IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of:

M.C.

No. 85678-2-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DÍAZ, J. — M.C. appeals a trial court order committing him to 90 days of 

involuntary treatment under two separate subsections of the Involuntary Treatment 

Act (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. M.C. argues that the State presented insufficient 

evidence to support its findings on one of those subsections. Because M.C. is no 

longer detained as a result of the challenged order and granting M.C.’s requested 

relief on appeal would not affect the validity of the civil commitment order, M.C.’s 

appeal is moot and we dismiss the appeal. 

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2023, a designated crisis responder filed a petition for M.C.’s initial 

detention under the ITA, after he was booked in jail on multiple occasions during 
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a two-week period and appeared to be “decompensating further” on each 

occasion. M.C. was detained and evaluated at Telecare North Sound Evaluation 

and Treatment Center (Telecare). On July 19, 2023, the superior court granted a 

petition filed by Telecare to detain M.C. for 14 days of involuntary treatment. 

On July 28, 2023, Telecare filed a second petition, seeking an additional 90 

days of involuntary treatment to continue to address M.C.’s medication and 

treatment needs. According to the declarations of Telecare’s professional staff, 

M.C. had made “minimal progress” toward stabilization, continued to refuse 

medication, was too “disorganized” to engage in any discharge planning, and 

required further inpatient hospitalization. The court held a hearing on the petition 

and considered the testimony of a clinical social worker employed by Telecare. On

August 2, 2023, the court again found there was sufficient evidence to detain M.C., 

and determined that he suffered from a mental disorder and met the criteria for 

grave disability under both subsections (a) and (b) of RCW 71.05.020(25). The 

court ordered 90 days of involuntary treatment. 

M.C. appeals.1

II. ANALYSIS

Once an individual has been committed for 14 days, the State may seek 

an additional 90-day period of involuntary commitment based on grave disability. 

 1 M.C.’s notice of appeal refers to a 14-day detention, but the order designated for 

review is the August 2, 2023 90-day order and it is clear from the briefing that it is 

the 90-day order M.C. challenges. 
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RCW 71.05.280(4), RCW 71.05.320(1)(a). The statute provides two definitions 

of “gravely disabled,” which is a condition: 

in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder: (a) Is in 

danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for 

his or her essential human needs of health or safety; or (b) manifests 

severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and 

escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions 

and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or 

safety

RCW 71.05.020(25)(a), (b).

M.C. recognizes that the court concluded that he was gravely disabled 

under both subsections of the statute, but expressly declines to challenge the trial 

court’s finding that he met the criteria for grave disability under RCW 

71.05.020(25)(b). M.C. asks this court to reverse the finding under RCW 

71.05.020(25)(a) and to strike that finding from the commitment order. 

Because M.C. does not challenge the commitment order in its entirety, the 

State argues that M.C.’s appeal is moot. We agree. “As a general rule, this court 

will not review a moot case.” In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 

P.3d 124 (2004). “An appeal is moot where it presents merely academic questions 

and where this court can no longer provide effective relief.” In re Det. of M.K., 168 

Wn. App. 621, 625, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). Here, as is often the case because 

periods of detention authorized by the ITA are relatively short, the detention which 

is the subject of the appeal has ended. See, e.g., In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 377, 

662 P.2d 828 (1983). Therefore, we are unable to provide “the most basic relief 

originally sought”—release. Id. 
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Yet, many appeals of civil commitment orders are not moot because of 

potential adverse collateral consequences stemming from the determinations that 

authorize involuntary treatment. See, e.g., id., at 377; see also M.K., 168 Wn. App. 

at 626; In re Involuntary Treatment of L.T.S., 197 Wn. App. 230, 234, 389 P.3d 

660 (2016). When making a civil commitment determination, courts may consider 

prior involuntary treatment. RCW 71.05.245. Thus, “each commitment order has 

a collateral consequence in subsequent petitions and hearings.” M.K., 168 Wn. 

App. at 626. So, despite release of the previously-detained individual, we are able 

to “render relief if we hold that the detention under a civil commitment order was 

not warranted.” Id. 

But in this case, because M.C. challenges only one of the two legal bases 

supporting the involuntary treatment order, a decision in M.C.’s favor would only 

result in that finding being stricken from the order, even if we were to agree that 

the evidence does not support the determination of grave disability under RCW 

71.05.020(25)(a). Such a decision would not invalidate the commitment order, 

since the unchallenged determination under RCW 71.05.020(25)(b) equally 

supports the detention. And M.C. fails to explain why a decision striking one basis 

for commitment will provide “future relief.” M.C. cites no authority, and we are 

aware of none, supporting the position that, where a commitment order is founded 

on multiple grounds, reversal of one ground eliminates potential future 

consequences of the civil commitment. 
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III. CONCLUSION

Because the challenged detention order has expired and reversal of one 

legal basis supporting the civil commitment order would not invalidate the order, 

M.C.’s appeal is dismissed as moot. 

WE CONCUR: