSCOM, however, became more suspicious of Iraqi 

motives and the relationship steadily deteriorated, 

despite intervention by the UN Secretary-General. 

Eventually, the balance tipped against compliance 

with inspection requirements in favor of pursuing 

other avenues of sanctions relief. Saddam’s decisions 
49

Regime Strategic

 Intent

in 1998 to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and 

the IAEA eventually led to UNSCOM’s departure and 

a Coalition military attack against Iraq, Desert Fox.

Saddam later regarded the air strikes associated with 

Desert Fox in December 1998 as the worst he could 

expect from Western military pressure. He noted, 

but was less infl uenced by, the limits of international 

tolerance shown in the UNSC to his hard-line against 

UNSCOM. He over-estimated what he could, in 

future, expect from Russia, France and China in the 

UNC in terms of constraining a more vigorous Coalition response.

• Iraq accepted OFF in May 1996 and oil began 

to fl ow in December 1996; revenues from this 

program gradually increased to $5.11 billion 

annually in 1998 (see the Regime Finance and 

Procurement chapter).

• Saddam distrusted OFF because he felt it would 

relieve international pressure on the UNSC to 

expeditiously lift sanctions. For the same reason, he 

refused in September 1991 to acknowledge UNSCR 

712, to garner international support by claiming 

that sanctions were starving the Iraqi people.

Impact of the “Chicken Farm” Documents

The release of long-concealed WMD documentation 

planted at Husayn Kamil’s farm in August 1995, and 

Iraq’s declarations in February 1996 revealing new 

aspects of the WMD programs were major turning 

points in the Regime’s denial and deception efforts 

following Desert Storm. Iraq considered the declaration to be a measure of goodwill and cooperation 

with the UN; however, the release of these documents validated UNSCOM concerns about ongoing 

concealment and created additional questions from 

the international community. In an attempt to comply 

with UN requirements:

• The Iraqi leadership required WMD scientists to 

sign an agreement in 1996 indicating that they 

would turn over any WMD documents in their 

houses and that failure to do so could lead to execution, according to reporting.

• Huwaysh, in 1997 ordered his employees to sign 

statements certifying they did not have any WMDrelated documents or equipment. The penalty for 

non-compliance was death. His scientists relinquished rooms full of documents, which MIC 

turned over to the National Monitoring Directorate. 

Huwaysh was unsure what the NMD ultimately did 

with them.

Although Iraq’s release of the “chicken farm” documents initially created a more positive atmosphere 

with UNSCOM, the relationship grew strained as 

UNSCOM and the IAEA inspections became more 

aggressive. The release destroyed the international 

community’s confi dence in the credibility of followon Iraqi declarations of cooperation. UNSCOM 

concluded that it had been successfully deceived 

by Iraq and that the deception effort was controlled 

and orchestrated by the highest levels of the former 

Regime. UNSCOM therefore directed its efforts at 

facilities associated with very senior members of the 

Regime and designed inspections to uncover documents rather than weapons. The situation eventually reached an impasse then escalated to crisis and 

confl ict. From this experience, Iraq learned to equate 

cooperation with UNSCOM with increased scrutiny, prolonged sanctions, and the threat of war. In 

response, Baghdad sought relief via a weakening of 

the sanctions regime rather than compliance with it.

Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs

The Regime made a token effort to comply with the 

disarmament process, but the Iraqis never intended 

to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to 

resume WMD activities. Several senior offi cials also 

either inferred or heard Saddam say that he reserved 

the right to resume WMD research after sanctions.

• Presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, while 

a detainee, wrote: “If the sanctions would have been 

lifted and there is no UN monitoring, then it was 

possible for Saddam to continue his WMD activities and in my estimation it would have been done 

in a total secrecy and [with] concealment because 

he gained from 1991 and UN decisions.” But in 

another debrief, Huwaysh said it would take 6 

months to reconstitute a mustard program.
50

The Saga of the “Chicken Farm” Documents

Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid and Qusay Saddam 

Husayn were behind an effort to conceal WMD documents and strategic materials that only ended after 

he fl ed to Jordan in August 1995. After the fi rst Iraqi 

declaration in April 1991, Husayn Kamil ordered that 

all “know-how” documents, catalogs, and technical documents from the WMD and missile programs 

should be gathered and given to the security services for safekeeping. The Director General of each 

MIC Establishment was to gather his organization’s 

important technical documents, and they were 

told that the documents were so important that the 

documents were to be destroyed only by the security 

services. Establishments were asked to deliver their 

documents to MIC security elements, which trucked 

them to a central rendezvous point in Baghdad where 

the trucks were turned over to the SSO and the SRG. 

On two or three occasions in April and May 1991, 

MIC security offi cers turned over truckloads of program documents.

A separate effort collected the documents of the PC-3 

nuclear weapons organization. Security personnel hid 

these documents for a time in Duliyah and Tarmiyah. Some nuclear documents were also loaded into 

a railroad car and shuttled between Baghdad and 

Hadithah in western Iraq.

The documents were later delivered to a house that 

belonged SRG training offi cer Lt. Col. Sufyan Mahir 

Hasan Al Ghudayri in the Ghaziliyah section of 

Baghdad. After Sufyan transferred to the Republican 

Guard in 1993, SRG Chief of Staff Col. Walid Hamid 

Tawfi q Al Nasiri took control of the documents and 

moved them to a new safe house in the Hay at-Tashri 

section of Baghdad near the Republican Palace.

An SRG element led by Col. Najah Hasan ‘Ali Al 

Najar was also selected to conceal several truckloads of metals—aluminum billets and maraging 

steel disks—that had been purchased for the uranium 

centrifuge enrichment program. The SRG loaded this 

material onto civilian trucks and drove them to various locations outside of Baghdad to evade inspectors. Col. Walid also managed and coordinated this 

activity.

Husayn Kamil’s fl ight to Jordan raised concerns that 

he would tell the UN about the hidden documents 

and materials. Qusay summoned Col. Walid to his 

offi ce and quizzed Walid about the documents. Walid 

explained to Qusay about the Hay at-Tashri safe 

house. Shortly after this meeting, Walid was ordered 

by his former SRG commander, Kamal Mustafa 

‘Abdallah Sultan Al Nasiri to move the documents 

out of Baghdad. Walid used seven to nine SRG trucks 

to haul the documents to a farm near ‘Aqarquf, west 

of Baghdad, where they were stored for a number of 

days. When Walid inquired of Kamal Mustafa what 

he should do with the documents, and Kamal Mustafa 

told him to burn them. After nearly two days of burning, Walid and his crew destroyed approximately a 

quarter of the documents.

At that point, Walid was contacted by Khalid Kulayb 

‘Awani Juma’, the head of the SSO Republican Guard 

Security Directorate, who ordered that the documents 

be moved to Salman Pak and from there to a fi nal 

destination. Walid and a convoy of trucks carried 

the boxes of documents in the middle of the night 

to Salman Pak where they were guided to Husayn 

Kamil’s “chicken farm” near Al Suwayrah. A number 

of people in civilian clothes met the convoy when it 

arrived at the farm and directed the unloading of the 

vehicles. The boxes of documents were all unloaded 

at the farm by 7 o’clock in the morning.

Walid also reportedly called Col. Najah the same 

night and directed Najah to meet his convoy of trucks 

containing the aluminum and steel at the SRG offi ce 

in Al Amiriyah. Col. Walid subsequently led the 

convoy to Husayn Kamil’s farm where these vehicles 

were also unloaded.

UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus and 

IAEA Action Team leader Mauricio Zifferero were in 

Baghdad at the invitation of the Iraqi Government. 

They had conducted several days of talks with the 

Iraqis and were about to depart for Amman, Jordan 

to talk with Husayn Kamil. Husam Muhammad Amin 

Al Yasin, Director General of the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD), received a telephone call 

from presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al 

Khatab Al Nasiri explaining that Ekeus and Zifferero should view some documents found at Husayn 

Kamil’s farm.
51

Regime Strategic

 Intent

The Saga of the “Chicken Farm” Documents (continued)

Husam Amin was able to reach Ekeus about one hour 

prior to Ekeus’ scheduled departure from Baghdad. 

Ekeus, along with the IAEA’s Gary Dillon, set off for 

Husayn Kamil’s farm, guided by two minders sent by 

the presidential secretary.

Reportedly, the original plan for the documents was 

to burn them all, and Walid and his crew had begun 

that process at the farm in ‘Aqarquf. Then someone 

had the “bright idea” to incriminate Husayn Kamil 

in the concealment of the documents, so they took 

the materials to his “chicken farm.” When inspectors examined the material at the farm, they noticed 

the presence of pebbles among the dust on top of 

the document boxes, as though someone had simply 

thrown dirt on top of the boxes in an attempt to make 

it appear that the boxes had been at the farm for a 

long time. When the UN began an inquiry into how 

the documents were discovered at the farm, the Iraqis 

produced several fanciful stories that quickly 

unraveled.

• Saddam had said that after sanctions Iraq would 

resume production of WMD to “achieve international balance and protect the dignity of Iraq and 

Iraqis and the Arab nations,” according to former 

presidential secretary ‘Abd. ‘Abd wrote while a 

detainee, “He [Saddam] would say if only Iraq 

possessed the nuclear weapon then no one would 

commit acts of aggression on it or any other Arab 

country, and the Palestinian issue would be solved 

peacefully because of Iraq.”

• Saddam would have restarted WMD programs, 

beginning with the nuclear program, after sanctions, 

according to Tariq ‘Aziz. Saddam never formally 

stated this intention, according to ‘Aziz, but he did 

not believe other countries in the region should 

be able to have WMD when Iraq could not. ‘Aziz 

assessed that Iraq could have a WMD capability 

within two years of the end of sanctions.

• Saddam’s intent to maintain and compartment 

WMD capabilities was well known and often 

acknowledged by high level authorities, according 

to a senior Al Kindi General Company offi cial. The 

Minister of Military Industrialization allegedly told 

the source that Saddam wanted a WMD program 

“on the shelf.” Huwaysh, in a written statement, 

explained instead that Saddam briefed senior 

offi cials on several occasions saying, “We do not 

intend or aspire to return to our previous programs 

to produce WMD, if the Security Council abides 

by its obligations pertaining to these resolutions 

[UNSCR 687, paragraph 14].” Saddam reiterated 

this point in a cabinet meeting in 2002, according 

to Dr. Humam ‘Abd-al-Khaliq ‘Abd-al-Ghafur, the 

former Minister of Higher Education and Scientifi c 

Research.

• Huwaysh believed that Saddam would base his 

decision regarding future Iraqi WMD development 

on how the UNSC followed through on its promise 

in paragraph 14 to establish “in the Middle East a 

zone free from weapons of mass destruction and 

all missiles for their delivery.” If this promise was 

not fulfi lled, Iraq should be free to act in its own 

interests. During an earlier debrief Huwaysh speculated that Iraq would have reconstituted many of its 

proscribed programs within fi ve years if OIF had 

not occurred.

• During a custodial interview, Saddam, when asked 

whether he would reconstitute WMD programs 

after sanctions were lifted, implied that Iraq would 

have done what was necessary.

Guarding WMD Capabilities

The abortive efforts to outwardly comply with the 

UN inspection process from 1995 onward slowly 

shifted to increased efforts to minimize the impact 

of the inspection process on Regime security, 

military, and industrial and research capabilities. 

Throughout 1997-1998, Iraq continued efforts to 

hinder UNSCOM inspections through site sanitization, warning inspection sites prior to the inspectors’ 

arrival, concealment of sensitive documentation, and 

intelligence collection on the UN mission.

• Increasingly after September 1997, Iraq burned 

documents, barred access to sites to UNSCOM, 

banned US inspectors, and threatened to shoot 

down UNSCOM U-2 missions until the UN forced 

compliance in November of the same year.
52

Security Services

Instruments of Denial and Deception

Iraq placed high priority on monitoring UN inspection teams, as well as the political dynamic of UN 

policy toward Iraq. Former Regime offi cials state that 

the Iraqi security services, along with select military 

elements, played critical roles in guarding Saddam 

and other key members of the Regime, enforcing 

Regime policies, and protecting Iraqi military and 

security activities. (See Annex B “Iraqi Intelligence 

Services” and Annex C “Iraqi Security Services” 

Annex for additional information.)

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)

The IIS, responsible for counterintelligence, was 

the lead organization charged with monitoring UN 

inspection activities and personnel. IIS directorates 

carried out human, technical and electronic surveillance of the UN in Iraq to detect intelligence agents 

and to predict which sites were to be inspected so that 

those sites could be sanitized.

• IIS personnel accompanied all UNSCOM and 

UNMOVIC inspection convoys, according to a 

former senior Iraqi offi cial. The IIS believed that all 

foreigners were spying on the security of Saddam 

Husayn or were seeking military or security information. The IIS believed that UNSCR 1441 was 

very tough and that it was important to engage in 

counterintelligence activities to protect against the 

loss of important information. IIS “minders” traveled with communications intercept equipment in 

their vehicles in order to listen to UNSCOM communications while on the move, though this strategy 

was not used against UNMOVIC in 2002 and 2004 

out of fear of detection.

• In the early and mid-1990s, the IIS was tasked 

with clandestine monitoring of UNSCOM weapons 

inspectors and their communications, as well as 

attempting to recruit or turn UNSCOM members, 

according to a former IIS offi cial. As soon as the 

UNSCOM mission began focusing on presidential sites, the SSO became actively involved in the 

inspection process.

• IIS personnel were directed to contact facilities and 

personnel in advance of UNMOVIC site inspections, according to foreign government information. 

The IIS developed penetrations within the UN and 

basic surveillance in country to learn future inspection plans. IIS offi cials also had the responsibility 

of organizing protests at UNMOVIC inspection 

sites.

• According to presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid 

Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri, during the mid-tolate 1990s Saddam issued a presidential decree 

directing the IIS to recruit UNSCOM inspectors, 

especially American inspectors. To entice their 

cooperation, the IIS was to offer the inspectors 

preferential treatment for future business dealings 

with Iraq, once they completed their duties with 

the UN. Tariq ‘Aziz and an Iraqi-American were 

specifi cally tasked by the IIS to focus on a particular American inspector.

• The IIS Directorate of Signals Intelligence (M17) 

conducted surveillance and collection activities 

directed against UNSCOM and the UN, according 

to a former M17 offi cer. As with the rest of the IIS 

effort, M17’s objectives were the identifi cation of 

spies and intelligence activities and the determination of inspection sites before the inspection took 

place. M17 used a number of techniques including 

signals intelligence collection from fi xed sites and 

mobile platforms, the bugging of hotel rooms, and 

eavesdropping on inspector conversations. The IIS 

also intercepted inspectors’ phone calls. As noted 

above, M17 did not carry out these activities during 

2002 and 2003.

• During UNMOVIC inspections in 2002 and 2003, 

the IIS was determined not to allow inspection 

teams to gather intelligence as the Iraqis perceived 

had been done in the past. Members of the IIS 

Directorate of Counterintelligence (M5) dramatically increased their physical observation of UN 

personnel during site visits, having as many as fi ve 

minders per inspector. The IIS also attempted to 

be extremely cautious in monitoring UNMOVIC 

inspections in order to avoid international incidents 

or being caught hindering inspection activities.
53

Regime Strategic

 Intent

• The SSO recruited sources on inspection teams to 

uncover information on planned inspection visits, 

according to a former SSO security offi cer. When 

the SSO offi cer assigned to an UNSCOM inspection team learned which site was due for inspection, 

he notifi ed the target site via walkie-talkie using a 

predetermined code system. The SSO offi cer onsite had authority to use whatever means was necessary to keep the team from entering the site before 

it was fully sanitized.

• Concealment failures ultimately compounded issues 

raised by UNSCOM. The most notorious failure 

was UNSCOM’s discovery in July 1998 of the 

“Air Force Document”, which called into question 

Iraq’s declaration of destroyed chemical munitions. 

Inspectors found the document despite extensive 

Iraqi efforts to sanitize the site prior to inspector 

arrival. The discovery resulted in a presidential 

decree creating a committee to purge such documents from MIC facilities to prevent other such 

occurrences.

Iraq’s Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD 

and MIC Programs

In 1998, after the Air Force Document incident, 

Saddam personally ordered the establishment of a 

Document Committee under the purview of the NMD 

to purge all MIC establishments of records of pastprohibited programs to prevent their discovery.

• The NMD oversaw the destruction of redundant 

copies of declared documents, as well as continued 

the concealment of documents of past programs 

that would cause additional problems with the UN. 

Financial documents that were deemed too valuable to destroy but too controversial to declare were 

placed in a lockbox in the care of a special agent 

of the IIS.

• According to NMD Director Husam Muhammad 

Amin, the NMD continued in its role of enforcing 

UNSC resolutions, despite its subordination to MIC 

and the departure of UNSCOM inspectors on 15 

December 1998. For example, the NMD carried out 

the destruction of missile production components, 

such as the 300-gallon mixer, that MIC had reconstructed against UNSC resolutions in 2002. This 

Security Services (continued)

The Special Security Organization (SSO)

The SSO was primarily responsible for the security of 

the President and other key members of the Regime, 

security of Presidential palaces and facilities, and 

ensuring the loyalty of key military units, principally 

the RG and SRG. SSO personnel also played an 

important coordinating role between Husayn Kamil 

Hasan Al Majid and the SRG elements that engaged 

in concealment of weapons, documents, and materials 

in the early 1990s. An SSO element also coordinated 

fl ight planning for UNSCOM and UNMOVIC aviation 

elements and provided warning of UN fl ight activities 

to the Iraqi Government. The SSO reportedly worked 

with the IIS to develop a database of inspectors.

• SSO minders also accompanied inspection teams 

involved in inspections of “sensitive sites,” which 

included RG, SRG, and security service sites. Their 

role, ostensibly, was to facilitate quick access to 

the facilities and prevent controversy. In 2002 and 

2003, SSO minders accompanied many inspection 

teams because of the requirement laid down by 

UNSCR 1441 to provide immediate access to all 

facilities, including presidential sites. They also 

served to warn Saddam Husayn’s security personnel that inspectors were approaching presidential 

locations.

• Qusay also ordered SSO personnel to hide any 

orders from Saddam when UN teams came to 

inspect SSO sites, according to two high-level SSO 

offi cers. They were also to hide any contingency 

war plans, anything dealing with Saddam’s family, 

SSO personnel rosters, or fi nancial data which 

could have posed a risk to Iraq national security. 

Offi cers would keep materials in their homes and 

return it once inspectors left.
54

VX Warhead Samples & The Iraqi Air Force 

Document Story

Two events in mid-1998 defi ned a turning point in 

UNSCOM/Iraq relations: The detection of VX-related 

compounds on ballistic missile warhead fragments 

and the discovery of a document describing the use of 

special weapons by the Iraqi Air Force. Both events 

convinced inspectors that their assessment of ongoing Iraqi concealment was correct. Conversely, the 

discoveries convinced Iraqi authorities of the futility 

of continued cooperation.

“You overlook many truths from a liar.”—’Amir 

Al Sa’adi in reference to an old Arabic proverb

In order to verify Iraqi declarations and special 

weapons accounting, wipe samples of ballistic missile warhead remnants were taken by an UNSCOM 

sampling mission in April 1997. These samples were 

analyzed by laboratories designated by UNSCOM, 

which detected the presence of degradation products 

of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of 

warhead remnants. In addition to these chemicals, a 

VX stabilizer and its degradation product were identifi ed in some of the samples. A second round of sample 

testing was conducted by the United States in February 1998, confi rming the previous fi ndings. However, 

subsequent analysis performed by French and Swiss 

labs was inconclusive.

In June 1998, in multiple statements, including from 

Iraq’s Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to the UN, Iraq categorically denied the outcome 

of the testing and argued that the results could not 

have been accurate since VX was not used in any kind 

of munitions in Iraq due to continuous production 

failure. According to the former the Minister of Military Industrialization, the Iraqi leadership viewed this 

episode as one more example of collusion between 

the US and UNSCOM to discredit Iraqi compliance 

efforts and lengthen sanctions.

UNSCOM submitted a report to the UNSC, which 

stated that the existence of VX degradation products 

confl icted with Iraq’s declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been fi lled 

with any CW agents.

In response, Iraq claimed that the contamination 

of the warhead fragments had been the result of a 

deliberate act of tampering with samples taken to 

the United States. In public statements following an 

August 1998 announcement of Iraq’s suspension of 

cooperation with UNSCOM, Tariq ‘Aziz denied Iraq 

had any weapons of mass destruction and accused 

UNSCOM of catering to hostile American policy by 

prolonging the inspection process. Said ‘Aziz, “the 

manner in which the inspection teams have acted 

recently is neither honest nor fast. This policy serves 

the United States. I have had . . . the impression that 

UNSCOM is back to its old games and tricks.” Al 

Sa’adi saw the VX issue as the critical catalyst in 

feeding Iraqi distrust of UNSCOM and convincing 

Iraqi offi cials that no matter what they did, it would 

never be enough to achieve sanctions relief. He 

summed up the matter by stating, “We lost faith with 

UNSCOM after VX; we determined they were after us 

by hook or crook.”

On 18 July 1998, another incident created a confrontation between UNSCOM and Iraqi offi cials. 

During an inspection of the operations room at 

Iraqi Air Force Headquarters, an UNSCOM team 

found a document containing information about the 

consumption of special (chemical) munitions during 

the Iran-Iraq War.

According to Husam Muhammad Amin, former director of the National Monitoring Directorate, “It was 

laziness on behalf of the Brigadier that the document 

was found. The Brigadier had more than one hour to 

hide the document while the inspectors waited at the 

entrance of the Air Force command. The Brigadier 

was sent to court and his judgment was imprisonment 

for 5-10 years in jail.”

The inspection team felt that this document could be 

helpful in their efforts to verify the material balance 

of Iraq’s chemical munitions. Rather than take possession of the document, the chief inspector on the 

team requested a copy. Initially Iraqi offi cials on the 

scene agreed; then reneged, saying inspectors could 

only take notes on the document or receive a redacted 
55

Regime Strategic

 Intent

role prompted MIC to undertake an internal deception campaign to withhold information regarding 

the procurement of dual-use material from the 

NMD, which was viewed as an obstacle to MIC 

progress.

• MIC employees in 1999 had to sign an affi davit stating that they would not import restricted 

materials or withhold documents, according to a 

former senior Iraqi offi cer who worked in MIC. 

The Minister of Military Industrialization claimed 

that although he prohibited any research that would 

violate UN sanctions, some scientists conducted 

research in secret. The deputy of NMD requested 

scientists to turn in documents that might be stored 

in their home in 2001, according to a sensitive 

source.

Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM

The tension that had built between Iraq and 

UNSCOM over 1997 began to ease in 1998 with 

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s visit in February and the subsequent draft of a Memorandum 

of Understanding that restricted the criteria for 

presidential site visits. A month later, the UNSC 

decided to review the status of sanctions every sixty 

days, giving the former Regime hope that the end 

of sanctions was nearing. These two concessions to 

Iraq calmed the situation and gave the appearance 

that things were moving forward. Over the summer 

of 1998, however, pressure on Iraq began to build 

again as the VX fi ndings leaked in June, and the Air 

Force document was discovered in July. Tariq ‘Aziz, 

in a carefully scripted early August performance, 

demanded that UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler report to the UNSC that Iraq had met its 

disarmament obligation, but Butler refused to do so. 

UNSCOM and the IAEA failed to close any of the 

outstanding WMD case fi les during the summer 

of 1998—despite high Iraqi hopes to the contrary. 

Saddam’s profound sensitivity over palace inspections 

and growing Iraqi bitterness about prolonged cooperation with the UN without getting anything in return 

also complicated Iraqi-UN relations. These events created breakdowns in the process that probably would 

have occurred whether or not Iraq retained WMD.

Saddam, Tariq ‘Aziz, and other senior Regime 

offi cials realized by August 1998 that Iraq would 

not be able to satisfy UNSCOM and the UNSC and 

have sanctions lifted. This led Saddam to suspend 

cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA on 5 

August and to halt all UNSCOM activities in Iraq, 

VX Warhead Samples & The Iraqi Air Force 

Document Story (continued)

copy. The chief inspector objected to these restrictions 

after which Iraqi offi cials seized the document from 

the chief inspector’s hands and refused UNSCOM 

any further access to the papers. According to Amin, 

Iraq considered any documentation or discussions 

detailing the use of chemical weapons to be a redline issue. Iraq did not want to declare anything that 

documented use of chemical weapons for fear the 

documentation could be used against Iraq in lawsuits. 

Iraqi Regime leadership was concerned Iran would 

seek legal reparations for the death and suffering of 

Iranian citizens due to Iraq’s use of CW in the 1980s.

From 1998 until 2003, Iraq was unwilling to hand 

over the Air Force document. According to Tariq 

‘Aziz, “In most cases Saddam listened and agreed 

with me when I would tell him that we must be 

forthcoming with the UN.” However, ‘Aziz added, 

“The Higher Committee did not want to release the 

document to the UN because the delivery times and 

methods contained in the document were thought to 

be sensitive.” When pressed further on why the Iraqis 

were so adamant about maintaining the Air Force 

document ‘Aziz paused, then stated, “We did not have 

to hand over the document because it was a matter of 

our national security.”
56

including monitoring, on 31 October. Even though 

Saddam revoked this decision on 14 November 

(under the threat of an American air strike), it had 

so poisoned the atmosphere with UNSCOM that the 

relationship could not be repaired. UNSCOM inspectors returned in November and December 1998, but in 

a letter to the UN Secretary-General on 15 December, 

UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler noted 

that “Iraq’s conduct ensured that no progress was 

able to be made in either the fi elds of disarmament or 

accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes.” 

Iraqi behavior, the VX detection, the Air Force document and other indications all conspired to eliminate 

any UN acceptance of imperfect compliance. Later 

that day UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew 

from Iraq; in the early morning hours of 16 December 

the Coalition launched a four-day bombing campaign 

against Iraq designated Desert Fox. On 19 December, 

Baghdad declared that UNSCOM would never be 

allowed to return to Iraq.

Transition (1998-2001)

The suspension of cooperation with UN inspectors ushered in a period of mixed fortunes for the 

Regime. This transitional phase was characterized by 

economic growth on the one hand, which emboldened 

and accelerated illicit procurement and programs. 

On the other hand Saddam’s increasing physical 

reclusiveness and the nature of the revenue streams 

weakened the routine functioning of the Regime and 

its governance structures.

At the conclusion of Desert Fox on 19 December 

1998, Vice President Ramadan announced the end 

of Iraq’s cooperation with UNSCOM at a press 

conference in Baghdad. He declared, “The issue of 

UNSCOM is behind us now. The commission of spies 

is behind us now. It no longer has a task . . . all that 

has to do with inspection, monitoring, and weapons 

of mass destruction is now behind us.” The UNSC, 

however, created three panels on 30 January 1999 

under the direction of Brazilian Ambassador Celso 

L.N. Amorim to re-start the process of inspections. 

The panel on Disarmament and Current and Future 

Ongoing Monitoring and Verifi cation Issues reported 

its results on 27 March 1999 and recommended to the 

Security Council that it create a new monitoring and 

verifi cation apparatus, within the existing framework 

of UNSC resolutions, to replace UNSCOM and tackle 

remaining Iraqi disarmament issues. Iraq’s agreement 

to inspections, however, was still needed for a successful effort. The recommendations from the panels 

formed the basis of UNSCR 1284, ratifi ed on 17 

December 1999. UNSCR 1284’s fi rst priority was the 

establishment of UNMOVIC to replace UNSCOM. 

The UNSC in January 2000 appointed Hans Blix 

as UNMOVIC’s Executive Chairman. Obtaining 

Iraq’s cooperation with UNMOVIC so inspectors 

could return, however, took nearly three more years. 

UNSCR 1284 also included language at Russia’s 

insistence that obligated the UNSC to consider lifting 

economic sanctions. UNSCR 1284 also provided the 

background to Iraq’s failure to accept renewed inspections from 2000 to late 2002.

Despite the end of the former Regime’s cooperation 

with UNSCOM, the OFF program continued without interruption. The UNSC not only renewed the 

original OFF mandate under UNSCR 986, but raised 

the revenue ceiling for Iraqi oil exports in October 1999 with UNSCR 1266. The ceiling was then 

eliminated with UNSCR 1284 (although the resolution reaffi rmed sanctions). While the former Regime 

managed to collect signifi cant hard currency revenues 

by illicitly exploiting the OFF contracting process, 

Saddam chafed under OFF controls, even as benefi ts 

to the Iraqi people increased and the UNSC raised 

oil production ceilings. On 17 July 1999, in a speech 

commemorating the 31st anniversary of the Ba’thist 

revolution in Iraq, Saddam stated, “Arab oil must be 

for the Arabs. It has become clear now that the oil is 

for foreigners . . . . The United States determines the 

amounts and prices of oil, with the help of its fl eets 

and the occupation forces . . . in the Arabian Gulf 

countries [and is] now dictating to others what they 

should sell or manufacture, the goods and commodities they purchase, how much and how many. Such 

a situation makes economic progress an unattainable 

wish in our greater Arab homeland.”

The former Regime attempted to use Iraq’s oil 

resources to leverage the world community, and 

from 1999 to 2001 repeatedly—but with varying 
57

Regime Strategic

 Intent

success—reduced or suspended oil production in an 

attempt to infl uence decision-making in the Security 

Council. Iraq controlled the contracting process for 

both selling its oil and arranging purchases of humanitarian goods and it took advantage of lax UN oversight. To try to garner diplomatic support in the UN, 

the former Regime ensured that Chinese, French and 

Russian energy fi rms, as well as others representing 

states sympathetic to Iraq, were prominent recipients 

of oil contracts. Iraq also manipulated oil contracts 

by imposing an illegal “surcharge” on every barrel 

sold. Furthermore, Iraq’s neighbors Syria and Turkey 

negotiated formal, but technically illegal trade protocols which allowed Iraq to provide oil at discounted 

prices for hard currency or items it could not obtain 

through OFF. Trade with Syria fl ourished, providing 

Iraq with the largest share of its illegal hard currency 

revenues by 2002. (See Syrian Trade Protocol, under 

the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for 

additional information.) 

Saddam invested his growing reserves of hard currency in rebuilding his military-industrial complex, 

increasing its access to dual-use items and materials, and creating numerous military research and 

development projects. He also emphasized restoring 

the viability of the IAEC and Iraq’s former nuclear 

scientists. The departure of UN inspectors and Iraq’s 

refusal to allow their return permitted MIC to purchase previously restricted dual-use materials and 

equipment that it needed for both weapons development and civilian applications. In addition, MIC had 

greater fl exibility in adapting civilian technology to 

military use. Yet without inspectors to certify Iraq’s 

ultimate compliance with UNSC resolutions, the UN 

could perpetuate sanctions indefi nitely. The actions of 

Minister of Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab 

‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh refl ected this situation: 

he said he gave explicit directions to MIC leadership 

and workforce to avoid any activities that would jeopardize lifting UN sanctions. But, according to reports 

from his subordinates, he disregarded UN restrictions, 

acting, as if Saddam had instructed him to do so and 

justifying his actions by telling his employees that 

no matter how much evidence Iraq provided it would 

never satisfy the UN. For example, Huwaysh authorized in 2000 the repair of two 300-gallon mixers, 

and two solid propellant casting chambers in 2002 

(all rendered inoperable by UNSCOM inspectors in 

1992), for possible use in building solid propellant 

missiles that exceeded the 150 km range restriction 

fi xed by UNSCR 687.

While international sympathy for the plight of the 

Iraqi people increased and support for sanctions progressively eroded, Saddam was unable to capitalize 

on these shifting moods to strengthen his bargaining 

position with the UN. Isolated internally by his paranoia over personal security, and externally by his 

misreading of international events, Saddam missed 

a major opportunity to reduce tensions with the 

United States following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. By failing to condemn the attacks and 

express sympathy to the American people, Saddam 

reinforced US suspicions about his connections to Al 

Qa’ida and certifi ed Iraq’s credentials as a rogue state. 

He told his ministers that after all the hardships the 

Iraqi people had suffered under sanctions he could not 

extend offi cial condolences to the United States, the 

government most responsible for blocking sanctions 

relief. From a practical standpoint, Saddam probably 

also believed—mistakenly—that his behavior toward 

the United States was of little consequence, as sanctions were on the verge of collapse.

Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions

Saddam, angered by sanctions, inspections, and the 

Desert Fox attacks, unilaterally abrogated Iraq’s 

compliance with all UNSC resolutions—including 

the 1991 Gulf war ceasefi re—with a secret RCC 

resolution, according to both presidential secretary 

‘Abd Hamid Mahmud and Diwan Chairman Ahmad 

Husayn Khudayr. Tension within the former Regime 

over the inspections process had been building since 

1995, but Saddam did not formalize his decision 

to cut Iraq free from UN-imposed limitations until 

1998. The RCC resolution was unique because of 

its confi dential nature, according to Ahmad Husayn. 

The RCC never repealed the resolution nor published 

it. The secret RCC resolution most likely represented—beyond a personal and impetuous swipe 

by Saddam at those he saw as his tormentors—an 

attempt by Saddam to create a legal foundation for 

future action, as well as preserve his standing in 

Iraqi history.
58

• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, on the second 

day of Desert Fox, Saddam said, “[T] he cease-fi re 

principle is over; the US broke the international law 

and attacked a country, which is a member in the 

UN.” He drafted a resolution which called for the 

RCC “to cancel all the international obligations and 

resolutions, which Iraq has agreed upon.” ‘Abd said 

that Saddam blamed the United States for attacking “Iraq without the UN permission, and [pulling] 

the inspectors out of Iraq.” As a result, “Iraq [had] 

the right to cancel all these (UNSC) resolutions to 

get rid of the sanction which was imposed for more 

than seven years.”

• The RCC resolution formally ended all Iraqi 

agreements to abide by UNSC resolutions. Ahmad 

Husayn Khudayr recalled that Saddam’s text 

ordered Iraq to reject every UNSC decision taken 

since the 1991 Gulf war, including UNSCR 687. 

Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful 

legal terms and “denied all the previously accepted 

[UNSC resolutions] without any remaining trace of 

them [in the Iraqi Government].”

• Saddam stressed to all those present in the offi ce 

that his decision was secret and not to disclose it 

until the decision was publicly announced. According to ‘Abd this admonition was also passed to 

RCC members.

• Later that evening, Saddam addressed the RCC; 

Tariq ‘Aziz, Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Taha Muhyial-Din Ma’ruf were among those present. Saddam 

asked the group’s opinion of his draft resolution. 

‘Abd remembered, “Tariq ‘Aziz started talking, 

because he has an experience in international foreign politics and was following the UNSC resolutions from 1991 to 1998, and also a leader of the 

committee that worked with the WMD inspectors in 

Iraq. He supported the resolution along with Ramadan and Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma’ruf.”

• Saddam signed three copies of the RCC-approved 

resolution. One was passed to ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al 

Duri, another went to Ahmad Husayn Khudayr, and 

the last was held by ‘Abd. According to both ‘Abd 

and Ahmad the resolution was kept secret for the 

remainder of the Regime. ‘Abd noted, however, that 

Saddam said, “One day I will declare this resolution.” The secret nature of the RCC resolution 

meant that it did not see widespread implementation in ongoing administrative processes, notably 

NMD operations.

We do not know what measures were taken by 

the former Regime after the secret resolution was 

approved, but a number of events may be linked 

to it. The former Regime made public statements 

and undertook potential WMD-related activities 

that would seem to follow from the December 1998 

RCC resolution (for more information, see examples 

from 1999 in the “Preserving and Restoring WMD 

Assets and Expertise” sub-section below). ‘Abd and 

Ahmad, however, claim that they know of no specifi c 

responses by the former Regime to the resolution. 

‘Abd stated that no action was taken because the 

secret resolution—despite its apparent gravity—was 

not distributed and remained limited to the three 

original copies.

• Taha Yasin Ramadan, also present for the secret 

RCC decision, held a press conference shortly after 

the end of the Desert Fox campaign and repeatedly 

termed Iraq’s compliance with UN requirements 

as something in the past: “The same applies to the 

blockade, which has lasted too long and which is 

now behind us,” he declared. “There are no terms 

[to end the confl ict]. We don’t accept any conditions. Everything in the past is behind us now.” “I 

am not talking about the details. What I am saying 

is that all that has to do with inspections, monitoring, and weapons of mass destruction is now behind 

us.” UN inspectors were denied access to Iraq until 

late 2002, when the threat of war caused Saddam to 

relent.

• Struggling to explain Saddam’s motives behind the 

secret resolution, Ahmad Husayn Khudayr offered 

that Saddam might have been attempting to save 

“face” by publicly accepting UN mandates but 

rejecting them in private. By doing this he could 

then reveal the resolution in the future and claim 

that he had never really stopped fi ghting. However, 

Ahmad’s reasoning is debatable: Saddam passed 

the secret order in the midst of an attack—suggesting a more resolute frame of mind—rather than 

immediately prior to an act of forced compliance.
59

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure 

and Expertise

There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam 

pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return 

to WMD after sanctions were lifted by preserving assets and expertise. In addition to preserved 

capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to 

resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted. The 

infrequent and uninformed questions ascribed to him 

by former senior Iraqis may betray a lack of deep 

background knowledge and suggest that he had not 

been following the efforts closely. Alternatively, 

Saddam may not have fully trusted those with whom 

he was discussing these programs. Both factors were 

probably at play. All sources, however, suggest that 

Saddam encouraged compartmentalization and would 

have discussed something as sensitive as WMD with 

as few people as possible.

• Between 1996 and 2002, the overall MIC budget 

increased over forty-fold from ID 15.5 billion to ID 

700 billion. By 2003 it had grown to ID 1 trillion. 

MIC’s hard currency allocations in 2002 amounted 

to approximately $364 million. MIC sponsorship of 

technical research projects at Iraqi universities skyrocketed from about 40 projects in 1997 to 3,200 

in 2002. MIC workforce expanded by fi fty percent 

in three years, from 42,000 employees in 1999 to 

63,000 in 2002.

• According to a mid-level IIS offi cial, the IIS successfully targeted scientists from Russia, Belarus, 

Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, China, and several 

other countries to acquire new military and defenserelated technologies for Iraq. Payments were made 

in US dollars. The Iraqi Government also recruited 

foreign scientists to work in Iraq as freelance 

consultants. Presumably these scientists, plus their 

Iraqi colleagues, provided the resident “know how” 

to reconstitute WMD within two years once sanctions were over, as one former high-ranking Iraqi 

offi cial said was possible.

• Saddam met with his senior nuclear scientists in 

1999 and offered to provide them with whatever 

they needed, and increased funding began to fl ow to 

the IAEC in 2001, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. Saddam directed 

a large budget increase for IAEC and increased 

salaries tenfold from 2001 to 2003. He also directed 

the head of the IAEC to keep nuclear scientists 

together, instituted new laws and regulations to 

increase privileges for IAEC scientists and invested 

in numerous new projects. He also convened 

frequent meetings with the IAEC to highlight new 

achievements.

• Saddam asked in 1999 how long it would take to 

build a production line for CW agents, according 

to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. 

Huwaysh investigated and responded that experts 

could readily prepare a production line for mustard, 

which could be produced within six months. VX 

and Sarin production was more complicated and 

would take longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer to 

Saddam, who never requested follow-up information. An Iraqi CW expert separately estimated Iraq 

would require only a few days to start producing 

mustard—if it was prepared to sacrifi ce the production equipment.

• ‘Imad Husayn ‘Ali Al ‘Ani, closely tied to Iraq’s 

VX program, alleged that Saddam had been looking for chemical weapons scientists in 2000 to 

begin production in a second location, according to 

reporting.

• Huwaysh stated that in 2001 Saddam approached 

him after a ministers’ meeting and asked, “Do you 

have any programs going on that I don’t know 

about,” implying chemical or biological weapons programs. Huwaysh answered no, absolutely 

not. He assumed that Saddam was testing him, so 

Huwaysh added that because these programs were 

prohibited by the UN, he could not pursue them 

unless Saddam ordered it. Huwaysh said Saddam 

seemed satisfi ed, asked no further questions, and 

directed no follow-up actions. The incident was 

perplexing to Huwaysh, because he wondered why 

Saddam would ask him this question. While he 

had no evidence of WMD programs outside MIC, 

Huwaysh speculated that Qusay had the ability 

within the SSO to compartmentalize projects and 

select individuals to do special work.
60

• Saddam stated to his ministers that he did not 

consider ballistic missiles to be WMD, according 

to Huwaysh. Saddam had never accepted missile 

range restrictions and assessed that if he could 

convince the UN inspectors he was in compliance 

regarding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 

then he could negotiate with the UNSC over missile 

ranges.

• Saddam stated publicly in early 2001 that “we are 

not at all seeking to build up weapons or look for 

the most harmful weapons . . . however, we will 

never hesitate to possess the weapons to defend Iraq 

and the Arab nation.”

• Purported design work done in 2000 on ballistic 

and land attack cruise missiles with ranges extending to 1000 km suggests interest in long-range 

delivery systems.

• In 2002, Iraq began serial production of the Al 

Samud II, a short-range ballistic missile that violated UN-imposed range limits—test fi rings had 

reached 183 km—and exceeded UN prescribed 

diameter limitations of 600mm. Iraq’s production of 

76 Al Samud IIs, even under sanctions conditions, 

illustrates that Iraq sought more than a handful of 

ballistic missiles, but was deterred by the existing 

trade restrictions (see the Delivery Systems chapter 

for additional information). 

• Saddam directed design and production of a 650 to 

750 km range missile in early 2002, according to 

Huwaysh. Saddam wanted the missile within half 

a year. Huwaysh informed him, later that year, that 

Dr. Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ Al Tamimi’s twin Volga 

engine, liquid-propellant design would reach only 

550 km and would take three to fi ve years to produce. Saddam seemed profoundly disappointed, left 

the room without comment, and never raised the 

subject again.

• Other reports suggest work on a ballistic missile 

designed to exceed UN restrictions began earlier. 

A high-level missile offi cial of Al Karamah State 

Company said that in 1997 Huwaysh requested 

him to convert a Volga (SA-2) air defense missile 

into a surface-to-surface missile. When the offi cial 

briefed Huwaysh on the results, however, he said 

Huwaysh told him to stop work immediately and 

destroy all documentary evidence of the tests. In 

mid-1998, another missile offi cial said Huwaysh 

ordered ‘Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shi’a, general director at the Al Rashid General Company to develop 

a solid-propellant missile capable of a range of 

1,000 to 1,200 km. The missile offi cial speculated 

Huwaysh’s order came directly from Saddam. A 

senior level offi cial at Al Karamah, alleged that in 

2000 Huwaysh ordered two computer designs be 

done to extend the range of the Al Samud, one for 

500 km and the other for 1000 km, which were provided him in late 2000. Huwaysh disputes all these 

accounts.

• As late as 2003, Iraq’s leadership discussed no 

WMD aspirations other than advancing the country’s overall scientifi c and engineering expertise, 

which potentially included dual-use research and 

development, according to the former Minister of 

Military Industrialization. He recalled no discussions among Regime members about how to preserve WMD expertise per se, but he observed there 

were clear efforts to maintain knowledge and skills 

in the nuclear fi eld.

Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams

Baghdad made little overall progress in lifting sanctions between December 1998 and November 2002, 

despite Russia’s pressure to include language in 

UNSCR 1284 that provided for the end of sanctions. 

The former Regime, however, was able to increase 

revenue substantially from several legitimate and 

illicit sources. Iraq started to receive the revenues of 

OFF in January 1997. Revenues from this program 

increased from $4.2 billion in 1997 to a peak of 

$17.87 billion in 2000 (see the Regime Finance and 

Procurement chapter).

• According to his former science advisor, ‘Amir 

Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi, Saddam, by mid-to-late 

2002, had concluded that sanctions had eroded 

to the point that it was inevitable they would be 

dropped.
61

Regime Strategic

 Intent

• The Regime also sought diplomatic support for the 

lifting or easing of sanctions by tying other countries’ interests to Iraq’s through allocating contracts 

under the OFF program and entering into lucrative 

construction projects to be executed when sanctions 

were lifted. In addition, Iraq held conferences to 

recruit and cultivate “agents of infl uence” to build 

pressure for lifting sanctions.

• Iraq negotiated a $40 billion agreement for Russian exploration of several oil fi elds over a 10-year 

period. Follow-on contracts called for the construction of a pipeline running from southern to northern Iraq. Performance would start upon the lifting 

of sanctions. Under OFF, 32 percent of the Iraqi 

contracts went to Russia. The Iraqis gave preferential treatment to Russian companies mainly to try 

to gain Russia’s support on the UNSC. The Russians, French, Ukrainians, and others succeeded in 

reducing the amount of OFF money Iraq paid to the 

UN Compensation Committee (for Gulf war reparations) from 30 to 25 percent thus adding signifi -

cantly to Iraq’s income stream.

• The Regime sought a favorable relationship with 

France because France was infl uential as a permanent member of the UNSC and was in a good position to help Iraq with lifting sanctions.

• Iraq awarded short term contracts under OFF to 

companies around the world. As of June 2000, 

French companies had contracts totaling $1.78 billion.

• ‘Aziz personally awarded several individuals 

substantial oil allotments. All parties understood 

that resale of the oil was to be reciprocated through 

efforts to lift UN sanctions, or through opposition 

to American initiatives within the UNSC.

Miscalculation (2002-2003)

The Miscalculation phase was marked by a series 

of poor strategic decisions that left Saddam isolated 

and exposed internationally. This period was triggered by the ill-considered reaction of the Regime—

driven personally by Saddam—to the 9/11 terrorist 

attack. This refusal to publicly condemn the terrorist action led to further international isolation and 

opprobrium. This was the fi rst of several miscalculations that inexorably led to Operation Iraqi Freedom 

in 2003.

Following President George W. Bush’s State of the 

Union speech on 29 January 2002, senior members 

of the Iraqi Government were nervous about both 

Iraq’s inclusion in the “Axis of Evil,” and the promise 

that “the United States of America will not permit 

the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us 

with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Some 

ministers recognized that the United States intended 

to take direct unilateral action, if it perceived that its 

national security was endangered, and argued that the 

best course of action was to “step forward and have 

a talk with the Americans.” Also concerned with the 

assertion of a connection between Iraq and its “terrorist allies,” they felt they must “clarify” to the Americans that “we are not with the terrorists.” Saddam’s 

attitude, however, toward rapprochement with the 

UN was well known and remained unchanged. He 

had posed to his ministers on numerous occasions the 

following rhetorical question: “We can have sanctions 

with inspectors or sanctions without inspectors; which 

do you want?” The implied answer was “we’re going 

to have sanctions one way or the other for a long time 

because of the hostile attitude of the United States 

and Great Britain.”

Iraqi statements on renewing cooperation with the UN 

varied, perhaps indicating a clash between the private 

views of some offi cials and Saddam’s policy. Vice 

President Ramadan on 10 February 2002 told journalists at the opening of the Syrian Products Exhibition 

in Baghdad that Iraq was ready to entertain a dialogue 

with the UN Secretary-General for “return of international inspectors to Iraq without any preconditions.” 

Four days later Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri 

“ruled out that Iraq would send any signals to the UN 

regarding its readiness to agree on the return of international inspectors.”

Dialogue, however, did begin between Iraq and 

the UN. Senior-level talks occurred in March and 

May 2002 at UN Headquarters in New York among 
62

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix, IAEA Director General 

Mohammed El-Baradei and an Iraqi delegation 

headed by Naji Sabri. The results of these meetings 

were mixed, although both Naji Sabri and Annan 

agreed that the talks had been a positive and constructive exchange of views on the Iraq-UN relationship. 

In July 2002, Naji Sabri and Annan met again for 

talks in Vienna, and Naji Sabri noted that it would 

take a while to reach agreement on issues where there 

had been “12 years of lack of contact” and “12 years 

of confl ict.” Despite the positive tone of these meetings, very little substantive progress was made: Iraq 

still refused to accept UNSCR 1284 or to allow UN 

weapons inspectors to return. As a result, UNSCR 

1441 imposed sanctions more harsh than those of 

UNSCR 1284.

President Bush’s speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002, emphasizing the threat 

Iraq’s WMD posed to global peace and security, 

unsettled Saddam and the former Regime’s leadership. Most chilling to them was the promise that 

“the purposes of the United States should not be 

doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be 

enforced—the just demands of peace and security 

will be met—or action will be unavoidable.” According to ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, 

Saddam was “very stiff” when he discussed this 

situation with his ministers some three weeks later, 

and was obviously still “feeling the pressure.” Collectively, there was an even greater fear among the 

Regime’s ministers that the United States unilaterally 

would attack Iraq, than when Bush made his “Axis 

of Evil” speech in January 2002. Saddam told them, 

“What can they discover, when we have nothing?” 

But some of the ministers were not as sure. Huwaysh 

said he began to wonder whether Saddam had 

hidden something: “I knew a lot, but wondered why 

Bush believed that we had these weapons,” he said. 

Huwaysh could not understand why the United States 

would challenge Iraq in such stark and threatening 

terms, unless it had irrefutable information.

The UNSC’s unanimous decision on 8 November 

2002 to adopt UNSCR 1441, which found Iraq in 

“material breach of all its obligations under relevant 

resolutions,” clearly demonstrated the seriousness of 

the international community. UNSCR 1441 required 

that Iraq “provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted 

access to any and all, including underground, areas, 

facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means 

of transport which they wished to inspect, as well 

as immediate, unimpeded and private access to all 

offi cials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the 

IAEA chose to interview in the mode or location of 

UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any 

aspect of their mandates.” UNMOVIC and IAEA 

were instructed “to resume inspections no later than 

45 days following adoption of this resolution and to 

update the Council 60 days thereafter.”

Having held out for so long, Saddam initially did 

not accept much of what UNSCR 1441 required. 

Although Russia and France were putting pressure 

on Iraq, Saddam felt the risk of war and even invasion warranted re-acceptance of inspections. According to Vice President Ramadan, Saddam eventually 

permitted UNMOVIC greater latitude than he had 

initially intended. Military leaders were instructed at a 

meeting in December 2002 to “cooperate completely” 

with the inspectors, believing full cooperation was 

Iraq’s best hope for sanctions relief in the face of US 

provocation. According to a former NMD offi cial, one 

of the Regime’s main concerns prior to UNMOVIC 

inspections was interviews of scientists. When asked 

why the former Regime was so worried if there was 

nothing to hide, the source stated that any such meeting with foreigners was seen as a threat to the security 

of the Regime.

Iraq’s cooperation with UN inspectors was typically 

uneven, and ultimately the Coalition considered the 

Regime’s efforts to be too little, too late. By January 

2003, Saddam believed military action was inevitable. He also felt that Iraqi forces were prepared 

to hold off the invaders for at least a month, even 

without WMD, and that they would not penetrate as 

far as Baghdad. He failed to consult advisors who 

believed otherwise, and his inner circle reinforced his 

misperceptions. Consequently, when Operation Iraqi 

Freedom began, the Iraqi armed forces had no effective military response. Saddam was surprised by the 

swiftness of Iraq’s defeat. The quick end to Saddam’s 

Regime brought a similarly rapid end to its pursuit of 

sanctions relief, a goal it had been palpably close to 
63

Regime Strategic

 Intent

achieving.

Renewing UN Inspections

Iraq allowed the IAEA and UNMOVIC to resume 

inspections in November 2002 in the face of growing 

international pressure while apparently calculating a 

surge of cooperation might bring sanctions to an end.

• As it was during the period of the UNSCOM 

inspections, the Higher Committee was re-established in 2002, this time headed by Vice-President 

Ramadan, in order to prepare for the UNMOVIC 

missions. According to Tariq ‘Aziz, Saddam 

believed that the goal of these inspections was to 

deprive Iraq of any scientifi c, chemical or advanced 

technology. Saddam said, “These people are playing a game with us—we’ll play a game with them.”

• Saddam assembled senior offi cials in December 

2002 and directed them to cooperate completely 

with inspectors, according to a former senior 

offi cer. Saddam stated that the UN would submit 

a report on 27 January 2003, and that this report 

would indicate that Iraq was cooperating fully. 

He stated that all Iraqi organizations should open 

themselves entirely to UNMOVIC inspectors. The 

Republican Guard should make all records and 

even battle plans available to inspectors, if they 

requested. The Guard was to be prepared to have 

an “open house” day or night for the UNMOVIC 

inspectors. Husam Amin met with military leaders 

again on 20 January 2003 and conveyed the same 

directives. During this timeframe Russia and France 

were also encouraging Saddam to accept UNSC 

resolutions and to allow inspections without hindering them.

• The Higher Committee gradually addressed UNSC 

concerns as Ramadan relaxed Baghdad’s original 

opposition to the UN resuming U-2 fl ights and 

conducting private, unmonitored interviews with 

Iraqi scientists. These actions eliminated major 

stumbling blocks in potential Iraqi cooperation with 

UNMOVIC.

• Saddam hoped to get sanctions lifted in return for 

hosting a set of UN inspections that found no evidence of WMD, according to statements ascribed 

to him by a former senior offi cer. The government directed key military units to conduct special 

inspections to ensure they possessed no WMDassociated equipment.

• Upon the direction of UNMOVIC, Baghdad started 

destroying its Al Samud II ballistic missiles 1 

March 2003 despite disagreements over the actual 

operational range of the missile.

• Beginning on 27 November 2002 until the UN 

withdrew all its personnel on 18 March 2003, 

UNMOVIC completed 731 inspections at 411 sites, 

including 88 sites it had visited for the fi rst time.

• The NMD published the Currently Accurate, Full, 

and Complete Declaration on 7 December 2002, 

and it attempted to resolve the pending issues of 

the UN’s Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s 

Proscribed Weapons Programmes until the beginning of the war.

Iraqi military industries several times required scientists to sign statements acknowledging the prohibition on conducting WMD research. At a minimum, 

the forms would have provided documents to offer 

the UN, but they may also have stopped “free lancing” and thereby ensured that any WMD research 

underway was tightly controlled to avoid inadvertent 

disclosures.

• MIC on 20 January 2003 ordered the general directors of its companies to relinquish all WMD to the 

NMD and threatened severe penalties against those 

who failed to comply, according to documentary 

evidence.

• The NMD director met with Republican Guard 

military leaders on 25 January 2003 and advised 

them they were to sign documents saying that there 

was no WMD in their units, according to a former 

Iraqi senior offi cer. Husam Amin told them that 

the government would hold them responsible if 

UNMOVIC found any WMD in their units or areas, 

or if there was anything that cast doubt on Iraq’s 

cooperation with UNMOVIC. Commanders established committees to ensure their units retained no 

evidence of old WMD.
64

Iraq’s National Assembly passed a law banning 

WMD, a measure that had been required under 

paragraph 23 of the Ongoing Monitoring and Verifi cation Plan approved under UNSCR 715—and one Iraq 

had refused to pass despite UN requests since 1991. 

On 14 February 2003, Saddam issued a presidential 

directive prohibiting private sector companies and 

individuals from importing or producing biological, 

chemical, and nuclear weapons or material, according 

to documentary evidence. The directive did not mention government organizations.

Iraq’s Other Security Concerns

Iraq engaged in denial and deception activities to 

safeguard national security and Saddam’s position 

in the Regime. These surveillance activities and the 

suspect vehicle movements in and around sensitive 

sites made it diffi cult for Western intelligence services 

to distinguish innoculous security-related measures 

from WMD concealment activities which added to the 

suspicion of Iraqi actions.

• According to a former senior SSO offi cer, prior to 

any UN inspection visits, the SSO leadership would 

instruct the chiefs of each SSO directorate to conceal anything to do with the President or his family, 

any documents referring to the Scientifi c Directorate, documents pertaining to human rights violations, documents pertaining to prisoners in custody, 

and photos of senior Regime personnel.

• The IIS was determined not to allow UN inspection 

teams to gather intelligence at sensitive sites, which 

the Iraqis feared had been done in the past. Members of the Directorate of Counterintelligence (M5) 

heightened their physical observation of UN personnel during site visits to prevent this, according 

to sensitive reporting from a source with excellent 

access. 

• Huwaysh instructed MIC general directors to 

conceal sensitive material and documents from 

UN inspectors. This was done to prevent inspectors from discovering numerous purchases of illicit 

conventional weapons and military equipment from 

fi rms in Russia, Belarus, and the Former Republic 

of Yugoslavia.

• Saddam was convinced that the UN inspectors 

could pinpoint his exact location, allowing US 

warplanes to bomb him, according to a former 

high-level Iraqi Government offi cial. As a result, 

in late 1998 when inspectors visited a Ba’th Party 

Headquarters, Saddam issued orders not to give 

them access. Saddam did this to prevent the inspectors from knowing his whereabouts, not because he 

had something to hide, according to the source.

In order to preserve his dignity and security, Saddam 

wanted to ensure that he had absolutely no contact with UNMOVIC inspectors. SSO “minders” 

used radios to alert Saddam’s security personnel of 

UNMOVIC’s actions so he could avoid contact with 

inspectors. According to a former senior Iraqi offi cial, 

on one occasion when inspectors arrived at a presidential site, Saddam left through the back gate.

Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before 

Operation Iraqi Freedom

ISG has not found evidence that Saddam Husayn 

possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but the available 

evidence from its investigation—including detainee 

interviews and document exploitation—leaves open 

the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq 

although not of a militarily signifi cant capability.

Several senior offi cers asserted that if Saddam had 

WMD available when the 2003 war began, he would 

have used them to avoid being overrun by Coalition 

forces.

• ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi told an emissary 

from the RG leadership, on 27 January 2003, that 

if Saddam had WMD, he would use it, according to 

a former offi cer with direct knowledge of Iraqi military ground operations and planning.

• According to a former senior RG offi cial, Iraq had 

dismantled or destroyed all of its WMD assets and 

manufacturing facilities. Had Saddam possessed 

WMD assets, he would have used them to counter 

the Coalition invasion.

• If he had CW, Saddam would have used it against 

Coalition Forces to save the Regime, according to a 

former senior offi cial.
65

Regime Strategic

 Intent

• Iraqi military planning did not incorporate the 

use—or even the threat of use—of WMD after 

1991, according to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid. WMD was 

never part of the military plan crafted to defeat the 

2003 Coalition invasion.

Senior military offi cers and former Regime offi cials 

were uncertain about the existence of WMD during 

the sanctions period and the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom because Saddam sent mixed 

messages. Early on, Saddam sought to foster the 

impression with his generals that Iraq could resist a 

Coalition ground attack using WMD. Then, in a series 

of meetings in late 2002, Saddam appears to have 

reversed course and advised various groups of senior 

offi cers and offi cials that Iraq in fact did not have 

WMD. His admissions persuaded top commanders 

that they really would have to fi ght the United States 

without recourse to WMD. In March 2003, Saddam 

created further confusion when he implied to his 

ministers and senior offi cers that he had some kind of 

secret weapon.

• Prior to December 2002, Saddam told his generals 

to concentrate on their jobs and leave the rest to 

him, because he had “something in his hand” (i.e. 

“something up his sleeve”), according to Minister 

of Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh.

• Saddam surprised his generals when he informed 

them he had no WMD in December 2002 because 

his boasting had led many to believe Iraq had some 

hidden capability, according to Tariq ‘Aziz. Saddam 

had never suggested to them that Iraq lacked WMD. 

Military morale dropped rapidly when he told 

senior offi cers they would have to fi ght the United 

States without WMD.

• Saddam spoke at several meetings, including those 

of the joint RCC-Ba’th National Command and the 

ministerial council, and with military commanders 

in late 2002, explicitly to notify them Iraq had no 

WMD, according to the former presidential secretary. Saddam called upon other senior offi cials to 

corroborate what he was saying.

Iraq’s Movement of Critical Defense Assets

From the mid-1990s to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

Iraq continued to move and conceal key air defense 

equipment and other military assets to ensure their 

survivability. Interviews with former Regime offi cials 

indicate that the Iraqis felt threatened after President 

Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech on 29 January 2002, and 

they increased movements of critical military equipment soon afterward.

• The biggest perceived threat to Iraq’s military 

equipment was cruise missiles; so military items 

were moved from location to location. The Higher 

Committee never thought that these movements 

would be seen as suspicious because they were carried out to preserve military equipment, according 

to former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz.

• Between August 2002 and early January 2003, the 

Iraqi military had taken measures to prepare for an 

anticipated US military attack on Iraq, according 

to a former IIS offi cial. These measures included 

the movement and hiding of military equipment and 

weapons. Army leaders at bases throughout Iraq 

were ordered to identify alternate locations and to 

transfer equipment and heavy machinery to off-base 

locations, taking advantage of farms and homes to 

hide items.

A recovered 2002 document outlines the Iraqi evacuation plan to protect key military industries and equipment from Coalition air strikes or threats. The former 

Regime developed these concepts in response to lessons learned after Desert Storm and Desert Fox. The 

report outlines the importance of utilizing a properly 

concealed Iraqi railroad system along with trucks and 

pre-equipped trailers to move important laboratories, 

equipment, and machinery.
66

• In Saddam’s last ministers’ meeting, convened in 

late March 2003 just before the war began, he told 

the attendees at least three times, “resist one week 

and after that I will take over.” They took this to 

mean he had some kind of secret weapon. There are 

indications that what Saddam actually had in mind 

was some form of insurgency against the coalition.

• Just before the war began, Saddam reiterated 

the same message to his generals. According to 

Huwaysh, Saddam told them “to hold the coalition for eight days and leave the rest to him. They 

thought he had something but it was all talk.”

• Saddam believed that the Iraqi people would not 

stand to be occupied or conquered by the United 

States and would resist—leading to an insurgency. 

Saddam said he expected the war to evolve from 

traditional warfare to insurgency.

Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq’s Nonuse of WMD 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom

The view has been advanced widely that if Saddam 

had WMD at the time of OIF, he would have used it. 

In the event, there are no indications that WMD was 

used during OIF.

If Iraq possessed WMD Saddam may have concluded, given his perception of the Coalition threat, 

he would not need to use WMD. Military commanders consistently over-reported their combat capability 

and Saddam had concluded most Iraqis would fi ght 

to defend the country. He may not have realized that 

his Regime could not be saved until it was too late 

to deploy CW from existing storage areas to operational forces. Saddam told his debriefer that it was 

clear to him, some four months before the war, that 

hostilities were inevitable. Despite this knowledge, it 

seems that Saddam and those around him misjudged 

the nature and intensity of the confl ict. It is possible 

that Saddam’s public statements and those to his 

chief lieutenants were intended to reassure rather than 

confi de.

Negative Indicators—What Iraqi Preparations Were 

Not Observed?

A former Iraqi army offi cer familiar with ground 

operations and planning compared ground CW activity required during the Iran-Iraq war to the absence 

of similar preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom 

in the 2nd RG Corps area. He noted that standard 

operating procedures for CW had been validated 

during the Iran-Iraq war by experience, with many 

accidents, as many shells were defective. Unlike 

during the Iran-Iraq war, during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom there were:

• No orders from Baghdad to bring any artillery 

pieces from indirect support to a special handling 

point.

• No meetings to carefully fi x friendly and enemy 

positions.

• No decontamination unit assigned to the unit 

engaging in chemical fi res.

• No special security offi cer informing any commander that a chemical ammunition convoy was 

coming.

• No SSO handlers ready to receive convoys.

• No messages warning chemical battalions to don 

protective gear and to prepare to receive chemical 

weapons.

• Former Director of the DGMI, Staff Gen. Zuhayr 

Talib ‘Abd-al-Satar: “Two to three months before 

the war, Saddam Husayn addressed a group of 150 

offi cers. He asked why the Americans would want 

to come here. Why would they come here when 

they don’t need anything from Iraq? They have 

already fulfi lled the goals that the military established in the fi rst Gulf war. They wanted to occupy 

the Gulf States and look it has happened. Everyone 

except for Saddam Husayn, his children, and his 

inner circle, everyone else secretly believed that 
67

Regime Strategic

 Intent

the war would continue all the way to occupation. 

Saddam and his inner circle thought that the war 

would last a few days and then it would be over. 

They thought there would be a few air strikes and 

maybe some operations in the south.”

• Former Minister of Defense Sultan Hashim 

Ahmad Al Ta’i: “We knew the goal was to make 

the Regime fall . . . . We thought the forces would 

arrive in Baghdad or outside Baghdad in 20 days 

or a month. We accepted that the cities on the way 

would be lost. All commanders knew this and 

accepted it. Saddam Husayn thought that the people 

would, of their own accord, take to the streets and 

fi ght with light arms, and that this would deter the 

US forces from entering the cities.”

• Former commander of the Nebuchadnezzar Republican Guard Division, Staff Maj. Gen. Hamid 

Isma’il Dawish Al Raba’i: “We thought the Coalition would go to Basrah, maybe to Amarra, and 

then the war would end . . . Qusay Saddam Husayn 

never took any information seriously. He would 

just mark on the map. He thought most of us were 

clowns. We pretended to have victory, and we never 

provided true information as it is here on planet 

earth. Qusay always thought he’d gain victory. Any 

commander who spoke the truth would lose his 

head.”

• Saddam’s draft speeches and public addresses conveyed this theme—an attack was unlikely, according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

• Saddam was convinced that a show of force would 

be suffi cient to deter an invasion. The United States 

would seek to avoid another Vietnam, according to 

a former senior Ba’th party member.

• Saddam had concluded time was on his side and 

that the Coalition would never be allowed to attack, 

according to the former science advisor.

If WMD stocks existed, timing was the problem.

The Coalition attack moved so rapidly that Saddam 

was unable to exercise any options to use WMD 

and when he realized the end of the Regime was 

near, he was not prepared tactically to use any 

WMD he might have had. Based on the statements 

of former senior offi cers, the Iraqi military—including the RG—allegedly had no plans for employing 

WMD, had not practiced tactical use of WMD since 

1991, had no available stockpiles of WMD, had not 

deployed any WMD to tactical units, and had no special infrastructure in place for handling WMD.

• The 2nd RG Corps had chemical defense battalions, 

according to the former Al Quds Forces Chiefof-Staff, but these battalions left their equipment 

in their barracks during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

because the corps commander was confi dent the 

Coalition would not use CBW against Iraq. They 

probably would have retained this equipment had 

the commanders envisioned using CBW munitions 

in the 2nd RG Corps.

• The RG did not use its special ammunition distribution system before either the Gulf war or Operation 

Tariq ‘Aziz on Saddam’s Overconfi dence

Debrief, 23 June 2004

Debriefer: You appeared confi dent. Your public statements were exactly what you said—that Iraq was 

prepared to defeat any American invasion.

‘Aziz: Of course I said these things: How could I 

say “I think we are making a mistake; we are not 

prepared for an attack?” That would be impossible. 

I had to say these things because this was my government’s position, but it was true. A few weeks before 

the attacks Saddam thought that the US would not use 

ground forces; he thought that you would only use 

your air force.

Debriefer: Wasn’t he aware of the buildup of forces in 

the region?

‘Aziz: Of course he was aware, it was all over the 

television screen. He thought they would not fi ght 

a ground war because it would be too costly to the 

Americans. He was overconfi dent. He was clever, but 

his calculations were poor. It wasn’t that he wasn’t 

receiving the information. It was right there on television, but he didn’t understand international relations 

perfectly. 
68

Iraqi Freedom, according to a former senior Iraqi 

artillery offi cer. This system—specialized chemical 

battalions; replacement of company drivers with 

chemical battalion drivers and ammunition handlers; and use of special MIC depots—had served 

it well during the Iran-Iraq war. The source commented that all systems broke down and there was 

no chemical ammunition distribution system during 

OIF. Even if units had received chemical ammunition, they would have buried it, not fi red it.

• General ‘Amir Husayn Al Samarra’i, commander of 

the Iraqi chemical corps, said the Iraqi army had no 

plans to use chemical weapons during OIF, according to reporting. If there had been a strategy for 

regular army forces to use chemical weapons, he 

would have known about it.

• The Commander of 2nd RG Corps stated it was his 

fi rm belief that Iraq did not have chemical weapons.

If WMD existed, Saddam may have opted not to use 

it for larger strategic or political reasons, because he 

did not think Coalition military action would unseat 

him. If he used WMD, Saddam would have shown 

that he had been lying all along to the international 

community and would lose whatever residual political support he might have retained in the UNSC. 

From the standpoint of Regime survival, once he 

used WMD against Coalition forces, he would foreclose the chance to outlast an occupation. Based on 

his experience with past coalition attacks, Saddam 

actually had more options by not using WMD, and 

if those failed, WMD always remained as the fi nal 

alternative. Although the Iraqi Government might 

be threatened by a Coalition attack, Saddam—the 

ultimate survivor—believed if he could hold out 

long enough, he could create political and strategic 

opportunities for international sympathy and regional 

support to blunt an invasion.

• Asked by a US interviewer in 2004, why he had 

not used WMD against the Coalition during Desert 

Storm, Saddam replied, “Do you think we are mad? 

What would the world have thought of us? We 

would have completely discredited those who had 

supported us.”

• Iraqi use of WMD would deeply embarrass France 

and Russia, who cultivated Iraq.

• Use of WMD during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

would serve to justify US and UK prewar claims 

about Iraq’s illegal weapons capabilities. Such a 

justifi cation would also serve to add resolve to 

those managing the occupation.
69

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Annex A

The Quartet—Infl uence and Disharmony 

Among Saddam’s Lieutenants

The Quartet comprised four of Saddam Husayn’s most senior lieutenants in the last years of his rule and 

provided high-level advice to Saddam on challenges facing Iraq. The four were as experienced, committed and loyal individuals as Saddam had available. Nonetheless, little of their advice was taken that did not 

conform to Saddam’s existing views. That a group as senior as the Quartet had so little infl uence on the 

Regime’s strategic policy indicates that the strategic intent of the Regime was Saddam’s alone. The Quartet 

had differing views on Iraq’s way forward on WMD, but the more cautious preferences within the group had 

little infl uence over Saddam’s actions.

This portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime offi cials who were active in 

many of Iraq’s former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical 

to our assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were not 

in a position to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fl ed to another country, was also a common 

occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workings of the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to 

confi rm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.

A Core of Lieutenants 

In 1996, Saddam Husayn formed a committee of senior Regime fi gures, known as the Committee of Four, or 

Quartet, to advise him on foreign policy and other national issues. For all but the last months of its existence it was comprised of Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, Revolutionary Command Council 

Vice Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa and ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid (aka 

Chemical ‘Ali). 

The Quartet was not a uniform group. Ramadan, in an organizational sense, and ‘Aziz, philosophically, represented old-style Ba’thism. ‘Izzat Ibrahim was increasingly a tribalist as well as an advocate of a more religious 

complexion for the Regime. ‘Ali Hasan was Saddam’s closest relative in the government before the appointment of Qusay to the Ba’th leadership and he served as the family’s man in the Quartet. 

‘Ali ‘Izzat Ramadan Tariq ‘Aziz
70

How Much Power and Infl uence? 

The Quartet comprised some of the Regime’s most 

senior and experienced individuals, but it did not 

have a signifi cant impact on the Regime’s policy on 

any critical issue. Instead, the Quartet had only the 

appearance of power. It did not command its own 

agenda; instead it advised Saddam only on issues 

he chose to refer to it. Likewise, the Quartet offered 

no proactive advice and had no executive power or 

policy-determining role, and it lacked a dedicated 

staff to conduct analysis or write assessments.

 • Personal divisions in the group hindered any 

attempt to infl uence Saddam as US pressure on Iraq 

began to mount, particularly after 2000. Two Quartet members claim to have been private dissenters 

from the policy of obstructing WMD disarmament, 

but there is no evidence they attempted to press 

Saddam on the issue through the Quartet. Quartet 

members were personally distrustful of colleagues 

to the point of fear. Mutual distrust and the group’s 

widely varied experience of the outside world limited its ability to speak decisively on strategic and 

foreign issues.

• Longstanding confl icting lines of communication to 

Saddam further eroded the Quartet’s effectiveness 

and solidarity. Backchannel communications to 

Saddam were a fi xture of his rule. Saddam’s growing reclusiveness after the mid-nineties increased 

this practice and the Quartet was immune neither 

to its members using backchannels against colleagues nor to disrupting effects of such practices 

on the body’s effectiveness. ‘Izzat Ibrahim reported 

his summary of Quartet recommendations, often 

only to have them contradicted by Tariq in separate 

discussions with Saddam.

• The Quartet, however, was solidly united on issues 

unrelated to Iraq’s external problems. All Quartet 

members espoused hate of Shi’a, Kurds, democrats, 

communists, clerics, monarchists, free markets and 

most other Arabs. This unity did not transfer to a 

common coherent view of the wider world or create 

a common assessment of how to deal with Iraq’s 

confrontation with the Coalition, or how to manage 

the crisis.

• Despite a limited ability to shape policy, the Quartet 

still carried considerable prestige among more 

junior levels of the Regime. The Quartet’s existence reassured Regime supporters that Saddam’s 

decisions had the benefi t of the best minds in the 

leadership. Conversely, the individual networks of 

subordinates and followers of Quartet members 

meant that there was some transmission of Saddam’s intentions through government. The Quartet 

was seen from below as powerful, even though—as 

the Regime evolved—senior lieutenants such as the 

Quartet members were personally little more than 

refl ections of Saddam’s own authority. 

Chains of Command 

Saddam was formerly an able administrator within 

standard civil service and military structures, but 

starting in the mid-1990s, his methods changed dramatically. Saddam duplicated his mastery of formal 

administration with increasing resort to a network 

of family and personal relationships, using verbal 

instructions heedless of formal chains of command. 

His motives appear to have been a combination of 

increasing obsession with personal security and a 

prioritization of personal interests.

• This development blurred Iraq’s formal mechanisms for developing state policy. Saddam had 

always retained the prerogative of fi nal policy 

determination, but the process by which he formed 

policy became progressively less clear, even to 

senior participants in the system.

• As Saddam became less wedded to formal processes, the Quartet—an advisory body to begin 

with—was poorly placed to lock into formal chains 

of command and determine outcomes. 
71

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Perceptions of Threat and Challenge

The striking feature of the Quartet’s members was 

their inward focus. They were not cosmopolitan 

and their insularity hurt their ability to appreciate or 

assess what other countries saw as their interests and 

how Iraq’s behaviour might create confl ict. The Quartet, including ‘Aziz, had a mindset of Iraq versus the 

world, rather than Iraq as part of the world. Even the 

globetrotting ‘Aziz remained focused on Saddam’s 

will and his exclusive power to determine Iraq’s 

course. 

With the partial exception of Tariq ‘Aziz, the Quartet had only a limited and hazy view of the United 

States, its interests and how policy was formed and 

driven in Washington. At no stage did the Quartet demonstrate a strategic concept of what the US 

wanted with Iraq, where common ground and differences really lay, and the nature of the challenge 

the US or Coalition presented. Nor did they have a 

strategy for dealing with the West, apart from tactical 

games at the UN.

• Saddam shared this myopic view. Saddam had a 

view of US goals, but it was wide of the mark: he 

said he believed the US had achieved all it wanted 

in the Gulf after Desert Storm and that a continuing 

“Vietnam syndrome” about casualties precluded 

a full invasion of Iraq. Only in very late 2002 did 

Quartet members Ramadan and Tariq come to profoundly disagree with Saddam’s view of US intentions and conclude that Iraq’s ability to manage 

Coalition pressure was collapsing. But Ramadan 

and Tariq have since been concerned to portray 

themselves as, by then, too frightened and powerless to avert Saddam’s collision with Washington.

• Saddam may have been closer to the mark in his 

sense that ultimate US policy in Iraq was Regime 

change. According to ‘Aziz, Saddam decided at the 

time of Irangate (the covert supply of missiles to 

Iran in 1987) that the United States could not be 

trusted to support Baghdad. ‘Ali Hasan said that 

in the 1990s Congressional calls for the overthrow 

of Saddam meant that there was no prospect of a 

strategic dialogue with Washington. 

• The Quartet had little appreciation of global change 

since the end of the Cold War or how it affected 

Iraq’s interests and options. Instead, they focused 

unilaterally on Iraq’s deteriorating relationship with 

the West, which was coincidental with such change. 

They did not seek to capitalize on Iraq’s potential 

signifi cance in global trade through its place in 

the oil market. The Quartet never deliberated over 

globalization as a concept and how to position Iraq 

within it. 

The Quartet’s view of the rest of the Arab world was 

almost as limited. Most members of the Quartet had 

negotiated for Iraq with other Arab states, but the 

Quartet had no strategy for building an Arab constituency from 1996 to 2003. The Arab world was not 

considered a resource for Iraq, either to bolster efforts 

against Iran or to act as intermediaries with the West. 

Instead, the Quartet seems to have shared Saddam’s 

aversion to some Arab states, Saudi Arabia, in particular, and to some extent Egypt. The Quartet was not 

pan-Arabist like Nasser or Ghaddafi . Yet ‘Ali Hasan 

was surprised in 2003 that no Arab state protested 

against the attack on Iraq. 

• Instead, the Quartet’s concept of who were Iraq’s 

‘friends’ harked back to Baghdad’s perception 

of the different circumstances of the Cold War 

(Russia); of the UN as the pivotal player (France 

and Russia) and (very rarely) Malaysia, which was 

at the time Chairman of the Organization of the 

Islamic Conference. 

Regime Strategic Goals 

The Quartet had a common set of strategic goals, 

which were driven by Saddam. All Quartet members prioritized security against Iran before all else. 

They saw Iran as bigger, hostile and that it had in 

the years since the Iran-Iraq war overtaken Iraq 

in WMD development. The Quartet recognized no 

progress toward containing Iran would be possible 

without fi rst getting out of sanctions.

• The Quartet did not publicly advocate a particular 

strategic role for Iraq. Privately, it was not a proponent of regional hegemonism, whether over Kuwait, 

or the region, nor did it consider the use of WMD to 

that end. Ramadan and ‘Aziz had thought the attack 

on Kuwait was folly and Ramadan opposed it in the 

RCC. 
72

• Opposition to Israel was ritualistic. Quartet members saw Israel as a secondary threat compared to 

Iran. Israel had no land border with Iraq and was 

unlikely to mount a sustained attack on Iraq. 

Shaping Regime Intent—Saddam, WMD and the 

Lieutenants

All Quartet members were convinced that WMD had 

saved Iraq in the war against Iran. ‘Ali Hasan and 

‘Izzat Ibrahim were personally involved in the use 

of chemical weapons (CW) in securing the Regime 

during the Shi’a Intifada by virtue of having held area 

commands in the region of unrest, although much of 

the physical organization of CW use lay with Husayn 

Kamil. But none saw the Quartet as an originator of 

WMD policy, nor saw themselves as promoters of 

WMD.

• Nuclear weapons (rather than WMD generically) 

were not a Quartet issue. Among the leadership, 

nuclear weapons as a goal appears to have been 

a particular priority of Saddam himself. ‘Aziz 

believes Saddam was ‘fully committed to obtaining a nuclear weapon’ throughout his career, but 

there is no evidence that Quartet members were 

enthusiastic about a nuclear program and no hint 

of Saddam referring the issue to the Quartet at any 

stage.

• Ramadan said that he, and to a lesser extent Tariq, 

opposed WMD in the later sanctions period because 

it created more problems than benefi ts. Ramadan 

during UNMOVIC tried to ensure Iraq had no 

WMD, in particular by pursuing an untrammeled 

access policy, but alleges he was frustrated by 

Saddam and his relatives.

• Indeed, it was on the cost/benefi t analysis of WMD 

in terms of Iraq’s economy and diplomatic relations 

that the most distinct policy cleavage in the Quartet 

emerged. Ramadan, and to a lesser extent Tariq, 

believed strongly that Iraq’s advantage lay in getting rid of WMD. Such a move would lift sanctions, 

normalize relations with the West and then allow 

reassessment of how to deal with Iran. Ramadan 

and ‘Aziz would not have ruled out a return to 

WMD, but they were more focused on the outcome 

of containing Iran rather than the means. ‘Ali Hasan 

and ‘Izzat Ibrahim were more motivated by catering 

to Saddam’s views, and neither advocated any alternative thinking about WMD and containing Iran. 

Therefore, there was a divergence of ends versus 

means, with Saddam having a totemic attachment 

to WMD despite the costs, a view not shared by all 

Quartet members. 

• The ever present danger of Iran was the most 

important long term factor in Quartet thinking. The 

Quartet thought Iraq was losing an arms race with a 

hostile larger neighbor. To the extent that there was 

support for WMD development among Saddam’s 

subordinates, Iran was the most important driver. 

Those prepared to support WMD disarmament to 

achieve peace with the UN, would probably not 

have ruled out WMD rearmament if it was necessary subsequently to counter Iran.

• There was also some acceptance of Saddam’s 

notion that WMD was the right of all nations and 

his opposition to multilateral counterproliferation. 

Quartet thinking was infl uenced by a belief that 

WMD is inseparable from industrialization and that 

dual use is inevitable. 

Fear and Loathing in Baghdad

Saddam did not trust the Quartet in a personal security sense. Only ‘Izzat Ibrahim was allowed to drive 

himself to meetings with Saddam (the others were 

collected and driven in darkened limousines), though 

his mobility seems to have been curtailed toward the 

end. Quartet members were physically frightened of 

Saddam. Ramadan recalls a continuing fear of incarceration and that his son-in-law was jailed for two 

years. ‘Aziz’s son Zayyid had also been jailed for a 

period. ‘Ali Hasan also was seen by his peers as fearful, despite his blood relationship and toadying. 
73

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Annex B

Iraq’s Intelligence Services

Overview

Iraq used multiple intelligence services to collect on the Regime’s various international and local concerns. 

The Iraqi Intelligence Service was the former Regime’s largest intelligence service; the Directorate of General 

Military Intelligence and the Directorate of General Security supported the Regime on a smaller scale.

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) served the Regime as a conventional intelligence service, but it also 

undertook denial and deception operations to thwart UN inspectors and for the illicit procurement of dual-use 

materiel and military equipment. The Directorate of General Security (DGS) and Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI), however, generally performed intelligence and security operations in a comparable 

fashion to other countries’ intelligence services. This annex will provide a view of the most recent organizational structures of these security services.

There are a few particular intelligence entities specifi cally involved in the WMD story:

• IIS M4 collected overseas intelligence against UN Missions dealing with Iraq

• IIS M4/4/5 provided support to sensitive, and sometimes illicit, procurement

• IIS M5/4/14 conducted surveillance of all UN missions within Iraq

• IIS M9 and M16 conducted “special substances” research and development

• IIS M17 collected signals intelligence against the UN

• IIS M20 assisted the aforementioned directorates in human surveillance

• IIS M23 provided security to Military Industrialization Commission and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 

facilities

This portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime offi cials who were active in many 

of Iraq’s former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical to our 

assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize their involvement or 

knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were not 

in a position to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fl ed to another country, was also a common 

occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workings of the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to 

confi rm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.

Iraqi Intelligence

Service

Directorate of General

Military Intelligence

Directorate of

General Security
74

The Iraqi Intelligence 

Service

IIS Structure and Functions

The original mission of the 

Iraqi Intelligence Service 

(IIS), commonly known as 

the Mukhabarat, was foreign 

intelligence collection, domestic counterintelligence, and 

clandestine operations—standard activities for intelligence 

services worldwide—but the former Regime also used 

the service, beginning in late 1997, as a tool for the 

Military Industrial Commission (MIC) and its illicit 

procurement efforts. The IIS consisted of over twenty 

compartmented directorates, under the leadership 

of Tahir Jalil Habbush. The IIS also assisted in the 

obstruction of UN inspection missions and concealment of sensitive materials, equipment, and documentation for the former Iraqi Regime.

M1, Offi ce of the Director

M1 was the executive directorate of the IIS. Subordinate branches provided administrative functions, 

public relations, the creation of cover documentation 

for fi eld agents, and general support to the entire 

service. The most recent director of M1 was Khudayr 

Isma’il Ibrahim Al Mashhadani.

M2, Directorate of Administration and Accounting

This directorate managed daily administrative affairs 

and provided the following services: salaries and 

retirement services; logistic support, including vehicles and medical services; and liaison with government ministries and directorates. M2 also supervised 

house rentals for each IIS directorate. Every directorate maintained at least one safehouse for relocating 

operations from regular directorate offi ces. Husayn 

Muhsin Hasan, M2’s director, held his position for the 

eight years prior to OIF.

M3, Directorate of Data Processing and 

Information Security

Commonly referred to as the Computer Directorate, and often mistakenly translated as Finance, M3 

focused on the training and use of information technology in the IIS. Sa’d ‘Abd-al-Razzaq Al Majid Al 

Tikriti was responsible for the information, documentation, and fi le storage for the IIS.

M4, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence

M4 was the primary directorate for foreign intelligence collection and foreign operations—it is also 

referred to as the “Secret Service Directorate,” when 

literally translated. Collection primarily focused on 

political and economic information; however, information regarding the military, media, health, and the 

administrative capabilities of foreign countries was 

also collected.

M4 was headed by Hasan Izbah Thalij Al ‘Ubaydi 

until 2003. As the director, Hasan reported to IIS 

Deputy Director Khalil Ibrahim Al Sultan, who was 

responsible for M4, M5, M40, and monitoring (possibly M-20) directorates. Previously, Hasan had been 

the M2 Director and the Offi ce Director of M1.

A fi fth division within M4 targeted Iraqi opposition groups operating outside of Iraq. That division, 

however, was separated from M4 in 1997 and re-designated M40. The M4 and M5 directorates exchanged 

information whenever members of either directorate 

discovered intelligence related to the other directorate’s responsibilities.

Tahir Jalil Habbush.

Structure of M4

• M4/1 Arab Countries

–M4/1/1 Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan

–M4/1/2 Egypt and Sudan

–M4/1/3 Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria

–M4/1/4 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf States

• M4/2 Iran and Turkey

• M4/3 Palestine and Israel

• M4/4 United States and Europe

–M4/4/5 Scientifi c and Technical Intelligence

 Department

• M4/8 Special Projects

–Commercial Section

–Accounting Section

–Liaison Section
75

Regime Strategic

 Intent

The Scientifi c and Technical Intelligence Department, 

The Scientifi c and Technical Intelligence Department 

headed by Muthanna Muhammad Ahmad Al Bayatti 

aided MIC’s “Special Offi ce” to facilitate the procurement of sensitive items and material through foreign 

channels (see Regime Finance and Procurement 

chapter for additional information).

M5, Directorate of Counterintelligence

M5 conducted domestic monitoring and counterintelligence operations within Iraq. Five divisions within 

M5 focused on specifi c regions of interest—similar 

to M4, its sister directorate. Muhammad ‘Abd-alWahhab Fada’am was the M5 Director from 2000 

until the fall of the former Regime; he was preceded 

by Ma’ad Ibrahim Al Duri (1996-2000) and Khalil 

Ibrahim ‘Abdallah Al Nasiri (1994-1996).

Section M5/4/14 monitored all international organizations operating within Iraq, including the UN. 

As stated by a former manager within the M5 Directorate, “It [M5/4/14] monitored the UN inspectors 

because that was its mission.” Shakir Karhut headed 

this section until OIF and worked under Mu’ayyid 

‘Abd-al-Jalil, the head of M5/4. According to high 

level offi cials within the former Regime, these two 

were heavily involved in collection efforts against the 

UN.

The IIS General Affairs Division (M5/5) is the 

most recent sub-directorate. It was specifi cally 

created to act as the “catch-all” for M5 operations within Iraq. Section 18 operated more 

than 40 domestic businesses within Iraq, such 

as restaurants, hotels, travel services, souvenir shops, and truck service centers, in order 

to collect information on foreigners routinely 

entering Iraq. Other sections reportedly monitored foreign journalists, the media, and for-
76

Structure of M5

• M5/1 Iran, Turkey, Israel

–Section 1 – Iran

–Section 2 – Turkey

–Section 3 – Israel

• M5/2 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, & The Gulf States

–Section 4 – Syria and Lebanon

–Section 5 – Jordan

–Section 6 – The Gulf States

• M5/3 North African and East Asia

–Section 7 – Non-Arab States in Asia

–Section 8 – Arabian States in Africa

—Egyptian Embassy Department

—Egyptian Citizens and Business in Iraq 

Department

—Sudan and Somalia Department

—Algeria and Libya Department

—Morocco and Tunisia Department

–Section 9 – Indian Continent and Non-Arab States 

in Africa

—Department 1 – India

—Department 2 – Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

Bangladesh

—Department 3 – Africa

• M5/4 Europe, the Americas, and the United Nations

–Section 10 – Europe (Eastern, Western, or Central)

–Section 11 – Europe (Eastern, Western, or Central)

–Section 12 – Europe (Eastern, Western, or Central)

–Section 13 – North and South America

–Section 14 – International Organizations in Iraq 

(United Nations)

• M5/5 General Affairs

–Foreign Journalist Surveillance

–Inter-agency Relations

–Embassy Security

–Section 18 – Domestic Projects

—1 – Cover Businesses within Baghdad

—2 – Cover Businesses outside of Baghdad

IIS Regional Directorates

The IIS had regional offi ces for local collection, which 

carried out the functions of various national-level IIS 

directorates in the local governorates. These regional 

offi ces were called directorates despite their small 

size and limited capabilities. While they were not 

subordinate to the M5 Directorate, they fell under M5 

administratively.

• M51 The Northern Directorate (Ninawa) located in 

Mosul

• M52 The Al Ta’mim Directorate located in Kirkuk

• M53 The Al Anbar Directorate located in Ramadi

• M54 The Central Euphrates Directorate (Karbala’) 

located in Karbala’

• M55 The Western Directorate (Al Muthanna) 

located in Al Samawah

• M56 The Southern Directorate (Basrah) located in 

Basrah

• M57 The Eastern Directorate (Diyala) located in 

Ba’qubah

• M58 The Salah-al-Din Directorate located in Tikrit

• M59 The Wasit Directorate located in Al Kut

The IIS functional directorates, such as M4, M5, M20, 

and M22, had liaison offi ces within these regional 

directorates. Tasking would be passed down from the 

national-level to the local offi ces for collection or 

protection missions.
77

Regime Strategic

 Intent

eign students within Iraq.

M6, Directorate of Internal Security

Khalid Najim ‘Abdallah Sultan Al Tikriti directed 

a staff of approximately 200 security offi cers who 

acted as political minders within the IIS. Personally 

appointed by Saddam, the M6 director had sweeping 

powers of investigation and fi nancial authority.

Like a satellite offi ce of the SSO, M6 and its three 

divisions monitored the loyalty of all IIS employees. 

The fi rst division supplied liaison offi cers to each IIS 

directorate and was responsible for technical monitoring, the archives, and security of the MIC; the second 

division was responsible for political mail, diplomatic 

couriers, and information security; and the third was 

responsible for the physical security of IIS headquarters and its arsenal.

M7, Directorate of Investigation and Prosecution

M7 oversaw the Hakamiyah prison facility in Baghdad and was last headed by Haythim Khalil Ibrahim 

Al Rawi. M7 had sub-directorates to investigate Arabs 

and foreigners, as well as for prison management and 

administration. M6 and M10 often provided additional support in internal investigations and interrogations.

M8, Directorate of Liberation Movements

In the opinion of a former IIS offi cer, the M8 Directorate was a political offi ce instead of an intelligence 

collection or exploitation directorate. Formerly 

directed by Khalid Al Duri, M8 was responsible 

for supplying administrative support for approved 

Palestinian organizations, receiving guests, providing hospitality, and arranging visits with offi cials. 

The source also stated that the M8 director reported 

directly to Tariq ‘Aziz on matters concerning Palestinians coming to Iraq from Syria.

M9, Directorate of Communications

M9 dealt with landline and wireless communications 

requirements between all IIS directorates. The IIS 

primarily used landlines for communications security; 

wireless communications were used only as an alternative if the land lines were down. The last director 

of M9 was Shibli Muhammad ‘Ali. Information is 

Structure of M9/J (1980 to 1990)

M9/J, headed by Dr. Muhammad from 1980 to 1987, 

consisted of at least fi ve sections until 1984: Administration and Archives, Analysis and Biology Testing 

and Concealment, Evaluations, Implementation, 

and the Special Material sections. After 1984, M9/J 

restructured its fi ve branches:

• Administration and Archives Section

• Secret Communications Section

• Physiochemical Analysis and Criminal Investigations Section

• Special Materials Sections

–Chemical Production

–Analysis and Implementation

• Explosives Section

–Explosives Preparation

–Explosives Investigation

The Secret Communications section handled the 

monitoring of postal communications and the development of invisible or secret inks. The Physiochemical Analysis and Criminal Investigations section 

conducted scientifi c analysis and research. The 

Explosives section was an independent unit that was 

located separate from the rest of M9/J to keep it as 

compartmented as possible. It conducted both explosive preparations and investigations for both offensive 

and defensive purposes.

Dr. Al Azmirli, after leaving M9/J in 1987, acted as 

a technical and scientifi c consultant who reported 

directly to the IIS director. Dr. ‘Ali Mukhlif replaced 

Al Azmirli as head of M9/J, however by 1988, Dr. 

Mukhlif could not directly report to the IIS director 

as in the past. He was required to report to a General 

Director (directorate level) and a “technical advisor.” 

Mukhlif would see the department through its next 

transformation in 1990, but he was replaced by Dr. 

‘Amir ‘Awan Juma’a Al Tikriti in 1991.
78

not yet available in regards to when M9 assumed its 

benign role of communications.

From 1980-1990, M9 developed chemical and 

biological weapons, produced toxins, poisons, and 

lethal devices for intelligence or assassination 

operations, and tested its products on prisoners. In 

the early 1980s M9 was known as the IIS Science and 

Technology Directorate, which had four divisions: 

Engineering, Chemical, Mechanical, and Electronics. 

M9/J, a subordinate section headed by Dr. Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Mun’im Al Azmirli, established labs 

after the start of the Iran-Iraq War for the development of chemical and biological weapons. According to Nu’man ‘Ali Muhammad Al Tikriti, a former 

department director within M9/J, prisoners from Al 

Hakamiyah Prison were used and killed by M9’s 

products in late 1983 (see Iraq’s Chemical Weapons 

Program and Iraq’s Biological Weapons Program 

chapters for additional information).

M9/J was removed from M9 in 1990, and it was 

assigned as its own directorate, M16. It retained most 

of its previous structure except for the Explosives 

Section, which was removed from its ranks entirely 

and also assigned as its own directorate, M21 (See the 

M16 and M21 sections of this annex for additional 

information). 

M10, Directorate of Studies and Research

M10, also referred to as the “analytic directorate,” 

was responsible for seeking, compiling, translating, 

and publishing open source materials from foreign 

governments, agencies, and organizations. Researchers investigated political, economical, social, international, and military topics and in-house linguists made 

translations. The director of M10 was Anmar Latif 

Nusayyif Jasim Al Dulaymi.

M11, The Training and Preparation Institute

The Training and Preparation staff, approximately 70 

employees, prepared lectures and intelligence courses 

for both new and current IIS offi cers and employees 

on a yearly curriculum. The director of M11 was 

Mu’affi q Saleh Al ’Ali Al Tikriti.

M12, Directorate of Accounting

Headed by Nazar Yasin Al Maslawi, M12 was 

responsible for domestic and foreign bank accounts 

and IIS fi nancial matters. Sub-directorates managed 

expenditures, fi nancial archives, and salaries, as well 

as supporting the comptroller. Each IIS directorate 

had an M12 offi cer to handle all accounting affairs of 

that directorate, such as the distribution of salaries, 

purchasing of equipment, food, clothing, and other 

directorate specifi c items.

M13, Directorate of Clandestine Operations

M13 was responsible for operational support services, such as lock-picking, surveillance photography, 

electronic eavesdropping, and counterintelligence 

functions at Iraqi embassies abroad. When a target 

was identifi ed and approved for collection, M13 

conducted the operation. Analysis of the collected 

information, however, was left to the requestor. M5 

most likely tasked M13 to collect against UN inspectors, who were monitored through wire taps, listening devices, and hidden cameras at the Canal Hotel, 

which served as the UN Headquarters in Baghdad. 

After Desert Storm, the High Technology Photography and Electronics Research and Development Project was subsumed into the Directorate of Clandestine 

Operations. For this reason, M13 is also commonly 

referred to as the Technical Operations or Technical 

Monitoring Directorate.

M14, Directorate of Special Operations

M14, directed by Muhammad Khudayr Sabah Al 

Dulaymi, was responsible for training and conducting 

special operations missions. It trained Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and 

Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, 

marksmanship, and foreign operations at its facilities 

at Salman Pak. Additionally, M14 oversaw the “Challenge Project,” a highly secretive project regarding 

explosives. Sources to date have not been able to 

provide suffi cient details regarding the “Challenge 

Project.”

M15, Directorate of Legal Affairs

M15 provided the IIS offi cers and employees with 

legal advice, handled all employees’ legal cases, 

reviewed all new laws that pertained to IIS offi cers, 

and implemented the laws and regulations within the 
79

Regime Strategic

 Intent

IIS. While it served all of IIS, M15 primarily assisted 

M1 and M2.

M16, Directorate of Criminology

M16 was created when M9/J was extracted from M9 

and designated as its own directorate in 1990. The 

directorate retained the organizational structure of 

M9/J except for the Explosives Section, which was 

also designated as its own directorate, the Al Ghafi qi 

Project (M21). The services M16 provided in the 

fi elds of chemical and biological science, criminal 

investigation and forensic sciences, chemical and 

poison production, and intelligence support offer 

insight to its nickname, the “Directorate of Special 

Logistics.” Nu’man ‘Ali Muhammad Al Tikriti was 

M16’s last director having served from 1996 until 

2003.

In late 2001 or early 2002, M16 requested assistance 

from the IIS Scientifi c and Technical Intelligence 

Department (M4/4/5) to acquire specialized equipment for M16. Devices were requested for atomic 

absorption, infrared, and ultraviolet spectrophotometers for the analysis of chemical substances; x-ray 

and bomb detection devices which were planned for 

use in Iraqi embassies; materials used to detect and 

exploit latent fi ngerprints for criminal investigations; 

and a device used to test for forged or falsifi ed documentation requested by the Secret Communications 

Directorate.

M17, Directorate of Signals Intelligence

M17 monitored, collected, and analyzed external 

signals and voice communications. The signals intelligence project, formerly known as “Project 858,” 

was almost completely destroyed during the fi rst Gulf 

War. Following the war, the project was resurrected 

and re-designated the “Hadi Project.” Responsibility for it was passed between Iraq’s intelligence and 

security services until a presidential decree in the late 

1990s brought it permanently into the IIS as M17. 

The directorate was the largest in the IIS, consisting 

of four divisions and two branches, and employing 

between 2,000 to 2,500 personnel. Khalid Karim 

Khalifa Braish Al ’Ajili was the director of M17 from 

1995 to the beginning of OIF.

M17 was the pinnacle of Iraqi signals intelligence. It 

monitored internal Iraqi communications to ensure 

Structure of M14

• Special Operations Department, composed of a 

foreign and a domestic section, performed government-sanctioned assassinations inside or outside of 

Iraq.

• The “Tiger Group” was similar to Special Operations, except that it was primarily comprised of 

suicide bombers.

• The Training Department provided training for all 

IIS offi cers going abroad.

• The Counterterrorism Department handled counterterrorism activities in Iraq and at embassies; 

reportedly, it disarmed terrorists hijacking a Sudanese airliner from Saddam International Airport.

• The Administrative Department provided support 

services such as administration, fi nances, communications, and logistics.

• The Anti-Iranian Department infi ltrated operatives 

into Iran for intelligence collection and operated 

against Iranian groups attempting to enter Iraq.

Structure of M16 (2000 to 2003)

• The Secret Communications Division was responsible for document seals and stamps, document 

authentication, and mail security. The division also 

worked on improving secret and invisible inks.

• The Physiochemical Analysis and Forensic Criminal Investigations performed various testing on 

foods and medicines, e.g. it tested for bacteria and 

viruses in food, dairy products, and water. The 

forensics department specialized in fi ngerprints, 

ballistics, forgery, and the protection of diplomatic 

mail.

• The Chemical Preparation Division conducted 

theoretical and practical research on toxic materials, poisons, and anesthetics for operational use by 

other IIS directorates, such as M4 or M5.

• The Explosives Division, also known as “Section 

27,” was responsible for detecting and disabling of 

explosive devices relating to the mail or vehicles, 

as well as producing such devices for the IIS. This 

division was a hybrid between M16’s former explosive ordinance disposal section and the former M21 

Al Ghafi qi Project.
80

The Evolution of the Former M9/J Department

After M9/J was reassigned as M16 in 1990, it was 

headed by Dr. ‘Amir ‘Awni Juma’a from 1991 until 

1996, when he was replaced by the last M16 director, 

Nu’man. M16’s organization from its inception until 

early 2000 consisted of the following four sections:

• Administration and Archives Division

• Secret Communications Division

• Physiochemical Analysis and Criminal Investigations Division

• Special Materials Division

–Chemical Production Section

–Explosives and Radiation Detection and Treatment Section

According to captured documentation, on 29 September 1999 the IIS Director approved the deconstruction of the Special Materials Division, as well 

as M21, the Al Ghafi qi Project. The Special Materials Section was reorganized so that the Explosives 

Detection and Treatment Section could merge with 

the Al Ghafi qi Project under M16 for the “unifi cation 

of technical specialties...since the defensive work is 

so closely tied with offensive work.” The Radiation 

Detection utility was to remain with M16.

A consulting agency for the IIS Director proposed 

that the Chemical Production Section become an 

independent division subordinate to M16, comprised 

of a Chemical Supply Department and an Intelligence 

Applications Department. Its duties at the time of 

reorganization consisted of preparing substances 

which paralyzes the individuals’ functionality, preparing tranquilizers and hypnotics for intelligence uses, 

preparing safe instant lethal substances, and camoufl aging these substances by various means such as 

drinks or medicine. This was the last restructuring of 

M16 prior to OIF. (See the M21 section for additional 

information on the Al Ghafi qi Project.)

Structure of M17

• M17/1 Service and Administration Division

–M17/1/1 Personnel

–M17/1/2 Vehicle Maintenance

–M17/1/3 Building Maintenance

• M17/2 Analysis Division

–M17/2/1 Algorithmic Encryption Design

–M17/2/2 Electronic Cryptanalysis

–M17/2/3 Manual and Mechanical Cryptanalysis

• M17/3 Operations Division—Intercept, Jamming, 

and Direction Finding

–Central SIGINT Station at Al Rashidiyah

–North SIGINT Station at Mosul

–South SIGINT Station at Basrah

–West SIGINT Station at Al Rutbah

–Communications Security Monitoring

• M17/4 Technical Support Division

–Signals Research

–Technical Analysis

–Satellite Intercept

• Computer Branch

• Analysis and Production Branch

–Administration

–Translation

–Military Communications

–Civilian Communications

–COMSEC Analysis

–Encrypted Communications Analysis
81

Regime Strategic

 Intent

communications security, intercepted foreign military communications, and collected against foreign 

embassies, UN Headquarters, and, from 1995 to 

1998, UN inspectors.

M18, Directorate of Residency

M18 issued visas, determined residency status, and 

enforced immigration laws for all Arabs and foreigners living in Iraq.

M19, Directorate of Commercial Projects

The Directorate of Commercial Projects ran front 

companies to help illicit procurement and importation 

of dual-use materiel and other prohibited items into 

Iraq. The Foreign Branch oversaw the management of 

trade with overseas front companies, such as MIC’s 

Al Basha’ir Trade Company, Ltd., and the Syrian 

fi rms SES Trade Company and the MAS Economic 

Group. The Domestic Branch oversaw the management of numerous small businesses throughout Iraq 

to fi nancially supplement IIS operations, usage by 

the IIS, such as print shops for forgery, and strategic 

surveillance of foreign interests.

In 1997, M19 director Mana’ ‘Abdallah Rashid 

ordered a halt to all Foreign Branch operations as 

a result of the failure of one of its companies to 

deliver spare parts, tires, batteries, electronic equipment, and vehicles. At the same time, the manager 

of the Domestic Branch was jailed for attempting to 

smuggle copper out of Iraq. These two incidents led 

to the permanent closure and subsequent salvage of 

the Directorate of Commercial Projects. M19 was 

disbanded and its sections were reassigned to the M4 

and M5 Directorates. The Foreign Branch projects 

were re-designated as M4/8 under the Directorate of 

Foreign Intelligence. The Domestic Branch projects 

were re-designated as M5/5/18 under the Directorate of Counterintelligence (see Regime Finance and 

Procurement for additional information on illicit 

procurement).

M20, Directorate of Surveillance

The Directorate of Surveillance monitored individual 

targets with human surveillance and may have been 

involved in collection against UN inspectors. M20, 

with three fi eld intelligence units and an administrative branch, was directly subordinate to the IIS 

Deputy Director. Support requests had to fi rst be 

approved by the Deputy Director before tasking 

was executed. Requests also had to provide specifi c 

information on targets and the intended location of 

surveillance. Restricted manpower and resources, 

however, limited collection periods to approximately 

seven to ten days. Akram ‘Umar Salih Al Tikriti was 

the director of M20 from 2000 to OIF. 

M21, The Al Ghafi qi Project

The Al Ghafi qi Project existed to make explosive 

devices for the IIS to be used in assassination and 

demolition operations. The Explosives Section of 

M9/J was extracted from the M9 Directorate in 1990 

and assigned as its own directorate, M21; at the same 

time, the remainder of M9/J was also extracted and 

designated as M16. The name Al Ghafi qi, referring to 

a geographic area between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 

was most likely attached to the project in 1990 as it 

was designated as an independent directorate. The 

project is also known as “sheen 27,” where ‘sheen’ is 

the fi rst letter in the word for Section, however, this 

was not seen until after 2000.

Khalil Ibrahim Fayad Al Sabahi was the director 

of the former Explosives Section since 1986, and 

he continued to head the organization as the M21 

Director until his departure in 1996. Dr. ‘Amir ‘Awni 

Juma’a, who was previously the M16 director until 

1996, was the superintendent of the Al Ghafi qi Project during the negotiations to integrate Al Ghafi qi into 

M16 in 1999. Badi’a Muhammad Salih was the director of the project, which was decommissioned in 2000 

and reassigned to M16.

No one person constructed an entire explosive device 

alone. The construction process drifted through the 

sections of the directorate. An improvised explosive device (IED) began in the Chemistry Department which developed the explosive materials for 

the device, the Electronics Department prepared the 

Structure of M18

• M18/1 The Arab Division: responsible for all Arab 

immigrants regardless of country

• M18/2 The Foreigners Division: responsible for all 

non-Arab immigrants

• M18/3 The Airport Division: a satellite offi ce 

located at the point-of-entry

• M18/4 The Regional Division: satellite offi ce 

located at the various regional governorates and 

points of origin. 
82

timers and wiring of the IED, and the Mechanical 

Department produced the igniters and designed the 

IED. Al Ghafi qi constantly invented new designs or 

methods to conceal explosives; books, briefcases, 

belts, vests, thermoses, car seats, fl oor mats, and 

facial tissue boxes were all used to conceal PE4, C4, 

RDX, or TNT.

M22, Directorate of Protective Services

The Directorate of Protective Services was similar 

in composition to a light infantry battalion and it 

protected IIS facilities along with the Ba’th Party 

national leadership. Its most recent director prior to 

OIF was Khassam Ibrahim Omar Ayyub Al Tikriti. 

M22 provided external security at IIS sites, while M6 

handled internal security issues—similar to the way 

that the SRG and SSO handled security at presidential 

palaces.

Three subordinate divisions in M22 carried out various physical security missions for the IIS Headquarters in Baghdad, the Mujahiddin è Khaliq (Iranians 

opposed to the current Iranian Regime), and the IIS 

Regional Offi ces (M51 through M59). M22 personnel 

guarded all IIS safehouses, and M22 personnel may 

have been present in the event of the transportation of 

WMD materiel, because it had previously provided 

convoy security for the shipment of light weapons.

M23, Directorate of Military Industries

Also known as “Al Munzhumah,” M23 provided security for all MIC and IAEC sites, and it assisted the 

Natioal Monitoring Directorate (NMD) with purging 

MIC facilities of documents to be safeguarded from 

the UN. An Iraqi Regular Army unit was commonly 

co-located at MIC facilities for external protection, 

but M23 handled security within the facility, as well 

as the security staff manning gates at industrial complexes, weapons manufacturing plants, chemical production plants, and MIC offi ces. M23 also provided 

limited security for three MIC companies: Armos, 

Al Basha’ir, and Al Mufakhir—all front companies 

for illicit MIC procurement. We do not know to what 

extent M23 provided security for these companies. 

The last director of M23 was ‘Abd-al-Hamid Sulayman Ibrahim Al Huraymis Al Nasiri.

M23 offi cers also were involved in NMD document 

concealment and destruction efforts. In August 1998, 

Saddam ended cooperation with UNSCOM inspecStructure of M23

• M23/1 Human Resources

–M23/1/1 Military Personnel

–M23/1/2 Civilian Personnel

–M23/1/3 Personnel Management

–M23/1/4 Passports and Visas

• M23/2 Internal Security

• M23/3 Investigations

–M23/3/1 Interrogations

–M23/3/2 Investigations

–M23/3/3 Jail

• M23/4 Nuclear Energy

–M23/4/1 Companies

–M23/4/2 Opposition Group Activities

–M23/4/3 Counter-Espionage

• M23/5 Maintenance Division

–M23/5/1 Management Section

–M23/5/2 Building Maintenance

–M23/5/3 Vehicle Maintenance

• M23/6 Counter-Espionage Division

–M23/6/1 Counter-Espionage

–M23/6/2 Companies

–M23/6/3 Opposition Group Activities

tions, and soon after he ordered the creation of a 

NMD committee to purge all MIC records of sensitive 

documentation related to past prohibited programs. 

While many documents had already been declared, 

some were given to M23 agent ‘Ayad Qatan Talab, 

the director of M23/6/1 Counter-Espionage Section, 

to keep in a lockbox. These documents have not yet 

been recovered.

M40, Directorate of Opposition Group Activities

M40 targeted opposition groups based overseas, such 

as the Al Dawa Party, the Communist Party, and the 

Wahhabis. M40 tasked its satellite offi ces around Iraq 

to monitor coalition forces prior to OIF, but limited 
83

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Structure of M40

• M40/1 Monitors the Al Wafaq Party, Communist 

Party, and Separatists

• M40/2 Monitors the Al Dawa Party, Al Majlis Party, 

and the Wahhabis

• M40/3 Monitors the Kurds

• M40/4 Monitors external threats, Al Mu’tamar, and 

Independents

• M40/5 Operations against the Kurds

• M40/6 Monitors the Al Yazidis, Al Saabiah, and Al 

Ashurin

resources prevented any measurable success. A civilian, ‘Isam 

Khudhayr ‘Abbas Al Dulaymi Al 

Awani, was the director of M40 

from 1990 to 9 April 2003. At that 

point, according to a former M40 

offi cer, all M40 offi cers were told 

to burn their documents and go home. “It was over,” 

the source said, “the IIS did not exist anymore.”

The Directorate of 

General Military Intelligence

The Directorate of General Military Intelligence 

(DGMI) was Iraq’s main military intelligence service. 

The DGMI collected intelligence on the military 

capabilities of the countries adjacent to Iraq, as well 

as Kurdish forces. The director of DGMI, Staff Lt. 

Gen. Zuhayr Talib ‘Abd-al-Sattar, reported directly to 

the Presidential Secretary, despite the subordination 

of the DGMI to the Ministry of Defense.

In addition to military analysis and targeting, the 

DGMI acted as an internal police force within the 

Iraqi military by assigning DGMI Intelligence Offi -

cers to each military unit down to the battalion level. 

Technically, the offi cer’s mission was intelligence 

support, but the majority of the offi cer’s work centered on controlling corruption and theft within the 

unit. Just as the SSO placed political offi cers within 

the Republican Guard, the DGMI placed intelligence 

offi cers within the military services to monitor troops.

This organization has also been 

recognized as the General Military 

Intelligence Directorate (GMID), 

General Directorate of Military 

Intelligence (GDMI), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), 

Military Intelligence Directorate 

(MID), and the Istikhbarat, the shortened version of 

its Arabic name: Mudiriyah Al Istikhbarat Al ‘Askriah 

Al ‘Ammah.

The Directorate of 
84

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85

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Annex C

Iraq’s Security Services

Overview

The former Regime’s security services protected the President, secured the presidential palace grounds, 

and guaranteed loyalty to the Regime. These organizations, however, also concealed information and material from United Nations weapon inspectors. This annex will provide a view of the most recent organizational 

structure of these security services. 

The Special Security Organization, using personal escorts and protection units, maintained the innermost security levels surrounding the President and the Regime. The Republican Guard, comprised of the Special Republican Guard and the Republican Guard Forces Command, served as the outer rings of Regime and national 

security. Prior to 1996 the Special Republican Guard was specifi cally tasked to conceal WMD-related material 

in collaboration with the Special Security Organization. 

This portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime offi cials who were active in many 

of Iraq’s former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical to our 

assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize their involvement or 

knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were not in a position to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fl ed to another country, was also a common occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workings of 

the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to confi rm, 

supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.

Special Security 

Organization

(Crest of the Republic)

Republican

Guard
86

The National Security Council 

The National Security Council provided a forum for 

cooperation between Iraq’s security and intelligence 

agencies regarding overlapping issues among the 

agencies and joint-service projects. It was comprised 

of ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al 

Khatab Al Nasiri, and the directors of the four main 

security and intelligence organizations—the Special 

Security Organization (SSO), the Iraqi Intelligence 

Service (IIS), the Directorate of General Military 

Intelligence (DGMI), and the Directorate of General 

Security (DGS). 

‘Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-President and the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 

acted as the chairman, and ‘Abd acted as the Secretary General of the National Security Council. The 

Council did not have regular preplanned meetings, 

but it met periodically at ‘Izzat’s headquarters at 

Al Admani Palace in Baghdad to address any problems or issues that had emerged since the last meeting. Despite these meetings most problems—big or 

small—were brought directly to Saddam by the agencies’ directors. 

‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri

Chairman

‘Abd Hamid Mahmud

Al Khatab Al Nasiri

Secretary General

Tahir Jalil Habbush

Director, IIS

Zuhayr Talib

‘Abd-al-Sattar

Director, DGMI

Qusay Saddam

Husayn

Director, SSO

Rafi ’ ‘Abd-al-Latif

Tulfah Al Nasiri

Director, DGS

The presidential secretary, ‘Abd, screened almost all 

of the reporting sent to the Presidential Offi ce by the 

SSO, IIS, DGMI, and DGS. The directors of these 

organizations, including Qusay Saddam Husayn, who 

headed the SSO, reported directly to ‘Abd, who chose 

what should proceed to the President. The correspondence from the SSO and IIS was opened by the presidential secretary himself, and not the staff. ‘Abd then 

evaluated whether it was for the President’s action or 

Daily Brief. If the matter related to routine administration, the Secretary acted on the correspondence, 

himself, and then he returned it to the originating 

offi ce. However, this did not include the hiring and 

fi ring of department directors. 

The presidential secretary had a higher status than 

Qusay prior to 2001. Qusay, as Director of the SSO, 

still had to report to ‘Abd despite being the President’s son. Qusay was no longer within ‘Abd’s chain 

of responsibility after Qusay was elected to the Ba’th 

Party Leadership in May 2001, however, the SSO was 

still required to report to the presidential secretary. 
87

Regime Strategic

 Intent

The Special Security

Organization

Saddam Husayn formed the Special Security Organization (Jihaz al-Amn al-Khass in Arabic) shortly 

after he became President in 1979. The assurance of 

Regime stability required a wide spectrum of support 

and services, and Saddam relied on the expertise of 

the Special Security Organization (SSO) until 2003. 

Saddam used the SSO, which consisted of over 5,500 

personnel, to reveal any threats to him and his 

position.

Leadership of the Organization

Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid

Husayn Kamil Hasan Al 

Majid headed the SSO 

from as early as 1983 

until 1989, according 

to a senior Republican 

Guard offi cer. By 1987, 

he was also the “Overseer” of the Military 

Industrial Commission, 

the Republican Guard 

(including the Special 

Republican Guard), 

Saddam’s Special Presidential Guard, and the 

Ministry of Oil. 

Husayn Kamil did not appear to rely on deputies. He 

had the power, because of his family ties and proximity to the President, to have anyone fi red or have them 

placed under suspicion. A former subordinate noted 

“Husayn Kamil did not have a right-hand man, as 

he was too arrogant.” Many of the senior leadership 

believe that all of Iraq’s problems with the United 

Nations were the result of his unilateral decisions. 

He was briefl y appointed to and eventually fi red 

as the Minister of Defense in 1991, after which he 

was appointed by Saddam to be the Minister of the 

Military Industrial Commission. His transfer from the 

SSO in 1989 created a gap in SSO leadership (See 

the “Husayn Kamil” textbox in the Regime Strategic 

Intent chapter for additional information). 

Fannar Zibin Al Hasan

During the fi rst Gulf War, Fannar Zibin Al Hasan, 

a cousin of Saddam, directed the SSO. Fannar was 

a fi gurehead. Qusay Saddam Husayn, who was 

appointed by Saddam to be the deputy director, actually led the organization. Little is known about the 

SSO leadership from 1989 to 1991. 

Qusay Saddam Husayn

Qusay became SSO 

Director in late 1991 or 

early 1992. The security 

organization lost much 

of its infl uence without 

Husayn Kamil. Many of 

the responsibilities were 

not passed to Qusay 

because he was viewed 

as inexperienced—he 

was approximately 

24 years old when 

appointed to direct 

the SSO. Qusay was a 

graduate of the College of 

Law; he was not given military rank and always wore 

civilian clothes. For this reason Qusay enlisted the 

assistance of Husayn Kamil for leadership guidance.

With the assistance of Husayn Kamil from 1991-1995 

and under the leadership of Qusay, the SSO undertook many functions, such as protection, collection, 

and deception operations. Together, these two used 

the assets at their disposal to orchestrate a denial and 

deception program against the United Nations. 

After the departure of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Qusay 

supervised the command authority of the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard while 

simultaneously serving as director of the SSO. In title, 

Qusay was referred to as the “Honorable Supervisor 

of the Republican Guard,” but he was never referred 

to as “the commander.” Qusay was able to manage 

the SSO, though he did not have the seniority, experience, or depth in military matters to command troops. 

Commanders feared and respected Qusay because, 

much like Husayn Kamil, he had almost-absolute 

power in the Regime. When he spoke to military commanders, however, he would generally issue vague 

managerial directives. 

Husayn Kamil

Qusay Saddam Husayn

Director, SSO
88

Qusay stepped down as the Director of the SSO after 

he was elected one of two deputies in charge of the 

military branch of the Ba’th Party on 19 May 2001, 

three days after being elected to Ba’th Party membership. Managing his new responsibilities in addition to 

his role in the SSO was reportedly a heavy burden on 

Qusay. 

Walid Hamid Tawfi q

Staff Maj. Gen. Walid 

Hamid Tawfi q held the 

position of SSO Director from June 2001 

until September 2002. 

Walid, a staff major 

general at the time, was 

selected to fi ll Qusay’s 

position because he was 

the most senior offi cer 

within the SSO. Qusay 

wanted to appoint the 

Director of Republican Guard Security to the position of SSO Director, but that offi cer was only a colonel. Qusay never 

completely relinquished control of the SSO. Qusay 

ordered Walid to report directly to him, though the 

normal chain of reporting for the SSO Director was 

to report security matters to the presidential secretary, 

‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri. 

Qusay eventually relieved Walid of duty and returned 

as the Director of the SSO in September 2002. The 

circumstances around Walid’s reappointment to the 

Governor of Al Basrah are uncertain. Walid claims 

that he was removed one week after he received a 

letter from Saddam admonishing him for monitoring an individual who was, without the knowledge of 

Walid, close to Saddam. 

Structure of the Organization

Unlike the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the directorates and branches of the SSO did not have a coded 

nomenclature.

Walid Hamid Tawfi q

Himayah—The Presidential Bodyguards

The fi rst tier of security closest to Saddam took no 

direction from the SSO, as this responsibility was 

removed from the SSO during the late 1980s. The 

Himayah (Arabic for “Protection”), a general term 

for the Department of Senior Escorts (al-Murafi q 

al-Qadim) was composed of two groups, the Special 

Protection (Amn al-Khas) and the Special Guard 

(Haras al-Khas), which were directly accountable to 

the Secretary of the President, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud 

Al Khatab Al Nasiri. The Special Protection was with 

the President 24 hours a day, seven days a week to 

provide personal security. The Special Guard had 

more of a logistic role, providing personal services 

such as laundry, food, and shopping. The SSO picked 

the candidates and monitored the members of this 

group to ensure loyalty to Saddam. 

The Offi ce of the Director

The Offi ce of the Director contained the staff closest to Qusay and daily SSO operations. Qusay relied 

less on the established offi cials of the organization, 

and by 1998 he developed his own close circle of 

personal aides much as his father had done. Among 

them were ‘Ali Husayn Al Rashid, Qusay’s longstanding personal bodyguard; Hani ‘Abd-al-Latif Tulfah Al 

Nasiri, the fi rst cousin of Qusay’s mother; and Suhayl 

Muhammad Sultan Al Duri, Qusay’s secretary, Director of Public Relations, and by default, the Offi cial 

Secretary of the SSO Director (Offi ce Manager). 

Suhayl replaced Sulayman ‘Ulwan Ibrahim Al Huraymis Al Nasiri who served as Qusay’s secretary since 

1991 and Offi ce Manager until 1997, when Qusay 

dismissed him. 

The director’s offi ce had four sections that handled 

allocation of residential properties for SSO employees, administration of SSO computers, fi nancial oversight, and the inter-offi ce and outgoing mail. 

The Directorate of Security Affairs

The Directorate of Security Affairs, the second tier of 

presidential protection, consisted of two sections that 

were charged with the security of presidential palaces, 

the offi ce of the presidency, and Ba’th Party offi ces 

and headquarters. Made up of over 1,700 personnel, 
89

Regime Strategic

 Intent

The Special Security Organization.

the Directorate of Security Affairs was the largest 

directorate and last headed by Col. Muhammad Rijab 

Al Haddushi. It supplied protective services to the 

Presidential Diwan and Ba’th Party Regional Command, as well as the support contingency known as 

“Group 40,” which was composed of drivers, cooks, 

and launderers who traveled with Saddam.

The Directorate of Republican Guard Security 

Hani ‘Abd-al-Latif 

Tulfah Al Nasiri, one of 

Qusay’s most capable 

deputies, headed this 

directorate, which 

monitored loyalty to 

the Regime within the 

Republican Guard. In 

2001 Qusay told Staff 

Maj. Gen. Walid Hamid 

Tawfi q, despite Walid’s 

appointment to SSO 

Director, that he would 

not have control over 

Hani or his directorate. Hani retained his position of 

Director of the Directorate of Republican Guard (RG) 

Security as he ascended the ranks of the SSO. Three 

months after Walid was appointed as SSO Director, 

Qusay appointed Hani, his preferred choice for SSO 

Director, to the position of Assistant Director. 

Three departments within this directorate closely 

watched the SRG, the Allahu Akbar Operations 

Command (1st RG Corps), and the Fat’h Al Mubayyin

Operations Command (2nd RG Corps). While not 

large enough to warrant their own departments, two 

SSO Security Offi cers scrutinized the RG Missile 

Command and the RG Airbase at Al Rashid, as well 

(see The Republican Guard section, below, for additional information). 

Prior to 1991 the SSO used security offi cers to monitor, educate, and discipline the military troops in an 

effort to protect against enemy intelligence. After 

1991 the SSO shifted its focus to monitor the military 

commanders to guarantee their loyalty and political reliability. These security offi cers, reminiscent of 

Soviet commissars, were embedded within Republican Guard units down to the battalion level, and they 

did not answer to the RG chain of command. 

SSO Security Offi cers underwent a special threemonth course held by the SSO, commonly wore 

civilian attire or military uniform without rank and, 

by nature of their positions, were not commonly liked 

Hani ‘Abd al-Latif
90

Duties of the SSO Palace Security

The Directorate of Security Affairs oversaw the security details within the presidential palaces and facilities of the Iraqi Regime. While the Special Republican 

Guard (SRG) maintained the perimeter and main 

entrance gate security, the Directorate of Security 

Affairs provided close-protection internal security 

measures:

• Access control for incoming and outgoing palace 

visitors, to include verifying authorizations, security badges, personal and vehicular searches.

• Verifying personnel records for all inside and 

outside palace workers with the assistance of the 

Directorate of General Security (DGS).

• Escorting or monitoring all workers (janitors, waiters, contractors, etc.) in the presidential palaces.

• Requesting and validating annual security clearances from the Directorate of General Security for 

all enlisted and commissioned SRG personnel. 

by the other soldiers. In the event of disloyalty or 

a security breach, the security offi cer would report 

the event directly to the director of RG Security. For 

example, a security offi cer at the battalion level would 

not be required to pass the information through the 

brigade and division security offi ces. The Director of 

RG Security could bypass the SSO Director because 

of his special link with Qusay. 

The Directorate of Communications

Secure communications between strategic Regime 

facilities was the responsibility of the Directorate of 

Communications, directed by Head Engineer Safa’ 

Shakir Taha. This directorate established and maintained landline and wireless communications for all 

palaces, directorates, presidential and Diwan offi ces, 

and Republican Guard headquarters. Two departments within the directorate specialized in wireless 

and landline communications systems. The Landline 

Department was headed by Engineer Salam ‘Aziz; the 

Wireless Department was headed by Engineer ‘Abdal-Rahman. 

The SSO Security Branch

Similar in mission to the RG Security Directorate or 

a police department’s Internal Affairs division, the 

SSO Security Branch monitored the personnel of the 

Special Security Organization. A cousin of Qusay, 

Fatik Karim Sulayman Al Majid, was the last known 

director of this branch. Fatik had almost constant 

access to Saddam, because the SSO Security Branch 

was Saddam’s window into Qusay’s inner circle. 

Saddam appointed strong loyalists, all of whom were 

members of his personal guard staff, to each of the 

security and intelligence services near the beginning 

of 2001. All of these positions reported the activities of their various agencies to Fatik, Director of 

the SSO Security Branch. Khalid Najim ‘Abdallah 

Sultan Al Majid Al Tikriti was appointed to head the 

IIS Security Branch (M6), Haytham Sulayman Al 

Majid was appointed to head the Security Branch for 

the Directorate of General Military Intelligence, and 

Salim ‘Abd-al-Qatar Sulayman was appointed to head 

the respective security element of the Directorate of 

General Security. 

Cross-checking of the various services placed the 

SSO in a superior position over these agencies. For 

example, the IIS was not informed of SSO operations, 

but the SSO would be informed of all IIS operations; 

only the liaison offi cers between the two organizations would communicate offi cially. If the IIS became 

aware of a Ba’th Party member plotting action against 

the Regime, the case would be passed directly to 

the SSO. However, if the IIS wished to keep a case, 

Saddam most likely would have been consulted. 

The Surveillance and Information Branch

The Surveillance and Information Branch was tasked 

with monitoring Iraqi offi cials, all employees within 

the offi ce of the presidency, and other designated 

targets, to identify individuals of questionable loyalty. 

The director of this branch, Rafi ’ Hamid Muhammad 

Al Sagmani, oversaw the operations of two sub-sections, the Telecommunications Monitoring Section, 

headed by Muhammad Ra’uf Ghassub, and the 

Human Surveillance Section, headed by Harith Al 

Duri. Rafi ’ was another of Qusay’s close associates 

within the SSO. 
91

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Administration Branch

The administrative branch of the SSO, which was 

headed by Wasfi Mukhlif Al Ajili, had four subordinate sections: Supplies, Services and Maintenance, 

Personnel (Human Resources), and Accounting, 

which handled salaries and promotions. 

Vehicles Branch

Despite having its own motor pool and vehicles, the 

SSO attempted to acquire parts or maintenance for its 

own vehicles from the Special Republican Guard. Lt. 

Col. ‘Isam Mahmud ‘Abdallah Al Tikriti headed the 

transport assets of the SSO. 

Structure of the SSO Security Branch

• The Organization Section monitored all assigned 

SSO personnel except those on the presidential 

detail. It had one offi cer assigned to each of the 

other branches and directorates within the SSO. 

This section was headed by Mu’ayyid ‘Abd-alHamid. 

• The Special Section monitored all assigned personnel to the presidential detail, including the protection detail, those who housed and provided logistics 

to the protection detail, and those who provided 

support services to Saddam (Group 40, shepherds 

for live meat, chefs, tailors, and day laborers). This 

section was headed by Sa’d ‘Abdallah Zahran. 

• The Investigation and Interrogation Section conducted investigations, interrogations, and detention of personnel for crimes ranging from theft to 

treason. Its jurisdiction was determined by Saddam 

or Qusay. This section was headed by Col. ‘Adil 

Hamid Jamil. 

• The Information and Identifi cation Section maintained personnel fi les, marriage approval, weapons 

accountability, and organizational identifi cation 

and passports for SSO personnel. The Information Section, also referred to as “Personnel,” was 

headed by Samir ‘Awad, and the Identifi cation Section was headed by Muhammad Wahadi. 

• The Separated Employees Section monitored all 

former SSO offi cers. Also known as the “Veterans’ 

Section,” this section was headed by Tha’ir Al Duri. 

The Scientifi c Branch 

The SSO operated a laboratory specifi cally to test the 

President’s food. All food, clothing, and presidential 

supplies were acquired through the Ministry of Health 

or the Ministry of Trade. This branch was headed 

by Dr. Sabah Shuhab Ahmad Al Sumaydi. His two 

immediate subordinates were Dr. ‘Adnan Ibrahim, 

Head of the Department of Chemistry, and Dr. Mujaz 

Tawfi q, Head of the Department of Biology. 

The lab tested anything specifi cally for the president, including clothing, and its function was very 

secretive, even within the SSO. For example, Qusay 

planned to refuse acknowledgement that the lab 

belonged to the SSO, even if confronted by UN 

inspectors about the lab. The lab was previously 

declared as belonging to the Ministry of Trade, which 

originally set up the lab for the SSO. Therefore, UN 

inspectors examined the lab under the assumption that 

it belonged to the Ministry of Trade, yet, fully aware 

of the lab’s true function with regard to Saddam. 

Had the SSO acknowledged its ownership of the lab, 

it would have further increased the level of distrust 

between inspectors and Iraq. 

The Special Security Institute

While many SSO offi cers were already seasoned from 

prior intelligence service positions, all SSO offi cers 

were trained in Baghdad at the Special Security 

Institute, directed by Khalid Kulayb ‘Awani. The 

Institute’s primary mission was to educate SSO, SRG, 

and presidential offi ce employees on all aspects of 

governmental security, including military training, 

political indoctrination, and security of presidential 

sites. It operated on a yearly schedule with classes 

beginning on the seventh day of January, a two-month 

vacation in July and August, and completion of the 

annual curriculum in December. 

The basic course for Special Security Offi cers lasted 

three months at the Institute in the Al-Jihad district of 

Baghdad. The course consisted of physical security 

training relating to different types of facilities and 

premises, personnel security and search techniques, 

the debriefi ng of casual contacts, and methods used 

by hostile intelligence services to recruit sources. 

This course turned company-grade Republican Guard 

offi cers into SSO Security Offi cers, who subsequently 

were embedded into military units. 
92

The Security Unit

The SSO had a battalion-sized unit responsible for 

the security of strategically important roads around 

Baghdad and Tikrit. Hasan Na’amah Hamid Al Alusi 

replaced Col. ‘Uday Al Habbus as the commander of 

the Security Unit in 2001. The unit consisted of four 

companies and a command element. The fi rst company was composed of police patrol cars, the second 

company were also police vehicles, including recovery vehicles, for traffi c enforcement, the third and 

fourth companies were foot-patrols mainly recruited 

from the SRG. 

The unit’s main focus was the route between the 

Baghdad International Airport and the Republican 

Palace in Baghdad. Similar service was provided 

by the unit on other routes, but with less manpower 

requirements. These security operations were, generally, permanent assignments; the Security Unit was 

rarely tasked with other assignments. 

Public Opinion Department

The Public Opinion Department collected information on all rumors regarding the Regime. This department, headed by Suhayl Muhammad Sultan Al Duri 

who simultaneously held the position of Manager of 

the Director’s Offi ce, maintained sources in all major 

cities who would report on all facets of public opinion 

regarding Saddam or the Regime.

Legal Department

The Legal Department, led by Judge Basim ‘Umar Al 

Tikriti, was responsible for all legal cases involving 

employees of the SSO. 

Research Department

The Research Department, headed by Dr. Mu’ayyid 

Al Tikriti, conducted a joint computer project with the 

Military Industrial Commission, according to former 

senior offi cers within the SSO command leadership. 

Allegedly, this section was comprised of four or 

fi ve employees in addition to Dr. Mu’ayyid and was 

fi nanced through the SSO. Neither Walid nor Hani, 

despite their senior positions within the SSO, knew 

much about the department’s sensitive activities. 

Collaboration With Other Services

The SSO collaborated with every Iraqi security or 

intelligence service on a limited scale—each service 

had a specifi c charter but overlapping responsibilities were common. Moreover, all of Iraq’s services 

were monitored for loyalty to the Regime. 

The SSO had links to every security and intelligence 

service of Iraq for political reasons, but it did not 

vet the reporting of the various agencies. All of the 

services shared similar reporting chains, however. 

Once a report had been seen by the director of the 

relevant service, it followed one of two paths: if the 

report related to administrative or fi nancial matters, it 

went to the Presidential Diwan; if the report related 

to intelligence or security, it went to the Presidential 

Secretary. 

The security and intelligence services relied on each 

other for operational missions as well. The SSO 

would be informed if an agency had a security breach 

or suspected disloyalty among its ranks. Alternatively, 

the SSO tasked the Directorate of General Security 

for background checks and the Iraqi Intelligence 

Service and the Directorate of General Military Intelligence for collection strategies and technologies. 
93

Regime Strategic

 Intent

The Republican Guard 

The Republican Guard (RG) consisted 

of two military branches charged with 

divergent missions outlined below. 

Nonetheless, both branches of the 

RG received orders from the RG 

Secretariat, which was directly subordinate to Qusay 

Saddam Husayn. The last offi cer to hold the position 

of Secretariat General, more commonly referred to as 

Secretary General, was Staff Lt. Gen. Kamal Mustafa 

‘Abdallah Sultan Al Nasiri. 

The smaller RG branch, the Special Republican 

Guard, was the third tier of presidential security after 

the Presidential Bodyguards and SSO. The Special 

Republican Guard’s primary mission was the physical protection and security of the presidential grounds 

and other sites sensitive to national security. 

The larger contingent, 

the Republican Guard 

Forces Command, was 

often recognized as the 

“elite fi ghting force 

of Iraq” and was also 

the group most often 

referred to when speaking of the Republican 

Guard. The Republican 

Guard Forces Command would be considered the fourth, and fi nal, 

tier of the Regime security services. 

Qusay, in the role of the “Honorable Supervisor” of 

the Republican Guard, like his father, kept a keen 

eye on the military forces closest to the Regime. No 

piece of military equipment could be moved—even 

for repair—by a brigade, division, or corps commander without the prior written permission of Qusay 

through the RG Secretariat. Security offi cers from the 

SSO were embedded within the Republican Guard to 

ensure that this was strictly followed and report if it 

was contradicted. 

The Special Republican Guard

The primary mission of the Special Republican Guard 

(SRG) was to secure and protect presidential areas 

Kamal Mustafa

and other sites sensitive to national security. Although 

tasked with guarding presidential grounds, the SSO 

offi cers also conducted all personal and vehicular 

searches and internal security. The SRG was responsible for manning gate guards and securing the grounds, 

perimeter, and surrounding areas. Even the SRG 

Commander, Brig. Barzan ‘Abd-al-Ghafur Sulayman 

Al Majid, was not permitted to enter any presidential 

grounds without prior approval. Saddam ensured that 

all military units were kept far enough away in order 

to prevent any potential coup. 

The SRG was originally 

a large brigade composed of seven battalionsized elements referred 

to as Regiments. The 

SRG bulked up to the 

size of a division in 1992 

when the threat to the 

government increased, 

although it had never—

before or after the 

threat—been trained for 

coup suppression. The 

SRG maintained its large 

stature until early 2000, when the branch could not 

support its own logistic requirements and was reduced 

from four brigades to one. It was again augmented to 

divisional size before Operation Iraqi Freedom, but 

the SRG units played no role in combat as maneuver 

units during Operations Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom. 

The chain of command within the SRG was strictly 

controlled, given the proximity of military troops to 

Saddam. Orders could only be passed down from the 

RG Secretariat to the SRG commander. The SSO at 

times would attempt to commandeer SRG assets for 

ad hoc tasks, but the SRG Commander would refuse 

to allocate a single vehicle without an offi cial written 

order from the RG Secretariat. 

The SRG, under the direction of the SSO, participated in WMD-related concealment activities from 

1991 to 1995. Equipment, documents, and other 

unidentifi ed sensitive materials from the Military Industrialization Commission were loaded 

on trucks and stored at SRG facilities in order to 

prevent their discovery by UNSCOM inspectors, 

according to numerous sources. 

Barzan ‘Abd al-Ghafur
94

Republican Guard Organizational Structure.
95

Regime Strategic

 Intent

The Republican Guard Forces Command

The primary mission 

of the Republican 

Guard Forces Command (RGFC) was 

to safeguard Regime 

stability and to protect 

the Regime from both 

foreign and domestic 

enemies. RGFC units 

helped repel the Iranian 

invasion in the mid to 

late 1980s, invaded 

Kuwait in 1990, suppressed the Shi’a and 

Kurdish uprisings in the 1990s, and briefl y defended 

the approaches to Baghdad in 2003. The mission of 

the RGFC resembled that of the Regular Army—tactical defense of the Regime and nation. 

The RGFC was composed of two corps-sized elements that were “supervised” by Qusay, but Staff Lt. 

Gen. Sayf-al-Din Fulayyih Hasan Taha Al Rawi, as 

Chief of Staff, was the operational commander. The 

original corps, the Allahu Akbar Operations Command (1st RG Corps), was dispersed in the northern 

half of Iraq and the other, the Fat’h Al Mubayyin

Operations Command (2nd RG Corps), in the southern half of Iraq. Each corps had three division-sized 

elements referred to as a “Forces Command” and an 

independent Special Forces Brigade. 

Two of these divisions were garrisoned in Mosul 

and Krikuk to support the Regular Army in the 

north, three heavy (armored) divisions protected the 

approaches to Baghdad, and one infantry division was 

garrisoned in Al Kut. The RGFC was the last and the 

heaviest armed tier of Regime security. While it was 

essential to the protection of the Regime, Saddam 

kept the units away from Baghdad to prevent their 

involvement in any military-led coups. 

Sayf Al-Din
96

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97

Regime Strategic

 Intent

Annex D

Saddam’s Personal Involvement

in WMD Planning

The Iraq Survey Group recovered this recording of Saddam and senior offi cials discussing the use of WMD. 

This discussion was part of a more general meeting which would appear from the content to have taken place 

during the second week of January, 1991. This is of particular interest as it provides a compelling demonstration of Saddam’s personal interest and involvement in WMD planning and preparation. 

Saddam’s Personal Involvement in WMD Planning

Saddam: I was talking to ‘Abd and I told him there is 

no need to make a big fuss about these suits because 

we are going to use them in this special occasion, 

even if it is a Chinese design the collar, the neck line 

should be lower than this.

Speaker 2: The suit, Sir, will have a neck line like the 

Dishdasha (Traditional dress of Arabia), so we can 

use normal white shirt with it. 

Saddam: Why did they bring it to us like this then?

Speaker 2: No, I saw the state minister wearing the 

suit. 

Husayn Kamil: Sir, formally, we are wearing it, but 

you seem to be cold sir (everyone was laughing).

Saddam: I think the people who designed that suit 

will not make that mistake: First, because you wear it 

right on the body, so it will get dirty soon; secondly, 

out of elegance, the hand shouldn’t appear from the 

suit like this.

Speaker 2: Sir, the design of the suit is with a white 

shirt and a collar (neck line) like dishdasha.

Saddam: Then my design is right.

Husayn Kamil: Absolutely right, sir.

Saddam: Then work on it and make the corrections to 

the sizes.

Speaker 2: Sir, we will amend it to be exactly with the 

neck line. 

Saddam: Even if it appears a little bit. Now when 

some one wears a suit, of course the shirt line will 

appear a little bit, but here I prefer not to have it 

obvious.

Speaker 2: Sir, you can see that nobody is wearing it.

Saddam: It’s forgotten, but now I will ask Abu Muthanna, because he is the best at remembering [shackling noise]. Since 1958 the Iraqi army has been using 

these kinds of suits [people commenting and talking 

in the background].

Saddam: I want to make sure that—close the door 

please [door slams)]—the germ and chemical warheads, as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are 

available to the “concerned people,” so that in case we 

ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any 

of their targets?

Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you’ll allow me. Some of the 

chemicals now are distributed, this is according to the 

last report from the Minister of Defense, which was 

submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads are stored 

and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and 

when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, 

some other artillery machines and rockets (missiles) 

are available from the army. While some of the empty 

“stuff” is available for us, our position is very good, 

and we don’t have any operational problems. Moreover, in the past, many substantial items and materials were imported; now, we were able to establish a 

local project, which was established to comply with 

daily production. Also, another bigger project will be 

fi nalized within a month, as well as a third project in 

the coming two to three months that will keep us on 

the safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir, only deal in 

common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol and 

methyl [interrupted].

Saddam: Etc. . . . this is not important to me.

Husayn Kamil: So, Sir, regarding the germs and [he 

pauses].

Saddam: And the Chemicals.
98

Husayn Kamil: No, we have some of the chemicals 

available [interrupted].

Saddam: So, we qualify that the missiles, by tomorrow, will be ready on the 15th.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, we don’t have the germs.

Saddam: Then, where are they?

Husayn Kamil: It’s with us.

Saddam: what is it doing with you, I need these germs 

to be fi xed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because 

starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the 

action to happen at anytime, and I consider Riyadh as 

a target.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, let me explain to you. What we 

produced now are the rocket heads and the containers, 

and we distributed them underground in three different locations. We considered these locations the best 

places we have, and that if we had a chance to scatter 

and to fi nd more locations, then we would have done 

it. These locations are far away from Baghdad, this 

is problematic because of transportation which will 

take seven days to commute, but we minimized all the 

transportation procedures in a way. However, when 

we want to commute it, we cannot do it within one 

day Sir, and if we want to do it by plane, then, Sir, we 

have to go for the method [paused].

Saddam: Let’s talk about it later [waiters entered the 

room, sound of plates banging and side talks to the 

waiters].

Husayn Kamil: (door slams) Sir, we have three types 

of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one 

we should use, some types stay capable for many 

years [interrupted].

Saddam: we want the long term, the many years kind.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, this option is available and all 

other options are available as well.

Saddam: You mean at which time should we use it 

and at which moment!

Husayn Kamil: Yes sir. That is why there has to be a 

decision about which method of attack we use: a missile, a fi ghter bomb or a fi ghter plane.

Saddam: With them all, all the methods.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, we have to calculate now [interrupted].

Saddam: Husayn knows about those.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, there are some calculations we 

have to do, since we have modifi ed fi ghters. The 

bombs or the warheads are all available, but the 

moment for using them at zero hour is something 

we should indicate sir; we will say that this will be 

launched (interrupted).

Saddam: At the moment of use (zero hour), you 

should launch them all against their targets.

Husayn Kamil: All of the methods are available, sir.

Saddam: We don’t want to depend on one option. The 

missiles will be intercepted and the planes, at least 

one will crash, but whenever the missiles or planes 

fall down over the enemy land, then I consider the 

goal is achieved and the mission fulfi lled.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, it is available and stored “somewhere,” but if you, Sir, order us to transfer it, we are 

a bit worried it will cause contamination. It has been 

stored for 45 to 47 years, and yet has not been certifi ed as being safe (uncontaminated). Sir, it had been 

experimented on only once and some of the employees, Sir, were contaminated.

-Time 07:36-08:20, Saddam: I want as soon as 

possible, if we are not transferring the weapons, to 

issue a clear order to the “concerned people” that the 

weapon should be in their hands ASAP. I might even 

give them a “non-return access. “ [Translator Comment: to have access to the weapons; to take them 

with them and not to return them]. I will give them an 

order stating that at “one moment,” if I ‘m not there 

and you don’t hear my voice, you will hear somebody 

else’s voice, so you can receive the order from him, 

and then you can go attack your targets. I want the 

weapons to be distributed to targets; I want Riyadh 

and Jeddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities with all 

the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. 

This is for the germ and chemical weapons.

Husayn Kamil: In terms of chemical weapons, we 

have an excellent situation and good grip on them 
99

Regime Strategic

 Intent

[Translator Comment: they are in good control of 

them].

Saddam: Only in case we are obliged and there is a 

great necessity to put them into action. Also, all the 

Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport this 

weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would 

come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. 

This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful. This is 

according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted).

Saddam: We should consider alternatives Husayn (He 

called Husayn Kamil, Husayn). Meaning that if the 

planes don’t arrive, then the missile will, and if the 

missile is intercepted, the plane will arrive.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, it is rare that the missiles are 

intercepted.

Saddam: Anyways, it is our duty to think of all the 

bad scenarios of this mission. Then Israel fi rst, and if 

the Americans attack us with unconventional, harmful 

types of weapons, or at the moment we see it feasible 

to attack, but as for now, put Riyadh and Jeddah as 

targets.

Saddam: Air Force Commander [Muzahim Sa’b 

Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, at the time], you should 

coordinate with the Minister of Industry to get access 

to the weapons in the shortest time possible, of course 

with a lot of consideration for the technical and safety 

factors. Also, I want to give a written authorization 

to the “concerned people” that is signed by me, in 

case something happens to me. You know this is a 

life and death issue, all the orders about targets are 

sealed in writing and authenticated. Furthermore, for 

the offi cials from the missile (rockets) authority, you 

should coordinate with them so that they take the missile to locations. They are to inform the chief of staff, 

or operations commander deputy, to go to Husayn, 

Minister of Industry and go with the same necessary 

procedures. Regarding the chemical weapon [interrupted].

Husayn Kamil: We are really in good control of it sir.

Saddam: No, I mean it should be with the “taking 

action” people. [Translator Comment: the people who 

will execute the command; implementers.]

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the chemical is available and our 

establishment is the one responsible for commuting 

the weapon and supervising how it is used.

Saddam: Excellent. Do you have anything stocked in 

the establishment stores?

Husayn Kamil: We have (empty) heads but we also 

have production all over. Not only in the factories; it 

is scattered.

Saddam: I want you to keep in mind that by the 15th

nothing should be stored in your factories that the 

“enemy” can have access to.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the Ministry of defense should 

pull that “Stuff” out. The Ministry of defense already 

ordered 25% of that stuff. When and if they ask us for 

the rest, we will have no problem supplying it. Sir, 

we are in an excellent & prepared situation regarding 

the missile warheads and fi ghter’s bombs. They are 

all modifi ed and ready for launching any time, the 

chemical and the germ.

No conversation (sound of plates banging).

Saddam: Where are the most American forces and 

troops gathered and concentrated?

Speaker 2: Sir, it is in Khalid Military city “Madinat 

Khalid,” located 60 kilometers past Hafr Al-Baten 

in Saudi, where the front General Command and Air 

Force Command are located. Most of the American 

army sectors, Sir, are by the coastal side in AlDammam, where most of the camp complexes exist.

Saddam: I want these big gatherings and complexes to 

be allocated properly and given to the Air Force commander to be added to the above targets of the germs 

weapons. This should be done by an order to Muzahim. This is by a direct order and it has the green light 

from me, since this mission doesn’t fall into daily 

regular operations. I will issue a letter, signed by me, 

listing the commands and the alternative plans and 

probabilities of this mission, which should be followed literally.

Speaker 2: Sir, Economically important targets such 

as refi neries, power plants & water reservoirs, should 

we include them in the mission?

Saddam: These locations should be put under the 

regular Air Force operations, and included in attacks 

not on this particular mission.
100

Husayn Kamil: Sir, these vital locations must be 

added to the mission and become priority targets to 

the biological & chemical weapons, because this will 

end all sorts of life. People are drinking water from 

these desalination plants and getting their fuel from 

refi neries, thus ending the mission.

Saddam: Muzahim has already written these locations 

down and will take care of it, Refi neries and [interrupted].

Muzahim: The Refi neries and desalination plants, Sir.

Saddam: May God help us do it. Then there was no 

conversation.

Saddam: We will never lower our heads as long as we 

are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody.

The recording continues after this for a further 48 

minutes, in which the participants discuss other military matters, such as senior command appointments 

and low-level defensive preparations. There was no 

further discussion of WMD. 
Regime Finance

and Procurement

Regime Finance

and Procurement

We have said with certainty that the embargo 

will not be lifted by a Security Council Resolution, 

but will corrode by itself.

Saddam speaking in January 2000 

to mark the 79th anniversary 

of the Iraqi armed forces.
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i

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Contents

A Word on the Scope of This Chapter.......................................................................................... 1

Key Findings................................................................................................................................. 3

Chapter Summary......................................................................................................................... 7

The Regime Timeline ................................................................................................................... 9

Ambition (1980-91)...................................................................................................................... 9

Decline (1991-96) ........................................................................................................................ 9

Recovery (1996-98)...................................................................................................................... 9

Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003) ............................................................................... 10

Directing and Budgeting Iraq’s Illicit Procurement............................................................................... 11

Overview ................................................................................................................................... 11

President and Presidential Secretary’s Role in Illicit Procurement ........................................... 11

Presidential Diwan’s Role in Illicit Procurement ...................................................................... 12

Diwan’s Role in Supplemental Funding of Government Ministries .......................................... 12

Extent of Knowledge of the Former Chairman of the Diwan .................................................... 13

Budgeting Iraqi Procurement ..................................................................................................... 14

General Government Budget............................................................................................. 14

Sources of Government Revenue ...................................................................................... 14

Supplemental Budgetary Process ..................................................................................... 14

Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure .................................................................. 14

Approval and Authorization of Supplemental Funding .................................................... 16

Disbursal of Supplemental Funds ..................................................................................... 18

Financing Iraq’s Illicit Procurement ...................................................................................................... 19

Overview .................................................................................................................................... 19

Iraqi Economy’s Role in Illicit Procurement.............................................................................. 19

Economic Ambition (1980-91).......................................................................................... 19

Economic Decline (1991-96) ............................................................................................ 21

Economic Recovery (1997-99).......................................................................................... 22

Economic Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003)..................................................... 22

Iraq’s Revenue Sources ............................................................................................................. 22

Bilateral Trade Protocols .................................................................................................. 24

Phases of the UN OFF Program ....................................................................................... 28

Disposition of UN OFF Funds .......................................................................................... 28

Oil Voucher Process........................................................................................................... 29

Secret Voucher Recipients................................................................................................. 30

Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International Leaders ....................................................... 31

American and British Oil Voucher Recipients .................................................................. 33

Benon Sevan’s Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers ........................................................................ 33

Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil Vouchers ................................................. 33

Oil Export Surcharges ....................................................................................................... 33
ii

How Surcharges Were Collected ....................................................................................... 35

Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import Contracts......................................................... 35

Private-Sector Oil Sales .................................................................................................... 37

Role of the SOMO............................................................................................................. 38

SOMO’s Relationship to the MoO .................................................................................... 40

Offi cial Oil Accounts ........................................................................................................ 40

Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for Procurement .............................................. 45

CBI .................................................................................................................................... 45

CBI’s Role in Licensing Money Exchangers .................................................................... 45

CBI’s Role in Tracking Foreign Accounts for Iraq ........................................................... 46

Iraqi Bank Holdings .......................................................................................................... 47

Funding of the Ministries .................................................................................................. 47

The Use of Foreign Banks................................................................................................. 48

Use of Banks in Lebanon .................................................................................................. 49

Use of Banks in Jordan...................................................................................................... 49

Use of Banks in Syria........................................................................................................ 50

Use of Banks in Turkey ................................................................................................... 50

Use of Banks in Egypt ...................................................................................................... 50

Use of Banks in Belarus .................................................................................................... 50

Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF............................................................. 51

The Role of Cash Transactions.......................................................................................... 51

Iraq’s Gold Reserves ......................................................................................................... 51

Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries, Commissions, and Front Companies ...................... 53

Overview .................................................................................................................................... 53

Ministry of Foreign Affairs......................................................................................................... 53

MFA-IIS Connections ....................................................................................................... 54

MFA’s UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy............................................................................. 55

MFA and Iraq’s Bilateral Protocols................................................................................... 56

Ministry of Trade ...................................................................................................................... 56

MoT’s Role in Procurement .............................................................................................. 57

Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover Contracts...................................................... 58

Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial Attaches................................................... 58

Ministry of Defense ................................................................................................................... 61

MoD Procurement Leadership ......................................................................................... 61

MoD Procurement Directorates ........................................................................................ 61

Budgeting and Financing Military Procurement............................................................... 62

MoD Procurement Process ............................................................................................... 63

Procurement for the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard .................................... 64

Military Industrialization Commission ...................................................................................... 65

Procurement Leadership in the MIC ................................................................................. 65

MIC: Benefi ciary of Illicit Funds ...................................................................................... 66
iii

Regime Finance

and Procurement

MIC Banking and Financing ............................................................................................. 66

Items Procured via the MIC’s Link to Iraqi Intelligence .................................................. 69

MIC Front Companies ...................................................................................................... 72

Iraqi Intelligence Service .................................................................................................. 77

IIS Procurement Leadership and Mission ........................................................................ 77

IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence Services.................................... 79

Items Procured by the IIS ................................................................................................. 79

IIS Front Companies ......................................................................................................... 80

Special Security Organization .................................................................................................... 82

SSO Procurement Leadership and Mission ...................................................................... 82

Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission ............................................................................................. 82

Ministry of Transport and Communication ................................................................................ 83

Mission and Key Procurement Companies under the MoTC............................................ 83

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research ............................................................. 84

University Collaboration With MIC.................................................................................. 84

Exploitation of Academic Exchanges for Procurement .................................................... 85

Ministry of Agriculture............................................................................................................... 85

Ministry of Interior .................................................................................................................... 86

Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman and Al-Handal ........................................................ 86

The Al-Eman Network ...................................................................................................... 88

Al-Handal General Trading Company ............................................................................. 90

Supplying Iraq With Prohibited Commodities....................................................................................... 93

Overview ................................................................................................................................... 93

Procurement Suppliers During the Decline Phase, 1991 to 1996 .............................................. 93

Romania ........................................................................................................................... 93

Ukraine .............................................................................................................................. 95

Jordan .............................................................................................................................. 100

Procurement Suppliers During the Recovery Phase, 1996 to 1998.......................................... 102

Syria ................................................................................................................................ 102

Turkey ............................................................................................................................. 104

South Korea .................................................................................................................... 107

People’s Republic of China ............................................................................................ 108

France ............................................................................................................................. 111

Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia .......................................................................... 112

Bulgaria ........................................................................................................................... 113

Procurement Suppliers in the Transition and Miscalculation Phases, 1998 to 2003................ 116

Russia .............................................................................................................................. 116

North Korea..................................................................................................................... 119

Transportation Routes From North Korea to Iraq ........................................................... 121

Payment Methods for North Korean Contracts ............................................................... 121

Poland ............................................................................................................................. 121
iv

Methods Used To Hide Transshipment to Iraq................................................................ 121

Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial Flows ...................................................................... 122

India................................................................................................................................. 122

Belarus............................................................................................................................. 125

Key Belarusian Individuals Linked to Illicit Trade With Iraq ......................................... 126

Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by Belarus ............................................... 127

Payments From Iraq to Belarus....................................................................................... 129

Taiwan ............................................................................................................................ 129

Egypt .............................................................................................................................. 130

Yemen.............................................................................................................................. 131

Opening Conventional Trade With Yemen for Oil and Cash........................................... 131

Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for Iraqi Illicit Imports........................................... 132

Importing Prohibited Commodities ..................................................................................................... 133

Overview .................................................................................................................................. 133

Deceptive Trade Practices Supporting Illicit Procurement .................................................................. 133

Use of Trade Intermediaries .................................................................................................... 133

Disguising the Nature of Prohibited Goods .................................................................... 134

Consealing the Identity of Commodities......................................................................... 135

Discussing the Commodity’s Destination ....................................................................... 137

Use of Illicit Smuggling and Transportation Networks ....................................................................... 137

Smuggling by Air ............................................................................................................ 138

Smuggling by Land ......................................................................................................... 138

Smuggling by Sea............................................................................................................ 139

Smuggling via Jordanian Ports........................................................................................ 139

Smuggling via Syrian Ports............................................................................................. 142

Smuggling via the Arabian Gulf...................................................................................... 142

Annexes

A. Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade Protocols.............................................................................. 145

B. Known Oil Voucher Recipients ....................................................................................................... 167 

C. Iraq’s Budgetary Process................................................................................................................. 201

D. Iraq Economic Data ........................................................................................................................ 207

E. Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology.................................................................... 217

F. Iraqi Oil Smuggling ......................................................................................................................... 221

G. Iraq’s Banking System .................................................................................................................... 251

H. UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq ..................................................................... 257

I. Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement Teransactions ................................. 261

J. The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions .............................. 267

K. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With Iraq............................................. 291

L. Procurement Acronyms ................................................................................................................... 295
1

A Word on the Scope of This Chapter

This chapter of the Comprehensive Report details the evolution of Iraq’s campaign to evade and overcome the 

UN ban on its import of material related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and conventional military forces. It 

also describes Iraq’s effort to use the sale of its oil to hasten the end of the entire sanctions regime. Because 

this chapter deals with Iraq’s international trade and fi nance, half of the picture rests with entities outside 

Iraq—countries, companies, and individuals. 

To tell the story, ISG had to describe—usually naming—Iraq’s trade partners or entities Iraq thought sympathetic to its plight. Most of those individuals or entities are clearly identifi ed in Iraqi documents, some of which 

were substantiated through interviews with former Iraqi Regime offi cials. ISG names those individuals and 

entities here in the interest of candor, clarity, and thoroughness. But it is not in ISG’s mandate or capabilities to 

investigate or judge those non-Iraqi individuals or entities. And in many cases, the Iraqi documents and detainees stop short of confi rming that a particular transaction was consummated, or that a courted foreign government offi cial said “yes” to Iraqi blandishments. 

ISG also must point out that some Iraqi trade was legal and legitimate under the UN Oil-For-Food Program. 

It is important to understand that the Iraqi Regime used both sanctioned and unsanctioned trade to buy infl uence and gain allies. But Iraq’s intent to circumvent sanctions by no means incriminates those who may have 

in some cases unwittingly provided unsanctioned commodities to Iraq. ISG would like to emphasize that this 

report does not intend to analyze or assess the legal implications for non-Iraqis. 
2

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3

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Key Findings

Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of 

himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to 

portray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab 

leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Consequently, Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfi ll his goals. 

Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 

1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He did 

not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, and longevity of UN sanctions. His initial belief that UN sanctions would not last, resulting in his country’s economic 

decline, changed by 1998 when the UNSC did not lift sanctions after he believed resolutions were fulfi lled. 

Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted the UN’s Oil for Food (OFF) program by 1996, he soon recognized its economic value and additional opportunities for further manipulation and infl uence of the UNSC Iraq 

661 Sanctions Committee member states. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuation of UN sanctions 

understanding that they would become a “paper tiger” regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them. 

Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, policies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an 

effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi 

intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ member states and other 

international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis. 

• From Saddam’s perspective, UN sanctions hindered his ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and 

autonomy. In the long run, UN sanctions also interfered with his efforts to establish a historic legacy. 

According to Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic 

strangle hold on Iraq. The UN controlled Saddam’s main source of revenue (oil exports) and determined 

what Iraq could import. 

• UN sanctions curbed Saddam’s ability to import weapons, technology, and expertise into Iraq. Sanctions also 

limited his ability to fi nance his military, intelligence, and security forces to deal with his perceived and real 

external threats. 

• In short, Saddam considered UN sanctions as a form of economic war and the UN’s OFF program and 

Northern and Southern Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US 

and UK. His evolving strategy centered on breaking free of UN sanctions in order to liberate his economy 

from the economic strangle-hold so he could continue to pursue his political and personal objectives. 

One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts 

to infl uence certain UNSC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent 

(Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

(MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public 

opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fi ve permanent members and foment 

international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign 

and an extensive diplomatic effort. 

Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of 

“Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, 

continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his 

military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms, 

dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs.
4

• Once money began to fl ow into Iraq, the Regime’s authorities, aided by foreign companies and some foreign 

governments, devised and implemented methods and techniques to procure illicit goods from foreign suppliers. 

• To implement its procurement efforts, Iraq under Saddam, created a network of Iraqi front companies, some 

with close relationships to high-ranking foreign government offi cials. These foreign government offi cials, in 

turn, worked through their respective ministries, state-run companies and ministry-sponsored front companies, to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or 

dual-use goods programs. 

• The Regime fi nanced these government-sanctioned programs by several illicit revenue streams that 

amassed more that $11.2 billion from the early 1990s to OIF outside the UN-approved methods. The most 

profi table stream concerned Protocols or government-to-government agreements that generated over $8 

billion for Saddam. Iraq earned an additional $1.5 billion from kickbacks and $230 million from surcharges 

associated with the UN’s OFF program; and $1.5 billion from smuggling oil and dry cargo “cash sales” or 

barter to private sector buyers. 

Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data

The Iraqi revenue analysis presented in this report is based on government documents and fi nancial databases, 

spreadsheets, and other records obtained from SOMO, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and the Central Bank of Iraq 

(CBI), and other Ministries. These sources appear to be of good quality and consistent with other pre- and 

post-Operation Iraqi Freedom information. When Iraqi information was not available, the ISG developed its 

own estimate.

Saddam directed the Regime’s key ministries and governmental agencies to devise and implement strategies, 

policies, and techniques to discredit the UN sanctions, harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At 

the same time, according to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to reveal the nature of its 

WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and his intentions. 

• Saddam used the Iraqi Intelligence Service IIS to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. 

Consequently, the IIS facilitated the import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan, Belarus and Turkey.

• The IIS had representatives in most of Iraq’s embassies in these foreign countries using a variety of offi cial 

covers. One type of cover was the “commercial attaches” that were sent to make contacts with foreign businesses. The attaches set up front companies, facilitated the banking process and transfers of funds as determined, and approved by the senior offi cials within the Government.

• The MFA played a critical role in facilitating Iraq’s procurement of military goods, dual-use goods pertaining to WMD, transporting cash and other valuable goods earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming and 

implementing a diplomatic strategy to end UN sanctions and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious 

means.

• Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research (MHESR) through its universities 

and research programs to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research 

projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by UNSC sanctions.

• The Ministry of Oil (MoO) controlled the oil voucher distribution program that used oil to infl uence UN 

members to support Iraq’s goals. Saddam personally approved and removed all names of voucher recipients. He made all modifi cations to the list, adding or deleting names at will. Other senior Iraqi leaders 
5

Regime Finance

and Procurement

could nominate or recommend an individual or organization to be added or removed from the voucher list, 

and ad hoc allocation committees met to review and update the allocations. 

Iraq under Saddam successfully devised various methods to acquire and import items prohibited under UN 

sanctions. Numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end 

user, and/or changed the fi nal destination of the commodity to get it to the region. For a cut of the profi ts, 

these trade intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, the prohibited items through land, sea, and air 

entry points along the Iraqi border. 

By mid-2000 the exponential growth of Iraq’s illicit revenue, increased international sympathy for Iraq’s 

humanitarian plight, and increased complicity by Iraqi’s neighbors led elements within Saddam’s Regime to 

boast that the UN sanctions were slowly eroding. In July 2000, the ruling Iraqi Ba’thist paper, Al-Thawrah, 

claimed victory over UN sanctions, stating that Iraq was accelerating its pace to develop its national economy 

despite the UN “blockade.” In August 2001, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sabri stated in an Al-Jazirah TV interview 

that UN sanctions efforts had collapsed at the same time Baghdad had been making steady progress on its economic, military, Arab relations, and international affairs. 

• Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of prohibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from 

agencies or personnel within the government itself.

• Numerous ministries in Saddam’s Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq’s borders, 

ports, and airports. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Military Industiralization Commission (MIC), 

however, were directly responsible for skirting UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for Saddam. 
6

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7

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Chapter Summary

The Regime Finance and Procurement chapter focuses on the economic means, key actors and organizations, 

foreign suppliers, and procurement mechanisms used by Saddam to pursue his set of objectives: survival of 

himself, his Regime, and his legacy. The fi rst section of the chapter provides an historic background divided 

into key economic phases. The chapter then examines Saddam’s major revenue streams outside the UN sanctions regime: bilateral trade Protocols, UN OFF oil surcharges, commodity kickbacks, and “cash sales” or oil 

smuggling activities. ISG estimates the total amount of revenue earned between 1991 and 2003, while paying 

special attention to money earned after the introduction of the OFF program. ISG also addresses how the 

Regime used its oil assets to infl uence non-Iraqi individuals by means of an institutionalized, secret oil voucher 

program. 

Following the revenue section, the chapter identifi es the Iraqi Regime’s key individuals, ministries, organizations, and private entities within the Regime that were involved in Saddam’s procurement and revenue 

activities. Next, the section identifi es foreign suppliers—governments, state-owned and private fi rms, and/or 

individual agents that engaged in the export of goods in contravention of UN resolutions. In some cases, ISG 

has uncovered foreign government activity and knowledge that ranged from tacit approval to active complicity. In other cases, fi rms engaged in the illegal activities without their government’s consent or knowledge.

Moreover, ISG’s investigation exposed Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries’ deceptive methods used to purchase, acquire, and import UN-banned items. 

Finally, this chapter provides several annexes that give more detail on the spectrum of issues examined in the 

procurement chapter of ISG’s report. Annex A consists of translations of Iraq’s major trade Protocols; Annex B 

is an oil voucher recipient list that ISG obtained from Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). Annex 

C relates to Iraq’s normal governmental budgetary process, while Annex D provides general Iraqi economic 

data. Annex E outlines ISG’s illicit earnings sources and estimation methodology, and Annex F provides an 

illustrative oil smuggling case study. Annex G explains Iraq’s banking system, and Annex H lists Iraqi-related 

UN Security Council Resolutions. Annexes I and J reveal suspected Iraqi dual-use and conventional weapons 

procurement transactions, while Annex K lists suspected companies engaged in military-related trade with 

Iraq. Finally, Annex L provides a list of procurement acronyms found throughout this section. 
8

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9

Regime Finance

and Procurement

The Regime Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy 

choices, readers should consult the Regime Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate foldout and in 

tabular form at the back of ISG report. Covering the 

period from 1980 to 2003, the timeline shows specifi c 

events bearing on the Regime’s efforts in the BW, 

CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and their 

chronological relationship with political and military 

developments that had direct bearing on the Regime’s 

policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that at the conclusion 

of each volume of text, we have also included foldout 

summary charts that relate infl ection points—critical turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—to particular events, initiatives, or decisions the 

Regime took with respect to specifi c WMD programs. 

Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the text 

with a gray triangle.

Ambition (1980-91)

During the Ambition phase in Iraq, Saddam and his 

Regime practiced open, traditional procurement of 

conventional weapons and developed clandestine 

methods for obtaining WMD materials and dual-use 

items. Iraq’s oil wealth allowed Saddam to overcome 

the inherent ineffi ciencies of a centrally planned 

economy. After the costly war with Iran, Saddam’s 

procurement efforts focused primarily on restocking 

Iraq’s war materials. These defense-related procurement goals, however, were hindered by economic 

weakness. In the later part of this period, the Iraqi 

economy began to falter, saddled with a high international debt from the war, rising costs of maintaining 

a generous welfare state, low international oil prices, 

and the high cost entailed in weapons and WMD 

programs. Saddam’s ill-conceived, shortsighted economic reforms in 1987 and reactionary price controls, 

nationalization, and subsidies in 1989 pushed the 

Iraqi economy further into crisis. Capping the Ambition phase, Saddam chose to fi ght his way out of 

economic crises by invading Kuwait. 

Decline (1991-96) 

In the post-Gulf war decline phase, the possession of 

WMD remained important to the Regime. Saddam’s 

procurement of conventional weapons and WMD, 

however, was hindered severely by a potent combination of international monitoring and a collapsing 

oil-based economy. These constraints were compounded by the decision not to make full WMD 

disclosures and the subsequent attempt to remove 

WMD signatures through unilateral destruction. 

The poor handling of the WMD disclosures further 

hardened the international community. UN sanctions, resulting from Saddam’s refusal to comply with 

UN resolutions, froze the Regime’s export of oil and 

import of commodities—cutting off Saddam’s ability 

to generate the revenue needed for illicit purchases 

on international arms and dual-use markets. The Iraqi 

economy also suffered under UN sanctions during 

this period as gross domestic product (GDP) per 

capita fell from $2304 in 1989 to an estimated $495 

in 1995. The decline in the street-value of the Iraqi 

Dinar rendered the average Iraqi citizen’s savings 

worthless, casting the Iraqi middle-class into poverty. 

Simultaneously, this period of decline exhibited an 

increase in corruption, incompetence, and patronage 

throughout Saddam’s Regime. 

Husayn Kamil’s fl ight to Jordan in 1995 and 

Saddam’s handling of the issue led to further WMD 

disclosures and subsequent international opprobrium. 

Saddam retained a desire for WMD, but economic 

growth and the ending of sanctions became the overriding concern as the economy hit rock bottom in 

late 1995. The combination of these factors motivated Saddam’s decision to accept UNSCR 986, the 

UN OFF program in 1996. 

Recovery (1996-98)

The Recovery phase was ushered in by Saddam’s 

acceptance of UNSC 986 and the UN OFF Program. Trade fostered under the OFF program starting 

in 1997 allowed Saddam to pursue numerous illicit 

revenue earning schemes, which began generating 

signifi cant amounts of cash outside of the auspices of 

the UN. With the legitimate side of the OFF program 
10

providing the Iraqi population with economic relief, 

Saddam was free to develop illicit procurement programs to arm his Regime against perceived and real 

threats. By the end of this period, Iraq had developed 

a growing underground network of trade intermediaries, front companies, and international suppliers 

willing to trade oil or hard currency for conventional 

weapons, WMD precursors, and dual-use technology. After 1996, the state of the Iraqi economy no 

longer threatened Saddam’s hold on power in Iraq, 

and economic recovery underpinned a more confi dent 

Regime posture. 

Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003)

The Transition and Miscalculation phases opened 

with Iraq’s suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM 

and IAEA. The subsequent lack of effective monitoring emboldened Saddam and his procurement 

programs. The Regime successfully manipulated 

Iraq’s oil production and sales policies to infl uence 

international political actors and public opinion. 

However, during this period, Iraq’s long-neglected oil 

infrastructure began to falter, resulting in an inability to meet demand. As a result, the growth in the 

legitimate side of the Iraq economy slowed. Meanwhile, Saddam’s increasing illegitimate revenue and 

profi ts from UN oil sales compensated for legitimate 

revenue loses. Illicit oil revenue provided Saddam 

with suffi cient funds to pay off his loyalists and 

expand selected illicit procurement programs. From 

1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s 

conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and 

effi ciency. Saddam invited UNMOVIC and IAEA 

back into Iraq in September 2002, in the face of growing international pressure, calculating that a surge in 

cooperation might have brought sanctions to an end.
11

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Directing and Budgeting Iraq’s 

Illicit Procurement

Overview 

Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (2003), Saddam 

continually directed his advisors to formulate and 

implement policies, methods, and techniques to terminate the UN’s sanctions and obtain prohibited conventional military and WMD-related goods.

• Saddam directed and approved illicit procurement

by his Regime.

• The Diwan and presidential secretary facilitated 

Saddam’s procurement directives by processing 

nonbudget funding for conventional military and 

WMD programs.

• The Iraqi budget process was divided into two 

different systems: a formal budget that served as a 

common governmental budget and a supplemental 

or secret budget that was controlled by Saddam 

and the Economic Affairs Committee (EAC). This 

supplemental process, which emerged in its most 

effi cient form after 1995, used illicit hard currency 

to fi nance prohibited procurement programs. 

President and presidential secretary’s Role in 

Illicit Procurement 

The highest levels of the government, including 

the President and the presidential secretary, used 

trade Protocols and other cooperative agreements 

after 1991 as vehicles to circumvent UN sanctions 

and to facilitate the continued arming of Iraq. Iraq 

negotiated bilateral trade agreements called “Protocols” with Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt and less 

formal cooperative trade agreements with several East 

European countries such as Belarus, Poland, Ukraine, 

and Russia. 

• The Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt Protocols 

were offi cial bilateral cooperative agreements 

approved by offi cials of the countries involved (see 

Annex A: Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade 

Protocols).

• According to press reporting, Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa traveled to Moscow on 25-26 January 2002. Recovered 

documents also indicate that ‘Aziz delivered a letter 

to Moscow in person, and he met with senior Russian leaders. 

• Belarusian President Lukashenko and Saddam 

developed a special relationship in which Lukashenko agreed to support Saddam because of the Iraqi 

President’s support of the 2001 Belarusian Presidential elections. 

Saddam approved and directed the illicit procurement relationships that Iraq had with other countries in order to improve Iraq’s military capabilities 

against regional threats. The presidential secretary, 

‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, was a member of the committee that was formed to task the IIS via IIS Director 

Tahir Jalil Habbush to procure technology for the 

MIC. In accordance with Saddam’s instructions to 

the Minister of Military Industrialization to improve 

Iraq’s missile capabilities, the MIC-IIS joint effort 

was to emphasize the support to Iraq’s missile programs. 

The oil vouchers that the Regime would give to those 

who supported his Regime goals further emphasized 

Saddam’s infl uence over these trade agreements. 

The presidential secretary along with Vice President 

Taha Yasin Ramadan facilitated the issuance of these 

vouchers and approved other trade arrangements by 

handling the paperwork involved and giving approval 

on behalf of Saddam for allocation of the oil shares. 

Reportedly, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian 

individuals, who in Baghdad’s view, had contributed 

in some special way to Iraq’s security, received oil 

vouchers at the request of Saddam (for the full list, 

see Annex B: Known Oil Voucher Recipients). Some 

of these persons have also been identifi ed in Iraqi 

military procurement efforts (see Table 1).
12

Presidential Diwan’s Role in Illicit Procurement 

The Presidential Offi ce of Saddam comprised two 

sections: the presidential secretary, and the Presidency 

Offi ce or Presidential Diwan. The Diwan was created in July 1979 to research and study specifi c issues 

requested by the President, the Council of Ministers, 

the Economic Affairs Committee (EAC), and the 

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The Diwan 

was purely an administrative presidential bureau with 

no policymaking authority. It had several departments 

representing a variety of issues (see Figure 1). There 

was also an Administrative Department and a Financial Accounts Department. 

Diwan’s Role in Supplemental Funding of 

Government Ministries

Military and security service entities such as the IIS 

and the MIC could submit requests for additional 

funds to the Presidency. The information on this 

procedure is often contradictory. 

• According to the Minister of Finance, the Iraqi 

security organizations submitted written requests 

for additional funds either to the Chairman of the 

Presidential Diwan, or to the head of the Presidential Secretariat. The latter, who was also the 

Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC), 

probably handled all requests from any security 

organization and may have been preferred by some 

organizational heads as he was considered to be 

closer to the President. 

• The head of the MIC, the Minister of Defense and 

the Director of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) have 

also described approaching the Diwan for supplementary funds. The Chairman of the Diwan and 

presidential secretary were sometimes unaware 

of requests made to one another. Saddam reportedly did this to limit the number of people who 

had access to expenditure data. Requests sent to 

the Presidential Diwan were sometimes sent to the 

Diwan’s Financial Accounts Department for study. 

The Chairman of the Presidential Diwan sometimes 

directed the head of the Financial Accounts Department to discuss the request with the concerned minister. (Both Khalil Yasin Al Ma’muri, the Secretary 

of the Council of Ministers (CoM), and Muhammad 

Mahdi Salih, the Trade Minister, were former heads 

of the Financial Accounts Department.) 

• Organizations seeking budget supplements could 

also schedule a personal appointment with Saddam.

Table 1

A Selection of Oil Vouchers Awarded by Saddam Husayn

Name Position

Ruslan Khazbulatov Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Parliament under President Boris 

Yeltsin’s administration

Gennadiy Zuganov Head of Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Sergey Rudasev Chairman of the Russian Solidarity With Iraq organization

Vladimir Zametalin and Nikolai Yevanyinko Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions and Former Presidential 

Administration Deputy Chief

Dr. Victor Shevtsov Director of Infobank and Head of Belmetalenergo (BME) a major 

Belarusian foreign trade company

Yuri Shebrov Director of BELFARM enterprise

Aleksandr Roboty Offi cer in the Belarusian security network (possibly the Belarusian 

KGB)

Oleg Papirshnoy Director of private Ukrainian company

Professor Yuri Orshansky Director of MontElect, a Ukrainian fi rm

Olga Kodriavitsev Unknown

Leonid Kozak Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions
13

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Extent of Knowledge of the Former President of 

the Diwan

The Chairman of the Diwan, Ahmad Husayn Khudayr 

al-Samarra’i, maintains that he authorized payments 

to bodies such as the MIC only on the orders of the 

President through the presidential secretary without 

knowing the details of the projects being fi nanced. 

However, the head of the MIC and Minister of 

Finance identifi ed him as having been involved in the 

processing of requests for extra-budgetary payments 

to the military and security services. Moreover, the 

Minister of Finance stated that documents containing details of the request, such as project information or justifi cation, were kept at the Chairman of 

the Diwan’s offi ce, or with the presidential secretary, 

depending on where the request had been submitted. 

In addition, captured documents suggest the Chairman of the Diwan had at least some knowledge of 

military and security matters. 

• In April 1996, al-Samarra’i provided a cover note 

for paperwork covering Protocols with a Georgian 

entity for a military aircraft industrialization complex.

• In April 2002, al-Samarra’i provided a cover note 

for paperwork concerning problems with a contract 

between the MIC and the Moldavian company Balcombe for an assault rifl e (7.62 x 39mm) ordinance 

production line. 

Figure 1. Organization of the presidential Diwan,

March 1991.
14

Budgeting Iraqi Procurement

Off-budget and secret budget planning bypassed 

large government forum and was processed directly 

between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the 

Presidency, between the requesting organization and 

the Presidency, or between the requesting organization and Saddam. The former Regime relied heavily 

on liquidating assets (forcing the Central Bank of 

Iraq to print more money) to meet its yearly budget 

shortfalls. 

General Government Budget

The general government budget, made up of current 

and capital spending, however, does not represent 

the total Iraqi budget because sensitive issues, such 

as defense, intelligence, and security were excluded. 

As a result, government expenditures and debt probably were higher than what was listed in the budget.

• In 2001, according to statistics from the CBI, the 

former Regime spent over $1.1 billion (constant 

2001 dollars). This represents an increase of 49.5 

percent over 2000. 

• Complete data about Iraqi government budget 

spending after 2001 are unavailable. A common 

refrain among government offi cials and detainees is 

that many of these records perished during looting 

and fi res after the US invaded Baghdad. 

Because of the economic constraints following the 

war with Iran (see Economics Section), it became diffi cult for the Regime to draft and adhere to an accurate budget. Figures estimated in January diverged 

considerably by the end of the fi scal year. Also, 

because of Saddam’s patronage policies, the Presidential accounts were reportedly routinely overdrawn by 

15 percent, and about 50 percent of the infrastructure 

expenditure was spent by Saddam. 

Sources of Government Revenue

On-budget revenue—revenue included in the general 

government budget—came from sources such as:

• Income and property taxes.

• Customs duties and tariffs.

• A percentage of the profi ts from government-owned 

institutions and businesses such as banks and insurance companies.

• The revenues of leased state properties.

• The municipalities. 

Not all-Iraqi government revenue was accounted 

for in the general government budget. Some of these 

off-budget funds included income earned through:

• The Syrian, Turkish, and Jordanian trade Protocols. 

• Kickbacks on UN OFF Program import contracts. 

Supplemental Budgetary Process 

The procurement programs supporting Iraq’s WMD 

programs and prohibited conventional military equipment purchases were fi nanced via a supplemental 

budget process that occurred outside of the publicized national and defense budgets (for details on the 

development, approval, and execution of the common 

national budgets, see Annex C: Iraq’s Budgetary 

Process). The approval process and disbursement of 

funds from the supplemental budget illustrate who 

was distributing the money into the illicit procurement programs and refl ect, in quantitative terms, the 

intent of the Regime. 

Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure 

There were two methods for ministries and organizations to obtain fundraising for specifi c projects or 

procurement activities that were over and above the 

scope of their annual budgets: 

• One method was through the EAC.

• The other was to go directly to the Presidential 

Diwan or the Presidential Secretariat. 
15

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Iraq’s National Budget 1991-2002

As illustrated in Figure 2, from 1991 to 1995, Iraqi 

revenues decreased by an average of 34.3 percent. 

From 1996 to 2001 revenues increased by an average of 42.3 percent. The reason for the 143.7-percent 

increase in revenues in 1996 is unclear because signifi cant oil revenues from the UN Oil-for-Food Program (OFF) would not have been realized until early 

1997. Some of this increase, however, is probably 

a result of revenues rising from such a low base. In 

1997, there was a 66.8-percent increase in revenues 

over 1996—a large increase that would be consistent 

with an increase in revenues from OFF. Expenditures 

also decreased from 1991 to 1995, but by an average of 28.2 percent. From 1995 to 2001, expenditures 

increased by an average of 16.8 percent—highlighted 

by a 49.5-percent increase in 2001. At the same time, 

over the 10 years since 1991, the government budget 

defi cit decreased from $1.6 billion to $410 million 

(see Annex C: Iraq’s Budgetary Process). 

Figure 2. The Iraqi state general government budget,

1991-2002.
16

The fi rst method, which was common for most ministries and organizations, was to apply for approval 

from the EAC for the allocation of additional funds 

(see Figure 3). 

• These requests may have been submitted to the 

Chairman of the Presidential Diwan or the Secretary of the Council of Ministers (CoM), who would 

submit the requests to Saddam. It is unclear how 

much control Saddam exerted during this phase of 

the process. 

• If the EAC voted positively, the Minister of Finance 

would send a directive to the CBI to send the prescribed amount to the domestic or overseas account 

or accounts of the concerned ministry. 

• If there were a dispute regarding the approval, the 

issue would be elevated to the CoM for approval. If 

the dispute were resolved in the requestor’s favor, 

the Minister of Finance would direct the CBI to 

complete the transaction.

The second method was reserved for the military and 

security service entities such as the IIS, the MoD, 

MIC, and other security organizations that submitted 

requests for additional funds to the President. The 

information on this procedure is often contradictory 

(see Figure 4). 

• According to the MoF, the Iraqi security organizations submitted written requests for additional funds 

to the President, through either the Chairman of the 

Presidential Diwan or the head of the Presidential 

Secretariat. The latter, who was also the secretary 

of the NSC, probably handled all requests from any 

security organization, and may have been preferred 

by some organizational heads as he was considered 

to be closer to the President. 

• The head of the MIC, the Minister of Defense, 

and the Director of the CBI have also described 

approaching the Diwan for supplementary funds. 

The Chairman of the Diwan and presidential secretary were sometimes unaware of requests made to 

one another. Saddam reportedly did this to limit the 

number of people who had access to expenditure 

data. Requests sent to the Presidential Diwan were 

sometimes sent to the Diwan’s Economic Department for study. The Chairman of the Presidential 

Diwan sometimes directed the head of the Economic Department to discuss the request with the 

concerned minister. Both Khalil Yasin Al Ma’muri, 

the Secretary of the CoM, and Muhammad Mahdi 

Salih, the Trade Minister, were former heads of the 

Economic Department. 

• Organizations seeking budget supplements could 

also schedule a personal appointment with Saddam. 

Approval and Authorization of Supplemental 

Funding 

While Saddam was the primary approval authority 

for requests for extra funds, signed authorizations 

were also issued from the Chairman of the Presidential Diwan or the presidential secretary (both were 

authorized to represent Saddam).

If the supplement request were made during a personal meeting between Saddam and the head of an 

Iraqi security organization, Saddam would immediately approve or disapprove the additional funds. 

• This verbal approval was put in writing and sent to 

the requesting ministry, and a disbursal order was 

sent to the MoF. 

• Confi rmation of these payments would usually be 

presented as an order from the presidential secretary to the Chairman of the Diwan. 

Approvals for all other ministries would be issued in 

writing to the concerned ministry and the MoF (It is 

unclear whether this includes the IIS, MoD, MIC, and 

Iraqi security organizations).

• Disbursal orders sent to the MoF contained the 

date, signature of approving authority, amount, but 

no information about the request. Documents containing details of the request, such as project inforThe Economic Affairs Committee (EAC)

In late 1995, Saddam reestablished the EAC to handle 

economic issues that would have normally gone 

to the Presidential Diwan (the EAC existed in the 

1980s but was abolished at an unknown date). The 

EAC had infl uence over fi scal and monetary policy 

issues such as government spending, taxation, and 

importation and interest rates. Only the head of the 

committee, rather than presenting them to the other 

committee members, handled some presumably sensitive issues. 
17

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 3. Supplementary budget process: most

ministries.

Figure 4. Supplementary budget process: IIS, MIC, and

other special organizations.
18

mation or justifi cation, were kept at the Chairman 

of the Presidential Diwan’s offi ce or the presidential 

secretary’s offi ce, depending on where the request 

had been submitted.

ISG has collected information concerning the nature 

of payments sought by the military and security services through the Diwan. However, this information 

generally lacks detail.

• For example, the IIS successfully sought additional funding of nearly 48.5 million Iraqi dinars 

($25,000—a conversion rate of 1,950 ID to the 

dollar was used to convert 48.5 million ID to 

$25,000) to provide weaponry and ammunition for 

the Jalal Al-Talibani Group in early 2002. 

According to MIC Director and Deputy Prime Minister, ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, 

the MIC would approach the Diwan for additional 

hard currency funds. Examples of such occasions 

occurring from 2000-2002 included:

• A payment of $42 million for an unsuccessful 

deal to purchase the Belarusian S-300 Air Defense 

System, with payment split evenly between the 

MoF and President Diwan.

• $25 million for the purchase of 7.62-mm ammunition from the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Syria.

• $25 million for the purchase of light weapons 

and ammunition (including RPG-7 and KORNET 

ATGMs) from Russia via a Syrian company.

• $20 million for a maintenance facility for helicopters and the purchase of Mi-17 and Mi-25 helicopter engines.

• $8.5 million for a contract with the FRY company 

ORAO for a maintenance facility for MiG-21 

engines.

• The purchase of 3,000 night-vision goggles from 

Ukraine.

Disbursal of Supplemental Funds 

As stated by the Minister of Finance, the preferred 

method used to disburse requests for extra-budgetary 

funds was for the EAC to add the additional funds to 

the requesting ministry’s budget. However in exceptional cases, such as when requests were time sensitive, the funds would be paid directly to the ministry. 

Most transactions were conducted using accounts at 

the Rafi dian bank. Additional accounts were located 

at the CBI. 
19

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Financing Iraq’s Illicit 

Procurement

Overview

Iraq developed four major mechanisms for raising illicit funds outside the legitimate UN OFF 

program. These included the sale of Iraqi oil to 

neighboring and regional states via trade Protocols, 

the imposition of surcharges on oil sold through the 

UN OFF program, and the receipt of kickbacks on 

UN-approved contracts for goods purchased under 

the UN OFF program, and so-called “cash-sales” or 

smuggling. 

• From 1996 through 2000 a combination of the 

UN OFF Program, bilateral trade, and illicit oil 

profi teering allowed the Iraqi economy to recover 

from the post-1990 depression. This recovery 

ended the threat of economically induced Regime 

instability and provided Saddam with suffi cient 

resources to pursue costly procurement programs.

• After the economic recovery waned in 2000, 

Saddam’s revenues continued to amass via 

increasingly effi cient kickback schemes and illicit 

oil sales. ISG estimates Saddam generated $10.9 

billion in hard currency through illicit means 

from 1990 to 2003 (see Figure 5). 

The 1996-2003 UN OFF Program opened many 

opportunities for Saddam’s Regime:

• It provided $31 billion in needed goods for the 

people of Iraq, relieving the economic pressure on 

Regime stability.

• Saddam was able to subvert the UN OFF program to generate an estimated $1.7 billion in 

revenue outside of UN control from 1997-2003 

(see Figure 6).

• The UN OFF oil voucher program provided 

Saddam with a useful method of rewarding 

countries, organizations and individuals willing to 

co-operate with Iraq to subvert UN sanctions. 

Iraqi Economy’s Role in Illicit Procurement

During Saddam’s rule, Iraq adopted the Soviet 

Union’s centrally planned economic model. Saddam 

sought to centrally plan all facets of the state 

economy and utilized “Five Year Plans” to optimize 

the use of national resources. Viewing the Iraqi 

economy from Saddam’s perspective, ISG assesses 

it underwent distinct phases from 1980 through to 

OIF: “ambition,” “decline,” “recovery,” “transition,” 

and “miscalculation.” Readers may fi nd it useful to 

refer to the Timeline summary chart at the end of the 

chapter. 

Economic Ambition (1980-91)

Given Iraq’s large oil revenues of the 1970s and early 

1980s, Saddam was able to ambitiously pursue a 

state-controlled economy without having to choose 

between solvency and other priorities, such as health 

and welfare programs, infrastructure development and 

development of his armed forces (see Annex D: Iraq 

Economic Data 1989-2003). Iraq’s oil wealth allowed 

Saddam to overcome the ineffi ciencies of the 

economy until the war with Iran. Even with the war, 

his cash reserves and borrowed money from friendly 

Arab states allowed Saddam to continue his ambitious 

policies into the mid-1980s. 

The Iran-Iraq war, however, exhausted and crippled 

the Iraqi economy:

• Iraq had been free of foreign debt and accumulated 

$35 billion in foreign reserves by 1980. These 

reserves, however, could not bear more than the 

opening salvos of the war with Iran, which over 9 

years cost an estimated $54.7 billion in arms purchases alone. 

• Following the war, Iraq was under pressure to pay 

off high-interest, short-term debts to Western creditors estimated between $35-45 billion. Saddam, 

however, never paid off this debt [see Annex D: Iraq 

Economic Data (1989-2003)]. 

The economic burdens resulting from the IranIraq war led Saddam to abandon Ba’th-socialist 

economic policies that dominated in the 1960s and 

1970s. In 1987, Saddam attempted to turn the Iraqi 

economy around with abrupt economic reforms, 
20

Figure 5. Iraqi illicit revenue sources (US $),1991-2003.

Figure 6. Iraqi illicit earnings by type (million US $), 1991-2003.
21

Regime Finance

and Procurement

including abolishing universal employment labor laws 

and privatizing key government industries. 

• As a result, thousands of government workers were 

jobless. 

• Bus companies, gas stations, department stores, 

agricultural businesses, and factories were left outside the responsibility of the government. 

Rather than shocking the Iraqi economy into performing, these measures, by 1989, deepened the economic 

crisis and accelerated the collapse of living standards 

for most Iraqis. Sensing a threat to the viability of 

the Regime, Saddam again imposed price controls, 

renationalized some former state enterprises, and 

raised industrial and agricultural subsidies. The Iraqi 

economy was pushed to crisis by Saddam’s inability 

to address or resolve a number of economic realities:

• The rising cost of maintaining the Iraqi welfare 

state, which was among the more generous and 

comprehensive systems in the Arab world. 

• Low oil prices on the international markets, which 

Saddam associated with Kuwait and its conducting 

“economic warfare” against Iraq.

• The lingering debt from the war with Iran.

• The cost of rebuilding his military and expanding 

his WMD programs. 

Saddam chose to fi ght his way out of economic crisis 

by invading Kuwait. 

Economic Decline (1991-96)

Rather than rescuing the Iraqi economy, the invasion of Kuwait resulted in even greater fi scal strains 

as Saddam found himself in a second costly war, 

this time facing a US-led Coalition. After Saddam’s 

defeat in Kuwait, the UN trade sanctions placed 

on Iraq following the invasion remained in place. 

These sanctions, supported by over 150 nations, cut 

Iraq’s ability to export oil, its main revenue generator. After Desert Storm, Saddam also had to contend 

with compensation claims made for reparations of 

damage infl icted during the invasion and occupation 

of Kuwait.

As Saddam stubbornly refused to comply with UN 

Resolutions in the early 1990s, the Iraqi economy 

crashed to a low point in 1995. 

• From 1989 to 1995, Iraq’s GDP per capita fell from 

$2304 to $495. Some estimates reveal that the Iraqi 

per capita GDP never rose above $507 from 1991 to 

1996.

• Infl ation between 1989 and 1995 increased from 42 

percent to 387 percent. 

• Simultaneously, the street dinar exchange rate rose 

from 10 ID per $1 in 1991 to 1674 ID per $1 in 

1995. 

• During this same period, income inequality became 

a larger problem because the limited wealth was 

concentrated in the hands of Regime loyalists and 

elite traders, while the average Iraqi subsisted on 

much less income. Equally signifi cant, by 1995 

the plummeting dinar consumed the savings of 

the average Iraqi, causing the Iraqi middle class to 

virtually cease to exist. 

This period of economic decline also resulted in 

a dramatic increase in corruption, incompetence, 

and patronage in all facets of government. A good 

example of the Regime’s incompetence in economic 

Collecting Compensation for the First Gulf War

The United Nations Compensation Commission 

(UNCC) was responsible for processing and collecting 

such claims as authorized by UNSCR 692. With the 

insistence of Moscow, the UN readdressed the revenue 

allocation of Iraqi oil revenue. In June 2000 it voted 

for the UNSC-adopted UNSCR 1330 that changed 

the percentage of oil allocated to the UNCC from 

30 percent (UNSCR 705) to 25 percent. The UNCC 

estimated that the reduction to 25 percent would 

generate an extra $275 million in Phase XII of the 

OFF program for the Iraqi Regime. As of 7 May 2004, 

claims totaling $266 billion have been adjudicated, 

and claims worth $48 billion have been awarded by 

the UNCC. Additional claims worth $83 billion need 

to be resolved.
22

matters was illustrated when the government set up a 

Directorate in 1992 to combat economic crimes under 

Ibrahim Al Battawi, who reported directly to Watban 

Ibrahim Hasan Al Tikriti, the Interior Minister and 

Saddam’s brother. The task of the Directorate was to 

punish merchants and traders guilty of “profi teering.” 

In July 1992, the Regime summarily executed 42 

merchants in front of their shops in Baghdad’s market 

district. Saddam felt that the duty of the private sector 

was to provide goods and services to the Iraqi people 

while constraining price increases. These merchants 

were found to be shirking their “duty.”

Economic Recovery (1997-99)

ISG judges that the harsh economic conditions from 

1995 to 1996 were the primary factors in Saddam’s 

decision to reluctantly accept the UNSCR 986 (see 

UN OFF Program section). 

• Saddam wanted to perpetuate the image that his 

people were suffering as “hostages” to the international community under the UN sanctions. 

UN-approved oil exports from Iraq began in December 1996. The trade fostered under the UN OFF 

program opened the door for Iraq to develop numerous kickback and illicit money earning schemes, 

possibly beginning as early as 1998. These legitimate 

and illegitimate revenue streams bolstered the Iraqi 

economy enough to raise it out of depression, at least 

for the Iraqi leadership and the elite. 

• In the 1996 to 2000 period, Iraq’s GDP increased 

from $10.6 billion to $33 billion. 

• According to the UN International Children’s 

Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Iraq’s chronic malnutrition rate dropped from 32 percent in 1996 to just 

over 20 percent in 1999. 

• Iraqi oil production jumped from under 1 million 

barrels per day (bbl/d) in 1997 to 2.5 million bbl/d 

in mid-2000. 

Economic Transition and Miscalculation (1999-

2003)

After 2000, Iraq’s economic growth slowed for a 

number of reasons, most involving the production 

and sale of oil. As the Iraqi economy improved, 

Saddam began to restrict oil production to infl uence 

the price of oil in the world market and to leverage 

political infl uence. Additionally, Iraq’s oil sector 

could not meet demand because of years of poor 

reservoir management, corrosion problems at various 

oil facilities, deterioration of water injection facilities, lack of spare parts, and damage to oil storage and 

pumping facilities. These petroleum infrastructure 

problems limited Saddam’s ability to export oil and 

hampered the Regime’s ability to sustain the economic growth shown in 1997 to 2000.

• Iraq’s GDP slipped from a peak of $33 billion in 

2000 to $29 billion in 2001.

• Iraqi oil production dropped from 2.5 million bbl/d 

in mid-2000 to under 2 million bbl/d in 2002.

Nevertheless, from the late 1990s until OIF, Saddam 

steadily strengthened the fi scal position of the Regime 

while investing, as he wished, in development, 

technology, industry, and defense. Saddam also had 

enough revenue at his disposal to keep his loyalists in 

the Regime well paid. In short, after 1996 the state of 

the Iraqi economy no longer threatened Saddam’s 

hold on power in Iraq.

• The budget for the MIC, a key illicit procurement 

organization, grew from $7.8 million in 1996 to 

$500 million in 2003.

• Despite Iraq’s economic problems, MIC Director Huwaysh stated that Saddam went on a palace 

and mosque building spree in the late 1990s that 

employed 7,000 construction workers.

Iraq’s Revenue Sources 

During UN sanctions on Iraq, from August 1990 

until OIF in March 2003, Saddam’s Regime earned 

an estimated $11.3 billion utilizing four primary 

illicit sources of hard currency income. The UN 

OFF program became Saddam’s sole legitimate 

means to generate revenue outside of Iraq (see Figures 7, 8, and 9):

• Illicit barrel surcharges (10-30 cents per barrel) on 
23

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 8. Summary of illicit Iraqi revenue, 1991-2003.

Figure 9. Illicit Iraqi revenue sources by percentage,

1991-2003 table.

Figure 7. Saddam’s legitimate and illicit oil revenue process.

Behind the scenes, the Iraqi government illegallly generated billions of dollars in 

revenue through illegal surcharges it placed on UN approval oil sales, kickbacks it 

secretly received on top of UN approval contracts for purchase of commercial goods, 

and from illegal/secret cash border sales and smuggling of oil.

$1,532,000,000
24

oil sold through the UN OFF program, hereafter 

referred to as surcharges.

• Ten-percent kickbacks from imports authorized 

under the UN OFF program, hereafter referred to as 

kickbacks.

• Exports, primarily petroleum, to private-sector 

buyers outside the Protocol and UN systems, hereafter referred to as private-sector exports. 

The Regime fi ltered the majority of the illicitly 

earned monies through foreign bank accounts in 

the name of Iraqi banks, ministries, or agencies in 

violation of UN sanctions. According to senior Iraqi 

offi cials at SOMO, oil suppliers and traders, who 

sometimes brought large suitcases full of hard currency to embassies and Iraqi Ministry offi ces, so that 

the payments would be untraceable, fi lled these illegal 

bank accounts. 

During 1997 to 2003, Saddam generated enough 

revenue to procure sanctioned military goods 

and equipment, dual-use industrial material, and 

technology as well as some legitimate uses. These 

sanctioned goods transactions will be described in 

detail in later sections. He used those funds to slow 

the erosion of his conventional military capability in 

contravention of UNSC resolutions. Available information also indicates Iraq used trade Protocols with 

various countries to facilitate the delivery of some 

dual-use items that could be used in the development 

and production of WMD. 

Bilateral Trade Protocols 

Iraq’s bilateral trade Protocols with neighboring 

states provided Saddam with his largest source of 

illicit income during UN sanctions. The Protocol 

with Jordan ensured the Regime’s fi nancial survival 

until the UN OFF program began in December 

1996. Total income from the Protocols is estimated at 

$8 billion.

• Baghdad coordinated Protocols with Syria, Turkey, 

Jordan, and Egypt. These governments were full 

parties to all aspects of Iraq’s unauthorized oil 

exports and imports (see Annex A: Translations of 

Iraq’s Bilateral Trade Protocols).

• According to SOMO records, Iraq earned approximately $3.5 billion from illicit oil sales to Syria, 

Turkey, and Egypt under the Protocols from 2000 

until the recent war, exclusive of trade with Jordan. 

ISG estimates Protocol trade with Jordan added an 

additional $1.4 billion since 2000 and $3 billion 

from 1991 through 1999. 

Jordan Trade Protocol. Jordan was the key to Iraq’s 

fi nancial survival from the imposition of UN sanctions in August 1990 until the implementation of 

the UN’s OFF program. Jordan was Iraq’s largest 

single source for income during the sanctions period. 

Oil sales to Jordan under Protocols began as early as 

1983. Terms were negotiated annually, including 1991 

and every year thereafter during sanctions. The UN 

Sanctions Committee “took note” in May 1991 of Jordan’s oil imports from Iraq. Essentially, the Committee neither approved nor condemned Jordan because 

of its dependence on Iraqi oil at the time (see Annex 

A: Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade Protocols).

• Iraq trucked both crude oil and oil products—fuel 

oil, gas oil, LPG, base oil, and gasoline—to Jordan 

under the agreement, according to SOMO records. 

Crude shipments rose from about 45,000 barrels per 

day (bbl/d) in 1990 to 79,000 bbl/d by 2002. Oil 

product shipments rose from 13,000 bbl/d to 20,000 

bbl/d over the same period.

• Jordan was to receive up to 90,000 bbl/d of crude 

oil that year. The difference between this number 

and the 79,000 bbl/d fi gure announced in 1993 

Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data

The following revenue analysis is based on government documents and fi nancial databases, spreadsheets, and other records obtained from SOMO, the 

Iraqi MoO, and the CBI, among others. These sources 

appear to be genuine, of good quality, and consistent 

with other pre- and post-OIF information. This hard 

data is augmented, put into context, and explained by 

statements from former and current Iraqi government 

offi cials, particularly from SOMO, the MoO, the MoT, 

and the CBI (for more details, see Annex E: Illicit 

Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology). 
25

Regime Finance

and Procurement

for what they imported in 1992, probably was the 

roughly 20,000 bbl/d that Iraq shipped to Egypt 

through Jordan during the fi rst half of 1992.

• Jordanian offi cials also agreed to import nonpetroleum Iraqi products in 2001, including sulfur, urea, 

and barley, but ISG has no information to know if 

these goods were actually imported or what Iraq’s 

earnings were from them.

ISG does not have complete Iraqi data for Iraq’s 

effective earnings from the Jordan Protocol during 

the sanctions period but estimate them at $4.4 billion

(see Annex E, Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation 

Methodology). 

• ISG judges that Iraq’s earnings amounted to about 

$400 million annually from 1991 through 1995 

for a total of $2 billion. This estimate include 

trade approved under the Jordanian Protocol which 

averaged to appromiately $200 million annually. 

This estimate also takes into account Iraq’s dept to 

Jordan which increased by $1 billion after 1995. 

This $1 billion dept was a result of the addtional 

imports from Jordan above and beyond the goods 

paid for through the Protocol. These additional 

goods averaged another $200 million a year. 

• ISG used announced trade Protocol levels to estimate earnings in 1996 to 1998 amounting to $730 

million. 

• A combination of SOMO invoice and collections 

data was used to estimate earnings from 1999 to 

2003 totaling $1.7 billion. 

• Iraq’s earnings under the Protocol primarily were 

deposited in an Iraqi MoT account in the Central 

Bank of Jordan (CBJ) (see Figure 10). 

Jordan deposited its credit payments for Iraqi oil, into 

an account at the CBJ on behalf of the CBI. Funds 

were then disbursed to suppliers by the CBJ by order 

of the CBI.

• In March 2003, prior to OIF, Iraq had an estimated 

$444 million dollars in its trade account in Jordan. 

With total deposits to the trade account during the 

sanctions Regime estimated at about $4.4 billion 

and $444 million remaining at the end of the war, 

Iraq would have spent almost $4 billion on Jordanian origin goods and reexports under the Protocol 

agreement.

The Jordan Protocol is generally referred to (by 

Jordanian and Iraqi offi cials) as a 100 percent credit 

account, with no cash being provided to Iraq. SOMO 

information and a senior MoT offi cial, however, 

indicated a small portion of the trade was 60 percent 

credit and 40 percent cash.

• SOMO documents list oil sales to the Jordanian 

Ministry of Energy and Minerals on a 60-percent 

credit, 40-percent cash basis. Contracts of this type 

are listed only for 2002 and are valued at only $6.2 

million.

• A high-level Iraqi MoT offi cial stated that Jordan’s 

payments to Iraq for the cash portion of the trade 

Protocol was negotiated between the CBI and 

Jordan and provided specifi c written instructions 

about how to transfer the funds to Iraq. ISG has no 

further information on this aspect of the Jordan-Iraq 

trade Protocol. 

• A MoO offi cial stated his ministry had two 

accounts in Jordan funded by the Protocol. This 

could refer, in part, to the 40-percent cash portion 

of the trade, although the accounts held almost $80 

million while this trade only earned $6.2 million. 

• According to SOMO’s database, the 60-percent 

earnings were deposited in the Jordan National 

Bank. The 40-percent cash earnings were deposited 

in the Ahli Bank, where much of Iraq’s cash earnings from other Protocols were deposited. These, 

along with cash earnings from other sources, could 

account for the funds in the Ministry’s accounts. 

• It is possible, maybe even likely, that Iraqi oil sales 

under the 60/40 arrangement, sales to the Jordanian 

military, and purchases that resulted in $1 billion in 

debt owed to Jordan are not technically part of the 

trade Protocol. Nevertheless, given the government 

to government nature of these transactions, they 

were accounted for here instead of as private-sector 

exports.

Syria Trade Protocol. Iraq’s trade Protocol with 

Syria was Iraq’s primary illicit income source from 

2000 until OIF in March 2003. With Syria facing 

increased political pressure from the US, opening 

relations with Iraq seemed attractive for both political and fi nancial reasons. Negotiations began, and the 

Protocol was signed before former President Hafi z 
26

al-Asad died on 10 June 2000. The relationship probably accelerated when al-Asad’s son, Bashar al-Asad, 

became President on 17 July 2000. For Baghdad, the 

relationship was attractive because Syria could buy 

signifi cantly more oil at better fi nancial terms than 

Iraq’s other available illicit markets and Damascus 

was more willing than any other neighboring state to 

allow military goods to be shipped to Iraq through its 

territory. 

• SOMO and the Syrian Oil Marketing Offi ce negotiated the bilateral trade Protocol in Baghdad from 

27 to 29 May 2000. Contracts were written under 

the Protocol from June 2000 through March 2003 

(see Annex A: Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade 

Protocols). 

• Under the agreement, Iraq exported crude, gas oil, 

fuel oil, gasoline, base oil, LPG and asphalt to Syria 

by pipeline and/or tanker truck. 

Iraq’s total earnings over the life of the Protocol 

were about $2.8 billion (see Figure 11).

• Iraq charged Syria roughly $6 less than the authorized price for crude under the UN OFF program. 

Gas oil was sold for $75 per metric ton and fuel oil 

was sold for $20 per metric ton, both signifi cantly 

discounted from world prices. These shipments 

allowed Syria to export its own crude oil at market 

prices instead of having to use it for domestic consumption. 

• Under the Syrian Protocol, 60 percent of Iraq’s 

earnings were deposited in a SOMO account in the 

Commercial Bank of Syria for use in buying Syrian 

goods or foreign-made items purchased through 

Syria. 

• Iraqi sources’ statements concerning the disposition of the remaining 40 percent cash payment are 

not clear. The best information, however, seems to 

indicate the cash was fi rst deposited in a Commercial Bank of Syria cash account. Once this account 

reached $1 million, the funds were transferred to an 

account at the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank 

in Beirut, Lebanon. One source states this account 

was in Lebanon, another in Damascus. SOMO 

eventually transferred the money to CBI accounts in 

Baghdad, possibly by courier. 

• According to SOMO records, $1.18 billion in contracts were written drawing on the SOMO (presumably credit) account with Syria. If 60 percent ($1.68 

billion) of Iraq’s total earnings of $2.8 billion were 

deposited in that account during the existence of 

the Protocol, there would be $500 million remaining in unspent funds at the end of the war. All of 

these contracts probably had not been completed 

before OIF. This, and the possibility of other small 

accounts, probably explains the $842 million in 

total Iraqi funds remaining in Syria at the outbreak 

of OIF. 

Turkey Trade Protocol. Trade under the Turkey-Iraq 

Protocol was a signifi cant source of illicit income 

for Iraq from 2000 until OIF in March 2003. The 

Protocol was a rationalization and expansion of preexisting Iraqi-private-sector contracts. Iraq was able 

to increase the volume of its exports and earnings. 

• The main details of the Turkish Protocol were 

agreed to at meetings between Iraqi and Turkish 

delegations in early 2000. Minutes of meetings 

were signed on 16 January 2000, 29 February 2000, 

and 16 May 2000. The 16 January document was 

signed by ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi, 

MoO, Republic of Iraq, and by a Turkish trade offi -

cial, Republic of Turkey. It was decided a joint team 

of experts from the two sides would meet every 

three months to review the progress of the implementation of the Protocol (see Annex A: Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade Protocols). 

• For 2000, Iraq agreed to export 2.75 million tons 

(54,247 bbl/d) of crude oil to four Turkish buyers: 

Oz Ortadobgu, Ram Dis, Tekfen, and the Turkish 

Petroleum International Company (TPIC) during 

2000. TPIC was the trading arm of the Turkish 

National Oil Company and was granted the right 

to contract for additional oil above the 2.75 million 

metric tons.

• Contracts were written under the Protocol from July 

2000 to February 2003. 

Iraq’s total earnings over the life of the Protocol 
27

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 10. Iraq’s estimated earnings from the Jordan 

Protocol (million US $).

Figure 11. Iraq’s estimated earnings from the Syria 

Protocol (million US $).

Figure 12. Iraq’s estimated earnings from the Turkey 

Protocol (million US $).

were $710 million (see Figure 12).

• Iraq charged Turkey roughly $6 less than the authorized price for crude under the UN OFF program. 

The low price served as an incentive for Turkey to 

participate in the scheme. 

• Under the Turkish agreement, 70 percent ($497 

million) of Iraq’s earnings were to be deposited 

into an account at the Turkey Halk Bankasi A.S. 

The account was under the name of TPIC, but the 

control of SOMO. This account was to be used by 

SOMO to pay Turkish companies for goods and 

services delivered and rendered to Iraqi organizations. 

• According to a senior SOMO offi cial, some of these 

funds were transferred to interest bearing accounts. 

As of January 2004, SOMO held $157 million in 

these accounts and had earned almost $7.7 million 

in interest since October 2000. 

• Iraqi statements about the amount of cash deposited 

are inconsistent, but the best information indicates 

the remaining 30 percent in cash ($213 million) was 

deposited in a SOMO account at the Saradar Bank 

in Lebanon. Some of these funds may eventually 

have been transferred to a CBI account at the Syrian 

Lebanese Commercial Bank. SOMO eventually 

transferred the money to CBI accounts in Baghdad, 

possibly by courier. 

• Iraqi statements about cash deposits are again 

inconsistent, but a SOMO foreign account balance sheet showed the TPIC (70 percent) account 

containing over $195 million just prior to OIF. 

Another report states Turkish entities owe Iraq 

$265 million but also mentions an account balance 

in January 2004 of $234 million. At least in the 

case of the $234 million, the accounting included 

both the Protocol credit account ($52 million) and 

some savings accounts ($182 million). If 70 percent 

($497 million) of Iraq’s total earnings of $710 

million were deposited in this account, and $195 

million (assuming the lower fi gure) was remaining 

at the end of the war, Iraq would have spent about 

$302 million on Turkish goods and reexports under 

the Protocol agreement. The value of contracts 

signed using SOMO accounts amounted to $303.5 

million according to SOMO records. Some of these 

contracts almost certainly were not completed prior 

to OIF. 

Egypt Trade Protocol. Iraq and Egypt participated 

in a relatively short-lived Protocol from late 2001 to 

early 2002. ISG does not have access to documents 

outlining this agreement, but, according to a senior 

Iraqi offi cial, the deal involved the MIC-related company, Al-Husan.
28

• The fi rst contract under the Protocol was signed in 

August 2001 and the last contract in June 2002. 

• The trade involved primarily crude oil, but the last 

two contracts were for fuel oil.

• The trade reached an estimated peak of 33,000 

bbl/d in May 2002. The cargo was shipped by truck 

from Iraq to Aqaba, Jordan, where it was loaded on 

ships for transport to Egypt or Yemen. 

Iraq’s total earnings over the life of the Protocol 

were $33 million according to SOMO records. All 

but $1 million was earned in 2002.

• Iraq generally charged Egypt about $7 per metric 

ton less than the authorized price for crude under 

the UN OFF program. The fi rst two contracts were 

$15 per metric ton off the UN price. 

• The Protocol was 60-percent credit and 40-percent cash. The credit account was under SOMO’s 

name at the National Bank of Egypt and the cash 

proceeds were deposited in the Ahli Bank (Jordan 

National Bank) in Jordan. 

United Nations OFF Program

The UN OFF program saved the Iraqi Regime from 

fi nancial collapse and humanitarian disaster. When 

Iraq began exporting oil under UN OFF in December 1996, the Regime averted economic conditions 

that threatened its survival. The program also provided Iraq with unprecedented opportunities to earn 

signifi cant amounts of hard currency outside the 

control of the UN. 

Phases of the UN OFF Program 

The UN OFF Program was run in phases. Each phase 

was approved by a UNSCR and was designed to 

last for 180 days, although the length was adjusted 

at times as deemed necessary. Phase 1 ran from 10 

December 1996 to 7 June 1997. The fi rst oil was 

exported on 15 December 1996, and the fi rst contracts fi nanced from the sale of oil were approved in 

January 1997. The fi rst shipments of food arrived in 

Iraq in March 1997 and the fi rst medicines arrived in 

May 1997. The fi nal oil exporting period (phase 13), 

authorized by UNSCR 1447 (2002), was in effect 

from 5 December 2002 through 3 June 2003 (see 

Figure 13). 

Disposition of UN OFF Funds

As of 19 November 2003, Iraq’s oil exports under the 

program had earned over $64 billion. After deducting 

the costs of the UN’s administering the OFF program 

and WMD monitoring mission, as well as, the Compensation Fund, $46 billion was available for Iraqi 

humanitarian imports. Of this amount:

• $31 billion worth of humanitarian supplies and 

equipment were delivered to Iraq including $1.6 

billion of oil industry spare parts and equipment.

• $3.6 billion was approved for projects to be implemented by UN agencies.

• $8.1 billion had been transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq as of 19 April 2004.

• The remainder of this revenue was uncommitted 

and in the UN-Iraq accounts awaiting further distribution. 

• In addition to the $46 billion, an additional $8.2 

billion in approved and funded humanitarian goods 

were in the production and delivery pipeline and 

under review by the UN and Iraqi authorities.

Oil Vouchers and Allocations

Throughout the UN OFF Program, Iraq used a 

clandestine oil allocation voucher program that 

involved the granting of oil certifi cates to certain 

individuals or organizations to compensate them for 

their services or efforts in undermining the resolve 

of the international community to enforce UNSC 

resolutions. Saddam also used the voucher program 

as a means of infl uencing people and organizations 

that might help the Regime. By the end of the fi nal 

phase (13) of the UN OFF Program, Iraq had allocated 4.4 billion barrels of oil to approved recipients. 

However, only 3.4 billion barrels were actually lifted 

(loaded and exported)—the same fi gure reported by 

the UN.

• The oil allocation program was implemented 

through an opaque voucher program overseen and 

approved by Saddam and managed at the most 

senior levels of the Iraqi Regime. 

• Starting in Phase 3 of the UN OFF program, until 

OIF, the Iraqi Regime began to politicize the alloca-
29

Regime Finance

and Procurement

tions process by giving quantities of oil to individuals and political parties it favored. 

• According to Tariq ‘Aziz, Taha Yasin Ramadan, 

and Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim Al ‘Azzawi, the oil 

voucher program was managed on an ad hoc basis 

by the Regime offi cials listed in Figure 14. 

• The IIS, Ambassadors, and other senior Iraqi 

offi cials also commonly made nominations for oil 

allocations. 

Oil Voucher Process

The MoO normally distributed the secret oil allocations in six-month cycles, which occurred in synchronization with the UN OFF phases (see Figure 15). 

Senior Iraqi leaders could nominate or recommend an 

individual or organization to be added or subtracted 

from the voucher list and an ad hoc allocation committee met to review and update the allocations (see 

Annex B: Known Oil Voucher Recipients). However,

Saddam personally approved and removed all names 

on the voucher recipient lists. 

This voucher program was documented in detail 

in a complete listing maintained by Vice President 

Ramadan and the Minister for Oil, ‘Amir Rashid. If a 

change was requested by telephone by Saddam or any 

other top offi cial, either the MoO or SOMO rendered 

a detailed memo for the record of the conversation. A 

senior Iraqi offi cial, ambassador, the IIS, or Saddam 

himself would recommend a specifi c recipient (i.e. 

company, individual, or organization) and the recommended amount of the allocation. That recommendation was then considered by the ad hoc committee and 

balanced against the total amount of oil available for 

export under the UN program disbursement. When 

former Vice President Ramadan fi nalized the recipient 

list, it was sent to‘Amir Rashid. The offi cial at SOMO 

in charge of issuing the fi nal allocation vouchers 

(making the disbursements) stated that Tariq ‘Aziz 

would give the fi nal list to him. He believed that it 

was ‘Aziz that fi nalized the list upon the direction of 

Figure 13. Oil earnings for each calendar year

(13 phases of the UN OFF Program), 1997-2003.
30

Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Issa Former Deputy Prime Minister. He was personally involved 

in the handling of Western expatriates and companies.

Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi Former Vice President, Ba’th party head, and Director of the 

Iraqi Oil for Food Program Committee.

‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi Former Minister of Oil. He ensured that the Ministry and its 

marketing arm, SOMO, kept detailed records on the oil allocation program.

Muhammad Mahdi Salih Former Minister of Trade.

Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim Al ‘Azzawi Former Minister of Finance.

Muhammad Sa’id Kazim Al Sahhaf Former Minister of Information.

Abd Al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah 

Huwaysh

Former Director of the Military Industrialization Commission 

(MIC).

Figure 14. Senior Iraqi leaders who managed the Oil

Voucher Program and were authorized to offer vouchers.

Saddam. 

Secret Voucher Recipients

In general, secret oil allocations were awarded to:

• Traditional oil companies that owned refi neries.

• Different personalities and parties, which were 

labeled “special allocations” or “gifts.” This group 

included Benon Sevan, the former UN Chief of the 

Offi ce of Iraq Program (OIP), numerous individuals 

including Russian, Yugoslav, Ukrainian, and French 

citizens.

• “The Russian State” with specifi c recipients identifi ed (see Annex B: Known Oil Voucher Recipients). 

Recipients could collect their allocation vouchers 

in person at SOMO or designate someone to collect 

them on their behalf. The oil voucher was a negotia-
31

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 16. The nationality of secret oil voucher recipients 

by volume of oil allocated.

Figure 15. Large differences in the later phases 

between the amount allocated under the voucher system 

and the amount actually lifted was due to disruptions in 

Iraq’s oil exports.

ble instrument. Recipients, especially those not in the 

petroleum business, could sell or trade the allocations 

at a discount to international oil buyers or companies 

at a 10 to 35 cent per barrel profi t. Frequent buyers 

of these large allocations included companies in the 

UAE as well as Elf Total, Royal Dutch Shell and 

others.

Figure 16 refl ects the general proportion of the 

nationalities targeted to receive Iraq’s oil allocations 

by volume of oil allocated, according to a former government offi cial with direct access to the information. 

The top three countries with companies or entities 

receiving vouchers were Russia (30%), France (15%), 

and China (10%)—three of the fi ve permanent members of the UNSC, other than the US and UK. 

Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International 

Leaders

The following select individuals (see Figure 17) 

include world leaders, senior politicians and corporate 

offi cials, were approved by the ad hoc committee as 

recipients of oil vouchers under this program (see 
32

Figure 17. Selected secret oil voucher recipients.

Millions of

Barrels Allocated

Millions of

Barrels 

Lifted

Mr. Zierbek Russian

Communist Party 110.10 87.391

Mr. Azakov and

Mr. Velloshia

Rus Naft Ambix and the Russian Presidential Offi ce 84.278 72.516

Vladimir Zhirinovsky 

and LDPR Companies

A former senior offi cial in the Iraqi government stated that Zhirionvsky visited Iraq 

on a regular basis

53.0 79.8

“Russian Foreign

Ministry” 55.0 42.722

Patrick Maugein

Iraq considered Maugein a conduit to 

French President Chirac, according to a 

former Iraqi offi cial in a claim ISG has not 

confi rmed.

14.0 13.199

“Raomin”

Allocations were made to an individual 

listed as Raomin who is further described 

in the voucher allocation list as the son of 

the former Russian ambassador in Baghdad.

13.5 13.071

Mr. Nikolayi Ryzhkov 

and Mr. Gotzariv

Members of the Russian

Parliament (Duma) 12.0 11.88

Charles Pasqua Businessman and former French

Interior Minister 11.0 10.751

Benon Sevan,

UN Chief of the Oil for 

Food Program

Former Iraqi offi cials say he received his 

illicit oil allocations through various companies that he recommended to the Iraqi 

government including the African Middle 

East Company.

13.0 7.291

Government of 

Namibia 7.0 7.123

Government of Yemen 5.0 4.713

Sukarnoputri

Megawati,

President of Indonesia

Iraqi documents list President Megawati 

as a recipient of oil allocations. 6.0 3.779
33

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Annex B: Known Oil Voucher Recipients for a more 

complete listing). 

The voucher list provided by SOMO includes Russian members of government, politicians, and businessmen. The former Iraqi Vice President Ramadan 

stated that he believed the Russian Government was 

sympathetic to the plight of Iraq and strongly against 

the sanctions imposed upon it and that most of the 

parties of the Russian Parliament (Duma) supported 

Iraq’s position. He stated that many Russian companies were dealing with the Iraqi ministries in charge 

of exports, and that this was no secret because many 

of the Russian Ministers visited Iraq regularly to aid 

this activity. 

American and British Oil Voucher Recipients

According to a former high-ranking Iraqi offi cial with 

direct access to the information, there are two Americans and one UK citizen listed as recipients on the 

list of Iraq’s illicit oil allocation program (although 

at least three names are annotated “American” on the 

Iraqi lists). Deputy Prime Minster Tariq ‘Aziz was 

the principal point of contact for handling all high 

profi le foreign recipients, all American recipients 

and most other non-Arab voucher recipients, called 

“internationals”, who lived in countries outside of 

the Arab world. 

Benon Sevan’s Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers 

At the center of the day-to-day operations of the 

UN’s $64 billion OFF program, Sevan who spent 

his entire career at the UN, received oil allocations 

through various companies that he recommended to 

the Iraqi government . This arrangement reportedly 

began soon after the OFF program started in December 1996. An investigation by the Iraqi Governing 

Council has uncovered a letter linking Sevan to a Panamanian-registered company called African Middle 

East Petroleum Company. The letter, dated 10 August 

1998, from Saddam Zayn Hasan, the executive manager of SOMO, and addressed to ‘Amir Rashid, the 

former Iraqi Oil Minister, implicates Muwafi q Ayyub 

in playing a role in setting up the deal. The letter says: 

“Muwafi q Ayyub of the Iraqi mission in New York 

informed us by telephone that the above-mentioned 

company has been recommended by his Excellency 

Mr. Sevan, director of the Iraqi program at the UN, 

during his recent trip to Baghdad.” A second page 

detailed the “Quantity of Oil Allocated and given to 

Mr. Benon Sevan,” listing a total of 7.3 million barrels 

of oil as the “quantity executed.” 

A source at SOMO confi rmed that Sevan received 

allocations by way of a Cypriot company or the 

Panamanian registered, the African Middle East 

Petroleum Company. According to the source, when 

the Chairman of the Iraqi UN OFF Committee, 

Ramadan, saw any company with Sevan’s name in 

parenthesis next to it (they were numerous, according 

to the source) on the proposed voucher recipient list, 

Ramadan automatically gave approval to issue the 

vouchers associated with that account.

• SOMO voucher documents only list Sevan in relation to the African Middle East Petroleum Company. ISG has no further information on the role of 

a Cypriot company or any other company. 

According a high-level source at SOMO, Sevan 

never received his oil allocations in person. Sevan’s 

vouchers were always picked up by Fakhir ‘Abdal-Nur (Abdul Noor), an Egyptian now residing in 

Switzerland and connected to the African Middle East 

Petroleum Company, who would sign documents on 

Sevan’s behalf and pick up his allocations at SOMO. 

Fakhir conducted this business for Sevan for each 

phase of the UN OFF MOI starting in the fourth 

phase and ending in the ninth phase. Sevan’s allocations ended after the ninth phase when SOMO representatives informed Fakhir that the African Middle 

East Petroleum Company owed money under the oil 

surcharge program and the payments were in arrears. 

Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil 

Vouchers

Those who were nominated by the IIS and placed 

on the master voucher list were most likely placed 

there for their service in an intelligence capacity for 

the former Regime. Two individuals were nominated 

by the IIS and approved for inclusion on the list (see 

Figure 18). 

Oil Export Surcharges

In addition to income from the trade Protocols and 
34

the UN OFF program Iraq demanded a surcharge 

fee for each barrel of oil it exported under the UN 

OFF program because of the relatively large builtin profi t margin allowed by the UN Oil Overseers. 

Buyers were willing to pay Iraq a surcharge, usually 

25 to 30 cents per barrel of oil, because they made 

suffi cient profi t to do so. Iraq reduced the amount it 

charged in 2002 as the Sanctions Committee gradually eliminated the profi t margin; the last SOMO 

invoice for a surcharge was dated September 2002. 

• The surcharge system began in the 8th phase of the 

UN OFF program. According to SOMO records, 

the surcharge was charged on 1,117 million barrels 

of oil between phases 8-12. The total contract value 

for the surcharges was $265.3 million.

• Iraq actually collected only $228.6 million in 

surcharge payments from September 2000 until 

March 2003 (see Figure 19). Iraq was unable to 

collect $36.7 million in surcharges. (see Annex E: 

Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology) 

• Payments were usually made to SOMO bank 

accounts in Jordan and Lebanon, but $61 million 

was delivered in cash to Iraqi embassies, usually 

Iraq’s Oil Allocation Voucher Process

The UN allowed Iraq to sell a certain amount of oil 

under the Oil For Food Program and the proceeds 

would go to Iraq through an UN approved bank, 

the BNP. The UN did not monitor Iraq’s oil voucher 

system and, according to senior Iraqi offi cials at 

SOMO, Baghdad made every effort to keep the details 

of the system hidden from the UN. During Iraq’s 

negotiations with the UN concerning the OFF program Baghdad fought hard for the right to determine 

to whom it could sell its oil and Baghdad considered 

the UN’s concession on this point an important victory. The UN approved the fi nal contract between Iraq 

and the lifting company, ensured the company was 

on the register of approved lifting companies, and 

monitored the actual lifting of the oil to make sure the 

amount lifted fi t within the approved contract amount. 

The UN also made sure that the total amount lifted 

matched the OFF allocation.

The Legality of Oil Voucher Allocations

The Oil Voucher Allocation system was set up by 

the former Regime of Iraq in order to allocate their 

exports under the UN Oil-For-Food (OFF) Program 

to entities that would gain Iraq the greatest benefi t. 

Using the voucher program as a method of rewarding 

and/or infl uencing entities or countries really did not 

begin until about Phase 3 of the OFF Program. Phase 

3 ran from 5 December 1997 to 29 May 1998. At the 

time, this internal Iraqi process was unknown to the 

UN and was not addressed in any UN resolutions.

The UN approved all companies lifting oil under 

the OFF program and accounted for all the Iraqi oil 

lifted by authorized oil lifting fi rms. However, some 

entities and individuals may have abused this system 

by using an intermediary to lift and sell the oil allocated to them by Iraq under the voucher system. For 

example, according to oil voucher registers recovered 

from SOMO and statements by Iraqi authorities, 

several private individuals and political organizations were listed as a voucher recipient. However, an 

intermediary (a UN registered oil lifter) was used to 

pick these vouchers and actually lifted the oil under a 

UN approved contract. In this example, the UN was 

not aware that an individual or political organization 

was involved in, and was profi ting from, the transaction. Consequently, if individuals or organizations 

knowingly received profi ts from these oil sales they 

were taking part in actions which were not sanctioned 

by the UN OFF program. ISG has no direct evidence 

linking these individuals or political organization to 

actually receiving the proceeds from these oil allocations. However, individuals and organizations are 

named as being on the list for oil allocations, statements from Iraqi offi cials support the fact that these 

entities received oil allocations, and evidence that 

Iraq entered into contracts with the intermediaries 

that actually lifted these allocations exist. In conclusion, the Oil Voucher Allocation program is another 

example of how Saddam’s Regime strove to undermine UN sanctions and the OFF process while 

garnering favor with well placed individuals and 

entities that would be able to favorably act on Iraq’s 

behalf on the political scene.
35

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Moscow by Russian entities, according to SOMO 

documents. Ten other Iraqi embassies were used 

in this way including: Hanoi, Vietnam, Ankara, 

Turkey and Geneva, Switzerland. 

• Some companies preferred to pay Iraqi embassies 

directly out of fear for public disclosure of the illegal arrangements. This may explain the preference 

to conduct such business with cash.

• Payments were mostly made in US dollars, but a 

few times they were made in Euros. The cash was 

later moved to Baghdad from the embassies via diplomatic pouch and deposited in the SOMO accounts 

at the CBI or Rafi dian banks.

A former senior Iraqi offi cial with direct access to the 

information stated that Saddam fi rst ordered companies be charged a fl at rate of 15 percent of their profi ts 

as the surcharge, but the companies refused to pay. 

Saddam then pursued a 50-cent per barrel surcharge 

that his advisors warned him was not workable. When 

Saddam realized they were right, he allowed the 

surcharge to be dropped to 30 cents and then fi nally 

to 10 cents. Ten cents was the amount fi rst charged by 

SOMO in September 2000.

• Some companies, particularly the French, refused 

to pay the surcharge.

• However, some companies used a ‘middleman’ to 

hide the link between the originating company and 

Iraq. 

Iraq tolerated the refusal of some companies to pay 

the 10-cent per barrel surcharge until the end of the 

8th phase (5 December 2000) in order to avoid their 

refusal to ship the oil and reduce Iraq’s projected 

exports. 

• The 10-cent surcharge was increased in January 

2001 during the 9th phase to 35 cents a barrel for 

sales to the US and 25 cents per barrel for sales 

to other countries. The surcharges continued into 

phase 12 at 15 cents per barrel to all customers (see 

Figure 20).

The surcharge system was an open secret. The subject 

was discussed by the media and by worldwide oil 

market. It was known the former Regime received 

income from its sales that were deposited in special 

accounts outside of Iraq. 

• The system continued until October 2001 when the 

UK and US took unilateral action to eliminate the 

excess profi t that allowed surcharges to be paid. 

How Surcharges Were Collected

The buyers agreeing to the surcharges did so with a 

pledge to pay. Iraq’s main leverage to enforce payment was to deny the buyer future contracts until he 

made good on his debt. Iraq exercised this option 

in the case of the African Middle East Petroleum 

Company, according to SOMO documents. By the 

12th phase, there were 42 entities receiving oil export 

allocations that were not allowed to sign contracts 

because they had not fully paid their surcharges. 

Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import 

Contracts

The fourth revenue source for Saddam’s Regime 

was kickbacks from UN OFF program commercial 

goods contracts being imported into Iraq. According 

to a former senior MoT offi cial, beginning with the 8th

phase in June 2000, Iraq began to demand a kickback 

on all UN OFF program import contracts to generate 

illicit income. The amount of the kickback could vary, 

but generally was around 10 percent. ISG suspects, 

however, that Iraq had been receiving similar types 

of kickbacks since the beginning of the UN OFF 

program to varying degrees. 

Contracts were written for 10 percent above the 

actual price and the supplier company would deposit 

this amount into Iraqi accounts. The fee was often 

included for spare parts or after sales service. The fee 

was often applied, particularly in Jordan, through the 

mechanism of the supplier providing a 10 percent performance bond in advance, which was then automatically transferred to an Iraqi account when the supplier 

was paid for the goods. 

• A source described how it often worked for one 

front company. For instance, the Al-Eman Group 

would sign a contract with Iraq and deposit the 10 

percent performance bond in an escrow holding 
36

Figure 18. IIS oil voucher recipients.

Figure 19. Iraq’s estimated earnings from OFF oil surcharges (million US $).

Figure 20. Surcharge amounts charged in US cents per 

barrel for each OFF phase.

(late)

Millions 

of Barrels 

Allocated

Millions 

of Barrels 

Lifted

Fa’iq Ahmad 

Sharif

And 

Mastek

60.756 43.614

A former senior Iraqi offi cial with direct access to the information believed Sharif to be a Malaysian resident and an owner or 

high level executive of the company Mastek.

Hamad Bin Ali 

Al Thani 27.359 19.215

A Qatari national and owner of the private airline Gulf Eagle 

(not a regular commercial enterprise). Al Thani was responsible 

for opening an air link between Baghdad and Damascus. 

account. When the goods were delivered to Iraq, the 

UN Iraq account would pay the full contract price 

to Al-Eman. At that point, the Jordan National Bank 

would automatically kick back the performance 

bond to an Iraqi account instead of returning it to 

Al- Eman, as would normally be the case. 

• ISG does not have information from Iraqi sources 

regarding the revenue earned from these kickbacks; 

but ISG estimates, using a 10 percent average, 

that these kickbacks totaled approximately $1.512 

billion from late 2000 until OIF (see Figure 21). 

For more information on the methodology used to 

generate this estimate, see Annex E: Illicit Earnings 

Sources and Estimation Methodology. 

According to senior MoT and offi cial sources, 

kickback payments were deposited into temporary 

accounts controlled by the Iraqi ministry involved 
37

Regime Finance

and Procurement

with the contract at banks in Jordan and Lebanon. 

These “bridge” accounts were not in the name of the 

ministry, but used false names to disassociate the Iraqi 

government from the transaction. Within 24 hours, the 

funds were transferred to a CBI account at the same 

bank. At the end of each day, the ministry bridge 

accounts had a zero balance. Kickback payments also 

were made to at least two Iraqi front companies: Alia 

in Jordan and Al-Wasel & Babel in the UAE. Ultimately, the kickback funds were couriered back to the 

CBI in Iraq. 

Each individual ministry that engaged in the import 

kickback contract scheme had copies of their respective contracts or deals. The MoT was responsible for 

monitoring these contracts but was not involved in 

negotiating the terms. The ministries illustrated in 

Figure 22 engaged in the 10 percent scheme. 

Although the kickback was paid to the particular ministry that entered into the contract, those ministries 

were not able to use the funds—they usually were 

transferred to the CBI as mentioned above. 

• In order to encourage kickback collections by the 

ministry, and in order to compensate the ministry 

for the diffi culties involved with the scheme, the 

CBI returned 5 percent of the 10 percent kickback 

to the ministry collecting the kickback. 

• These funds were distributed to the employees of 

the particular ministry as an incentive to collect the 

kickbacks. 

Another method of generating kickbacks from UN 

OFF import contracts emerged in the later years of 

the UN OFF program. This method was based on 

deceiving the UN over the quality of the items being 

imported to Iraq. For this illicit revenue scheme, 

Iraq arranged for a co-operative supplier to obtain 

a legitimate UN OFF contract specifying “fi rstquality” humanitarian goods. Iraq would then be 

authorized under UN OFF to pay top quality prices 

for the items via the UN OFF-controlled accounts. 

In reality, however, the co-operative supplier substituted cheap, poor-quality goods for the contract. 

This generated very high profi ts for the co-operative 

supplier. Saddam then arranged for the excess profi ts 

to be returned to Iraq via diplomatic channels, after 

the co-operative supplier took its “fee.” This revenue 

scheme was particularly nefarious since it left the 

people of Iraq with second-quality, sometime useless, 

humanitarian goods (see the Use of Foreign Banks 

sections). 

Private-Sector Oil Sales 

Iraq’s trade with private-sector businessmen during 

the sanctions period provided a $1.5 billion supplement to illicit money earned from kickbacks and 

surcharges related to the UN OFF program and 

Protocols with neighbor states (see Figure 23). Iraqis 

also refer to this trade as “border trade” or “smuggling.” (see Annex F: Iraqi Oil Smuggling for a case 

study on this topic.)

• These sales began almost immediately after sanctions were implemented, with examples dating back 

to at least 1993. 

• Iraq exported crude oil, petroleum products, and 

dry goods such as dates and barley. ISG has very 

little information about the volume or earnings 

from the dry goods portion of the trade, but estimates earnings of about $30 million annually. 

• ISG estimates Iraq earned about $439 million annu 

 ally from 1991 through 1998.

Private-sector sales were made by SOMO, but outside 

the UN OFF oil export program and the trade Protocols with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt. SOMO 

information on these sales covers from 1998 until 

OIF. SOMO information on these sales cover part of 

1998 until OIF. According to SOMO, payment for 

these sales amounted to $992 million, and was made 

in three ways:

• Some contracts were listed as “cash.” According to 

the SOMO Invoice and Contract Data Base, these 

contracts were signed from June 1997 through 

March 2003 and were for all types of petroleum 

products (gas oil, fuel oil, asphalt, etc.) as well as 

small amounts of crude oil. These cargoes were 

shipped through the Arabian Gulf, Turkey, Jordan, 

Syria, and possibly Lebanon. The contracts were 

valued at $560 million and $523 million was actually collected. 

• Another category of contracts was “goods/barter.” 

These contracts were signed from January 1998 

through March 2003 and were primarily for fuel 

oil and gas oil. Like the cash contracts above, these 

cargoes were shipped through the Arabian Gulf, 

Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and possibly Lebanon. The 

contracts were valued at $469 million. Because 

these were barter contracts as payment for goods 

to be received by specifi c Iraqi ministries, SOMO 

received no cash in payment.
38

• The fi nal category of contracts was “Iraqi Dinars.” 

These contracts were signed from May 1999 

through December 2002. They were all for fuel 

oil and all were sold to the “North,” probably the 

Kurds. The income was in dinars and when translated into dollars at prevailing exchange rates only 

amounted to about $2 million. Because this was not 

hard currency income, it is not counted in the total 

hard currency income mentioned elsewhere in this 

section. 

SOMO lists its cash, barter, and dinar contracts as 

being destined for the “North,” “West,” or “South.”

• Based on the buyer’s names, shipments to the North 

almost certainly were mostly destined for Turkey. 

One of the major purchasers paying with cash was 

the Asia Company, which bought almost 11 million 

barrels for $174 million from May 1999 through 

January 2003. According to ‘Amir Rashid, Iraq’s 

Oil Minister, Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish 

Democratic Party, controlled this company. The 

dinar contracts probably were destined for the 

Kurds in the three Northern Governorates. Some of 

the shipments to the North could have found their 

way to Iran. The total value of private-sector trade 

with the North was $538 million.

• Based on the buyers listed, shipments for the West 

were destined at least for Jordan and Syria. Some 

of these shipments probably also found their way 

to Lebanon. The total value of private-sector trade 

with the West was $95 million.

• Based on the buyers listed, shipments for the South 

were destined for export by small vessels through 

the Arabian Gulf, with most probably destined 

for the UAE and other nearby bunkering markets. 

Some probably wound up in India and perhaps 

other destinations. The total value of private-sector 

trade with the South was $359 million. 

According to a number of Iraqi offi cials, the money 

earned from private sector border trade was primarily deposited into accounts in Lebanon and Jordan 

controlled by the CBI (see Figure 24). 

• The accounts were kept in US dollars, except for 

one account in Euros that was closed after one 

month.

• One account was maintained in the Rafi dian Bank, 

Mosul, Iraq branch. This account handled earnings 

from the private-sector trade through the North.

• The “SOMO Offi ce” in Basrah handled earnings 

from private sales through the South. ISG does 

not know if this means there was a corresponding 

Rafi dian Bank account to handle these earnings in 

the South. 

Role of the SOMO

Iraq’s SOMO is the state-run monopoly that controls 

all of Iraq’s crude oil exports. It is overseen by the 

Iraqi MoO and functions as the Ministry’s marketing 

arm. SOMO maintained all records for sales under 

the UN OFF program; cash border sales, sales 

through the Protocol agreements, and oil allocation 

(vouchers) arrangements.

• According to the procedures agenda approved by 

the UNSCR 986, SOMO was responsible for the 

marketing process of Iraqi oil and was eventually 

permitted to sell as much oil as it could. However, 

these sales contracts were only allowed to companies registered with the UN as approved buyers 

of Iraq’s crude oil. These companies were only 

to make payments to Iraq into the UN supervised 

escrow account in the Banque Nationale de Paris in 

New York. 

According to SOMO offi cials, Saddam demanded 

that Iraq keep the price of its oil as low as possible 

in order to leave room for oil traders to pay Iraq the 

illegal surcharges. A sales director at SOMO stated 

that they were instructed by the government to get the 

lowest price. Under normal circumstances, SOMO 

would have sought the highest price for Iraq’s oil, its 

only legal source of real revenue. 

Among the companies listed in SOMO’s records 

as having paid illegal surcharges are some of the 

world’s largest refi neries and oil trading companies. 

SOMO maintained detailed fi nancial records listing 

invoices and collections for each contract. These companies, when questioned about surcharge payments, 

deny they were the parties that made them. 

• For example, according to SOMO records, one 

of the most active purchasers of Iraqi crude was 

a Swiss-based company named Glencore. It paid 

$3,222,780 in illegal surcharges during the period 

of the program. The company denies any inappro-
39

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 21. Iraq’s estimated earnings from OFF import 

kickbacks (million US $).

Figure 23. Iraq’s estimated earnings from private-sector 

oil sales (million US $).

Figure 22. Iraqi ministries involved in OFF kickbacks.

Ministry of Oil (MoO) Ministry of Housing Ministry of Education

Ministry of Water & Sanitation The Electricity Board Ministry of Telecommunications

Ministry of Health Ministry of Trade Ministry of Agriculture

Figure 24. Total amounts received in Iraqi bank 

accounts under private sector “cash sales”.a

a

This SOMO information is different by less than $1 million from 

the SOMO data base information cited above. The reason for the 

discrepancy is unknown.

Bank Currency Amount

Ahli Bank-Jordan US$ $287,120,131.61

Rafi dian “Filfel” (Mosul) US$ $146,648,012.00

Jordan Bank-Jordan Euros converted to US$ $47,026,041.80

Ahli Bank-Jordan US$ $42,035,812.95

Iraqi Embassies US$ $930,000.00

Fransa Bank-Lebanon US$ $48,000.00

Total US$ $523,807,998.36

priate dealings with the Iraqi government outside of 

the UN OFF program. 

Determining who paid surcharges, and for what 

amounts for each oil transaction will take some time. 

Iraqi oil shipments passed through many parties 

before being delivered to end recipients, the large oil 

refi neries and companies outside Iraq. The parties 

or oil agents that fi rst bought the oil only to turn 

around and resell it for profi ts could have been 

anyone from small-inexperienced oil dealers and 

companies, or even businessmen and companies 

being bribed or rewarded for various reasons by the 

Iraqi government.

• According to SOMO records and senior MoO 

offi cials, oil surcharges were deposited into Iraq’s 

bank accounts. Only designated, trusted Oil Ministry employees withdrew the cash and brought it to 

Baghdad on a regular basis.

• An estimated $2 billion is believed to be left from 

the illicit funds deposited in foreign Iraqi bank 

accounts.

• As of February 2004, over $750 million had been 

recovered from these accounts and returned to Iraq, 

according to the US Treasury Department. 
40

Saddam directed SOMO to set up accounts at the 

National Bank of Jordan, also known as the Ahli 

Bank of Jordan. SOMO created separate accounts 

both for surcharge payments and for Protocol-generated revenue. Three surcharge accounts were created, 

one each for the deposits of US dollars, Francs, and 

eventually Euros. The two required signatories on 

these accounts were SOMO employees. 

Funds from SOMO accounts had to be released by 

a SOMO order. Payments from accounts holding 

the credit portion of earnings from the Protocol with 

Syria (at Syrian Commercial Bank) and the credit 

portion of earnings from the Protocol with Turkey 

(the TPIC account on behalf of SOMO at the Halk 

Bank) required authorizations from various ministries 

and the Presidential Offi ce (Diwan). When SOMO 

received the appropriate approvals, it generated a 

letter directing the banks to make payments. 

• SOMO had at least thirteen accounts that were used 

to receive and/or hold the 10 percent fee amounts 

received from the various ministries. 

• The MoO had no authority over these accounts and 

they were located in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 

the UAE. 

SOMO’s Relationship to the MoO

While SOMO’s role was to sell Iraq’s oil and handle 

some of the funds derived from those sales, the 

MoO’s role was primarily to procure goods and 

services needed by the oil sector. As part of this effort 

the MoO would collect the 10 percent fee on import 

contracts. 

• A former Oil Ministry offi cial in charge of contracting for maintenance equipment and spare parts 

stated they would accept a low bid and require 

another 10 percent be added to the contract. Iraqi 

offi cials believed 10 percent could be easily hidden 

from the UN. For example, if the bid were for $1 

million, the supplier would be told to make it $1.1 

million. This scheme was quite effective for generating illicit revenue. 

• The MoO has bank accounts at several different locations and in several different countries. 

SOMO’s 13 accounts were separate from the MoO. 

According to a high-level source at the MoO, the 

Ministry had only basic information relative to the 

SOMO accounts, such as the name of the fi nancial 

institution, the account holder’s name, and the name 

of the person who had signatory authority on the 

account. 

• The source stated that the MoO had this information so that they could transfer funds to the accounts 

when oil was sold. According to a source at the 

Ministry, the MoO is currently trying to recover 

funds from some of these accounts, particularly in 

Jordan, and return the money to Baghdad. 

Iraq’s MoO currently has two active bank accounts 

at the Jordan National Bank, Queen Noor Branch, 

Amman, Jordan. These are the same accounts that 

the MoO has used for the last several years. The fi rst 

account is a joint account held in the name of the 

MoO and Jordan Petroleum Refi nery Co., Ltd. Its balance on 30 November 2003 was approximately $78.4 

million. The second account is called the Ministry 

personal current account. Its balance on the same date 

was $3.9 million. 

• The source of these funds was from the sale of 

crude oil and oil products to Jordan under the Trade 

Protocols. 

• The Oil Ministry claims that the funds in these 

accounts were to be used to purchase engineering 

and chemical materials necessary to keep Iraq’s oil 

industry operating at a minimum production level. 

Offi cial Oil Accounts 

SOMO held a variety of bank accounts to manage 

and control Iraq’s legal and illegal oil revenues. These 

accounts have been categorized as non-surcharge 

accounts (including Protocol revenues), oil surcharge 

accounts, and cash sales accounts. Figure 25 shows 

the bank accounts that SOMO opened for non-surcharge purposes. 

• The fi rst fi ve SOMO accounts are individually 

named accounts at the Ahli Bank in Jordan. For 

more detail on those names, see Figure 26. 

• The fi fth account listed at the Ahli Bank in the 

name of ‘Ali Rajab & Yaqdan was a Protocol trade 

account set up to receive payments related to the 

Iraq-Jordanian Protocol and was opened just a few 
41

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 25. SOMO accounts balances outside of Iraq 

(data provided by SOMO in January 2004).

SOMO Account Balances Outside of Iraq

Country Account Name Bank Name Account 

Type

Balance in 

US $

Jordan Saddam Zibin, ‘Ali Rajab &

Yaqdan Hasan Ibrahim Ahli Bank, Jordan Cash Account 5,247,427

Jordan Saddam Zibin, ‘Ali Rajab &

Yaqdan Hasan Ibrahim Ahli Bank, Jordan Cash Account 33,190

Jordan Saddam Zibin, ‘Ali Rajab &

Yaqdan Hasan Ibrahim Ahli Bank, Jordan Cash Account 5,138

Jordan Saddam Zibin, ‘Ali Rajab &

Yaqdan Hasan Ibrahim Ahli Bank, Jordan Cash Account 991,544

Jordan ‘Ali Rajab & Yaqdan Ahli Bank, Jordan Trade Account 2,987,054

Lebanon SOMO Fransabank, Lebanon Cash Account 241,052

Lebanon SOMO Fransabank, Lebanon Cash Account 46,583

Lebanon SOMO Fransabank, Lebanon Cash Account 41,010,787

Egypt SOMO National Bank of Egypt Trade Account 19,710,881

Syria SOMO Commercial Bank of Syria Trade Account 790,361,517

Syria SOMO Iraqi Embassy in Syria Cash Account 1,223,401

unknown SOMO Syrian Lebanon 

Commercial Bank Cash Account 251,949,039

Turkey TPIC Halk Bank, Ankara Trade Account 195,697,846

Russia SOMO Iraqi Embassy, Moscow Cash Account 1,342,975

Vietnam SOMO Iraqi Embassy, Hanoi Cash Account 406,805

Malaysia SOMO Iraqi Embassy, Kuala 

Lumpur Cash Account 250,000

Switzerland SOMO Iraqi Embassy, Geneva Cash Account 710,000

TOTAL 1,312,182,052

Figure 26. Key individuals involved in Iraqi oil accounts 

in Jordan.
42

months before the start of OIF. This trade account 

allowed 60 percent of oil proceeds to remain in the 

trade account and 40 percent of the proceeds to be 

utilized elsewhere. The signature authority on this 

account was ‘Ali Rajab and Yaqdan Hasan Ibrahim.

• There are two different cash accounts listed at 

the Sardar Bank in Lebanon, both with the name 

“Rodolphe” listed as the bank point of contact. 

• SOMO established another account at the National 

Bank of Egypt that was used as a Protocol trade 

account, similar to the one set up for Syria. Again, 

a 60/40 split allowed 60 percent of oil proceeds to 

remain in the trade account and 40 percent of the 

proceeds to be deposited into Ahli Bank account in 

Jordan.

• The Commercial Bank of Syria cash account 

received the 40 percent of the oil proceeds. The 

bank was instructed that when the account balance 

exceeded $1 million, it was to instantly transfer the 

extra amount to the Syrian Lebanon Commercial 

Bank account.

• The Turkish Petroleum International Company 

(TIPC) is a trading arm of the Turkish National 

Oil Company and the SOMO equivalent in Turkey. 

SOMO funds were deposited at the Halk Bank 

located in Ankara Turkey. 

• The account was actually in the name of TPIC “in 

the favor” of SOMO. Currently SOMO is requesting to have funds still held at the Halk Bank 

released.

• The SOMO amounts listed at the Iraqi Embassies 

were received directly from oil contract holders. 

These payments were sometimes delivered directly 

to the Embassies and other times deposited fi rst into 

an Ahli Bank account. 

As noted in Figure 25, the accounts at the Ahli Bank 

in Jordan are in the names of Saddam Zibin, Yaqdan 

Hasan Ibrahim Al Kharkhi, and ‘Ali Rajab Hasan. 

The accounts all have the same prefi x of 501333 and 

suffi x range from 02 to 12. Senior sources at SOMO 

were not sure of the reason for this. 

Figure 27 shows the SOMO non-surcharge accounts 

through TPIC maintained at the Halk Bank in Turkey. 

The cumulated interest earned for these accounts, 

according to SOMO, was $7,678,946.70. Seven of 

these accounts (shown in green) remain open. The 

current Iraqi Embassy in Turkey has been in contact with the TPIC representatives about the current 

account balance of SOMO with TPIC. The embassy 

was informed that TPIC believes that the amount due 

to SOMO is only $100 million. A source at SOMO 

stated that TPIC must have allowed unauthorized 

withdrawals from these accounts. 

In the eighth phase of the UN OFF program, Iraq 

began to impose a 10-cent per barrel illicit surcharge 

on all oil sales contracts to foreign entities with the 

exception of Syria (see the Oil Surcharge section). A 

summary of the surcharge amounts due collected, and 

left outstanding for phases eight through twelve are 

displayed in the chart below (see Figure 28).

These oil surcharge payments were deposited into 

several accounts at banks located in Jordan and Lebanon. Names of these banks included the Jordanian 

National Bank (Ahli Bank), the Sardar Bank, and 

the Fransabank in Lebanon (see Figure 29). Escrow 

accounts were opened in the name of SOMO however these other numbered accounts were opened by 

Director General of SOMO, Rafi d ‘Abd-al-Halim 

Jasim or his Deputy and the Director of Finance or his 

Deputy for the deposit of surcharges. 

• The various accounts at the Ahli Bank were created 

to receive cash, which fl owed in from surcharges, 

the Protocol accounts, and from payments received 

through border trade cash sales.

• The amounts listed for the CBI and the Rafi dian 

Bank are accounts that were still open in early 

2004. 

• The two al-Wasel & Babel accounts were for US 

Dollars and Euros. They were only open for one 

or two months before being closed out. Al-Wasel 

& Babel is a partially state owned oil and banking 

enterprise in the UAE 51 percent of which is state 

owned while UAE investors own the other 49 percent. This business was used to move goods outside 

of the UN MOU and is still in operation. 

• Three accounts are shown at the Fransabank in 

Lebanon. They were Euro accounts, however, the 

balances have been converted to US Dollars for this 

chart. 
43

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 27. SOMO bank accounts at the Halk 

Bank in Turkey.

Figure 28. Summary of amounts collected/received 

under surcharge accounts.
44

Figure 29. Total amounts received under surcharge 

accounts, September 2000-March 2003.

Figure 30. Bank account distributions of surcharge 

revenues.

a

Represents additional crude sales outside of the OFF 

program.

a
45

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• Two of these accounts were set up to receive oil 

surcharge amounts while the third account (marked 

with an *) shows the total proceeds received by Iraq 

for the sale of crude oil outside of the UN MOU 

and not just for the surcharge amounts. 

Figure 30 is a graphic representation of the data in the 

chart above. It illustrates how the surcharge revenues 

were distributed among the associated SOMO bank 

accounts. 

Figure 31 lists the Iraqi bank accounts, which were 

established to receive cash payments from illegal 

border sales of crude oil. 

• Sources at SOMO explained that the account at the 

Jordan bank was set up for Euros and was closed 

after just one month. The balance of this account 

was shifted over to the Ahli Bank accounts.

• The Rafi dian “Filfel”/Iraq account represents 

a SOMO account at the Rafi dian Bank branch 

offi ce located in Mosul which collected surcharge 

amounts from the border sales of oil to the areas to 

the north. The SOMO offi ce in Basra handled the 

areas to the south.

Figure 32 depicts the allocation of the cash sales revenue in the various banks.

Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for 

Procurement 

Iraq manipulated its national banking structure to 

fi nance the illicit procurement of dual-use goods 

and WMD-related goods, as well as other military 

goods and services prohibited by the UN. Through 

its national banking system, Iraq established international accounts to fi nance its illegal procurement 

network. Iraq’s international accounts, mainly located 

in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, were instrumental in 

Iraq’s ability to successfully transfer billions of dollars of its illicitly earned oil revenues from its various 

global accounts to international suppliers, front companies, domestic government and business entities, 

and foreign governments (see Annex G: Iraq’s Banking System for more details on the origins of the Iraqi 

banking system). 

CBI

The CBI was responsible for issuing and storing currency of the government, protecting against counterfeit currency and disbursing funds based on directives 

from the Minister of Finance. Individuals and companies doing business with the government of Iraq 

would have to go through the CBI, which handled all 

offi cial government transactions and funds. The CBI 

is composed of three domestic branches, including 

its headquarters in Baghdad as well as one offi ce in 

Basra and one offi ce in Mosul. The Director of the 

CBI before OIF was ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh.

According to a senior Iraqi fi nancial offi cial, the 

CBI established overseas accounts in 24 Lebanese 

banks, seven Jordanian banks, and one Belarusian 

bank to deposit cash from the ten percent system 

of kickbacks from foreign suppliers of goods and 

foodstuffs. CBI did not maintain overseas accounts 

in other countries because senior bank offi cers feared 

that such accounts would be frozen by the United 

States. The fi nancial offi cial said that other Iraqi government ministries also maintained overseas accounts 

of funds provided from the CBI overseas accounts. 

CBI did not maintain any overseas holdings in real 

estate, stocks, bonds, or diamonds. 

CBI’s Role in Licensing Money Exchangers

Prior to OIF, the Exchange Department of the CBI 

was responsible for licensing the approximately 250 

licensed money exchangers in the business of converting currency of one country into the currency of 

another country. Money exchangers were required to 

obtain a license from the MoT, and present it to the 

CBI in order to register as a money exchanger. Some 

money exchangers mark their currency for identiStatements by ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh,

Former Director of the CBI

Custodial debriefi ngs revealed that:

• The CBI funded government departments through 

payments to the Ministry of Finance. The Presidential Diwan was the only department that received 

money directly from the CBI. 

• The CBI distributed cash only on the instruction 

of the Minister of Finance to the Rafi dian and 

Rashid Banks. The Diwan transferred money to 

their accounts. On instruction from the Minister of 

Finance, Treasury Bonds were issued to cover cash 

taken from the CBI. 
46

Figure 31. Total amounts received in Iraqi bank 

accounts from border trade “cash sales” as of 

January 2004.

Figure 32. Total amounts received in Iraqi bank accounts 

from border trade “cash sales.”

fi cation purposes and to assist in the prevention of 

counterfeiting.

CBI’s Role in Tracking Foreign Accounts for Iraq

The CBI Investment Department maintained a book 

that contained all foreign accounts opened by the 

bank, including the numbered or bridge accounts 

opened in Lebanon and Jordan. The bridge accounts 

concealed the fact that foreign companies were 

making payments to Iraq. Under this system, illicit 

foreign payments appeared to be going to an account 

opened in a personal or numbered account. Then the 

foreign banks immediately transferred proceeds from 

the bridge account to a CBI account. 

CBI maintained accounts in foreign countries specifi -

cally for the transfer and distribution of funds to third 

parties. The Investment Department of the CBI did 

not conduct normal banking activity after the United 

Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990 because its 

access to overseas accounts, and investment opportunities in particular were tightly limited and controlled. 

However, the Foreign Accounts section of the Investment Department still maintained vigilance over 

the CBI accounts that had been frozen around the 

world in order to track the accrual of interest in these 

accounts. 

• This section also maintained the hidden overseas 

accounts in Lebanon and Jordan, which the former 

Regime used for earnings from the ten percent 

contract kickback scheme and oil surcharges 
47

Regime Finance

and Procurement

payments. An Investment Department offi cer of 

the CBI was directly responsible for transferring 

foreign currency funds from the CBI’s hidden overseas accounts in Lebanon and Jordan to separate 

accounts held by the former Regime leadership and 

the IIS in overseas banks.

In late 1999, the state-owned Rafi dian Bank took over 

the CBI’s role in managing Iraqi government funds 

abroad, mostly through Rafi dian’s Amman branch. 

The Central Bank of Iraq did not possess any 

authority for auditing the foreign currency account 

activities of overseas assets of the Rasheed Bank, 

the Rafi dian Bank, or the Iraqi government ministries. In 1994, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to 

give the Rasheed and Rafi dian Banks as well as Iraqi 

government ministries the authority to open their 

own overseas accounts independent of CBI controls 

or authority. As a result, the CBI was no longer able 

to determine the foreign currency holdings of these 

institutions.

When directed by the EAC, CBI would transfer foreign currency funds from its overseas accounts in Jordanian and Lebanese banks into ministries’ accounts, 

often those held at the Rafi dian Bank in Amman, 

Jordan or Beirut, Lebanon. In theory, the EAC would 

only direct CBI to transfer funds into another government bank or ministry overseas account to fund an 

import purchase. The EAC transfer of funds’ request, 

however, only indicated the recipient Iraqi organization, the amount, and the bank account number 

to which the funds were sent. CBI offi cials had no 

means for establishing the end use or fi nal destination 

of the transferred funds. 

• CBI did not transfer any funds into personal 

accounts from its overseas accounts. Any transfer 

of government funds into personal accounts would 

have been possible only if conducted through the 

overseas branches of the Rafi dian and Rasheed 

banks or other government ministries’ accounts. 

CBI Director ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh wrote several 

letters to the cabinet ministers requesting increased 

controls, or at least auditing capability, over foreign 

currency transactions conducted by the Rafi dian and 

Rasheed banks and government ministries. In early 

March 2003, with the imminent threat of war, the 

cabinet ordered government ministries with overseas 

accounts to transfer all their foreign currency funds 

to CBI accounts in overseas banks. This was done 

in order to provide greater security for government 

funds that had been dispersed in these various overseas accounts, but not yet utilized. 

• In early 2003, Saddam convened a meeting during 

which he ordered the removal of $1 billion from 

the CBI in order to avoid the risk of all the money 

being destroyed in one location in the event of an 

allied attack. Present at the meeting were the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade, the Director 

of the MIC, the presidential secretary, the Chairman 

of the Presidential Diwan, and the Director of the 

CBI. 

• Two weeks before the outbreak of the war in March 

2003, Saddam formed a committee that was responsible for the distribution of funds. The committee 

consisted of the Minister of Finance, the Chairman 

of the Presidential Diwan, the presidential secretary 

and Saddam’s son, Qusay Saddam Husayn alTikriti. The group visited the CBI and inspected the 

boxes that contained the $1 billion. The money was 

stored in 50-kilogram boxes that contained either 

$100 notes or 500 notes.

• According to multiple Iraqi offi cials, including the 

CBI Director, Qusay, along with SSO Assistant 

Director Hani ‘Abd-al-Latif Tulfah Al Nasiri, and 

approximately 50 other people, appeared at the 

CBI on 19 March 2003 and removed the boxes of 

money. The money was then distributed to different 

ministries, including the MoT, which received eight 

boxes of money. After the war, the MoT boxes were 

turned in to the proper authorities through ‘Adnan 

Al Adhamiyyah, head of the MoT Legal Department. Overall, most of the money was recovered 

except for about $130 million.

Iraqi Bank Holdings

Figure 33 summarizes the total assets accumulated by 

Iraqi’s banks before OIF (for more details, see Annex 

G: Iraq’s Banking System). 

Funding of the Ministries

Prior to the sanctions resulting from the August 1990 
48

invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government would 

fi nance its international trade and operations using letters of credit, secured or non-secured and recoverable 

or non-recoverable, in accordance with international 

banking laws and regulations. The imposition of the 

sanctions forced the Iraqis to seek alternative methods 

to avoid having their assets frozen in accounts in the 

name of their government or ministries. The two primary methods used to circumvent the sanctions were 

to pay cash to intermediaries and the use of nominee 

named letters of credit. 

The Finance Minister authorized individuals to take 

currency out of Iraq. This was against the law for both 

Iraqi citizens and non-citizens without the consent of 

the Finance Minister. The Finance Ministry would 

receive an order from Saddam, authorizing an individual to take a certain amount of currency outside of 

Iraq. The Finance Minister would then arrange with 

Iraqi customs for that individual to be allowed safe 

passage through the border, with the currency. Typically, the funds authorized were not very large. Funds 

ranged between $2,000 and $3,000, occasionally as 

high as $5,000. Those authorized to take the currency 

abroad were friends of Saddam and supporters of the 

Iraqi cause. 

At the beginning of 2000, each ministry and governmental agency established accounts with banks in 

Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in the names of selected 

employees within each of their respective organizations. The Iraqi government used its Rafi dian and 

Rasheed banks in these countries because of their 

direct links to Baghdad. After MIC contracted for the 

procurement of goods or materials they would send 

instructions to the bank to transfer the amount of 

the contract value into an account for the supplier or 

middleman. The recipient would be credited with the 

funds, but the funds would not actually be released 

until after delivery of the products. 

The Use of Foreign Banks 

Before the 1991 Gulf War, the Regime had funds in 

accounts in the US, Europe, Turkey and Japan. After 

1991, the Regime shifted its assets into accounts in 

Jordan, Lebanon, Belarus, Egypt and Syria. An agreement was drafted with Sudan but never completed. 

Accounts appeared in the names of the CBI and the 

SOMO. 

The CBI’s Investment Department Director General, 

Asrar ‘Abd-al-Husayn Muhammad was responsible 

for management of these overseas accounts and maintained signatory power of the accounts, up to a limit 

of $1 million. CBI Director ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh 

had fi nal responsibility and supervisory authority 

Figure 33. Total assets in Iraq’s banks for 2003.
49

Regime Finance

and Procurement

over these accounts. There were no restrictions on the 

amounts ‘Isam could transfer or withdraw from the 

accounts. The CBI Investment Department retained 

information on account numbers and account activities at its offi ce in Baghdad on computer discs, and 

the overseas banks forwarded account statement to 

the Investment Department on a monthly basis. CBI’s 

paper records of these accounts were burned, either 

during OIF or afterwards when the bank offi ces were 

looted. CBI did not maintain records of other ministries’ overseas accounts or records of Regime leaders’ 

personal overseas accounts. 

Since 1993, as a result of the fi nancial obligations 

and economic strains of two consecutive wars and the 

freezing of its accounts in Western Europe and the 

United States, CBI had virtually no foreign currency 

in overseas accounts or its own vault in Baghdad. 

CBI then began increasing the number of its overseas 

accounts in Jordan and Lebanon after Iraq accepted 

and implemented the UN OFF Program and oil 

exports started to fl ow in December 1996. CBI only 

began accumulating large amounts of foreign currency in these accounts in 2001 after the introduction 

of a formal system of illegal kickbacks from foreign 

suppliers in 2000, according to a senior Iraqi fi nancial 

offi cer.

Prior to 2001, the amount in these accounts was 

minimal. CBI selected Jordanian and Lebanese Banks 

for the establishment of overseas accounts based upon 

prior relations with the bank or based upon competitive bids tendered by various banks that sent representatives to Baghdad seeking the Regime’s banking 

business. When selecting a new bank, CBI would 

consult international banking records and consider 

the additional level of interest the foreign bank would 

offer above the international bank interest rate. Usually, this interest rate would be between 0.5 and 0.8 

percent above the international bank rate, usually the 

London rate.

According to a senior Iraqi fi nance offi cer, when CBI 

planned to open a new account, the bank would send 

two investment department offi cials to either Jordan 

or Lebanon with an offi cial letter. When the Regime 

requested CBI draw upon the accounts to transfer 

foreign currency cash to Baghdad, CBI would send 

a delegation of three CBI offi cials, one with account 

signatory power, to the foreign bank with an offi cial 

letter from the CBI. It usually took a week to ten days 

for the banks to prepare the cash, since the banks 

usually did not maintain large amounts of foreign 

currency cash on the premises. Then, the cash, the 

amounts of which usually ranged between $5-10 million, was delivered to the Iraqi Embassy and put in 

diplomatic pouches for transport back to Baghdad by 

vehicle. CBI Director ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh himself 

once carried $10 million in his vehicle on his return 

trip from Beirut to Baghdad. 

Use of Banks in Lebanon

16 Lebanese banks were used to hide Iraqi cash, 

which was physically trucked to Baghdad by the IIS 

when accounts reached a predetermined level, according to a high-ranking Iraqi offi cial. A committee 

consisting of the Ministers of Trade, Treasury, Commerce, the director of the CBI and the Diwan secretary sent CBI offi cials abroad to collect this cash, 

according to the former head of the Diwan.

Use of Banks in Jordan

Much of Iraq’s money in Jordan was held in private 

accounts operated by the Iraqi Embassy in Amman 

or the Iraqi Trading Offi ce. It was standard practice to have two signatories for the accounts as a 

security measure to prevent theft. Double-signatory 

Iraqi accounts in Jordan could only be government 

accounts. Of particular interest was the Jordanian 

Branch of the Rafi dian Bank, which was established 

purely for use of the Iraqi government; the United 

Bank for Investment was also important, because of 

its establishment for use by Saddam’s family. Transactions were never made by telex or electronic transfer, because it was feared these would be detected by 

the US or UK. Instead, those wishing to buy oil, or 

other commodities such as sheep, outside of the OFF 

program would pay cash to an account at Rafi dian 

Bank in Amman. Further cash transfers would then be 

made to other banks, including the Hong Kong and 

Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in Amman, 

where possible Regime money remained. Transfers of 

cash to other countries would be hand-carried using 

the diplomatic bag to avoid the need to send money 

electronically. Money was sent to Europe in order 

to procure goods for Iraq, but was never sent there 

for secrecy, as the controls over the fi nancial system 

made it too diffi cult.

According to a former high-ranking Iraqi government 

offi cial, when Jordanian offi cials approved a transaction, the Jordanian Ministry of Industry and Trade 

notifi ed the Central Bank of Jordan to verify the 

availability of funds. Jordanian suppliers were then 

required to post a performance bond and the Iraqi 

importers were required to obtain a letter of credit 
50

from the Rafi dian Bank. The Letter of Credit required 

specifi cation of payment terms according to the IraqiJordanian Protocol. After the receipt of goods, the 

Iraqi importer would verify acceptance so payment 

could be released. 

In order to make payments to Iraq for the cash, an 

arrangement was negotiated annually between the 

Central Banks of Iraq and Jordan. There were written 

instructions concerning the process for transferring 

funds to Iraq. In order to transfer funds, the Rafi dian 

Bank served as an intermediary between the Central 

Bank of Jordan and the CBI. Jordan was a unique 

case; trading with Iraq was ongoing since the early 

1980s so the trade credits Iraq earned from this Protocol were controlled by the Central Bank. Funds were 

dispersed by the Central Bank of Jordan by order of 

the CBI or by specifi c Protocol designed for payment 

for goods and services. This Protocol included automatic payments to Jordan for Iraqi air travel and Iraqi 

telephone calls as well as salaries for the employees 

of the Iraqi embassy in Jordan. 

According to a high-ranking Jordanian banking offi -

cial, the CBI had no accounts with the Central Bank 

of Jordan and the only relationship between the two 

was through the implementation of the bilateral oil 

for goods barter Protocol. The CBJ worked diligently 

with the MoT, industry and the Customs Directorate to ensure proper valuation of Protocol shipments, 

because over-valuation had been a problem. 

Use of Banks in Syria

The Syrian connection became much more widely 

used after the February 1999 ascension of King 

‘Abdallah II in Jordan and the June 2000 ascension of 

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. King ‘Abdallah II’s 

government began to create more problems for the 

Iraqi Regime with regard to importing products from 

Jordan. Consequently, Iraq turned to Damascus who 

offered a much friendlier atmosphere for goods not 

sanctioned by the UN.

The Commercial Bank of Syria was the repository of 

funds used by the Iraqi government to purchase goods 

and materials both prohibited and allowed under UN 

sanctions. The fair market value of oil and oil products would be deposited by Syrian buyers into an 

account in the Commercial Bank of Syria. Each ministry in the Iraqi government had use of these funds; 

however, there were quotas set for the amounts they 

would be able to use. The top four ministries with 

access to these funds in descending order included the 

MoO, the MoT, the Ministry of Industry (MoI) and 

the MIC. The orders to disburse funds through this 

account would come from the Iraqi Minister of Oil. It 

is estimated that there could be $500 million held in 

this account.

Use of Banks in Turkey 

SOMO and the Turkish Petroleum International 

Company (TIPC) had an agreement to maintain a 70 

percent account in the Halk Bank in Turkey and interest bearing accounts. 

Use of Banks in Egypt 

A high-ranking offi cial in Iraqi banking stated that 

this trade agreement began around 2001 and continued through 2002. SOMO set up bank accounts at 

the Al Ahli Bank in Egypt through which payment 

was made for the purchase of oil from Iraq. SOMO 

offi cials had signatory authority over the accounts. 

This trade agreement was set up by the MoT and 

MoO and was not within the guidelines of the UN 

OFF program.

Some Egyptian government offi cials helped the 

government of Iraq to obtain hard currency illegally 

via the UN OFF program. It is unclear whom in the 

Egyptian Government was providing the assistance 

and who was aware of this activity. Under this illicit 

system, the Egyptian government offi cials would sign 

a contract with the Government of Iraq to purchase a 

certain amount of approved humanitarian goods for 

a set price under the UN OFF Program. The contract 

would specify that the goods shipped would be fi rstquality merchandise. In actuality, the goods shipped 

would be second-quality goods. When the UN paid 

the Egyptian Government offi cials for the fi rst-quality goods, the Egyptian Government offi cials would 

distribute the funds for the second-quality products, 

take a small margin of profi t for them, and convert the 

remaining money into US dollars or gold bullion and 

deposit the money into the Rafi dian Bank or directly 

into the CBI. When this hard currency was received in 

Baghdad, the Iraqi government would pack bundles of 

US one hundred dollar bills into bags and boxes and 

distribute them to the Iraqi embassies abroad. However, after the arrest of the Iraqi IIS Chief of Station 

in Amman, the Iraqi government moved their primary 

transit point to Damascus out of fear that the couriers would be arrested while crossing the Jordanian 

border. 
51

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Use of Banks in Belarus

The CBI used Infobank in Belarus to hide Regime 

assets in employee-named accounts. These accounts 

held funds accumulated through the kickback of funds 

from import contracts under the UN OFF program. 

Huwaysh, former Director of the MIC, estimated that 

there was $1 million in this account and the Iraqi MIC 

had $1.5 million for procurement of Belarusian goods 

in this account. However, that actual total was $7.5 

million (see Iraq’s Illicit Revenue section).

Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF

A high-ranking government offi cial stated that 

Saddam ordered all funds located in foreign banks 

brought back to Iraq in 2001. ISG judges that 

Saddam took this action to prevent his assets from 

being frozen or seized by the international community. This order indicates that Saddam knew he might 

come under international pressure in 2001, possibly 

as a reaction to the Al-Samud missile project or the 

illicit profi teering from the OFF program. 

• A committee was formed to accomplish the transfer 

of these Iraqi funds. The committee consisted of the 

Finance and Trade Ministers, the Chairman of the 

Presidential Diwan, and the Director of the CBI. 

• The role of the Diwan Chairman was mainly to 

provide funds to those individuals, known as “couriers”, selected by the Finance and Trade Ministers 

and CBI Director to travel to retrieve the funds. 

Most couriers were trusted employees of their 

respective government entities. 

• At the committee’s second meeting, the Director of 

the CBI stated that Iraq had already brought back to 

Iraq up to $200 million worth of gold. The gold was 

purchased through an unidentifi ed bank in Beirut 

and secured in CBI vaults. 

The Role of Cash Transactions

The CBI provided foreign currency in cash to Saddam 

through an offi cial funding mechanism established 

to release cash from CBI reserves to the Presidential 

Offi ce. The Presidential Offi ce did not have a fi xed 

budget, and CBI often received messages requesting 

foreign currency for release to the Presidential Offi ce. 

The amounts ranged from thousands of US dollars 

up to $1 million, which were always paid in cash in 

foreign currency. The Presidential Offi ce was the only 

entity that would ever request money in cash from the 

CBI, but the requests never exceeded $1 million. The 

Presidential Offi ce stated that the cash was used for 

overseas travel, for government business, and medical reasons. The CBI Credit Department accounted 

for the cash sent to the Presidential Offi ce in the same 

way that it accounted for funds used by Iraqi ministries. The ministries, however, never received foreign 

currency cash. If the ministries needed Iraqi dinars 

for domestic purposes, they would obtain it from their 

respective Rafi dian bank accounts. 

Saddam seldom interfered in the affairs or business 

of the CBI. As a standard practice, CBI intra-governmental relations focused on the Cabinet of Ministers, 

the Ministry of Finance, and the Presidential Offi ce 

Staff. The authorization for CBI to release cash to 

the Presidential Offi ce usually came from either the 

Presidential Offi ce Chief of Staff or the Vice Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. Some notable 

exceptions were Saddam’s post-1993 annual special 

requests for cash and his last request for cash on 19 

March 2003, when he authorized Qusay to withdraw 

$1 billion from the CBI. 

Iraq’s Gold Reserves

The CBI vaults contained four tons of gold reserves 

as of early June 2003. The value of these gold 

reserves was insignifi cant in comparison to the bank’s 

level of cash reserves. CBI began accumulating these 

gold reserves in 2001 by purchasing gold in relatively 

small quantities on a frequent basis from Lebanese 

banks in which the former Iraqi Regime had large foreign currency deposits. As a standard purchase procedure, the respective Lebanese banks supplying the 

gold would deliver it to the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut 

for shipment to CBI vaults in Baghdad via diplomatic 

pouch. The CBI bought gold in amounts ranging from 

100 to 500 kilograms per purchase. This amount of 

gold could be shipped easily by diplomatic pouch. 

Also, CBI bought gold in small quantities in order 

to avoid raising the market level of gold in Lebanon 

and to avoid scrutiny by the US. The Regime did not 

remove any of the gold from CBI vaults during the 

war with coalition forces. 

• The CBI Investment Department Director General 

Asrar ‘Abd al-Husayn was directly responsible for 

management of the gold purchases using cash from 
52

the overseas accounts in Lebanon. CBI Director 

Dr. ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh, however, retained fi nal 

responsibility for supervision of the gold purchase 

program.

• The Regime implemented the gold purchase in 

2001 upon the recommendation of Dr. ‘Isam and 

against the opposition of Minister of Finance 

Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim. ‘Isam was concerned that 

Saddam and his sons could easily remove cash 

reserves whenever they wanted or could easily 

use the cash reserves in purchasing weapons from 

foreign suppliers. 

• Gold, on the other hand, was heavy and could not 

be easily removed, ensuring that the CBI would 

retain these reserves, even if the Regime decided 

to remove the cash reserves. ‘Isam, however, could 

not use this argument to convince Saddam to begin 

a gold purchase program, and he instead argued 

that the gold reserves could not be destroyed in the 

event of bombing and fi re at the bank during a war. 

• Saddam accepted this latter argument and authorized the gold purchased beginning in 2001. Prior to 

the outbreak war with coalition forces, the Regime 

did not have any plan for dispersing the gold upon 

commencement of hostilities. 

The Rafi dian Bank central offi ce in Baghdad had an 

unknown but relatively small quantity of gold in its 

vault as of 19 March 2003. Under the former Regime, 

Iraqis were not allowed to sell their gold overseas, 

but many people attempted to smuggle their personal 

gold out of Iraq to take advantage of the higher prices 

in overseas markets and to secure foreign currency. 

When these smugglers were caught, the government confi scated the gold and put it in the vault of 

the Rafi dian Bank. Iraqi ministries did not retain any 

gold. 
53

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Executing Illicit Procurement in 

Iraq: Ministries, Commissions, 

and Front Companies

Overview

Saddam used his complete control over the Iraqi 

Government to facilitate his illicit procurement programs. Almost every Ministry in the Regime assisted 

with procurement in some way. Directed by Saddam, 

the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oil, and Trade 

helped the former Regime orchestrate its primary 

foreign objective of ending UN sanctions (see Annex 

H: UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to 

Iraq).

• The MFA curried favors at the UN. Among 

other techniques and tactics used by the MFA, it 

bestowed oil allocations to nationals of the UNSC 

permanent members to infl uence and divide the 

council in order to erode sanctions. For additional 

details on the MFA role in infl uencing the UNSC, 

see the RSI chapter.

• The MoT established bilateral trade Protocols that 

were used to hide prohibited trade. The Ministry 

used commercial attaches to pay for illicit procurement.

• The MoD developed requirements, hosted and 

conducted foreign visits, and procured conventional 

military goods, the export of which breached UN 

sanctions.

• The banking system established foreign accounts to 

hold illicit hard currency until it could be used for 

procurement or smuggled into Baghdad.

• The MHESR conducted dual-use research; procured and developed technical expertise in WMDrelated fi elds and procured key technologies 

through university systems. 

Saddam, however, relied on three organizations in 

particular for the procurement of prohibited materials 

to include potentially-WMD related or dual-use items 

(see Annex I: Suspected Iraqi Dual-Use Procurement 

Transactions):

• The MIC, headed by ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al 

Mullah Huwaysh since 1997, and its associated 

front companies led Iraqi efforts to obtain prohibited military hardware and dual-use goods.

• The IIS was directed by Saddam to assist the MIC 

with procurement in 1998. 

• The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IEAC) pursued its own illicit procurement goals, occasionally 

with MIC assistance. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Directed by Saddam, the MFA helped the former 

Regime in its quest to end UN sanctions. To pursue 

those objectives, the MFA implemented a foreign 

economic strategy fi rst aimed at ending UN sanctions 

(established since 1990) and subsequently eliminating the UN’s OFF program. Another important MFA 

mission focused on supporting the Regime’s illicit 

procurement mechanism. In particular, the MFA 

played a critical supporting role in facilitating Iraq’s 

procurement of military goods, prohibited dual-use 

items, transporting cash and other valuable goods 

earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming and implementing a diplomatic strategy to end UN sanctions 

and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious 

means. The MFA facilitated, established, and maintained foreign government and business contacts and 

provided Iraqi offi cials involved in illegal international trade with fi nancial and political sanctuaries.

The MFA also assisted the implementation of fi nancial transactions and provided physical sanctuaries 

and political/diplomatic/commercial covers for other 

Iraqi intelligence offi cials involved in procurement 

activities across Iraq’s borders. According to a former 

chief of the Iraqi interests section in Syria, it was 

common practice for embassies to forward foreign 

cash from the CBI overseas accounts in Lebanon, to 
54

its vault in Baghdad via diplomatic pouch and courier 

system. 

• He specifi cally mentions the Iraqi Embassy in 

Beirut, Lebanon and the Iraqi interests section at 

the Algerian Embassy in Damascus, Syria, undertaking such activity. 

• The Iraqi Embassy in Beirut would transfer cash to 

Damascus by diplomatic-plated vehicles. 

• The Iraqi Embassy in Moscow assisted, among 

other deals, a Russian company called Alfa Echo in 

signing contracts for importing oil from Iraq. 

Moreover, the MFA possessed an indigenous intelligence capability, its Research and News Analyzing 

Offi ce (RNA) that kept senior Iraqi leadership, such 

as the President, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 

Minister informed about global events. The MFA 

managed this offi ce and had branches in many of its 

key embassies. It is not certain whether personnel in 

the MFA’s Research and News Analyzing Offi ce were 

IIS agents or actual MFA offi cials. Nonetheless, the 

RNA focused primarily on collecting information of 

economic and political consequence to Iraq by means 

of open sources and other news reporting. MFA’s 

RNA paid special attention to political, military and 

economic developments in the Middle East (special 

attention to Israel), global oil production and market 

developments, Eastern Europe, and the United States. 

Acting as Iraq’s plenipotentiary, Tariq ‘Aziz (see 

Figure 34) often facilitated business meetings 

between foreigners and Iraqi offi cials. Foreign business representatives and government offi cials would 

contact him in order to gain access to key Iraqi 

offi cials that were in charge of approving oil and arms 

contracts. 

• On 27 December 2002, the president of the Russian 

company Russneft, Michail Gutserviev, informed 

‘Aziz and the former Oil Minister ‘Amir Rashid 

that he planned to travel with a fi ve-man delegation 

to Iraq via private plane to negotiate with the Iraqi 

Oil Minister for oil and gas contracts. The Russian 

business delegation was supposed to fl y into Iraq 

in a Tupolev 134 (fl ight number AKT 135/136) and 

expected to stay in Iraq on January 13-15, 2003. 

• In 2002, Baghdad sent a scientifi c delegation to 

Belarus and China in order to stay current on all 

aspects of nuclear physics and to procure a Chinese 

fi ber optics communication system. 

MFA-IIS Connections

The MFA also supported IIS operations by offering 

its agents political and economic cover to conduct 

economic and political espionage. Besides providing 

traditional covers for IIS agents, the MFA cooperated 

closely with the IIS on other functions. A former IIS 

offi cer also stated that all MFA diplomatic couriers 

were IIS offi cers and were monitored by the IIS’s 

Directorate of Internal Security (M6). Moreover, 

at Iraqi consulates and embassies where IIS offi cer 

presence was absent, MFA personnel fi lled in as their 

representatives. While ISG does not know the full 

extent of MFA’s role in assisting the IIS in conducting illicit activity, it has found other indicators of the 

breadth and nature of the IIS’ activities from captured 

documents. 

• According to one document on MFA letterhead, 

the MFA transferred two known IIS agents to its 

embassy in Belarus under pseudonyms in June 

2002. Another document in the same fi le, an IIS 

“Ministerial” Order, acknowledged the transfer, the 

agents’ job descriptions, their salaries, as well as 

sent copies of IIS order to other directorates.

• One month prior to OIF, at least seven IIS offi cers 

were reassigned to the MFA to cover up their true 

positions in the government. They were given new 

identities and positions. This activity was similar 

to giving agents cover stories operating outside of 

Iraq, according to one former IIS agent. 

• Outside of Iraq, Iraqi embassies provided the IIS 

with the only means of secure communications outside of the diplomatic courier services. Iraqi embassies transmitted ciphered faxes to foreign posts. 

However, the majority of posts had manual codebooks while major posts like Washington, Paris, 

Moscow and South African were given machines 

Figure 34. Tariq ‘Aziz—

Iraq’s plenipotentiary.
55

Regime Finance

and Procurement

necessary to accommodate the large amount of 

incoming faxes. The IIS personnel deciphered all 

faxes, according to a former IIS offi cer. 

MFA’s UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy

The MFA formulated and implemented a strategy 

aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching 

its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and 

economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of 

ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program 

by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC 

members: Russia, France and China. Iraq believed 

it managed to varying degrees of success to infl uence these permanent UNSC members from strictly 

enforcing previously agreed UN resolutions and from 

initiating additional resolutions that further debilitated the Iraqi economy. By offering permanent and 

non-permanent Security Council members economic 

“carrots and sticks,” Iraq belived it managed to partially infl uence voting at the UNSC. Iraq’s economic 

“carrots” included offering companies from those 

countries lucrative oil, reconstruction, agricultural and 

commercial goods, and weapon systems contracts. In 

contrast, the Iraqi “sticks” included not only redirecting those contracts to other more “pro-Iraqi” companies, but held the threat of forfeiture of foreign debts 

– totaling between approximately $116-250 billion. 

Saddam expressed confi dence that France and Russia 

would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN 

sanctions regime. 

• According to one source, using “semi-diplomatic 

cover,” the IIS attempted to recruit agents from the 

UN headquarters in New York to provide information or infl uence public opinion and their national 

policy toward Iraq. 

• Besides attempting to co-opt certain permanent 

UNSC members, under cover of MFA sponsored 

international conferences, Iraq tried to recruit sympathetic eastern European politicians by publicly 

lauding their pro-Iraqi sentiments and support in the 

UN. 

Iraqi-Russian Relations. Saddam’s Regime needed 

both Moscow’s political clout in the UN and its economic expertise and resources to sustain his Regime 

from the 1990s until OIF. Numerous trips taken by 

then Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz to 

Moscow served as a good indicator of the Russians’ 

opinion of Iraq’s dependence on Russia.

• According to news reports, in July 2001, Tariq 

‘Aziz expressed gratitude to Russia for its efforts to 

pass UNSCR 1360 which continued the UN’s OFF 

program for a tenth phase. Moreover, Iraq promised 

to economically reward Russia’s support by placing 

it at the head of the list for receiving UN contracts 

under the UN OFF program. 

Iraqi-Chinese Relations. ISG judges throughout 

the 1990s, the PRC consistently advocated lifting 

Iraqi sanctions while privately advising Baghdad 

to strengthen cooperation with the UN. In October 

2000, Baghdad continued to seek Chinese support for 

the removal of UN imposed economic sanctions. By 

November 2000, Chinese Vice Premiere Qian Qichen 

stated that China would support Iraq’s efforts to end 

the sanctions, and work for an early resolution to the 

Iraqi issue according to press reporting. 

• According to diplomatic reporting, Chinese Premier 

Zhu Rongji and Vice Premier Qian Qichen met with 

Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz on 27-28 

January 2002. Softening Beijing’s earlier stance 

for ending sanctions, Premier Zhu Rongji reportedly told ‘Aziz that China was willing to continue 

its efforts toward an early solution to the Iraqi issue 

and that it had been advocating that the sanctions 

issue be settled at an early date. China also hoped 

Smart Sanctions

In early July 2001, the US and the UK withdrew their 

joint-proposal to revamp the UN existing sanctions 

regime, called “Smart Sanctions,” because of Russian, Chinese, and French opposition. The US/UK 

proposal attempted to restructure two key elements 

of the existing sanctions regime: illicit procurement 

of weapons and dual-use goods and illicit generation of revenue from Iraqi oil sales outside the UN’s 

OFF program. In contrast, the Russian draft resolution proposed to reduce the current percentage to the 

Compensation fund another 5 percent to 20 percent 

of total value of Iraqi oil exports – and increase the 

total amount in Iraq’s escrow account to $600 million 

to pay other expenses in accordance with UNSCR 

1175(1998) and 1284 (1999) (see Annex H: UNSCR 

Applicable to Iraq). The UN estimated that each 5 

percent reduction in payments to the United Nations 

Compensation Commission (UNCC) added about 

$275 million in Iraq’s coffers per each UN OFF sixmonth phase. 
56

that Iraq would strengthen its cooperation with the 

UN and improve relations with its neighbors.

• Iraq indirectly threatened to end trade relations with 

China if Beijing agreed to the goods review list (see 

Annex H: UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq). 

Iraqi-French Relations. Unlike the relatively 

predictable relationships with China and Russia, 

the Iraqi-French relationship was more tumultuous. 

Saddam recognized the important role that France 

played on the international stage, and in particular in 

the UNSC. Consequently, Saddam ordered the MFA 

and other ministries to improve relations with France, 

according to recovered documents. The documents 

revealed that the IIS developed a strategy to improve 

Iraqi-French relations that encompassed inviting 

French delegations to Baghdad; giving economic 

favors to key French diplomats or individuals that 

have access to key French leaders; increasing Iraqi 

embassy staff in Paris; and assessing possibilities for 

fi nancially supporting one of the candidates in an 

upcoming French presidential election. 

Moreover, the IIS paper targeted a number of French 

individuals that the Iraqi’s thought had close relations to French President Chirac, including, according to the Iraqi assessment, the offi cial spokesperson 

of President Chirac’s re-election campaign, two 

reported “counselors” of President Chirac, and two 

well-known French businessmen. In May 2002, IIS 

correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a 

MFA employee (quite possibly an IIS offi cer under 

diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to 

discuss Iraq-French relations. The French politician 

assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the 

UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, 

according to the IIS memo. 

From Baghdad’s perspective, the MFA concluded 

that the primary motive for French continued support 

and cooperation with Iraq in the UN was economic. 

According to Tariq ‘Aziz, French oil companies 

wanted to secure two large oil contracts; Russian 

companies not only wanted to secure (or lock in) oil 

contracts, but also sought other commercial contracts 

covering agricultural, electricity, machinery, food, and 

automobiles and trucks products.

• France competed with Russian agricultural products 

for Iraqi contracts. 

• In May 2002, a representative from a French water 

purifi cation company requested projects for his 

company in Iraq. 

MFA and Iraq’s Bilateral Protocols

Concurrent with Iraq’s overarching strategy to break 

UN sanctions, the MFA, with the approval of Saddam, 

attempted to mitigate the economic effects of UN 

sanctions and at the same time to by-pass the scrutiny 

of the UN’s OFF program by arranging various types 

of economic bilateral agreements. These countries, in 

particular, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan (see Figure 35), 

were willing to enter into such agreements. 

Geographic proximity, cultural affi nity, and a historical and interdependent economic relationship with 

Iraq explain why Turkey, Jordan, and Syria reached 

formal Protocols with Iraq outside the UN OFF 

program and in contravention of UN resolutions. Iraq 

would sell oil and oil products to these countries in 

exchange for cash and goods. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 

and Iran did not enter into any economic arrangements with Iraq, but Iran had reportedly assisted 

Iraq’s oil smuggling operations in the Arabian Gulf 

region throughout the 1990s and up to OIF.

Ministry of Trade 

The MoT coordinated economic activities between 

other Iraqi Government ministries as well as foreign companies and foreign ministries. The MoT 

accomplished these tasks by consolidating the import 

requirements from all ministries, obtaining approval 

expenditures by the MoF, and negotiating overseas 

trade agreements. The MoT generally accomplished 

trade for Iraq through:

• Legitimate channels under the auspices of the UN 

sanctions regime and the UN OFF.

• Cooperative preferential trade protocol agreements 

with Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt.

• Common trade agreements, albeit in contravention 

of UN sanctions, with other partners. 

In addition to these traditional procurement roles, 

the MoT provided a limited role in the procurement 

of illicit goods such as military weaponry or WMD 
57

Regime Finance

and Procurement

technologies for the Regime. To supplement this 

procurement activity, the MIC and MoD used their 

own methods to procure communications systems, 

ammunition, security equipment, and computers. 

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, Director of the MIC, however, stated that the MIC was able 

to import the raw materials it needed and did not need 

to use any other ministry’s funds to purchase goods 

and services abroad. 

Nevertheless, the importance of the MoT in illicit procurement should not be dismissed. The MoT’s trade 

deals with willing countries and foreign companies 

provided Iraqi military and security entities, such as 

the MoD, Special Republican Guard (SRG), IIS, and 

the Diwan, with the access and connections needed 

to ultimately procure dual-use and sanctioned goods 

and services. In contravention of UN sanctions and 

resolutions, the MoT provided “cover” contracts for 

ammunition, communication systems, and other military materiel for the MoD, SRG, IIS, and the Diwan. 

MoT’s Role in Procurement

For the most part, the MoT procured legitimate 

civilian goods both legally under UN OFF, as well 

as illicitly through bilateral trade protocols and other 

unregulated trade agreements. The MoT played one 

of its most important roles in the execution of the UN 

OFF Program, including:

• Coordinating other ministries’ import requirements 

into a “Distribution Plan.” After UN approval, this 

consolidated plan served as the basic import schedule for goods and services imported under each six 

month UN OFF phase.

• A few non-ministerial organizations, including the 

MIC and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), 

were not permitted to purchase items under UN 

OFF. These ministries or departments relied on the 

MoT to procure common goods for them via UN 

OFF. 

Figure 35. Iraq and surrounding countries.
58

Muhammad Mahdi Salih, the former Minister of 

Trade, claimed the MoT supported the Iraqi military 

through the OFF program only with legitimate civilian items. Typical goods procured by the MoT for the 

MIC and MoD via OFF included: stationery, offi ce 

computers, generators, civilian trucks, water tankers, 

fuel tankers, and building materials. For example, Al 

Salih recalled that the MoT had purchased 100,000 

uniforms for the Iraqi police and vehicles for the 

SSO. The trade minister, however, later admitted 

to importing ammunition, communication systems, 

and other military items for MoD, IIS, SRG, and the 

Diwan outside the UN framework. 

The MoT also played an important role in executing 

the Jordanian trade protocol. Under this agreement, 

the MoT gathered and forwarded all Iraqi contracts 

to Jordan for approval. These records were, however, 

inadvertently destroyed with the rest of the MoT 

building in the opening hours of OIF. Both the MoT 

and MoO shared responsibility for negotiating the 

bilateral Protocol agreements with Syria, Turkey, and 

Jordan. The MoO, however, was the prime negotiator 

in the case of Syria and Turkey, and controlled the 

trade under these Protocols. 

• The MoT purchased goods under the Syria and 

Turkey trade Protocols, particularly for military and 

security services that did not have their own allocation of funds under the agreement.

• Captured documents reveal the MoT paid for 

“goods and services” through these protocols for 

the Directorate of General Security, General Police 

Directorate, Directorate of General Military Intelligence, MoD and SSO. 

• There are no indications of the nature of the items 

procured by the MoT for these organizations other 

than a reference to MoD contracts with the General 

Company for Grain Manufacturing, which suggest 

that the MoT was procuring for food. 

According to Muhammad, in addition to the UN OFF 

and the trade protocols, the MoT coordinated trade 

outside of UN sanctions with a number of other 

countries, including UAE, Qatar, Oman, Algeria, 

Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan. These were essentially frameworks for cooperation and free trade that 

allowed for the import and export of domestically 

produced products without license or tax. 

Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover Contracts

There is some debate among Iraqi sources regarding 

the MoT’s role in providing false cover contracts for 

sensitive imports. According to one former offi cial, 

the MoT provided “cover” contracts for militaryrelated goods, such as communications equipment, 

computers, and military clothing obtained via the 

Jordan, Syrian, and Turkish trade Protocols. Considering the political sensitivity surrounding these 

agreements, none of Iraq’s neighbors wanted to be 

scrutinized by the international community for doing 

business with the Iraqi military, either for civilian 

(dual-use) or overtly military goods. False cover contracts would have been easier to hide in the fl ow of 

trade occurring over Iraq’s borders with Syria, Jordan, 

and Turkey.

• This source is corroborated by annotations on captured tables of Syrian and Turkish trade contracts, 

which reveal that every entry listing the MoT as the 

sponsoring government agency was concealing the 

MIC and MoD as the true end users for the goods. 

• Captured records also show that MoT contracted 

with the Syrian fi rm SES International (a known 

provider of military and dual-use goods to Iraq) for 

$11.3 million of goods from December 2000, over 

80 percent of which was for goods and services for 

two MIC manufacturing companies. 

• Muhammad Mahdi Salih, the former Minister of 

Trade, recalled that the MoT had conducted business with SES, but only for civilian goods, including deformed bars and timber under UN OFF, and 

for Mitsubishi pickups under the Syrian trade Protocol. He denied that the MoT ever procured goods 

for MIC manufacturing companies. 

• The former head of the MIC, Huwaysh, who did 

not believe that the MoT had ever procured goods 

for these two companies, later corroborated Al 

Salih’s denial. 

Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial 

Attaches

According to the former Minister,, the MoT’s commercial attache (CA) program began in 1983. CA’s 

were eventually posted in Jordan, Syria, Turkey, 

Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Moscow, Belarus, and 
59

Regime Finance

and Procurement

China. In many of these offi ces, there was only a 

single employee, but the offi ce in Jordan ultimately 

employed four individuals, headed by a Commercial Counselor and included a CA and a dedicated 

accountant. According to a former high-ranking Iraqi 

Government offi cial, these individuals were managed 

and paid for by the MoT, but reportedly acted independently and were not required to report back to the 

MoT. 

CAs worked from Iraq’s embassies abroad and served 

as special trade ambassadors working in Iraq’s interest. Common roles for CAs included:

• Working in the Iraqi Embassy to register foreign 

companies for trade with Iraq.

• Checking to see whether foreign companies should 

be blacklisted for dealings with Israel. 

• Facilitating trade with foreign suppliers. 

• According to reporting, some IIS offi cers worked 

under cover as CA. ISG assesses that it is possible 

the MoT was not aware of this IIS presence in its 

ranks. 

• According to the trade minister, CA in the trade 

protocol states (Jordan, Syria, and Turkey) were 

aware of the bank accounts used to transfer protocol 

cash profi ts (30 to 40 percent of all contracts) into 

Iraq.

• CAs in Jordan, and to a lesser extent, Syria and 

Turkey, also followed up on all Iraqi Government 

fi nancial transactions from the trade Protocols. 

In the mid-1990s, the Jordan desk was the most 

important CA for Iraq. The Amman Commercial 

Counselor and his deputy were responsible for 

facilitating all UN OFF contracts, the trade protocol 

business (the Syria and Turkey protocols did not 

exist until after 1999), and any additional private 

trade from the military and security service entities. 

Facilitating these contracts focused on opening letters 

of credit in Jordanian banks and following up with 

payment when receipt of the goods was confi rmed 

in Baghdad. The CA accountant followed contract 

implementation, tax collection, and tracked any fees. 

• As an example, captured documentation details that 

individuals at the CA’s offi ce in Amman opened letters of credit for the payment of $2.275 million to a 

Lebanese company in 2000. 

• Supporting documentation shows that this was for 

BMP-2 IFV 30-mm cannon barrel-manufacturing 

technology from the Former Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (FRY).

• There is no indication, however, from the documentation that the CA staff was aware of the exact 

nature of the contract. 

• In the late 1990s the importance of the CA’s offi ce 

in Jordan declined. A year before OIF, the MIC 

removed cash from the CA’s offi ce in Jordan 

because of weak activity, and appointed a military 

representative to represent its interests. 

According to the former Minister of Trade, the MIC, 

and SOMO arranged contracts with Syria directly 

through the CA in Syria and the Commercial Bank 

in Syria. It is more likely, however, that the CA in 

Syria had a less active role with MIC and SOMO, 

particularly in the payments process, because business 

in Syria was conducted through payment on supply 

rather than letters of credit.

• Supporting intelligence shows in one case that 

SOMO authorized the 5th Syrian Commercial Bank 

in Damascus to transfer funds directly to a Syrian 

middleman working for the Syrian-based SES with 

no mention of the CA. 

• In May 2002 Iraq’s Al-Basha’ir Trading Company 

instructed SES where and how to distribute funds 

received from Iraq’s Oil Ministry (probably on 

behalf of Iraqi military).

As with the Syrian Protocol, the January 2000 Turkish 

Protocol operated on a payment on supply basis, and 

therefore probably did not involve the CA in Turkey. 
60

Jordanian Case Study

Figure 36. Timeline to support Jordan CA case study.

Commercial attaches worked on behalf of the MIC to 

make purchases and transfer money for payment in 

foreign countries. The timeline in Figure 36 shows the 

events related to a purchase of and payment transfer 

for materials from Jordan, according to translated 

documents. 
61

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Ministry of Defense 

UN sanctions after Operation Desert Storm severely 

hindered the MoD’s overt procurement of weapons, 

ammunition, and other military goods. The Regime, 

however, did not abandon conventional military 

procurement, developing instead an illicit procurement program based on supplemental budgeting, the 

MIC, and the use of other ministries to conceal the 

procurement of dual-use goods.

• The Presidential Diwan, presidential secretary, and 

Saddam Husayn developed a supplemental process 

to fund numerous programs outside of the state 

budget, including the MoD’s illicit conventional 

procurement. 

• Saddam empowered the MIC to pursue his continuing illicit procurement, using front companies and 

trade intermediaries to avoid international scrutiny. 

• As the UN OFF program opened additional trade 

opportunities, non-security ministries would purchase dual-use items and redirect them to the MoD. 

• This mutually supporting relationship between the 

MoD, MIC, and Saddam’s illicit funding mechanism also supported the procurement needs of the 

RG and SRG. 

MoD Procurement Leadership 

The Minister of Defense reviewed all MoD procurement and, in coordination with the Presidential 

Diwan, could approve MoD procurement requirements up to $2 million. The MoD Chief of Staff 

(CoS) and subordinate supply directors processed and 

coordinated procurement requirements for approval 

at higher levels, but could not approve MoD procurement. For procurement requirements greater than $2 

million, the Minister of Defense was required to participate in a more deliberative process involving the 

MIC, presidential secretary, and the President. The 

MoD did not have fi nal approval authority for these 

high cost procurement programs.

MoD Procurement Directorates

According to Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta’i, the 

former Minister of Defence, the MoD was divided 

into directorates, the two largest being the Directorate of Armament and the Directorate of Weapons and 

Supplies. These two Directorates were the MoD’s 

primary procurement organizations (see Figure 37). 

Directorate of Armament and Supplies. According 

to Staff Gen. Sultan, the Directorate of Armament 

and Supplies procured non-weapons related supplies 

necessary for the military to carry out its missions. 

These consumable items included, but were not limited to, offi ce supplies, military rations, and military 

uniforms. 

Directorate of Weapons and Supplies. According 

to Staff Gen. Sultan and ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al 

Khatab Al Nasiri, the former presidential secretary, 

the Directorate of Weapons and Supplies had two 

key procurement-related roles: acquiring weapons 

and ammunition and supporting foreign procurement delegations. Prior to 1990, the Directorate of 

Weapons and Supplies directly procured weapons 

and materials for the MoD from both domestic and 

foreign sources. After the imposition of UN sanctions 

with UNSCR 661 in 1990, the directorate was no 

longer able to obtain weapons abroad and depended 

on the MIC to execute foreign procurement. 

MoD’s Procurement Leadership at the Onset of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Minister of Defense: Staff Gen. Sultan Hashim 

Ahmad Al Ta’i. As the Minister of Defense, he 

approved all MoD procurement proposals submitted 

by the Chief of Staff. Sultan was also a member of 

the “Committee of Three” which had oversight and 

control over the Iraqi defense budget. 

Chief of Staff: Staff. Gen. Ibrahim Ahmad ‘Abd-alSattar Muhammad. Ibrahim was directly responsible 

for MoD procurement activities. He could reject, but 

not grant fi nal approval on MoD procurement decisions. 

Director of Weapons and Supplies: Staff Maj. Gen. 

Talib ‘Uwayn Juma’h Taha Al Tikriti. Taleb was 

responsible for coordinating MoD weapons procurement via the MIC from 1999 to 2003. 

Director of Armaments and Supplies: Staff Maj. 

Gen. Nabil Rahman Ahmad. Nabil was responsible 

for the procurement of products such as military uniforms, supplies, and other consumable items used to 

support military operations. 
62

• According to the Minister of Defense, the MIC 

was responsible for 95 to 99 percent of MoD 

procurement. Data from the Syrian trade protocols; 

however, indicate that this percentage was probably 

closer to 70 percent. In any case, the MIC negotiated contracts, identifi ed foreign and domestic 

sources for prohibited items (often via its front 

companies), and arranged the delivery of goods for 

the MoD. 

• After 1997, Staff Gen. Sultan dealt directly with 

the head of the MIC, ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al 

Mullah Huwaysh, and his two deputies, Daghir 

Muhammad Mahmud and Muzahim Sa’b Hasan 

Muhammad Al Nasiri, on substantive procurement 

issues. 

• The Directorate of Weapons and Supplies coordinated with the MIC on MoD procurement projects 

via regular meetings. These meetings addressed a 

range of day-to-day procurement issues, including the mechanics of requesting and delivering 

items, fi nancing procurement contracts, addressing 

complaints over late deliveries, and adjudicating 

problems related to poor quality equipment. 

According to Staff Gen. Sultan, the Directorate 

of Weapons and Supplies participated in several 

MIC-coordinated defense procurement delegations 

each year, providing expertise in weapons pricing 

and how foreign systems could best improve Iraq’s 

defense capabilities. 

• When Iraq hosted these delegations, the MIC handled, negotiated, and signed procurement contracts 

on behalf of the MoD. 

• Taleb Uwayn Al-Juma’a, the Chief of the Directorate of Weapons and Supplies, usually served as the 

MoD delegate for these visits. When accompanying 

the MIC abroad Staff Maj. Gen Talib was subordinated to the MIC leadership. 

• The only time MoD procurement was not coordinated by the MIC was when the Minister of 

Defense or his Chief of Staff headed the Iraqi 

delegations. 

• Talib developed some overseas procurement contacts from MIC sponsored travel to Yugoslavia and 

Russia. He also traveled to Syria two or three times, 

on one occasion with Huwaysh. 

Budgeting and Financing Military Procurement

As with the other Iraqi ministries, the MoD operated 

two budgetary processes: one deliberate and the other 

supplemental. The formal MoD budget was small, 

preplanned, and approved via a deliberative process 

involving multiple ministries and commissions. The 

MoD’s formal budget was used to purchase non-sanctioned items and fund the basic operation of the force. 

• According to data from a captured general government budget document, containing only operating 

expenditures, Iraqi defense spending was $124.7 

million in 2002. This fi gure, however, does not 

represent true Iraqi defense spending, as the former 

Regime did not list defense spending in its general 

budget during the 1990-2003 sanctions regime. 

In sharp contrast to the MoD’s formal budget, 

the supplemental MoD budget was controlled by 

Saddam and was used for illicit procurement of 

prohibited items. 

• Typically, Iraqi military units identifi ed requirements and forwarded them up the chain of the command to the directorate head.

• The director reviewed and forward procurement 

requirements to the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff 

who would review the procurement recommendations and forward them to them to the Minister of 

Defense.

Figure 37. Ministry of Defense leadership hierarchy 

(from 1997 to 2003).
63

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Although other Iraqi ministries were required to work 

within their formal budgets, the defense minister 

could request more money from the Presidential 

Diwan. On some occasions, however, the MoD 

supplemental budget requests were routed through 

Saddam’s secretary, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab 

Al Nasiri, who could make decisions more rapidly 

than the Diwan. 

• Although ‘Abd has stated that he had no role in 

MoD procurement, ISG judges that he played a role 

in high-priority procurement for the MoD, based on 

his position and statements by another high-level 

Iraqi military offi cer. This offi cer asserted that a 

September 2002 supplemental request for Internet 

satellite communications for the MoD was routed 

through the presidential secretary. The Secretariat 

subsequently arranged for the purchase through a 

Syrian company. 

Ultimately, Saddam personally approved the funding 

for classifi ed MoD, MIC, and IIS projects; informed 

the governmental bodies of his approval via his secretary, and used ‘Abd to distribute supplemental funding 

for the projects. 

MoD Procurement Process 

After 1991, MoD procurement depended on the 

nature of the item required. If the UN prohibited the 

goods, the illicit procurement process accomplished 

the procurement. If the items were dual-use goods, 

they were procured via the channels described elsewhere in the chapter. 

Illicit Procurement for the MoD. After the UN 

imposed sanctions in 1990, member states were prohibited from exporting conventional military goods 

to Iraq. As a result, Saddam tasked the MIC to obtain 

prohibited materials and equipment on behalf of the 

MoD. According to Staff Gen. Ibrahim, the former 

MoD CoS, the Minister of Defense coordinated all 

foreign illicit procurement directly with the MIC. 

• The MIC and MoD negotiated specifi c weapons 

procurement requirements at a “Coordination 

Conference” held every three months at the MIC 

headquarters in Baghdad.

According to a former high-ranking MIC offcial, a 

Special Committee for Procurement for the MIC, 

MoD, and SRG was established in mid-2002 (see 

Figure 38). The Special Committee reviewed and 

recommended security-related procurement requirements, which were then approved by Huwaysh, and 

ultimately passed to Qusay for approval. 

• The committee’s fi rst task was to develop Iraq’s air 

defense system.

• ISG has found very little corroborating evidence of 

the existence of this committee. Even if it coordinated signifi cant procurement in the nine months 

before the regime was removed, it is likely Saddam 

still retained the fi nal approval on expensive or 

Dual-Use Goods Defi ned

“Dual-Use Goods” are items that might be of use 

to the military, but were not specially or originally 

designed or modifi ed for military use. The term 

“goods” includes equipment, chemicals, materials, 

components (including spare parts), technology, and 

software. 

The term “dual-use goods” can be contrasted with 

“military goods” that were specially or originally 

designed for use by the military. 

UN Sanctions on the Procurement of Conventional 

Military Goods

All member states of the United Nations were prohibited from exporting conventional military goods to 

Iraq by UNSCR 661, 670, and 687. Some countries, 

however, failed to abide by these international agreements and permitted their nationals to participate 

in the sale of conventional military goods to Iraq. 

Some nationals involved in this illicit arms trade were 

associated with, or in some cases directly related to, 

their national leaders. For more detailed information 

see and Annex H, UN Security Council Resolutions 

Applicable to Iraq and Annex J: The Procurement of 

Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions
64

politically sensitive procurement projects.

Dual-Use Goods Procurement for the MoD. 

For routine procurement requirements, the Diwan 

reviewed the Minister of Defense’s requisitions and 

identifi ed an appropriate ministry to prepare the contract to purchase the items domestically or through 

foreign sources. 

• Most Iraqi ministries served as false end-users for 

MoD dual-use goods procurement. For example, 

the Building Ministry purchased engineering equipment and heavy machinery, the Health Ministry 

procured medical equipment, and the Transportation Ministry obtained trucks for the MoD. 

• When possible, the MoD initiated contracts in coordination with the MIC. For example, if the MoD 

needed vehicles it would go directly to the MIC 

vehicle supplier.

• Once the items were purchased and the delivery 

made, the purchasing ministry would notify the 

MoD that its equipment had arrived. The MoD 

would then arrange to deliver the shipment to its 

subordinate units. 

The MoD reimbursed these other government ministries, via the Diwan, with money from the general 

MoD budget—concealing the source of the money. 

The MoO, through SOMO, also helped the MoD by 

funding purchases via the UN OFF program or with 

illicit oil revenue schemes.

Procurement for the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard

The RG and SRG requested weapons systems and 

other military goods via the MoD. The MoD and 

MIC, in turn, used their associated front companies 

and trade networks to procure conventional military equipment for the RG and SRG from foreign 

sources. Qusay Husayn, as the “Honorable Supervisor” of the RG and SRG, ensured they received the 

most modern military equipment in the Iraqi Army 

(see Iraq’s Security Services Annex for additional 

information on the RG and SRG). 

RG and SRG Procurement Leadership and 

Budget. From 1996 until the fall of the Regime, Maj. 

Gen. Mahmud Rashid Isma’il Al ‘Ani served as the 

Director of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in 

the RG and the Chief Procurement Advisor to both 

the RG and SRG. He reported directly to the RG 

Chief of Staff, Staff Lt. Gen. Sayf-al-Din Fuliyyah 

Hasan Taha Al Rawi. 

• Maj. Gen. Mahmud also monitored the manufacture 

of supplies for the RG. Consequently, he attended a 

monthly meeting at the MIC with the Commander 

and Directors of the RG. 

• Qusay reportedly respected Mahmud’s. technical 

expertise as evidenced by choosing him to represent 

the RG in overseas delegations.

• Mahmud also enjoyed a close relationship with 

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, the 

head of the MIC, most likely because they were 

related.

From 2000 onwards, the RG’s annual budget was 

Figure 38. The MIC-MoD Special Committee for Procurement.

i
65

Regime Finance

and Procurement

derived from the national military budget. Although 

the mandated budget at the MoD-level fl uctuated 

yearly, the RG budget never exceeded 40 percent 

of the overall Iraqi Armed Forces budget. The SRG 

budget never exceeded 10 percent of the overall RG 

budget. The RG budget was Qusay’s responsibility, 

but the Offi ce of the Secretariat submitted requisitions 

to the Chief of Staff’s offi ce to obtain funds for the 

RG. 

RG and SRG Procurement Process. According to 

Staff Lt. Gen. Kamal Mustafa ‘Abdallah Sultan Al 

Nasiri, the former RG Secretary, RG commanders 

met with the RG Headquarters staff twice per fi scal 

year to prepare a requisition list for equipment shortages and spare parts. This list was then forwarded to 

the Offi ce of the Secretariat, via the Offi ce of the RG 

Chief of Staff for action. The SRG sent its shortage 

list directly to the Secretariat for inclusion in the overall RG requirements list. The Director of the Offi ce of 

the Secretariat managed the fl ow of resources for the 

RG and SRG. He also coordinated budgetary matters 

between the RG and the rest of the Iraqi military community. After the Offi ce of the Secretariat approved 

the procurement requirements, the MoD Directorate 

of Weapons and Supplies, led by Staff Maj. Gen. 

Talib ‘Uwayn Juma’h Taha Al Tikriti, obtained the 

items in accordance with standard MoD procedures. 

• According to a former high-ranking MIC offi -

cial, the RG and SRG had their own additional 

procurement channels after 1999 and had wide 

authority to procure items on their own. Qusay’s 

prominent role in the RG organizations gave them a 

predisposition for obtaining illicit goods via Syria, 

according to one source. 

• Between 2000 and 2002, the Iraqi Government 

purchased thousands of supply and personnel 

transport vehicles for the RG and SRG by the 

Ministry of Transportation and Communication 

(MoTC). Turkey, Russia, France, Germany, and 

South Korea supplied these vehicles, according to a 

former senior Iraqi cabinet minister.

According to captured documents and other evidence the MoD, MIC, and its associated front companies obtained conventional goods for the RG and 

SRG from Russia, Syria, and Belarus. (For more 

details on these breaches of UN sanctions see Annex 

J: The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods 

in Breach of United Nations Sanctions). The RG and 

SRG most likely used their operational budgets to 

purchase common military supplies and consumable 

materials. As with the rest of the MoD, the RG and 

SRG also benefi ted from other ministries purchasing 

dual-use goods on their behalf. 

After the requested equipment was delivered to Iraq, 

the MoD Directorate of Weapons and Supplies sent 

the Offi ce of the Secretariat an offi cial letter notifying that the equipment was available. Once the goods 

were delivered to the RG and deemed acceptable, the 

Secretariat authorized the MoO to pay the appropriate 

ministry or commission. 

Military Industrialization Commission 

By the late 1990s, Iraq was eagerly trying to acquire 

foreign military goods and technical expertise for its 

conventional military and missile programs using a 

network of Iraqi front companies, some with close 

relationships to high-ranking foreign government 

offi cials. The billions of dollars of revenue generated by the various protocols, illicit surcharges, and 

oil smuggling schemes drove the explosive growth in 

military imports. This allowed MIC to smuggle millions of dollars worth of military equipment into Iraq 

in contravention of UN sanctions. 

Procurement Leadership in the MIC

From its founding in 1987, the MIC was directly 

subordinate to the Offi ce of the Presidency. It eventually consisted of 10 research companies, 36 manufacturing companies, eight training centers, two 

stand-alone units; three front companies and the 

headquarters offi ce (see Figure 39). The headquarters, located in Baghdad had two deputies and nine 

directorates: administrative and fi nancial, commerce, 

research and development, projects, technical, internal monitoring, legal, training and procurement, and 

the National Monitoring Directorate. The Minister’s 

offi ce consisted of the Secretary’s Offi ce, the Secret 

Correspondence Offi ce, the Special Correspondence 

Offi ce handling mail between MIC and the ministries 
66

and between the headquarters’ directorates and the 

individual companies. 

MIC: Benefi ciary of Illicit Funds 

Revenues from oil protocols with Jordan, Syria, and 

Turkey increased the MIC budget by approximately 

6,400 percent between 1996 and 2003. During this 

period, MIC Director and Deputy Prime Minister, 

‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh (see 

Figure 40), transformed the MIC into a more effi cient 

and profi table bureaucracy.

• According to a high-level MIC offi cial, the MIC 

budget grew from $7.8 million in 1996 to $350 

million in 2002 to $500 million in 2003. The MIC 

covered its operating costs through internal ministry-to-ministry sales of goods and services, including a 3 percent surcharge on items imported for the 

MoD by Al-Basha’ir—a MIC front company.

• According to the same offi cial, the MIC also had a 

hard currency budget of approximately $365 million, of which $300 million came from illicit oil 

trade with Syria, Jordan and Turkey. The remainder 

of the hard currency budget came from the Presidency, sales to foreign companies in Iraq, profi ts 

from the Arab Company for Detergent Chemicals 

(ARADET), and foreign investment (see Figure 41 

below for more detail). 

The MIC budgeting process started at the company 

level every June and continued through September. 

Companies gathered their plans for production, 

procurement, and salaries for the upcoming year and 

submitted them to the Directorate of Administration 

and Finance in the MIC headquarters. The Directorate 

of Administration and Finance compared the fi gure 

with the historical fi gures and tried to reduce the size 

of the budget. Then the Technical, Project, Trade, and 

Research Directorates were asked to review and comment on the company fi gures. 

When the Directorate of Administration and Finance 

had processed the companies’ budgets, the 21 directors-general of MIC discussed them during budget 

meetings. These budget meetings were conducted 

much like court proceedings, and the group made 

decisions on each proposed budget. The budget fi gures were adjusted accordingly, and a fi nal budget for 

each company was issued. 

The company budgets for the 51 subordinate MIC 

companies, for MIC headquarters, and for the eight 

MIC training centers were consolidated into one 

budget. Unlike other ministries, the MIC did not 

have to submit its budget to the Finance Ministry, 

but it did send a summary report to the Secretary of 

the CoM. The summary report did not contain detailed 

fi gures or descriptions. Huwaysh had the discretionary 

authority to reallocate funds within the budget, as he 

felt necessary. 

MIC Banking and Financing

The MIC had several foreign bank accounts in Jordan 

and Lebanon that it used to store hard currency. 

Rather than having the purse strings controlled by 

many people in the organization, there were actually 

only three men most responsible for the transfer of 

funds from the Iraqi Government to the supplying 

companies: Jasim Ahmad Hasan, Muhammad Salih 

‘Abd-al-Rahim, and Hashim Karim ‘Abbas, of whom 

were all members of the MIC’s Commercial Directorate. The Commercial Directorate was concerned 

mainly with payment and payment methods, and with 

delivery of the contracted items after MIC and the 

supplier signed contracts. The MIC could authorize 

payments for small contract amounts, but for larger 

amounts Huwaysh sought permission from presidential secretary ‘Abid Hamid Mahmud or through the 

Presidential Diwan. 

• Captured documents also include bank statements 

and correspondence directing MIC to release funds 

to suppliers. 

• According to two sources in the Commercial Directorate, their department was funded with a monthly 

budget of approximately $2 million.

Funds originated at the Presidential Palace and were 

authorized to be transferred by Saddam. On behalf 

of Saddam Husayn, Ahmad Husayn Khudayr alSamarra’i, Chairman of the Diwan, authorized the 

funds to be sent to the CBI. The Director of CBI, 

‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh (no relation to ‘Abd-al-Tawab 

‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh), forwarded the funds 

to the MIC accounts at the Rafi dian Bank in Baghdad. ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh 

controlled the Rafi dian accounts. He determined how 
67

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 39. Structure of the MIC.
68

much was to be sent to each foreign bank account 

based on project funding, and ordered transfers of 

exact amounts to specifi c banks and account numbers. 

Huwaysh was responsible for authorizing each transfer to each account in Jordan and Lebanon. Following 

the transfers, Muhammad, Hashim, and Jasim then 

controlled the funds in the Jordan and Lebanon bank 

accounts. 

All of these accounts were related to Iraqi trade contracts, for the payment of foreign suppliers to the Iraqi 

government. When a contract was signed with a supplier, a bank letter-of-credit was opened on behalf of 

the supplier. The goods were delivered to a company 

owned by MIC or working for the MIC. The goods 

were inspected, and Huwaysh was notifi ed. Huwaysh 

notifi ed the Commercial Department at MIC, and then 

the Commercial Department sent a memo to Hashim, 

Muhammad, and Jasim. The three of them then sent 

a memo to the Jordan or Lebanon bank to release the 

funds in the form of a letter of credit to the supplier. 

The MIC used accounts in the Al-Itihad and Al-Ahay 

banks in Beirut. According to a high-level offi cial 

with the MIC, approximately one month prior to 

OIF, Huwaysh dispatched Jasim and Munir Mamduh 

Awad al-Kubaysi,, Director of Al-Basha’ir, to Beirut 

on a mission to recover MIC funds still held in Beirut 

banks. Their instructions were to travel to Beirut, 

secure the funds, transfer them to the Iraqi Embassy 

in Damascus and then return to Baghdad. Huwaysh 

had ordered a review of outstanding contracts more 

than a year old and as a result was able to identify 

$100 to $150 million in these banks that had not been 

disbursed.

• According to two sources in the Commercial Directorate, prior to OIF there was a meeting in Baghdad 

with members of the Commercial Section and the 

Legal Section of the MIC. They claim that Jasim 

and Muhammad were ordered to remove $47 million from the banks in Lebanon and Jordan. 

• They attempted to withdraw funds from the Jordan 

National Bank but were informed that they did not 

have that amount of funds available because of 

unauthorized withdrawals from suppliers.

• One of the two sources in the Commercial Directorate stated that Jasim and ‘Ali Jum’ah Husayn 

Khalaf canceled approximately 60 lines of credit 

and were able to withdraw $6 million in currency 

from the Jordan National Bank, which they then 

took to the Iraqi Embassy in Syria.

The information provided by these two sources 

Figure 40. MIC leadership.
69

Regime Finance

and Procurement

contradicts Huwaysh’s statement that in early April 

2003, he traveled to Syria to determine why Jasim 

and Munir Mamduh ‘Awad had not returned to Baghdad. According to Huwaysh, he had not been able to 

determine what had happened to the two gentlemen or 

the funds.

Items Procured by the MIC via Front Companies

Iraq’s MIC had two primary avenues for procuring 

materials and manufacturing equipment outside of 

UN OFF channels. One avenue involved the use of 

import committees and the other a straightforward 

contracting process to purchase items from foreign suppliers. The MIC obtained large amounts of 

imported materials and production equipment through 

a process described by a senior Iraqi: 

• During the annual budget formulation process, 

managers of MIC facilities identifi ed imported 

products that their enterprises needed to support 

their production plans for the following year. After 

the MIC approved the annual budget at the beginning of each calendar year, the managers prepared 

tenders for the required imports. The MIC then 

distributed the tenders at the annual Baghdad Trade 

Fair and advertised them in Iraqi trade papers. 

• The MIC received bids on the tenders from potential suppliers indicating price, terms; for example, 

‘X’ offered to provide some equipment for $1 million. Bids on the tenders from potential suppliers 

were submitted to a MIC import committee. Originally there was just one import committee, but the 

volume of imports grew in later years to the point 

where a second import committee was established 

to handle the volume. The import committees met 

every night at the Baghdad International Trade Fair 

site. 

• The import committees would then take the original 

tenders and subject them to a rebidding process. 

For example, company ‘Y’ could offer to supply the 

same equipment as company ‘X,’ but for $500,000 

less than its competitor’s bid, a large saving compared to the original price. Through this process, 

the import committees saved the MIC millions of 

dollars. The committees issued quarterly reports on 

the amounts of money saved. Huwaysh was very 

proud of this bidding process and often gave the 

committee members bonuses based on the amount 

of money saved. 

• The MIC issued a contract when the import committee accepted a bid on the goods. ISG speculates 

that the contracted companies were then responsible for obtaining the goods—importing them from 

Jordan, Syria, Turkey, or elsewhere as necessary—

and delivering them to the MIC customer. 

• Engineers from the MIC Technical Directorate 

always headed the import committees. Other members of the committees included representatives 

from the MIC Commercial, Administration and 

Finance, and Legal Directorates, along with an IIS 

representative from MIC security. 

Items Procured via the MIC’s Link to Iraqi 

Intelligence

The other procurement avenue operated through 

the MIC “Special Offi ce” and enlisted the IIS to 

locate suppliers of particularly sensitive or obviously 

military items, such as weapons and ammunition 

(for more details see the IIS procurement section of 

this chapter and the RSI IIS annex). Items purchased 

through the Special Offi ce were then shipped to Iraq 

via third countries using front companies as buyers. 

MIC procurement companies played a key role in 

these import activities, as did several front companies 

with ties to top Syrian leaders. During the annual 

budget formulation process, managers of MIC facilities identifi ed imported products that their enterprises 

needed to support their production plans for the following year. 

The MIC and the IIS formed a special channel for 

importing sensitive goods and services—dual-use 

or related to weapons and munitions manufacturing—particularly those that required the assistance 

of foreign government offi cials. A source within the 

MIC Commercial Directorate stated that the IIS was 

“involved in everything.” The IIS was the fi nal authority on MIC contracts due to its direct relationship 

with Saddam. 

In November 1997, Saddam approved a MIC proposal 

to enlist the IIS to develop new procurement, technology transfer, and technical assistance channels to 

supplement the existing MIC Commercial Directorate 

channels, according to a source with direct access. 

• Huwaysh formed the MIC-IIS relationship to support Iraq’s missile program after Saddam instructed 

him to improve Iraq’s missile capabilities. 
70

• Ties fl ourished after the death of IIS Director Rafi ’ 

Daham Ibrahim Al Hasan Al Tikriti in October 

1999 and the subsequent appointment of Tahir Jalil 

Habbush as IIS Director. A Joint MIC—IIS nomination group initially directed the joint effort. 

Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun, the head of the MIC Research 

and Development Offi ce, led the MIC element of this 

second procurement channel. Senior MIC offi cials 

have described Dr. Zabun as very capable and powerful. Dr. Zabun is clearly one of the key fi gures in 

the Iraqi clandestine procurement story. 

• Dr. Zabun’s offi ce handled all of the secret, special contracts with Russia, Belarus, Yugoslavia, 

Ukraine, and Bulgaria. 

• Dr. Zabun attended all meetings related to these 

contracts, and managing these contracts became a 

huge task for the Special Offi ce. 

According to an Iraqi offi cial, the IIS’s procurement 

activities operated through the IIS Scientifi c and 

Technical Information Offi ce, designated M4/4/5.

 The Research and Development Offi ce cooperated 

closely with M4/4/5 to fi nd sellers of the sensitive 

materials and equipment sought by the MIC. 

• Dr. Zabun coordinated MIC—IIS business dealings, 

with much of the coordination occurring directly 

between the Director of M4/4/5 and Dr. Zabun. 

• M4/4/5 desk offi cers worked closely with IIS offi -

cers in overseas stations to fi nd the suppliers. Desk 

offi cers had specifi c country responsibilities. 

• Directives and other communications with the IIS 

stations in embassies abroad were transported via 

diplomatic pouch. 

An Iraqi offi cial described the coordination process 

(see Figure 42). 

• MIC requirements—for information, materials, 

technology, or technical assistance—were sent 

upward from MIC manufacturing establishments to 

Huwaysh. 

• Huwaysh then sent an offi cial “Secret, Confi dential, 

and Immediate” communication through Zabun to 

IIS Director Habbush. Dr. Zabun strictly controlled 

all communications on MIC-IIS dealings. A special 

IIS courier element actually carried the correspondence back and forth. 

• The request then descended through the IIS M4 

Directorate chain-of-command to the IIS Director who sent it to the appropriate desk offi cer for 

action. 

• The desk offi cer then made arrangements with the 

fi eld stations, issued tenders, and so on. 

When the fi eld offi cer located potential sellers or 

received bids, the Director of M4/4/5 would work 

with Dr. Zabun to broker a meeting between principles in MIC and the desk offi cer and others involved 

in the procurement effort.

• Typical participants in these meeting included Dr. 

Zabun, the M4/4/5 director, their deputies, the M4/

4/5 desk offi cer who was involved in setting up the 

transaction, personnel from the MIC establishment 

seeking the procurement, the heads of the MIC 

Commercial and Finance Directorates, and often 

Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi, head of the MIC 

procurement company Al-Basha’ir.

• This group probably considered the terms of the 

proposed deal and discussed methods of transport 

and payment for the goods.

• Huwaysh probably made the fi nal decision on most 

major procurement actions. 

Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun: The MIC’s Procurement 

Expert

MIC Director Huwaysh considered Dr. Hadi Tarish 

Zabun as his right-hand man for conducting foreign 

procurement deals. Dr. Zabun was the acting Director General of the Al Milad Company (MIC’s largest 

domestic research and development company) prior 

to taking over the MIC Directorate of Research and 

Development and the MIC Special Offi ce. He also 

served as Huwaysh’s expert on the missile industry. 
71

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 41. MIC hard currency budget (million US $) in 2002.

Figure 42. MIC-IIS special procurement cycle. 
72

MIC Front Companies 

The MIC used front companies to accomplish those 

business transactions it could not conduct amid 

UN scrutiny. Front companies handled the tasks 

of smuggling oil, funneling UN OFF revenues, 

and importing weapons and dual-use materials 

sanctioned by the UN. The MIC formed many of 

these companies in 1991 to bypass UN sanctions and 

spread the transfer of funds through a wider variety of 

companies to avoid international attention (for a list 

see Annex K: Suspected Front Companies Associated 

With Iraq). 

• The MIC operated three primary procurement front 

companies that were critical to Iraq’s clandestine 

import activities: Al-Basha’ir, Al-Mafakher (AlMufakhir), and ARMOS. 

• These companies also had a close association with 

the IIS and used connections that the IIS had in 

foreign countries to procure goods. 

• The IIS was also heavily involved in the operation of these companies by having IIS personnel 

in middle and upper management and in security 

operations. 

The most important of these companies was AlBasha’ir, which was formed by Husayn Kamil and 

managed by Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi. The 

companies ARMOS and Al-Mafakher were created 

later by the head of MIC, ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah 

Al Mullah Huwaysh, to help facilitate competition 

among MIC front companies in importing banned 

goods and to improve productivity. Apparently, 

Huwaysh deemed these companies to be so important 

to MIC that around 1998 he moved responsibilities 

for the companies from one of his deputies to the 

Commercial Directorate. This allowed him to exert 

greater control over the operation of the companies, 

according to a former Regime offi cial. 

• There was a large network of international companies and banks with which these front companies 

traded. Some were merely banks or holding companies, primarily in Syria and Jordan that purchased 

items from the manufacturer and acted as middlemen before sending the items to Iraq under false 

documents.

The networks of these companies still exist through 

their former employees, even as the old offi ces now 

stand empty. The owners and employees of former 

front companies may be seeking to become a part of 

the post-Saddam Iraqi business community. 

Bidding Process With MIC Committees. According 

to a former civil engineer, the MIC bidding process 

began when a MIC facility generated a requirement, 

called a tender. There were two kinds of tenders, 

regular or invitation. 

• Regular tenders were open and could be bid upon 

by any contractor or private company approved by 

MIC security, including foreign contractors. 

• Invitation tenders were issued when specialty 

items were required that could only be supplied 

by specifi c companies. In addition to MIC security approval, it is most likely the IIS and/or MFA 

also vetted these companies. The invitation tenders 

were issued directly to company agents in Iraq and 

Jordan, not to the foreign companies directly.

• This approval process was a result of Iraqi offi cials’ 

concerns over foreign companies with hidden connections to Israel. According to captured documents, the MIC blacklisted a Bulgarian company 

because a Russian-Israeli businessman owned it. 

Interested foreign and domestic supply companies 

then offered bids for the tenders through the MIC 

legal department. The MIC Procurement Committee, an informal seven-member panel, selected the 

best bid based on the offered price and the preference 

rating of the particular supply company. After a tender 

was awarded to a specifi c supplier, the MIC facility that originated the tender passed the contract to a 

MIC trading company such as Al-Basha’ir, ARMOS, 

or Al-Mafakher. These companies worked through the 

approved supplier to conduct the actual procurement. 

The Al-Basha’ir Trading Company. The MIC established the Al-Basha’ir front company in 1991. The 

company’s names has been discovered on hundreds 

of contracts for weapons and dual-use materials, as 

well as legitimate day-to-day goods and supplies. 

The company traded in items such as construction 

materials, foodstuffs, and power generators to cover 
73

Regime Finance

and Procurement

its real activity, which was coordinating with neighboring countries to facilitate the purchase of illicit 

military equipment. The company was headed by 

Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi, a former 15-year 

employee of the IIS. Because of his connections, relations between Al-Basha’ir and the IIS were especially 

close from the time he became Director of the company in the late 1990s. 

• Contrary to some sources, Al-Basha’ir was owned 

and operated by the MIC. Munir’s history with the 

IIS and the fact that many other members of the 

Al-Basha’ir staff were also IIS offi cers, led many to 

assume Al-Basha’ir was an IIS front company. 

• The last chairman of Al-Basha’ir’s board of directors was the head of the MIC’s Administration and 

Finance Directorate, Raja Hasan Ali Al-Khazraji. 

ISG judges that several Regime members exerted 

varying degrees of infl uence over the Al-Basha’ir 

procurement process. There is, however, confl icting 

reporting of who was in control of Al-Basha’ir procurement. Several sources have stated that it was the 

MIC Director, ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah 

Huwaysh. Reportedly, Qusay Saddam Husayn alTikriti and a committee comprised of senior offi cials 

of the SSO met with Al-Basha’ir trustees to direct the 

procurement of prohibited materials and to authorize 

payments. 

• Trustees included Munir Mamduh ‘Awad, Jasim 

Ahmad Hasan, and Muhammad Salih ‘Abd-alRahim. Qusay and his advisers would tell the AlBasha’ir trustees what items they wanted purchased 

about twice a month. 

• Qusay made all fi nal decisions on procurement and 

expenditures. 

• Prior to Qusay, Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid, 

Saddam Husayn’s, son-in-law held this position. 

Al-Basha’ir participated in the bidding process for 

the MIC by splitting the company into foreign and 

domestic sections. The split allowed Al-Basha’ir to 

increase its ability to communicate within the company and its offi ces abroad and for the import of 

military and security-related equipment. One set of 

documents would show the actual items to be procured and then the Al-Basha’ir trustees would prepare 

a second set of procurement documents with benign 

end-use items to conceal the true nature of the illicit 

activity. 

• For example, Al-Basha’ir described spare tank parts 

as air conditioning systems. Al-Basha’ir would 

then prepare the bank transfers for the seemingly 

innocuous items. 

• One set of papers for the actual items were either 

given to the SSO, or in some cases taken to the 

homes of some of the Al-Basha’ir offi cials. 

• The company would offer small contracts to the 

Iraqi companies, while large contracts would be 

based on a recommendation from the Director of 

the IIS, ‘Uday, Qusay, Vice President Ramadan or 

Saddam. 

Munir Mamduh ‘Awad was largely responsible for 

Al-Basha’ir’s success, according to an Iraqi offi -

cial with direct access to the information. He ran 

the company well and maintained a close relationship with the IIS. As a result of this relationship, 

Al-Basha’ir could use its IIS liaison, Majid Ibrahim 

Sulayman, to facilitate purchases with IIS fi eld stations around the world. 

Munir also had a close relationship to the Shalish 

family and with other prominent personalities in 

Syria, and he opened the connection with the SES 

International in Syria. Dr. Asif Shalish was head of 

the Syrian fi rm SES, while his uncle, Dhu-al-Himma 

‘Isaa Shalish, owned the company and is the Chief of 

Presidential Security for his cousin, President Bashar 

al-Asad. Close relations with the Syrians allowed AlBasha’ir to garner the bulk of the trade through Syria, 

which became the primary route for Iraq’s illicit 

imports over the last years before OIF.

• The SES and Lama companies are two of the major 

holding companies for Al-Basha’ir goods in Syria. 

• Fifty-four percent of all MIC purchases through the 

Syrian Protocol were through Al-Basha’ir, according to captured SOMO documents. 
74

The IIS used the Al-Basha’ir front company to 

facilitate a deal with the Bulgarian JEFF Company to 

obtain T-72 tank parts and Igla MANPADS, according to a former MIC senior executive. The goods 

were either fl own to Baghdad under the guise of a 

humanitarian mission or they were delivered via 

Syria. If coming via Syria, illicit military goods typically arrived via the Latakia Port and then were then 

trucked to Iraq in SES company vehicles.

Information from contracts found and data derived 

from the records of the SOMO indicates that the AlBasha’ir Company was also a major broker in Iraqi 

oil smuggling (see Figure 43). 

• The Jordanian branch of Al-Basha’ir signed contracts for the export of oil and oil products from 

Iraq, according to SOMO records.

• SOMO records indicate Al-Basha’ir signed 198 

oil contracts from November 1999 through March 

2003. The contracts were for fuel oil, usually at $30 

per ton, and gas oil, usually at $80 per ton. Almost 

all were for export by ship through the Arabian 

Gulf, although the destination of two contracts was 

listed as “North,” which usually meant Turkey.

• The value of the contracts totaled $15.4 million. 

This is the amount to be paid to SOMO. ISG does 

not have information about the amount of money 

Al-Basha’ir earned from the trade.

ARMOS Trading Company. ARMOS, a joint Iraqi 

MIC—Russian venture, was initially proposed by a 

Russian general named Anatoliy Ivanovich Makros. 

Makros, a former Soviet delegation leader in the 

1980s, MIC, and IIS founded ARMOS in 1998. 

Makros’ original scheme was to bring Russian technical experts into Iraq with cooperation from MIC 

and IIS through ARMOS. Despite the Russian ties, 

however, MIC offi cials dominated the company (see 

Figures 44 and 45).

• Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun, head of the MIC Special 

Offi ce, was chairman of the ARMOS Board of 

Directors.

• Dr. Siham-al-Din Khayri Al ‘Ali, a Romanian-educated economist who had worked in the MIC Commercial Directorate, was the manager of ARMOS. 

• Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi, manager of AlBasha’ir, was also on the board of directors, along 

with a representative of the IIS M23 Directorate 

(MIC Security). (see the IIS procurement section of 

this chapter and the RSI IIS annex.)

ARMOS had a much smaller staff than Al-Basha’ir. 

But despite its size, the company achieved good 

results, according to an Iraqi offi cial with direct 

access to the information. ARMOS conducted 

approximately 5 percent of the amount of business of 

Al-Basha’ir, but fi ve times more than Al-Mafakher. 

In comparison to Munir, however, Dr. Siham-al-Din 

wielded relatively little power. 

• ARMOS served as the conduit for many Russian 

contracts, including contracts for aircraft engines 

for the Iraqi Air Force, according to another offi cial.

• Captured documents show that ARMOS was 

involved in a deal to import MI-8 helicopter engines 

from Russia through Syria in 2001. 

Captured documents detail an agreement in 2002 

between Iraq and Russian experts, Mr. Shakhlov and 

Mr. Yusubov for the procurement of Russian missile 

technology and equipment in which ARMOS acted as 

a liaison between them. The documents also mention 

how the Iraqis used the Russian organization for victims of nuclear disasters as a cover for the operation. 

The use of a charitable organization in this transaction highlights the variety of methods used by the 

Iraqi front companies to conceal their activities. The 

contract reads, “as for the second party (the Russian 

Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund Institution) blockade 

imposed on Iraq will not be considered a forceful 

circumstance.”

• The value of the contracts was for a total of 

$600,000. 

• Some $100,000 for the Russian Standard Military 

Specifi cations system. 

• Another $500,000 for the Schematic Diagram 

System. 

According to Huwaysh, although the company was 

organized primarily to do business with Russia, 

in 2002 the MIC granted ARMOS access to other 

potential markets, including Bulgaria and Ukraine. 

This new access was similar to that of Al-Basha’ir. 
75

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 43. Value of Jordanian Al Bashair oil export 

contracts, 1999-2003.

Figure 44. (a) Letter from the MIC front company 

ARMOS to MAS referencing chemicals and (b) translation (enclosed list of chemicals are shown in Figure 45).
76

Figure 45. Chemicals for liquid propellant for sale by the 

MAS Economic Group to MIC.
77

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• In May 2002, ARMOS was offered Bulgarian electro-chemical gun-barrel machining (ECM) from a 

Cypriot gray arms broker, Green Shield.

Al-Mafakher for Commercial Agencies and Export 

Company. The MIC established the Al-Mafakher for 

Commercial Agencies and Export Company, Ltd in 

2001. Adil Nafi k, a former Al-Basha’ir Deputy Director, managed Al-Mafakher. According to a former 

MIC employee, the company was considered ineffective, mainly because of its ineffi cient staff and the fact 

that it was a newly established business.

• Al-Mafakher was much smaller than Al-Basha’ir—

with just six employees—and conducted only 1 

percent of Al-Basha’ir’s business. 

• Al-Mafakher had investment abroad, including a 

50-percent share in Elba House in Jordan and a 

25-percent stake in a Tunisian company, possibly 

named Parabolica, which manufactured leaf springs 

for automobiles. 

Iraqi Intelligence Service

Saddam used the IIS to undertake the most sensitive 

procurement missions. Consequently, the IIS facilitated the import of restricted dual-use and military 

goods into Iraq through Syria, Jordan, Belarus, and 

Turkey. The IIS had representatives in most of Iraq’s 

embassies in these foreign countries using a variety 

of offi cial covers. One type of cover was the “commercial attaches” that were sent to make contacts 

with foreign businesses, set up front companies, and 

facilitate the banking process and transfers of funds 

as determined and approved by the senior offi cials 

within the government (see MoT Section, Facilitating 

Illicit Trade through Commercial Attaches). In June 

2002, two IIS employees were transferred to the MFA 

and sent to work at the Iraqi Embassy in Belarus 

under the cover title of “attache,” according to a letters written between the IIS and MFA. 

• From 1994-1997, the IIS M19 Directorate of Commercial Projects used front companies to import 

prohibited items, according to reporting.

• A general order by Saddam in 1998 to collect technology with military applications led to the formation of a committee consisting of the presidential 

secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, IIS Director 

Tahir Jalil Habbush, MIC Director ‘Abd-al-Tawab 

‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, and the head of the 

Directorate of General Military Intelligence. This 

committee tasked Habbush to procure technologies 

when Huwaysh deemed the items to be of a sensitive nature.

• In 1998, after Saddam Husayn issued a general 

order for the use of IIS in developing new procurement relationships, the IIS dissolved M19 and 

transferred procurement efforts to the M4 Directorate of Foreign Intelligence who had more direct 

access, infrastructure, and developed relationships 

with foreign countries, according to multiples 

sources. 

IIS Procurement Leadership and Mission 

IIS Procurement under the direction of Tahir Jalil 

Habbush (see Figure 46) was part of a collaborative 

effort headed by the MIC to obtain equipment, materials, and expertise for Iraq despite UN sanctions. In 

1997, Saddam approved a MIC proposal to enlist IIS 

to develop new procurement, technology transfer, and 

technical assistance channels outside of Iraq. Within 

the IIS, primary procurement activities took place 

in the Scientifi c and Technical Information Offi ce 

(M4/4/5).

• Prior to 1998, the IIS M-19 Directorate had both a 

Domestic Branch that dealt with Iraqi companies 

and a Foreign Branch that dealt with foreign trade, 

according to a former IIS offi cer with direct access. 

The Foreign Branch was headed by Sadak Shaban. 

• In accordance with a 1997 mandate from Saddam 

to improve Iraq’s missile capabilities, the MIC and 

IIS formed a joint effort to accomplish this goal, 

according to a senior MIC offi cial. The participants 

included head of the IIS Scientifi c Intelligence Section and the director of the IIS.

The IIS offi cers stationed outside of Iraq were in a 

good position to carry out the mission of the MIC 

and IIS procurement without drawing the attention 

of the international community. IIS offi cers generally reported back to the Scientifi c and Technical 
78

Figure 46. IIS procurement 

leadership. Procurement Leaders In 1997 ‘Abd-al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh, became Minister of the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), 

and he reinitiated links with the IIS to join forces on 

procurement. Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun was an important 

player in the MIC in terms of granting contracts to Iraqi 

front companies as head of the “Special Offi ce,” a staff 

section within the MIC. Director Huwaysh determined 

what items were needed and then Dr. Zabun acted as 

a liaison between the IIS and the MIC to secure and 

grant the contracts. According to Dr. Zabun the IIS 

controlled MIC security and MIC security controlled all 

visas, foreign travel, and permission to talk to foreign 

companies for all MIC employees. Tahir Jalil Habbush 

as head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) was in 

charge of placing IIS offi cers in locations internal and 

external to Iraq. This facilitated the development of 

business relationships with foreign countries purchasing prohibited goods for Iraq.

Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah 

Al Mullah Huwaysh 

Tahir Jalil Habbush 

Procurement Leaders

Intelligence Section, designated M4/4/5. Dr. Zabun’s 

“Special Offi ce” cooperated closely with M4/4/5 to 

fi nd sellers of the sensitive materials and equipment 

sought by MIC. M4/4/5 desk offi cers worked closely 

with IIS offi cers in overseas stations to fi nd the suppliers. Desk offi cers had specifi c country responsibilities. 

• After reorganizing the M19 Directorate into the 

M4/8 Division in 1998, the IIS operated several 

front companies in Syria, according to a former 

high-ranking IIS offi cer. The Director of M4/8 was 

Hasan al-’Ani.

• Dr. Zabun coordinated the entire MIC—IIS business dealings, with much of the coordination occurring directly between the Director of M4/4/5 and 

Dr. Zabun. 

• For example, one offi cer was responsible for all 

Syrian and Bulgarian procurement; another was 

responsible for Russian and Yugoslav procurement, 

while others handled actions with North Korea, 

Egypt, and elsewhere. Directives and other communications with the IIS stations in embassies abroad 

were transported via diplomatic pouch.

• The IIS, along with an Armenian-Iraqi named 

Ohanes Artin Dosh, established a front company 

in Switzerland with several subsidiaries, according to a high-ranking Iraqi offi cial with direct 

access. Jaraco SA, a fi rm operated by Esfandiar and 

Bahman Bakhtiar was another IIS front company. 

The Iraqi Government gave the Bakhtiars 150,000 

Swiss francs to establish this company. An unwritten agreement allocated equal shares of Jaraco to 

the IIS and to the Bakhtiars. 

In some instances the sensitivity of the relationship 

between Iraq and the foreign country was such that 

it was easier for the company to set up a branch 

within Iraq to broker deals rather than for Iraq to 

operate within the foreign country. Most reporting 

suggests that IIS did place offi cers in foreign countries to operate companies; however, one former IIS 

offi cer with direct access stated that the IIS dealt with 

foreign companies through branches located in Iraq 

and exploited the employees of these companies. 

• According to a high-level MIC offi cial, Neptun 

Trading Company had an offi ce in Baghdad up until 

OIF. An alleged Russian military intelligence offi -
79

Regime Finance

and Procurement

cer suggested Neptun would be a good company for 

the IIS to cooperate with to supply the Iraqi army 

with Russian items. Colonel Yevgeniy Turskiy, a 

Russian Military Attache to Iraq directed the company in Baghdad. A source from the Directorate of 

General Military Intelligence Section 6 stated that 

Neptun was run by Russian intelligence and was a 

cover company run out of the Russian Embassy in 

Baghdad. 

IIS M16 Directorate of Criminology. The IIS M16 

Directorate of Criminology has been a major concern 

to ISG because of its work with poisons and toxins. 

ISG does not know the full scope of M16’s activities, 

and ISG does not know the degree to which the Technical Consultation Company’s procurement efforts 

contributed to these activities. There is confl icting 

evidence that suggests M16 did procure banned items 

for its labs through illicit channels. The Director of 

M16, Nu’man ‘Ali Muhammad Sulayman Al Tikriti, 

and other reports suggest that M16 was only involved 

in research and development and that it did not possess prohibited chemicals after 1997, according to 

multiple sources.

• In late 2001 or early 2002, IIS M16 Offi cer Khalid 

‘Alawi met the director of M4/4/5 to discuss procuring goods, including equipment used to analyze 

chemical materials. M4 was unable to obtain the 

equipment, and it was never delivered to M16. 

IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence Services

IIS also used its connections within foreign government intelligence services to facilitate the transfer 

of illicit goods into Iraq. Before the end of 2000, the 

Iraqi and Syrian Ministers of Transportation met to 

establish the Iraqi Organizing Offi ce in the Syrian 

port of Tartus to facilitate the shipment of goods to 

Iraq via land, according to a former IIS offi cer with 

direct access. The operating manager was an IIS offi -

cer from the Syrian Department of the IIS Directorate 

of Counterintelligence (M5). The predecessor of the 

Iraqi Organizing Offi ce was the Al-Noras Company 

operated by Muhammad Talad al-’Isa and a Syrian 

intelligence offi cer. Iraq used this arrangement to 

deliver heavy equipment transport vehicles, but ISG 

did not detect any weapons shipments. 

• In 1999, secret exchanges occurred after Iraq sent 

intelligence delegates from the IIS, represented 

by ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri, the 

MIC, and the Presidential Bureau to Syria. The 

discussions yielded an agreement that Syria would 

facilitate the transportation of material coming to 

Iraq by changing shipping documents to make the 

military equipment look like ordinary civil items, as 

well as changing end-user certifi cates to the Syrian 

Ministry of Defense. 

• Iraq had contracts with a Belarusian company—

Belmetalenergo (BME)—and a joint RussianBelarusian fi rm—Electric-Gaz-Com (EGC)—to 

import missile technology, parts and expertise. All 

contracted goods with Belarus were sent through 

Syria. The SES International would implement contracts for transportation of the goods to Iraq under 

the protection of Syrian intelligence for a fee of 10 

percent of the contract price.

Items Procured by the IIS 

In accordance with Saddam’s instructions to MIC 

Director ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah 

Huwaysh, the MIC-IIS relationship was formed to 

support Iraq’s various missile programs. Although 

missile programs may have been the reason for 

the cooperative effort, the IIS also procured for the 

telecommunications industry, scientifi c research and 

development community, and the military. The following are examples of IIS deals that involved the 

procurement of such items: 

• In February 2003, Saddam ordered Al-Basha’ir 

head Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi, Al-Milad 

Company Director General Sa’ad Abbass, and IIS 

M4/4/5 procurement offi cer for Syria and Bulgaria Majid Ibrahim Salman al-Jabburi to travel to 

Damascus, Syria to negotiate the purchase of SA11 and Igla surface-to-air missiles, according to a 

source with good access. This team negotiated with 

‘Abd-al-Qadir Nurallah, manager of the Nurallah 

Company, to purchase the missiles from a Bulgarian fi rm, to provide end-user certifi cates, and to ship 

the weapons to Iraq. 

• In mid-2001, the Technology Transfer Department 

of the IIS procured between 10 and 20 gyros and 20 

accelerometers from a Chinese fi rm for use in the 

Al-Samud ballistic missile, according to a former 

high-ranking offi cial in the MIC. At approximately 

the end of 2001, the IIS also arranged for Mr. 

Shokovan from China to teach a course on laser and 

night-vision technology.
80

• The IIS completely controlled all procurement from 

North Korea, according to a senior MIC offi cial. 

Iraq signed a contract with North Korea to add an 

infrared-homing capability to the Volga missile 

to provide jamming resistance in 1999. Iraq also 

sought to improve the accuracy of its Al-Samud 

and Al-Fat’h ballistic missiles by obtaining inertial 

navigation systems, gyros, and accelerometers from 

North Korea. The IIS also completely controlled 

procurement via a Russian and Ukrainian company 

named Yulis that supplied small arms, Kornet antitank guided missiles, and night-vision equipment 

between 1999 and 2000. 

• Iraq sought assistance from the Russian company 

Technomash in developing a test bench for missile 

engines, missile guidance and control systems, and 

aerodynamic structures. The ARMOS Company 

signed a contract with a company in Poland to 

obtain Volga missile engines. The IIS completely 

controlled this transaction, which sought approximately 250 Volga engines. 

• The IIS facilitated a visit by a delegation from the 

South Korean company Armitel, and contracts were 

signed to procure fi ber-optic equipment for military 

communications between 1997 and OIF, according 

to a former MIC senior executive. The contracts 

were valued at $75 million, and Iraq received more 

than 30 containers during two shipments, the fi rst 

via Syria and the second via Lebanon. Middle 

companies in Syria and the UAE covered these 

contracts. 

• From 2000 until OIF, the IIS used the MIC AlBasha’ir front company to facilitate a deal with the 

Bulgorian JEFF Company to obtain T-72 tant parts 

and Igla MANPADS according to a former MIC 

senior executive

IIS Front Companies

The IIS ran a number of front companies that were 

used to procure specialized items for its own use 

and for other security elements. The primary IIS 

Directorate handling these transactions was the M4/8 

Directorate, previously known as the M19 Directorate. As of 1994, M4/8 was organized into three different sections, the domestic section, the foreign section, 

and the trading section (for more information on the 

IIS structure see the RSI IIS annex). 

The Domestic Section, also known as Section One, 

was primarily responsible for creating front companies inside Iraq and facilitating trade with these 

companies to import/export oil, batteries, copper 

and food products. Section One also maintained front 

companies in the restaurant and retail businesses on 

behalf of the IIS Directorate of Counterintelligence 

(M-5). These M-5 front companies included the AlZaytun and Al-Amhassi restaurants (see Figure 47). 

Although M-5 owned these business establishments, 

they were leased to Iraqi nationals who were not 

associated with the Iraqi Government. Section One 

managed a total of eight companies within the trade, 

travel, and hauling industries, but as of June 2003, AlDala and Al-Yarmuk travel companies were the only 

front companies still operating in Baghdad. 

The Foreign Section, also known as Section Two, 

conducted covert trade with overseas companies. 

Sadiq Sha’ban was the director of this section from 

1994 to 1995 Salih Faraj was director in 1995, Sadiq 

Sha’bi from 1995 to 1997, and Husayn al-Ani from 

1997 to 2003. 

The Trading Section, also known as Section Three, 

dealt with the import and export computers, electronic 

equipment, listening devices, copper, and industrial 

products for use within the IIS and other government 

agencies. Starting in 1995, this section, while it was 

housed within the Projects Department, operated 

directly under the management of the IIS General 

Director. According to a former high-level offi cial at 

the IIS, Walid Hadi, who served as the section’s director from 1989 until 2003, basically became a fi gurehead from 1995. 

In 1997, M-19 Director Mana ‘Abdallah Rashid 

ordered a halt to all the activities of Section Two, 

because of the failure of one of the sections companies to deliver spare parts, tires, batteries, electronic 

equipment, and vehicles to the Offi ce of the Presidency. During this same period, Hassan Khushnaw, 

the manager of a Section One front company, Al-Wadi 

Al-Akhad Trading, was caught attempting to smuggle 

copper out of Iraq. Khusnaw was subsequently 
81

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 47. IIS front companies.

Figure 48. Special Project Department M-4/8 (M19) 

directors.
82

arrested and jailed, along with the previous director 

of M-19, Sami Hanna. These incidents resulted in 

the permanent closure of the companies, except for 

Al-Yarmuk and Al-Dala. Sections One and Two were 

removed from M-19 and placed within the Counterespionage Directorate (M-5) and Directorate of Foreign 

Intelligence (M-4), respectively (see Figure 48). Section Three remained under the IIS Director’s offi ce. 

• The term “Trade Offi ce” was used internally, but 

when dealing with the outside world, the name 

“Technical Consultation Company” was used. 

• The Trade Offi ce fell organizationally under Khudayr al-Mashadani, the head of the Special Offi ce, 

M1, but Walid Hadi reported directly to Tahir Jalil 

Habbush, the head of the IIS, according to an Iraqi 

offi cial.

The M4/8 directorate operated several front companies in Syria. To manage these companies, the directorate was broken down into three sections, including 

commercial, accounting, and liaison sections. The 

liaison section coordinated activities between the 

commercial and the accounting offi ces. Some of the 

cover companies operated by the directorate included 

Al-Riat, Al-Manuria, and Al-Enbuah. 

The IIS used companies that had contact with 

the outside world as a means of collecting foreign 

contact intelligence. The organization owned and 

operated a front company called Al-Huda Religious 

Tourism Company. Al-Huda was also known as the 

Al-Dhilal Religious Tourism Company, and was 

established after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war 

and subsequent exchange of prisoners.

• The company’s ostensible purpose was to transport 

religious tourists to holy places in Iraq, such as 

Samara, Karbala and Najaf.

• The IIS created the company as a way to gain 

access to the Iranian tourists once they were within 

Iraq and collected information through casual illicitation.

• All of the employees of the company were IIS 

employees.

Special Security Organization

ISG has found little evidence that the SSO was used 

to procure WMD materials, prohibited or dual-use 

goods. This fi nding is consistent with the SSO’s 

mission of domestic only operations and inherent 

primary mission of securing Regime sites and leaders 

and monitoring the citizenry to ensure loyalty. The 

SSO associated laboratory, the Food Examination and 

Analysis Laboratory (FEAL), conducted food testing 

but there is no evidence to date that FEAL used illicit 

channels to procure equipment for Iraq.

• Amir Ibrahim Jasim al-Tikriti, a member of the 

SSO and a relative of Saddam, was sent to Poland 

in 2000 to work on his doctorate in mathematics. 

Although there he procured Volga engines and 

batteries on behalf of the IIS for Iraq, according to 

claims. The same source stated that this procurement relationship was largely a result of Amir’s 

relationship to Saddam and not because of his SSO 

affi liation. 

• According to authorization and shipping documents, between 1993 and March 2003, the State 

Company for Marketing Drugs and Medical Appliances, Kimadia, shipped dual-use chemicals and 

culture media to Iraq’s SSO. The items were supplied to SSO’s Walid Khalid.
83

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 

According to multiple Iraqi sources, the IAEC was 

responsible for the development and retention of 

nuclear expertise in Iraq. The IAEC most likely relied 

on its own procurement department for acquiring 

materials and technology. 

• A foreign intelligence service revealed in 2002 that 

the IAEC was pursuing procurement contracts from 

a South African company for HF communications 

systems and 16,000 channel receivers.

• Captured documents dated 2002 show direct negotiations with several Indian institutions for medical 

and chemical technology transfers.

• Other documents dated 2002 reveal contracts to 

obtain vacuum furnaces manufactured in Russia. 

Documentary evidence and debriefi ngs, however, 

reveal that the IAEC also used the MIC, MIC front 

companies, and the IIS to procure foreign materials 

and technologies. 

• Internal memoranda dated January 1995 reveal that 

the IAEC was reviewing procurement contracts 

with the Al-Basha’ir Company, the Latif Company, 

and the Al Jubayl Offi ce. These contracts were 

based on oil bartering—common practice before 

the UN OFF Program was accepted in 1996.

• In July 1996, MIC, Al-Basha’ir Company, Ministry 

of Industry, and IAEC were passing correspondence 

regarding overdue debts to Al-Basha’ir totaling 

$14.2 million.

• According to a former Iraqi scientist, the IAEC 

asked the MIC to obtain $3.5 million worth of computer cards in 1998. 

In January 2002, according to a detained senior MIC 

offi cial, Saddam directed the MIC to assist the IAEC 

with foreign procurement. On a few occasions the 

IAEC used MIC to procure goods, ostensibly as part 

of the IAEC modernization project. At this time, 

Saddam Husayn also directed the IAEC to begin 

a multi-year procurement project called the IAEC 

Modernization Program. This program, which was 

still functioning up to the Coalition invasion in 2003,

strove to revitalize the IAEC capabilities. The chief 

improvements under the program included:

• Creation of new machine tools workshop at 

Tuwaitha outfi tted with new generic machine tools, 

including CNC machines (see Figure 49).

• Improvement of the IAEC’s nonnuclear technical 

and manufacturing capabilities.

• Budget increases that resulted in ten-fold salary 

increases and new recruiting efforts for IAEC scientists.

The IAEC’s procurement relationship with the IIS 

dates back to the late 1990s. The IIS procurement 

channel was reportedly reserved for sensitive foreign technical information and items prohibited by 

the UN sanctions. March 2002 IIS internal documents describe the creation of a committee to obtain 

resources for the IAEC. 

Ministry of Transport and Communication

The Ministry of Transportation and Communication 

(MoTC) also facilitated and participated in the procurement of prohibited items for the former Regime. 

The MoTC transshipped sensitive commodities into 

Iraq using a range of deceptive practices designed to 

foil international monitoring efforts. The MoTC also 

served as a benign end user cover for the acquisition 

of dual-use items for the MoD and other Iraqi security 

services. The MoTC procured prohibited fi ber-optic 

materials to improve the Iraqi telecommunications 

infrastructure. By evaluating these contributions, 

ISG judges that the MoTC played a small but important role in Iraq’s illicit procurement programs. 

Mission and Key Procurement Companies under 

the MoTC

The MoTC was responsible for all internal movement 

of commercial goods in and out of Iraq. The MoTC 

accomplished this mission through 14 state-owned 

enterprises known as “General Companies”. Three 

of these stand out as playing key parts in facilitating 

illicit procurement for Iraq. 

• The Iraqi Land Transportation General Company 
84

(ILTC), which controlled all surface transport in 

and out of Iraq with the exception of fuel transport 

and railways. 

• The Iraqi-Syrian Land Transportation Company had 

offi ces near customs points at Tartus port in Syria 

to assist in the movement of goods into Iraq. This 

ILTC subordinate company seems to have been 

established to handle the increased transactions 

resulting from the Syrian Trade Protocol. 

• The Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transportation Company, 

an OFF shipping company run by MoTC, had an 

offi ce in Aqaba, Jordan, and performed a similar 

role as the Syrian Land Transportation Company. 

ISG also suspects that the Iraqi-Jordanian Land 

Transportation Company was probably set up to 

accommodate trade from the Jordan Protocol. 

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c 

Research 

Throughout the 1990s, Saddam Husayn used 

the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c 

Research (MHESR), through its universities and 

research programs to retain, preserve, and protect Iraq’s indigenous scientifi c and WMD-related 

capabilities, including its research projects and 

knowledge base. The MHESR had close working ties 

with MIC, which supported the ministry by coordinating, directing, and implementing the Regime’s critical 

research and development activities, according to 

former MIC director Huwaysh. ISG also has uncovered one case where Iraq used the cover of its student 

exchange program to procure goods. 

University Collaboration With MIC

The MIC maintained close working ties with the 

MHESR, links that entailed fi nancial support for 

academic research and the provision of academic 

experts for MIC projects. These ties shaped MHESR 

academic priorities, provided an opportunity for 

MIC to directly commission academic research, and 

facilitated an exchange of personnel between the two 

entities. 

The MHESR Research and Development Directorate, 

headed by Hasan Salih (and later by Majid Ibrahim Salman Al Jabburi) developed a close working 

relationship with the MIC Research and Development Directorate (headed by Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun) 

and the MIC General Director for Teaching. Hasan 

Salih was responsible for all research and development activities and would frequently meet with the 

Research and Development Directors from all the 

ministries to discuss work and research problems. 

The MIC’s interests were considered particularly 

important in the selection of research projects at the 

universities. 

• According to one source, prior to OIF, approximately 700 to 800 academics were regularly sent to 

work at the MIC or its companies for a few hours 

per week.

• The MIC Director claimed that he increased the 

number of contracted university instructors working 

with the MIC from a handful in 1997 to 3,300 by 

2002.

• Twenty professors assisted the Al-Samud factory. 

They worked to solve technical problems and 

provide training for staff members at the factory. 

According to one source, however, many Iraqis 

considered the overall effort of limited value. 

• MIC missile experts also worked closely with the 

universities, in some cases supervising students 

with graduate research and in other cases teaching 

students at the universities.

Huwaysh involved himself in each phase of MICsponsored projects with the MHESR, including 

project applications, planning, development, and 

implementation. Huwaysh reviewed and approved 

all project proposals submitted by university deans, 

department heads or faculty advisers within Iraq. 

After receiving Huwaysh’s approval, the company 

and the university staff would discuss and agree to the 

parameters of the project. Then MIC opened the project up to a normal bidding process, inviting different 

institutions, including foreign nationals from Jordan 

and Syria, to tender bids for the project proposals. 

After scrutinizing incoming bids, university department heads conducted and then submitted a feasibility assessment of the proposal to the MIC. The MIC 

chose the fi nal bidder; the contract price would be 

discussed when the contract had been fi nalized. 

• MIC closely monitored its research projects. MIC 
85

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Iraq’s academic exchange program—for both 

students and professors—was used to facilitate the 

transfer of dual-use technology, using home universities as false end users to illicitly acquire goods 

in support of Iraq’s WMD programs. By sending 

students and professors abroad, Iraq may also have 

been using both students and professors to transfer, 

support and advance Iraq’s intellectual and WMD 

“infrastructure.” 

• In 2000, Amir Ibrahim Jasim al-Tikriti, a member 

of the SSO, was sent to Poland to continue his 

mathematics doctorate on the assumption that he 

would return to the SSO upon completion of his 

studies. During that time in Poland, ISG judges that 

the IIS recruited or tasked al-Tikriti to facilitate the 

purchase of Volga missile engines for the Iraq’s AlSamud II missile program. ISG has corroborating 

evidence that the MIC trading company ARMOS 

signed the contract(s) with a Polish fi rm for the 

Volga engines, and that the IIS controlled the entire 

acquisition. 

• According to reporting, approximately 250 Volga 

engines were purchased from a stock of old missiles and sent back to Iraq possibly with complicity of the Iraqi Embassy in Warsaw. Al-Karamah 

purchased the engines and originally stored them 

at the Samud factory, and then moved them to Ibn 

Al-Haytham. 

Ministry of Agriculture

Throughout the 1990s, the Ministry of Agriculture 

(MoA) procured controlled items outside UN sanctions and then later outside the UN OFF Program 

for special projects as well as legitimate agricultural 

projects. The front company Al-Eman Commercial 

Investments owned by Sattam Hamid Farhan alGaaod had a special relationship with the Agricultural 

Supplies Committee of the MoA. According to an 

Iraqi businessman, Al-Eman Commercial Investments 

from 1990 to 2003 supplied MoA with seeds, pesticide, veterinarian medicine, harvesters, tractors, water 

pumps and spare parts of machinery. 

• Before OIF, Al-Eman periodically sent shipments 

from Jordan to Iraq via the Iraqi Embassy. Jordan 

allowed the shipment of one container a month 

under diplomatic cover that did not require inspection. 

MIC Research Support at Universities

Documentary evidence reveals that MIC and its companies divided their research projects among Iraq’s 

major universities. 

• Baghdad University and Mustansiriyah University 

provided general multi-discipline support to MIC 

projects. 

• Mosul University provided support to the MIC in 

the areas of remote sensing and chemistry.

• In another case, Basrah University provided support in polymer chemistry. 

Other examples of specifi c projects sponsored by MIC 

companies include:

• The Al Rashid State Establishment fi nanced polymer research on thermal insulators for the Sahm 

Saddam (“Saddam’s Arrow”) missile.

• The Al Hittin Company subsidized research on 

replacing brass shell casings with polyethylene.

• The Al Hittin Company also funded research on 

heating rate problems in induction furnaces.

• The Al Shahid Company fi nanced research focusing 

on energy loss from the safety dump of copper from 

the furnace.

• The Al Qa’qa’ Company sponsored nitrocellulose 

research.

• The Al Samud company paid for research on an 

inexpensive method to produce spherical iron 

molds.

leadership biannually held “conferences” where 

university staff conducting MIC-sponsored research 

briefed the MIC leadership on the progress of their 

work. These conferences afforded the MIC opportunities to monitor progress on research projects, 

identify problems, and offer solutions to the 

researchers. 

Exploitation of Academic Exchanges for 

Procurement
86

• In 1995, Al-Eman purchased a kit of reagents worth 

$5,000 from the Swiss fi rm Elisa for an organization named Al-IBAA, a special unit in the Iraqi 

MoA. Al-IBAA was connected to Saddam, had a 

special research facility and was granted an unlimited budget. Al-IBAA was able to obtain any equipment and support within Iraq that it needed and 

paid cash for all its orders. 

• According to a high-level Iraqi civilian offi cial with 

direct access, the MoA took control of one of the 

food testing labs, which was used to test Saddam 

Husayn’s food. Equipment for the lab was purchased through the Iraqi–Jordanian Protocol. Dr. 

Sabah of the Veterinary College was instrumental in 

these purchases (see Figure 50). 

The MoA also used the MIC to obtain goods that 

were deemed especially diffi cult to procure given the 

restrictions of UN sanctions. At the same time, the 

MIC would occasionally identify the MoA as a false 

end user to obtain restricted dual-use goods. 

• Between 1992 and 1998, the MIC was responsible 

for all chemical procurement in Iraq. The MIC 

brought active ingredients into the country using 

false bills of lading, formulated the product, and 

then distributed the fi nal product to the appropriate 

ministry. For example, the MIC smuggled insecticides—probably Malathion and Parathion—into 

Iraq, formulated them at Al-Tariq, and subsequently 

provided them to the MoA. 

• In late 2002, MIC and IIS directed Iraqi businessman, Sattan Al Ga’awd (who may also be known as 

Sattam Al-Gaaod), to approach a Croatian engineer, 

Miroslav, and other Croatians to purchase restricted 

precursor chemicals from Croatia. According to an 

Iraqi businessman with direct access, Al Ga’awd 

was tasked for this activity due to his close working relationship in the past with the Iraqi Government. The end user of the chemicals was reportedly 

the MoA but the actual recipient was said to be 

involved in CW activities, according to the same 

source. 

Ministry of Interior 

ISG has not discovered evidence that the Ministry 

of Interior (MoI) was involved in the procurement 

of WMD materials, prohibited items, or dual-use 

goods. This fi nding is consistent with the MoI internally focused mission. In addition, prior to OIF, the 

MoD not the MoI administratively controlled security 

groups that may have been involved in illicit procurement activities. 

Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman and 

Al-Handal

In addition to the major front companies already 

mentioned in this report, the Iraqi Government and 

its citizens set up hundreds of other front companies 

both within the country and around the world for 

the purpose of smuggling prohibited items into the 

country. ISG now knows of over 230 of these front 

companies, many of which were created for a single 

transaction and never used again. There were, however, several major front companies that participated 

in the majority of this illicit business, some of which 

were government-sponsored and one large conglomerate, Al-Eman, which was privately owned. 

The term “Iraqi front company” has become pervasive 

in terms of Iraq’s procurement networks. One defi nition of an Iraqi front company is an Iraqi company or 

Iraqi controlled company, operating either within Iraq 

or abroad that knowingly partakes in international 

commerce with the intent to acquire goods or services 

for an Iraqi client using deceptive trade practices. 

Deceptive practices could include misleading or 

colluding with suppliers, intermediaries, or others 

involved in the acquisition, shipping, or payment 

processes. This would include such actions as misrepresenting the origin or fi nal destination of goods, 

or misidentifying the goods, the end user, or end use. 

Complicating matters, many of these companies were 

involved in legitimate trade, with illicit activity playing a less signifi cant role. The association of the IIS 

with a company also suggested Iraqi infl uence and 

front activity. 

The assumption and general appearance was that 
87

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 49. Machinery purchased by the MIC for the 

IAEC after 2001.

Figure 50. The MoA used the following process to fi ll 

requirements for goods and services.
88

many Iraqi companies involved in international trade, 

as a norm, were aware of deceptive trade channels 

and took advantage of them in dealing with both 

routine and sensitive acquisitions. However, the 

government’s association and infl uence with trade 

companies varied. Some companies may not have 

had a choice, but others found it in their fi nancial 

interest to get involved, and therefore approached 

and competed for government contracts.

Al-Eman, directed by Sattam Hamid Farhan AlGa’awd (Al Ga’aod) (see Figure 51) had its start in 

the early 1990s, and up until OIF, was the largest 

network of Iraqi front companies with a number of 

subsidiaries operating in Baghdad, Iraq, Dubai in 

the UAE, and Amman, Jordan. Al-Eman companies 

have been observed for the last 10 years as they procured dual-use and military goods for the Iraqi Government, and were heavily involved in the UN OFF 

kickback scheme. Al Ga’awd used his relationships 

with Saddam and his son ‘Uday, and Husayn Kamil 

to both acquire contracts for supplying the various 

ministries with sanctioned materials, smuggling oil, 

and he used those relationships to intimidate others.

• Al-Eman is essentially a family-run business, with 

strong family ties linking most of the subsidiary 

fi rms.

• The accountants in Al-Eman are key fi gures with 

the best overall knowledge of the company’s activities. 

• Al-Eman did considerable business with Syria 

through the “Syrian Protocol,” an arrangement of 

false purchases and kickbacks that laundered funds 

for Iraqi purchases.

The Al-Eman Group was also involved in the OFF 

kickback scheme through the Jordan National Bank 

and embassy commercial attaches. Upon completion 

of services under UN OFF, the Banque Nationale de 

Paris deposited payments in the National Bank of 

Jordan, which provided banking services to Al-Eman. 

The National Bank of Jordan automatically deducted 

a 10-percent performance/kickback from the UN OFF 

payment. The National Bank of Jordan then deposited the kickback amount into accounts controlled 

by the Iraqi Regime. The CAs in the Iraq embassies 

played a key role in orchestrating procurement and 

fi nancial activity. The attaches arranged collection 

and transferred kickbacks, and Al-Eman worked very 

closely with them. 

The Al-Eman Network

Dozens of companies were included in the Al-Eman 

network, most of which were either owned or operated by members of the Al-Gaaod family. The following table (see Figure 52) is a sampling of some of 

the Al-Eman companies and their role in acquiring 

materials for the Iraqi government: 

Key Al-Eman Owners: Sattam Hamid Farhan Al 

Ga’awd and his Family. Extended family plays a key 

role in Al-Eman operations. As of March 2003, three 

of Sattam Hamid Farhan Al Ga’awd’s cousins ran 

subsidiary or affi liated companies in the network.

• Jalal Al Ga’awd owns the subsidiary Sajaya. 

• Talal Al Ga’awd functions in a public relations role 

for the family. 

Al Ga’awd’s Ties to Iraqi Leadership

Al Ga’awd’s was one of Saddam’s most trusted confi dants in conducting clandestine business transactions, often traveling abroad using an Ecuadorian 

passport. Just prior to March 2003, he traveled to 

Sweden and Ukraine on behalf of Qusay. 

• Al Ga’awd also had a close partnership with ‘Uday 

and Husayn Kamil, and was a key player in the 

MIC. 

• He assisted As’ad Al ‘Ubaydi Hamudi, the 

brother of Dr. Nazar Al ‘Ubaydi Hamudi, a scientist involved in producing chemical weapons, in 

obtaining contracts with the Al Qa’qa’a General 

Company, The Atomic Energy Company, the AlKaramah State Establishment the Al Basil General 

Company, the Al Muthanna State Establishment 

and over 25 other companies within the MIC from 

1992 until 2002.

• Al Ga’awd, Dr. Nazar, and As’ad are all linked to 

the Al ‘Abud network described in the CW section 

of this report.
89

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 51. Sattam Hamid

Farhan Al-Ga’aod.

Figure 52. The Al-Eman Network.

Ga’aod
90

• Hamid Al Ga’awd is owner of the Al-Yanbu Company.

The Iraqi Regime arrested both Talal and Hamid Al 

Ga’awd in 1996 as a result of unspecifi ed fi nancial 

and contractual problems related to deals with the 

MoA. As of late 2001, Sattam Hamid Farhan Al 

Ga’awd’s brother, ‘Abd-al-Salam Farhan Al Ga’awd 

was running a fi rm called Al-Arab Agencies. This 

company was used for shipping, operating primarily 

out of Basrah. Al-Arab handled many of the fi rm’s 

transport requirements and petroleum exports via the 

Gulf. 

• Another of Sattam’s brothers, Najib Al Ga’awd, 

was involved in the procurement of spare parts for 

Russian-made tanks as late as 2001. According to 

captured documents, Najib Al Ga’awd’s company, 

Al-Talh Offi ce Co., provided an offer to the MIC 

for 12 T-72 tank engines, dated 1 February 2000 for 

a net price of 900,000 Euros.

• The same documents also included an offer dated 1 

February 2001 for spare parts of T-55 tanks. 

• The company letterhead stated that it had offi ces in 

Moscow, Yugoslavia, and Jordan.

Although Sattam Hamid Farhan Al Ga’awd has 

admitted to an Iraqi who was interviewed by ISG that 

he would smuggle oil out of Iraq and foodstuffs into 

Iraq in violation of the UN OFF agreement, he has 

stated that he believed this to be legitimate business. 

According to the interviewee, it was unnecessary to 

alter the packaging of the goods to conceal the true 

nature of the contents, because it was only food. ISG 

judges that Al Ga’awd’s statements have routinely 

been designed to overly downplay his role in the 

former Regime.

Sattam Al Ga’awd’s Relationship with the IIS. Al 

Ga’awd has denied being involved in the IIS, while 

other sources have claimed that he was an active 

member at least since 1993.

• His brothers, Abd al-Salam Farhan Al Ga’awd, Abd 

al-Salam Farhan Al Ga’awd, Abd al-Salam Farhan 

Al Ga’awd, and Najib Hamid Farhan Al Ga’awd 

were all members of the IIS.

• Sattam Hamid Farhan Al Ga’awd was able to use 

his connections with the IIS to import items prohibited by the UN, including chemicals. 

The IIS frequently used businessmen with international connections to import goods, including 

nonmilitary goods, into Iraq. Al Ga’awd associates 

suspected he had IIS links based on a number of factors. 

• A high-level government offi cial observed that 

Al Ga’awd must have had government contacts to 

avoid Regime interference. He believed Al Ga’awd 

was in the IIS because he was not a Ba’th Party 

member and was not in the government, yet he was 

a “powerful man.” 

• The source asserted that, generally, IIS connections 

allowed Iraqi businesses to contact the best suppliers in other countries to obtain sanctioned items. 

Al-Handal General Trading Company 

Closely tied to Saddam’s family and to the IIS, 

the fi rm Al-Handal Trading received preferential 

treatment in the issuance of Iraqi procurement 

tenders. The head of the fi rm, Wadi al-Handal, has 

established several subsidiary companies under the 

fi rm to facilitate acquisition of sensitive goods for 

Iraq. All of the Al-Handal connections are based in 

Baghdad. 

The Al-Handal General Trading Company was 

established originally in Dubai to import car parts 

and accessories into Iraq, but in the wake of the Gulf 

war, Wadi al-Handal quickly recognized that broadening his business line could make enormous profi ts. 

Wadi established several subsidiary companies under 

Al-Handal (see Figure 53). The company used two 

primary means to move proscribed equipment into 

Iraq. The fi rst was using ships leaving Dubai, and 

smaller items were carried on board in personal luggage and off-loaded in Basrah. Al-Handal had at least 

one vessel berthed in Alhamriya Port, Dubai. Wadi’s 

preferred method was to use his brother in Amman, 

Sabah al-Handal, who owned a plastic pipe company. 

Equipment would be delivered to Sabah’s company, 

be labeled as plastic pipe or related equipment, and 

then shipped onward into Iraq overland. 

• Al-Huda is the main holding company for AlHandal General Trading. 

• Al-Huda is the mechanism Wadi used to establish 

and control other front companies, and much of the 
91

Regime Finance

and Procurement

fi rm’s acquisition business was conducted through 

Al-Huda. 

There are at least three different front companies in 

Iraq that use the name Al-Huda. Al-Huda Religious 

Tourism Company is an unrelated, well-known IIS 

front that oversees and monitors tourists coming 

into Baghdad to visit holy sites. Another Al-Huda 

company was owned by ‘Uday Saddam Husayn 

al-Tikriti. According to a cooperative source, the 

company, however, Al-Huda Industrial Holdings, 

Figure 53. Al-Huda-related companies in the UAE.
92

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93

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Supplying Iraq With Prohibited 

Commodities

Overview

Despite UN sanctions, many countries and companies engaged in prohibited procurement with the 

Iraqi regime throughout the 1990s, largely because 

of the profi tability of such trade.

• Private companies from Jordan, India, France, Italy, 

Romania, and Turkey seem to have engaged in possible WMD-related trade with Iraq.

• The Governments of Syria, Belarus, North Korea, 

former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Yemen, and 

possibly Russia directly supported or endorsed private company efforts to aid Iraq with conventional 

arms procurement, in breach of UN sanctions. 

• In addition, companies based out of the following 

14 countries supported Iraq’s conventional arms 

procurement programs: Jordan, the People’s Republic of China, India, South Korea, Bulgaria, Ukraine, 

Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, Georgia, France, Poland, 

Romania, and Taiwan.

• The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions 

increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 

(see fi gure 54). 

• A few neighboring countries such as Jordan, Syria, 

Turkey, Egypt, and Yemen, entered into bilateral 

trade agreements with Iraq. These agreements provided an avenue for increasing trade coordination 

and eventually led to sanctions violations. 

The countries supporting Iraq’s illicit procurement 

changed over time. These changes refl ected trends 

based on Saddam Husayn’s ability to generate hard 

currency to buy items and the willingness of the 

international community to criticize those countries 

selling prohibited goods to the Regime. The following 

sections addressing each country have been grouped 

according to when evidence indicates they began supporting Saddam’s illicit procurement programs. 

Procurement Suppliers During the Decline Phase, 

1991 to 1996

ISG has identifi ed entities from three countries that 

began supporting Iraq with illicit procurement during 

the post-Gulf war “decline” phase in the Regime: 

Romania, Ukraine, and Jordan. Romania and Ukraine 

had just emerged from the Soviet bloc with an excess 

of military hardware and expertise and a need for 

hard currency. Jordan, which profi ted primarily from 

allowing transshipment, argued that Iraq was a major 

trading partner before 1991 and trade with Iraq was a 

necessity. 

Romania 

According to a high-level offi cial of the former Iraqi 

Regime, trade between Iraq and Romania fl ourished 

during the Ceauscescu era (1965 to 1989). The IIS 

had an active presence in Romania throughout this 

period and MIC engineers were active in procurement 

programs directed from the Iraqi Embassy in Bucharest. 

• In the mid-1990s, reporting indicated that the Iraqi 

MFA and MIC were both interested in changes to 

Romanian export controls over nuclear, biological, 

and chemical weapons and their associated technologies. 

According to documents identifi ed by UNSCOM 

in Operation Tea Cup, Iraq reestablished a procurement relationship with the Romanian fi rm Aerofi na in 

February 1994. The Iraqis and Romanians conducted 

two to three delegation visits between Bucharest and 

Baghdad to discuss sending Romanian missile experts 

to Iraq to assist with design and guidance control 

problems in the Al Fat’h missile, later called the Al 

Samud, and to obtain missile parts and related raw 

materials.

• By August 1994, several procurement contracts had 

reportedly been signed.

• In November 1995, Iraqi sent a letter to Aerofi na 

requesting that the missile repair part shipments be 

temporarily stopped due to concerns over the quality of the goods.
94

Figure 54. Top 12 sources of WMD and arms-related 

procurement transactions with Iraq.

2003 refl ects only January to March. Transactions include negotiations, 

agreements, contracts, or deliveries of goods.
95

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• As a result of UNSCOM’s operation, the Romanian 

Government acknowledged in 1998 that Aerofi na 

sold Iraq weapons parts in 1994 via an intermediary company in Jordan. 

According to a source with good access, a Romanian 

source provided analytical equipment and testing for 

SG-4 tank gyroscopes and gyroscopes intended for 

missile applications to Iraq in the late 1990s. This 

equipment may have been used to ascertain the quality of illicitly imported gyroscopes because Iraq could 

not manufacture them domestically. The name of the 

Romanian supplier was not specifi ed. 

In March 1998, Iraqi intelligence conducted an operation to smuggle weapons and military equipment 

from Romania in violation of UN sanctions, according to a reliable source. Walid al-Rawi, an IIS agent 

stationed in Romania, was sending pictures of tanks 

and military equipment available for sale from Romania back to Baghdad. An Iraqi diplomatic pouch was 

used to transfer the photographs. There is no further 

information concerning the type, number, or source of 

the conventional military goods purchased. 

• Al-Rawi used Qatar and Dubai in the UAE as transshipment points for the illicit goods. Bribes were 

used to circumvent customs inspections at ports. 

Walid Al Rawi obtained fi nancing for the military goods by requesting money from Baghdad. If 

approved, the cash was reportedly sent to Romania 

via Geneva.

According to captured documents, Romania’s 

Uzinexport SA was contracting in October 2001 to 

provide Iraq with equipment, machinery and materials linked to a magnet production line for an Iraqi 

V-belt drive project. This company worked with a mix 

of Iraqi front companies and intermediaries that were 

representing the MIC, the Iraqi lead for the project. 

The magnets—assembled by the Iraqis with Romanian help—could have been suitable for systems used 

to spin gas centrifuge rotors for the enrichment of uranium. Although there is no evidence that the magnets 

were employed in the production of gas centrifuges, 

the capability to indigenously produce magnets would 

have allowed Iraq to maintain knowledge and skillsets in this area. 

• The various front companies and trade intermediaries involved in the project included the Jordanian 

branch of the Iraqi fi rm Al-Sirat, the Jabir BinHayyan General Company, the Aa’ly El-Phrates 

company, and the Ali Al-Furat Trading Company. 

Jordan may have also been used as a transshipment 

point for the magnet technology. 

• Captured documents indicate that the total sum of 

the contract awarded to Uzinexport for the V-belt 

project was $4,607,546. This was paid though a 

combination of cash, letters of credit, oil, and raw 

materials.

Ukraine

Ukraine was one of the fi rst countries involved in 

illicit military-related procurement with Iraq after the 

fi rst Gulf war. Iraqi delegation visits to Ukraine were 

fi rst evident in 1995. These visits were reciprocated 

in Iraq from 1998 to 2003. The highest-levels of the 

Ukrainian Government were reportedly complicit 

in this illicit trade as demonstrated by negotiations conducted in regard to the sale of a Kolchuga 

antiaircraft radar system to Iraq in 2000. In addiUNSCOM’s Operation Tea Cup (1997 to 1998)

From 1997 to 1998, UNSCOM inspectors conducted 

“Operation Teacup,” an operation designed to reveal 

Iraq’s efforts to procure prohibited military and 

WMD- related goods. 

• The operation was launched after the defection 

of Saddam’s son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, in 1995. 

Thousands of WMD-related documents were captured by the UN at Husayn Kamil’s chicken farm, 

including the Al Samud contracts (see the Husayn 

Kamil and The Saga of the “Chicken Farm” Documents insets in the Regime Strategic Intent chapter.)

• In this operation, Iraqi buyers (including Dr. 

Hashim Halil Ibrahim Al ‘Azawi) negotiating with 

Romanians for prohibited gyroscopes were videotaped. 
96

tion, Ukrainian state and private exporting companies 

independently facilitated the transfer of prohibited 

technologies and equipment, mainly in the missile 

fi eld, to the embargoed Regime. 

According to IIS memos to the Iraqi Embassy in 

Kiev, Ukraine, was an important political ally for 

Iraq. After the initial business contacts in the mid1990s, the government of Iraq embarked in a diplomatic exchange with Ukraine in 2001. ISG judges 

that Saddam’s goal with this relationship was to gain 

access to Ukraine’s signifi cant military production 

facilities, including a large portion of the former 

Soviet space and rocket industry. 

• The recovered IIS memos further indicated that the 

former MIC Director Huwaysh visited Ukraine in 

2002 hoping to develop a closer industrial partnership. 

• By 2001, the commercial exchange between the 

two countries reached $140 million. Captured documents indicate that Iraq strove to make “sure that 

the Ukrainian share from the oil for food program 

[got] bigger” to encourage further trade between the 

two countries. 

ISG has recovered further documentation disclosing 

representatives from Ukrainian fi rms visited Iraq to 

coordinate the supply of prohibited goods from the 

early 1990s until the onset of OIF. Information supplied by an Iraqi scientist indicates that Iraqi delegations visited Ukraine in 1995.

 • By 1998, the Iraqi Al-Karamah State Establishment 

hosted numerous visits from Ukrainian suppliers 

seeking contracts assisting Iraq with its missile 

program. 

• Mr. Yuri Orshansky, from the Ukrainian Company 

MontElect, led the Ukrainian visits. Orshansky’s 

relationship with Iraq began in September 1993 

when he arrived in Baghdad accompanied by Dr. 

Yuri Ayzenberg from the Ukrainian fi rm Khartron, 

a known company with missile guidance system 

design capability. Within 2 months, an Iraqi delegation reciprocated the visit to Ukraine. • While in Ukraine, Orshansky, Ayzenberg, and General Naim (the head of Iraq’s Scud missile guidance 

program) executed a “protocol” amounting to an 

outline of future cooperation between the parties for 

missile-related technologies. 

Professor Yuri Orshansky and the MontElect 

Company

Yuri Orshansky, a professor of electronics and director of the Ukrainian MontElect Company, was the key 

facilitator between Saddam’s Regime and Ukraine. 

• He was a member of the Iraqi Ukrainian Committee 

for Economic and Trade Cooperation. 

• In December 2000, he was made an honorary 

consul for Iraq in Kharkov.

• For his efforts, Orshansky was awarded at least 

13.6 million barrels of oil under Iraq’s secret oil 

voucher system from Phase 3 (beginning December 1997) through Phase 13 (beginning December 

2002). He actually lifted at least 6.9 million barrels of oil from Phase 5 (beginning November 1998) 

through Phase 8 (beginning June 2000). He was 

not allowed to lift later allocations because of failure to pay Iraqi surcharge payments. SOMO estimated that Orshansky earned approximately $1.85 

million in profi t from these gifts (refer to Known Oil 

Vouncher Recipients, Annex B). Between 1993 and 

1995 Orshansky traveled to Iraq at least six times. 

During this period, Iraq sent at least four delegations to Ukraine. 

Orshansky continued to visit Iraq in 1998 to 2003 

and, through his company MontElect, he transferred a 

range of equipment and materials to the Al-Karamah 

State Establishment including:

• Engines for surface-to-air Volga 20DCY missiles in 

2001.

• 300 liquid fuel motors to be used in al Samud I missiles.

• According to a former Iraqi government offi cial, 

Iraq also signed a contract with Orshansky for the 

design and building of a plant and build a plant to 

produce tiethylamine (TEA) and xlidene—the two 

components of TEGA-02 (missile fuel).
97

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• The technology included guidance components for 

surface-to-air missiles, assistance in the development of batteries for the latest antiaircraft missiles, 

providing equipment for missile research and possibly assisting in the establishment of a college for 

training of missile expertise. 

• Cooperation was initiated by Iraq requesting quotes 

on a test stand for rocket motors, a series of gyroscopes and accelerometers for missile-guidance 

systems and high precision machine tools for manufacturing missile components. 

In 2000, the Ukraine-Iraq relationship became 

public-knowledge when the Ukrainian Government 

was implicated in selling Iraq a Kolchuga antiaircraft 

radar system. President Leonid Kuchma was accused 

of personally approving the Kolchuga sale, worth 

$100 million, via a Jordanian intermediary. 

• Evidence of Ukrainian Government complicity in 

the sale to Iraq was based on a secret 90-second 

audio recording made 10 July 2000 by Mykola 

Melnychenko, a former counter-surveillance expert 

in a department of the Ukrainian Security Service 

(SBU), according to press reports. The recorded 

conversation involved President Kuchma, Valery 

Malev, the head of Ukspectsexport, a state export 

agency, and Leonid Derkach, the former SBU 

Chairman. Kuchma allegedly authorized Derkach to 

export 4 Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq via Jordan. 

Kuchma also gave Malev permission to bypass 

export controls for the deal.

• Initially, Ukrainian Government denied the allegations but then changed its position on the issue 

several times. First, it denied that the meeting had 

ever taken place. Later it admitted that the meeting had taken place and that President Kuchma had 

authorized the sale, but argued that the sale had not 

been completed. (No Kolchugas have been found in 

Iraq.)

• It is interesting to note that the Government of 

Ukraine lifted export restrictions on Kolchuga 

radars four days after Kuchma authorized the sale 

to Iraq. After this deal, Ukraine and Iraq signed a 

trade and technical cooperation agreement in October 2000. Ukraine parliament ratifi ed the agreement 

in November 2001. 

The Iraqi IIS, MIC, and the associated MIC front 

companies also acquired military-related goods from 

Ukraine. According to information obtained in an 

interview with the former MIC Director ‘Abd-alTawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh:

• In 2001, the IIS purchased fi ve motors for 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the Ukrainian 

company Orliss for the MIC and Ibn Fernas. The 

Orliss company representative was by a female physician named Olga Vladimirovna. The motors were 

allegedly transported from Ukraine to Iraqi via Iraqi 

diplomatic pouch.

• In another instance an “Olga” (most likely Ms. 

Vladimirovna from Orliss) was known to have 

assisted the MIC with a carbon fi ber fi lament winding and insulating material project. She was also the 

point of contact, in late 2002, for a contract with an 

unspecifi ed Ukrainian supplier for missile engines 

and gyroscopes, but none of these items were ever 

delivered. The MIC only received some models of 

the gyroscopes. 

Figures 55 and 56 further illustrate the activity 

between the MIC, and the MIC front companies such 

as ARMOS, and Ukrainian military supply companies 

in 2002. 

In addition to gyroscopes and motors, Iraq sought 

missile fuel from private Ukrainian companies. 

Huwaysh stated that Iraq approached Ukraine for 

diethylene triamine (DETA) and AZ-11 (a mixture 

of 89 percent DETA and 11 percent UDMH). The 

MIC intended to use the fuel for the HY-2 missile 

system. Iraq reportedly had approximately 40 HY-2 

missiles but only had suffi cient fuel for 15 of them. 

Iraq, however, never received either the AZ-11 or its 

components. 

By 2003, recovered documents and intelligence 

indicate that the ARMOS Trading Company was playing a greater role an intermediary between Iraq and 

Ukraine. ARMOS was a joint venture with a Russian 

company established by MIC to import technology 

and assist in the acquisition of materials and equipment for MIC and other Iraqi ministries. 
98

Figure 55. A document, dated April 2002, showing trade 

between ARMOS Trading and MontElect, signed by 

Sergey Semenov from MontElect.
99

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 56. A recovered document signed by Semenov 

(tied to MontElect in Figure 55) discussing the Syrian 

Protocol with ARMOS in August 2002.
100

• ARMOS specialized in bringing both Russian and 

Ukrainian experts into Iraq and represented Russia 

and Ukraine during business transactions, mainly 

for the fi nancing of military goods transactions (See 

the MIC Front Company section for further details 

on ARMOS). 

• Documents indicate that ARMOS and MontElect 

were involved in offers of military equipment for 

Al-Karamah in January 2003. Signatures on the 

recovered documents implicate ARMOS, Al-Karamah, Sa’ad General Company, the Trade Offi ce of 

the MIC, and Dr. Sergey Semenov of MontElect. 

The documents also revealed the use of Syrian 

transportation companies and use of the IraqiSyrian Protocol to facilitate the transaction. Iraq 

made two payments of $405,000 for the equipment. 

Jordan

Jordanian companies performed a variety of essential 

roles from 1991 through 1999 that aided and abetted 

Iraq’s procurement mechanism: transportation hub, 

fi nancial haven, one of several illicit revenue sources, 

and overall illicit trade facilitator (see the Trade 

Protocol section). Firms from Jordan facilitated the 

transshipment of prohibited military equipment and 

materials to the Iraqi Regime. Iraqi front companies 

conducted the vast majority of this illicit trade. This 

trade included the following:

• Captured documents reveal that a company called 

Mechanical Engineers and Contractors shipped 

missile parts to Iraq. Payment was made through 

the Jordan Investment and Finance Bank according to the guidelines established by the Iraq-Jordan 

Trade Protocol.

• A high-level former Iraqi government offi cial stated 

that during 2002, compressors used in nitric acid 

production and Russian missile control systems 

destined for MIC front companies were shipped 

through Jordan. 

• A $50 million contract was signed for the Iraqi 

Electricity Commission in 2002, for the purchase of 

Russian-made cables designed to withstand explosions. 

Multiple sources indicate that the former Iraqi 

Regime also received offers from Jordanian companies for items such as global positioning system 

(GPS) equipment, metrological balloons, gyroscopes, 

video gun sights, electronic countermeasures equipment, and communications equipment. 

• In February 2003, Iraq’s Abu Dhabi Company 

sought to purchase a large quantity of fi eld telephones and some frequency hopping radios from 

Jordan. 

• In February 2003, Iraq’s Orckid General Trading 

Company sought details of solid-state gyroscopes 

available through a Jordanian company. High performance gyroscopes can be used in UAVs, avionics and platform stabilization. 

• The Iraqi fi rm Al-Rabaya for Trading in Baghdad 

contracted with a Jordanian fi rm, for US manufactured GPS equipment. The parties of the contract 

were identifi ed as Munir Mamduh Awad alKubaysi, Managing Director or Iraq’s Al-Basha’ir 

Trading Company, and Dr. Sa’di ‘Abbas Khadir, 

Director General of the Al-Milad General Company, companies run by the MIC. 

The Al-Eman Investment Group employed many private subsidiaries to procure goods through Jordan 

for Iraq. An Iraqi businessman with direct access 

to the information affi rmed that the trade Protocol 

was used as a mechanism for conducting illicit trade. 

Al-Eman’s Vice President, Karim Salih, also acquired 

Al-Samud missile engine parts for the MIC. 

• Iraqi businessmen stated that the Al-Eman Establishment conducted business with many Iraqi ministries and was a critical component of the Iraqi illicit 

procurement apparatus.

• According to an Iraqi businessman with extensive 

Regime contacts, a Jordanian company, with offi ces 

in Amman and Baghdad, delivered engine spares 

for turboprop trainer aircraft owned by the Iraqi 

military. This Middle Eastern fi rm also dealt with 

the Iraqi Ministry of Information and the MoT, and 

had extensive contacts with the Iraqi CA in the Iraqi 

Embassy to Jordan in Amman. The fi rm did not 
101

Regime Finance

and Procurement

manufacture goods; it simply acted as a broker for 

Iraq.

• The MIC procured banned items with the assistance of the Iraqi CA in Jordan. In 2000, a former 

high-ranking Iraqi offi cial stated that a payment 

of $2.275 million was made to a Lebanese company for BMP-2 (armored vehicle) 30-mm cannon 

barrel-manufacturing technology. This technology 

originated with an arms fi rm called YugoimportFDSP, a fi rm based in the former Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia known for violating UN sanctions on 

Iraq. 

Methods Used To Hide Illicit Procurement via 

Jordan. According to a high-level source from the 

Al-Eman network, the Jordanian Government aided 

Iraqi efforts to conceal its illicit trade activity through 

its decision announced in October 2000 to terminate 

an inspection agreement with Lloyd’s Registry. This 

agreement, in force since 1993, permitted Lloyd’s 

to inspect goods coming through the Port of Aqaba. 

All OFF goods were monitored at all points of entry. 

Lloyd’s, however, was not required to report illicit 

cargo (see Ministry of Transport section).

• An Iraqi customs offi cial with direct access 

believed that the IIS operated several front company offi ces at the Turaybil checkpoint on the 

Iraq-Jordan border. These included Al-Etimad and 

Al-Basha’ir. Any goods destined for these companies received special treatment at the border. 

A Jordanian businessman with extensive business 

contacts with the former Iraqi Regime asserted that 

offi cial Jordanian approval was required for all trade 

with Iraq. Individual shipments had to be approved 

by the Jordanian security committee; the goods were 

sometimes photographed. Fawaz Zurequat, a possible 

Jordanian intelligence offi cer, who may have been 

imprisoned after 1999 because of his involvement 

with trading with Iraq, was a key Jordanian contact in 

this process.

• An Iraqi customs offi cial believed that the trade 

with Jordan was very useful for acquiring prohibited goods, particularly vehicles and computers. 

The Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI) had two shipments per week 

through Turaybil after 2000—Iraqi customs offi -

cials were not permitted to check these goods.

Transport Routes for Procurement via Jordan. Iraq 

had formal agreements with Jordan during the 1990s. 

Jordan was the primary route through which Iraqi 

material moved. The IIS had a presence at key Jordanian transport nodes.

• ‘Abd-al-Karim Jasim (Abu Lika) was the IIS representative at Al-Aqaba Port for three years until OIF. 

• Turaybil on the border of Iraq and Jordan was the 

main entry point for illicit trade. A former highranking government offi cial asserted that the IIS, 

DGMI, and the Directorate of General Security 

(DGS) had large offi ces there and enjoyed close 

liaison relationships with their Jordanian intelligence counterparts. Maj. Gen. Jihad Bannawi was 

head of the IIS section at Turaybil. 

• Al-Eman had its own shipping division to transport goods to Iraq. It shipped goods through the 

Jordanian, Syrian, and Turkish offi cial border 

checkpoints according to an Iraqi businessman, 

the supplier shipped goods through Aqaba Port or 

Amman airport.

Financing Procurement via Jordan. After 1999, 

the most important Jordanian contribution in assisting Iraq’s illicit procurement apparatus was access 

to Jordan’s fi nancial and banking systems. An Iraqi 

businessman assessed that before 1996, 95 percent of 

Iraqi trade was conducted through Jordanian Government-run banks. After 1996, Jordanian banks handled 

only 30 percent of that trade, mostly from Russia. 

Document exploitation reveals that the Central Bank 

of Iraq (CBI) and the Iraqi SOMO provided the funds 

to Jordanian banks, which were spent by MIC, Iraqi 

front companies, Iraqi intelligence organs, and the 

commercial and military attachés present in the Iraqi 

Embassy in Jordan. 
102

The MIC maintained bank accounts in Jordan for 

the purpose of making foreign purchases. A senior 

executive in the MIC confi rmed that the MIC Director, ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, 

directed the opening of accounts in Jordan. These 

accounts were in the name of the Iraqi CA in Jordan, 

Selman Kadurm Abd Ghidau, and an unidentifi ed 

accountant. The accounts were at fi ve different Jordanian banks, but most of the money was deposited 

at the Al-Ahli (or Jordan National Bank) (see the 

Revenue section and the Banking section). 

Procurement Suppliers During the Recovery 

Phase, 1996 to 1998

After the onset of limited trade under the OFF 

program, during the “recovery” phase, the Regime 

was better suited to offer either oil or cash for its 

procurement needs. ISG has identifi ed companies in 

the following seven additional countries willing to 

engage in unsanctioned trade with Saddam during this 

phase: Syria, Turkey, South Korea, China, France, the 

former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. 

Syria began to emerge as a primary transshipment 

and procurement facilitation partner, although Turkey 

served as a transshipment point, presumably focusing 

on consumer goods via its trade Protocol with Iraq. 

South Korean private fi rms traded in high technology 

items such as computer and communications equipment. Companies from China and France began negotiating for key equipment sales in this period. The 

former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bulgarian fi rms may have been willing to risk international 

scrutiny from trading with Iraq due to the lure of high 

profi ts, lack of effective government oversight, and 

government corruption in the wake of the collapse of 

the Warsaw Pact. 

Syria

Syria was Iraq’s primary conduit for illicit imports 

from late 2000 until OIF. Under the auspices of the 

Iraq-Syria Protocol, Iraqi ministries and other entities 

would sign contracts with Syrian companies for goods 

and services prohibited by the UN OFF program. 

SOMO databases show that Iraq signed contracts 

worth $1.2 billion, with payment dates from October 

2000 through April 2003. These contracts relate to 

Iraq’s imports fi nanced from SOMO accounts under 

the Iraq-Syria Trade Protocol. The funds most likely 

came from the protocol credit account controlled by 

SOMO. 

Military and security entities openly contracted with 

Syrian companies under the auspices of the Iraq-Syria 

Trade Protocol, according to the SOMO database. 

• The MIC, MoD, and the Presidential Diwan (the 

latter acting on behalf of the IIS, RG, and DGMI) 

contracted for $284 million worth of goods—24 

percent of the total procurement noted. 

• Of this $284 million, 60 percent ($169 million) 

was signed with one company, SES International. 

When all Iraqi procurement entities are included, 

SES signed contracts worth a total of $187 million. 

Although the SOMO database does not include specifi c information about the goods contracted for, the 

benefi ciary companies listed include MIC research 

centers and manufacturing companies. 

• The MoT and the MoTC imported goods for the 

MoD and the security forces according to the 

SOMO database. The MoT imported goods valued 

at $2.9 million and the MoTC imported goods 

valued at $8 million for the MoD. The MoT and 

MoTC contracted for an additional $9.9 million in 

goods for Iraq’s DGMI, DGS, and General Police 

Directorate.

• The MoT often acted on behalf of other entities, 

including security and research entities such as the 

MIC and the IAEC, according to a former senior 

Iraqi government offi cial. The MoT accounted for 

25 percent of the imports from Syria listed in the 

SOMO database. It is possible some of the MoT 

transactions not specifi cally mentioned as being on 

behalf of MoD or security forces aforementioned 

also were destined for Iraqi security, industrial, and 

research facilities. How much of these other MoT 
103

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 57. Allocation of the goods portion of the Syrian 

Protocol, 2000-2003.

This information is based on the contracting entity, not necessarily 

the benefi ciary entity.

imports may have been destined for these end users 

is not known. The SOMO database does not mention any MIC transactions that were not explicitly 

contracted for by MIC (see Figure 57). 

Most of Iraq’s military imports transited Syria by 

several trading companies, including some headed 

by high-ranking Syrian government offi cials, who 

competed for business with Iraq. Syrian traders were 

often paid under the auspices of the Syrian protocol, 

according to multiple sources. According to a captured letter dated 2 March 2002 and written on the 

letterhead of a MIC front company, Al-Basha’ir, a 

former MIC Deputy Director stated that the North 

Korean Tosong Trading Company would “be fi nanced 

according to the Iraqi-Syrian Protocol...through SES 

International.”

• The Central Bank of Syria was the repository of 

funds used by Iraq to purchase goods and materials 

both prohibited and allowed under UN sanctions.

• According to the MIC Director ‘Abd-al-Tawab 

‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, Syrian traders who 

imported weapons and materials for Iraq worked 

extensively with MIC front companies. The Syrian 

traders were also required to share their profi ts with 

the other traders. The owner of the Syrian trading 

company SES, for example, frequently complained 

that he had to give up too much of his profi ts to the 

other traders.

• Dhu al-Himma Shalish, head of Syrian Presidential 

Security and a relative of Syrian President Bashar 

al-Asad, owned the SES International, and was 

heavily involved in the Iraqi weapons trade, according to a source with direct access. 

• Dhu al-Himma’s nephew Assif Shalish managed 

SES and its subordinates. 
104

represented his father in a deal to sell weapons to 

Iraq, possibly including missiles with a range of 

270 km, according to Huwaysh. 

• A Syrian named Ramy Makluf, another relative 

of Bashar al-Asad, reportedly owned the Nurallah 

Company, another fi rm that worked with the MIC. 

Makluf was involved in an effort to procure IGLA 

man portable air defense systems, Kornet antitank 

guided missiles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), 

heavy machine guns, and 20 million machinegun 

rounds for delivery to Iraq, according to a highlevel Iraqi offi cial. The contract for the delivery of 

these munitions was signed in 2002 with a sixmonth delivery deadline, but the war intervened 

before the delivery. 

According to captured documents, the Iraqi MIC, and 

the Ministries of Trade, Defense, Industry, Transportation and Communication, and the Presidential 

Offi ces (Diwan) signed contracts with the Syrian 

front company, SES International Corporation, valued 

at approximately $186 million starting from December 2000 to March 2003. This fi gure differs markedly from the amount refl ected in the SOMO records 

mentioned earlier. This particular document also 

indicates the degree of regularity under which these 

transactions occurred between Iraq and the Syrian 

company. SES signed 257 contracts with various 

Iraqi ministries during the three-year period. The 

document also refl ects how the Iraqi ministries signed 

the contract with SES for a benefi ciary company or 

other government organization.

• For example, the MoD signed one $185,780 contract with SES for the Presidential Offi ce; the MIC 

signed another $1 million contract with SES for the 

Al Qadisiyah General Company. 

Turkey 

Although not a direct source of illicit military goods, 

Turkey provided Iraq with signifi cant revenue 

streams that permitted the Iraqi Regime to fund its 

illicit procurement activities. In addition to the UN 

OFF program, Turkey signed a trade protocol that 

provided substantial monetary and material resources 

for Iraqi state institutions and procurement authorities. 

SES International reportedly was the primary facilitator for the transshipment of weapons and munitions, as well as many other goods purchased outside 

of UN channels, through Syria to Iraq. ISG judges 

that this close relationship may have been based, in 

part, on Dr. Shalish’s personal friendship with the 

former Presidential secretary, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud. 

According to captured SOMO records, half of the 

goods paid for by the MIC through the goods component of the Syrian protocol between March 2000 and 

2003 went through SES.

• According to those deals recorded in the SOMO 

records, SES transactions during this period 

amounted to $86.4 million. 

• According to an interviewee, SES offi cials did not 

participate in any negotiations between Baghdad 

and the supplier and were not privy to the details of 

the contracts signed between these entities.

• Dr. Asif Shalish traveled to Baghdad to coordinate 

shipments of weapons and sometimes received cash 

payments. At other times, the Iraqis reimbursed 

Shalish by transferring funds from their overseas 

accounts to an SES account in Syria. 

Syrian Government Complicity. Syrian front companies had links to high-ranking Syrian government 

offi cials and because of these links Syria became the 

primary route for Iraq’s illicit imports over the last 

two years before OIF. 

• Asif Shawkat, the deputy director of Syrian Military Intelligence, was involved in weapons trade 

with Iraq, according to a high-level Iraqi offi cial. 

Shawkat is the brother in law of Syrian President 

al-Asad. Multiple reports indicate that Shawkat’s 

brothers, Mufi d Makmud and Muhammad 

Mamhud, managed his smuggling business. 

• The Al-Mas Group, one of the Syrian companies 

that worked with the MIC, is owned by Firas 

Mustafa Talas, son of the former Syrian Defense 

Minister Mustafa Talas. The Al-Mas Group was 

composed of six companies that offi cially handled 

civilian goods but also dealt in weapons and military technology. In middle to late 2002, Firas Talas 
105

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Since 1991, Iraqi-Turkish trade revolved primarily 

around the Turkish import of Iraqi oil products outside the UN OFF Program. Iraqi oil sales to Turkey 

were substantial. For instance, in March 2002, Iraq 

exported between 40,000 and 80,000 barrels of oil per 

day (bbl/d) to Turkey using approximately 450 to 500 

Turkish trucks to transport the oil and oil products in 

spare fuel tanks. In February 2003, in the prelude to 

the war, this trade came to a halt. Illicit trade between 

Iraq and Turkey was built on the foundations of preOperation Desert Storm trade—Turkey had traditionally been one of Iraq’s biggest trading partners. This 

was formalized by a trade agreement signed by the 

two governments in 1993 and their other trade agreement, the Iraq-Turkey Trade Protocol, in 2000.

Turkey was a secondary conduit for illicit purchases 

of civilian goods from 2000 until OIF. Under the 

auspices of the Iraq-Turkey Trade Protocol, Iraqi 

ministries and other entities would sign contracts with 

Turkish companies for goods and services prohibited by the UN’s OFF program. Information from a 

SOMO database shows that Iraq signed contracts 

worth almost $304 million, with payment dates from 

April 2000 through April 2003. These contracts 

refl ect Iraq’s imports fi nanced from SOMO accounts 

under the Iraq-Turkey trade Protocol. The funds 

most likely came from the protocol credit account 

controlled by SOMO. The CBI controlled the funds 

from the protocol cash account. ISG does not know 

if there were other expenditures for imports through 

Turkey from other SOMO or non-SOMO accounts 

(see Figure 58). 

The MIC was the only military or security entity that 

openly contracted with Turkish companies under the 

auspices of the Iraq-Turkey trade Protocol, according 

to the SOMO database. 

• The MIC contracted for $28 million worth of 

goods—9 percent of the total procurement noted. 

• Of this $28 million, 137 contracts were signed with 

at least 24 different companies. The single largest 

Turkish supplier seems to be Ozgin Cinko Bakirve 

Metal Mamulleri, Imalat Sanayi, although the name 

was listed in seven different ways. This company 

accounted for a total of 30 contracts with MIC 

worth over $10 million—36 percent of MIC’s total 

contract value. Although the SOMO database does 

not include specifi c information about the goods 

contracted for, the benefi ciary companies listed 

include MIC research centers and manufacturing 

companies. 

• In contrast to Iraq’s arrangement with Syria, the 

MoD did not import goods from Turkey under its 

own name. It did, however, import goods through 

the Ministries of Trade and Transport, according to the SOMO database. The MoT imported 

goods valued at $2.7 million (10 percent of its total 

contracts) and the MoTC imported goods valued 

at $48.9 million (59 percent of its total contracts) 

for MoD. Therefore, MoD’s share of total contracts 

was $51.6 million or 17 percent of the total contract 

value. 

• Because the MoT sometimes acted on behalf 

of other entities, it is possible some of the MoT 

transactions not specifi cally mentioned as being on 

behalf of the MoD as mentioned above also were 

destined for Iraqi security, industrial, and research 

facilities. How much of these other MoT imports 

may have been destined for these end users is not 

known. 

In addition to the Turkish demand for cheap Iraqi oil 

and oil products, the Turkish government also tolerated, if not welcomed, the fl ourishing, mainly illicit 

trade conducted in the northern Iraqi free trade 

zone. Turkey and Iraq engaged in direct military trade 

for common military use materials. For example, 

documentary sources reveal that in 1997 the IIS, the 

DGMI, and the Iraqi Military Attaché in Ankara dealt 

with the Turkish fi rm Sigma Gida IAS SAN VE TIC 

Ltd for the sale to Iraq of fi reproof military clothing; 

150,000 meters of material were purchased for $27 

per meter. In lieu of cash, Iraq paid in oil. 

The Iraq-Turkey Trade Protocol also allowed Iraq 

to procure goods prohibited by the UN sanctions, 

although most of those goods were for nonmilitary 

uses. The Iraqi Finance Minister approved cash allo-
106

cations to ministries from the Turkish trade protocol. 

According to captured documents, the Iraqi MoT 

procured 10,000 small generators, Mitsubishi pickup 

trucks, and assorted construction materials during 

2002 through the Syrian SES International Company 

with money accrued by trade covered from the Turkish trade Protocol. 

Methods Iraq and Turkey used to Hide Illicit 

Procurement. Turkey did not undertake any active 

measures to hide its illicit trade with Iraq. Indeed, this 

trade was conducted in a semi-transparent fashion. 

Multiple open sources frequently reported the illicit 

trade between Turkey and Iraq. The illicit oil trade 

and most of the protocol trade was conducted through 

the Habur bridge (or gate) near Zakho on the IraqTurkey border. Both secret and open sources describe 

this fl ow of trade.

Financial Flows Between Iraq and Turkey. Highlevel sources affi rm that both Iraq and Turkey agreed 

to open a trade account denominated in US dollars in 

the name of TPIC (Turkish Petroleum International 

Company), but run for the benefi t of SOMO, at the 

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. (also known as Halkbank), 

a Turkish state-owned bank. This indicates a fair 

degree of complicity in illicit activity between Iraq 

and Turkish state institutions. According to the 16 

January 2000 Protocol, 70 percent of the value of the 

crude imported by Turkey under the Protocol would 

be deposited in Halkbank. The remaining 30 percent 

would be deposited directly by the crude purchaser 

to accounts at the Saradar Bank in Lebanon or the 

Ahli Bank in Jordan that were designated by SOMO. 

Tekfen, a Turkish oil company, was the only company 

to deposit money into the Ahli Bank. Other Turkish 

oil companies paid into the Saradar Bank. 

According to open sources, since 2000 the UN OFF 

program, the trade protocol and other illicit Turkish 

oil importation, generated over $1 billion per year 

for Iraq. This revenue, however, pales in comparison 

to the $2.5 billion in bilateral trade that took place 

in 1990. SOMO documents state $710.3 million 

was collected from the Turkish Protocol from contracts signed between July 2000 and February 2003. 

According to SOMO documents, it is estimated 

SOMO collected $538.4 million in barter goods and 

Figure 58. Allocation of the goods portion of the Turkish

Protocol, 2000-2003.
107

Regime Finance

and Procurement

cash through private sector trade outside the Protocol 

between November 1997 and March 2003. ISG lacks 

information about earnings prior to these periods.

Former Regime personnel indicate that the SOMO 

account at Halkbank was used exclusively for Iraq to 

pay Turkish companies for the sale of goods and services delivered to Iraq. The goods included oil sector 

equipment, industrial equipment and raw materials, 

communications and transport goods, and building 

materials. The total amount deposited in the account 

at Halkbank was $499,232,952. The total withdrawn 

equaled $302,305,033, leaving a balance before OIF 

of $196,927,919. 

South Korea 

Illicit trade between South Korean companies and 

Iraq was largely limited to contracts signed for high 

technologies, such as military computer equipment, 

sophisticated communications and radar systems. 

Although the South Korean Government was keen to 

promote South Korean companies to gain advantage 

in the international marketplace, there is no evidence 

to suggest that the South Korean Government was 

complicit in the transfer of prohibited goods.

• The earliest evidence detailing a military procurement deal with a South Korean fi rm was a 1998 

negotiation between a Korean company and the 

Al-Basha’ir Company, trading petroleum products 

for six patrol boats. 

• The evidence shows that from 2000 to 2001, South 

Korean companies provided technical components, 

software and expertise in the fi eld of computerization and communications—assisting Iraq in its 

indigenous production of military computers and, 

thus, overall improvement of its conventional military power. 

• As early as December 2002, delegates from the 

Iraqi Salah-al-Din General Company met with representatives of South Korean defense companies to 

fi nalize issues surrounding several contracts which 

had already been signed by both sides. 

As with other suppliers, Iraq used a network of front 

companies and intermediaries to conceal its activity with South Korean companies. These companies 

refused to directly supply Iraq resulting in their use 

of third party intermediaries from India, Jordan, 

and Syria to facilitate trade. 

• In 2000, the MIC signed a contract with a South 

Korean company for technical expertise in establishing an indigenous computer design and production facility in Iraq. The contract included South 

Korean technical assistance for the production of 

computers for military purposes and the manufacture of circuit boards. The contract for South 

Korean technical expertise was signed for $14.4 

million.

• In 2000, the IIS technology transfer division used 

two front companies (the Iraqi company Galala 

and an Indian front company, United Commodities) to procure computers, technical expertise, and 

training on computer design and production. Upon 

completion of this training, the MIC established an 

indigenous computer design and production line. 

This example illustrates the use of multiple front 

companies to hide the IIS role in the transaction. 

• Exploited documentation illustrated that the MIC 

Commercial Department, through Dr. Hadi Tarish 

Zabun, Director General of Scientifi c Research 

facilitated “special contracts” for computers for a 

radar system and fi ber optics for the communications system in 2001. 

• In 2000, the Iraqi company Al ‘Izz (Al-Ezz) represented MIC in negotiations with a South Korean 

company named LG Innotech, which specialized 

in optical fi ber and digital exchanges. According to 

captured documents, LG Innotech agreed to provide 

the MIC a total of 530 notebook-type hardened 

CPU systems specially designed for military use. 

The Iraqi Regime planned to integrate the $11.35 

million of CPUs into its air defense systems and 

artillery fi re control mechanisms. According to the 

same document, LG Innotech ultimately fulfi lled 

more than 80 percent of the contract. This contract 

also used a third party and negotiated in parallel 

with the LG Innotech military CPU contract. 
108

Most of the transactions involving prohibited goods 

between companies from South Korea and Iraq began 

in the summer of 2001, following a MIC visit to 

Seoul. The May to June 2001 visit was designed to 

develop contacts with South Korean fi rms for Iraqi 

companies. Subsequent meetings, refl ected in recovered Salah-al-Din General Company documentation, 

reveal the following agreements: 

• An agreement with the Shinsung Company to 

acquire production plans and technology transfers 

of crystal units, fi lters, and oscillators. 

• An agreement with Salah-al-Din and the Korean 

company UNIMO Technology Co. Limited to 

acquire portables and mobile radio technology 

transfers and to upgrade the existing production 

facilities in Salah-al-Din Company for hybrid circuits.

• An agreement between Salah-al-Din and Techmate Corporation of Korea for production and 

technology transfer of hand generators, coils and 

transformers, hand crank generator (GN-720) cable 

tester, image still picture transmission equipment, 

and coastal radar.

• An agreement with Armitel in South Korea for the 

technology transfer for the local manufacturing 

(assembly & test) of STM -1 optical transmission 

system (AOM-1155) with Salah Al-Din. 

Another element of illicit trade with South Korean 

companies focused on procuring fi ber optics telecommunication technology with potential military 

applications. 

• In 2001, the MIC’s Commercial Department signed 

a contract for fi ber optics with the South Korean 

company Armitel. Payment, however, was not made 

because the equipment provided did not meet Iraqi 

specifi cations. 

• The IIS coordinated with one of its agents to bring 

a delegation of experts from Armitel. Their senior 

expert, Dr. Lee, visited Baghdad and as a result, 

signed many contracts with the Iraqi MoTC, specifi cally in the fi eld of fi ber-optic communications 

and military communications. These contracts were 

valued at $75 million. 

• The MoTC and Armitel executed a portion of these 

contracts, delivering two shipments of more than 30 

containers. Delivery was conducted through Lebanon using Syrian and UAE trade intermediaries. 

The fi rst contract was delivered through Syria and 

the second through Lebanon. These contracts were 

covered through Syrian and UAE middle companies. 

People’s Republic of China 

Although China stated publicly on multiple occasions 

its position that Iraq should fully comply with all UN 

Security Council resolutions and cooperate with the 

Security Council and the Secretary General, fi rms in 

China supplied the former Iraqi Regime with limited 

but critical items, including gyroscopes, accelerometers, graphite, and telecommunications through 

connections established by MIC, its front companies, 

and the IIS. However, there is no evidence to suggest 

the Chinese Government complicity in supplying 

prohibited goods to Iraq. It is likely that newly privatized state-owned companies were willing to circumvent export controls and offi cial UN monitoring to 

supply prohibited goods. In supplying prohibited 

goods, Chinese companies would frequently employ 

third countries and intermediaries to transship commodities into Iraq. The Chinese-Iraqi procurement 

relationship was both politically problematic and 

economically pragmatic in nature, but it ultimately 

provided Iraq with prohibited items, mainly telecommunication equipments, and items with ballistic 

missile applications. This relationship allowed Iraq 

to improve its indigenous missile capabilities.

Multiple sources clearly demonstrate that Iraq’s procurement goal with Chinese fi rms was to overcome 

weakness in missile inertial guidance capabilities 

caused by a lack of technical expertise and components. Iraq had limited capabilities in indigenously 

manufacturing gyroscopes and accurate accelerometers, compounded by the inability to purchase high 

precision machinery and equipment. Chinese com-
109

Regime Finance

and Procurement

panies willingly supplied these types of items to the 

Iraqi Regime. 

• In the fall of 2000, Iraq sought 200 gyros, suitable 

for use in Russian and Chinese cruise missiles, 

and machine tools with missile applications from 

NORINCO, a Chinese military supplier that has 

been sanctioned many times by the United States, 

twice in 2004. (No delivery established.)

• Contracts were initiated in 2000 between Al-Rawa 

and a Chinese fi rm, for test equipment associated 

with inertial guidance systems, including a oneChinese Assistance in Iraqi Telecommunications

One area of robust cooperation between Chinese 

fi rms and Iraq was telecommunications. These technologies had both military and civilian uses. Saddam’s Regime used Chinese circuits and fi ber optics 

to connect static command, control, and communication (C3) bases. UN sanctions impeded rehabilitation 

of the telecommunications sector. This equipment was 

sanctioned because of the nature of modern communications systems, which could be used both for civil 

or military purposes. These obstacles were overcome 

by the Iraqi Regime by acquiring materials for cash 

and procuring materials illicitly, outside the purview 

of the UN. 

One Chinese company, illicitly provided transmission 

equipment and switches to Iraq from 1999 to 2002 for 

projects that were not approved under the UN OFF 

Program. Reporting indicates that throughout 2000, 

along with two other Chinese companies, it participated in extensive work in and around Baghdad that 

included the provision and installation of telecommunication switches, more than 100,000 lines, and the 

installation of fi ber-optic cable. 

In early January 2001, the Chinese company pulled 

out of a $35 million mobile phone contract in Iraq, 

citing diffi culty it would face sourcing key components from a US fi rm. The company, which had been 

negotiating for two years on a Baghdad ground station module network, cited US Government pressure 

as the reason for its decision. Iraqi telecom offi cial 

retaliated by putting all other contracts with this 

company on hold and cutting off contact with the fi rm. 

The company, however, in 2002 used Indian fi rms as 

intermediaries to illicitly supply fi ber-optic transmission equipment for Iraqi telecommunications projects. 

Other companies were also present in Iraq. A summary of their activity is given below: 

• A Chinese company agreed to provide switches to 

Iraq as part of a large switching project for Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Working 

with a second Chinese fi rm, this company participated in a bid for a project in Iraq not sanctioned 

by the UN. In late 2002 this company submitted a 

bid for a large switching system for Iraq. 

• Reporting indicated that another Chinese company, 

working through a second Chinese company, had 

supplied switches to Iraq. This company’s switches 

were used for both unsanctioned and sanctioned 

projects in Iraq. This company illicitly supplied the 

switches for the Jordan Project, a fi ber-optic network in Baghdad that was completed in late 2000. 

This company might have been involved in supplying switches with more capabilities than specifi ed in 

an UN approved project. 
110

axis turntable for testing gyroscopes. (No delivery 

established.) 

• In mid-2001, ‘Abd-al-Wahab, an IIS offi cer stationed at the Iraqi Embassy in China, procured 10 

to 20 gyroscopes and 10 to 20 accelerometers from 

an unknown Chinese company for approximately 

$180,000. The gyroscopes and accelerometers were 

intended for the guidance and control system of the 

al Samud II and Al-Fat’h missiles.

Iraq also sought dual-use items with potential ballistic missile applications from Chinese fi rms. Iraq 

sought items such as fuel for propellants and graphite, a key component in reentry vehicle nose tips, 

directional vanes, and engine nozzle throats. Iraq’s 

need for graphite-related products was heightened 

following severe damage infl icted during Operation 

Desert Fox to the Shahiyat Missile Facility, a known 

graphite production facility. Although this site was 

reconstructed, Western intelligence assessed that Iraq 

could not indigenously produce the quality of graphite necessary for ballistic missile components making 

it dependent on imports. Recovered documents from 

2001 indicated a drive to acquire Chinese graphiterelated products such as electrodes, powder, and missile-related fuel:

• Al-Najah Company, working through an Indian 

intermediary, purchased supplies of Chinese missile-grade graphite during August and September 

2001. 

• In January 2003, Al-Merbab General Trading Company and Al-Ramig sought a supply of chemicals, 

both of which have applications in liquid rocket 

propellants, from Chinese companies. The Chinese 

companies, however, refused to sell chemicals to 

the Middle East because of its potential weapons 

application.

From the Iraqi perspective, MIC and IIS attempts 

to illicitly acquire goods from Chinese fi rms were 

problematic. MIC and Chinese suppliers conducted 

many committee meetings and had other contracts, 

but most meetings never ended in any signed contracts. According to a high-ranking offi cial in the 

MIC of unknown reliability, Chinese fi rms used its 

military and dual-use contracts with the MIC as leverage in its attempts to obtain discount-priced Iraqi oil. 

• Documents recovered indicate that an Iraqi delegation was sent to China to reestablish a partnership 

with NORINCO, a Chinese arms manufacturer. 

NORINCO agreed to conduct business with Iraq 

but specifi ed that Beijing was not to be informed. 

Iraq promised to pay NORINCO with crude oil and 

petroleum products, using the Iraqi front company 

Al-Basha’ir.

• These strained negotiations sometimes resulted in 

the use of alternative foreign suppliers. This was 

evident in procurement attempts to acquire gyroscopes from Chinese fi rms where MIC companies 

sought alternative suppliers in Belarus. 

Although the Chinese Government promoted Chinese companies in commercial activity following 

defense reforms in 1998, ISG has found no evidence 

to suggest Beijing’s direct involvement in illicit trade 

with Iraq. Indeed, ISG suspects that some contracts 

that were abruptly stopped may have been a result 

of Beijing’s direct intervention. A delegation from a 

Chinese fi rm to Iraq in December 2000, suspended 

contract talks possibly according to Beijing’s questioning of its activities with Iraq. Most transactions, 

however, were orchestrated through newly privatized state-owned companies competing in a bloated 

and highly competitive, newly founded commercial 

system where they were able to participate in illegal 

trade with little oversight. 

As with other suppliers, Iraq procured illicit goods 

from Chinese companies behind a network of front 

companies and trade intermediaries. Turkish, Syrian, 

Indian, and Jordanian intermediaries were used in the 

procurement process for both seeking quotations of 

goods and in assisting delivery of prohibited goods. In 

all likelihood, the various trade protocols provided a 

legitimate trade cover under which these illicit transactions took place. 

• As in many other cases, the Syrian-based SES 

International Corporation was used as an intermediary between Chinese companies and Iraq. In 
111

Regime Finance

and Procurement

October 2001, Syrian technicians were dispatched 

to China on Iraq’s behalf to contact infl uential 

Chinese air defense companies. Follow-on meetings were to be held in Beijing and Damascus. An 

Indian affi liated, UAE-based fi rm was also used as 

an intermediary to facilitate trade in graphite and 

ballistic missile-related goods from Chinese fi rms.

• In conjunction with the use of brokers and intermediaries, the IIS employed Chinese personnel as IIS 

agents to obtain prohibited goods and build relations between entities. In one case, the IIS tasked 

Professor Xu Guan, a member of the Chinese high 

committee for electronic warfare to collect information on laser-tracking systems, laser guidance systems and information on cooperation between Iran 

and China. The IIS also stationed its own offi cers at 

the Iraqi Embassy in China to manage the IraqiChinese relationship and facilitate trade. 

France 

The French-Iraqi procurement relationship existed 

within a larger bi-lateral political relationship, which 

was turbulent and problematic throughout the 1990s 

up until OIF. From Saddam Husayn’s perspective, the 

relationship was built on Iraq’s hopes to infl uence a 

permanent membership on the UN Security Council 

against the United States and UK (see the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs section).

• Illustrating Iraq’s persistent efforts to curry favor 

in Paris, France was one of the top three countries 

with companies or individuals receiving secret oil 

vouchers (see the Oil Voucher section). Iraq also 

submitted numerous contracts under the UN OFF 

program to companies in France totaling $2.9 billion. 

• In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French 

approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter 

of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs in Baghdad, 

working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions. 

Behind this political maneuvering, ISG has found 

evidence that French companies, after 1998, sought 

and formed procurement relationships with Saddam’s 

Regime. These relationships could have been renewed 

partnerships developed before 1991 when France 

was a major conventional arms supplier for the Iraqi 

Regime. These procurement transactions included 

offers and contracts for conventional weapons 

systems and negotiations for possible WMD-related 

mobile laboratories. 

Recovered documents dated December 1998 and September 1999 indicate that the French company Lura 

supplied a tank carrier to the Iraqi MoD. A French 

expert, “Mr. Claude,” arrived in Iraq in September 

1999 to provide training and offer technical expertise 

on the carrier. 

By 1999, recovered documents show that multiple 

French fi rms displayed a willingness to supply parts 

for Iraqi conventional military items, mainly related 

to aircraft. 

• Documents from the Al-Hadhar Trade Company, 

dated November 1999, describe a delegation of 

French companies that had participated in an International Exhibition in Baghdad. One of the companies was willing to collaborate and supply spare 

parts for the French Mirage aircraft. 

• IIS documents dated from December 1999 to January 2000 show that the Deputy General Manager of 

a French company called SOFEMA planned to visit 

Iraq on 15 January 2000 on behalf of a number of 

French military companies to “seek possible trading 

between the two countries.” An accompanying top 

secret document from the DGMI, M6 Section, corroborates this meeting and further ties the purpose 

to Iraqi air defense capabilities. 

• Another recovered letter, dated September 1999, 

illustrated the approval of a meeting by the DGMI 

M6 Section with the Head of the Iraqi-French 

Friendship Society, Mr. William Libras. Libras 

offered to supply Iraq with western manufactured 

helicopters. This was followed with a letter indicating contact between Al-Hadhar Trade and the 

French suppliers stating that the French companies 

“have the ability to update the aircraft and add any 

system you request.” 
112

ISG uncovered further conventional military trade in 

November 2002 when a French electronic warfare/ 

radar expert named “Mr. Cloud” (possibly Mr. Claude 

from the section above) met with representatives of 

the Al Kindi Research Facility. According to captured 

documents, the purpose of the visit was to facilitate 

military-related microwave, direction fi nding, and 

passive radar technology transfer. The recovered 

documents include military-related technology transfers and Iraqi contractual agreements with foreign 

manufacturers.

Beginning in late December 2002, the MIC initiated 

efforts to acquire replacement parts for the Roland 

II surface-to-air missile system, valves for Iraq’s air 

defense system, and various other high technology 

items with military and battlefi eld applications. These 

efforts were underway with Majda Khasim Al-Khalil 

(a Lebanese female) who in turn met with the French 

Thompson Company representatives. ISG found evidence of coordination on this procurement up until 23 

days before OIF. 

Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

According to captured documents, Iraq and FRY 

cooperated extensively both militarily and economically when the Milosevic Regime was in power. This 

cooperation ceased when a democratic government 

took power. For example, talks were held between 

Iraq and the former Yugoslavia on military and 

economic cooperation from 25 February to 2 March 

1999. The Iraqi side was represented by the Minister 

of Defense, Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Tai. Maj. Gen. 

Jovan Cekovic, the Director General of the Yugoslav 

company, Yugoimport, headed the Yugoslav side. 

The documents detail the Protocol resulting from the 

meetings.

• The two countries expressed their readiness to 

re-establish and continue the military-economic 

cooperation, which they considered one of the most 

co-operative bilateral endeavors.

• According to the documents, the two sides agreed 

to foster greater cooperation among all services of 

each country’s military forces.

• During the meetings, Iraq informed the Yugoslavs 

that because of the current economic situation in 

the country, it is not able to provide funds for the 

future cooperation. To remedy this problem, the 

Iraqi side proposed the supply of crude oil and its 

product instead of currency as a viable solution.

• The two sides then agreed that the next session of 

the Joint Committee for Military and Technical 

Cooperation was to be held in Belgrade in April 

1999. 

A source that was a senior executive in the MIC 

stated that the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cooperated closely and extensively with the 

IAEC, the MIC, and the MoD. Representatives 

from Yugoimport Federal Directorate for Supply and 

Procurement (FDSP), a Yugoslav company, signed 

numerous business contracts with Iraq. Their Baghdad 

representative was Colonel Krista Grujovic. During 

the start of business with Iraq, which was sometime 

around early 1998, Yugoimport opened accounts in 

Amman, Jordan, for Yugoslav Federal under the trade 

name Yugoimport FDSP. However, after a period of 

time their name was changed to MIKA (also known 

as MEGA), a Lebanese company. Yugoimport FDSP 

was then effectively eliminated from all bank records 

and other documents.

• Reportedly, Mahmud Muhammad Muzaffar was 

in charge of the Yugoslav procurement connection 

and was universally liked within the MIC. The Iraqi 

Government sent him under diplomatic cover to 

work as a scientifi c advisor at the Iraqi embassy 

in Belgrade. When Yugoslav companies spoke to 

Muzaffar about doing business with Iraq, he would 

connect their company contacts to MIC representatives. 

• Yugoslav Federal was a military institution under 

the management of the Yugoslav Ministry of 

Defense. It was responsible for overseeing several 

Yugoslav military production companies.

• Yugoslav Federal signed the foreign trade contracts 

on behalf of these military production companies in 

exchange for a certain percentage of the profi ts.
113

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• Yugoslav Federal also supplied materials and expertise directly to Iraq from the Yugoslav production 

companies.

A senior executive at the MIC stated that the fi nancial 

transfers between Yugoslavia and Iraq were under the 

supervision of the Belarusian Infobank. Infobank also 

issued security bonds for the advance payment portions of the contracts. 

• The contracts were signed pursuant to the IraqiSyrian Protocol where the payments were made 

through a third party, usually a Syrian-based company.

• This Syrian company would pay the contract 

amount to the Belarusian bank in exchange for a 

10- to 12-percent cut of the value of the contract.

According to the senior executive of the MIC mentioned above, the former Yugoslavian Government 

was represented commercially through the use of 

experts and ex-military personnel to assist in the 

transfer of technology and technical expertise for 

new military projects. The coordination was under 

the direct supervision of the MIC Director, ‘Abdal-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, Dr. Hadi 

Tarish Zabun, head of special procurement at the 

MIC, and the Iraqi Deputy Minister of Defense. This 

source also stated that the President of Yugoslavia 

opened accounts in Amman, Jordan. under the Lebanese cover company MEGA. 

In October 2002, Stabilization Forces (SFOR), Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, conducted an inspection of the 

ORAO Aviation Company, in Bijeljin, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. Over 60 computer hard drives and a 

large number of documents were seized. Among the 

captured documents was a fi ve-page memorandum 

that documents the discussions and agreements 

between ORAO, Al-Salafa, and the Iraqi Ministry of 

Defense concerning the illegal shipment of R13-300 

and R25-300 jet engines for military aircraft.

• Included in the memorandum is an agenda for the 

enlargement of existing capacities for overhaul of 

R13-300 and R25-300 jet engines.

• The agenda also included a realization of an old 

agreement for overhaul of the engines in the former 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The time limit for 

the delivery and assembly of equipment was to be 

up to nine months.

• Other documents captured indicated that the MIC 

front company Al-Basha’ir was also involved in the 

deal, as well as Yugoimport. According to a contract 

between the two companies, the total amount of the 

deal was worth $8.5 million.

Al-Basha’ir was to be responsible for transporting the 

equipment from Syria to Baghdad for a total price of 

$300,000.

As of May 2000, 45 overhauled engines had been 

delivered; however, captured documents detail a dispute between ORAO and Iraq’s Ministry of Defense 

over the price and delivery of 19 remaining engines.

Al-Salafa is an Iraqi company that is a part of the AlEman network of front companies.

Bulgaria

Although the procurement relationship began in 

1998, from 2000 until the start of OIF, the MIC conducted business with the Bulgarian JEFF Company, 

a company that the IIS recommended the MIC use.

The JEFF Company’s headquarters was located in 

Sofi a, Bulgaria. According to a senior executive in 

the MIC, the Bulgarian government was aware of the 

dealings between the JEFF Company and Iraq. ISG 

cannot confi rm this claim. The MIC used the AlBasha’ir Company to coordinate contracts with JEFF. 

To establish a contract, JEFF personnel would travel 

to Iraq to meet with the Al-Basha’ir Company or vice 

versa. Al-Basha’ir would then deliver the contract to 

the Commercial Department of the MIC where an 

arrangement for the contractual payment would be 

made. 

Reportedly, Bulgarian companies exported numerous military items to Iraq after 2000 in violation of 

UN sanctions (see fi gure 59).
114

• The MIC had contracts with the JEFF Company 

for engines and maintenance parts for the T-72 tank 

and Igla manportable air defense systems (MANPADS). 

• The Bulgarian company ELMET provided components for Iraq’s UAV programs. 

• Captured documents detail the illegal procurement of missiles with tandem warheads, launcher 

units, thermal imagers, test units, and simulators. 

The deal was brokered between Al-Basha’ir, SES 

International in Syria, and the JEFF Corporation in 

Bulgaria for 175 Kornet antitank guided missiles 

(ATGMs). The contract specifi ed that Al-Basha’ir 

was acting on behalf of the MIC of Iraq. Delivery 

of the ATGMs was to take place in March of 2003, 

but it is unclear whether the delivery actually took 

place. 

In 1998, Bulgarian companies contracted with Iraq 

to provide numerous dual-use items such as ammonium perchlorate, aluminum powder, phenolic resin, 

carbon fi ber, and machine tools. Recovered Iraqi 

documentation stated that the end use for these goods 

was for the Al Fat’h missile. 

• Ammonium perchlorate is an oxidizer that makes 

up over 50 percent of the propellant weight of a 

modern solid propellant. Aluminum powder is 

mixed with the ammonium perchlorate and it acts 

as a fuel in the solid propellant. These two chemicals make up the bulk of the propellant mass. These 

basic items were used in the Iraqi Badr 2000 missile system, which was destroyed by UNSCOM. 

But the Ababil and the Al ‘Ubur missile system 

used these items in their propellant.

• Phenolic resin is a very special high-temperature 

resin used by Iraq to bind and hold in place the 

carbon fi bers. 

• The carbon fi ber with the phenolic resin could be 

used in making lighter weight motor cases, nose 

tips, or nozzle throats. These areas experience high 

heat and using a light material lessens the overall 

weight of the missile, extending its range. 

• Prior to 1991, the Iraqis had made missile parts 

from carbon fi ber and had expressed a desire to 

UNMOVIC to again use carbon fi bers. Carbon 

fi bers could also be used in the fabrication of highstrength centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium. 

For these reasons both UNMOVIC and IAEA 

placed carbon fi ber on their watch lists as a controlled material. 

Figure 59. JEFF Company contracts, 2002.
115

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Figure 60. Dual-use equipment imported by Iraq from

Bulgaria.
116

In 2001 Iraq used the Syrian Protocol to purchase 

numerous machine tools from Bulgaria. Some of 

these machines are numerically controlled (CNC) or 

are capable of being adapted for CNC. Such equipment was controlled under the Goods Review List 

(GRL) and would have needed to be approved by the 

UN before being exported to Iraq. 

All of these dual-use machines could be used for 

the production of civilian goods. However, many of 

these machine tools can be used in producing conventional military items, CW, or nuclear programs, 

particularly the shaping of materials such as polytetrafl uorethylene (PTFE) or metals. 

• For example, rocket motor cases or propellant tanks 

start as a large sheet of metal that needs to be cut, 

shaped, rolled, drilled, milled, and welded to form 

the correct shape. 

• CNC machines allow the operator to program exact 

instructions into the computer so it can precisely 

reproduce a pattern a thousand times over to the 

same specifi cations. This is critical for both missile 

and nuclear components. Figure 60 details these 

transactions. 

Procurement Suppliers in the 

Transition and Miscalculation 

Phases, 1998 to 2003

For the fi nal two phases in Saddam’s Regime, “Transition” and “Miscalculation,” ISG has identifi ed eight 

new procurement partners. From the supply side, 

companies from Russia, North Korea, Poland, India, 

Belarus, Taiwan, and Egypt have become key trading 

partners in military or dual-use goods. Like Syria and 

Turkey in earlier phases, Yemen became a transshipment facilitator for Saddam’s procurement programs.

• This increase continues the trend observed in the 

previous phase. This increasing trend most likely 

occurred because of a lack of international condemnation, poor oversight of supplying companies by 

their governments, poor export controls, and the 

high profi ts to be had from Saddam’s illicit revenue. 

• ISG also observes an interesting trend over time 

as Saddam’s international supporters shifted in 

the 1998 time-period from former-Soviet and 

Arab states to some of the world’s leading powers, 

including members of the UNSC.

Russia

Although the Russian Government has denied 

being involved in supplying weapons to Iraq, there 

is a signifi cant amount of captured documentation 

showing contracts between Iraq and Russian companies. In fact, because Russian companies offered so 

many military items, the MIC and a Russian general 

named Anatoliy Ivanovich Makros established a joint 

front company called ARMOS in 1998 just to handle 

the large volume of Russian business (see also the 

ARMOS section). The Russian-Iraqi trade was also 

assisted through bribes to Russian customs offi cials, 

according to a former Iraqi diplomat. 

This former Iraqi diplomat further described how 

Iraq’s embassy personnel smuggled illicit goods on 

weekly charter fl ights from Moscow, through Damascus, to Baghdad from 2001 until OIF. These prohibited goods included high-technology military items 

such as radar jammers, global positioning system 
117

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jammers, night-vision devices, and small missile 

components. Some fl ights were not inspected, even 

though they were reported to the UN. Cash and equipment were reportedly also smuggled into or out of 

Iraq in bimonthly diplomatic courier runs to Moscow.

In early 2003, the Russian company, Rosoboronexport, offered to sell and deliver several weapons 

systems to Iraq. Rosoboronexport had Igla-S shoulder-fi red SAMs and Kornet anti-tank missiles available for immediate sale to Iraq, and was prepared to 

sell larger medium-to-long range advanced (SA-11 

and SA-15) air defense systems and T-90 tanks, 

according to the trip report and a high-level source in 

the former Iraqi Government. 

• ISG has recovered documents detailing two trips 

related to these sales. The fi rst round of negotiations 

with Rosoboronexport and other Russian companies occurred from 27 January 2003 to 6 February 

2003, while the second trip took place from 12 

February 2003 until 21 February 2003. 

• The Iraqi delegation requested air defense equipment, antitank weapons, and night vision devices. 

Iraq also desired to upgrade existing air defense 

equipment (SA-6 and SA-8) and radars.

• According to the trip report, four contracts were 

signed between Rosoboronexport and four Iraqi 

companies: Hittin, Al-Karamah, Al-Milad, and Al 

‘Ubur.

According to Iraqi documents, Rosoboronexport 

executives demanded that they be permitted to ship 

the weapons through a third country with false 

end-user certifi cates. The Russian side emphasized 

that Rosoboronexport is a government agency and it 

cannot be involved with directly supplying Iraq with 

weapons. Other Russian offi cials offered to send 

equipment and technical experts to Iraq under the 

cover of OFF contracts. Before returning to Baghdad, the Iraqi delegation stopped in Damascus to 

obtain false end-user certifi cates from the Syrian 

Ministry of Defense for the fi rst items to be shipped, 

the MANPADS and antitank missiles.

• Although some of the equipment was shipped, ISG 

does not know how much of the equipment was 

actually received in Iraq before Operation Iraqi 

Freedom.

Many of the contracts signed with Russian companies, were for technical assistance, according to an 

Iraqi offi cial with direct access to the information. 

These offers included contracts with TECHNOMASH employees for technical assistance in developing guidance and control systems, aerodynamic 

structures, and a test bench for missile engines. Iraq 

also signed a contract for the transfer of technology 

for the manufacture of laser rods to be used in laser 

range fi nders. The Mansur Factory in Iraq was to be 

the main recipient of this technology. Other contracts 

with Russian companies are detailed in the following:

• The Russian Company, Systemtech was run by 

a Russian missile scientist named Alexander 

Degtyarev. Most of the dealings with this company 

were connected with missile guidance and control, 

and contracts were valued at around $20 million.

• According to captured documents, in November 

2002, the Umm Al-Ma’arik General Company 

negotiated two draft contracts with the Russian 

company Uliss, in support of the “Saddam The 

Lion” Tank Project. They notifi ed the Commercial 

Directorate of the MIC that contract number 2002/

AM/8 had been concluded. On 10 February 2003, 

MIC Deputy Director Daghir Muhammad Mahmud 

approved the contract.
118

Figure 61. Military goods Iraq acquired from Russian 

sources.
119

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• According to captured documents, four contracts 

with Russian fi rms were signed in December 2001. 

These are detailed in fi gure 61. A 25 January 2003 

letter from the MIC front company Al-Basha’ir 

complained to the Minister of the MIC that these 

deliveries had not been completed as of January 

2003. 

North Korea

From 1999 through 2002, Iraq pursued an illicit 

procurement relationship with North Korea for 

military equipment and long-range missile technology. The quantity and type of contracts entered 

between North Korea and Iraq clearly demonstrates 

Saddam’s intent to rebuild his conventional military 

force, missile-delivery system capabilities, and indigenous missile production capacity. There is no evidence, however, to confi rm that North Korea delivered 

longer-range missiles, such as Scud or Scud-variants. 

North Korean and Iraqi procurement relations 

began in 1999 when the MIC requested permission 

from the Presidential Secretary to initiate negotiations with North Korea. In a recovered memo the 

Secretary approved the plan and directed the MIC to 

coordinate negotiations with both the IIS and MoD. 

Recovered documents further suggest that orders for 

negotiations were also passed from Saddam directly 

to the Technology Transfer Offi ce at the IIS. Related 

documents from this time period reveal that the North 

Koreans understood the limitations imposed by the 

UN but were willing “to cooperate with Iraq on the 

items it specifi ed.”

The Director of the MIC formally invited a North 

Korean delegation to visit Iraq in late 1999. The 

Director of North Korea’s Defense Industry Department of the Korean Worker’s Party eventually visited 

Baghdad in October 2000, working through a Jordanian intermediary. Multiple sources suggest Iraq’s 

initial procurement goal with North Korea was to 

obtain long-range missile technology. 

• August 1999 correspondence between the IIS 

Director and a North Korean company called 

the Changwang Group (variant Chang Kwang or 

Chang Gwang), a known company associated with 

weapons-related sales, discussed the supply of 

“technology for SSMs with a range of 1,300 km 

and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300 km.” 

The Changwang Group proposed a multitiered sale 

of weapons and equipment and “special technology” for the manufacture and upgrade of jamming 

systems, air defense radar, early warning radars, 

and the SA-2 missile.

• In a recovered transcript of a telephone conversation prior to the October 2000 meeting, senior 

offi cials at the MIC and the IIS noted topics for 

discussion with the North Korean delegation would 

be the development of SSMs. The Iraqi delegation 

at the meeting included SSM Commander Staff 

Maj. Gen. Najim ‘Abdallah Muhammad. Ensuing discussions during the meeting focused on the 

transfer of military equipment including a shortrange “Tochka-like” ballistic missile that the North 

Korean fi rm said could be purchased from Russia. 

• A captured MoD memo dated 12 October 2000 

summarized the October 2000 meetings, stating that 

SSM Commander Najim had discussed Tochka, 

Scud, and No Dong missiles with a range of 1,500 

km. 

• Staff Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b Hasan Muhammad 

Al Nasiri, a Senior MIC Deputy and a main player 

in procurement negotiations with North Korea, in 

interviews has adamantly denied the discussion of 

longer-range missiles with the North Koreans. 

Documentary evidence shows that, by mid-2001, Iraq 

had signed $10 million of military- related procurement contracts with North Korean companies. 

• The contracts from late 2000 included a deal with 

the Al-Harith Company, believed to be associated 

with Iraqi air defense development, and the AlKaramah State Establishment, known to procure 

technology for missile guidance development, to 

improve Iraqi SSM guidance and control technology, and to upgrade the Iraqi Volga missile homing 

head by adding infrared sensors.
120

• The missile contracts in 2001 were designed to 

improve Iraqi missile systems using North Korean 

parts. These contracts were signed with the AlKamarah State Establishment, the Al-Harith General Company, and the Hittin General Company, 

which is associated with the development of Iraqi 

heavy weaponry. Fifteen percent of this contract 

was reportedly completed and was paid for through 

a Syrian company to the North Korean Embassy in 

Damascus. 

• According to documentary evidence, Muzahim 

Sa’b Hasan visited North Korea in September 2001 

to discuss procurement projects for the Al-Samud 

missile control system, radio relays for communications, and improvements to Iraqi antiaircraft systems. The trip resulted in four signed contracts with 

the Al-Karamah State Establishment for potentiometers (missile guidance and control-related technology), missile prelaunch alignment equipment, 

batteries, and test stands for servos and jet vanes. 

Ultimately, North Korea backed away from these 

agreements, informing the Iraqis that they would 

study the issue. ISG judges that this equipment was 

intended for use in the Al Samud II ballistic missile 

program. 

As the Iraqi-North Korean procurement relationship 

matured, it broadened from missile–related projects 

to a range of other prohibited military equipment 

and manufacturing technologies. Recovered documents from November 2001 describe numerous 

contracts between Hesong Trading Corporation, based 

in Pyongyang, and the Al-Karamah, Al-Harith, and 

Hittin Companies. These contracts included deals for:

• Ammunition, communications, potentiometers for 

short-range surface-to-surface missiles, powder for 

ammunition, and light naval boats.

• Laser range fi nders and fi re-control systems for 

artillery, tank laser range fi nders, and thermal image 

survey systems. 

This series of contracts also specifi ed numerous technology transfers from North Korea to Iraq to allow 

Saddam to design and implement laser head riding for 

anti-tank missile applications and to manufacture:

• PG-7 rockets (an Egyptian variant of the Russian 

RPG-7). 

• Night-vision devices.

• Six-barrel 30-mm guns.

• Laser rangefi nders for guns.

• Thermo image survey systems and rifl ing tools for 

122-mm and 155-mm barrels.

• Ammunition, jigs, fi xtures, dies, parts, liquid-propellant rocket structures, liquid propellant rocket 

aerodynamics computations, guidance, and control 

systems. 

As with its other suppliers, Iraq used its accustomed 

methods to obtain illicit goods from North Korea. In 

short, North Korea’s illicit procurement relationship 

with Iraq was concealed behind a network of front 

companies, trade intermediaries, and diplomatic 

communications.

• The North Korean side of the relationship was 

represented by the Defense Industry Department of 

the Korean Worker’s Party through the Changwang 

Trading Company. The Tosong Technology Trading 

Corporation and Hesong Company were also used 

to broker the negotiations.

• The Syrian-based SES International was used as an 

intermediary in this trading process. Many transactions from North Korea would be orchestrated by 

the North Korean embassy in Damascus, which 

would then endorse the shipment to an Iraqi agent 

in Syria for transshipment to Iraq.

• These intermediaries worked on a commission basis 

and assisted in facilitating delivery into Iraq for 

profi t. 

• Recovered documentation concerning the North 

Korean negotiations stated that all communications 

should be sent via the Iraqi embassy in Damascus. 

Secure communications also took place through the 

Economic Section of the North Korean Embassy in 

Damascus. 
121

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Transportation Routes From North Korea to Iraq

ISG has found evidence suggesting that North Korea 

planned to pass goods through Syria to Iraq. Captured documents reveal North Korean ships planned 

to use Syrian ports to deliver goods destined for Iraq. 

Occasionally, North Korea would insist on the use of 

aircraft to Syria to expedite delivery and reduce the 

risk of discovery of the illicit goods. 

Payment Methods for North Korean Contracts

Recovered contracts and records of negotiations identify the use of fi nancial routing via Beirut, Lebanon 

and Damascus, Syria to conceal Iraq as the end user 

of the goods. A recovered letter from the Al-Basha’ir 

to the Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, dated 

2 March 2002 dictated that ‘contracts’ would be 

fi nanced according to the Iraqi-Syrian Protocol. This 

bilateral trade Protocol used both cash and - credit to 

pay for commodities via Syria. 

Poland 

A Polish based front company engaged in illicit trade 

with Iraq played a limited, but important role in 

Saddam’s efforts to develop Iraq’s missile programs.

Equipment supplied by this Polish based front company between 2001 and 2003, such as SA-2 (surfaceto-air) Volga missile engines and guidance systems, 

were necessary for the Al Samud II missile program. 

Iraq acquired Polish SA-2 Volga missile engines for 

their Al Samud II missiles. The Volga engines were 

the main propulsion system used in the liquid-propellant Al Samud II missile, a weapon that exceeded 

the 150-km-range limit established by UNSCR 687 

(1991). While there is some confusion regarding the 

exact number of Volga missile engines procured by 

Iraq, ISG estimates that Iraq obtained about 280 missile engines from Poland during this period. ISG has 

found no evidence that the engines were ever fi tted 

to active missile systems. 

• Iraq signed four contracts to acquire Volga SA-2 

engines between January 2001 and August 2002. 

• These engines were to be procured for the Al-Karamah State Establishment, through the ARMOS 

Trading Company (an Iraqi-Russian procurement 

organ) and a company located in Poland called 

Ewex, a front company supported by the IIS. 

• Iraq paid approximately $1.3 million for 96 

engines. 

• Ewex used Polish scrap dealers and middlemen to 

gather Volga rocket components from scrap yards 

in Poland operated by the Polish military property 

agency. 

Former Regime offi cials corroborate that ARMOS 

also signed a contract or contracts with the Iraqis to 

obtain Volga engines from individuals in Poland. The 

Volga engines were removed from missiles that had 

been decommissioned. The Volga missile engine procurement was entirely controlled by the IIS, according to debriefs of high-level former Regime offi cials. 

• The MIC was also involved in contracting with 

Ewex for Volga engines. A high-level offi cial 

stated that Iraq purchased approximately 200 Volga 

engines. Many of the Volga engines acquired in this 

way arrived damaged. 

As mentioned in the Higher Education section, Amir 

Ibrahim Jasim al-Tikriti, a doctorate student in Poland 

linked to the IIS and SSO, facilitated the procurement of at least 50 more SA-2 engines and as many 

gyroscopes, missile sensors and acid batteries for 

missiles from Ewex in early 2003. ‘Amir Ibrahim 

Jasim was the cofounder of Ewex and was supervised 

by Husan ‘Abd al-Latif, an IIS offi cer working with 

the Energy Department of the IIS Scientifi c and Technical Information Offi ce in Baghdad. 

Methods Used To Hide Transshipment to Iraq

According to documentary evidence, dated June 

2001, the Iraqi Government and the Ewex Company 

attempted to conceal the illicit procurement of missile 

engines from the international community. According 

to open sources, Polish authorities arrested Ewex 

company offi cials in 2003 on suspicion of illegal 

arms deliveries to Baghdad. Documents recovered 
122

by Polish police included Ewex contracts with the 

well-known Iraqi front company called Al-Basha’ir, 

shipping documents, extracts from the Polish trade 

register, payment orders, and letters from Ewex 

directly to its Iraqi business partners. 

A high-level former Regime offi cial stated that MIC 

Special Offi ce Director Hadi Tarish Zabun, IIS Scientifi c and Technical Information Branch Offi cer Hadi 

‘Awda Sabhan, and Al-Karamah State Establishment 

Director General Dr. Muzhir (Modher) Sadiq Saba’ 

al-Tamimi met to discuss how to conceal this particular illicit transaction from the UN. Dr. Muzhir had 

previously led the Iraqi long-range missile program. 

The documents regarding the deal were eventually 

transferred for safekeeping to Ayyab Qattan Talib, 

an offi cer from the IIS M23 directorate that oversees 

military industry security.

The parties to the transshipment of Volga missiles included personnel from the Iraqi embassy 

in Warsaw, Iraqi intelligence offi cers, and Iraqi 

businessmen. These parties clandestinely transported 

Volga missile engines through Syria, according to a 

high-level offi cial in the former Regime. Ewex representative, Amir Ibrahim Jasim al-Tikriti during April 

2002, requested an extension of the shipping time for 

illicit transfers because shipments would have had to 

proceed via many channels, particularly by circuitous 

transport routes, in order to conceal the contents from 

prying UN inspectors or foreign intelligence agencies. 

In 2002, three shipments of engines and spare parts 

were transferred; the third shipment arrived in Tartus, 

Syria, and was moved to Baghdad by the Al-Karamah 

State Establishment. The third shipment contained 32 

Volga engines and 750 related materials. In addition, the MIC contracted to deliver Volga engines to 

Iraq, from Poland, via Jordan as insurance against 

the interdiction of Syria-bound shipments. According 

to multiple sources, Polish missile parts also entered 

Iraq at the Al-Walid border crossing (see also the 

border crossings map). 

Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial Flows

Numerous contracts, memoranda, and references 

detail the transfer of payments for the Volga missiles. In one contract, original date unknown, Ewex 

transferred $500,080 for the purchase of an unspecifi ed number of Volga missile engines, which were 

delivered in June 2001. Raja Hasan Al-Khazraji, 

General Manager of the Commercial Affairs Department, wrote requesting the release of funds for fi nal 

contractual payments. There are also letters written 

by Dr. Zabun to settle payment without deductions for 

damaged materials on condition that compensation 

will be included in future contracts. A contract also 

stipulates that ARMOS Trading Company received a 

commission of $3,750. 

Dr. Muzhir, wrote a memorandum concerning contract number 2/2001, in which he requests that the 

MIC transfer $315, 840, equaling 25 percent of the 

total contract price for 96 engines to account number 

500090, National Bank of Jordan, Special Banking Section. The authorized person in control of the 

account was ‘Abd-al-Jabbar Jadi ‘Umar. There is 

also a MIC memorandum authorizing the payment 

of $200,690 to Ewex via account number 501133/12, 

which equals 25 percent of the total contract price 

for the 61 engines received at Syrian ports. Dr. Zabun 

approved a contract dated July 2001 with Ewex for 96 

engines with the same value and terms as a previous 

contract for 38 engines. 

Other correspondence exists between the Commercial 

Affairs Department General Manager, Raja Hasan 

Ali, the MIC and Al-Karamah discussing charging late penalties and compensation for damaged 

items. Further correspondence rejects the charges 

and authorizes full payment of the contracted amount 

of $1,263,360 million to Ewex for Volga engines 

shipped through Syria. Bank accounts used at the 

Jordan National Bank (Special Banking) to pay for 

SA-2 Volga missile imports up until at least June 

2001, include 501083/14 and 12429.

India

ISG judges that the Government of India was not 

directly involved in supplying Iraq with military or 

dual-use items, but several Indian companies were 

active in illicit trade, particularly, NEC Engineering Pvt. Ltd. When Indian authorities discovered the 
123

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 62. Contract between NEC and Al-Rashid

Company.
124

company’s activities in 2001, New Delhi launched an 

investigation to stop the NEC’s trade with the Iraqi 

Regime. Despite the investigation, NEC continued to 

sell prohibited materials to Iraq and looked for ways 

to conceal its activities. 

NEC was involved in numerous business agreements 

with Iraq that were contracted outside the UN OFF 

program. Several of these contracts with Iraq violated 

UN sanctions because the material or technology was 

in direct support of a military system, such as the 

Iraqi missile program. 

Al-Najah was the primary front company in Iraq used 

by the MIC manufacturing company, Al-Rashid, to 

import from NEC. In March 2002, Muntasir ‘Awni, 

Managing Director of Al-Najah Company, submitted several inquiries to Siddharth Hans. Hans has 

been identifi ed as holding positions with companies 

in India, including director of NEC Chemicals and, 

at other times, several positions with NEC Engineers 

Pvt, Ltd. In each position, Hans has supported only 

Iraqi projects and inquiries for clients under Al-Najah. 

Among other things, the inquiries covered:

• A Tefl on coating machine.

• Laser range-fi nding equipment.

• Precision machinery.

• Block and cylinder material. 

Prior to the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq had experimented 

with the use of carbon fi bers to provide high strength 

and light weight for some of its missile components. 

Al-Rashid was instrumental in missile development 

prior to the Gulf war and in the years that followed. 

In May of 2000 NEC contracted with the Al-Rashid 

General, Co., to provide 40 kg of “Grade A” carbon 

fi bers. Carbon fi bers, while dual-use material, have 

extensive use in missiles and nuclear equipment. 

Figure 62 is an excerpt from captured documents 

regarding this contract. 

NEC engineers provided Iraq with crucial infrastructure development for its missile program and other 

programs. For example, NEC designed and built an 

ammonium perchlorate (AP) production plant for 

Iraq. AP is an essential ingredient for modern solid 

propellant production. It is the oxidizer for a solid 

propellant and constitutes over half of the propellant’s 

weight. 

• NEC imported solid-propellant ingredients for Iraqi 

surface-to-surface missiles, in addition to other 

materials. 

The excerpt from captured documents in fi gure 63 

details some of the contracts undertaken between the 

Iraqi front company, Al-Basha’ir, with India’s NEC, 

on behalf of MIC companies Al-Rashid and 7 Nissan 

General Company.

When the Indian Government became aware of 

NEC’s activities in 2001, New Delhi launched an 

investigation regarding the company’s illicit business with Iraq. Both Hans Raj Shiv and his son 

Siddharth Hans were implicated in the investigation, which expanded overseas by September 2002. 

The Indian Government impounded the passports of 

NEC representatives. Siddharth Hans was taken into 

Indian custody when he returned to India in mid-June 

2003. Pending further court hearings, Siddharth was 

released from custody in early July 2003. 

• In August 2002, NEC was considering changing 

the name on Iraqi contracts from NEC to Nippon 

Industrial Equipment or Euro Projects International 

Limited. These changes were probably in reaction 

to the Indian Government’s ongoing investigation 

of NEC. 

Other Indian companies involved in supplying Iraq 

with prohibited items include the Arab Scientifi c 

Bureau (ASB) and Inaya Trading. ASB and Inaya 

Trading were involved in the procurement of chemicals associated with liquid-propellant missile systems 

and with chemical production and handling equipment. According to documents recovered during an 

ISG investigation of the ASB, there were numerous 

inquiries from Iraq and corresponding offers to supply 

liquid-propellant missile-associated components. 

Solicited or offered items included:
125

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Figure 63. Selected contracts between NEC and Iraqi 

companies.

• Some 50 to 100 tons of 98 to 99 percent nitric acid.

• Hydrofl uoric acid.

• One hundred nitric acid pumps for 99.99 percent 

nitric acid.

• Unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), a liquid 

fuel use for improved performance in liquid rocket 

propellants.

• Diethylene triamine (DETA), a liquid fuel used in 

liquid propellant missiles.

• Other chemicals sought by Iraq included hydrazine, 

hydrogen peroxide, xylidene, and triethylamine, 

which are chemicals commonly used for fuels and 

oxidizers by liquid-propellant missiles. 

Belarus

Belarus was the largest supplier of sophisticated 

high-technology conventional weapons to Iraq from 

2001 until the fall of the Regime. Complicity in this 

illicit trade was exhibited at the highest levels of 

the Belarusian Government. Belarusian state establishments and companies implemented cooperation 

agreements with Iraq to transfer technology, equipment, and expertise to the embargoed Regime. 

• The Iraqis constantly worked to improve the 

illicit trade relationship with Belarus despite the 

absence of a formal trade agreement between the 

two countries. The illicit trade relationship allowed 

Iraq to obtain high-technology military equipment. 

Belarus was relatively advanced in military research 

and development including air defense and electronic warfare. 
126

• Belarus acquired hard currency and a market for 

its post-Soviet defense industry, according to a 

detainee. 

• The intelligence services of both countries helped 

to facilitate this trade, according to a cooperative 

source with good access. A detainee debrief affi rms 

that Belarusian aid in radars, laser technology, 

metallurgy, and electronic warfare systems were the 

key areas of cooperation. 

In 2001 and 2002, two MIC delegations visited 

Belarus to discuss Belarusian assistance in upgrading 

Iraqi defense capabilities, particularly air defense and 

electronic warfare systems. Former MIC Director, 

Huwaysh, led the Iraqi delegations. The Iraqi delegations also included the former Director of Al-Kindi 

Dr Sa’ad Da’ud Shamma’, the former Director of the 

Al-Milad air defense company, Brigadier General 

Husayn, and several high-ranking Iraqi air defense 

offi cials. Huwaysh, however, was the overall manager 

of the relationship between Iraq (especially MIC) and 

Belarus according to a detainee debrief. 

A former high-ranking Iraqi government offi cial 

says that diplomatic relations between Belarus and 

Iraq were so strong that an Iraqi-Belarusian Joint 

Committee was formed to promote illicit trade. The 

committee was cochaired by the Iraqi Minister of 

Finance, Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim al-Azzawi, and 

Vladimir Zamitalin of the Belarusian Presidential 

Offi ce. Indeed, the President of Belarus, Aleksandr 

Lukashenko, consistently supported the political 

positions and defense needs of Iraq. In a September 

2002 meeting, President Lukashenko met MIC and 

MFA offi cials to discuss military cooperation. During 

the meeting, President Lukashenko expressed his 

willingness to support Iraq and to send air defense 

experts to help Iraq fi ght the United States.

Key Belarusian Individuals Linked to Illicit Trade 

With Iraq

The following Belarusian individuals were instrumental in driving forward the illicit trade with Iraq: 

• Vladimir Zamitalin. Ex-deputy to the head of the 

Presidential Bureau and former head of the Belarusian side of the combined Iraqi-Belarusian Committee for Commercial and Economic Cooperation. 

He was in charge of the special military cooperation 

with Iraq and functioned as a secret envoy between 

President Lukashenko and Saddam.

• Leonid Kozek. Ex-deputy to the head of the Presidential Bureau and member of the Iraqi-Belarusian 

cooperation committee.

• Nikolai Ivanenko. Current deputy to the head of 

the Presidential Bureau and last head of the Belarusian side of the combined Iraqi-Belarusian committee for economic cooperation. He had a role in the 

special military cooperation with Iraq, and is a relative of President Lukashenko. He visited Iraq twice 

and met with Saddam, carrying a written letter to 

Saddam from President Lukashenko.

• Vitali Kharlap. Belarusian Minister of Industry.

• Professor Kandrinko. Director of the communications department at a Belarusian concern called 

AGAT. He played a successful role in negotiations 

with Salah Al-Din state company and concluded 

many contracts concerning the manufacture of communication sets.

• Professor Kloshko. A scientist who led the department of telemetric systems for surface-to-surface 

missiles and had many contracts with the MIC.

• General Petr Rokoshevskiy. Deputy for arming 

and training in the Belarusian MoD. Rokoshevskiy 

had a role in activating military cooperation with 

Iraq. This involved working with the Iraqi MoD, 

SRG, and the MIC for supplying rocket propelled 

grenades (RPG-7), munitions, and laser-directed 

Konkurs antitank rounds. He played a major role 

in signing a contract with the Iraqi MoD and the 

MIC for training 20 offi cer engineers of the SRG in 

using the S-300 PMU-1 (SA-20) air defense system 

at the Belarusian military academy. Rokoshevskiy 

was also involved in signing contracts for supplying engines for T-72 and T-55 tanks, MiG-29 fi ghter 

jets, and BMP-1 mechanized infantry fi ghting 

vehicles. 
127

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by 

Belarus

Belarus exported a range of military goods to Iraq. 

This illicit trade was organized and executed by a 

number of Belarusian companies. Captured documents reveal that in December 2002, Balmorals Ventures Ltd. implemented contract 148/2002 with the 

Al-Kindi General Company to deliver electronic components to the value of $70,367. This price included 

the cost of delivery to Syria and onward shipment to 

Baghdad. The goods could have been components for 

a radar jamming system. 

Viktor Shevtsov was the director of Infobank and of 

another Belarusian company involved in illicit trade 

with Iraq named BelarusianMetalEnergo (BME).

Infobank helped fi nance deals with Iraq and, according to Huwaysh, may have been run by Belarusian 

intelligence. BME was involved in supplying castings 

and machinery for T-72 tanks, and modernizing SA-2 

air defense missiles and associated radar systems. 

BME had many multimillion dollar contracts with 

Iraq and worked closely with Infobank to fi nance 

illicit trade. Shevtsov organized, at his own personal 

expense, trips on-board Belarusian airlines from 

Minsk to Baghdad. These fl ights transported experts 

and directors of Belarusian companies connected 

to Iraq as well as technical and military equipment 

destined for Iraqi ministries. 

Alexander Degtyarev was also a major player in 

the illicit trade business with Iraq. Degtyarev was a 

Russian scientist whose specialty was missile guidance and control. Shevtsov introduced Degtyarev 

to the Iraqi MIC. Degtyarev owned the Belarusian 

companies named Systemtech and ElectricGazCom 

(EGC), which had contracts with Infobank and Iraq to 

supply radars plus control and guidance systems for 

SA-2 missiles. The latter equipment was transported 

through Syria and paid for through Syrian banking 

institutions. Degtyarev was a regular visitor to Iraq, 

traveling there every two weeks according to a highlevel MIC offi cial and a mid-level former Iraqi civil 

servant with direct access to the information. 

A high-level MIC offi cial stated that EGC signed contracts with the Iraqi Al-Karamah State Establishment 

to build a facility for the manufacturing and testing of 

control and guidance systems for surface-to-surface 

missiles such as al-Samud. This trade also included 

the sale of gyroscopes and accelerometer testing 

stages. In addition, ECG signed contracts with the AlBatani State Company for the technology transfer of 

manufacturing systems for an Iraqi satellite research 

project. 

A former Iraqi offi cial revealed that President Aleksandr Lukashenko as a vehicle for illicit trade with 

Iraq promoted a joint Belarusian-Iraqi company. 

Lukashenko was anxious that illicit trade should 

continue on a regular basis and requested that a fi rm 

called Belarus Afta be established in Baghdad as a 

clearinghouse for illicit military trade.

• Radar technology and air defense were the most 

crucial export commodities to Iraq from Belarus. 

Captured documents and a mid-level Iraqi military 

offi cer with direct access to the information affi rm 

that there was joint Belarus-Iraqi development of 

an improved P-18 (Mod Spoon Rest) early warning 

radar between November 2000 and March 2003. 

This radar was employed at Al-Habbaniyah Air 

Defense Center against Coalition aircraft during 

OIF. 

• Systemtech provided assistance in the fi elds of 

research, testing, and project implementation. Dr 

Raskovka was the senior Systemtech offi cial helping the Iraqis, visiting Iraq every 3 to 4 months for 

3 years. The Iraqis wanted to purchase an S-300 air 

defense system. Contracts were signed and training 

undertaken, but the pure logistic problems of supplying the system without alerting the international 

community were insurmountable.

Other interviewees revealed that Belarus provided 

numerous supplies of illicit goods to Iraq. These 

included equipment for T-72 and T-55 tanks; Volga, 

Pechora (SA-3) and other air defense missile systems; 
128

Mi-17 helicopters; spares and repairs for MiG-23, -25 

and -29 plus Sukhoi 25 jets; laser guidance systems; 

fi ber optics; infrared spare parts; GPS jammers; and 

radios. 

Even during the prelude to OIF, the illicit Belarusian 

military trade with Iraq did not stop as shown by captured documents. Belarus provided PN-5 and PN-7 

night-vision devices for Iraq through the Al-Basha’ir 

front company. Three months before the onset of the 

IAEC—MIC Cooperation for the Procurement of 

CNC Machines

Based on interviews with Fadil Al Janabi, former 

head of the IAEC, and ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al 

Mullah Huwaysh, former Minister of Military Industrialization, it is evident that the MIC procured CNC 

machines for the IAEC as part of a “special project” 

for modernizing Iraq’s scientifi c infrastructure in 

2001. 

• According to interviews with Fadil Al Janabi, presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab 

Al Nasiri was approached in 2001 with a proposal 

for a modernization program that included procurement of new machinery and equipment, enabling 

the IAEC to create molds and manufacture specialty parts in-house. Al Janabi wanted to procure 

these CNC machines through the MIC to bypass 

foreign supplier’s reluctance to sell manufacturing 

equipment to the IAEC. 

• Huwaysh recalled that in 2001, Al Janabi and 

Khalid Ibrahim Sa’aid contacted him with a 

presidential order to assist the IAEC with a “special project.” The MIC was not to be involved with 

establishing technical specifi cations or providing 

funding, but was to serve as a functional link. 

• During this initial meeting, which was also 

attended by Munir Mamduh ‘Awad Al Kubaysi, 

Director General of MIC’s Al-Basha’ir Company, 

Huwaysh claimed he was informed that he did not 

need to know what was being procured. He further 

remembered the relative high cost of the machines, 

costing approximately half the budget of the entire 

special IAEC modernization project. 

IAEC scientists and employees, in contrast, have 

claimed that CNC machines procured from Taiwan 

were not high precision and were the same as those 

used at the Al Badr General Company.

• A source with access stated that the most precise 

machines were capable of 5-micron accuracy, but 

none of the machines were fi ve to six axes because 

this would have “broken sanctions and all of the 

machines were declared to inspectors.” The IAEC 

employee stated that these high-precision machines 

were installed at Tuwaitha and information regarding these machines was provided to the UN and 

IAEA in the declaration given in December 2002. 

• ISG has found Iraqi documents that corroborate 

this assertion, showing that the IAEC had prepared 

UN forms (OMV Form 22.5/ MOD.2) for eight CNC 

machines, all of which were identifi ed as three-axes 

machines. The descriptions in the declarations are 

consistent with the statements of the mid-level managers. 

It is important to note, however, that these IAEC 

sources referred to the MIC manufacturing company 

Al Badr and not Al-Basha’ir, the MIC front company 

involved in negotiations with Huwaysh. In the interchange between the IAEC and the MIC, Al Janabi 

was explicitly ordered that all transactions and 

communications on this procurement project were 

to go through Munir Al Kubaysi and Al-Basha’ir. 

ISG judges it is probable that this “special project” 

procurement was carried out by Al-Basha’ir as 

a separate classifi ed channel for IAEC precision 

machinery. This assessment supports Huwaysh’s 

claim of the sensitivity surrounding the “classifi ed” 

nature of the IAEC modernization project in 2001.
129

Regime Finance

and Procurement

confl ict, President Lukashenko instructed the Belarusian Ministry of Defense to allow Iraq to purchase 

any goods from Belarusian military supplies. 

Payments From Iraq to Belarus

The main revenue stream for funding illicit trade with 

Iraq came from the Iraq-Syria Trade Protocol. The 

amount of illicit military trade between Belarus and 

Iraq was signifi cant according to captured documents, 

with Belarusian Governments receiving nearly $114 

million in payments from Iraq. 

According to a detainee, the critical fi nancial element in the illicit trade process between Belarus and 

Iraq was Infobank. Belarus demanded to be paid 75 

percent of the contract price in hard currency before 

delivery of any goods. Iraq did not agree to this. 

Therefore, Infobank agreed to provide bridging funds, 

including the 75 percent up-front fee, to fi nance 

illicit deals between Belarus and Iraq for a fee of 15 

percent of any contract. According to a high-level 

Regime source with direct access, kickbacks paid 

to Iraq by Belarusian companies for exports to Iraq 

under the UN OFF Program were kept at the Infobank 

to fund future illicit Iraqi imports from Belarus. A 

senior former executive in the Iraqi MIC believes that 

Infobank had a total of $7 million of Iraqi money in 

its accounts before OIF. Infobank also fi nanced illicit 

military trade between Iraq and Yugoimport-FDSP of 

Serbia, paying equivalent up-front fees, according to a 

former senior executive in the MIC. 

Taiwan 

Although a limited supplier of prohibited goods to 

Iraq, companies from Taiwan negotiated for conventionally military goods and provided critical CNC 

machines to the Regime from 2001 to 2003. These 

machines provided Iraq with a means to improve its 

military-related production.

The earliest evidence of Iraq’s procurement relationship with Taiwan dates back to January 2001, when 

Iraq sought military equipment and dual-use goods 

from companies in Taiwan. In an apparent attempt to 

circumvent UN sanctions, Dr. Khalid Sulayman of the 

Iraq-based company ETIK for General Trading Limited approached the Taiwanese arms brokerage fi rm, 

Epnon International Limited, seeking 150 engines for 

T-72 and T-55 tanks, 200 engines for the T-62 tank, 

and 100 engines for the BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored 

personnel carriers. The engines were to be in complete and new condition.

Although Epnon’s prices were higher than other 

sources, ETIK learned that it did business without the 

need for offi cial papers. The deal was originally structured as cash only; however, under-the-table transaction with the payments made in advance occurred, 

and an agreement was eventually reached for half the 

payment for the engines to be in cash, and the other 

half in oil.

• ISG has found no evidence that these engines were 

delivered to Iraq. 

There is limited information on the supply of CNC 

machines to Iraq, but during UNSCOM’s tenure, 

UN inspectors confi rmed Iraq had obtained CNC 

machines manufactured by companies in Taiwan.

• During an inspection in 1998 of the Al Rashid General Company’s Dhu-al-Fiqar (Tho Al Fekar) Plant 

at the Taji Metals Complex, UNSCOM inspectors found four new Hartford vertical machining 

centers, with one machine installed and being used 

on Ababil-50 motor bulkheads. The four machines, 

made by the She Hong Machinery Company Limited, were three-axis vertical machining center with 

an indexing fourth axis and a 20-tool carousel. 

• The inspectors considered these modern, standard 

quality CNC machines suitable for good quality 

aerospace and missile-related applications. Later in 

1998, another inspection at the Dhu-al-Fiqar (Tho 

Al Fekar) Mechanical Plant reported another four 

Hartford CNC machines milling Ababil-50 rocket 

nozzles. The team identifi ed that three of these 

machines possessed a computer-controlled turntable. 

• ISG cannot confi rm that these CNC machines were 

purchased directly from sources in Taiwan. It is 

equally likely that these machines were obtained 

from unknown third parties. 
130

In 2001, the IAEC and MIC were working to obtain 

CNC machines to modernize Iraq’s scientifi c infrastructure. By 2002, documentary evidence shows 

Iraqi front companies soliciting bids and contracting 

for CNC machines from companies in Tawian. The 

CNC machines procured from Taiwan by Iraq consisted of three or more axes, suggesting potential use 

in weapons production. 

• In early May 2002, the Baghdad-based Iraqi fi rm, 

Aldarf Company, represented by ‘Ali Al bakri, 

sought tilting rotary tables for two machining 

centers. She Hong Industrial Company, one of 

Taiwan’s largest manufacturers of machine tools, 

acknowledged the Iraqi company’s need for accessories and stated that rotary tables manufactured by 

Taiwan’s Golden Sun industrial Company Limited, 

Taichung could be added to both machines that Iraq 

already possessed. 

• Recovered correspondence from the Al-Basha’ir 

Company revealed a deposit of $900,000 into 

the account of Mr. ‘Abd-al-Razzaq Al Falahi 

and Brothers to execute a contract for importing 

machine tools from Taiwan. This money was then 

transferred into the account of She Hong Industrial 

Company. 

• In July 2002, Iraq asked a Jordanian company to 

seek a new quote from a company in Taiwan for a 

gun-drilling machine, earlier quoted at a price of 

$146,000. 

• January 2003 bids for CNC wire-cutting machines 

from Taiwan were also revealed in documentation 

from the Al Badr State Company, a subsidiary of 

the MIC. 

Iraq took active measures to ensure that illicit trade 

for machine tools from Taiwan was concealed. Recovered correspondence from Al-Basha’ir expressed that 

the wording of the contract conducted by Mr. ‘Abdal-Razzaq Al Falahi should not make reference to 

Al-Basha’ir and that monies should be deposited in 

a static account for all transactions. Correspondence 

from a MIC-run company also indicated that bids 

from companies in Taiwan were under the auspices of 

the Iraqi and Syrian agreements, implying that goods 

obtained from Taiwan would be transshipped through 

front companies operating out of Syria or that Syrian 

front companies would act as intermediaries and 

facilitate delivery of the procured equipment. 

Egypt 

Since 1990, illicit procurement activity between 

Iraq and Egypt provided Baghdad with a limited 

amount of materials that the Regime found diffi cult 

to acquire outside UN sanctions. Materials that Iraq 

acquired through its relations with Egypt, outside UN 

sanctions and resolutions, included nitric acid, stainless steel and aluminum alloys. 

Egyptian and Iraqi procurement relations began in the 

early 1980s when Baghdad provided Cairo with $12 

million in 1981 in return for assistance with production and storage of chemical weapons agents. At this 

time Baghdad also entered into a series of contracts 

with the Government of Egypt to procure the twostage Badr-2000 missile and to provide the technological infrastructure to build the missile indigenously, 

before it attempted to extend the range of its Scud-B/

8K-14 missiles. 

Following Operation Desert Storm and UN sanctions, 

procurement from Egypt was limited. Nevertheless, 

Iraq used its ties with Egypt to procure key items that 

were diffi cult to procure elsewhere.

• The MIC, through its front company Al-Husan, 

had a $5 million contract with an Egyptian fi rm for 

stainless steel, forged steel, and aluminum in 2003.

Trade in nitric acid, a precursor in the manufacture of 

solid propellant also fl ourished following the destruction of the Al Qa’Qa State Company Nitric Plant in 

December 1998, during Operation Desert Fox. 

 • A senior offi cial from the MIC stated that Iraq had 

a secret agreement with Egypt during 2001 to 2002 

to have nitric acid shipped from Egypt through 

Syria to Iraq. It is unclear how many tons of nitric 

acid Iraq received from this secret agreement.
131

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Many transactions for prohibited goods were 

orchestrated through a trade protocol sponsored by 

the Iraqi MoO. The second Deputy Director for the 

MIC, Daghir Muhammad Mahmud, was responsible 

for monitoring these transactions. 

• A source with direct access estimated that there 

was approximately $50 million in the trade protocol 

account. Goods and materials were occasionally 

procured on a cash basis from Egypt, but the majority of the protocol was based on oil transshipped 

through Jordan. 

• M-23 offi cers from Balad, Iraq often accompanied 

MIC personnel to Egypt and between 2000 and 

2003. M-23 was responsible for the physical security of MIC facilities and personnel. ‘Abd-al-Hamid 

Sulayman Al Nasiri, the Director of M-23, personally went to Egypt under the auspices of the IAEC 

about six months before OIF. 

According to a senior Iraqi offi cial from the MIC, 

the Egyptian state was involved in illicit trade with 

Iraq. Known Syrian procurement agents for Iraqi 

front companies also assisted in some of these transactions. It is also apparent that the Syria-Iraq Trade 

Protocol facilitated illicit trade from Egypt. Individual 

brokers and Iraqi foreign nationals in Egypt may have 

also initiated illicit trade, motivated by the lure of 

corporate and individual profi ts. 

• Nitric acid supplies were reportedly the responsibility of the Dr. Asif Shalish, Director of the Syrian 

SES International, who dealt regularly with Iraqi 

procurement companies. All payments of the nitric 

acid were handled under the Syrian protocol and 

the head of Al-Basha’ir, Munir Mamduh Awad alKubaysi. 

ISG, however, judges that the most likely transshipment routes through Jordan and Syria were based on 

the ties to the trade protocols. 

Yemen 

Improving bilateral relations between Sana’a and 

Baghdad in the late 1990s resulted in direct Yemeni 

participation in Iraq’s illicit procurement schemes.

After 2000, Yemen became a state trade intermediary 

for Iraq, providing Baghdad with “end-user” cover for 

military goods prohibited by UN sanctions and resolutions. There is no evidence, however, that Yemen 

was complicit in the procurement of WMD-related 

commodities.

Throughout the 1990s, Yemeni President Ali ‘Abdallah Salih publicly supported UN sanctions against 

Iraq, but he remained concerned about the humanitarian impact on Iraq’s citizens. Starting in February 

1997, senior members of the Yemeni Government 

privately argued that Yemen should unilaterally abrogate the UN sanctions on Iraq. They contended that 

lifting the embargo would help to provide the Iraqi 

people with much-needed humanitarian assistance 

and enhance regional stability. By 1999, President 

Salih was beginning to publicly criticize the United 

States and the UK for the imposition of no fl y zones 

over Iraqi airspace and the UN embargo. 

Opening Conventional Trade With Yemen for 

Oil and Cash

In addition to increasingly pro-Iraqi rhetoric, Yemen 

and Iraq also built closer trade ties in 1999. Through 

regularly scheduled Iraqi-Yemeni Joint Committee 

meetings, Iraq and Yemen had signed trade agreements and Memoranda of Understanding aimed 

at strengthening bilateral ties, sparking economic 

growth, and exchanging energy experts in the fi eld 

of natural gas and petroleum exploration. The two 

countries also signed a customs treaty, whereby no 

duties would be paid on the transfer of goods between 

Iraq and Yemen. Although these agreements were

within the guidelines set forth by UNSCR 986, they 

provided an avenue for increasing trade coordination and eventually led to sanctions violations.

• The Iraq Government signed a $9 million deal in 

November 2000 with the Yemeni Hayal Sa’id group 

of companies to provide Iraq with food and medical- related goods in exchange for hard currency 

derived from Iraqi oil sales.

• On 29 September 2000, President Salih authorized 

one of the fi rst commercial airline fl ights to Baghdad. Salih had rejected earlier calls by Yemeni 
132

opposition parties for this action out of fear of a 

US government reaction. After a Royal Jordanian 

Airlines fl ight landed in Baghdad on 27 September, 

however, Salih decided he could defl ect Western 

criticism by claiming the fl ight was on a humanitarian mission. It was expected that Yemen would 

allow additional fl ights to Baghdad in the future. 

By November 2000, another session of the Yemeni 

Iraqi Joint Committee, led by ‘Abd-Al-‘Aziz AlKumaym, was held in Baghdad. The meetings again 

centered on improving bilateral relations, but mainly 

dealt with increasing economic activity between the 

two countries. The joint committee reached agreement in a number of areas, including the purchase 

of Iraqi oil at below market prices for cash using 

unnamed Yemeni businessmen instead of the Yemeni 

Government. This kind of transaction was very 

profi table for Yemen, but violated UN sanctions. In 

addition to the profi ts earned by this trade, Saddam’s 

Regime also agreed:

• To provide 60 scholarships for Yemeni students to 

study at Baghdad University.

• To the exchange of experts to take place in the 

fi elds of agriculture and telecommunications. 

Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for 

Iraqi Illicit Imports

Several high-ranking Iraqi, Yemeni, and Syrian 

Government offi cials met to discuss the establishment of an illicit trade protocol between February and July 2001. The purpose of these particular 

meetings centered on formulating and implementing 

a plan that would allow Iraq to acquire Russianmanufactured military spares through a complicated 

supply chain and front company network. The main 

participants in the meetings were the Iraqi Ministry of 

Defense General Secretary, the Yemeni Ambassador, 

and Firas Talas, the son of the former Syrian Defense 

Minister Lt. Gen. Mustafa Talas. A Yemeni businessman named Sharar ‘Abd-al-Haq brokered the illicit 

Yemeni business transactions. 

• Lt. Gen. Mustafa Talas, while absent from the meeting, provided a letter, which stated that he recently 

met Dimitrof Mikhail, president of Russian Company of Iron Export. Dimitrof, a former senior Russian intelligence offi cial, had agreed to supply spare 

parts without requesting the identity of the end user. 

• ‘Abd-al-Haq agreed to transport military supplies 

from Yemen to Iraq using the illicit trade networks. 

• According to the letters, Iraq provided ‘Abd-al-Haq 

a list of requirements, signed by the Iraq Defense 

General Secretary. This list included spares for the 

following: MiG-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, 

MiG-29, Su-22, Iskandri missiles with a range of 

290 kilometers, updated parachutes, L-39 combat 

capable trainers, Bell 214st helicopters, T-55 and 

T-72 tanks, armored cars, BMP-1 and BMP-2 

armored personnel carriers, and other cars and 

trucks. 

• A contract for Bell 214th helicopters was negotiated 

with Yemen for the value of $7,287,213. The contract outlined the transportation scheme to take the 

prohibted items from Singapore to Sana’a, Yemen 

to Damascus, Syria to Baghdad with payment to be 

made through the International Bank of Yemen. 

According to recovered documents, President Salih 

called his brother, the Yemeni Air Force Commander, after this meeting and told him to provide 

Iraq with spare parts even if they needed to take 

them from Yemeni stocks. He also ordered his brother 

to acquire more materials from Russia.

• Reportedly, in early December 2001, the Iraqi Air 

Force had received spare parts for MiG-29 fi ghter 

aircraft, mainly through Tartus, Syria. No further 

information is available as to the origin of the 

aircraft parts. It is likely that these items were purchased via the Russian/Yemen/Syria supply chain.
133

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Importing Prohibited 

Commodities

Overview

Iraq under Saddam Husayn used various methods to 

acquire and import items prohibited under UN sanctions. Numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the 

end user, obtained false end-user certifi cates, and/or 

changed the fi nal destination of the commodity to 

get it to the region. For a cut of the profi ts, these trade 

intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, 

the prohibited items to land, sea, and air border entry 

points along the Iraqi border. 

• Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, 

UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of prohibited items through deceptive trade 

practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this 

included support from agencies or personnel within 

the government itself.

• Numerous ministries in Saddam’s Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq’s 

borders, ports, and airports. The IIS and MIC, 

however, were directly responsible for skirting 

UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for 

Saddam. 

Deceptive Trade Practices 

Supporting Illicit Procurement

Use of Trade Intermediaries 

Trade intermediaries were a specifi c subcategory of 

front company that served as middle-men or agents 

for illicit procurement between the Iraq clients and 

international suppliers. On the surface they were 

transport-related businesses such as freight or shipping companies that disguised the routing, destination, or purpose of acquired goods. They were either 

foreign or domestic companies and charged a percentage of the contract fee for their services. There were 

three types of Iraqi trade intermediaries:

• Companies in full collusion with the former 

Regime (often these were owned or operated by the 

Regime).

• Intermediaries willing to overlook ambiguous or 

partially completed trade documents if the profi t 

margin was suffi cient.

• Companies that were unaware of the Iraqi involvement in the contract because of falsifi ed paperwork 

or Iraqi deception. 

The conditions for illicit trade via intermediaries were 

set by the reestablishment of normal trade under the 

1996 UN OFF Program and the bilateral trade protocols with Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. These protocols 

provided effective cover for illicit trade to occur, 

establishing legitimate linkages between trading 

companies, and making it more diffi cult to monitor 

compliance with UN sanctions. 

• Iraqi trade companies established branch offi ces in 

neighboring countries or to call on the support of 

affi liated/sister companies operating abroad. Sometimes these branch offi ces/sister companies represented the primary offi ce for soliciting offers from 

foreign suppliers. These relationships gave the 

appearance that commercial business was being 

conducted with business clients in the neighboring 

country, rather than Iraq. 
134

Iraqi trade intermediaries generally used several 

approaches to hide the illicit nature of their cargo. 

These approaches were used singly or in combination 

(depending on the sensitivity of the commodities) 

to get the items into a neighboring country where it 

could be easily smuggled into Iraq.

• Disguising the nature of the item. 

• Hiding the ultimate end user. 

• Changing the fi nal destination. 

• Nondisclosure. Alternatively, any of these three 

bits of information could simply be not provided 

or written illegibly on the shipping documents. 

Although against common trade practices, this 

ambiguity could provide suffi cient deniability for 

those suppliers in the acquisition chain. 

Disguising the Nature of Prohibited Goods

The Iraqi Regime skirted UN restrictions by using 

cover contracts under the trade Protocols or outright incorrect descriptions of items in transit. The 

MIC was known to use this method to purchase 

military equipment using funds from the UN OFF 

program. Military-use items would also be incorrectly 

described in the paperwork as dual-use items. ISG 

has uncovered numerous examples of Iraqi efforts 

to disguise the nature of illicit imports to skirt the 

UN sanctions Regime:

• Captured Iraqi documents verify that NEC provided 

restricted items to Iraq, although ISG has not found 

any evidence that NEC provided Iraq with chemicals that could be used to produce CBW agents.

• In 1999, the MIC imported Georgian T-55 and T-72 

tank engines under cover contracts for agricultural 

equipment, according to documents corroborated 

by a high-level MIC offi cial (see fi gure 64). 

• Translated correspondence between the Iraqi front 

company Al-Rawa’a Trading Company and AlKaramah detailed November 2000 plans to alter 

shipping documents for agricultural towing batteries (military use) to describe them as batteries 

for ambulances. Muhammad Talib Muhammad, 

director of Al-Rawa’a, was concerned because, if 

the batteries were discovered during inspection 

upon arrival in Iraq, it could create a “crisis.” The 

purpose of altering the documents was clearly to 

describe the batteries dual use rather than military 

use, thereby making it easier to bring them into the 

country.

• In February 2003, the Russian state arms export 

company, Rosoboronexport, and other Russian 

companies planned to sell advanced antiaircraft 

and antitank missile systems to Iraq, according to 

a document signed by the head of MIC security 

recovered at the IIS Headquarters in Baghdad. The 

Iraqis and Russians planned to ship the prohibited 

goods using UN OFF cover contracts to disguise 

the items as illumination devices, water pumps, and 

assorted agricultural equipment. ISG does not know 

if this equipment was shipped to Iraq before the 

start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Figure 64. A bill of lading from October 1999 for T-72 

and T-55 tank engines described as “spare parts for

agricultural equipments.”
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Concealing the Identity of Commodities

In addition to disguising the identity of the item, 

trade intermediaries employed many techniques to 

hide the identity of the end user of the commodities. 

A common practice used by Middle Eastern trade 

intermediaries representing Iraq’s interests would 

routinely approach suppliers about requirements for 

“unidentifi ed clients.” The international suppliers 

would either settle for incomplete end-user statements 

(part of the formal international trade documentation 

requirements) or accept false end-user statements 

from neighboring countries sympathetic to Iraq. 

• After 1997, many of the illicit goods imported by 

MIC came through Syria using false end-user certifi cates provided by high-ranking Syrian offi cials. 

International Commodity Deception: 

The Spherical Aluminum Powder Case Study

The lure of high profi ts brought unscrupulous trade 

intermediaries to Iraq to offer their “services.” Iraq’s 

Al Badr Bureau Trading and Engineering Firm sought 

bids on spherical aluminum powder, a key component 

for solid rocket propellant, through a Pakistani trade 

intermediary. After three attempts to purchase the 

powder failed, the intermediary’s managing director 

sought other means to obtain the powder for Al Badr. 

Throughout the trade negotiations, both Amanatullah 

and Dr. Farhan Ghazar, the Al Badr representative, 

were aware the powder was a prohibited military 

item. 

• In late April 2002, the Pakistani intermediary proposed shipping the powder to Iraq through Pakistan 

and then Syria using “falsifi ed shipping documents” listing a different material in the shipping 

containers. He requested Dr. Ghazar’s assistance to 

create these false invoices.

• By mid-May, he had identifi ed an unnamed British 

manufacturer that was prepared to ship the powder 

to Karachi and passed the company’s end-user certifi cate to Dr. Ghazar, as a metallurgist, who should 

have no trouble falsifying the document.

• The Pakistani intermediary and Ghazar also sought 

possible nonmilitary end uses for the powder that 

could be listed on the British certifi cate.

• After completing the planning for the illicit shipment, he and Dr. Ghazar sought to assure his Iraqi 

clients that his Pakistani company was fully prepared to handle this sensitive project and any future 

requests for other Iraqi customers. 

Throughout the summer and fall of 2002, the Pakistani intermediary continued to try to close the contract for spherical aluminum powder with Iraq. He 

made a trip to Iraq with samples in July and mailed 

samples to Dr. Ghazar in October 2002. Had Iraq 

agreed to the shipment in November 2002, the Pakistani intermediary’s own delivery estimates would 

have had the powder delivered to Pakistan from a 

British fi rm no earlier than February 2003. Therefore, 

it is unlikely Iraq was able to obtain the aluminum 

powder before OIF. Nevertheless, this case illustrates 

the methods used by Iraq and its illicit trade intermediaries to evade UN sanctions and international 

monitoring. 

The former Syrian Minister of Defense, Mustafa 

Talas, routinely signed false end-user certifi cates 

for weapons dealers, generally for a fee of 12 to 15 

percent of the total contract amount.

• Documents from the Al-Basha’ir front company 

illustrate this method of deception. According to the 

documents, the Indian NEC Company complained 

to Al-Basha’ir in 2000 that the majority of the items 

requested by the MIC were seized before reaching 

Iraq, “despite the fact that most of it had documents 

with clauses mentioning the requirement of not 

shipping it to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba.” 
136

Circumvention of UN Sanctions Importing 

Missile-Related Materials in 1998

To avoid UN inspectors’ possible detection of sanctioned materials, Iraqi offi cials would instead fi nd 

alternate methods to get what they needed. The Al 

Fat’h missile project illustrates how the Iraqis managed to avoid UN detection. Documents captured 

at the MIC Headquarters reveal the MIC’s March 

1998 plan to purchase dual-use materials, including: 

ammonium perchlorate, aluminum powder, carbon 

fi ber, and phenolic resin for use in the Al Fat’h missile 

project. After discovery of these materials by the UN, 

Iraqi offi cials were instructed to submit a form B-1 

by Richard Butler, Chairman of UNSCOM. This form 

detailed Iraq’s plans to use 20 tons of ammonium 

perchlorate and 3 tons aluminum powder to manufacture composite solid propellant for the Al Fat’h motor. 

It also described a need for 350 kilograms of carbon 

fi ber to insulate parts of the Al Fat’h motor. The 

materials were to be shipped through Jordan by the 

Iraqi company Al ‘Ayan, with Al Wadha Commercial 

Agencies Company, possibly a subsidiary of Al-Eman, 

acting as an intermediary. 

 A letter, classifi ed “Top Secret” by the Iraqi Government, from Al ‘Ayan Trading Company to the MIC 

summarized the inability to ship the ammonium perchlorate, aluminum powder, carbon fi ber, and phenolic resin because of the UN restrictions on Jordan in 

shipping those materials for the missile program. Al 

‘Ayan suggested the following solution:

• Advise the benefi ciary to contact the supplier to 

publicize the “cancellation” of the contract with Al 

‘Ayan. 

• All related communications and inquiries would 

remain strictly at the commission (possibly the 

MIC) offi ce and not at the project site. 

• Al ‘Ayan would divert the shipment routing to avoid 

entering Jordan.

• Al ‘Ayan would change the type of commodity on 

the bill of lading, alter the benefi ciary’s name at 

intended port of entry, and change the port name. 

• The contract duration would be amended to add 

one month for delivery. 

The contract would increase in value by 20 percent of 

the actual sum to compensate Al ‘Ayan for aiding Iraq 

in acquisition of prohibited materials. 
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Disguising the Commodity’s Destination

Perhaps the most basic method for Iraq to skirt 

international scrutiny was to simply list a neighboring country as the fi nal destination, when in fact the 

commodities were only held there until they could 

be smuggled to Iraq by Saddam’s agents. Because of 

the high amount of ordinary trade occurring under the 

bilateral trade protocols, and government complicity, 

Syria and Jordan were the most common transit countries used as false destinations for prohibited commodities bound for Iraq. The UAE also served as a 

transit location and, according to reporting, profi teers 

in Iran even took part in transiting Russian goods into 

Iraq. The MIC paid these transit services with the 

profi ts of oil sales under the trade protocols. 

• According to a report, the Al Raya Company, an 

IIS front company, requested weapons from Syrian 

or Jordanian arms dealers. The merchant would 

acquire the goods in Syria or Jordan and move them 

into Iraq through the Jordanian Free Commercial 

Zone. This free trade zone was controlled by the 

Jordanian Ministry of Finance and Jordanian Intelligence Service and it served as an effective conduit 

for importing prohibited items through Jordan to 

Iraq. This report corroborates other reporting on the 

role of Jordan prior to 1999. 

• After 1999, the MIC’s Al-Basha’ir Company served 

as a primary conduit for handling illicit shipments 

via Syria. At the MIC’s request, Syrian trade companies obtained specifi c items for Iraq, primarily 

from suppliers in Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and 

other Eastern European countries. When delivered 

to Syria, Al-Basha’ir took delivery of the commodities under the oversight and assistance of Syrian 

government offi cials. These offi cials normally 

received a 12.5-percent mark-up as a kickback to 

ensure goods moved from Syria to Iraq without disruption. Al-Basha’ir then smuggled the items into 

Iraq and delivered them to MIC.

• In another case, seized documents reveal that in 

2000 the Indian NEC Company delivered “100 

explosive capsule units for the RPG-7” to the AlBasha’ir Company in Iraq by leasing “a private 

plane which delivered the shipment directly to Syria 

with great diffi culty.” 

Use of Illicit Smuggling and 

Transportation Networks

Iraq has been at the center of various trade routes 

for centuries. Historically, this trade involved illicit 

activity, or smuggling, to escape taxes or to evade 

governmental oversight. Despite the imposition of 

sanctions by the United Nations in 1990, Iraq managed to circumvent UN sanctions through longestablished business relationships with its neighbors, 

cross-state tribal connections, and use of ancient 

smuggling routes. Contemporary smuggling methods used by Iraqi trade companies used the entire 

spectrum of smuggling methods: disguising illicit 

shipments as legitimate cargo; hiding illicit goods in 

legitimate shipments; avoiding customs inspections; 

and for high priority, low-volume shipments, using 

Iraqi diplomatic couriers. 

Captured documents indicate that there were approximately 500 offi cial and unoffi cial border crossing 

points between Iraq and Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait, and Iran. According to the documents, there 

were also other border checkpoints between Iraq 

and Turkey and between Iran under Kurdish control. 

Despite the number of possible crossings, almost all 

goods entered Iraq at just fi ve major border crossings 

and the port of Umm Qasr.

• Only goods supplied under the UN OFF Program 

were subject to UN inspection at the four permitted 

border points; Turaybil/Al-Karamah on the Jordanian-Iraqi border, Tanf/Al Qaim on the Syrian-Iraqi 

border, Habur Bridge/Zakho on the Turkish-Iraqi 

border, Ar’ar on the Saudi-Iraqi border and the port 

of Umm Qasr on the Gulf. 

A mid-level Iraqi offi cial asserted that Iraq signed 

a formal transport agreement in the 1990s. These 

agreements ensured that before 1999 Jordan was 

the primary conduit of illicit trade with Iraq. The 

change in the Iraqi-Jordanian relationship was 

promoted by a combination of improvement in 

Iraqi-Syrian relations, and Jordanian concern over 

increased political scrutiny in the United States.
138

Syria’s two primary transportation companies, SES 

International (previously known as Lama Trading 

Company) run by its General Manager, Asif Al-Shalish, and the Nurallah Transportation Company, had 

signifi cant ties to the Iraqi MIC. 

Smuggling by Air

A former Iraqi diplomat described how several times 

per month Iraqi diplomatic personnel would smuggle 

large quantities of money and prohibited equipment from Russia to Iraq. From 2001 until the fall 

of Baghdad, goods were smuggled out of Russia by 

Iraqi Embassy personnel. Equipment smuggled by 

this method included high-technology items such as 

radar jammers, GPS jammers, night-vision devices, 

avionics, and missile components of various types. 

A charter fl ight fl ew from Moscow to Baghdad every 

Monday, with a return fl ight on Wednesday. The fl ight 

was not inspected by the UN and was used to smuggle cash and other goods, which Iraq was not allowed 

to procure under UN sanctions, into Baghdad. Cash 

and equipment were smuggled two or three times a 

month by diplomatic courier, usually disguised as 

diplomatic mail. Bribes were paid to Russian customs 

offi cials to facilitate these illicit shipments. 

• A former Iraqi MFA employee who worked as a 

diplomatic courier and had direct access to information reports that the Iraqi ambassador to Russia 

personally delivered GPS jammers to the Iraqi 

Embassy in Damascus during April 2003. The 

ambassador used a private jet for transport, with the 

GPS jammers concealed as diplomatic mail. The 

jammers were transferred to Al Qaim border checkpoint. 

A senior executive in the MIC provided information 

detailing how direct frequent fl ights between Minsk 

and Baghdad were instituted in the summer of 2000. 

Belarus established a joint airline with Iraq that 

employed four Boeing-747s to transfer unspecifi ed 

illicit items, experts, and offi cials direct to Baghdad 

under the cover of humanitarian aid missions. 

Amman airport was also used as an air transshipment 

point. An Iraqi businessman declared that, a Jordanian company procuring illicit goods on behalf of 

Iraq shipped prohibited goods to Amman airport for 

onward transfer to Iraq. 

Smuggling by Land

Iraq deployed many state institutions whose mission 

was to facilitate illicit trade by land. According to an 

Iraqi customs inspector with direct access, the IIS, the 

SSO, and the MIC used the border checkpoint system 

as a method of obtaining prohibited goods. 

One such Border Check Point (BCP) facility was 

located at Turaybil. The activity at that BCP was 

representative of the smuggling infrastructure used 

to ship illicit goods into Iraq at other BCPs. Turaybil 

was part of the MoTC border checkpoint system that 

facilitated the movement of a large amount of contraband goods into Iraq. The Iraqi customs service was 

forbidden to inspect IIS shipments.

• Turaybil contained an IIS offi ce, an ILTC offi ce, an 

SSO offi ce, and a Directorate of Military Intelligence offi ce, according to information relayed by 

an Iraqi customs inspector with direct access. The 

“Orient Company” was often listed as the sender of 

equipment, with Iraqi front companies, including 

Al-Basha’ir, Al-Faris, Hatteem and Al-Faw, served 

as the consignees. The “Orient Company” was the 

most common cover name for illicit IIS-assisted 

shipments into Iraq—the company did not exist. 

• The volume of traffi c at the Turaybil border crossing meant that it would not be possible to adequately inspect traffi c entering Iraq.

According to a captured document, days before OIF, 

the JEFF Corporation of Bulgaria offered and was 

prepared to export 500 Igla MANPADS missiles, 

50 grip stocks, and two inspection platforms to Iraq. 

There is no evidence that the contract was fulfi lled. 

The Iraqi front company named Al-Basha’ir, however, 

subcontracted the Nurallah Transportation Company 

of Damascus to ship the embargoed goods from a 

Lebanese port to Al-Basha’ir warehouses, and then 

on to Baghdad. The goods would take a total of three 
139

Regime Finance

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months to reach Baghdad from Bulgaria via the sea 

and multiple shipments by truck. An Iraqi businessman has confi rmed that illicit equipment arriving in 

Damascus from Minsk, Belarus, was transferred to 

Baghdad via Syrian roads and railways. 

Open sources detail how the Habur bridge or gate 

near Zakho on the border with Turkey was also a 

scene of illicit smuggling. The large volume of traffi c across Habur bridge (see Figure 65) hindered the 

adequate monitoring of cargo. Recent open sources 

point to the fact that UN monitors were able to 

inspect only one in every 200 trucks that crossed into 

Iraq via this route. 

Other sources suggest that Iraq may have also 

received goods smuggled in by truck from Dubai via 

Saudi Arabia. Illicit trade between Iraq and Iran was 

also problematic. Smuggling occurred on the road 

linking the Iraqi city of Al-Basrah and the Iranian city 

of Khorramshahr. Iran exported foodstuffs, luxury 

goods, and especially cement and asphalt along the 

40-kilometer highway. A former employee of the MIC 

declared that the smuggling was under the protection 

of both the Iraqi SSO and the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps. 

There are a dozen offi cial entry points into Iraq from 

the neighboring countries (see fi gure 66) of Jordan, 

Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, three 

air entry points at Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul and 

two main ports at Umm Qasr and Al-Basrah. As indicated on the map, the UN monitored only fi ve border 

crossings. The primary reason for the UN’s oversight 

centered on the UN OFF Program. UNSCOM weapons inspectors seldom visited Iraq’s border control 

points because they were based in Baghdad. The UN 

contracted two private companies from 1996 to 2003 

(Lloyds Register and later a Swiss company called 

Cotecna) to authenticate and certify the arrival of 

humanitarian supplies under the UN OFF Program 

at three land border points. (A fourth was added 

just prior to OIF and the port of Umm Qasr (see 

fi gure 67). 

This left at least two major border crossings and 

Baghdad’s airport completely unmonitored. Even at 

the monitored crossings, cargo not approved by the 

UN could freely enter Iraq because UN monitors only 

dealt with UN OFF cargo. Any non-UN cargo could 

freely enter Iraq at either monitored or unmonitored 

entry points. 

Smuggling by Sea

During the sanction years, traders used a pool of 

private dhows, barges, and tankers to smuggle oil out 

and commodities into and out of Iraq’s southern ports 

with relative ease. It is possible that easily concealed 

military and dual-use items could have been transported by this method. 

Smuggling via Jordanian Ports

The port of Aqaba in Jordan served as a maritime 

transshipment point. Beginning in the mid-1990s, 

Lloyds Register provided monitoring of goods arriving at Aqaba, but Jordan terminated the contract in 

2000. The IIS had a representative in Aqaba, overseeing illicit trade including shipments made by a Middle 

Eastern fi rm.

From 1996 to March 2001, Muhammad Al-Khatib, a 

Jordanian businessman, became the most prominent 

intermediary for the Indian company NEC. Al-Khatib 

runs the Jordanian transport companies named MK2000, Jordan Oil Services, and the Jordan Establishment for Transit, all located at the same Jordanian 

address. Al-Khatib facilitated the shipping of illicit 

goods to Iraq. Contraband was shipped by Pacifi c 

International Lines Ltd and Oram Logistics PTE Ltd 

from India (Bombay and Madras) to Aqaba in Jordan. 

In all the deals:

• Al-Khatib was identifi ed as the consignee.

• All voyages involved transshipment, at least one via 

Dubai.

• Goods were unloaded at Aqaba port by Al-Khatib 

and reloaded onto Al-Khatib company trucks for 

onward transit to Iraq.

• All payments by Iraq were made to Al-Khatib with 

Al-Khatib paying other players in the logistics and 

supply chain.

• Iraq submitted tenders to NEC through Al-Khatib. 
140

Figure 65. A truck holding 

area near Habur Bridge BCP 

showing the high volume of 

border traffi c into Iraq.
141

Regime Finance

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Figure 66. Map detailing Iraqi border crossings, 

including those monitored by the UN.
142

Smuggling via Syrian Ports

Open sources reveal that a draft trade and security agreement existed between Iraq and Syria that 

covered a variety of economic and political arrangements. These included the opening of the Syrian ports 

of Al-Latakia and Tartus for Iraqi imports. It took 

approximately two weeks to deliver cargo to Al-Latakia or Tartus from Black Sea ports, according to a 

senior executive in the MIC. 

Sources asserted that a heavy pontoon bridge set 

provided by the Ukrainian arms export fi rm Ukroboronservice to Syria was ultimately supplied to the 

Iraqi RG. It was initially delivered from Mykolayev 

on the Black Sea coast to Beirut in Lebanon on the 

MV Nicolas A, arriving in early October 2002. The 

equipment was imported by the Syrian fi rm SES 

International, probably covered by a Syrian end-user 

certifi cate. A delivery verifi cation certifi cate signed 

by Syria’s Customs Department, verifi ed by SES, 

indicated that the shipment had reached Syria by 

mid-October. Sources further revealed that elements 

of the heavy pontoon bridge set had been delivered to 

RG forces at Fort Rashidiyah, near Baghdad by early 

November. Other elements were deployed to a rivercrossing training site between late October and early 

November of 2002. 

Smuggling via the Arabian Gulf

The Iraqi Regime frequently employed smugglers 

who used oil smuggling routes through the northern 

Arabian Gulf. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Navy facilitated this illicit trade by providing safe 

passage through the northern Persian Gulf for Iraqi 

oil smugglers in return for a fee. This arrangement 

allowed oil smugglers a safe passage through Iran’s 

northern territorial waters, but smugglers remained 

subject to being interdicted by Iranian authorities 

farther south (see fi gure 68). 

By calculating the $50 per metric ton of oil fee, 

the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) estimated in 

2000 that Iran was taking about 25 percent of the 

profi t from smuggled Iraqi oil (see fi gure 69). These 

high profi ts resulted from the difference between the 

market price for crude oil and the low prices Saddam 

was willing to charge to earn revenue that was not 

tracked by the UN.

The chart illustrates the facilitation role Iran played in 

Iraqi oil smuggling. On two occasions in 1998, Iran 

took actions to stop oil smugglers from using its territorial waters. The fi gure compiled by the MIF, clearly 

indicates the impact this action had on the volume of 

prohibited trade in the Gulf. 

Iran and the UAE were the most frequent destinations for Iraqi smuggled oil. The MIF also found that 

the majority of the smuggling vessels were owned by 

entities from these countries.

Figure 67. The port of Umm Qasr monitored 

by UN inspectors, 1991-2003.
143

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Figure 69. By share breakdown of the sale price for a 

metric ton of smuggled Iraqi crude oil in 2000.

In 2000, a metric ton of crude oil was worth about 

$205. A metric ton of crude oil equates approximately 7.5 barrels of oil.

Figure 68. Primary oil smuggling routes 

within Iranian territorial waters as identifi ed by 

the Maritime Interdiction Force.
144

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145

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Annex A

Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral 

Trade Protocols

This annex contains translations and copies of 

the Jordan (partial), Syria, and Turkey trade 

Protocol agreements with Iraq. Iraq and Egypt 

participated in a relatively short-lived Protocol 

that earned Iraq about $33 million in late 2001 

and early 2002. ISG does not have access to 

documents outlining this agreement. 

Jordan-Iraq Trade Protocol

Oil sales to Jordan under the Protocol began as 

early as 1983. Terms were negotiated annually, 

including 1991, and every year thereafter during 

sanctions. There actually were two Protocols: 

an Oil Protocol and a Trade Protocol. ISG does 

not have a copy of the Trade Protocol. ISG does, 

however, have copies of three Oil Protocol documents for 2003, which were negotiated from 

19 to 21 November 2002. Engineer Muhammad Batayna, Ministry of Energy and Mineral 

Resources signed the fi rst document for the Iraqi 

side by ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi, 

Iraqi Minister of Oil and for the Jordanian side. 
146

An ISG Translation of the 2003 Iraq-Jordan Trade Protocol Agreement (part 1/2003)

By the Name of God, the merciful, the compassionate

Agreement Record

Number (1 / 2003)

Regarding preparation for crude Oil and its derivatives

From Iraq to Jordan for 2003

During the visit of the Minister of Energy and Minerals of Jordan to Baghdad from the period of 

19th to the 21st of November of 2002, a meeting took place between the Iraqi Minister of Oil and the Minister of Energy and Minerals of Jordan, wherein they studied the preparation related to the Iraqi crude oil 

and its derivates to Jordan through 2003, and both agree on the following:

Firstly:

A. President Saddam Husayn (May God protect him), authorized a grant of $300 million to the 

people of Jordan. The grant will be from the value of oil and its derivatives that Jordan imports 

during 2003.

B. The grant will be deducted from the value of crude oil in the amount of $25 million monthly.

C. If the total value that is mentioned in paragraph (A) drops down to $600 million in year 2003, 

the grant will drop by 50% of the total dropped value, and the annual deduction will be adjusted 

in November and December of 2003.

D. The grant should not be less than $200 million.

Secondly: 

There will be $45 million allocated for the commercial exchange agreement, (which is $3.75 million monthly) from the total value of derivatives that is utilized by Jordan for local consumption during 

2003. Also, on the grounds of the same agreement, $15 million shall be allocated from the total value 

of liquid gas that Jordan imports from Iraq for local consumption in 2003. These amounts shall be used 

for fi nancing exports related to improving, supplementing, necessity, and spares from the Jordanian Oil 

Refi nery Company, for the benefi t of the Iraqi, Ministry of Oil. The above mention materials and the 

materials produced in Jordan shall be paid via the Jordanian Oil Refi nery Company.

Thirdly:

All dues from crude oil that is imported from Iraq to Jordan in 2003 shall be paid in cash, and the 

funds shall be utilized for the same goals that are mentioned in the second paragraph and via the Jordanian Oil Refi nery Company.

Fourthly: 

Shall agree on the equality of oil and derivatives prices as mentioned in the agreement record 

number (2/2003), between the Ministry of Oil, Oil Marketing Company and the Ministry Of Energy and 

Minerals in Baghdad dated November 21, 2002. 

Written and signed in Baghdad on Ramadan 16, 1423 H 

 Corresponding, November 21, 2002 

[Signature] [Signature]

From the Iraqi side From the Jordanian side

Dr. Aamir Mohamed Rasheed Engineer, Mohamed Batayna 

Minister of Oil Ministry of Energy and 

 Minerals
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Regime Finance

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An ISG Translation of the 2003 Iraq-Jordan Trade Protocol Agreement (part 2/2003)

Agreement Record

Number (2/2003)

During the meetings that convened at the Oil Marketing Company in Baghdad between November 19th 21st of 2002, concerning the Iraqi and Jordanian study related to the supply of crude oil and its 

derivatives from Iraq to Jordan for the local consumption for year 2003, have concluded the following:

Firstly: Quantities and daily average:

A. Crude oil: 

The two parties agree that the Iraqi side shall supply a total quantity of crude oil in 2003 estimated to be 4.04 million tons, (plus or minus 10%) to be distributed in the months of the year, in accordance with the following daily average (ton/day):

Month

Quantity (ton/

day) Month

Quantity (ton/

day)

January 12,000 July 12,000

February 12,000 August 11,000

March 12,000 September 11,000

April 12,000 October 11,000

May 4,000 November 12,000

June 12,000 December 12,000

B. Derivatives: 

The two parties agree that the Iraqi side shall supply quantities of derivatives to Jordan through 

2003, as follows:

- Fuel oil 520 thousand tons plus/minus 10%

- Gas oil [al solar] 250 thousand tons plus/minus 10%

- Liquid gas 95 thousand tons plus/minus 10%

The average daily supply shall be in accordance with this chart for the months of the year:

Month

Fuel Oil Tons/

Day

Gas Oil [al Solar] Ton/

Day

Liquid Gas Ton/

Day

January 1000 600 450

February 1000 600 450

March 1000 600 350

April 1200 600 250

May 3200 700 250

June 3200 700 200

July 1400 700 100

August 1000 700 100

September 1000 700 100

October 1000 700 300

November 1000 800 350

December 1000 800 350
148

And a follow up on supplying crude oil and derivative quantities as indicated on the mentioned 

charts and its transfer, receiving shall be pursued in coordination with the two sides. In addition, the two 

sides shall audit the total quantities and the daily average, according to actual needs and in conformity 

with the operation conditions with the two sides. If the Jordanian Side wishes to change the average daily 

quota, the Iraqi side shall be notifi ed 15 days prior to the new day of the daily quota.

C. The supply of the liquid gas shall be 25% propane, and 75% butane for the quantity of 350 

tons per day, any additional supplies will be on the basis of fl exibility in specifi cations to 40% propane 

and 60% butane.

D. The fuel oil shall be supplied with no less than 60 degrees of ignition.

Secondly:

Prices and other conditions: 

A. Crude Oil

1. Between January 1st, 2003 and December 31, 2003, the price of crude oil shall be in accordance with the pricing formula demonstrated below:

 The light, Basra crude oil price shall be paid in USD per barrel, the price is for a tank load from 

station (T1) in Iraq that will be equal to the light Basra crude oil that is announced for Europe, from the 

delivery of the Arab Gulf for the month that the load occur, minus $0.95 per barrel, from December 31, 

2002, a review on the amount will occur if changes ensue on transportation fare. 

In case the actual price is higher than $20 per barrel, the Jordanian side will be granted a deduction of 40% for the increase for the light Basra crude oil that is announced in Europe.

2. The Jordanian side shall be granted a special reduction as we agree in the report number (5/

2002) dated November 21, 2001.

3. The payment of the prepared crude oil shall be paid within a month (30 days) after the load is 

completed.

4. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals shall establish a letter of credit from the Jordanian Central Bank, which shall have a paragraph implying acceptance of the shipping documentation in case its 

value exceeds the monthly value as stated in this credit.

 B. Derivatives:

The prices of derivatives mentioned above which will be supplied to Jordan from January 1st, 

2003 to December 31, 2003 shall be as follows:

1. Fuel oil:

The price per metric ton of fuel oil that is loaded monthly on tankers in Iraq’s storage by dollar 

shall be the average monthly of the fuel oil FOB, Italian base according to the published bulletin of 

PLATTS market of Europe( 3.5% fuel oil) for the loading month with a deduction of $2.5 per ton.

2. Gas oil (Alsolar):

The price of one barrel of gas oil that is loaded monthly in (C&F) Al-Zarqua in dollars, for the 

monthly average prices for gas oil (FOB) at the Arab Gulf which published at the PLATTS market bulletin of Europe with deduction of two dollars per one barrel.

The same equation shall be applied, and the special condition for gas oil will pertain for kerosene 

if it is supplied to Jordan during the period of January 1st, 2003 to December 31, 2003.

3. Liquid gas:

A. Loaded on tankers from the refi nery of Bayji/Kirkuk:

The price shall be in dollars and will be the monthly average of prices published at the bulletin of 

PLATT’s LP Gas Wire for the metric ton of propane and butane gas for midwest, with the percentages of 

75% butane and 25% propane, minus ten dollars per one unit of metric ton.

B. Delivery at Al-Zarqua refi nery/Erbid/Amman:

One metric ton is equal to the mentioned price before deduction, as indicated in paragraph (A), 

plus 40 dollars per metric ton.
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Benzene for automobiles: 

 If there is a need to import regular benzene from Al-Zarqua refi nery, the supply shall be according to product availability in accordance with the pricing equation below: 

The price of one barrel from regular benzene for vehicles on a basis of (C&F) Al-Zarqua is equal 

to the monthly average of the price of benzene for vehicles published in the bulletin of Argus Asia Products Report, titled FOB the Arab Gulf, minus $2 for every barrel and payment shall be made in cash. 

Thirdly: Transportation fare:

The Jordanian Oil Refi nery Company shall pay the transportation costs of gas, liquid oil, and 

other expenditures for sold quantities on the basis of (C&F) base on notice from the Oil Marketing Company, and it will be deducted from the total value of the product, as much as $15 per ton for the gas oil 

and in the amount of $50 per ton for the liquid gas and $17 per ton for benzene as transportation fees.

The Iraqi side shall continue to carry the liquid gas in case it wasn’t possible to transport the 

quantity demanded. The Jordanian Oil Refi nery Company can transport some of the quota based on its 

ability.

Fourthly: Crude oil:

The two sides agree that the Iraqi side shall supply the total quantities of the crude oil to Jordan 

with the same specifi cation that were previously agreed upon, (except the adhesiveness specifi cation 

for oil SN500, the minimum stickiness shall be 9.5 centimeter stock at 100 degree Celsius), this will be 

through 2003, estimated 17,140 tons plus or minus 10% distributed with according to the specifi cations 

and the month of the year as follows:

 Quantity (Tons/Year) Quantity (Tons/Month)

SN100 40 One Quota

SN150 3000 250

SN500 9500 792

BS150 4600 383

And the price of these materials during the period of January 1st, 2003 and December 31, 2003 are 

as follows:

C&F Al-Zarquaa

Price (Dollar per 

Ton)

SN100 307

SN150 295

SN500 305

BS150 410

Fifthly: 

The weight and measurements shall rely on shipment documentation at the loading location for 

the purpose of calculating quantities for all sorts of derivatives and contracts (FOB and C&F). The transportation contracts shall have a text that imply that the transporter shall carry the burden of value for the 

decrease for more than 0.5% for all oil products, except benzene, the percentage of decrease shall be more 

than 0.7%.
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An ISG Translation of the 2003 Iraq-Jordan Trade Protocol Agreement (part 3/2003)

Agreement report

Number (3/2003)

Raw Oil and its production’s transportation

During the meetings held in the Ministry of Oil in Baghdad from the 19th to the 21st of November 2002 

between the Iraqi side and the Jordanian side (enclosed are the attendee’s list) concerning the agreement 

of transporting raw oil and its derivatives to Jordan, both parties have agreed to:

First the crude oil

Starting 2/1/2003 the Iraqis will continue to deliver 28% of Jordan’s needed crude oil which quantities 

and daily average have been decided in the agreement of (2/2003) dated and signed on 11/21/2002.

A. Based on the 7/2002 agreement which was signed by both parties for the period between the 1st

and the 31st of January 2003, the shipping cost will be ten Jordanian Dinars per ton minus 200 

Jordanian Fils towards safety, transportation arrangement and road maintenance for the oil tankers 

during the bidding execution period. Additional seven Fils will be applied for each kilometer/ton 

in the case of any change of shipping or delivery distance.

B. Shipping costs will be determined starting 2/1/2003 through the relegation of the tender’s decision for shipping the crude oil that was issued by the Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Minerals. 

C. The Jordanian side will furnish the Iraqi one with a list of the transportation companies detailing 

the quantities of the crude oil for the entire period, when forwarding tender # 2 for the year 2002 

which covers the period between 2/1/2003 and 1/31/2004 to the Jordanian transporting companies. 

D. Arrangements and communication will be maintained regarding road maintenance between the 

crude oil shipping stations in (T1) and the Iraqi-Jordanian border, in order to follow up and implement the plan in the shortest possible period and to improve the crude oil’s tanker line. 
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Secondly: oil derivatives

The Iraqi side will continue to ship the needs of Jordan’s oil production for 2003. Quantities and daily and 

monthly averages were decided based on agreement number 2/2002 signed by both parties, on 11/21/2002 

as follow:

1) Heating Oil

 a) Shipping cost per ton from 1/1/2003 through 1/31/2003 will be as follows:

From To Jordanian Dinar/Ton

Bayji Al Zarqaa 13.054

 Al Aqabah 17.640 

 Al Dowrah Al Zarqaa 11.604 

 Al Aqabah 17.0227

b) Shipping cost to and from different locations will be set starting 2/1/2003 in Jordanian Dinar 

per ton according to the following formula: 

 

Cost according to (A-1) of the minute # (7/2002) X shipping cost of the crude oil applied 

starting 2/1/2003

9.80

2) Crude, Liquid and Gas Oil (Solar)

The Iraqi side will continue to ship Jordan’s actual need for 2003 according to agreement (2/

2003) signed on 11/21/2002 in Baghdad.

Thirdly:

The Iraqi side will commit to the predetermined regulation number (42) of 2002 and the decisions issued 

by the Jordanian Cabinet of Ministers when dealing with the maximum dimensions, total weight, and 

engine capacity of the crude oil tankers.

According to the Minister’s Cabinet decision number 1626 dated 6/25/2002, the maximum total weight 

should not exceed fi ve tons per truck (tanker), excluding the liquid gas tankers.

Fourthly:

The Oil Production Distributor Company will be in charge of shipping the above mentioned crude oil and 

all of its derivatives for the benefi t of the Jordanian side.

The Distribution Company will continue to authorize the Iraqi Jordanian Land Transportation Company 

to operate the transportation and to receive its dues according to the rules in regard to the crude oil and the 

fuel oil only. The Jordanian party will be notifi ed in a timely fashion in case of any changes.

Fifthly:

The monthly quantity of crude oil and its derivatives needed to be shipped will be decided in a letter, fax 

or telex issued by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and directed to the Oil Marketing Company. Copies will be sent to the Oil Production Distribution Company and the Technical Department of 

the Ministry of Oil.

In case of a program change, the other party will be notifi ed prior to any changes, while the Iraqi side is 

gradually reaching the needed quantity by increasing or decreasing within maximum of ten days from the 

notifi cation date, in order to avoid the overloading up trucks waiting to offl oad in Jordan, and to make 

available the needed number of containers. Follow up of the situation in the trucker lots will be taken 

care of by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals Resources, or by the Jordanian Oil Refi ning Company.
152

Sixthly:

Transporting the imported quantities will be managed by the Oil Production Distribution Company 

according to agreement number (2/2003) which indicated change in the quantity needed to be transported 

not to exceed plus or minus 10%.

Seventhly: 

Loading locations in Jordan will be switched in coordination with the Oil Production Distribution Company.

Eighthly:

Periodical meetings will be conducted by a coordinated committee from both parties to follow up with the 

transportation plan.

Ninthly:

The entity that is authorized by the Oil Production Distributor Company will ship the crude and raw oil, 

and then submit its inquiry in accordance with the Ministry’s instructions to the Energy and Mineral 

Resources Ministry. 

Tenthly:

The entity/entities responsible for shipping the crude oil and its derivatives shall pay the difference 

between the shipped and received quantities in the receiving locations, according to the shipping documentations, taking into consideration the 7% allowance for the benzenes and 5% for the crude oil and 

other production. 

Eleventh:

Coordination between the Jordanian Refi nery Company and the Oil Production Distribution Company will 

be directed to overcome any problems concerning the tanker’s accumulation and to avoid any future oil 

transportation problems regarding the oil production. Concerning crude oil, an arrangement will be made 

through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.

Twelfth:

Status of the Iraqi tankers will be followed by the Oil Production Distributing Company in order to 

ensure its safety.

Thirteenth:

The Oil Production Distribution Company will identify and direct the tankers to the offl oad locations. 

Any tanker not in its specifi ed location as stated on the shipping policy (issued by the shipping center and 

endorsed by the Oil Production and Distribution Company) shall not be offl oaded by the Jordanian Refi ning Company, in addition the Oil Production and Distribution Company must be notifi ed.

Fourteenth: 

A. Based on its ability, the Oil Production Distributing Company will ship the Jordanian Refi ning 

Company’s needs for liquid and gas oil (Solar) directly from Iraq to Al Aqabah.

B. The Jordanian Refi ning Company shall pay any discrepancies in shipping cost from Al Zarqaa 

and Al Aqabah to the authorized entities by the Oil Production and Distribution Company as follows: 

- Gas Oil (Solar) (10) Dollar/Ton

- Liquid Gas (18) Dollar/Ton
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Fifteenth:

Based on the Jordanian request, the Oil Production and Distributing Company offered to ship the extra 

quantities of the liquid gas imported through Al Aqabah port to its storage locations in Al Zarqaa, Amman, 

and Irbid using its own tankers according to a separate agreement to be signed between the Oil Production 

and Distribution Company and the Jordanian Refi ning Company Ltd., similar to the agreements signed in 

earlier years. 

Sixteenth:

The Distribution Company or its authorities will ship the oil derivatives, request the Jordanian Oil Refi ning Company according to its regulation to pay the shipping cost and receive all dues directly.

Seventeenth:

The Oil Production and Distribution Company will be exempted from all applicable fees existing in the 

Kingdom of Jordan.

Eighteenth:

This agreement is expandable to include any additional needed periods pending an acceptance by both 

parties.

Written and signed in Baghdad on Ramadan 16th 1423

 November 21st 2002

[Signature] [Signature]

By Jordanian side By Iraqi side 

Engineer Azmy Khrisat Saddam Zaban Hasan

General Trustee Deputy

Ministry of Energy and Oil Ministry

Mineral Resources 

 [List of attendees

Jordanian Side Iraqi Side

 

1. Engineer Azmy Khrisat 1. Mr. Saddam Zaban Hasan

2. Mr. Ezzuddeen Kanakryyah 2. Mr. Thamir Abbas Ghadban

3. Engineer Abdul Kareim Alawein 3. Mr. Sameer Mikhail Asaad

4. Engineer Wijdan Al Rabady 4. Mr. Fadil Muhammad Baqir

5. Mr. Hazim Rahahlah
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Syria-Iraq Trade Protocol

The Iraq-Syria Trade Protocol was negotiated from 

27 to 29 May 2000 in Baghdad. The primary participants were the SOMO and the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization. The document (See Figures 1 

and 2) was signed for Iraq by Saddam Zayn Hasan, 

Authorized Director of SOMO, and for Syria by Dr. 

Dawwud Haydar (Daood Haidar), Chief of the Syrian 

Oil Marketing Offi ce. 

Turkey-Iraq Trade Protocol

The main details of the Turkey-Iraq Protocol were 

agreed to at meetings between Iraqi and Turkish delegations in early 2000. Minutes of meetings 

were signed on 16 January 2000 (Mosul), 29 February 2000 (Baghdad), and 16 May 2000 (location 

unknown). The 16 January document (See Figure 

3) was signed for Iraq by ‘Amir Rashid Minister 

of Oil, Republic of Iraq, and for Turkey by Kursad 

Tuzmen, Undersecretary for Foreign Trade, Republic 

of Turkey. It was decided that a joint team of experts 

from the two sides would meet every three months to 

review the progress of the implementation of the trade 

Protocol. 
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Figure 1. The Iraq-Syria 

Trade Protocol Agreement.
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Figure 1. The Iraq-Syria 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 2. Iraq-Syria Trade 

Protocol Annexes: 

Appendix 1 (top left), 

Appendix 2 (top right), 

Appendix 3 (bottom).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement.
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Figure 3. The Iraq-Turkey 

Trade Protocol Agreement 

(continued).
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Annex B

Known Oil Voucher Recipients

This annex contains the 13 secret lists maintained by 

Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jizrawi and the 

Minister for Oil, Amir Rashid Muhammad al-Ubaydi. 

• A high-level SOMO offi cial provided ISG with 

both English and Arabic versions of these lists on 

16 June 2004. The lists reproduced here are the 

original SOMO translations in English.

• The 13 lists coincide with the 13 six-month phases 

of the UN OFF Program. Saddam’s oil allocations 

were distributed in six-month cycles, in synchronization with the UN OFF phases. 

These lists contain the following information:

• The estimated profi t earned by allocation holders 

during that period in US dollars per barrel. This 

fi gure is SOMO’s estimation based on the price differential between Iraq’s prices and the market price 

for crude.

• The allocation holder (including their nationality) 

and the name of the company lifting the oil on their 

behalf.

• The quantity of oil allocated for each individual, 

company, or organization.

• The quantity of oil lifted by that allocation holder 

during that period. 

It is important to note that, in many cases, the individual, company, or organization named on the SOMO 

lists never converted their allocations into fi nalized 

contracts (signed by SOMO). These contracts were 

required to draw the vouchers to actually lift the oil. 

In other cases, voucher recipients never lifted all 

the oil designated in their vouchers, while others, 

on occasion, lifted more than their share. It is also 

important to note that, in many cases, receiving an oil 

voucher and lifting the oil was a legitimate transaction 

under the Oil For Food Program. 

The former Regime imposed a 10-cent per barrel 

surcharge on the oil allocations starting in the middle 

of the eighth UN OFF phase (September 2000). 

Recipients were instructed to deposit the surcharges 

in specifi c bank accounts held by Iraq in Jordan 

and Lebanon or to deliver the cash to one of Iraq’s 

Embassies. SOMO was directed to refuse allocation 

contracts to anyone not willing to pay the surcharge. 

Many individuals, companies, and organizations 

refused to pay this surcharge. As a result, the ninth 

phase list refl ects only the names of recipients who 

agreed to the surcharge and actually lifted oil. 

After the ninth phase, Saddam instructed SOMO not 

to sign any voucher contracts for individuals, companies, or organizations until they paid their past due 

surcharges. These unused allocations are evident in 

the phase 10 to 13 lists. This arrangement persisted 

through April 2003 when OIF commenced. 
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List

The names of US citizens and business entities have been redacted from this report in accordance with 

provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable law. The full report has been provided 

to appropriate recipients in the Executive Branch and Congress.
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
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Oil Allocation Recipient 

List (continued)
202

Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh was the vice 

chairman of the EAC. Other members of the EAC 

included the:

• Minister of Oil.

• Minister of Trade.

• Minister of Agriculture.

• Minister of Industry and Minerals.

• Minister of Planning.

• Head of the Cooperative Economic Societies.

• Current CBI Director. 

• One previous CBI Director.

• Several former fi nance ministers.

A sub-committee of the EAC, known as the Foreign 

Currency Disbursement Committee (FCDC), met 

weekly, primarily to address the allocation of hard 

currency earned from Iraq’s legal and illegal trade 

activity. 

• This sub-committee evolved from an ad hoc to a 

regularly scheduled affair. This probably occurred 

in 1997 or later when the Regime began to see an 

increase in its legal and illegal revenues from the 

implementation of the UN OFF program.

• Minister of Finance Hikmat maintained a close 

relationship with the director of the CBI, ‘Isam 

Rashid Huwaysh. The Director provided the Minister with monthly reports on Iraq’s hard currency 

balances. 

• The FCDC reviewed contracts and the ministries’ 

demands for hard currency, and also kept track of 

the country’s foreign currency reserves in the CBI. 

Individual ministries knew how much foreign currency was available to spend only after the revenues 

earned through Iraq’s illegal activities had been 

allocated by the FCDC. These revenues did not 

appear in the national budget.

The FCDC included six members:

• Minister of Finance (sub-committee head).

• Minister of Oil.

• Minister of Trade.

• Minister of Industry and Minerals.

• Current CBI Director.

• One previous CBI Director.

According to part of a captured budget document, 

some ministries and organizations were not funded 

through the MoF-led EAC discussions, and others 

were only partially funded by this process. They 

received funds directly from the Presidency. Specifi cally, they received all or additional funds either 

through the Chairman of the Presidential Diwan, or 

the Presidential Secretariat. Some of these organizations included the: 

• MIC.

• MoD.

• IIS.

• SSO.

• IAEC. 

While the MIC and the MoD were partially funded by 

minister of fi nance-led EAC budget discussions, the 

IIS, SSO and the IAEC were not listed in the budget. 

Saddam probably ordered funds transfers in support 

of these organizations. The Presidential Diwan and 

the Presidential Secretariat also were not listed in the 

budget.

Budget Review and Approval

After review by the EAC, budget recommendations 
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were sent to the CoM for approval, where the budget 

became law. The RCC rubberstamped the CoM’s 

decision and issued a presidential decree signed by 

the president. 

Presidential Diwan Financial Accounts Department

Any decision in any area that needed Saddam’s signature, approval, comment or review had to be routed 

through one of the Diwan’s departments. Fiscal decisions were routed to the Presidential Diwan’s Financial Accounts Department. 

• This department was responsible for reviewing 

government budget decisions, ministry requests 

for budget increases, new fi nancial allocations, and 

any other fi nancial matters except those for the IIS, 

SSO, and DGMI.

• Any ministry or organization’s fi nancial request 

outside of the annually allocated budget was to be 

sent to the president for review and or approval 

through this directorate.

• The department also managed domestic banking 

accounts reserved for the payment of employee 

salaries and Diwan expenditures.

Budget Execution 

According to the minister of fi nance, funds were 

disbursed monthly to the various ministries’ accounts 

in the CBI or Rafi dian Bank. These monthly disbursements were approved by the MoF, and in the case of 

recurring expenses, such as salaries, the disbursement 

was made yearly. Monthly allocations were a portion 

of the annual budget for each ministry. Government 

funds were held by the MoF in accounts at the CBI 

and Rafi dian Bank. Disbursements to other ministries 

were usually made from funds at the Rafi dian and 

other state-owned banks (See Figures 4 and 5). 

• The MoF, however, did not have authority to 

approve disbursals involving the Presidential Secretariat, the Presidential Diwan, the IIS, the Directorate of General Security (DGS), and certain secret 

MoD and MIC expenses.

Role of the National Security Council

Those organizations whose budgets were not 

reviewed by the Presidential Diwan’s Financial 

Accounts Department were presented to the NSC. 

Vice President and RCC Vice-Chairman Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri chaired the NSC with the head of the 

Presidential Secretariat, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud—the 

Secretary of the NSC. Because both ‘Izzat Ibrahim 

and ‘Abd headed NSC meetings, it is unclear who 

precisely exercised the most power. However, the 

Presidential secretary was infl uential. The NSC met a 

few times each year, as necessary, to discuss budget, 

security, and intelligence issues (for additional information on the NSC, see the Security Services Annex). 

Other members of the NSC included the following:

• Interior Minister.

• Foreign Minister.

• Qusay Saddam Husayn, head of the RG.

• General Director of the IIS.

• General Director of the SSO.

• General Director of the DGMI.

• General Director of the DGS. 

According to late 1994 documents from the Secretariat of the NSC and addressed to the MoI, directors 

of the IIS, SSO, DGS, the Military Security Directorate, and the DGMI, met with the NSC to discuss their 

budgets plans. Meetings were held at the offi ce of the 

vice-chairman of the RCC. 

Documents from late 1994 indicate that the budget 

process for intelligence and security organizations, 

such as the IIS, the DGMI, and probably other organizations, involved roughly seven steps:

• The requesting organization sent a note to the NSC 
204

Figure 4. The Iraqi general budget 

process for most ministries.

Figure 5. The Iraqi general budget process 

for secret and off-budget issues.
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Secretariat requesting funds.

• The NSC Secretariat sent a note to the NSC Auditing Division requesting its opinion on the funds 

requested.

• The NSC Auditing Division sent a note to the 

Secretariat, approving the funds transfer. Depending upon the sensitivity of the request, the Auditing 

Division would suggest adding the requested funds 

to the organization’s budget after receiving approval 

from Saddam. The NSC Secretariat would send a 

note to Saddam with the Auditing Division’s suggestion. Upon the President’s approval, the NSC 

Secretariat would send a note to the MoF informing 

it of Saddam’s decision.

• The NSC sometimes sent a note within the Secretariat and to the requesting organization about 

the NSC’s decision and to inform the MoF that it 

should add the funds to the concerned organization’s budget.

• Finally, the NSC Secretariat sent a note to the 

Minister’s offi ce in the MoF informing it of the 

NSC’s decision. 

• According to the minister of fi nance, the Presidential Diwan probably also viewed NSC budget 

proposals before they were sent to the MoF. 
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Annex C

Iraq’s Budgetary Process

Key Budgetary Actors

Ministry of Finance

The MOF oversaw the formulation of the general 

government budget, which was based on the calendar year.

• The budget process began in June when the MOF, 

headed by Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim, Minister of 

Finance from 1995-2003, requested that other 

ministries and organizations submit their budget 

proposals.

• In October or November, each ministry submitted 

its proposed budget for the next fi scal year to the 

MoF Budget Offi ce. The Budget Offi ce and the 

various organizations began discussions at the technical level. The offi ce negotiated with each ministry 

to arrive at an acceptable budget fi gure. If they 

could not reach an agreement, the fi nance minister 

met personally with the other minister to reach an 

accord. 

• Budget proposals from each ministry formed the 

Regime’s current spending (operating expenditure) 

input to the general government budget.

Ministry of Planning

The Ministry of Planning (MoP) also negotiated 

with each ministry to arrive at an acceptable budget 

fi gure for their respective projects. 

• Projects submitted from each ministry formed the 

Regime’s capital spending (infrastructure expenditure) budget input to the general government 

budget. 

• This ministry was responsible for large projects 

designed to improve production and foster development in various sectors of the economy, particularly 

within the ministries of industry and agriculture, as 

well as the MoO and MoD, according to the Director of the CBI. 

In the early 1980s, as a result of fl uctuations in economic resources and the effects of the war with Iran, 

Iraq suspended its use of long-term economic planning. In 2001 and 2002, the former Regime restored 

the use of fi ve-year and ten-year plans, respectively, 

as long-term planning tools. According to Iraqi press 

reports, the fi ve-year plan was designed to foster 

economic development, distribute resources among 

government projects, and improve the country’s production capabilities. The ten-year plan was concerned 

with long-term economic policy to achieve high 

economic growth rates. The Planning Commission 

worked with the EAC to create the ten-year plan and 

probably worked with the EAC on the fi ve-year plan 

as well. 

• In November 1994, Law No. 24 established the 

Planning Commission, abolished the MoP and took 

over all its rights and duties.

• In August 2002, an RCC decree reestablished the 

MoP (Some details of Law No. 24 continued to 

apply) and abolished the Planning Commission. 

The MoP “assumed its tasks, jurisdiction, rights, 

and obligations.” This decree appointed ‘Abd-alMun’im Al Khatab, former head of the Planning 

Commission since the mid 1990s, as Minister of 

Planning.

Economic Affairs Committee

In late 1995, Saddam re-established the EAC to 

handle economic issues that would have normally 

gone to the Presidential Diwan. The EAC had infl uence over fi scal and monetary policy issues such as 

government spending, taxation, importation and 

interest rates and met weekly at the MoP. Some 

issues, presumably sensitive, were handled only by 

the head of the committee, rather than presenting 

them to the other committee members.

• Upon approval by the fi nance and planning ministries, the combined operating and capital/project 

budgets would go to the EAC—subcommittee of 

the CoM—for approval. 

Members of the EAC were also heads of ministries 

and organizations within the régime. The chairman 

of the EAC was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Hikmat. The MIC Head, ‘Abd-al-
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Annex D

Iraq Economic Data (1989-2003)

Under the rule of Saddam, economic data were 

considered state secrets; thus, reliable data for the era 

was limited. According to the Economist Intelligence 

Unit data (see Figure 6), Iraq’s GDP stood at roughly 

$38 billion in 1989, measured in constant 2003 dollars. From 1990 until Saddam accepted the terms and 

conditions of UN Resolution 986 in 1996 the GDP 

in Iraq remained at less than 30 percent of the 1989 

value. In the 1996 to 2002 period, the data shows a 

gradual recovery as GDP increased from $10.6 billion 

in 1996 to $33 billion in 2000 before dropping back 

to $29 billion in 2001. 

Per capita GDP during the period followed the 

downward trend seen in overall GDP. GDP per capita 

went from approximately $2304 in 1989 to $938 in 

1990. From 1991 until 1996 per capita GDP never 

rose above $507. During this period income inequality was a problem as the wealth was concentrated in 

the hands of Regime loyalists and traders while most 

Iraqis subsisted on much less income. 

In comparison to the estimates in Figure 6, the CBI 

published a statistical bulletin with GDP data in current prices (Figure 7). The data used in fi gure 7 were 

acquired in 2004 at the CBI. It should be noted that 

the validity or reliability of the data is unknown. 

Because of the lack of specifi c economic data, it is 

diffi cult to disaggregate the Iraq GDP into sectors. 

It is estimated that in 1989 (Figure 8) oil comprised 

approximately 61 percent of the economy. However, 

following the invasion of Kuwait and sanctions on the 

oil exports, this steadily declined until 1996 when the 

UN OFF program allowed Iraq to resume controlled 

export of oil using UN approved contracts. The Agricultural sector of the GDP, although larger than some 

neighboring states, was quite small when compared to 

oil and services. Iraq’s fertile agricultural land covers 

about one-fi fth of its territory and has allowed Iraq to 

sustain a noteworthy agricultural system that is based 

mostly on barley and dates. 

Sources of Revenue

Iraq’s oil development began in 1901. The Iraq 

National Oil Company (INOC) was formed in 1964, 

and with Iraqi oil nationalization between 1972 and 

1975, INOC took over from the international oil companies previously running the country’s oil industry. 

In 1987, INOC was dissolved and merged with the 

MoO. Before the Gulf War, oil accounted for more 

than 60 percent of the country’s GDP and 95 percent of foreign currency earnings. Following Iraq’s 

invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the embargo on 

Iraqi oil exports, Iraqi oil production fell to 10 percent of its prewar level from 3.5 million barrels per 

day in July 1990 (Figure 9) to around 350,000 barrels per day in July 1991. UN-approved oil exports 

began in December 1996 after Iraq fi nally accepted 

UNSCR 986 (passed in April 1995). However, Iraq’s 

oil sector continued to suffer from years of poor oil 

reservoir management; corrosion problems at various 

oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; 

lack of spare parts, materials, equipment, and damage 

to oil storage and pumping facilities. 

Unlike most Gulf States, Iraq has considerable 

agricultural potential. About 12 percent of its land 

is arable, of which 4 percent is irrigated. Another 

9 percent is suitable for grazing and 3 percent is 

forested. However, during Saddam’s reign, Iraq did 

not effectively use its agricultural potential. Under 

the Ba’th party, activity in the food and agriculture 

sectors of the economy continued to decline. Government expenditures on agriculture dropped from 18 

percent of total government expenditures in 1976 to 

less than 10 percent in 1980 and continued to decline 

during the Iran-Iraq war. Under Saddam, as a result 

of drought, lack of inputs, poor methods and weak 

administration, Iraq was unable to achieve agricultural 

production levels near its potential. Following the fi rst 

Gulf war, the irrigation systems fell into disrepair and 

much of the irrigated cropland in central and southern 

Iraq was badly damaged by salinization. Rapid population growth during the past three decades, coupled 

with limited arable land and an overall stagnation in 

agricultural production has steadily increased Iraq’s 

dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs. 

By 2002, under the UN OFF program, between 80 

percent and 100 percent of Iraq’s food staples were 

imported. However, Iraq remained self-suffi cient in 

fruits and vegetables. 
208

Figure 6. Estimated GDP/real GDP in 2003 USD.

Figure 7. GDP in current prices.
209

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Figure 8. Sectoral 

composition of Iraq’s GDP, 

1989.

Figure 9. Iraq oil production, 

1988-2003.
210

Industrial Diversifi cation and Manufacturing

Industrial development, diversifi cation and manufacturing have gone through numerous phases in Iraq. 

In the mid-1970s a strong emphasis was placed on 

import substitution and the government established 

food-processing industries in smaller towns throughout the country. However, the main focus of development was on the petroleum sector, and refi ning, 

natural gas processing and some part of supplies for 

the industry developed in Basra and Kirkuk. The 

cement and building supplies industry also expanded 

rapidly. By the late 1970s the emphasis in development planning shifted toward heavy industry and 

diversifi cation away from oil. Iron and steel production was set up with French assistance at Khor 

al-Zubair and the defense industrial sector received a 

high priority. However, objectives were ill defi ned and 

the economy’s concentration on oil was never challenged. Inevitably, as with all other segments of the 

economy, manufacturing and industrial diversifi cation 

was scaled down when the Iran-Iraq war began and 

never recovered. 

Foreign Debt

Iraq’s indebtedness has been the result primarily of 

the war with Iran. Iraq traditionally had been free of 

foreign debt and had accumulated foreign reserves 

that reached $35 billion by 1980. These reserves were 

exhausted in the early stages of the war with Iran. It is 

estimated that from 1980 to 1989 Iraq’s arms purchases alone totaled $54.7 billion. Following the war, 

Iraq was faced with the dilemma of paying off shortterm debts to western creditors estimated between 

$35 to 45 billion at high interest rates. However, 

the Regime resisted western attempts through the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 

to reschedule the debt primarily because Baghdad 

believed it could negotiate more favorable terms dealing with countries bilaterally. 

Iraq’s foreign debt was comprised of western credit 

provided for military assistance, development fi nance 

and export guarantees. This assistance has been 

estimated at $35 billion in principal. The former 

Soviet Union and Russia also provided loans to Iraq 

via the Paris Club during the 1980s and 1990s for the 

development and production of military programs 

(Figure 10). Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 

and the United Arab Emirates provided an additional 

$30 to 40 billion in fi nancing to fi ght Iran (Figure 

11). Although the Gulf States considered the fi nancial 

support provided to Iraq to be a loan, Iraq believed 

that the Gulf States were required to provide help to 

Iraq in its fi ght to prevent the spread of radical Iranian 

fundamentalism. 

In addition to the money borrowed by Iraq during the 

1980s, Iraq has had compensation claims made for 

reparations of damage infl icted during the invasion 

and occupation of Kuwait during 1990 and 1991. 

The United Nations Compensation Commission 

(UNCC) was responsible for processing and collecting such claims as authorized by UNSCR 692. The 

OFF program provided that 30 percent of Iraq’s oil 

sales would be used to settle compensation claims 

authorized by the UNCC. This fi gure was reduced to 

25 percent in December 2000 and was set at 5 percent 

when oil exports resumed after OIF. As of 7 May 

2004, claims totaling $266 billion have been adjudicated and claims worth $48 billion have been awarded 

by the UNCC. Additional claims worth $83 billion 

need to be resolved.

Another source of potential fi nancial obligations 

accrued by Iraq since 1990 were contracts signed with 

countries such as Russia, UAE, Egypt, China, France, 

and the Netherlands mainly in the energy and telecommunications sectors. Because of UN Sanctions 

during the period, the contracts were not executed. It 

is uncertain if these contracts will be honored in the 

future. 

Iraq’s total foreign debt compared to GDP from 

1989 until 2003 was not sustainable (Figure 12). 

Iraq was borrowing much faster than it was producing for over a decade (see Figure 13). 
211

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Figure 11. Iraq’s major 

creditors (non-Paris Club).

Figure 10. Iraq’s Paris Club 

creditors.
212

Figure 12. Foreign debt, 

1989-2003.

Figure 13. Iraq public debt 

(Central Bank of Iraq 2004).
213

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Balance of Payments/Exchange Rates

The Balance of Payments (BoP) is an account of 

all transactions between one country and all other 

countries—transactions that are measured in terms of 

receipts and payments. From the US perspective, a 

receipt represents any dollars fl owing into the country 

or any transaction that require the exchange of foreign 

currency into dollars. A payment represents dollars 

fl owing out of the country or any transaction that 

requires the conversion of dollars into some other currency. The CBI Department of Research and Statistics 

provided statistics on Iraq’s Balance of Payments, 

which are summarized (Figures 14 and 15). 

Exchange rates are important during these transactions because they represent the linkage between 

one country and its partners in the global economy. 

Exchange rates affect the relative price of goods being 

traded (exports and imports), the valuation of assets, 

and the yield on those assets. The CBI pegged its 

offi cial rate between $3 to 3.38 per dinar in the 1970s. 

The last offi cial exchange rate of $3.11 per dinar 

was set in 1982. During the 1970s the offi cial and 

market rates generally corresponded and by 1980 the 

country had $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves. 

Because of the war with Iran that fi gure had fallen to 

$2 billion by 1987. The currency depreciated rapidly in the unoffi cial market during the Iraq-Iran war 

and after the fi rst Gulf War the pace of depreciation 

increased further. During 1997 to 2003, the exchange 

rate fl uctuated between 1500 -2000ID per $1 and 

was fairly steady at about 1950 ID to $1 in recent 

years. Although the Regime did not alter the offi cial 

exchange rate after 1983, it acknowledged the rate 

differential in 1999 by allowing state run banks to 

exchange hard currency at the rate of 2000 ID to 

$1. According to the statistical bulletin published by 

CBI (Figure 16) the numbers projected by sources 

in the US are consistent, with numbers reported 

internally. It is important to note that the validity 

and reliability of the data provided by CBI has not 

yet been evaluated. 

Employment

Iraq’s economy suffered from under-employment, 

an economic affl iction that was typical of oil-based 

economies. Iraq’s oil sector historically generated 

about 60 percent of Iraq’s GDP, but only employed 

two to three percent of Iraq’s labor force. Unemployment has risen signifi cantly during the period 

of 1988-2003. Unemployment in Iraq during 2003 

was estimated to be around 28 percent of the labor 

force. Some 40 percent of the employed are estimated 

to work in the public sector, many in marginalized 

economic activities, in diffi cult conditions, and for 

minimal pay. Women represent about 52 percent of 

Iraq’s population, but constitute only 23 percent of the 

formal workforce, mostly as middle level professionals in the public and service sectors and in rural areas 

as seasonal agricultural workers. 

Over the long run, labor markets are affected by 

demographics, changes in productivity and the rate 

of growth in potential output. In the short run, these 

markets will refl ect volatility in the level of economic 

activity. The unemployment rate in Iraq represents 

the ratio of those actively seeking work and the total 

number of people in the labor force. Iraq’s economy 

was powered mainly by state run centrally controlled 

government entities. Although Saddam did encourage privatization during the 1980s, this was not successful because of the continuing confl icts and lack 

of fi nancing and support for private business owners 

in Iraq. 

Social Conditions and Indicators 

Following the war with Iran in 1988, Iraq was 

ranked 50th out of 130 countries on the 1990 UNDP 

Human Development Index (HDI). This index 

measures national achievements in health, education, 

and per capita GDP. Iraq was close to the top of the 

“medium human development” category, a refl ection 

of the Government’s continued investment in basic 

social services. By 1995, Iraq had declined to 106th 

out of 174 countries and by 2000 it had plummeted 

to 126th, falling behind Bolivia, Egypt, Mongolia 

and Gabon and close to the bottom of the “medium 

human development” category.
214

Figure 14. Balance of 

payments: overall balance.

Figure 15. Balance of payments.
215

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According to the HDI, an Iraqi born in 1987 could 

expect to live 65 years while citizens in bordering 

Jordan had a life expectancy of 67 years. By 1998 

an Iraqi was expected to live only 63.8 years while 

a Jordanian saw an increase in life expectancy 

70.4 years in 1998. Compared to Jordan, where the 

literacy rate rose from 75 percent in 1985 to 88.6 

percent in 1998, Iraq’s had dropped from 89 percent 

to 73.5 percent. In 1990, Iraq ranked three places 

above Jordan on the HDI. In 2000, Iraq placed 34 

below Jordan. 

Figure 16. Exchange rate 

ID/USD.
216

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217

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Annex E

Illicit Earnings Sources and 

Estimation Methodology

Figure 17 and the subsequent notes describe how ISG 

derived its estimates for Iraq’s various illicit revenue 

streams. 

Jordan Protocol

Iraq has provided little data on the earnings from the 

Jordanian Protocol. 

• Data for 1991-95 is an ISG estimate based on accumulated Iraqi debt owed to Jordan over this period 

of $1 billion—averaging $200 million in “income” 

for each of the fi ve years. To this was added an 

estimate for the amount of trade to be fi nanced by 

Jordan under the trade Protocol of $200 million per 

year. This provides a total of $400 million per year. 

• Data for 1996-98 is the Protocol trade fi gure cited 

in press and other reporting. 

• Data for 1999-2001 is based on SOMO data for 

the value of invoices with Jordan under the general 

trade Protocol as well as a 60 percent credit, 40th 

percent cash arrangement with Jordan’s Ministry of 

Energy and Mineral Resources. SOMO did not provide actual collections for this period so the invoice 

fi gure was adjusted downward based on the average 

difference (70 percent) between invoices and actual 

collections in 2002 and 2003. Seventy percent of 

the SOMO invoice fi gure is used to estimate Iraq’s 

actual collections. 

• Data for 2002-2003 is based on SOMO actual collections under the trade Protocol and 60/40 arrangements. 

Syria Protocol

Data is based on SOMO actual collections. The program did not exist prior to 2000. Any exports to Syria 

prior to 2000 would be accounted for as private sector 

trade. 

Turkey Protocol

Data is based on SOMO actual collections. The 

program did not exist prior to 2000. Any exports to 

Turkey prior to 2000 would be accounted for as private sector trade. 

Egypt Protocol

Data is based on SOMO actual collections. The 

program existed only in 2001 and 2002. There is no 

evidence that oil exports to Egypt occurred except in 

these years. 

Import Kickbacks

This program did not exist prior to 2000. Iraq has provided little data on earnings from the UN OFF import 

kickback scheme. Data for 2000-2003 is based on:

• UN data for Iraq’s oil earnings per phase.

• The amount of money actually spent on imports 

by the UN OFF program during its existence after 

deducting for UN purchases for the Kurdish North 

(contracts Iraq would not get kickbacks from).

• UN data that over $16 billion in funds remained 

unspent when OIF started—more than the $10 billion in earnings from phases 12 and 13 and indicating those earnings did not result in actual kickbacks 

received by Iraq.

• An assessment that lags between earnings and contract signings in the UN OFF procurement program 

resulted in the money earned in phase 7 of the program (prior to the implementation of the kickback 

scheme) actually being used to sign contracts and 

obtain kickbacks in phase 8 and later—when the 

kickback program was in effect. 

The total value of contracts signed for and delivered 

by the UN under the UN OFF program was $31 billion. Based on UN data as of December 2002, 93.7 

percent of all contracts were signed by Baghdad. The 

UN signed the rest for the Kurdish North. Consequently, ISG estimates the value of contracts signed 
218

Figure 17. Iraqi illicit earnings by type, 1991-2003 (million US $).a

by Baghdad and paid for by the UN over the life of 

the program amounted to $29.047 billion. 

The earnings from each phase were calculated as a 

percentage of total UN OFF earnings (See Figure 18). 

This percent was then applied to total contracts signed 

by Baghdad and paid for by the UN ($29.047 billion) 

to obtain an estimate for actual contracts per phase. 

Iraq earned roughly 10 percent of the contract value 

Figure 18. Kickback earnings calculations.

as a kickback so the contract value for each phase was 

multiplied by 10 percent. The phases, which roughly 

account for half a year each, were then allocated to 

years to obtain the estimate for kickback earnings per 

year, as follows:

• Phase 7 for 2000.

a
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• Phases 8-9 for 2001.

• Phases 10-11 (minus $50 million) for 2002.

• The $50 million from phases 10-11 for 2003. 

Oil Surcharges

Data is based on SOMO actual collections. The program did not exist prior to 2000. 

Private Sector

Data for 1991-98 is based on an ISG estimate for the 

value of cash and barter trade conducted by the Iraqi 

government with private sector entities outside any 

Protocol or UN OFF program arrangements during 

the period. The estimate is based on Iraqi oil export 

volume and price trends through the period via the 

Gulf, Turkey, and Syrian routes. Dry cargo exports 

were estimated at $30 million in each year based 

on approximate cargo volumes and prices. Data for 

1999-2003 is based on SOMO actual collections for 

cash transactions and the invoice value for barter 

trade (no cash or credit “collections” were realized 

from the barter trade). SOMO included only partial 

data for 1998, so the ISG estimate was used for that 

year. Dry cargo exports were estimated at $30 million 

in each year based on approximate cargo volumes and 

prices.
220

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Annex F

Iraqi Oil Smuggling

Captured documents recovered shortly after OIF 

indicate that between 1992 and 2003 Iraq exported 

crude oil and other oil products to many countries 

or their nationals, who wittingly breached United 

Nations sanctions. UNSCR 661 restricted all member 

states from importing any goods, including oil and its 

derivatives, originating from Iraq. 

Case Study

The captured documents listed below indicate how 

Iraq arranged the illicit transshipment of oil with 

buyers by reference to signed contracts, letters, check 

payments and telex messages. This study includes 

summaries of contracts and letters exchanged between 

companies, banks and individuals in various countries 

including Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, France, Slovakia and the 

UAE. Additionally, these documents list some of the 

foreign companies and agents who were involved in 

the smuggling activities. 

• Some of the Iraqi refi neries were still operational 

after Desert Storm, and in spite of UN sanctions, 

continued to produce for export tons of gas oil 

that was primarily used for fi ring electrical power 

plants. 

Smugglers, using small oil transporters similar to 

the one in the picture in Figure19, bribed RG naval 

units on a regular basis in order to gain free passage 

through Iranian waters. To avoid Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) patrols, these vessels would sail 

to the southern end of the Gulf and dart across the 

narrow straights from Iranian waters to UAE territory. In the majority of these cases, the vessels would 

then transfer their cargos of gas oil or fuel oil onto 

larger tankers; it would then be transported to market. 

This money making scheme benefi ted the smugglers, 

Iraqis, Iranians, and oil recipients alike. 

The Al-Basha’ir Company was the largest front 

company created by the MIC in 1991. The company’s 

name has been discovered on hundreds of contracts 

for weapons and dual-use materials, as well as many 

legitimate day-to-day goods and supplies. In addition to dealing with oil, this company traded in items 

such as construction materials, foodstuffs, and power 

generators to cover its real activity, which was coordinating with neighboring countries to facilitate the 

purchase of illicit military equipment. 

• A former employee of more than 15 years of the 

IIS, Munir Mamduh ‘Awad Al Kubaysi, headed AlBasha’ir. Because of the IIS connections, relations 

between Al-Basha’ir and the IIS were especially 

close. In addition to those ties with the IIS, the 

operation of the company was handled closely by 

the MIC.

The last chairman of Al-Bashair’s board of Directors was the head of the MIC’s Administration and 

Finance Directorate, Raja Hasan Ali Al-Khazraji.

Information from contracts found and data derived 

from the records of the SOMO indicate that the AlBasha’ir Company, in addition to being the largest 

front company, was also a major broker in Iraqi oil 

smuggling. 

The Jordanian Al-Basha’ir Company, the Jordanian 

branch of Iraq’s most important military procurement 

front company, signed contracts for the export of oil 

products from Iraq, according to SOMO records (see 

Figure 20). These records indicate that Al-Basha’ir 

signed 198 contracts from November 1999 through 

March 2003. ISG does not know if contracts were 

signed before this date. The contracts were for fuel 

oil, usually sold at $30 per ton, and gas oil, usually 

priced at $80 per ton. Almost all were for export by 

ship through the Arabian Gulf, although the destination of two contracts was listed as “North,” which 

usually means Turkey.

• The value of the contracts totaled $15.4 million. 

This is the amount to be paid to SOMO. ISG does 

not have information about the amount of money 

Al-Basha’ir earned from the trade. 

The following inset is a translation of a contract, 

signed 2 June 1992, between Al-Basha’ir Trading 

Company and Al Walid Company for Export and 

Import. The contract states that Al Bashir agrees to 

sell oil to Al Walid, who was to transport the oil by 
222

Figure 19. A smuggling tanker.

Smuggler “Volgoneft-147”

Figure 20. Value of 

Jordanian Al Bashair 

oil export contracts 

(1999-2003).

All information is from the SOMO databases.
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ISG Translation of an Oil Sale Contract signed June 1992 

First Party: Al-Bashair Trading Company Limited

Address / Baghdad / Al-’Adl District /Area 645 /Lane 8 /House 39

Telephone #: 8852379

Second Party: Al-Walid Importing & Exporting Company Limited

Address / Baghdad / Jamilah District /Al-Talibiyyah /Safi -al-Din Street

P. O. Box 5223

In accordance with the second party offer and approved by the fi rst party, it was agreed that the second party would 

buy the Iraqi gas oil products in order to export it out of Iraq by land through Turkey, according to the following 

conditions:

1. Name of the Product: Iraqi gas oil

2. Quantity:

A) Approximately 132,000 US gallons per day plus or minus 10 percent. This quantity increased according to the availability of the product to 198,000 US gallons per day.

B) The total agreed quantity was over 14.5 million US gallons plus or minus 10 percent.

3. Quality: The guaranteed specifi cations of the product are in accordance with the local marketing specifi cations in Iraq.

4. Contract time period & implementation date: The contract is valid for 90 days starting on 15 June 1992, 

which is considered the starting date for carrying out the contract. On the condition of legalizing the 

contract one week from the contract’s signing date, the contract can be renewed to an extra time period 

according to the approval of the two parties.

5. Freighting:

A) Freighting will be by the foreign tank trucks that enter Iraq from the northern zone and are specifi ed by 

the purchaser who has to inform the seller about them as soon as they enter Iraq.

B) Freighting site is Hamam Al-’Alil store in Ninawa governorate or any other suitable site agreed by both 

parties.

C) Freighting should be for the full capacity of the tank truck (tanker). 

Also safety & security conditions are in store for the capacity of the other tankers in case of emergency, 

except for the main fuel tanker truck.

6. Final destination:

Turkey, through Iraqi borders.

7. Price: 

A) 4 American Cents per liter freighted on the tank truck in the freighting store.

B) The aforementioned price is fi xed for freighting all the mentioned quantity in clause 2 of the contract, 

in accordance with the mentioned freighting procedures in above-mentioned clause 5.

8. Payment:

A) Purchaser has to pay for the freighted product every ten days in cash in US dollars to the bank account 

of the company (fi rst party) in the Central Bank of Iraq or any other bank account the fi rst party chooses, 

in accordance with the commercial list issued by the fi rst party.
224

B) Second party committed to pay the commercial list for the freighted quantities every ten days, within 

four days from date of issue, unlike the fi rst party which has authority to stop freighting and/or apply 

delay interests on the second party in accordance to the ruling bank rate.

9. Contract implementation guarantee: The second party has to offer bank guarantee of the sum of 300,000 

Iraqi Dinars for the benefi t of the fi rst party in order to guarantee the payments and implementation.

10. Implementation conditions: 

A) The contract valid only during the economic siege of Iraq only, hence the contract’s clauses will be 

reviewed when the economic siege circumstances end.

B) The fi rst party will not bear any liabilities or responsibilities or expenses for the sake of transporting 

the product out of Iraq by the second party.

11. The fi rst party has the right to cancel the contract in case of breaking any condition by the second party 

without requiring notice or court judgment.

12. Other conditions: Freighting executed in accordance to the general freighting conditions, operational 

instructions attached to the contract which are considered as an integral part of the contract.

13. All communications & correspondence between the two parties should be in accordance to the offi cial 

addresses that are mentioned in the contract.

14. This contract must be legalized by the administrative board of the company within (7) days from the date 

of signing the contract.

 Composed in Baghdad on 2 June 1992

First Party

Al-Bashair Trading Company Limited

Second Party

Al-Walid Importing & Exporting Company Limited 
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truck to the Turkish border. Although a valid contract 

during the duration of the UN sanctions on Iraq, it 

was to be reconsidered if the sanctions were lifted. 

The contact was scheduled to permit the shipment of 

approximately 132,000 US gallons per day (plus or 

minus 10 percent) and this fi gure could increase to 

around 198,000 US gallons per day, depending upon 

available supplies. The total quantity to be sold was 

approximately 14.5 million US gallons (plus or minus 

10 percent) within a 90-day period, as from 15 June 

1992 and might be renewed dependant upon both 

parties agreement. Monies were to be paid into an 

account at the CBI. 

Figure 21 is a summary of a letter from the Wadi 

Hajar Trading Company Baghdad to Scrufys Moro 

Holdings, Pediment Holdings, Occelus Company, 

Limassol, Cyprus. This letter refers the signed 

contract between the Pediment Company and the 

National Iranian Petroleum Distribution Company. 

The start date for delivery was specifi ed as 15 December 1993 and the delivery was to the port of Bandar e 

Mahshahr. The Iraqi side gave guarantees of security. 

Figure 22 is a contract between the national Iranian 

Petroleum Distribution Company Tehran, Iran and 

Pediment Holdings Tehran (registered in Cyprus) who 

was represented by a Mrs. Parvin Moeini Jazani. The 

subject of the contract was the delivery of 100,000 

tons of gas oil by pediment Holdings. The place of 

delivery was given as the Oil Berth Jetty of Bandar e 

Mahshahr or Siri Island. The contract was signed on 

06 December 1993. 

The letter shown in Figure 23 is from Max Moini, 

who coordinated the shipment of oil products. Talks 

were held with various organizations including the 

National Iranian Tanker Company, National Iranian 

Oil Company, the Ministry of Intelligence (Iran) and 

the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 

On 23 November 1993, A. J. Khazamipour, Managing Director of Rashi International, sent a letter (see 

Figure 24) to Mr. Goran from the Pediment Holding 

Company. Rashi International, a Dubai-based company and a subsidiary of I.O.S. group of companies, 

passed on to Goran a “tax” bill from the Iranians for 

using the “coordinated area” during this operation. 

The Iranians valued their support at 40 cents per ton 

plus 10 cents for the “coordination” expenses. 

Soon after, A. J. Khazamipour and Rashi International sent another letter dated 29 November 1993 

(see Figure 25) to Mr. Goran of Pediment Holding 

requesting that he pay $40,000 for a deposit for the 

project. 

A copy of two checks (see Figure 26) made out to Mr. 

Moini for the “deposit concerning diesel operations.” 

One check is $40,000 for the deposit and the second 

for $6,250 covering the 25-percent commission fees. 

The signature in the check’s signature block resembles the signature of A. J. Khazamipour from the previous letters discovered from a named US company .

Figure 27 is a contract for petroleum products 

between the seller, Wadi Hajar Trading Company, 

Ltd., of Baghdad and the buyer, Pediment, Ltd., 

Limassol, Cyprus. The contract discusses the options 

of using barges or pipelines. Interestingly, it is specifi ed that the transport of the oil products might be by 

road tankers. The contract stipulates that the buyer 

undertakes to issue a letter of guarantee for a value of 

$1million. 

Figure 28 is a letter addressed to Mr. Muhammad 

Said Kuba from Pediment Holdings, Ltd., Cyprus. 

The letter states that Pediment is ready to buy petroleum products via the Iraq-Iran border pass at Zirbatia 

Mehran by using trucks. Payment for such was to be 

made by cash to an Amman Bank account. 

The recovered contract shown in Figure 29 listed the 

seller, Al-Basha’ir Trading Company, Ltd., Baghdad, 

and the buyer, Unipack Paris Company. The contract 

was signed and dated 27 April 1993. The products 

mentioned include gas oil, kerosene, gasoline and fuel 

oil and it is indicated that the transport of the products 

will be by road tankers and will take place at Basra 

storages. 

Next, Figure 30 shows a letter authorizing the Czech 

Republic Company, Exim Praha, to procure crude 

light oil from the Iranian border. 

Figure 31 is a telex from a French bank to a bank in 

Brussels that indicates that Vitol Geneva of Switzerland opened a letter of credit for Unipack of Belgium 

for an amount of $12,518,129. 
226

Figure 21. Summary of a 

letter from the Wadi Hajar 

Trading Company.
227

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Figure 22. Contract 

between the National Iranian Petroleum Distribution 

Company Tehran, Iran and 

Pediment Holdings Tehran.
228

Figure 22. Contract 

between the National Iranian Petroleum Distribution 

Company Tehran, Iran and 

Pediment Holdings Tehran 

(continued).
229

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Figure 22. Contract 

between the National Iranian Petroleum Distribution 

Company Tehran, Iran and 

Pediment Holdings Tehran 

(continued).
230

Figure 23. Personal letter 

from Mr. Max Moini.
231

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Figure 24. Letter from A.J. 

Khazamipour, 

Rasi International.
232

Figure 25 . Second letter 

from A.J. Khazamipour, 

Rashi International.
233

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Figure 25 . Second letter 

from A.J. Khazamipour, 

Rashi International

(continued).
234

Figure 26. Two checks to 

Max Moini.
235

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Figure 27. Contract for 

petroleum products.
236

Figure 27. Contract for 

petroleum products

(continued).
237

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Figure 27. Contract for 

petroleum products

(continued).
238

Figure 28. Letter addressed 

to Muhammad Said Kuba.
239

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Figure 29. Contract 

between al Bashair

Trading Company and

Unipack Paris.
240

Figure 29. Contract 

between al Bashair

Trading Company and

Unipack Paris (continued).
241

Regime Finance

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Figure 29. Contract 

between al Bashair

Trading Company and

Unipack Paris (continued).
242

Figure 30. Letter

authorizing the Czech 

Republic Company, Exim 

Praha, to procure crude

light oil.
243

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Figure 31. Telex from a 

French bank to a bank in 

Brussels.
244

Figure 32 shows a contract between Unipack of Paris 

and a Turkish company called Gonen Tasimacilik 

Gemi. The contract stipulates that Unipack pay an 

advance of $150,000 and in return Gonen would 

supply 60 standard road tankers with a capacity of 

between 20,000 to 35,000 liters. The Gonen Company is to transport kerosene, mazul, super benzene, 

crude oil and fuel oil, from Basra in Iraq to Bandar 

Humayni, Iran. A roundtrip of 250 km. 

Next, fi gure 33 is another Telex from Vitol Geneva, 

to a French Bank and copied to Unipack of Paris. It 

details shipments of oil for August and September 

1993. Banks in Slovakia and the Union Bank Swiss 

Geneva are also mentioned. 

On 15 October 1993, First Yu Swiss Bank Belgrade 

sent a letter of guarantee (see Figure 34) to Wadi 

Hajar Trading Company Baghdad. The letter refers 

to a contact between Ocellus Company Limited and 

Wadi Hajar Trading Company concerning the delivery of spare parts for agricultural machines worth 

$50,000,000. 

Figure 35 is a letter dated 30 December 1993 to a 

Mr. Jamal Fariz, Manager of the Foreign Exchange 

Department at the Jordanian Investment and Finance 

Bank, who speaks of a contract that was concluded 

between Ocellus Company and a Mr. Hadi Talub 

Ibraheem, concerning the delivery of spare parts for 

agricultural machines for the amount of $50,000,000. 
245

Regime Finance

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Figure 32. Unipack of

Paris contract.
246

Figure 32. Unipack of

Paris contract (continued).
247

Regime Finance

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Figure 33. Telex from Vitol 

Geneva to a French bank.
248

Figure 34. First Yu Swiss 

Bank Belgrade letter of 

guarantee.
249

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Figure 35. Letter dated 30 

December 1993 to

Mr. Jamal Fariz.
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Annex G

Iraq’s Banking System

Origins of the Iraqi Banking System

In imitation of Egyptian leader Abdul Nasser’s 

nationalist/socialist policies, the Iraqi government 

of ‘Abd-al-Salam ‘Arif nationalized all private 

commercial banks in Iraq in 1965, as well as the 

branches of foreign commercial banks. The government closed the nationalized banks and moved their 

customer accounts to the state-owned commercial 

bank, Rafi dian Bank, which was owned by the MoF. 

As a result, Rafi dian Bank had to rapidly expand its 

branch system to service its expanded customer base, 

but it did not have the human resources to manage 

a complex network. In addition, nationalization of 

the private banks caused the best bank managers to 

leave the industry and created distrust among foreign 

investors. The combined effect of these factors caused 

the effectiveness and service quality of the country’s 

banking system to deteriorate. 

In response to Rafi dian Bank’s inability to service the 

country’s banking needs, in the early 1970s the CBI 

and the MoF proposed to the government that a new 

state-owned bank be licensed. As a result, in 1988 

Rasheed Bank, also owned by the MoF, was licensed. 

In addition to serving the private sector, Rasheed 

Bank and Rafi dian Bank soon took over much of the 

banking business of state-owned enterprises, relieving 

CBI of that function. 

The Ministry of Finance was responsible for overseeing budgets of several ministries as well as the 

state-operated banking system. Currently, the six 

state-owned banks (Rafi dian, Rasheed, the Agricultural, the Industrial, the Real Estate, and the Socialist) account for about 93 percent of banking system 

assets. There are also 18 private banks with capitalization of $25 million and deposits of $107 million. 

The 18 private banks were established in an effort to 

handle local depositors’ fi nancial needs and reform 

as well as modernize the banking sector. These 

banks remained small, in part because most Iraqis 

did not think it was safe to put their money in banks. 

Figure 36 lists both the state and privately owned 

banks of Iraq, including branches, establishment date 

and capital assets remaining after OIF. 

Organization of the CBI

The CBI was composed of fi ve main departments, 

plus support elements (see Figure 37).

• Department of Investment. This department maintained account information for foreign accounts.

• Department of Accounting. This department 

maintained the employee accounts of the CBI.

• Department of Exchange. This department 

licensed money exchangers.

Iraqi Ministry of Finance’s Banking Role

The Iraqi MoF was headed by Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim from 1995 to 2003. Hikmat was responsible for 

managing the funds for the Iraqi government held in 

the CBI. All revenue for the government went into 

accounts in the CBI. Apart from normal budgetary 

requirements, a major duty for the Finance Minister 

was to disperse money for Saddam. The Presidential 

Diwan had special accounts separate from the normal 

government accounts. Routinely, letters from Saddam 

would arrive at the MoF ordering the transfer of funds 

from government accounts to Presidential Diwan 

accounts located at the CBI. 

• The Presidency was also the authorizing authority for transferring money to other ministries. Any 

order for funds received by the MoF was sent to the 

Director of the CBI, ‘Isam Rashid Huwaysh. Any 

disputes between ‘Isam and Hilsmat were settled by 

Saddam. 

• When hard currency was collected in the CBI, it 

was allocated to the ministries that needed hard 

currency to buy things internationally, such as the 

Ministry of Health. Because hard currency was in 

such short supply, the ministries that received it had 

to pay it back in Iraqi Dinars. 
252

Figure 36. Iraqi banking 

system structure.
253

Regime Finance

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Figure 37. Department, 

department directors, and 

branches within CBI as of

1 July 2002.
254

The CBI did not make extra payments directly to any 

ministries or to the Diwan, including the IIS and the 

MIC. Payments were made to the MOF accounts at 

the Rasheed and Rafi dian Banks, and then distributed. At the end of the month, the CBI would send an 

account of what was sent to the Rasheed and Rafi dian 

Banks to the MoF. After two or three days the MoF 

would instruct the CBI to print Iraqi Treasury Bonds 

as an accounting procedure to balance the books. Iraq 

did not have a more formal economic or rigorous 

monetary policy. 

State-Owned Banks

Iraqi had two state-owned commercial banks: the 

Rafi dian and the Rasheed. Both the Rafi dian Bank 

and the Rasheed Bank accounted for about $1.8 billion in assets, or about 86 percent of the total assets 

in Iraq’s banking system.

Rafi dian Bank

The Rafi dian Bank was owned by the Ministry of 

Finance and was founded in 1941. It was the largest, 

oldest, and most important commercial bank in Iraq. 

It handled much of the Regime’s foreign assets. The 

central branch of Rafi dian bank was located in Baghdad. The chairman and General Manager was Diya’ 

al-Khayyun. In addition to the Baghdad Headquarters, 

there was a main branch in Basrah; and over 164 

smaller branches located throughout Iraq. There were 

eight overseas branches in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan (2), 

Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Great 

Britain. 

Rafi dian Bank was primarily a conduit for transferring money out of Iraq. Several branches were 

involved in passing illicit revenue from oil and cigarette smuggling around the Middle East. In the February to April 2002 timeframe, Mufi d ‘Aziz (Director 

of Rafi dian Bank) and ‘Abd al-Huwaysh all-Mukhtar 

(Regional Director of the Rafi dian Bank) withdrew 

$50 million from accounts at the Commercial Bank of 

Syria.

Rasheed Bank

The Rasheed Bank was Iraq’s second largest commercial bank with 170 domestic branches. It was government-owned and established in 1988. It operated 

outside Iraq through correspondents. The Rasheed 

Bank was established to provide competition for 

Rafi dian, primarily in Iraq.

Specialized Credit Banks

Iraq also used four specialized state-owned banks: 

the Agricultural Bank, the Industrial Bank, the Real 

Estate Bank, and the Socialist Bank, all which collectively account for about seven percent of the total 

assets in the banking system. These four banks were 

established to increase the fl ow of fi nancial support 

to certain sectors of Iraq’s economy such as agriculture, industry, business creation, and real estate. 

They played virtually no role in Iraq’s illegal fi nancial 

transactions during sanctions. 

Privately Owned Banks

In the face of decreasing foreign currency reserves 

held in country and an increasing illiquid domestic 

banking system, the CBI and MoF in approximately 

1992 successfully petitioned the government to allow 

the licensing of new private commercial banks. By 

February 2003, there were approximately 18 private 

commercial banks. These private banks offered superior service, were more computerized, and were faster 

growing than the state-owned banks. By early 2003, 

the private banks held the majority of private-sector 

accounts and deposits, although the government 

ministries and state-owned enterprises still banked 

primarily with state-owned banks. 

Private banks were set up with capital from individuals. Under Iraqi banking laws, no one individual 

was allowed to own more than a fi ve-percent share 

holding in a private bank. The quality of management 

of the private banks was better than the governmentmanaged banks. The private banks were able to offer 

better salaries, and attract the best candidates from the 

banking sector.

According to a senior Iraqi Government offi cial, in 

order to evade controls under international sanctions, 

the government of Saddam used private commercial 
255

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banks for some transactions in the belief that private 

banks would not be as closely monitored by the UN 

as the state owned banks and the CBI. 

Middle East Bank

‘Uday Saddam Husayn owned shares in the Middle 

East Bank. The Middle East Bank is one of the largest private banks in Iraq. Uday also controlled the 

appointees and directors of the bank.

Islamic Bank

The Islamic Bank was unconventionally established. 

Formed by the Humayim family, the bank was established on a decree from the RCC, which was contrary 

to Iraqi banking rules and regulations. Money of 

Ba’th Party Members and supporters of the Regime 

was deposited into this bank. 

The Role Played by the Hawala System

The hawala system was the most common informal 

payment system used in Iraq under Saddam. The Iraqi 

Regime encouraged its citizens in Iraq and abroad to 

open accounts in foreign currencies at Iraqi banks in 

order to track funds that were traditionally transferred 

through informal payments arrangements. The reliability of the ancient hawala system came from trust 

and the extensive use of personal connections and 

family-tribal relationships. In its simplest terms, an 

individual desiring to transfer money exchanged cash 

for a hawala note, often coded or secretly marked to 

foil potential counterfeiters. This note would then 

be transferred to the other party via mail or courier. 

The party on the other end of the transaction then 

presented the note to an associated exchanger in their 

country, who converted the hawala note back into the 

appropriate cash specifi ed in the note, minus a handling fee. In modern times, the use of e-mail, faxes, 

and telephones have made these private cash transfers 

almost instantaneous and nearly impossible to trace or 

regulate. 

Before OIF, there was no regulation of the hawala 

system in Iraq and the use of them was outlawed. 

Regardless, illegal hawalas were often used by the 

average Iraqi individual or company to transfer funds 

from expatriate communities to the homeland. The 

illicit system is reliable and effi cient and is preferred 

because it is faster and less expensive than bank 

hawalas. 

• The speed is due to the lack of paperwork and 

bureaucracy, while the cost effectiveness is due to 

not having to deal with a bank’s artifi cial, higher 

exchange rates. However, the anonymity and lack 

of traceable documentation make this system vulnerable to abuse by individuals and groups transferring funds to fi nance illegal activities. 

• For example, in order to import goods, a letter of 

credit was normally needed from a bank in Jordan. 

To get this, the Jordanian bank would need some 

cash. Because it was illegal to transfer cash out of 

Iraq through the normal banking system, the illegal 

hawala system was used to move the money. 

• The hawala system was positive for the economy 

because it reduced the liquid cash within the 

economy and helped counter the effects of infl ation. 

Hawalas were eventually legalized and regulated by 

Saddam in an attempt to reduce smuggling and help 

stimulate the economy. 

The Hawala

The term “hawala” means “transfer” or “wire” 

in Arabic banking terms. The word hawala comes 

from the Arabic root hwl, meaning to “change” or 

“transform.” In common Arabic usage, hawala are 

performed in three different ways—two of which are 

legal:

• Hawalas through Iraqi banks are synonymous with 

bank money transfers. Bank hawalas are legal. 

• Illegal hawala transfers are based on an ancient 

informal banking system used throughout South 

Asia and the Middle East to transfer money across 

distances past legal and fi nancial barriers. In 

modern times, unlicensed money exchangers use 

this process, coupled with modern telecommunications to discreetly transfer money. 

• Hawalas made using the old process via licensed 

money exchangers are considered legal. Not all 

money exchangers perform hawalas. 
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Annex H

UN Security Council Resolutions 

Applicable to Iraq

The following information from the Offi ce of the 

Spokesman for the United Nations UNSG summarizes the Chapter VII resolutions applicable to Iraq 

between 1990 and 2003. Emphasis has been added. 

UNSCR 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 imposed 

economic sanctions on Iraq, including a full trade 

embargo barring all imports from and exports to 

Iraq, excepting only medical supplies, foodstuffs, 

and other items of humanitarian need, as determined 

by the Security Council sanctions committee, which 

was also established by UNSCR 661. The sanctions 

committee was chaired at the beginning of 2004 by 

the Ambassador of Romania, with the delegations of 

the Philippines and Pakistan providing vice chairmen. 

UNSCR 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the cease-fi re 

resolution, declared that the full trade embargo 

against Iraq would remain in place, pending periodic 

reviews every 60 days (para. 21) and every 120 days 

(para. 28) of Iraqi compliance with the obligations 

imposed under UNSCR 687. 

UNSCR 712 (1991) of 19 September 1991 allowed 

for a partial lifting of the embargo, which would have 

enabled Iraq to sell some oil to use the proceeds for 

humanitarian purposes. In return, Iraq would have 

been subject to strict UN monitoring of the contracts 

and distribution of humanitarian goods bought with 

the oil revenues. 

UNSCR 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 enables Iraq to 

sell up to $1 billion of oil every 90 days and use the 

proceeds for humanitarian supplies to the country. 

On 20 May 1996, the UN and the Government of 

Iraq concluded the MoU that codifi ed the practical 

arrangements for the implementation of the UN OFF 

agreement. The sanctions committee subsequently 

adopted on 8 August 1996 the Procedures for the 

implementation of UNSCR 986. On 9 December 

1996, the UNSG reported to the Security Council 

(S/1996/1015) that all the steps necessary to ensure 

the effective implementation of UNSCR 986 had been 

concluded. As a result, UNSCR 986 went into effect 

at 00.01 hours Eastern Standard Time on 10 December 1996. The fi rst food shipment arrived in Iraq on 

20 March 1997. 

UNSCR 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996 established the export/import monitoring system for Iraq. 

Iraq and countries exporting to Iraq must notify 

UNSCOM and the IAEA regarding the supply of 

“dual-use” items to Iraq. Such items are subject to 

inspection upon their arrival in Iraq as well as at the 

site where the items will be used.

 UNSCR 1111 (1997) of 4 June 1997 decided that the 

provisions of UNSCR 986, except those contained 

in paragraphs 4,11 and 12, shall remain in force for 

another period of 180 days beginning at 00.01 hours, 

Eastern Daylight Time, on 8 June 1997. Further 

decided to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of 

the implementation of this resolution 90 days after the 

entry into force of paragraph 1 and again prior to the 

end of the 180 day period, on receipt of the reports 

referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, and expressed its 

intention, prior to the end of the 180 day period, to 

consider favorably renewal of the provisions of this 

resolution, provided that the reports referred to in 

paragraphs 3 and 4 indicate that those provisions are 

being satisfactorily implemented. 

UNSCR 1115 (1997) of 21 June 1997 decided not 

to conduct the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 

and 28 of UNSCR 687 (1991) until after the Special 

Commission submits its next consolidated progress 

report due on 11 October 1997, after which time those 

reviews will resume in accordance with UNSCR 687. 

UNSCR 1129 (1997) of 12 September 1997 decided 

that the provisions of UNSCR 1111 should remain in 

force, except that States are authorized to permit the 

import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including fi nancial and other essential 

transactions directly relating thereto, suffi cient to 

produce a sum not exceeding a total of one billion 

United States dollars within a period of 120 days 

from 00.01 hours, Eastern Daylight Time, on 8 June 

1997 and, thereafter, a sum not exceeding a total of 

one billion United States dollars within a period of 60 

days from 00.01 hours, Eastern Daylight Time, on 4 

October 1997; and decided further that the provisions 

of paragraph 1 shall apply only to the period of implementation of UNSCR 1111. 

UNSCR 1134 (1997) dated 23 October 1997 

expressed the fi rm intention, if Iraq does not comply 

with paragraphs 2 and 3 of UNSCR 1115, to adopt 

measures which would oblige all States to prevent 
258

without delay the entry into or transit through their 

territories of all Iraqi offi cials and members of 

the Iraqi armed forces who are responsible for or 

participate in the instances of non-compliance of 

paragraphs 2 and 3 of UNSCR 1115. It decided not 

to conduct the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 

and 28 of UNSCR 687 until after the next consolidated progress report of the Special Commission, 

due on 11 April 1998, after which those reviews will 

resume in accordance with UNSCR 687, beginning 

on 26 April 1998. 

UNSCR 1137 (1997) dated 12 November 1997 

imposed travel restrictions on all Iraqi offi cials 

and members of the Iraqi armed forces who were 

responsible for or participated in the instances of 

non-compliance including the denial of entry to 

Iraq to Special Commission offi cials on the grounds 

of their nationality and the denial of entry to sites 

designated by the Special Commission for inspection 

to Special Commission inspectors on the grounds 

of their nationality. The resolution decided that the 

review provided in paragraphs 21 and 28 of UNSCR 

687 shall resume in April 1998 in accordance with 

paragraph 8 of UNSCR 1134, provided that the Government of Iraq shall have rescinded its decision of 

29 October 1997 to impose conditions on cooperation 

with the Special Commission. 

By UNSCR 1143 (1997) of 4 December 1997 the 

Security Council decided that the provisions of 

UNSCR 986, except those contained in paragraphs 4, 

11 and 12, shall remain in force for another period of 

180 days beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Standard 

Time, on 5 December 1997. 

By UNSCR 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998 the 

Security Council decided that the provisions of 

UNSCR 986, except those contained in paragraphs 4, 

11 and 12, shall remain in force for a new period of 

180 days beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Standard 

Time, on the day after the President of the Council 

has informed the members of the Council that he 

has received the report of the UNSG requested in 

paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1153, on which date the 

provisions of UNSCR 1143, if still in force, shall 

terminate, except as regards sums already produced 

pursuant to that resolution prior to that date.

• Also by UNSCR 1153, the Security Council 

decided that the authorization given to States by 

paragraph 1 of UNSCR 986 shall permit the import 

of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including fi nancial and other essential 

transactions directly relating thereto, suffi cient to 

produce a sum, in the 180-day period referred to in 

paragraph 1 of UNSCR 1153, not exceeding a total 

of 5.256 billion United States dollars, of which the 

amounts recommended by the UNSG for the food/

nutrition and health sectors should be allocated on 

a priority basis, and of which between 682 million 

United States dollars and 788 million United States 

dollars shall be used for the purpose referred to in 

paragraph 8 (b) of UNSCR 986, except that if less 

than 5.256 billion United States dollars worth of 

petroleum or petroleum products is sold during the 

180 days period, particular attention will be paid to 

meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in the food/

nutrition and health sectors and the UNSG may 

provide a proportionately smaller amount for the 

purpose referred to in paragraph 8 (b) of UNSCR 

986. 

By UNSCR 1158 (1998) of 25 March 1998 the Security Council decided that the provisions of UNSCR 

1143 shall remain in force, subject to the provisions 

of UNSCR 1153, except that States are authorized 

to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum 

products originating in Iraq, including fi nancial and 

other essential transactions directly relating thereto, 

suffi cient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of 

1.4 billion United States dollars within the period of 

90 days from 00.01 hours, Eastern Standard Time, on 

5 March 1998. 

 UNSCR 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998 authorized 

States, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of the 

resolution, to permit, notwithstanding the provisions 

of paragraph 3 (c) of UNSCR 661, the export to Iraq 

of the necessary parts and equipment to enable Iraq 

to increase the export of petroleum and petroleum 

products, in quantities suffi cient to produce the sum 

established in paragraph 2 of UNSCR 1153.

• By the same resolution, the Committee established 

by UNSCR 661, or a panel of experts appointed 

by that Committee may approve contracts for the 

parts and equipment and up to a total of 300 million 

United States dollars may be used for that purpose. 
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• UNSCR 1175 also noted that the distribution 

plan approved by the UNSG on 29 May 1998, or 

any new distribution plan agreed by the Government of Iraq and the UNSG, will remain in effect, 

as required, for each subsequent periodic renewal 

of the temporary humanitarian arrangements for 

Iraq and that, for this purpose, the plan will be 

kept under constant review and amended as necessary through the agreement of the UNSG and the 

Government of Iraq and in a manner consistent with 

UNSCR 1153. 

UNSCR 1194 (1998) of 9 September 1998 decided 

not to conduct the review scheduled for October 1998 

provided for in paragraphs 21 and 28 of UNSCR 687, 

and not to conduct any further such reviews until Iraq 

rescinds its above-mentioned decision of 5 August 

1998 and the Special Commission and the IAEA 

report to the Council that they are satisfi ed that they 

have been able to exercise the full range of activities 

provided for in their mandates, including inspections.

• By UNSCR 1194, the Security Council also reaffi rmed its intention to act in accordance with the 

relevant provisions of UNSCR 687 on the duration 

of the prohibitions referred to in that resolution and 

notes that by its failure so far to comply with its 

relevant obligations Iraq has delayed the moment 

when the Council can do so. 

By UNSCR 1210 (1998) of 24 November 1998, 

the Security Council decided that the provisions of 

UNSCR 986, except those contained in paragraphs 4, 

11 and 12, shall remain in force for a new period of 

180 days beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Standard Time, on 26 November 1998. The resolution 

also decided that paragraph 2 of UNSCR 1153 shall 

remain in force and shall apply to the above-mentioned 180-day period. 

In January 1999, the Security Council decided to 

establish three panels on disarmament, humanitarian 

issues and prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property to 

discuss options that would lead to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq. Ambassador Amorim (Brazil) chaired all 

three panels. He submitted the panels’ reports in the 

spring of 1999 (S/1999/356), and the Council considered the recommendations contained therein. 

UNSCR 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999, extended the 

UN OFF program for a further 180 days starting on 

25 May 1999. 

UNSCR 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999 decided that 

paragraph 2 of UNSCR 1153, as extended by UNSCR 

1242, shall be modifi ed to the extent necessary to 

authorize States to permit the import of petroleum 

and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including fi nancial and other essential transactions directly 

related thereto, suffi cient to produce an additional 

sum, beyond that provided for by UNSCR 1242, 

equivalent to the total shortfall of revenues authorized 

but not generated under UNSCR 1210 and 1153, 3.04 

billion United States dollars, within the period of 180 

days from 00.01 hours, eastern standard time, on 25 

May 1999. 

UNSCR 1281 (1999) of 10 December 1999, extended 

the UN OFF program for a further 180 days starting 

on 12 December 1999 (phase VII). 

On 17 December 1999, after several months of 

intensive consultations, the Security Council adopted 

UNSCR 1284 (1999), stressing the need for a comprehensive approach to the full implementation of all 

relevant Security Council resolutions and Iraq compliance with these resolutions. The resolution established the United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation 

and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to undertake the responsibilities of the former UNSCOM, 

which was charged with monitoring the elimination 

of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The resolution also removed the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports

and provided for additional specifi c arrangements for 

facilitating humanitarian supplies to Iraq, including 

the conditional suspension of the sanctions Regime. 

On 8 June 2000, the Security Council unanimously 

adopted UNSCR 1302 (2000) by which it extended 

the UN OFF program for a further 180-day period 

beginning 9 June 2000. The Council repeatedly 

extended the program for 180-day periods over the 

following years. 

Then, on 14 May 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1409 (2002), which adopted 

a revised Goods Review List of military-related 

goods or commodities, which was to enter into effect 

on 30 May 2002. From that date onward, States are 
260

authorized to sell or supply any commodities not 

included on the Goods Review List, while the Council would regularly conduct thorough reviews of the 

Goods Review List. 

On 28 March 2003, the Security Council unanimously 

adopted UNSCR 1472 (2003), making technical and 

temporary adjustments to the UN OFF program on 

an interim and exceptional basis, so as to ensure the 

implementation of approved contracts concluded 

by the Government of Iraq for the relief of the Iraqi 

people.

• The resolution authorizes the UNSG and representatives designated by him to establish alternative 

locations, inside and outside Iraq, for the delivery, 

inspection and authenticated confi rmation of 

humanitarian supplies and equipment under the 

program. 

• It also authorizes him, among other things, to 

review as a matter of urgency the approved funded 

and non-funded contracts concluded by the Iraqi 

Government and to contact suppliers of those 

contracts and, when necessary, to require them to 

delay, accelerate or divert shipments. It also allows 

him to negotiate and execute new contracts for 

essential medical items. 

On 25 April 2003, the Council unanimously adopted 

UNSCR 1476 (2003), extending the provisions of 

UNSCR 1472 until 3 June 2003. 

The Security Council formally ended all sanctions, 

except those related to the sale or supply to Iraq of 

arms and related material, other than those required 

by the occupying powers to serve the purposes 

of Security Council resolutions, in UNSCR 1483 

(2003), which was adopted on 22 May 2003 by a vote 

of 14-0 with one country not participating in the vote.

• The resolution states that, with the exception of the 

arms prohibitions noted above, all other sanctions 

established by UNSCR 661 and subsequent resolutions “shall no longer apply.”

• It also requests that the UNSG will continue the 

exercise of his responsibilities under UNSCRs 

1472 and 1476 for a period of six months, and will 

terminate within this time period, in the most cost 

effective manner, the ongoing operations of the 

UN OFF Program. 
261

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Annex I

Suspected WMD-Related DualUse Goods and Procurement 

Transactions

The following is a list of procurement transactions, 

contracts, attempted transactions, or contract tenders 

of products of suspected dual-use goods. The section 

below lists terms used by ISG throughout the report 

and this particular annex, as well as summarizes specifi c UNSCR affecting member states’ obligations in 

exporting dual-use and military goods to Iraq.

• Permitted Goods: UNSCR 661 limited exports to 

Iraq to medical supplies, foodstuffs, and other items 

relating to humanitarian needs, but the UN nonetheless required that all dual-use goods requested by 

Iraq be reviewed and approved by the UN Sanctions Committee prior to the exportation of such 

humanitarian goods. Regarding the importation of 

foodstuffs and medicines, the Iraqis notifi ed the 

Sanctions Committee. 

• Dual-Use Goods were subject to UN approval:

From 1990 through 1996, UN member states were 

allowed a free hand in interpreting what goods they 

considered to be suitable for export to Iraq. In 1996, 

UNSCR 1051 (1996) established an import/export 

monitoring system for Iraq. Under UNSCR 1051, 

Iraq and countries exporting to Iraq were obliged to 

notify the UN of any “dual-use” items as described 

by the 1051 List. This list of dual-use goods was 

subsequently modifi ed by UNSCR 1409 (passed in 

2002) that became the basis of the Good’s Review 

List (GRL). From 30 May 02, the date of UNSCR 

1409, member states were permitted to sell dual-use 

goods not included on the GRL with the approval 

of the Sanctions Committee, while exports of goods 

described by the GRL had to be submitted to the 

UN for their consideration and approval. 

• Prohibited Military Goods: UNSCR 661 and 687 

prohibited UN member states from exporting military goods to Iraq. Therefore, any goods “specially 

designed” or “modifi ed” for military use were 

banned for export to Iraq (prohibited). “Goods” 

included equipment, component parts, technology, 

and software (including software used for the development and production of military goods). 

The goods described below appear to be dual-use as 

specifi ed by the 1051 or the GRL, and consequently 

could have been of use to Iraq for the development, 

production or use of WMD. However, without full 

technical specifi cations of the items or knowledge of 

whether UN approval was granted for these exports, 

ISG cannot determine whether UN sanctions were 

actually breached with the procurement transactions 

summarized below. Investigating possible breaches 

of sanctions relating to the export of dual-use goods 

is outside the scope of ISG.

Chemical Dual-Use Related Procurement

Possible Violations of UN Sanctions by French 

Companies

2002—French Company Carbone Lorraine 

Supplied the MIC with Chemical Warfare Raw 

Materials

As of August 2002 the former Iraqi Regime and the 

French company Carbone Lorraine had been cooperating for many years in the procurement of hightech industrial equipment, some of which had WMD 

applications. 

2001—Attempt To Procure Mobile Laboratory 

Trucks

A French fi rm known for violating UN sanctions 

submitted a request for bids to a South Korean and a 

German company for 20 mobile laboratory trucks in 

August 2001. The end-user for the trucks was pur-
262

ported to be the Iraqi General Company for Water and 

Sewage. 

Possible Violations of UN Sanctions by Indian 

Companies

1999—NEC Company Assists Iraq in the Purchase 

of Chemical Equipment and Precursors

Reportedly, the Indian company NEC and the Iraqi 

company Al-Basha’ir combined resources in 1999 to 

set up a front company called Technology Trading 

S.A. (TTSA). TTSA appeared to conduct research 

on herbicides, pesticides and other agriculturerelated issues. Baghdad could have directed TTSA 

to research and development of chemical dual-use 

programs for the Iraqi government. 

• Iraq used TTSA and NEC to purchase chemical 

laboratory equipment and precursors from India. 

• These items were shipped by land via the Syrian 

and Jordanian borders using false cargo manifests 

and bribes to preclude customs inspections. 

Biological Dual-Use Related Procurement

Sales of Biomedical Equipment Technology and 

Services by Swiss Companies

1995—Purchase of Reagents by an Iraqi Front 

Company

Reportedly, an Iraqi front company called Al-Eman 

purchased a kit of reagents worth $5,000 from the 

Swiss fi rm Elisa on behalf of an organization named 

El Ibaa in 1995. El Ibaa was a special unit in the Iraqi 

MoA. 

• El Ibaa was directly connected with Saddam, had 

a special research facility, and was granted an 

“unlimited” budget.

 • Its stated research areas were the breeding of animals such as cows and sheep and certain types of 

crops.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Austrian 

Companies

2001—Negotiations To Procure Autoclaves 

AGMEST and the Al Rafad Scientifi c Bureau for 

Promoting Drugs and Medical Appliances, both 

located in Baghdad, negotiated a contract for the Iraqi 

Ministry of Health for autoclaves from an Austrian 

fi rm in early 2001. 

• Two of the autoclaves were reportedly intended for 

the Vaccine and Serum Institute in Baghdad, a probable reference to the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine 

Institute (ASVI). 

• In July 2002, Sabah N.M. Ali of AGMEST in 

Baghdad, Iraq, Firas Kadhum of the Iraqi Al Rafah 

Scientifi c Bureau for Promoting Drugs and Medical 

Appliances, and an offi cial from a Jordanian fi rm 

negotiated a contract for autoclaves, sterilizers, and 

vacuum pumps from the Austrian company with the 

end user being SDI. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by German 

Companies

2001—Attempts To Acquire Biotechnology and 

Biological Weapons-Related Technology and 

Expertise

The Amman, Jordan offi ce of the Iraqi front company 

Winter International forwarded offers for dual-use 

laboratory equipment from a German fi rm to the 

Winter International offi ce in Baghdad, in March 

2001. The end-user of this equipment was purported 

to be the Iraqi MoI. The equipment offered included: 
263

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and Procurement

• An electrophoresis system including a special 

atomizer with rubber bellows for producing reagent 

mists. This system can be used for recombinant 

DNA process-cloning and many other molecular 

biology applications.

• A refrigerated ultracentrifuge, a microcentrifuge, 

a low temperature freezer (between -30 and -80 

degrees Celsius), and an automatic DNA-analysis system with mono-laser. This equipment is on 

the UN dual-use monitoring lists and would have 

required verifi cation.

• A moisture purging vacuum pump and electroporator. This equipment is used for plasmid cloning. 

2002—Attempts To Procure a DNA Synthesizer

From August 2002 through February 2003 representatives from a Jordanian trading company with links 

to Iraq attempted to purchase a DNA synthesizer 

from a German based company. This equipment was 

restricted under the UN GRL.

• An offi cial claiming to be the managing director of 

the Jordanian fi rm Al Theker forwarded the information to Iraq. The report stated that it appeared 

that the Jordanian fi rm’s offi cial was forwarding 

information back to the Baghdad-based Wateera 

Company.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Italian 

Companies

2002—Attempt To Procure Biotechnology and Bio 

Weapons Related Technology and Expertise

In January 2002, the Al-Mazd Group for Medical and 

Engineering Systems and Technology (AGMEST) in 

Baghdad requested a quotation for 10 freeze dryers 

through the Iraqi Ministry of Health from an Italian 

fi rm. 

2002—Attempt To Procure Dual-Use Autoclaves

In March 2002 the Iraqi fi rm Al Mutasem Engineering used a Jordanian intermediary company, to 

contact an Italian fi rm and receive a price quote for 

dual-use autoclaves.

• Autoclaves are commonly used in laboratories to 

 sterilize equipment. They are not a vital part of a 

 BW program as there are other means to sterilize 

 equipment. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Turkish 

Companies

2002—Procurement of CBW Protective 

Equipment

A Turkish fi rm sold and transferred atropine autoinjectors to the Iraqi government starting in August 

2002. The company also provided coordination in 

response to Iraqi requests for chemical protective 

equipment, unspecifi ed laboratory chemicals and 

biological growth media. 

• In December 2002, the same fi rm continued to 

work with the Iraqi government on a new order for 

atropine autoinjectors and was also working to fi ll 

Iraqi orders for additional CBW protective equipment; specifi cally 600 microbial decontamination 

systems, 600 CBW protective kits including protective masks and garments, and 10 sterilizers. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Indian 

Companies

2002—Attempt To Procure Biotechnology

Equipment

According to reports, an Indian export company 

provided a quotation for a dry powder injection-fi lling 

project at the Al-Anaam Pharmaceutical Company 

packaging plant in Baghdad. 

2002—Attempt To Procure Biotechnology

technology

According to reporting, in late 2002, Iraq’s State 

Company for Vegetable Oil issued tender no. 649/

2002 to several different Iraqi trading fi rms in an 
264

attempt to procure detergent production facilities that 

included high-capacity spray drying equipment and 

cyclone fi lters. An Indian fi rm was the only supplier 

to present Iraq’s State Company for Vegetable Oil 

with an offer.

2003—Attempt To Procure Dual-Use Drugs

In January 2003, an Indian fi rm offered to deliver 10 

metric tons of bulk Ciprofl oxacin to the Iraqi State 

Company for Manufacturing of Drugs and Medical 

Appliances, Kimadia’s Samarra Drug Industries.

• Ciprofl oxacin is a widely used antibiotic that could 

also be used to treat Anthrax infection. It was 

specifi cally added to the UN Goods Review List 

(GRL), pursuant to UNSCR 1454.

• Iraq’s procurement and stockpiling of Ciprofl oxacin 

would have facilitated the country’s employment 

of BW against coalition forces, Iraq’s neighbors, 

and/or its own citizens.

• There is insuffi cient data available to confi rm the 

completion of this deal.

2003—Transfer of Hormone Tablet Production 

Manufacturing Technology 

An Indian fi rm working through representatives of 

the Syrian Group Company (SGC) Baghdad offi ces, 

provided an offer for a hormone tablet facility to Iraq 

in late January 2003. The client for the facility was 

identifi ed as “M/S Al-Amin” which is very likely the 

Al-Anaam Pharmaceutical Company.

Nuclear Dual-Use Related Procurement

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Belarusian 

Companies

2001—Contract for Ferrite Materials Including 

Magnets

The MIC company Al-Tahadi had a contract with the 

Belarusian company, Balmorals Ventures, for ferrite 

materials, including permanent ferrite magnets.

• Some of the equipment was received from this contract, to include, a press machine and a mixer.

• The MIC initiated direct contact with the Belarusian company and therefore neither Al-Sirat nor AlNajah companies were involved in this procurement 

attempt.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Romanian 

Companies

2000—Production Lines of Anisotropic and 

Isotropic Cast AlNiCo Magnets

The MIC company Al-Tahadi had two contracts for 

production lines for magnets. The fi rst contract was 

signed in approximately 2000 with a Romanian company, Uzinimportexport, for production lines of both 

anisotropic and isotropic cast AlNiCo magnets. 

• The contract was worked through the private front 

company Al-Sirat.

• Al-Tahadi received other offers for this production 

line. For example, an Indian company, NEC bid on 

the contract through the front company Al-Najah, 

but the Romanian company had a better price. 

• Al-Tahadi did not receive equipment or materials 

from this contract. 

• The contract included an output capacity of one ton 

of magnets per year, raw materials for two years, 

training for two years, and equipment. The equipment included a 25kg induction furnace, electric 

furnaces for heat-treating, facilities for producing 

molds, facilities for measurements and magnetization, and magnetic annealing furnaces.
265

Regime Finance

and Procurement

 Al-Tahadi did not have a plan for acquiring the raw 

materials after the two year contract expired because 

these materials were readily available. The AlNiCo 

production lines did not include the sintering process. 

The magnets specifi ed in the contract were ring magnets, cubicle magnets and cylindrical magnets with a 

mass of 0.5 to 500 grams.

Delivery Systems Procurement

For a listing of Iraq’s illicit procurement of missile 

delivery systems commodities, see the Delivery Systems Chapter, Procurement section.
266

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267

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and Procurement

Annex J

The Procurement of Conventional 

Military Goods in Breach of UN 

Sanctions

Before the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq indigenously produced ammunition, small arms, gun barrels, and other 

basic military items. The war, however, destroyed 

Iraq’s military industrial base leaving Saddam’s 

Regime with critical shortages of military spare parts, 

ammunition, and other materiel. United Nations 

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 frustrated 

Saddam’s attempts to reconstitute his military capacity following Desert Storm, because UNSCR 661 

prohibited UN members from exporting conventional 

military goods and related technologies to Iraq. 

Many individuals, foreign companies, and some 

countries knowingly violated UN sanctions. In some 

cases, governments failed to comply with or enforce 

sanctions out of recalcitrance of international 

norms or inability or negligence to monitor the commercial activities of certain individuals and fi rms 

willing to conduct illicit business with Saddam’s 

Regime. Governments not only included UN members, but also permanent members of the UNSC. 

Iraqi efforts to obtain military goods and related technologies in the mid-1990s until OIF in March 2003 

can be divided into several categories: raw materials; 

consumables; and military goods. Iraq sought materials such as steel, aluminum and titanium to supply its 

military manufacturing industry. Under Saddam, Iraq 

constantly needed spare parts for manufacturing and 

for military equipment. As with any military organization, the Iraqi military always required consumables 

such as batteries, tires, and ammunition. ISG judges 

that Iraq’s most pressing requirement, however, was 

for military equipment.

• For potential suppliers, the sale of military equipment offered the strongest profi t margins. 

• Since the beginning of sanctions in 1990, Saddam 

successfully acquired a wide range of military 

goods or their component parts for SAM systems, main battle tanks, anti-tank guided missiles 

(ATGM), combat aircraft, GPS jammers, and nightvision equipment. 

• Throughout this investigation, ISG has exploited 

information from captured documents from various Iraqi ministries and agencies and debriefi ngs of 

both detainees and willing sources from the former 

Iraqi Regime. Examples found by ISG, provided 

below, represent only a small cross section of the 

total illicit dealings with Iraq. However, a full 

investigation of all violations of UNSCR vis-à-vis 

Iraq is outside the scope of ISG’s investigation. 

The United Nations Sanctions on Iraq

The UNSC passed numerous resolutions from 1990 

to 2003 prohibiting member states to export, military 

goods and technology to Saddam’s Regime, placing 

fi nancial constraints on UN members conducting 

business with Iraq, establishing WMD and military 

restrictions on Iraq, and the formulation and implementation of the UN OFF program. UNSC passed 

two UNSCR, 661 (1990) and 687 (1991) that specifi -

cally prohibited the export of military goods to Iraq 

by UN members. Paragraph 24 of UNSCR 687 reads:

In accordance with UNSCR 661 and subsequent 

related resolutions and until a further decision is 

taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply or promotion or 

facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their 

nationals or from their territories or using their fl ag 

vessel or aircraft, of; arms and related material of 

all types, specifi cally including the sale or transfer 

through other means of all forms of conventional 

military equipment including paramilitary forces 

and spare parts and components and their means of 

production for such equipment. 

These restrictions included prohibitions on the 

licensing of military technology and other transfer 

arrangements used in the production, utilization, or 

stockpiling of military items. These UNSCR also prohibited the use of personnel or materials for training 

or technical support services relating to the design, 

development, manufacture, use, maintenance, or support of military goods. 
268

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Ukrainian 

Companies

Summary of Ukrainian involvement 1995-2003:

Documents obtained by ISG indicate that Iraqi delegations visited Ukraine in 1995, and Ukrainian groups 

visited Iraq between 1998 and 2003. During these 

visits, both parties discussed missile deals. Another 

source indicates that in 2001 and 2002 Ukrainian 

delegates provided Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 

components to Iraq. In addition, ISG recovered papers 

that indicate Ukrainian companies had offered to 

supply other military equipment to Iraq. 

1995-2003: Ukrainian and Iraqi Delegation Visits

Information supplied by an Iraqi scientist, indicates 

that Iraqis visited Ukraine in 1995 and that the AlKaramah State Establishment hosted many visits from 

Ukrainian suppliers who were negotiating for contracts from 1998 to 2003.

• An Iraqi scientist stated that Ukrainian suppliers 

were the most frequent visitor to Iraq assisting Iraq 

with its missile program. The Ukrainians visited 

many times led by a Mr. Orshansky. Orshansky 

usually brought 50 to 60 people from multiple 

Ukrainian companies dealing with a range of issues 

including civil power projects as well as missile and 

other military technologies. The Ukrainians wanted 

to sign a contract to supply theory, design, and 

equipment, but the deal was never completed due to 

the defection of Husayn Kamil from Iraq in 1995.

2001-2002: Ukrainian Company May Have 

Supplied Military Goods to Iraq

A source indicates that a Ukrainian company supplied 

components for UAV.

• In 2001 and 2002, the Ukrainian company, Orliss, 

provided UAV components, such as engines and 

gyroscopes, to the Iraqi Government. The individual from Orliss who handled these transactions 

was Olga Vladimirovna, Director of the Orliss 

Company. Vladimirovna provided her business card 

to several individuals at the Ibn Firnas Company.

2003: Papers Indicate Ukraine Company Supplied 

Military Goods

Recovered papers indicate that a Ukrainian company 

was offering to supply military equipment in early 

2003. 

• Recovered documents indicate that the Al-Karamah 

State Establishment purchased equipment through 

ARMOS Trading Company in Baghdad from the 

Mont Elect Company, Ukraine before January 

2003. Two payments were made of $405,000.00 

for the equipment. Signatures on the document 

included representatives from: ARMOS; Al-Karamah State Establishment; Sa’ad General Company; 

Al-Karamah; Dr. Sergei Semonov, for the Montelect Establishment, and the Trade Offi ce of the 

MIC. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Cypriot 

Companies

1997: Cypriot Company Offered T-72 Tanks, AntiAircraft Missile Systems, and Sniper Rifl es 

Recovered documents refer to a Cypriot company’s 

offer of military goods; including tanks, anti-tank 

weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons systems.

• A letter dated 23 August 1997 from a Cypriot 

company F and F Dawn, Ltd. (located in Limassol, 

with offi ces also in Paris) shows that the General 

Manager, Ahmad Fayiz Al Mirabi, offered military 

goods to the Al-Basha’ir Company and Mr. Munir 

Mamduh ‘Awad.

• A second letter, marked ‘Top Secret’, from the 

Offi ce of Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Aziz 

Ahmad Husayn to the DGMI, dated 21 September 1997, refers to an offer to sell Baghdad “tanks 

(142 T-72 with a possible total of 300), bombers, 

missiles (Tow-2 /anti-tank), anti-aircraft missiles 

system (Stinger) and Barrett USA semi-auto sniper 

rifl es.” 
269

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by French 

Companies

Summary of French involvement 1998-2003: Some 

French businessmen sought business with Iraq during 

this period. In one instance, a French businessman 

brought a tank carrier to a weapons convention in 

Baghdad, and in another instance, a French electronic 

warfare expert visited Iraq. In addition, the MIC 

attempted to acquire components for the French-manufactured Roland missile system. 

1998-1999: Tank Carrier Imported to Iraq

A letter from Aqra General Trade Company Baghdad 

dated 18 November 1998 requests an entry visa and 

reads, ‘‘Find attached herein a copy of the passport 

of Jean Claude, a French citizen and the manager of 

the French company Lura. Mr. Claude will bring a 

tank carrier model to the MOD that will be supplied 

to Baghdad by the end of this month. Kindly facilitate 

the procedures to issue him an entry visa to Iraq, considering that our company will bear his stay expenses 

in Baghdad.’’ 

• A second letter from Aqra General Trade Company 

Baghdad dated 8 December 1998 reads, ‘‘Reference 

to our letter we would like to inform you that the 

vehicle (Tank Carrier) arrived at Abi Gharib [most 

likely Abu Ghurayb] Customs Department, kindly 

notify the competent authorities to give Mr. Jean 

Claude an entry visa to Iraq ASAP.’’

• A letter to the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Directorate from the MoD Armament and 

Equipping Directorate dated 12 September 1999 

reads, ‘‘kindly acknowledge that Mr. Jean Claude, 

Manager of the French Company, Lura visited the 

country on Saturday, 11/09 to operate the Rescue 

and Armor Transport Vehicle stored at Modern 

Vehicles storehouse. Kindly appoint an offi cer to 

escort the afore-mentioned with the technicians for 

three or four days.’’

• Another letter to the Armament and Equipping 

Directorate dated 18 September 1999 from the 

Manager of the Aqra Company, states, “During 

the visit Mr. Jean Claude, Commercial Manager 

of the French company, made to Baghdad, it was 

agreed, in the presence of the committee formed by 

the ministry to take over and inspect the vehicle, 

to send a technical expert to train some specialists 

how to operate the vehicle. Kindly take the necessary actions to issue entry visas for Jean Claude, 

the Commercial manager and Philippe Robert, the 

Technical Expert.’’ 

1999-2000: Deputy General Manager of French 

Company Visits Iraq

Recovered documents include letters dated December 

1999 and January 2000 that show that the Deputy 

General Manager of a French company called 

SOFEMA planned to visit Iraq on 15 January 2000 

on behalf of a number of French Military Companies. 

Mr. Dominique Salini’s 29 December 1999 introduction letter from the al-Hadar Company is included in 

the textbox below. A subsequent letter to the GMID 

M6 Section from the head of Air Defense Security 

dated 3 January 2000 requests an opinion on holding a meeting with a representative from the IIS and 

Salini.

2002: Documents Indicate French Experts Visited 

Iraq and Agreed to Military Technology Transfer

A recovered document indicates that a French electronic warfare/radar expert met with representatives 

of the Al Kindi Research Facility in November 2002. 

The purpose of the meetings was to facilitate military-related microwave, direction fi nding, and passive 

radar technology transfer. The translated documents 

include military-related technology transfers and Iraqi 

contractual agreements with foreign manufacturers. 

ISG also acquired two meeting logs among the documents.

• The subject meeting log indicated that on 3 November 2002 an individual identifi ed as a French expert 

and referred to as Mr. Cloud (possibly Mr. Claude 

from the prior paragraphs), visited the Al Kindi 

Electronic Warfare/Radar Research, Development, 

Test and Evaluation Center. The Log states that the 

offi ce of Muhammad Fadil fi nanced Mr. Cloud’s 

visits to Iraq. Fadil brought Cloud to Iraq on 2 previous occasions.
270

Letters Dealing With a Planned Visit of Mr. Salini of the French SOFEMA Company to Iraq in Early 2000

In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq

Presidency of the Republic

General Directorate of Military Intelligence

Air Defense Security System 

Serial No. /Sect 2/Div 5/

Date / /1/2000

To/General Directorate of Military Intelligence/M4/Sect 6

Subject/Requesting for your opinion

1. Al Hadar Company “Al Hadhar Company” Letter, numbered 271, dated 29/12/1999, which has been sent by 

your directorate.

2. Please give us your opinion on holding a meeting between Mr. Dominique Salini, Deputy General Manger 

Commercial of the French Company SOFEMA, and our representatives.

Please review and inform us...with our best regards.

Intelligence Major General Head of Air defense Security System

3/1/2000

Call the company representative in Iraq (TC: Handwritten note).

Waiting for the company to respond to the new appointment 17/1. (TC: Handwritten note).

Letterhead.Al-Hadhar.jpg

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Serial No.: 271

Date: 29/12/1999

 Sect 6

Mr.: NR993 gentlemen (TC: There is a big scratch over the “NR993” and “Sect 6” is written in place of it)
271

Regime Finance

and Procurement

 Letters Dealing With a Planned Visit of Mr. Salini of the French SOFEMA Company to Iraq in Early 2000

(continued)

Our Greeting,

Mr. Dominique Salini is visiting Iraq. He is the Deputy General Manager Commercial of French Company 

SOFEMA, which is considered marketing company representing a lot of French military companies. We kindly 

request a meeting to discuss your needs with him. He will visit Iraq between the period 15/1/2000 to 

19/1/2000. Attached is the company catalog for reviewing.

 With all our respect.

 Attachment: Company catalog.

 Deputy Manager

 ‘Isam Al ‘Aqidi 

 Copy for the branch 

 29/12 

 Bulgaria - Sivishtov 5250 – St. T. Milanovich No.10 A – Telefax: 00359631-25577

Iraq – Baghdad – Al-Masbah Tel: 7172829- Fax: 7172738 – Telex: 213175 ISAM –

P.O. Box: 4245, Sabe Abkar - Baghdad
272

• At the 3 November 2002 meeting, Cloud was 

brought in due to his expertise and experience in 

obtaining equipment in support of the Dawa II. 

Fadil, Cloud, and Saeed discussed technical issues 

indicating he could provide solutions through 

Fadil’s offi ce.

• Fadil, Cloud, and Saeed also discussed the technical specifi cations of Radioson equipment, direction 

fi nding equipment, and a land-based station that 

was tabled in a previous meeting.

• Saeed, Fadil, and Cloud discussed the possibility 

of obtaining or constructing a base to manufacture 

microwave parts, passive and active sensors, signal 

enhancers, and low distortion components. Cloud 

promised to provide Saeed and Fadil with information regarding these electronic warfare products.

• A second document identifi ed as a technical 

cooperation memorandum outlines Saeed’s meeting with Cloud. The memorandum was presented 

to the General Manager of the Al Kindi Electronic 

Warfare/Radar Research Center. The document 

confi rms that a meeting took place as scheduled 

with Saeed, Fadil, and Cloud.

• Fadil, Saeed, and Cloud agreed to cooperate so 

Cloud could facilitate the transfer of high frequency 

(HF), microwave, and passive radar militaryrelated technology to Iraq. A memorandum of ‘‘4 

November’’ (probably 2002) requests permission to 

proceed with the technological transfer process. 

2002-2003: Iraq’s MIC May Have Attempted To 

Procure French Roland Missile Parts

A source related that Iraq attempted to acquire battlefi eld and air defense technology 25 days before the 

onset of OIF.

• Beginning in late December 2002, the Iraqi MIC 

initiated efforts to acquire replacement parts for 

the Roland II surface to air missile system, valves 

for Iraq’s air defense system, and various other 

high technology items with military and battlefi eld 

applications. These efforts were underway up until 

23 days before the onset of hostilities. The MIC 

Commercial Section corresponded with Majda 

Khasem Al-Khalil (a Lebanese female) who in turn 

met directly with the French Thompson Company 

regarding the acquisition of the missile parts.

Majda later provided samples of night vision goggles 

and protective Kevlar devices to the MIC. The paragraphs below describe the development of this effort 

as portrayed from the Iraqi side.

• On 25 December 2002, a high level MIC offi cial 

requested permission to acquire ‘hard cables’ for 

Iraq’s air defense headquarters. The MIC offi -

cial supplied Majda, Sour Debbar, and Dr. Awad 

Al-Souri as points of contact capable of supplying 

these materials. Majda was described as “the Lebanese.”

• On 22 February 2003, Ra’ad Isma’il Jamil, General 

Manager of the Salah-al-Din General Company, 

and a Brigadier General Hassem discussed the purchase of parts for the Roland II system with Majda. 

A communication sent the same day by Jamil and 

Hassem notifi ed the MIC Deputy Minister that, 

based on his orders, they invited Majda to reach 

“clear and fi nal agreements” regarding subjects 

already discussed and that they had arranged for her 

safe passage with border control. 

 • During a meeting with Jamil and Brigadier Hassem, 

Majda mentioned that she met with French experts 

regarding to rehabilitating Iraqi Roland II parts. 

Majda had learned from those experts that it was 

not possible to rehabilitate those parts due to their 

deteriorated state, but it was possible to provide 50 

new parts at the same price to repair the old ones. 

The 50 new parts met the same technical specifi cations the Iraqi MIC stated for the old parts. Majda 

informed Jamil and Hassem that she provided 

the French experts with technical questions and 

designs. The aforementioned experts addressed 

the questions and designs “thoroughly, clearly, and 

completely.”

• On the evening of 22 February 2003, Majda promised to have the new components within ready 30 

days of the ministry’s acceptance of the contract. 

Majda further agreed to ship the old Iraqi parts 
273

Regime Finance

and Procurement

back to Baghdad without repair. The MIC assumed 

responsibility for the transportation and movement 

of the parts through Iraqi customs. The Ministry 

believed that they could use internal components 

from the old parts as spare parts in the future.

• Majda further stated she was ready to import 

“set valves from either types, 12 sets of each at 

$250,000” as requested by the MIC Deputy Minister. Majda agreed to deliver these items within 

10 days of signing of an agreement. She further 

mentioned that “the French side” was ready to 

implement this agreement and take care of the 

documentation process regarding shipping and warranty certifi cation, but that she would need some 

money to cover this process. Majda stated she was 

ready to provide a bond accepted from the Iraqi 

side towards a down payment and she provided 

complete specifi cations for both sets of valves. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by 

North Korean Companies

Summary of North Korean involvement 1999-

2003: Starting in 1999, North Koreans visited Iraq to 

hold talks relating to rocket engines. By 2003, North 

Korea and Iraq had negotiated and signed contracts 

for missile components, ammunition, and other 

goods. North Korea later reciprocated by inviting the 

Iraqi leadership to Korea. According to documentation, in May 2001 a delegation from North Korea, 

including specialists in defense, were due to visit Iraq. 

1999-2001: Planning for Military Procurement 

Delegation Visits

Recovered documents indicate that Iraq and North 

Korea government offi cials proposed numerous 

delegation visits in letters written between 1999 and 

2000.

• A letter dated 11 August 1999 marked ‘Top Secret 

and Personal’ from the Presidential Secretary and 

addressed to the Minister of Military Industries, 

refers to an invitation and a letter on 2 August 1999. 

The letter indicates that permission for the MIC and 

the MoD had been granted to allow a verbal invitation to the North Korean Defense Minister or his 

deputy to visit Iraq.

• A letter dated 28 February 2000, shows that the 

North Korean Defense Industry Department of 

Korean Workers Party offi cially invited an Iraqi 

military delegation to visit North Korea. The visit 

was arranged to show North Korea’s willingness to 

supply Iraq with military equipment and to allow 

for discussions between military experts. The letter 

later states that the North Koreans believed the 

proposed visit would open good relations between 

the militaries “against the common enemies.” 

• A letter from the Defense Industry Department of 

Korean Workers Party, dated 30 July 2000, gave 

compliments to the Iraqi Minister of Military Industries and indicated an appreciation for the invitation 

of the Korean delegation to Iraq. “On our belief, in 

the present situation of international circumstance, 

it will be most preferable that your delegation visit 

our country fi rst to open the wonderful relationship 

and to continue the reliable and extensive cooperation in the fi eld of military industries between two 

ministries. In this great chance together with, we 

would like to emphasize that our last invitation of 

your delegation to our country remains still valid 

and effective.”

• A letter from the Defense Industry Department 

of Korean Workers Party to the Minister of Military Industries in Iraq (probably the MIC), dated 

23 September 2000, accepted Iraq’s invitation and 

acknowledged that the North Korean side would 

send a high-ranking delegation, headed by the 

Deputy Minister, for seven to 10 days starting on 

about 8 October 2000. The letter indicated that the 

North Koreans hoped this visit would be a “turning point” for establishing new relations in military fi elds between the two ministries against “our 

common enemies.”

• A record of a telephone call dated 5 October 2000 

between the Secretary General and Brigadier General Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun, from the MIC, with the 

Staff Brigadier General ‘Adil Hamid, specifi ed the 

proposed subjects to be discussed during the North 

Korean delegation’s visit on 10 October 2000. 
274

The topics included: the upgrade of communications systems, especially HF, the modernization of 

anti-tank missiles, the possibility of purchasing an 

assembly line to produce 30mm artillery, the development of SAMs, and air defense systems. The air 

defense topics described were the modernization of 

SAMs, including, “early warning systems, SAM/2 

T, and SAM/2 A.” 

• A captured telephone contact note dated 10 October 

2000 confi rmed that the fi rst meeting with the North 

Korean delegation was planned for 11 October 

2000 with the MIC Director in attendance. The note 

11 August 1999 Handwritten Document From the 

Director of the IIS marked Secret/Personal 

1. This organization is preparing for cooperation 

with Iraq in the fi elds of furnishing weapons and 

military equipment, to pass special technology for 

its manufacture and upgrade as follows:

a. Jamming systems against enemy aircraft radars, 

the communication amongst the aircraft, and 

their communication with ground bases.

b. Upgrade of radar systems, command systems, 

and Russian early warning (radars) used in 

Iraq, among them (P-14, P-18, P-19, K66, 

H.FINDER).

c. Development of air defense systems, types (Volga 

and SAM 2).

d. Development of automatic fi ring systems against 

aircraft launchers.

e. Development of special radars for missiles, 

linking it with systems to disrupt enemy missile 

targeting.

f. Pass on technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300 kilometers and landto-sea missiles with a range of 300 kilometers.

g. Long-range launcher tubes, caliber 230mm and 

122mm, capacity (22) launchers.

h. Pass on technology to build a mini-submarine.

i) Repair and maintenance of Eastern made equipment and weapons according to what the Iraqi 

side has determined.

2. The Korean side is prepared to send a technical 

delegation to discuss preliminary measures with 

Iraqi specialists in order to obtain an agreement on 

the proposals. After that, the Iraqi side is sending 

a technical delegation to visit Korea to complete 

discussions and (conduct) a fi eld survey on the 

specialized factories.

3. Currently, there is a desire from the Iraqi side to 

cooperate with the Korean side to arrange and 

prepare a secret visit for the Korean Minister of 

Defense or his deputy to Iraq for high-level discussions in this area.

4. The Korean side has conveyed through the source 

that Iraq is not allowed to associate itself with 

long-range missiles as specifi ed, but it can deal 

with missile technology as long as it doesn’t exceed 

the range of 150 kilometers, as decreed by Security Council decisions. Whereas, they exhibit their 

readiness for cooperation in the fi elds specifi ed by 

Iraq.

5. In light of what was presented, we propose cooperation with the Korean proposal, in pursuance of 

the aforementioned plans, especially and forming a 

working team from MIC, Air Force Command, Air 

Defense Command and the Intelligence Service to 

deal with the proposals and negotiate inside and 

outside of Iraq. The results have been submitted to 

the President to receive approval of a visit by the 

Korean Minister of Defense or his deputy. 

Note: This note was directed to a North Korean organization called the “Chang Kwang Group”
275

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specifi ed that the Iraqi attendees would include staff 

from the Director, Armament and Accommodations, 

Staff Brigadier General ‘Adil Hamid, concerned 

representatives from the Air Force Command-Air 

Defense Command, Communications Administration, a Navy Representative and a SSM Command 

Representative.

2000: Contracts Negotiated for Iraqi Defense 

Programs

Information from a former high ranking offi cial 

who worked in the MIC, corroborated by captured 

documents, indicates that Iraq and North Korea had 

negotiated contracts worth $10 million to support the 

Iraqi military programs by mid-2001. These contracts 

included a Volga air-defense missile homing head, 

ammunition, small machines, and spare parts. 

• Between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 

2001, North Korea and Iraq reportedly began 

discussing contracts supporting the Iraqi missile 

program, particularly for guidance and control 

systems. While the head of the MIC, ‘Abd-alTawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, handled the 

negotiations with the North Koreans, orders for the 

negotiations were passed directly from Saddam via 

the Technology Transfer Offi ce of the IIS. 

• A fi ve-person North Korean delegation, headed by 

the deputy Minister of Defense, visited Iraq at the 

end of 2000. A 7-person Iraqi delegation to North 

Korea reciprocated this visit, lead by the deputy 

Minister of the MIC, General Muzahim Sa’b 

Hasan. Another North Korean delegation traveled to 

Iraq in the third quarter of 2002.

• The Harith General Company and Al-Karamah 

General Company signed the fi rst contract at the 

end of 2001 for the development of a Volga homing 

head by adding infrared sensor. Another 3 to 4 

Hittin General Company contracts followed for 

small ammunition, small machines, and spare parts. 

The total value of these contracts was $10 million.

• Iraq also proposed that North Korea supply and 

install guidance and control kits in 50 of Iraq’s 

Al Samud and Al Fat’h missiles. Each kit would 

consist of 2 gyros, 3 accelerometers, and an onboard computer. The fi rst installment was for 10 

kits. North Korea, however, rejected the proposal in 

the near term, but agreed to study it further. 

• The Syrian companies Lama and SES allegedly 

facilitated the Iraq-North Korea contracts, charging an additional 10-15 percent commission on the 

contract value. (See also the Front Company discussion.)

Recovered documents from 2001 corroborate the 

information given by this source. These documents 

show that a North Korean company signed four contracts and discussed others with Iraq. This included 

the supply of missile components, a deal to modify 

radars and the Volga missile system, the supply of 

engineers, an agreement for ammunition manufacturing equipment, and the supply of components for 

ammunition. These contracts were between the Iraqi 

companies Al-Karamah, Hittin, and Al Harith and the 

North Korean Hesong Trading Corporation, based in 

Pyongyang. The goods were to be shipped to Syria 

and then onto Baghdad.

• The fi rst contract was for the procurement of 

components for short-range missiles, associated test 

equipment, installation in Iraq, and for the training 

of Iraqi engineers.

• The second contract was for the modifi cation of 

ABARONA, P-15 radars, and modifi cations to the 

Volga System (S-75), including technology transfer 

and the supply of 20 North Korean engineers. 

• The third contract was for an automatic copying 

machine for the manufacture of 122mm guns, a 

screw fi lling machine, and TNT for munitions. 

• The fourth contract was for fuses for 57mm antiaircraft gun ammunition, RPG-7 projectiles, and 

delay mechanisms for the RPG-7.

• Minutes of a meeting dated 06 September 2001 

refer to another contract that has the names of high 

ranking offi cial “His Excellency Pak Gyong Chol 

the 1st Deputy Minister of D.I” and Muzahim Sa’b 

Hasan, the MIC Deputy Minister. The minutes refer 
276

to an earlier meeting held in Pyongyang 11 June 

2001 and to a visit by a delegation to Baghdad 

Iraq from 2 to 7 September 2001. They refer to 

6 contracts in total and to future long-term cooperation. Supplied goods included: ammunition, 

communication equipment, short-range S-S missiles, artillery and night vision systems, powder for 

ammunition, and light naval boats.

• A 31 December 2001 letter from SES International 

(a Syrian Company) to Tosong Technology Trading Corporation indicates that the North Korean 

company received a cash payment from Iraq’s State 

Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). SES took a 

10 percent commission for their efforts, according 

to their agreement with the Al-Basha’ir Company, 

the MIC’s chief procurement front company.

• By 2 March 2002, a letter from Al-Basha’ir Company to Tosong Technology Trading stated that contracts were signed and will be fi nanced according to 

the Iraqi–Syrian Protocol. The letter also stipulated 

that Tosong must nominate a Syrian company for 

this purpose. 

• In a 4 April 2002 letter, a Mr. J.B.K from the 

Tosong Technology Corp’s Damascus offi ce 

suggested to Mr. Muzahim Sa’b Hasan, the MIC 

Deputy Minister, that a more suitable transportation 

method for the contracted goods should be found. 

He recommended that the goods in question should 

be moved to Syria by aircraft rather than using ship 

transportation. 

2001: North Korean Delegations Plan To Visit 

Iraqi Intelligence Organizations 

A recovered letter dated 16 May 2001 from the authorized manager of the Al Maimana General Trading 

Company to, intelligence agent nr993 of the Directorate of General Military Intelligence, reads, “For the 

sake of improving the job that our company, is doing 

with your department, a delegation from North Korea 

including a large number of the specialized companies in the fi eld of defense will visit the country for 

the period from 29 May 2001 to 03 June 2001.” 

2001: North Korean Delegations Visited Iraq

Evidence supplied by an Iraqi with direct access indicates that the Al-Karamah State Establishment had 

many foreign suppliers and, in 2001, hosted visitors 

from North Korea.

• Representatives from a North Korean company 

reportedly visited Iraq for three days in April or 

May 2001. The North Korean delegates attended 

meetings covering a range of subjects, including 

one meeting focused on rocket engines. 

• The North Koreans were interested in technical 

aspects surrounding Iraq’s indigenously produced 

rocket engines and how Iraqi engineers welded their 

combustion chambers and nozzle assemblies.

• Iraq’s main interest during the discussions was to 

obtain parts and solutions to missile-related engineering problems. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Russian 

Companies

Summary of the Russian involvement 1999-2003: 

Russian engineers visited Baghdad providing technical assistance for the Al Samud missile program. 

Russian companies prepared equipment for air 

defense, offered missile launchers, signed a contract 

for missile gyros, and invited Iraqis to visit Moscow 

factories. Russians offered to supply military technology for Iraqi rockets and missiles. Meetings were also 

held in the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow where Russian 

companies offered to provide technical expertise to 

improve and to build weapons systems, including 

tanks. 

1999: Russian Missile Technical Support Visit

A source indicates that seven Russian engineers 

provided technical assistance to the al-Samud missile 

program in 1999. The Russians also reportedly supplied machines and parts to Iraq. The MIC arranged 

and funded the contract that the Iraq Intelligence 

Service (IIS) oversaw.
277

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• In April 1999, seven Russian engineers spent three 

months in Baghdad providing technical assistance 

to Iraq’s al-Samud liquid-propellant missile program. The group of engineers included a Russian 

expert in engines, two experts in guidance and 

control, an expert in airframes, one who worked 

on test benches, a lab tester, and one expert in the 

supply of machines and parts. Each Russian had 

an individual contract for an unknown amount of 

money for their technical expertise.

• The visit also included a $10 million contract for 

parts and machines such as a fl ow forming machine, 

a milling machine, a furnace, and raw materials. 

These machines and equipment were housed at the 

Al-Karamah State Establishment. 

• The MIC arranged and funded the contract with the 

Russians. The IIS directorate within the MIC, however, oversaw the contract. IIS offi cers occasionally 

attended meetings between the Russians and the 

Iraqi representatives from the Al-Karamah State 

Establishment.

• From January to February 2003, a Russian technical team reportedly visited Iraq to train Iraqi technicians on upgrading an air defense system. The 

Russians conducted the training in Baghdad.

2000-2001: Russian Establishment Offered 

Military Goods

According to captured documents, a Russian company offered to prepare military air defense equipment and a written proposal to supply a defense 

system called the S-300.

• A letter dated 4 September 2000 from the authorized Manager of the Al Maimana General Trading Co. Ltd., to Intelligent Agent nr993 of the 

DGMI reads, “we are enclosing you the offer of the 

Russian Lemz Establishment which includes the 

possibility of preparing equipment of air defense 

(radars, communications equipment, land services 

equipment etc).”

• A second letter dated 16 November 2000 to intelligence agent nr993 of the DGMI reads “Since 

we have connections with many Russian and 

French companies that showed its readiness to 

deal with us in the fi eld of importing equipment of 

air defense and its spare material, our company, 

Al Maymana General Trading Company, Ltd., is 

happy to present its services to you in the fi eld of 

importing the materials and the equipment that you 

need to serve our great Iraq and from a Russian and 

European origins.”

• A third letter dated 3 March 2001, to Intelligence 

Agent nr993 states, “Our Company, Al Maymana 

General Trading Company Ltd has done great 

efforts to provide the armed forces to serve our 

great Iraq and its leader Saddam Husayn (may 

God keep him safe). Through our job, a credible 

side has proposed the possibility of a Russian Air 

Defense system, type S-300 PMU (four launching 

sites with 36-70 missiles) and entering it to the 

country.” 

2001: Offer to Supply Rockets and Technology

Sources and documents suggest that Iraq was actively 

seeking to obtain the SS-26/Iskander missile from 

Russia.

• Document exploitation has revealed that Firas 

Talas, the son of former Syrian Defense Minister 

Lt. Gen. Mustafa Talas, visited Iraq in July 2001 

and discussed a variety of missile systems and 

components he could supply through Russia. Firas 

offered to sell Iraq the S-300 SAM and the 270km 

range SS-26/Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile, or to provide assistance to help Iraq produce 

the Iskander. Firas claimed that he had previously 

met with Izakoff, the former Defense Minister of 

the Soviet Union, who told him that his [Izakoff’s] 

friend owned documents for “TEMPS” missiles 

called “Sterlite” in the West. Reportedly, Izakoff 

said the missiles had a range of 1,500 km and were 

very accurate. Tlas said Izakoff claimed that the 

missiles were destroyed by Mikhail Gorbachev, but 

that Izakoff could supply the documents so that Iraq 

could produce them. 
278

• Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had contacted both 

Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraq acquiring the Iskander missile in 2002. Russia would not 

export any military hardware with out an enduser certifi cate signed by the issuing government 

agency, which is the capacity in which Syria would 

have served.

2001: A Russian Company Offers to Supply 

Services and Missiles

Documents recovered indicate that a Russian company in which the Russian Government was a principle shareholder (51 percent) offered missile launchers 

and expertise for the production of military equipment.

• DGMI letters mention a Russian Company called 

Motovilikha Plants Corporation and the Manager, Nikolay Dimitshtico. A 13 June 2001 letter 

informed the Iraqi MoD that the Modtovilikha 

Plants Corporation can export through the Russian 

Ross Iron Export Organization and that the MoD 

will receive a bid for the BM-21 missile launcher 

from them.

• Correspondence between the DGMI and MIC also 

mentions that the delegation from Motovilikha 

Plants Corporation informed MoD that they could 

assist Iraq with their expertise in the production of 

military equipment.

• Correspondence between the DGMI and the 

Military Attaché instruct the DGMI to export only 

through the Ross Iron Export Organization. The 

Attaché also received a bid on missile launchers 

(BM 21).

• Captured correspondence reveals that the DGMI 

directed the Military Attaché to contact the Motovilikha Plant Corporation to ascertain if the corporation has a delegation from the Russian Government 

to handle export of the weapons. The DGMI also 

asked if Motovilikha is prepared to submit a bid for 

the weapons.

• The Iraqi Military Delegation, headed by the 

Assistant of the Army Chief of Staff, transmitted 

the Gun Directorate requirements to the Motovilikha Delegation.

• A DGMI investigation of Motovilikha Plants Corporation revealed that the Russian Government 

owned 51 percent of the shares of this company.

The Military Industry Organization controlled 21 

percent of the shares, specializing in the production 

of missiles. The company employees owned the 

remaining shares.

• On 21 April 2000, the factory sent specialists to 

Iraq to submit price offers for upgrades of the BM21 missile launchers. A letter from the company 

lists the following goods as “available for supply:”

—The 152mm gun system;

—The towed 120mm gun with an automatic 

guidance system;

—The 240mm gun with automatic guidance 

system; and

—Missiles with high explosive warheads.

The company also informed the Iraqi MoD and IIS 

that they are upgrading the BM-21 launcher system 

extending the range from 20 km to 40 km. After 

upgrading the BM-21, it will become the BM 9A52-2. 

2001: Supply of Components for Al-Samud 

Missiles

Captured documents indicate a proposed Iraqi visit to 

Moscow to submit a list of required missiles components, such as accelerometers, gyros, and control electronics, to Russian companies.

• Maj. Gen. Dr. Muzhir Sadiq Saba signed a 9 March 

2002 letter on the subject of Russian companies. 

The letter refers to the contents of a secret letter 

dated 19 June 2001, concerning the import of substances for the Al-Samud missile. Saba described 

an individual named ‘Iyad ‘Abd-al-Qahhar ‘Abd-alSalam as “a distinguished industrialist.”

• According to the letter, ‘Iyad Abd-al-Qahhar was 

assigned to control unfi lled missile requirements, 

such as acceleration sensors (accelerometers), 

valves, and controlling electronics. Dr. Muzhir further requests that a list of essential required items 

be provided, so al-Salam can obtain them during his 

visit to Moscow.
279

Regime Finance

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• The letter also indicates that ‘Iyad carried out the 

fi rst stage of manufacturing a digital computer for 

Al-Karamah and that he received an invitation from 

a Russian company to visit factories in Moscow 

to obtain detailed knowledge of other products. 

The letter is from the Al-Karamah State Establishment and is directed to the deputy of the Minister’s 

Council President and the MIC Minister. 

2002: Russian and Belarusian Companies Supply 

Missile Test Equipment

Recovered documents refer to the procurement of 

missile test equipment from Russia and Belarus.

• A contract from the Al Kindi General Company 

dated 18 June 2002 is addressed to, “The agreement of the Deputy Prime Minister- the Minister 

of MIC...to buy the following subjects: checking 

system of gyroscope with two axes, thermal rooms, 

and checking vehicles system.”

• This signed contract between the Russian Systemnikh Company and Al-Karamah State Establishment does not indicate preparation of a checking 

system of the gyroscope with 3-axis because of the 

limited investment available from the Al-Karamah 

and Al-Milad companies. However, the information 

recorded reads, “it should be known that we have a 

possibility to get 3 axes information by using 2 axes 

with adding specifi ed programming with coordinating with Belarus side.”

2001-2003: Proposed Procurement of Missile 

Tracking and Test Equipment

Captured documents describe the proposed procurement of military technology from Russia for the 

manufacture of missiles and the design and manufacture technology for missile telemetry equipment 

(tracking equipment).

• Iraqi correspondence from Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun, 

the former head of MIC R&D and of the MIC Special Offi ce, to the Deputy Prime Minister and to the 

MIC Minister proposed the procurement of Russian 

missile technology and equipment on 28 November 

2001.

• One technology description refers to a Russian 

special “military standard specifi cation.” The 

special offer from a Russian military expert named 

“Yosbov” included a study of the development, 

manufacture, assembly, and use of missiles, with 

a total cost of $100,000 for Russian and English 

languages copies and $70,000 for Russian language 

only. The documentation states that, this technology would particularly “contribute in developing 

[Iraq’s] space and missile programs.”

• Another desired technology includes a telemetering system which was described as, “urgently 

needed for missile program especially Al-Samud 

and Al-Fat’h missiles.” Dr. Zabun described this 

telemetering system as having a frequency range 

of between 2.1 to 2.4 GHz with 500 usable channels and an output microwave power of 15 watts. 

Also, Dr. Zabun listed a requirement for a smaller 

size unit to fi t into the missiles. The radio frequency 

transmission range for the missile package was 

specifi ed at 200 km.

• There was also an arrangement for supplying 20 

“loaded parts,” for 20 experiments. These ground 

parts were to be placed in three data receiving 

points transmitted to the missile-monitoring center 

to allow for analysis and missile tracking. This 

contract included spare parts, accessories, and a 

transfer of technology allowing for the design and 

manufacture of the telemetering equipment in Iraq.

• The telemetering system offered three receiving and 

transmitting stations with accessories in addition 

to an operating room equipped with computers and 

programs for displaying and analyzing data. The 

offer also included a training course conducted by 

fi ve Russian experts in Iraq for fi ve Iraqi engineers. 

• Dr. Zabun anticipated that the Iraqi cadre training would be conducted in two stages, the fi rst in 

Moscow, for six specialists and for 600 hours, and 

the second in Iraq for one month under Russian 

specialist supervision.

• ARMOS, a MIC-run Iraqi-Russian front company, 

served as liaison between the MIC and the Russian suppliers. The Iraq military attaché in Moscow 

provided the contracts and related documents to the 

Russians for signature.

• The contract was hidden behind the guise of the 
280

“nuclear disaster victims fund Al-Karamah.” The 

contract reads “as for the second party (the Russian Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund Institution)—

the Russians blockade imposed on Iraq will not be 

considered ‘a forceful circumstance’.’’

• The telemetering package total cost was $500,000. 

The Iraqis planned to deposit the funding for the 

contract in the Ahli Bank in Amman, Jordan. A 

memo from the manager of ARMOS, dated 29 

January 2002, states that the chairman of the Russian Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund requested that 

ARMOS deposit the amount for the 2 contracts into 

these accounts. 

ISG judges that this telemetering equipment would 

have provided Iraq with ground-based transmitting 

and receiving stations and the associated modules 

for fi tting into missiles. The ground-based stations 

would have utilized monitoring equipment for the 

tracking of missiles during fl ight tests. This telemetering equipment would have had a working operational transmission range of 200 km, despite the UN 

imposed 150 km range limit for Iraq’s indigenously 

produced missiles.

2002—Russian Company’s Sales Contract for 

Military Helicopter Equipment 

ISG recovered a contract between Al-Basha’ir Company of Iraq and Notr Inc of Russia that negotiated 

the sale of Russian MI-8MT helicopter equipment. 

Please see Figure 38 and overleaf for a copy of this 

contract. 

2003: Iraqi MIC Delegation Visits Russia

Information from a former high-level Iraqi offi cial 

indicates that an Iraqi joint delegation met with representatives from four or fi ve private Russian companies to discuss how the companies could provide 

technical expertise to the Iraqi military.

• In January 2003, members of an Iraqi delegation 

held meetings with representatives from 4 or 5 

Russian companies in the trade section offi ce of 

the Iraqi embassy in Moscow. Daghir Muhammad 

Mahmud, the MIC Deputy Director, Sulayman 

Al-Huraymis, Director of the IIS M-23 Directorate, 

and Dr. Suham, Director of the ARMOS Company 

participated in the meetings. 

• Several Russian company representatives met with 

Iraqi delegates and discussed providing technical 

expertise to the MIC. Daghir and Russian representatives discussed using their company’s expertise 

to improve and build weapons such as artillery 

and tanks. Daghir also discussed fi nancial matters 

involving the MIC’s debt to Russian companies.

2003: Russian Team Visits Iraq To Train Air 

Defense Technicians

According to an offi cial from the Iraqi Al Kindi Company, a Russian technical team visited Iraq in January 

or February 2003 to train technicians on an upgrade 

to an air defense system. The training was conducted 

in Baghdad.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Bulgarian 

Companies

Summary of Bulgarian Involvement 1999-2002: 

Bulgarian companies contracted to upgrade Iraqi 

tanks and invited Iraqis to visit Bulgaria to view 

military equipment including a fi ghter jet engine 

workshop. 

1999-2002: Bulgarian Company Supplies Iraq 

With Military Goods

Recovered documents indicate that a Bulgarian Company offered to supply Iraq with night vision goggles 

and parts for Iraqi T-55 tanks and aircraft from 1999 

to 2002.

• Letters from the General Manager of SARA-M, 

Sofi a, dated 1999-2002, offered the Brigadier General of DGMI various military goods.

• A letter refers to previous meetings, in which the 

Iraqi side requested tanks and night vision goggles. 

In this letter, SARA-M attached a factory catalogue 

translated into Arabic and stated that they hope 

“that it satisfi es, through which they can serve our 

heroic Army to break down the embargo implemented upon our struggling nation.” The SARA-M 

Company General Manager also stated that he is 

ready to discuss means of supply, quantity, and 

price with the DGMI.
281

Regime Finance

and Procurement

• In another letter, SARA-M referred to an Iraqi 

request to supply radiators and tanks air pressures 

devices, stating that SARA-M can provide 100 

radiators and “T- 55 tanks air pressures devices” to 

stores in Baghdad.

• The SARA-M representative also offered a quotation for Russian-origin aircraft wheels. The wheels 

were apparently stored in special warehouses in 

Bulgaria and were ready for deliver to Baghdad.

• In another letter, SARA-M offered to supply Iraq 

with night vision goggles. It states that the goggles 

were “for the infantry, chopper pilots, and tank 

drivers. An offer is made to send Iraq samples to be 

checked.” 

2001: Offer To Supply Military Goods

Recovered documents show that a Bulgarian company 

signed contracts to upgrade Iraqi tanks and missiles in 

2001, including supplying spare parts and a technology transfer.

• The MIC invited a delegation from the JEFF 

Bulgarian Company to Iraq to negotiate technical offers on updating tanks and missiles, (several 

types including Perchora—SA-3) providing spare 

parts, fi ghter/helicopter engines, and various other 

military equipment. In addition, they discussed 

the transfer of technology related to a number of 

“important and sensitive projects.” The negotiations ended with signing a number of contracts to 

the amount of $50 million.

• The MIC requested that the JEFF Bulgarian Company submit a formal invitation to visit the helicopter and engine maintenance factories specifi ed in 

the fi nal contract.

• The JEFF Bulgarian, Co., invited four people to 

visit Bulgaria to view equipment and jet fi ghter 

engine workshops.

• The MIC proposed that Mr. Majid Ibrahim Salman 

(also called Majid Muhammed Isma’il) serve as 

the Iraqi representative for the technology transfer, negotiating with the company, maintaining an 

ongoing relationship with experts, and controlling 

the operations. The JEFF Bulgarian, Co., agreed 

to bear all expenses for Salman’s accommodations 

and hospitality. The IIS fi nanced a two-day visit in 

Syria for Salman. The IIS Deputy Minister signed 

the instructions on 3 September 2001. 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now called Serbia 

and Montenegro) Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions Summary of Yugoslav involvement 1999-

2002: Representatives from several Yugoslavian 

companies reportedly visited Iraq in 1999 and 2001 

to discuss missile components and related support 

sales. In 2001, a Yugoslavian company also offered to 

provide Iraq with parts for 125mm tank main guns. 

1999: Federal Republic of Yugoslavian (FRY) 

Delegations Visit Iraq

Information supplied by an Iraqi Scientist indicates 

that the Al-Karamah State Establishment hosted FRY 

delegations in 1999.

• During the summer of 1999, FRY companies 

visited Iraq twice. Although their visits were mostly 

about missile engine parts, they discussed “all 

aspects of supplying the Al-Karamah State Establishment.” 

• The Yugoslavian delegation included the former 

Ambassador to Iraq and expert named Georgi 

Bladagovich of the Infi nity Company. Bladagovich 

had been in Iraq before the start of Desert Storm.

2001: Iraqi Delegation Visits FRY To Discuss 

Missile Technology 

According to a high-ranking Al-Kindi offi cial, senior 

Iraqi military offi cials and businessmen visited FRY 

in mid-2001 to discuss Iraq’s air defense and missile 

testing capability. 

• The Iraqi Minister of Defense, General Sultan 

Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta’i, reportedly led the delegation to Serbia. The delegation also included the 

Director of the Al- Kindi Company in Mosul, Dr 

Sa’ad Dawwud Al Shamma’, and several high ranking Iraqi air defense offi cials.
282

• The primary purpose of the trip was to discuss 

Serbian air defense artillery systems used in the 

war with NATO. Sultan wanted to acquire thermal tracking capabilities for their Perchora Radar 

System. Iraq also reviewed Serbian proposals for 

purchasing missile testing wind tunnels. During 

the discussions, the Serbians reportedly committed 

to provide Iraq with spare parts for existing radar 

systems in the Iraqi inventory.

• As part of the visit, the Iraqi delegation met with 

a soldier was allegedly responsible for shooting 

down a US F-18 aircraft with the Perchora system. 

The Bijoura Project engineer participated in this 

discussion, noting that a “classical version” of the 

system downed the aircraft. Afterward, several Iraqi 

delegates doubted the accuracy of the story.

2001: Offer To Supply 125mm Tank Main Gun 

Components

Recovered documents demonstrate a Yugoslav 

company’s offer to supply parts for a 125mm gun. 

The gun was part of an Iraqi tank called ‘Saddam The 

Lion.’

• A letter dated 8 June 2001, from Col Krsta Grujovic 

of Yugoimport was sent to the General Manager of 

the Saddam General Company and reads as follows: “referring to preparation of the parts of 125 

mm gun, we would like to point out the following; although we know the availability of technical 

schemes with you, the producing company intents 

sending a copy of these schemes for signature from 

both sides. In order to be approved for delivery 

purpose and to make sure that there are no mistakes in documents, we will submit these schemes 

in two weeks. There are some parts available for 

the producing company and mechanical operations 

were done until semi-fi nial stage. The producing 

company intents to provide these parts to gain time 

and not charging you price difference. The schemes 

of these parts will be submitted in two weeks.”

• A handwritten internal memo, dated 5 July 2001 

was attached to the Yugoimport letter. This memo, 

addressed to the projects department, was signed 

by Ra’ad Sabah, the Manager of Saddam General 

Company. The memo’s heading indicates that the 

gun parts and technology (schemes and drawings) 

mentioned are designed for a tank gun, “for the 

product Saddam the Lion.” 

2002: A FRY Company Offered Technical 

Cooperation With Iraq

Captured documents indicate that a Yugoslavian 

company offered Iraq missile system maintenance 

services, air-to-air missiles, and other related military 

technologies.

• The letter, marked ‘Secret,’ refers to a Yugoslav 

company called Cofes and reads, “referring to your 

letter # Cofes 1096, dated 25 05 2002, concerning 

the cooperation aspects with the Yugoslav company Cofes and according to the special catalogue 

attached with your letter mentioned above. We 

would like to inform you our need to cooperate in 

the following aspects listed below and would look 

forward to meet with Cofes company’s specialists 

to discuss with them the aspects listed below and 

specify the methods of cooperation. Please review 

and inform us with regards.”

• The letter subsequently lists the following equipment:

—“Missile system maintenance

—Homing AA missiles

—Programmable missile targets

—Navigation

—Modifi cation of charging the missile with fuel 

and oxidants facilities for the missile maintaining.” 
283

Regime Finance

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Possible Belarusian Breaches of UN Sanctions

Summary of Belarusian Involvement 2000-2003: 

Iraqi delegations visited Belarus to negotiate the 

purchase of air defense systems and electronic warfare technology. Belarusian experts visited Iraqi air 

defense systems. Belarusian fi rms agreed to multiple 

contracts to import missile guidance and control 

equipment to Baghdad. 

2000-2001: Two MIC Delegations Visit Belarus

In 2000 and 2001, two MIC delegations visited 

Belarus, according to an offi cial from the Al-Kindi 

Company. The purpose of the visit was to upgrade 

Iraqis air defense and electronic warfare capability. 

• Both Iraqi delegations were headed by ‘Abd-alTawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh, the former 

MIC Director, Dr. Sa’ad Dawwud Al Shamma, the 

former Director of Al- Kindi, and Brigadier General Husayn, the former Director of the Al Milad 

Company. The delegations also included several 

high-ranking Air Defense Force offi cials.

• While in Belarus, the delegations reportedly 

focused on air defense cooperation, specifi cally 

involving the acquisition of an upgraded version 

of the Russian made P-18 radar, which used digital 

electronics and sophisticated anti-jamming capabilities. As a result of this trip, Belarus allegedly 

supplied Iraq with a new model of the P-18 and 

spare parts. According to the source, Iraq had an 

older metric version of the radar in their inventory. 

• In addition, the MIC delegation sought to acquire 

two or three Russian made S-300 air defense 

systems. Once acquired, Iraq planned to create 

the infrastructure to build an Iraqi version of the 

system. Part of the plan for infrastructure included 

sending Iraqi technicians to Belarus for training. At 

the fi rst delegation meetings, a contract was signed 

to train Iraqi technicians on the S-300 system.

• The MIC delegation subsequently discussed the 

acquisition of the Strela Air Defense System, a 

new system with a 7-11 km range. They reportedly 

also discussed acquisition of GPS jamming and 

Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) 

technology. Specifi c upgrades focused on the 

Perchora air defense radar system and acquisition 

of new missile guidance systems to increase missile 

engagement ranges.

2002: Contracts To Supply Gyros and Guidance 

Equipment

Recovered documents show that a Belarusian company representative was contracted to procure missile 

guidance and control equipment for Iraq in 2002.

• Notes of a meeting state that representatives of a 

Belarusian entity called EGC conducted technical discussions with Iraq from 10 to 17 February 

2002. These negotiations ended with signing an 

agreement no. 209/2002 totaling $5,053,971. EGC 

acknowledged through this agreement that they 

would supply control and guidance missile system 

(CGMS) equipment needed by the Al-Karamah 

State Establishment.

• Additional notes from the 10 to 17 February 2002 

meeting refer to another contract with EGC worth 

$20,771,700. This agreement was for the supply of 

laboratory and experimental equipment necessary 

to “implement scientifi c research for CGMS and 

improve quality and production.”

• A letter dated 28 February 2002, addressed to the 

MIC refers to orders to import strategic material 

and equipment for the Al-Karamah State Establishment. In the letter, Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun arranged 

to “discuss with Alexander Dekteryoff to supply 

gyroscope and other accessories.” Dekteryoff was 

the Belarusian representative for the deal. The letter 

also mentions two contracts for items delivered 

through Syria totaling $5, 261,507. The letter specifi es the following payment procedures:

—Payment of “15 percent of the total amount of 

both contracts” ($789,226) to the Belarusian 

Infobank.

—The remaining amount “shall be paid in cash 

within ten days after receiving the shipment,” 

according to both contracts.
284

—The company shall issue a credit letter for 3 

percent, to us, through Infobank “good for the 

duration of the contract, as a good business 

performance.”

• The same letter also requested that MIC approve 

and appropriate the amount of $5,261,507 in cash 

through the “Iraqi-Syrian agreement” (presumably 

the Iraq-Syria trade Protocol). After approval, the 

Syrian agent would pay the Belarusian side in cash 

in Amman or at another place of their choosing.

• Another letter to the Vice Premier of MIC dated 

20 March 2002 refers to additional contracts 

with Belarusian companies and an Alexander 

Dekteryoff, PhD.

• Approval was granted for the Al-Karamah 

State Establishment to carry out a contract 

with Dekteryoff to import CGMS, according 

to two agreements. The fi rst agreement was for 

$5,053,791. The second agreement was for 207,716 

Euro, which was modifi ed in accordance with letter 

from Dekteryoff’s representative to $182,137.

• This agreement was considered to be a high priority, expedited contract. According to the letter, 

“Your Excellency has previously approved to 

fi nance the two agreements through the IraqiSyria Accord. Due to the important nature of the 

imported material, it is necessary to expedite the 

contract, in order for Al-Karamah State Establishment to carry out the programs assigned in an exact 

and advanced manner (which is considered scientifi c and technological priority). And making the 

fi rst payment would expedite the shipment of the 

goods, as promised by Mr. Dekteryoff.”

• The March 2002 letter also specifi ed payment via 

the Syrian trade Protocol, “Your Excellency, would 

you please, approve the payment of 15 percent 

that’s equal $785389.24 in cash, from our account 

in Amman, and appropriate the rest of the remaining amount for the two contracts through the IraqiSyrian accord. Furthermore, we will ask the Syrian 

side to be apprehensive about the contract in order 

for them to get their share of the deal ASAP.” A 

note in the margins of this letter instructs ‘‘immediately make payment of 15 percent and the rest of 

amount according to the Syrian agreement.’’ 

• The letter is signed by Raja Hasan ‘Ali, Director 

General of the Trade Bureau, Dr. Muzhir Sadiq 

Saba’, Director General of Al-Karamah, and Dr. 

Hadi Tarish Zabun, Director of the Minister’s 

offi ce. 

2002-2003: Belarusian Experts Assist in the 

Maintenance and Repair of Iraqi Missile 

Batteries With Russian Cooperation

Captured documents show that Belarusian experts 

visited Iraq and assisted with the maintenance and 

repair of missile batteries. The work was complete in 

February 2003.

• Correspondence from the DGMI dated 30 December 2002 refers to a number of Belarusian experts 

who visited Pigura Missile Batteries of the 145th 

Missile Brigade. The experts engaged in maintenance and repair operations with the following units 

in the Iraqi 145th Brigade: 166th Battery, 30th Battery, 31st Battery, and 35th Battery.

• Captured documents reveal a letter, dated after 

17 February 2003, from the Iraqi Air Force Command to the Military Attaché in Moscow. The letter 

directed their Military Attaché in Moscow to inform 

the Russian IroKlub Company that six of 10 amplifi ers they had supplied to Iraq had malfunctioned. 

ISG judges that these malfunctions may have been 

the Russian missile equipment that the Belarusians 

were repairing. 

• A letter sent to DGMI from the Air Defense Security System stated that the Belarusian experts 

left Iraq by land to Syria on 24 February 2003 in 

accordance to the orders of the Russian Ambassador to leave Iraq before 26 February 2003.

• Another report refers to the visit of 18 Belarusian 

experts working at Al-Harith Establishment / MIC. 

The report stated that the experts formed a repair 

and maintenance workgroup for artillery batteries.
285

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Possible Syrian Breaches of UN Sanctions

Summary of Syrian involvement 2001-2003: With 

the assistance of Firas Talas, the son of the former 

Syrian Defense Minister, Damascus offered Iraq missile technology and fuels. Firas Talas and the MAS 

Economic Group offered Iraq the services of South 

African engineer, Chinese, and Syrian Engineers in 

2002. Firas Talas made several additional visits to 

Iraq and signed several military contracts. Syria also 

offered the services of a French expert who expressed 

his wish to visit Iraq to provide details about documents. Syria also planned to supply Iraq with spare 

parts for a 155mm weapon system in March 2003. 

2001: Correspondence and Meetings Referring to 

Supplying Military Goods

Documents recovered indicate that Firas Talas met 

with former Russian senior offi cials who offered to 

supply Iraq with military equipment and technology, including production technology relating to 

surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 700 km. 

ISG believes that in this particular case Firas Talas 

was acting as a facilitator attempting to supply Iraq 

with goods of Russian origin, goods from Yemen, and 

experts from China, South Africa, and Syria. 

• A recovered letter, dated 12 May 2001, was sent to 

the Iraqi MOD from the Chairman of the Board of 

the MAS Economic Group offering cooperation in 

supplying military goods through bids and tenders.

• Sources and documents suggest that Iraq was 

actively seeking to obtain the SS-26/Iskander missile from Russia.

• Document exploitation has revealed that Firas 

Tlas, the son of former Syrian Defense Minister Lt. 

Gen. Mustafa Talas, visited Iraq in July 2001 and 

discussed a variety of missile systems and components he could supply through Russia. Firas offered 

to sell Iraq the S-300 SAM and the 270km range 

SS-26/Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile, or to 

provide assistance to help Iraq produce the Iskander. Firas claimed that he had previously met with 

Izakoff, the former Defense Minister of the Soviet 

Union, who told him that his [Izakoff’s] friend 

owned documents for “TEMPS” missiles called 

“Sterlite” in the West. Reportedly, Izakoff said the 

missiles had a range of 1500km and were very 

accurate. Talas said Izakoff claimed that missiles 

were destroyed by Mikhail Gorbachev, but that Izakoff could supply the documents so that Iraq could 

produce them. 

• Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had contacted both 

Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraq acquiring the Iskander missile in 2002. Russia would not 

export any military hardware with out an enduser certifi cate signed by the issuing government 

agency, which is the capacity in which Syria would 

have served.

• Talas also mentioned that he met with a Yemeni 

tradesman called “Shahir ‘Abd-al-Haq.” During 

this meeting, the tradesman said the Iraqi Minister 

of Defense sent him to see Talas to help import 

Yemeni spare military parts into Iraq. These 

Yemeni contracts included parts for MiG-21, a 

PMP pontoon bridge, and Ilyushin 76 military 

transport aircraft.

• Tlas clarifi ed that Shahir accompanied him on 

the plane when he arrived in Iraq on 29 Jun 2001. 

Talas was surprised when Shahir was not allowed 

access to Iraq and that he met with Tariq ‘Aziz, the 

Deputy Prime Minister, at the airport. Later Aziz 

told Talas that Shahir was not allowed to enter Iraq 

because he “co-operates with the Israeli intelligence.”

• In an internal memo from Major Quays Mahdi of 

the DGMI, referred to his attendance at a 1 August 

2001 meeting. with a four-person Russian delegation, Mr. Talas, and representatives of the Iraqi Air 

Defense, Air Force, and Army Aviation commands. 

According to this memo, the meeting took place in 

the Commanding Offi cer’s Club. The Iraqi Directorates represented were: Armaments, Electrical 

Mechanical Engineering, and Missiles. Staff Chief 

Marshall Sa’ad of the MoD directed the meeting.

• The Russian delegation at this meeting in August 

2001 included Paris Ivanovish, a specialist in the 

fi elds of the Volga and Bichora systems, as well as 
286

being a representative of a military factory that specializes in air defense; Georgi Sergeevich Pitrov an 

specialist in air to air missiles and the Deputy Head 

of the Ukrainian Government Offi ce called “Log;” 

Oleg Georgovich Orlov a Czech-based businessman 

specializing in weapons; and Vadim Borisovich 

Kaziulin.

• The Russian delegation agreed with the requests to 

supply equipment to Iraq as specifi ed. Both parties 

agreed to send six experts to Iraq. The group was to 

review and decide what the Iraqis required in regard 

to the maintenance and production workshops associated with tanks, armor and infantry. This group 

was scheduled to arrive in Iraq 15 days after the 

meeting. Staff General Khaldun Khattab Umar, the 

Secretariat of the MoD, was the group’s contact. 

2002: MAS Economic Group Requests Iraqi Entry 

Visas for Military Technicians

A letter from the MAS Economic Group dated 30 

January 2002, requested the urgent issue of Iraqi 

entry visas for 3 Chinese and 2 Syrians who were to 

work for the MoD. In July 2002, another letter from 

the MAS Group referred to 3 South African engineers 

residing in Damascus who were awaiting visas from 

Baghdad. A letter from Iraqi Staff Major General 

Talib ’Uwayn Juma’h, the Army Chief of Staff, 

approved the extension of the Iraqi visas for the three 

South African experts on 10 August 2002. 

2002: Procurement of Military Goods and Services 

for Iraq

Documents recovered show that ARMOS requested a 

bid for for rocket fuel from the Syrian MAS Economic Group in 2002. The company Director of MAS 

was Firas Talas, the son of former Syrian Defense 

Minister. Firas was also involved in a Chinese offer in 

2002 to help with the Iraqi Air Defense System.

• A letter from Dr. Siham-al-Din Khayri Al ‘Ali, 

the Deputy Director of ARMOS Trading, dated 15 

October 2002, requested a bid from the MAS Economic Group for rocket fuel. One of the types of 

fuel listed included one entry for 15 tons of hydrazine at 97-percent purity.

• A recovered letter from Firas Talas, dated 21 October 2002, states, “Technicians from the Syria 

have been dispatched to China to deal with some 

quite infl uential companies (companies that have 

a great infl uence upon the Chinese government) 

and that these companies have expressed their 

desire to co-operate with Iraq for a modernization of the air defense systems.” The letter further 

states that the meeting should take place, “in either 

Damascus or in Peking and that they held no objection to the idea of sending a delegation to visit 

Peking.”

• Another letter from Talas, also dated 21 October 

2002, relays to “Abu Mustafa” that technicians 

from “our side have been sent to China in order 

to do business with esteemed powerful companies 

with the government and that they have complied 

positively to co-operate with you to develop the Air 

defense Systems.” Also, that associate meetings 

should be held in Damascus or Beijing and that 

there was no objection to sending a delegation invitation letter to visit them. The letter gives regards 

and a wish to visit Mustafa soon in Baghdad.

2003: MAS Economic Group Facilitates French 

Military Sales Catalogue Dissemination

An internal DGMI memo from Lt. Col. Imad Salih 

dated 13 January 2003, refers to a Syrian MAS Economic Group letter with 5 attached CDs and catalogues from a French expert named Eric Joubert. The 

Syrian Company was facilitating the supply of the 

French technology. The documents contained information and equipment lists of interest to the DGMI 

directorate and the Iraqi intelligence service. Joubert 

expressed his wish to visit Iraq to give more details 

about the CDs and catalogues.

2003: Contract for Supply of Spare Parts for 

155mm Weapon Systems

Recovered documents indicate that a Syrian company 

agreed to supply Iraq with Syrian Defense establishment components of 155 mm weapon systems.
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and Procurement

• A recovered contract dated 20 February 2003 

names the legal representatives from the Iraqi Al 

Sumud and Al-Basha’ir General Companies and 

a name of the legal representative for the Syrian, 

SES International . The contract designates that 

SES will supply the MIC with 100 parts for the 

155 mm weapon system. These parts, produced 

by the Syrian Defense Plants Establishment, cost 

$2,574,000. 

• The contract specifi ed a guarantee deposit letter 

from the Al Mawarid Bank, Beirut, Lebanon for 

$514,000 as a down payment on the deal. The 

deposit letter was to be directed to a “Jasim Ahmad 

Hasan and a Hashim Karim ‘Abbas” in regards to 

the sponsoring of a representative of the SES International Corporation.

Possibel Breaches of UN Sanctions by Jordanian 

Companies

2001: Jordanian Company Offers To Supply an 

Ammunition Production Line

• A letter dated 28 January 2001 from the Al-Basha’ir 

for Trading Investment Company of Amman, 

Jordan (Jordanian branch of the Iraqi Al-Basha’ir 

Company) to the ARMOS Trading Company Baghdad refers to a presentation given by Al Bash’air 

for the proposed installation of an assembly line, 

portions of which were manufactured in Yugoslavia 

(tender no. 2000/56/70).

• Specifi cations indicate that this proposed technical transfer was for the production of .22 caliber 

ammunition. The proposal included: a block 

diagram, “know how” documents, installation, 

supervision over equipment installation, trial run 

and performance tests on equipment, and technical 

assistance. Annual production capacity amounts 

were estimated as 25 million rounds. This production line cost $ 9,466,015.

Possible Yemeni Breaches of UN Sanctions

2001: Government of Yemen Offers to supply Military Goods to Iraq

Recovered documents refer to the Yemen Ambassador meeting with the Iraqi military to discuss a list 

of guaranteed military materials. According to the 

documents, the President of Yemen gave his blessing 

to support the effort to supply military goods to Iraq.

• A letter from the Iraqi Defense Minister Sultan 

Hashim Ahmad dated 23 March 2001 speaks of 

a meeting with the Republic of Yemen’s Ambassador, Mr. ‘Abd-al-Malik Sa’id. The letter states 

that Yemen had been helping the Iraqi Armed forces 

through a Yemeni business-man named Mr. Shahir 

‘Abd-al-Haq.

• Reference is given to a meeting held 19 February 

2001, were the Yemeni side was ready to export 

military materials from Yemen and Ethiopia to Iraq. 

The letter indicates the President of Yemen, Ali 

‘Abdallah Salih, gave his blessing to the deal and 

that the Iraqis were given guarantees for the spare 

parts. These parts were specifi cally drawn from the 

stocks of the Yemeni armed forces, air force, army 

aviation and included armor, trucks, and weapons.

• A follow-up meeting was held on 22 March 2001, 

which included the Yemeni Ambassador and Mr. 

Shahir. Shahir and the Ambassador provided the 

Iraqi military with a list of guaranteed available 

military materials and prices. Shahir also revealed 

that he had met with the President Salih who had 

given his blessing for these efforts and support. The 

letter indicates that the President Salah, “believes 

that the support of Iraq with the proposed exports 

is necessary” and he had made calls to his brother, 

an Air Force Commander, asking him to present 

everything possible to Iraq, even if he has to take 

supplies from the Yemeni Air Force and ask Russia 

and others for replacement material. 
288

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Chinese 

Companies

Summary of Chinese involvement 2001-2003: 

According to multiple sources, Chinese companies 

provided Iraq with limited rocket guidance software, 

missile gyros, and accelerometers. Chinese companies also attempted to sell the former Regime jamming equipment.

2001: Chinese Company Attempts To sell Military 

Goods to Iraq

According to a former Iraqi government offi cial, 

Chinese administrators attempted to sell a camera and 

a jamming system that could be used against infra-red 

missiles. The deal failed because of both the price and 

undetermined Iraqi requirements. 

• A member of the Chinese High Committee for 

Electronic Warfare (EW), Professor Xu Govan 

(phonetic), negotiated with the Iraqi MIC for the 

sale of 1 CCD Camera and 1 Jamming System 

for infra-red missiles. Xu was an expert in electro-optics and wanted to sign a memorandum of 

understanding with MIC specialists to provide EW 

equipment. A large Chinese company, the CIEC 

Company, accompanied Xu to the negotiations with 

the MIC.

• The MIC determined that the jammer failed to 

meet Iraqi requirements and was too expensive. Xu 

loaned the CCD Camera to the MIC to test.

• According to the source, Xu was an IIS agent, 

recruited on 17 May 2001. At recruitment, Xu 

signed a commitment to work for the IIS, received 

a $7,500 recruitment bonus, and began drawing 

a $500 per month stipend. The IIS fi lmed Xu’s 

recruitment. The IIS tasked Xu to collect information on laser tracking systems, laser guidance systems, and information on the cooperation between 

Iran and China.

2001: Iraqi Embassy Offi cer Coordinates the 

Procurement of Gyros and Accelerometers

A former high ranking offi cial in the MIC with direct 

access to the information supplied information on

‘Abd-al-Wahab, an Iraqi IIS offi cer stationed at the 

Iraqi Embassy in China who managed the Iraqi-Chinese technology procurement relationship. ‘Abd-alWahab reportedly arranged the procurement of gyros 

and accelerometers from China for Iraq in 2001.

2002: IIS and IAEC Import Chinese Missile 

Software

According to reporting, Iraq imported rocket guidance 

software from China, which was labeled as children’s 

software. Directorate M16 of the IIS and the Iraqi 

Atomic Energy Commission imported the software.

• From 2002, until the beginning of hostilities in 

2003, Iraq imported rocket guidance software from 

China disguised as children’s computer software. 

The software was used to guide the missiles Iraq 

fi red at US Forces in Kuwait during initial hostilities in 2003. Iraq paid for the software with hard 

currency or oil.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Czech 

Companies

2001: Offer To Supply GPS Jamming Equipment

Recovered documents indicate that a Czech Republic 

Company called Metropol Limited offered portable 

GPS Jamming Equipment and other military goods to 

Iraq.

• A Metropol letter dated 24 October 2001 indicates 

that the company was “in a position to offer the 

supply of equipment against enemy’s cruise missiles and aircraft.” The letter offers to supply portable jamming equipment that might be used “against 

GPS which are used for navigational purposes (and 

in equipment, such as cruise missiles).”

• In additional captured letters dated 21, 24, and 29 

October 2001, Metropol offers Iraq aircraft engines, 

helicopter engines, and night vision goggles for 

helicopters. The company also offered to supply 

Iraq with 82 mm and 120 mm mortars, new and 

overhauled tank engines (T-72 and T-55), Krasnopol 152/155 mm guided artillery weapons, Igla 
289

Regime Finance

and Procurement

9k38 portable air defense systems (1000 missiles 

with launching containers), and Kornet E anti-tank 

systems (1000 missiles and 50 launchers). The 

Metropol offer also included missile aggregates 

for Volga air defense systems including batteries, hydraulic systems, servos and engines, spare 

parts for B-755 engines, parts for the S-75 Volga 

Launcher, and spare parts for the P-14 Oborona. 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Indian 

Companies

2002: Indian Individual Coordinated the Purchase 

of Missile-Related Materials for Iraq 

According to recovered documents, an Indian and 

Iraqi national negotiated for the procurement of conventional military goods for Iraq. 

• Between November and December 2002, an 

individual from India and an Iraqi, negotiated the 

procurement of goods, including turbojet engines 

for Mig-23 and Mig-29 aircraft, diesel engines for 

tanks, a radar system, and ammunition.

• The Baghdad offi ce of the Arabic Scientifi c Bureau 

and Inaya Trading were also involved in the 

attempted procurement of dual-use chemicals associated with missile propellant uses. However, the 

documents do not indicate if contracts were signed 

or if shipments took place. 
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291

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Company Name Location

Across Continents Trading Agency Baghdad, Iraq

Adel Commercial Bureau Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Abidin Investment Company UAE

Al-Ahliyah for Trading Agencies and Exports, Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Ali Trading Co.

Al-Amia (AKA Global) Company

Al-Anmar Company Amman, Jordan

Al-Basha’ir Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Bir Company for International Trade Amman Jordan

Al-Dahma International Trading Establishment Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Dellah Travel and Tourism Company

Al-Doha Trading Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Eman Amman, Jordan

Al-Enbuah

Al-Faris State Company, Ministry of Industry and Minerals Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Fattah Corporation Amman, Jordan

Al-Fitra Trading Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Furat Rent-A-Car UAE

Al-Ghery International Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Hamra Company UAE

Al-Handal General Trading Company Dubai, UAE

Al-Hashimy Trading Company Baghdad

Al-Hikma Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Huda Export and Import EST Jordan

Annex K

Suspected Intermediary and 

Front Companies Associated 

With Iraq

The companies listed in this annex have been reported 

in the Intelligence Community as front companies 

involved with the former Iraqi Regime. Because 

there are different interpretations as to what makes a 

company a front as opposed to a trade intermediary 

or manufacturer, this list can be seen as an example 

of companies that were involved in supplying the 

Iraqi government with prohibited conventional 

weapons and dual-use materials. At least two of the 

MIC domestic manufacturing companies, Al-Nida 

and Al-Rashid, have been mistaken for front companies in prior reporting. However, these companies 

still used known front companies such as the MIC’s 

Al-Basha’ir and Syria’s SES as middlemen when 

procuring materials for production. Other companies 

that were manufacturers or trading companies may 

also have been mistaken as front companies. 
292

Al-Husan Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Hussaini Company for Trading Agency Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Jawhara Al-Khaleejeya

Al-Karamah State Establishment

Al-Karradah

Al-Kawther Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Kibba Trading Agencies, Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Maymana Trade Group UAE

Al-Maeeny Engineering Bureau Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Mersal Commercial Agencies Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Mihrab Company Amman, Jordan

Al-Mufakher Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Naizak Trading Establishment UAE

Al-Najah Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Noras Syria

Al-Rafed Bureau Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Rawa’a Trading Company Iraq

Al-Riat

Al-Riaya Trading Company UAE

Al-Sabah International Bangkok, Thailand

Al-Sadera 

Al-Safoh Offi ce General Trading Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Said Group for Industry and International Trade Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Saiham Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Salam General Company

Al-Salman Trading Company Iraq

Al-Savivem Company Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Sidra Trading Co. Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Tuhfa Co. for General Trading, Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Al-Wadhah Co for General Trade, Ltd.

Al-Yisr Trading Company UAE

Al-Zaghal Industrial Company Amman, Jordan

Arabic Computer Systems Company UAE

Arabic Scientifi c Bureau Baghdad, Iraq.

ARMOS Trading Company Baghdad, Iraq
293

Regime Finance

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Atera Manufacturing Baghdad, Iraq

Daei International Trading Co., Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Dulaymi Company Doha, Qatar

Elba Jordan

Elite Scientifi c Co., Ltd. Amman, Jordan

General Trading Baghdad, Iraq

Ghadar Engineering and Contracting Co. Amman, Jordan

Global Trade and Investment Lebanon 

Haraq General Trading Mosul, Iraq

Hayar Trading Company UAE

Hidhab Al-Reef Company for General Trading Baghdad, Iraq

Hutten General Co. Baghdad, Iraq

IBT Trading Baghdad, Iraq

Inaya Company for Trade Agencies, Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

International Company for Cleaners Production Amman, Jordan

International Industrial Development (IID) Baghdad, Iraq

Irad International Trading Company UAE

Ishtar Trading Baghdad, Iraq

Kadhum M. Al-Wakil & Shamsh Co., Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Khaled el-Wer of the Trading and Agriculture General

Company (TAGCO)

Amman, Jordan

Khalid Al-Delaimi Co. Baghdad, Iraq

Khalifa Bin Jassim Trading Co. Dubai, UAE

LAMA Syria

Limo Investments, Ltd Baghdad, Iraq

Lootah General Trading Company

Mamad Al-Azawi Engineering Baghdad, Iraq

Mayamin Trading Baghdad, Iraq

MEGA Lebanon 

Mesopotamia Trade Co., Ltd Baghdad

Middle East Trading Jordan

Millennium Moscow, Russia

Murgam Trading Company UAE

Nibal Electronics

Nile Air Conditioning Company UAE
294

Nurallah Company Damascus, Syria

Orkid General Trading Co. Baghdad, Iraq

Phoenix International Trading Company Of Lebanon Beirut, Lebanon

Retired Offi cers Bureau (ROB)

Sabah Al Faisal and Partners Co. Amman, Jordan

Sajaya General Trade Company, Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Samid Land and Maritime Shipping and Transportation 

Company

UAE

Sawfi ya Brothers Company UAE

SES International Corporation Damascus, Syria

SIAM Premium Products China

Tariq Al-Samlama Baghdad, Iraq

The Abdulla Group

The Hams Company for Business Engineering Services Amman, Jordan

The Mesopotamia Company, Ltd. Baghdad, Iraq

Tigres Trading Company Baghdad, Iraq

Toros International Trading Co. Baghdad, Iraq

Trans Dubai Company Dubai, UAE

Ur Company UAE

Upper Euphrates Company UAE

Waliya Opel Indigas Company UAE

Yasin & Middle East Scientifi c Group Jordan

SFOR Stabilization Forces 
295

Regime Finance

and Procurement

Annex L

Procurement Acronyms

Acronym Meaning

ABS Scientifi c Bureau for Drug Information and Medical Appliances

AEST Albostangy Equipment Services and Trade 

AP ammonium perchlorate 

ARADET Arab Company for Detergent Chemicals 

ARC Arabian Russian Company of Jordan 

ARI acute respiratory infections 

ASB Arabic Scientifi c Bureau 

ATGM anti-tank guided missile

AWACS airborne warning and control systems 

AZ-11 a type of liquid rocket propellant, composed of 2 components (DETA 

and UDMH), according to captured documents

bbl/d barrels per day 

BCP Border Control Checkpoints 

BME Belmetalenergo

BOP Balance of Payments 

BW Biological Weapons

CA Commercial Attaché 

CAEC Abrasive Import and Export Corporation

CBI Central Bank of Iraq

CBJ Central Bank of Jordan 

CBS Central Bank of Syria

CBW Chemical and biological weapons

CCD Charge coupled device

CGMS Control and Guidance Missile System 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CNC Computer numeric controlled machines or devices

CoM Council of Ministers 

CoS Chief of Staff 

CPA Coalition Provision Authority 

CPMIEC China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation 

CPU Central Processing Unit 
296

CW Chemical weapons

DETA diethylenetriamine: one of the two components of AZ-11, a type of 

liquid rocket propellant

DGMI Directorate of General Military Intelligence

DGS Directorate of General Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

Diwan The Presidential Offi ce

DOCEX Document Exploitation

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

EAC Economic Affairs Committee

ECCM Electronic Counter-Countermeasure 

ECM Electro-chemical machining

EGC Electric-Gaz-Com 

EMIS Electromagnetic Isotope Separation 

EP Entry Points

ETGC External Technology General Corporation

EUC end-user certifi cates 

EW Electronic Warfare 

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FCDC Foreign Currency Disbursement Committee

FEAL Food Examination and Analysis Lab 

FRY Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GID General Intelligence Directorate (Jordan)

GPS Global Positioning System

GRL Goods Review List

HDI Human Development Index

HE high explosive 

HF High Frequency 

HSBC Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation 

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HVD High-Value Detainee 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IAEC Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 

IAF Iraqi Armed Forces 
297

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ID Iraqi Dinar 

IFAT A Swiss-based, Consen subsidiary established in August 1983 

IID International Industrial Development 

IIS Iraqi Intelligence Service 

IIS M19 The primary IIS body handling procurement of specialized items. 

Redesignated as M4/8 in recent years, and also was known as the Technical Consultation Company or the Trade Offi ce

IIS M23 MIC Security Directorate

IIS M4 Foreign Clandestine Operations branch of the Iraqi Intelligence Service 

or Directorate of Secret Service 

IIS M4/8 Formerly the IIS M19, organized into three different sections, the internal section, the foreign section, and the trading section

IIS Section 

One

The internal section primarily responsible for creating front companies 

inside Iraq and facilitating trade with these companies to import/export 

oil, batteries, copper and food products

ILTC Iraqi Land Transportation Company 

IMF International Monetary Fund

INOC Iraq National Oil Company 

ISG Iraq Survey Group

ITU International Telecommunication Union

JD Joint Delegation 

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

KOMID North Korea’s Korea Mining Development Corporation. Previously 

known as the External Technology General Corporation (ETGC)

LU Launcher units

IIS M-5 The IIS Directorate of Counterintelligence or Counterespionage Directorate 

MABOT Mina al Bakr Offshore Terminal 

MANPADS Man portable Air Defense Systems

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MHESR Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research 

MIC Military Industrialization Commission 

MoA Ministry of Agriculture 

MoD Ministry of Defense

MoF Ministry of Finance 

MoH Ministry of Health 

MoI Ministry of Industry
298

MoO Ministry of Oil

MoT Ministry of Trade

MoTC Ministry of Transport and Communication 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NORINCO China North Industries Corporation 

NSC National Security Council 

NVD Night Vision Devices

NVG Night Vision Goggles

OFF United Nations Oil-for-Food program

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OIP Offi ce of the Iraq Program 

OMI Organization of Military Industrialization, synonymous with the MIC, 

the preferred usage

R&D Research & Development

RCC Revolutionary Command Council 

RG Republican Guard

RNA Research and News Analyzing 

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy 

SDI Samarra Drug Industries 

SFOR Stabilization Forces 

SISMI Italian Intelligence and Military Security Service 

SOE State-Owned Enterprises 

SOMO State Oil Marketing Organization 

SRG Special Republican Guard 

SSM Surface-to-Surface missiles

SSO Special Security Organization 

TAGCO Trading and Agriculture General Company 

TIS Thermal imagery sight 

TOSSCO Technical Oilfi eld Services and Supply Company 

TPAO Turkish Petroleum Company 

TPIC Turkish Petroleum International Company, a TPAO subsidiary
299

Regime Finance

and Procurement

TTC Thermal tracking camera 

UAE United Arab Emirates 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UDMH One of the two components of AZ-11, a liquid rocket propellant

UHF Ultra -High Frequency

UN United Nations

UNCC United Nations Compensation Commission 

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientifi c and Cultural Organization

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring Verifi cation & Inspection Commission

UNOPS United Nations Operations

UNSC United Nations Security Council 

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSYG UN Secretary General 

UTL United Telecommunications Limited 

VHF Very High Frequency

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Final Cut 8.5 X 11 with Full Blee